[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 2017
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
_________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey, Chairman
KAY GRANGER, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
KEN CALVERT, California STEVE ISRAEL, New York
TOM COLE, Oklahoma TIM RYAN, Ohio
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
TOM GRAVES, Georgia
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mrs. Lowey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Rob Blair, Walter Hearne, Brooke Boyer, B G Wright,
Adrienne Ramsay, Megan Milam, Collin Lee, Cornell Teague,
Allison Deters, and Matthew Bower
Staff Assistants
Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
__________
PART 1
Page
FY 2017 Department of Defense Budget Overview .................. 1
FY 2017 U.S. Navy / Marine Corps Budget Overview................ 113
FY 2017 U.S. Air Force Budget Overview ......................... 235
FY 2017 U.S. Army Budget Overview............................... 307
FY 2017 National Guard and Reserve.............................. 373
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
22-432 WASHINGTON : 2016
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
----------
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey NITA M. LOWEY, New York
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
KAY GRANGER, Texas PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
KEN CALVERT, California SAM FARR, California
TOM COLE, Oklahoma CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BARBARA LEE, California
TOM GRAVES, Georgia MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
KEVIN YODER, Kansas BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas STEVE ISRAEL, New York
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska TIM RYAN, Ohio
THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHARLES J. FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DAVID G. VALADAO, California MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland DEREK KILMER, Washington
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia
DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
DAVID YOUNG, Iowa
EVAN H. JENKINS, West Virginia
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
William E. Smith, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2017
----------
Thursday, February 25, 2016.
FISCAL YEAR 2017 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET OVERVIEW
WITNESSES
HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good morning. The committee will come to
order. I thank all the members for being here, especially the
big chairman, Mr. Rogers.
I am pleased to welcome the 25th Secretary of Defense,
Ashton Carter. This is Dr. Carter's second appearance before
the subcommittee as Secretary, although we know him well from
his many years of service to our Nation.
We also welcome General Joe Dunford, a great marine,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Michael McCord,
Comptroller of the Department.
Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed 70
years ago, and I quote: ``From what I have seen of our Russian
friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is
nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing
for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially
military weakness.''
Churchill was referring to the post-war leadership in
Moscow, but the same can be said today. I fear that, as I
examine this administration's budget request, they have to be
breathing a sigh of relief. One year ago, in this same room, we
were told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that last year's
budget request represented the lower ragged edge of resources
the Department needs to carry out its strategy. The budget
request before us today is almost exactly the same amount as
last year's, and yet this administration now claims to provide
robust funding for your Department.
Mr. Secretary, lower ragged edge or robust funding? The
security environment used by the Department to justify a
shrinking Army and Marine Corps, a smaller Navy, an older Air
Force does not exist. In fact, we face more serious threats,
from more sources, than at any time since World War II. Russia
occupies Crimea and continues to menace Ukraine, its neighbors,
and our NATO partners. China is building whole islands in the
South China Sea and militarizing them, yet this administration
suggests cutting an already inadequate shipbuilding budget.
Many of our gains in Afghanistan have been reversed, while the
Taliban and now ISIS await our departure, and Iraq is barely
better.
Iran's global terrorist network just received a massive
transfusion of money and continues to challenge our interests
and our allies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and across the Middle
East. Syria is a living hell on earth, devolving even further
by the day with Russian and Iranian sponsorship, and we seem to
be deconflicting our operations with both countries, hardly our
allies.
ISIS has a major franchise in Libya, its base of operations
in North Africa, 160 miles of Mediterranean coastline.
Terrorism is like a cancer across the world, and this budget
does not do enough to hold its spread.
Moreover, many of us on this committee are concerned that
this budget mortgages future military capabilities to pay for
today's urgent requirements.
Mr. Secretary, our Commander in Chief proclaimed in his
State of the Union address we spend more on our military than
the next eight nations combined, as if dollars and cents are
the only yardstick by which we measure the effectiveness of our
Armed Forces and the strength of our global leadership. Our
adversaries measure our strength based on our military
capability and our national will, and currently those
adversaries and some of our allies question both. Members of
our subcommittee hear this repeatedly from foreign leaders as
we travel abroad and we meet them here at home, as they watch
our foes continually test us without consequence.
Mr. Secretary, I also want to bring to your attention a
concern that many share about the activities of the National
Security Council. It has come to our attention repeatedly that
the rules of engagement for our Special Forces and rules of
engagement for our conventional forces are being micromanaged
right out of the White House. I am sure you would agree that
battlefield decisions should be left to military professionals.
In closing, I can assure you that a bipartisan majority in
Congress stands ready to provide our Commander in Chief with
the resources that our military needs to meet challenges from
Russia and China, and defeat the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and
other lethal terrorist groups, with or without the strategy
that the law requires. In fact, the 2016 NDAA required the
administration to provide a strategy to counter violent
extremists in Syria by last week. We are still waiting.
Now, having said that, I would like to turn the microphone
over to my ranking member, Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Visclosky
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
holding the hearing today.
And Secretary Carter, General Dunford, and Secretary
McCord, welcome to the hearing. I thank each of you for your
commitment to service.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my continued concern
regarding the self-inflicted uncertainty created by the Budget
Control Act of 2011. Admittedly, I used much of my time at the
fiscal year 2016 hearing for the same purpose, and although
much has changed in the last twelve months, including the
enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 that mitigated
the BCA caps for two years, it is hard to argue that the
Department of Defense or any Federal agency is now appreciably
better positioned to plan or budget for the future.
It pains me to think about how much less efficient the
Department of Defense has been over the last six fiscal years,
as it has been forced to carry out our national defense
strategy in an increasingly unstable security environment that
you have described, while navigating the unpredictability of
sequestration, of government shutdown, vacillating budget caps,
continuing resolutions, and appropriations, through no fault of
the full committee, that arrive well into the next fiscal year.
Even the least clairvoyant among us can foresee the problems
looming in fiscal year 2018.
The BCA was sold as a deficit-reduction tool, yet the
Congressional Budget Office projected that from 2016 to 2025,
the cumulative deficit will be $1.5 trillion more than the
office projected in August of 2015.
The prolonged inability of Congress and the administration
to find a consensus needed to replace it and its faux austerity
policies that truly address long-term drivers of our budget
deficits, growth in mandatory spending, and the lack of revenue
is an abject failure.
On a positive note, despite the ongoing efforts in Congress
to renegotiate the agreement of fiscal year 2017, I am
guardedly optimistic that the BBA will provide some
predictability in this year's appropriations process. We have a
number, and I hope that this subcommittee under the chairman's
leadership will be allowed to make the difficult and deliberate
decisions needed to prioritize the resources available to
strengthen our defense and minimize the risk of our Nation and
those in uniform.
Secretary Carter, you have stated that this budget is a
major inflection point for the Department and takes the long
view. Further, you have indicated this request favors
innovation and readiness posture over force structure. I was
pleased to hear both those sentiments. But based on the
outcomes of the last handful of budget requests, I am
skeptical, again, of any strategy, plan, or program that is
reliant on relief from the BCA caps in future years. I
certainly understand the motivation behind DOD's decision to
assume more funding in the outyears. However, I am worried that
that assumption may not come to fruition.
I assure you that I am committed to working with my
colleagues to find a lasting solution to our fiscal situation,
which, again, necessitates addressing both revenue and
mandatory spending.
In conclusion, I would simply also observe that I
appreciate that the much-anticipated plan for the closing of
Guantanamo Bay detention facility was transmitted to Congress
earlier this week. I hope that the plan is considered on its
merit rather than to be reflexively rejected.
Mr. Chairman, again, thank you very much for holding the
hearing.
Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
Chairman Rogers.
Opening Remarks of Chairman Rogers
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, Secretary McCord, thank you
for being here. Thank you, more importantly, for your years of
service to your country. We appreciate that very much, and we
thank you for being here this morning for what is the first
hearing of this subcommittee for fiscal 2017. We have 21
hearings across the committee this week. You are one of which,
but we think very, very important one of which.
For the fifth year in a row this subcommittee has been able
to pass a defense appropriations bill out of the House. I am
confident we can do the same this year. We know our troops and
their families are depending on it. Our only hope is that when
we pass a bill through this committee and on the floor of the
House and send it to the Senate, that they act, which they have
refused to do for the last several years. Consequently, we get
into an omnibus negotiation by necessity to keep from closing
down the government. But it is time the Senate acted on a bill.
It is amazing.
Under your leadership, the men and women who serve in the
U.S. military answer the call time and again to leave their
loved ones, put themselves in harm's way, execute challenging
missions abroad. We are mindful that our responsibility to
support our allies in need and respond to threats from our
enemies imposes significant demands on our troops. This
committee appreciates their dedication and willingness to
serve, and your leadership, amidst the unprecedented challenges
facing our Nation this day.
The global security environment continues to grow
increasingly complex and unpredictable, and the mounting
threats we discussed this time last year are still with us, and
in some cases have increased. Two years after the Russian
annexation of Crimea, Russian aggression remains a threat to
sovereign states in the region and a considerable influence, of
course, across the Middle East.
The Islamic State maintains its hold on population centers,
where it terrorizes innocent lives and has created an unlivable
situation for countless Syrians, Iraqis, now even Libyans. We
have seen this conflict force the migration of millions of
people, precipitating an unprecedented humanitarian crisis
across the Middle East and Europe.
Meanwhile, Iran and North Korea continue to rattle their
sabers, while China exerts military strength in the Pacific.
Today, we will discuss with you many of these threats and
how your budget request addresses our ability to defeat them.
However, we continue to hear rhetoric from the administration
that appears to minimize or just flat out misunderstand the
reality and the magnitude of the threat that we face from
violent extremism. Just this week, the President announced his
intention to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. At a
time when the threat of terrorist activity at home and abroad
shows no signs of abating, the President is advocating for the
transfer of known terrorists out of United States custody to
countries where we cannot control their ability to return to
the battlefield. For detainees that he believes pose a
continuing threat, he asks the American people to allow them to
be detained on American soil, in their own backyard.
As the President made the case that these prisoners will be
subject to strong security measures while in the custody of
other nations, a former Guantanamo prisoner was arrested in
North Africa on terror charges. The Director of National
Intelligence tells us that 30 percent of the prisoners released
from the facility have reengaged in terrorism, yet the
President continues to argue that releasing these prisoners
will make us safer. That is twisted logic.
Once again, I am perplexed by the administration's decision
to continue to prioritize this misguided campaign promise
despite clear direction from this Congress, not to mention the
implications for national security.
With Active Duty end strength set to decline further until
2017, the conversation we will have today about responding to
increasingly complex threats across multiple regions, against
enemies with very different missions and capacities, becomes an
even more complicated matter.
The challenges you face are well documented. The demands
they place on our troops and our military leadership are great.
I look forward to discussing how this committee can best equip
you to lead in these uncertain times and respond to threats to
American security around the world.
This committee remains confident in your ability to lead
and protect our troops and to ensure the safety of Americans at
home and abroad. You have our full support, and we deeply
appreciate your service and your commitment to our Nation and
our service men and women across the world.
Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, indeed, you have our full support, and the remarkable
men and women you represent, whether it is civilians or it is
military, are the best of America. And we are so proud of all
volunteers doing some remarkable things.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. Thank you for being with
us.
Secretary Carter. Thank you very much----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Your statement will be put in the record
and so forth.
Statement of Secretary Carter
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Visclosky, thank you.
And all of you, thanks for what you said about the troops.
That means it all. That is what I wake up for every morning. I
am sure that is true of the chairman as well. They are the best
of America, and we are very proud to be associated with them,
and I am very pleased to hear you say the same things. It is
good for them to hear that too. So thank you. Thank you all
very much.
And thanks for hosting me today, and in general for your
steadfast support to the men and women of the Department of
Defense, military and civilian alike, who serve and defend our
country all over the world.
I am pleased to be here with Chairman Dunford to discuss
President Obama's 2017 defense budget, which marks, as was
indicated, a major inflection point for this Department. I am
also pleased to be discussing the budget first before this
committee, which has been a leader in securing the resources
the Department needs.
In this budget, we are taking the long view. We have to,
because even as we fight today's fights, we must also be
prepared for what might come 10, 20, 30 years down the road.
Last fall's budget deal gave us much needed and much
appreciated stability. I want to thank you, all of you, your
colleagues, for coming together to pass that agreement.
The Bipartisan Budget Act set the size of our budget, which
is why our budget submission and my testimony focused on its
shape, changing that shape in fundamental but carefully
considered ways to adjust to a new strategic era and seize
opportunities for the future.
Let me describe the strategic assessment that drove our
budget decisions. First of all, it is evident that America is
still today the world's foremost leader, partner, and
underwriter of stability and security in every region across
the globe, as we have been since the end of World War II. I was
in Brussels the week before last meeting with NATO defense
ministers, as well as defense ministers of the counter-ISIL
military coalition, and I can tell you they all appreciate the
leadership from the Department of Defense of America.
As we continue to fulfill this enduring role, it is also
evident that we are entering a new strategic era. Today's
security environment is dramatically different from the last 25
years, requiring new ways of investing, new ways of operating.
Five evolving strategic challenges--namely Russia, which
has already been mentioned, appropriately so, China, North
Korea, Iran, and terrorism, five--are now driving DOD's
planning and budgeting as reflected in this budget.
I want to focus first on our ongoing fight against
terrorism and especially ISIL, which we must and will deal a
lasting defeat, most immediately in its parent tumor in Iraq
and Syria, but also where it is metastasizing elsewhere in the
world. We are doing that in Africa. We are also doing it in
Afghanistan, where we continue to stand with the Afghan
Government and people to counter Al Qaeda and now ISIL, while
at the same time, all the while, we protect our homeland.
As we are accelerating our overall counter-ISIL campaign,
we are backing it up with increased funding in 2017 in our
request, requesting $7.5 billion, which is 50 percent more than
last year.
Just this week, following the progress we have made in Iraq
by retaking Ramadi, we have also made operationally significant
strides in our campaign to dismantle ISIL in Syria. There,
capable and motivated local forces, supported by the U.S. and
our global coalition, have reclaimed territory surrounding the
eastern Syrian town of Shadadi, which is a critical ISIL base
for command and control, logistics, training, and oil revenues.
More importantly, by encircling and taking this town, we
are seeking to sever the last major northern artery between
Raqqa and Mosul, and ultimately dissect the parent tumor into
two parts, one in Iraq and the other in Syria. This is just the
most recent example of how we are effectively enabling and
partnering with local forces to help deal ISIL a lasting
defeat.
Next, two of the other four challenges reflect a
recognition of, a return to in some ways, great power
competition. One challenge is in Europe, where we are taking a
strong and balanced approach to deter Russian aggression. We
haven't had to devote a significant portion of our defense
investment to this possibility for a quarter century, but now
we do.
The other challenge is in the Asia Pacific, where China is
rising, which is fine, but behaving aggressively, which is not.
There, we are continuing our rebalance in terms of weight of
effort to maintain the regional stability we have underwritten
for the past 70 years, allowing so many nations to rise and
prosper in this, the single most consequential region for
America's future.
Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose threats
in specific regions. North Korea is one. That is why our forces
on the Korean Peninsula remain ready, as they say, to fight
tonight.
The other is Iran, because while the nuclear accord is a
good deal for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, we
must still deter Iranian aggression and counter Iran's malign
influence against our friends and allies in the region,
especially Israel, to whom we maintain an unwavering and
unbreakable commitment.
DOD must and will address all five of these challenges as
part of its mission to defend our country. Doing so requires
new investments on our part, new postures in some regions, and
also some new and enhanced capabilities. For example, in
confronting these five challenges, we know we will have to deal
with them across all domains, and not just the usual air, land,
and sea, but also particularly the areas of cyber, electronic
warfare, and space, where our reliance on technology has given
us great strengths and great opportunities, but also led to
vulnerabilities that adversaries can seek to exploit.
Key to our approach is being able to deter our most
advanced competitors. We must have and be seen to have the
ability to ensure that anyone who starts a conflict with us
will regret doing so.
To be clear, the U.S. military would fight very differently
than we have in Iraq and Afghanistan or in the rest of the
world's recent memory. We will and must be prepared for a high
end enemy, what we call full spectrum. In our budget, our
capabilities, our readiness, and our actions, we must
demonstrate to potential foes that if they start a war, we have
the capability to win, because a force meant to deter conflict
must show that it can dominate a conflict.
In this context, Russia and China are our most stressing
competitors, as they have both developed and continue to
advance military systems, including anti-access systems, that
seek to threaten our advantages in specific areas. We saw it
last week in the South China Sea. We see it in Crimea and Syria
as well. In some cases, they are developing weapons and ways of
war that seek to achieve their objectives rapidly, before they
think we can respond.
Now, we don't desire conflict with either country. And
while I need to say that they pose some similar challenges
militarily, they are very different nations, very different
situations, and our preference is to work together with
important nations. But we also cannot blind ourselves to their
apparent goals and actions. Because of this, DOD has elevated
their importance in our planning and our budgeting.
In my written testimony, I have detailed how our budget
makes critical investments to help us better address these five
evolving challenges. We are strengthening our deterrence
posture in Europe by investing $3.4 billion for our European
Reassurance Initiative, quadruple what we requested last year.
We are prioritizing training and readiness for our ground
forces and reinvigorating the readiness and modernization of
our fighter aircraft fleet. We are investing in innovative
capabilities like swarming 3D-printed micro-drones, the Long
Range Strike Bomber, and the arsenal plane, as well as advanced
munitions, like the maritime strike Tomahawk, the long range
antiship missile, and the newly antiship capable SM-6 missile,
in which we are investing nearly $3 billion to maximize
production over the next 5 years.
We are emphasizing lethality in our Navy, with new weapons
and high end ships, and by extending our commanding lead in
undersea warfare, with new investments in unmanned undersea
vehicles, for example, more submarines with the versatile
Virginia Payload Module that triples their strike capacity from
12 Tomahawks to 40 Tomahawks.
And we are doing more in cyber, electronic warfare, and in
space, investing in these three domains a combined total of $34
billion in 2017 to, among other things, help build our Cyber
Mission Force, develop next generation electronic jammers, and
prepare for the possibility of a conflict that extends into
space.
In short, DOD will continue to ensure our dominance in all
domains.
As we do this, our budget also seizes opportunities for the
future. That is a responsibility I have to my successors, to
ensure the military and the Defense Department they inherit is
just as strong, just as fine, if not more so, than the one I
have the privilege of leading today.
That is why we are making increased investments in science
and technology and building new bridges to the amazing American
innovative system to stay ahead of future threats. It is why we
are also innovating operationally, making our contingency plans
and operations more flexible and dynamic in every region.
It is why we are building what I have called the force of
the future, because as good as our technology is, it is nothing
compared to our people. And in the future, we need to continue
to recruit and retain the very best talent from future
generations.
That is also why we are opening all combat positions to
women, as well as doing more to support military families, to
improve retention, and also to expand our access to 100 percent
of America's population for our All-Volunteer Force.
And because we owe it to America's taxpayers to spend our
defense dollars as wisely and responsibly as possible, we are
also pushing for needed reforms across the DOD enterprise, from
continuously improving acquisitions, to further reducing
overhead, to proposing new changes to the Goldwater-Nichols Act
that defines much of our institutional organization.
Let me close on the broader shift reflected in this budget.
We in the Defense Department don't have the luxury of just one
opponent or the choice between current fights and future
fights. We have to do both. That is what this budget is
designed to do, and we need your help to succeed.
I thank this committee again for overwhelmingly supporting
the Bipartisan Budget Act that set the size of our budget. Our
submission focuses on the budget shape. We hope you approve it.
I know some may be looking at the difference between what
we proposed last year and what we got in the budget deal, but I
want to reiterate that we have mitigated that difference and
this budget meets our needs. That budget deal was a good deal.
It gave us stability, and for that, we remain grateful.
Doing something to jeopardize that stability would concern
me deeply. The greatest risk we face in the Department of
Defense is losing that stability this year and having
uncertainty and sequester and caps in future years. That is why
going forward, the biggest concern to us strategically is
Congress averting the return of sequestration next year so we
can sustain all these critical investments over time.
We have done this before, if we think back to historic
defense investments that made our military more effective, not
only technologies like GPS, the Internet, and satellite
communications, but also in other areas, like especially the
All-Volunteer Force. They were able to yield tremendous
benefits because they garnered support across the aisle, across
branches of government, and across multiple administrations.
That same support is essential today to address the
security challenges we face and to seize the opportunities
within our grasp. As long as we work together to do so, I know
our national security will be on the right path and America's
military will continue to defend our country and help make a
better world for generations to come.
Thank you.
[The written statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
remarks.
Chairman Dunford, General Dunford, thank you for being with
us, and thank you for your remarkable career.
Statement of General Dunford
General Dunford. Thank you. Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking
Member Visclosky, Chairman Rogers, distinguished members of the
committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to
join Secretary Carter and Secretary McCord in appearing before
you. I am honored to represent the extraordinary men and women
of the Joint Force. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civil servants remain our single most important competitive
advantage.
Thanks to your support, the United States military is the
most capable fighting force in the world. With your continued
support, the Joint Force will continue to adapt, fight, and win
in current operations, while simultaneously innovating and
investing to meet future challenges.
I don't believe we ought to ever send Americans into a fair
fight. Rather, we must maintain a Joint Force that has the
capability and credibility to assure our allies and partners,
deter aggression, and overmatch any potential adversary. This
requires us to continually improve our joint warfighting
capabilities, restore full spectrum readiness, and develop the
leaders who will serve as the foundation for the future.
The United States is now confronted with challenges from
both traditional state actors and nonstate actors. The
Department has identified five strategic challenges, which
Secretary Carter has already addressed.
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea continue to invest in
military capabilities that reduce our competitive advantage.
They are also advancing their interests through competition
with a military dimension that falls short of traditional armed
conflict and the threshold for a traditional military response.
Examples include Russian action in the Ukraine, Chinese
activities in the South China Sea, and Iran's malign activities
across the Middle East.
At the same time, nonstate actors, such as ISIL and Al
Qaeda, pose a threat to the homeland, the American people, our
partners, and our allies. Given the opportunity, such extremist
groups would fundamentally change our way of life.
As we contend with the Department's five strategic
challenges, we recognize that successful execution of our
defense strategy requires that we maintain credible nuclear and
conventional capabilities. Our strategic nuclear deterrent
remains effective, but it is aging and requires modernization.
Therefore, we are prioritizing investments needed for a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. We are also making
investments to maintain a competitive advantage in our
conventional capabilities. And we must further capabilities in
the vital and increasingly contested domains of cyber and
space.
As the Joint Force acts to mitigate and respond to
challenges, we do so in the context of a fiscal environment
that has hampered our ability to plan and allocate resources
most effectively. Despite partial relief by Congress from
sequester-level funding, the Department has absorbed $800
billion in cuts and faces an additional $100 billion of
sequestration-induced risk through fiscal year 2021. Absorbing
significant cuts over the past 5 years has resulted in our
underinvesting in critical capabilities, and unless we reverse
sequestration, we will be unable to execute the current defense
strategy.
The fiscal year 2017 budget begins to address the most
critical investments required to maintain our competitive
advantage. To the extent possible, within the resources
provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, it addresses the
Department's five challenges. It does so by balancing three
major areas: investment in high end capabilities, the
capability and capacity to meet current operational demands,
and the need to rebuild readiness after an extended period of
war.
In the years ahead, we will need adequate funding levels
and predictability to fully recover from over a decade of war
and delayed modernization. A bow wave of procurement
requirements in the future include the Ohio-class submarine
replacement, continued cyber and space investments, and the
Long Range Strike Bomber. It will also be several years before
we fully restore full spectrum readiness across the services
and replenish our stocks of critical precision munitions.
In summary, I am satisfied that the fiscal year 2017 budget
puts us on the right trajectory, but it will take your
continued support to ensure the Joint Force has the depth,
flexibility, readiness, and responsiveness that ensures any
future fight is not fair.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to be before you
this morning, and I look forward to your questions.
[The written statement of General Dunford follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
GUANTANAMO
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Dunford.
Let me associate myself with the remarks of Chairman
Rogers' concern about prisoners being released from Guantanamo
that go back to the fight. I mean, that is disturbing. I think
it makes me quite angry.
In light of the President's intention to visit Cuba, there
has been some speculation that there might be some announcement
that would relate to the future of the Naval station at
Guantanamo. Can you assure us that there are no plans for any
change of our operations and historic role there?
Secretary Carter. I know of no such plans. Our plan, in
fact, is just the opposite, which if you are talking about the
Guantanamo Bay Naval----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, the Naval base. There has been some
speculation that they might----
Secretary Carter. This is not about--no. GTMO's a strategic
location.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Absolutely. We have less assets in the
region than we have ever had.
Secretary Carter. Yeah. The detention thing is a separate
subject. And just to agree with Chairman Rogers, the reason to
have a conversation with the Congress about the future of the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay is precisely because there
are people there who cannot be safely transferred to the
custody of another country. That means they need to stay in
detention. And so they have got to go somewhere. And if they
are not going to be at Guantanamo Bay, they have to be
somewhere in the United States.
The proposal that the President made and that we helped him
craft asks Congress, because doing so is forbidden by law now,
to work with us to see if we can devise a detention facility in
the United States precisely in recognition of the fact that we
are not going to be able to let these people out.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Respectfully, my question had to do with
the future of the Naval station.
Secretary Carter. The Naval station----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. There are no plans for----
Secretary Carter. None.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Some sort of an
announcement that would change----
Secretary Carter. No.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Our historic role there?
Secretary Carter. No.
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me focus a little bit on the Middle
East. I think the committee is going to be taking a look at,
and I know Mr. Visclosky and I worked very closely on what is
called the overseas contingency operations account, which
historically is aimed at the focus on the war on terrorism. We
did a pretty good job of vetting in our last bill all aspects
of that account.
Can you review for the committee very briefly--I see at the
top of the funding responsibility the issue of force
protection. We still obviously have troops in the region. Can
you review for the committee very briefly the issue of force
protection, our continued, and it is, may I say, a rather
expensive investment, in the Afghan Security Forces Fund, their
capabilities? Even after all these years of supporting them,
there are some questions as to how capable they are.
And two areas that have been mired in some, I won't say
controversy, speculation, Iraq train and equip, Syria train and
equip.
Can you briefly go through the list with our committee as
to why these are your particular focuses? It is not that they
aren't ours, but in reality, could you briefly go through that?
Secretary Carter. Absolutely. And I will start out and then
ask the Chairman also to elaborate on some of this.
You are right, those are four ingredients of our OCO
request. There are others, like the European Reassurance
Initiative that I mentioned, which is about Russia.
We very much appreciate your support for OCO, and we
understand that--I know the Constitution, which is we propose
and you decide on the budget, so every nickel that is in OCO is
subject to the visibility and approval of this body, and that
is perfectly appropriate, and we are used to that and very
comfortable with that. And it is used for a variety of
absolutely essential purposes. I will touch on a couple of
them.
Force protection is the highest priority that we have, both
abroad and at home. Taking care of our people is incredibly
important. So it remains a high priority. I will ask the
Chairman to say something more about that, because he and I
were just talking about that yesterday in some locations. He is
also the expert on Afghanistan, having done an absolutely
fantastic job of commanding there, but just so he doesn't have
to sing his own praises.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Indeed he has.
Secretary Carter. He really did. He really did. And as a
consequence, despite all the interruption of a year, almost a
year, eight months in the transition of the Afghan Government
from Karzai to the National Unity Government of Ghani and
Abdullah, despite the fact that--and I remember that when--when
we started to build the Afghan Security Forces, you were
dealing with recruits who couldn't read and write.
The Afghan Security Forces' capability is growing. They
have many of the capabilities, but not all the capabilities
they need. That is why we stick with them. That is why our plan
is to stick with them. And that is why in our budget, by the
way, we request funding for the Afghan Security Forces for
fiscal year 2017. And our plan is to continue to do that in the
future. And all of the other NATO and other partners have also
committed to doing that, supporting the Afghan Security Forces.
Because the whole strategy, and the one that General
Dunford executed so well, was to make the Afghan Security
Forces capable of securing the country, stopping terrorism from
once again arising on that territory and striking the United
States, and also to give us a friend in a dangerous part of the
world. And all of that is what we are pursuing in Afghanistan.
That is why we want to stick with it.
You mentioned also train and equip----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, to some extent part of what we are
doing in Afghanistan is a perpetual, apparently, train and
equip.
So, General Dunford, and then I am going to go to Mr.
Visclosky.
General Dunford. Chairman, if I could start with
Afghanistan, where you finished. To put it in some kind of
perspective for the committee, when I arrived in Afghanistan in
February of 2013, so about 3 years ago, we had over 100,000
U.S. forces on the ground that were fundamentally responsible
for security in Afghanistan. Today, we have 8,800 Americans on
the ground. And in the interim period, the Afghan Security
Forces have assumed responsibility for security in Afghanistan,
they have conducted two elections, and gone through a very
difficult and politically turbulent period.
So, quite honestly, we have a lot of work to do, and
particularly in the area of the aviation enterprise, special
operations, intelligence, and so forth. But if you put in
perspective where we have come from the last three years and
you put in perspective the current investment versus where we
were three years ago, but more importantly, if you put in
perspective our national interests in Afghanistan, which are to
maintain an effective counterterrorism platform and partner in
that part of the world, from which we face a still significant
threat, my assessment is that we are moving in the right
direction, certainly not as quickly as we want to.
Let me assure the committee on force protection, we have
very specific standards. We work hard in the Department to do
that. I think you know when Secretary Carter was the deputy and
we moved forward on the MRAP program, that was evidence of the
commitment that we have to our people. And today those
standards and the lessons learned over the past ten years have
been incorporated and, frankly, reflected in the investment
that we make in taking care of our people.
And very quickly on the Syria and Iraq----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yeah. I mean, there has been, obviously,
a lot in open sources about the lack of success in some of
those areas. So maybe you can talk a little bit about that.
General Dunford. Lack of success in force protection?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. No, in train and equip.
General Dunford. Oh, in train and equip.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have got a lot of people on the
payroll, we are training a lot of people.
General Dunford. Chairman, over the last----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We want to make sure that those tax
dollars are well spent.
General Dunford. First of all, the endeavors in Iraq and
Syria, relatively speaking, if you put it in perspective from
some of the things we have done in the past, is still
relatively new. We have trained over 15,000 in Iraq, and the
evidence of their performance was recently demonstrated in
Ramadi and is currently demonstrated in Anbar Province.
And so where we were four months ago, I would tell you,
four months ago we did not have the momentum in the campaign in
Iraq. Today, I can tell you with authority that we do have the
momentum and the Iraqi security forces have proven to be
capable in the Anbar Province and are now organizing for
operations up in the north.
We have trained 2,500 Peshmerga. They also have been
extraordinarily successful in cutting the lines of
communication between Iraq and Syria, and they will also be
very important as we conduct operations in Mosul.
In Syria itself, we had a slow start, but right now, as
Secretary Carter outlined, the partners that we have on the
ground that are being supported by U.S. funding, the ones that
just recently took Shadadi, are going down to now isolate soon
the caliphate, the location of the caliphate in Raqqa. And,
again, they have also been successful in cutting the lines of
communication between Iraq and Syria.
So from my perspective, a lot of work left to be done, but
the enemy is under great pressure. We have significantly
reduced their freedom of movement. We have begun to virtually
and physically isolate them in their major areas of
concentration, and we are doing that by, with, and through the
Iraqi and Syrian partners that we have trained over the past
year.
So my assessment is that, again, much work to be done, but
the trajectory is in the right direction.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, we will be watching those programs
very carefully. And thank you for your assessment.
Mr. Visclosky.
AUDIT READINESS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, just for the record, I would continue to
reiterate my concern about making sure we are on schedule for
the Department to have auditable financial statements by 2017.
Not orally here, but for the record, if you could respond to
any major investments that still need to be made, and if so,
any of those automated systems, whether or not they are fully
funded in the fiscal year 2017 request.
Secretary Carter. We will provide that.
[The information follows:]
The Department is committed to having the majority of its
components under audit by the end of 2017. We currently have
approximately 80 percent of the Department's total General Fund
budgetary resources under audit, representing approximately 90 percent
of dollars appropriated since Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. We still have
plenty of work left to address findings from these audits, but this
consistent and more rigorous audit regimen will result in stronger
business processes that produce higher quality financial information
for decision-making. As with most other large Federal agencies, we are
confident that positive audit opinions will result over time.
Substantial resources have been designated to support achieving
auditable financial statements. In FY 2017, we project spending $629
million on audit readiness management and oversight, validation of
component and service provider audit readiness, and support for
Independent Public Accountant financial statement audits. In addition,
we project spending $71 million in FY 2017 for financial systems. We
have assessed our environment and believe we have identified all major
investments and resources, including deployment of automated systems,
needed to support annual audits. Funding for these systems is included
in the President's FY 2017 budget request. As remaining audit readiness
activities are completed and audits continue, the Department will
continue to refine resource requirements.
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, the issue I would want to address at the
outset is the industrial base that I am very concerned about. I
think all of you are as well. Are there any particular sectors,
industries, components that the Department today has a problem
with? Every time we get a waiver notice from the Department of
acquisition, it brings this problem to mind, and I am very
concerned about it.
Follow-up is, what can be done? Is there something from a
budgetary standpoint that is lacking that we can be helpful
with?
Secretary Carter. Well, thank you. And I share that concern
and long have shared that concern because, second only to our
people, it is the unparalleled quality of our equipment that
makes us the finest fighting force the world has ever known. We
have got to keep that going. It does depend upon a healthy
industrial base.
And two things, Mr. Visclosky, come to mind. I mean, first
of all, the stability that you have provided that I spoke of
early is simply having a knowledge of what our budget is going
to be two years in a row. That is the kind of thing that allows
our program managers to manage programs in a more stable basis
so that the levels below the prime contractor, which depends so
totally upon those contractors to make all the spare parts and
so forth, stay in the game and don't decide they can't work
with Defense anymore.
In answer to your question, what is the single sector that
I am most concerned about, one is certainly manufacturing. That
is one of the reasons why we have started manufacturing
institutes, funded manufacturing institutes several places
around the country, these are public-private partnerships
focused on manufacturing, because it is a problem in our
country overall, is making sure that we maintain competitive
advantage in manufacturing relative to other parts of the
world. But it affects the defense industrial base very directly
as well.
And then finally, there are some products that we can't
outsource to other countries because we can't fully trust them.
And that is the reason behind such investments as the Trusted
Foundry and so forth, to make sure that we have control over
certain critical components.
So it is a very broad--you know, we have, jeez, almost $200
billion of investment in our industry every year, research,
development, and acquisition. It is a very substantial part of
the industrial economy and it is important that we manage it
well so that the strength of America's manufacturing base stays
strong and stays strong for us.
Mr. Visclosky. Besides the predictability, which I wouldn't
at all argue, are there any budgetary shortfalls? You mentioned
the institutes. Is there anything we can do to be helpful to
make sure we don't have any more degradation as far as the
manufacturing capability?
Secretary Carter. I think we have tried to put in our
budget--but if I may, I will come back and try to highlight the
things that we have done. It is very much on the minds, I know,
of our undersecretary for acquisition, technology and
logistics, Mr. Kendall. The manufacturing institutes come to
mind, changes we have made in payment schedules on contracts.
But the main thing is the stability of our overall programs.
But I will come back to you with more specifics, because I
think it is an excellent--not an excellent concern, there is no
such thing as an excellent concern, but I certainly share your
concern.
[The information follows:]
whether there are budgetary shortfalls impacting the health of the
industrial base
Yes. While I believe that we have reasonably balanced our
investments focused on industrial base health, requirements in this
area will nearly always exceed the availability of funds. Recent
analysis identified a number of high-risk industrial base sectors that
provide critical, defense-specific products, which impact our current
and future technical dominance and power projection capabilities. The
areas of highest risk involve cross-cuffing, cross-service capabilities
that no single program investment can mitigate, such as sub-components
shared across the industrial commons of missile, space platforms, and
trusted or trustworthy micro-electronics embedded in multiple programs.
More specifically, radiation hardened electronics, focal plane array
sensors, solid rocket motor design, and critical energetic materials
are areas of high risk. We are making some very small investments in
these areas, but additional investments would further reduce the risk.
Additionally, budget uncertainty jeopardizes the success of the Long
Range Research and Development Plan and other initiatives to advance
technical dominance while reducing incentives for industry to adopt
growth- versus income-oriented strategies.
is there anything congress can do to be helpful to make sure we don't
have any more degradation as far as the manufacturing capability of the
industrial base?
I would ask for all members' continued strong support for the
ongoing efforts, which focus on advancing technology innovation through
two current investment strategies:
First, support our existing resource requests to mitigate fragile
and critical industrial base capabilities including radiation hardened
electronics, focal plane array sensors, solid rocket motor design, and
critical energetic materials, through the Defense Production Act Title
III program, the Manufacturing Technology program, the Industrial Base
Analysis and Sustainment program, the Small Business Innovation
Research/Small Business Technology Transfer Program, and the
congressionally established Rapid Innovation Fund.
Second, continue supporting the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes
(MIIs), which are part of the Federal Government's National Network for
Manufacturing Innovation. MIIs consist of public-private partnerships
focused on a particular technology area, such as additive
manufacturing, integrated photonics, flexible hybrid electronics,
digital manufacturing and design innovation, revolutionary fibers and
textiles, and lightweight modem metals. The MIIs reduce barriers to
rapid development and commercialization of advanced manufacturing
processes, facilitate rapid prototyping, and promote workforce
development in the field of manufacturing.
Continued congressional support for all of these critical programs
will help the Department to position the defense industrial base for
modernization in the coming years.
Mr. Visclosky. If you want to move on, go ahead.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Chairman Rogers, and then Mrs. Lowey has
joined us.
Chairman Rogers.
CHINA
Mr. Rogers. China. Developing, procuring aircraft carriers,
submarines, amphibious assault capabilities, making territorial
claims to shoals and reefs in the South and East China Seas,
expanding them into islands of some size. By all accounts,
China is positioning itself to exert more influence in the
Pacific and trying to build itself into a maritime power.
Meanwhile, they claim that they are being provoked by their
neighbors and by the West, using it as a justification to
aggressively pursue their own interests with regard to
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.
Mr. Secretary, what is your thinking now? Has your thought
process evolved in light of these fairly recent developments on
the importance China is placing on the development of a blue-
water naval force?
Secretary Carter. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I agree with
your assessment completely. And our assessment has changed over
time, not because we have changed our assessment, but because
the facts have changed. China is doing exactly as you say.
There was a time when the Chinese military was largely a land-
based military, it was a military focused on defense of its own
territory. Now it clearly has the aspiration to extend its sway
in the Pacific.
And the United States policy there is, as it has been for
70 years, to remain the pivotal military power in the Asia
Pacific. That is what our rebalance to the Asia Pacific is
about, that is why we are making all the investments in high-
end Naval warfare, undersea warfare, new kinds of weapons, new
aircraft, Joint Strike Fighter, Long Range Strike Bomber, and
so forth, in recognition of that.
With respect to the Chinese specifically and the South
China Sea, the idea that we have provoked them into that. The
reason that these activities are getting notice isn't because
the United States is doing something new. We have been sailing
in the South China Sea and will continue to sail wherever
international law allows, for decades now. We are not doing
anything new. The thing that is new is the Chinese--there are
some other countries that do some of this, but nothing on the
scale of China--exactly as you say, dredging and putting
military equipment on.
That is having two effects. It is being reacted to in two
ways. First is by us in our investments, and that is why when
we talk about this being an inflection point in our budget,
that is part of it, looking to the future, including China.
It is also having the effect of causing others in the
region both to increase their own maritime defense activities
and to align them with the United States, old allies like
Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and then new
partners like Vietnam and India that are working with us
increasingly.
So the Chinese behavior is having the effect of self-
isolation, and it is also galvanizing others to take action
against it. That is a change in the strategic aspect that China
presents to the region. We are determined to do what the United
States has done for 70 years, which is to keep a peaceful and
stable environment.
That is the environment in which the Asian miracle has
occurred. It has been because of the counterweight of the
United States to what would otherwise be a region that has no
NATO, no security structure. We have provided that for 70
years.
TAIWAN
Mr. Rogers. Do these actions of China recently, does that
threaten our ability to live up to our treaty obligations to
Taiwan?
Secretary Carter. Well, no. Our treaty obligations to
Taiwan are very strong. We are constantly adjusting them.
Obviously, the more the threat grows from China, the more we
have to adjust both our operational approach and our technical
approach. That is one of the reasons why we are making these
investments, is because of our commitment under the Taiwan
Relations Act to the capabilities to defend Taiwan.
But I think, just to follow what you said, Mr. Chairman,
earlier, China's activities have expanded to beyond Taiwan,
which has been with us now for several decades, and they are
looking to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and so
forth. So it is not just Taiwan anymore, but it certainly
includes Taiwan.
Mr. Rogers. General Dunford, could you address this
subject, the threat that might be posed by the recent changes
in China's activities in regard to blue-water capability and/or
aircraft or land-based?
General Dunford. Chairman, I can. It is very clear to me
that those capabilities that are being developed are intended
to limit our ability to move into the Pacific or to operate
freely within the Pacific, and we call that anti-access/area
denial capability.
So their developments in antiship capability, anti-aircraft
capability, then, as you describe, the blue-water navy, are
clearly intended to limit our ability. That is why in this
particular budget we have focused on capability development
that allows us to maintain a competitive advantage versus
China. It is also why we are fielding the most modern
capabilities in the Department to the Pacific first. Things
like the F-35, the F-22, and so forth, and other capabilities
are going to the Pacific first.
So I absolutely share the concern that you have outlined,
Chairman Rogers, and it is certainly something that for me in
terms of joint capability development, it is a priority for us
over the next five, seven, ten years, to ensure that the--you
know, what Secretary Carter said is true, we are capable today
of meeting our obligations in the Pacific. And there is no
doubt in my mind that we have a competitive advantage over
China today.
It is equally clear to me that on the trajectory that China
is on today, were we to not maintain an investment profile as
outlined in the current budget, we would lose our competitive
advantage over time and find ourselves unable to adequately
advance our interests in the Pacific.
Mr. Rogers. Some people say that what China is doing in the
region, as we have talked about here, is more to impress and
perhaps intimidate their neighbors than it is to confront us.
What do you say to that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Carter. Well, it is both, because it is
definitely intended to intimidate or dominate the neighbors,
but it is also partly clearly strategically directed at us,
because it is we who have provided the security structure in
that region.
Now, you know, I am not one of these people who believes
that conflict with China is inevitable. It is certainly not
desirable. But it is we who have provided the environment of
peace and stability there that has allowed China to develop
freely and economically, and before them Japan, before them
South Korea, before them Taiwan, before them Southeast Asia,
now India and China. It is we who have provided that
environment. Some Chinese understand that is actually a good
thing. We are not out to keep China down. But we don't look for
anybody to dominate the region and certainly not anybody to
push the United States out.
We are a Pacific power, we are there to stay. It is where
half of humanity lives, half of the world's economy, important
part of the American future. We are there to stay.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Lowey and then Ms. Granger.
BUDGET STABILITY
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome and thank you for your service, Secretary
Carter, General Dunford, and Under Secretary McCord.
I know that there was some discussion before I arrived of
the budget, but I would like to hear you say it again. What
problems are created when Congress does not pass a spending
bill by October 1? What does it do for your budget? And can you
carry out the Department's mission within the amounts proposed
in your fiscal year 2017 request?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Congresswoman.
We can carry out the mission, as we have said, with the
budget that we have proposed, which we proposed at the level
prescribed by the bipartisan budget agreement. The stability
provided by that agreement is very important to us.
And to get to the first part of your question, when we have
instability, what happens? Within the Department, we start to
do things inefficiently, first of all, we begin to shorten the
contract times, and so money is wasted, and we can't plan
programs for the long run, there is program instability, which
hurts the industrial base.
For our people, it is very bad for morale, both military
and civilian. The people say: Hey, what is going on here? There
is gridlock in Washington, we don't have a budget, the
government is going to close down or sequester.
I don't think it is fair to our people. They look at their
families, they are trying to plan their future, and they say:
Is this an institution that I can plan a future with? We have
an All-Volunteer Force. We have to have good people, and we
need them to see a future with us.
And then finally, I worry about what it looks like around
the world, our friends and foes alike who say: Jeez, can't you
guys get it together here and have a budget for the long run?
So it is very deleterious just to have instability, and
that is why I am so grateful to really you on this committee,
among others, for coming together this year and putting
together a bipartisan budget agreement. That is the basis on
which we submitted our budget, and the stability provided to us
is incredibly important.
And, Chairman, you may want to add on stability.
General Dunford. The one thing that I would say,
Congresswoman, is, you know, as I look at the last several
years, we have kind of lived year to year, and I would echo the
Secretary's comments.
I am confident that we can meet our obligations today. I am
equally confident that the bow wave of procurement that I
alluded to in my opening remarks and the modernization that has
been deferred over the last few years is a bill to be paid in
the future. And as confident as I am about being able to say
that we can meet our requirements today, I am equally confident
that were we to continue to do what we have been doing over the
last few years, there is absolutely no way five or seven years
from now we would have the same conversation about China that
we just had with Chairman Rogers. It would be a fundamentally
different conversation.
So that is where the piece about predictability and
stability comes in, is you have to have a very coherent long-
term view towards joint capability development. The living year
to year, the uncertainty, the budgets that aren't complete,
what that causes us to do, one, is be very inefficient with the
taxpayers' dollars, because we make bad decisions in that kind
of environment.
But more importantly, our focus continues to be on the near
term, and we have got to be able to do two things at one time.
We have got to meet our current operational requirements, but
we have got to do the innovation and investments necessary to
maintain our competitive advantage in the future. And achieving
that balance requires a much different fiscal environment than
the one that we have been operating in now for some three or
four years.
But thanks for your question.
CYBERSECURITY
Mrs. Lowey. Well, thank you. And I know, if it is up to
Chairman Rogers and I, we will proceed with regular order.
But talking about competition and workforce, I would like
to ask a question on cybersecurity. First of all, if you could
please describe the primary risks faced by the Department of
Defense in the cybersecurity realm. And the budget indicates
that measures are taken to increase the capabilities of the
Cyber Mission Force initiated in fiscal year 2013. If you
could, describe the primary elements, and how does the budget
request support your efforts in cybersecurity?
Secretary Carter. Thanks for that. I will start with that
and then, Chairman, you add.
Our highest priority--to get the first part of your
question--our highest priority has to be defending our own
networks, because our military networks are what stitches
together the ingredients of our military and makes the whole
greater than the sum of the parts. So all of our operations of
ships, planes, tanks, people, troops, intelligence, and so
forth, comes together in the network, and making sure those
networks aren't penetrated or compromised is job one. We spend
a lot of effort on that.
We also recognize that cyber can be a tool that we can use
against our enemies. So, for example, right now--and I can't go
into details in this setting but can with you separately--
CYBERCOM is operating against ISIL, because these guys, you
know, why should they be able to communicate? Why should they
be using the Internet? These are people who are not part of the
free, open culture that the Internet is supposed--this is evil
and the Internet shouldn't be used for that purpose. We can do
that under our authorities as part of our campaign against
ISIL.
And the last thing, another priority for us, is we do help.
We don't have the lead here, because there is Homeland Security
and law enforcement and so forth. But if there are other kinds
of attacks on the homeland potentially, we would assist in the
defense of our homeland in cyberspace, as we do in everything
else.
In terms of our investments, you are right, 133 Cyber
Mission Force elements at CYBERCOM. That is just a piece of it,
though, because the services all have cyber efforts, they are
all tied up with the COCOMs, those cyber efforts are included
in our operations plans. And we have an enormous investment in
our IT systems, many tens of billions of dollars in our IT
system, all of which is being modernized, put in the cloud so
it can be better defended.
So there is an enormous investment, and we have increased
it in this budget in recognition of the growing importance of
cyber and our need, as the Chairman just said, to focus on the
future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General, briefly, because I know Ms.
Granger would like to have----
General Dunford. Congresswoman, I will be very quick.
First, with regard to the primary risk, and I would echo the
Secretary, protecting our own warfighting capability is
critical. But as much as you focus on the risk, every time we
talk about risk in cyber, we ought to talk about opportunity as
well, and we do have opportunities.
And so to your second question, about investment, the
investments that we are making are across the range of our
primary missions, one, to defend our own network, to support
the defense of our Nation, as well as take advantage of
offensive capabilities, to take the fight to the enemy. And the
Secretary alluded to what we are currently attempting to do
against ISIL, which we, obviously, wouldn't talk details in
this particular venue, but the investments we are making.
The Secretary also talked about the Cyber Mission Force. So
over the last few years, we did build those 133 teams. Our
investments this year are focused on providing them with the
tools and, frankly, the training facilities, which are unique
in cyber world, but those are probably two of the other areas
that I would highlight that we are trying to do, again, to
enhance the effectiveness of the capabilities we have.
We will grow capacity over time, but this year's budget is
focused on enhancing the capability of the cyber force that we
have been building over the last few years.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
Ms. Granger and then Mr. Israel.
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mr. General Dunford, Mr. Secretary
for all the attention you are giving to keeping us safe, and
there is nothing more important.
As we do that, we have partners that we are asking to play
an increasing role in the fight against ISIS. My concern is the
foreign military sales. The process is cumbersome and it is
bogged down. For example, the congressional notification for
the F-18s for Kuwait has been stalled in the executive branch
since March of 2015.
This is just one example of the many concerns we have been
hearing. In fact, the delays are driving our partners to turn
elsewhere, including Russia and China, for assistance. That is
not a good situation for us. The relationships are critical to
U.S. national security and they must be protected. Our current
action and lack of action is risking our long-term strategic
alliances.
I know this is not just a DOD issue, but, Mr. Secretary,
you play a significant role in the process. What are you doing
to try to expedite the requests from our partners, and what
changes are being made to fix this problem?
Secretary Carter. Well, I align myself completely with what
you said. Our exports, defense exports, are a twofer. They help
our industrial base, which in turn helps us, because when
others make investments in our defense industrial base, those
are investments in the base upon which we depend. When they buy
aircraft that we are also buying, they make them less expensive
for us. So it is all good. And you know from the Joint Strike
Fighter and other aircraft how important that is.
And then the other thing is that it makes them stronger,
and they are our friends. And we don't want to have to do
everything ourselves, so we are trying to get other people to
get in the game, not be free riders, help us fight the fights
that need to be made, and they need the capability to do that.
And then the last thing I would say is you are absolutely
right, if we don't give it to them, somebody else will give it
to them, and that somebody else won't be what we want to have
in there.
So for all those reasons, speeding up the approval process,
you are right, it is too cumbersome, there are lots of people
involved. It is something that I have been working on for a
number of years, my predecessors did as well, and I talked to
Secretary Kerry about and Secretary Pritzker as well. But this
is an important, positive thing for American defense when we
are able to arm our friends and allies so that we can help them
help themselves.
Chairman.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, I would just echo that. I
was in Kuwait on Monday, as a matter of fact, and met with the
Minister of Defense and my counterpart, the Chief of Defense.
From their perspective, great partner. Our presence in Kuwait
has been critical to prosecute the current fight against ISIL.
It has been critical for the last 2 decades-plus. And they are
incredibly frustrated.
And I agree with Secretary Carter, those are the kinds of
countries that we should be keeping close. They are valuable
allies both in the fight and from a U.S. posture perspective.
And we should look for ways to expedite the delivery of
equipment, because they have and they will go elsewhere.
And we want to build interoperability, we want to build
effective partnerships and allies, and one of the ways you do
that is this commonality of equipment. And if they are going to
buy Chinese UAVs or Chinese aircraft or missiles or those kinds
of things, it makes it incredibly difficult for us then to put
coalitions together in a circumstance like we find ourselves
right now. And winning in the circumstance we are in right now,
make no mistake about it, is going to require an effective
coalition.
So I think it is a foundational element of us actually
advancing our national security interests, is to make sure we
have that interoperability and commonality of equipment. And in
order to incentivize people to deal with us, we have got to
make it easier.
Ms. Granger. We really do, and so anything that we can do
from the Congress to help speed that up or make it smoother,
please let us know, because we understand. I always go back to
Egypt. And when they had the uprising in Egypt, you know,
everything just shut down. There was no communication except
military to military, because they were using our equipment and
we trained their pilots. And so we kept that going and knew
what was happening that way. And we really need to do
everything we can to make it faster and smoother.
Thank you both very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Granger.
Mr. Israel, then Judge Carter.
Mr. Israel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, welcome.
Before I ask my question, I want to, Mr. Secretary, commend
you. I know you make many smart decisions. One of the smartest
is the appointment of Steve Hedger as principal deputy
assistant secretary. He began his career in my office as a
legislative assistant for defense issues.
Secretary Carter. Well, thank you for that, because I
couldn't agree with you more. He is absolutely fantastic, and I
rely on him completely and I am grateful for him.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Mr. Israel. And now we have embarrassed him thoroughly.
Mr. Secretary, a good part of the debate in this committee
and the debate on the budget revolves around the issue of
military hardware, platforms, technology, systems. I want to
ask about the software, and by that I mean how we educate our
officers, our troops, the intellectual talent that we need.
This is something I learned when I was on the HASC, and
former Chairman Ike Skelton and I worked on professional
military education. And I also learned it firsthand during a
visit to Iraq when I was speaking with General Odierno and I
asked him: What do you need? What kind of deficiencies do you
have? And he went through a variety of issues, and then he
said: You know what, Congressman, I think we could use some
more cultural anthropologists. He said: You know, we need
situational awareness, but situational awareness also includes
an awareness of culture, an awareness of linguistics, you have
got to know, when you are kicking in a door, who is behind the
door.
And so I would like you to comment, Mr. Secretary, and then
I will have a question for General Dunford, I would like for
you to comment on, are we doing enough to invest in that
software? And are some of the challenges that we are just too
busy to learn? Are the challenges that our budgets just don't
allow us to make those investments? And what more can we do on
those professional military education obligations that we have?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Congressman. While we are
acknowledging people who have done a tremendous amount for our
country, I would like to acknowledge you also for your service
in this body and to the country and your loyalty to the
Department of Defense. Thanks.
You are on one of the subjects that the Chairman and, I
think, feel most passionately about, it is a critical part of
the force of the future, and that is professional military
education or the continuing development of our people. We need
to get the best, which is why recruiting is so important, but
once we get them, we need to develop them in the course of
their career, because the world changes, technology changes,
the skills they need change. And in order to retain them, they
need to feel continually like they are building their skill
set, and that is crucial.
And when you talk to young folks, and I do all the time,
and say, ``What does it take to keep you? What would make you
leave? What do you talk about when you go home and you sit
around the dinner table and try to decide whether you are going
to stay or not? What do you talk about?'' and there are lots of
things they talk about, and we try to account for all of them,
but a big one always is: Well, am I growing?
And one of the things that is part of society today that
wasn't so much in the past is companies recognize that, a lot
of people recognize that their education didn't end when they
were kids. You have to educate yourself your whole life,
because you need to keep up, otherwise the world is going to
pass you by. That is true everywhere in our economy, you see
people trying to do that. But it is critical for our military,
both to keep their skills sharp and to make them motivated to
stay.
And a concern I have and one of the things we are
addressing in this budget, and it is not a lot of money, it is
really attention, is this. Every time there is a little shave
in the budget or turbulence--I was asked earlier about
consequences of turbulence, where you go in and you grab money
where you quickly can because all of a sudden you have to grab
money, which is a bad way of managing yourself--when we have to
do that kind of thing, one of the things you grab is
professional military education funding, fellowships and so
forth. That is pennywise and pound foolish, and it is an
example of the near term killing the far term.
So I think you are absolutely right. I like the word
``software.'' And I will stop at that point and see if the
Chairman wants to add anything.
Mr. Israel. Actually, General, if you would elaborate on
that in the time I have left. And may I also ask you to comment
on something I know you have worked on, and that is the value
of mindfulness in helping to shape sharper and better minds in
the military.
General Dunford. I will, Congressman. I will start with the
mindfulness question.
I became aware of mindfulness about 6 years ago when I was
commanding out on the West Coast the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force, and we were looking for ways to enhance the resilience
of our marines and sailors at the time. And I got a briefing
from a Dr. Liz Stanley at the time, who made it clear to me
that mindfulness will help us in terms of enhancing resiliency
of the force, mitigating the consequences of things like post-
traumatic stress, but more importantly, enhancing the ability
of people to deal with the challenges and focus on the
challenges they confront at a particular time.
So I think there is a lot to that, and we have continued to
work that over the last few years, and I think there is a lot
of promise to enhance the capabilities of the force with
mindfulness training.
Mr. Israel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Judge Carter and then Mr. Ruppersberger.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome. We thank you for all you do for our Nation.
You are an important part of keeping us safe, and I am proud to
know.
Secretary Carter, as you well know, only five of our NATO
allies meet their obligations on defense spending, with one of
them being Greece, who backed in the wrong way. A strong and
stable Europe is, of course, a vital national security interest
of ours, but even more importantly, of the European citizens.
With the European Reassurance Initiative funding in fiscal
year 2017 quadrupling, what concrete steps are you taking or
can we take to force Europe to reassure themselves, and how can
we better incentivize European countries to contribute more to
their own safety?
Could you take us through the decisionmaking that was
involved in deciding to implement a rotational ABCT as opposed
to a permanently stationed ABCT? Wouldn't an enduring unit
encourage critical strategic partnership with allied nations'
armed forces and provide a greater institutional knowledge and
mission capability as compared with the rotational force?
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Congressman. And you are
right, the Europeans need to do more, in general. And I am now
in a long string of Secretaries of Defense who have decried the
decline in European defense spending. It is not uniform. There
are countries that are increasing their levels. Particularly, I
would just single out the United Kingdom as one. And, of
course, our allies around the world, like Japan, Australia, and
so forth, are all doing more, and so they are getting stronger.
But in general, Europe is underinvested.
And our European Reassurance Initiative, our plans there
are to work with them to defend them. To do that, we need their
participation and assistance and their own capabilities.
ERI puts some equipment there permanently, but you are
right, our approach to force, to increased force presence there
is rotational presence, persistent rotational presence, rather
than permanent presence. And you say, why? And the reason is
two-fold. One is that we don't think it is practical for us to
get support for increasing more overseas basing in Europe. The
pressure on us has been in just the other direction, and we
have been doing less in Europe; continuing to have a strong
defense of Europe, but have fewer forces positioned in Europe.
We think we can do the mission--we know we can do the
mission rotationally in a better way in the following sense,
and I will let the Chairman elaborate on this. But I know if
you spoke to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Acting
Secretary of the Army about this, this is what they have told
me. They actually prefer the persistent rotational presence,
because it is better for readiness.
These guys who go over there, and I have met with them, I
have visited our guys in Europe, in Grafenwoehr and Estonia and
so forth, and they say we are much more ready now as a
consequence of our being here, we know the environment, we are
at a high state of readiness. So it is good training for them
to rotate. Then they go back home.
If they were there all the time and the people back home
never got to go to Europe, the readiness for Europe wouldn't be
as high. So the Army believes that by rotating different units
through Europe, you increase the proficiency and, therefore,
the punch of the ERI.
Let me ask the Chairman to elaborate.
General Dunford. Congressman, I view rotational forces as a
way to meet an enduring requirement as opposed to seeing them
as separate. And I have spent the majority of my career in a
service that used the rotational method to meet its
requirements. So multiple tours in Okinawa, for example, where
we meet the majority of our requirements.
I couldn't agree more with the Secretary of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Army. My experience is that using a
rotational basis to put forces in Europe will actually ensure
that they maintain readiness and it will give them a breadth of
experience that they might not otherwise have were they just
permanently in Europe.
So I think, frankly, it is a good way to meet our
requirements. And, again, I don't view it as either enduring or
rotational. I view rotational forces as a way to meet an
enduring commitment.
Mr. Carter. Well, for a moment expanding on the European
participation, how effective is European participation if their
rules of engagement are strictly defensive, which is what we
have experienced in some of the theaters when they participate?
And you say you are still challenging them, but in reality, we
have got to have people that fight.
General Dunford. Congressman, I had the privilege of
commanding, you know, all the NATO nations in the ISAF mission.
We had 50 members of the coalition. And I will tell you, there
are some exceptions. But that issue of caveats in rules of
engagement, we overcame that in Afghanistan probably back in
2011 and 2012. And we have some incredibly effective partners,
and over time, they were able to accomplish the mission and
operate within the same ROE that we do, and my expectation is
that they will do that in the future.
There are certainly alongside of us today, we don't have
NATO in Iraq, for example, in Syria, but we have NATO nations
there, and almost anywhere we are, we have either members of
the NATO alliance or NATO itself. And I, frankly, think that we
can work through those things, and we have in the past. It is a
political issue, but once there is commitment and will to the
mission, the forces are more than capable enough to be shoulder
to shoulder with us and make an invaluable contribution, and I
believe that as a commander.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge Carter. It is a
critical issue.
Mr. Ruppersberger, then Mr. Crenshaw.
CYBER COMMAND
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. First thing, Mr. Secretary,
General, I think right now the job that you are doing, we are
in a good position as far as protecting our country.
With that said, we know a lot about cyber, we know it is
one of the biggest threats that we face, we know that it
affects our business, our communities, our combatant commands
wherever we are, and we have got a lot of work to do there.
In that regard, because of the fact that we need to deal
and focus on cyber, one, I personally believe that we need to
take Cyber Command and make it into a fully functional
combatant command. And I would say this too, I happen to
represent NSA in my district in Fort Meade in that area. Are
you considering that? If you are, do you have any timeframe?
And also, we need to focus on the budget issue.
And then if I do have time, I want to follow up one
question on what Judge Carter was saying about Russia.
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Congressman.
With respect to CYBERCOM, yes, we have considered and
continue to consider various ways of improving our managerial
approach and our command approach for cyber. CYBERCOM is a very
effective organization. It is a growing organization, so we are
going to have to see where it goes. And as you know, it is now
a subunified command to STRATCOM. That is an arrangement that
works now, but it is not necessarily optimal, which is why we
are looking at it.
We do have a reluctance about adding new headquarters
staff, because one of the things that we are doing in this
budget is cutting headquarters staff, and so we need to be
careful about that. But whichever way that turns out, the
command structure, CYBERCOM has an important future.
And you mentioned NSA. It is important to me that CYBERCOM
and NSA are in the same place, and the reason is very simple.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And I agree with that too.
Secretary Carter. Skilled cyber people, and this gets back
to some of the earlier questions, they are hard to find. Cyber
is partly a money issue for us, but it is not really a money
issue, it is a people issue, and finding good people is
critical. Having NSA next to CYBERCOM means that they can
interchange talent and draw on one another. That is a huge
strength for both of them.
So the fact that Admiral Rogers wears both hats, Director
of NSA and CYBERCOM, that is a critical advantage right now.
There may come a time when we have enough people that we can do
something different, but for now, I would not recommend that
separation. But it is people, that is the long pull.
RUSSIA
Mr. Ruppersberger. If I have time, I do also want to get in
a question about Russia. I was in Russia this November about
the Syria issue, and then we then went to Estonia and Latvia.
And there is a great concern, in talking with representatives
from other countries in the European area, Poland and Romania,
there is a great concern: Will the United States stand behind
them if the aggression of Putin continues to go on, especially
in those border states?
They are concerned. I think the fact that we are going to
put about 4,000 or 5,000 troops in that area will help them.
But I think we have to let them know and let the world know and
let Putin know we are the strongest military in the world, and
we need people to know that.
And I am wondering if there are any strategies that we
might even consider. You don't want to escalate, but you also
want to stand up and show that you are strong, and you need to
get the morale of these countries. Putting troops on the
border, if that is the case. I am not saying to do that, that
is your call as far as the military. But I think we need to
show that we are strong, that we are not going to tolerate the
aggression of Russia, and especially with our allies that are
right on the border.
Secretary Carter. I will start first, then the Chairman.
The reason why we are quadrupling the ERI is precisely for
the reason you say: to signal the determination of the United
States and NATO to defend NATO territory. We do that with
activity sets, which are these equipment sets that move around,
we do it with rotational presence, we do it with the permanent
presence that we have there in Europe, we do it with exercises
and so forth.
And Russia should know that what they see there in Europe
on a daily basis isn't what we would use to defend Europe. They
would get the whole weight of the American military behind the
defense of Europe. And we have plans to do that, that is what I
was alluding to earlier, for the defense of our NATO territory
in concert with them, and we would do it with the full weight
of the United States, as has always been the case in the
defense of Europe.
It is going to be a different kind of thing than it was
back in the days of the Fulda Gap. And I emphasize that. We
call it the new playbook, because it is not just territorial,
it is little green men, what we call hybrid warfare. I am sure
you heard about that in your travels. It is the other kinds of
things, the kinds of things you saw in Crimea and Ukraine.
So it is a different kind of threat, but it is exactly what
we have to plan for in order to show strength, but most
importantly be strong in defense of our NATO allies.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Very briefly.
General Dunford. Congressman, very quickly. The Secretary
mentioned exercises, and you asked the question specifically
about were we to posture forces on the border, would that make
a difference.
I would just say that what the European Reassurance
Initiative does in terms of increasing exercises is two things.
One is it helps us develop interoperability with our NATO
partners. So that is important.
But the exercises that General Breedlove designs are
designed to send a clear and unmistakable message of our
commitment to Europe as well, our commitment to Article 5 of
the NATO alliance, and as importantly, a clear demonstration to
Russia that if Russia faces NATO, they face the full weight of
the military capability of 28 nations, the full economy of 28
nations, and the full political will of 28 nations.
And, quite frankly, if you put all that together, that is a
pretty overwhelming challenge for the Russians. And our
exercises are designed to make sure one part of that is clear,
that we can bring the full weight of the military capability of
28 nations to bear in the event of a contingency.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you. Non-NATO ally support
for Ukraine would be appreciated, I know, by the Ukrainians.
They are still waiting.
Mr. Crenshaw and then Ms. McCollum.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your service and service to our men
and women in uniform.
Secretary Carter, you pretty well laid out all the diverse
threats that we face. I can't think of a time where we have
faced any more on near-term, short-term, or long-term basis,
and we are facing them at a time of shrinking budgets.
And this subcommittee, I think, has a role to play. Some of
us have served under different Presidents and different
Secretaries of Defense, and I think we all bring a unique
perspective.
And I want to, Mr. Secretary, have a brief discussion with
you about your decision to end the Littoral Combat Ship program
at 40.
If you look at that program, you can see that it was set up
to be a 52-ship program. And the reason I say it is your
decision is because there was a memo that you wrote to the
Secretary of the Navy, it was reported in the press, and it
talked about the fact that maybe some of the lethality wasn't
there. It was almost like, I guess, where the report said that
maybe the Navy spends too much money on ships and not enough
money on some of the other platforms, like the E-2D Hawkeye or
the P-8 or the F-18. And I happen to be a big supporter of all
those programs. But I just am not sure it is correct to justify
them comparing them to other programs.
And when I read that memo and I talk to other members,
senior members of the Department of Defense, it seems like
there is this question of, well, maybe the Littoral Combat Ship
is more of a presence ship, like a patrol boat or frigate, it
is there to kind of show our presence, but maybe it doesn't
have the kind of high-tech capabilities in this new world to
really deal with China, deal with Russia, deal with Iran.
And so I guess my concern is, that is one opinion. You read
articles about how important the LCS can be, you talk to some
of the folks who have been on them over in the Asia Pacific,
and they would tell you, you almost need those kind of ships to
defeat some of the folks over there.
So I guess my question is, is if the Navy says we need 52,
that was their estimate and they reiterated that after they did
a year-long study that we actually asked them to do, and then
your decision is they need 40, I guess the question becomes,
how does that requirement change so quickly and will we get to
see an analysis that went into your decision?
In other words, do you really believe we need less Littoral
Combat Ships or do you believe we need to spend more money in
other areas? Bottom line, is that a decision based on long-term
national security or is that a decision based on a short-term
budget?
Secretary Carter. It is a decision based on long-term
security, and I will explain the decision. Let me just say
something. The Littoral Combat Ship is a successful program, it
is an excellent ship, and it will be much better than the mine-
countermeasure ships, the coastal patrol craft, and so forth,
that it replaces. And these are critical capabilities.
And in general in shipbuilding, this budget makes a huge
investment in shipbuilding, new DDGs, new Virginia-class
submarines, aircraft carriers, overhaul and maintenance of
aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, the first Ohio-class
replacement submarines. So there is an enormous amount in--oh,
I should add also the added Virginia Payload Modules for the
submarine program. So there is a lot that goes into
shipbuilding.
And our ships, the number of ships of the U.S. Navy is
actually increasing. It is going to go to 308 from about 280
today. So we are going to have a bigger Navy, not a smaller
Navy. That is our plan and that is in the budget in front of
you, a Navy that gets larger.
But to the question of the Littoral Combat Ship, the Navy's
warfighting analysis concluded 40 of them were enough, and,
yes, we did want to apply resources elsewhere, to the lethality
of our ships. That is critically important, that we not only
have enough ships and more ships, which we are going to have,
but that they are the very best.
That is why we are investing in combat systems, that is why
we are investing in all the new missiles and weapons that I
talked about. We have a new lightweight torpedo, a new
heavyweight torpedo program, various antiship missiles,
including the new capability for the SM-6 missile, surface-to-
air missiles, all the stuff that makes our Navy the most
lethal, in the face of China, Russia, Iran, others who are
trying to have that capability.
So there is some balancing that needs to be done between
high-end and very important lower-end ships, like the Littoral
Combat Ship. There is nothing wrong with--I just want to be
clear--there is nothing wrong with the Littoral Combat Ship. We
like it. Our plan is not to buy 52, but to buy 40. But that
doesn't mean there is anything wrong with the program. It has
been very successful and it is needed in those numbers.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum and then Mr. Graves, the gentleman from
Georgia.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Gentlemen.
Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, the 2017 funds that this
committee appropriates for the defense budget will be available
to support the policies and the programs of the next President,
the next President the American people elect in November.
A leading candidate for president is telling the American
people and the world that torture works. He says he will use
torture to help defeat ISIL, including things way beyond
waterboarding. He says he will order our military to take out
the families of Islamic terrorists. I presume that means
directing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to use men and women under your military
command to intentionally kill innocent family members,
including children, that might be suspected terrorists.
I find these rants frightening and dangerous to our Nation.
General Dunford, do you support allowing U.S. troops or the
intelligence community to use torture to exact information from
suspected terrorists? Does the use of torture advance the
military or national interests of the United States?
Secretary Carter. Congresswoman, before the Chairman
answers your question, I really need to say something, and the
question is a fair question. I want to say something about the
framing of it that I believe in very strongly, however.
Ms. McCollum. Please, sir.
Secretary Carter. Which is, this is an election year. We
will have a new President. I recognize that. I feel very
strongly that our Department needs to stand apart from the
electoral season. So I respectfully decline to answer any
questions that arise from the political debate going on. I just
don't think that is appropriate. And I want General Dunford
especially, even more so than me, not to be involved in
political debates.
So I think if you address the general question of how we
try to conduct ourselves as a military in the air in Syria--you
were a commander in Afghanistan--that is fine, but with great
respect, I just want to----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We respect your decision.
MILITARY ETHICS
Ms. McCollum. Well, we had discussions on the political
nature of Guantanamo and President Obama. Will you just make a
blanket statement, then, as to the military's role of the use
of torture? Because we have had a lot of hearings on this. This
caused a lot of angst in this Congress. We went through one
administration that used it and, as far as I know, we are
working to stop and ban the use of torture, because it does not
serve our national interests.
General Dunford. Congresswoman, let me answer the question
broadly without getting into what Secretary Carter highlighted.
One of the things that makes me proud to wear this uniform
is that we represent the values of the American people. And
when our young men and women go to war, they go with our
values. And I think our performance on the battlefield over the
past decade-plus of war reflects that young men and women from
this country bring their values with them. And when we find
exceptions, you can see how aggressively we pursue addressing
those exceptions.
I guess what I would say in response to your question is we
should never apologize for going to war with the values of the
American people. That is what we have done historically, that
is what we expect to do in the future, and, again, that is what
makes me proud to wear this uniform.
Ms. McCollum. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am assuming the values
of the American people do not include torture. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I agree with you. I agree with the
General's statement as well.
Mr. Graves and then Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, both of you, for
your--everybody, for their patience.
JSTARS RECAPITALIZATION
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I am very concerned with the timeline and the funding
reduction included in this year's budget for the JSTARS recap,
and wanted to discuss that for a few minutes.
The timeline for IOC has gone from 2022 to 2023 to 2024,
and as a result, the existing JSTARS fleet's life-cycle costs
are just going to go through the roof. Every year the Air Force
defers recapitalization they are missing out on $100 million or
more in reduced operations and maintenance cost.
Secondly, the current E-8 aircraft are reaching the end of
their service life and they will require waivers and additional
funds to maintain themselves. This will likely lead to a
lengthy capabilities gap, depriving warfighters of the GMTI in
battle management. And recently half the fleet was in depot
maintenance. This all but ensures that there will be a huge
capability gap in the 2020 timeframe before a replacement
aircraft would even be ready right now.
So now we are being told that there is need for more tech
maturation. This is completely at odds with the plan that we
have heard from the Air Force over the last four years. They
have repeatedly said that the recap will involve mature
technology and that the recap will be only an integration
effort.
Can you just help us understand and maybe explain why this
year's budget includes additional delays which result in
additional expenses and some gaps in capability?
Secretary Carter. I can. I will describe the acquisition
strategy.
First of all, you are absolutely right, and the Air Force
does have a continuing requirement for a Ground Moving Target
Indicator, GMTI, radars of the kind JSTARS is. JSTARS is a
fleet of sixteen 707-based aircraft now. They have been around
for a long time. They have to be recapitalized, because we need
that capability.
And you don't need as big physically a radar anymore.
Radars have gotten smaller. We flew a bunch of them, and
General Dunford's forces flew them in Afghanistan, and we have
flown them elsewhere.
And so the Air Force is committed and our budget does lay
in the funds for a JSTARS recap. They have not chosen--they
want to do a competitive source selection for that, both for
the radar and the integration with the airframe. So they
haven't picked a winner of that yet. They have announced that
competition for a JSTARS replacement and put in money, I think
it is somewhere between $2 and $3 billion in this five-year
defense plan to begin the recapitalization.
So that is the acquisition strategy. We can get you more
detail on that. But I think the thing I can say as Secretary of
Defense is we are committed to that capability. We have to
recapitalize the JSTARS, because as you note, it is an airframe
now that is decades old and we just can't keep flying it. We
need the capability.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And you are
absolutely right. It is a very old platform, but a very needed
platform today. And my understanding in some of the briefings I
have been in is that in not-too-distant time from now half of
the fleet will be at its full life cycle, 100 percent-plus of
its life cycle, and we still don't seem to be on a timeline
that would fill that gap.
And I think we have had tremendous support on this
committee for this program and for advancing it and moving it
as swiftly as possible because of our deep concern for our
troops and the capabilities that they have in the field. So any
additional support or hurriedness on this would be greatly
appreciated.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
Ms. Kaptur and then Mr. Calvert.
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, thank you for your service
to our country. I will ask my questions quickly and you can use
the time remaining to answer them, if you could, please. And
the four topics will be Russian propaganda, ISIL's growth, the
State Partnership Program, and survivor benefits.
On Russian propaganda, I read, General Dunford, your
statement in the testimony: ``The Russian military presents the
greatest challenge to U.S. interests.'' I agree. I want to
express my own deep concern about Russia's well-funded and
organized propaganda war in Ukraine, the Baltics, Europe, and
even here in the West. And I observe the West's approach to
confront that force of hybrid warfare is fragmented and
underfunded.
Can you respond, potentially review what is being done
across various departments, design a strategy to counter Russia
in their efforts, including assigning a lead in the
administration to this task, working with our allies?
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
Number two, on the State Partnership Program, I think it is
one of the most effective tools in working with our European
allies to meet the challenge we face in Europe. Ohio, for
example, our Guard has a relationship ongoing with Hungary and
Serbia, California with Ukraine, Illinois with Poland. What
does the budget do to facilitate this growing capability that
is essential, really, to carrying out our activities in that
realm?
Thirdly, describe the development and size of ISIL as a
terrorist force and the motivation for what seems to be drawing
additional adherents. And I would appreciate for the record
what is DOD's view of victory in Syria.
[The information follows:]
DoD's view of victory in Syria is a peaceful and stabilizing
political settlement, established and effective governance, and the
complete defeat of ISIL to include the denial of Syria as a safe haven
to train and operate from.
SURVIVOR BENEFITS
Ms. Kaptur. And finally, on the matter of survivor
benefits, I was recently contacted by a veteran constituent
with three children who is an Afghanistan veteran herself at
the E7 level and has PTS, she is a Gold Star wife due to the
death of her husband in Iraq in 2004. Under current law, a
required offset in payments between her dependency and
indemnity compensation and her survivor benefit plan annuities
prohibits her from receiving the full amount of both. For the
record, let me also state five percent of military widows
remarry, 95 percent of widowers do.
For women with children, it just seems to me there ought to
be something going on at DOD that would help those who have so
nobly served our Nation. So I wanted to put that on the record.
And if you can't fully answer it here, I appreciate it in your
written reply.
[The information follows:]
The Department has consistently opposed proposals to eliminate the
offset between Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuities and Dependency and
Indemnity Compensation (DIC) at government expense for the following
reasons:
Duplication of benefits: Both entitlements are paid
by separate departments for the purpose of providing a
continuing annuity to the survivors of military members or
former members. Both benefits are subsidized by the federal
government.
Death on active duty enhancement: The SBP annuity of
a surviving spouse whose sponsor dies on active duty may be
assigned to a child or children, permitting the spouse to
receive both SBP and DIC without offset during a child's
dependent schooling years, additionally these survivors are
entitled to a social security annuity for survivors.
Complementary programs: DIC is a flat $1,254 per
month, plus $311 for each dependent child (2016). SBP is 55
percent of an elected base amount not to exceed retired pay.
The existing entitlement, with offset, ensures that survivors
receive the higher value. This sets DIC as a floor for more
junior members while allowing more senior members the potential
of a larger SBP amount with all the benefits from the tax free
aspect of DIC.
Equity: Allowing concurrent receipt of SBP and DIC
without offset would create a group of survivors receiving two
government-subsidized survivor annuities. Survivors of most
military retirees and survivors of veterans who did not serve
to retirement would receive only one.
High cost: Eliminating the SBP offset for all
survivors entitled to DIC would cost the Military Retirement
Fund more than $7 billion over 10 years.
Ms. Kaptur. So first on the Russian propaganda issue.
Secretary Carter. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. And I
will start on the Russian propaganda thing.
It is related to hybrid warfare. Russia has bought media in
the West, no question about it, you can turn it on in your own
living room, and sometimes that contains what I have called the
big lie. Our principal response to that as a country and as the
West is the truth, but we have to watch the effect of that, and
the State Department does that, the intelligence community does
that, and others.
But for our part, you asked us, it is related to hybrid
warfare. And earlier we were discussing the European
Reassurance Initiative and its parts, and we were talking about
territorial defense, which is important. But another critical
part of the ERI is hardening the states of Europe to
essentially subversion, which is hybrid warfare shades into
subversion, hardening them by helping them to defend themselves
from cyber manipulation and from other kinds of insidious
influences that we saw precede the Russian actions in Crimea
and Ukraine.
So we are trying to learn from that. That is exactly what
hybrid warfare means. That is why hybrid warfare is part of the
new playbook, as I call it, for NATO. It is not like your NATO
was long ago, in the Fulda Gap, which was a more conventional
kind of conflict. We have to expect a more unconventional kind
of conflict, and that is exactly what the Chairman and I and
General Breedlove think about and plan for when it comes to
Europe.
I will stop there except just, one, if I may, put in a plug
for the State Partnership Program with you. We get huge value
out of these State Partnership Programs.
Ms. Kaptur. Huge. Huge.
Secretary Carter. And we fund them. And their people are
very enthusiastic. The countries tell me all the time how much
they love the State that is their partner. It is a great way of
tying America to others and complementing what the Defense
Department does institutionally. They are great programs and I
appreciate you support for them.
Ms. Kaptur. I hope, Mr. Secretary, with that endorsement,
that you will find ways to broaden it, to fully utilize it,
particularly in those places which are so much at risk right
now.
And on the propaganda front, I really hope in your position
you can lead an administration effort to be a little more
coordinated, not just DOD, but we need a strategy to totally
combat the propaganda that is flooding nations like Ukraine. It
is not in our interest, it is not in liberty's interest to have
this continue without an equal response, and the West's
response is very anemic compared to what is coming out of the
Russian.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me commend Ms. Kaptur for her
persistence on this issue. And while you are aiming it to
Russian propaganda, we might come up with a game plan for ISIS
and the Islamic State as well.
Mr. Calvert, and Mr. Ryan after.
CHINA
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Carter, General Dunford, Mr. McCord, thank you
for being here, thank you for your service to our country. We
certainly appreciate it.
I want to expand on Chairman Rogers' questions regarding
China. And, obviously, China's been closing the technology gap
between our countries. Its military until recent history, as
you mentioned, historically was focused internally with their
primary mission to protect the Communist Party and the existing
government within their country. Until recent history, they
have been interested in projecting military power just in their
own region.
I would argue that we win wars not just because we are just
the best trained and most proficient, because we are very good
at large-scale strategic operational and tactical logistics,
supply, maintenance procedures, and practices, we are good at
getting our people and our equipment anywhere on the globe in a
timely manner and have the decades of conflict experience
through the world and in prepping and executing these combat
service support functions.
China is new to this. China is new to power projection. I
question their ability to conduct these functions effectively
in fighting the conflict beyond their shores. You can have the
largest military in the world, but if you can't feed or supply
them after three days, they become worthless.
Can you comment on China's ability to effectively project
warfighting power beyond its shores, but especially with regard
to their ability to conduct effective logistics, supply,
maintenance, operations, external to China? I don't think we
have put a lot of thought into that.
General Dunford. Congressman, thanks for the question.
First of all, I agree with you that our logistics
capability is one of our competitive advantages. I also agree
that from a power projection perspective, the Chinese
capability is relatively immature.
However, if we are talking about within the Pacific, they
do have one advantage, which is interior lines. In other words,
from a geographical perspective, if we talk about a conflict in
the South China Sea, if we talk about a conflict in the East
China Sea, in Taiwan, and those areas, their logistics
challenge is significantly less than the challenge that we
would have as we project power to places like the Middle East
or to the Pacific.
I do see, you know, from my own personal experience, when
you talk about putting equipment at sea, when you talk about
employing sea-based capabilities, when you talk about logistics
over long distances, that takes many, many years. We have
maritime preposition ships. I was around in the early days of
maritime preposition ships, and when you put equipment aboard a
ship, 6 months later try to take it off a ship, and all the
fuel had turned to sludge. And so we had to learn how do that,
to make sure that the level of maintenance and readiness was
what it is today. That was a discovery learning process that,
frankly, took many, many years to develop that.
So I would agree with the thesis that the Chinese have a
long way to go in terms of developing power projection. I guess
what I would say is that if you look at the investments that
they are making, the attention they are paying to it, the
reorganization they did is a recognition in part of the comment
you made, they are just now recently--they are looking at our
capabilities in terms of jointness and integration, a piece of
which is our logistics capability, and they have just made some
major reorganization inside the Chinese military, which I think
is in part to mitigate the challenges that you have identified
and that they know exist.
So do I think they have a legitimate power-projection
capability today? No. Do I see forces deployed to places like
Djibouti, do I see the maritime development that you mentioned,
do I see the aviation capabilities developing? Yes.
And so I think it is fair, from my perspective, you know, I
don't look at intent, I look at capability and I look at the
trajectory the Chinese are on, and I think it is fair to say at
some point in the future, were they to continue to emphasize
power projection, continue to make the investments that they
are making right now, that they will develop a power-projection
capability. But I would agree with you, I think that is some
time away.
But, again, in the near term, what they are developing
would provide them a capability that probably is much easier to
attain, and that is the capability with interior lines in a
Pacific scenario to project power in one of those scenarios
that I mentioned.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan and then Mr. Womack.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
HEALTHY BASE INITIATIVE
Mr. Chairman, thank you for being here.
And one of the issues--the issue we talk about here--the
budget, money, how are we going to free up money, and I know we
have a lot of priorities. And the challenges we face today are,
I think, unlike we have ever had to as far as dealing with
these global challenges, the technology, making sure the third
offset, all these new investments that we have to make.
So we have got to be very smart in how we try to free up
money. And I know that we have been spending since 2001 a good
deal more money on health care. And so one of the issues I want
to ask you about just briefly and put a plug in for, when we
look at rates of diabetes and blood pressure and all these
things that are causing us to spend a lot of money in the
healthcare system, military healthcare system, I want to talk
to you about the Healthy Base Initiative, what kind of food we
have coming in, what kind of nutrition that we are giving these
elite warriors.
And we know that a lot of these issues are caused, they are
diet related, and I think it would be smart for us to take a
holistic approach here and just say, hey, if we know we start
feeding our soldiers, airmen, and the rest healthy food, that a
lot of these problems can be avoided, which frees up money for
us put into the third offset and some of these other things.
So you don't have to necessarily comment, maybe comment for
the record, on the Healthy Base Initiative and what we can do
to make sure we start driving down some of these healthcare
costs to free up money for some of these other things.
I know Mr. Visclosky mentioned the defense industrial base
issue. Youngstown, Ohio, is home to America Makes, which is the
Additive Manufacturing Institute. It is doing a phenomenal job
and, I think, can transform manufacturing. So I want to make
sure we robustly support these institutes as we move forward
into the future.
And then, just to touch base quickly on what Mr. Israel
said on the idea of these kind of mind fitness training, again,
mind, body, health, how we prepare these men and women to
function at the highest level possible and using the most cost-
effective ways to do it.
I know that you mentioned Liz Stanley, Mr. Chairman. I know
she is not doing any more work within the military now, and I
would just like to say we need to reconsider that, and I think
not just offer it, but ramp it up, because I think that would
be a huge opportunity for us to reduce some of the suicide and
increase performance.
C-130J
Lastly, and a question. In Youngstown, at our air base
there, we have the only Aerial Spray Unit. And we are now
dealing with the global Zika issue, and I see we are reducing
our C-130J request by three. And I just wonder, can you touch
upon the Zika issue, keeping our troops safe around the world,
making sure that we have the capacity to address this issue?
And also will the reduction of C-130Js affect our ability
within the Aerial Spray Unit and others to combat this global
problem?
You have a minute and a half to kind of deal with all that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. See if you can do it.
Secretary Carter. I will be very brief, and we will get
back to you on the Healthy Base Initiative.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Secretary Carter. We do spend $50 billion a year on health
care, so it is a big part of our budget. Obviously, like
everywhere else in the economy, we want to not see that grow
too quickly, and one of the ways you do that is to keep people
healthy, and one of the ways you keep people healthy is to
teach them what is healthier. So that is an important
initiative.
I also want to thank you for the--the manufacturing
institutes are a tremendous success. These are public-private
partnerships, they are kind of model ways of doing things, and
they are very critical to keeping manufacturing and high-
skilled jobs, but more importantly, industry supporting
defense, from our point of view, in the United States.
I will say this about Zika, and I will get back to you on
the C-130J.
[The information follows:]
Congressman Ryan, as you state, we perform the Aerial Spray Mission
with the 910 Air Wing (AW), out of Youngstown, Ohio. The mission is
completed with the C-130H aircraft stationed at that unit. The men and
women of the 910 AW and their C-130H's are mission ready and capable
and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. There are no plans
to convert these special mission aircraft to C-130Js as the current C-
130H's are performing well and, as I stated, they stand mission ready
and capable. To date, I am not aware of the 910 AW being engaged in the
battle against Zika but I can assure you, that if called upon, the
Department of Defense and all of our related resources will respond
appropriately to fight this disease.
Secretary Carter. I am not aware that it in any way the
spraying program is at risk as a consequence of the overall
buy. We have several hundred C-130Js and we adjust the buy
accordingly.
With respect to Zika, we have not been assigned a role yet
in that. There are funds that Congress has made available to
the Department of Health and Human Services for combating Zika
and they are doing various things. We stand ready to help them
with research, with spraying, whatever they end up asking for.
So we are kind of on tiptoes if we are asked to do things. We
have not been asked to do things yet, but, obviously, we will
play a role if we are asked to play a role.
Chairman.
General Dunford. Dealing with the onset of the Zika virus
is our focus, obviously, has been on preventative medicine and
protection of the force, and our commanders have all identified
individuals, for example, that are at high risk, pregnant women
in South America and those kinds of things, and afforded them
the opportunity to leave the area where they are at risk for
the Zika virus.
So right now what we are doing is just making sure that our
force, wherever they are deployed, particularly in those areas
where the Zika virus is present, are taking all the measures to
make sure we have a healthy force. And I would say the things
that we do, Congressman, you know, our medical professionals
are very experienced and very good in preventative health. In
the areas, something like this, they are very good at making
sure that we are proactive in keeping the force healthy and
ready.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much.
The committee, of course, would like to commend the
Department for the good work they did addressing the Ebola. I
mean, your command and control of that was very important
moving towards its eradication.
Mr. Womack.
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you for your patience.
READINESS
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Dunford.
Always great to see you.
Mr. Secretary, I am a big picture guy, and, obviously, it
is obvious with your third offset strategy you are a big
picture guy. I truly appreciate that.
There is another big picture view that is stark reality,
and everybody on this dais knows it, we talk about it a lot,
and that is the trajectory of the Federal budget and the
squeeze that is happening as a result of the growth in the
mandatory programs and the fewer and fewer dollars there seem
to be for discretionary programs, including the defense of our
country. It is alarming to me, and we don't have an answer for
that.
That said, as a result of sequestration and the Budget
Control Act, we have lost a lot of what I believe is readiness
capability because of a very difficult, constrained resource
environment. And it looks like that we are going to be trying
to buy back some of that readiness now and deferring some of
our other obligations to the future, which this Congress is
pretty good at. I hate to see the Department of Defense having
to do the same, but that is the reality of the constrained
resource environment that we happen to be in.
So I am just going to throw that out on the table as a
concern from this Member of Congress and ask you to comment and
give us the reality of what is happening in the Pentagon and
how we are having to push a lot of very vital procurement needs
to the future to be able to buy back some of this readiness
that has been lost to date.
Secretary Carter. I will start and then ask the Chairman to
do the same.
You are right. We are trying to give priority in this
budget both to restoring readiness, particularly full spectrum
readiness, and to modernization. We have to balance those two,
no question about it. We are trying to find the money for those
two priorities elsewhere in the budget. And that is why, as I
said, the shape of our budget is so different this year in how
we are trying to turn a strategic corner.
With respect to readiness, each of the services is somewhat
different, but they are all trying to get back to full spectrum
readiness. We are funding their return to full spectrum
readiness.
The stability you gave us with the Bipartisan Budget Act is
absolutely critical. Without that, we can't be on that
trajectory to full spectrum readiness. So the stability is very
important.
And you began your question by talking about everything
that goes into stability. We are only the Department of
Defense. We are part of the discretionary budget. We understand
you all have to deal with all the parts of the Federal budget.
But we can't just keep focusing all our energy on the
discretionary part of the budget, as has been the case, and
that is why I am so glad that the budget agreement was reached
and gave us some stability.
But readiness is a big priority for us. I could go through
each of the services, but I don't have time.
Let me ask the Chairman to comment in general on readiness.
General Dunford. Two quick comments, Congressman. Thanks
for the question.
You know, I think, as you know, with readiness, we can't
actually buy our way out of the problem that we have right now.
There are a couple of things that impact. We certainly need
resources, and we have asked for those. There is a factor of
time. It is going to take time. The operational tempo that we
are experiencing right now has an effect on readiness.
And then some of the impact of the last few years with
regard to the industrial base and the maintenance backlog that
has resulted, there is a physics issue in terms of getting all
the equipment fixed that need to be fixed. And then, of course,
the modernization that has been deferred also impacts
readiness, because some of the equipment buys that we would
have done two, three, or four years ago now are out now three,
four years from now.
But what I would say I try to do in making recommendations
to the Secretary for this budget is you look at readiness and
you look at force structure and you look at modernization and
then you look at the foundational elements of infrastructure
and so forth.
My perspective was that given the resources that we have,
we have got to try to achieve some balance among those four
areas and posture ourselves for the next five or seven years.
And so you are right. What you don't want to do is make
decisions always for the near term that actually mortgage the
future.
I think in 2017 what we really tried to do, and that is
highlighted by the capability areas that we have emphasized, is
we have lived year to year, and I know this from the previous
life as a service chief, we have just tried to get through the
fiscal year, and we have delayed some of those decisions three
to five years.
I think we reached a point this year where we recognized in
some very critical capability areas we could no longer wait
before we started to make those investments. And so what we
tried to do is achieve the best balance we could in those four
areas I mentioned so that we were making some investment in the
future even while being attentive.
And I will tell you, job number one has been for the
Secretary and I, making sure that the young men and women that
we are deploying today have the wherewithal to accomplish the
mission with minimal loss of life or equipment. I mean, we have
focused on that. But given that, we did make some other
decisions that would allow us to balance near-term readiness
with long-term modernization and, of course, readiness, and I
describe that as health of the force today and wellness. The
investments you make today are really about wellness and health
of the force tomorrow.
So tough decisions had to be made. And, again, I think what
I would say is we came out of fiscal year 2017 balancing the
resources we had the best way we could. But you have identified
something that actually is my number one concern.
My number one concern is less what we are doing in fiscal
year 2017 or where we are today. My number one concern is where
will we be 5 to 7 years from now if we don't change the
trajectory that we are on right now, where will we be 5 to 7
years from now if we don't start making the investments that
will allow us to all have the same conversation we have had
here this morning where we can say, Russia is a challenge, sure
it is, North Korea, Iran, China, all challenges.
But make no mistake about it, we have a competitive
advantage and we can dominate those countries today. I am not
sure we can say that in 2022 if we maintain the same path we
are on today, and I think that is what we are all most
concerned about.
Mr. Womack. Appreciate the service of these gentlemen. And
I yield back my time.
DECONFLICTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We thank you, and we thank you for your
service. And you didn't put a plug in, but others have referred
to the enormous contribution of our National Guard, of which
you were part of for many, many years.
There is a lot of keen interest, I know we are past high
noon, but we are going to labor on. And let me know if there is
any ill ease at the front table.
I would like to talk a little bit about the whole issue of
deconfliction with Russians and others in the Middle East. Can
you comment on that? There is a lot of open source information
there. In Iraq, we are cheek by jowl with elements of the Quds
Force. To some extent we see Russian superiority in major
portions over Syria.
Can you talk a little bit about what we are doing? There is
a report in The Washington Post that we have been letting the
Russians know where certain operations are occurring. Can we
talk a little bit about that in this session here?
Secretary Carter. Sure. We can. And I would, obviously, go
into it in greater detail with you privately in another
setting. But I will start.
And why don't I do Syria and you can do Iraq or whatever.
In terms of the Russians in Syria, we have a memorandum of
understanding with them that is--and the word is accurate and
precise--to deconflict our war on ISIL from what the Russians
are doing, which, unfortunately, is something quite different,
which is supporting Assad in the civil war, which is not what
they said they were going to do.
And so they are off on a whole wrong trajectory of fueling
the civil war in Syria. That is a somewhat separate subject.
And we don't agree with them in that, and we can't align
ourselves with their strategy in that way. And our
deconfliction doesn't mean we are aligning ourselves with the
Russians, it just means that we are working with them so that
we don't inadvertently run into each other in the air or on the
ground.
They are, I have to say, abiding by that memorandum of
understanding. It is very professional, it is military to
military at a very operational, professional level, not the
Chairman and me. And the Russians conduct themselves in
accordance with that agreement and, therefore, don't impede our
campaign against ISIL.
At the same time, I just have to repeat, we don't otherwise
associate ourselves with what the Russians are doing in Syria,
because it is totally wrongheaded.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. In Iraq, I mean, to some extent the Quds
Force have been able to unite a disparate group of Shiite
militias and have been enormously successful in terms of
influencing the course of action there. I just wonder do you
have any degree of discomfort, and what is your feeling about
what is happening there?
General Dunford. Yeah. Chairman, thanks. In Iraq, there are
really two issues. You know, you talked about us being
collocated with forces. I would tell you from a recent trip, I
am satisfied. We have a very aggressive counterintelligence
program in Iraq to make sure the force protection of our men
and women is taken care of. So that is a piece of, I think,
what you alluded to.
With regard to the provisional military forces that happen
to be backed by Iran, the one thing I am encouraged by is the
Iraqi Government, particularly in operations like Ramadi, they
recognize that our support was conditioned on not having those
Iranian-backed forces in and around that area, and so they
weren't participating in Ramadi.
I also know that there is a great deal of energy being
applied to talk about how to integrate those forces into
legitimate Iraqi Security Forces. And we are not at any time
providing support for any forces that aren't actually
legitimate, read part of the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and
under Prime Minister Abadi's control and responsibility.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are interested in, and of course all
of us are interested here in the issue of force protection. And
just because at this point in time people that are, should we
say, cheek by jowl with us are, quote, leaving us alone, one
has to assume that they, themselves, are doing what we are
doing.
General Dunford. Chairman, I can tell you, just to make
sure it is clear, we are concerned about that, we are watching
that very closely. And I wouldn't suggest to you for a minute
that we are complacent about it, and I know our commanders on
the ground aren't complacent about it either. And we have a
significant amount of resources dedicated to make sure that we
can recognize the changes and take appropriate action in
anticipation of those changes.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is good to have that public
reassurance.
On the issue of rules of engagement, one of the benefits of
congressional travel is that we often separate ourselves from
general officers to talk with the men and women who do
remarkable things. And I followed a little bit of the lead of
my predecessor getting out to Bethesda, Walter Reed, and from
time to time I run into situations where remarkable people who
have done courageous things have been injured. And it bothers
me when I hear that they didn't get the air support that they
needed.
As you have pointed out, maybe the Afghans are ready for
primetime, but I do hear more than anecdotal information that
some of those forces don't fight at night, and as a result some
of our men have been put in compromising positions.
And it sort of hinges on what, in my introductory remarks,
which are not political, is that there is a feeling out there,
and I think this is shared by a lot of Members of Congress,
that there are somehow forces of higher up, and I understand
the chain of command, that people have to check with a variety
of different people before they, shall we say, look after the
mission that they are involved in.
Could you comment a little bit about that and give, again,
a level of reassurance here? To think that somebody would be
sort of checking on you and the remarkable people who are in
positions of command and second-guessing you, assure me that
that is not happening.
General Dunford. Chairman, I can. Let me try to explain it.
First of all, I wouldn't understate the concerns of the folks
that you have talked to at Bethesda, Walter Reed, or talked to
in the field. I have talked to them too, and sometimes they
have confusion, they have questions. And believe it or not,
even though I am a general, they bring it up to me as well. And
that is the one nice thing about our force today, is they don't
hesitate to unload on you. If you make yourself available for
questions, you have got to be prepared to answer them, because
they are going to ask them.
But I would distinguish--you know, rules of engagement kind
of has become a catchall phrase for a whole wide range of
activities that take place on the battlefield. I can assure you
of you this. When it comes to the right of self-protection,
there is nothing that limits a soldier, sailor, airman, or
marine from taking appropriate action if they are threatened.
There is no question about that. That is the fundamentals of
rules of engagement.
What you are really referring to, though, is when, where,
and how we employ combined arms on the battlefield. And so I
would tell you there are times when those decisions are made at
a more senior level, and, frankly, I made them at a senior
level on occasion, because there are strategic implications
sometimes with regard to civilian casualties and so forth.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Collateral damage.
General Dunford. Collateral damage. And so that sometimes
has to be managed.
So we have various levels of authorities that are
associated with the numbers of civilian casualties and the
amount of collateral damage that may take place in a certain
operation, and that is sometimes elevated to the general
officer level.
And my experience is that, again, when it comes to
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines taking action that
involves their right of force protection, they can crush a
handset, so to speak, and call in combined arms and do what
must be done.
When it comes to conducting a deliberate strike that may
have strategic implications, we have, we do, and we will make
those decisions at a level where risk can be managed
appropriately to make sure that what appears to be tactical
actions with strategic consequences, the decisionmaking is
being made at the right level.
In my case, it was managing a very difficult relationship
with the Government of Afghanistan. In some cases, our very
presence and ability to conduct counterterrorism operations was
being managed as a result of these strikes.
And so from the troops' eyes, I don't understate for a
second their concerns, and I try to explain to them, just like
I have tried to explain to you, look, it isn't we don't trust
you; it is you can't necessarily see--everyone looks through a
soda straw in combat, and everybody's soda straw is slightly
different. And, frankly, when you sit there as a commander,
your soda straw is a little wider than a squad leader or a
platoon commander.
And, again, when it comes to them doing what needs to be
done to take care of themselves or their unit, it is completely
decentralized. When it comes to manage broader strategic
relationships, yes, sometimes we make decisions at a level that
the troops, the lieutenants, the captains would prefer to make
those decisions themselves. And those of us that have become
more senior feel like sometimes we ought to make those
decisions, and there is a balance.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am glad to hear it, because I do think
as our footprint shrinks and there is that certain
inevitability, that force protection, every soldier and whoever
is representing our government deserves that assurance. And I
just want to make sure that you have made it quite clear that
that is the case.
Mr. Visclosky.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could return to the European Reassurance Initiative,
which is contained in OCO, and we have had a number of
interchanges as to the difficulty in planning year to year. Any
sense, given at least my impression that this is going to be a
permanent situation for some period of time, us vis-a-vis the
Russians, that some of those moneys migrate into the base
budget as opposed to end up in OCO, say, in 2018?
Secretary Carter. The reality there is that this is money
that we need to spend on a requirement that has quickly come
upon us, therefore, it is appropriate that it be in OCO. There
are other things that we are doing about the Russians and the
kind of threat represented by the Russians that are in the base
and are part of our enduring investment.
So there is a mix here. And I think that if the question is
are we going to be doing more about the general kind of threat
represented by Russia and China in the base budget in the
future, you see that in fiscal year 2017 already, and I think
you will see it in the outyears, assuming that what the
Chairman said is our biggest risk here, strategic risk, which
is a collapse of budget agreement and a reversion to the Budget
Control Act, which is what he was referring to early. That is
the biggest risk to everything we are trying to do, ERI and
everything else.
HEALTH CARE AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
Mr. Visclosky. If I could ask one more question. And more
if you would want to address the issue of the budget
recommendations on health care, retirement. I have mentioned in
the past I think Congress has a huge burden to bear and blame,
not that the administration is always right in these, but
something has to be done. Mr. Womack mentioned mandatory, I
mentioned mandatory on the civilian side. You suffer from the
same problem.
What is, if you would, from the administration's
perspective, your justification of doing this from a budgetary
standpoint? The general had talked about his concerns six,
seven years out.
Secretary Carter. We have made proposals and the Department
continues to ask for your support, and we haven't always gotten
the support, not necessarily of this committee, but of Congress
for what we regard as reasonable steps to make our provision of
health care more efficient and to cap the rise in the growth of
healthcare costs.
We try to do that in a way that doesn't compromise the
quality of care, doesn't restrict the number of people
receiving care. But I will give you some examples of that and
then perhaps the Chairman would want to comment on it as well.
Medical treatment facilities, using them more efficiently.
The issue of copays I know has come up in past years, and that
is really--these are very small copays we ask for, and their
basic purpose is to make people ask themselves: Do I really
need to go to an emergency room for this or could I take a
different route? If they need to go to an emergency room, we
want them to go. This is just a little signal in that regard.
And we try to allocate these efforts across the population
so that we protect the parts of our military family, Active
Duty and retired, who have the greatest needs and have the
fewest alternatives.
So we try to do it as carefully as we can. We know it is
difficult. We know that we have not received 100 percent
support. We are grateful for the support we have gotten from
this committee and others. But it is tough. It is tough on us.
We understand it is tough on the Congress as well.
With respect to retirement, we do have, thanks to our
partnership with Congress, an approach to retirement for new
members, a blended retirement system. I think that is a good
thing. I think it will be good for the All-Volunteer Force.
Going forward, just to remind you, for members of the
service who are already in, they don't have to go to that
blended retirement if they don't want to. Nobody is changing
the deal for people who are already in the military. This is a
program that will be available to folks in the future.
That is a few things about health care. Perhaps the
Chairman would like to add some additional thoughts.
General Dunford. Congressman, maybe just to put it in
perspective from where I sit. Sometimes we look at health care
and compensation as separate from training and equipping. To
me, it is all about taking care of people, it is all about our
number one responsibility, which is to bring our young people
home alive and give them the wherewithal to accomplish the
mission, and then keeping faith with them. So there is a
balance.
I can just share with you why we are so focused on these
areas now. As a service chief in the Marine Corps, they have a
little bit different dynamic. I think in the Department as a
whole, we spend some 55 percent, close to 60 percent if we keep
going on people. In the Marine Corps, we spend close to 70
percent on people. And health care, I think, has gone from 4
percent of the budget to some 9 percent of the budget, if I am
not mistaken.
So as I started to, as a service chief, look at the
trajectory of the cost of people, I realized that, look, there
is absolutely no way that I can make sure these folks are
properly trained and equipped as well as paid, compensated. And
so I think there is a balance that has to be achieved.
And so I think these initiatives are, in fact, designed,
number one, to provide better programs to recruit and retain
high quality people, but also to start to control the costs and
still be able to take care of people.
When I explain this to families, they actually get it. When
I talk to spouses even, I say: Look, here is the reason why we
tried to control the cost of personnel over the last couple
years. We used to spend--and this was, again, a service
perspective--we used to spend 12 percent on modernization. Now
I am down close to 8 percent on modernization.
At the end of the day, you may be well paid, you may live
in a good house, you may have good medical care, but we may not
have the wherewithal to provide you with the best training and
equipment. And the spouses uniformly look at me and say: Hey,
you better not compromise on the equipment and the training you
provide to my loved one.
So to me, this is a question--I look at compensation
holistically. It is just not those two things you mentioned,
but it is the entire package that ensures we have the most
well-trained, the most well-equipped, and the most well-
incentivized force that we can possibly have.
And so I appreciate the latitude that we have had to try to
make some of these decisions, because the desired end state, I
think, we all share. We share high-quality people that are
recruited and retained, frankly, in the right skill sets and so
forth, and we also share the end state of making sure that when
we ask them to do something, we give them the wherewithal to
properly do it.
Mr. Visclosky. Appreciate it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Womack.
Mr. Womack. Yeah. One real quick follow-up. Back to ERI for
just a moment and the rotational brigades, and kind of a plug
for the Reserve component, since my chairman brought that up
just a minute ago. Rotational brigades, I think ideal for
Reserve component formations. It does a lot of things. I won't
go into all those here.
State Partnership Programs, particularly with host nation
support, the relationships that are forged there become combat
multipliers for us if necessary. So I just put in a plug for
that. I have gotten to know General Hodges pretty well, and
what a remarkable person to be able to make 30,000 look like
300,000 on a given day, and I know he relies heavily on these
State Partnership Programs for that too. So I just kind of
throw that out there and ask for your continued support in that
regard.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, thank you, Mr. Womack.
And I know the two gentlemen that have done most of the
speaking today also rely on Secretary Michael McCord.
And while you didn't say anything, may I commend you and
thank you for the close working relationship you have had with
our staff and other committee members. There has never been a
time when we have requested information that we haven't gotten
the facts that we needed to do the job.
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will just, if I
could, make one or two comments.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Please do.
Mr. McCord. On the discussion on the IMIs and the value of
those, we are looking carefully at possibly sending you a
reprogramming this year to create one more. It is not a final
decision yet, but that is a possibility.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You could be sure we take a look at all
of the reprograms that you send----
Mr. McCord. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. And ask for a full
justification.
Yes, Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I have been remiss as a Notre Dame grad for
also congratulating the comptroller on defeating Notre Dame,
and then the next day your women's team beat the Maryland
women's basketball team. It just rolls on forever.
Mr. McCord. I was not going to bring up the basketball, Mr.
Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. And that is why I respect you. Thank you so
much.
Secretary Carter. And I thank you for thanking Under
Secretary McCord. He is terrific, and we very much benefit, and
I am delighted to hear that he works so well with you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Secretary, General Dunford, Mr.
McCord, on behalf of the remarkable men and women you
represent, please extend our thanks and gratefulness for their
dedication and service, all volunteers, and as I said at the
beginning, the best of the America. We need to look after them
and their families.
We stand adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Calvert and the
answers thereto follows:]
Acquisitions
Question. As you know, CBO and GAO have regularly reported that DOD
starts more acquisition programs than it can afford to complete. As a
recent CBO report stated ``Several areas of DoD's budget have
frequently turned out to cost more than originally planned or to
increase more rapidly than expected. Those areas include the following:
costs to develop and purchase weapon systems . . . [and] operation and
maintenance costs.''
How do you guard against starting more programs than you can
afford? Cost estimates are routinely lower than what the actual cost
ends up being. How do you ensure that cost estimates are realistic? Do
you, when evaluating program budgets, recommend that budget requests
adhere to the service estimate; the independent cost estimate, or
whichever estimate is higher?
Answer. DoD guards against starting more programs than we can
afford through our Affordability Policy, implemented in all three
Better Buying Power initiatives and codified in DoD Instruction
5000.02, ``Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.'' The purpose
of our Affordability policy is to set cost-constrained limits to
program acquisition and program operating and support costs to the
maximum resources the Department can allocate for a capability.
The Department ensures cost estimates are realistic through the
combined efforts of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) and the Service Cost Centers. The CAPE provides an
Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) that can be compared and contrasted to
the Service Cost Position (SCP) for acquisition programs where the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) is the Milestone Decision Authority. These estimates are
developed separately and provide the USD(AT&L) with two analytically
rigorous products. The USD(AT&L) reviews the differences between the
ICE and SCP and determines which estimate is likely to be more
realistic over the lifecycle of the program, and directs the budget
reflect this estimate. Procedures are also in place to enforce
compliance with this direction.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Calvert.
Questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto follows:]
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)
Question. We learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that the rotation of
Brigade Combat Teams in and out of theater generates a steep learning
curve within new units, as they attempt to reach the effectiveness of
the unit they replaced. Armored brigades rotating to Europe as part of
the European Reassurance Initiative will no doubt face that same
learning curve; everything from the laws that govern international
border crossings, to the nuances of working with partner nations. These
rotations will necessarily invite friction and risk. What is your
assessment of these risks, which Russia is certainly aware of, and
would permanently stationing one or more Armored Brigade Combat Teams
in Europe help to mitigate those risks, and better assure our NATO
allies?
Answer. U.S. presence--both forward stationed and rotational--
reinforces to our NATO allies and partners that the U.S. is committed
to deter and counter Russian malign influence, coercion, and
aggression. Under current conditions and European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI) funding, rotational forces along NATO's eastern flank
are the most effective way for the U.S. Army to meet U.S. European
Command's (EUCOM) requirement for the continuous presence of an Armored
Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). Rotating ABCTs provides a ready and trained
capability to EUCOM, while also exercising the Army's ability to
quickly mobilize and deploy ABCTs. Moving forward, we will continually
assess what additional steps are required to meet the demands of a new
and evolving security environment in Europe.
Question. The military will necessarily build readiness in units
that are preparing to rotate to Europe as part of the ERA, but this
readiness will be rapidly consumed in the conduct of the ERI rotation.
as a majority of the exercises with partner nations are small-scale,
leaving battalions and brigades with few opportunities to exercise
their core competencies. Using the USMC's model of a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) as a justification for the legitimacy and
effectiveness of a rotational ABCTs in Europe is an apples-to-oranges
argumentative fallacy, at best. Additionally the Department of Defense
only has nine active duty ABCTs, which it deploys on a rotational basis
to Europe, Kuwait, and Korea with every brigade either recovering from
a deployment, training for an upcoming deployment, or currently on
deployment. How does the department reconcile this alarming high use of
the ABCTs, which rivals the rate of use during wartime, and how will
the department adjust for an increased demand for ABCTs, should a
wartime need arise? What is the signal for the DoD to increase the
quantity of active duty ABCTs?
Answer. We are re-evaluating our defense posture in Europe to
ensure we can respond in a timely manner to crises and contingencies in
order to support U.S. European Command objectives. Europe, Kuwait, and
Korea are forward positions that will improve the response time of an
ABCT to most likely contingency locations. Moving forward, if there is
a change to an existing threat or a new threat arises, we will
continually assess where our Armored Brigade Combat Teams are forward
positioned and what additional requirements may be needed to support
ongoing and future contingency operations.
Question. In the event we call on our military to quickly build
forces in Europe due to Russian aggression or any other factors, what
are the limiting factors in the reception of our forces? Assuming that
a full division or more of combat troops were required to meet the
threat, are the ports, road systems, reception and staging areas, and
all other associated infrastructure needs fully capable of moving our
forces in at a rate that is acceptable by DoD leaders and contingency
planners? If not, what are the barriers to a buildup of forces, and
what is our plan to remove these barriers?
Answer. In the event of a crisis or contingency, we have the
ability to quickly bring U.S. forces to Europe. We recently
demonstrated this capability in exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE in late 2015.
We continue to analyze existing capabilities (e.g., host nation
infrastructure, commercial ports and airfields, etc.) to identify
potential barriers and gaps in our ability to provide timely support to
U.S. European Command objectives. Going forward, we will continually
assess requirements for future investment--either U.S.-funded or by
leveraging the NATO Security Investment Program--to enhance Reception,
Staging, Onward movement, Integration (RSOI) capabilities in the
theater.
Question. U.S. participation in NATO operations and the ERI brings
with it an increased amount of equipment in the form of ABCT equipment
sets and A PS stocks, which will necessarily require a significant
amount of European infrastructure for movement, storage, and
maintenance. Are European facilities and services that are used for the
purpose of keeping U.S. military equipment in Europe being offered to
the DoD at competitive market rates--or lower--to thus represent their
status as partners with the U.S. tax payer in this enterprise? If not,
what are the reasons the U.S. is not being offered competitive rates
for the purpose of defending Europe? What is the estimated amount of
spending, or in-kind funding, being dedicated by European countries?
Answer. The Department is currently finalizing preferred locations
for storage and maintenance of Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
equipment sets and Army Prepositioning Stocks (APS) in Europe, at which
point negotiations with host nations will be initiated for competitive
market rates for facilities and services.
The Department aims to use existing infrastructure and services on
the host-nation bases where possible. As a cost-savings measure in
locations where existing infrastructure is not immediately ready for
use, the Department is renovating infrastructure that has already been
built and provided to the U.S. by the host nation. In cases where
usable infrastructure does not exist, host nations are providing real
estate on their existing bases, or purchasing real estate for use by
the U.S. In terms of services and maintenance for infrastructure, all
host nations have expressed a willingness to sustain the facilities we
build, and that are joint use. The same applies to utilities.
Troop Reductions
Question. We are currently experiencing a reduction in military
personnel, while deployments for regional alignment, the European
Reassurance Initiative, and in the fight against ISIS, are increasing
demands on the force. Additionally, according to the National Military
Strategy of 2015, the U.S. military can defeat a regional adversary,
while denying the objectives of an adversary in a different region;
this is a dramatic transition from the times when the U.S. military was
capable of defeating adversaries in two regions simultaneously. How
concerned are you about the continuing trend of troop reductions, and
please articulate for us what risks are we taking if we continue to
reduce the size of our military in the coming years, as planned?
Answer. I am concerned about the trend lines in the Joint Force's
capacity, capability, and readiness to maintain our competitive
advantage and overmatch against any likely future adversary. PB17
projects force end strengths consistent with the 2014 QDR forecasts.
However, the emergence of ISIL and Russian revanchism has changed the
strategic environment since the QDR was published. Force availability
shortfalls increase risk in our ability to rapidly respond to multiple,
overlapping contingencies. End strength reductions below the current
plan must be benchmarked against our strategic challenges and would
mean adjusting the ends of our defense strategy.
JSTARS--Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Question. Sixty Members of the House Armed Services and Defense
Appropriations Committee wrote to you last November expressing concern
about repeated schedule slips of the JSTARS Recapitalization program.
Yet your FY 17 budget submission slips the Initial Operating Capability
(10C) for JSTARS recap by at least an additional year and reduced
funding for JSTARS by $170M when you compare the FY 17 request to what
the Air Force indicated was required for FY 17 in the FY 16 request.
Please explain this further delay?
Answer. The Department's FY 2017 budget request fully funds the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Recap Program to
the OSD/CAPE Independent Cost Estimate to achieve the Warfighter's
required Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date in the fourth quarter
of FY 2024. The FY 2017 budget request was revised to align with the
anticipated award of the development contract in the first quarter of
FY 2018.
The FY 2017 budget includes necessary funding to complete planned
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction phase activities and to
prepare for the planned award of the development contract in early FY
2018. In FY 2017, the Air Force plans to complete radar risk reduction
activities focused on ensuring at least two radar designs are
sufficiently mature to support the planned full and open competition
and schedule for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.
Contracting
Question. There are numerous reports out of Redstone Test Center
(RTC) that the speed in which contracts are being awarded is slowing,
and that the change is due to organizational and systemic causes,
instead of manpower shortages. Please explain how DoD monitors the
efficiency and effectiveness of its contracting arms, and what the
tolerances for acceptable performance are. What changes or events
within DoD contracting agencies over the past three years would have
resulted in a delay in awarding contracts? To what extent is DoD
considering proposing that contracting decisions be returned to the
Command carrying out programs, as opposed to a central contracting
Command.
Answer. The Army uses a variety of tools to monitor the
effectiveness of its contracting, such as the Virtual Contracting
Enterprise suite of information technology tools that track
procurements and other key metrics in real time. Additionally, the Army
conducts Contracting Enterprise Reviews that are reported quarterly to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement and to the
Army Acquisition Executive that track various metrics and highlight any
challenges facing the contracting enterprise. The Army also manages a
robust Procurement Management Review Program that looks at the business
operations of all the Contracting Commands, rather than focusing solely
on compliance of individual contract actions. Any trends are reviewed
and shared with the affected activity, and corrective actions are
addressed at both the execution and management levels.
The Air Force also utilizes numerous methods to monitor the
effectiveness of its contracting organizations, including tracking
metrics such as the definitization of undefinitized contracting
actions, protests, and competition. The Air Force tracks its
Procurement Acquisition Lead times as part of its Air Force Common
Output Level Standards across its enterprise. In addition, Air Force
Contracting conducts self-inspections of identified deficiencies for
corrective action and then forwards those to higher headquarters for
trend analysis across the buying command and at the enterprise level.
The Department of the Navy (DON) utilizes a variety of tools to
monitor the effectiveness of its contracting practices that includes
procurement oversight led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Acquisition and Procurement (DASN(AP)). DASN(AP) relies on the
Procurement Performance Management Assessment Program (PPMAP) as its
primary method of validating the extent of sound contracting practices
that occur within the DON. PPMAP enables DASN(AP) and the eight Navy
and two Marine Corps Heads of Contracting Activity (HCAs) to evaluate
the quality of procurement processes and management systems; validate
the execution of delegated procurement authority that occurs according
to law and regulation; mitigate risk of vulnerabilities to strengthen
internal controls; institute appropriate corrective actions, as needed,
to improve (or maintain) the quality of procurement operations; and
identify best practices across the enterprise.
There are numerous reasons why a contract award may appear to be
delayed. Some examples of issues that affect the procurement process
outside of contracting include incomplete, unclear, or late submission
of requirements to the contracting office; changes to the solicitation
based on questions from industry that increase the proposal submission
time; increased time for evaluations due the complexity of the
requirement; lack of complete and/or quality proposals from industry;
and protests. The Redstone Test Center awarded two competitive actions
during FY 2013-2016 that were worked through the Army Contracting
Command--Redstone Contracting Center; however, it transferred several
acquisitions to the Army Contracting Command--Aberdeen due to resource
constraints (test center manpower and inexperienced contracting
personnel). There was a loss of experienced evaluators at Redstone
during the time period of these source selections, further straining
available resources and contributing to delays. Of Redstone Arsenal's
contracting workforce losses (411 between CY 2011-2015), 75 percent had
more than 10 years of experience. In 2015 alone, Redstone lost 100
(nearly 12 percent) of its seasoned civilian contracting workforce.
Contracts for the Redstone Test Center were also protested before and
after award, causing further delay.
In addition, the Army experienced a steady decline in the civilian
contracting workforce, impacting the contracting centers. In 2011, the
Army civilian contracting workforce was 7,098 strong, but by the end of
2015, the Army civilian contracting work force decreased by 1,220 to
5,878 (17 percent loss). Many of the losses sustained were senior
contracting personnel. By 2015, more than 30 percent of the contracting
workforce had 5 years or less experience, and more than 60 percent had
10 years or less experience. A junior workforce is not as efficient as
a senior workforce, and they require more time to solicit, evaluate,
and negotiate contract awards.
Currently, Army contracting decisions are made at the appropriate
command level within its four buying commands. There is no centralized
Army Contracting Command authority. Command authority and procurement
authority are separate and distinct. The four buying commands in the
Army have been delegated procurement authority via the Army's Senior
Procurement Executive. Accordingly, each HCA exercises that authority
over their subordinate operational contracting activities. Procurement
authorities are retained within contracting organizations by way of
delegation from the HCA to the Principal Assistant Responsible for
Contracting (PARC). All Army PARCs reside within the contracting
organizations, which are locally aligned to support the various
requiring activities and major programs. The PARC further delegates
authority to individual Contracting Officers, who exercise procurement
authorities in accordance with the Federal, Defense, and Army
Acquisition Regulations and Supplements.
EELV
Question. DoD's methodology for ensuring access to space appears to
be based in part upon a misreading of the Commercial Space Act of 1998.
The Air Force interprets the Commercial Space Act of 1998 as
prescribing that the USAF may only procure commercial ``launch
services''' rather than separate rockets or engines, where the intent
of Section 201 of the Space Act was to ensure that the USAF procured
space transportation capabilities from commercial providers, saving
U.S. government assets, such as the Space Shuttle, for only the most
important missions. The Space Act sets up a commercial versus U.S.
government framework, and does not prohibit the USAF from directing the
production of different parts to build a space launch system. As such,
the USAF is missing an opportunity to re-engine the Atlas V rocket,
which would save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, instead of
procuring a completely new launch system. Industry has validated that
an American-made engine can be produced for the Atlas V without a loss
of capability. Pleace articulate how allowing the USAF to procure the
different parts of a launch system could move us away from the Russian
RD-180 engine sooner, and at a significant cost savings to the tax
payer.
Answer. The Department believes that section 201 of the Commercial
Space Act (CSA) of 1998, Public Law 105-303, as presently codified in
section 50131 of title 51, United States Code, directs it to procure
commercial launch services, as opposed to launch hardware, which was
the approach on many of the heritage launch vehicle programs prior to
that time. Since the enactment of the CSA, the Department's Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program acquisition strategy has been
consistent with this requirement. Therefore, based on that requirement,
the Department currently purchases launch services and not launch
vehicle hardware or components.
The Department wants to end use of the Russian RD-180 rocket engine
as soon as possible, but we do not believe this can be accomplished
before 2021 or 2022. To be clear, the Department does not intend to
unilaterally pay for the development of a direct replacement engine for
the RD-180 on the Atlas V. The costs would be excessive to the
Department, and a specific engine program would only benefit one launch
service provider.
The Department's goal is to develop competitive public-private
partnerships with commercial launch service providers that can result
in new and improved launch service capabilities. Investing in ongoing
efforts by commercial launch service providers leverages the work
already being done in launch service development. This is the quickest
and most efficient way to end use of the RD-180.
Question. Secondly, the Mitchell Commission also concluded that
rockets designed and built by various contractors can use the AR-1
engine. Given this fact, I believe Congress needs to know more about
what information the Air Force is receiving and from whom. What are the
credentials and direct engineering experience and management experience
of persons who are disagreeing with the Mitchell Commission
conclusions? The reason this question is necessary is that the opinion
of Mitchell Commission Deputy Chairman Dr. Michael Griffin, as well as
past managers of NASA programs, differs from the current Air Force
narrative which presents re-engined rockets as virtually unusable. What
specific rocket engine and rocket body combinations are your
information sources referring to from the past?
Answer. The RD-180 Availability Risk Mitigation Study, also called
the Mitchell Study, was chartered by the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition to review the potential impacts of losing access
to the supply of Russian manufactured RD-180 rocket engines used to
power the Atlas V launch vehicle. The study had 4 official findings,
listed below, none of which specifically addressed the utilization of
the Aerojet Rocketdyne AR-1 engine on existing launch vehicles.
Finding #1: Impacts of an RD-180 loss are
significant, and near term (FY 2014-2017) options to mitigate
them are limited.
Finding #2: There are decision points that will
provide indicators on the viability of the RD-180.
Finding #3: Current Phase la/2 EELV acquisition
strategy is impacted by RD-180 availability.
Finding #4: Key milestones/decision points for
current EELV acquisition strategy will come to a head in FY
2022 (Phase 3).
The determination of AR-1 compatibility with a particular launch
vehicle would have to be made by the individual launch service
providers that manufacture and control the technical baselines. That
determination could only be made after a significant amount of detailed
technical evaluation.
Question. Thirdly, whereas there was early concern that AR-1 would
win any competition, the present path seems to lock us into a situation
of funding stove-piped systems by various companies. NASA will have
spent over $5 billion dollars on Commercial Crew development alone
before we start paying $55 million or more per seat to those providers.
Thus NASA, and soon the Air Force, is NOT simply purchasing services,
you are developing products. The launch vehicle you chose in 2012 for
the STP-2 mission still has not made its debut flight; thus, the Air
Force is investing in future products, not simply purchasing services.
If commercial companies decide to sell their launch vehicles to another
country, the taxpayer would have to make these investments all over
again. What are you doing in your Air Force contracts to provide more
transparency of expenditures than NASA, and more intellectual property
protections, for the U.S. taxpayer?
Answer. The Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
program's acquisitions strategy from the outset has been to procure
launch services and not launch vehicles or component hardware. This
acquisition approach is also used on the Orbital/Suborbital-3 (OSP-3)
contract used to acquire the STP-2 launch service from Space X. The
OSP-3 contract acts as an on-ramp for EELV New Entrants to gain
experience with the National Security Space launch service process. The
Department has significant insight into both the United Launch Alliance
and Space X vehicle designs, and this is necessary in order to verify
that the companies are providing a service that meets the Department's
technical specifications and mission assurance requirements. The
Department does not, however, control the technical baseline, nor does
it own the intellectual property rights to the individual launch
vehicle designs.
As the Department continues to procure launch services, it will
make every effort to leverage competition to guarantee the most cost
effective program possible while continuing to provide the Nation with
assured access to space as required by statute and policy.
Cyber
Question. The cyber domain is becoming an area of greater concern
given the recent cyber attacks against electrical infrastructure in
Ukraine. Please describe the current environment in Europe regarding a
collective, multi-lateral, defense against cyber threats, and what
conditions would have to exist in a cyber attack for a NATO partner to
invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Is the U.S. considering kinetic
responses to cyber attacks, and what conditions would have to exist for
such a response?
Answer. With regard to a collective, multi-lateral defense against
cyber threats in Europe, the United States works with the organizations
in which we participate, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
At the OSCE, the United States chairs a working group that, since
2013, has developed and adopted two sets of cyber-related Confidence-
Building Measures (CBMs) intended to reduce the risk of misperception,
escalation, and conflict stemming from the use of cyber technologies.
To date, the OSCE is the only regional security organization that has
adopted CBMs in the cyber domain.
With regard to NATO, at the Wales Summit in 2014, Allies recognized
that the impact of a cyberattack could be as harmful to modern
societies as a conventional attack and affirmed that cyber defense is
part of NATO's core task of collective defense. Allies also emphasized
the need to strengthen the defensive measures of NATO and of nations
and adopted an Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defense and an associated
Cyber Defense Action Plan to provide a framework to make NATO more
resilient to cyberattacks and to identify Alliance cyber defense
priorities. The Alliance has not specified which conditions would have
to exist in a cyberattack for a NATO partner to request invocation of
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As with a conventional attack, the
North Atlantic Council will consider the facts of the specific case and
determine whether Article 5 should be invoked.
Through various documents, reports, and public statements by the
President and the Secretary of Defense, the United States has
articulated that it can respond to a cyberattack on U.S. interests. In
such a case, the effects of a cyberattack would be assessed on a case-
by-case and fact-specific basis by the President and his national
security team. If a decision is made by the President to respond to a
cyberattack on U.S. interests, the United States reserves the right to
respond at a time, in a manner, and in a place of our choosing, using
appropriate instruments of U.S. power.
LCS
Question. Please articulate the specific reasons, citing DoD
studies that justify the reduction of the LCS buy from 52 to 40.
Answer. The decision to truncate LCS was informed by the needs of
long-term U.S. national security strategy. First, the Department's
warfighting analysis (briefed to HASC/SASC staffers in a classified
setting) showed that 40 LCS/FF are sufficient to meet the Department's
operational warfighting requirements. Second, 40 LCS/FF exceeds recent
historical presence levels and does so with a more modern and capable
ship. The LCS/FF will replace legacy mine countermeasure ships,
frigates, and patrol coastal ships.
Truncating LCS/FF freed up resources needed to modernize other
surface ships, to increase the lethality of our undersea fleet, and to
increase investments in naval aviation procurement and readiness. The
Navy is mitigating risk in a war against a high end adversary by
curtailing the procurement of the least survivable and least lethal
surface combatant creating a more capable fleet. These investments fill
critical gaps in capability required to counter the rapid modernization
and technological advances of our adversaries. Even with the LCS
reduction, the budget continues to grow the battle force from 280 ships
at the end of FY16 to 308 ships by FY21, meeting the Department's
posture requirement.
CPGS
Question. I would like a budget for both of those options to be
provided to the Committee as soon as possible. For the AHW budget,
specifically, I want the plan to include as much as possible the use
and adaptation of current boosters in the U.S. inventory. I believe
such options are much more cost effective than some options explored
last year in conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency. With the
budget, please include a timeline for deployment--I want to see the AHW
contrasted with the submarine-platform approach. Additionally, I have
the following questions for this year's cycle. Thank you.
What feedback have you already received from the COCOMs concerning
their requirements for this capability? Is it currently incorporated in
any of the Integrate Priority Lists? Who handles the process of
translating these IPL priorities to what you are executing in the CPGS
arena?
Answer. Two Combatant Commands, U.S. European Command and U.S.
Pacific Command, have submitted high priority requirements for these
capabilities in their most recent Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) conducts an annual
assessment of Combatant Command IPLs through the Capability Gap
Assessment. The Force Application Functional Capability Board, on
behalf of the JROC, is responsible for identifying, assessing, and
recommending for approval the joint military requirements for these
capabilities.
Question. What have you told the COCOMs concerning the timelines
for this capability and what was their response?
Answer. U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command were
informed through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
Capability Gap Assessment (CGA) that certain capabilities will be
fielded within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) 2018-2022, with
others slated for fielding beyond the FYDP. The Combatant Commands
concurred with the JROC CGA.
Question. How is the current CPGS program structured to provide
this capability, and how do the currently ongoing efforts contribute to
reaching your end goal?
Answer. The Department is on track for the Conventional Prompt
Global Strike (CPGS) program to reach a Milestone (MS) A decision by
the end of FY 2020, consistent with congressional direction.
In 2013, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed via
memorandum (JROCM) that the CPGS program focus on demonstrating the
feasibility of hypersonic boost-glide for a potential intermediate-
range strike system independent of Service or basing/platform. The
current CPGS technology maturation effort will inform the future
program of record decision.
The current OSD-led CPGS program has participation from the Army,
Navy, Air Force and National Laboratories from across the country. The
CPGS program has established a number of Integrated Product Teams
(IPTs) to investigate critical technologies relevant to potential
hypersonic boost-glide weapon systems. These IPTs are buying down risk
for the future CPGS capability.
The $25 million plus-up in FY 2015 has allowed the CPGS program to
move forward with a number of hypersonic technologies that have
applicability to a broad range of basing and platform options. In
addition, the currently planned Flight Experiment 1 in FY 2017-2018
will demonstrate advanced avionics, miniaturization of subsystems,
manufacturability, and guidance algorithms.
Finally, the CPGS team is studying basing and platform options in
collaboration with the Joint Staff. Selection of a basing/platform
option will pace the CPGS program of record decision after the MS A
decision, which will be not later than the end of FY 2020.
Question. What thought have you given to phasing the execution of
the program to support the development of a conventional triad? Does
this figure into your current planning?
Answer. Current Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) activities
are designed to develop programmatic options to engage time-sensitive,
high-value, and defended targets from ranges beyond the capabilities of
existing conventional weapons or in situations where other forces are
unavailable, not responsive enough, denied access, or not preferred. In
this phase of development, the Department is maturing common
technologies that apply across a range of operational concepts and
promote coordination, communication, and data sharing across the
Services and national CPGS community.
The CPGS technology maturation efforts intentionally support a
broad range of basing and platform options. For instance, the CPGS
Flight Experiment 1 in FY 2017-2018 will demonstrate component
miniaturization, which supports accommodation of a hypersonic glide
body that could be deployed on land, sea, or air platforms.
Participation by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in these technology
efforts, including sharing of ground and flight test data, analysis,
and models and simulations, keeps the potential for capabilities across
multiple basing/platforms open.
By keeping the trade space open across all potential platforms, the
CPGS effort has maintained the possibility of a Family of Systems that
could base on land, sea, or air platforms.
Question. Given your current approach to the problem, is there
sufficient funding in the POM to execute your plan? If not, what other
resources are necessary? Are you planning to a budget- or budgeting to
a plan?
Answer. The Department supports the President's budget and
priorities. The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) effort has
sufficient funding to achieve a Milestone A acquisition decision by the
end of FY 2020, consistent with FY 2016 congressional direction.
Current CPGS efforts focus on maturing basing-agnostic, hypersonic
technologies that will inform future CPGS acquisition milestone
decisions.
The Department's acquisition strategy to field a CPGS capability is
under development and informed by ongoing technology maturation efforts
and specific Warfighter requirements. As the program of record is
defined, the Department will adjust POM inputs to support the CPGS
development plan.
Question. What impact have our adversaries efforts in this area had
on your planning and budgeting process?
Answer. The Department is monitoring other international hypersonic
efforts as reported in the open media, such as China's DF-ZF and
Russia's 3K22 Tsirkon systems. Our current planning is driven by the FY
2016 National Defense Authorization Act and the 2013 Joint Requirements
Oversight Council direction. Per this guidance, the current
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) plan is to continue to mature
hypersonic technologies utilizing a synergistic combination of modeling
and simulations, ground testing, and flight testing with an eye toward
supporting future acquisition decisions. Finally, we are paying close
attention to all aspects of program protection.
Question. What is the CPGS office doing to increase the OPTEMPO of
CPGS testing? The adversary is flying 4 times a year; we are flying
once every 3 years!
Answer. The Department is monitoring other international hypersonic
efforts. The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) effort has taken
a deliberate approach to technology maturation by relying on the strong
ground test and modeling capabilities of the United States. In doing
so, the CPGS effort acquires valuable data at significantly less cost
than flight testing.
Although the CPGS effort conducts a flight test every three years,
the program's OPTEMPO is much more aggressive, as evidenced by the
numerous ground test activities that have already been completed (e.g.,
hypersonic sled tests and hypersonic wind tunnel tests).
The CPGS program is on track to achieve a Milestone A decision by
the end of FY 2020, consistent with FY 2016 congressional direction and
funding.
Question. Do you think the rapid fielding of this system is in line
with the SCO you created?
Answer. The current CPGS plan, derived from the FY16 NDAA and the
2013 JROCM, does not call for a rapid fielding option. However, the
concepts being matured under the auspices of CPGS are being shared with
the SCO to enhance collaboration on potential early fielding options.
The Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) was established to rapidly
enable new roles and capabilities for existing DoD, intelligence
community, and commercial systems. While the SCO explores promising
concepts across all DoD missions and technical areas, including strike,
it focuses on innovating with existing systems and components, rather
than developing new technologies, such as CPGS.
Maintaining CPGS momentum and continuity is vitally important. The
CPGS program has compiled a successful record of advancing the state of
the art for CPGS technologies by coordinating efforts of many different
organizations across the government, industry, government-affiliated
laboratories, federally funded research and development centers, and
university-affiliated research centers. The CPGS program demonstrated
the feasibility of a boost-glide end-to-end missile concept capability
in November 2011, led a successful warhead sled test in October 2013,
and is now overseeing the next boost-glide flight experiment,
designated as Flight Experiment 1 (FE-1). An integrated master schedule
is in place and competitive contract awards were completed in September
2014. The CPGS program has established a strong, collaborative team and
is making progress on a number of technical fronts for hypersonic
flight systems.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Diaz-Balart and the answer thereto
follows:]
Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSI)
Question. The Department of Defense, through the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)), provides
grant funding for a research and education program targeted to
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and minority-Serving
Institutions' The program is designed to improve the capabilities of
HBCU/MSI to conduct research and educate scientists and engineers in
areas important to national defense.
It is my understanding that DoD began an effort to include more
Hispanic-Serving Institutions through this program a few years ago.
What is being done on a national scale to strategically include
Hispanic-serving institutions? Can DoD provide statistics/data on HSI
related DoD research? How can this committee partner with DoD to ensure
HSI's have an opportunity to contribute to the national defense of our
nation? How can DoD better improve the capabilities of the HSI defense
related research'?
Answer. The focus of these questions appears to be the research and
education funding program that the Office of the ASD(R&E) administers
under the authority of 10 U.S.C Sec. 2362. Therefore, I will respond in
that context, as well as in the larger context of DoD-wide activities
that benefit the Hispanic population.
1. What is being done on a national scale to strategically include
HSIs?
On a national scale, through outreach activities such as workshops
and webinars, we encourage minority-serving institutions, including
HSIs, to participate in DoD programs. These events provide information
about DoD business processes, including solicitations, proposal
submissions and reviews, research areas of interest, and other
information to assist them in responding to DoD funding opportunities.
The HSI community routinely responds to DoD funding opportunities
for which all institutions of higher education can compete. These
include the Defense University Research Instrumentation Program and the
Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative, as well as single-
investigator programs. With respect to our targeted funding program,
only designated minority-serving institutions (MSIs) are eligible to
compete. HSIs constitute one of those eligible groups. We issue an
annual solicitation and use a merit review process to assess which
applications are most technically meritorious.
2. Can DoD provide statistics/data on HSI related DoD research?
Each year, DoD prepares a report for the White House Initiatives
Offices (within the U.S. Department of Education) that provides
comprehensive data on our funding experience--research and other types
of funding--and additional activities with HSIs. We obtain the direct
funding information from our systems that feed USASpending.gov. In FY
2014, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available,
DoD awarded an aggregate $81.6 million to HSIs. Of that amount, $58.8
million was for research and development activities. The impact of
other DoD activities that benefit HSIs, e.g., campus visits and
technical assistance workshops, is more difficult to quantify. In
addition, DoD has a plan, developed pursuant to Presidential Executive
Order 13555, ``White House Initiative On Educational Excellence For
Hispanics,'' that includes Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) activities at all educational levels as well as DoD
workforce diversity in order to benefit the Hispanic population more
broadly.
3. How can this committee partner with DoD to ensure HSIs have an
opportunity to contribute to the national defense of our Nation?
The committee can partner with DoD in encouraging HSIs to apply
under the various basic and applied research opportunities (e.g.,
research project funding, equipment funding, scholarships, fellowships,
and internships) that are available annually. The committee can also
assist in increasing HSI graduates' awareness of DoD as a potential
employer for STEM and other disciplines.
4. How can DoD better improve the capabilities of the HSI defense
related research?
Primarily through implementation of our STEM strategic plan and our
current efforts to respond to congressional direction, DoD intends to
place emphasis on increasing the capabilities of MSIs, including HSIs,
to conduct defense-related research and provide STEM education. Through
the STEM strategy required by the FY 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Public Law 114-92, and the
report to Congress requested by the House Report 114-139, accompanying
H.R. 2685, the DoD Appropriations Bill, 2016, we will be engaged over
the next few years in efforts to increase the participation of
underrepresented minorities in STEM activities, with one focus being
MSIs and their students. In addition, DoD will continue its program to
provide equipment needed at HSIs to strengthen their STEM programs and
research capacity to carry out research related to the DoD mission.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Diaz-
Balart. Questions submitted by Ms. McCollum and the answers
thereto follow:]
Maternity Leave
Question. Our women and men in uniform are the most important
resource that we have and we must build a fighting force that retains
the investments we have made in our service members.
Can you elaborate on the Department's decision to reduce the Navy's
maternity leave benefit from 18 weeks to 12 weeks?
Answer. The legal basis for the maternity leave expansion is rooted
in the Department's authority to grant convalescent leave. Convalescent
leave isn't technically leave, but rather it is the Service member's
place of duty to ensure they're fully recovered from childbirth and
ready to resume their duties.
The maternity leave policy creates additional ancillary benefits
for the Department by potentially improving recruiting and retention.
Given that we retain women at a 1/3rd lower rate than we do men at 10
years of service, the expected ancillary benefit of improved retention
is very important in determining what would be an appropriate maternity
leave period, the readiness of individual Service members had to be
weighed against overall unit readiness, rather than retention goals.
Careful consideration of all these factors, and the advice of
senior uniformed leadership, led the Secretary of Defense to determine
12 weeks was the most appropriate standard for maternity leave across
the Department.
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Question. Within the proposed FY2017 budget, DoD requests
authorization to authorize a new BRAC round in 2019 as well as $4
million for planning and oversight. In previous years, the DoD asked
for a BRAC round in 2017 that was rejected by the authorization
committees and by amendments offered on the Floor to deny funding for
any planning for BRAC activities.
Secretary, in your proposed budget for FY 2017, you include $4
million to begin planning for a new BRAC round in 2019. The last BRAC
was conducted in 2005 and has been characterized as more of a
consolidation BRAC than one healed for efficiency. Why does the
Department need to conduct a BRAC? How much would the BRAC save for
future budgets? What percentage of the budget is currently spent on
unused facilities and maintenance?
Answer. The Department has been clear that it needs to maximize its
defense capabilities within its constrained budgets. The Department has
parametrically estimated that it has 22 percent excess capacity.
Elimination of excess infrastructure through an analytical,
transparent, and apolitical process such as base realignment and
closure (BRAC) is the best way to achieve critical savings while
minimizing operational impact. We estimate that a BRAC 2019 round will
save around $2 billion annually which would come primarily from closing
unnecessary installations, based on the 1993 and 1995 rounds. The
Department does not track spending on unused facilities and
maintenance; however, every dollar spent on unnecessary facilities is a
dollar wasted. Significant savings are generated by closing
installations in their entirety, not by hollowing out bases, which will
inevitably result absent BRAC authority.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. McCollum.
Questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the answers thereto
follow:]
State Partnership Program (SPP)
Question. What does this budget do to facilitate growing the State
Partnership Program? What additional authorities would you need to
expand the SPP mission to include humanitarian missions, counter
messaging efforts, and to work with civilian populations in the partner
countries? What effort is there to capitalize on the immense personal
ties to this region and capabilities in the U.S. to combat Russian
subterfuge and propaganda, particularly in the area of social media and
television?
Q26.1: What does this budget do to facilitate growing the State
Partnership Program?
In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2016, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) are undertaking a feasibility
study on the establishment of a centralized funding account to support
the State Partnership Program (SPP). In the meantime, SPP activities
are supported by a variety of funding streams, including U.S. Army and
U.S. Air Force funds allocated for that purpose, along with sources
that geographic combatant commanders can access to respond to their
specific security cooperation objectives. As such, potential SPP growth
would be supported by a combination of resources made available through
these various funds.
Q26.2: What additional authorities would you need to expand the SPP
mission to include humanitarian missions, counter messaging efforts,
and to work with civilian populations in the partner countries? What
effort is there to capitalize on the immense personal ties to this
region and capabilities in the U.S. to combat Russian subterfuge and
propaganda, particularly in the area of social media and television?
The National Guard utilizes existing Department of Defense legal
authorities to engage in humanitarian assistance/disaster response
missions. Examples include the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA) fund, Humanitarian Assistance,
Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries,
and Foreign Disaster Assistance. The SPP is not the appropriate tool to
conduct overt intelligence collection or military information support
operations such as counter-messaging, or for other efforts to influence
civilian populations.
Survivor Benefit Program and Dependency & Indemnity Compensation
Question. Under current law, a required offset in payment between
her Dependency and Indemnity Compensation and her Survivor Benefit Plan
annuities, prohibits widows and widowers of active duty service members
from receiving the full amount of both.
Should this issue be considered as we look to reform military
compensation? What can DoD do to address this offset?
Answer. The Department has consistently opposed proposals to
eliminate the offset between Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuities and
Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) at government expense for
the following reasons:
Duplication of benefits: The entitlements are paid by
separate departments for the purpose of providing a continuing
annuity to the survivors of military members or former members.
Both benefits are subsidized by the federal government.
Complementary programs: DIC is a flat $1,254 per month, plus
$311 for each dependent child (2016). SBP is 55 percent of an
elected base amount not to exceed retired pay. The existing
entitlement, with offset, ensures that survivors receive the
higher value. This sets DIC as a floor for more junior members
while allowing more senior members the potential of a larger
SBP amount with all the benefits from the tax free aspect of
DIC.
Equity: Allowing concurrent receipt of SBP and DIC without
offset would create a group of survivors receiving two
government-subsidized survivor annuities. Survivors of most
military retirees and survivors of veterans who did not serve
to retirement would receive only one.
High cost: Eliminating the SBP offset for all survivors
entitled to DIC would cost the Military Retirement Fund more
than $7 billion over 10 years.
Syria
Question. How does the DoD define victory in Syria and what does it
look like?
Answer. We collectively achieve victory as a coalition when ISIL no
longer poses a threat to the U.S., our allies, and our partner nations.
Specifically, the coalition must deny ISIL safe haven, effectively
degrade ISIL' s command and control by removing key leaders from the
battlefield, and dismantle the facilitation networks that allow ISIL to
fund operations and move resources freely in Iraq, Syria and beyond.
Success in Syria requires working with our Turkish partners to
secure the northern border of Syria, supporting vetted Syrian
opposition forces who are willing to fight ISIL, and conducting strikes
to attack core ISIL's command and control and sources of revenue, while
disrupting their ability to plan and conduct external attacks against
the homeland, our partners, and our allies.
Afghanistan
Question. During the hearing, GEN Dunford stated our ``national
interests in Afghanistan are to maintain an effective counter-terrorism
platform and partner in that part of the world.''
How does this change the scope of our operations in Afghanistan? Is
this in accordance with the original authority authorizing the use of
force in Afghanistan? Does this imply an enduring force in Afghanistan
to maintain a counter-terrorism platform?
Answer. The continued threat requires that we maintain an effective
counterterrorism (CT) partner and platform in Afghanistan. This does
not represent a change to the scope of U.S. military operations. The
U.S. is currently conducting CT operations that will continue as part
of the strategic partnership with Afghanistan in accordance with the
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) to defeat Al Qaeda, and
including the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province.
Energy
Question. Executive Order 13693, set goals of 25% renewable energy
production and 15% renewable energy consumption by 2025. Where are you
currently with these goals? What in the budget address achieving these
goals?
Answer. Executive Order 13693, ``Planning for Federal
Sustainability in the Next Decade,'' established new targets for the
production of clean energy and the consumption of renewable energy.
Reporting on progress towards meeting these new targets will begin
after FY 2016 has ended.
For FY 2015, the Department was subject to two legislatively
mandated renewable energy goals:
1) 10 USC 2911(e): produce or procure 25 percent of
electricity consumption from renewable sources by FY2025 and
2) Energy Policy Act (EPAct) 2005: consume 7.5 percent
electricity from renewable sources by FY2015.
DoD met the FY 2015 target milestone for 10 USC 2911(e) goal,
achieving 12.4 percent against a target of 12 percent, but failed to
meet the EPAct 2005 goal, achieving just 3.6 percent against a target
of 7.5 percent.
The Department spends very little appropriated funding on acquiring
renewable energy facilities. Typically, DoD pursues small-scale
distributed renewable energy (e.g. rooftop solar equipment, solar
heaters, ground source heat pumps) only when the business case supports
it. For larger-scale renewable energy projects, DoD is leveraging
third-party financing in which the Department allows a renewable energy
developer to construct, own, operate and maintain the renewable energy
resource. In turn, the Department purchases the renewable energy
generated at or below the cost of what DoD would pay for conventional
power. DoD does not make any capital investment in the renewable energy
project itself. When economically feasible, renewable energy projects
are being built with micro-grid-ready applications that can enable the
provision of continuous power in the event of a disruption. This
redundant, secure, and reliable power from renewable generation
significantly reduces the risk of blackouts or other power disruption
events and enables the DoD to continue to carry out its mission.
F-35A
Question. The budget calls for a reduced purchase of F-35A's for
the Air Force. Will this impact fielding of the F-35 to the National
Guard?
Answer. While the number of F-35As was reduced in the FY 2017
President's Budget, the Air Force's commitment to the program of record
of 1,763 F-35As remains unchanged. The reduced purchase may slow the
National Guard's transition to the F-35A, but it will not change the
planned allocation of F-35As assigned to the National Guard.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur.]
Tuesday, March 1, 2016.
FISCAL YEAR 2017 UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS BUDGET OVERVIEW
WITNESSES
HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES NAVY
ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES
NAVY
GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The committee will come to order,
everybody can take their seats, please. Good morning,
everybody, the committee will come to order. This morning, the
subcommittee continues a series of open defense posture and
budget hearings with our military services, our combatant
commands, and other major components of our Armed Forces. Today
we focus on the fiscal year 2017 budget request, and the
posture of the Navy and our Marine Corps.
Joining us this morning is Secretary of the Navy, Ray
Mabus, who will be testifying before this committee for the
final time. I understand that Secretary Mabus is the longest-
serving Secretary since World War I. I stand ready to be
corrected, but it is a long time in grade, and we thank you for
your very honorable service, not only to your home State, but
to the Nation and to the Navy and the Marine Corps.
We also welcome, for the first time, Admiral John
Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Robert
Neller, the 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps. On all of our
behalves, we thank you for the remarkable job you do, and the
men and women who you support and lead across the Nation and
across the world. We are enormously proud of all of you and
your leadership responsibilities.
In this time of rapidly expanding threats to our national
security, our goal in these hearings, and in our fiscal year
2017 bill is to make sure our sailors and Marines and their
families have everything they need. Every day brings another
report regarding China's attempt to assert itself in the
Western Pacific. They are building ships, submarines,
underwater submarine pens, their naval militia is increasing,
and they are designing cutting-edge weapons at an alarming
rate. All of these things, quite honestly, simultaneously.
In the South China seas, they construct runways, air
defense radar systems, and missile batteries on some of these
disputed islands. They are bent on denying us access to
airspace and challenge us, literally, at every turn. Their
actions test our rules of engagement on a regular basis.
And then there is the regime in North Korea, which
continues to illegally launch satellites and test missiles and
nuclear systems. These provocative actions taken by North Korea
undermine global security. Likewise, Iran is building naval
capacity, its sophisticated antiship missiles to menace our
forces in the Persian Gulf.
At the same time, a newly-aggressive Russia expands and
modernizes its surface and submarine forces. These fleets are
now more active in the Atlantic--we have heard a lot about that
in this committee--and in the Mediterranean than any time since
World War II. They are also expanding a naval base to allow new
ballistic missile submarines in the Northern Pacific.
With all of these current and emerging threats, and a new
pivot to Europe, we still have yet to fully implement our
Pacific strategy. While such a pivot surely requires a greater
emphasis on the Navy and Marine Corps, we continue to see
budget requests that only marginally provide for an increased
naval presence in the Pacific.
As was true last year, all of us remain concerned with the
core Navy, ships and shipbuilding, and the shipbuilding
industrial base. And after much talk of a 313-ship Navy, today
the Navy has 272 deployable ships. For fiscal year 2017, your
goal is to have 287 deployable ships. I continue to ask whether
this is enough. Are we building enough ships and submarines to
decisively defend against and deter our enemies in all corners
of the globe, including the Arctic? You have heard me say this
before: When it comes to ships, numbers matter. Yes, quantity
has a quality all of its own.
In addition to the quantity of ships, all of us are
concerned with the mix of ships, submarines, surface
combatants, amphibs, support ships, and how they are operated
and maintained. The logistics tail is important, as is what the
tyranny of distance in the Pacific does to their lifespan.
In this area of budget constraints, we need to make sure
that we are making every dollar count by investing in the
correct ships, in the correct numbers, at the correct time. We
also need to ensure that we are investing in the right weapon
systems and advanced technology for the immediate threats we
face, not just future conflicts. The strategy of playing
catchup will only encourage more dangerous and aggressive
behavior from our adversaries.
So I need to say right up front, we all need to work
extremely closely together to ensure the funding you are
appropriated is sufficient to take care of our sailors and
Marines and maintain their readiness at the highest possible
level.
On behalf of all of our committee members, I ask you,
again, to convey to all of our sailors and Marines, our deep
gratitude for their skill, determination, sacrifice, and all
the things their families face while they are away on
deployment.
We have much to talk about this morning. F-35, littoral
combat ships, cruisers readiness, and end strength, to name
just a few issues. We look forward to your comments and an
informative question-and-answer session. We have a number of
members here, and more are expected; quite a lot of time
commitments with other hearings. But we are keenly interest and
supportive of what you are doing. Let me turn to my good
friend, the ranking member, Mr. Visclosky for any comments he
may wish to make.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Visclosky
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think
the chairman set the table very well for us. I appreciate his
holding the hearing. And gentlemen, I thank each of you for
your service and for your testimony today and certainly look
forward to the interchange. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours,
welcome.
Summary Statement of Secretary Mabus
Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Visclosky, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you
today to discuss the Department of the Navy. As the chairman
pointed out, this is the first testimony before the committee
for the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Neller.
In the time since they took these positions, I have had the
privilege of their frank, their professional, and their
invaluable counsel. They are officers of the highest caliber,
who expertly lead our Navy and Marine Corps during ever-
tightening fiscal constraints and an increasingly dynamic
threat environment.
This is my eighth time, which may be a record, and I am not
sure anybody wants it, and my last to appear before you. Thank
you for all of your courtesies to me and thank you for all that
you have done for the Department of the Navy. For me, leading
the Department of the Navy is the greatest honor of my life. I
couldn't be more proud of our sailors, our Marines, our
civilians. I am also proud of the many steps we have taken and
the changes we have made to try to ensure working with Congress
that the Navy and Marine Corps in the future remains the
greatest expeditionary fighting force the world has ever known.
First and foremost, we continue to provide presence. That
unrivaled advantage, all and above, beneath, and from the seas,
gives our leaders options in times of crisis, reassures our
allies, deters our adversaries. There is no next best thing to
being there. Maintaining that presence requires gray hulls on
the horizon. And while there has been discussion about posture
versus presence, the simple fact is that for the Navy and the
Marine Corps, our posture is presence.
In every case, from high-end combat to irregular warfare,
to disaster relief, our Naval assets get on station faster, we
stay longer, we bring everything we need with us, and since we
operate from ships, which are sovereign American territory, we
can act without asking any other nation's permission.
That is the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, America's away team
doing its job across the globe. Resourcing that presence
depends on four fundamentals: people, our sailors and Marines;
platforms, our ships and aircraft; power, how we use energy and
make us better warfighters; and partnerships, our relations
with our international allies, with industry, with the American
people.
When I took this post almost 7 years ago, we had an
incredibly committed and capable force. But each of those four
Ps was under pressure. Our people were under stress from a high
operational tempo and extended deployments; our fleet was
shrinking; and too many of our platforms were costing too much.
Our use of power was a vulnerability. We were losing too many
Marines guarding fuel convoys in Afghanistan, and volatile oil
prices were stressing a lot of areas, particularly training.
And our partners were seeking reassurance of our sustained
engagement.
Now our people, platforms, power, and partnerships are
stronger than they have been in many years, enabling us to
provide that invaluable presence. And here is why: people. We
have instituted the most sweeping changes in personnel policy
in many years. Promotions are based now more on merit and not
tenure. Commanding officers are empowered to meritoriously
promote more sailors and Marines. We have made careers paths
more flexible. One example is, thanks to congressional action,
the Career Intermissions Program, which has been greatly
expanded.
We have also increased professional development,
educational opportunities that bring America's best ideas to
the fleet by adding 30 graduate schools slots through our Fleet
Scholars Education Program and sending high-performing sailors
on SECNAV industry tours to great American companies, like
FedEx and Amazon, where they learn private-sector best
practices that can be applied when they return.
We are absolutely committed from the leadership to the deck
plates on combating the crime of sexual assault, and the
tragedy of suicide. We have revamped physical fitness
assessments, making them more realistically aligned to the jobs
that we do, and we have promoted healthier lifestyles through
better nutrition and a culture of fitness.
All billets in both services are now open to women.
Standards will absolutely not be lowered. But anyone who can
meet the standards will be able to do the job. This will make
us a more combat-effective force. We are trying to mitigate
stress on sailors and Marines and their families by making
deployments more predictable, extending hours for childcare,
and creating co-location policies. To tap into the innovative
culture inherent in the Navy and Marine Corps, we established
task force innovation, which takes good ideas from deck plate
sailors and field Marines through our online crowd sourcing
platform, to recognize, fund, and rapidly move those ideas
fleet-wide.
On platforms, we have reversed the decline in ship count,
and thanks to Congress, and, in particular, to this committee.
Our Navy will reach 300 ships by 2019, and our assessed and
validated need of 308 ships by 2021. In the 7 years before I
took office, the Navy contracted for 41 ships. In my 7 years,
we have contracted for 84. And we have done so while increasing
aircraft purchases by 35 percent, all with a smaller top line.
Practices like firm, fixed-price contracts, multiyear buys,
stable requirements, have driven down cost on virtually every
class of ship. We are also in the process again, thanks to
Congress and thanks to this committee, of recapitalizing nearly
every Naval aviation program. We have expanded unmanned
systems, on, under, and above the sea, and increased focus by
establishing a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Unmanned, and an Office of Unmanned Warfare Systems on the CNO
staff, known as N99, specifically designed to coordinate all
unmanned programs. We are also implementing advanced energy
technologies like electromagnetic rail guns and lasers.
Power. To increase our lethality and operational
flexibility, I set a goal of having 50 percent of sea and
shore-based energy derived from alternative sources by 2020,
competitive with the price of conventional power. We met that
goal ashore by the end of last year. At sea, after
demonstrating the Great Green Fleet at RIMPAC in 2012, we
deployed it for routine operations a few weeks ago. Energy
efficiency has been greatly increased on our bases, and at sea.
Ultimately, since 2009, both the Navy and Marine Corps have
achieved a large drop in oil consumption.
And, finally, partnerships. I have traveled nearly 1.2
million miles to 144 different countries and territories,
visiting sailors, Marines, allies, and partners. Twelve of my
trips have been to Afghanistan, where I have visited every
Marine-forward operating base in Helmand Province to be with
our forward-deployed men and women. And I have actively engaged
with our allies and friends around the world to build and
sustain a network of navies with whom we train, operate, and
trust. And we have worked in partnership with Congress to
fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide for and maintain
a Navy. As a result, our sailors and Marines are there for us
at home and abroad, around the globe, around the clock.
As George Washington once said, ``It follows then as
certain as that night succeeds the day that without a decisive
Naval force, we can do nothing definitive and with it
everything honorable and glorious.'' Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The written statement of Secretary Mabus follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Summary Statement of Admiral Richardson
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. Admiral Richardson, good
morning. Thank you for being with us.
Admiral Richardson. Good morning, sir. Chairman
Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Visclosky, distinguished members
of the committee, I am honored and humbled for the privilege to
appear before you today as your CNO on behalf of the over
500,000 active and reserve sailors, our civilians, and their
families.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. If you could move your microphone just a
little closer to you.
Admiral Richardson. Is that better? To start, sir, I want
to thank you and the committee for your leadership in keeping
our Nation secure, and in keeping our Navy the strongest that
has ever sailed the seas. This year's budget continues our
important work. I always think it is good to start by framing
the problem. America is a maritime Nation, and our prosperity
is inextricably linked to our ability to operate freely in the
maritime environment. And today's strategic environment is
increasingly globalized and increasingly competitive. Our
global systems are used more and more, they are stressed more,
and they are contested more. For the first time in 25 years,
there is competition for control of the seas. The maritime
environment has seen explosive growth; from the sea floor to
space, from deep water to the shoreline, and in the information
domain, things are accelerating.
The global information system has become pervasive and has
changed the way we do business, we all do business, including
at sea. And technology is being introduced at an unprecedented
rate, and is being adopted by society just as fast.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, as you outlined, a new set of
competitors are moving quickly to use these forces to their
advantage, and for the first time in 25 years, the U.S. is
facing a return to great power competition. These new forces
have changed what it means for the Navy and Marine Corps to
provide maritime security. And while the problems are more
numerous and complex, our responsibility remains the same.
Naval forces must provide our leaders credible options to
protect America from attack, advance our prosperity, further
our strategic interests, assure our allies and partners, and
deter our adversaries, which rests on our ability, and, with
our sister services, to win decisively if conflict breaks out.
To do this, the Navy is focusing on four lines of effort.
First and foremost, we are going to do right by our people.
Everything we do begins and ends with them. With the Marines,
we are going to broaden our Naval warfighting concepts and
capabilities. We are going to strengthen our partnerships, and
we are going to learn faster. Unquestionably, the most
important part of our Navy is our Navy team. Everything we do
begins with them. As our platforms and missions become more
complex, the need for talented people continues to be a
challenge. We need to recruit, train, and retain the right
people and our Sailor 2025 initiatives that the Secretary
highlighted are aimed squarely at that challenge. These efforts
are based on our core values of honor, courage, and commitment,
and demonstrated through four core attributes: integrity,
accountability, initiative, and toughness.
That team is committed to our mission, which requires us to
strengthen our power at and from the sea. This budget reflects
some very tough choices as we achieve this aim. We prioritize
shipbuilding and the industrial base to the maximum extent
possible.
First in that effort is the Ohio Replacement Program, which
I believe is vital to our survival as a Nation. We are taking
steps to more deeply ingrain information warfare. We are
investing in our Naval aviation enterprise, rapidly integrating
unmanned systems, and bolstering our investments in advanced
weapons. In addition to these investments, we are also
adjusting our behaviors to keep pace with the world that
continues to accelerate. We are doubling down on our approach
that relies more heavily on experimentation and prototyping,
and we are pursuing multiple avenues to drive shorter learning
cycles into all that we do. We must learn faster.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, the 2017 Navy
budget is this year's best approach to solving the problems and
seizing the opportunities that face the Navy today. I thank
you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The written statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Summary Statement of General Neller
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Admiral. General Neller.
General Neller. Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member
Visclosky, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to be here with you this morning. Your
Marines know that the Congress and the American people we serve
have high expectations of us. You expect us to be ready to
answer the call to fight and to win. Today, Marines remain
forward deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and ready to respond
to crises around the world. The posture of our force would not
be possible without the support and actions of the Congress.
Our global orientation, our maritime character, and
expeditionary capability have all been ably demonstrated during
this past year. In 2015, along with our Navy shipmates, Marines
executed approximately 100 operations, 20 of them amphibious,
140 theater security cooperation events, and 160 major
exercises.
Today's Marine Corps is a capable Naval force, and our
forward-deployed forces are ready to fight, but we are fiscally
stretched to maintain the readiness across the depths of the
force, and at the same time, modernize to achieve future
readiness.
As we remain engaged in the current fight and maintain our
forward presence in order to respond to crises, our enemies and
potential adversaries have not stood idle. They have developed
new capabilities which now are comparable, and, in some cases,
exceed our own. This is further complicated by a constrained
resource environment from which we must continue our current
operational tempo, reset our equipment, maintain our
warfighting readiness, and, at the same time, modernize.
As our attention is spread across the globe in a security
environment where the only certainty is uncertainty, we must
make decisions about our strategy and structure that will
determine our Nation's military capability in the future. The
character of the 21st century is rapid evolution. It is
imperative that we keep pace with change. History has not been
kind to militaries that fail to change or evolve. And the
change we see in the beginning of this century and beyond, we
believe is dramatic.
The efforts of the 114th Congress have provided sufficient
resources to support the Marine Corps' near-term readiness, and
we thank the Congress for that fiscal stability. However, the
President's budget for fiscal year 2017 increasingly challenges
your Corps to simultaneously generate current readiness, reset
our equipment after 15 years of war, and sustain our facilities
and ranges, and, at the same time, modernize to ensure future
readiness and capabilities.
Additionally, maintaining the quality of the men and women
in today's Corps is our friendly center of gravity. In other
words, that thing that we must protect. This is the foundation
for which we make Marines, win our Nation's battles, and return
quality citizens to our society. As the Marine Corps draws down
to 182,000 Marines, we continue to develop capabilities in the
fifth generation fighter, the F-35, cyber warfare, information
operations, special operations, embassy security guards, in our
security cooperation group. Our goal is to ensure that we set
every Marine up for success on the battlefield and in life and
that they understand their value to our Corps and the Nation.
The Congress' intent is for the Marine Corps to serve as the
Nation's force in readiness. And that guides who we are and
what we do.
Being ready is central to our identity as Marines. The
fiscal reductions and instability of the past years have
impacted our readiness and, as resources have diminished, the
Marine Corps has protected the near-term operational readiness
of its forward deployed and next to deploy units in order to
meet our operational commitments. This means that we do not
have the depth or readiness on our bench that we would like for
a major contingency.
Modernization is our future readiness. The recapitalization
of our force is essential to this future readiness with
investments in facilities, sustainment, equipment reset,
modernization, ground combat vehicles, aviation command and
control, and other capabilities. That said, with the continued
support of the Congress, the Marine Corps will maintain ready
forces today and modernize to generate this future readiness.
The wisdom of the 82nd Congress reaffirmed by the 114th
Congress remains valid today. The vital need of a strong force
in readiness and your Marines are honored to serve in this
role.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today and your leadership in addressing our fiscal challenges
and our warfighting readiness. I look forward to your
questions.
[The written statement of General Neller follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FLEET SIZE IN RELATION TO CURRENT THREATS
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much, General Neller. Our
focus today is on the Navy and Marine defense posture, but a
lot of that is formed by the growing defense posture of both
Russia and China, and this committee has been devoted in a
variety of different settings to learn exactly what the
Russians and Chinese are doing.
For a time when I first got on the committee, we sort of
looked at the Chinese as not as great an adversary because of
what we always regarded as our overwhelming superiority. But
today, we see what they are doing around the world, and
whatever we do, we need to get it right. And I wanted to get to
the issue, which I mention to you often, Mr. Secretary, that
numbers matter. The ships, I know you have been caught in some
degree of crossfire, but in reality, we have the smallest Navy
we have ever had. And then there is talk of, and there has been
some action out of the Department of Defense to lower certain
ship numbers. We need a mix. Where are we going? And are we
fully capable of meeting our needs given what the Chinese are
doing aggressively, and what the Russians are doing
aggressively?
Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, you just made the points I
have been trying to make, but more eloquently than I have. We
deal with the fleet size we do today because of decisions made
10, 12 years ago. It takes a long time to build a ship. It
takes a long time to build up a fleet. And I am very proud of
where we have come, primarily, with the help of this committee
to move to validated need from our Force Structure Assessment
of 308 ships by 2021. And it is a good mix of ships. We are
building two Virginia-class attack submarines a year. We are
building two DDG 51s a year. We are, in this budget request,
asking for our next big-deck amphibious ship to build to the
Marine need of at least 33, but preferably 38 amphibs, and to--
--
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am interested in the numbers. I think
we are also interested in their capabilities. We are going to
have a smaller fleet, and I understand we have set a high goal
for more ships, a better mix. If we don't have the numbers,
what are we doing to add to capabilities?
Secretary Mabus. Well, number one, Mr. Chairman, we are
getting the numbers. It just takes us----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are getting the numbers in large
part because of this committee; instead of one-and-a-half
Virginia class submarines, we demanded two. And if we had our
power we would probably have a higher number.
Secretary Mabus. As I tried to thank you for doing that,
primarily due to this committee, to Congress, we are on track
to--we are there in terms of the contracts signed, in terms of
authorizations, appropriations, we will get to 308 ships by
2021. So what the debate is about is about whether we keep that
fleet, whether we keep it past 2021, whether we add to the
capabilities, and in this budget request, we have requested
money for the Virginia Payload Module, to increase the
capabilities of the Virginia class.
We are moving from littoral combat ships to the frigate
which has greatly increased lethality and survivability. What
this budget request has done with the LCS is preserve decision
space for the next administration and Congress.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, the Secretary of Defense has
ordered a reduction in the number of littoral combat ships, so
how does that measure up?
Secretary Mabus. Well, because we have two shipyards that
make these littoral combat ships.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And may I say, the committee is very
keen on supporting our industrial base, not only for those
ships, but for other ships.
Secretary Mabus. So are we. Because if you lose shipyard
workers, if you lose that industrial base, it is almost
impossible to get it back. And the recommendation in the budget
is for two littoral combat ships in fiscal year 2017. What this
does is keep both shipyards healthy, keep both shipyards open,
and preserve decision spaces as to how we go forward from
there.
The decisions about what to do, the number of littoral
combat ships, the type of littoral combat ships, will not be
made by this administration. They will be made by the next
administration and by Congress. And this allows the decision
space for the next administration and for Congress to go in
whatever direction they want to, with a healthy industrial base
when you make that decision.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky.
DOMESTIC SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you
ended on industrial base, and that is what I would like to
direct my line of questioning to. The current fiscal year 2016
bill, which passed on the floor of the House with this
committee's support as well as the support of the Senate full
committee, contained a general provision that prohibited the
use of funds to award a new TAO(X) program contract for the
acquisition of certain components, unless those components were
manufactured in the United States.
The components included auxiliary equipment, including
pumps, shipboard service; propulsion equipment, including
engines, reduction gears, propellers, cranes, spreaders. Both
the House and Senate committees agreed, and I appreciate the
support of the committee and the chairman on that issue. During
conference, the Navy requested a waiver of that option to
procure an engine with sufficient power to propel the ship
based on design specifications, and in the end, in conference,
the Secretary was given that ability to request a waiver.
I would remind my colleagues that the ship involved here is
a fleet oiler. And I don't diminish the importance of fleet
oilers. But this is an oiler, this is not an attack submarine;
this is not a nuclear aircraft carrier; and we are seeking
waivers. I am reminded every time the subcommittee gets a
request for waivers for such purchases by the entire Department
of Defense that we have a significant problem. And my concern
here is that we are buying rocket engines from the Russians
because we don't have that capacity in the United States of
America. If we are now seeking waivers for engines for oilers
for the United States Navy, I am wondering if the industrial
base that was in place that propelled our country to victory in
World War II, is adequate going forward. And my first question
is, what actions did the Navy take to make sure that the prime
on this contract did everything possible to find an engine made
in the United States of America for an oiler?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, I absolutely share your
concern about the industrial base in the United States. And one
of the things that we have seen, as the number of shipyards has
decreased, as the number of suppliers to those shipyards has
decreased, that many times, we are down to one supplier of
critical parts. And if something happens to that supplier, we
don't have any place to go in the United States.
I do not ask for waivers for things like this lightly,
because the industrial base that has driven not only the Navy
and Marine Corps, but America forward, has to be preserved to
the maximum extent possible. The only time that I ask for
waivers is if there is no American product which meets the
specifications and the specifications are driven by what those
ships have to do.
Mr. Visclosky. And I appreciate it. If I could ask, I
assume the Navy also talks to the prime and says, show us that
this is impossible to do before we give you the waiver that--I
assume you, yourself, are satisfied, but are we putting
pressure on these contractors that you have got to look hard,
and that there is just nobody that makes an engine for an oiler
in the United States of America that is acceptable?
Secretary Mabus. I know that our contracting officers, and
the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development &
Acquisition, Mr. Stackley, are well aware of the need for
American products. And there are not many places that we have
to ask for a waiver, but there are, sadly, a few.
Mr. Visclosky. If I could, just one more question, Mr.
Secretary, on that. Let us assume for the sake of argument,
this engine is going to be procured elsewhere. Is there a
process within the Department of the Navy to then talk to, if
you would, the Secretary of Defense, as well as come to the
Appropriations Committee, Congress, authorizers, and say, we
have a problem going forward. If we are lacking today in
propulsion systems, somehow we have to figure out how to make
that investment to encourage that. Our committee is investing
in rocket engines today because we don't have that capacity.
Is there, at that point, when you ask for the waiver, an
acknowledgement that we have a problem, is there some
communication going on both within the Department, as well as
to the Congress, that we have an initial problem and we don't
want it to become worse?
Secretary Mabus. I know there is that system inside the
Department of the Navy. And if the concern, if the part is a
big enough concern, then certainly, we will consult with
Congress on how to fix this. There is a thing called the
Defense Production Act that says that if we don't have
something that we need for national defense that is produced in
the U.S. at scale, that with Congress' help, we can invest in
it. And we have used DPA for various things, including
manufacturing of certain parts for our ships and aircraft.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think we need a reinforced response
here to get your oar in the water here.
Admiral Richardson. If I could----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think it is important here. We are
going to go to Mr. Crenshaw, and Ms. McCollum.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think also, just in support of
the Secretary's comments, some of the strategies to do sort of
block-buy approaches, where you are buying many ships, you
know, at once. Not only is that the most efficient way to get
ships for the best price, but it also instills a sense of
confidence in the industrial base that there will be a
consistent, predictable investment. It allows them to invest,
and so we appreciate the work of the committee to, you know,
provide that type of flexibility so that we can go in, provide
long-term confidence that will grow, you know, or strengthen
that industrial base even down to some of those sub-tier
providers that are, you know, in many senses, as the Secretary
said, really, literally hanging on by a thread.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are on your side here.
Mr. Crenshaw, then Ms. McCollum.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus,
welcome back. The chairman mentioned you are the longest
serving Secretary of the Navy since World War I, and I think
you are also the fifth longest serving Secretary of all. In the
old days, they had some really long-serving Secretaries, so we
worked together over the years on a lot of issues about ships
and planes and submarines. Thank you for your service and the
folks that you represent.
Admiral Richardson and General Neller, first time here, but
I am sure the Secretary has given you his secret notes on
testimony before the subcommittee, so welcome to you all as
well.
You know, there are so many things that the Navy does that
we have worked on together over the years, and when I look at
the budget this year, you see things that you can talk about
for a long time in terms of--you have mentioned them, the Ohio
Replacement class, the cruiser modernization, the P-8s, the E2-
D Hawkeyes, the LCS, but I want to focus, and the chairman
mentioned the question of ships and that numbers matter, and
the littoral combat ships, which has been described as the
Navy's ship of the future. We had a meeting last week with the
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Carter, and one of the things that he
has done, is say, we ought to end littoral combat ships
acquisition at 40 instead of the original 52.
And I asked him, I said, is this something that is based on
a short-term budget analysis? Or is this, is there some broader
reason that has to do with national security? And I wasn't
clear about the answer, but I do know that you all requested, I
think, in your shipbuilding budget, 52 ships 2 years ago, and
then this committee said, well, let's do a really detailed
study to make sure that is right. You did that and reiterated
the fact that 52 was the number that we needed.
And so I guess my question is, to start with, as we focus
in, has that requirement changed? That initial 52 from the
warfighting analysis you did? Has that changed?
Secretary Mabus. It has not. We have a validated
requirement for 52 LCSs.
Mr. Crenshaw. Well, do you know, is there any sort of
analysis that you know of, if it is not your analysis, is there
some sort of analysis that has been done that would indicate
that we need less?
Secretary Mabus. I don't know of any Navy analysis that has
been done that indicates that.
Mr. Crenshaw. I got you. Well, Admiral Richardson, let me
ask you real quick. You know, there is also kind of, I think, a
mischaracterization of the LCS. Any new ship program has issues
and questions just any time you do that, and there have been
questions around the LCS. But it seems to have been
characterized in some corners as maybe not as critical as it
could be in warfighting. It is more like a present ship, like a
patrol boat. I think that the Secretary of Defense used the
term, is a very good lower-end ship, which I would hope is a
mischaracterization.
So maybe you could tell this subcommittee, number one, what
part the LCS is going to play in the warfighting plan? And
also, maybe talk about some of the new capabilities, make sure
that we are aware of some of those new capabilities that it
brings to this warfighting capability.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, as the Secretary said, the
validated requirement remains for 52 small-surface combatants.
The LCS is the current program that fulfills that commitment,
and those ships play a vital role as independent actors. As you
know, the LCS has deployed already and has done terrific work
on those deployments, and has a vital role in our meeting, you
know, warfighting scenarios as well.
You know, they are not, they never were designed to be, you
know, the one and only ship. They operate alone for some
missions and in concert with the rest of the battle fleet for
others. But they provide our central capabilities, not only as
a surface combatant, and we are enhancing our capability there
by virtue of the small-surface combatant task force which
resulted in the modifications, improvements, and lethality, and
survivability that will be incorporated into the ultimate
frigate design. We will back-fit those capabilities as much as
possible into all of the LCSs.
They provide an antisubmarine warfare capacity, both with
their helicopter, their towed arrays, and then they also
provide a role in the mine countermeasures mission. So, a very
flexible ship. And as the Secretary said, the Force Structure
Assessment, that process by which we determine the size of the
fleet remains valid at 52. The fact that we are truncating at
40, I think, reflects, you know, the hard choice, the extremely
hard choices that we had to make to deliver this budget.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. McCollum, and then Ms. Granger.
THE ARCTIC REGION
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Secretary Mabus, and
Admiral Richardson, we are becoming more and more aware of the
Arctic as a rich resource environment that is feeling the full
effects of climate change. The melting sea ice has opened up
new navigable waters in the Arctic and it has changed the
strategic calculus in the region. The world is seeing Russia
aggressively reassert a naval presence in the region, creating
a joint Arctic command in 2014, and conducting military
exercises in the region last year.
I am concerned that the Arctic is a strategic area that is
ripe for Russian expansion, directly challenging our national
security interests and those of our allies. As you are well
aware, the United States only has one operational heavy
icebreaker, that is owned by the Coast Guard, and the Coast
Guard is working to build a second one. Russia is building 14
more.
Now, this deficit has to seriously impact our ability to
conduct search and rescue operations and maintain a maritime
presence in the region. The Navy's 2014 to 2030 Arctic world
map from February 14 states, and I quote, "While the region is
expected to remain a low-threat security environment, while our
nations resolve differences peacefully, the Navy will be
prepared to prevent conflict and assure national security
interests are protected," end of quote.
A lot has happened, and Russia has been very aggressive
over the past several years. So given the recent developments
in Russia's military posture, does the Navy still consider the
Arctic region to be quote, "a low security threat" because this
committee has been told over and over again recently, that
Russia is lighting up its coastal waters, and that Russia waits
to see how assertive, how aggressive, and how strong,
especially the United States is in the region, in making this
calculus.
So could you please tell me what specific investments in
the 2017 budget has the Navy made to address the issue of
Russia's military expansion into the Arctic region?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I couldn't agree with you more
that the Arctic is becoming an increasingly strategic area,
particularly as the Arctic ice cap recedes, those waterways are
opening up for twice as long as they were before. That is
exposing continental shelves and the resources on them to that.
We remain committed to staying on that roadmap to enhance our
ability to operate in the Arctic. With respect to icebreakers,
we are working very closely with our partners in the Coast
Guard. That part of the mission will remain theirs. The
security part will remain ours. And we have had a steady
presence. In March, the Secretary and I will go up and
participate in what has been an ongoing exercise program in the
Arctic where we send our submarines up there to surface through
the ice, continue to do research, and ensure that we can
operate up there. We are right now, General----
Ms. McCollum. If I could go back to the icebreakers. So
there is one operational icebreaker, that one goes down, there
isn't a second one. So we are relying on calling someone else.
If the Navy has a ship that is stranded in the area, the Coast
Guard with an icebreaker would come in to help, correct?
Admiral Richardson. The Coast Guard runs our icebreakers.
Yes, ma'am.
Ms. McCollum. And there is one. And there are plans to
build another one. Are two icebreakers sufficient for all that
the Coast Guard is charged with, I mean, in the area?
Admiral Richardson. I think the Commandant of the Coast
Guard has been very articulate in saying he is not satisfied
that that is enough.
Ms. McCollum. Is the Navy satisfied?
Admiral Richardson. We are right there with our Coast Guard
partners saying that we need to enhance, increase our number of
icebreakers.
Ms. McCollum. I just pause this out for the committee. You
know, if we were to ask for another icebreaker, either from the
Coast Guard, or direct the Navy, that is now considered--would
that be considered an earmark if it wasn't in the President's
budget, Mr. Chair?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am all for asking for more. I think we
are getting our clocks cleaned in the Arctic. Russians are
doing all sorts of bad things, staking claims to areas that
actually are under different sovereignties. We need to get
moving here. I am all for it.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair, because waters and
weather conditions can make, you know, being able to have a
response time critically impactful in the region. And we just
want to make sure that the Coast Guard has the tools it needs
to fulfill its mission, but you also have what you need to do
to fulfill yours--thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Granger, and then Mr. Ruppersberger.
READINESS
Ms. Granger. Thank you, and thank all three of you for
being here and for serving so well and the people that you
represent. I had an amazing opportunity yesterday and I know
you did too, to go to the White House to see the Congressional
Medal of Honor awarded to Edward Byers. And you talked about
the right people. There couldn't be anyone more right than that
man and his enormous courage. So what it did to me, you know,
when you do something like that you say, okay, am I doing
everything I can do to support?
And so we need to be always aware of the people that serve,
and make sure they have the equipment also, the right equipment
and the right people. You talk about readiness, and it took me
a while on this subcommittee before I realized that readiness
is not the same everywhere for all of the branches.
So could you explain, specifically, when you just--you
talked about it--but on those top priorities, what is the
readiness and what does it mean to the Navy, and then what does
it mean to the Marine Corps? Looking at those things that you
think are so important, and how do our budget shortfalls affect
those priorities? Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, thanks for that question. And
readiness for me is one of the things which both General Neller
and I are most concerned, and it has, even within the Navy, it
has many dimensions, if you will. One aspect of readiness is
the ability to repair our ships on time, and so our ability to
get our ships through the public and private shipyards on time
and on schedule is key to getting them back out to sea where
they belong at that level of readiness.
Similarly, our ability to, you know, train our people to
make sure that they come through the deployment cycle and get a
chance to go into the schools and get the training that they
need, then come together as a team, join their units and work
up together and deploy together is another very important part
of our readiness. This is particularly true with our pilots,
for instance, which are dependent upon, you know, flying hours,
getting in that aircraft and doing the time they need at the
high end to make sure that they deploy fully ready.
And so, there is a further readiness dimension that
involves munitions. Do we send our forces forward with the
right weapons, and this is an area where we have, frankly, been
taking risk in terms of, you know, the numbers of munitions
that we need to fully execute the scenarios that we are called
to do. And then there is, you know, the supply parts and
everything else. Just the basic logistics.
And so in all of those areas, you know, if you add all of
that up together, our requirement is to have two carrier strike
groups ready at any time, and three ready to go within 30 days.
That is our reinforcement force that will go out and supplement
those initial two that respond immediately.
The ability to do that has been challenged. It really
started back in 2007, when we started those long deployments,
you know, 10 months became almost the norm in terms of
deployment. It was further exacerbated by sequestration in
2013, which put just a tremendous divot in the system with the
hiring freezes, the overtime caps, et cetera, our ability to
get through all of those. We are still recovering from that.
And those are, you know, investments that we have to invest in
to make up for lost time. Right now, we are right at
sustainment, and so our ability to recover that readiness keeps
moving out to the right. It was 2020. This year it is, you
know, beyond 2020, because we are just having a hard time
closing that readiness gap. And I will defer to General Neller
to talk about the Marine Corps.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
General Neller. Representative Granger, thanks for the
question. As the CNO said, readiness is kind of a compilation
of a bunch of different variables. People, training, equipment,
the readiness or maintenance of that equipment, ammunition,
transport. I mean, the term that we use in talking to the
chairman is joint comprehensive readiness. And that is more of
the joint force. So, long story short, 15 years of war, no
longer have large numbers deployed, still have Marines and
sailors serving with Marines deployed, and the readiness of the
force was, you know, was somewhat degraded. It is much easier
to recover the ground side of readiness, than it is ship
readiness or heavy industrial base things like airplanes.
So if you asked me today what is the readiness of your
Marine Corps, I would say on the ground side, it is trending
up. We would, as a goal, like to have 80 percent of our units
ready to go. We are not quite there, particularly on the
aviation side. The Congress has given us $5 billion to reset
our ground equipment. We have got about 79 percent of that
complete, and about 50 percent of that equipment is back to the
force.
So, I am not where we want us--where I want us to be or
where we want to be, but we are trending the right way.
Aviation is a little different story. It is a long part of
sequestration, part of long flight hours, part of not bringing
stuff back as fast, to reset it as we should have, the F-35
being late.
So our aviation readiness is really my number one concern.
We don't have enough airplanes that we would call ready basic
aircraft. That means we are not getting enough flight hours.
People join the aviation community to fly. So we have a plan,
and we are also in the midst of recapitalization of every model
type series. And each of those aircraft are in different
places. MV-22, probably the furthest ahead; the CH-53, just
beginning the process.
So we have a plan. I think we have kind of reached the
bottom of this trough of readiness. Last week, the CNO and I
went out to the fleet readiness center at North Island in
California where they refurbish F/A-18s. They are making
progress. There has been money put into that. But I hate to say
money is something that can fix it, but it is money and time.
And so, we are confident that over time, this is going to get
fixed. So you add procurement, you add refurbishment, we need
to get more airplanes on the ramp so people can fly and
maintain their training readiness. So not where we want to be,
but we are trending the right way, but it is not going to be
something that happens tomorrow.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Granger.
USS ``FORT WORTH''
Secretary Mabus. May I say one thing about one specific
ship?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes.
Secretary Mabus. The USS Fort Worth has just had a terrific
deployment to the Pacific, and we attribute most of USS Fort
Worth's success to its sponsor.
Ms. Granger. Well said. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. That is a very important attribution.
Thank you. Mr. Ruppersberger, and then Mr. Calvert.
CHINA'S ANTI-ACCESS AREA DENIAL CAPABILITIES
Mr. Ruppersberger. Sure, as everyone on this committee, I
thank you all for your service, your leadership. Secretary
Mabus, I mean, you reach out, your leadership, your priority
with respect to all of the men and women, and we have been in
good hands for a long while.
I want to--and this question probably is to you or Admiral
Richardson. I would like to begin by addressing the ongoing
activities of China in the South China Sea. Regardless of
whether or not China would like to admit it, they are
militarizing the South China Sea. And I believe that the
consensus, at least, I think in this room, is that the
militarization and the denial of access to the area in the
future is China's intent.
Now, although the United States Navy continues to operate
in these waters, I am concerned about how effective these
operations will be in deterring the continued militarization of
their area. And while I understand the importance that freedom
of navigation exercises have, and reassuring our allies in that
area, it seems that has not served as a deterrent against the
continued Chinese militarization of reclaimed islands in the
region.
Now, my question is, what other strategies has the Navy
considered as deterrents against the continued Chinese
placement of anti-access area denial assets in the region; and
two, have any of these strategies, or future strategies, been
deemed unfeasible due to budgetary limitations, including the
issue of sequestration which it seems, at least for 2 years, we
have a hiatus, but we still have to address that issue?
Secretary Mabus. Congressman, I will give you sort of a
general overview, and then I will turn it over to Admiral
Richardson for more specifics. But that sea with as much
transit as is going through it is--we have to make sure that we
ensure freedom of navigation, that everybody can go through
there, and we can make a pretty good argument that Asia is
doing as well as it is today economically because of the United
States Navy, because we have kept that open.
What my job is, what Admiral Richardson's and my job is, is
to make sure that we have got the assets there for any
strategy; that we have got the--whether it is ships,
submarines, aircraft there, so that as our leaders weigh what
strategies to employ, that the assets are not only available,
but that are there, and that is the presence that the Navy and
Marine Corps give this country.
And that is why it is so important to continue to keep the
fleet size that we know that we need. That is why it is so
important to continue to do the rebalance to the Pacific with
moving 60 percent of our fleet, which will be there by 2020,
and it will be a much larger fleet.
But that is the job of a service Secretary, a service chief
is to make sure that those assets, that those options are
available to our leaders as they make the decisions of what
sort of strategies to employ.
RESOURCES AND SEQUESTRATION
Mr. Ruppersberger. But don't forget, I want to address the
issue of whether or not we have given you the resources, and if
you could address the issue of sequestration, because it is
still there 2 years from now.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I just, I will reinforce what the
Secretary said that, you know, in the context of the rebalance
to the Pacific, the Indo-Pacific, really, you know, this South
China Sea challenge should be appreciated in that. And not only
are we sending 60 percent of a bigger fleet--and we are on
track to do that, we are on our program--but also, you know,
our higher-end capability is going out there as well. So it is
not just numbers. And it gets back to what the Secretary said.
It is, you know, it is about options and it is about credible
options. You have got to have something there to have an
option, and that thing has to be capable enough to be credible.
To the question of resources, you know, I work very closely
with Admiral Harris and Admiral Swift, our commanders out there
in the Pacific to make sure that if they see any kind of a
challenge with respect to resources that would hinder or impede
the number of options they have, that we address that right
away. We are not seeing that right now, sir.
Mr. Ruppersberger. So you are getting resources. Now, can
you address the issue of sequestration? We can't let that go.
Admiral Richardson. Absolutely. The sequestration, the
specter of sequestration would set us back irreparably across
the Navy, whether it be readiness, force levels, capability,
that would just--we have got to get to a point where that sword
of Damocles is not hanging over our head.
Secretary Mabus. The sequestration that happened in 2013,
both the CNO and the Commandant had mentioned this before, but
it put us in a hole in terms of readiness of our ships, because
of our shipyards, the public shipyards that get backlogged, and
particularly in our aircraft. It is going to take us until 2019
to catch up with that backlog, and sequestration was a big part
of that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are not looking for 8 more years,
are you? Mr. Calvert and then Mr. Israel.
ACQUISITION PROCESSES
Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you all for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for 8 years as a Secretary of the
Navy. Thank you for your service.
I would like to talk a little bit about Navy acquisition.
Admiral, you have been talking about this for some time, to
speed up the acquisition efforts, keep pace with the evolving
threats, it is too slow, it is too costly and too complicated.
Additionally, by the time the fleet sometimes receives that
equipment, many times it is already outdated. So we would like
to have you inform us about the processes you are putting in
place to improve that process.
Also, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the amphibious assault
ships. I think we are down to 30, I have been told you need at
least 34 to make it work. I understand about one-third of the
30 aren't operable for one reason or another. So, obviously,
that is troubling. So as we are talking about the acquisition
process, is the assault ship one of the top ships you need to
get moving, to get this new LX(R) available to the Marines to
make sure that we can stay proficient?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I am happy to answer your
question, and welcome it on the acquisition and the need to
speed that up. With the Secretary's encouragement, we started a
number of initiatives that will get that going.
First, to address urgent needs and make sure we are not
missing a trick, a technology or a solution. We have
established a rapid prototype, experimentation, and development
process that really has--will adjudicate those urgent needs or
opportunities. It doesn't have to be expressed in a need, and
will allow us to bring together technologies, engineer them
together in creative ways, prototype them quickly, run through
a bunch of options, get them out to the fleet sooner so that
they are in the hands of sailors and Marines, and that is when
learning really starts. We will figure out quickly which ideas
have merit, which ideas just don't, which are dead ends.
And by doing that type of experimentation approach I think
much more quickly, I believe, with confidence, that we will get
to solutions that will translate to programs of record much
more quickly, and we will be more competent in the technology
that emerges.
Once they enter that acquisition stream, we are also
establishing the Maritime Accelerated Capabilities Office,
MACO, to allow a speed lane, if you will, for those programs
that qualify, that are sufficiently mature, and can get to the
fleet, to the delivery sooner. And so we are leveraging a lot
of the techniques that the Air Force's Rapid Capability Office
uses. And we look, by virtue of that, to get technology into
the hands of the warfighter more quickly, and then gradually,
transition more and more programs over into that speed lane, if
you will, so that we can just respond at the speed of the
environment, at the speed of technology, at the speed of our
competitors.
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS
Secretary Mabus. On amphibs, I would say we are up to 30
now, because we started below that. We do have a validated need
for the Marines for at least 34, 38 is preferable, because to
get two battalions of Marines across the beach in contested
entry, that is from the available ships, that is what it would
take. And a third being unavailable, or in maintenance, is
pretty standard for all ship classes across the fleet. You have
got to do the maintenance, that has been one of the problems
that we have had is we have had such high operations tempo that
we haven't done enough of the maintenance to make sure that
these ships live out their useful lives.
We will get to 34 by 2024, and to the current plan, as you
would thank the Congress for LPD-28, which is the 12th LPD,
which allows us, then, to go to the LX(R), the replacement for
the LSD on the same hull form, so we will be able to build
those cheaper and faster going forward.
While they don't replace, in any sense, amphibious ships,
we have got some other classes of ships that can assist in
amphibious operations, things like the expeditionary transfer
dock, the expeditionary sea base. Two of the first kind have
been built, three of the second kind are being built, the
second kind has a flight deck on it. It can be used as a sea
base, as a prepositioning for equipment, as a place to offload,
particularly Marine equipment and supplies.
The Expeditionary Fast Transport, the former joint high
speed vessel, can also be used for getting Marines and their
equipment places very fast. Now, the ships that I just
mentioned are not combat ships, they are civilian--they are not
built to survivability standards, they are not supposed to be,
but they can help ease a little bit of the burden, because we
can put them places that today we are having to use amphibs.
Amphibs are probably too much of a ship there. And we are
planning on hubbing the expeditionary transfer docks in the
Pacific around Japan and Korea, and we are planning on hubbing
the expeditionary fast transports around Japan and Singapore.
Mr. Calvert. Just one last comment, Mr. Chairman, we are
all very proud of the shipyards of Mississippi and Maine, but
we do have a little shipyard in San Diego, NASSCO, that we are
also very proud of. They do great work down there.
Secretary Mabus. I am so proud of NASSCO and the ships that
they deliver to us, and the prices that they have driven down,
thanks to a very innovative workforce.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, I am sure the accolades are well
deserved like they were for Fort Worth. I would like to confirm
what the gentleman opined, the issue of operability here. What
is operable and what is not operable that he was referring to
in his initial comments? I would like the specifics.
General Neller. Let me.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Very briefly.
General Neller. Yes, sir. I keep track on a weekly basis of
the maintenance schedules where all the amphib ships are.
Obviously, we have equity in that. As the Secretary said, there
are 30 ships, we are going to go to 34; the requirement is 38,
because we anticipate 15 percent in the yard. Of the ones that
are in the yard today, sir, I think a good percentage of them
are in for routine maintenance and could be gotten underway if
needed. So the Navy--we understand the maintenance requirements
of the Navy so we are working really hard because we have a
requirement to get on board those ships to train. So with the
CNO and the Secretary, we are trying to be creative in how we
use Marines and get them afloat, whether it is in these
alternate platforms. At the end of the day, the requirement
that is validated is 38 amphibs, to have 34 or two Marine
expeditionary brigade forcible entry capability, but we will
use these other platforms because a lot of things we do at
theater security cooperations, humanitarian assistance disaster
relief, NEOs even, we can do off these other ships.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General.
Mr. Israel and then Mr. Womack.
PERSIAN GULF
Mr. Israel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to focus
on the Persian Gulf, another strategic area. And then if I have
time, I may ask about the professional military education, one
of my favorite topics, something you all know about. General
Neller, in particular, at Marine Corps University. And Admiral
Richardson, you and I have exchanged some Naval history books,
and I appreciate that.
On the issue of the Persian Gulf, two areas, one long-term,
strategically, I am interested in your views of Iranian
maritime challenges and threats in the region of the Persian
Gulf, Naval threat. And then more specifically, I would like
you to comment on the incident that occurred in January when 10
sailors drifted into Iranian waters. They were arrested, they
were questioned, they were released. I want you to comment on
how that happened. If there are technical problems with
deficiencies that lead our sailors into dangerous waters, what
are the backup systems?
And third, what have we done with respect to assessing the
ships that were temporarily captured to ensure that there is no
malware, or other threats, or technologies that may have been
installed or somehow appended to those vessels?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, thank you very much for the
question. With respect to the long-term future of Iran, just
the geography of that region gives one concern, and Iran has
been acting with malign intent across several different
vectors, whether it is short-range or medium-range ballistic
missiles, whether it is anti-ship coastal defense cruise
missiles, you know, across the spectrum. And so we applaud the
agreement that would eliminate a nuclear threat from Iran, from
our perspective, so much has not changed in terms of what we
have to do to watch Iran, secure that region for safe passage
of the resources through the Strait of Hormuz, and operating in
the Gulf.
With respect to the incident in January, it just shows
you--first of all, those sailors, by international law, should
not have been captured and detained. I think we made it very
clear that that behavior is not consistent with international
law. And, so, another indication of the type of threat we are
dealing with there.
With respect to the details, the questions that you asked,
that investigation is still in progress. We will get to every
one of those questions that you asked for, sir. And we are
looking at all of that. We have examined those boats. We are
digging back down into exactly the concerns you have, and when
that investigation is complete in the near future, I look
forward to coming back and briefing the committee, in detail,
on what we find.
Mr. Israel. Admiral, is the near future next month? Next
year? Give the committee a sense.
Admiral Richardson. Month. We are talking months, sir, 1 or
2 months. I think we can get to that.
Mr. Israel. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we will invite them
back to do a brief.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think this and the whole rules of
engagement, the things we heard anecdotally, the things we hear
from sailors that are--confrontations that occur in these
regions make it apparent to some that we are not meeting those
types of challenges, but absolutely, we would love to have you
come back when the full evidence is on the table.
Admiral Richardson. Mr. Chairman, you said it. There is a
lot of talk about this thing, that is why we need to go through
the disciplined process of a formal investigation so that we
can find the truth of the matter and address what we find.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We don't want our sailors ever treated
in that manner again. There should be some repercussions, maybe
not to them, but perhaps to others.
Mr. Israel. If I may just continue on the subject of the
Persian Gulf. During the negotiations of the JCPOA, there were
assessments that Iran was behaving in a more responsible
fashion. I opposed the deal. There were assessments that Iran,
during those negotiations, was not engaging in particularly
belligerent or provocative behavior. Can you give us an
assessment as to whether there has been any increase in
provocation against any of our Naval assets in the Persian Gulf
since the agreement has been signed?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, it is something we watch extremely
closely. It does ebb and flow, not just with respect to the
negotiations surrounding that agreement, but just in general.
And so, if we may be seeing some kind of a local increase, it
has not risen to any historical unprecedented levels, but it is
something that we continually address as well, sir. We can't
condone or even leave these situations unaddressed.
So I work closely with General Austin in Central Command
and our Naval component out there to make sure that we are
addressing those as they happen.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Mr. Israel. And in deference to the committee, I have some
questions on professional military education and I know you
understand the value of that, and I am hopeful that you
continue to address the value of professional military
education, the software, as you are addressing many of the
hardware----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are going to try to get a second
round in. Mr. Womack, and then Mr. Graves.
SUBMARINE AND WEAPON CAPABILITIES
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Once again, like the rest of my colleagues, Secretary
Mabus, I really appreciate the work that you put into your time
there as Secretary over these number of years. I am sure you
are not going to miss looking at this group beyond this
hearing, but, again, thanks for your long-standing service.
To General Neller and to the Admiral, welcome. And,
Admiral, to you personally, thank you for the wonderful
breakfast that we shared at your home at the Navy yard
recently. It was a delightful morning, enjoyed meeting your
wife and had a great meal. I particularly liked the way the
chef did the onions in that particular offering. That is kind
of some inside humor.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is on the record. I am sure his
better half will appreciate that.
Mr. Womack. I say that as I say inside humor there.
And to my chairman, I would like to thank him for the
encouragement to do some travel and have some interaction with
our military counterparts. So to my chairman, I would like to
thank you for that.
I have had the unique privilege of being able to do two
demonstration and shakedowns, one in the Atlantic and one in
the Pacific, aboard the West Virginia and now aboard the
Kentucky. And it is along that Ohio replacement that I want to
ask my question. I am kind of a capabilities person. I know
that in constrained budget times, we have to look very closely
at our capability, particularly in some of the areas where we
have proliferating threats.
So help me understand the technological advantage that we
presently have. And if you look across the future years defense
program, what we call the FYDP, where you see the potential for
parity to begin to enter the equation if it hasn't already with
some of our adversaries?
Secretary Mabus. Once again, I am going to give an
overview, and then turn it over to our submariner here. But in
the areas that we look at, and the technological advantages
that we have. We have got two majors, one is technological, the
other is what Congressman Israel was talking about, and that is
our sailors and Marines who operate these things and keep them
up to speed.
But we own the undersea worldwide. Other countries, China
and Russia in particular, are fielding advanced capabilities. I
think the Virginia class, with its technologies and its
capabilities, and particularly as we improve on those, the
Virginias that we are building now, are vastly improved from
the Virginia, the first of its class. The Ohio class
replacement is going to leverage a lot of those technologies
that Virginia now uses. And in this budget, we have asked to
start the VPM, the Virginia Payload Module, that will be put in
every Virginia starting in 2019, going forward to give it more
capability, more flexibility, it can deliver more cruise
missiles, for example, out of that, or other things, because
this will be a multi-mission capability.
In terms of weapons, the Secretary of Defense announced
several weeks ago that we are looking at repurposing some of
the weapons that we have now, like the SM-6, which is an anti-
air weapons and anti-ballistic missile weapon to being a
countership missile, and that will complicate our adversary's
designs pretty dramatically.
We are also investing a lot in other future weapons
capabilities, things like lasers. We have a laser in the PONCE
in the Arabian Gulf today that is a 30 kilowatt. It has been
tested. It has been there for almost 3 years. It can disable a
small boat or a drone. We are now building 100 to 150 kilowatts
of laser weapon as a follow-on, the electromagnetic rail gun,
which is a game changer. We are getting ready to test it this
year before deploying it on some of our ships.
And in the longer range, we protected science and
technology money. We protected research and development money
for things like unmanned, our unmanned system of vehicles for
these weapons that may be a little more costly, like the
railgun or the--well, the laser, but once operable, are very,
very economical, we are talking dollars per shot instead of
millions of dollars per shot. And as we are doing that to what
the CNO said, we are trying to rapidly get these things to the
fleet, the rapid prototyping. Do the initial testing here or on
shore, but then get them to the fleet, let sailors, let Marines
test them in far more operational conditions, see what works,
succeed faster or see what doesn't work, fail faster, instead
of going through the years-long process, and then beginning the
operational testing.
So I think that looking forward, we are facing more threats
and more competition from countries than we have in years,
since the days of the Cold War and your peer competitors. But I
think that given the trajectory that we are headed on, that as
long as we don't have the previous question, a sequester or
some large disruption, as long as the Ohio class replacement is
funded in a way that doesn't disrupt every other program that
the Navy has, I think that we can proceed with a good bit of
confidence.
THREATS TO NAVY PLATFORMS
Mr. Womack. I know I am out of time. I would like a quick
comment. I realize the security level that we are here, the
classification level, I know we can only talk generally about
it, but specifically, my question is, where do we see threat,
U.S. parity on a key platform?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. So I don't think a moment of
comfort, and words like ``ownership'' and ``dominance,'' I
asked my team to stop using that language, because it just
doesn't keep us hungry enough to fight for every inch to
maintain our superiority. I would say that if you look across
the Navy, you can talk in surface, aviation, undersea, and also
in the information domain, which includes cyber, the pace is
the issue. And in every one of those things, as we strive to
move into what I describe as maybe the fifth generation of
warfare, we are outpaced right now. And so, that is why the
Secretary and the Commandant and I are so focused on this
aspect of speed, because while we do enjoy a margin of
superiority now, that is perishable. And if we don't pick up
speed in each of those four areas, we are going to be
challenged.
This also includes high-end weaponry, that is why we
invested almost $1 billion in research and development to look
at advanced weaponry, so that our weapons are pacing this
threat, pacing the environment as well. So it is really across
the board. And if we do not come through these pacing issues, I
just--I am concerned that we are going to fall behind.
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, I would say this as I yield back my time, a
great enemy of pace is sequestration, as I think everybody
around this dais understands and we have got to find a
solution. I yield back.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. With that said, the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Graves.
``OHIO'' CLASS SUBMARINES
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral, thanks for
being here. Following up real quickly on the submarine
question, the Ohio class. First let me just say that I am
pleased to see it has been requested in the budget, and that
there is a commitment from the Navy for the replacement
program. I think we are all in support of that. And this should
be a top priority for all of us.
Knowing that the youngest of the subs currently is at 18
years, and I know there have been some extensions, I think it
is safe to say most are near their service life or towards the
end of it. And so, real quickly, knowing that the timeline is
quite potentially 14, 15, 16 years away from having the first
replacement in service, what is the plan from the Navy to
maintain the current fleet and to provide the abilities that
are necessary today until the first ones are ready?
Secretary Mabus. As you pointed out, Congressman, the Ohio
class itself has been extended, it can't be extended any more.
And that is why we have got to start building the first one in
2021, it will go on patrol on 2026 or 2027 to replace the first
one that is coming out. Then our plan is to build 12 of those
submarines over a 15-year period to replace one--well, it won't
replace one for one, because we are building 12 to replace 14.
The reason we are doing that is because the Ohio class had to
be refueled midlife, the replacement will not have to be
refueled. So we will have basically the equivalent of two
submarines by not having to go through that refueling.
Mr. Graves. So you feel confident that you will be able to
bridge that gap, this replacement gap with the current fleet as
replacements come online?
Secretary Mabus. Yes, I do.
Mr. Graves. Without any additional delays?
Secretary Mabus. We have, ever since I have been here a
long time ago, have known when we had to start building the
first one in order to replace those that are coming out of
service.
Mr. Graves. Thank you.
Admiral Richardson. I can add on top of that, I think you
identified that this is a program that is at the red line with
respect to risk, and we can't afford to delay for a day the
Ohio Replacement Program. Neither can we neglect to ensure that
we continue to invest in the current Trident fleet which will
be extended to 42 years, longer than we have ever extended any
other submarine class. And so, it is the great work that goes
on in Kings Bay and Bangor to keep those ships maintained and
going back to sea so that they can conduct their mission,
execute DASOs, those sorts of things that are absolutely
critical. Then we are coming to the end of the number of
Tridents that need to be refueled, but we need to continue to
invest in our shipyards for that major maintenance that gets
them into the second half of their life.
CYBER THREATS AND RESPONSES
Mr. Graves. Right. Thank you. The second question that has
been a great focus of this committee recently has been cyber,
and how is everybody adjusting to the new theater that exists
and that we are coming to know unfortunately more and more and
more of. I know the Navy created the cyber awakening task force
because of some instances that had occurred in previous years.
Can you tell us a little bit about that, what the outcome has
been, and has the desired outcome been achieved and how do you
see that moving forward?
Secretary Mabus. The outcome of that cyber awakening is a
program called CYBERSAFE, and it is how do you protect the most
valuable parts of our military, and our ships, and our
capabilities, and it is a defensive depth. I can get you a much
more detailed briefing in a different venue for exactly how we
are doing this. But overall, we are standing up, Navy is, 40
cyber mission teams to fold into cyber command which is DODY,
about half of those will help our operations, and about half
are for the combat commanders to do that.
We are recruiting differently in terms of looking for those
special skills. We are redesignating some of the billets that
we currently have, so that we can get and then keep these cyber
warriors, because you are right, this is the future of warfare.
CNO has done a lot of deep work on this and has been, I think,
making a lot of progress on it. And the Marines, as they draw
down to 182,000, one of the areas that they are increasing is
cyber.
Mr. Graves. Okay.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. If I could just pile on to
that a little bit. As the Secretary outlined, there is a people
component to this, standing up the cyber mission teams that can
respond to operations and warfighting in that domain. I will
tell you, as you know, sir, it is game on in that domain. That
is going on right now today. And so we are recruiting, training
and hoping to retain that highly skilled workforce. I will tell
you there is probably no place in the industrial base that is
more competitive than people with these keen cyber skills. And
so we are grateful for every one of those sailors that stays
with us.
The task force cyber awakening did transition into
CYBERSAFE. Our general approach, kind of at this level of
classification is that we will look to harden the network,
reduce its outward facing interface, reduce its vulnerability,
its target service, if you will. So we will kind of harden the
outer shell, reduce and harden that, and then nothing is
completely leakproof in this world. And so we have got to be
ready to detect any kind of infiltration through that barrier,
and then respond to isolate that as quickly as possible. So
that is generally how we are going. We are making some serious
investments across the budget, the entire FYDP to get to that
level of both people and infrastructure to support that.
Mr. Graves. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your
many years of service, decades I know, and wish you well in
your next chapter.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Diaz-
Balart.
LARGE SURFACE SHIPS
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. A lot
of my questions have already been answered. I want to just,
again, first thank the three of you for being here and more
importantly, for your service.
Admiral, you spoke about the worrisome issue of pace, of
keeping up, and you mentioned that you spent some time talking
about the submarines, which is one of the things I was going to
ask about. If you would, if you could talk to us a little bit
about the large surface ships and how we are doing there, what
are the plans there to make sure we are not falling behind?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, that is a great question. And so,
in our large surface combatants are guided missile destroyers
(DDGs) and cruisers. We have got a modernization program that
really brings us into the fifth generation across the board. So
from their combat system and combat radars, we are advancing
into what we call Block 9 of the AEGIS combat control system,
and we are on pace to do that as quickly as possible really.
And so that has been a keen priority of us.
Similarly, in the electronic countermeasures world, we have
got systems coming on to those to make them more resilient to
withstand and prevent being hit by an incoming weapon.
And then, finally, as the Secretary mentioned, we are doing
everything we can to repurpose and advance the offensive
weapons that they carry. So repurposing the SM-6, for instance.
And then, we are also enhancing the large surface combatants'
ability to connect and work with other forces in the Navy,
whether those be strike aircraft or other surface ships,
submarines, networking that altogether so they can combine in
new and creative ways. You have heard, I am sure, this concept
of distributed lethality; similarly, we have the NIFC-CA
innovative fire control counter air, which is the Navy aviation
piece. We are looking to stitch that all together to one sort
of integrated fires and effects network.
FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, just also briefly, I believe
it was you, Admiral, or the Secretary, talking about maybe
having to reconsider some actual number of submarines, because
of the new threats.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. As we have discussed, the way
we do that is by virtue of a force structure assessment which
examines the combatant commanders' needs, the warfighting
needs, and the theater campaign plan. It is really an aggregate
of trying to figure out the demand signal. The last time we did
that for the whole force was in 2012, and we refreshed it in
2014. But back then, we did not have a resurgent Russia, we did
not have ISIL to contend with, the Chinese challenge was in a
much different place. And so, I have directed that we open a
recommission, we restart a study. We take a look at what are
the current war fighting demands, the current demands, the
missions that we are tasked to achieve, take into account the
updated threat environment, and look forward to delivering that
new Force Structure Assessment as soon as it is done.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you, but since
I got on this committee, I have been really depressed, because
every time that you look at where we are vis-a-vis the rest of
the world, it is--the challenges are just huge. And I
understand that tough choices have to be made for fiscal
decisions, but I hope that we do get back to a position where
decisions could be made, strictly not on fiscal--when we are
talking about defense, not on fiscal constraints, but on actual
need. And clearly we are not there. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MARINE CORPS FOOTPRINT
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I have a few questions for General
Neller about where the Marines are.
Your footprint around the world. When I think about the
battle for Fallujah, the sacrifices there, things happening and
problems apparently going badly. When I recall the sacrifices
of all our military, but particularly Marines, what are we
doing today in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Middle East, the
Marine contribution? Do you have lower numbers, talk about
readiness if you are always ready? What is the footprint? Your
footprint around the world?
General Neller. Chairman, there are probably 31-, 32,000
Marines forward deployed, counting those west of the
international date line in the Far East. In the Middle East
right now, you have a Marine Expeditionary Unit that is in
support of the combatant commander, you also have a Special
Purpose MAGTF, and then we have some adviser teams that are
directly involved with the support of the Iraqi security
forces.
I would say that we are actually making progress in Iraq,
albeit slower than we would like. We also have a Marine in
command of a special operations task force there on MARSOC. So
I am in contact with these officers, weekly, if not daily, and
they keep me up to date so that in my Joint Chiefs of Staff hat
I understand what is going on. So the securing of Ramadi was
facilitated by some coalition Special Forces Marines that are
in there. So there is--I don't want to get into numbers, but
Special Purpose MAGTF, about 2,500, a good portion of them are
in Iraq. The MEU, our MEU is about 2,400 Marines, and another
equal number of sailors.
We have aviation in the region, along with Naval aviation,
which is part of the strike package. So they are fighting, they
are in there, and supporting the mission there. We have got a
small number of Marines in Afghanistan advising the Georgian
battalion, that do force protection at Bagram Air Force Base.
As was mentioned, the Arctic was mentioned earlier. Right
now in Norway, there are about 2,000 Marines exercising with
about 10 other coalition countries in Norway, up above the
Arctic Circle. So we haven't been there as much as we used to
go there. We have prepositioned equipment in the caves. So I am
sure others are watching that we are back in Norway, training
with the Norwegians and the U.K. and other countries, and we
plan to go back there, because just as we are concerned about
the Arctic, our Scandinavian partners and our NATO partners are
also concerned.
In the Pacific, there are actually two MEUs deployed, or
underway. The 31st MEU out of Sasebo and Okinawa, and the 13th
MEU, which deployed off the west coast. They are headed to
relieve the east coast MEU in CENTCOM, but there is a major
exercise going on in the Korean Peninsula, in support of
General Scaparrotti, Key Resolve and we will composite those
two MEUs and do a major amphibious landing as part of that
exercise, which, again, will bother the young man that leads
that particular country, north of 38th parallel. We are mildly
interested in what he thinks.
MARINE CORPS AVIATION
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I know there are adversity boots on the
ground, but boots that are on the ground around the world are
declining, and not to take anything away from our special
operators joint effort, but those numbers spiked up there, and
they do remarkable work while others historically have done
some remarkable work. Can you talk a little bit about the
aviation piece here? I know you have a huge dependence on
aviation. You have got the joint strike fighter, your fighter
that has been particularly designed for your crews. Can you
talk a little bit about where we stand in terms of readiness?
General Neller. We are going to--there are three versions
of the joint strike fighter for the Naval force, it is the B,
which is the STOVL version and the C, which is carrier version.
The program of record for us is 420 aircraft, 67-C and the rest
Bs. We have one operational squadron that will deploy in Japan
this January. We will form another squadron this year. The
airplane has aeronautically a sound talking to the air crew. I
know there are concerns about where we are with the software.
But we are iterating the software. We were down at the vendor,
Lockheed Martin, a few weeks ago talking to them and expressed
our desire to go faster, provide us more spares. So the
aircraft is going to get better, but I think the real test is
when you talk to the air crew that are flying, they are very,
very positive and they are very, very excited. I think it is
going to change for the Naval force what we can do. So now you
ask where are the carriers? Where are the MEUs? Now you ask
where are the Ospreys because you have an unfueled flight
radius of over 500 miles, and basically globally deployable
rotary wing aircraft that can take Marines anywhere in the
world. Now we are going to put F-35s on an amphib ship. A fifth
generation aircraft that can put most, if not the great
majority of integrated air defenses around the world at risk.
That is going to fly off an amphib ship.
To go back what the CNO said about command and control and
iterating the ships, we are going to have to look at amphibs in
a different way, because they are going to have to have the
command and control to link them to the rest of the fleet as a
warship, as opposed to just a ship that hauls around Marines
and their stuff.
So we see great opportunity here, the F-35 needs to get the
3-F software. We are going to hold the vendor accountable for
that and keep pressing them for that. We need a new airplane,
and we need to refurbish our old and that is kind of the place
I think all the services find themselves in is you have to
maintain your legacy.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Recapitalizing.
General Neller. Recapitalizing, and you are buying new, and
then when you take somebody--whenever you give somebody a new
piece of kit, they have to kind of go off. It takes us 18 to 24
months to take a squadron down, give them a new airplane, train
them up and then put them back out there. So we are going
through that right now with every model type series we have.
And so it is going to take some time. My concern is that we get
enough aircraft that are flyable and our air crews get enough
time to fly because people join the service; if they want to be
aviators, they join to fly. We know at the same time, all our
commercial air carriers are hiring.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is----
General Neller. Delta told us they are going to hire 900
pilots this year. So I am concerned about that which goes back
to the people.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much. Mr. Visclosky.
SUICIDE PREVENTION EFFORTS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two questions. The
first has to do with the 21st century sailor and Marine
initiative. And gentlemen, I would want to thank all three of
you. Over the last couple of years I have expressed concerns
about the efficiency of the Department's resiliency program,
particularly as it relates to suicide prevention. All of the
departments have stayed in very close touch with our office,
and my sense is very focused on the initiative and moving
forward. Could you just briefly tell us, Mr. Secretary, where
that is? And then, I have one more question.
Secretary Mabus. The entire initiative, as you know, is to
bring all the programs that relate to resilience, readiness or
our people under one roof, so that we can see if things cut
across, issues. On the suicide prevention piece particularly,
we have, in the last year, trained 800 people to be at
virtually every command that we have that can recognize warning
signs, that can provide intervention and that can provide
assistance. And we are working not just in that lane, but also
in educating all our sailors and all our Marines to recognize
the warning signs that one of their shipmates may be getting
into trouble, maybe contemplating something like this.
We are also trying, after people leave the service, to
continue that care. That if they did seek and receive some care
for a potential like that, that we keep in touch with them for
at least a year after they get out so that they are not just
left stranded after they leave.
And the other things that we are doing under 21st century
sailor and Marine sexual assault prevention, we have got a
myriad of programs there. One of things that has just popped
up, and I have told the committee, I mentioned this last year,
one of the things that cuts across many of these is alcohol, is
alcohol abuse for sexual assault, for child abuse, for spouse
abuse, for suicide, and for readiness.
The reason that we put in for both the Navy and the Marine
Corps breathalyzers, so that instead of just doing drug tests,
we are doing breathalyzers. It is not a punitive thing, but if
somebody pops going to work, they have still got alcohol in
their system, and if they do it more than once, we are going to
get them some help.
So the Marines keep what you have earned, you don't lose
it, you don't make a life-changing, life-threatening or career-
changing thing for that. There are many other programs in that
21st century sailor and Marine. I will be happy to come brief
you, or get you a complete written assessment of what we are
doing, but it seems to be working.
DEPOT MAINTENANCE
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate that narrowing of focus. If I
could, Admiral, just on depot maintenance, I understand there
is a backlog and there is an increased request for 2017. I
assume there are a number of ways you solve that problem. One,
a decrease in tempo, I don't see that happening. I am not
suggesting there is any new money anywhere. But if there were
additional monies, could they be put to use? Is there a
capacity to use and eat into some of that backlog you have?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. I will tell you that we are
really looking to, one, make sure that the shipyards are fully
manned, and Congress has been very supportive. We are on track
to hire up to 33,500 workers across all of the public yards.
And so, that will address some of the aircraft carriers and
submarines taking longer than scheduled to get out of
maintenance. We are also investing in the shipyards'
infrastructure, and, so, any additional resources that we can
get just allows us to invest in that infrastructure faster,
smooth out work lanes, and that sort of thing.
As well, many of our surface ships, non-nuclear surface
ships, are maintained in private yards. A critical part of our
industrial base is our repair yards. I have had a chance to
visit many of those around the country, San Diego, Hampton
Roads area, and they are terrific. But they also need to rely
on consistent funding, predictable funding so that they can do
the planning, and they can do the capital investment that
allows them to get better as well and get our ships through on
time. We are digging out of a hole in that area, in particular,
in surface ship maintenance. It is critical we stay on this
path. And so we very much appreciate the support of Congress
there.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Granger and then Ms. McCollum.
PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC
Ms. Granger. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, several years ago,
some time ago, the administration announced the pivot to Asia
and a congressional delegation went to Darwin, Australia a year
or so later to see what kind of change had been made at that
base. I don't--well, I know we are responding now to the
Chinese aggression and militarization in that area, but did I
miss it? I can't see that there is anything else that went
along with the pivot. Did I just miss it, or am I correct?
Secretary Mabus. Well, in terms of military equipment and
people of the Navy and Marine Corps, as I said before, we are
moving 60 percent of our fleet to the Pacific, that is up from
about 54 percent before. We will be there by 2020 and it will
be a much larger fleet. As CNO said previously, we are putting
our U.S. most advanced assets there. The P-8s are going there,
the DDG-1000s are going there. We are putting an additional
submarine into Guam and an additional submarine tender into
Guam. We are putting in two additional DDGS with ballistic--
antiballistic missile capabilities into Japan.
We are going to forward station for littoral combat ships
in Singapore. For the Marines, you mentioned in Darwin last
year and this year, we are putting about 1,200 Marines into
Darwin on a 6-month rotational basis to train not only with the
Australians, but also with other countries in the region. That
will grow over the next few years to a full MAGTF, which is
about 2,400 Marines and all their equipment. This is an all-of-
government rebalance to the Pacific. But in the military sense
you can see, as General Neller said, we have 22,500 Marines
west of the international dateline. We will keep that number
west of the international dateline. And so, we are moving more
ships, more ships from a bigger fleet, a bigger percentage of
our fleet from a bigger fleet, and we are moving the most
advanced capabilities that we have as soon as we get them, they
go to the Pacific first.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. McCollum and then Mr. Crenshaw.
MATERNITY LEAVE POLICY
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two questions
following up a little on what the ranking member asked. But I
want to start out with what I heard Admiral Richardson say at
the beginning of his testimony, that we want to do right by our
people. So Secretary Mabus, last July, you implemented a new
maternity leave policy that extended fully paid maternity leave
for Navy and Marine Corps to 18 weeks. And I commend you for
making maternity leave a priority.
Last month, Secretary Carter announced a new Department of
Defense-wide maternity leave police that would set it at 12
weeks. So where this was good news in doubling the maternity
rate leave for Army and Air Force, it reduced by 6 weeks, 6
weeks, maternity leave for women in the Navy and Marine Corps
who are not currently pregnant.
So I am concerned that the Department of Defense's new
policy rolls back a more progressive position with Navy and
Marine Corps investing in women and families. We have heard you
gentlemen speak quite often about keeping retention and
recruitment. Our women and men in uniform are the most
important resource that we have, and we must build a fighting
force that retains these investments.
So Secretary Mabus, you had a reason for making that
decision to set the Navy and the Marine Corps maternity leave
at 18 weeks. What went into that decision?
Secretary Mabus. We would lose twice as many women as men
between about the 6-year mark to the 12-year mark in both
services, the Navy and the Marine Corps. And it was to try--it
is almost always to have a family. In a dual military couple,
it is almost always the woman that leaves. We thought expanding
maternity leave was an effort to do two things: One was to keep
these sailors and Marines, to keep them from having to make the
choice between family and service, to keep those mid career, or
7-to-12 year people that we have invested so much money in. We
have invested millions to train a pilot or a submariner, or a
surface warfare officer or cyber warrior. And if we can keep a
woman, in particular, during--instead of leaving, number one,
we will save money; number two, it as rating decision, because
if we keep that 9-year sailor, we don't have to replace that
sailor with a brand new recruit.
And so that was the thinking that went into the expansion.
And we did a lot of research in terms of the private sector and
where they had found the most success.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate what
you did by really looking at mid career women in particular,
and by extending for those women who found themselves in the
family way currently the 18 weeks. I have to think that there
were women who might have been making a decision to reenlist in
that based on what I think was a wise policy that you had in
July who might be thinking now that they would have made a
different decision.
So Mr. Chair, when it comes to the sexual assault and the
maternity leave issues, and some of these family issues, I know
that the authorizers are working on that quite often, but it is
a really a cost-benefit analysis to the investment that we make
out of this committee in what people have referring to as the
soft power.
Thank you for answering the question, and I want to learn a
little bit more about how this may be effective to women if you
are doing the surveys after how the women felt about the change
in policy, which was taken out of your hands. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum. And
appropriators are just as committed and interested in this
subject as are our authorizers, and it will be reflected in our
bill through your good efforts, and also Ms. Granger.
Yes, Mr. Crenshaw.
ANTI-ACCESS AREA DENIAL CHALLENGES
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We talked a lot
about ships today. Obviously we talked about the Navy and we
talked about submarines. I know you have other programs that
are vital to our national security. The Chairman touched on
airplanes, P-8s, the E-2D Hawkeyes, the Growler. And as I
understand it, you have China getting more modern, and Russia
getting more aggressive in new areas, one of which I have read
about called anti-access/aerial denial, A2/AD. I think it is a
term that was used to confuse our adversaries, as well as
Members of Congress. It is hard to say.
But tell us a little bit about that whole challenge, and
then how we are meeting with some of the other assets we have
like the Growler, like the E-2D Hawkeye. I think we would all
be interested in knowing what those programs are and how they
are meeting these new challenges, and are they being supported
by the 2017 budget request?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I thank you for that question. We
achieved perfect operational security, even we don't know what
we are talking about. So thank you for that compliment.
The idea of area denial, A2/AD, is really generated by,
again, our competitors taking advantage of some of these forces
that are operating in the technology and information domain,
where it is just becoming easier, much easier, to have a
weapons system that can detect a target at great range, can
assign a weapon to that target, and then strike out to hundreds
of miles with great precision.
Now that takes an entire sophisticated chain of events to
make all that happen. And as we respond to that, we are
responding across that entire kill chain that we call. So you
really have to, from the very initial detect to the end game,
defeating any kind of weapon that is coming in, you have to
dissect that entire sequence and take it down wherever you can.
You mentioned aircraft. Aircraft are a huge part of that.
In terms of aircraft, you mentioned E-2D and the Growler, both
of those play a vital part. They are fully supported in the
budget, the fifth generation aircraft, the F-35, the Commandant
mentioned the Marine Corps version, the vertical takeoff, we
are asking for 10 more F-35Cs, the aircraft carrier version of
that in this budget than we did in our 2016 request to kind of
move ourselves into the fifth generation with respect to
aircraft. And so, this budget fully supports looking at those
technologies, it will help us defeat that anti-access/area
denial type of a net with confidence so we can continue to have
access wherever we need it to push the fight forward.
I would like to take a moment, too, sir. We have talked a
lot about depot capability, and the Commandant mentioned this.
Oftentimes we talk a lot about shipyards, but our aviation
depots are absolutely critical to maintaining the ready
aircraft so all of the pilots can fly. So just like in ships,
we are making up for a backlog in, particularly the legacy
Hornets and some of the helicopters that are working through
depots. We are investing heavily in making sure the depots are
funded to their maximum capacity. We are bringing on new
artisans, and they truly are artisans that work on these
aircraft. And we are also enlisting help from the private
sector, Boeing and L-3, as specific to increase the throughput
to get out of this backlog of maintenance and aircraft, and get
more aircraft on the flight line that are ready to fly.
So additionally, because we have been flying the Super
Hornets more, they are reaching the end of their life faster,
so we have requested additional Super Hornets, both in 2017 and
2018, to help us get to where these F-35 purchases can start to
pick up the load. And so it is really kind of a three-
dimensional process, moving our legacy Hornets and other
aircraft through the depots, buying some Super Hornets to help
us accommodate and make up for the increased use of those
aircraft, and then bringing this F-35, other fifth generation
aircraft like the E-2D and the Growler that will make us
relevant in that fight.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay, I want to make sure that members
have a chance to a second round here. Mr. Israel, any comments
or questions?
Then Mr. Womack.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Mr. Israel. Yes, thank you. Very briefly. On the issue of
professional military education, most of this conversation has
been about platforms, hardware technologies. If you could all
very briefly comment on whether you think we are investing
enough in training and ongoing education. Specifically, as a
matter of career retention, offering opportunities, enhanced
opportunities to learn should be an effective retention
strategy. If you would all comment on that very briefly.
Secretary Mabus. I will give you one very specific program
that we announced this year. We are going to take 30 slots for
officers around Lieutenant, or Captain level, and pay for their
graduate-level education, and we have already got people
studying now at Harvard, Yale, and Dartmouth under that. And
they are chosen by their commanders as the people with a lot of
runway in front of them, a lot of career prospects. And we want
to use this as one of the ways to keep them in the military.
Mr. Israel. Thank you.
General Neller. I would just say that it is a very
inexpensive way to maintain the professionalism, and the
capability of the force is to continue to educate. So you train
for the mission; you educate for the future. And so we are
committed that we have, whether it is educational opportunities
like the Secretary mentioned, professional military education
for officers, and I think one thing that we have done better,
but we need more work on, is for our enlisted force. Very,
very, very smart people, and I don't think we are stressing
them as much as we probably could to get more out of them.
So I would like to see, you know, more of our enlisted
force because they are deployed. They are busy. And to ask them
to get an associate or a bachelor's degree is a heavy lift, but
because of the way the world is and because of the capabilities
we are going to use, and the things that we are going have to
be able to solve, and the problems, I know they have the
capability and the motivation to do that. We have just got to
create a better environment for them to have that opportunity.
So we are committed to that, because it is, in the overall
scheme of things, it isn't a lot of money, and it is going to
maintain the quality of the people, and it is going to keep
them in. And that is really the most important thing is, we
don't have to keep them all. We have got to keep enough of the
very, very best that are going to lead us into the future.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well spoken. Mr. Womack.
AVIATION SHORTFALL
Mr. Womack. Two quick questions. One is a follow-up to
Ander's question about Super Hornets. There were two in the
2017 request, and I think there were 14 out in the 2018
request. Is there a capability gap in that timeframe at all?
Secretary Mabus. Well, we have also, in our unfunded
priorities list, asked for an additional 14 in 2017. But the
way the budget was structured, the two for 2017, the 14 for
2018, gets us a good way down the road to where we need to be
for the industrial base, for the line, the F-18 line having
only two in 2017, presupposes some international sales. And if
those don't materialize, to keep the line hot, we would need to
move aircraft into there.
MILITARY PAY INCREASE
Mr. Womack. I understand. And real quickly, we haven't
talked about military pay and compensation. The budget request,
1.6 increase, I think a half a point below ECI. Are we sending
a message to our men and women in uniform, and what would that
message be?
Secretary Mabus. My understanding was the 1.6 was above the
rate of inflation, and the message we were trying to send was
we value you. We value what you are doing for this country. And
it is not just pay. It is also the benefits that, like
education, like the new GI Bill, for not only the military, but
for their families. It is things like childcare. It is things
like making sure that families are resilient. And what we are
trying to do is make careers more flexible, make them very
competitive with the private sector.
Now, we are not the private sector. We do a very different
mission than the private sector. But the CNO pointed out,
cyber, people that come out with the IT capabilities that we
need in cyber, have a lot of job opportunities. One of the
things that we offer is the ability to serve. But we have to be
competitive in some other ways, and the last thing I would say
is something that the CNO has talked a good bit about today.
And that is, as I go out and do all-hands calls around the
fleet, which I do a lot, of course, I get questions about
retirement, and salary, and benefits. But I don't get as many
as I do about stability. Let us know that we are going to--give
us some stability in terms of where we are going as a force. Am
I going to still have a job in 5 years? Are you going to
significantly reduce the size of the Navy or the Marine Corps?
What is going to happen to me in the future? Give me some
certainty.
And that would--that is what I hear a lot, and that is also
what we are asking for. We deeply appreciate the 2-year
agreement. However, 2 years is not very long. And the force is
looking for, are you going to continue that commitment year in,
year out?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. This committee is all about
stability, and thank you for underlining that, and certainly, I
think, the full Appropriations Committee as well. We believe in
regular order, and certainly as it affects, as it adversely
affected our military in the past, we don't want to repeat that
situation again.
Mr. Ruppersberger, and then Mr. Diaz-Balart, briefly.
UNDERSEA COMMUNICATION CABLES
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah, Admiral Richardson, when we
discussed the topic of cybersecurity, and cyber warfare, it is
impossible to do so without talking about the cloud. However,
much of the critical global Internet infrastructure still lies
in miles of undersea cables stretched across the globe. And
this network is not only critical, but is vast. And there are
over 550,000 miles of undersea telecommunication cables
crisscrossing the globe as we speak.
Now, these cables are not only critical to the global
economy, but also vital to the national security of the United
States and our allies. Now, given the unclassified nature of
this hearing, in your budget submission, is the Navy, U.S.
Navy, properly resourced to secure these cables from sabotage
and espionage? And also what are your challenges in conducting
this mission?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, thank you for pointing that out.
And you make the point that just like traffic over the seas as
choke points, you know, the Straits of Gibraltar and other
choke points. So does our information system have choke points?
It seems like when you log on to a computer, you have got
access to the whole thing and it is free rein.
But as you pointed out, 99 percent of that Internet traffic
travels over those underwater cables, and so they are vitally
important. It is difficult to talk about this almost at any
level in an unclassified hearing. But we are----
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am aware of that. I am aware of what
vessels we use to deal with that.
Admiral Richardson. Right. Yes, sir. But we are focused on
that, you know, with a keen edge. We are working very closely
with our team over in Europe. I talk to Admiral Ferguson and
Admiral Foggo, our commanders over there, frequently about
this. There is a homeland defense perspective of this, and so
Admiral Gortney is the NORTHCOM commander, and he and I are
completely focused on this mission.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman. Former
SOUTHCOM Commander General Kelly had mentioned many times how
he could see drugs in boats, et cetera, moving through his area
of operation, and yet, just didn't have the assets to go after
a number of those. And you know, illicit drugs kill tens of
thousands of young Americans every year. How is your budget
recommendation going to--will it be able to make a dent on
that, and if so, to what degree?
Secretary Mabus. What General Kelly pointed out is the hard
fact of a shrinking fleet. And as I said, we have turned that
around. We are going to have more assets, and you are going to
have more assets not just for the Pacific, but for these sorts
of missions. And we are using different types of ships for
these missions as well.
The first littoral combat ship, Freedom, on its way from
the shipyard, basically, deployed, seized 3,500 tons of illicit
drugs. We are sending vast expeditionary transports, which are
very fast and unloading our Coast Guard friends to do the law
enforcement part of this.
So it is--yes, it is an issue. We are building toward the
fleet and part of the Force Structure Assessment that the CNO
talked about, that to get to a fleet of 308 ships, include
ships for SOUTHCOM, which is both the Caribbean, the Atlantic,
and the Pacific in that area.
General Neller. I will just add to that, sir, that we do a
lot of work with our partners in Central and South America as
far as training and building their capacity and there is other
money within the Federal budget that allow us to do that
counternarcotics funding. Last year, we deployed, in support of
SOUTHCOM, a Special Purpose MAGTF to Honduras, that operated in
and around the area, primarily to be there during the
hurricane, high-disaster potential season. We are going to do
that again this year.
So is that going to be enough to reduce the incursion to
meet the demand for drugs in this country? Probably not. But we
are trying to do what we can do within our capability and to
support, now Admiral Tidd, as the commander of SOUTHCOM.
Admiral Richardson. And sir, I just--you know, one more log
on this fire. Where we can, you know, we do send assets down
there. We were privileged to send the George Washington Strike
Group around through the SOUTHCOM area, and all along, you
know, both coasts of South America they worked intensely with
the partners down there. They helped build their capacity and
do a number of exercises, senior leader engagements, et cetera,
to show our commitment to that super important theater every
time we can.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is that the George Washington that this
committee put money into?
Admiral Richardson. The very same, sir.
COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I want to
talk about, I know we talk about the pivot to the Pacific, and
whether it is fulfilled or not. In reality, we have a pivot to
Europe here. And let me say, General Breedlove landed a B-52 in
our office recently in terms of some of the issues that we are
facing in Europe.
What are we doing since we are moving all of these assets
to the Pacific, for good reason, since we are aware that we
have got a Russian aggression in all forms that are facing the
U.S. Navy?
Secretary Mabus. Well, again, thanks to this committee and
to Congress, because the fleet is growing, we just added the
fourth ballistic missile defense capable destroyer that is
going to be home ported in Rota. We have four of those that can
do not only ballistic missile defense in the phased adapted
approach, but also theater security cooperation, operations
exercises. We do Operation BALTOPS with Scandinavia every year
with a lot of ships, a lot of our partners.
The Marines, as the Commandant mentioned, have
prepositioned equipment in the caves in Norway. They are going
through the exercise co-response with some of our allies now.
The Marine's Special Purpose MAGTF, the one in Moron that has
an element in Romania, the Black Sea Rotational Force to work
with; Romania, Bulgaria, our allies there, and to partner with
the U.S. Army in exercises and operations in that region.
We are, as we send Atlantic Coast carrier strike groups in
and amphibious ready groups through the Mediterranean, we do
work with our allies and our partners.
COUNTERING ISIL
Mr. Frelinghuysen. When you were here last year, Mr.
Secretary, ISIS didn't have a 150-mile bulkhead on the
Mediterranean. How are we prepared to address that issue with
today's Navy?
Secretary Mabus. Well, one of the things that is certain
is, we don't know what is coming next. Is the uncertainty like
an ISIS that we didn't know about 2 years ago? And so the only
thing we can do is have enough platforms, that are flexible
enough to do any mission; to have enough aircraft and weapons
that go on those platforms, and to train our sailors and
Marines for not just one specific issue.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have got instability in North Africa.
We have got instability in Egypt. Our NATO ally, Turkey, has a
degree of instability and I would like to see some comments
relative to our confidence factor that we are ready. And I am
sure the Marines will be able to provide that.
General Neller. Well, Chairman, I would say that, and the
Secretary mentioned this, the Special Purpose MAGTF that was
based out of Moron, and I didn't mention them as I kind of went
around our force laydown. But they are a land-based force
because there is not enough--we don't have an amphib ship or
ships that would give them the flexibility to move around. They
position their force.
We have special forces. Again, this is an unclassified
hearing, but we have special forces that are operating in that
part of the world, and in order to make sure that they have got
somebody to back them up, those Marines position themselves
during the time that they are on the other side--on the south
side of the Med to react to them.
So, Admiral Richardson and I are looking at different force
packaging on how we could move the ships that we have and
provide a better capability for Admiral Breedlove--or General
Breedlove and General Rodriguez. Clearly, they have requested
an ARG/MEU to support them. And we are trying to figure out
how, with the numbers of platforms we have, maybe one of these
alternate platforms would be a solution or a partial solution.
But you have got ISIL in Libya, and other parts, you have got
Boko Haram down in Nigeria. You have got the western part of
Africa, the Gulf of Guinea that the Secretary has spent a lot
of time in with our partners.
So being a maritime force, and then being able to come from
the sea, we can be in a multiple--we have the flexibility and
agility that gets the maneuver from the sea. So I was asked
earlier about amphib ships, LXR, and as the CNO mentioned, you
know, I don't--I know a little bit about ships, but I know that
if you build more of them at one time and you reduce your
nonrecurring engineering, and we have got a proven hull form in
the LPD, if there is any way that we can move any of that to
the left and repeat this, you know, it would allow us to get
more ships faster, and it would kind of untether us. We are on
the land because we have to be on the land. We would much
rather be on ship.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We need to make those types of
commitment. We need more ISR. We need eyes on the ground.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I can just byline a little bit.
The Secretary mentioned that we are going to have the carrier
strike groups spending more time in the Mediterranean
addressing that. And they will be fully ready to meet those
threats. We are going to--you know, that is the level to which
those sailors and Marines train.
But we are only able to meet half the Combatant Commander
demand right now. So as we adjust to both the Russian threat
and ISIL, you know, that is going to come at the expense of
somebody else. And so this is why we need to do this Force
Structure Assessment all over again to determine what is the
proper fleet size to allow us to get at the whole problem.
Closing Remarks of Chairman Frelinghuysen
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, gentlemen, thank you for your
testimony this morning. And again, to you, Mr. Secretary, there
is a cake in your future. I am not sure whether you want to
display it, but it will go with you, saluting your 8 years of
dedicated service to our Nation. And Admiral Richardson,
General Neller, thank you for your testimony and your
leadership. We are proud of the men and women that you
represent. The cake is coming your way without a candle. We
stand adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the
answers thereto follow:]
Littoral Combat Ship
Question. Please articulate the specific reasons, citing DoD
studies, that justify the reduction of the LCS buy from 52 to 40. Is it
the opinion of the Navy that 40 Littoral Combat Ships is sufficient to
conduct the missions demanded by combatant commanders today or in the
future?
Answer. The Navy's requirement for Small Surface Combatants remains
52, as determined by the 2012 Force Structure Assessment (FSA), which
was most recently updated in 2014. There is no Navy analysis that
indicates that 40 ships are sufficient to meet warfighting and presence
requirements.
Question. How many LCS platforms are needed to meet the demand of
multiple large-scale contingency plans in two theaters?
Answer. The Navy requires 52 Small Surface Combatants to meet the
demand for large-scale contingency plans in two theaters.
Question. What are the negative consequences and national security
risks of only procuring 40, and how will the Navy compensate for the
shortage?
Answer. Until the Small Surface Combatant objective of 52 is
reached, risk is manifested in three primary areas:
Fewer Small Surface Combatants mean that ships
responding to a crisis must either surge from home ports in the
United States, which takes more time, or swing from other
theaters where risk of conflict exists, injecting risk into
that theater's ability to respond to an opportunistic
aggressor. Delayed response time to a crisis enables the
adversary to better set conditions in his favor and may
necessitate revisions to the Joint Warfare Commander's campaign
plan.
Additionally, in the event of a shortage of Small
Surface Combatants, other assets may have to be assigned the
associated missions. This injects risk when the capabilities of
the reassigned assets are not the same as those of the Small
Surface Combatants, and also injects risk in the area from
which the assets were reassigned.
Finally, if time or events preclude waiting for the
delayed arrival of the Small Surface Combatants or if no
suitable alternatives are available, the Joint Warfare
Commander may need to accept the risk to the campaign of not
assigning an asset to achieve the Small Surface Combatant's
mission.
USMC End Strength
Question. Will a shrinking Marine Corps result in fewer Marines
being available for Combatant Commanders to employ, or will the OPTEMPO
of the Marine Corps rise in the coming years, assuming the today's
demand for ground forces continues?
Answer. Current operational demand already exceeds the Service's
capacity of readily available forces to meet myriad requirements across
the combatant commands. Reduced end strength, therefore, simply
exacerbates the challenge of trying to balance operational demands
against force providing capacity and capability. A shrinking Marine
Corps does not equate to reduced OPTEMPO; what it does is increase
risk--to the force, mission, and institution. As the Nation's ready
force, the Marine Corps is committed to providing ready forces to meet
operational requirements today and into the future As the Marine Corps
reconstitutes after over a decade of prolonged conflict that focused on
counterinsurgency operations, sufficient end strength is required to
properly size units to effectively operate across land, air, maritime,
space, and cyber space domains, and across the entire range of military
operations.
USMC Amphibious Ships
Question. You stated in your budget hearing that you have a
validated requirement for 34 USMC Amphibious Ships, but have a
preference for 38. Please draw a distinction between ``validated
requirement'' and ``preference'', and why you are using these
categories. Can the USMC complete its wartime mission, conducting
operations in multiple theaters simultaneously, with only 34 Amphibious
Ships? What are the national security risks we invite if we do not
procure 38 Amphibious Ships?
Answer. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps have determined the force structure to support the
deployment and employment of 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs)
simultaneously is 38 amphibious warfare ships. Understanding this
requirement, and in light of the fiscal challenges faced by the nation,
the Department of the Navy has agreed to sustain a minimum of 34
amphibious warships. However, Combatant Commander demand is more
realistically assessed in excess of 50 amphibious warships.
Shortfalls in the amphibious warship inventory have multiple
negative effects. This must be viewed as a two-faceted problem of
inventory and availability. A decreased inventory has negative effects
on both overall capacity and maintenance. For instance, our existing
inventory of 30 ships will, at current maintenance rates, only yield
approximately 21 operationally available amphibious warships at a given
point in time. This puts the nation at risk of being unable to embark
the 2 MEB assault echelon required for a forcible entry capability.
Further, as ships are stressed due to increased use, they require more
maintenance, driving up maintenance costs and compounding the problem
of availability.
While this 34-ship force accepts risk in its role of providing
combat support and combat service support elements of a MEB, it has
been determined to be adequate in meeting the needs of the naval force
within today's fiscal limitations. This inventory level also provides
the needed capacity for a forward presence and a MEB/Expeditionary
Strike Group (ESG) to respond to a crisis or contingency. Any
shortfalls below 34 will negatively affect our ability to ensure
constant presence, and our ability to immediately respond to tasks on
the lower intensity end of the range of military operations with Marine
Expeditionary Units.
Further, this negatively impacts our ability to serve as the
nation's expeditionary force in readiness and to prevent incidents from
escalating beyond small scale crisis. For instance, we have a
noteworthy lack of maritime presence in the Mediterranean. To mitigate
this, the Navy and Marine Corps are exploring opportunities to deploy
Marines on non-combatant auxiliary platforms, a less-than-ideal
workaround necessitated by the current fiscal environment. Auxiliary
platforms are not a replacement to the capabilities and survivability
of amphibious warships. Furthermore, this shortfall has forced the Navy
and Marine Corps to explore ways to distribute elements of a single
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/MEU across Combatant Commander boundaries
to provide some measure of coverage in various regions. Again, this is
not an ideal method when compared to the preferred employment of the
full ARG/MEU as an aggregated three-ship force which can bring to bear
its fill capability.
Finally, shortfalls negatively affect our ability to train.
Conducting amphibious operations with our joint services is not just a
matter of putting Marines on Navy ships. Those units must have the
opportunity to operate with each other during their workup to establish
relationships, tactics, techniques, procedures, and build
interoperability.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
Question. How has the potential for a sea-based CPGS system
affected the acquisition of any sea platforms, or the modification or
upgrade plans to any vessels?
Answer. CPGS has not affected the acquisition, modification, or
upgrade of any sea-based platforms. The Navy, supporting the OSD
Defense Wide Account (DWA) effort, has received guidance that CPGS
efforts should have no effect on, nor drive costs for, the VA-Class
Payload Module (VPM) effort.
Question. What feedback has the Navy given DoD regarding technical
requirements for the design of a CPGS system so that it might fit on a
ship or submarine?
Answer. The Navy, supporting the OSD DWA effort, has performed
trade studies looking at potential architectures for various future
CPGS applications and basing modes--air-based, land-based, and sea-
based. Understanding the constraints of all basing modes, Navy has
worked with OSD on notional CPGS payload shapes and sizes.
Question. Is money being spent to prepare sea or land platforms for
the future fielding of a CPGS system; if so, from what account?
Answer. Navy has not spent funds preparing any platform for future
fielding of a CPGS capability.
SM-3 Missiles
Question. I am concerned by the continued erosion in quantities
programmed across the future years defense budget for SM-3 Block IB and
IIA production. The lack of an inventory objective for the system makes
it particularly challenging for the Congressional Defense Committees to
assess actual progress toward meeting warfighter requirements. I
request the Department of the Navy, in coordination with the Missile
Defense Agency, to establish and report by fiscal year the inventory
objectives required to satisfy warfighter requirements for the SM-3
Block TB and Block 11A missile.
Answer. (U) Standard Missile (SM-3) missiles are fielded aboard
Navy ships and, recently, at the Romania Aegis Ashore facility. Navy
cooperates closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which acts as
the government procurement agent for all SM-3 variants. MDA has
developed an in-depth, budget constrained, SM-3 missile buy-delivery
plan, which results in the inventory plan shown below.
PB17 END OF FISCAL YEAR SM-3 INVENTORY PLAN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SM-3 Blk 1/1A............................................. 101 85 60 49 37 35
SM-3 Blk 1B/TU............................................ 92 128 166 202 236 271
SM-3 IIA.................................................. 0 0 2 11 12 14
-----------------------------------------------------
Total................................................. 193 213 228 262 285 320
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to a Navy Inventory Objective, the Navy utilizes a Naval
Munitions Requirement Process (NMRP) to establish the desired inventory
for all Naval ordnance items. For SM-3 missiles, the NMRP model yields
a Total Munitions Requirement (TMR) which includes ammunition ship
fill, projected threat-based combat expenditures, war reserve
ammunition for combat reload, as well as missiles in the maintenance
pipeline. The current approved TMR for SM-3 missiles has been provided
via classified means.
Personnel Review and Complaint Processes
Question. As a follow-up to my question last year about the SWO
Training Program, how do the Immediate Superiors in Command (ISIC) and
Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) ensure the instructions are
being followed? When a problem occurs, what documentation is there of
those problems and the subsequent resolution? Can you provide a sample
training plan as provided to SWO junior officers?
Answer. The Immediate Superiors in Command (ISIC) are responsible
for monitoring and validating that the SWO training programs under
their command are being adequately followed. ISICs are commanded by
Major Command Screened Officers, or more senior, and are Captains
(Paygrade 0-6) or Flag Officers. Unit Commanding Officers (CO) are
responsible for keeping their ISIC well informed of the progress of SWO
qualifications within their command. Additionally, each ISIC and Unit
CO receives refresher training on the SWO training program during Type
Commander (TYCOM) indoctrination before they assume command.
It is not abnormal for officers to struggle meeting the
requirements to qualify as a SWO. A majority of these officers will
overcome their challenges with support mechanisms in place at the unit
level. Tools are available to a CO and to SWO candidate officers to
enable qualification. The SWO qualification program is regulated by
instruction COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANTINST 1412.1 (Surface Warfare
Officer Qualification and Designation). This instruction directs a
minimum completion of schools, qualifications, and boards within a
timeline for an Officer to qualify as a SWO and subsequently be
eligible for career progression as a SWO. Deviations from the minimum
path to qualification are not authorized. Inabilities to meet the
requirements for SWO qualification are reportable per the previously
cited reference to COMNAVSURFPAC or COMNAVSURFLANT, via the ISIC. Per
this instruction, an officer is required to attain SWO qualification
within the first 18 months of shipboard service following completion of
Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC). Naval Personnel Command (NPC)
placement officers work closely with the Executive Officer (XO) of each
ship to establish a rotation date for their next career assignment
which is dependent upon their SWO qualification. This process provides
a dialogue for the ship, ISIC, TYCOM, and NPC to assess officer
progression. A CO may grant more time than 18 months to attain SWO
qualification if particular circumstances listed in the instruction are
met. In that case, the CO will submit a letter describing the extension
and the circumstances to NPC, copying their ISIC and TYCOM. This
notification enables ISIC and TYCOM oversight to assess whether the
officer will be able to meet qualification requirements, and if
additional support resources are needed to enable qualification.
Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) is the executive agent for
all SWO schoolhouse training. All new accession officers attend Basic
Division Officer Course (BDOC) within the first six months of
commissioning. Courses are taught in three schoolhouses: Newport, RI;
Norfolk, VA; and San Diego, CA.
Additionally, each ship develops individual SWO training plans to
meet the requirements promulgated in the aforementioned SWO
Qualification and Designation Instruction. Latitude is given to unit
COs to best define how they train and qualify officers to meet the
requirements of CNSP/CNSLINST 1412.1. Unit CO's are allowed the
flexibility to create training exams, scenarios, and boards for
qualifications to meet the minimum Personal Qualification Standard
(PQS) requirements as stated in paragraph 6 and 7 of CNSP/CNSLINST
1412.1. In those paragraphs, the course requirements and PQS
requirements are outlined and serve as the basis for individual
training plans developed by units. CO's are also provided the
flexibility to allow a variety of methods for a SWO candidate to
demonstrate knowledge. This is useful when an officer is having a
difficulty in an oral board demonstrating they understand the minimum
standard requirements for qualification. If desired, the CO can then
tailor the officer's training so further training is conducted with
additional exams or other methods of demonstrating mastery of the
required information and knowledge. A final oral board, chaired by the
CO and composed of other qualified, experienced SWOs, will still be
required; however the amplifying exams or demonstrations will allow the
candidate the opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge base.
COMNAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSURFLANT, as the respective TYCOMs for the
east and west coast, each have an officer assigned to manage the
administrative requirements of the SWO qualification program within
their respective subordinate commands. Each of the responsible TYCOMs
assigned officers have contact with ISICs and units to coordinate and
monitor SWO qualification progression and associated challenges. NPC
and SWOS also have program managers who collect feedback to monitor
required SWO career progressions, as well as incorporate improvements
into the SWO training prior to career milestones.
Ultimately, if a SWO candidate officer is not recommended for SWO
qualification by a Unit CO and their ISIC, the final decision remains
with the TYCOMs.
Question. What cross-decking opportunities are available? In the
past two years (since March 8, 2014), in how many cases where a Junior
Officer requested cross-decking, with the support of his or her new
Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC), were those requests approved? How
many were denied? In that time frame, how many Article 138 complaints
have been decided in favor of the officer filing the complaint and in
how many of those cases did the officer receive a new posting which
meets SWO requirements?
Answer. Cross-decking is one of a variety of tools available to a
unit CO to provide their SWO candidate officers with the necessary time
at sea to attain required experience and ultimately qualify. Cross-
decking involves the temporary assignment of an officer to a different
ship that has an operational schedule that supports training
opportunities at sea. When a ship is not operating for an extended
period of time, most likely due to maintenance requirements, units
coordinate with their ISIC, as well as other units, to find a ship to
accommodate continued at sea training for a SWO candidate officer. Most
often, those opportunities are sought between ships of the same class
as it allows the officer to capitalize on the training they have
received to date. Where possible, an opportunity for cross-deck
training is pursued in the same homeport, although circumstances may
vary and officers may cross-deck to a unit not in the same homeport.
If a ship is in an extended shipyard availability, then per CNSP/
CNSLINST 1412.1, unit COs are authorized to give extensions for SWO
qualification. When a ship is in maintenance for an extended period,
the use of simulators is a valuable tool that COs use to continue
training and progression towards qualification for SWO related
watchstations. These simulators are available in every Navy homeport.
The TYCOMs do not directly manage or monitor cross-deck training of
SWO candidate officers, rather those opportunities are managed by the
unit CO. The TYCOMs are not notified and do not track cross-deck
requests made by SWO candidate officers. In the process of reviewing a
SWO non-attainment notification, cross-deck opportunities, as
applicable, would be considered by the TYCOM prior to endorsement.
CNSF does not have record of any Article 138 complaints being
filed, or submitted, on the basis of being denied the opportunity to
cross-deck for SWO qualification training.
Question. Last year, you reported that all positively endorsed non-
attainment recommendations have been approved by CNSF. What
circumstances might move the CNSF to disapprove a recommendation? When
was the last disapproval?
Answer. The TYCOMs rely on ISICs to fully review and assess SWO
non-attainment packages given the context of each individual case, as
circumstances will vary. ISICs are the first to receive a SWO non-
attainment package for review. Once a SWO non-attainment notification
is received by a TYCOM, they receive a detailed review to ensure that
the SWO candidate officer was given the required time to allow for SWO
qualification and that any information provided by the SWO candidate
officer, describing extenuating circumstances, is fully assessed and
considered; however some cases involve formal Inspector General (IG)
complaints. Although rare, in those cases the decision for non-
attainment is likely held in abeyance until any required assessments
pertaining to the IG complaint are fully understood.
Circumstances that might cause CNSF to disapprove a SWO non-
attainment package would be if it were discovered that an ISIC and CO
were not satisfying the minimum requirements of the instruction to
provide opportunities and training for a SWO candidate officer. The
basis of a SWO qualification is school house training, PQS completion
onboard a ship, on the job training, individual study, individual
demonstration of required operational proficiencies, and formal boards.
If it is discovered that a CO is not completing these minimum
requirements, then the TYCOM reviewing the SWO non-attainment package
would evaluate options to allow the subject officer appropriate
opportunities per CNSP/CNSLINST 1412.1.
CNSF does not have record of the last disapproval of a SWO non-
attainment package. However, there are two instances in the preceding
three years where SWO candidate officers were identified as not able to
attain SWO qualification by their unit CO, but after additional effort
the subject officers achieved SWO qualification. In each instance, the
SWO non-attainment notifications were made to the ISIC, were endorsed
by the ISIC, and submitted to CNSP. While the notifications were being
reviewed by CNSP with the ISIC, the unit reported additional progress
by the SWO candidate officer and the unit CO changed their
recommendation to provide more time for SWO qualification. The first
case was onboard USS PRINCETON (CG 59) and reported on July 19, 2013.
The second case was onboard USS PATRIOT (MCM 7) and reported on March
11, 2015. In each instance, the officer ultimately qualified as a SWO
and has continued with their career milestones. These cases demonstrate
the multiple opportunities and flexibility given SWO candidate officers
to remediate and earn qualification.
Inspector General Complaints
Question. Thank you for the numbers last year regarding IG
Inspections.
As a follow up:
Question A. Of the cases opened between today's date of March 8,
2016 and two years prior to that, March 8, 2014, how many of them have
been completed?
Answer. Contacts \1\, upon receipt by the Naval Inspector General
are uploaded into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System
listing key information (receipt method, date of receipt, source etc.),
at which time we open a case for tracking and processing purposes.
Between March 8, 2014 and March 8, 2016 the Naval Inspector General
opened a total of 8146 Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System
cases \2\ and closed 7825 of them (96 Percent). These numbers include
213 investigations (3 Percent), 148 have been closed and 65 remain
open.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Contacts: Any initial communication received through the Navy
Hotline program.
\2\ Cases: Every contact upon receipt is entered into the Naval
Inspector General Hotline Tracking System and a case number is created.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question B. How many investigators does the U.S. Pacific Fleet
have? How many sailors are under its Area of Operation (AOR)? How many
complaints \3\ per year are received?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Complaint: An expression of dissatisfaction or discontent with
a process or system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. As of March 8, 2016, U.S. Pacific Fleet and its subordinate
Inspector General Offices were staffed with three investigators
supporting 105,231 sailors within their Area of Operation. For Fiscal
Year 2015 The U.S. Pacific Fleet Inspector General Program processed
multiple contacts, resulting in the opening of 278 cases, which
included 118 complaints per the Naval Inspector Hotline Tracking
System.
Question C. You reported that an investigation \4\ takes 417 days--
on average, which means that some are longer. What would represent an
ideal time, if you had the sufficient personnel to reduce the
timeframe?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Investigation: Any form of examination into specific
allegations or wrongdoing. An allegation is one form of an IG inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Per SECNAVINST 5370.5B, DON Hotline Program, dated November
24, 2004 and Naval Inspector General, Policy Memorandum Number 2013-
001, Improving Hotline Performance, dated Apr 23, 2013; the Naval
Inspector General objective is to complete Hotline investigations
within 90 days of receipt. Per Title 10 United States Code Section
1034, Protected Communications; Prohibition of Retaliatory Actions,
Military Whistleblower Reprisal investigations are to be completed
within 180 days.
Question D. Please provide a breakdown of the time needed for
preliminary investigations versus full investigations.
Answer. The Naval Inspector General objective is to close Hotline
contacts which do not include Whistleblower Reprisals contacts, within
30 days of receipt including preliminary inquiries \5\. If a full
investigation is warranted and subsequently approved by the Naval
Inspector General those investigations are to be completed within 90
days from the date of receipt of the contact. Per Title 10 United
States Code Section 1034, Protected Communications; Prohibition of
Retaliatory Actions, Military Whistleblower Reprisal investigations are
to be completed within 180 days from date of receipt. The Naval
Inspector General only processes Military Whistleblower Reprisal
contacts. Whistleblower Reprisal contacts for Non-Appropriated Fund
Instrumentalities and Defense Contractor/Subcontractor employees are
processed by the Department of Defense Hotline. Appropriated Fund
Civilian Whistleblower Reprisal contacts are processed by either the
Department of Defense Inspector General or the Office of Special
Counsel depending on the matter of concern. From March 8, 2014 to March
8, 2016 the average time to close a preliminary inquiry was 276 days
and a full investigation was 527 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Preliminary Inquiry versus Investigation: The preliminary
inquiry is less formal than the investigation because it does not
require the creation of a written investigative plan or the preparation
of an investigative report. When it becomes necessary to notify the
subject or subject command that allegations have been made against
them, the preliminary inquiry is over and the investigation begins.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question E. What are you doing to ensure IG whistleblower
complaints aren't being dismissed for lack of timeliness simply because
the complainants followed the chain of command process first, as you
stated they're supposed to in last year's QFR?
Answer. In accordance with 10 United States Code, Section 1034
Protected Communications; Prohibition of Retaliatory Actions: Paragraph
``(5) Neither an initial determination under paragraph (3) (A) nor an
investigation under paragraph (3) (D) is required in the case of an
allegation made more than one year after the date on which the member
becomes aware of the personnel action that is the subject of the
allegation.'' However, the Naval Inspector General does not arbitrarily
dismiss a contact based on not meeting the one year timeline. Our
process is to interview the complainant to ascertain the reason for the
untimely submission, and only after do we make a case closure
determination.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Carter and the answers thereto
follow:]
SM-3 and Ballistic Missile Defense
Question. Admiral Richardson, the FY17 request includes a
significant reduction in quantities of SM-3 TB and IIA missile defense
interceptors across the Five Year Defense program. As you know, this
subcommittee has worked to hold production steady at the economically
efficient rate of 52 missiles per year for the last three years.
Has demand from COCOMs for BMD capable ships increased or decreased
in the last twelve months? Are load outs of SM-3s on deploying ships
sufficiently robust to meet COCOM requirements?
Answer. Demand from COCOMs was consistent between FY16 and FY17.
Navy sourced a 2% increase in BMD ship presence from FY17 over FY16. In
the same time period, COCOM demand for SM-3s increased 14% and SM-3
sourcing increased by 8%.
Question. I note that the plan for BMD capable ships rises from 33
to 43 across the FYDP, a notable 25% increase for this important
mission. I know that the Navy does not manage procurement of SM-3s, but
absent sufficient inventories, BMD capable ships are certainly unable
to perform their full mission.
As capabilities of potential adversaries grow, would the Navy
benefit from an inventory of missiles that keeps pace with ships?
Answer. Yes. As the number of advanced Integrated Air and Missile
(IAMD) ships increases through the FYDP, ensuring the Navy has
sufficient missile inventory to load and potentially reload our most
advanced ships is necessary to quickly and decisively destroy the
threat.
Standard Missile (SM-3) missiles are fielded aboard Navy ships and,
recently, at the Romania Aegis Ashore facility. Navy cooperates closely
with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which acts as the government
procurement agent for all SM-3 variants. MDA has developed an in-depth,
budget constrained, SM-3 missile buy-delivery plan, which is shown
below.
PB17 END OF FISCAL YEAR SM-3 INVENTORY PLAN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SM-3 Blk 1/1A............................................. 101 85 60 49 37 35
SM-3 Blk 1B/TU............................................ 92 128 166 202 236 271
SM-3 IIA.................................................. 0 0 2 11 12 14
-----------------------------------------------------
Total................................................. 193 213 228 262 285 320
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to a Navy Inventory Objective, the Navy utilizes a Naval
Munitions Requirement Process (NMRP) to establish the desired inventory
for all Naval ordnance items. For SM-3 missiles, the NMRP model yields
a Total Munitions Requirement (TMR) which includes ammunition ship
fill, projected threat-based combat expenditures, war reserve
ammunition for combat reload, as well as missiles in the maintenance
pipeline.
Question. Do you think there is some assumed risk in reducing the
planned buy of SM-3 missiles by 50% in FY17?
Answer. Yes, a smaller quantity of ordnance assumes a measure of
warfighting risk. BMD capable ships and missiles continue to see demand
from COCOMs that exceeds supply.
The higher cost SM-3 Block 1B/IBTU and SM-3 Block IIA incorporate
new capabilities against an evolving threat that is beyond the
capability of SM-3 Block I/IA. Current Navy Global Force Management
(GFM) demand has been met with the MDA procurement plan.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Carter.]
Wednesday, March 2, 2016.
FISCAL YEAR 2017 AIR FORCE BUDGET OVERVIEW
WITNESSES
HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
GENERAL MARK A. WELSH III, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good morning, everybody. The committee
will come to order.
This morning, the subcommittee continues a series of
hearings on our defense posture, and today we focus on the Air
Force.
Our two witnesses are not strangers to us. Secretary
Deborah Lee James has been Secretary of the Air Force since
2013, and we always appreciate her candid and informed counsel.
Welcome, Secretary James. Thanks for being back with us.
Chief of Staff of the Air Force Mark Welsh is appearing
before our committee for the last time. In coming weeks, he
will be retiring from the Air Force after 40 years of dedicated
service to our Nation.
General, you are a skilled and valuable advocate for the
Air Force. We owe you and your family a debt of gratitude, and
Godspeed to you.
And part of your family, your better part, is here----
General Welsh. Much better part.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Betty Welsh.
And may I say thank you, Betty, for an Air Force life. Your
dedication to the airmen, both here and abroad, the
extraordinary things you have done. And may I add, for the
committee's information, you have four children, one of whom is
a Marine, so the service continues.
And we are awfully proud of you both. Thank you.
General Welsh, you caught our attention with your remarks
before the recent Air Warfare Symposium. You addressed the
possibility of the Air Force being called upon to fight a major
theater war in Eastern Europe or Asia against a well-trained
and well-equipped army. I assume you were referring to perhaps
the Russians or Chinese. You said, and I quote, ``We're not
really ready for that. It's going to be ugly,'' end of
quotation.
An assessment like that from someone of your experience
should be of concern to our committee and to the Nation, but
the facts are the facts. We have the oldest Air Force aircraft
in history and the smallest Air Force in years.
At the same time, the Chinese Air Force, the third largest
air force in the world, is rapidly closing the gap with ours
across a broad spectrum of capabilities: quality of their
aircraft, command and control, radar, electronic warfare, and
data links. China also possesses one of the largest forces of
advanced, long-range surface-to-air missiles in the world and
some pretty sophisticated space architecture.
Russia is procuring some new Flanker fighters and
developing a fifth-generation PAK FA fighter. The Kremlin also
plans to build 56 long-range, advanced S-400 surface-to-air
missile battalions. They put down their markers for a lot of
firepower, both in Syria and Iran, and deployed air forces to
protect it.
Elsewhere, Iran and other nations are working to buy
additional advanced air defense missile systems from Russia.
And while you and our committee are focusing on these
rising threats our Air Force and those of coalition nations are
actively engaged with ISIS and Al Qaeda in the Middle East and
the Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan.
While paying tribute to the bravery and skill of our
aviators, some suggest that airpower alone will not destroy
these forces or even bring them to their knees, that boots on
the ground will only assure that.
Of course, we need to keep all of these challenges in mind
as we go through this year's budget process. And the committee
is anxious to hear your perspective on how the Air Force will
maintain its aging fleet of bombers and fighters amidst growing
demand for their services and the readiness of those who
operate them, and, may I add, their youth relative to the age
of the aircraft.
And I am sure members will have questions about JSTARS, the
Russian rocket engines, the A-10 and the nuclear enterprise,
and your continuing needs for ISR--intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance. But a major issue hovering over the Air
Force and the entire Defense Department these days is the
looming bow wave of major acquisition programs. And I am sure
you will address a lot of those issues in your testimony.
We also saw the headline recently which read, ``The Coming
Dogfight Between the F-35 and the New Bomber.'' These are the
two most sophisticated and expensive planes ever, and we need
to hear how the Air Force proposes to fund both.
In closing, Secretary James, General Welsh, the committee
hopes you will convey to your airmen, officers, and enlisted,
wherever they are, at home and abroad, our deep gratitude for
their remarkable service each and every day.
I am pleased to yield to Mr. Visclosky for any remarks he
may wish to make.
Opening Remarks of Mr. Visclosky
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding the hearing.
General, Secretary, thank you very much for being here.
Look forward to your testimony.
Mrs. Welsh, I join the chairman in welcoming you. If there
are any difficult questions here in the committee, obviously we
will direct them to you. Welcome.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Secretary James, welcome. Thank you.
Summary Statement of Secretary James
Ms. James. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Visclosky, and to all of the members of the committee.
It really is a pleasure for General Welsh and I to be able
to come back and represent before all of you today the nearly
660,000 Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian
Airmen and their families, and we very much welcome the
opportunity to do so.
When we testified before all of you last year, we talked
about our three priorities, and those three priorities are:
taking care of people; striking the right balance between our
readiness needs of today and the modernization that we need for
tomorrow; and making every dollar count, being the most
efficient Air Force with the taxpayer dollar that we can
possibly be.
Well, I am here to tell you that those three priorities
have not changed, but what has changed over the last year or
two or three are some of the world's conditions. And you
touched upon much of this, Mr. Chairman, and if you will permit
me just to foot-stomp a few points.
As we sit here today, your Air Force is working hard to
degrade and ultimately destroy Daesh in the Middle East. And,
of course, we are not doing it alone. We are doing it as part
of a whole-of-government, a whole-of-military, and a coalition
approach.
Last year alone, coalition forces upped the ante against
Daesh, flying more than 55,000 sorties in support of Operation
Inherent Resolve, which represents a threefold increase over
the year 2014. And make no mistake, our United States Air Force
shouldered the lion's share of that effort.
Moreover, there is a resurgent Russia. It continues to
foment problems in the Ukraine. They have become involved in
Syria. And of course, they have recently announced plans to
modernize their nuclear weapons.
In addition, we very recently observed North Korea conduct
an illegal nuclear test and a rocket launch within just the
last few weeks. We continue to see worrisome activity in the
South China Sea by Chinese military forces. And, of course, we
have very serious growing threats in space and cyberspace.
And the bottom line to all of this is that the Air Force is
key in each of these areas, each of these roles, and we are
fully engaged in every region, in every mission area across the
full spectrum of military operations. The way I would put it is
we have never been busier as an Air Force, certainly not in the
35 years that I have been an observer on the scene here in
Washington.
So, to confront these challenges, to continue confronting
these challenges, and in order to maintain a fighting effective
force, we bring before you a budget which tries to do our best
to balance capacity, capability, and readiness.
It also invests in future modernization, though this is
where we made some of the tough choices this year, given that
the budget agreement for fiscal year 2017, for all of its good,
did not provide the full amount that we need for our Air Force.
And, as a result, we couldn't bring before you as robust of a
modernization portfolio as we would have liked.
So let me now detail a few of the highlights of our budget
choices as I go through these three top priorities, beginning
with taking care of people.
Our Airmen and their families are our most important
resource, and our budget reflects this truth. With that said,
you already mentioned we are the smallest that we have ever
been. We have been downsizing for years, and we know that
enough is enough and we cannot go any lower. The downsizing
must stop.
And, indeed, it has. We are now in a period of modest
upsizing, and we are doing that in a total force way. And the
top priorities include the areas of intelligence, Intelligence,
surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR), cyber, maintenance, and
our battlefield airmen. And we want to thank this committee for
supporting the most recent Active Duty plus-up from roughly
311,000 to 317,000 by the end of this fiscal year. You also
supported our recent plus-ups to the National Guard and
Reserve, and we thank you for that. And to underscore, we
simply cannot go any lower.
And, in reality, in our opinion, we believe that mission
demands in fiscal year 2017 are going to require us to likely
grow more in fiscal year 2017. And so, to meet these demands, I
plan to take a judicious approach to incrementally increase our
total force beyond the current levels, provided, of course,
that we can attract the right talent. And so we would be
grateful, when the time comes, for this committee's assistance
should a reprogramming action be required to help fund those
additional people should we get that talent.
Now, speaking of total force, we are continuing to maximize
our use of the Guard and Reserve by shifting additional
missions and workload when it makes sense to do so, such as in
the fields of Cyber and ISR, Command and Control, Mobility, and
Space. And we are continuing to push the envelope big-time when
it comes to integration of our Guard and Reserve. And that goes
from the staff level at the highest headquarters to the wing
level. All levels of integration we are interested in.
Moving on to other personnel concerns, we would ask for
your support to provide requested funding for a 1.6-percent pay
raise for both our military and civilians as well as targeted
pay and retention bonuses for a variety of career fields,
including our very important remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)
force.
By the way, the RPA and manned pilot incentives are now
equalized, and that is great news, but we shouldn't stop there.
Specifically, we are submitting a legislative proposal this
year which is intended to go farther to retain our aviators
against what we see as an improving economy and increasing
demand for commercial pilots.
And, finally, still on the subject of people, we are
expanding our budget for the Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response program this year. We are fully funding our childcare
operations, boosting educational benefits. And we are making
every effort to fund the most important infrastructure projects
that are of benefit to our airmen.
Now, moving on to the readiness and modernization equation,
because we really need both. As you just said and as we have
tried to explain repeatedly, less than half of our combat Air
Forces today are sufficiently ready for a high-end fight. Now,
when I say a high-end fight, I mean a conflict that might take
place in an anti-access area-denial environment--an
environment, plainly put, where the adversary can shoot us down
or can interfere with us in some substantial way in space or
air or cyber.
Moreover, in addition to that, today's aircraft inventory
is the oldest it has ever been, and our adversaries are closing
the technological gap on us quickly, which tells me we have to
modernize. We need to both be ready and we need to modernize.
Now, in terms of readiness, we will be funding flying hours
to their maximum executable level, we will invest in weapons
system sustainment and ensure combat exercises like the Red
Flag and the Green Flag remain strong.
Now, after consulting with the combatant commanders,
General Welsh and I agree that we are going to make some needed
adjustments to address some of the world changes that I
mentioned earlier. For example, we are now proposing to rephase
the retirement of the A-10 and the Compass Call aircraft. And
the bottom line here is we are not proposing to retire any of
these aircraft in fiscal year 2017.
We do believe that we will need to divest these weapons
systems in the future, but this change of this year will
maintain sufficient number of fighter and electronic attack
aircraft across the force in support of current operations. And
then the rephase that I mentioned will allow us to better align
retirements of the older aircraft as we phase in the newer F-
35.
Furthermore, we are going to continue to examine this plan
on a year-by-year basis and modify, if necessary, according to
the global security situation.
Now, in conjunction with ensuring the right number and mix
of the manned aircraft, we also need the right number of
remotely piloted aircraft and the very important munitions. It
is no secret that ISR is the number-one combatant commander
desire for additional Air Force capability. And to that end,
thank you, thank you, thank you, especially to this committee,
for the $500 million in the department-wide funding that we
received last year to fund increased ISR capability.
Believe me, we are working big-time with Office Secretary
of Defense (OSD) to get as much of that for the Air Force and
the ISR capabilities that we provide as we possibly can for
things like: the government-owned, contractor-operated MQ-9
lines and the RQ-170 and ISR communications architecture,
improved targeting analysis, and we would like some additional
money for man-days for our National Guardsmen who we are
bringing on to help us in the ISR world. So these are all the
areas that we are hoping to receive funding for, and we thank
you for that funding.
Additionally, we have 24 MQ-9 Reapers in the budget and
more money for Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and small-
diameter bombs, which are the key munitions being used in the
war effort.
Turning to modernization, we have ongoing investments in
our top priorities of nuclear deterrence, space, cyberspace. We
are continuing to advance on the F-35, the KC-46, the combat
rescue helicopter, and the T-X program. That is our next-
generation trainer. And we are going to start the Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) recap, as
well.
We will also continue to move forward with the B-21, the
aircraft formally known as the Long Range Strike Bomber. And
Government Accountability Office's (GAO)'s recent decision, I
think, highlighted that we did follow a deliberate,
disciplined, and impartial process to determine the best value
for the warfighter and the taxpayer.
But, most important of all, what I want everybody to
understand about the B-21 is that we really, really need this
capability for our country. It will be the future lynchpin of
our bomber force. It will be enormously helpful in that anti-
access, area-denial type of an environment that we view in the
future, and it will be important for both conventional and
nuclear purposes.
Now, all that is modernization, but this is where we had to
make some tough choices. So we had to defer some F-35s. We had
to defer the purchase of some C-130Js. We have to delay
upgrades to improve some of our fourth-generation capabilities.
And, of course, many, many, many needed infrastructure projects
for our basing structure are simply going to have to wait. And
we would renew our call once again for your help in authorizing
a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) in fiscal year 2019.
A few points on space launch. Point one, I want to affirm
to all of you that we are moving as quickly as we can to
eliminate use of the RD-180 engine. The target, as you know, is
2019. This is ambitious, but we are doing it and we are working
it hard.
Point two, we are moving toward a domestic solution for
rocket propulsion systems using full and open competition,
which is exactly what the law asked us to do and just as we did
with the B-21. And we have now obligated all 220 million of the
dollars that Congress appropriated in 2015 for this purpose.
And point number three and finally, we do need reasonable
flexibility to access RD-180s over the next few years until
such time as the new engine is developed--that is important--
but also integrated into a system and certified. So we need to
develop it, we need to integrate it, and we need to certify it.
And having just a little bit more flexibility with a few more
RD-180s, we think, is important to maintain the competition
that we have all wanted for years. A total of 18 is our
request.
The last priority is make every dollar count. This is the
efficiencies. And we have a number of things going on here,
including streamline energy usage, we are implementing ideas
from our airmen, and we are continuing the march toward
auditability.
As I wrap, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for
your leadership and the others on the committee for the
Bipartisan Budget Act--much, much needed stability,
predictability, and we are grateful for that.
While we are appreciative, however, we do worry about the
return of sequestration in fiscal year 2018. We ask you,
please, do your very best to get that lifted permanently.
Because if we were to return to sequestration, remember, we
parked jets, we furloughed people, we took all sorts of actions
that delayed our return to full-spectrum readiness.
So, again, thank you so much for your support of our Air
Force, and we look forward to your questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary.
General Welsh, front and center.
Summary Statement of General Welsh
General Welsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Visclosky. And a special thank you for recognizing my wife.
Betty is magic. And the fact that you took the time to
acknowledge her presence here today, I just can't thank you
enough, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Members of the committee, it is always an honor to be here
with you, and it is privilege to be here with Secretary James
representing our remarkable Airmen.
I would like to briefly address just two issues that are
pressing on the Air Force today: first, the health of the
remotely piloted aircraft enterprise, which we get a lot of
questions about, including some from members of this committee;
and, second, pilot retention.
First, the RPA enterprise. We are laser-focused on
improving the quality of life and establishing a manageable,
long-term, livable battle rhythm for our remotely piloted
aircraft community.
The explosion in people, platforms, and resources that
constitute this community, the medium altitude ISR community,
since 2001 has been stunning, and so has the volume and the
quality of the work they have done in the battlefield. Because
the mission area grew so rapidly, we have never gotten ahead of
the training curve. And each year, recently, more pilots were
leaving the remotely piloted aircraft force than we were able
to train to go into it. Not good math for us.
The Secretary of Defense helped us this last year by
freezing the global requirement for RPA caps for the Air Force
at 60, which is 5 below the 65 we were operating with 55 cap's
worth of people, which meant our people were in a surge mode
nonstop. This allows us to fully man our training units for the
first time ever and to build our RPA pilot training pipeline to
where it needs to be. By the end of fiscal year 2017, we will
be training 384 pilots a year in the RPAs. That is 200 more
than we have ever produced in a year in the past.
This is the first and the most significant step in the
overall RPA get-well plan, intended to improve quality of life
for our RPA airmen and their families. That plan also includes
incentive pay increases and bonuses for crews, standardized
organizational constructs, and crew ratios designed to allow
sanity back into their schedule, and greater Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve operational mission activity to relieve
some of the pressure on the Active Duty force.
Air Combat Command also initiated an internal grassroots
review that made over 140 recommendations that we are now
working to close.
As part of that effort, we intend to bed-down an RPA
operations group with the ability to execute missions around
the world at a new Contiguous United States (CONUS) location on
an existing installation approximately a year from now and then
a full RPA wing at another location approximately 2 years from
now. Both will provide additional assignment options for a
force that has been very limited in their choice of locations
up till now. Essentially, most of our RPA pilots went from
Creech Air Force Base to Holloman Air Force Base to somewhere
overseas. That was their entire career track up till this
point.
In the future, we are also planning to place RPA units
overseas in both Europe and the Pacific. For years now, our RPA
teams have been planning and executing lifesaving and life-
taking missions, but until now there has been absolutely no
normal in their lifestyle. They deserve the same care, feeding,
and professional development stemming from careers guided by a
normalized roadmap, and that is where we are headed. Air Combat
Command's hard work on this get-well plan is intended to light
the way for us.
No Airman joins the service to get wealthy, but the
unmanned aviation bonuses and incentive payments that you have
appropriated do help us with recruitment and retention. And I
just wanted to thank you for your support in that effort. But
on their own, they aren't enough. If we do not fix quality of
life for our RPA operators and their families, they won't stay
in the Air Force. So we are committed to fixing this.
The second issue is pilot retention, because the long-
awaited pilot retention problem is here. In calendar year 2015,
major airlines hired about 3,500 pilots, and they expect to
keep hiring at a commensurate rate for the next nine to ten
years. Military pilots are in the perfect position to fill
those jobs. They are highly trained, they are experienced, and,
thus, they are very attractive to the airlines.
Each year, we hope to retain about 65 percent of the pilots
who are eligible to separate from the Air Force. One of the
major tools we use in that retention effort is our aviation
retention pay that you appropriate for us. The take rate in
2015 was just 55 percent, so 10 percent below the average.
Proficient Air Force pilots can potentially transition from
being a company-grade officer in the Air Force to being a
commercial captain in a few short years with an airline salary
that is roughly two times higher than military pay with someone
of equivalent experience.
And while we cannot reasonably expect to stop the outflow,
we are doing everything in our power to mitigate it and to
convince those pilots who are on the fence to stay with us and
those who are leaving to go into the Guard and Reserve.
We are increasing pilot production to maximum schoolhouse
capacity. We are revisiting the operational demand signal for
pilots in nonflying jobs. We are partnering with RAND
Corporation to fully assess the net effects of this hiring
surge by the airlines. And we intend to seek legislation to
increase all aviation retention pay for manned and unmanned
platform pilots to $35,000 per year. And we will ensure that
you have all the details you need to assess that proposal.
Ladies and gentlemen, my personal thanks to each of you for
routinely dedicating your time and attention to our Air Force
and to those proud Americans who give it life. The Secretary
and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of Secretary James and General Welsh
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General.
We have a lot of chairs, and the ranking member is sitting
at the table here today, and there is a keen interest in asking
questions. Mr. Womack would like to have Chairman Cole have his
opportunity to be here today.
So, in an unselfish act, I am going to recognize you for
the first question so you can go relieve him.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Mr. Womack. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate my friend Mr. Carter for giving me the opportunity
to do that so Mr. Cole can make it.
First of all, to our witnesses here today, thanks. Thanks
for everything you do. It has been a source of great personal
pride for me to have a relationship with both of these two
persons, who have both visited my district. And I am eternally
grateful for what you represent, how you represent us, and what
you represent in uniform.
And I would just say this. I have had an opportunity, the
unique opportunity, to be around our services in a very unique
way, and I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, as far as Reserve
component integration goes, nobody does it better than the Air
Force. And that is a leadership-driven exercise. And I am
really grateful for that.
I want to confine my questions to ISR. General Welsh, you
just gave a pretty good synopsis of where we are in that
capability. And, Madam Secretary, you talked about it in your
remarks.
The Air Force fiscal year 2017 request includes funding to
sustain the MQ-1 and MQ-9 medium-altitude permissive ISR
capability with 60 remotely piloted aircraft combat lines to
support combatant commander needs.
So here is my question. Based on this surging demand that
you have already articulated, we know that you are increasing
RPA support unit capacity stateside, and do you expect the RPA
enterprise to continue to grow into the out-years? And what
concerns does that present for our country and certainly for
our Air Force?
I would also like to--I am going to put a couple of
questions on your plate here, and then I will yield.
As demand for ISR has grown quickly, the capacity has yet
to keep up. And, understanding our budgetary constraints, when
do you expect our capacity to catch up with demand? Now, that
does require to have a bit of a crystal ball out there in terms
of future conflicts, but I think you get the idea there.
And with the ever-increasing need for more, coupled with
units like the 188th in my district that support this growth,
do you see the need for more stateside basing of similar units
in the total force?
And I had some others, but I know I will run out of time. I
want to give you an opportunity to respond to those particular
questions because they are going to be increasingly important
to the fight.
Ms. James. So I would say, Congressman Womack, when it
comes to the first part of your question, in terms of do we
foresee ISR growth, yes, we do.
We have ISR growth already embedded in our budget now. And
based on, as the Chief referenced, the Culture and Process
Improvement Program (CPIP), that action that the air combatant
commander took where he asked many of the airmen for their
suggestions, it became very clear really to him and to all of
us that we needed more growth.
So I expect that there will be more growth that is coming
out of the next Program Objective Memorandum (POM) that we do.
So there is what you see before you in the 5-year plan, but by
the time we lay out next year's 5-year defense plan I wouldn't
be at all surprised to see more growth.
In terms of when will capacity catch up with demand, I
don't want to sound flip, but I think the answer is probably
never, because as we continue to grow, the demand just keeps
going up, up, up.
Now, we do have what we call our get-well plan in order to
have a proper quality of life, a proper pace of life, and the
right number of Airmen who are in sync with doing a certain
number of caps. So that plan we will catch up within the next
year, year and a half or so, if I am not mistaken. But every
time I speak to a combatant commander, they want more. And,
indeed, that has been our history. Every time we thought we
knew what the requirement was, the requirement has gone up.
And I, furthermore, think that more stateside basing is
something that we absolutely should look at.
General Welsh. I agree with the boss. I think the growth in
the RPA community will be two different types: short-term and
long-term.
The short-term growth will be more demand for what we have
today. We hear that routinely. The Department has tried to
stabilize the requirement at 90 lines. The Air Force will be
responsible for 70 of those; 60 will be blue-suit; 10 of them
will be government-owned, contractor-operated. And they will do
ISR only. They won't do anything else. And the others will come
from the Army and from others and other Government Owned
Contractor Operated (GOCO) operations run by the Department.
So that is going to be the requirement going forward. Will
it stay there? Probably not. I remember it was 21 caps in 2008,
and it hasn't stayed there very well.
The thing we have to think about, though, if it goes up
dramatically is more people. It is manpower. The biggest
restriction we will have won't be money or the ability to buy
the platforms; it is finding the people and increasing our top
line to afford 10,000 or 20,000 or 30,000 more people to do
this enterprise.
We have built this enterprise out of nothing over the last
10 years, 12 years, and it now has 7,000 active duty and 14,000
Total Force personnel. We did it at the same time we were
drawing down the Air Force overall 50,000 people. So to the
rest of the service, it was a 57,000-person cut.
So everything else is thinned out. We needed to build this
enterprise, but if we keep building it, we are just taking
muscle out of every other mission area to do it now. There is
no place else to go, which is why we had to go to modernization
this year in the budget. We couldn't take more people.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Womack.
Ms. McCollum and then Judge Carter.
THE ARCTIC REGION
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is going to come as no surprise to my colleagues that I
am going to talk about the Arctic, as I have with many of our
other service representatives and even in the classified
briefings.
Chairman Calvert and I spend a lot of time working on
interior issues, and we are hearing firsthand from many tribal
nations that we are going to have to be looking at working with
them for relocation for places to live. And so it made me
curious about what was going on with some of our other Federal
assets in the Arctic region.
So, Secretary James and General Welsh, as you know, the
Arctic is a resource-rich environment feeling the full effects
of climate change. Melting sea ice has opened navigable waters
in the Arctic and has changed the strategic calculus in the
region.
With respect to the Air Force, I am particularly concerned
about the effect climate change is having on our facilities in
Alaska. A GAO report on the Department of Defense
infrastructure and climate change from May of 2014 states that
the combination of thawing permafrost, decreasing sea ice, and
rising sea levels on Alaska coast have led to an increase in
coastal erosion at several Air Force radar early-warning
communication installations. This erosion can damage roads,
utilities, seawalls, runways, and, in some cases, cutting these
facilities off from all but small planes and helicopters.
Due to the critical need for these early-warning facilities
and a changing threat environment, we must ensure that our
infrastructure in Alaska is maintained. Are there Air Force
facilities at risk? What is the Air Force doing to mitigate the
impact of climate change on all your facilities?
Ms. James. So I will start maybe. And, Chief, you jump in,
as well.
First of all, when it comes to the Arctic, I agree with
you, it is very important. And we do, of course, have a
Department of Defense (DOD) strategy which feeds into the
national strategy on the Arctic.
And for the Air Force, of course, our focus in all of this
is access in air and space as well as early warning, being able
to conduct ISR, and providing communications. In the near term,
very focused on Air Force support to civil authorities and
other agencies that are doing a wide range of activities.
In terms of climate change, that is a big deal, too. And
recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) have recognized
climate change as an emerging threat and condition that we have
to really pay attention to in our national security. And
combatant commanders, of course, have to react and deal with
emerging threats as they present.
I do not have at my fingertips--but perhaps you do--the
exact impacts in Alaska.
General Welsh. Ma'am, there are a couple of facilities that
have been affected. We have one radar site--and I am blanking
on the name. I apologize. I can get it for you. I am just not
thinking of it right now.
Ms. McCollum. That is okay.
General Welsh. Which has had a real problem with this,
because the ice that used to be along the coastline that
protected the infrastructure along the shore from the waves
that would crash in is gone. And so the waves are now hitting
the shore, they are hitting the concrete abutments where the
piering was. They are actually working at the foundation of
some of the infrastructure that is along the coastline--stuff
that was never a problem before, and it is clearly a problem
now.
I believe the last number I saw was $50 million to $60
million in estimated damages at a couple of--total, in a couple
of places in Alaska, these small sites that are along the
coast.
We can get you the specifics on this, ma'am, because there
is an issue. It is a serious issue.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Chairman, as these facilities are
facilities we looked at maybe at doing general maintenance as a
line item in previous budgets, we might have to be looking at
moving them and the relocation costs associated with that.
So I think as we move forward in our budget planning for
facilities--and I am going to have another question later on
about some facilities that maybe should be closed down--we are
going to have to look at cost savings, but we are also going to
have to look at a security threat possibly in Alaska if we
don't start moving forward on making sure that these facilities
are secure.
I saw some University of Alaska shots of what they
predicted would happen to some of our Air Force assets in
Alaska and the moves that might have to come, because they
don't see this climate change doing anything but moving
forward. And Alaska is losing its ice shelf at a more rapid
pace than they thought, exposing some of our facilities.
Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Judge Carter and then Mr. Ruppersberger.
AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome both of our guests. I think you are both
exceptional people, and it is an honor to work with you.
General Welsh, as you know, the Army--and you know I am at
Fort Hood, I have got the Army all over me--is transitioning
from 15 years of counterinsurgency to decisive action
operations.
How does this budget reflect the Air Force's role in
supporting this strategic transition, ensuring we capitalize on
the relationship built between the Air Force and the ground
forces over the last 15 years? Can you speak to your service's
current support of the ERI at combined training centers and the
European training exercises?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. I would be happy to.
A couple of things. Number one, worldwide, not just in
Europe, we have been working very closely with the Army for a
long time now. Remember, air-land battle actually started back
in the mid-1980s. We have come a long, long way since that
point in time, and we have airmen embedded with Army units all
over the world now. They live with them, they train with them,
they fight with them, and they die with them occasionally.
So this is something we cannot lose the lessons from, not
just of the 15 years but of the last 30 or 35. We are working
this very, very hard. We have established a program office, for
example, to make sure those guys keep up with the technology
that the rest of our battlefield airmen and special operations
community are using and bring that to the relationship with the
United States Army.
We are reenergizing the effort to support the Army
rotations at the National Training Center and at Fort Polk with
our Green Flag exercises. We are in Europe, all the things that
are going on with European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). We
have Air Force units that are rotating heel-to-toe, just as the
Army and the Marine Corps have ground units rotating heel-to-
toe. The Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTACs) are
training North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) JTACs side-
by-side with Army maneuver units.
We are committed to doing this together. Mark Milley and I
are kind of bonded at the hip on this one. We can't lose this
relationship.
Mr. Carter. And you think it is better than to permanently
station over there to have the heel-to-toe deployment? Is that
a better plan? I have asked the same thing of the Army.
General Welsh. Oh, I think it depends on how you look at
it, sir. You know, the Army has done about what the Air Force
has done, which since, you know, 1980 or so, we have pulled 75
percent of our force structure out of Europe. Replacing it
permanently back into Europe would be immensely expensive and
would pose a set of challenges you might not get past.
The next best thing is rotational presence, making sure we
stay connected to our allies, making sure we are assuring and
reassuming them, and making sure that we are training together
in an environment that it is important to know how to fight in
just in case we ever had to.
Mr. Carter. Do I still have time?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge Carter.
Mr. Carter. Oh, thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Oh, did you have another question?
Mr. Carter. No, that is fine.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger and then Ms. Granger.
THREATS TO U.S. SPACE ASSETS
Mr. Ruppersberger. Again, I want to thank you both for your
leadership. It takes leadership, and you are doing a great job.
I want to get into the--we have talked a lot in this
committee about space costs, not only in terms of launch costs
but also in their development. However, in the face of the
resurgence in China and Russia, it is important to ensure that
we are taking the necessary actions to protect our investments
in space.
Now, in recent years, both Russia and China have conducted
tests of antisatellite weaponry. In order to ensure the United
States is able to continue to project power in space, I believe
it is vital that we have visible deterrence to these
capabilities of our near-peer competitors.
I understand the nature of this question is sensitive and
perhaps these deterrents are not yet ready to be made public or
are classified. However, please do your best to answer the
following questions:
First, do Russia and China currently have the capability to
pose a credible threat to U.S. space assets?
Second, is the Air Force investing in deterrent
technologies to defeat their capabilities?
And one other question I would like you to answer in the
end--and I am repetitive when we do this, but I think that the
sequestration law is probably one of the worst things that has
happened to this country and to our national security. And I
just want to make sure we ask the question, that you can
address if we don't deal with this issue.
Luckily, we have a 2-year hiatus, thanks--and I think most
of the members of this committee, especially my friends on the
other side, understand how serious the sequestration law is to
our national security.
Thank you.
Ms. James. I would begin by saying I do think there are
very credible threats to our space assets. And you know it,
Congressman Ruppersberger; a lot of America does not realize
how important space is to both military and to the civilian way
of life, but it is crucial.
And there are credible threats out there. That is precisely
why we are putting so much focus on it. We have shifted on the
order of $5.5 billion toward, as you call it, sort of deterrent
aspects, protecting our constellation.
And we are also, very, very importantly, undergoing a
culture change. When in the past perhaps we looked at satellite
operations as an operations aspect, now we are looking at it
much more as a--just as we look at other domains. We are doing
war-gaming, we are doing experimentation, we are actively
thinking about, if this happens, then how do we protect and
fight the constellation. That is a culture change for our
Airmen, as well.
And then sequestration, I couldn't agree with you more. It
is a bad law. It will have impacts if it goes through again in
every part of our Air Force, including space.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
General.
General Welsh. Sir, our space assets are clearly at risk
today. We are investing and planning for ways to mitigate that
risk and become more resilient in that domain over time. And,
clearly, sequestration is a threat to national security unless
we are planning on changing the national security posture of
the United States.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger.
Ms. Granger and then Mr. Ryan.
RESERVE COMPONENT
Ms. Granger. Thank you both for being here, and thank you
for your service. It is exceptional, and we appreciate it very
much.
General Welsh, on your retirement, I hope we get to see
some of you in Texas. I look forward to that.
General Welsh. You will, ma'am.
Ms. Granger. And, Secretary James, thank you.
The Army recently released a report of the National
Commission on the Future of the Army, and that was similar to a
product to the Air Force which was released several years ago.
As part of the report, a sizable drawdown of forces was
announced.
I know you mentioned this in your openings remarks, but go
over it one more time, what a right-size Air Force looks like
in terms of military end strength. And how are you best
incorporating the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve?
Ms. James. I will begin by saying I think a right-size Air
Force has to be bigger than the Air Force of today, which is
why we are building up minimally to that 317,000 number I
referenced on our Active Duty side.
But I am prepared, if we can get the right talent in, to go
beyond that. Under law, the Secretary of the service has up to
2 percent authorization to exceed end strength in any given
year. And so that is what I meant when I said, if we can get
the right talent, I would use that authority, and we may have
to come back and ask for your assistance at the appropriate
time with a reprogramming.
I think, similarly, we could use some additional end
strength in the Reserve components, National Guard and Reserve.
And, once again, I would judiciously use that authority if we
get the right talent into our force.
I think, you know, ultimately, 321,000, particularly on the
Active Duty side, is a number that we have validated, we have
talked about it in the past, so I would use that as a target.
But then we look at the ISR discussion that we just had and
needing to build that up. Those numbers are not fully in the
321,000. So it may actually be higher than that.
But my point is the bottom line is we can't go any lower,
and we have to continue the steady state of modestly building
up to fill holes, important capabilities like ISR. And it must
be on a total force basis. We thank the gentleman, Mr. Womack.
We like to think, you know, we are big total force supporters,
and we are.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
RETENTION
Yesterday, we had a hearing, and we talked about maternity
leave for women in the military and having a situation where
they are more likely to stay in and come back and not lose that
asset.
When you talk about the pilots and the training and how
many you have to train and making sure you have the right
people, I know you are also looking at how to keep the right
people. Because that training and losing them to the airlines
and training again is so incredibly costly.
So do you see changes in the future? Are you looking at
things that would keep them in longer?
Ms. James. We are constantly looking at retention
incentives, retention approaches. Specifically when we are
talking about women, the Chief and I rolled out a series of
initiatives some time ago to either help recruit or retain or,
in some cases, develop some of our fantastic women minorities
and, you know, white males, for that matter. We want better
retention across the board.
So the maternity leave is one aspect. There are other
aspects, as well. But you are quite right; when we lose highly
trained, very capable people, it is not a good day for the Air
Force. And so we want to keep them.
And, again, keeping them might mean keeping them in the
Guard and Reserve. If they are on the team, they are on the
team. But we want to retain.
Ms. Granger. General Welsh, do you have anything to add
from your many years of service on retaining our talent?
General Welsh. Yes, ma'am. We have always retained enough
talent to remain a great Air Force, and I think we will in the
future.
There are always going to be people whose time has come to
separate. Their family needs more stability. They have a
different career goal in mind in a different arena. Those
people will serve honorably, they will leave, we will
congratulate them and be very proud they stood beside us.
There are other people who are going to stay in because
they love the Air Force, they don't want to leave, they just
want to keep doing what they are doing.
And then there are some in the middle who are wavering one
way or the other, who typically enjoy the job, enjoy the work
they are doing, whether it is flying or anything else, but they
are frustrated by something. It could be not enough hours at
the child development center, it could be not enough flying
time, it could be any numbers of things. And what we have tried
to focus on is identifying those things that would make a
difference to the people who are on the fence and try and keep
them in.
For anybody who is leaving, we have tried very hard to get
the information out to them so they can go to the Guard or
Reserve. Because if we keep them in the Guard and Reserve, we
keep them in the Air Force. It really is one Air Force when it
comes right down to it, and they will be fantastic supporting
us in those components.
And so the Active Duty force has to remain strong so the
Guard and Reserve can remain strong. So that is where we tend
to focus. What are the things that keep those people who are
wavering and could go either way in the Air Force? And that is
where incentive pay, bonuses, and things do have an impact in
that regard, but they are not going to convince everybody. But
the ones we are after, they sometimes will keep with us.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Granger.
Mr. Ryan and then Mr. Crenshaw.
C-130 SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service. I appreciate you being here.
One of the issues that we have to grapple with, too, is not
just the military issues but also some of the other threats
that we are seeing that face our country and the world.
Last year, in the appropriations report, we gave you some
language for compliance with a directive to say that we need to
prioritize recapitalization of the Air Force's three special
mission aircraft--so the aerial spray, the airborne firefighter
system, and the hurricane hunters. And we are seeing even more
of this now with Zika, that the aerial spray unit, I think, can
play a major part in helping us combat some of this.
So can you tell us what your plan is to ensure that we can
meet these challenges?
General Welsh. Sir, the Air Mobility Command has got the
lead to put together an integrated modernization plan for the
entire C-130 fleet. That includes everything from C-130J
recapitalization to Avonics Modernization Program (AMP)
Increment 1 and 2 for all the C-130H models in all three
components.
Now, that plan has been--the funding is in place to
complete the modernization program for both increments. The
detailed plan of which units rotate when is being developed
right now, which ones will go to--on what timetable to do the
Increment 1 and 2 upgrades.
And the other piece they are putting in this is a game plan
for, if we were able to get additional C-130Js, where would
they go first. Because the only thing we have left on the buy
on the Active side is our Air Force Special Operations Command,
C-130Js, which come in over the next 4 years before they
complete. After that, there is no money in the C-130J line, but
we would clearly like to continue to recapitalize the C-130
fleet as we can. It wouldn't make sense to upgrade airplanes,
Inc 1 and then Inc 2, and then buy a C-130J and replace the
newly modernized airplane.
So we are trying to build into that plan an option for
recapitalizing specific units in the Reserve component with the
J model as kind of the first place we would go. Your language
from last year that came out in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) is part of the factors that AMC is
considering in that detailed planning.
I think within the next 2 months the plan will be
finalized, it will be coordinated with The Adjutant Generals
(TAGs) and with the Air Force Reserve wing commanders, and we
will be able to share with everybody.
Mr. Ryan. Okay.
Madam Secretary, do you have anything to add?
Ms. James. No, no, I really do not. I think the Chief
covered it.
Mr. Ryan. Okay. Great.
The other piece, quickly, Mr. Chairman--because I know you
are looking at me.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We always enjoy looking at you----
Mr. Ryan. I could feel him. I could feel him right here.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Listening to you.
ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING
Mr. Ryan. Just to mention America Makes, which is the
additive manufacturing institute in Youngstown, Ohio, that is
doing a lot of work with the Air Force now. We are also
partnering with the University of Dayton Research. And this is
3D printing parts well into--hopefully soon, but well into the
future that I think can save the Air Force lots and lots of
money, the military lots and lots of money, to be able to print
some of these parts wherever you are. This is the future of
manufacturing. This is the future of the military. And you are
continuing to help drive this.
So I want to bring that to your attention and say how great
it is to watch this whole new industry and sector unfold. It is
projected to grow about 25 percent a year for the next 10 years
and can help us reduce costs here. So I want to thank you for
your support for that and hope we can continue to have your
support on that. So thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are always proud of the Buckeye
contribution, and I am sure the Air Force has duly noted it.
Mr. Crenshaw and then Mr. Graves, who is very patient at
the end there.
JSTARS
Mr. Crenshaw. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me add my words of thanks to both of you all for
your service.
I want to talk a little bit about the JSTAR program. It
seems like every year the Air Force moves the goal post, and I
guess it creates a certain amount of consternation with this
subcommittee. Like, this year, you asked for half as much
money, and then the program slipped another 2 years.
And, as I understand it, this is a nondevelopmental
program. You take an end-use airplane and you put an end-use
sensor on it, and people say, why does that take 12 years? And
I have talked and I know other members of the subcommittee have
talked to senior people at the DOD, have talked to senior folks
in your organization, just to say, what is going on? Who is
slowing this thing down? And industry indicates you could
probably do this in half the time. That may or may not be true,
but we get different answers from the different folks we talk
to.
And I guess the question is--maybe, since you all are going
to make the final decision, we get to ask the right people--
what is going on? I mean, why is it taking so long? Is it being
slowed down on purpose?
It seems to me that there is a certain risk involved, if we
don't have these replacement planes, that the combatant
commanders are not having an asset they need.
So tell us what is going on, why is it taking so long, and
is there a chance you could speed it up or make it happen in a
more reasonable amount of time. We need some, kind of, final
answers, please.
Ms. James. So I would begin by saying the start date on
this has changed over time for at least two or three reasons.
So the two that really leap to mind: The Air Force slowed it
down at one point because I think it was the judgment of our
service acquisition executive and some others that the laydown
of the strategy wasn't quite ready at that point, that it was
too ambitious, that if we were going to do it we wanted to do
it right, and we needed a little bit more time to think it
through. So that was one aspect.
Another aspect is there has been a debate, which has now
been settled, by the way, but there has been a debate within
the Department of Defense with respect to, you know,
requirements and could this capability be done by an unmanned
platform and is it really ISR or is it battle management or is
it both. So there was a debate sort of surrounding requirements
that we had to work through, which is now settled, as I said,
which allows us to move forward.
So I just want to say to you we are very committed to the
program. It is an important part of our future. We are going to
get going with it. I would love to speed it up if at all
possible, and we will be looking to see can we do that.
It is a little bit more challenging, though, than taking an
existing platform and putting existing radars. It is a little
bit more challenging than that because it requires the
integration of these things together in new ways. So it is not
quite that simple.
But believe me, we do want to go as quickly as we can
because it is an important program for us.
Mr. Crenshaw. Well, do you have--I mean, so it slipped to--
this year, you asked for half as much as we might have
anticipated, and so it slips 2 more years. What are you saying?
That it is not going to slip anymore? Or it is back on track?
Or what is the new timeline?
Ms. James. So right now we are in what we call technology
maturation and risk reduction. There are three different
companies that are participating in this. And this is to buy
down the risk associated with some of the radars.
So the amount of money that we requested this year very
much goes with that increment of the program. So you have to
get that part done before you start spending money on the other
increments of the program.
So it is certainly my hope and I am going to be working as
hard as I know how to work to keep it on track according to
this schedule from here on out, with the caveat that these are
development programs, integration can be a challenging aspect,
and you just don't know what you do not know. So it is
development, and that is why I would caveat it.
Mr. Crenshaw. So you have a plan now. You have settled some
of those issues, and there is a plan to get it done, right?
Ms. James. That is right.
General Welsh. Congressman, there is no bigger proponent
for this program than me. It is in the budget. It is funded all
the way through initial operational capability (IOC). 2024 is
the plan. We would like to pull it back to 2023 for IOC, which
means we should be delivering airplanes into 2021 or 2022 at
the latest.
And we think we are past all the resistance. We think we
are past the tech maturation problems. We think, this year, the
reason for the lower amount was so that companies could
actually do this work. It has to do with integrating a radar,
which there were some problems with. And that is why I think
our Senior Acquisition Executive (SA) made a wise choice to
just take a deep breath for a year, let's get this right, and
then we will kick the program off and go.
I think we are on track. Unless somebody else jumps up and
tries to stop it, I think we now have a plan, it is funded, and
we are ready to roll.
Mr. Crenshaw. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is an imperative. And you are going
to be reporting, I think, to the committee in pretty short
order as to where we stand.
General Welsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Calvert--excuse me, Mr. Graves, I wanted to recognize
Chairman Calvert, who actually was ahead of you.
Mr. Calvert.
SPACE LAUNCH
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary James, General Welsh, thank you for
appearing before the committee. And, certainly, thank you for
your dedicated service to our country. We certainly appreciate
it.
We are proud of our Reservists and our National Guard units
over at March Air Reserve Base in California. They are doing a
fabulous job for our country, and we certainly appreciate their
support.
I would like to talk a little bit about where we are going
in launch. A number of us are concerned about space and our
future in space, what our plan is to make sure we maintain our
superiority, but we also have to get to space. And, obviously,
you know, we went down this track to create some competition
for ULA with SpaceX, which has been successful and--some
successful launches.
We didn't anticipate, of course, that Russia would invade
Crimea and occupy it and the provocative actions in Ukraine and
Syria and elsewhere, where it makes it very difficult for us to
justify acquiring RD-180 engines from Russia to power our Atlas
V. And, of course, the Delta is retiring. Now we have created
another monopoly maybe.
So we need to get a replacement engine as quickly as
possible. You were talking about that in your testimony. And I
am happy to see where the Air Force has worked together with
ULA and Rocketdyne to start moving forward with the AR-1
replacement engine. And Rocketdyne seems to be pretty confident
that they can get this engine up by 2019, but you mentioned
that there may be a need to acquire RD-180 engines, but I don't
think that the Congress, certainly in the Senate--I don't see a
lot of support for that.
So what is your plan for launch in the next few years
before we can get a replacement engine? I think, you know,
obviously, Blue Origin and others are trying to create other
ways for us to get to space, but we are going to have this gap
here. Are we going to put off the retirement of the Delta? How
many reserve engines do you have on the RD-180? How long will
that get us?
So, with that, I will turn that over to the Secretary and
the General.
Ms. James. You just gave a great summary, Mr. Calvert, of
the complexity of space. And there are probably 10 other
factors that I could throw into the mix that you just said. It
is a very complex thing.
I always try to go back to basics as I try to think through
all of these complexities. The basics are we have three
mandates. We want assured access to space, and that is the one
that we care most about. We want to get off the RD-180 as soon
as possible, and we are shooting to have that development done
by fiscal year 2019. And we want competition.
I think the conundrum is we are increasingly looking like
we can not have all three of those because we are boxed in in
such a way that something is going to have to give. So it
remains to be seen what, but let me, if I may, tell you our
strategy.
Because the Commercial Space Act says that we buy, in this
country, launch as a service--in other words, we do not buy an
engine and we do not buy a rocket; we buy launch as a service--
that is why we are trying to invest in rocket propulsion
systems that relate to launch as a service.
And so, as I mention, we have just awarded, in a full and
open competition way, moneys that you all appropriated that
provide different companies that have the capacity possibly to
take us into space ways to help their rocket propulsion systems
do that. And Aerojet is one of companies, but there are others
that also won some of these moneys in the competition as well.
The reason I said why flexibility and some additional,
like, nine new RD-180s would give us what we think is
reasonable flexibility, it allows us to compete. If we don't
have more, there may not be a competition.
Mr. Calvert. But isn't it true--I mean, I don't--there
seems to be overwhelming opposition to that, especially in the
Senate. One particular Senator I have in mind is just
absolutely no. So if that occurs, what do we do in the
meantime?
Ms. James. Then we may not have the competition aspect.
That is why I say we have three mandates; we may have to give
up on one. We may have to look for another mechanism to assure
us the access to space.
Mr. Calvert. Is SpaceX capable of meeting that challenge
if, in fact, they are the only launch capability we have?
Ms. James. There are eight types of launches, and right
now, today, SpaceX is capable of doing four of the eight.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Calvert. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Would you put some numbers on what you
are talking about here? This Monday, didn't you announce that
you will spend a certain amount this year and up to $530
million for Aerojet?
Ms. James. Yes. So------
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And then you are making a similar
investment with the Blue Origin.
Ms. James. That is correct.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Maybe we can give the committee some
perspective. We're talking about, I think, spending, I think,
to date, what is it, $750 million or something. It is some
incredible amount.
Mr. Calvert. I think it's closer to $1 billion.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes.
Ms. James. That is right.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Put some numbers, if you would, if you--
thank you for yielding.
Ms. James. Would you like me to do it now, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Please do. Yeah. I think----
Ms. James. Okay. So what we have announced $115 million for
Aerojet Rocketdyne, which assuming our options are exercised,
would go up to $536 million over the next few years. And then
there is--that is what it is for Aerojet. And I could go
through each of the companies. But the main point I wanted to
make is we have now obligated all $220 million that you have
given us for fiscal year 2015, to just show the urgency, that
we are getting on with this. And these are all different
companies that can help us get to space in a full and open
competitive way.
But the main point is the competition. We were trying to
preserve the competition for the next few years. And that is
where, if we can get the additional RD-180s, we can assure that
competition.
Mr. Calvert. Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we already
have a problem meeting our launch requirements. We don't have
enough launch capability. And I certainly have some concerns
here in the short term on how we are going to meet our short-
term requirements to get to space. And that is something we
really need to focus on here.
Mr. Visclosky. Would you yield for a second?
Mr. Calvert. Sure.
Mr. Visclosky. You had mentioned 2019, Madam Secretary. How
confident are you? Is that a floor or is that a ceiling?
Ms. James. The technical experts--put the companies aside
for just a moment. If I look at the--sort of the technical
experts in the government, they say 2019 for the development of
a new engine is ambitious. We are moving toward it. It has not
been done before in history. It is ambitious. But that is our
objective. That is what the law says, and that is what we are
moving toward. But the development of the engine is not
integrated on a rocket, and it is not certified. So there are
other pieces to this that must also be accomplished. And to get
all of that done, we certainly believe it is beyond 2019.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Who do we have? Mr. Graves.
JSTARS
Mr. Graves. Good morning, Madam Secretary, General. Thank
you for being here.
Following up on Mr. Crenshaw's questions as it relates to
JSTARS, and, first, let me just say thank you. I appreciate
hearing that you would love to speed up the program, and,
certainly, your passion for the program as well. We have a
passion also as a committee, and very broad support, bipartisan
support, in the Appropriations Committee, and in the Armed
Services Committee as well in the House and in the Senate.
And--but each year we have been hearing this love and desire to
speed up or accelerate, but for some reason things slip and
slip and slip.
Before you maybe share with us how we could accelerate, you
know, knowing that you would like to accelerate, what are the
mechanisms or the ways or the processes in which we could help,
or that you expect could accelerate a program, share with this
committee the dangers if we don't, because my understanding,
and maybe I am misinformed, is that there is going to be a
major capabilities gap that will occur, that we can continue
pushing this off. But as we do that, the current aircraft that
are being utilized today are beyond their service life, or
close. Half are in depot maintenance currently, when they
should be in the air. And many are going to be coming off line
over the years. And I heard that 2023 being IOC, which means
really not capable or being used for another few years, I would
imagine, or maybe that is.
But even if that was the first year of operation and then
in a theater somewhere, that is still 7 years from today. And
there is still a gap that is expanding over and over.
So, knowing that, could you just describe to us what the
dangers are if we don't accelerate. And then what are the ways
that you see that we could accelerate and move forward a little
bit quicker. Thank you.
Ms. James. Well, I would just begin by, you essentially did
a great job of explaining the dangers. We could have a
capability gap. The JSTARS of today are, on average, I believe,
47 years old. They have a lot of down time. There is a lot of
maintenance issues. And yet they are very much needed by the
combatant commanders. So the longer this takes, the more the
risk that we would have that capability gap.
Just a couple other data points on the current schedule. We
do expect a milestone B for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2017. The Chief already said the IOC is in fiscal year 2024.
But there is some possibility we could move that up a year or
two. I believe--I do not believe more money this year would
help. But let me go back and double-check that. I do believe
more money in the out-years would allow us to speed up and
possibly achieve that one- or two-year improvement that the
Chief talked about. But please allow me to go back and double-
check that dollar issue.
Mr. Graves. And as you mentioned, the capabilities gap, and
maybe, General, you could answer this, current number of
aircraft today that are operational, and current number that
would be operational when the first IOC is available in 2024.
General Welsh. Sir, I would have to look--I would have to
go look at the schedule of when airplanes are scheduled to drop
offline based on new depot requirements and degrading
airplanes. I don't know that exact number right now at IOC----
Mr. Graves. Average year would be 54 years old.
General Welsh. We can find those. But the first one is
within a year of now. So it is--the problem is here. It is not
in the future. And so the thing that has slowed this down the
most over time has been this debate about what is the best way
to meet this requirement. That has been the big slow-down. We
are past that now. It was a fair conversation, I think. It had
to happen. I am hoping we are past that.
The combatant commanders are still very clear in their
requirement, the joint staff--Joint Requirements Oversight
Council still supported the requirement, and so we are moving.
And we will sign an Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) contract. Right now, the milestone is the first quarter
of fiscal year 2018. Once that contract is signed, I think we
will have a better idea of the real timeline for the program.
And we will very shortly, after that, have an idea of how much
can you accelerate based on where the technology and the
integration process stands then; How successful was our risk
reduction, and technology maturation effort over this year and
the next year? And we will know more by then.
At that point, I think if we can accelerate, that is when
we can throw more money at the problem and try and move it
ahead faster. Until then, I think we are guessing. And I would
hate to put a whole lot more money into the program at this
point until we knew that we could actually use it the right
way.
Mr. Graves. Okay. All right.
General Welsh. I would hate to even ask you for that money
at this particular point.
Mr. Graves. Well, thank you. Mr. Chairman, let me note, I
mean, this just gives me greater appreciation for our airmen
and women to know that they are doing all they can with an
average age of aircraft, you said, 47 years old today. And it
would be likely 54 years old when we finally get there. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
General Welsh. Chairman, if I could just point out, that
would be--now be, at that point in time, our seventh fleet of
aircraft that would be over 50 years old.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So noted with alarm.
AIR FORCE DEPOTS
Chairman Cole. Thank you.
Mr. Cole. Well, we are not all alarmed because a lot of
those get maintained at Tinker Air Force Base, Mr. Chairman. So
I think we do that pretty well, just in case that was
overlooked.
But it actually does get to the question I wanted to ask.
And I will be sort of shamelessly parochial here. But I will
try and include other depots as well. As you know, Madam
Secretary, better than any of us around this table, about 70 or
80 percent of the cost of any weapon system is maintaining it
over its project life cycle. And we all know that we are
maintaining a lot of systems a lot longer than we ever intended
them to be maintained.
So, we run into problems, like my friend from Georgia
referred to, where these things are very difficult. Almost have
to be individualized in how you overhaul each particular plane,
because we are way beyond what anybody thought about, you know,
how you would maintain them. So, even getting parts sometimes
is a huge problem.
So, how comfortable are you that you have got what you need
in terms of both the three major depots that you have, and,
obviously, we have a lot of private contractors involved in
this kind of work, and are we directing enough money into those
areas if, indeed, we are going to have to keep these planes
flying longer than any of us would like to?
Ms. James. Well, first, if I could begin by saying, I, of
course, have been to our depots. Very, very proud of the work
that is going on. Fantastic accomplishments for this very
important area of sustainment. I would also tell you that we
are continuing to invest in such things as tooling, and the
various types of equipment that are required in the depots for
both our new systems like the F-35, the KC-46 that are coming
on. But also, for our existing systems, the existing aircraft,
the nuclear mission, et cetera, et cetera. So I think we are
doing a pretty good job of investing in that sort of equipment.
Two concerns I would, you know, give you is that--and this
is a concern across the board I mentioned at my opening
statement: infrastructure, so keeping up the roads, keeping up
the buildings. So for the depots, I am worried about
infrastructure. But you know what? I am worried about that
across the whole Air Force. So that is one thing.
And then civilian hiring is another thing. So the depots
are, of course, largely civilian employees. And when you
combine the effects of sequestration a few years ago and that
set us behind in terms of the workload, the hiring, that got us
all messed up. You have got Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) rules, which are a constraining factor for us. Security
clearances that are, you know, long to come through. All of
this is a concern. So I would say civilian hiring and
infrastructure would be the two concerns.
Mr. Cole. On that point, on the hiring point and the
workforce point, you know, frank--during sequestration, a self-
inflicted wound we all agree was a mistake, but when we had
government shutdowns, we also made a pretty big mistake,
because we were furloughing people that we paid through the
Working Capital Fund at places like Tinker that didn't need to
be furloughed. And so a lot of that extra work was built up.
So none of us ever want to be in that situation again. But
if we are, I would--and I ask for a response on this, I would
urge that you keep the workforces that you can working. Don't
just send them home because some have to go home. Make sure--
because it was a much more difficult problem getting up, having
lost their capacity, then we are in an overtime situation, and
it is more expensive at the other end.
So when you can keep people working, and those workforces,
again, because of way in which they are paid, many of them can
be kept there. I would hope we could do that if we are ever in
this situation again.
Ms. James. Thank you.
Mr. Cole. Do you have a comment that you would care to
make?
Ms. James. No. I think that all----
Mr. Cole. I could make an assurance.
Secretary James. That all makes good sense to me.
Mr. Cole. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
RD-180
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Just getting back to Congressman
Calvert's question about the RD-180, if we don't have the
capacity, we are dependent on these Russian engines, right? How
else are we going to do whatever we need to do for the next
couple of years without them?
Ms. James. If we did not have them----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is a national security issue here.
Ms. James. Right. It is a national security issue. And if
we did not have them at all, then we would rely on SpaceX to
the extent that we could. We would have to shift to the much
more expensive Delta alternative and pay whatever the cost is
that we would have to pay. So it is theoretically possible, but
without RD-180s at all, it is a lot of new complexity. And I
don't see how we would have the competition, perhaps, that we
have all hoped for and envisioned, because there would be no
way Delta would ever be competitive with SpaceX.
RUSSIAN AND CHINESE CAPABILITIES
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I mentioned in my opening remarks about
the capacities of the Russian Air Force and the Chinese.
Certainly, there has been a lot of aggressive behavior. In some
cases, we are deconflicting with them over Syria, and at times,
they appear to have us, sort of, butt out. The Chinese have
been doing some pretty remarkable things in the South China
Seas. A lot of aspirations, a lot of their own capabilities.
How are we matched against their, General Welsh, or, Madam
Secretary, against some of their capacities?
General Welsh. Sir, right now capacity-wise, let's start
with the Chinese, they have about 325,000 people in the
People's Liberation Army/Air Force, which is a little bit--
about the same size as we are, a little bit larger. But we have
a couple thousand more aircraft today. The rate they are
building, the models they are fielding, by 2030, they will have
fielded--they will have made up that 2,000 aircraft gap. And
they will be at least as big, if not bigger than our Air Force
is in terms of aircraft. And they will have to go to the people
with it to operate them, so they will be significantly larger
in terms of people.
They also, during that timeframe, will field a number of
new aircraft, a handful full of new--completely new variants,
and will have modified three of their older variants in that
same timeframe. And we are not keeping up with that kind of
technology, development.
We are still in the position of we have--we will have the
best technology in the battle space, especially if we can
continue with our current big three modernization programs, the
Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB) and the F-35. But they will
have a lot of technology that is better than the stuff we have
had before. And so the--what the--and the Russians are doing
the same thing in the nuclear business. Not so much in the
conventional force, but they are demonstrating capabilities
that they haven't demonstrated to us before, cruise missiles.
Some of their new aircraft are dropping weapons for the first
time in conflict. We are able to watch and see how this is
working.
So they are a serious Air Force. And they are serious about
getting better. And the Chinese, in particular, clearly have a
blueprint that is matching against our shortfalls. And so I
think that is something that we have to consider as we look to
the future. Not modernizing our Air Force is not an answer that
is acceptable.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Sometimes it is a sensitive subject, but
there is an issue of rules of engagement. We had the Navy in
here the other day, and we discussed the history of free
passage and free navigation. You know, we look at things that
the Chinese are requiring of us today. How do you deal with
that issue? I don't think it is just anecdotal. There are
challenges that our airmen are facing that sometimes we don't
hear about.
What are the rules of engagement? And how would you
characterize some of the instances we have read about, in terms
of the Chinese, shall we say, confronting our aircraft? The
Russians, I assume, in other parts of the world have been going
across the East Coast and at times obviously doing a variety of
surveillance. How are we matching that?
General Welsh. Sir, the--I am assuming you are talking
about the intercepts of aircraft that are----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, I am.
General Welsh [continuing]. Being conducted.
There have been incidents where we thought the intercept
and the contact of the pilot after the intercept was not
acceptable. It was certainly not within the bounds of normal
behavior. But there have not been that many of them, relatively
speaking. And when there is one, it is highlighted. We actually
do communicate with both the Russians and the Chinese and point
out to them the behavior. And the behavior tends to adjust. For
example, in the East China Sea, we had an issue with aircraft
from a particular unit that were intercepting some of our ISR
platforms that were behaving aggressively. And after a demarche
following that, that behavior changed.
So it is not--when you read about it, it is really an
isolated incident, in my view, compared to the majority of
intercepts which are relatively professionally accomplished.
And that is true both with China and Russia. We also intercept
their platforms when they fly either around Europe or they fly
around the coast of the United States. And we have the same
protocols. We----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. What about the issue of denial of
airspace?
General Welsh. Well----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We read from time to time of symbolic
flights. But in reality, have we conceded anything?
General Welsh. No, sir. In the South China Sea, for
example, as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command
repeatedly states, we have not changed our patterns, we have
freedom of navigation in that area. We still do overflight of
that area. We have made it very clear that that is not a
Chinese restricted zone of any type, either on the sea or in
the air.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Joint strike fighter, the ALIS system,
can we talk a little bit about some of the issues that you have
been focusing on to get that system right and tell us why it is
so important?
General Welsh. The two big issues that I believe exist
between now and initial operational capability this fall, our
window is August to December to clear that, and I am pretty
confident we are going to get there from here. The two issues
have been development of the automated logistics information
system. It has been a complicated process. It has been
difficult journey that the companies and the services have been
on trying to get this to where it needs to be for the future.
But I am actually relatively confident we will get there
for what we need to have at IOC. The biggest issue right now is
getting engine data incorporated into Autonomic Logistics
Information System (ALIS) because it comes from a different
contractor. And the companies have been working together trying
to make this happen. And I am expecting to have that data
integrated in July. And that will give us a month or so to look
at how it operates, make sure it is working properly before we
enter our IOC window.
The other issue that--Lockheed Martin, in particular, and
their subcontractors are paying an awful lot of attention to is
a software problem, and it has to do with radar stability. It
is software stability, but it is really radar stability. And
they have been working this extremely hard. They now have their
software integration labs on 24/7, 7-day-a-week operations
doing multiple quick iterations of software changes.
They are fielding a recommended change to the software they
think will field this problem. They have done it in the labs in
February. They are putting it into platforms in March. And we
hope we will be able to put it in the airplanes shortly
thereafter to make sure that it is working. So those are the
two big things, sir. But I think we will get there.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. There has been some loose talk, and I
think it is hopefully on the loose, that somehow people--some
might bypass this new system of systems here. And that is
something I don't think would be advisable.
General Welsh. As far as bypassing the F-35?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. No, not the F-35, but trying to get
around the--what you tell me is going to be a good news story
at some point time.
General Welsh. Oh, yes, sir. No. We cannot get around----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We can't do that.
General Welsh. We got to run forehead first right through
the middle of it. Yeah. This has got to work, the airplane's
got to do what we were told it would do, and what the
requirements demand that it does, clearly. And that is where we
are going.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Further questions, members?
Yes, Mr. Visclosky. Excuse me.
U.S. SPACE STRATEGY
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had a
number of questions today and comments about space. What I
would like to do is talk about space strategy. Because we have
talked about launch, we have talked about defense. NRO uses
space; NASA uses space; CIA uses space; Department of Defense
uses space. Who is the principal contact in point to organize
the United States of America Government's space strategy?
Ms. James. Well, I will begin. And, Chief, please do jump
in. So I will say there is the Principal Defense Space Advisor,
and that would be me. And I am the principal one when it comes
to looking across budgets and organizational constructs, and at
least being a single voice to be able to advise our top
leaders.
And then there is strategic command, which is the
operational warfighters. So this would be Admiral Haney. And
under him, General Hyten would be the Air Force space component
of space command. So these are the warfighters who are focusing
on changing the culture, who are focused on the--what we call
the Joint Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) which, for the
first time, we are going to be sitting aside--but we are
sitting now side by side with the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), which are our top space partners, I will say,
figuring out ways that if things should go poorly on Earth, how
do we defend the constellation, how do we war game that out and
so on.
So that is kind of from the warfighters' perspective. I
would say Admiral Haney is at the top of that, and then of
course, there is our General Hyten as the Air Force component
commander.
Mr. Visclosky. How does that work between you and General
Haney, and who makes the ultimate decision? I assume there is
some consensus as it develops, plus the world changes every
day. Is it essentially your office and STRATCOM that coordinate
all these agencies that have an interest in space?
Ms. James. So we work very closely together. And of course,
I do not do anything without General Welsh as well. And
ultimately, we are making our recommendations up to the Deputy,
the Secretary of Defense, and even to the President. So that is
the high level attention that space receives these days. But we
work very closely together, and there have not been, you know,
disputes about, you know, him thinking one thing and me
thinking another thing. We work very, very closely together.
Mr. Visclosky. Does STRATCOM have a larger role to play? Is
it about right? Because you have, again, civilian agencies that
are involved here as well as military, intelligence. I just
want to make sure there is kind of that central point of
contact.
General Welsh. Sir, I would look at it as the resource and
policy decisions are led by--in the Department of Defense are
led by the Defense Space Council and the Secretary, to include
resource decisions that are made. And it is done in
coordination with the NRO, the intelligence community, and with
U.S. Strategic Command as an observer. Their intent is to meet
the requirements of U.S. Strategic Command along with the
requirements of those other organizations. For operational
strategy in space, U.S. Strategic Command has the lead for the
Department of Defense, and they do coordinate with NRO, with
the intelligence community, and even with industry as partners
who operate satellites in that domain.
The big change has got to be, going forward, a more
integrated approach to everything they do in that domain,
because everything is going to have to be more resilient, not
just military hardware in space. Commercial hardware also is
going to have to be more resilient, because it is also at risk
from anything from debris to Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs).
And so one of the great things about General John Hyten is
that he has a great big vision for space operations and
integration. And he is really helping us kind of organize
around this idea that it has got to be much more cooperative,
but it has to look at this domain as a contested domain, and
potentially a warfighting domain. And that changes the level of
cooperation we have to do on the operational concepts.
Mr. Visclosky. As far as integration, are there any
budgetary issues you face in 2017 that retard that?
Ms. James. We think we are adequately funded in fiscal year
2017. So this goes to some of the additional investments that
we have been making over time.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. If I could ask about resources in
another way. On the nuclear modernization plan, as I understand
it, the request for 2017 is $6.5 billion, which is about 195
percent more than the 2016 budget. And I understand all that
request is in the base, not OCO. Given--and, again there has
been conversations today about the unpredictability going
forward. Do you have a level of confidence that that
modernization program and those significant new dollars that
are needed are going to be there? And where do they come from
assuming the shadows of the future remain unaltered here for a
couple of years?
Ms. James. Well, there is no question that we, and I
believe the other services, face a bow wave beyond our 5-year
defense plan. So we all have an imperative to be ready, to have
the right number of people, and to be modern. And somehow,
under sequestration projections, in particular, it is not all
going to add up. So there is going to have to be a--decisions
made as a United States of America, what kind of a military do
we want to have? And if we want to be able to live with that
lesser dollar figure, then there is going to have to be
decisions on what has to be given up. I think we need it all. I
think we need these nuclear modernization programs, as well as
the other modernization programs, as well as the people and the
readiness.
So I don't have a good suggestion for you on how--what to
cut because I think we need it all. And I hope that a future
debate of the country would agree, given the threats that the
chairman and you and others have talked about around the world.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Judge Carter.
CYBER CAPABILITIES
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Cyber plays a critical
role in all aspects of national security. As the main service
component for cyber funding, your budget reflects shortfalls in
cyber networks and the defense information systems network. In
recent months, it has become evident that both China and Russia
have shown the willingness to use their offensive cyber
capabilities.
Secretary James, we all understand the services are taking
risks due to the current budgetary environment. But how can we
justify taking risk to the area that affects every aspect of
our national defense?
Ms. James. Well, I want to begin by explaining that we do
have about $4 billion in our budget for the totality of cyber.
And so that includes the IT backbone. It includes our defense.
And it also includes efforts to use cyber as a substitute for
kinetic operations. So those are the three main components.
We have been trying over time to focus more on the defense
and on the substituting cyber for kinetic piece of the
equation. And so that is where some of the risk has come into
play for the IT backbone. With that said, our Under Secretary
of the Air Force is leading an effort right now to look at ways
that we can maybe leverage the private sector differently to
plug in more on the IT backbone to allow us to continue to
shift the focus to defense and to the substitution on the
kinetics part of it. I also want to say that we have been, I
think, leaders in the Department of Defense on another element
known as the joint information environment, the joint
information network. And that also will mitigate our future
cyber risks.
Mr. Carter. So you can sleep well at night on the--under
that theory?
Ms. James. I never sleep well at night, Congressman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We need to talk more often.
Ms. James. Yes, thank you.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Welsh. Sir, if I could add one thing. The boss
mentioned $4 billion in 2017. We have $20 billion across the
FYDP going into this pot. And we have also started a task force
called Task Force Cyber Secure under the boss' direction run by
her Chief Information Officer (CIO). And the intent of that
task force is to identify the right places to target spending
before we spend more. And so I think we are actually in a
pretty good place on this. We have a lot of resources going
into it. And we are trying not to throw money at the wrong
thing before we know exactly what the right thing is.
Mr. Carter. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum.
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I, too, would like
to reflect the sentiments of this committee of thanking you,
Secretary James, not only for the outreach that your
professional staff has had with our office, but your personal
outreach to me as well. And, General Welsh, thank you for your
service. But having been in a family that was very much
attached to the Air Force, to your wife, I know all the work
that my mother put in to making sure that our family was whole
and functioned so that my father could be function--you know,
working on his job.
I hope I have two questions that might free up some funding
that you can put towards writing us some other programs. So,
Secretary James, I would like to call your attention to a memo
that was written last July by the commander of the Air Force
Space Command, General John Hyten, entitled ``Commanders Intent
for Ongoing Material Decisions.'' And the memo states that the
Air Force should begin outsourcing some of the on-orbit,
operation, and maintenance of its wideband global SATCOM
communication satellites to commercial operators. And the
intent would be to free up, then, more uniformed Air Force
personnel currently devoted to these infrastructure,
maintenance, and utilization. And they could put them towards
other purposes. And it would also help lower costs in the Air
Force.
So I would like you to respond to, you know, the global,
you know, system and what we could do to help the Air Force
with discussions on industry and possibly commercializing more
of this system?
And then the second question I have, Secretary James and
General Welsh, has to do again with BRAC. Because there is--the
Department of Defense, you have proposed a new round of base
realignments and closures in 2019, believing as much as 25
percent of the infrastructure might be in surplus. 25 percent
is a quarter of surplus infrastructure. So what is your
assessment of the extent of excess facilities in the Air Force?
And could you describe to what extent these surplus facilities
burden the Air Force, and actually hold you down doing the job
you want to do in a cost-effective manner to stand ready to
protect the United States?
Ms. James. So first on the issue of can we use the
commercial companies more in our satellite communications
realm, I think the answer is absolutely. And we are trying to
move in that direction. I think our future will never be
completely commercial. I think it will be a mix. But I think
over time, we absolutely ought to and can get to more
commercial participation in that.
And indeed, right now, we are running several path finders.
Think of those as pilot programs where we are working with
industry on some creative new efforts that could lead us down
that path, such as trading hardware use for bandwidth elsewhere
in our constellation.
So we are working on this. And I think the future with
commercial could help us save money. It could provide more
flexibility. It could also give us more resiliency in our
constellation. So I think there is a lot of potential there.
Then when it comes to a BRAC, we very much need another
round of base closures and realignment. I think our estimate at
this point, because it is not a full-up analysis, but it is our
best estimate, is more like 30 percent excess capacity--30
percent excess capacity. And the impact of not having a base
closure means we are having to maintain more structure than we
think we need. And you heard me say I am worried about
infrastructure across the Air Force. We have an ever-shrinking
pot of money for infrastructure improvement, and we are
spreading it out way, way thin. And if we could reduce that
overall footprint of infrastructure, we would have more money
to keep up and improve the facilities that we really need going
forward. So we very much do need a base closure going forward.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Aderholt.
SPACE LAUNCH
Mr. Aderholt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry for being a
little late. But I am glad I could be here for the hearing this
morning. Thank you for being here, and we appreciate your
testimony.
I wanted to ask you a little bit about the Delta 5 and
Falcon 9. I understand there is talk--there is some discussion
about the retiring of the current Atlas 5 rocket and using only
the Falcon 9, the Delta medium and the Delta heavy. The current
Atlas 5 launches 75 percent or more of our national security
payloads and serves the NASA commercial crew program.
Meanwhile, Air Force is evaluating a new version of the Falcon
9. It seems prudent to keep the AR1 engine on track for its
promised production delivery date of late 2019 by not diluting
the funding for it. The Mitchell Commission and other experts,
they talk about the re-engine rocket as--discussed about the
fact that being unusable. And in recent decades, re-engine
rockets performed well.
Even the current Atlas V is re-engined--is a re-engined
rocket, and Orbital ATK is re-engineering the Antares rocket
with a Russian RD-181. We need to see the first flight and the
certificates for the new Falcon 9, the heavy--the Falcon heavy
and the upscale BE4 engine and the Vulcan rocket.
The question being are you willing to make it a priority
for the EEOV funding to keep that funding there to keep AR1 on
track, so that if we need it for the current Atlas V, we will
have it ready for the testing in 2020?
Ms. James. So we recently, like a couple of days ago,
completed the final two awards out of four to invest in rocket
propulsion systems. So one of those awards was to Aerojet
Rocketdyne. And, indeed, they did get the most money of any of
the other awardees. So more money, I am sure, would be welcomed
by the company. But in a full and open competition environment,
and, remember, that is what the law told us to do, was to
invest in rocket propulsion systems in a full and open way,
Aerojet Rocketdyne did get a pretty good award just a few days
ago. So we believe, as the government, that we are on track to
develop an engine replacement for the Russian engine by 2019.
But I caveat, that is ambitious. The technical experts say it
is very ambitious. But we are pulling out the stops to do it,
as are the various companies who are participating.
Beyond 2019 and the development of that engine, assuming
all goes well, we still need to integrate it into a rocket, and
it must be certified. And only until those three things are
complete will it take us to space. So an engine alone, of
course, will not take us to space. We need the total
capability, and we think that will be a bit beyond 2019.
Mr. Aderholt. As you--as the Air Force is the answer of
access to space, the primary customer of ULA and the major
customer of SpaceX, the Air Force has every right to conduct an
independent study of the timeline of AR1, BE4, and any proposed
SpaceX future certifications such as that of the Falcon heavy,
I think it is imperative that you conduct an independent study
and review--and your review include all the development of the
risk factors known to the industry. And my question to you
would be, would you be willing to do that?
Ms. James. Well, as far as I know, but please allow me to
go back and double-check, we are sort of very much integrated
and watching very closely the development in terms of how these
projects are going. Now, the prime, in this case, United Launch
Alliance (ULA), that is the manufacturer, obviously, who has
got to select an engine to go forward--you know, there are two
possibilities. They consider the BE4 to be the front runner
with the AR1 to be the backup. That is their decision, based on
where they believe they are in the timelines. And we have
people who are watching this very closely as well. So I believe
we are already fulfilling that intent. But please allow me to
go back and double-check that.
Mr. Aderholt. Okay. If you could get back with us on that,
I would appreciate it.
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Ruppersberger.
SPACE LAUNCH LOCATIONS
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. You know, I think it is very
positive that a lot of the questions here today are about
space. Most people--most of the public don't really have a clue
about what space is about. In the old days, when we went to the
moon, everybody knew space and who the astronauts were. So it
is something that affects us every day, and it costs a lot of
money. So the more that we can keep focused, the better.
I think the issue of launch and ULA, probably ULA is the
best, but the costs got out of control, and also the
scheduling. And so that is why there is language in there now
to deal with the issue of competition. If you look at the
American way, the competition makes the difference. But on the
other hand, and I think, you know, Robert raised that, and, you
know, we have to make sure that we have competition, that we
still have the best. And just, you know, we can't afford to
fail with the money and all the things that are involved.
The one area that I would like to get into that I am a
little concerned about, again, getting back into the space, is
the need to ensure access to space with specific launch
locations. And what I mean by that, we are currently relying on
Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg Air Force Base launches in
order to reach equatorial or polar orbits. Now, this reliance
on these two locations marks them as single points of launch
failure for these type of launches we have been talking about.
And should there be a natural disaster, mechanical failure, or
an attack on these facilities, the ES would not be able to put
space assets into orbits.
My question is, should we be developing, Secretary, launch
sites like Wallops Island or Kodiak, Alaska to ensure access to
space?
Ms. James. I am afraid I do not have a good answer for that
one, and I will have to come back here for record, if I might.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, that is why I raised the issue,
because it is out there, but----
General Welsh. I will give you an opinion on this. And I
think General Hyten would probably share this. As we look at
this space enterprise and how we do it differently in the
future, as we look more at disaggregation, micro satellites,
cube satellites, small satellites, things that do not have to
go from a large launch complex all the time, I think
proliferating launch complexes is probably going to be a
natural outshoot of this. I think it is commercially viable. It
may be a way for companies to get into the launch businesses
who could not afford to get into it, or don't see a future in
it for large national security space launches.
But I think this has got to be part of the strategy that
this whole national team puts together as we look to the
future. This is the kind of thing John Hyten is talking about.
How do we change the game for the long term?
Mr. Ruppersberger. The other thing, you talk about
competition, and you have SpaceX now and ULA, that is it. And
SpaceX is in a limited area as far as your certification. Is
that correct?
Ms. James. SpaceX is currently certified for four of the
eight launches.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Four of the eight. Okay. Now, how are
you doing with the other companies out there that have the
possible capability as far as bringing them aboard?
Ms. James. There is one other company at the moment which
has submitted a statement of interest to get certified. So that
is a possible third. And so we continue to monitor and work
with companies as they wish to possibly enter this market.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Is there an incentive for money--money-
wise for those companies to move forward? Or do you think we
are just going to be here with these two now?
Ms. James. Well, the incentive that the companies tend to
look at is they look at the totality of the market of which,
you know, our piece, the national security launches, is a piece
of that market. But there is another market worldwide. And, so,
that is what they tend to look at. They look at the totality of
it. And as I said, we have two now that are certainly active
participants.
I mentioned earlier I believe in the competition too. And
that is what the law says to do. But I worry that if you don't
have two that truly are competitive from a cost-competitive
standpoint, you are not going to have much of a competition.
Mr. Ruppersberger. My final point is that I think one of
the major issues with ULA, and we know the history why Boeing
and Lockheed came together, we needed that as a country.
However, I have been very concerned. I have been to the
leadership in Alabama on numerous occasions. But the issue of
the scheduling where I have seen programs that were very
effective, now they are up--it is classified. I can't talk
about them--that had to wait a year and a half for launch. I
hope you are working with ULA or if SpaceX on the issue of
scheduling. Our scheduling seems to be antiquated, and it seems
that we might be able to do that better and quicker.
Ms. James. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Any comments on that?
Ms. James. As far as I understood it, it was mostly on the
government to determine when these things would launch. And, of
course, the government does it partly based on need and it is
partly budgeting. There is a variety of factors. I wasn't aware
that the companies were a reason for the holdup. But----
Mr. Ruppersberger. It is a system if you look at others
versus other countries too. But I would hope you would look at
that.
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
The Air Force and other services have some immediate needs.
They are often reflected in the OCO account, what we used to
call the directed funding for the war on terror. You have some
money in there, I think over $400 million, to procure some
additional Reapers. What else do you have in there and why are
those types of investments important? I know there have been
some issues relative to losses. I assume there is some reasons
we have had these losses. What else is in there? Because we
have a fight on our hands right now. We can look towards the
Russians' and Chinese' long-range capabilities. So what are we
doing, should we say, on the fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda
and other groups, the capabilities there?
General Welsh. One of the notable things that we--you have
actually helped us with immensely, but we can always use more
help in this arena is buying munitions. You know, we have
authority this year now to buy munitions on a forecast usage
rate instead of dropping a bomb and then waiting three budget
cycles before we actually get it replaced.
Now, what we have been doing for the last 15 years is
raiding our operational stocks to support major war plans in
order to do the current day-to-day business with the weapons
that we are expending in the Middle East. This ability to
forecast expenditure for the next year and then put Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) money against buying against it
before we drop the bombs is helping stabilize that. But it is
not replacing the stockpiles. The stockpiles are still down. We
need to think about that. It is a serious problem. And we are
at a point where we have to have some kind of money other than
OCO to get at it because----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Because we don't really focus on
munitions, I mean, really.
General Welsh. No, sir. And we have got to go to the
companies and say: You need to be able to increase your
production capacity in some cases, if we really want to refresh
the stockpiles. To do that it can't be OCO money. It has got to
be money that has a tail on it. So anything we could do in that
regard to free up money to use for munitions is going to be
helpful for us every year.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I shared with you yesterday when your
were kind enough to pay a courtesy call with me and with Peter,
Ranking Member Visclosky, that you were complimentary of our
investment, and you were this morning of--on ISR. And I have to
say, as I said General Breedlove has brought--you know, he
has--the amount of ISR that is out there, not only relative to
his command, Central and South America, Africa, these are areas
that have immediate needs, I assume, right?
General Welsh. Chairman, they do. I would just add one
caution. I mentioned it before. The way we got after the ISR
shortfall starting in 2008, is we just got--we were told buy as
much as you can. Field it as fast as you can. That led to the
problem we have in the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)
enterprise today because we didn't keep up with the people. We
bought the equipment and we kind of created the people as we
went and took it from other places. If we want to increase the
numbers in the RPA enterprise, or the ISR enterprise, we have
got to look to the future, plan on having money ahead of time,
and build a plan that we can actually execute and have the
people to actually implement and run the system. That may
require a plus-up on a top line of manpower for the Air Force.
But we need to be able to look at it to plan ahead of time and
show it to you. Otherwise, we are going to be in this thrash we
have been in for the last 8 or 9 years in the ISR arena
forever.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And what are you doing to assure
everybody has a piece of the cyber, you know, advocacy? What
are we doing to make sure that we are working jointly?
General Welsh. Sir, every----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So those resources are not--we can have
an accounting for them.
General Welsh. Sir, the boss mentioned the joint
information environment. That is a joint single network for the
Department intended to bring all of our services and OSD
together on a single network for everybody from the warfighters
to the folks back in the Pentagon. That is a multiservice
contribution. Everybody is contributing both money, manpower,
planning, and resources to make this thing happen. We are in--
right in the--you know, right with the rest of the pack running
as fast as we can to make that a reality. That will force us
into joint--in the information architecture arena. Now that is
step one. We have some regional security stacks that go with
that which are the way the warfighters actually connect into
and out of this system. Those are also joint. They are being
executed in the major commands, and they will be done with air
components included in the discussion with everybody else.
So this is now a joint discussion. All the information
systems we have from the Distributed Common Ground System
(DCGS) that moves our intel data around are all connected to
everybody now. And so we have just got to make sure that we
keep moving in that direction. And I think we are clearly on
that path.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We like the connections. We hope all
those links are well protected and hardened.
Mr. Visclosky.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could get back to the nuclear modernization program,
you have a long-range standoff weapon under development not
without controversy. But the point of the question is more that
there are parallel efforts going on, both with the Department
of Defense as well as NNSA. It is estimated that on the
standoff weapon, the estimated costs go up to $30 billion for
1,000 weapons, there being an additional eight to 10 at NNSA.
When we talk about modernization, ICBMs come up, B61s come up,
the long-range standoff bomber comes up, the long-range weapons
comes up. Given, one, the strategy of our Nation, and then,
obviously, we have a fiscal year impact on that strategy, how
is that prioritization made? Is there a prioritization within
these programs as far as modernization program?
Ms. James. I would begin, Mr. Visclosky, by pointing out
that these are not really new programs and new capabilities, I
should say. These are capabilities that we have had. And, of
course, now, we are focusing on modernizing them in order to
continue to deter adversaries and assure our allies.
And the other point I wanted to make is that both of these,
of course, relate to validated requirements that come from
STRATCOM through the joint staff, and eventually come to the
services, in this case, the Air Force, to fulfill. In the case
of the Long-Range Standoff missile (LRSO), that is the follow-
on missile to replace the aging nuclear Air Launched Cruise
Missile, and it is designed to be the nuclear standoff
capability with improved capability. And then the B61/12,
similarly, is the follow-on program to replace several legacy
versions of the B61 weapon which are in need of modernization.
MUNITIONS
Mr. Visclosky. General, on an unclassified level, how would
you characterize the health of your munitions inventory?
General Welsh. On the conventional side or the nuclear
side, sir?
Mr. Visclosky. Conventional.
General Welsh. On the conventional side, the inventory is
fantastic. The weapons are great and they are getting better
and better. The problem is capacity, is volume. We have
depleted our stocks over time with the fight we have been in
for the last 15 years. We have not been able to replenish them.
We just did not have as much money as we would like to have to
put into munitions. We have been sharing a lot of them with
allies in this effort, many of whom use precision weapons now
along with us but don't produce their own.
And so we just have stockpiles that have been depleted and
we need to replenish them if we want to really have war plans
that we can actually go execute quickly in the event of some
kind of major contingency. And that is where any help we can
get on the munitions side for funding is very, very helpful.
Mr. Visclosky. And is that reflected in the 2017 request to
an extent?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. We have increased the request for
munitions funding in 2017. We got help last year and to include
use of OCO funding to help to use in a different way. Now
acquiring munitions on forecast, as I mentioned before, but we
have--we still need to keep at this every year. This is one
that is not going to go away in the short term because we
really depleted the stocks.
NUCLEAR FORCE PERSONNEL
Mr. Visclosky. One final question if I could, Mr. Chairman,
on the nuclear force there have been problems in the past as
far as morale, esprit de cours, issues have come up. And my
sense under your watch is significant steps have been taken and
improvements have occurred under both of you, I really should
say. Would you just want to comment on that as where you think
you are in that process? And, again, from budgetary standpoint,
is there anything you would be lacking in 2017 to continue to
push as far as that sense of, you know, everybody has a very
important responsibility here. And I do believe you have both
made very good progress here.
Ms. James. Well, we have worked very hard on it. We have
shifted dollars. We have shifted manpower. We have redone over
time the way we train our nuclear forces. We are providing more
professional development opportunities for the people who are
engaged in this important mission. There is new financial
incentives. So we really have focused a lot of attention on
people, readiness, and modernization of the force. And I think
it is very important that we keep the momentum going, that we
keep double-checking and seeing how we are doing. But I agree.
I think we have made progress, very good progress.
Mr. Visclosky. Yeah. Very good. Thank you both. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Aderholt.
DATA RIGHTS
Mr. Aderholt. Yeah, just got one quick question. Of course,
as you know, NASA invests a lot of--billions of dollars in
hardware development for commercial space crew and cargo and
resupply. But the only intellectual property rights that we
receive in the NASA commercial program is the right to buy the
data rights to those items for the second time if the company
goes out of business. Question being, what is the Air Force
doing to ensure a better deal than we currently have? And more
particularly, what are you doing to ensure that the U.S.
Government maintains enough intellectual property production
rights, should the service providers fail to perform adequately
within respect to be the cost, schedule or future behavior?
Ms. James. So if I may come back to you with a complete
answer, but give you the best answer I can give you right now,
one of the reasons why when we had in front of us the last
NDAA, which said invest in rocket propulsions systems, do it by
2019, full and open competition, one of the reasons why we
chose the OTA, other transaction authority approach, was
because we could tailor it, it was flexible enough that we
could work with different companies who have different pathways
that they are looking to build to get us to space, and give us
some access to data, like intellectual property data. It does
not mean we own it, but it gives us access to that data such
that we can convince ourselves that this will, in fact, be
ultimately a reliable pathway for us.
So because we do launch as a service, we do not own the
components, that is why we do not have the direct intellectual
property. But the key is to get access to the data, and that is
one of the reasons why we selected this OTA approach. So that
is the beginning, but if I may come back to you with a more
complete----
Mr. Aderholt. Okay. Well just, you know, I think the bottom
line is trying to find a better--to make sure the taxpayers'
dollar is protected. And I think that is the bottom line. So if
you could follow up with me on that I would be appreciative.
GPS OCX
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I would like to close on a positive
note, but the initials OCX, where do we stand? We have made
substantial investments there. Maybe you want to call on Betty
to----
General Welsh. This is where I drop my pen.
Ms. James. I think we need Betty's opinion on this one.
Yeah. OCX is still a very big challenge for our Air Force. It
is a very important capability. This is the ground stations for
our GPS, and it still is very much a troubled program. We were
faced not long on--when I say ``we,'' I mean we, the Air Force,
and we, OSD, with some serious questions to answer, how are we
going to go forward? Were we going to go forward at all? What
if we cancelled? What if we did this? What if we did that?
At the end of the day, we said we have got to have this
capability, and we are going to have to keep with this approach
a bit longer. But between Frank Kendall and me and our teams,
we are going to provide, like, a lot more oversight. We are
going to have going forward more off ramps for the contractors.
So that is to say, if you don't get this done by time certain,
that is an off ramp. And you may face cancellation even. So
there is going to be a lot more of that going on because it is
a capability that we really need for the future. But it is a
troubled program.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, people are more than likely, if
anything, to step up there, their jamming and their--you know,
their cyber attacks. And this is something which is pretty
critical to all of us.
Anything further?
I want to thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here.
General Welsh. And appreciate everybody's testimony. And I
think we will have some questions for the record. And we would
like to have those in due course. Again, good hearing. Thank
you very much. And Godspeed to you. Thank you. Stand adjourned.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the
answers thereto follows:]
Core Workload
Question. Congress has long mandated that a minimum of fifty
percent of all depot maintenance dollars be spent in organic depots on
workload performed by government employed federal employees in order to
maintain command and control of at least half to a majority of all of
our depot-level work necessary for military readiness.
What percentage of depot maintenance for FY16 will be conducted in
organic depots by civilian federal employees and what percentage do you
plan for FY17 to be conducted in organic depots by civilian federal
employees?
Answer. We estimate the organic depots will perform approximately
55% of the workload with federal employees with another 1.3% performed
at the depots under a 10 U.S. Sec. 2474 partnership.
Question. The core law mandates that all new weapons systems that
will be used for the war fight will be integrated into the organic
depots within 4 years of the introduction of the initial operating
unit.
What, if any, systems within the Air Force, whether programs of
record or simply new systems, will fail to meet this threshold? What is
the most common reason systems fail to be fully integrated within the
depots within 4 years of FOU status?
Answer. There are a small number of systems that are behind in
activating organic depots for a variety of reasons. Some of the most
common reasons are: the lack of expected demand to warrant activating
an organic repair line; funding shortfalls due to the combination of
fiscal constraints coupled with higher priority mission requirements
taking precedent over depot activation; and special access programs
that is excluded from core requirements. Despite these challenges, the
Program Managers continue to work depot activation of core workload. To
assist program offices, the Air Force is developing tools and policy to
establish sustainment strategies early in the acquisition life cycle to
promote timely depot activations.
Question. Under Performance Based Logistics (PBL) arrangements, how
do you ensure that the government has complete command and control over
all core workload of that system so that the government decides which
workload is performed in the organic depots by federal employees at the
appropriate levels? For example, with engine work, if a contractor is
required to provide a certain rate of workload to the depot for repair
and fails to provide that workload, what are the ramifications to the
contractor? How does the depot ensure that core workload is provided,
especially if it is available and simply has been diverted or assigned
to a private contractor's privately held facility?
Answer. The Air Force performs a core workload determination for
all war-tasked systems to calculate the level of direct labor hours
required to be performed at organic depots by federal employees. Core
determinations are broken down to sub-systems, components, and software
levels. Once the core requirement is set, it is the responsibility of
the Program Manager and Product Support Manager to ensure the
Performance Based Logistics provider allocates and activates workload
to the organic repair facility as prescribed by the core workload
determination. If an organic depot is not performing in the year of
execution, then the Program Manager will work with the using command,
Air Force Materiel Command leadership and the depots to resolve the
issue. Sub-components below the assigned core component level may be
outsourced for a variety of reasons, such as capacity, skills, etc., as
long as the required labor hours for the overall sub-system and
component are met.
Question. Recognizing the key role of the depots and the risk of
over-reliance on contractors, current law requires DOD to maintain a
core maintenance capability--a government-owned and -operated
combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, processes, and
technology that is needed to meet contingency and other emergency
requirements. The Biennial Core Report by GAO is expected later this
year (2016).
Does the Air Force believe there has been sufficient information
and metrics to more closely gauge and report an accurate ``estimated
cost of sustaining workloads'' for the Air Force?
Answer. The core report, in conjunction with the 5050 report,
provides an accurate cost of sustaining workloads. Reporting and
managing depot capabilities and workloads utilizing the Department of
Defense (DoD) guidance in implementing 10 USC 2464 (Core) and 10 USC
2466 (50/50) are adequate to provide the management information and
metrics to gauge and report cost of sustaining workloads. The current
DoD guidance provides the best use of taxpayer funds while ensuring the
needs of the warfighter are met. Used together these reports do provide
an accurate portrayal of the cost of sustaining workloads.
Question. There is broad based support for transparent and
streamlined acquisition process.
What recommendations do you propose to protect or promote the
organic industrial base as we pursue acquisition reform?
Answer. The key to protect and promote the organic industrial base
is to maintain core and 50/50 statutes while also placing more emphasis
and oversight on sustainment in the requirements and development phases
of acquisition. Adding sustainability to how we assess program success,
along with cost, schedule, and performance criteria, will better
protect the organic industrial base. The Air Force is looking at how to
assess sustainment considerations with measurable criteria early in the
acquisition process. Adding sustainability on an equal basis as cost,
schedule and performance will protect critical organic national
industrial base capabilities.
Question. What considerations are important for review of data
rights and intellectual property as well as the definition of
commercial item?
Answer. As required by U.S. Code 2377, the Air Force procures
commercial items to the maximum extent practicable and provides
offerors the opportunity to compete in any procurement to fill such
requirements.
When procuring data rights for commercial items, the Air Force
generally obtains what is available in the commercial market so long as
doing so meets the Air Force's needs. When determining those needs, the
Air Force considers several possibilities as outlined in Chapter 4 of
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, including:
Whether the Air Force will have the information
necessary to understand and evaluate a system's design
throughout the life cycle.
Whether the information obtained will provide the
Air Force with the ability to operate and sustain weapon
systems under a variety of changing technical, operational, and
programmatic environments.
Whether the Air Force will be able to re-compete
item acquisition, upgrades, and sustainment activities in the
interest of achieving cost savings. Oftentimes, the lack of
product data and/or data rights makes it difficult or
impossible to award contracts to anyone other than the original
manufacturer, thereby taking away much or all of the
Government's ability to reduce total ownership costs through
competition.
When evaluating its needs for data, the Air Force also considers
not only the immediate, short-term costs of acquiring the needed
technical data and data rights, but also the long-term cost savings
resulting from being able to compete production and logistics support
activities and reduce total ownership costs over the life cycle. In
addition, the Air Force budgets for and funds the maintenance and
upkeep of product data throughout the life cycle.
Question. What steps have been taken to ensure that the Air Force
CITES have been adequately consulted individually during the study on
data rights and intellectual property mandated by acquisition reform
efforts last year?
Answer. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) is currently
organizing the required government-industry advisory panel which will
conduct the required study of data rights and intellectual property.
The Air Force will have representation on this panel. OUSD(AT&L)
expects the panel will meet approximately six times between April and
September 2016. During these meetings, the Air Force will work with the
government-industry advisory panel, emphasizing the importance of
consulting the designated CITES and developing a plan to do so.
Question. As defense budgets have declined, there has been a much
needed focus on the acquisition of new weapons systems to modernize the
Armed Forces. However, little attention has been given to the
inescapable fact that sustainment is 70-80% of the total lifecycle cost
of a weapon system. This is confounding when considering today's budget
and what that dollar amount may mean during the lifetime of the JSF
program, for example.
In the Fiscal Year 2017 budget, how do you as decision makers
adequately balance new procurement programs and adequately keep pace
with modernization demands and critical maintenance requirements that
continue to be squeezed?
Answer. During periods of fiscal uncertainty, it is particularly
difficult to balance the demands of current operations, modernization
of existing weapon systems, and procurement of new capabilities. The
Air Force planning and programming process ensures our annual budget
submissions are aligned with national strategic direction and balanced
between short-term operational and maintenance requirements and longer-
term modernization and recapitalization efforts. However, fiscal
uncertainty and mandates to keep aging aircraft have forced the Air
Force to delay the pace of modernization as we continue to pay for the
maintenance, repair and overhaul of aging weapon systems. The average
age of Air Force aircraft fleets is 27 years, and some of our most
critical capabilities, including JSTARS, are flown on aircraft that are
increasingly expensive to maintain and are operated by virtually no one
else. The Air Force is committed to striking the right balance between
current and future capabilities; but, we need the flexibility within
existing top line to make tough choices such as the divestment of aging
fleets. We request sufficient and predictable funding to sustain our
older fleets, recapitalize to address future threats, and resource the
lifecycle costs of each.
Research and Development: Radar Technology
Question. In both the House Report (H. Rpt. 114-102) and Senate
Report (S. Rpt. 114-49) to the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), language was included regarding research with respect to
advancements in radar technology, specifically regarding multi-function
and phased array radars and all digital polarimetric radars. The
language also included conformal phased array antennas that could
possibly operate on different frequency bands and be reconfigurable in
flight. Of note, the associated technologies should provide advanced
capabilities with respect to discrete object sensing and tracking.
I am specifically interested in understanding how the Air Force,
and AFRL, intend to respond to this language, and what the long-term
plans and possible funding requirements are being considered with
respect to research within this area.
Answer. The Air Force's Science and Technology (S&T) program
includes robust research in the radar and antenna technology areas
outlined in the House and Senate Reports to the Fiscal Year 2016
National Defense Authorization Act. The Fiscal Year 2017 President's
Budget request for Air Force S&T supports research and technology
advancement in these critical areas.
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading research in
radio frequency (RF) component, aperture, and system technology
enabling future Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), air dominance, and ground precision attack
capabilities. Prior and current projects are focused on achieving
multi-function passive and active RF capabilities with increased
bandwidth and frequency agility, along with developing conformal, load-
bearing antenna structures that offer lower cost insertion on a range
of target platforms. Since the late 1990s, AFRL has been addressing the
challenge of wideband phased arrays leveraging wideband analog, digital
and photonic antenna element designs. The AFRL team includes
researchers and program managers from across the laboratory and the
portfolio includes significant partnership with the Defense Advanced
Research Agency, the intelligence community, the Missile Defense
Agency, NASA, industry and academia.
A major AFRL focus through the passive multimode effort is the
development of a 1.4-18 GHz phased array with dual polarization, 10:1
bandwidth ratio supporting multi-function air-moving target indication,
ground-moving target indication, and synthetic aperture radar imaging
employing the same aperture. This system development, initially flight-
tested in 2013, is targeted for transition toward tactical combat
aircraft, but can be leveraged into ISR and electronic warfare systems.
AFRL also has a long history of development of conformal,
structural phased array antennas to reduce cost and flight performance
impacts associated with platform integration. The current focus
includes the development of conformal spray-on antenna technology in
the 0.6-6 GHz band, to be demonstrated for RF direction finding
applications on a Tiger Shark unmanned aerial vehicle, and low-cost 3-D
antennas optimized by sophisticated computational electromagnetics
modeling, targeted toward emerging low-cost unmanned tactical platforms
such as potential future derivatives of the miniature air-launched
decoy.
We welcome the opportunity to provide additional technical details
on the many research directions in these areas and the potential for
future Air Force and defense capabilities.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole.
Questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto
follow:]
The Commercial Space Act of 1998
Question. Through consultation with legal counsel at the American
Law Division, it is clear to me that the Air Force is misinterpreting
the Commercial Space Act of 1998. The Air Force interprets the
Commercial Space Act of 1998 as prescribing that the USAF may only
procure commercial ``launch services'', rather than separate rockets or
engines, whereas the intent of Section 201 of the Space Act was to
direct the Air Force to procure space transportation capabilities from
commercial providers, saving US government assets, namely the Space
Shuttle, for very specific exceptions. The Act sets up a commercially
procured versus US government produced framework, and in no way
prohibits the Air Force from directing the production of very specific
components to build or retrofit a space launch system, such as a new
engine for an existing rocket family. The FYI 6 NDAA's direction to
have an engine to replace the RD-180 as soon as possible is not in
conflict with the Commercial Space Act. The grant to Aerojet-Rocketdyne
to further work on the AR-I engine indicates that you agree; yet, the
refusal to have an engine competition to specifically replace the RD-
180, indicates a possibly different and troubling interpretation of the
1998 Act, and a prioritization of nurturing multiple businesses over
the matter of assured access to space. Because of this apparent
misinterpretation of the law, the USAF is missing an opportunity to
deliberately re-engine the Atlas V rocket, and instead is delaying our
termination of the use of the RD-180 by spreading EELV dollars amongst
numerous grants instead of focusing on replacing the RD-180. Re-
engining the current Atlas V could save taxpayers hundreds of millions
of dollars, and provide a valuable interim capability while we are
waiting for new systems, such as methane engines and the proposed
Vulcan rocket, to mature and prove themselves.
My understanding is that the Aerospace Corporation has reviewed
detailed data supplied by Aerojet-Rocketdyne, regarding the most likely
performance of a current Atlas V rocket reengined with two AR-I
engines. With regards to the 6 of 8 EELV insertion orbits served by the
current Atlas V rocket (using the RD-180). What did the written
comments from Aerospace Corporation, shared with the Air Force, show?
Does the re-engined rocket serve all six orbits and insert into proper
orbit the payloads typically served by the current RD-180 engined Atlas
V?
Answer. The Single Core EELC Launch Architecture study was one of
many studies requested by the program office as the acquisition
strategy was being developed in the Spring of 2015. The purpose was to
see if it was possible to develop a launch architecture based on a
single core using strap-on solids to achieve entire DoD mission
manifest. The Aerospace Corporation completed the study using the
latest available data as of early 2015. The study concluded that a
single-core medium through heavy architecture was possible but no
single enhancement could facilitate it. In addition to new first stage
engines, a new upper stage and new/improved solids would be required.
As part of this effort, a new LOX/RP-1 engine in an Atlas V was used in
six of the 44 scenarios evaluated. In this study, a re-engineered Atlas
with new LOX/RP engines could provide performance very close to that of
an Atlas V with an RD-180 for some missions. There could be shortfalls,
however, particularly for the heavier Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit
(GTO) missions (e.g. WGS and AEHF on an Atlas V 531 and 541) and the
more complex Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) missions. Since this
analysis used AR-1 data obtained in February 2015 as the baseline for
the new LOX/RP engine, the results of the Atlas V/new RP engine
performance was shared with Aerojet Rocketdyne in September 2015.
Question. Aerojet-Rocketdyne just last week completed a review by
Marshall Space Flight Center, regarding the likely performance of a
current Atlas V re-engined with two AR-1 engines.
Is the Air Force willing to receive and evaluate this information
and discuss the findings of these two reviews with Aerojet-Rocketdyne
and with the Hill before proposing additional RFP's which spread the
limited EELV engine-development dollars amongst multiple providers for
launch system components other than booster engines? (I am referring to
the National Defense Authorization Act directive to replace the RD-
180).
Answer. The Air Force is willing to receive and evaluate any
information and findings of the Aerojet-Rocketdyne reviews you mention.
The Air Force has contacted NASA to request the Marshall Space Flight
Center provide a point of contact for the Air Force to obtain the
review information and findings.
The Air Force's proposed strategy is a measured approach that
invests in raising the technical maturity and reducing risk of the
entire propulsion industry, investing in multiple rocket propulsion
system solutions, then down selecting to invest in nominally two launch
systems (based on available funding and industry investment needs) that
best support the overall goal of two or more commercially-viable launch
systems that also meet National Security Space requirements. This is
based on continual engagement with industry starting with a request for
information released in the fall of 2014.
Question. The current Atlas V launches perhaps three-fourths of our
national security missions. Some in the private sector have suggested
terminating the Atlas V and dividing launches between the Falcon 9 by
SpaceX and the two Delta IV variants being produced--though not
indefinitely--by ULA. Please tell me what risks this incurs. Are you
concerned about the launch schedule performance by Space X in their ISS
cargo missions? I am not asking for your opinion of NASA's opinion. I
want your opinion of the low number of launches and what risk that
poses for national security. Secondly, what costs would such a proposal
create, if Congress were to impose it on the Air Force? My
understanding is that you believe it could cost up to 5 billion
additional dollars.
Answer. Moving away from the Atlas V launch vehicle prior to
developing the next-generation launch service has cost and schedule
risks in addition to increased risk for assured access to space,
depending on when it is imposed. The Air Force has assessed the impact
as a delay to launch missions of 12-48 months and an increased cost in
excess of $1.5 to $5 billion. These figures vary significantly because
they depend on when the Air Force loses access to the RD-180 engine.
The Air Force is implementing a robust certification process for
on-ramping New Entrants which includes multiple demonstration flights.
This process ensures New Entrants can meet the mission assurance needs
for National Security Space missions and lowers the risk for on-
ramping. In a competitive environment, it is important to on-ramp New
Entrants to ensure assured access to space through multiple providers.
The Air Force has a rigorous source selection process and criteria
for assessing the credibility of the launch providers schedule and
ability to execute their manifest in support of National Security Space
missions.
EELV-USAF Industry Advisors
Question. The Mitchell Commission has concluded that rockets
designed and built by various contractors can use the AR-I engine.
Given this fact, I believe Congress needs to know more about what
information the Air Force is receiving and from whom.
While I am sure your sources are knowledgeable, what are their
credentials in engineering physics and in engineering rocket programs,
especially as compared to the Mitchell Commission?
Answer. The Aerospace Corporation, the Air Force's independent and
objective Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC),
has, since 1960, provided support to the Air Force in the design,
acquisition, and operation of space and launch systems. Aerospace
employees provide specialty expertise in all areas applicable to launch
vehicle and spacecraft systems (e.g. thermal control, optics, guidance,
dynamics, propulsion, etc.). Further, the Air Force has continued to
work with Major General (ret) Mitch Mitchell on the path forward, along
with most of the members from his assessment team. Major General (ret)
Mitch Mitchell is an employee of The Aerospace Corporation. Government
members from that team have prominent roles on the program and have
worked on recent engine development and launch system development
efforts, to include the Atlas V, the Delta IV and the RS-68 and
upgraded RS-68A. As you may know, the technologies being developed on
some of the rocket propulsion system agreements are firsts for the US
rocket industrial base and the Government is working closely with
industry to address risks to these new developments through early
technical maturation efforts.
Question. What specific rocket engine and rocket body combinations
are your information sources referring to from the past? (in the
handout you provided to staff on February 17).
Answer. They were not speaking of specific systems, but in general
design terms, highlighting the fact that an engine is not ``plug-and-
play''. However, all experts identify the need to design the launch
vehicle around the engine is a standard systems engineering best
practice.
For example, the development of the F-1 engine and the Apollo
Saturn V launch vehicle took place together over the span of a decade.
The earliest test firings of components that became part of the Saturn
V first-stage F-1 engine took place in 1957. Flight-rating tests were
completed in 1964. The first Saturn V unmanned flight test--Apollo 4--
took place in November 1967. The first manned Saturn V flight--the
Apollo 8 circumlunar mission (the first lunar orbit mission)--occurred
in December 1968. Further, the development of the RS-68 engine, which
powers the first stage of the Delta IV, occurred over an eight year
period during the development of the Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle.
EELV Engine Evaluation
Question. The USAF is investing hundreds of millions of dollars in
the development of multiple engines for the Vulcan rocket. Rather than
allow the industry to perpetuate the narrative of a preferred engine
for a rocket, it is in the best interest of the taxpayer to have an
independent third party evaluate the progress of development, to
evaluate performance, and to conduct a cost-benefit analysis at
multiple milestones of the project?
Answer. We strongly believe that working with launch service
providers to determine how they can become more efficient and
commercially viable is the most economical path to transition to a
domestically produced launch service solution. Specifically on the
Vulcan system, the technology that is being developed by the two engine
providers is new to the US industrial base. We believe it is prudent to
carry two solutions at this time due to the technical maturity of the
systems, but we do not intend to carry forward all rocket propulsion
systems indefinitely. The Secretary of the Air Force has asked the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (in addition to the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency) to
review the launch service investment plan in order to provide a third
party cost assessment. In addition, the Aerospace Corporation, the Air
Force's independent and objective Federally Funded Research and
Development Center, has, since 1960, provided support to the Air Force
in the design, acquisition, and operation of space and launch systems.
Aerospace provides specialty expertise in all areas applicable to
launch vehicle and spacecraft systems. Aerospace acts as our
independent third-party to evaluate the progress in each of our rocket
propulsion system other transaction authority agreements.
Question. Does the USAF have a plan to incorporate an unbiased look
at the program? If not, why?
Answer. Yes, the Secretary of the Air Force has asked the Office of
the Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (in
addition to the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency) to review the launch
service investment plan to provide a third party cost assessment. In
addition, the strategy to transition off the RD-180 by investing in
industry's commercial launch systems was developed and vetted in an
unbiased forum, the Defense Space Council, which in addition to the
Secretary of the Air Force, included senior space leadership from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Intelligence
Community, U.S. Strategic Command, Army, Navy and the National Security
Council.
EELV Intellectual Property
Question. The USAF is wise to develop multiple sources of space
access, but you invite risk when the intellectual property to produce a
launch system is fully retained by the industry provider. If a member
of industry were to succumb to market forces and go out of business, or
were to find that space launch systems were no longer profitable
enough, we would lose half of our space launch capabilities in one fell
swoop.
Since OTA's provide less data on a company's financial health than
a FAR contract, and less technical data than a FAR contract, and no
audit of how disbursed funds have been spent, exactly what intellectual
property rights are retained as part of the EELV acquisition?
Answer. The Commercial Space Act mandates the use of commercial
launch service providers for Federal Government space transportation
services. The patent and data rights articles in the agreements
represent a balanced approach to preserving both commercial and
government interests. The data rights provide the Air Force with the
needed access to safely launch its payloads to the required orbit using
industry's launch systems. Specifically, the Other Transaction
Authority (OTA) Government Model Agreement includes Article XI on
Patent Rights and Article XII on Data rights, which outlines Government
access to patents and data. Each of the final Rocket Propulsion System
(RPS) OTAs has specifically negotiated articles that detail the patent
rights and data rights based on the amounts and types of investments
from Government and non-Government sources. The Government rights
outlined in the final RPS OTAs vary by company and ranges from Limited
Rights to Government Purpose Rights. Finally, it is important to note
that there is sufficient cost and technical reporting. For example, the
contractor is required to report their investment to date at each
milestone payment invoice and the milestones were chosen to track
technical progress. In addition, Article VII on Accounting and Audit
Administration, includes a requirement to allow the Comptroller General
to audit records related to the performance of the OTA.
Question. What risk do we incur under the current process of IP
rights as represented by the EELV grants announced thus far?
Answer. The Commercial Space Act mandates the use of commercial
launch service providers for federal government space transportation
services. The patent and data rights articles in the agreements
represent a balanced approach to preserving both commercial and
government interests. They are consistent with the data rights obtained
by the Air Force on the EELV program in 1998 and provide the Air Force
with the needed access to safely launch its payloads to the required
orbit using industry's launch systems. Since the Air Force has the data
rights to integrate and safely launch National Security Space payloads,
there is no additional risk incurred.
Question. Whereas the 1998 Commercial Space Act could be
interpreted as prohibiting the establishment of an entire launch system
separate from the private sector, retaining production rights should a
provider fail is not prohibited.
What are you doing in your contracting and OTA awards to assure
that the U.S. taxpayer, as represented by the U.S. Air Force, has
production rights to systems we are paying development funding for,
and/or providing integration finiding for (which could be construed as
development funding of certain components), in the event an industry
provider becomes unable or unwilling to continue the production of
space launch systems?
Answer. The Air Force has not acquired production rights to rocket
propulsion systems. Due to the complexity, it is unlikely that another
company could produce a Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) with the
technical data package from another supplier. The Fiscal Year 2015
National Defense Authorization Act directed that ``. . . the system
developed . . . (E) be available for purchase by all space launch
providers of the United States.''
The Air Force has implemented this requirement in each of the final
RPS other transaction authorities with an article/clause requiring that
the RPS developed under the agreement be available for purchase by all
U.S. space launch providers. By investing in a portfolio of propulsion
systems with this requirement, the Air Force has mitigated the risk of
not procuring production rights.
B-21 Acquisition
Question. The acquisition of recent high-profile DoD weapon
systems, such as the F-35, have been marked by cost overruns and
delayed timelines; systems are subsequently fielded to our Airmen in a
less-than fully-capable configuration, e.g., lacking software required
for performance and the use of all weapon systems.
What deliberate steps are being taken to ensure the acquisition of
the B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber does not follow in the path of other
inefficient and unpredictable acquisition programs?
Answer. From the onset of the B-21 program acquisition strategy,
the acquisition and user communities aligned to eliminate baseline
requirements changes that might impact cost or schedule. The
requirements were set early in the program providing stability, while
utilizing the reuse of mature and existing technologies. This allowed
industry partners optimum trade-off between affordability and
capability to secure a stable design of the platform during the
technology development phase. With sustainment as a key element of the
acquisition strategy, the aircraft is being designed to be adaptable
through the use of an open mission system architecture that can evolve
to address future threat environments as more sophisticated A2/AD are
pushing our legacy bombers farther and farther away from the fight.
This method enables the platform to rapidly adapt as the threat
changes, shortening development cycle times for future upgrades and
facilitates sustained competition throughout the B-21 lifecycle,
enhancing long-term affordability and supportability.
Furthermore, the acquisition strategy relies on incentives to
control cost and schedule and aligned these incentives towards the back
end of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase to motivate
the contractor to proceed smoothly into production. In addition to
leveraging lessons learned from previous acquisition programs, B-21 is
funding to the Air Force independent cost estimate which is based on
historical programs and data, and will become the Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB). The APB is the scoring metric which the program will be
measured against, providing transparency with Congress and the
taxpayer.
Question. What metrics will be used to monitor progress, and what
tools does the Air Force have to bring a wayward program back into
compliance?
Answer. The Air Force tracks how programs progress using numerous
cost, schedule and performance metrics against an approved baseline.
Programs report progress in these areas through many means such as
Selected Acquisition Reports, Major Automated Information Systems
(MAIS) Annual Reports, MAIS Quarterly Reports, and quarterly Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary reporting at the Department of Defense
(DoD) level. Air Force programs also provide Monthly Acquisition
Reports to the Service Acquisition Executive. The Monthly Acquisition
Report includes information on schedule, performance and funding
progress.
The Air Force also conducts an assessment of the Performance of the
Air Force Acquisition System across the enterprise on a quarterly and
annual basis. The reports from these assessments provide the status of
performance of the enterprise in the areas of cost, schedule,
technical, funding execution, contracting, product support, and
workforce. All of the data used to generate these reports comes from
electronic reporting tools either at the DoD or Air Force level.
In addition to cost, schedule and performance, the Air Force
monitors program progress in implementing the DoD Better Buying Power
principle of ``Should Cost'' to reduce or eliminate costs during
program execution. Programs are tracked by the number of Should Cost
initiatives they are pursuing, the projected savings from those
initiatives and the realized savings achieved.
Finally, the Air Force monitors program progress through annual
Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs). At a CSB, all requirements
changes and significant technical configuration changes for ACAT I and
IA programs in development, production and sustainment that have the
potential to result in cost and schedule impacts to the program are
reviewed. CSBs provide the Air Force an opportunity to strategize how
to mitigate cost and schedule impacts to programs that may have
encountered challenges in the development, production or sustainment
phases.
JSTARS
Question. The Fiscal Year 2017 budget submission slips the initial
operating capability for JSTARS recapitalization by at least an
additional year, and reduces funding for JSTARS by $170M when you
compare the Fiscal Year 2017 request to what the Air Force indicated
was required for Fiscal Year 2017 in the Fiscal Year 2016 request.
Please explain this further delay and reduction of requested funds?
Answer. As part of the Milestone A review and decision process,
senior Air Force and Department of Defense acquisition leaders assessed
the draft JSTARS recapitalization acquisition strategy and determined
the need for more time in the earlier stages of the program to reduce
overall program risk. Additionally, the Air Force spent more time
analyzing mission area requirements and associated costs. As a result,
the Technology Maturity Risk Reduction and Engineering Manufacturing
Development phases expanded, giving industry more time to mature their
system-level designs and allowing the Department of Defense to better
understand the mission area cost-capability trade space. We expect the
additional time reducing risk and understanding requirements will
facilitate a more executable and affordable program.
The Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget request was reduced by $170
million to reflect the anticipated award of the post MS B Engineering
Manufacturing Development contract moving from the Fourth Quarter of
Fiscal Year 2017 to the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2018.
Question. What metrics are being used to track progress for the
JSTARS recapitalization, and what tools does the Air Force have to
ensure the JSTARS recapitalization programs stay within compliance.
Answer. While the JSTARS Recap program is in the Technology
Maturation Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase the Air Force is tracking
progress against a number of standards including contracted activities
(i.e., System Requirements Reviews, System Functional Reviews, and
System Preliminary Design reviews), schedule execution, risk
management, and financial execution (i.e., obligations and expenditures
against OSD goals). Additionally, we will implement earned value
metrics as part of the Fiscal Year 2016-2017 radar risk reduction
effort. Currently, we have met all of our program goals in pursuit of a
fourth quarter, Fiscal Year 2017 Milestone B, including three
successful Milestone Decision Authority decisions in less than one
year. Our Engineering, Manufacturing and Development contract will
implement a broader and more detailed suite of program metrics. The
program manager is responsible for compliance, which is verified as
part of the systematic and periodic acquisition review process.
The Air Force tracks how programs progress using cost, schedule and
performance against their approved baseline. Programs report on
progress in these areas through many means such as Selected Acquisition
Reports, Major Automated Information Systems Annual Reports, MAIS
Quarterly Reports, and quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary
reporting at the Department of Defense level. Air Force programs also
provide monthly acquisition reports, which include information on
schedule, performance and funding progress, to the Service Acquisition
Executive.
The Air Force also conducts an assessment of the Performance of the
Air Force Acquisition System across the enterprise on a quarterly and
annual basis. The reports from these assessments provide the status of
performance of the enterprise in the areas of cost, schedule,
technical, funding execution, contracting, product support, and
workforce. All of the data used to generate these reports comes from
electronic reporting tools either at the DoD or Air Force level.
In addition to cost, schedule and performance, the Air Force
monitors program progress in implementing the DoD Better Buying Power
principle of ``Should Cost'' to reduce or eliminate costs during
program execution. Programs are tracked by the number of Should Cost
initiatives they are pursuing, the projected savings from those
initiatives, and savings achieved.
Finally, the Air Force monitors program progress through annual
Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs). At a CSB, all requirements
changes and significant technical configuration changes for ACAT I and
IA programs in development, production and sustainment that have the
potential to result in cost and schedule impacts to the program are
reviewed. CSBs provide the Air Force an opportunity to strategize how
to mitigate cost and schedule impacts to programs that may have
encountered challenges in the development, production or sustainment
phases.
Officer Promotions
Question. Retaining the best personnel requires a superior
personnel management system; how your officers view the integrity of
your Below Zone (BZ) selection process is critical to that system. The
services are charged by Title 10, U.S. Code, to select the best
qualified officers for promotion to the next grade. DODI 1320.14 states
that board members must certify that they ``carefully considered the
records of each officer whose name was submitted to the board.'' Any
methodology for consideration of officers below the zone that does not
afford board members the same amount of time for every BZ file, as is
afforded to In and Above Zone files, or utilizes a practice to rapidly
screen through BZ candidates, is not in keeping with the intent of the
statute, or the DODI. A rapid screening of a Below Zone file would not
constitute ``careful consideration'', and it would invite opportunities
for you to overlook the best qualified officers. If it is not already
your practice, integrating BZ candidates into the In and Above Zone
populations for the purpose of careful and unbiased consideration would
meet the intent of the law, and would only marginally increase the
length of your promotion selection boards. After such proper
consideration, statutory limitations on the number of BZ selectees
could then be applied.
Please describe for me your practice for considering officers for
promotion from below-the-zone, and inform me how much additional cost
you would incur if a modification to properly consider Below Zone
candidates is needed, and if you are willing to make such a
modification to increase the integrity of your promotion selection
board system.
Answer. The Air Force has a thorough, multi-phase process for
considering officers for promotion below-the-zone (BZ). We are
confident we are executing a fair and equitable process and selecting
the best qualified officers available in our Air Force. The Air Force's
current practice for evaluating below-the-zone records was approved by
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management and Personnel in 1992. Our process implements an
additional phase entitled the `Exceptionally Well Qualified (EWQ)
Review' (what you refer to as `screening') and includes two phases over
what is accomplished for in- and above-the-zone (I/APZ). This has
resulted in an increased number of officers selected below-the-zone to
both lieutenant colonel and colonel, as compared to selection rates
pre-1992. The Air Force currently allows for selection of the maximum
number of officers from the below-the-zone category which is set at
10%.
Our promotion recommendation process begins before the central
selection board (CSB) convenes. The officer's senior rater (O-6 for
majors and below; general officer for lieutenant colonel and above)
communicates directly with the CSB via the Promotion Recommendation
Form (PRF). This form summarizes the entire record and provides key
performance factors from the officer's entire career. The form also
provides the ability for the senior rater to identify officers with
superior records through the designation of a numerically limited
promotion recommendation given to the top 10% of those eligible. As the
`cover document', this is the senior rater's opportunity to tell the
CSB whether or not an officer is ready for increased responsibility.
During the EWQ process, CSB members carefully consider eligible records
to determine if the officer is exceptionally well qualified; there are
no time limits to this phase, nor are there any limitations on number
of records that can be forwarded to the next (scoring) phase.
During Phase 2, those records forwarded from the EWQ portion are
reviewed again and scored numerically. This process mirrors that
performed for the I/APZ process and allows for thorough review of all
records, rescoring when there are disparate scores between panel
members, and multiple second and third reviews for records near the cut
off line with similar scores. This thorough process also ensures all
records are given careful consideration.
Finally, our BPZ promotion quotas are at the expense of the I/APZ
quotas. Thus during the final phase (referred to as displacement), the
CSB must determine the least meritorious BPZ selected record is better
than the best non-select I/APZ record. This comparison ensures the best
records overall from all three zones (A/IBPZ) are selected while still
allowing for the maximum number of BPZ records to be selected.
The Air Force believes our current promotion selection process
meets statutory and DoD policy requirements, therefore, we do not
recommend modifications to our BPZ promotion practice.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
Prioritization--Nuclear Modernization Plan
Question. Secretary James and General Welsh, your prepared
testimony states that the Air Force's FY 2017 budget request includes a
$6.5 billion investment in Nuclear Deterrence Operations over the
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). This is an increase of $4.3 billion
compared to the FY 2016 budget request. Correspondingly, in your
testimony, you point out that the Budget Control Act spending caps
create significant uncertainty in the planned modernization of the
nuclear mission in FY 2018 and beyond.
Given that the cost increase coincides with such considerable
budget unpredictability, are we at risk for laying the groundwork for
nuclear modernization programs that will ultimately prove to be
unaffordable for the Air Force?
Answer. Maintaining a capable and credible nuclear deterrent
remains the Air Force's number one priority. However, unless the
Department receives relief from the Budget Control Act, difficult
choices will have to be made in future years to ensure a proper balance
of modernization, capability, capacity and readiness across the Air
Force's critical mission areas.
Question. If it is not an option to delay or cancel these nuclear
modernization programs because they are valid requirements, then what
conventional weapon systems, missions, or force structure is likely to
be cut in order to pay for these programs?
Answer. Maintaining a capable and credible nuclear deterrent
remains the Air Force's number one mission priority; however, the Air
Force must balance this with modernization, capability, capacity and
readiness of our other critical mission areas. The Fiscal Year 2017
President's Budget request addresses each of these areas. However, to
afford these critical capabilities, we had to make difficult choices,
including delaying F-35 procurement, delaying C-130H recapitalization,
and reducing fourth generation modifications. We will endeavor to
provide the best military advice regarding tradeoffs in future budget
requests, but expect we will face similar difficult choices.
Question. General Welsh, the need for a new air launched nuclear
cruise missile has received a lot of attention in the press, with some
arguing that it is unnecessary and possibly destabilizing. Setting
aside those very valid concerns about the Long-Range Standoff Weapons
mission, how does that modernization program rank in priority order
when compared to the ICBM, B-61, and Long-Range Standoff Bomber?
Answer. Each of these programs provides capabilities critical to
the U.S. Nuclear Triad and to suggest one is more important than
another is to presuppose a shift in U.S. policy. Legacy nuclear weapons
and weapon systems are well beyond their intended design lives and face
challenges in both sustainment and operational effectiveness. If the
U.S. is to maintain a credible deterrent, full funding for Department
of Defense and Department of Energy programs is critical to keep these
vital recapitalization programs on schedule.
Modernization of the C-130 Fleet
Question. The incorporation of the C-130H T56 Series 3.5 EEP's has
been described as providing a 10% reduction in fuel use, and over 20%
improvement in turbine reliability. This seems to further the efforts
towards energy conservation goals and could save the USAF over $2
billion over the lifetime of the C-130H fleet. In October 2015, the
USAF contracted for the procurement of 50 EEP kits using
congressionally authorized and appropriated FY14 ($15.7M) and FY15
($22.6M) funds. Congress again appropriated $33.2M in FY16 to continue
EEP upgrades. The FY17 USAF budget request did not include any funds
for C-130H EEP upgrades.
What is the USAF life-cycle strategy for C-130's including engine
upgrades of the ``H'' model and C-130J modernization?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget request is
consistent with the Air Force's commitment to modernizing the C-130H
fleet through a four-phased approach: (1) We will ensure the C-130H is
safe to operate by keeping the aircraft structurally sound, (2) Meet
airspace compliance mandates with C-130H Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP) Increment 1, (3) Address avionics modernization with C-130H AMP
Increment 2, and (4) Partially recapitalize the fleet with C-130Js.
Congress has appropriated funds for additional modernization
efforts, including Fiscal Year 2014 and Fiscal Year 2015 funds for the
T-56 3.5 engine modification. The Air Force obligated these funds in
September 2015 to procure 50 T-56 3.5 engine modification kits; these
kits will modify the 10 LC-130Hs operating out of the 109th Airlift
Wing in Schenectady, NY.
Congress also appropriated Fiscal Year 2014 and Fiscal Year 2015
funds for the Eight-Bladed Propeller Upgrade. The Fiscal Year 2014
funds will obligate in July 2016 for non-recurring engineering and to
purchase and install the eight-bladed propellers on the 10 LC-130Hs
mentioned above. Lastly, Congress appropriated Fiscal Year 2016 funds
for the Electronic Propeller Control System (EPCS) and In-Flight
Propeller Balancing System.
Since these C-130H propulsion upgrades have only been tested
individually, the Air Force will conduct an operational utility
evaluation (OUE) to test the T-56 3.5 engine modification in
combination with the eight-bladed propellers and the EPCS from January
to July 2017. The OUE's data and final test report will support a
fielding recommendation based on the operational effectiveness,
suitability, and affordability of these propulsion system upgrades.
This evaluation is necessary prior to an Air Force decision on the
significant investment these modifications would require to outfit the
entire legacy C-130H fleet.
Microelectronics and Trusted Foundry
Question. During Secretary Carter's testimony to the HAC-D, he
highlighted a concern with microelectronics and Trusted Foundry. As the
US Air Force prepares to embark on a major nuclear modernization
effort, modernization of various aircraft platforms and ensuring our
dominance in space and cyber, the availability of trusted
microelectronics is a critical component of this modernization effort.
Are there any issues with microelectronics and the defense
industrial base? More specifically, does the US Air Force have a
strategy to maintain availability of nuclear hardened microelectronics
during this modernization? Are there other shortfalls with the Defense
Industrial Base or manufacturing capability within the US that concerns
with USAF?
Answer. The Air Force, as well as other Department of Defense
components, is concerned over the continued capability of the domestic
industrial base in the area of microelectronics. Industry-wide
globalization, segmentation separating integrated circuit designers
from producers, and the rate of change in technology make it more
difficult to acquire needed products.
The Air Force continues to focus on maintaining the availability of
nuclear hardened microelectronics for the Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD) program. During Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 2014, the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Guidance Applications effort,
under the ICBM Demonstration/Validation program element, invested
funding to adapt the Navy's electronic parts library for future use.
Through this effort, approximately 25 parts suppliers were identified.
The library of parts that they supply will be available to bidders on
the GBSD contract and GBSD will use the same or similar suppliers for
radiation-hardened electronics as were used by the Navy during the
Trident II D5 Life Extension program. Additionally, in Fiscal Year 2017
ICBM Guidance Applications will be independently validating and
verifying suppliers (especially for parts with a single supplier) for
their ability to produce parts for strategic radiation and other
missile environments that are historically challenging. Similar efforts
are being accomplished for the ICBM Fuze Modernization program, which
is utilizing Congressionally-approved life-of-program-buy authority to
purchase and qualify common electronic parts with the Navy fuze
program.
The Air Force is confident in the capability and capacity of the
domestic industrial base to support our currently fielded systems and
those in production. We concerned about the domestic capability and
capacity to design and produce future systems needed across the domains
of air, space, and cyberspace. The skill base supporting the military-
unique demands of the Air Force needs to be continually refreshed and
we must avoid gaps in demand on the industrial base to prevent
corresponding gaps in the knowledge and skills.
Question. As you may know, the DoD was directed to submit a report
on the topic of Trusted Foundry within 90 days of the December 2015
FY16 Omnibus Appropriations Act. What input did the USAF provide to OSD
in regards to Trusted Foundry?
Answer. The Air Force, in coordination with the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering, is pursuing
multiple options to address the topic of Trusted Foundry. We provided
input involving three basic categories:
First, continued use of the existing Trusted Foundries. We plan to
continue using trusted foundries in accordance with Public Law 110-417,
Sec. 254, 14 Oct 2008; however, the unique parts manufactured on the
foundries at Burlington, VT and East Fish Kill, NY are not available
elsewhere without redesigning them. Redesign will take 5-7 years and
more than $250 million in non-recurring engineering costs. Until a new
part is designed, we plan to continue acquiring current parts from
these foundries using Life of Type Buys and stockpiling parts for
future acquisition programs beginning in Fiscal Year 2018. Given the
time it will take to redesign the current parts for manufacturing on
another foundry line, we will press forward with designing the next
generation part to obtain more state-of-the-art capability for future
use. In order to reduce risk, we will pursue options generated from
activities in the paragraph below.
Second, the Air Force, along with the rest of the Department of
Defense (DoD), is exploring methods to perform ``trusted manufacturing
on untrusted lines.'' This approach permits us a greater number of
foundries to consider for manufacturing of future generations of state-
of-the-art parts. A DoD foundry was considered, but not adopted.
Experience over the past 25 years indicates the two prior attempts
floundered after 10 years and could not keep up with DoD's need for
state-of-the-art parts. In addition, U.S. industry has migrated foundry
manufacturing overseas to reduce costs for commercial devices for the
wireless communications industries. DoD's share of this market is 3%
and usually less annually; therefore, DoD has little to no influence
over commercial foundries. Activities in this area are ongoing and
results are expected in Calendar Year 2017 to inform future decisions.
Initial, classified indications suggest these activities will be
successful in providing DoD with options to trusted foundries.
Third, the Air Force will leverage Joint Federated Assurance Center
(JFAC) activities to ensure parts obtained from untrusted sources
comply with JFAC objectives for trust and assurance.
Question. What involvement does the US Air Force have with the
Department's manufacturing institutes?
Answer. The Air Force, via the Air Force Research Laboratory,
currently executes three co-operative agreements supporting
Manufacturing Institutes: America Makes, American Institute for
Manufacturing Photonics (AIM-IP) and NextFlex.
In 2012, the Air Force, on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, led an interagency effort to launch America Makes, a public-
private partnership in additive manufacturing with the mission to
accelerate the adoption of additive manufacturing and 3D printing
technologies in the U.S. manufacturing sector and to increase domestic
competitiveness. AIM-IP was established in August 2015 and is focused
on developing novel manufacturing processes for integrated photonic
devices. NextFlex was established in September 2015 and is focused on
developing highly tailorable devices on flexible and stretchable
substrates.
Scientists and engineers from the Air Force Research Laboratory
support the Institutes by participating on technical advisory boards
and government advisory boards and by providing subject matter
expertise for source selection and project execution.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky. Questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the answers
thereto follow:]
State Partnership Program
Question. What does this budget do to facilitate growing the State
Partnership Program?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 State Partnership (SPP) budget does
not support program growth. The geographic combatant commanders' SPP
demand signal continues to increase, as evidenced by increases in
approved partnerships and a list of proposed partnerships waiting for
Office of the Secretary of Defense approval. Unfortunately, SPP is one
of many valuable programs we have not been able to grow as a result of
fiscal constraints.
Question. What additional authorities would you need to expand the
SPP mission to include humanitarian missions, counter-messaging
efforts, and to work with civilian populations in partner countries?
Answer. The National Guard has adequate legal authorities to engage
in humanitarian assistance/disaster response missions (examples include
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA);
10 U.S.C. 2561--Transportation of relief supplies; 10 U.S.C. 402--
Denton Program, Space Available Transport; 10 U.S.C. 404--Foreign
Disaster Assistance) and civilian engagement. A legislative change to
increase SPP activities would be to adjust the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 to authorize pay and allowances funds, as well as operation and
maintenance funds, for Foreign Military Financing and OHDACA type
appropriations. At this time, the Department has not proposed
legislation to add these caveats.
Question. What effort is there to capitalize on the immense
personal ties to this region and capabilities in the U.S. to combat
Russian subterfuge and propaganda, particularly in the area of social
media and television?
Answer. State Partnership Program (SPP) activities and priorities
are coordinated to meet the geographic combatant commander's security
cooperation objectives. SPP is not the appropriate security cooperation
tool for overt intelligence collection or military information support
operations. We recommend questions about U.S. capabilities and efforts
to combat Russian subterfuge and propaganda in the region be addressed
to U.S. European Command.
Title 10 U.S.C. 12304b Activations
Question. Does this authorization entitle National Guard Airmen to
all the same retirement, education and TriCare benefits as the
authorization currently being used to deploy these Airmen to
Afghanistan or Iraq? Specifically, what is the difference?
Answer. The benefits afforded to an Airman depend upon the
authority used to call the Airman to active duty. Activation under
12304b is involuntary. The benefits associated with a 12304b
activation, however, do not match the benefits of 12302 (a partial
mobilization involuntary activation authority) or of 12301(d) (a
voluntary activation authority), both of which are being used to deploy
Airmen to Afghanistan and Iraq. Specific differences in benefits
include:
Reduced age for Retirement (10 U.S.C. 12731)--12302
and 12301(d) provide this benefit; 12304b does not
Post 9/11 GI Bill (10 U.S.C. 3301)--12302 and
12301(d) provide this benefit; 12304b does not
Pre-Mobilization Health Care (10 U.S.C. 1174(d))--
12302 and 12301(d) provide this benefit if the member serves in
support of a contingency operation. 12304b is to be utilized
for preplanned missions in support of combatant commands. This
typically does not include contingency operations. 10 U.S.C.
101(a)(13), which defines contingency operations, does not
expressly recognize 12304b activations. Accordingly, current
DOD policy recognizes 12304b as a support activation authority
that is not intended for contingency operations
Vocational Rehabilitation (10 U.S.C. 3103)--12302
and 12301(d) provide this benefit; 12304b does not
Voluntary Separation Pay Recoup Protection (10
U.S.C. 1175a)--12302 provides this benefit; 12304b does not
Federal Civilian Differential Pay (5 U.S.C. 5538)--
12302 provides this benefit; 12301(d) provides this benefit if
a member serves in support of a contingency operation; 12304b
does not provide this benefit because it is not utilized as an
activation authority for contingency operations.
Maternity Leave
Question. What is the Air Force doing to ensure cultural acceptance
of females taking 12 weeks of maternity leave, particularly for senior
NCOs and officers?
Answer. When the Secretary of the Air Force announced the
Department of Defense-wide change to maternity leave policy, she
stressed that commanders will grant maternity leave in all cases where
Airmen are eligible and that no Airman shall be disadvantaged in her
career, including limitations to assignments, evaluations, or selection
for professional military education because she has taken maternity
leave. We trust that commanders will take this charge and make every
effort to ensure that all eligible personnel are able to take maternity
leave without disadvantage. Since the initiative is so new, we do not
have any data that suggests a culture of acceptance does not exist. The
Air Force will continue to evaluate policy execution as the initiative
matures.
Question. Is there any intention of publishing formal guidance or
training materials on this topic to ensure females feel comfortable
taking the full allotted time?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense announced the changes to the
maternity leave policy late January 2016 extending this non-chargeable
leave benefit from six to twelve weeks to members who give birth and
retain their child(ren). The following week, the Air Force announced
those changes via a ``SecAF All'' email, CSAF email to senior
leadership, a ``MyPers''' message to the major command Manpower and
Personnel Directorates and base Military Personnel Sections and an
article on the Air Force Portal. In the Secretary of the Air Force's
email, she stressed that commanders will grant maternity leave in all
cases where Airmen are eligible and that no Airmen shall be
disadvantaged in her career, including limitations to assignments,
evaluations or selection for professional military education because
she has taken maternity leave. The guidance sent out to the field has
highlighted the importance of supervisors at all levels to ensure
eligible personnel are able to take maternity leave without
disadvantage. Additionally, Public Affairs Guidance was distributed to
all major command Public Affairs offices for sharing with the bases;
this included a question and answer section.
While the policy is in full effect right now, Air Force Instruction
36-3003, Military Leave Program, is scheduled to be updated with the
revised guidance and is projected to be published no later than May 31,
2016.
While we expect female Airmen to feel comfortable in taking the
full amount of maternity leave without repercussion, we know new
programs always need to be monitored. We will continue to evaluate any
potential impacts as the initiative matures and implement additional
policies as necessary to ensure our Airmen are not disadvantaged
because they took maternity leave.
Question. What do you anticipate as the impact on their career and
evaluations as a result of taking 12 weeks off for maternity?
Answer. All active duty personnel receive at least one performance
report per year to evaluate their duty performance over the course of
that reporting period. There are a multitude of situations where an
individual is away for extended periods of time such as lengthy
advanced training courses or other medical conditions. The Air Force
has measures in place to ensure proper reporting and evaluation of
Airmen. Further, in her guidance to all Airmen on this subject, the
Secretary of the Air Force mandated that no Airman shall be
disadvantaged in her career, including limitations to assignments,
evaluations or selection for professional military education because
she has taken maternity leave.
From a development perspective, the Air Force will need to examine
the policies in place throughout the portfolio of in-residence formal
training and professional military education programs in regards to
extended absences and program completion. Many of the programs have
physical and team oriented curricula that require attendance and
participation to meet standards. Policies will need to be put in place
to ensure training and development opportunities are not missed due to
a pregnancy.
Since this is a new initiative, we will continue to evaluate any
potential impacts as the initiative matures and implement additional
policies as necessary to ensure our Airmen are not disadvantaged
because they took maternity leave.
Total Force
Question. What progress are you making with placing a National
Guard officer in command of an active duty unit'? How many NG officers
and Airmen are filling active duty billets? How many NG officers are in
command of active component units?
Answer. The Air Force continues to make progress integrating Air
National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve leaders with active duty
units. For example, an Air National Guard colonel has been selected by
the Air Force Colonels Management Office to take command of the 6th Air
Mobility Wing at MacDill AFB, Florida in July 2016 for a period of two
years. The ANG currently has ten general officers assigned to active
duty billets, one lieutenant colonel serving as Commandant of the Air
Force Officer Training School, and one chief master sergeant on a
limited recall to active duty serving as the Commandant of the Air
Force First Sergeant Academy. The ANG also has one officer in command
with the First Air Force and another officer currently deployed as an
operations group commander to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.
F-35
Question. When will the basing requirements for the F-35A be
released?
Answer. The basing enterprise and criteria for the Air National
Guard F-35A operational locations (Ops 5-6) and the Air Force Reserve
F-35A operational location (Ops 7) were released on April 12, 2016.
Question. Does the reduced F-35 procurement effect fielding to the
National Guard or to the active force?
Answer. We have not yet determined how the delayed F-35 procurement
will impact fielding. However, the Air Force's total F-35 procurement
goal remains 1,763. The Fiscal Year 2017 President's Budget request
does not change that total number. It only slows procurement in order
to address near-term requirements, including costs to maintain current
fighter capacity.
Energy
Question. What is your current progress in complying with Executive
Order 13693? What in the budget addresses achieving these goals?
Answer. EO 13693 identifies numerous sustainability and energy and
greenhouse gas reduction goals. With the multiple competing demands on
our budget--high operations tempo, coupled with weighty warfighter
investment and operations requirements--we are currently falling short
of meeting EO 13693 goals. Projects that seek to reduce gas emissions,
water intensity, and energy intensity compete directly against critical
modernization and readiness demands. To balance it all, we're funding
infrastructure on a mission-critical, worst-first basis.
Notwithstanding the difficult decisions we've had to make across
our investment, operations, and infrastructure accounts, our commitment
to EO 13693 goals remains steadfast. For example, the Air Force
currently leads the DoD in energy intensity reduction, down by 24%
since 2003. At Los Angeles Air Force Base, we put in place DoD's first
fleet of all-electric, zero-emission general purpose vehicles and we're
working toward Vehicle to Grid (V2G) capability. In March 2016, we
established the Office of Energy Assurance (AF-OEA). The AF-OEA will
bring best-practices and expertise to develop, implement and oversee an
integrated facility energy portfolio, including privately-financed,
large-scale renewable and alternative energy projects as well as direct
Air Force investments. Additionally, we recently commenced our
Resilient Energy Demonstration Initiative (REDI) to stand up smart,
cyber-secure, clean powered microgrid demonstration projects on
critical Air Force installations. Integrating available tools and
authorities and a holistic approach to energy planning, REDI will
produce reliable, clean and cost-effective solutions that can be
replicated across the Air Force enterprise.
There is no specific budget line item reserved for EO 13693
associated activities. The Air Force uses all available authorities,
including third-party financing and direct funding via various budget
lines, such as the facilities, sustainment, restoration, and
modernization (operation and maintenance appropriation) and military
construction, to fund the projects that support EO 13693 goals.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur.]
Thursday, March 3, 2016.
FISCAL YEAR 2017 ARMY BUDGET OVERVIEW
WITNESSES
HON. PATRICK MURPHY, ACTING SECRETARY, UNITED STATES ARMY
GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The committee will come to order. We are
going to proceed as quickly as we can, knowing that there is a
series of votes.
This morning, the committee continues a series of open
defense posture and budget hearings. Today, the committee will
receive testimony on the posture of the United States Army and
its fiscal year 2017 budget. We welcome two Army leaders in new
positions to the witness table: the Honorable Patrick Murphy,
acting Secretary of the Army; and General Mark Milley, Chief of
Staff of the Army. Secretary Murphy was recently sworn in as
Under Secretary of the Army and serves as acting Secretary of
the Army. He previously served with us here in Congress from
2007 to 2011. He is also an Army veteran, including service in
Bosnia, and then with the 82nd Airborne in Baghdad.
Secretary Murphy, welcome, and thank you for your
continuing service to our Nation. Great to have you here.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We also welcome for the first time
General Mark A. Milley, the 39th Chief of Staff of the Army.
General Milley has held multiple command and staff positions in
eight divisions and the Special Forces throughout the last 35
years, most recently as the 21st Commander of the U.S. Army
Forces Command, Fort Bragg.
General Milley, thank you for being with us.
Gentlemen, as you know there was a time in the recent past
when some experts saw a declining need for U.S. land power and
actually planned for a smaller less capable Army. Such thinking
was clearly wrong. While the United States remains the most
formidable ground combat force on Earth, declining end strength
and a frozen budget will challenge the Army's ability to answer
the bell when asked by future Commanders in Chief. For now, the
Army is very much engaged in Afghanistan, trying to secure the
hard-fought gains we made over the last 15 years of conflict,
even as plans for our departure have been postponed. We also
have soldiers advising and assisting and still in harm's way in
Iraq, Syria, Africa, and around the world; some in small
operations, some in larger, all of those operations complex.
The Army has a missile defense mission in the Persian Gulf, and
a peacekeeping mission, an enduring one, in the Sinai. Over
28,000 soldiers stand alert in South Korea against the
unpredictable regime to the north.
At the same time, the need for a strong capable Army is
underscored by new threats. You stand against Russian
belligerents in Europe and act to deter a newly aggressive
China, which I may say has the largest Army in the world. In
fact, as we meet here today, our Army has nearly well over
200,000 soldiers deployed in 140 countries. For these reasons,
the Army has presented a budget that emphasizes readiness to
ensure our soldiers are prepared for whatever our unpredictable
world brings.
But, gentlemen, this appears to be a status quo budget. The
funding level of 2017 request nearly mirrors the current
levels. After the return of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan,
the expectation had been that units would return to full
spectrum training, yet the Army's operational tempo has not
slowed down, and since then, additional units, equipment, and
soldiers have deployed to Eastern Europe to deter and defeat
Russian aggression. Meanwhile, critical maintenance has been
delayed and infrastructure repairs postponed.
Properly funding readiness, however, comes at a cost,
primarily in the form of major reductions to large
modernization programs. Most notably, it appears that Army
aviation is the major billpayer for preserving readiness. This
comes at a time when we are hearing Army leadership saying that
additional aviation assets are their highest priority as they
seek to deter Russia.
I would add that the National Commission on the Future of
the Army is strongly recommending that the Army actually expand
aircraft procurement to meet demands for air power on the
Korean Peninsula and in Europe, and to ensure that the National
Guard remains a viable partner.
Another challenge you face is the steady drawdown of your
end strength numbers based on mission assumptions made several
years ago. The world has dramatically changed in the last 2
years, and so have our strategic challenges. Remembering the
repeated combat rotations, the 18-month deployments of recent
years, today, we will discuss whether you believe the Army is
properly sized to meet its range of requirements. The committee
certainly appreciates the complexity of these challenges that
are before you. We know these are dangerous times and will do
everything we can to provide you with the resources you need,
even if they are not always in your budget request.
In that regard, I want to call to your attention the study
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to explore
Army lethality. We all agree that we never want to send our
soldiers and marines into a fair fight; we must maintain the
upper hand. The subcommittee directed this research out of
concern that our historic lethality overmatch over our
adversaries is eroding and, in some cases, has been lost
entirely. Specifically, we were concerned about the lethality
of individual soldiers in small units and about field artillery
that has not kept pace with technological advances. We are
concerned about the losses we are facing in range, response
time, accuracy, and lethal effects to name a few. To illustrate
a point, I would point the committee's attention as it has
been--we have been giving our attention to eastern Ukraine
where we have seen a relatively new Russian technology--
artillery, armor, small arms--used to great effect. This is one
of reasons the subcommittee provided $314 million in new
funding last year to begin up-gunning some of our Stryker
Combat Vehicles. I would also add that China has made some
impressive gains in these vital areas as well. This important
study should be landing on your desk shortly, and I look
forward for working with you to fill those gaps.
I would like to hear from you and your staff on actual
recommendations for fiscal year 2017.
Secretary Murphy, General Milley, I want to close by asking
you to convey to our soldiers and their families how much this
committee appreciates their work and their sacrifice to each
and every day. You represent the best of America. You look
after the best of America. And it has been our pleasure and
honor to work with you as well as with your predecessors.
I am very pleased to yield to my ranking member, Mr.
Visclosky.
Remarks of Mr. Visclosky
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your holding a hearing.
And, gentlemen, appreciate your service and do look forward
to your testimony today. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Secretary Murphy, welcome. Welcome back. It is different to
have you on the other side of the dais, but we are glad you are
here.
Summary Statement of Secretary Murphy
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Ranking Member Visclosky and members of the committee,
thank you so much for the opportunity to discuss our Army with
you here this morning. This is my eighth week on the job as
acting Secretary of the Army, and it is truly an honor to be
back with my Army family. I have traveled this year to see our
soldiers, civilians, and their families at Fort Hood, Fort Sam
Houston, and most recently Iraq and Afghanistan. The selfless
service and dedication of our team should inspire us all. We
are tasked with the solemn responsibility to fight and win our
Nation's wars and to keep our families safe here at home. Our
Army must produce ready units today to defer and defeat our
Nation's enemies, defend our homeland, project power, and to
win decisively. By ``ready,'' we mean that units that are fully
manned, trained for combat, fully equipped, according to their
designed structure, and led by competent leaders. We must also
be ready for our future fights by investing in modernization
and research and development. We do not want our soldiers to
have a fair fight. We want them to have the technical and
tactical advantage over our enemies.
READINESS
With our $125.1 billion budget request, our Army will focus
its efforts on rebuilding readiness for large-scale, high-end
ground combat. We do so because we believe ignoring readiness
shortfalls puts our Nation at the greatest risk for the
following reasons.
First, readiness wins wars. Our Army has never been the
largest in the war, and at times, we have not been the best
equipped. But since World War II, we have recognized that ready
soldiers, properly manned, trained, equipped, and led can beat
larger or more determined forces. Whether confronting the
barbaric acts of ISIS or the desperation of North Korea, our
Army must be prepared to execute and to win. We train like we
fight, and our Army must be ready to fight tonight.
Next, readiness deters our most dangerous threats and
assures our allies. We are reminded with alarming frequency
that great power conflicts are not dead. Today they manifest on
a regional basis. Both Russia and China are challenging
America's willingness and ability to enforce international
standards of conduct. A ready Army provides America the
strength to deter such actions and reassure our partners
throughout the world. Readiness also makes future training less
costly. Continuous operations since 2001 have left our force
proficient in stability and counterterrorism operation. But our
future command sergeants major and brigade combat leaders have
not had the critical combat training experience as junior
leaders trained for high-end ground combat. Investing in
readiness today builds a foundation necessary for long-term
readiness.
Finally, readiness prepares our force for potential future
conflicts. We cannot fight the last fight. Our Army must be
prepared to face the high-end and advanced combat power of an
aggressive Russia or, more likely, Russian aggression employed
by surrogate actors. This budget dedicates resources to develop
solutions for this to allow our force the space to develop new
concepts informed by the recommendations of the National
Commission on the Future of the Army. Our formations must first
be ready to execute against current and emerging threats. The
choice, though, to invest in near-term readiness does come with
risk. Smaller modernization investments risk our ability to
fight and win in the future. We have no new major modernization
programs this decade. Smaller investments in end strength risk
our ability to conduct multiple operations for sustained
periods of time.
In short, we are mortgaging our future readiness because we
have to ensure in today's battles against emerging threats.
That is why initiatives like BRAC in 2019 are needed to be
implemented now. Let us manage your investment, and it will
result in $500 million a year in savings and a return on your
investment within 5 years.
FUNDING LEVELS
Lastly, while we thank the Congress for the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015, which provides short-term relief and 2
years of predictable funding, we request your support for the
enactment of our budget, as proposed. We request your support
for continued funding at levels calibrated to current threats
and our national security interest. And we request your
continued support for our soldiers, civilians, and their
families so that our Army remains the most capable fighting
force in the world and wins our Nation's wars and keeps our
families safe here at home.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And you will have that support. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary.
General Milley, thank you for being with us.
Summary Statement of General Milley
General Milley. Thank you, Chairman Frelinghuysen.
And thanks, Ranking Member Visclosky and everyone else that
is here and all the distinguished members of the committee, for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss your
Army. And thank you for your consistent support and commitment
to our Army soldiers and civilians and families. And thank you
for supporting this budget.
READINESS
Six months ago, when confirmed as the 39th chief of staff,
I committed to you and the American people to ensure that this
Nation has the Army it needs and is postured for an uncertain
and increasingly complex future and that we must remain the
world's most cable, versatile and lethal ground force valued by
our friends and feared by our enemies. This mission has one
common thread, and that thread is readiness.
A ready Army is manned, trained, equipped, and well led as
the foundation of America's joint force. In order to conduct
missions, to deter, and, if deterrence fails, to defeat a wide
range of state and nonstate actors today, tomorrow, and into
the future. Fifteen years of continuous counterinsurgency
operations combined with recent reduced and unpredictable
budgets has created a gap in our proficiency to conduct
combined arms operations against enemy conventional or hybrid
forces, resulting in an Army today that is less than ready to
fight and win against emerging threats.
America is a global power, and our Army must be capable of
meeting a wide variety of threats under varying conditions
anywhere on Earth. Our challenge today is to sustain the
counterterrorist and counterinsurgency capabilities that we
have developed to a high degree of proficiency over the last 15
years of war but simultaneously rebuild the capability to win
in ground combat against higher end threats. We can wish away
this latter case. But we would be foolish as a Nation to do so.
This budget prioritizes readiness because the global
security environment is increasingly uncertain and complex.
Today, we see in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa
radical terrorism and the malign influence of Iran threatening
that regional order. In Europe, we see a revanchist Russia who
has modernized its military, invaded several foreign countries,
and continues to act aggressively toward its neighbors using
multiple means of national power.
THREATS
In Asia, in the Pacific, there are complex systemic
challenges with a rising China that is increasingly assertive
militarily, and a very provocative North Korea. Both situations
creating the conditions for potential conflict.
While we cannot forecast precisely when and where the next
contingency will arise, it is my professional military view
that if any contingency happens, it will likely require a
significant amount of United States Army ground forces. If one
or more possible unforeseen contingencies happen, then we, the
United States Army, risk not having ready forces available to
provide flexible options to our national leadership, and if
committed, we risk not being able to accomplish the strategic
tasks at hand in an acceptable amount of time. And, most
importantly, we risk incurring significantly increased U.S.
casualties.
In sum, we risk the ability to conduct ground operations of
sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic
objectives or win decisively at an acceptable cost against a
highly lethal hybrid threat or near-peer adversary in the
unforgiving environment of ground combat.
The Army is currently committed to winning our fight
against radical terrorists and deterring conflict in other
parts of the globe. The Army provides 46 percent of all global
combatant commander demand on an annual basis. And we provide
64 percent of all emerging or unforecasted combatant commander
demand. And as the chairman noted, we have over 200,000
soldiers currently deployed all around the globe.
To sustain current operations and to mitigate the risk of
deploying an unready force into future combat operations, the
Army will continue--and we must--to prioritize and fully fund
readiness over end strength modernization and infrastructure.
We prefer investment in both current and future readiness. The
security environment of today, however, and the near future
drive our investment into current readiness for global
operations and potential contingencies.
So, specifically, we ask that you support and fully fund
the manning and equipping of our combat formations and our
ability to conduct realistic combined arms combat training at
both home station and our combat training centers.
MODERNIZATION
Additionally, we ask your support for our modernization in
five key capability areas. We ask support for aviation, command
and control of the network, integrated air and missile defense,
combat vehicles, and emerging threat programs. And, finally, we
ask your continued support for our soldiers and families to
recruit and retain high quality soldiers of character and
competence.
And I also want to acknowledge in closing the great work of
the National Commission for the Future of the Army. And we as a
Total Army are embracing the report. We are reviewing all of
their recommendations and will report back through the
Secretary of Defense on the way forward and our thoughts about
the 63 findings within the Commission's report. So, in order to
best utilize the resources provided, we intend to continue to
streamline our headquarters, ruthlessly cut activities that do
not contribute to an effective fighting force, and we do ask
for another round of BRAC. We request your support for the
proposed budget as written, and we thank Congress for your
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 which provided short-term relief
and 2 years of predictable funding. With your support, we will
be able to build readiness for contingencies, invest
selectively in the readiness of our future force. And I thank
you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The joint statement of Secretary Murphy and General Milley
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Milley.
Vice Chair Kay Granger.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY
Ms. Granger. Thank you both for being here and for what you
are going to do as well as what you have done. The report,
General Milley, the report on the National Commission on the
Future of the Army was released after you finalized your budget
request. So what changes do you see that way? How do you plan
to implement the recommendations of the report? And what
challenges do you see in implementing them.
General Milley. Thank you, Congresswoman.
We work closely with the Commission. They interviewed lots
of commanders, et cetera. So we are very pleased, actually,
with that Commission report. So one of the things we have
done--we are reviewing it right now, the 63 recommendations.
And we have got a very deliberate and rigorous process with a
council of colonels and a set of general officer boards that
are reviewing it all. And they will come on a weekly basis,
each of those recommendations in piece parts, are coming to the
Secretary and me. But also Frank Grass is on the decision group
that we formed; Tim Kadavy, who is the head of the National
Guard, Army National Guard; and also Jeff Talley, who is the
head of U.S. Army Reserve, along with our Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army. So collectively that group of people, the
Secretary through the Vice, we will receive briefings and make
decisions on our recommendations to go forward. Congress
activated the Commission. All those recommendations will come
back to Congress through the Secretary of Defense on what we
think of those 63 that we can do.
At this point, preliminary outputs from us, of the 63, it
is, round figure, call it about 50ish or so, that we think are
very easy to implement, at no cost to implement, or we have
already begun implementation and have been doing it for a
while. So there is about, call it 50ish, that we think are
good. There is a couple that we think are not worthy of
pursuing. And then there are about 10 or 15 of those that are
significant, we think warrant detailed analysis, and they are
expensive. And we will have to come back to you with our
thoughts on what those are.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. I will save my other
questions for another round.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Israel.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Mr. Israel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here.
Mr. Secretary, great to see you again. Enjoyed our service
together in this institution.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you noted that a ready
Army is a manned, trained, equipped, and well-led force. And I
agree with you completely. It seems to me that another element
of readiness, and I know that you agree with this, and I know
General Milley agrees with this based on conversations, is an
Army whose people are well educated, that they have certain
skills and abilities based on professional military education,
which is sensible, not only in an investment in the minds of
our service men and women but also as a matter of just good
smart retention and recruitment policy.
General, I was at West Point several years ago, and they
had assembled for me a panel of captains and majors who had
been deployed to theater, came back, received their master's
degrees in international relations at Columbia University, got
deployed again, and every single one told me they were much
more effective warriors having a master's degree on their
second deployment versus their first deployment. And that was
part of a deal that they agreed to continue their service for
an additional--I am not sure how many years it was--but
additional service to the Army in exchange for that education.
So I would like both of you to comment on the value of
professional military education, whether you believe that our
current investments are covering what we need to be doing. Are
there disincentives that are getting in the way of a track in
professional military education? And, finally, I have not yet
read the entirety of the National Commission on the Future of
the Army, but did the Commission consider at all the issue of
professional military education, how we ought to be addressing
it in the future? And if you would both comment on those
questions, I would be grateful.
Mr. Murphy. Congressman, it is great to be back with you.
And thank you so much. And you have been a champion for not
only West Point but for Army. We appreciate everyone. I think
you know my background. I joined the Army at 19 and was lucky
enough to be one of those professors at West Point. And I was
there when 9/11 happened and then deployed for two combat
deployments right afterwards as an Army captain.
The great thing about West Point, but overall what
professional military education, it is that West Point truly is
like the Athens and Sparta of our military in that we pursue
the strongest warriors but also those who have intellectual
rigor. And that vigor is what is needed to lead troops, because
they need to lead them in the right way.
The investment this past year in this budget, this 2017
budget, is $708 million. And that's a lot of money for the
American taxpayer. But when you have an Army right now at over
one million soldiers that is spread as thin as possible with
this OPTEMPO against ISIS, against an aggressive Russia,
against North Korea and doing what we need to do, you know, we
had to make some obviously hard choices in budgets. You can't
do everything. And we have doubled down on readiness. And that
is combat readiness for our troops and our units. But make no
mistake. Those soldiers, whether it is at West Point or the
Sergeants Major Academy or elsewhere, that are going through
Army University and other things for both enlisted and
officers, they are getting the critical skill sets needed to be
leaders of character with that intellectual vigor that I
mentioned earlier needed right now during these challenging
times to lead soldiers, you know, in areas that are not exactly
easy to operate in.
Mr. Israel. Thank you.
General.
General Milley. Thanks, Congressman.
A couple of things. One of the things that I think
distinguishes the United States military from almost every
other military in the world is the adaptability of our
officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. And we are a
product of our society. We are a product of our culture. And
one of the things that I think is really important to
understand about American soldiers is that we emphasize how to
think about a problem, not what to think. Many, many armies
train people what to think. You know, if confronted with this
situation, execute 1, 2, 3, steps 4, 5, 6. We don't do that. We
train people and we emphasize how to think, critical thinking,
because ultimately we want the leadership to be adaptive and
agile in a very complex environment. So you have got to figure
out how to solve problems. So to that end, the Army education
program writ large for enlisted and officers is multitiered. It
is ad echelon. It is wide and deep. And it is probably--I don't
know the advanced education programs for all of the commercial
world out there, but I would argue that the United States
Army's education program would match anything in the world
today in any commercial industry anywhere. We take soldiers,
and I will use officers as an example, train them and educate
them at the lieutenant level after they graduate from
university or West Point. Then they go back a few years later,
after they have had some operational time and they get another
career course as a captain. They come back out of the
operational force; they go back yet again to Leavenworth, and
they go to the staff college. They come back out, and they go
back yet again to the War College as a full colonel. And then
as the general officer corps, we have a series of educational--
continuing educational--programs. And that is the norm.
Now, what you are talking about is advanced civil education
where we send people to graduate school. We send a considerable
amount of our officers to graduate school. It is very valuable.
I am personally a participant in some of that stuff. And what
is really important is that we get officers that come out of
there that are critical thinkers and able to adapt in a complex
world. So that is the end state we want. We want that product,
and to date, we are very happy with it.
As we go into the years ahead, we want to expand those
programs as part of our talent and management and not contract
them. We want to expand them, because we find that they are
very valuable, and the environments we are going into are
increasingly complex. So they are very valuable. We fully
support it.
Mr. Israel. Well, I would appreciate an opportunity to get
with you separately to talk about how we can expand that and
how we can contract some of the disincentives that occur to
professional military education.
[Clerk's note.--The Army G-1 offers the Director, Talent
Management Task Force (Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1) to
meet with Representative Israel and other Members of this
Committee to discuss talent management and answer all
questions.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Israel.
Mr. Crenshaw.
IMPROVED GRAY EAGLE PROGRAM
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both.
Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the Improved Gray Eagle
program. I know that we had the Gray Eagle and then got the
Improved Gray Eagle. And it is obviously new and improved. And
this committee recognized that, and I guess, last year, we
supported 17 of those new Improved Gray Eagles. And as I
understand it, there is still a need for another 12. But it was
kind of demonstrated, but it is not in the budget this year.
And I just wondered why you decided not to include that in this
year's budget. Is that kind of a budget restraint? Are we going
to see that unfunded priority? Tell us a little bit about the
decision that goes into that.
Mr. Murphy. Sure, Congressman, and I am going to have the
chief add some, as well, comments. But, Congressman, we had to
make some tough decisions in this budget. When we have, as I
mentioned, the threats that face the American family right now
in our Nation, we had to make some tough--and aviation,
obviously, had to take a hit. And we had to divest, as you
know, pass with the Kiowa warrior and other platforms of our
aviation platforms.
Be that as it may, we have made significant investments in
aviation. There are some--about $400 million of that divestment
in the aviation program have come under the Gray Eagle and
other similar programs. But we felt that it was filled up,
meaning we got the assets that we needed right now to execute
what was in passing year--in past budgets. But I would like the
chief to comment as well on this program.
Mr. Crenshaw. Well, I appreciate it. And I appreciate your
kind of directness, because sometimes when you--you know,
obviously, you got tough choices to make. And it is easy to
say: Well, this is all about national security, and it is
everything we need. It is nice to hear somebody say: Look. We
can't quite do everything we need to do. That means additional
risk, and I am sure the general can talk about that, and I
appreciate that, because we want to help you in every way we
can. And we always like to get kind of the straight scoop.
So, General, can you just tell us a little bit about that
maybe additional risk that we might incur, you know, by doing
that. What are the--just very briefly because I better go vote.
You better go vote, ma'am.
Ms. Granger. Yes, sir.
General Milley. Yeah, just briefly, we made a conscious
decision to accept risk in the Gray Eagle program. We like the
program. It is manned/unmanned teaming. It is an ISR asset. But
we had to make some choices. So you will see it in the UFR list
that we submitted to the Joint Staff and the Secretary of
Defense for their review. And it will come over to Congress.
But it is an important program. We think it is a valuable asset
to our fielded forces. We want it. But we had to make some
tough choices, as the Secretary said.
Mr. Crenshaw. I appreciate that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Visclosky.
And let me apologize to both of our witnesses today for
what is obvious that we have got some votes that are causing
some turmoil and disruption of this hearing. But we are so
proud you are here, and we want to obviously focus on your
needs and deliver for you.
Mr. Visclosky.
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to talk about the issue of sexual assault and
sexual harassment, hostile environment. We have talked about
this issue for some number of years. Every year, whether it is
the Army, other services, people--and I believe the witnesses
are adamant about addressing the issue. And, obviously, it is a
societal issue as well. But in May of 2015, in an independent
study, RAND found that 14.49 percent of Active Duty women
soldiers had been sexually assaulted. Almost 23 percent of
Active Duty women soldiers reported experiencing a sexually
hostile environment, and 23 percent were sexually harassed in
2014. And we have been talking about this issue for some number
of years.
Noticed, and money isn't everything, that there is a
reduction in the amount of money committed by the Army to some
of these programs. And, apparently, there is great fear--the
rationale as to why there are so many reports now is people
feel free to come forward. But that is some years ago. But,
apparently, there is still great fear about professional and
social retaliation within these units. And so, despite the idea
that you can now come forward, my sense is the idea that there
is still not this pressure in units has not significantly
dissipated. I am just in--I know you committed, but what is the
Army doing to let people know this just can't keep going on?
Mr. Murphy. Congressman, we are doing a heck of a lot. And,
I mean, let me be very clear on certain things. First, this is
a cancer in our society and our Army. But our Army needs to be
better because we have a special trust and confidence of the
American people. And we have initiatives which have been very
successful, like Not in My Squad--that is led by Sergeant Major
Dailey--who are getting after it at the squad level throughout
our Army. Now, those results--I know you are talking about a
RAND study, but the other studies and reports that have shown
the good news with our progress with your initiatives,
Congressman, has been incidents are going down; reports are
going up. Reports are going up because women and men feel
confident they can go through the chain of command and report
instances that are unacceptable, that go against the very ethic
of our Army of selfless service, honor, integrity.
I will say one other thing. The initiatives that we
invested in over these last several years have led our Army
actually to be some of the industry leaders in this regard,
that college campuses, over 200, are now adopting our programs,
things like special victims counsel, special victims
investigators, special victims' advocates, so that they feel
that not only do they have to report, but they are there
throughout the process to make sure we root out these bad
apples so that they will never serve again, and some of them
will go to jail for a very long time.
As a former prosecutor, I prosecuted sex crimes when I was
in the military, Congressman. I will tell you that it is night
and day when I was in the Army 14 years ago than it is now. It
is 10 times better than how it was over a decade ago.
Mr. Visclosky. I would continue to encourage you.
General Milley. Can I make a comment, Congressman, if
that's okay?
Mr. Visclosky. Sure.
General Milley. As a, you know, commander of multiple units
over the years, the focus of effort has got to be the chain of
command itself. That is where good order and discipline is
established. That is who has personal responsibility, legal
responsibility, ethical responsibility, moral responsibility,
but personal responsibility for the welfare of those they
command, regardless of level. Company, battalion, brigade, it
doesn't matter; you are personally responsible for that outfit.
And you are personally responsible for the good order and
discipline. It is clear. It has been unambiguous since 1775 and
the foundation of our Army. So the nexus of solving the problem
is enhancing training, educating, and holding accountable unit
chains of command. It is unforgivable, unforgivable in my mind,
to have sexual assault in a unit. To me it is fratricide. To me
it is blue on blue. It is assaulting a fellow soldier. It is
unforgivable. It has to be absolutely pursued through unit
chains of command. They are doing that, and we are seeing the
results of that, as the Secretary already mentioned. So chains
of command I think are the key to success to me.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me associate myself with Mr.
Visclosky's remarks. This is obviously a commitment of every
member of this committee. Many of us just got through quite a
remarkable academy review process. And I have to say: You have
the best of America in your ranks, whether they are on their
way to West Point or whether they are at the recruiting
station. And so I do want to associate myself with Mr.
Visclosky's feeling. And may I say, of those that I appoint to
West Point and to the Naval Academy, I have to say for the
record most of those young women are far better, have their act
together than a lot of the young men that I interview. And to
think that they would ever be in a system where this type of
situation would continue to exist, of course, is totally
unacceptable. And we are very confident from what you are
telling us here today that this is--you are bringing the hammer
down after, obviously, giving people due process and their
rights within the military justice system. Thank you for----
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes.
Ms. Granger, any questions?
Ms. Granger. No.
END STRENGTH
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are going to welcome the chairman of
the whole committee here, Hal Rogers.
As he gets to his seat, General, I would like you to
address the 12 recommendations in the National Commission of--I
want you to comment on the plan issue of end strength, the
recommendations there, and why that is important, given what is
happening around the world in terms of conventional military
responsibility, as well as the unconventional forces that we
support.
General Milley. Thank you, chairman. This goes--I believe
the question, Mr. Chairman, is about the size of the Army,
Total Army. First, let me say that the United States Army is
not a small army. Right today, we are almost a million soldiers
strong, broken out--and this budget takes us to an Army of
980,000 strong with 450,000 in the Active, 335 in the National
Guard, and 195,000 in the United States Army Reserve. And with
that size force, the question is, size force to do what? So the
size of a force is only relative to the tasks that you are
required to do based on the National Security Strategy, the
National Military Strategy Defense Planning Guidance and other
strategic documents. Our analysis says that, in my view anyway,
my military analysis says that that size force, as it
translates into specific capabilities, such as ground maneuver,
Brigade Combat Teams, air defense, ISR, and so own and so
forth, that size force is able to do the National Strategy but
at a degree of risk. So the question isn't an absolute question
of how many numbers; it is a question of how much risk the
Nation is willing to take relative to the tasks that are
charged to the military in the various strategic documents.
In my view, that risk is, for the Army anyway, for us to
accomplish the tasks that we have to accomplish in the
strategies, to do those tasks in accordance with the timelines
that are basically laid out, and in an acceptable level of cost
in terms of U.S. casualties, I think we are putting the Nation
at increased risk. In a classified version, I will be happy to
discuss the exact details of that risk and what level I have
apportioned that risk. And I think that is well-known. I think
that is well-known. And the Secretary of Defense and others
have also testified to that. So, as the force gets smaller,
risk increases. Having said that, we have to compensate for it
by a highly ready force. So the size of the force is one factor
but also the readiness of the force. So we have to compensate
and mitigate with very, very high levels of readiness, high
levels of responsiveness, and high levels of technological
capabilities. The Secretary of Defense's guidance to us was to
buy us capability over capacity. In other words, skills over
size. Having said that, quality is not just based on that.
Quantity has a quality all its own, as the saying goes. So the
size of the force, the end strength, and the capabilities
associated with it, the number of brigades, number of enablers,
et cetera, is a concern. And it is really reflective of how
much risk we are willing to take. And I have advised on what I
think my military judgment is on that risk to the appropriate
authorities.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General.
Pleased to recognize the full chairman of the committee,
the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Rogers.
THREATS
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, welcome to the subcommittee. Your first
time testifying before this group. We welcome you. Wish you
well.
As you well know, the threats facing our homeland and our
troops grow more complex and unpredictable with each passing
day: China seeking to build itself into a maritime power,
purchasing aircraft carriers, submarines, amphibious assault
capabilities, making territorial claims in the South and East
China Sea areas. Russia continues to aggressively pursue its
own interests, threatening the sovereignty and security of
several states in the region, including the Ukraine and others.
Middle East devolving further and further into chaos; women,
men, children forced to flee their home countries to escape
relentless brutality of ISIS and the Assad regime as well as
Russian fighter planes.
COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADES
With so much uncertainty and turmoil in so many different
parts of the world, I remain concerned about our ability to
respond to complex challenges in multiple regions at the same
time as our force structure continues all the while to decline.
According to the current plan, Army is set to reach an Active
Duty end strength of 460,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017 and
will endure a reduction of another 10,000 troops by 2018. You
are planning to cut yet another combat aviation brigade over
the next 3 years, leaving us with just 10 CABs in the Active
Force.
The first CAB eliminated was in my home State of Kentucky.
Just last year, the Army deactivated the 159th CAB at Fort
Campbell, which resulted in the loss of 2,500 personnel at that
base. Nevertheless, the soldiers at Fort Campbell have
weathered this unwelcome loss, are as ready and equipped as
ever, and are deploying in the fight against ISIS this spring.
The headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division deployed to
Iraq just last month. Soldiers from the 2nd BCT will be
deploying in May to join them. They have our support. And we
wish them a safe return home.
Responding to threats from our enemies, each with their own
unique set of capabilities, is made increasingly difficult in
light of these constraints in personnel and resources. Your
charge is to maintain our ability to defeat these threats to
our homeland and our national interests in any circumstance.
And we know this is no easy task. We acknowledge the hardships
rendered by the increasing demands on our soldiers. I look
forward to having a thoughtful conversation about how this
committee can equip you to lead in this very uncertain
environment. This committee has every confidence in your
ability to guide our troops in the midst of unprecedented
challenges and tight budget constraints. You have our support.
And we know that you will do what it takes to ensure the safety
of our soldiers and our homeland. And we look forward to
hearing your testimony today.
I yield.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Kaptur.
CAPACITY OF U.S. ARMY VERSUS RUSSIA
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
General. It is good to see you again. And, obviously, acting
Secretary the Army, our dear colleague, Mr. Murphy, Patrick
Murphy, great to see you here today.
I am going to ask the general a question about the
capability of our U.S. Army versus the Russian Army. In sum,
how do you look at these two capacities?
General Milley. Right now, the Russian military, not just
their Army but military writ large, has embarked upon a program
of modernization that began at the beginning of the century
sometime; I will peg it at around 2003, 2004, 2005, something
like that. What they did was they saw what happened to the army
of Iraq as a result of our capabilities in 2003. They went to
school on our capabilities, and then they began a very rapid
modernization. So they are reorganizing. They are bringing on
new equipment. And this is not just army, across their entire
military, and they brought in new doctrine.
Their military today is significantly better than it has
been since at least the fall of the Berlin Wall. They are quite
capable. And they have got significant capabilities, which
are--I prefer not to go into specifics here--but just to say
that they are significantly more capable than they have been at
any time in the last 25 years.
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA EFFORTS IN UKRAINE
Ms. Kaptur. I am very interested in their propaganda
campaign across Ukraine and adjoining nations. What is the Army
doing to counter organized Russian propaganda efforts in
Ukraine, Eastern Europe and the Baltics, as well as even this
country? And what might we do to help you?
General Milley. The Russians are definitely being very
aggressive in information space and through all means of
national power, but specifically one of them is information
that they are using very aggressively throughout Eastern
European but not just Eastern European; in other parts of the
world.
What are we doing about it? General Breedlove, as you know,
is the Commander of United States EUCOM and the SACEUR, Supreme
Allied Commander Europe. He has a comprehensive strategy--
theater strategy--that he has worked up. And we are part of
that. And, again, I would ask to defer any specifics to a
classified session. But we, the Army, are contributing to his
overall campaign plan in the information space and, more
broadly, in other domains as well.
NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. And I would like to ask for--in
relation to the National Guard State Partnership Program, what
additional authorities would you need to expand the SPP mission
to include assistance to Ukraine, countermessaging efforts,
helping with internally displaced persons, humanitarian
mission, and, obviously, joint exercises?
General Milley. Yeah. So what we are doing broadly--and it
is in this budget; it is in the Secretary of Defense's budget--
with the European Reassurance Initiative, which he has
increased 400 and some-odd times from the previous submission.
The whole purpose of that is to get after what you are talking
about relative to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. We are
taking it seriously. We want to get after it. So we are
rotating not just State Partnership Program, but it is broader
than that. We are going to rotate heel to toe a conventional
brigade over there from the Active Force. We have already got
the 173rd, and we have got the cavalry regiment in place there.
And we are cycling through other capabilities and enabler type
capabilities. In addition to that, we want to put prepositioned
stocks of equipment up to division, division minus size, and we
will put that over there.And then what we are asking for is
additional 12304 moneys in this budget in order to
operationalize the Guard. The Guard is a very key component of
the entire program, not only in Europe but elsewhere in the
world. But specific to Europe, they are fundamental. These
State Partnership Programs have proved to be hugely valuable
because they have got linkages and connective tissues into all
of these armies of Europe. So it is a very valuable program. We
have asked for additional moneys so we can get more man years
to deploy the National Guard. It is not a question so much of
authorities. It is a question of being able to fund National
Guard and Active Duty for these exercises and rotational
deployments.
And I guess the last thing I would said is we have got the
4th Division out of Fort Carson, Colorado, and part of their
division headquarters over there also as an additional command
and control know how to do that. But the whole series of
initiatives are important, and we will ask for your continued
support of those.
Ms. Kaptur. I want to thank the chairman for his support of
the upgrades and procurement for the Abrams tank. We had to
fight that battle in this committee. They said we would never
have another land war; we would never need anything like this
again. And I appreciate what you have included in your budget
request, General and Secretary, in that regard.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
Mr. Womack.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Great to see my friend acting Secretary Murphy. Worked with
him on some other matters. And great to see you here and
appreciate your service.
General Milley, always great to see you.
And let me just begin by saying, as I have noted
previously, the understanding of the jointness between our Army
team, that being the Army, the Reserves, and the National
Guard, I think you have got a great handle on that, and I also
appreciate that line of thinking on the State Partnership
Program. Obviously, I am a huge fan. And while it is important
that they are helping us develop relationships in other
countries, very important countries, let's not forget also that
the skill sets that are being improved by having our National
Guard and reservists on duty in a lot of different key skill
sets is pretty important too. And so I am grateful for that.
I think Ms. Granger, before I came in, had already started
the discussion. But it has been recently reported you have
included several recommendations from the Commission in your
unfunded priorities list. Can you give us an idea which
Commission recommendations are included in the unfunded
priorities list?
General Milley. We--I shouldn't say ``we.'' I have
submitted the UFR list up through the Mr. Chairman and the
Secretary of Defense, and they are having an opportunity to
review that right now. But your higher dollar cost items that
are referred to in the Commission, specifically the aviation
initiative. The aviation initiatives that are being recommended
we think are sound and solid and make good strategic sense and
operational sense. But they are very expensive to execute. So
we will be hard-pressed to execute those initiatives in full
without additional moneys. And so we put that into the UFR.
That is the biggest one.
Mr. Womack. There were--I can't remember how many--
recommendations. You have already indicated that there are
several that are really good recommendations that are being
massaged. But I think you said the number 13 that are too
costly that--or bad ideas. I don't know.
General Milley. There is a couple that--Congressman, there
is a couple that I think my recommendation to the Secretary of
the Army is that there is a couple of them that are probably
not worthy of further pursuit. One of them is the deactivation
of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team that is in there as a means
of paying for the aviation. I don't think that is a good
tradeoff. I think that is a bad tradeoff. If you look at what
capabilities are being demanded by combatant commanders today,
and that is not including some contingency and career with
Russia or some other country. Just today, an Infantry Brigade
Combat Team is one of the last things I would want to get rid
of. As a matter of principle, when it comes to force structure,
to me, the very last thing you want to give up is your foxhole
strength, given it is your tooth-to-tail ratio. So your
infantry, your armor, your combat aviation, your combat
engineers, Special Forces: these are the units that are out
there closing with and destroying the enemy. They are doing the
core, the c-o-r-e, tasks of an army. That is the last
capability that I want to give up. If I have nothing else in
the Army, that is what I want. If you don't have infantry,
artillery, armor, attack helicopters, Special Forces, then you
don't have an army. We can have all this other stuff, but if
you don't have that, you don't have an army. So the very last
thing is my strong recommendation to the Secretary of Army and
Secretary of Defense, the last thing to give up are combat
organizations. And we have got to look hard at scrubbing the
books and making some really difficult tradeoffs. But that is
one of them, which was that recommendation about deactivating
an IBC. I don't think that is a worthy idea and shouldn't be
pursued any further.
Mr. Womack. And I just want to give the acting Secretary an
opportunity to throw in on that subject if he would prefer.
Mr. Murphy. Congressman, I would love to throw in on it,
because I think you know where I stand on it. There is no doubt
that we have to be a Total Army. This is an army that is
comprised--the majority--if you look at the U.S. Army soldier--
and that is a profile of that--most likely he is in the Guard
or Reserve, 53 percent of our soldiers in the Guard and
Reserve. So we have to act like one team. And we haven't been
able to do these 15 years of continuous operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and elsewhere without the Guard and Reserve. So the
Milley-Murphy team is absolutely: Meet them from the front to
make sure that we get that message out there.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You guys have got your stuff together.
We like it.
General Milley. My mother's name is Murphy. We are actually
cousins.
Mr. Womack. You are probably going to trademark that now.
Mr. Murphy. But, Congressman, I mean, whether it is the SPP
program in Arkansas or Guatemala, or, Ms. Kaptur, you know, in
Hungry and Serbia, where the Ohio National Guard is, or in
Pennsylvania, where it is Lithuania, these programs are force
multipliers for our partners. We can't do these engagements
alone. You know, it just can't be--this Russian aggression
which you are seeing right now, it just can't be the United
States standing there by itself and the America taxpayer. That
is why these programs are vitally important. They give
confidence and assurance to our allies that they will not stand
alone, that we will be there shoulder to shoulder with them to
face down that Russian aggression.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, thank you, Mr. Womack, and you
obviously include Kentucky and Maryland in those numbers too.
Chairman Rogers and then Mr. Ruppersberger.
AVIATION REDUCTIONS
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The President's budget claims to prioritize the
modernization, quote, of the Army's helicopter fleet. Yet opts
to cut the aviation procurement account by 35 percent, 2.1
billion cut. The Army's requesting only 52 Apaches, down from
the 64 of the current year. Additionally, the Army is funding
37 fewer Blackhawks, 17 fewer Chinooks.
Mr. Secretary, we certainly understand the challenges Army
is facing to fund readiness within the budget caps. But it is
difficult to understand why aviation has been so heavily
targeted. The Army consistently tells us how critical aviation
is to its ability to fight and participate in joint missions.
What is the rationale for these inordinate cuts to Army
aviation?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, these are
very, very difficult decisions. And when we look at what is
going on in Iraq right now and Syria against ISIS, you know,
the intent to taking back Mosul, you know, and the need to have
aviation assets to do that, you know, pending requests from
Iraq, the Iraqi Government, shows you an example of how
important aviation is. But, Mr. Chairman, you know, I left this
committee and this Congress 5 years ago. And when I left 5
years ago, the budget for the Army was $243 billion. We are
asking right now for a base budget of $125.1 billion. Aviation
is our most expensive asset and one of our most, if not the
most, expensive asset. Now we have asked in this budget for
$3.6 billion for modernization. Now, again, that is, as I
mentioned, you know, earlier, the light utility helicopter and
the Gray Eagle, both of those end of production; that is a cost
savings of $400 million. So that is less, and it is a part of
that. But these were tough decisions. We wish we could make
more investments in aviation. But, sir, we have to be
absolutely focused on winning tonight, on the threats that are
going on right now. You know, I am not trying to compare other
services, but we are asking for $25 billion in modernization.
The Air Force and the Navy, both of them are double that, their
requests. We have mortgaged--in my opening statement, I was
very clear with all of you and the American public: we are
mortgaging modernization, our future modernization readiness
for future fights, to focus on readiness today, because that is
the mission that you as a Nation are giving us to do.
Mr. Rogers. Well, the National Commission recommends adding
up to 120 Apaches more. How does that play into your plans?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, we are working through this. We
have a tri-commission with the National Guard, Reserve and
Active Duty into one room. We are working through this line by
line to make sure that we could look at those Commission
recommendations; there are 63 of those recommendations. As
Chief of Staff of the Army General Milley has mentioned, there
are approximately 50ish that we have seen that we think we can
implement, that are good ideas, that we have either already
done or are about to do, that are low cost. There are two ideas
that we feel pretty strongly that are not good ideas. But there
are about a dozen or so that are good ideas, Mr. Chairman, but
cost a lot of money that are--you know, the Commission came
after the budget was proposed to the Congress. So it came
after, and we are working hard, and we should get back to you,
Mr. Chairman, and this Congress within the next several weeks,
talk about 5 or 6 weeks, with our recommendations as an Army on
how we could potentially execute on those expensive items and
how we could do that.
Mr. Rogers. You do not really think that we are going to go
along with you and cut Army aviation by 35 percent? Do really
believe that?
General Milley. Let me make a comment, Chairman Rogers, and
I appreciate--one of the things we are doing with aviation, we
are having to stretch it out over time. It all comes down to
money. It all comes down to where you want to cut and what the
tradeoffs are. So would we like what the Commission wants to
do? Roger that. We would love it, and we think it is a good
idea, but they don't come with a checkbook. So that is why we
put it in the UFR list. So if we don't cut--aviation is the
most expensive subcomponent of the budget, if you will, for the
Army.
If we don't stretch that out, then we are going to end up
sacrificing armor, infantry, which are in high demand. They are
in equally as high demand as aviation. I am very familiar with
the 101st, the 101st Aviation and cutting out the 159. And I
was the deputy commanding general for the Screaming Eagles. I
love Fort Campbell. I love Kentucky. And I love helicopters. I
have been in a lot of firefights over the years, and my first
call is to get an attack helicopter on the ground. Our G-1,
right now, Jim McConville is an Apache helicopter pilot and
flew a close air support mission directly for me. He saved my
life, in fact. In fact, he probably regrets it today that he is
a G-1 and not Chief of Staff of the Army. But there is nobody
who loves aviation. I love Air Force aviation. I love fixed
wing. I love that stuff. That is all good.
Now, I am an infantryman by trade, and a special operator,
and there is nothing more valuable to us on the ground than
something that flies in the air, and there is nothing more
lethal for the enemy, but at the same time, wars are won on the
ground. So we have to maintain our infantry and armor and
combat aviation and we think we are striking a balance in this
particular budget.
Mr. Rogers. Who will respond to the National Commission's
recommendations? Who will decide what to accept and not accept?
General Milley. I think you do, Congressman. I think the
Congress does. Congress--or I believe, anyway--that Congress
mandated the Commission. The Commission reported out to
Congress. They gave us the recommendations. We are going
through those recommendations with the staff, et cetera, and we
will report out to the Secretary of Defense, and we will give
the Congress the benefit of our recommendations of their
recommendations and how we can actually execute them.
Mr. Rogers. When will you do that?
General Milley. We put a timeline; it is probably about 4
or 5 more weeks. Last week was 6 weeks, so this week, it will
be 4 or 5 more weeks. What the Secretary and I are doing is
taking a brief every week on, you know, four or five
recommendations, four or five. We are eating the elephant at a
bite at a time sort of thing.
Mr. Rogers. Well, we certainly need that----
General Milley. Right, we recognize that.
Mr. Rogers. But you would be prepared to change your
request based on that conversation we are having, as far as
aviation goes?
General Milley. The budget request?
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
General Milley. I mean, you know, I have to be honest with
you, Mr. Chairman, I think, given the top line that we have,
given what was given to us as a top line, I think this budget,
as written, is the most balanced budget to balance the
modernization, the readiness, and the end strength of the Army.
And we are taking risk. And I have expressed that risk as high
risk, relative to the National Strategy and the ability to
conduct operations, et cetera.
There is no question about it. So that is the result of a
top line. And, you know, I am openminded, and I am sure the
Secretary is as well. And I am willing to talk about it. But we
put a lot of work in the crafting of that budget, and we think
it strikes about the right balance.
Mr. Rogers. So you are not going to listen to the
recommendations as far as----
General Milley. We are listening, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. You are not agreeing to any of them apparently.
General Milley. No, we are listening to the recommendations
very closely. And we want to execute some of them, but they
came with no money. I mean, there is no money associated with
those. If there is extra money associated--if someone says,
``If you do these recommendations, here is the money to execute
them,'' then that is great. I think those recommendations are
good recommendations.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I doubt that there is any other element
of our force that is being cut by 35 percent, is there? Who
else is being cut by that amount?
General Milley. Aviation took the biggest cut because it is
35 percent of the money, because they are the most expensive
part of the force. Everything from flying--plus, we are
divesting capabilities. We are divesting ourselves with the
Kiowas, and so on. So it is a cut, not so much in the numbers
of aircraft or the capabilities that are on the ground; it is a
cut in the money, and we are stretching it out over time. And I
think it is a risk that we are going to go have to take.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add something
real quick, please. When I left 5 years ago, we had 45 Brigade
Combat Teams. We now have 31 Brigade Combat Teams on Active
Duty. So that is almost about--I don't have the math in front
of me, but that is about a third of the cut as well. And that
is over the last 5 years, sir.
So the Army has made a lot of choices. We have cut
headquarter staff over 25 percent for over $300 million in
savings. I mean, we are getting after it, Mr. Chairman. There
is a lot more work to do, but we have taken that Commission
report, and we are adopting a lot of those things that we can
adopt right now. And the other ones that cost money, we are
working through it to see how we could get after it. And we
look forward to working with you on that as well because we
need your help.
General Milley. And, Mr. Chairman, on the 11th Brigade that
you mentioned, we don't want to cut that 11th Brigade. We want
to keep that 11th Brigade, but there is no money to do it. That
is the problem. There is a top line to it. And we think, given
that top line, we are given X amount of dollars, and I want
that Ferrari, but I can only afford a Volkswagen, so I am
giving you the best-balanced Volkswagen that can minimally
achieve--they use the words ``minimally sufficient.'' That is
what is in that Commission. This budget, this PB provides,
according to that Commission, a minimally sufficient Army. I
agree with that. That is what we are buying. We are buying a
minimally sufficient Army that has a whole bunch of risk
associated with it in the international arena, with Russia,
China, North Korea, Iran, counterterrorism, and defending the
homeland. And it is all coming down to how much risk we as a
Nation are willing to take, and that is the bottom line. But
given the amount of money we were given, we think it strikes
the best balance possible.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We don't want to endorse Volkswagen too
quickly these days, so maybe we will choose another----
General Milley. Bad choice.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yeah. Mr. Ruppersberger and then Mr.
Cole.
CIVILIAN FORCE DRAWDOWN
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah, okay. Well, General, thank you for
being here.
Acting Secretary Murphy, we served on the Intelligence
Committee together. And I should have disclosed this: I was his
mentor when he first came in. So don't mess up, because it
reflects on me too.
Mr. Ryan. And he got appointed anyway.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah, that is a good point. There is a
lot of talk, and I won't be repetitive about the drawdown, and
the chairman has dealt with it. And I will say this: I think,
you know, what we have been going through with sequestration
and the cuts, and I believe very strongly like bringing down
450,000 is a historically low number for the military, and I
believe Congress has made some serious flawed assumptions about
future levels of security, and we are seeing other countries,
Putin, whatever, taking advantage of that right now. I think
that most of the people who are specialized in national
security will say these are some of the most dangerous times
that we have. And I do want to say this, that my friends on the
other side of the aisle in this committee have done a heck of a
lot to maintain where we are now as far as our national
security, because most people don't understand how serious this
is. And the testimony over and over about Russia and China, and
if we don't start dealing with some of these issues, we will be
weaker than they are, and that is not where we want to be with
this country. And if the people in this country knew that, they
wouldn't want that either.
I want to get into the issue, again, of the drawdown. But
there is another area. I have Fort Meade, Aberdeen, NSA, and
all in my district. So I have a lot of Army in my district. And
one of the things that hasn't been talked about--but I think is
really relevant--is the civilian force, who really do a lot.
There is a lot of brain power there, people that assist our
military. And it is very important and very relevant.
And I just wonder what actions the Army is taking to ensure
that this institutional knowledge is being passed on to the
remaining workforce, number one. And what is the Army doing to
attract highly skilled young professionals to fill this
institutional gap in the Army workforce? Again, I am talking
civilian now. But any base that we have, we have a lot of
civilian workforce, and we need them, but we need the younger
generation coming in. So are we working on that? Are we
focusing? Are we training? What are we doing in that regard?
Mr. Murphy. Well, Congressman----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Now don't mess up there.
Mr. Murphy. You know, part of this is that we have had to
make tough decisions. We have let go 37,000 civilians over the
last several years. And mostly that was through attrition. And,
you know, again, the Army team isn't just folks who wear a
uniform like I used to do. Now I am part of the Army team now,
and there is a quarter million civilians in our Army that
believe in the same values, that live those same values that
our soldiers live by, of selfless service, of honor and
integrity. And they work their tails off to keep our Nation
safe. They are in those places like Aberdeen and NSA that are
developing the next technology so our soldiers do not have that
fair fight that we mentioned.
But, again, with these budgets come tough decisions. And as
the acting Secretary of the Army, we are making them. Now,
luckily, we have been able to make them mostly through
attrition in the civilian workforce. But the message is very
clear that we need them as part of the Army team, as part of
our family, because they are out there every day--sometimes 7
days a week, you know, in those labs and doing what is
necessary to get the next weapon system or the next night
vision goggles and get them invented to give us the technical
and the tactical advantage over our enemy.
So it is something that I am very concerned with, but we
are taking the appropriate measures to balance that workforce
to make sure that we have the best Army team that we need.
Mr. Ruppersberger. General, do we have a plan for the new
generation coming in, retraining, replanning, taking advantage
of some of the brain power that is being either cut or retiring
from attrition?
General Milley. Talking civilian?
Mr. Ruppersberger. I am talking about civilians.
General Milley. I will have to check into the details of
the civilian advanced education programs, et cetera, that we
talked about earlier with the uniforms. I do know that we pay
close attention to training and working the education and
trying to bring in the right talent at the right time. As the
Secretary said, we have had to cut significantly, not only
uniform forces over the last 4, 5, 6 years, but also the
civilian force. But I will get back to you on the education and
the talent management of the civilians.
[The information follows:]
As the Secretary said, we have had to cut significantly, not only
uniform forces over the last 4, 5, 6 years, but also the civilian
force. As the Army evolves, we are undertaking significant changes in
the way we recruit, manage, and develop our civilian work force. We are
focusing on preserving the most important capabilities of this critical
element of our Total Force. We have improved training, educational, and
experiential opportunities for the Civilian workforce. We have aligned
the Civilian workforce into 31 Career Programs, which provides a
defined path for career development and progression that is based on
required competencies. The Civilian Education System (CES) is the
Army's core leader education program for Civilians. Through CES, the
Army offers progressive and sequential leader development courses for
all Army Civilians to take throughout their careers. The Army Civilian
Training and Education Development System (ACTEDS) Intern Program
provides for a strategic succession plan to replenish the Civilian
workforce while maintaining the requisite skills required for
functional proficiency. Program re-engineering efforts have resulted in
improved hiring execution, with program goals to hire 1,000 Interns
annually. About fifty percent of our Intern hires are within Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematic fields, and about half of our
Intern hires are Veterans. We also conduct functional training to
provide Army Civilians the opportunity to take planned and coordinated
courses of study in scientific, technical, mechanical, fiscal,
professional and other career fields. The results improve individual
and organizational performance that enhance achievement of Army
missions. Additionally, our focus on leader development, improvements
to the Civilian Education System, and continued maturity of the Senior
Enterprise Talent Management (SETM) Program and Enterprise Talent
Management (ETM) Program are designed to build a more professional and
competency-based civilian workforce. Together, our programs will
develop and maintain a cadre of senior Civilian with enterprise-wide
perspective who are capable of being adaptive and agile Army leaders.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you. Okay.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Great. Thank you.
The gentleman from Oklahoma.
PALADIN IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I wish our friend from Maryland had been in our
conference today. I wish some of our budget hawks would have
heard what you had to say. And it would have been helpful.
And Mr. Secretary, it is always good to see you back. You
and Secretary McHugh have now established a home for retiring
Members there at the Secretary's job, and done it in a
bipartisan fashion.
Mr. Murphy. Thanks. I am only 42, so I don't think I will
retire for a couple of decades.
Mr. Cole. Well, it is nice to have somebody in your spot,
honestly, that understands our world here too. It really was
very helpful with Secretary McHugh, and I know will be with you
as well. I have two just specific questions that I wanted to
pose to you, and both of them, again, are parochial, quite
frankly. I have Fort Sill in my district so I am interested,
number one, in the progress in the Paladin Modernization
Program, the PIM program. Where are we at? Is it on track? Are
you satisfied with the results that are coming out?
And, second, you know, obviously, one of the high-use
assets that the Army has are Patriot batteries. We have got
those deployed in a lot of places. So, one, I want your
assessment of what we have, and the use. And, two, where are we
at? We are going to have more and more threats in this area, as
we know, going forward, so as you are anticipating, what do you
see coming down the road?
General Milley. Yeah, well, two things. Paladin and
Patriot. We are satisfied with the Paladin. You know, the
entire--we think it is on track, and we think it is value
added. And the entire Army modernization program writ large,
whether it is aviation, whether it is artillery, whether it is
ground vehicles, et cetera, as a broad statement to
characterize the whole modernization effort, we are taking
existing systems and existing technologies and incrementally
improving them. And that is what I think is going to be the
Army modernization program over about the next 5 to 10 years. I
do not see, and I have looked at this thoroughly, breakthrough
technologies that are going to change the character or the
nature of ground warfare in the next 5 to 10 years.
When you get to 10 years and beyond, though, I think there
are fundamental technologies out there that will radically
modernize ground forces in the conduct of war. That is beyond
10 years. But from now to 10 years, this budget, and the FYDPs
coming up, our modernization program writ large is essentially
a series of spinoffs to incrementally improve lethality and
survivability and mobility, et cetera. That is what we are
going to see, I think, for the U.S. Army and ground forces.
Specific to Paladin, I am very comfortable with where it is at.
Where it is on track and the improvements that are being done.
And your note on Patriot is well appreciated. The Patriot force
is one of our highest stress forces. As you know, there is
seven battalions of Patriot deployed globally right now in some
high-threat areas. They provide a critical function to not only
defend U.S. assets and U.S. infrastructure, U.S. troops, but
also those of our friends and allies. So Patriot is critical.
We have got 15 of those battalions on the books, and we have
got 5 THAAD companies. We are trying to expand and improve
Patriot, and a lot of that has to do with the missile itself.
And we are trying to add additional THAAD batteries, but those
are critical for the integrated air defense system in both
Europe, Asia, and Central Command AORs.
Mr. Murphy. Congressman, if I can just add to, I echo and
agree with the chief's comments. I do want to say, when you
talk about the Patriot system, this is one of the most globally
engaged teams that we have. Over seven of them are deployed.
Half of them are deployed, so it is one-to-one dwell time. I
mean, the OPTEMPO of those units and those teams are
unbelievable and really breakneck. And as the chief mentioned,
two are assigned in station in Korea, one in Japan, one in
Germany. Three battalions are allocated throughout the CENTCOM
area in the Middle East. But when you talk about, when I said
to Chairman Rogers about modernization, you know, the Patriot
modernization program was status quo. I mean, this year I am
asking, we are asking in this budget for $154 million. That is
a decrease of $2 million. Last year, it was $156. So, again, we
are mortgaging modernization to meet readiness right now,
Congressman. And we can't risk anything else when it comes to
readiness. We have to win tonight.
Mr. Cole. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan and then Mr. Diaz-Balart.
SUICIDE RATES
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary, great to see you.
General, great to see you.
One of the issues that I know this committee is very
concerned about is the continued challenge with suicides. And I
saw in the testimony that the Army only has 1,789 of the 2,090
behavioral health providers required to deliver clinical care
and have folks embedded in the brigades. What kind of impact is
that having on the issue of suicides?
Mr. Murphy. Congressman, you know, you have been a leader
with mindfulness and some other issues to get after it, and
when you look at our warriors, part of that resiliency that we
talked about is to make sure they have the mental resiliency.
And we have redoubled our efforts in that.
Now, I will say, you know, 10 percent of the Department of
Defense budget, we look at 10 percent of their budget is in,
you know, medical resource or medical readiness. That has
remained flat. Our expenses, our outputs have been flat for the
last 4 years because of the efficiencies that we created within
the services underneath the Department of Defense. I will also
say that overall, I mean, we are the fifth largest healthcare
system in the country, the fifth largest. But when you look at
right now, 10 percent of our forces are nondeployable. That is
over 100,000 soldiers; 80 percent of those 10 percent are
because of medical reasons. So when you look at things like
mental, you know, embedded behavioral health teams, we have
doubled down on these teams. When I was at Fort Hood just a few
weeks ago, these teams are trying to break the stigma of mental
resiliency. They can go into those mental health providers.
They can go in, and it is okay to go in there ahead of time and
be proactive.
Having them in those units at our elements at the brigade
level are critically important, and that is because the
Congress provides the funding and everything after it, but
those 59 embedded behavioral health teams at the brigade level,
we need to do more. We are trying to do more, and with your
help, we will be able to do more.
APACHE BATTALIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD
Mr. Ryan. I appreciate that.
General, so evidently, the four battalions for the National
Guard with 18 Apaches, it is my understanding that there is
some concern within the Guard that the Guard may opt to split
up those four battalions among numerous States, and do you
think this will hamper their ability to offer a viable
capability, given the strain this will place on their efforts
to train together?
General Milley. Yeah, I haven't heard the guard
recommendation yet, Congressman, to be candid. So I don't know
what their course of action is for the distribution of the
bases of issue to do that.
Splitting them up, though, on the surface of it, not
knowing what their recommendation is, the whole idea of Apache
is to keep them consolidated so they can train as a unit, fight
as a unit, and have combat effects on a battlefield as a unit.
If they were to be split up into penny packets around a wide
variety of States, that could be problematic for the actual
operational employment and the training value. Now, there may
be workarounds for that. I don't know. I would have to wait and
see until I hear the course of action.
Mr. Ryan. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that hearing things like
phrases like ``high risk,'' ``minimally sufficient Army,''
``mortgaging modernization,'' ``Volkswagen,'' I mean, these
are----
General Milley. They get to hear it twice now----
Mr. Ryan. That has been memorialized, General. Sorry. Each
of those issues and the behavioral health issue, these are very
concerning issues, and there is an 800-pound, you know,
elephant in the middle of the room: we need money.
We need money to do this. And I just say very respectfully,
as we sit on a committee that is very bipartisan, we need
money. And the American people are going to look to us either
in the next year or the next 10 years because a lot of this
stuff is projected out. And in 10 years, the emperor has no
clothes, and we don't have the equipment, the capabilities that
we need. And not to get too political, but we have a very high
concentration of wealth in this country. There should be no
reason why we can't ask the 0.01 percent of the people in the
country to help us address the national security issues in the
United States. That should not be beyond the capabilities of
this committee to ask and put forward to the American people
exactly what these challenges are, exactly what they cost, and
say: Hey, we need a little bit of help from people who are
doing really well. And if you want the stock market to keep
going up and if you want the lanes for shipping and commerce to
continue to be protected, we need the money to be able to do
that. And we are going to go back and forth for how many years
until we recognize that we need a little more dough to make
this happen.
So I don't mean to get on the stump, but this is very
concerning to me to hear the general, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, talk about very high risk and a minimally sufficient
Army. That is not the United States of America. I yield back.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, respectfully, we also need to know
what we are doing around the world, and that is why Congress in
a bipartisan way has looked for what the Defense Department's
plans and strategies are all about and how they are going to be
implemented. And we are here today, obviously, to support the
Army's important role.
And there is the issue of accountability. We have some
systems that we work on here with all of our services where it
is incredible. We talked about acquisition and procurement, and
our committee worked very closely with Chairman Thornberry. You
know, the taxpayers also have a right to know that--you know, I
was involved with the Future Combat Systems, you know. I mean,
I defended it, but my God, we have had some enormous expensive
failures. We have been able to draw from some of those
technologies, but in reality, a lot of money was wasted. So I
share your feeling. I am not sure about the tax issue, but
certainly, I feel your feeling that we do need more money
rather than less.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.
ARMY'S ROLE IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, General,
Secretary.
You know, in this time of the tight budgets, it coincides
with, frankly, the enemies of freedom of United States,
frankly, being emboldened around the planet, whether it is
Asia, whether it is Europe. One of the areas that doesn't
usually get a lot of public attention is our own hemisphere.
And without the U.S. military, the Army Special Forces, et
cetera, there is no doubt that we would have not seen the
success, you know, whether it is Colombia, for example, or you
name it.
So let me talk a little about where you see--whether it is
footprint or goals for this hemisphere, because again, in this
hemisphere, we are now seeing an emboldened Cuban regime. Now
we know that Hezbollah--confirmed Hezbollah, we have known it
has been in Cuba. But now that is public. We, for the first
time in, what, a generation, have seen potentially Cubans even
helping now in Syria. We see the strengthening ties with Iran,
with Russia, with China.
So, despite what many would like the perception to be, the
reality is a lot different. So I just want to throw out kind of
an open-ended question. How do you see our involvement in the
hemisphere? How do you see our relationships, and how do you
see the Army's role in those relationships and that potential
involvement?
General Milley. Thanks, Congressman. The Army is very
heavily involved in the Western Hemisphere writ large: Canada
to the north, Mexico to the south, the Caribbean, Central
America, South America.
I had an opportunity travel not too long ago to travel to
Colombia and participate in the Combined Chiefs of Staff of all
of the Armies of the Western Hemisphere. It got great reports.
U.S. SOUTHCOM, in particular, U.S. Army South is leading the
way, and those Armies are very thankful for our efforts.
The threat in the Western Hemisphere is there. It is not as
intense as it is elsewhere. But we are mindful of what is
occurring in Mexico with the counternarcotics campaign and the
fight in northern Mexico. I do point out to almost everyone I
talk to about terrorism and counterinsurgency. The success that
has occurred in Colombia, that is an incredible success story.
It is probably the best counterinsurgency campaign that I am
aware of. And I have studied most of them. And it is an
incredible effort by the Colombian people, the Colombian
military, and supported actively and consistently over time by
the United States with a relatively small number of forces. And
they have successfully, you know, dealt with that insurgency
and they are pretty much, at least my estimate, is nearing the
end game in bringing that to an end. It is an incredible story,
and it is something worth studying in that detail. But we are
heavily engaged throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And you don't see that changing any time
soon. I mean, I know that, in SOUTHCOM, General Kelly has
mentioned many, many times to I think most of us, or all of us,
that focusing on narcotrafficking for example, or human
trafficking, that he can see a lot of activity taking place,
but he can only, in essence, try to go after about 20 percent.
And it is literally lack of resources of having, potentially--
--
General Milley. Right.
Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. You know, helicopters or a
ship they can land the helicopters on, et cetera. So, you know,
how do you see our future plans there?
General Milley. Right. For the Army, the Army's commitment,
we have got capabilities committed into South American, in
Central America, et cetera. I do not see, unless something
radically changes, given the size of the Army, and where we are
at, and what our global commitments are, I do not see a radical
increase over beyond what we have right now coming up into the
future.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, General, how about a decrease?
General Milley. No, I don't necessarily see a decrease
either. I think it is, for SOUTHCOM, Army support of SOUTHCOM,
I see pretty much a steady state.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. All right, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Judge Carter, the center of military might, right, in
Texas.
ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM READINESS
Mr. Carter. Yeah, of course, a great place.
Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. I
apologize for being late. I am the chair of the subcommittee on
the defense of this Nation at our borders, and I had a hearing
with the Coast Guard that I had to at least get kicked off so I
could come see you. And, of course, everything centers around
Fort Hood as far as I am concerned.
General Milley.
General Milley. As the former commander of Fort Hood, yes,
sir.
Mr. Carter. You have been there. With the announcement of a
rotational ABCT deployment to Europe, we will now have three
out of the nine Active Armored Brigade Combat Teams deployed
around the world at any given time. If we engage with three,
reset three, and build readiness in three as the next
rotational set, what options are available to the Nation for
future contingencies? What challenges and risks should the Army
have suddenly if they are asked to do something? I mean,
everybody is either going to be training, resetting, or
deployed. When we have got places like Eastern Europe and the
Korean Peninsula, which are bubbling all the time, what is the
concept that keeps that working?
General Milley. Thank you, Congressman. You know, we have
got nine Armored Brigade Combat Teams in the regular Army. And
there is five more in the National Guard. So one of my
initiatives that we are working on is, again, operationalizing
the National Guard. That is a very important initiative. We
have got to get that going. We have got to bring the Guard into
resourcing of these various rotations. And, of course, the
Guard wants to do that. So it is a function of money, and so on
and so forth.
So we are going to do that, so the Guard is one of the
options to do that. Secondly, you know, if a contingency were
to kick off, you know, one of these other contingencies that
were significant, I mean, the President, SecDef would have to
be making some significant decisions as to the strategic
tradeoffs. So and I am very confident we would do that as a
Nation. We would say: Okay, you are not going to do that
mission; you are going to do this mission. So you are going to
have to make those choices. And another thing we are taking a
look at, Congressman, is I have got a study ongoing through
TRADOC to determine whether or not we need to add, convert one
of our existing brigades to an armored brigade or perhaps
hybrid brigade as we go into the future. That study is not in
yet. I don't expect it in for a few months.
But there may be a need for additional armored forces,
given the nature of the world and the direction the world seems
to be going right now. So we are taking a look at that. No
decision has been made. That probably wouldn't--that definitely
wouldn't be a PB17. That would be something in the POM 2018 or
2019 that we would have to take a look at it. But I am
concerned about the OPTEMPO of the armored forces. They are in
high demand.
Mr. Carter. And in this last round of cuts that came out,
we had, because we are the home of the armor, we were told that
we are not reducing the number of BCTs you have got, but they
did come in and take one infantry company out of each BCT.
General Milley. Right.
Mr. Carter. Now, and that is in the regular Army. I assume
the same adjustment is made in the Guard or not?
General Milley. No, we did--correct, not the Guard. We did
that in order to rebalance all of the brigades throughout the
Army. That wasn't targeted at one installation or another. That
is to take those companies out in order to maintain Brigade
Combat Team and battalion force structure.
Mr. Carter. Well, the reduction of that infantry company,
is that in light of our just prior conversation of only nine
armored----
General Milley. Yeah.
Mr. Carter [continuing]. Does that also put any kind of
limitation on us to be able to respond to an incident somewhere
in one of the hotspots as you just described? It looks like to
me there are less soldiers there.
General Milley. So, on a given--I mean, we had to cut to
get the numbers down. And that is where we decided to cut, was
to take out those companies out of those battalions and out of
those brigades. So what it does is, it is reducing the size and
capability, the capability of a given unit, battalion or
brigade by a single company out of the 12 that they have in the
brigade.
Mr. Carter. It is also reducing the lethality also. They
are less lethal. Right?
General Milley. It reduces lethality. It reduces
survivability.
Mr. Carter. And I bring all of this up not in any form of
criticism.
General Milley. Sure.
Mr. Carter. But as an example of pointing out what you are
having to deal with----
General Milley. Right.
Mr. Carter [continuing]. In looking at our ability to fight
the enemies of our Nation--
General Milley. Right.
Mr. Carter. [continuing]. Within the constraints of what we
are having to deal with in this committee.
General Milley. Right.
Mr. Carter. And I can say without reservation on both sides
of the aisle: we are concerned very much about what is
happening to the Army because, in reality, you don't have any
big toys to put in the mix. You have got people.
General Milley. Right.
Mr. Carter. And the less people, the less lethal you are. I
am hoping we are going to figure out a way to grow the Army.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge Carter.
Mr. Visclosky, and if there are others that have some
questions, if you could just let me know, so we can round the
bases and look toward the end or adjournment.
INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief, and I
think Judge Carter led me into my editorial comment, which I
try to avoid in these settings. There are very serious people
on this committee trying to solve very serious problems. There
is a lack of resources. Until one political party in this
country comes to grips with the theory and the fact that we
have to slow entitlements, we are going to have a deteriorating
conversation with next year with you because you don't have
enough resources.
Until another political party in this country comes to
grips that we can't starve this Nation of investment dollars to
invest in our future through additional revenue, we are going
to continue to have this conversation with you and others
because of a lack of resources. And I would hope that both
those parties come to grips with both those issues, so we can
make sure you have the resources for not only the helicopters
that the chairman alluded to but the training for those who fly
them so that they are as safe and as effective as possible. And
I hope that day comes much sooner than later, because the Judge
is also right: we need more resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, any other member comments?
General Milley, you made reference earlier that the
Russians--and I presume you put the Chinese in the same
category--have been looking at what we have been doing in the
Middle East for quite some time. I think you know one of our
commitments in this committee is not only to military
readiness--and certainly to yours--but the whole issue of ISR.
We haven't talked much about it, and you made reference to the
fact we can't often talk about some of those things, but we
certainly are keeping an eye, as I am sure you are, on what is
happening in Ukraine and Russian capabilities. A lot of those
capabilities are in open sources. We trust and hope on this
committee that as we look to see what the Russians an Chinese
are doing--and I am not suggesting, you know, going to war
here--that we always keep an eye on the development of those
capabilities, and--this is just my personal perspective--if you
look at the construct of the budget we received here, it tends
to be Russian- and Chinese-centric, but we also have the
ongoing fight, which the Secretary mentioned. I mean, there are
a lot of things happening in Mosul. And if you look at what we
did in Ramadi, it was certainly done with our advanced
technology and air support, and in reality, there is not much
left of Ramadi, and Mosul is even a more difficult target.
But the committee is bound and determined to give you the
ways and means, as best we can within the construct, to address
Russian and Chinese aggression, but we have, of course, this
cancer spreading around the world: ISIL, or the Islamic State.
And you need the resources there, conventional resources, and
what we call resources for unconventional purposes. And we are
bound and determined to deliver that for you.
So I want to thank you on behalf of the committee--I know
Mr. Visclosky and all members--for the incredible work you do,
and the men and women you represent, all of whom are
volunteers.
We stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Rogers and the
answers thereto follow:]
Aviation Accidents
Question. General Milley, last December the Army grounded all
aircraft in active duty units for several days in response to several
fatal helicopter crash incidents. 8 soldiers were lost in these
accidents, 2 of whom were stationed in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. I
understand the Army reviewed the situation to determine the cause of
the incidents and prevent further tragedies like these from occurring.
Is this trend due to faulty equipment or insufficient training?
Answer. The FY 2016 Army Aviation accidents resulting in fatalities
are still under investigation, to include those that occurred at Fort
Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Hood, Texas; and in Korea. Since March 2014,
materiel failure was the primary cause in 3 (11 percent) of 27 Class A
Army Aviation flight accidents and human error was the primary cause of
22 (81.5 percent). Historically, 80 percent of aviation accidents are
caused by human error. The Chief of Staff of the Army directed a
holistic review of Army Aviationo in December 2015. This team is
examining aviation training strategy, funding, execution, and
assessment. They are expected to submit their initial findings to the
Chief of Staff of the Army by March 31, 2016. The timeline for release
of the final report is pending.
Question. What was achieved by the recent training review and will
it have an enduring impact?
Answer. In December 2015, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a
holistic review of Army Aviation. This team is examining aviation
training strategy, funding, execution and assessment. The review team,
comprised of Army Aviation experts, is led by LTG Kevin Mangum.
Although the timeline for release of the final report is pending, they
are expected to submit their initial findings to the Chief of Staff of
the Army by March 31, 2016. Their work will undoubtedly have an
enduring impact on Army Aviation.
Flying Hours
Question. General Milley, the National Commission on the Future of
the Army noted that the Army has scaled back the amount of flying hours
for active and reserve components and recommended increasing them.
Will this make a meaningful difference in the safe operation of
Army helicopters?
Answer. Due to budget constraints, the Army reduced the number of
flying hours for aircrews. In December 2015, the Chief of Staff of the
Army directed a holistic review of Army Aviation. This team is
examining aviation training strategy, funding, execution and
assessment, to include flight hours and their relationship to readiness
and safety. Although the timeline for release of the final report is
pending, the review team is expected to submit their initial findings
to the Chief of Staff of the Army by March 31, 2016. Their
recommendations, which may include additional flying hours, will inform
the Army's broader approach to aviation readiness and safety.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Rogers.
Questions submited by Mr. Cole and the answers thereto follow:]
ISR Assets
Question. General Milley, I understand the Army owns 29 large
aerostats (formerly PTDS) and 29 medium aerostats (formerly PGSS).
However, only a few (four) large aerostats have been deployed in the
CENTCOM area of operations.
What are the barriers preventing the full use of ISR assets?
Answer. At the height of the war the Army had 124 aerostats [65
Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS); and 59 Persistent Ground
Surveillance Systems, (PGSS)] deployed to Afghanistan. Currently the
Army has 18 active aerostats and one spare deployed to the U.S. Central
Command area of operations (13 active PTDS, one spare PTDS, and one
active PGSS in Afghanistan; four active PTDS in Iraq). We have one PTDS
in storage in Kuwait and another one in storage in CONUS, both awaiting
the Combatant Command's decision on where to deploy them in Iraq. We
also have 47 aerostats (20 PTDS and 27 PGSS) remaining in CONUS storage
that are available for Contingency Operations. The Army made a decision
in 2013 to retain the aerostats in order to support future deployment
requirements. Upon a validated requirement and associated funding, the
Army will deploy as many of them as required. The aerostat program is a
government-owned, contractor-operated operation.
Question. Why hasn't the Army deployed more aerostats in the
CENTCOM area of operations?
Answer. The Army is fielding all of U.S. Central Command's current
aerostat requirements. If more are requested and validated, the Army
will deploy them.
Question. Why aren't CENTCOM deployed aerostat assets equipped with
wide area motion sensors?
Answer. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has prioritized Full Motion
Video (FMV) capabilities in their aerostats over wide area surveillance
(WAS) sensors. Currently, all CENTCOM aerostats in Afghanistan and Iraq
are fitted with FMV; three of the aerostats in Afghanistan are also
fitted with WAS. Two aerostats in Iraq will also be fitted with WAS
once the authorization to operate (ATO) is finalized. Both WAS sensors
for Iraq are ready for shipment, but awaiting the ATO. CENTCOM
determines the sensor array in the aerostats based on mission
requirements and priorities.
There are weight limitations in the aerostats and an operational
tradeoff must be made when adding WAS. When WAS is added, one of the
FMV cameras must be removed. CENTCOM is reluctant to add WAS at the
expense of their higher-priority FMV requirement. If CENTCOM requests
additional WAS for deployed aerostats, we have enough systems in our
CONUS storage facility that we can immediately make them available for
deployment and would make their delivery a priority.
Question. Who makes the decision to allocate or deploy ISR assets
and the sensors on the aerostats?
Answer. U.S. Central Command makes the request. The Joint Staff
validates it, and the Army sources it.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole.
Questions submited by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto
follow:]
ABCTs
Question. The Army has only nine active duty ABCTs, which deploy on
a rotational basis to Europe, Kuwait, and Korea, with every brigade
either recovering from a deployment, training for an upcoming
deployment, or currently on deployment. How does the department
reconcile this alarmingly high use of the ABCTs, and how will the
department provide for an increased demand for ABCTs, should a wartime
need arise?
Answer. The Army has already taken steps to address increased
demand by transitioning the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE)
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to an Armored BCT available to support
ongoing or emerging requirements. The Army is also looking at a range
of other options to include converting an Infantry BCT to an Armored
BCT and increasing utilization of the reserve component. All options
incur varying levels of risk in terms of time to build readiness and
employ the capability, different fiscal considerations, and personnel
tempo. Increased demands on Army forces is not limited to Armored BCTs
and includes Combat Aviation Brigades, PATRIOT units, and Infantry
BCTs, to name a few.
Question. While the National Guard's five ABCTs are an option for
use, the time it takes for any of them to be mobilized and deployed is
lengthy, which will cause great disruptions in the rotation of ABCTs to
Europe, Kuwait, and Korea. You will have to accelerate training,
lengthen deployments, or leave certain COCOM commanders without an
ABCT; all undesirable strategic tradeoffs. Additionally, what is the
signal for the Army to increase the quantity of active duty ABCTs?
Answer. Current operational and contingency war plan demands
exceeding the number of existing Armored BCTs is a strong signal to
increase the number The requirement to conduct two near-simultaneous
conventional combat operations under a defeat/deny scenario may exceed
our ability to satisfy combatant command requirements and leave us with
little flexibility to address any other demands for armored (or other)
forces.
Troop Reductions
Question. How concerned are you about the continuing trend of troop
reductions, and please articulate for me what risks we are taking if we
continue to reduce the size of our Army in the coming years?
Answer. We have grave concerns about the Army's readiness to
respond to a major contingency concurrent with our existing
requirements in a timely manner at current end-strength. In the event
of a major contingency, the United States Army risks not having
sufficient ready forces available, and if committed we risk not being
able to accomplish the tasks at hand in an acceptable amount of time,
incurring increased U.S. casualties, and not achieving our strategic
objectives. Continued reductions increase these risks.
Question. What risks do we take if we reduce the Active/Guard/and
Reserve end strength beyond what you have planned in FY17?
Answer. We risk the ability to conduct ground operations of
sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic objectives or
win decisively at an acceptable cost against a highly-lethal hybrid
threat or near-peer adversary. If one or more possible contingencies
happen then the United States Army risks not having sufficient ready
forces available, and if committed we risk not being able accomplishing
the tasks at hand in an acceptable amount of time, incurring increased
U.S. casualties, and not achieving our strategic objectives. Additional
reductions beyond those planned and programmed in the President's
Budget request for fiscal year 2017 would increase these risks.
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)
Question. We learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that the rotation of
Brigade Combat Teams in and out of theater generates a steep learning
curve within new units, as they attempt to reach the effectiveness of
the unit they replaced. Armored brigades rotating to Europe as part of
the European Reassurance Initiative will no doubt face that same
learning curve; everything from the laws that govern international
border crossings, to the nuances of working with partner nations. These
rotations will necessarily invite friction and risk. What is your
assessment of these risks, which Russia is certainly aware of, and
would permanently stationing one or more Armored Brigade Combat Teams
in Europe help to mitigate those risks, and better assure our NATO
allies?
Answer. While it is true that Armor Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs)
rotating from the United States to Europe will face challenges and must
address the cultural nuances of operating with Allied and Partner
Nations, these challenges can be mitigated through the use of our
standing Headquarters elements permanently in the European Theater,
which include U.S. Army Europe and U.S. European Command. Our presence,
forward stationed and rotational, sends a very strong message to our
Allies and Partners: the U.S. commitment to NATO and our Partners is
ironclad and unbreakable--regardless of the home station locations of
U.S. ABCTs. The U.S. remains committed to deterring and defending
against Russian aggression and assuring our NATO Allies and Partners.
Rotating ABCTs provides the best trained, most ready capability to
EUCOM while also exercising the Army's ability to quickly mobilize,
deploy, and get an ABCT into the fight. Moreover, rotating forces to
Europe will build needed expertise in global deployment, a skill vital
to rapid response that has atrophied over the past decade. Rotation
will build a bench of CONUS based forces familiar with the mission,
terrain, and people of Europe and the capabilities of our NATO Allies.
These units will rotate overseas at higher readiness levels as they
will complete a combat training center rotation as a part of their
train up.
Question. What is your recommendation for the number of ABCTs that
should be permanently stationed in Europe, and exactly where should
they be stationed?
Answer. The Army is working with EUCOM and the Joint Staff to
refine the operational requirement for armored forces in Europe.
Beginning in 2017 the Army will have an Armored BCT continuously
present in Europe, and will build additional ABCT and other armored
division capabilities through forward stationing of equipment sets in
subsequent years. Rotating ABCTs provides the needed capability quicker
than could be achieved by permanent stationing, and exercises the
Army's ability to quickly mobilize, deploy, and get the force into the
fight.
Cyber Security
Question. What progress has been made in the realm of protecting
against supply chain cyber threats?
Answer. U.S. Army Cyber Command maintains a liaison office and
works directly with Army Materiel Command, to support cyber
vulnerability mitigation efforts. Specific details of mitigation
efforts are classified and can be provided under separate
correspondence.
Question. How has the Army mitigated the risk of different research
departments becoming ``stove-piped?' What progress has been made in the
development of Trusted Systems and Networks?
Answer. The Army mitigates possible ``stove-piping'' by different
research departments by engaging with various fellow researchers
through mechanisms such as the DoD Communities of Interest (Col) which
were established to assess DoD-wide capability gaps in cross-cutting
technical areas of interest and align science and technology (S&T)
investments across the Services and DoD Agencies (Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Missile Defense Agency, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, etc.) to address these gaps. In the area of cyber,
the Cyber Col includes the National Security Agency and Federally
Funded Research and Development Center research efforts. In addition,
the Army has established cyber governance and oversight bodies that
bring together key stakeholders to work cyber acquisition, resourcing
and requirements collaboratively across the Army.
In the area of trusted systems and networks, the DoD continues to
make progress. As part of the Col strategy, the Army S&T conducts
research in the following areas: trusted architectures, cross domain
security, identity and access management, software and hardware
assurance, and data integrity and confidentiality. Some of the specific
technologies being worked include encryption to secure the tactical
cloud, tactical public key enablement, tactical cross-domain solutions,
and software-based encryption. A recent accomplishment is the
transition of lightweight data in transit/data at rest encryption
software and a Linux integrity module and trusted boot function
software to Program Executive Officer Soldier/Nett Warrior acquisition
program in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. We have a number of planned
transitions in this area of research, to include cyber risk assessment
tools for mobile applications to PEO Soldier/Nett Warrior in FY 2017, a
software vulnerability assessment tool to PEO Command, Control and
Communication-Tactical (C3T)/Product Director Network Enablers in FY
2018, and enabling technologies for Tactical Public Key Infrastructure
to both PEO C3T/VVarfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) in FY
2016 and PM Tactical Radios in FY 2018. Other transitions include a
software based encryptor to PEO C3T/WIN-T in FY 2017 and unmanned air
system support for this software encryptor to PEO Aviation's Small
Unmanned Aerial Systems, a wireless personal area network encryption
capability to PEO Soldier/Nett Warrior in FY 2017 and a field
programmable gate array-based 29 hardware encryptor/next generation key
loader for encryption keys to PEO C3T/PD Network Enablers in FY 2018.
Question. What progress has been made in protecting space and
missile defense assets against cyber threats?
Answer. Significant progress is being made by the space and missile
defense community in protecting space and missile defense assets.
Mission assurance activities include: identification of space and
missile defense cyber key terrain; periodic execution of Red Team and
Blue Team vulnerability assessments; initiation of targeted studies
such as the cyber defense of satellite communications; initiation of
computer network defense on mission systems; implementation of rigorous
supply chain security policies to address counterfeit components and
malicious tampering; ensuring cybersecurity early in the system
development lifecycle; auditing the protection of Department of Defense
intellectual property, and continuous evaluations of cutting edge cyber
technologies that could enhance existing protection methods and tools.
Question. Additionally, how has Line 6, PE 0602120A, funding been
used to research methods for protecting data against corruption or
interception, and for the support of cyber vulnerability assessment
programs?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 2015, Congress provided an additional $7.75
million in line 6, PE 0602120A for cyber security research. The Fiscal
Year 2015 congressional funds support research at the U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command Technical
Center that identified space system (i.e., satellites and
communications links) vulnerabilities to cyber threats, approaches to
build resiliency into the space platform industrial base supply chain,
approaches to customize and secure mission operations software, and
approaches to implement secure space-based wireless wide area networks.
The Army's main defensive cyber security science and technology
efforts are funded in PEs 0602782A, Command, Control, Communications
Technology, 0602783A, Computer and Software Technology, and 0603794A,
C3 Advanced Technology.
Contracting
Question. There are numerous reports out of Redstone Test Center
(RTC) that the speed in which contracts are being awarded is slowing,
and that the change is due to organizational and systemic causes,
instead of manpower shortages. Please explain how the Army monitors the
efficiency and effectiveness of its contracting, and what the
tolerances for acceptable performance are.
Answer. The Army uses a variety of tools to monitor the
effectiveness of its contracting, such as our Virtual Contracting
Enterprise (VCE) suite of information technology tools that track
procurements and other key metrics in real-time. Additionally, we
leverage several of our contracting enterprise reviews to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement and the Army
Acquisition Executive that report various metrics along with
highlighting any challenges from the contracting center Directors/
Commanders. The Army also manages a robust Procurement Management
Review Program that looks across the entire business operations of the
contracting commands and does not focus solely on compliance of
individual contract actions. Any trends would be reviewed and shared
with the affected activity and potential corrective actions addressed
at both the execution and management levels. Over the past several
years the Army has pushed diligently to fully implement the tenants of
the DoD Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives. These initiatives have a
solid focus on improving tradecraft and ensuring the Government
receives exactly what it is paying for at the lowest possible cost.
While we have achieved enormous cost and performance savings through
BBP, this level of review and oversight has added additional steps,
checks and balances to the procurement process.
Question. What changes or events within RTC over the past three
years would have resulted in a delay in awarding contracts?
Answer. During Fiscal Year 2013-2016, Army Contracting Command
(ACC)-Redstone Arsenal (RSA) awarded two competitive actions for RTC.
Although support on other actions were discussed and planned for
execution at ACC-RSA simultaneously, the following requirements were
moved to ACC-Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) due to resource constraints.
A follow-on to the Information Management Support contract was
transferred to APG in June 2015. New competitive contracts for the RTC
Wide Engineering Services and the RTC Wide Support Services were sent
directly to APG for award by the customer. Because RTC is a
reimbursable customer, there was insufficient funding of contracting
personnel during periods which competitive procurements were conducted.
There was insufficient RTC manpower to support source selection boards,
including personnel changes in the middle of source selection boards
and inexperienced ACC-RSA workforce contributed to speed of source
selections. On these two actions, a Pre-Award protest and a Post-Award
Protest were also contributing factors. Over the last two years ACC-RSA
has implemented streamlining initiatives to improve Procurement Action
Lead Time, to include (but not limited to) updating local processes and
standardized templates, delegating Chief of Contracting Office
authority to Buying Directors and developing standardized metrics and
quarterly performance management reviews.
There are numerous reasons why a contract award may be perceived as
slowing or delayed. The procurement process has many players outside of
contracting. Some examples of issues that affect the procurement
process outside of contracting include incomplete, unclear or late
submission of requirements to the contracting office, changes to the
solicitation based on questions from industry that increase the
proposal submission time, increased time for evaluations due the
complexity of the requirement, and lack of complete and/or quality
proposals from our contractor base.
As resources continue to decline, Army Test and Evaluation Command
(ATEC) and RTC are pursuing multiple avenues to improve acquisition
efficiency. ATEC has worked with our servicing contract organizations
to establish a Test and Evaluation Center of Excellence (COE) to
consolidate our major range support contracts into a single location,
thus allowing one office of contracting personnel to focus on our
unique test and evaluation support needs. In establishing the ATEC COE,
RTC's contract support was recently realigned from the Army Contracting
Command at Redstone (ACC-R) to APG at the ACC-APG in order to improve
the timeliness of contract awards. In this process, we have identified
potential efficiencies via future contract consolidation across the
ATEC enterprise, to include consolidation of contracts at RTC.
Specifically within RTC, the commander is pursuing consolidation of
multiple RTC service contracts, where feasible, in order to increase
efficiencies and eliminate redundancy. In order to accomplish this
consolidation of support and to prevent an impact on mission, where
required, RTC in conjunction with the contracting command, initiated
bridges and extensions while efforts were ongoing to award contracts.
Since the transition, RTC has experienced an improvement in overall
service.
Question. To what extent is the Army considering proposing that
contracting decisions be returned to the Command carrying out programs,
as opposed to a central Contracting Command?
Answer. The Army is not considering any proposals to retum
contracting decisions to the Command carrying out programs as opposed
to a central Contracting Command.
There was a recent Mission Command Alignment order published by
Army Materiel Command (AMC) to strengthen the Life Cycle Management
Command Commanders' ability to set and manage work efforts within their
respective portfolios, but the technical and functional decisions
related to contracting within the aligned contracting centers remain
unchanged.
The order also strengthens Army Sustainment Command as AMC's
``single face to the field'' and provides supported Army Service
Component Command, Corps, Division, and Brigade Commanders a single
point of entry into AMC capabilities, including contracting, but the
technical and functional decisions related to contracting remain
unchanged.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
Question. Have future Army variants of a CPGS system been modeled
in wargaming? If so, what were the outcomes of these wargames, and how
are they affecting DOD's CPGS program?
Answer. Short and medium range variants of a land based CPGS system
were recently modeled in a wargame for the Office of Net Assessment.
The results of this wargame have not yet been released. When received,
the results of this wargame will be provided to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) for
consideration in the planning for the Department of Defense CPGS
program.
Question. While still in the technology maturation phase, is it
possible for the Army to provide DOD with input into the future
acquisition of CPGS systems?
Answer. The current Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) effort
is a research and development (R&D) technical maturation program and,
as such, is basing and lead-Service agnostic. To date, the Department
of Defense (DoD) has not made a decision whether to transition CPGS
into an acquisition phase. Based on the successful Advanced Hypersonic
Weapon project, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
(USASMDC) continues to be an integral partner of the national CPGS
activity. Currently the USASMDC is supporting the DoD CPGS R&D program
as the flight test director and flight test execution agency for the
Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike Flight Experiment 1, and
continues to provide input on possible future acquisition programs to
the CPGS office.
Question. If the Army and COCOMs, were asked to field a version of
a smaller Navy variant for a land-launched version (either from CONUS
or from a forward base such as Guam), what capabilities are lost by
that decision, especially with regards to loss of range, and loss of
power applied to the target?
Answer. While the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, in
support of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), has undertaken
some simplified analysis of alternative Hypersonic Glide Body designs,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense CPGS program office has the
necessary information and tools to best answer this question.
Question. It seems to me that vulnerability of a land-based variant
has not been fully-weighed against vulnerability of other systems (and
higher costs of other systems, inclusive of the necessary modifications
to submarines). How is the Army working with other services, i.e., the
Navy, to develop hypersonic missile technologies and capabilities given
current and future threat scenarios?
Answer. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC)
continues to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and the other service Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
stakeholders to develop hypersonic missile technologies. USASMDC is
currently engaged with OSD for the CPGS program in a number of
technical areas including basing and limited operational capability
studies. USASMDC is a key member of a national CPGS team that also
includes the Navy and Air Force as well as a number of Federally Funded
Research & Development Centers and industry. USASMDC supports the
development of hypersonic missile technologies through participation in
both the flight test program and the technically oriented Integrated
Product Teams.
Question. I would like an update on that matter, and I would like
the consideration to be applied to the concept of systems which are
moveable (as contrasted with mobile, on a truck), and systems not
limited to a fixed silo approach. I request as much information on this
program as possible to be supplied at the TS or lower level.
Answer. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) basing studies to
date have included land, air, and sea options (including moveable
missiles). We recommend that the Committee work with the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence
Systems CPGS office on the current status of the national CPGS program.
Officer Promotions
Question. Retaining the best personnel requires a superior
personnel management system; how your officers view the integrity of
your Below Zone (BZ) selection process is critical to that system. The
services are charged by Title 10, U.S. Code, to select the best
qualified officers for promotion to the next grade. DODI 1320.14 states
that board members must certify that they ``carefully considered the
records of each officer whose name was submitted to the board.'' Any
methodology for consideration of officers below the zone that does not
afford board members the same amount of time for every BZ file, as is
afforded to In and Above Zone files, or utilizes a practice to rapidly
screen through BZ candidates, is not in keeping with the intent of the
statute, or the DODI. A rapid screening of a BZ file would not
constitute ``careful consideration'', and it would invite opportunities
for you to overlook the best qualified officers Integrating BZ
candidates into the In and Above Zone populations for the purpose of
careful and unbiased consideration, and voting, would meet the intent
of the law, and would only marginally increase the length of your
promotion selection boards. After such proper consideration, statutory
limitations on the number of BZ selectees could then be applied. Please
describe for me your practice for considering officers for promotion
from below the zone, and inform me how much additional cost you would
incur if a modification to properly consider Below Zone candidates is
needed, and if you are willing to make such a modification to increase
the integrity of your promotion selection board system.
Answer. Every below the zone officer is considered without
prejudice or partiality in accordance with DODI 1320.14 and the
Secretary of the Army's written instructions to the board. The Army's
process for selection of officers from below the primary zone of
consideration is well established, trusted, and has proven over the
years to offer opportunity for exceptionally well qualified officers to
advance in accordance with their demonstrated potential for increased
responsibilities ahead of their peers. Our process provides a careful
consideration of all below-the-zone candidates to determine those with
the highest likelihood of competing for selection with officers in the
primary zone of consideration. Once the highest potential below-the-
zone officers are identified, their files are compared to officers
within the primary zone and the board selects those who will displace
officers for selection for promotion. The Army's process properly
considers officers for selection from below the zone. Board members
certify to the Secretary of the Army that their deliberations and
evaluation of officers' files were thorough and careful, and that the
board process was conducted in accordance with the Secretary's
guidance. We are in compliance with the spirit and letter of both law
and policy.
U.S. Munitions List
The Administration's proposed rule change to the United States
Munition List (USML) Category XII, which would remove International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) protections for the export of night
vision component technologies, would allow U.S. companies to sell night
vision component technologies to foreign companies. It is my
understanding that those companies, in turn, could use those components
to create and sell night vision systems that exceed the capabilities of
many of the systems available to U.S. forces. For instance, the
integration of 2000 FOM image intensification tubes with commercially
available PVS-14 Night Vision Monoculars would create a night vision
system with better performance than the systems available to 90% of
U.S. forces, according to my understanding. Similarly, 1920 x 1200 HD
Focal Plane Arrays combined with COTS thermal imaging sights could
create high definition thermal weapon sights 600% more capable than
those used by the U.S. military. In light of the ease with which these
systems can be converted, changing the ITAR restrictions could amount
to selling our nation's night vision advantage, thereby placing our
Soldiers at greater risk. Given the technological threat posed by the
change in ITAR classification of night vision components, please answer
the following:
Question. Is it appropriate to use rulemaking to bypass the ITAR to
allow the commercial sales of night vision technology and, potentially,
other technologies used in combat?
Answer. Yes, it is appropriate to use the rulemaking process to
modify the International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) as required by Section
38 of the Arms Export Control Act. To date, 15 Categories of the ITAR
have been revised using this process. The proposed modifications to the
ITAR are part of the ongoing Export Control Reform (ECR) that has been
briefed to Congress and has been in progress since 2010. The re-write
of CAT XII is consistent with the tenants of ECR. ECR implements the
administration policy of higher fences around fewer things. The federal
rulemaking process provides for the broadest engagement with the
public, the administration, and the Congress to understand the proposed
changes to the ITAR.
Question. Should documented performance thresholds be established
so that the most sensitive technology will remain with the U.S.
Military?
Answer. No, the most sensitive performance thresholds should not be
published in the public domain, as this could reveal capabilities,
vulnerabilities, or classified information. The control of technology
requires descriptive parameters that allow the exporter to understand
what is on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or the
Commerce Control List, without compromising capabilities.
Question. What office within the U.S. Army and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense has responsibility for ensuring technology sales
do not erode U.S. military superiority and advantage?
Answer. The protection and safeguarding of our soldiers and
maintaining our overmatch across all warfighting domains are the
responsibility of everyone within the Department of Defense.
Within the Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Secretary of
the Army has delegated the responsibility to Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) for
developing, coordinating, and promulgating Army export policy. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and
Cooperation, under the guidance and control of the ASA(ALT), drafts and
coordinates proposed export policies with Headquarters, Department of
the Army staff agencies to include Operations, Intelligence, Force
Development, Cyber, and relevant field activities.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the responsibility
is delegated to the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA),
under the guidance and direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
Using the interagency integrated software application, USXPORTS,
DTSA staffs and coordinates commercial export requests with relevant
agencies and military departments and responds to Department of State
or Commerce with a Department of Defense position.
Question. Should the DOD and State Department retain an oversight
role to ensure sensitive night vision technologies are protected?
Answer. The administration has integrated the interagency review of
proposed exports, such that all agencies can review and comment on
exports, including night vision devices, through a single integrated
information technology system. The Department of Defense provides
comments on proposed exports through this system to the process owner
and can monitor exports and trends.
Question. Has the Army, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
solicited written feedback from U.S. Combatant Commanders regarding
whether the sale of these items poses a danger to our deployed troops?
If not, I ask that you do so.
Answer. Yes, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff solicited written comments from the Combatant Commanders.
Shore Defenses
Question. I wish to follow up my questions from last year with a
further inquiry, and update, on how Army current and emerging
capabilities can contribute to shore defense. In addition to
projectiles from, for example, the Paladin, to hit targets on land, and
perhaps landing craft, what kinds of technology investments are being
made by AMRDEC to help shore defenses defeat high-end, moving, heavily
defended, and offensively capable warships?
Answer. The U.S. Army's Aviation and Missile Research, Development
and Engineering Center is investing in adapting existing Army and
Marine Corps High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and Multiple Launch
Rocket System systems to provide a land-based offensive surface warfare
capability. In addition, we are developing technologies such as sensor,
datalink, and payload components to engage and defeat mobile surface
vessels. A prototype system will be demonstrated in Fiscal Year 2021,
which will provide a basis for cost-capability trades for an objective
system. This effort will enable Army forces to support joint force
freedom of movement and action through the projection of power from
land into the maritime domain.
Army Operating Concept
Question. How is the Army rebalancing personnel allocations,
maintenance, modernization and S&T programs to accommodate the new Army
Operating Concept?
Answer. The Army Operating Concept (AOC) guides future force
development through the identification of capabilities that the Army
must possess to accomplish missions in support of policy goals and
objectives. In addition to shaping the types and quantity of forces we
will need, it is also informing our modernization and S&T efforts as we
pursue capabilities in key areas of aviation, command and control
network, integrated air missile defense, combat vehicles, and emerging
threats programs.
Technology Development
Question. What are the Army's specific strategies associated with
the development of space, cyber, electronic warfare, position,
navigation and timing (PNT) and missile defense technologies and
capabilities to address near term and sustained threats?
Answer. The Army's strategy to enhance near term space, PNT, and
missile defense capabilities includes multiple lines of effort. In the
space arena, the Army is pursuing several modest small satellite
technology development and demonstration programs for the tactical
warfighter to include: beyond-line-of-sight communications; collection
of imagery data to support battlespace awareness, battle damage
assessment, and precision targeting; enhanced command and control;
space laboratory capabilities to evaluate and test potential
technologies; and several space superiority efforts. In the cyber
domain, technology development initiatives include: achieving mission
assurance in a cyber-contested environment; ensuring cybersecurity is
addressed as a design consideration early and throughout the system
development lifecycle; integration of emerging vulnerability
assessments; implementation of rigorous supply chain security policies
and capabilities that address counterfeit components and malicious
tampering; integration of cyber into operational exercises and
workforce training; and continuous evaluations of cutting edge cyber
technologies which enhance existing protection methods and tools.
Strategies to support missile defense include the development and
demonstration of technology to both identify and defeat missile threats
with conventional strike and directed energy applications. The Army
continues to enhance its EW position through a range of programs and
initiatives. The Integrated Electronic Warfare System (IEWS) will
provide EW officers the ability to accurately discriminate friendly and
enemy transmissions--in effect, to manage the EW spectrum. The Multi-
Function Electronic Warfare (MFEW) system will provide electronic
attack and electronic warfare support capabilities, with initial
operational capability (IOC) expected in FY23. In August 2016, the Army
will, for the first time, incorporate a contested EW environment into
4th Infantry Division's National Training Center rotation 16-08, with
the ultimate goal of incorporating EW into all future CTC rotations.
Missile Technology
Question. Please provide your short and long term development plans
for the Modular Missile Technology Program, which offers the potential
to engage targets for which the Hellfire Missile is used, at greatly
reduced costs per missile.
Answer. The Modular Missile Technologies (MMT) Program is
developing a Modular Open Systems Architecture suitable for guided
munitions. The MMT concept allows for the assembly of multiple
configurations from a common set of subsystems in order to reduce life-
cycle costs in all phases and evolve the system rapidly to address an
ever-changing threat. To demonstrate the feasibility of the concept and
simultaneously address several Army Aviation lethality gaps, MMT's
first configurations are a 25-pound guided forward-firing missile and a
10-pound drop/glide munition suited for the air-tosurface mission
against personnel and lightly armored targets. A planned mid-term
effort will add additional seeker capability to provide a 25-pound
multi-role forward firing variant (air-to-air and surface-to-surface).
Additionally, a 20-pound unguided forward-firing variant is planned to
address area targets. Longer term, the Army has plans to apply the MMT
concept to larger missiles as well. Each of these missile development
efforts is being coordinated with current and future Army Aviation
rotary wing and Unmanned Aerial System platform development efforts to
ensure maximum commonality across the fleet over time.
Question. What is the status of the Hellfire inventory,
procurement, and stockpile for the next five years?
Answer. The following reflect the inventory and status for the next
five years:
Longbow*: Fiscal Year (FY) 2016: 10,702; FY 2017: 10,940; FY 2018:
9,693; FY 2019: 8,697; and FY 2020: 6,899.
Joint Air to Ground Missile (JAGM)**: FY 2016: 0; FY 2017: 0; FY
2018: 180; FY 2019: 624; and FY 2020: 1,125.
Laser**: FY 2016: 10,222; FY 2017: 10,382; FY 2018: 11,138; FY
2019: 10,668; and FY 2020: 10,443.
For a total of: FY 2016: 22,940; FY 2017: 23,339; FY 2018: 23,029;
FY 2019: 22,008; and FY 2020: 20,487.
The Army is currently procuring 114R laser Hellfires and
transitioning to JAGM starting in FY 2018. The production for this is
as follows:
JAGM: FY 2016: 0; FY 2017: 0; FY 2018: 180; FY 2019: 624; and FY
2020: 1,125. Laser: FY 2016: 816; FY 2017: 2,025: FY 2018: 22,236; FY
2019: 1,421; and FY 2020: 530.
* Fire and forget variant fired off AH-64D platforms
** Fired off all air platforms
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Carter and the answers thereto
follow:]
Size of the Force
Question. Given Army rotation policies, existing commitments, and
the need to be prepared to handle numerous near simultaneous events,
what concerns do you have that a total force of 980,000, with an active
Army of 450,000, could be strained beyond capacity?
Answer. We have grave concerns a 980,000 total force will not have
the capacity to meet overall demand. In 2014, Army leadership stated a
total force of 980,000 mitigated current and future threats at
significant but manageable risk as long as the assumptions of the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review proved valid. Those assumptions have proven
wrong as evidenced by the rise of ISIL, aggressive actions by
revanchist Russia, the continuation of Army operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the growing possibility of interstate war in multiple
theaters. Based on current and anticipated future conditions, the cost
in time and casualties would be high. As a result, we rate our current
military risk as high and strategic risk to be significant and trending
high.
Question. What are the operational implications and strategic
limitations associated with a force this size should a major
conventional combat operation ensue on the Korean Peninsula in light of
our current requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Europe?
Answer. If a force of this size is called to conduct major
conventional combat operations on the Korean peninsula in addition to
sustaining current requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Europe, and
elsewhere, Strategic implications of a major conventional combat
operation would include the need for full mobilization of the reserve
component, the potential need to rapidly grow the force, reduced
capacity to address emerging demands, and high risk to strategic
objectives. All of this will increase the time it takes to meet
combatant command timelines, possibly jeopardizing meeting those
timelines, in support of operational plans and will translate into
higher casualty rates and difficulties in providing replacement forces
within current deploy: dwell policy guidance.
ERI
Question. Secretary Murphy, have you decided where the
Prepositioned Stock identified for the European Reassurance Initiative
is coming from? Is it primarily from depots within the United States,
or is it going to come from one of the nine ABCTs stateside?
Answer. Based on current projections, the Army will procure new
equipment for approximately one-third of the requirements to support
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) APS-2 growth. The remaining equipment
requirements will be sourced from internal Army redistribution and unit
inactivations or conversions. Detailed sources of equipment for the new
European-based APS are: 42 percent--depot stock; 33 percent--
procurement of new equipment; 11 percent--81st Armored Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) conversion to a Stryker BCT; and 14 percent--other Army
excess redistribution.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Question. Can you outline the reasoning behind the reduction in
funding request for the WIN-T system?
Answer. This is all about prioritization during a fiscally
constrained period. The Army's Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 funding request
for Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is $427 million,
$268 million less than the FY 2016 request of $695 million. The Army is
committed to the WIN-T network modernization capability, but had to
slow WIN-T, Increment 2 procurement. The difference in WIN-T funds from
the FY 2016 request to FY 2017 is largely a result of balance within
the Army portfolio. There is also a need to address other emerging
priorities such as Cyber Defense Funding, and Cryptographic
Modernization of Legacy Radio Systems Improvements.
Question. Is this system still an Army priority?
Answer. The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical remains an Army
priority and is the backbone of the Army Tactical Network. Our strategy
is to continue to procure and field this critical system while we
continue to make improvements: reducing weight, increasing performance,
and Soldier usability.
Question. What is the outlook for this system over the next five
years?
Answer. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment
1, (first phase of program) is fully fielded to 199 Army units
including Divisions, Corps, Brigade Combat Teams, multi-functional
support brigades, and Expeditionary Signal Battalions. WIN-T Increment
2 (current phase) has been fielded to 14 Brigade Combat Teams and 6
Divisions. Over the next five years, the Army will continue to field
WIN-T, Increment 2. WIN-T Increment 2 end state will field to 18
Divisions, 56 Maneuver Brigades, and 37 multi-functional support
brigades.
Regional Training Institute
Question. General Milley, can you please provide an update on
progress to establish a Regional Training Institute on Fort Hood?
Answer. The Army National Guard is currently meeting all training
requirements without a Regional Training Institute (RTI) at Fort Hood,
and the Texas Army National Guard does not currently have an approved
stationing plan for an RTI at Fort Hood. The Texas Army National Guard
has indicated an interest in moving its RTI from Camp Mabry in Austin
to Fort Hood, but has not yet provided a formal request to the National
Guard Bureau or the Army to consider.
The National Commission on the Future of the Army provided three
recommendations in its final report related to institutional training
capacity, which the Army is currently considering. Specifically,
Recommendation 43 calls for the Army to ``establish true
regionalization of the Army's school system and continue to consolidate
the infrastructure where efficiencies can be gained.'' Any requests to
grow additional training capacity must be viewed holistically with
other Army regional capacity if we are to realize any savings from the
One Army School System.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Carter.
Questions submitted by Mr. Visclosky and the answers thereto
follow:]
Personnel Radiation Detection Capability
Question. General Milley, there is a genuine concern with
terrorists trying to procure nuclear material for bomb making purposes.
Clearly this scenario puts America's service members at potential
increased risk of radiation exposure. The threat at home via dirty bomb
or incident at nuclear facilities is no less dangerous.
Is it correct that the majority of the Army's personal dosimeters
and radiac sets, developed in the 1970s, have outdated technology, are
obsolete and not able to function in tandem with more modern systems
fielded in limited numbers over the last several years?
Answer. Yes. Lessons learned from DoD's response to assist Japan
after the Fukashima nuclear reactor incident indicated the need for
Joint interoperability and common units of measure, whereby the Army
began working with the Navy to select the Joint Personnel Dosimeter-
Individual (JPD-I) as its future personal dosimeter. The JPD-I will
have enhanced capabilities over legacy tactical radiological dosimetry
systems. These include a real-time display of dosage using common units
of measure, interoperability with Nett Warrior to periodically transmit
the Soldiers' exposure data up the chain of command to facilitate
decision making on troop safety based on soldiers' radiation exposure
status, the ability to electronically transmit post exposure data to
the Army's Dosimetry Center, and interoperability with the Department
of the Navy during future operations. The Army will begin fielding the
JPD-I in Fiscal Year 2020.
Question. Are these older dosimeter systems able to measure and
record the range of radiation dose presented by nuclear threats faced
by service members today?
Answer. Yes. However, the legacy DT-236 or DT-236A wrist watch
individual dosimeter does not provide a real time display of the
soldiers radiological exposure. The DT-236A must be read at the company
level by the AN/PDR-75 or AN/PDR-75A dosimeter reader, which is a
standalone device that is not interoperable with Nett Warrior or any
other modernized Army systems. The legacy system requires the soldier
to report to the company headquarters away from his or her battle
position so that the dosimeter can be read by the dosimeter reader,
which may not occur for days or weeks on the modern distributed
battlefield based future concepts of operations. Additionally, the DT-
236/236A must be mailed back to the Army Dosimetery Center at Redstone
Arsenal after the soldiers deployment so that it can be evaluated and a
dose of record determined and entered into the soldiers medical record,
which is both time consuming and costly. The older DT-236 lacks
adequate sensitivity for it to be used to determine the actual dose of
record.
Question. If there are potential shortfalls in the Army's current
radiation detection capabilities, what is the acquisition plan to field
more modern dosimeters capable of providing all service members a legal
dose of record of radiological exposure over the entire length of their
careers? Is that a Total Force acquisition plan?
Answer. Yes, our approach is a Total Force acquisition plan. The
Army currently has sufficient stocks of legacy AN/PDR-75 and AN/PDR-75A
systems to provide tactical radiological dosimeter capability to the
Active, Guard, and Reserve components. However, the Army will begin
fielding the Joint Personnel Dosimeter-Individual to the Active, Guard,
and Reserve components in Fiscal Year 2020.
Armored BCT/Infantry BCT
Question. General Milley, during your testimony you stated there is
a study with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to determine
whether the U.S. Army should convert one IBCT to an ABCT. In the Army's
presentation of the FY17 Budget Roll-Out, the brief highlights
Operations and Maintenance (Regular Army) funding to convert one
Stryker BCT to an Infantry BCT. Considering the planned build-up of
Army forces in eastern Europe as part of the European Reassurance
Initiative, what type of BCT footprint do you see more applicable to
the challenges in that theater?
Answer. European Reassurance Initiative funding will enable the
Army to maintain persistence presence of an Armored Brigade Combat Team
in Europe year-round in addition to the permanently stationed Airborne
Infantry Brigade Combat Team and Stryker Brigade Combat Team which are
already in Europe. Having three different Brigade Combat Teams in
Europe will give U.S. European Command (EUCOM) the maximum flexibility
to respond to a variety of challenges in theater. European Reassurance
Initiative funds will also be used to build an Armored Division static
unit set of Army prepositioned equipment that will include one
additional Armored Brigade Combat Team, a Fires Brigade, and Division
Headquarters in 2017, followed by other division level enablers such as
a Sustainment Brigade, Air Defense Brigade, and ammunition over the
next several years. This static unit equipment set will enable a rapid
build-up of additional forces in theater if required. This footprint
will improve EUCOM's ability to deter Russia and assure our allies and
partners. The Army is committed to working with the EUCOM Commander to
meet any emergent requirements he may have.
Question. Is that included in the FY17 budget, or do you expect to
refine ERI budget initiatives in future budget submissions?
Answer. Yes, the Army's Fiscal Year 2017 European Reassurance
Initiative budget request enables the Army to provide the Armored BCT
with enablers and to begin buildup of the static set, which will take
multiple years to build. We are continuing to refine our equipping plan
to ensure we can provide the set in a way that avoids degrading unit
readiness by taking equipment from units that need it for training, but
is still reasonably economical. As we refine the plan we will ask for
your help in making minor adjustments to realign the resources we have
requested among multiple appropriations.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Visclosky. Questions submitted by Ms. McCollum and answers
thereto follow:]
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Question. Secretary Murphy and General Milley, the Department of
Defense has proposed a new round of BRAC in 2019 stating the need to
cut excess infrastructure in order to reduce costs.
In fact, just yesterday this committee heard from the Secretary of
the Air Force that up to 30 percent of their infrastructure is
estimated to be in excess. 30 percent!
Now, I'd like to quote from your written testimony submitted to the
committee for today's hearing.
``The Army maintains 154 permanent Army installations, and over
1100 community-based Army National Guard and Army Reserve Centers
worldwide. Regrettably, we estimate an annual burden of spending at
least $500 million per year on excess or underutilized facilities.''
Half a billion dollars is an incredible amount of money to spend on
maintaining facilities that the Army does not want or need.
Question. Gentlemen, can you expand on the extent of excess
facilities in the Army?
Answer. At a Total Army of 980,000, we estimate the excess building
footprint at about 170 million square feet, or 21 percent excess
capacity. The vast majority of excess capacity is not in empty
buildings, but in underutilized buildings that are partially full.
It costs about $0.30 per square foot per year to provide very basic
maintenance at an empty building (i.e., pest control, perimeter fence,
boarding up windows). It costs about $3.00 per square foot per year to
sustain and maintain a partially occupied building. A modest renovation
project can cost roughly $30 per square foot. Demolishing and replacing
a dilapidated building can often cost $300 per square foot.
The Army cannot carry excess capacity costing over half a billion
dollars per year indefinitely. Good buildings, which can be better
utilized at our highest military value installations, are deteriorating
faster than they should be because we lack the resources to keep them
all maintained properly. We need BRAC authority to analyze what types
of excess exist at each installation, and to develop recommendations to
best consolidate into our highest military value installations. By
closing some lower military value installations, we will realize
significant reoccurring savings in the intermediate and long term.
Question. How does this continued waste of resources affect your
long-term readiness, and how much would another round of BRAC save for
future budgets?
Answer. Facilities needed to support readiness, training exercises,
airfields, and other priorities are deteriorating, while resources are
diverted supporting installations that could be closed. The Army cannot
carry excess infrastructure costing over half a billion dollars per
year indefinitely. Good buildings are deteriorating faster than they
should because we lack the resources to keep them all maintained
properly.
Half a billion dollars in savings represents the annual personnel
costs of about 5,000 Soldiers, about the number assigned to a Stryker
Brigade Combat Team. It represents five annual rotations at the Army's
Combat Training Centers (CTC), which are the foundation of Army combat
readiness.
Until we get the BRAC authority to analyze what types of excess
exist at individual installations, and develop recommendations on how
to best consolidate into the highest military value installations we
have, we do not know which lower military value installations should be
closed and/or realigned. However, we do know BRAC is a proven process
producing significant reoccurring savings of roughly $2 billion per
year for the Army, as validated by the Government Accountability
Office. A future BRAC round will save the Army hundreds of millions of
dollars per year. Once the up-front costs are paid, the intermediate
and long-term savings from BRAC can fund any number of important Army
warfighter initiatives, including force structure, additional CTC
rotations, and modernization.
Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV)
Question. Mr. Secretary, in full disclosure, I was a proponent of a
wheeled AMPV ambulance--using the Stryker--as viable and cost effective
alternative to a tracked ``armored multipurpose vehicle.'' The Army
decided to move forward with the Bradley fighting vehicle derivative
and in FY2014 the President's budget stated the AMPV total cost at
$10.8 billion. The FY17 budget now has the program's cost at $12.9
billion--a $2.1 billion increase. What's the cause of the cost
increase?
Answer. The Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) program has not
experienced a cost increase from its approved baseline, established in
May 2015. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 President's Budget was based upon
an early program estimate. Much of the uncertainty regarding program
assumptions were clarified by the FY 2015 President's Budget. The Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation's Independent Cost Estimate at
Milestone B, on December 22, 2014, established the program's cost caps
and funding levels and were reflected within the AMPV Acquisition
Program Baseline. The program is on schedule and operating within the
cost baseline established at Milestone B and as reported in the latest
Selected Acquisition Report submitted to Congress in August 2015.
Question. Do you expect future cost increases?
Answer. The Army does not expect future cost increases on the
Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV) program. AMPV is a low technical
risk program that continues to execute within the cost baseline
established at Milestone B and as reported in the latest Selected
Acquisition Report submitted to Congress in August 2015.
Question. Finally, is there a plan ``B'' should this program become
non-viable from a cost, schedule or performance perspective?
Answer. The Army is committed to the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle
program to replace the M113 vehicles in the Armored Brigade Combat
Teams in accordance with our Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy. The
program remains within its cost, schedule, and performance baseline and
maintains low technical risk. If warranted, the Army will execute
tradeoffs consistent with the acquisition strategy to ensure the
program remains viable.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. McCollum.
Questions submitted by Mr. Ruppersberger and the answers
thereto follow:]
JLENS
Question. Secretary Murphy, JLENS has been a major concern of mine
and for my constituents in Maryland's Second Congressional District.
According to a recent Army report, this incident was caused human
error, procedural issues, and design flaws. Because of the incident in
which JLENS broke free of its mooring, that my constituents now fear
not only for their own personal safety, but for the value of their
homes and property. In this setting, I will say that I understand the
purpose of having this capability. What I do not understand is why this
program has remained a funding priority for the Army despite a recent
report by Operational Test and Evaluation Command finding ``system-
level reliability . . . not meeting the program's goals'' and
``problems related to the timely passing of'' radar targets from JLENS
to NORAD, and despite JLENS being a NORTHCOM program, who if I'm not
mistaken, should be funded through the Air Force's budget.
In this budgetary environment, can you explain why the Army still
deems this program worthy of a $45M budget request for FY17, over three
times higher than the FY16 appropriated amount?
Answer. The Army's Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget request was $40.565
million and received a $30.000 million congressional mark due to the
accident resulting in a delay to the exercise schedule. The FY 2017
request of $45.482 million supports implementation of corrective
actions and re-initiation of participation in the operational exercise
(OPEX). The Army is currently executing an orderly shutdown of
operations and assessing multiple courses of action pending operational
decisions regarding the future of the capability and disposition of the
OPEX. The Army is also evaluating whether the FY 2017 request will be
sufficient to fund corrective actions and re-initiation of the
exercise.
Question. Can you confirm, on-the-record, that regardless of where
this program winds up, the Army and its partners have taken the
necessary precautions to ensure that a similar aerostat mishap will not
occur again over American soil?
Answer. Yes. Safety continues to be emphasized and enforced for
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS).
The Army conducted a thorough investigation of the 20 October 2015
JLENS incident to determine the likely root cause and any contributing
factors. Once the investigation results are approved, the necessary
precautions, based on the findings and recommendations, will be taken
to minimize the likelihood of a similar incident. Aerostats are subject
to the same risks as all aviation platforms.
Question. Has the Army, or as far as you know NORTHCOM, considered
alternative locations for the placement of JLENS away from a
significant population center? I would recommend that the Department of
Defense consider conducting such a study.
Answer. Yes. The Army, in consultation with NORAD/NORTHCOM (N/NC),
conducted detailed analysis to determine the best solution to emplace
the JLENS capability for the defense of the National Capitol Region
(NCR). The location that was ultimately selected by the Army, Joint
Staff and N/NC was based on criteria that included operational
suitability and available locations for defense of the NCR. Available
airspace to operate in was the deciding factor, along with facilities
(land available), physical security and support structure (power,
soldier support, communications, etc.).
Upon completion of the now-suspended OPEX, it was presumed that N/
NC would assess the performance of the persistent overhead surveillance
and fire control radars, determine if a capability like this was needed
as an enduring capability for NCR defense, and potential siting
locations that would optimize radar coverage and employment in the
future.
Facilities Reduction Program
Question. General Milley, the Army's Unfinanced Requirements List
was recently leaked by a news source known as Breaking Defense. The
Army has requested $1.362 billion in installation support funding. This
is undoubtedly a result of years of deferred maintenance, leading to a
large backlog of property that needs to be either demolished or
recapitalized. The Facilities Reduction Program account has been hit
particularly hard, resulting in abandoned and derelict buildings at
installations across the nation. I'm certain some of them are within
the districts of Members of this subcommittee. For instance, I have
blocks of vacant buildings at the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Not only are they a safety and
environmental concem, but they cost the Army approximately $600,000 per
year to maintain and secure.
How does the FRP account stand to benefit if this unfinanced
requirement were funded?
Answer. The unfinanced request includes additional funding for the
Army's Facility Reduction Program. If Congress provides additional
funding, the funds could be used to dispose of many excess and obsolete
real property assets, reducing annual operating and maintenance costs
while supporting the Army's Facility Investment Strategy.
Question. My staff was recently briefed on the metrics that the
Army uses to prioritize these sites under FRP. I would like to request
a copy of the priority list be provided to my staff to gain a better
understanding of how this funding is being obligated.
Answer. The Army's Unfunded Requirements (UFR) list contains an
additional $15.7 million for the Facilities Reduction Program (FRP).
This amount would fund roughly an additional 150,000 square feet in
facilities demolition. The Army's strategy is to assume risk throughout
its installations portfolio, including the FRP. This strategy is a
direct result of the budget constraints contained in the Balanced
Budget Act. It is also the cause of the facilities reduction backlog,
which is approaching 20 years at current funding levels. The Army's
current FRP contains an estimated 47 million square feet across more
than 7,700 facilities, at a cost of $517 million. Aberdeen Proving
Ground's FRP requirements are approximately 1.2 million square feet
with an estimated cost of over $600 million. The Army is currently
working on an FRP priority list for FY 2017. This list will be
forwarded to your staff upon completion.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Ruppersberger. Questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur and the
answers thereto follow:]
Countering Propaganda/Information Operations
Question. What is the Army doing to counter the organized Russian
propaganda effort in the Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the
U.S.?
Answer. The Army supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Joint Staff (JS), and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) with
trained and ready forces and in countering propaganda with U.S. Army
Europe (USAREUR). USAREUR supports EUCOM's Operational Influence
Platform (OIP), which utilizes advanced and emerging online
technologies to influence specific target audiences through the
internet, smartphones, and traditional media.
OIP leverages popular social media platforms to identify and engage
key audiences using cutting edge commercial marketing techniques.
Relationships, tactics and procedures developed through OIP
additionally provide USAREUR the agility to quickly engage critical
audiences during contingency operations.
USAREUR leaders in coordination with OSD and JS also support
EUCOM's Senior Military Engagement Program (SMEP); highlighting key
false comments in order to support public diplomacy, diplomatic
conversations, and key leader engagements with allies and partners
during military exercises, media events, and face-to-face meetings
throughout the eastern EUCOM flank.
USAREUR coordinates and works through EUCOM with independent media
to highlight lies or false Russian statements published in their media
by means of two on-line and hard copy publications, ``per Concordiam''
and ``Connections'' that promote security cooperation and increase
allied and partner collaboration and interoperability.
The Army provided forces are the foundation of USAREUR's expansive
bi-lateral and multinational exercises aimed to train formations,
enhance Alliance interoperability, and reassure Partners and Allies.
USAREUR communicates and demonstrates both the military and political
will needed to assure and deter through persistent engagement with all
Allied and Partner nations, a tiered and multi-faceted communications
plans, and utmost transparency on all theater activities.
Increased touchpoints at all levels with Allies and Partners allows
for dynamic engagement and communication of our commitment to their
security, for the development of situational awareness of the ground
level information environment, and transparency of operations. In
Fiscal Year 2016, USAREUR will conduct 105 exercises of various sizes;
62 exercises remain to be executed from April to September 2016.
Exercises permit senior leader engagements, which demonstrate a
holistic view of USAREUR operations and highlight key Russian
misinformation tactics.
Question. The U.S./West's effort appears fragmented and
underfunded, what do you recommend we can do better?
Answer. The Army supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Joint Staff (JS), and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) with
trained and ready forces and in countering propaganda with U.S. Army
Europe (USAREUR). In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President's Budget
Request, the Army requests $2.8 billion to support the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI), a quadruple increase of $500 million from
FY 2016.
If fully funded, the FY 2017 ER1 sets European theater conditions
to provide measures for a quick joint response against any threats in
the region that could impact U.S. vital interests and allow the Army to
demonstrate resolve through: increased theater presence and permit
``heel to toe'' 12 month rotations; building partner capacity through
additional Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) exercises; providing
additional Army Pre-positioned Equipment; and enhancing the composition
of European Activity Sets, resulting in additional enabler personnel
and activities participation in support of TSC exercises.
In FY 2016 EUCOM will spend $2.1 million on EUCOM's Operational
Influence Platform (OIP) and $1.5 million on EUCOM's Senior Military
Engagement Program; with a $1.7 million unfunded requirement request
for Operational Influence Platform (OIP).
In FY 2017-2021 EUCOM submitted a request for about $29 million in
Base in the Chairman's Program Assessment letter outlining EUCOM
requirements with OIP the leading program. The Army Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) 2017-2021 funded EUCOM's Operation Assured VOICE
program requirements at $3.1 million.
Operation Assured VOICE harnesses and orients a range of theater
information and influences activities to reinforce regional security
and establish an environment unfavorable to extremist ideas,
recruiting, and support. Operations consist of programs to provide a
powerful means to counter Russian aggression, challenge extremist
ideology, and prepare for contingency operations.
The Army, as executive agent supported, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Capability Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
(OSD-CAPE) recommended EUCOM receive $5 million in FY 2017 ERI Overseas
Contingency Operations funds to run a pilot program for EUCOM's OIP. In
POM 2018-2022 EUCOM also submitted OIP for inclusion in the CPA letter.
EUCOM received a $5 million ERI ``plus-up'' in Program Budget
Review 2017, as recommended by the OSD-CAPE Irregular Warfare Issue
Team.
Question. What percentage of our EU effort is dedicated to counter-
messaging Russian propaganda?
Answer. This question is best answered by the Joint Staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense as they have greater visibility over
the activities of the U.S. European Command and the Department of
State's counter-messaging efforts.
Question. How does the Army work with other U.S. government
agencies in this effort?
Answer. This issue falls under the purview of the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as the Army and other
Services work closely with OSD and the Joint Staff, who in turn work
with other government agencies.
Question. What help do you need from Congress to evaluate Russian
propaganda capabilities and design a counter strategy?
Answer. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead for messaging and
counter messaging and is therefore better positioned to inform Congress
about any additional help they may need. Within the Department of
Defense, this issue falls under the purview of the Joint Staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), not the Army. Therefore, OSD
is better suited to determine how the Department of Defense can assist
the DOS.
Question. Who leads the effort to counter Russian messaging in the
U.S. government? If no one currently, who should?
Answer. Within the U.S. government, the Department of State leads
the effort to counter Russian messaging.
Question. What additional authorizations and funding do you need to
successfully counter their messaging effort?
Answer. The Department of State is lead for counter-messaging
efforts. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
would determine if the Department of Defense needs additional
authorization and funding to assist the Department of State in their
efforts.
State Partnership Program
Question. What does this budget do to facilitate growing the State
Partnership Program?
Answer. The Fiscal Year 2017 State Partnership Program (SPP) budget
does not address SPP growth. The geographic combatant commanders'
demand for new partnerships is constant and the new Office of the
Secretary of Defense-approved partnerships requested averages two new
partnerships per year.
Question. What additional authorities would you need to expand the
SPP mission to include humanitarian missions, counter-messaging
efforts, and to work with civilian populations in partner countries?
Answer. The National Guard has the adequate legal authorities to
engage in humanitarian assistance/disaster response missions (examples
include Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation
(OHDACA); 10 U.S.C. 2561--Transportation of relief supplies; 10 U.S.C.
402--Denton Program, Space Available Transport; 10 U.S.C. 404--Foreign
Disaster Assistance) and civilian engagement. If we determine we need
additional authorities, we will pursue legislation through the
Department of Defense.
Question. What effort is there to capitalize on the immense
personal ties to this region and capabilities in the U.S. to combat
Russian subterfuge and propaganda, particularly in the area of social
media and television?
Answer. Questions about U.S. capabilities and efforts to combat
Russian subterfuge and propaganda in the region should be addressed to
the Department of State. State Partnership Program (SPP) activities and
priorities are coordinated to meet the geographic combatant commander's
security cooperation objectives. SPP is not the appropriate security
cooperation tool for overt intelligence collection or military
information support operations.
Title 10, 12304B Rotations
Question. Does this authorization (the 12304b mobilization
authorization) entitle National Guard Soldiers to all the same
retirement, education and TriCare benefits as the authorization
currently being used to deploy these Soldiers to Afghanistan or Iraq?
Specifically what is different?
Answer. No, the benefits under 12304b are different than the other
mobilization authorities. The Department of Defense is pursuing
multiple legislative changes to bring the 12304b mobilization authority
benefits more closely in line with other benefits provided under the
12302 and 12301(d) authorities, the two most commonly used authorities
for deployment purposes.
Survivor Benefit Program (SBP) and Dependency & Indemnity Compensation
Question. Under current law, a required offset in payment between
her Dependency and Indemnity Compensation and her Survivor Benefit Plan
annuities, prohibits widows and widowers of active duty service members
from receiving the full amount of both.
Should this issue be considered as we look to reform military
compensation?
Answer. The Department has carefully reviewed this matter and has
consistently opposed proposals to eliminate the offset between Survivor
Benefit plan (SBP) annuities and Dependency and Indemnity Compensation
(DIC) at government expense for the following reasons:
Duplication of benefits: Both entitlements are paid
by separate departments for the purpose of providing a
continuing annuity to survivors of military members or former
members. Both benefits are subsidized by the federal
government.
Complementary programs: DIC is a flat $1,254 per
month, plus $311 for each dependent child (2016). SBP is 55
percent of an elected base amount not to exceed retired pay.
The existing entitlement, with offset, ensures that survivors
receive the higher value. This sets DIC as a floor for more
junior members while allowing more senior members the potential
for a larger SBP amount with all the benefits from the tax free
aspect of DIC.
Equity: Allowing concurrent receipt of SBP and DIC
without offset would create a group of survivors receiving two
government-subsidized survivor annuities. Survivors of most
military retirees and survivors of veterans who did not serve
to retirement would receive only one.
High cost: Eliminating the SBP offset for all
survivors entitled to DIC would cost the Military Retirement
Fund more than $7 billion over 10 years.
Question. What can DoD do to address this offset?
Answer. The Department has carefully reviewed this matter and has
consistently opposed proposals to eliminate the offset between Survivor
Benefit plan (SBP) annuities and Dependency and Indemnity Compensation
(DIC) at government expense for the following reasons:
Duplication of benefits: Both entitlements are paid
by separate departments for the purpose of providing a
continuing annuity to survivors of military members or former
members. Both benefits are subsidized by the federal
government.
Complementary programs: DIC is a flat $1,254 per
month, plus $311 for each dependent child (2016). SBP is 55
percent of an elected base amount not to exceed retired pay.
The existing entitlement, with offset, ensures that survivors
receive the higher value. This sets DIC as a floor for more
junior members while allowing more senior members the potential
for a larger SBP amount with all the benefits from the tax free
aspect of DIC.
Equity: Allowing concurrent receipt of SBP and DIC
without offset would create a group of survivors receiving two
government-subsidized survivor annuities. Survivors of most
military retirees and survivors of veterans who did not serve
to retirement would receive only one.
High cost: Eliminating the SBP offset for all
survivors entitled to DIC would cost the Military Retirement
Fund more than $7 billion over 10 years.
Maternity Leave
Question. What is the Army doing to ensure cultural acceptance of
females taking 12 weeks of maternity leave, particularly for senior
NCOs and officers?
Answer. On March 1, 2016, the Acting Secretary of the Army
published an Army Maternity Policy. This action, coupled with
Commanders' enforcement of the policy, will ensure the cultural
acceptance of female Soldiers taking 12 weeks maternity leave.
Question. Is there any intention of publishing formal guidance or
training materials on this topic to ensure females feel comfortable
taking the full allotted time?
Answer. Yes. On March 1, 2016, the Acting Secretary of the Army
published the Army's Maternity Policy which states ``Commanders may not
disapprove maternity leave'' and ``No Soldier will be disadvantaged in
her career, including limitations in her assignments (unless she
voluntarily agrees to accept an assignment limitation), performance
appraisals, or selection for professional military education or
training, solely because she has taken maternity leave.''
Question. What do you anticipate as the impact on their career and
evaluations as a result of taking 12 weeks off for maternity leave?
Answer. We do not anticipate any negative impact on our female
Soldiers' careers and evaluations as a result of taking 12 weeks off
for maternity leave.
Energy
Question. How does the ES2 strategy address not only installation
energy consumption but also operational energy consumption?
Answer. The ES2 vision features a strong, mobile, and flexible
force that is housed, trained, and maintained on resilient
installations capable of projecting power, unimpeded by disruptions to
domestic utilities or land-use constraints. When deployed, these forces
accomplish their missions by making optimal use of available resources
with the lowest possible logistics footprint and by creating beneficial
relationships with local communities. The ES2 Strategy is focused on
five goals: inform decisions; optimize use; assure access; build
resiliency; and drive innovation. These goals are equally applicable on
our installations and in the operational environment.
The Army Operational Energy (OE) Program is a strategy to improve
the capabilities of our combat units and increase commanders' freedom
of action through better management of energy, water, and waste during
operations. Focusing on optimizing use, assuring access, and driving
innovation for OE builds capability through extending range and
endurance. OE activities that optimize use and assure access include
the diversification and expansion of energy and water supply at both
CONUS bases and overseas contingencies locations. We are driving
innovation by incorporating battery storage into microgrids, whether in
CONUS or at contingency locations. This enables us to reduce dependence
on logistically delivered energy supplies, and to maximize the impact
of incorporating renewable energy. Highly automated microgrids enable
us to approach 100% efficiency of the resources we generate. OE-related
efforts to increase generation and manage supply chains reduce
logistics structure, both on the battlefield and in reliance on
resupply convoys--lowering risks to units and Soldiers.
Question. Where are you currently with the goals set by Executive
Order 13693?
Answer. The Army is striving to improve the resilience of our
installations and operations, to enhance our mission effectiveness. We
are actively working to increase energy and water efficiency, deploy
renewable energy systems, implement sustainable practices, and increase
our climate change preparedness. These actions are consistent with
Executive Order (EO) 13693, Planning for Federal Sustainability in the
Next Decade, which complements the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Army's commitment to energy security and sustainability.
While EO 13693 takes effect in FY 2016, many of the requirements
are a continuation of EO 13514, Federal Leadership in Environment,
Energy, and Economic Performance. Given that many new targets are
continuations of previous requirements, the Army shows interim
progress. In FY 2015, the Army further reduced its total delivered
energy by 6.9 percent, for a total reduction of 22.6 percent since FY
2003. The current consumption of 67.1 trillion British Thermal Units
(BTUs) is nearly 19.6 trillion BTUs less than FY 2003 levels. The Army
decreased goal energy use intensity (EUI) by 2.8 percent to 79.7
thousand BTUs per square foot in FY15. We accomplished this in spite of
the removal of over 34.5 million square feet (MSF) of building space
from the real property inventory. This is one of the lowest EUIs among
all Federal agencies. The Army has installed 158.9 megawatts of
renewable energy capacity to date and currently produces renewable
energy equal to 12 percent of total consumption. In FY 2015, the Army
decreased potable water use by 1.2 billion gallons from FY 2014, for a
total consumption of 32.7 billion gallons. The Army reduced industrial
activities, landscaping, and agriculture (ILA) water use by 1.2 billion
gallons (21.3 percent) since the FY 2013 baseline. The Army exceeded
the FY 2015 fossil fuel reduction goal of 20 percent with a total
reduction of 41 percent, which is again one of the highest reductions
in the Federal Government.
All of our energy and sustainability efforts continue to focus on
increasing resiliency and enabling the Army mission. The Office of
Energy Initiatives (OE1) will continue its mission of accelerating the
development of 1 gigawatt in large-scale renewable energy projects. The
Net Zero Initiative has been expanded to all permanent installations to
appropriately steward energy, water, and solid waste for a sustainable
future, with continued deliberate use of appropriated and third-party
authorities (including Energy Savings Performance Contracting projects
through the President's Performance Contracting Challenge).
Additionally, the Army is including new efforts to expand energy
security considerations across the Army enterprise in support of ES2
and new Federal goals. At the end of FY 2016, the Army, through the
Department of Defense, will begin reporting on new EO 13693
requirements as key measures of our progress.
Total Force
Question. Is the development and deployment of IPPS-A on schedule
and on budget?
Answer. Yes. The IPPS-A program is on schedule and on budget in
accordance with the program high-level schedule and Service Cost
Position provided to the Milestone Decision Authority at the Milestone
B Decision in December 2014.
Subsequent to the Milestone B Decision, the Army awarded the
Increment 2 System Integration Services Contract after successfully
navigating a five-month contract protest. The IPPS-A program, in
coordination with the System Integrator, Army, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense stakeholders, completed an Increment 2 System
Requirements Review in October 2015 and a System Functional Review in
February 2016 where the business processes and associated functionality
of IPPS-A Systems Requirements were validated. The program is now
planning for the Integrated Baseline Review in April 2016, at which
time the cost, schedule and requirements for Increment 2 system
development will be baselined. Following the Integrated Baseline
Review, the Army will begin preliminary design activities for Increment
2.
Question. What is being done to ensure it is not a costly failure
like DIMHRS?
Answer. The Army is committed to fielding the IPPS-A program in
order to solve total force, talent management, and audit requirements.
To ensure the Army will succeed, the program is making certain that
requirements are stabilized from the beginning and using governance
boards (up to 3-Star level) to guarantee the requirements remain
stable. Technology delivered today is better than it was seven to eight
years ago, thus reducing the number of customizations required.
Lebanon
Question. How do you assess the stability of Lebanon?
Answer. This issue falls under the purview of the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the national intelligence
community.
Question. How will the Gulf Cooperation Council declaration that
Hezbollah is a terrorist group impact Lebanon's internal stability?
Answer. This issue falls under the purview of the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the national intelligence
community.
Question. How does the cancelation of the Saudi Arabian aid package
impact the Lebanese Army?
Answer. This issue falls under the purview of the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the national intelligence
community.
Question. What military equipment are we currently selling or
providing to Lebanon?
Answer. Army-managed military equipment sold/provided to Lebanon
over the last 40 months via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs
include six Huey II Helicopters, 250 Hellfire missiles, 239 Tube-
Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wireless-Guided (TOW) 2A anti-armor, and
bunker buster missiles, miscellaneous small arms, ammunition, and
communications equipment, as well as 72 M198 155mm Howitzers as a Grant
via the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. Future planned
deliveries include: three additional Huey II Helicopters by end of
March 2016; equipment as Grant via the EDA program include 24 M109A5
Howitzers and 10 M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles
(FAASV). Finally, Army is analyzing proposals to transfer 32 M2A2 ODS
Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) and 12 OH-58D Kiowa Helicopters to
Lebanon via the Counter-terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) by Fiscal
Year 2017.
Question. Aside from equipment, how are we contributing to
Lebanon's fight against ISIL?
Answer. This issue falls under the purview of the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, we note that one
Lebanese Officer is enrolled as an International Fellow at the U.S.
Army War College.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur.]
Tuesday, March 22, 2016.
FY 2017 NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE
WITNESSES
GENERAL FRANK J. GRASS, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
MAJOR GENERAL TIMOTHY KADAVY, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
MAJOR GENERAL BRIAN NEAL, ACTING DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JEFFREY W. TALLEY, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The committee will come to order.
This afternoon, the committee conducts an open oversight
hearing on the posture of the National Guard and Army Reserves.
We are pleased to welcome four distinguished general officers
as witnesses.
General Frank J. Grass is the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau, a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
representing more than 467,000 citizen soldiers and airmen in
the Army and Air National Guard. General Grass has appeared
before this committee in this capacity on a number of
occasions, and it has always been a pleasure to have him here.
However, this will be his last appearance before the committee.
General Grass is retiring this fall.
General Grass, you have led the Guard through some
challenging times. We wish you well in your retirement, and
thank you for all the good work you have done on behalf of the
men and women of our Armed Forces.
Lieutenant General Timothy Kadavy is the Director of the
Army National Guard, consisting of 28 fully capable brigade
combat teams. This is General Kadavy's first year to testify
before the committee.
Welcome, General.
Major General Brian Neal is the Acting Director of the Air
National Guard. This is General Neal's first year to testify
before this subcommittee.
General, we appreciate the experience and expertise that
you bring to this hearing.
And, finally, we are pleased to welcome the Chief of the
U.S. Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Jeff Talley. His units
total over 200,000 soldiers. General Talley has testified
before this committee many times. Unfortunately, this will also
be his final appearance as he, too, is preparing to retire.
Welcome, General Talley, and thank you for your service to
our Nation.
And we have discussed repeatedly in this room, the country
is facing more serious threats from more sources than at any
time since World War II. The ISIS franchise, Al Qaeda, and
other terrorist groups are active in the Middle East, North
Africa, and, really, literally around the world. Russia
continues to menace Ukraine, its neighbors, and our NATO
partners. China is rapidly expanding its military and naval and
air and space capabilities. In short, no one knows for sure
where the next conflict will develop forcing us to respond
militarily.
Generals, this country relies now, perhaps more than ever,
upon the service of your citizen soldiers and airmen to ensure
mission success. Our Guard and Reserve units performed
magnificently in Afghanistan and Iraq and continue to do so
throughout the world, and the committee would like to commend
them for their dedication and time away from home and family.
All these factors make the dedication of our Reserve forces
even more laudable. That said, the committee is deeply
concerned about their readiness following 15 years of war. We
are eager to hear your testimony, which will assist the
committee to better determine the needs of the men and women
who make up the Guard and the Reserve.
It has been this committee's long tradition to work to
ensure that the Reserve component is properly equipped and
trained. Even with the recent budget constraints, this
committee will continue to do everything possible to ensure
adequate funding to enhance readiness for both your homeland
and overseas missions.
Generals, we look forward to your testimony, but, first, I
would like to call upon my ranking member, Mr. Visclosky, for
any comments he may wish to make.
Remarks of Mr. Visclosky
Mr. Visclosky. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate you
holding the hearing.
Gentlemen, I appreciate your service to our country and
look forward to your testimony. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Grass, the floor is yours. Thank
you for being here.
Summary Statement of General Grass
General Grass. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Visclosky, and
distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
be here today with my fellow Guard and Reserve leaders. I am
honored to represent the men and women of the National Guard,
both Army and Air, their families, communities, and employers
who support them.
I would first like to send my condolences to the people
affected by the deadly bombings today in Brussels. This act of
terrorism on the lives of innocent individuals is a tragic
reminder of the security challenges we face both at home and
abroad.
The Guard is tremendously appreciative of this committee's
support. Your investment has resulted in the finest, most
diverse National Guard that I have seen throughout my career.
In countries such as Afghanistan, Djibouti, Iraq, Kosovo,
Qatar, the Sinai, and many other locations, our Guardsmen work
seamlessly with their Active component counterparts to ensure
security around the world. Since 9/11, the Guard has mobilized
nearly 780,000 citizen soldiers and airmen, conducting complex
operations around the globe.
The experience and capabilities gained from our Federal
mission, along with the equipment and leadership skills
utilized overseas, yields a highly responsive National Guard
here in the homeland, with roughly 3,000 to 4,000 citizen
soldiers and airmen on duty every day here in the homeland.
Of course, the success of our warfight and our homeland
mission is directly related to the incredible and enduring
partnerships with international, Federal, State, and local
partners. Our Nation is currently facing unprecedented security
challenges both at home and abroad. These challenges come
during a turbulent fiscal environment.
Your passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act brought some
much-needed relief. However, sequester levels of funding could
result in the smallest National Guard since the end of the
Korean war. Since that time, our U.S. population has doubled.
Your continued investment in training, manning, equipping is
needed to maintain the readiness of your National Guard as a
combat reserve of the Army and Air Force, the same force that
is called upon by the Governors in times of need here in the
homeland.
Generals Kadavy and Neal will further elaborate on specific
Army and Air Guard issues, so I won't go into too much detail.
However, I would like to briefly emphasize a few key points and
programs that need your continued support.
First, our Full-Time Manning Program is absolutely critical
to delivering the very foundational levels of readiness needed
during global and homeland crisis.
Second, our successful State Partnership Program has
established enduring partnerships with 76 nations. Many have
and continue to participate in coalition operations worldwide
and have improved their interoperability with U.S. forces.
Third, our counter-drug program is a crucial tool in the
whole-of-government approach to combating transnational
organized crime.
Fourth, our National Guard's cyber program provides the
Nation with cutting-edge capabilities to protect our Nation's
critical infrastructure and systems and utilizes the skills our
citizen soldiers and airmen gain through their civilian
careers.
Fifth, with roughly 140,000 graduates, the National Guard
Youth ChalleNGe Program provides at-risk youth with an
opportunity to learn skills, get an education, and have an
opportunity in life.
Lastly, I want to thank you for your support of the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. Your valuable
investment in NGREA enables us to fulfill our domestic and
overseas missions.
Your support for these programs as well as other programs
that allow us to accomplish our mission and take care of our
service members and their families in our communities is
greatly appreciated.
Recently, the National Commission on the Future of the Army
came out with its recommendations. I thank the Commission for
their hard work. Similar to the collaborative effort that
followed the Air Force Commission report in 2014, we are
working diligently as a total Army to build the strongest
ground force possible for this Nation. I would like to offer my
sincere appreciation to Acting Secretary Murphy and General
Milley for their incredible leadership in this transformative
process.
Again, I am honored to be here today representing the men
and women of the National Guard and their families who support
them. I thank you for your continued support, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The written statement of General Grass follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Grass.
General Kadavy, thank you for being with us.
Summary Statement of General Kadavy
General Kadavy. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Visclosky,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing
me the opportunity to represent the nearly 348,000 soldiers of
the Army National Guard. And thank you for your continued
support that this committee has given our soldiers and Army
National Guard families. I look forward to working with you to
ensure we sustain that support so vital to our total Army.
I am happy to report to you today that the Army National
Guard's relationship with the Army is strong and enduring. We
are a valued and integrated part of the United States Army. I
am working closely with Acting Secretary of the Army Murphy,
General Milley, General Grass, Lieutenant General Talley, and
the adjutant generals to strengthen our total Army.
The Army National Guard is regularly employed and, when
deployed, goes with the Army's most modern equipment. Soldiers
from all three components are continuing to work side-by-side
in exercises and operations across the globe, including
reassuring allies in Europe and the Pacific.
As we move forward, readiness remains our top concern.
Increased training, equipment modernization, continued
commitment to our Full-Time Support requirements, and regular
rotational utilization will ensure our force's continued
readiness.
And when it comes to the Army National Guard, readiness for
combat also translates into readiness for missions at home, as
we saw last week in Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi. The Army
National Guard soldiers are doing extraordinarily outstanding
work supporting civil authorities in the aftermath of the
recent floods.
I would like to thank the committee for providing us with
the programming and resources we need in order to serve the
Nation. And, particularly, your generous support for the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account has enabled us to
remain a modern and interoperable force. Modernization is
always an ongoing effort, and your support has been critical to
allowing us to meet that responsibility.
I would also like to thank the members of the National
Commission on the Future Army for their hard work. I want to
assure this committee that we are working with the Army
leadership to assess the Commission's recommendations. We take
special interest in recommendations such as multicomponent unit
solutions, additional Combat Training Center rotations, and
increased flying hours for training, all of which would
certainly enhance our readiness.
We are also looking closely at the Commission's
recommendation on enhanced support to the Pacific and European
combatant commands. The Army National Guard looks forward to
being part of the Army's strategy to support these commands.
Additionally, we know there is great interest on certain
issues such as the Aviation Restructure Initiative. I assure
you that we are looking at all of the Commission's
recommendations, and, as part of the Army team, we will present
our findings in the near future.
Lastly, with regard to the Commission's determination that
a force of 980,000 is minimally sufficient to meet the Nation's
challenges, I agree with General Milley that this places us at
the edge of being able to meet our current strategy.
I would like to close by saying thank you. Thank you for
allowing me to speak here today and for all that you do for our
soldiers, civilians, and families of the Army National Guard. I
look forward to your questions.
[The written statement of General Kadavy follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Summary Statement of General Neal
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Kadavy.
General Neal, thank you.
General Neal. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Visclosky, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today.
I want to start by publicly thanking the over 105,000
dedicated professional men and women of the Air National Guard
for the tremendous job they do every day both at home and
overseas. I also want to thank you for your support of the Air
National Guard.
When the Air National Guard was created, its primary
mission was to train for the next major conflict. The concept
of training one weekend a month, 2 weeks a year was based on
the original strategic reserve model. Today, the Air Guard is
on operational reserve, a force that contributes every day to
both the warfight and also provides search capacity for crises.
The men and the women of the Air National Guard have
stepped up gallantly to meet the demands of an operational
reserve force. As the Acting Director, it is my job to ensure
our Guard airmen have the resources and training to do the jobs
we ask of them. My priorities are: one, support for the 21st-
century Guard airmen; two, readiness; and, three, modernization
and recapitalization.
Overall, we must ensure the men and women of the Air
National Guard have the support they need as they balance
civilian careers, family responsibilities, domestic response
needs, and their growing responsibilities to national security.
We must make sure our Guard airmen and their families have
access to the spiritual, psychological, and medical support
they may need. Our Guard airmen need equipment that is capable
of integrating seamlessly into the combat environment, and we
must ensure they are trained for the full-spectrum operations
we expect them to perform.
In closing, I want to thank you for your support of the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. NGREA is
essential for the Air National Guard to the accomplishment of
both its Federal and domestic missions. NGREA keeps our combat
equipment safe, reliable, and compatible within the combat
environment and is the Air Guard's primary source for dual-use
equipment needed to respond to domestic emergencies. If it were
not for NGREA-funded programs, the Air National Guard would
simply not be the force we are today.
Again, thank you for inviting me here today. I look forward
to your questions.
[The written statement of General Neal follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Summary Statement of General Talley
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Neal.
General Talley, thank you for being with us.
General Talley. Chairman Frelinghuysen, Vice Chairman
Visclosky, distinguished members of the committee, for now
almost 4 years, I have been the Chief of the Army Reserve,
Commanding General of the United States Army Reserve Command,
and this is my final appearance before your committee, as I
will soon return to the civilian sector and retire from
America's Army.
I want to personally thank each of you for your steadfast
support of our soldiers, civilians, and families. As you know,
citizen soldiers are critical enablers, providing enduring
operational capability and strategic depth to your Army and to
the joint force. Because the Army Reserve comprises the
majority of the Army's combat support and sustainment
capabilities, the Nation can afford nothing less than a ready,
equipped, and operational Army Reserve.
Maintaining the adequate level of readiness to meet
existing demands is my primary concern and current challenge.
At any given time, between 16,000 and 24,000 Army Reserve
soldiers are serving in support of the continental United
States and overseas, but we must maintain an additional pool of
trained and equipped soldiers annually to support forecasted
requirements.
I strongly believe that Full-Time Support is essential for
the readiness in the Army Reserve. Full-Time Support provides
administrative, medical, training, maintenance, and
mobilization support for Army Reserve units and is absolutely
necessary for generating and sustaining individual readiness,
which is a prerequisite for leader and unit readiness.
Yet the Army Reserve's Full-Time Support Program is
currently resourced to only 76 percent of its identified
requirements. We must maintain and, if possible, increase Army
Reserve Full-Time Support.
One way to increase Full-Time Support is by placing regular
Army soldiers back in Reserve units to augment the Active,
Guard, and Reserve program in our military technicians. This
Title 11 program was tested and implemented back in the
nineties and, in my opinion, should be reinstated. Such an
effort would promote readiness and help reinforce our Army
total force policy across all three components of our great
Army.
Another readiness concern is equipment modernization. I am
very grateful for the support of this committee and what you
have provided through NGREA appropriations, which has accounted
for more than 35 percent of Army Reserve equipment procurements
between fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2015.
Yet equipment modernization rates for the Army Reserve
continue to lag behind the other Army components. For fiscal
year 2016, we are scheduled to receive 3.1 percent of the
Army's procurement budget, which is significantly less than our
pre-9/11 allocations of 6 percent. Continuing to neglect
equipment modernization requirements will only exacerbate
existing capability gaps between your Army Reserve and the
other Army components.
This committee has already heard from Army Chief of Staff
General Mark Milleyabout the importance of Army total force
policy. I want to reinforce his testimony by emphasizing the
positive impact that full implementation of Army total force
policy will have on our readiness. Integrating the Active and
Reserve components through cross-component assignments and the
use of a one-Army school system ensures consistent standards
across all of our components.
Finally, the importance of funding the accounts that
provide training days for the Army Reserve soldiers cannot be
overstated. While the current level of training is sufficient
to provide ready forces to meet our identified requirements,
the resources are not sufficient to build a force capable of
responding to unforeseen contingencies.
Mr. Chairman, the Army Reserve supports the most capable
Army the world has ever known. This committee's support is
crucial to ensuring that we remain ready to provide support to
the total force as we meet current global requirements, respond
to national emergencies, and mobilize for contingency
operations when our Nation needs us most.
In closing, it has been my distinct honor and pleasure to
serve the men and women of the United States Army Reserve. I
thank you and the committee for your continued support, and I
look forward to your questions. Twice the citizen, and stay
Army strong.
[The written statement of General Talley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Great. Thank you. Good finish. Good
finish. Thank you, General Talley.
Member questions. Mr. Calvert, in order of arrival, and
then Ms. McCollum.
GUARD AND RESERVE FACILITIES
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Something that I think may be going on across the country,
certainly in my part of the world in southern California, we
have had--and I think I have brought this up before to a couple
of you in the past. A lot of the facilities that were built for
the Guard were built between World War II and Vietnam, a lot in
the small communities, you know, the Cold War reaction. And
many of these buildings aren't energy-efficient; they are old.
Obviously, we have budgetary issues.
How much thought has been going into consolidating these
Guard facilities into larger facilities? For instance, I will
use an example, March Reserve Base in my part of southern
California, where we built large Guard facilities, which you
may have visited, one of you or two of you, and Naval Guard
facilities and Reserve facilities, where you can consolidate
equipment, mechanics, bring on some efficiencies to bear.
How much thought is there about consolidating some of these
small facilities into larger facilities to get some economy of
scale?
General.
General Grass. Congressman, if I could start.
First of all, BRAC-05 made some huge changes for the Guard,
and we have consolidated many facilities over the last probably
5 years. I have been to a lot of Active Duty posts where we now
have our regional training institutes located, which is helping
us come together, Active, Guard, and Reserve, using those
facilities.
Our joint force headquarters. Recently, I was in Delaware,
where they dedicated a new building, and the Chief of the Navy
Reserve was there with us as we did a ribbon-cutting. So on one
side of the building is the Delaware State headquarters. On the
other side, it is shared with the Navy Reserve.
We see more and more of those. Of course, they were 100-
percent financed if we built them on--they were joint and built
on an active installation, so that was very helpful.
States are in a bit of crisis right now to find money, many
States are. But, sir, you hit on it. There are a lot of old
facilities. Tim and Brian can give you more, but the last
number I saw, we were well over 45 years, average age of some
of our small facilities.
General Kadavy. Congressman, I will just add from the Army
National Guard standpoint, 47 percent of our readiness centers
have an average age of 50 years or older.
Now, we have invested, as General Grass said, through BRAC
and Grow the Army to build some new facilities, but most of our
armories are still either degraded, misaligned, or out of date.
Many of them were built in the 1950s and 1960s for a different
type Army that doesn't quite have the kit of past years that we
have today, larger vehicles and et cetera. So your comments are
right in line.
Unfortunately, the Army's strategy over the last few years
has been less MILCON and more FSRM and BOS to sustain the
current facilities. So we are fighting through that right now
as we try to maintain our status of our facilities at what is
currently, this year, at a fair rate. We project, without
adequate funding--or, at current funding levels, by 2018 we
will be at a poor level, and by 2027 we could potentially be at
a failing level for the Reserve centers in the Army National
Guard.
Thank you.
General Neal. Well, Congressman, you know, the Chief and
General Kadavy have already talked about the age. And, as you
point out, your earlier question is how do we combine and how
do we basically get the best synergies.
Most of our Air Guard bases, frankly, are standalone and
pretty small. But at the big places likes March, we are looking
at not only combining facilities but combining operations.
And so I don't know if you have heard the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force talk about
total force integration. So we are looking to combine
functions, which, by definition, will combine people doing the
same job into the same building, and that is how we will get
synergies. We are still in the infancy, but we are all for
that, so we support that idea.
General Talley. Sir, I just want to add to that. The Army
Reserve has 58 facilities in your great State, 16,000 soldiers,
and our economic impact to the State of California is about
$962,000 a year.
We are already doing this, to echo on what General Grass is
saying, where we find ways to not only combine and share
facilities across all the Reserve components, to include our
great Guard, but Hunter Liggett is a great place to look in
California, where we not only have integrated facilities but
integrated operations in terms of training.
And I would argue Hunter Liggett in California is a great
model, particularly when we use camp parks and partner very
strongly with the California Guard. That is a great business
model for us to use for the rest of the United States as we try
to improve our efficiencies and share facilities and in
training and operations.
Mr. Calvert. Well, I just bring that up because, you know,
in Corona, California, my hometown, and Riverside next door,
both of the communities wishing to take over those old
facilities that were built 50, 60 years ago and consolidate
that at March, which everybody seems to be in favor of doing.
So the sooner we can do these type of things--and I think it is
going on all over the country--the better. So thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Calvert.
Ms. McCollum and then Ms. Granger.
LODGING-IN-KIND PROGRAM
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have a quick question for the Reserve and one for the
Guard.
One issue I have been hearing a lot about, my staff has
been hearing a lot about, is the lack of adequate funding for a
lodging-in-kind program. It is a program that Reservists from
rural districts depend upon to give them a space to sleep over
drill weekends. And because the program has not been adequately
funded over the last 2 years, we are hearing that many
Reservists have been forced to pay out of pocket for their
lodging costs and their transportation. And these are costs
that many of them cannot afford to pay, but I just, quite
frankly, don't think they should be paying.
So, General Talley, can you tell me why we are not
adequately funding the lodging-in-kind program? And that has to
have an effect on retention in the Reserves if you start paying
out of pocket. What can we do to help you with that?
General Talley. Congresswoman, thank you very much for the
question, because it is something that I tried hard to initiate
my first year in the job.
So the Army doesn't have--the Army does not--I am ashamed
to say the Army does not resource in-kind lodging the way that
our other services do. It is not a policy issue; it is just a
resource issue.
So, within the Army Reserve, as the Chief of the Army
Reserve, I have self-funded the in-kind lodging program that we
have in the Army Reserve. So I am looking across the Army
Reserve budget and saying where can I assume risk elsewhere to
bring some money into an Army Reserve in-kind lodging, focused
on company-level command teams and below, especially those that
are more than 50 miles out. And I have funded it every year out
of the Army Reserve account.
But it is only a very, very small amount of money, and I
would love to grow that program and, particularly, provide more
capability and resourcing. Because since we don't have State
boundaries and it is very common in the Army Reserve culture to
go from this State to that State as you are drilling and
training, it does become very problematic.
NATIONAL CYBER GUARD
Ms. McCollum. Well, if you would please get the committee
staff the amount that you are spending currently and then
whatever the shortfall would be, I would appreciate that.
I have a question about the cyber protection teams in the
National Guard, and either one of you gentlemen can answer it.
In 2015, the National Guard announced plans to activate 10
National Guard/Army cyber protection teams, covering 24 States,
and they are based on FEMA regions. And one of the States, of
course, you know, full disclosure, FEMA Region 5 is Minnesota.
And it is my understanding that three teams were activated last
year, but there are seven teams left to be activated yet.
And you have all kinds of information, I was just out on
your Web site, about the National Cyber Guard and announcing,
you know, the States that are going to be participating in it,
yet these teams were not funded in the fiscal year 2017 budget.
And as the cyber domain continues to expand, I agree with you,
I believe these teams are going to be essential to meet our
national security demands. Citizen soldiers of the National
Guard bring private-sector experience and expertise that makes
them uniquely qualified for the critical task of defending our
national security in the cyber domain.
So could you please tell me about these vital roles these
teams are going to be playing? What is your rollout for
structure?
And how do you make your decision on which FEMA team gets
resourced first? Is it teams that you can stand up quick? I
would think Team 5, which includes Chicago, Milwaukee, Madison,
and the Twin Cities, would be ripe with people that you could
train to train the trainer in the future.
And what is it going to take to adequately fund these
teams? And can you tell me the three teams that are currently
funded? That I couldn't find on the Web site.
General Kadavy. So, Congresswoman, yeah, you are correct,
we did name all 10 CPTs, cyber protection teams, late last
year. While they are beginning to stand up, they actually don't
activate until fiscal year 2017 for the first three teams. The
next four are in fiscal year 2018, and then three teams in
fiscal year 2019. They can begin to grow, but the full
resources don't show up until those years.
So POM funding for our cyber protection teams begin in the
POM year, fiscal year 2018 through 2022. So all that is being
taken out of current-year operational tempo and paying
allowances to begin to train the servicemembers. And we project
that to be a 12- to 24-month period to train them at a cost of
about $10 million, a million dollars per team, as we begin to
stand those capabilities up.
As is related to Cyber Guard, we did provide earlier cyber
network defense teams to all 54 States, territories, and the
District of Columbia, and many of them are what participate.
Those have been ongoing with different various levels of
training. And they go there, compete, and share lessons learned
on how to protect their State networks, their Guard network.
Ms. McCollum. Well, I asked the question, what three are
standing up?
General Kadavy. The three that stand up in fiscal year 2017
are Georgia and California and then a combined CPT of Ohio,
Michigan, and Indiana. Those are the ones that were announced
about a year ago this time.
Ms. McCollum. And, Mr. Chair, sir, what is going to be the
next round, and how do you determine that? Based on what? What
is your criteria?
General Grass. Congresswoman, when we looked at the Army
and Air combined, one of the things we took into consideration
is where is the expertise in academia, where is the expertise
in business and industry.
And so we took the Army and Air, the two Directors came to
me, and we are actually on a path right now that, if we field
everything and get everything trained up in units in the
States, we will have at least 30 States with a cyber capability
by 2019, both Army Guard and Air Guard.
So we take all those criteria, we do an analysis. We work
with the States, we look at their strength, their ability to
have structure. And then we start standing it up.
CYBER
Ms. McCollum. Well, that was my question. So you have a
formula that you can send to the committee so we can figure
out--because cybersecurity is something that we are talking a
lot about and figuring out how this works and how we can be
helpful with that.
You didn't have funding in the budget last time. The
committee supplied it, and you stood up three. If you were to
somehow or another receive more funding, do you have a process
in place to stand up some more?
General Grass. Congresswoman, one of the issues we are
dealing with right now, all services and all components are
pushing for cyber as fast as we can. And there are three levels
of training they go through. Their initial skill training,
which is when they enter the military; then there are
certifications they have to receive; and then there is joint
training.
What we are looking at right now across the board is what
can we bring a soldier or an airman into from civilian skills
and give them credit for that so we don't have to replicate
that. Because there is just not enough infrastructure and
enough instructors yet to get that up and running. But we are
pushing as fast as we can.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Chair, my last question.
Well, then I am confused, because I just asked you if you
had a protocol in place. You have three States, three FEMA
regions, right----
General Grass. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. McCollum [continuing]. Stood up. So, obviously, you
have criteria on what you need to move forward, correct?
General Grass. Right. The services own that criteria.
Ms. McCollum. Okay. And so my question was--and what you
said you did is you looked at regions to see what kind of
assets--academia and the rest--that they have. So I am assuming
you have done that with all the FEMA areas. I mean, there
aren't that many of them to take a look. So you could have some
cybersecurity teams ready to go.
And, now, if I just heard you right, the three that we
talked about, they are in the early stages where you are trying
to figure out even what they have to offer?
General Grass. No, no. What we are trying to do, ma'am, is,
as new teams stand up, we are finding that a lot of the
individuals, the soldiers and airmen we are recruiting have
some skill set already. And what we want to be able to do is,
you know, we can extend our capacity to train if we can give
them credit for certain courses. And we are working on that
right now with CYBERCOM.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, let's provide the Congresswoman
some additional information so that we can satisfy her
questions.
Ms. Granger and then Mr. Ryan.
FULL TIME SUPPORT
Ms. Granger. Thank you all for being here today, and thank
you for your service. I hope you know that we appreciate it and
we depend on it.
I have a question for General Grass.
We often discuss end strength and our concerns about
reductions. However, the topic of Full-Time Support is often
left out of that discussion. You brought it up and mentioned it
in your opening remarks, and I appreciate that.
But the numbers are really startling. A total of 2,350
Full-Time Support cuts in fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year
2016. Fiscal year 2017, the budget proposes an additional
reduction of 1,207.
Can you give us more of an insight of what the impact will
be on that and the importance of Full-Time Support?
General Grass. Congresswoman, first of all, it is a
foundational principle that the full-time manning is what makes
us click at home. Last week, you know, in Texas--you can pick
any State--the first individuals in that armory, to open that
armory for responding in the homeland are going to be the full-
time staff. They have the keys, they have the logbooks.
If you look to the future and as we reduce these numbers,
there will be less people at those armories to open those doors
in the homeland mission. The same folks are the folks every day
that are working to get units ready to go overseas for our
10,000 Army and Air Guardsmen that are deployed overseas. They
are taking care of those families of those deployed when issues
arrive. They are working with the recruiters to put people in.
They are working pay issues. So they are a foundational
readiness producer for us.
What we have seen is it is the largest pot of money. So, as
we take reductions, it is the one account that we have to take
money out of to be able to, you know, across the board, be able
to pay our bills. We are very concerned right now of dropping
below the 2016 levels. As you mentioned, ma'am, 1,207 more
positions in 2017 we would lose out of those armories.
We started the ramp that we are on today, we started that
in about the 2000-2001 timeframe. And that was built by a study
that was done by the Army, and it was looking at transforming,
you know, our old traditional style of Guard weekend to a more
modern operational force. So that was done even before the war
started.
And all we are asking is to kind of get to about a 70-
percent level. We are just under that today. And if we could
maintain a 70-percent level, we feel that it is adequate
spending. I mean, it is money well spent for the Guard. But,
also, if we are going to remain operational, as we are today,
we have got to have those individuals in those armories.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Granger.
Mr. Ryan, then Judge Carter.
NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAMS
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a couple questions here, one regarding the National
Guard counter-drug programs.
General Grass, as you know, this committee has put
additional resources into this program that gives some support
to local law enforcement, both State, local law enforcement.
And we know that from 2011 till 2014 the National Guard has
allowed a total of more than $130 million to expire from this
account instead of transferring the funding back to the larger
Defense counter-drug account.
So I would like to ask, given everything that is happening
in the country with opiates and heroin and everything else that
is going on, is this an important program for the Guard, and do
you value this program? And why has the funding not been
executed?
General Grass. Congressman, the funding is vital. The
problem we are having is the episodic budget that we are
dealing with, being able to keep men and women. You know, we
make a commitment to them, and then we don't have the money to
start the year. It has caused problems.
For 2017, the amount in the budget is about $87.7 million.
This year, thanks to this committee and the great work that you
have done and others, we are $212 million total. It is probably
about the best we have ever had. It fully funds our five
counter-drug schoolhouses, and every State receives an
allocation of counter-drug funding. And we received it early
enough in the year that this year we will probably be pretty
successful with executing that amount for 2016.
We really feel that for 2017 we need to get that number
definitely back up to about $212 million to $220 million based
on the demands the States have given us.
I met yesterday with the new SOUTHCOM commander, and we are
looking at how we build our strategy within the States that we
have. Each State has their program, but how is that reflected
then with the combatant commander to the south of us, Southern
Command, and Northern Command? And how do we build that
strategy, working with the Threat Integration Committee?
So it is a vital program today, and not just on our
borders. It is in our hometowns. It is heroin. You know, it is
abuse of prescription drugs.
Mr. Ryan. So there is no funding in the budget request for
these training centers now?
General Grass. There will be some in there. We will
probably--with the current budget, if we went to $87 million,
we would be lucky to keep one open, which I talked to the
Deputy Secretary that owns that account. We could probably keep
one open if we come all the way back to $87 million. But the
amount of money in each State would significantly drop.
Mr. Ryan. And so if we got back up to the 220, 215 area,
you would be able to utilize all five----
General Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ryan [continuing]. Centers?
And the problem before was what was happening here in
Congress--no budget, continuing resolutions. Is that what you
were saying?
General Grass. Yes, sir. And getting the money halfway
through the year, not being able to bring on the full staff and
get them out there working with law enforcement till half the
year was gone.
Mr. Ryan. So the times that you were able to train up a
little bit and get people out and coordinated with the other
law enforcement agencies, did you see some level of success in
those programs?
General Grass. Yes, sir, we have. In fact, I have been at a
session with the Office of National Drug Control Policy where a
representative from the White House came over and presented
four of our young counter-drug warriors with awards for their
great work in counterthreat finance, where their information
that they were able to obtain, working for law enforcement,
resulted in millions of dollars captured and take those
individuals to court and prosecute them.
Mr. Ryan. This is primarily coming in from Mexico?
General Grass. Sir, it is from everywhere.
Mr. Ryan. I mean, I know it is everywhere in the United
States, but, from our understanding, working on this in other
committees that I am on and other caucuses, there is a
concentration somewhere in Mexico where a lot of this heroin is
coming out of.
General Grass. There is.
Mr. Ryan. Is that where you have seen some of the success?
General Grass. Yes, sir. And not that long ago, I went and
met with the Governor of the Virgin Islands and I met with the
Adjutant General of Puerto Rico, and they are seeing an
increase coming up in through the eastern Caribbean now, as
well.
Mr. Ryan. Okay.
Are we going to have another round, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We will, certainly.
Mr. Ryan. I yield back.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me turn to the co-chair of the Army
Caucus, who raised the flag for the Army this morning with Mr.
Ruppersberger, his other co-chair, Judge Carter. And then Mr.
Graves.
REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kadavy, as you know, the established regional
training institutes, those are critical to the Army's total
force policy and overall readiness for the Guard and Reserve. A
major shortcoming in this initiative is the inadequate
sustainment, restoration, and modernization funding.
Can you please describe the importance of the regional
training institutes, what the RTIs do specifically to increase
National Guard readiness? And will you be supporting those
States that are establishing these important institutions with
additional SRM and operations and maintenance funding to ensure
their success?
General Kadavy. Congressman, thank you for the question.
Regional training institutes, sir, are key institutional
schoolhouses for us. So they do professional military
education, primarily for noncommissioned officers, but they
also do officer candidate school and warrant officer candidate
school, as well as reclassification. So when a soldier moves
from one community to another and can no longer be an
infantryman but now is going to be an armor soldier, they do
reclassification there as well.
FSRM is key to us. We prioritize it to the best of our
ability to achieve those, but it is a critical funding issue
for us. We will have to continue to work on it. The priorities
always go to the readiness centers. But we do put quite a bit
of resources--and we will get you that full number--into our
RTIs, Congressman.
Mr. Carter. I know the Guard in Texas is trying to set one
of them on Fort Hood, on North Fort Hood. Got some space
disputes going on right now, but we are working on it.
General Kadavy. Yes, Congressman. So that would be an
extension to their RTI, the regional training institute, down
around Austin at Camp Mabry.
Mr. Carter. Mabry, yes.
General Kadavy. And what they are looking at is some
facilities to do some additional combat arms training at Hood
for the infantrymen, field artillerymen, and scout advanced
training.
I am aware that we are working an issue, along with the
Texas Army National Guard, to get some license so we can have
some predictability in facilities there at North Fort Hood so
that we could train on them. We don't have it yet. That is an
impact from the predictability, as it is related to the course
instructors and the planners that want to know when they can
hold courses and et cetera.
But, almost always, our longest, most limiting factor in
accomplishing that mission is the pay and allowances related to
our school dollars on a yearly basis.
Mr. Carter. Well, we are certainly working to try to get
that issue resolved, and we are hopeful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Judge, you might could define your
acronyms that we are putting out here as well, too. I am
familiar with most of them.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Graves, and then Mr.
Womack.
ARMY ASSOCIATED-UNITS PILOT PROGRAMS
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And just as Texas, Georgia is proud and Army strong. And I
wanted to just first thank both General Grass and Kadavy for
this morning's announcement as it relates to the associated-
units pilot program. And I just had a question or two about
that. And I know Georgia will make you proud. I am grateful
that Georgia National Guard was chosen as one of the pilot
programs, located in Macon.
Can you help us with an understanding of how you expect or
anticipate this will create additional readiness for our
National Guards and what your anticipations or goals are?
General Grass. Congressman, if I could start.
When I first looked at this, and General Milley was working
on it with us, my first thought was, this is what happens every
day overseas right now. So if we can work together overseas
like we have for 15 years, well, we ought to easily be able to
make this work at home.
General Kadavy. Congressman, just as General Grass said, we
want to train the way we fight. And it is important that we
work on a day-to-day basis together as the three components of
the Army.
The 48th--great history and have deployed multiple times,
tremendous leadership and tremendous soldiers. They are the
right unit. So they are going to be unique. Not only are they
going to be associated with the Third Infantry Division, the
battalion out of Fort Benning is going to be associated with
that particular brigade, as well.
So we are going to learn a lot. It is a pilot project.
There will be additional training days and additional
exercises, but they will be focused on training specifically
with the Third Infantry Division.
Mr. Graves. What type of indicators or benchmarks you will
use maybe to judge its success or make adjustments? Any
thoughts on that you can share?
General Kadavy. Well, the unit status report is always a
good starting point. We will see what the impact is of the
additional resources and the association to the training
rating, in particular. And then we will see what value we are
getting out of the integration, both from the Active and Army
National Guard standpoint.
Mr. Graves. Great. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Womack and then Mr. Coal, the gentleman from Oklahoma.
REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And for the record, let me just say that the question about
the RTI came from the distinguished gentleman to my right, Mr.
Carter, and not from me, a former RTI commander.
And I would just--you know, if you will indulge me just a
minute, General Kadavy made a great response, but RTIs add a
lot of value, because we are able to take a very important
component of the unit status report he was just talking about,
MOS qualification, and be able to dramatically change those
percentages, which is a fundamental component of whether a unit
is ready to mobilize in support of our country.
And in the case of the 233rd down in Arkansas, we had
reclassification programs for the field artillery, for the
infantry. And, General Grass, you will remember, we stood up a
signal component, 25 series, for Fort Gordon to answer the
needs of a lot of our Active component in the signal arena.
So the RTIs are very, very nimble and extremely qualified
in producing the warfighter specialty qualifications that go
into their overall readiness, in addition to the officers that
are coming out of the OCS program. So I am a big fan of it, not
just because I had a relationship with it but because they do a
terrific job.
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS
On another subject--and I am going to talk about State
partnership for just a minute. This whole committee understands
the importance, I think, of being able to put National Guard
and Reserve component soldiers in key places around the globe
to build goodwill, to enhance training opportunities, and to,
in a reciprocal basis, be able to introduce our forces and
their forces for joint activities.
And you were telling me a story, General Grass, the other
day, about Moldova, and I want you to just go over that real
quickly to illustrate how much value we get and the logistical
efficiency that takes place when we do one of these
reciprocating-type events. So could you explain that one real
quickly?
General Grass. Yes, Congressman.
We worked very closely--in the case of Moldova, that has a
partnership with North Carolina. General Ben Hodges, you know,
the commander, Army commander in Europe, wants to engage more.
And you can think about where Moldova is and the people and
their attitude to what is happening to their east.
And so, with the partnership, we took soldiers, took a unit
out of North Carolina for their annual training period, put
them on a C-17. They flew to Moldova; they are training there
for 2 weeks. The same C-17 that took them over picked up a
mortar platoon from the Moldovan force, brought them back to
North Carolina. In fact, they are just finishing up right now.
And then they trained with the U.S. forces in primarily North
Carolina. At the end, we just did the same rotation back and
forth.
You know, the interoperability that we are building with
that mortar platoon, especially in that critical part of the
world, and the experiences our men and women from North
Carolina are getting there and the theater, campaign, the
theater security cooperation that is going on right there for
General Hodges, as well as General Breedlove, it is a small
event, but it is big in today's world.
Mr. Womack. So, General Grass, if you were given an
opportunity to expand the SPP program, where would you take it?
And what can this committee do to help the National Guard
expand it?
General Grass. Congressman, you know, this year's budget
right now is sitting at about $9.8 million overhead. Because,
as I just explained, that training event, we used some
combatant commander dollars, we used some of our training
dollars once we build the association, but there is an overhead
of having a bilateral affairs officer in that country from the
U.S. to work that. There is an overhead for an adjutant general
to do his visits or her visits and to link up with their
partner.
So, in order to go beyond the 76 countries we have right
now, we really need about $16 million to $20 million a year to
support our overall program. Again, we are sitting at about
$9.8 million for 2017.
Again, this committee was very helpful in getting us money
for 2016, which will allow us to expand at least one more
partnership this year in the Pacific. And, again, I met with
the SOUTHCOM commander, and I know there is a lot of interest
right now in adding another country in South America, as well.
But without the additional overhead, at some point we will
have to either stop adding partnerships or reduce the overall
engagement. And the combatant commanders have told me they
don't want to reduce the overall engagement today.
Mr. Visclosky. Would the gentleman----
Mr. Womack. Suffice it to say, Mr. Chairman, our State
Partnership Programs are a subject matter that is covered by
every single member up here that has these associations
everywhere we travel, including recently to South America.
I yield to the gentleman from Indiana. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate the gentleman raising the
issue.
General, I thought that account had about $19 million in it
for the partnership total?
General Grass. Sir----
Mr. Visclosky. Or am I incorrect on that? Because you had
mentioned $9.8 million.
General Grass. 9.8 is in the budget right now for 2017. For
2017.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. So you are asking for 9.8 for 2017.
General Grass. No, sir. It is 9.8 is what came forward in
the budget that was requested from Congress. We are asking for
a plus-up----
Mr. Visclosky. 2017.
General Grass [continuing]. Of about $7 million to get us--
--
Mr. Visclosky. And that was 2017.
General Grass. For 2017.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. And you used the example with Moldova
and North Carolina. Essentially, those moneys for all that
transport--and that is an example, it is illustrative--is not
coming out of that.
General Grass. And, sir, that was a training point----
Mr. Visclosky. That is to the training point, yeah, right.
General Grass [continuing]. For the C-17 pilots.
Mr. Visclosky. So the general question, following up, if
the gentleman will yield again, is there is a legitimate need
for some additional resources here to make sure that is a
robust program.
General Grass. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
Mr. Womack. I will have other questions, but I will yield
back for right now.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay.
Mr. Cole and then Mr. Diaz-Balart.
EQUIPMENT NEEDS
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I am sorry I missed your testimony. We are all
juggling a lot of hearings these days, so I apologize for that
very much.
I will start with you, General Talley, if I may, and then,
General Grass, you may want to hand this off a little bit. But
I am interested in where we are equipment-wise right now. If
you had to pick four or five areas of equipment that you feel
like we are short or not up to what you need, could you shed
some light on that?
And then I would like to ask the same question with respect
to the Guard.
General Talley. Congressman, thank you for the question.
Well, here is where we are in terms of both our equipment
on hand and the modernization. The Army Reserve right now is
about 92 percent of our equipment on hand is there, and about
72 percent of that is modernized.
But the real challenge I have on equipment modernization is
the Army Reserve's equipping/modernization budget is
approximately 2.6, 2.7 percent. Our pre-9/11 levels, which I
know you missed because you came in after my opening testimony,
were 6 percent.
So pre-9/11, the Army Reserve--which was part of the
operational force, but I think it is fair to say we were
considered more strategic collectively as a Reserve prior to 9/
11--I am 6 percent of the equipping modernization budget. Fast
forward to today, I am 2.6 percent, 2.7 percent, depending on
how you view the numbers, of the equipping/modernization
budget. Thirty-five percent of all my procurements from really
2013 to 2015 were from NGREA. So this is problematic.
So we are lagging behind the other two components. And what
concerns me is, since most of the enablers are in the Army
Reserve and we have the early entry set, the theater forces for
the total Army--you know, we focus on BCTs, but I got to make
sure the enablers are ready, and the Army relies on me to get
those enablers out there early and set the theater and stay in
the theater. And this is a concern.
Now, the Army has recently come up and provided, in the
current budget, some help on mission command, equipment, and
modernization. But, collectively, overall, I have some strong
concerns.
Mr. Cole. So you didn't answer in terms of specifics, but
you do just have a big overall problem, period, that would
affect almost everything you have, then, right?
General Talley. Absolutely. Sir, for the record, I can give
you the specific details, probably the top five or six, if you
would like.
Mr. Cole. That would be great. I would appreciate it if you
do that.
General Talley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cole. Could I ask essentially the same question to you,
General Grass?
General Grass. Congressman, if I could, we are probably
sitting very close to what Jeff mentioned, at 92 percent on the
Army. The Air is a different issue. It is modernization of very
expensive items. What NGREA, National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Account, really helps us with is those critical dual-
use, that we can tie them to the homeland as well as going
overseas.
Looking at the current Army Guard shortfalls, engineer
equipment, communications equipment, detection equipment in our
chem-bio-nuclear-type units are things that we are looking at
expanding and spending more money on. In some cases, upgrading
some of our wheeled systems is also important.
On the Air side, in the homeland--and you have probably
seen some of this in the press--putting the AESA radar, which
is the radar that can help us distinguish small items, getting
those on as many of our F-16s and our F-15s as we can to
support NORAD.
And then there are some upgrades, as you know, on the C-130
fleet that we need to be able to continue to fly them in
international airspace in 2020. Right now, we are on a path to
get there, but if over the next 4 years the funding gets cut in
any way, it is a problem General Welch and I have both talked
about. Ultimately, General Welch would like to get us in a
situation where we recapitalize our old H-model C-130s and get
into the J's.
General Talley. Sir, I am going to sneak back in real quick
for the record.
So bridge erection boats, $73 million; common bridge
transport, so engineer stuff, $157 million; heavy cranes, $73
million; scrapers, which are big heavy junk, $48 million; and
then palletized load systems, $286 million. Those are the type
five, sir.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you.
Would you yield to Mr. Visclosky?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is that right? Did you want to go now?
Mr. Visclosky. No, the gentleman can go ahead.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The gentleman from Florida, I apologize,
and then Mr. Visclosky.
CYBERSECURITY
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I apologize for being late, as well, gentlemen.
I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity. And, you
know, it is something that continues to grow, and it is a vital
part of our national defense. But how is the Reserve--I know
you are involved in it. I know you have, frankly, some avenues
that are a little unique because you have access, right, to the
folks in the private sector.
So how are you, and can you increase that contribution,
your efforts? And is there anything that we can do to help in
any way? I don't know who wants to handle that.
General Grass. Congressman, I will take it first.
Of course, we are committed. And with the Council of
Governors, which are 10 Governors that we meet with the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary three to four
times a year, this is one of their critical areas that they
wanted us to focus on.
The first thing we had to get hammered out from the
National Guard perspective is the authorities to use the
National Guard in the homeland. And you can imagine, you know,
attribution and responsibility, proprietary equipment. So we
have worked through all that, and I think we have a pretty good
way forward right now.
The second part is we set out, as we mentioned earlier, to
get as many States that could support it with the types of
skills in industry, in business, also looking at what we can
support from academia. We positioned those units across the
States and then start using them.
What we found, and I can ask General Neal to talk about, as
soon as we can stand up an Air Guard unit, it is being used
today. We are actually bringing our Air Guard units online, and
we are going to mobilize for 4-month periods our cyber
protection teams, and they will serve in support of CYBERCOM.
In the case of the Army Guard, again, we are trying to
stand them up as quick as we can.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Okay.
General Neal. Congressman, that is correct. So we are part
of the national cyber support in support of U.S. Cyber Command.
So, starting in April, we will have a constant presence, 24/7,
of a cyber contribution to the Cyber Command's defensive
forces.
And I think you asked about leveraging the----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Uh-huh.
General Neal [continuing]. Civilian communities. We are
doing that. Really, probably no place serves better as an
example than Washington, the State of Washington. As you know,
there are a lot of tech companies out there, and we have quite
a few of those, including executives that are
multimillionaires, who are traditional Guardsmen and, you know,
love contributing to the cyber defense of the Nation.
So it is pretty interesting. We are able to do that around
the country. And as the cyber demands grows or the requirement
from U.S. Cyber Command continues, we would hope to stand up
more cyber ops squadrons.
General Talley. Sir, let me get in on that for just a
minute. So, in the Army Reserve, I am going to zip through
pretty quick offense, defense, protective platform.
Offense: The military intelligence command of the Army
Reserve provides direct support to the NSA cyber warriors.
Defense: Two-star, 335th Signal Command has all of my cyber
brigades. They do the defense, and they protect the platform. I
have 3,500 cyber warriors and another 3,500 that are cyber-
related, and most of those work in the private sector.
This committee, which I want to thank, helped bring $6
million to my private-public partnership program, where we have
had six universities and a number of very prominent private
companies, Microsoft being one of them, as a joint Army Reserve
private-public cyber initiative. And we are integrating those
private skills directly into our soldiers and supporting Army
Cyber and Cyber Command, and this committee has helped.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you. It is
amazing what our Reservists and what our Reserve Force,
frankly, can and do. And so, again, thank you for this
opportunity.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have some reservists on your home
turf of Cuba, I believe. Right? Don't we have a unit there from
Pennsylvania? Didn't want to get you too excited.
Mr. Visclosky.
DUAL-STATUS TECHNICIANS
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Grass, under the fiscal year 2016 Defense
Authorization Act, some Guard dual-status technicians lose
their Title 31 status and become Federal civilian employees
under Title 5. Forty-one governors have written to Congress
asking the repeal of this provision. Could you tell the
committee more about the program and how the conversion
directive by the 2016 authorization affects the readiness of
your units?
General Grass. Congressman, in the National Defense
Authorization Act 2016, as you mentioned, the guidance in there
is to convert our technicians, both our dual-status and non-
dual-status. Dual-status being someone that is required to wear
a uniform to work and they are also required to serve in the
unit, but during the work they serve as a technician or a
general--a GS type employee.
Mr. Visclosky. And as I understand it, just because we had
a conversation, and I didn't grasp this until this past week
when we met, that is the majority of your civilian employees.
General Grass. The majority are civilian employees during
the week, but they are required to be in uniform, those dual-
status. So with a 20 percent conversion, which is what is in
the NDAA right now, we are very concerned about the readiness
effects as well as the effects on our people. We want to make
sure we get it right.
The Technician Act was passed in 1968. So we feel it is a
good time to review the legislation and put into place that
program. The governors and the adjutants general have told me
they are very concerned about losing command and control of
those forces and they being available to them in times of
disaster in the homeland. So we are working very closely within
the Department of Defense to try to find a solution here.
What we really need, sir, is we need a delay. Right now we
have to implement on 1 January of 2017, and we feel we are just
not ready without having a huge impact on people and readiness.
So we need a delay at least until probably fiscal year 2017,
which is 1 October of 2018, but a delay of some time to do some
more analysis of this Defense Authorization Act, which is law
right now.
EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
Mr. Visclosky. Okay. If I could follow up on your earlier
conversation we had about the Partnership Program. In this
year's budget, the request for the European initiative is
increased from $789 million to $3.4 billion. My understanding
is we have 22 different partnership programs under the Europe
Command. Do you have any sense that some of those funds will be
made available to help facilitate what I think everybody
acknowledges is a good program?
General Grass. Congressman, they will be. And I will let
General Kadavy let you know the things he is working for this
summer using the European Re Initiative fund to help pay for
some of the training associations that we have with our State
partners. And the Air National Guard is doing a lot of the
similar-type activity.
General Kadavy. Congressman, in fiscal year 2016 we
received $20 million of European Reassurance Initiative
funding. That will support 7,776 Army National Guard soldiers
doing about 160,000 man days.
So what will this buy? First, there is an exercise,
Resolute Castle----
Mr. Visclosky. And that is for 2016, General?
General Kadavy. This is for 2016. This summer, Congressman.
So Resolute Castle, which is an engineer exercise, the
Tennessee and Alabama Army National Guard, 1,200 personnel
doing engineer projects in training areas in Romania and
Bulgaria, their State partners. And then in Anaconda 2016,
which is the major exercise this summer, the Army National
Guard will provide 2,700 enabling capabilities from air defense
to engineers to logistics to transportation.
And then later this summer Saber Guardian 2016 in Romania,
one of our combined arms battalion task forces from the 116th
ABCT that went to the National Training Center last year will
provide a battalion that will go train with the Romanians and
other Eastern European allies in Romania later this summer.
And we are going to use ERI in conjunction with annual
training and other overseas deployment dollars for most of
these exercises to be a 29-day training period for our
soldiers.
Mr. Visclosky. And looking ahead to 2017, should we be
having a conversation, given the anticipated increase in tempo,
as to what the right size figure out of that European
initiative should be?
General Kadavy. Right now, Congressman, we believe that we
are targeted for $20 million again in fiscal year 2017.
Mr. Visclosky. You should be spending more money in
Slovakia, you know that.
General Kadavy. General Carr loves Slovakia. He just
returned back from last week.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you.
ARMY ASSOCIATED UNITS
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Before I yield to Ms. Kaptur, I want to
get a little more information on the associated units. Of
course, our Army chief of staff did a pretty remarkable job
this morning of sort of rolling out his billboard. Is this a
result of the Commission on the Future of the Army? In other
words, is this a step to recognize that that is one of their
main recommendations? And is that why it is being set up?
I know obviously we take pride in the integration that we
have seen over the last 15 years of the whole Army. What,
actually, what legal basis does it have?
General Kadavy. This was one of General Milley's initial
initiatives. We have been working through this with the Active
Component and with the United States Army Reserve for a number
of months prior to the National Commission----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am all for it. I mean, quite honestly,
a year ago everybody was at loggerheads here and all hell was
breaking loose in terms of who did what and who is getting what
equipment. And I think we have made some progress, and I am
highly supportive of it.
But of course when I hear the term pilot, maybe that is the
camel's nose under the tent. So we are starting to take a look
at this full integration. And just satisfy my curiosity. Does
that mean that the Guard and Reserve bring their--I won't say
their worn out equipment--to the battle space or does everybody
train on what the regular Army, what the regular military is
doing?
General Grass. Chairman, if we get it right--and that is
why it is a pilot, we want to make sure we get it right. And
you think about an Active unit coming to a Guard unit or a
Guard unit going to Active, there are authorities we have got
to work through, and we can get through there. But think about
our young men and women now on a weekend drill where they have
access to the most modern equipment.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yeah, I am supportive of it.
Now, as we look at, let's say, our footprint in
Afghanistan, 9,800, and I know the reasons, no one ever wants
to mention the term 10,000, but there is a view that to put
together that force the military has had to draw from a variety
of different units, decouple different, should we say, aspects
of existing units, I assume regular Army units as well as Guard
and Reserve. Is there some degree of that in what we are
initiating here?
General Grass. One of the proposals that was rolled out
today----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am not articulating it well, but I
think you know what I am talking about.
General Grass. Yes, sir. There would be an exchange of our
Active, Guard, and Reserve officers with some of the Active
into our units.
Also, when the commissioners briefed us, the first thing
they said upfront was there was one Army, a total Army. And
this is the first step in the----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am all for it. I understand the notion
of one Army school system. I think I do. But just in terms of
the equipment, I think we have been--this committee
historically has been very favorable through the NGREA account
and I think we will continue to be.
What is the dynamic of, let's say, Humvees and light
tactical vehicles and trucks and things that----
General Kadavy. Mr. Chairman, I think I asked General
Milley the exact same question. And the intent is there will
have to be programming decisions made in fiscal year 2018 and
beyond, which is his first program to build. His intent is
like-type equipment, like-type capability, and ensuring
interoperability.
So I think, yes, those things will happen. One June is
initial operating capability, which is starting to coordinate,
discuss, build relationships. And then not until 1 October of
2017 full operation capabilities, which is when all those
programming decisions we are talking through right now, which
will be in the fiscal year 2018 program. But the intent is for
them to have the exact same signal equipment, exact same
wheeled vehicles. They will be part of that team.
TRAINING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So you are optimistic. I come from the
school of having defended the Future Combat System. And I just
want to make sure whatever we are embracing here--I am all for
it--that this is actually going to work. I mean, good thing
about General Milley's presentation today, he was so emphatic
that there would be one Army, that it was sort of let known
that if some people didn't like where he was going, they could
exit the stage. I like that.
Major General Neal. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, please jump in, General.
General Neal. So we had this. It was done by Forces
Command, starting with Dan Allyn, who was a great commander,
and then after him General Milley, and then now General Abrams.
And it was called the Training Partnership Program.
And so this isn't anything new. But what is new is that is
where they aligned all the various RC units with AC. And it was
basically PowerPoint deep, maybe a little bit more than that.
Maybe I am not being as generous as I should.
So when we had new FORSCOM commanders came in, and General
Milley was trying to work on this when he was the commander,
and now he floated up to be the CSA and General Abrams has got
this clearly by the handle, the thought process is we have got
to make this not a slogan, not a PowerPoint, it has got to be
reality. Let's take a step back, let's engage a pilot, and
let's get to all the specifics that you are talking about in
terms of using the same platform.
So for my case, I got the 100th, go for broke, in Hawaii
that is partnering with the 25th Infantry Division. I have got
the Quartermaster Airborne Company at Fort Bragg that will plug
and play with the 82nd. We will start there. So now what we are
doing is rather than starting big and just aligning with
everybody, we are really putting meat and potatoes on it, and
it is getting strong emphasis from the top. And be reassured,
it will work.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am all for it. But we had a session
this morning with the surgeon generals, and we talked about the
aspects of health readiness and the inadequacy of the
Department of--it is better than it used to be, electronic
medical health records. I mean, there will have to be a meshing
of a lot of different things in order for this to work and we
are obviously encouraged by this step forward. I guess that is
the best way to put it.
Do you want to get any last word in, General Grass? Then we
are going to go to Ms. Kaptur.
General Grass. Chairman, just one. I think it makes the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account even more
important for those units especially that are aligned, that we
are going to continue to need that help, because there just
won't be enough dollars to modernize and recapitalize.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are with you.
Ms. Kaptur, and then Judge Carter, I think, has some
additional questions.
STATE PARTNERSHIP
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to associate myself with the chairman's support and
Congressman Womack and others of the State Partnership Program.
Ohio is partnered with Hungary and with Serbia. And my only
observation is, in view of what is happening in Ukraine, I
would just urge those in command to think hard about, for
example, if States like Ohio that are partnered with Hungary
could use that opportunity to help Ukraine, even by shipping
humanitarian goods, to look at integration of some of those
activities on the ground. Same is true with Serbia. Just some
thoughts where we have a will but perhaps the structure that
currently exists doesn't think that way. It is too cordoned off
just based on the geography of each of those partnerships.
So that is just a statement. And I really love that
program.
I have one request for the record, and then two questions,
if I might. On the 12304b rotations, the European Reassurance
Initiative calls for a large increase in the use of National
Guard and Reserve soldiers and airmen to fulfill rotational
requirements. But I am concerned that the code used to activate
them does not provide the full range of benefits, health care,
education, retirement as for other enlisted levels.
General Grass and General Talley, can you please outline
and answer to the record for us the difference in benefits our
soldiers and airmen receive under this code versus a combat
deployment? And what is the cost difference to restore these
benefits to our troops? So that will be for the record.
[The information follows:]
Rep. Kaptur. I have one request for the record, and then two
questions, if I might. On the 12304b rotations, the European
Reassurance Initiative calls for a large increase in the use of the
National Guard and Reserve soldiers and airmen to fulfill rotational
requirement. But I am concerned that the code used to activate them
does not provide the full range of benefits, health care, education,
retirement as for other enlisted levels.
General Grass and General Talley, can you please outline and answer
to the record for us, the difference in benefits our soldiers and
airmen receive under this code vs combat deployment? And what is the
cost difference to restore these benefits to our troops? So that will
be for the record.
General Grass. Service Members (SM) mobilized under 10 USC 12304b
do not receive the following six benefits that a member mobilized under
10 USC 12302 would receive. Benefit numbers 3 through 6 are currently
in the legislative proposal process.
1. Benefit: Medical Care (delayed-effective-date active duty order)
a.k.a Pre-Tricare (eligible 180 days prior to active duty order start
date)
Description: 10 USC 1074
(a) Under joint regulations to be prescribed by the administering
Secretaries, a member of a uniformed service described in paragraph (2)
is entitled to medical and dental care in any facility of any uniformed
service.
(d)(1) For the purposes of this chapter, a member of a reserve
component of the armed forces who is issued a delayed-effective-date
active-duty order, or is covered by such an order, shall be treated as
being on active duty for a period of more than 30 days beginning on the
later of the date that is--(A) the date of the issuance of such order;
or (B) 180 days before the date on which the period of active duty is
to commence under such order for that member.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``delayed-effective-date active-
duty order'' means an order to active duty for a period of more than 30
days in support of a contingency operation under a provision of law
referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of this title that provides for
active-duty service to begin under such order on a date after the date
of the issuance of the order.
Reason: SM are only eligible if supporting contingency operations
as defined in 10 USC 101(a)(13)(B) for greater than 30 days. In this
definition of contingency operations, 10 USC 12304b is not specifically
listed.
Budget Implications: The number of personnel affected is a
projection based on Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Active Duty for Operational
Support (ADOS) activations in support of contingency operations and FY
2016 12304b programming. In FY 2016, a total of 6711 RC Service members
are expected to be activated for ADOS. This budget methodology makes
the following assumptions:
1. The Declaration of National Emergency will continue through FY
2024 due to the emerging ISIS threat and increasing global instability.
The 10 U.S.C. 12302 authority will be available to activate the RC
through FY 2021 and probably through FY 2024.
2. The Services provided 12304b projections for FY 2017-2021 and
expect to maintain a total steady state of nearly 3000 12304b
activations to sustain the preprogramed operations tempo from FY2017-
2021.
This proposal used the 12304b activation data from FY 2014 through
FY 2024 in the following table:
12304b ACTIVATION PROJECTIONS FY14-FY24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force............................................ 0 1182 1076 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130
Army................................................. 962 1007 1008 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................................ 962 2189 2084 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Defense Health Agency testimony to the House
Appropriations Committee, Defense (HAC-D), regarding the military
health system (http://www.health.mil/ReferenceCenter/Congressional-
Testimonies/2016/03/22/Bono-DHP-Budget) the document states that for
FY17, DoD requested $33.5 billion for the Defense Health Program,
which serves 9.4 million uniformed and other military beneficiaries
worldwide ($33.5 billion / 9.4 million beneficiaries = $3,564/
beneficiary per year).
According to Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
(DEERS), for the Air National Guard there is an average of two
dependents per Service Member.
For FY17, the cost per Service Member (and family members) for Pre-
Tricare Health Care would be $5,346 for the 180 days of eligible
coverage prior to mobilization. The total FY17 cost for the Air Reserve
Component (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) for the projected
12304b activations (1130) would be $6.04M.
2. Benefit: Transitional Health Care (up to 180 days after release
from active duty)
Description: 10 USC 1145
(a) Transitional Health Care.--
(1) For the time period described in paragraph (4), a member of the
armed forces who is separated from active duty as described in
paragraph (2) (and the dependents of the member) shall be entitled to
receive--
(A) except as provided in paragraph (3), medical and dental
care under section 1076 of this title in the same manner as a
dependent described in subsection (a)(2) of such section; and
(B) health benefits contracted under the authority of section
1079(a) of this title and subject to the same rates and
conditions as apply to persons covered under that section.
(2) This subsection applies to the following members of the armed
forces:
(A) A member who is involuntarily separated from active duty.
(B) A member of a reserve component who is separated from
active duty to which called or ordered in support of a
contingency operation if the active duty is active duty for a
period of more than 30 days.
(4) Except as provided in paragraph (7), transitional health care
for a member under subsection (a) shall be available for 180 days
beginning on the date on which the member is separated from active
duty. For purposes of the preceding sentence, in the case of a member
on active duty as described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of
paragraph (2) who, without a break in service, is extended on active
duty for any reason, the 180-day period shall begin on the date on
which the member is separated from such extended active duty.
Reason: SM are only eligible if supporting contingency operations
as defined in 10 USC 101(a)(13)(B) for greater than 30 days. In this
definition of contingency operations, 10 USC 12304b is not specifically
listed.
Budget Implications: The number of personnel affected is a
projection based on Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Active Duty for Operational
Support (ADOS) activations in support of contingency operations and FY
2016 12304b programming. In FY 2016, a total of 6711 RC Service members
are expected to be activated for ADOS. This budget methodology makes
the following assumptions:
1. The Declaration of National Emergency will continue through FY
2024 due to the emerging ISIS threat and increasing global instability.
The 10 U.S.C. 12302 authority will be available to activate the RC
through FY 2021 and probably through FY 2024.
2. The Services provided 12304b projections for FY 2017-2021 and
expect to maintain a total steady state of nearly 3000 12304b
activations to sustain the preprogramed operations tempo from FY2017-
2021.
This proposal used the 12304b activation data from FY 2014 through
FY 2024 in the following table:
12304b ACTIVATION PROJECTIONS FY14-FY24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force.......................... 0 1182 1076 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130
Army............................... 962 1007 1008 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................... 962 2189 2084 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Defense Health Agency testimony to the House
Appropriations Committee, Defense (HAC-D), regarding the military
health system (http://www.health.mil/Reference-Center/Congressional-
Testimonies/2016/03/22/Bono-DHP-Budget) the document states that for
FY17, DoD requested $33.5 billion for the Defense Health Program,
which serves 9.4 million uniformed and other military beneficiaries
worldwide ($33.5 billion/9.4 million beneficiaries = $3,564/beneficiary
per year).
According to Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
(DEERS), for the Air National Guard there is an average of two
dependents per Service Member.
For FY17, the cost per Service Member (and family members) for
Transitional Health Care would be $5,346 for the 180 days of eligible
coverage after returning from mobilization. The total FY17 cost for the
Air Reserve Component (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) for
the projected 12304b activations (1130) would be $6.04M.
3. Benefit: Qualifying Service Toward Reduced Retirement Age
Description: 10 USC 12731(f)
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), a person is entitled,
upon application, to retired pay computed under section 12739 of this
title, if the person--
(1) has attained the eligibility age applicable under
subsection (f) to that person;
(2) has performed at least 20 years of service computed under
section 12732 of this title;
(3) in the case of a person who completed the service
requirements of paragraph (2) before April 25, 2005, performed
the last six years of qualifying service while a member of any
category named in section 12732(a)(1) of this title, but not
while a member of a regular component, the Fleet Reserve, or
the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, except that in the case of a
person who completed the service requirements of paragraph (2)
before October 5, 1994, the number of years of such qualifying
service under this paragraph shall be eight; and
(4) is not entitled, under any other provision of law, to
retired pay from an armed force or retainer pay as a member of
the Fleet Reserve or the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.
(f)
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the eligibility age for purposes of
subsection (a)(1) is 60 years of age.
(2)
(A) In the case of a person who as a member of the Ready
Reserve serves on active duty or performs active service
described in subparagraph (B) after January 28, 2008, the
eligibility age for purposes of subsection (a)(1) shall be
reduced, subject to subparagraph (C), below 60 years of age by
three months for each aggregate of 90 days on which such person
serves on such active duty or performs such active service in
any fiscal year after January 28, 2008, or in any two
consecutive fiscal years after September 30, 2014. A day of
duty may be included in only one aggregate of 90 days for
purposes of this subparagraph.
(B) (i) Service on active duty described in this subparagraph
is service on active duty pursuant to a call or order to active
duty under a provision of law referred to in section
101(a)(13)(B) or under section 12301(d) of this title. Such
service does not include service on active duty pursuant to a
call or order to active duty under section 12310 of this title.
Reason: SM are only eligible if supporting contingency operations
as defined in 10 USC 101 (a)(13)(B) for greater than 30 days. In this
definition of contingency operations, 10 USC 12304b is not specifically
listed.
Budget Implications (per ULB submission): The number of personnel
affected is a projection based on Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Active Duty for
Operational Support (ADOS) activations in support of contingency
operations and FY 2016 12304b) programming. In FY 2016, a total of 6711
RC Service members are expected to be activated for ADOS. This budget
methodology makes the following assumptions:
1. The Declaration of National Emergency will continue through FY
2024 due to the emerging ISIS threat and increasing global instability.
The 10 U.S.C. 12302 authority will be available to activate the RC
through FY 2021 and probably through FY 2024.
2. The Services provided 12304b projections for FY 2017-2021 and
expect to maintain a total steady state of nearly 3000 12304b
activations to sustain the preprogramed operations tempo from FY2017-
2021.
This proposal used the 12304b activation data from FY 2014 through
FY 2024 in the following table:
12304b ACTIVATION PROJECTIONS FY14-FY24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force............................................ 0 1182 1076 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130
Army................................................. 962 1007 1008 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
Total............................................ 962 2189 2084 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140 2140
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DoD Office of the Actuary used a 10-year look from FY 2014 to
FY 2024 to compute an estimated cost. The cost for the Services is the
Retired Pay Accrual contribution paid to the Military Retirement Trust
Fund. The actuaries are unsure if this proposal will have a cost, but
felt that the estimated costs in the table below should be included in
good faith. For example, for budgeting purposes, the early retirement
eligibility authorization effectively reduces the budgeted RC
retirement age from 60 to 58. Extending early retirement eligibility to
12304b active duty may not move the needle enough to effectively reduce
the estimated early retirement age from 58 years to 57 years and 11
months.
The DoD Office of the Actuary states ``if [the ULB is] enacted,
actual results/costs implemented by the DoD Board of Actuaries may
differ from those shown in this estimate. They may decide to not
reflect costs until actual experience emerges, or decide the impact is
below the valuation's rounding thresholds.'' For example, the actuaries
estimate the Retired Pay Accrual contribution of $5.5 million for the
Army in FY 2021 for the range of 1,000-10,000 man-years worth of 12304b
activations.
The 5 years of cost estimated required for the ULB submission (FY
2017-FY 2021) are included in the table below.
The attached actuary excel spreadsheet displays the assumptions and
the costs through FY24. Actuary costs assume 14 percent of new entrants
to the part-time drilling reserves become eligible for a reserve non-
disability retirement. The resources reflected in the table below are
funded within the FY 2017 President's Budget.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS ($MILLIONS)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dash-1
FY FY FY FY FY Appropriation Budget Line Program
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 From Activity Item Element
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force 1.15 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.25 Military 01 010
Personnel, Air
Force
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army 5.00 5.10 5.20 5.40 5.50 Military 01/02 05/06
Personnel,
Army
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy does not intend to use this authority, which would have been funded in the following account: Military Personnel, Navy.
Marine Corps does not intend to use this authority, which would have been funded in the following account: Military Personnel, Marine Corps.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 6.15 6.25 6.40 6.65 6.75
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AFFECTED
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force 565 565 565 565 565
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Benefit: Post-9/11 GI Bill.
Description: 38 USC, Ch 33 (sections 3301, 3312 amended).
Section 3301:
In this chapter:
(1) The term ``active duty'' has the meanings as follows (subject
to the limitations specified in sections 3002(6) and 3311(b)):
(A) In the case of members of the regular components of the
Armed Forces, the meaning given such term in section
101(21)(A).
(B) In the case of members of the reserve components of the
Armed Forces, service on active duty under a call or order to
active duty under section 688, 12301(a), 12301(d), 12301(g),
12302, or 12304 of title 10 or section 712 of title 14.
(C) In the case of a member of the Army National Guard of the
United States or Air National Guard of the United States, in
addition to service described in subparagraph (B), full-time
service--
(i) in the National Guard of a State for the purpose
of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing,
or training the National Guard; or
(ii) in the National Guard under section 502(f) of
title 32 when authorized by the President or the
Secretary of Defense for the purpose of responding to a
national emergency declared by the President and
supported by Federal funds.
Section 3312:
(a) In General.--
Subject to section 3695 and except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c), an individual entitled to educational assistance under this
chapter is entitled to a number of months of educational assistance
under section 3313 equal to 36 months.
(b) Continuing Receipt.--The receipt of educational assistance
under section 3313 by an individual entitled to educational assistance
under this chapter is subject to the provisions of section 3321(b)(2).
(c) Discontinuation of Education for Active Duty.--
(1) In general.--Any payment of educational assistance
described in paragraph (2) shall not--
(A) be charged against any entitlement to educational
assistance of the individual concerned under this
chapter; or
(B) be counted against the aggregate period for which
section 3695 limits the individual's receipt of
educational assistance under this chapter.
(2) Description of payment of educational assistance.--
Subject to paragraph (3), the payment of educational assistance
described in this paragraph is the payment of such assistance
to an individual for pursuit of a course or courses under this
chapter if the Secretary finds that the individual--
(A)
(i) in the case of an individual not serving
on active duty, had to discontinue such course
pursuit as a result of being called or ordered
to serve on active duty under section 688,
12301(a), 12301(d), 12301(g), 12302, or 12304
of title 10; or
(ii) in the case of an individual serving on
active duty, had to discontinue such course
pursuit as a result of being ordered to a new
duty location or assignment or to perform an
increased amount of work; and
(B) failed to receive credit or lost training time
toward completion of the individual's approved
education, professional, or vocational objective as a
result of having to discontinue, as described in
subparagraph (A), the individual's course pursuit.
(3) Period for which payment not charged.--The period for which, by
reason of this subsection, educational assistance is not charged
against entitlement or counted toward the applicable aggregate period
under section 3695 of this title shall not exceed the portion of the
period of enrollment in the course or courses from which the individual
failed to receive credit or with respect to which the individual lost
training time, as determined under paragraph (2)(B).
Reason: 38 USC 3301 does not list 10 USC 12304b as an authorized
order to service in the definition of ``active duty''. Also 38 USC
3312(c)(2)(A)(ii) does not list 10 USC 12304b as an authorized order to
service that would cause the member to have to discontinue education in
which the service member is using educational assistance.
Budget Implications (per ULB submission): The Department of Defense
(DoD) has no responsibility for funding of the basic benefits of the
Post-9/11 GI Bill. Costs for the Post-9/11 GI Bill are borne by the
Department of Veterans Affairs, under the provisions of section 3324(b)
of title 38, which states, ``Payments for entitlement to educational
assistance earned under this chapter shall be made from funds
appropriated to, or otherwise made available to, the Department for the
payment of readjustment benefits.'' While DoD has estimates regarding
the number of personnel affected and cost to carry out this proposal,
there is no budget implication to DoD.
5. Benefit: Extension of Eligibility for Vocational Rehabilitation
Benefits.
Description: 38 USC 3103(f).
(f) In any case in which the Secretary has determined that a
veteran was prevented from participating in a vocational rehabilitation
program under this chapter within the period of eligibility otherwise
prescribed in this section as a result of being ordered to serve on
active duty under section 688, 12301(a), 12301(d), 12301(g), 12302, or
12304, of title 10, such period of eligibility shall not run for the
period of such active duty service plus four months.
Reason: 38 USC 3103(f) does not list 10 USC 12304b as an authorized
order to service for the purpose of extending the eligibility for
Vocational Rehabilitation benefits.
Budget Implications (per ULB submission): The VA finds the
Vocational Rehabilitation benefit at no cost to DoD. This benefit is
elective. Veterans who have elected to use this benefit should be
expected to use the benefit whether their period of eligibility is
extended or not.
6. Benefit: Voluntary Separation Pay.
Description: 10 USC 1175a.
(j) Repayment for Members Who Return to Active Duty.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a member of the
armed forces who, after having received all or part of voluntary
separation pay under this section, returns to active duty shall have
deducted from each payment of basic pay, in such schedule of monthly
installments as the Secretary concerned shall specify, until the total
amount deducted from such basic pay equals the total amount of
voluntary separation pay received.
(2) Members who are involuntarily recalled to active duty or full-
time National Guard duty in accordance with section 12301(a), 12301(b),
12301(g), 12302, 12303, or 12304 of this title or section 502)(f)(1) of
title 32 shall not be subject to this subsection.
(3) Members who are recalled or perform active duty or full-time
National Guard duty in accordance with section 101(d)(1), 101(d)(2),
101(d)(5), 12301(d) (insofar as the period served is less than 180
consecutive days with the consent of the member), 12319, or 12503 of
this title, or section 114, 115, or 502(f)(2) of title 32 (insofar as
the period served is less than 180 consecutive days with consent of the
member), shall not be subject to this subsection.
(4) The Secretary of Defense may waive, in whole or in part,
repayment required under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that
recovery would be against equity and good conscience or would be
contrary to the best interests of the United States. The authority in
this paragraph may be delegated only to the Undersecretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness and the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
Reason: The involuntary mobilization authorities under section
12304a and 12304b were added to title 10 by sections 515 and 516 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA for
FY12). The NDAA for FY12 did not make a conforming amendment to the
list of involuntary mobilization authorities in section 1175a to
include 12304a and 12304b.
Budget Implications (per ULB submission): The Services will not
budget for the addition of 10 U.S.C. 12304a or 10 U.S.C. 12304b to 10
U.S.C. 1175a. If 12304a and 12304b are added to the list of involuntary
authorities, a potential future recoupment may not be realized.
However, such a recoupment is not part of budget planning and
therefore, this proposal does not have budget implications. Since most
of the personnel who received VSP are in the IRR, the actual number
involuntarily mobilized under this authority, and therefore who will be
affected by this proposal, is a much smaller subset that DOD cannot
currently identify.
General Talley. The 12304(b) authority involuntarily mobilizes
Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers to active duty to augment Active
Component forces in the execution of preplanned missions in support of
Combatant Commands. Section 12304(b) excludes many of the benefits
afforded to Soldiers under other mobilization authorities, such as
12301a, 12302, and 12304. The following list highlights some of the
disparities:
(1) Early Eligibility for Health Care. Title 10 USC 1074 (d)--
Unlike RC Soldiers mobilized under 12301(a), 12302, and 12304, those
mobilized under 12304(b) are not authorized to receive early
eligibility for health care if the order does not specify support to a
contingency operation.
(2) Post 9/11 GI Bill. Title 38 USC 3301--Unlike RC Soldiers
mobilized under 12301a, 12302, and 12304, those mobilized under 12304b
are ineligible for the Post 9/11 GI Bill.
(3) Federal Civilian Differential Pay. Title 5 USC 5538--Unlike RC
federal civilians mobilized under 12301(a), 12302, and 12304, those
mobilized under 12304(b) are not authorized to receive Federal Civilian
Differential pay.
(4) TRICARE Assistance Management Program (TAMP) Transitional
Health Care. Title 10 USC 1145--Unlike RC Soldiers mobilized under
12301(a), 12302, and 12304, those mobilized under 12304(b) are not
authorized to receive 180 days of transitional health care.
(5) Voluntary Separation Recoupment Protection. Title 10 USC
1175a--Unlike RC Soldiers mobilized for at least six months under
12301(a), (b), (g); 12302; 12303; 12304, or 32 U.S.C. 502(f)(1), those
mobilized under 12304(b) are subject to recoupment of a pro-rated
portion of their Voluntary Separation Pay.
TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION
Ms. Kaptur. Then, in terms of total force integration, I
wanted to ask, outside the district I represent is the 180th
Fighter Wing, and for the first time in its history has an
Active-Duty command officer. By all accounts it is going very
well. But I want to ensure that our National Guardsmen are
getting the opportunities they deserve. And so I am wondering
if you could tell us how many Active-Duty commands are filled
by National Guard officers and what is the timetable for
integrating more of these positions across both the Army and
the Air Force.
INNOVATIVE READINESS TRAINING
And then my second question deals with innovative readiness
training. Both the National Guard and Reserves have many assets
that could be put to use in our local communities on local
projects and at the same time provide valuable training. Youth
Challenge comes to mind in particular. But it seems to take an
awful long time to get any kind of approval from the Secretary
of Defense.
What can be done to delegate the approval for these
projects to the State level or to speed up the timeline at the
national level to ensure that the communities most in need and
the missions most beneficial to unit training are approved in a
timely manner?
So, first, on the total force integration, the integration
of the Guard in the Active Duty, and then, secondly, innovative
readiness training.
General Grass. Congresswoman, if I could, in January I was
visiting Guam for a ribbon-cutting ceremony on a new facility.
And while I was there, I ran into the 180th Wing. The squadron
was there supporting PACOM and Air Forces Pacific, an
outstanding unit commanded by an Active-Duty colonel who will
be coming out of command here shortly.
General Neal can give you a little more detail of our plan
way ahead because General Welsh wants to go ahead and offer an
Active command to a Guard officer now.
General Neal. Congresswoman, currently there are no Air
Guard commanders of an Active-Duty wing. There will be an
announcement imminently by General Welsh of an Air National
Guard colonel who was selected to command an Active-Duty wing.
But I don't want to get ahead of the chief of staff of the Air
Force. So it is imminent.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are on television. So go right
ahead.
General Neal. You probably heard they already announced--
well, I think General Welsh said the same thing earlier in the
month. Just that the Air Force Reserve is going to command an
Active-Duty wing also.
As far as your IRT, innovation readiness training, what we
are doing is two things. One, inadvertently, when we did the
DODI, we reported on it, we left out a line that should have
said basically that it applies to the Title 32--to the National
Guard. We are going back to correct that. We anticipate in the
next 4 to 6 weeks we will have that corrected. Therefore,
unfunded, when you don't need funds--and I know General Bartman
and I have talked about that extensively--when you don't need
funding for those projects, it will be a very quick
coordination process.
The IRT training that takes right now, what, could take 2
years, because of a lot of the environmental stuff, we are
working on a process that will cut that down to 90 days. So,
hopefully, with any amount of luck, within the next 60 days,
you will have a process on both funded and unfunded projects
that will be very quick and you no longer have to wait a year
or 2 for all this. So that is what we are trying to do.
Ms. Kaptur. That would be a big help.
General Talley. So, ma'am, there was a lot packed in your
questions. And so thank you for that.
But, Congresswoman, the first thing I would say, there are
lots of different mobilization authorities. And so the bottom
line upfront is, hey, when a soldier, a citizen soldier gets
mobilized, shouldn't they have the same benefits? You shouldn't
find out after the fact that you didn't quite get the same
deal. So I am going to hand this to you, but I will come back
for the record. This is a very good summary of everything you
just asked on one slide for you. And we have to fix this.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
General Talley. You are welcome, ma'am.
And switching over, break to the second question, the Army
Reserve does innovative training all the time. We don't have a
problem getting it approved and getting the authorities. We do
MedRed missions all over the world since we own most of the
doctors and nurses. We just did a big medical support in
southern Missouri. I think I got asked at the Senate last week
about what we were doing. We just did something with the Indian
reservation, Native American reservation in Montana.
I can give you for the record, we will send you a list of
all the examples we are doing. We have no problem getting
authority and approval for that. It is just good old title
training.
[The information follows:]
Congresswoman Kaptur. Thank you for your interest in Innovative
Readiness Training missions. Below is a list of projects scheduled for
the USAR for FY15-FY17.
FY15 IRT Projects Overview
(AC, AR) West Black Belt Medical--ARMEDCOM provided medical care
for an underserved population of 30,000 in the Selma, Camden, and
Demopolis, Alabama areas.
(AC, AR) Medical--The project provided METL training for an
ARMEDCOM unit while delivering medical care for an underserved
population of 40,000 in the Sikeston, Kennett, Dexter, and Malden areas
of Missouri. The United States Navy Reserve participated as a
supporting service.
(AR) Fort Belknap--ARMEDCOM provided medical care to a Native
American population of 5,200 in the Fort Belknap, Montana area.
(AC, AR) Fort Thompson--ARMEDCOM provided medical care to a Native
American population of 6,500 in the Fort Thompson, South Dakota area.
(AC, AR) Meigs County Medical--ARMEDCOM provided medical care to an
underserved population of 25,000 in the Athens area of Pomeroy and
Meigs County in Ohio. The United States Marine Corps Reserve
participated as a supporting service.
(AR) Northern Cheyenne--807th Medical Command served a Native
American population of 5,000 in the Lame Deer, Montana area.
(AR) Chenango County--3rd Medical Command provided medical care to
an underserved population of 280,000 in the Binghamton area of New
York. The United States Navy Reserve participated as a supporting
service.
(AR) Turtle Mountain--807th Medical Command provided medical care
for a population of 8,600 in the Belcourt and Dunseith, North Dakota
area.
(AC, AR) Fort Washakie--807th Medical Command provided medical care
to a Native American population of 3,500 in the Lander and Riverton
area of Wyoming.
(AR) Old Harbor Engineer--The project provided horizontal METL
training opportunity for the 9th MSC to improve environmental
conditions by extending a road for a distance of 5,720 feet which is a
little more than one mile. This prepared the area for a fish plant by
bringing it up to FAA safety standards.
FY16 IRT Projects Overview
(AC) Arctic Care Medical IRT--I Corps will provide veterinary
services for an underserved population of 790 in Kodiak Island Borough,
Alaska. Kodiak Island Borough, Alaska is designated as a Health
Services Professional Shortage Area (HPSA).
(AR) Chenango County Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment
Support (MCDS) will provide medical care for an underserved population
of 102,000 in Chenango County, New York.
(AR) Fort Belknap Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM will provide medical
services to a Native American population of 5,200 in the Fort Belknap,
Montana area.
(AR, AC) Fort Peck Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM will provide medical
services to a Native American population of 4,200 in the Billings, MT
area.
(AR) Fort Thompson Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM will provide medical
services to a Native American population of 6,500 in the Fort Thompson,
South Dakota area.
(AR, AC) Greyhound Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment
Support (MCDS) will support an underserved population of 26,000 in the
West Memphis, Arkansas area.
(AR) Lone Star Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment Support
(MCDS) is leading a medical project for a population of 1.6 million in
the Brownsville, Hebbronville, Laredo, Mission, Pharr, Raymondville and
Rio Grande City, TX area.
(AR) Old Harbor Engineer IRT--9th Mission Support Command (MSC) is
supporting a horizontal METL training opportunity to improve
environmental conditions by extending a road for a distance of 5,720
feet which is a little more than one mile. This will prepare the area
for a fish plant and bring it up to FAA safety standards.
(AR) Sequoia Riverlands Engineer IRT--416th TEC is leading a
vertical METL training opportunity to construct an outdoor, stand-alone
sanitary restroom building for public use in the Kaweah Oaks Preserve,
Exeter, and Ca area.
(AR) South Mississippi Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment
Support (MCDS) will provide medical care for an underserved population
of 29,000 in the McComb and Natchez, Mississippi area.
(AR, AC) Tropic Care Big Island Medical IRT Project--9th Mission
Support Command (MSC) will provide medical care for an underserved
population of 32,000 in the Kau and Puna District of Hawaii.
FYI7 IRT Projects Overview (The projects listed below are
tentative)
(AR) Tropic Care-Kauai Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment
Support (MCDS) is planning to lead a medical project in Lihue, Hawaii.
The following expertise/services are being requested by the community:
General Dentistry, Oral Surgery, Hygienist, Family Practice,
Internists, Physician Assistant's, Nurse Practitioner, Physical
Therapist, Nutritionists, Behavior health, Optometry, Eye glasses,
Veterinary, and CPR certification.
(AR) Round Valley Indian Health Center Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM is
planning to lead a medical project in Covelo, California. The following
expertise/services are being requested by the community: Dentist, Oral
Surgery, Family Practice, Ob-Gyn.
(AR) Fort Belknap Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM is planning to lead a
medical project in Harlem, Montana. The following expertise's/services
are being requested by the community: Dentist, Hygienist, Family
Practice, Internists, Rheumatology, Physical Therapist, Nutritionists,
Behavior Health, Optometry, Eye glasses, Veterinary.
(AR) Fort Peck Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM is planning to lead a medical
project in Poplar, MT. The following expertise/services are being
requested by the community: Dental Hygienist, Ob-Gyn (Well-woman
exams), Screenings (Physicals).
(AR) Rosebud EMS Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM is planning to lead a
medical project in Rosebud, South Dakota. The following expertise/
services are being requested by the community: Dentist, Hygienist,
Endocrine, Family Practice, Pediatrician, Nurse Practitioner's,
Internists, Rheumatology, Physical Therapist, Nutritionists, Behavior
Health, Optometry, Eye glasses, Veterinary, Dermatology.
(AR) Fort Thompson Medical IRT--ARMEDCOM is planning to lead a
medical project in Ft. Thompson, South Dakota. The following expertise/
services are being requested by the community: Dentistry, Hygienist,
Family practice, Pediatrician, Internists, RN, Pharmacy, Rheumatology,
Ob-Gyn, Physician Assistant's, Nurse Practitioner's, Physical
Therapists, Nutritionists, Behavior health, Optometry, Eye glasses,
Veterinary, CPR certification, Drug demand reduction, Medics.
(AR) Swain County Health Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command
Deployment Support (MCDS) is planning to lead a medical Project in
Bryson City, North Carolina. The following expertise/services are being
requested by the community: General dentistry, Family Practice,
Behavior health, Optometry, Eye glasses, Veterinary.
(AR) Saint Mary's Health Wagon Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command
Deployment Support (MCDS) is planning to lead a medical Project in
Wise, Virginia. The following expertise/services are being requested by
the community: Dentistry, Oral surgery, Periodontist, Hygienist, Family
Practice, Colonoscopy, Colposcopy, Rheumatology, Ob-Gyn, Physical
Therapist, Nutritionists, Behavior Health, Optometry, Eye glasses,
Veterinary.
(AR) Lonestar Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment Support
(MCDS) is planning to lead a medical Project in Harlington, Texas. The
following expertise/services are being requested by the community:
Dentistry, Hygienist, Family practice, Physician Assistants, Nurse
Practitioners, Nutritionists, Behavior health, Optometry and CPR
certification.
(AR) Ozark Highlands Medical IRT--3rd Medical Command Deployment
Support (MCDS) is planning to lead a medical Project in the following
communities: Mountain Home, Marshall, Norfork, and Yellville, Arkansas.
The following expertise/services are being requested by the community:
Dentistry, Medical, Optometry, Veterinary, and Behavioral Health.
(AR) Blackfeet Nation Park Engineer IRT--416th Theater Engineer
Command (TEC) is planning to lead an engineer project that will consist
of vertical/horizontal Construction, grading, and improving road access
in Browning, Montana. The following expertise/services are being
requested by the community: Project Management, Truck drivers, and
Heavy Equipment Operators.
(AR) YMCA of the Rockies Engineer IRT--416th Theater Engineer
Command (TEC) is planning to lead an engineer project that will consist
of Camp Expansion; culvert, utilities, trail, cabin deck replacements,
shade shelters, surveying, bathhouse remodel, parking lot lighting,
road improvements and construction storage facilities in Granby,
Colorado. The following expertise/services are being requested by the
community: Electricians, Plumbers, Carpenters, Heavy Equipment
operators, Project mgmt., Truck drivers and Maintenance facility.
(AR) City of Montrose Engineer IRT--416th Theater Engineer Command
(TEC) is planning to lead an engineer project that will consist of Mass
grading of a regional park that is 40k cubic yards in Montrose,
Montana. The following expertise/services are being requested by the
community: Project management, Truck drivers and Heavy Equipment
operators.
(AR) Texas A&M-Construction Engineer IRT--416th Theater Engineer
Command (TEC) is planning to lead an engineer project that will consist
of restoring infrastructures to economically distressed communities;
roads, drainage, sewage electricity/internet connectivity in San
Antonio, Texas. The following expertise/services are being requested by
the community: Civil Engineers, Project management, Water purification
and Electricians.
Ms. Kaptur. All right.
You know, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say something. I
am glad this is being broadcast. This is an example, this
committee, of Congress working well, but it doesn't get enough
publicity. The publicity that goes out there is so negative and
very destructive to our country, in my opinion. I want to thank
you and I want to thank the ranking member for bringing us
together as a committee and conducting the business of the
country. I am proud to serve on this committee, and I am proud
of each of you gentlemen and the forces you lead.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, we have some excellent substantive
witnesses. So we appreciate their input and contribution.
Judge Carter.
ADEQUATE TRAINING FUNDING
Mr. Carter. This may be just me speculating, but on this
multicomponent pilot program, getting back to that one more
time, it takes--it has been told me, at least--it takes 90 to
100 days to stand up a unit, training days to stand up a unit
to be deployed, something like that. This would probably
increase more training days on top of those training days that
in many instances you are being called upon to do.
Do we have the funds to do the additional training that
this might call upon us to do? And what does it do to the
citizen soldier concept of the guy back home or gal back home
that has got a job? As we shift them to that, is that going to
put more of a burden upon their employment situation back home
or is it worked out and not a problem? I just don't know the
answer.
General Grass. Congressman, if I could start. As I do my
townhalls, I ask the question: Are we using the Guard too much?
Just got a report out from a survey that was done by our
company grades Army and Air. Ninety-two percent said it is
either about right or they would like to deploy more. The
younger ones that haven't deployed are looking for a
deployment.
So from that perspective there are men and women in the
Guard, and I am sure Jeff would tell you in the Reserve as
well, that want to deploy. The associations will probably give
us more opportunities. But we cannot break our model of 39 days
a year as far as the baseline. And I hear that from the
townhalls. The men and women that serve are concerned if we say
the number is greater than what it has been in the past, a
weekend a month, 2 weeks in the summer, that their employers
and their families would get concerned if we made that
statement.
But what we find is there is probably well over 80 percent
of the Guard that is doing more than that time right now. But
they know that they are working for a National Training Center
rotation or they are going down to an external combat training
center rotation for the following. They know they have to hit
concern gates in training. And they are willing to do that all
day long.
We have a unit that just is getting ready to deploy with
the 101st Airborne through a training association. They know
they had to put in extra days to get ready to go. So as long as
they know their mission, they know that this is going to make
them more ready, and the family and employers seem to be very
comfortable with that.
BORDER SECURITY
Mr. Carter. Because we don't want to lose these good
people. We want to keep them.
And this is a completely off-the-wall question, but this
morning in Belgium when this disaster hit, they announced that
the Army immediately sealed the borders. I guess the Guard's
job would be to seal the borders if we had to do that. Just the
question: Is that right? And is there some plan if our
government said major terrorist attack, either seal the State
borders or seal national borders, the Guard would go do that?
General Grass. Congressman, we could. Again, that would be
up to each State individually. But there was an operation
called Winter Freeze right after 9/11, shortly after 9/11, and
we put Guardsmen in a Federal status in support of Customs and
Border Protection at the time, and they were in a Federal
status, though, when they went to the border. But in most
cases, as we went into the airports after 9/11, those were
Federal dollars paying for men and women who worked for the
governor and the adjutant general.
Mr. Carter. Okay. That is what I assumed.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge Carter.
The other bookend of the Army Caucus, the gentleman from
Maryland.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Bookends? I have never been called a
bookend before. Is that a good one or a bad one?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are a giant.
CYBER FORCE
Mr. Ruppersberger. A giant. Okay.
Hey, brother. How are you doing? Good. Okay.
All right. Thank you all for being here, what you do, and
we really appreciate all that your troops do for us both in the
wars that we are dealing with and also at home. And we have a
lot of respect.
Since 1993, I am going to get a little parochial here, but
the Maryland National Guard and the Republic of Estonia have
experienced a close and fruitful relationship through the
National Guard State Partnership Program. And as a result of
this program, the Maryland National Guard has provided many
years of support to assist in the development of Estonia's
cyber defense program, and Estonia is now recognized as a
leader of cyber defense within NATO.
I had to go to Russia in November, and I stopped at Estonia
and Latvia. And so I was able to see and hear really what
Estonia would tell us about how satisfied they were about the
National Guard and the cyber programs.
My question would be--and I am not sure who, General Grass
or Neal or whatever, Talley--is how can the National Guard
capitalize on the experience contained within the Maryland
National Guard and the Air National Guard as a whole to assist
in the development and training pipeline for tomorrow's cyber
warriors?
General Grass. Congressman, let me first say that Maryland,
that partnership has led the way to a point now where I believe
they actually have two universities in Estonia, one in
Maryland, that have partnered on a cyber master's program. It
started from the partnership, but it is handled separately
within the two governments.
I will ask General Neal to talk about the great work of the
175th, what they are doing there in cyber, because it is one of
our leading Air Guard units.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Where are you from, General Neal?
General Neal. Congressman, you know I am a proud Maryland
Guardsman. So thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
General Neal. And of course it is good to see you again,
sir.
So we do have a pretty robust cyber force, cyber squadrons,
cyber groups in Maryland, and they have hooked up with Estonia.
And what they are doing now is they are doing joint cyber
training and joint cyber exercises. So it is very robust right
now, because, as you know, over there in Estonia they have the
NATO Cyber Center of Excellence. And they are actually talking
about maybe setting up a cyber center of excellence over here
in Maryland.
So that is how they are capturing it. And we hope to export
that to other States, obviously under the auspices of General
Grass and the entire SPP program. But it is a great program to
show what can be done.
MARYLAND GUARD--CYBER
Mr. Ruppersberger. Why do you think that the Maryland
National Guard has done so well in developing this
relationship, number one? And secondly, in the expertise?
General Neal. Well, sir, I don't think it is just cyber.
You know, when I was up at the 135th, we would take doctors
over there, we would take civil engineers over there and do
projects. So it is a pretty robust SPP, State Partnership
Program. And we have done a lot of countries and a lot of
States. And I think the growing trust, and everybody recognized
suddenly that they looked up one day and said: Wow, you have
got a log of cyber stuff in Estonia, we have a lot of cyber
stuff in Maryland, it just makes natural sense. And the trust
was already built.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. That is it. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Womack.
Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger.
ISR AND THE RESERVE COMPONENT
Mr. Womack. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
In the brief time that I have remaining, I just want to
offer my sincere congratulations and admiration to General
Grass for his longstanding service to the National Guard of
this country, and certainly as the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau and a member of the Joint Chiefs.
And, General Grass, and to your wife Pat, thank you so much
for your service to our country. It has been a real honor to be
around you here during these hearings. And I want to thank you.
And I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge Jeff Talley
too. What a tremendous representative of the Army Reserve you
have been. And I wish you very well in your future. And it has
been a great honor serving with you here as well too. So thank
you so much.
For these other two guys, they are probably going to hang
around a little longer, and they will get our wrath a little
bit more.
Couple of real quick questions, Mr. Chairman, if you don't
mind.
First of all, ISR and the Reserve Component, our committee
has heard so much from our Army and Air Force guys about the
need for more ISR. Just can't get enough ISR. So I throw that
out on the table for you--and, General Neal, you may want to
take the lead on this--about the capacity for our Reserve
Component forces. And I have some in my district, as a matter
of disclosure, that are training toward that mission set. So
explain to me where we are and what more we can do.
General Neal. Well, for ISR, of course, that is a broad
spectrum, Congressman. But when we will talk about remotely
piloted aircraft, I think everybody kind of understands that is
basic ISR. But right now the Air Force has agreed to do 60
lines, 60 combat lines of flying around the world in support of
the combatant commanders. And out of those 60 lines, the Air
National Guard is doing 14. As you know, we are doing one out
of Fort Smith. And that is a surge. And to do anything in surge
or do anything of that magnitude it takes people, it takes
equipment, and it takes training. And it doesn't just take
training day-to-day, it takes the initial pipeline training.
We have the ability to expand beyond that. In other words,
we have the main documents built. We have in theory the ability
to go beyond that at our soon-to-be 12 RPA fully qualified or
fully established RPA units. But to do that we need a bigger
pipeline for the Active Duty. So Active Duty has to grow and
get their formal training schools or initial training schools
better. We have to grow in manpower to fill out all the
organizations. And then, quite frankly, we need the money to be
able to pay everybody.
PILOT AND AIRLINE NEEDS
Mr. Womack. The last question I have, also kind of relative
to the Air Force, very relative to the Air Force, is my
understanding is the airlines have an enormous need for new
pilots. That has to have an impact on big Air Force. And so
help me understand the cascading effect of what the airlines
are doing and how it affects our men in blue suits.
General Neal. Congressman, that is a concern for the Air
Force and a concern for us. I think the concerns are slightly
different. The Air Force either has a pilot or doesn't have a
pilot. So it does not have an airline pilot, it has a military
pilot. We have military pilots and we have airline pilots.
So for them, their concern is retaining them. And if you
follow the papers or you look at the pay scales, they are
pretty high right now in the airlines. I mean, airlines are
making billions of dollars right now. So their concern is
retaining pilots.
We still get some people coming out of the Air Force. Our
biggest concern is, at least mine, and I may be optimistic, is
not retaining pilots, it is retaining the full-time pilots. We
just don't pay enough to retain. Like technicians. We talked
about technicians earlier, Congressman, and they don't make
enough compared to the airlines. So my problem is full-time
pilots.
We are working with the airlines, the Air Force is working
with the airlines to see if we can have some kind of program
that allows them to maybe do a short term of full-time stuff
and the rest of the year maybe in the airlines. So the airlines
are very open to working with us in the military, but I am
optimistic that we will always be able to recruit and retain
traditional drill status Guardsman pilots in the Air Guard. But
the full time is a challenge.
Mr. Womack. One more 30-second question, if you don't mind,
Mr. Chairman.
On that Title 5 swap we were talking about a minute ago
with my friend from Indiana, in the workup to the NDAA, General
Grass, were you guys consulted on the 20 percent moving over
to--the flip that took place? Because it seems to me, and
memory is little bit fuzzy here, that that kind of happened. It
was written into the bill, became the law, and without a lot of
input. So help me understand how that unfolded.
General Grass. Congressman, over the years there have been
a number of questions brought up about this force. But I was
not consulted before the NDAA was published.
Mr. Womack. That is regretful.
I yield back.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Indeed it is.
Ms. McCollum.
EMPLOYER FATIGUE
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I think I am going to add to what my colleague Mr. Womack
said, and then ask a question, and I think it all goes
together.
U.S. Park Service is having a hard time with pilots and
mechanics. U.S. Forest Service has as well. I was up in
International Falls. They are recruiting our pilots up there.
It is a real problem with our pay scale, both for mechanics and
pilots.
So something that no one really wants to talk about on the
record is employer fatigue. Employers don't want to talk about
it. My Guardsmen and Reserve men and women don't want to talk
about it. Nobody wants to go on the record saying it is a
problem or that they are starting to hear from their employers.
But that is going to affect retention and recruitment.
Employer fatigue. How are we addressing that? Because I
actually spoke to one employer. Just loves the fact that for
years and years he has stood up and stood with the--I won't say
which branch even. I don't want to identify this individual at
all. It is starting to affect their bottom line. And the
employees are starting to see, as pay goes up, it affects their
bottom line in their household income.
So employer fatigue and what is going on with private
sector pay. What are we doing to address that? Are you having
conversations with folks about it?
General Neal. Well, ma'am, from the Air Guard, since you
brought up with pilots, that is an easier one. We have started
to have those, as I mentioned before, with the airlines. There
is some fatigue. It more becomes about having an understanding
of what to expect. So I can't speak for other parts of the
private sector we haven't really talked to. But if they have an
expectation of when they can have these men and women that are
pilots, it goes a long way to kind of keeping employer fatigue
down.
There is no doubt about it, we have been pretty busy for 15
years, and we have asked a lot of our traditionals, traditional
Guardsmen, we are 70 percent traditional, and we have asked
them over and over again to leave their wives and their jobs.
And then we ask them to come back, and then maybe we have a
Sandy and we ask them to leave again when it is unplanned. But
we find that giving them expectations and sticking to it goes a
long way. So that is what we are working on now.
We have not had a lot of outcry from the employers, at
least at my level. I think you will find that most wing
commanders, because we are wing based, they go out and try to
talk to these employers when there is a problem, to help
mitigate that. And like you say, most employers are very
supportive, but the bottom line is the bottom line.
So far we seem to be doing okay, but it is a concern of
mine, that down the road as we go farther and farther down this
road, and we have cyber, we have RPA, and we have pilots, all
who pay very well on the civilian sector, and that is a real
concern, ma'am.
General Talley. So, ma'am, if it is okay, I would like to
answer. Thank you for that question.
So it is a problem. And I have been saying it is a
challenge for the whole 4 years I have been in this position.
And back when I was a major, troop program unit, juggling
between what all of our reservists do, which is between family
and professional civilian career and military career.
The first thing we have to do is we have to have
predictability--so that is one in five--and we have to stick to
it. But then if we are trying to generate such high levels of
readiness to the left of the mobilization date, that extra time
is significant.
And so one of the reasons I have--I would like to believe
that two of the most important things I have done in 4 years,
one is plan, prepare, provide, and how to generate readiness in
the Army Reserve through that business model.
The other is the Army Reserve Private Public Partnership.
So what we have done is we have partnered with those private
companies and we have given them predictability and we have
shown them how we can help their bottom line through leverage
and sharing of capability and resourcing in a way that they
feel good. But one is we have got to give them the
predictability, we have got to keep it at one in five, and we
have to recognize, at least in the case of the Army Reserve,
the only reason they are such a good surgeon or an engineer is
because that is what they do in the private sector. If I lose
that private sector support, your Army Reserve will not be able
to be the technical experts that the Army and the joint forces
expect.
So I have put my eggs in the basket of Private Public
Partnership. I had a meeting with Acting Secretary of the Army
Murphy this morning and all we talked about was Private Public
Partnership and what a great model that could be for the Army.
So we need to do more. But we need one in five, keep it one
in five. Remember we are a Reserve that is called on to be part
of the operation force, not the reverse.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Do you want to further comment, clarity,
and then Mr. Visclosky has some questions.
General Grass. Congresswoman, if I could add, it is a
concern, as Jeff said, and I think he laid it out very well.
What we have seen, though, is that predictability is so
important when we meet with employers. And I would tell you
just personal experience that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
is very concerned about it. And when he locks a unit in at 180
days that they are going on a deployment, for anybody to mess
with that, they have to come back to him and let him know why
they are changing that rotation schedule, whether it is off
ramping them because of a mission change. So we have got great
commitment from within the Department of Defense.
The other thing that we work very closely with is within
the Department of Defense we have the Employer Support to Guard
and Reserve Program. We recognize every year 15, and the
Secretary of Defense recognizes 15 top employers.
I think the stress comes more in the small business and
private business owners. And I think in looking to the future,
if there is a way we could help them in some way when we do hit
a small town fairly heavy, because that is where it occurs.
For the Army Guard and the Air Guard right now, our
numbers, of course, on the Army Guard probably the lowest it
has been in 15 years for deployments. So if we have the
predictability and we have a soldier who has an issue with
employment, we can work around that now to help them in some
cases.
General Kadavy. If I could just add a couple things,
Congresswoman. Part of the reason why the associated unit is a
pilot project is because these are one of the things that we
need to understand when enough training and readiness starts to
impact families and employers. So that is one of the things we
will study.
We are sending almost 6,000 soldiers to Europe to support
ERI, and we are going to ask their employers and our soldiers
and their families these exact same questions. Is a 29-day
annual training to do an overseas deployment, what is the
impact? So we are interested in that.
We continue to communicate with our soldiers and with our
leaders in the States. Adjutant generals have a very big play
in it. So far they have told us that while there is strain, it
isn't at a breaking point.
And the last indicator I would say that I keep an eye on is
our retention numbers. And thus far it isn't our retention that
is our issue if we will make end strength or not. We are
retaining well beyond our expected rates.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. That is why he is chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I should have been aware of my
surroundings. I apologize.
OPEN COMBAT JOBS TO WOMEN
Mr. Visclosky. One question, if I could--thank you, Mr.
Chairman--is I think because the Secretary of Defense in
December ordered the military to open up all combat jobs to
women, that we tend to forget 161 women have lost their lives
in Afghanistan and Iraq and over 1,000 have been wounded. But
given the directive in December for the Guard, what actions and
efforts will you have to undertake to comply with the December
directive as far as women being able to apply for all units?
General Kadavy. Congressman, we will follow the Army's
program and policy. One of the things that are unique to us is
we have always said we take units to soldiers. And so there may
be States that don't have combat arms organizations. And if you
have a female that wants to serve in a combat arms
organization, how do we get around that?
So those are some of the challenges that we will be working
through. We don't have the exact answers yet because of the way
the Guard is organized is 54 different entities by the States,
district, and the territories. But we are working through that.
That will be one of the issues, I think, that in particular may
impact the Army National Guard.
General Grass. Congressman, if I could add, as a member of
the Joint Chiefs, we discussed this topic quite frequently
leading up to the decision. And one of the things we felt, that
to make this successful we have to get women in some of the top
jobs quickly so that they can see that there is a progression
within the organization.
I know that General Milley in our last discussions is
already looking at finding women that are willing to transfer
into these skill sets so that we can get them in the training
pipeline, but not just at the entry level. If they are willing
to transfer over as a field grade officer, as a company
commander, that is what is going to make us successful. And of
course on the general officer side as well.
Mr. Visclosky. I thought about that.
General Neal. And, Congressman, for the Air National Guard,
we just echo the Air Force. We are recruiting now 100 percent,
everything we do is open to women. And we will recruit them. If
they want to apply, they go to school, and when they finish
training they are fully qualified. So it will be a non-issue
for us.
General Talley. Not an issue for the Army Reserve. We are
all enablers. So we already had women in all of our positions
already. But we did get the third female ranger graduate was an
engineer from the United States Army Reserve.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. On that very positive note, I would like
to thank General Grass, wish you God speed, General Talley, for
both of your years of incredible dedicated service to our
Nation. And to General Neal and Kadavy, thank you very much for
being here. We appreciate all you do. And please thank the men
and women who stand behind you who do the work of freedom at
home and abroad.
We stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Calvert and the
answers thereto follow:]
Compatibility
Question. Given the current fiscally constrained environment, my
concern is that the priority for newer and more capable equipment, such
as communication equipment, is being fielded to the active duty Army
while less capable equipment may be given to the Reserve forces. In
addition to having certain units with equipment that is potentially
less capable, it creates a compatibility issue between different units.
This could ultimately lead to degradation in the active and reserve
component's ability to fight as a unified team in a conflict or combat
environment.
What is being done to minimize or eliminate disparities in
equipment between the active duty and reserve force?
Answer. Thank you for this question Congressman. Due to fiscal
constraints and budget uncertainty, equipment disparities will not be
eliminated between active Army and Army Reserve forces. The unintended
consequences of these fiscal realities significantly challenge efforts
to minimize growing equipment disparities and the ability to sustain
the Army Reserve in an operational role. The Chief of Army Reserve is
not the appropriation sponsor for the equipment procurement budget.
Resourcing Army Reserve equipment procurement is centrally managed by
the Department of the Army. Efforts to close equipment modernization
gaps include investment in modernization programs and cascading
equipment.
The primary method for minimizing disparities involves the Army
Reserve partnering with the active Army in developing the President's
Budget (P-1R) submission for procurement funding. In FY16, less than 3%
of the Army's base budget for procurement and modernization was
prioritized for investment in Army Reserve programs focused on
logistics and enablers. Army Reserve equipment modernization should not
be dependent on NGREA funding to compensate for resourcing disparities
in the base budget.
An economically viable method for filling modernization shortfalls
is cascading active Army equipment as a substitute to compensate for
restructured, delayed, and cancelled procurement programs. This method
provides an interim solution at the risk of full compatibility.
Because of resource constraints, today's Army is forced to
prioritize combat system readiness ahead of modernization.
Consequently, the Army Reserve will remain the least equipped and least
modern Army component because we do not have Brigade Combat Teams.
Establishing dedicated and sustained funding for logistical and enabler
programs resident in the Army Reserve is crucial to improving readiness
and restoring equipment compatibility between active Army and Army
Reserve forces.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Calvert.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the answers thereto
follow:]
Question. I understand that for the National Guard the most cost
effective way to train is at the Armory, (Homestation training.) But I
understand that one issue with Armory-based training is that it is
primarily limited to training individuals, not as a crew or to train
collectively. With the critical equipping and modernization shortages
being one of the Guard and Reserves greatest challenges:
Can you explain how the use of Virtual Simulations Training can
help impact that readiness at the individual, crew and collective
level? Does your current training strategy include the use of simulated
training for gunnery and maneuver training at the armory level?
Answer. The ARNG uses Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and
Simulations (TADSS) to augment the live-fire training strategy to build
on and enhance the subsequent live-fire training event. TADSS focus on
the fundamental engagement techniques for each weapon, system, or
element for individual through company level training. TADSS can
improve and/or sustain readiness by providing state-of-the-art training
capabilities to enhance training realism. TADSS increase training
realism by simulating or emulating red and blue forces, equipment,
environments, and conditions. TADSS can stimulate digital command and
control systems, increase the frequency of training, make training more
available and enable multiple repetitions of tasks, events, and
situations. They enable training that is otherwise too costly, too
dangerous, or not possible due to safety implications or environmental
restrictions. TADSS are used to improve training efficiency by reducing
institutional (leader development) or unit (collective) training time,
controlling costs by reducing the amount of time required on live
training sites; reduce or offset training ammunition requirements and/
or operating tempo costs; eliminate or reduce the need for additional
training land and other training support infrastructure; improve safety
and reduce property and equipment wear and tear.
The current Training Circular 3-20.0 Integrated Weapons Training
Strategy, Specifies TADSS must be used for live-fire training during
each of the four gates from Individual through Company/Troop/Team.
Within each gate prerequisite Table II is designated specifically for
simulations. Although not all simulators can be house/utilized at the
armory most of ARNG TADSS are portable or mobile to allow the training
to be brought the Soldier and not the Soldier to the training.
Question. Can you tell explain the cost savings of doing
Homestation training? Savings of travel and time for instance?
Answer. AR 525-29 describes Home Station (HS) Training as the
foundation and critical component in training on fundamental individual
and collective skills. This foundation is built at home station through
exercises such as field training exercises (FTX), staff exercises
(STAFFEX) and command post exercises (CPX). In order to maximize the
Combat Training Center (CTC) experience, commanders use home station
training to ensure the highest possible capability levels prior to a
CTC rotation. Home Station training reduces operational tempo (OPTEMPO)
and travel costs to ARNG/FORSCOM training facilities, especially
considering that not all states have ARNG/FORSCOM training facilities
within its boundaries or within a reasonable travel distance.
Considering the finite amount of training time scheduled for ARNG
units, an increase in travel equates to less training time available or
the use of additional Multiple Unit Training Assembly (MUTA). The
efficiencies gained through training at home station maximizes
resources across all COMPOs and informs future investment priorities
for infrastructure growth while maintaining the core requirements of
``State'' home station range live-fire requirements.
Question. Is it possible to use current NGREA funds for crew
training equipment that is based on a fee-for-service basis (or a
lease) for a training period or is there an option that is available
currently for TAGs to use crew training equipment without owning it? If
not, would it be something you would look into as an option to save on
training costs and to maintain readiness
Answer. It is our understanding that NGREA funds cannot be used on
a ``fee for service'' basis for a training period because these types
of services are budgeted within the Army and the Air National Guard's
Operation and Maintenance accounts. Based on our review, the Purpose
Statute (31 U.S.C. 1301) would not allow our agency to use NGREA funds
in this manner since the annual NDAA explains that NGREA is available
for ``procurement of aircraft, missiles, tracked vehicles, ammunition,
other weapons and other procurement for the reserve components.''
Leasing of equipment within DoD generally take two separate forms: (1)
operating leases, and (2) capital leases. The DoD Financial Management
Regulation prohibits the use of operating leases with procurement
funding sources such as NGREA. A capital lease, which allows for
incremental payments towards owning the equipment, may be a technical
possibility, however, it in light of DoD's full funding policy and OMB
A-11's ``scoring'' methodology for capital leases, all of the costs of
the lease would need to be included in one FY of NGREA funding.
Additionally, we note that a large portion of NGREA funds are
placed on contracts that are awarded and administered by various
external program offices. There is a shared responsibility between NOB
and these program offices in terms of acquisition planning and finding
the best value contracting method for NGREA requirements, to include
examining the potential advantage of a capital lease. We are not
opposed to looking into a capital leasing option in conjunction with
the cognizant program office as appropriate.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole.
Questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto
follow:]
Personnel Reforms
Question. I would like a progress update on the integration of
personnel systems to facilitate the continuum of service efforts. Are
they resourced adequately? Are the Reserve and National Guard
components adequately manned on a full-time basis to execute the tasks
associated with implementation of those reforms? If not, where should
funding be allocated to facilitate total army recommendations
Answer. To date, the Integrated Personnel and Pay--Army (IPPS-A)
Program Manager (PM) has been working to support all personnel and pay
requirements of the Army National Guard (ARNG). The Director, Army
National Guard (DARNG) is the lead partner for ensuring the successful
development and fielding of IPPS-A. Our support spreads across the 54
States and Territories, to include Washington, D.C. and we are
integrated at the IPPS-A Functional Management Division (FMD)/PM
levels. The ARNG has assigned full-time liaison officers (LNO) to the
IPPS-A team to ensure functional needs for the ARNG are adequately
included in IPPS-A. We have additional requirements for temporary
manpower support through Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) and
Contractors who provide critical technical and legacy systems
sustainment in an effort to provide the very best data for transition
to IPPS-A. The temporary support must be funded through POM 18-22.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Kaptur and the answers thereto
follow:]
12304b Rotations
Question. During the Hearing, LTG Talley provided an excellent
depiction (attached) of the benefits associated with mobilization under
12304b compared to other titles.
How much would it cost provide each of these benefits to our
reservists? Who is the approval authority for authorizing these
benefits?
Answer. Reserve Servicemembers are not entitled to receive these
benefits under existing law. As such, no one in the DoD has authority
to approve these benefits.
Question. Why were these benefits not included in the original
creation of the 12304b mobilization?
Answer. Congresswoman Kaptur, thank you for your question. The Army
Reserve does not have knowledge of the benefits that were considered
when 12304b was originally drafted. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs under the authority, direction, and control of the
USD(P&R) develops and enforces implementing policy, programs, and
guidance for the activation, mobilization, and demobilization of the
Reserve Component personnel in accordance with Department of Defense
Directive 5125.01.
Total Force Integration
Question. During the hearing MG Neal said the announcement of a NG
officer taking command of an Active Wing was imminent.
Please provide date of the release, which command it will be, and
name/location of the selected officer.
Answer. An Air National Guard Colonel has been selected by the Air
Force Colonels Management Office to take command of the 6th Air
Mobility Wing at MacDill AFB, Florida in July 2016 for a period of two
years. We anticipate the official announcement to occur shortly.
Question. Please provide a full list of all NG and Reserve units
commanded by an active component officer.
Answer. 120 AW, Great Falls, MT; 180FW Toledo, OH; 190SOW
Harrisburg, PA
Question. Please provide the proposed integration plan and
schedule.
Answer. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard members are
currently present on Headquarters Air Force staffs, but their positions
often are not fully integrated. The Air Force is currently working to
develop a more fully integrated staff model, in which the workload
distributed to Total Force positions will execute Total Force work. To
ensure this outcome, statutory authorities and monetary funding codes
must be analyzed for adequacy.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. Kaptur.]
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