[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2016
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 6, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
21-471 PDF WASHINGTON: 2016
_____________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Cochairman
Chairman JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina TOM COTTON, Arkansas
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona STEVE DAINES, Montana
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois BEN SASSE, Nebraska
DIANE BLACK, Tennessee DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio GARY PETERS, Michigan
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
TED LIEU, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
CHRISTOPHER P. LU, Department of Labor
SARAH SEWALL, Department of State
DANIEL R. RUSSEL, Department of State
TOM MALINOWSKI, Department of State
Paul B. Protic, Staff Director
Elyse B. Anderson, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Introduction................................................. 1
Overview..................................................... 5
Recommendations to Congress and the Administration........... 10
Specific Findings and Recommendations........................ 16
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 57
II. Human Rights................................................. 61
Freedom of Expression........................................ 61
Worker Rights................................................ 79
Criminal Justice............................................. 99
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 121
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 142
Population Control........................................... 147
Freedom of Residence and Movement............................ 169
Status of Women.............................................. 178
Human Trafficking............................................ 186
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 197
Public Health................................................ 203
The Environment.............................................. 211
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 223
Civil Society................................................ 223
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 235
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 252
Access to Justice............................................ 268
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 282
V. Tibet......................................................... 298
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 328
I. Executive Summary
Introduction
December 2016 will mark 15 years since China's accession to
the World Trade Organization (WTO). At that time, the Chinese
government made commitments that were important not only for
China's commercial development in the international
marketplace, but also for its development of the rule of law
domestically. China--now ranking as the world's second largest
economy--has benefited greatly from the international rules-
based system in driving its economic transformation and growth,
but the Chinese Communist Party has continued to reject the
notion that the rule of law should supersede the Party's role
in guiding the functions of the state, impeding China's ability
to honor its WTO obligations. As such, China has largely failed
to implement the substantive legal reforms anticipated 15 years
ago and has persisted in violating international human rights
standards and its own domestic laws with lasting harm to both
U.S. interests and the Chinese people.
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(Commission), established by the U.S.-China Relations Act of
2000, which also extended Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) to China, is mandated to monitor human rights and rule
of law developments in China. Since October 2002, the
Commission has issued an Annual Report each year, providing a
summary of key developments over a range of issues, identifying
new trends, and highlighting cases of political prisoners and
rights advocates. As the Commission's 15th Annual Report
demonstrates, it serves the need to monitor the Chinese
government's repression of the Chinese people and continues to
be a vital source of accurate information.
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the Chinese
Communist Party and government further restricted the limited
space for peaceful expression, religious activity, and assembly
with harsh consequences for rights advocates, lawyers, and
civil society, and continued to implement the world's most
sophisticated system of Internet control and press censorship,
affecting both domestic and foreign journalists. For the first
time since 2012, the Chinese government expelled a foreign
journalist, in this case, for criticizing the government's
ethnic policies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). The government routinely denied medical treatment to
imprisoned activists, targeted family members and associates of
rights advocates, including those overseas, with harassment and
retribution, and became more brazen in exerting its
extraterritorial reach. The government also continued harsh
security measures that disregarded the protection of human
rights in ethnic minority regions including Tibetan autonomous
areas and the XUAR. Underscoring the severity of conditions in
China, 12 countries, led by the United States, expressed
serious concerns about human rights abuses in China at the
March 2016 gathering of the UN Human Rights Council, the first
such collective statement on China in the history of the
Council. The group specifically noted ``arrests and ongoing
detention of rights activists, civil society leaders, and
lawyers'' as well as ``unexplained recent disappearances and
apparent coerced returns of Chinese and foreign citizens from
outside mainland China.''
Legislative and policy developments during this past year
included further reforms to the household registration (hukou)
system and passage, after years of advocacy, of the PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law and the PRC Charity Law. Yet these
efforts were overshadowed by the apparent distrust and
sometimes hostility with which the Chinese government continues
to view its citizens and by the lackluster implementation and
enforcement of laws and regulations meant to protect China's
most vulnerable citizens and stem the degradation of its
polluted physical environment.
Faced with a rapidly aging population, a shrinking labor
pool, and high levels of public dissatisfaction, central Party
authorities announced in October 2015 a decision to adopt a
universal two-child policy. Nevertheless, authorities
maintained that population control policies will continue to be
the long-term ``basic national policy,'' without any noticeable
reduction to the vast infrastructure of government officials
who implement coercive population control policies in violation
of international standards. The revision of birth limits may
never fully address China's sex ratio imbalance. As of 2015,
there were reportedly approximately 34 million more men than
women in China. Furthermore, according to a 2010 estimate,
there were 62 million ``missing women and girls,'' due in part
to a cultural preference for sons exacerbated by decades of
coercive population control policies. The sex ratio imbalance
has led to a demand for marriageable women, which is a factor
that may contribute to human trafficking for forced marriage
and commercial sexual exploitation.
While official statements in 2012 at the start of Xi
Jinping's tenure as Chinese Communist Party General Secretary
and in 2013 as President of China seemed to indicate that he
was open to political reforms and limits on the power of public
officials; in fact, Xi has overseen a deterioration in human
rights and rule of law conditions in China marked by greater
consolidation of his own power--leading some analysts to draw
comparisons to Mao Zedong--through forced ideological
conformity and the systematic persecution of human rights
lawyers and defenders. Xi, referred to this year by several
provincial and local Party leaders as the ``core'' (hexin)
leader, continued to head at least six Party ``leading small
groups'' (lingdao xiaozu) that guide policy in vital areas
including the economy, domestic reform, and national defense.
Xi's leadership style has led some experts to question whether
he will adhere to Party precedent whereby promotions to the
most senior positions are based on inner Party negotiations and
consensus, when the appointment of cadres to the Standing
Committee of the Communist Party Central Committee Political
Bureau (Politburo) occurs at the 19th Party Congress in 2017,
at which time five of its seven members are expected to retire.
The anticorruption campaign against Party officials, an ongoing
feature of Xi's domestic policy, has led to accusations of
torture and coerced confessions and even a spate of suicides by
those who reportedly were to undergo Party disciplinary
investigations. A former energy administration official
asserted during his trial in February 2016 that authorities had
employed torture to force him to sign a confession. Moreover,
some have argued that Xi has used the anticorruption campaign
to eliminate political rivals, as demonstrated by life
sentences imposed on former Chongqing municipality Party
Secretary Bo Xilai in 2014, former Politburo Standing Committee
member and Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang in 2015,
and in 2016, to Ling Jihua, senior aide to former President and
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao.
Under Xi's leadership, both the Party and government
continued to invoke nationalist rhetoric featuring a ``Chinese
dream'' to spur ``the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation.'' Central to that vision is the rejection of so-called
Western or universal values that the current Party leadership
has labeled as ``foreign'' or ``hostile'' forces. Such rhetoric
is used to delegitimize calls for political reform and various
forms of social organization viewed as threats to the Party. In
April 2016, Xi addressed senior Communist Party and government
leaders at a rare national conference on religious work, the
highest level meeting on religious work since 2001, and warned
that China must be vigilant in guarding ``against overseas
infiltration via religious means,'' while underscoring the
importance of the ``sinicization'' of religion. The Party
increasingly promoted the notion that civil society, including
religious groups, was especially susceptible to ``foreign
influence'' and ``infiltration'' and promulgated legislation,
such as the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China, to
counter this perceived threat. Chinese authorities continued to
impose controls on religion and civil society in ethnic
minority areas. In March 2016, a senior Tibet Autonomous Region
Party official highlighted deeply entrenched hostility toward
the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism's best known teacher, by
declaring that he is ``no longer a religious leader after he
defected [from] his country and betrayed its people.'' In a
June 2016 white paper regarding religion in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, where millions of Muslims live, Chinese
authorities warned that they would ``never allow any foreign
organization or individual to interfere with China's religious
affairs.''
In the face of increasing repression, well-known advocates
like lawyer Gao Zhisheng, Mongol rights advocate Hada, and
rights defender Guo Feixiong continued to speak out about the
abuses they have suffered at the hands of their government.
Although Gao and Hada are no longer physically imprisoned,
authorities persist in monitoring their activities; in November
2015, authorities in Guangdong province sentenced Guo to a six-
year prison term in connection with his advocacy of press
freedom. As of August 2016, Guo reportedly had been on a hunger
strike for three months to protest his treatment in prison.
These cases and more than 1,300 other current political
prisoner cases are documented in the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database. Family members of those unjustly imprisoned
engaged in bold advocacy on behalf of their loved ones,
including the wives of some of the lawyers and rights defenders
detained during the crackdown that began in and around July
2015 (July 2015 crackdown) and later charged with crimes of
``endangering state security.''
Also noteworthy during this reporting year were the anger
and discontent expressed by Chinese citizens calling for
government accountability, transparency, and justice with
respect to issues including food and drug safety, access to
medical care, pollution, and official misconduct. Public dismay
was apparent in the uproar over tainted vaccines and in the
public response to the suspicious death of Lei Yang, a 29-year-
old environmentalist and new father, while in police custody in
May 2016. An open letter by Lei's fellow alumni of Renmin
University described his death as ``the random, willful killing
of an ordinary, urban, middle-class person.'' The letter
concluded with a remarkable statement:
The death of Lei Yang is not an accident, but a
structural tragedy . . .. We must have the most basic,
dependable safety, civil rights, and urban order. Short
of this, we, who are not too old to give up on the
future, will not let the issue go. We won't tolerate
evil indefinitely.
Overview
Over the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the following
general themes and key developments emerged:
1. Ideological conformity and claiming the primacy of
the Communist Party remain of paramount importance as
does reining in independent thought.
2. Civil society increasingly is viewed by the Party
and government as a security threat and is subject to
expanding control.
3. Rule by law has taken deeper root as the Party and
government use the law to repress and control China's
citizenry, yet disregard the law when it does not serve
their priorities.
4. The economic slowdown and labor unrest are sources
of insecurity for the Party and government.
5. ``One Country, Two Systems'' has been compromised
while basic freedoms erode in Hong Kong.
Ideological Conformity and the Primacy of the Party
The Communist Party's determination to rein in independent
thought, ensure ideological conformity within its own ranks and
beyond, and guarantee its primacy remained evident across
Chinese society during this reporting year. Party disciplinary
and surveillance measures and demands for ``loyalty'' were
aimed at bolstering Xi's political power. In October 2015, the
Party issued a rule against the ``improper discussion'' of
central Party policies. In February 2016, Xi reiterated the
Party's dominance over the media in China during widely
publicized visits to Xinhua, People's Daily, and China Central
Television (CCTV)--the three flagship state and Party media
outlets. In a speech on media policy at a Party forum the same
day, Xi reportedly declared that the media ``must be surnamed
Party'' (bixu xing dang) and called for ``absolute loyalty'' to
the Party from official media outlets and personnel.
Government and Party authorities placed greater pressure on
national propaganda makers to promote the Party's ideology. In
June 2016, for example, the Party's discipline arm published a
critical report on the work of the Central Propaganda
Department. The report criticized ``ineffective'' news
propaganda and weak management of social media, and called for
stronger coordination of ideological work in higher education.
The intensification of ideological conformity met with
criticism even within Party ranks. In early February 2016, the
chief editor of the Party-run Global Times, Hu Xijin, received
media attention for a post on his microblog account urging that
``China should open up more channels for criticism and
suggestions . . ..'' When influential retired real estate mogul
and Party member Ren Zhiqiang questioned Xi's demand for
loyalty, his microblog accounts were shut down and his Party
membership suspended. A March 2016 open letter--posted online
by authors who identified themselves as ``loyal Communist Party
members''--called for Xi's resignation. The Chinese government
responded swiftly and harshly by detaining more than a dozen
people, including the family members of exiled writers who
denied any involvement.
Civil Society as Security Threat
With the passage in April 2016 of a widely criticized law
governing overseas NGO activity in China, the government
codified an approach to civil society that treats many groups
and individuals operating in this space as security threats
rather than important contributors to Chinese society. One of
the law's new provisions prohibits foreign NGO activities in
mainland China that officials deem ``endanger China's national
unity, security, [or] ethnic unity'' or ``harm China's national
interests and the public interest . . .,'' giving the
government an overly broad level of discretion in violation of
international standards. The legislation also designates the
Ministry of Public Security and provincial-level public
security agencies as the registration authorities for foreign
NGOs. The full implications of the new law, which will take
effect on January 1, 2017, are not yet clear, but its passage
is widely viewed as a major blow to Chinese civil society. The
broad range of organizations covered under the law, such as
industry and trade associations, chambers of commerce, and
development- and rights-based entities, is likely to have a
chilling effect on innovation, exchanges, and cooperative
projects.
Individuals and entities previously regarded as working in
areas deemed acceptable by the government increasingly found
that this is no longer the case. After more than 20 years of
distinguished work in areas including anti-domestic violence
litigation and the protection of rural women's land rights, the
Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service Center
ceased operations in February 2016, reportedly in response to a
government directive. In addition, labor rights advocate He
Xiaobo and his organization Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services
Center previously received recognition and funding from the
government for providing services to migrant workers, but in
December 2015, authorities detained He, along with over a dozen
other labor rights advocates, and charged him with
``embezzlement'' before releasing him on bail. While
unregistered religious groups, including Christian house
churches, have long faced government harassment and worse for
worshipping outside of state-approved parameters, this
reporting year Pastor Gu Yuese (Joseph Gu), a senior official
in both the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China
Christian Council--the two state-sanctioned Protestant
Christian associations in China--was fired and then detained
and arrested following his public condemnation of authorities'
cross removal campaign in Zhejiang province. Although Zhejiang
authorities reportedly released him on bail in March 2016, his
movement and communications were restricted. These and similar
developments raise concerns that domestic civil society and
religious groups, even those that previously have had limited
space to operate, are under increasing threat of government
pressure, harassment, and closure.
Rule by Law
The Chinese government and Party continued to embrace rule
by law--that is, using the law as a means to expand control
over Chinese society while disregarding the law when it does
not accommodate Party imperatives or advance Party objectives.
Chinese lawyers and advocates at the vanguard of pressing for
human rights and access to justice continued to find themselves
targeted under the Chinese government and Party's abusive rule
by law. As of May 2016, authorities had formally arrested at
least 20 individuals in connection with the crackdown on
lawyers and rights advocates that began in and around July
2015, 16 of them on charges that fall under the category of
``endangering state security,'' which can lead to lengthy
sentences. In August 2016, four of these individuals reportedly
pleaded guilty to subversion charges, following hearings in a
Tianjin court at which their family members were reportedly
barred from attending. Zhou Shifeng, director of the Fengrui
Law Firm at the center of the July 2015 crackdown, was
sentenced to 7 years in prison, and Hu Shigen, a long-time
rights advocate and house church leader, was sentenced to 7
years and 6 months. Shortly before these hearings, authorities
said detained rights lawyer Wang Yu and legal assistant Zhao
Wei were released on bail, but as of early August, neither had
been seen publicly. Additionally, family members of those who
run afoul of the Chinese government are increasingly at risk of
collective punishment. For example, authorities placed Bao
Zhuoxuan, the teenage son of Wang Yu and Bao Longjun, under
strict surveillance and monitoring at the home of his
grandparents and prevented him from seeking legal counsel or
talking to journalists.
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued
to use ``black jails'' and other forms of extralegal and
extrajudicial detention to suppress individuals such as those
petitioning the government over grievances, Falun Gong
practitioners, and rights advocates. Even though China ratified
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1988, the UN Committee
against Torture concluded in late 2015 that China has failed to
eliminate torture, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody,
and numerous other forms of ill-treatment in detention.
Chinese authorities' ongoing broadcasts on state television
of prerecorded confessions of individuals who have yet to be
formally charged with crimes or whose cases have not been sent
to trial are serious violations of international standards with
regard to the right to due process, a fair trial, and the right
against self-incrimination. Not only did Chinese authorities
broadcast ``confessions'' of Chinese citizens, such as Zhang
Kai, a rights lawyer who worked with Christian congregations in
Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang, to prevent the local government
from removing crosses from their places of worship, they aired
the ``confessions'' of two Swedish citizens--Peter Dahlin, the
cofounder of a legal advocacy NGO in Beijing municipality, and
Gui Minhai, the co-owner of a publishing company in Hong Kong.
In testimony presented at a Commission hearing in May 2016,
Gui's daughter, Angela, asserted her father's confession was
``staged,'' stating that the Chinese government authorities
``felt they needed to fabricate a justification'' for his
illegal detention.
The Chinese government continued to obstruct access to
legal counsel for individuals detained in politically sensitive
cases, including many of the legal professionals rounded up
during the crackdown that began in and around July 2015, as
well as elected Wukan village Party committee chief Lin Zulian
in Guangdong province. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention released an opinion in June 2016 finding that
American citizen Sandy Phan-Gillis, detained by Chinese
authorities since March 2015, had been, among other things,
denied access to legal counsel. The opinion marked the first
time the Working Group had determined that the Chinese
government arbitrarily detained an American citizen.
Authorities in Tibetan autonomous areas and the XUAR
continued to implement policies that further threaten culture,
language, and religion, as well as prevent the effective
exercise of local ``autonomous'' governance enshrined in
China's Constitution. Additionally, on December 27, 2015, the
National People's Congress adopted the PRC Counterterrorism
Law, which contains provisions that expand police authority,
raising concerns among human rights organizations that
criticized the law as repressive and expressed fears that it
would further empower officials to punish peaceful activities
and target ethnic minorities.
Economic Insecurity and Labor Unrest
Party legitimacy over the last three decades has been
inextricably linked to economic growth and improving the lives
of the Chinese people. But this legitimacy could face
challenges as economic growth slows to the weakest annual rate
in 25 years and economic liberalization stalls. President Xi's
emphasis on the media's role in ``tell[ing] China's stories
well'' extended to economic reporting. Chinese journalists
covering the stock market reported being instructed to focus on
official statements issued by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission, which offers a decidedly positive outlook on the
state of the economy. At the same time, the websites of many
U.S. media companies remained blocked in China, including the
New York Times, Bloomberg News, and the Wall Street Journal.
The Commission observed growing labor unrest, especially in
the manufacturing and construction sectors, as well as a
government crackdown on labor advocacy. A labor rights group
based in Hong Kong recorded over 2,700 strikes and protests in
China in 2015, more than double the number recorded in 2014.
The Chinese government prevents workers from organizing
independent unions in part because the Party still regards
organized labor as it regards citizen activism in other public
spheres: a threat to the Party's hold on power. While wages in
China continued to rise, workers faced slower wage growth, and
disputes over unpaid wages increased. In December 2015, public
security officials in Guangdong province, a manufacturing hub
home to many of China's labor NGOs, detained at least 18 labor
rights advocates affiliated with labor NGOs. As of July 2016,
two remained in detention. Such economic insecurity and labor
unrest is set against the backdrop of China's efforts to gain
market economy status in the United States based on its WTO
accession protocol.
Erosion of Hong Kong's High Degree of Autonomy
This past year, developments indicated that Hong Kong's
``high degree of autonomy,'' guaranteed under the ``one
country, two systems'' principle enshrined in the Basic Law,
faced renewed threat of interference from mainland China. The
disappearance, alleged abduction, and detention in mainland
China of five Hong Kong-based booksellers (Swedish citizen Gui
Minhai, British citizen and Hong Kong resident Lee Bo, and Hong
Kong residents Lui Bo, Cheung Chi-ping, and Lam Wing-kei) in
October and December 2015 and the televised ``confessions'' of
four of the men in January and February 2016 were condemned
internationally. British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond
declared Lee's abduction from Hong Kong a ``serious breach'' of
the Sino-British Joint Declaration that assures Hong Kong
residents ``the protection of the Hong Kong legal system.'' In
its Hong Kong Policy Act report to Congress, the U.S.
Department of State emphasized these concerns, noting that the
cases of the booksellers ``raised serious concerns in Hong Kong
and represent what appears to be the most significant breach of
the `one country, two systems' policy since 1997'' (the year of
the British handover of Hong Kong). Upon his return to Hong
Kong in June 2016, Lam Wing-kei publicly revealed details of
his and the other booksellers' abductions and detentions,
including their forced confessions. Notably, Lam alleged that
the abductions and detentions were directed by central
government officials in Beijing.
Underscoring the threat to freedom of expression, Hong Kong
journalists and media organizations reported a continuing
decline in press freedom in Hong Kong, citing government
restrictions, violence against journalists, and pressure on
reporters and editors from media ownership, including owners
with financial ties to mainland China. The purchase of the
South China Morning Post by Chinese online commerce company
Alibaba Group raised concerns that Hong Kong media could face
even greater pressure to self-censor or avoid reporting on
topics deemed sensitive. After acquiring the paper, Alibaba's
executive vice chairman said the firm aimed to counter negative
coverage of China.
In the face of increasing pressure from mainland China,
divisions emerged among pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong,
often along generational lines. After the ``Umbrella Movement''
protests in 2014, pro-democracy activists launched several new
political parties that reflected general dissatisfaction with
the existing political landscape, including the lack of
democratic concessions from the Chinese government. Many of the
new parties promote self-determination for Hong Kong, as
opposed to democracy in mainland China. Others pressed for
outright independence amid burgeoning localist sentiment. The
Hong Kong government required prospective candidates for office
in the September 2016 Legislative Council elections to sign a
loyalty pledge affirming that Hong Kong is an ``inalienable''
part of China--several who refused to do so, or who did so
unconvincingly, were disqualified. Despite central government
warnings that promoting democratic self-determination for Hong
Kong ``endangers state sovereignty and security,'' Hong Kong
voters elected 6 localist candidates; altogether, opposition
parties won 30 out of 70 total seats.
Recommendations to Congress and the Administration
Developing a ``Whole-of-Government'' Human Rights
Action Plan. The Administration and Congress should work
together to develop an action plan on the role of human rights
in U.S.-China relations, detailing specific ways to implement a
coordinated interagency approach that integrates human rights
issues across the full spectrum of bilateral issues. A ``whole-
of-government'' human rights diplomacy prepares all agencies
interacting with Chinese government counterparts to discuss
relevant human rights and rule of law issues and to articulate
the link between human rights improvements in China and U.S.
economic, security, and diplomatic interests. In addition,
Congress and the Administration should work together to
consider whether legislation or other measures are needed to
implement interagency coordination on human rights in China,
including by providing targeted talking points and prisoner
lists to all U.S. Government delegations visiting China as well
as support for the growing number of regular bilateral
``dialogues'' and various ``People-to-People'' and multitrack
diplomatic efforts that include both governmental and non-
governmental actors.
Strengthening the ``Rebalance'' to Asia. The
Administration and Congress should work together and with
regional allies and policy specialists, on ways to bring China
into an economic and security cooperation system in Asia that
includes upholding international standards on human rights and
the rule of law. The Administration and Congress should work
together to ensure that sufficient resources and executive
authority are granted to advance human rights and the rule of
law as critical national interests, pursued in tandem with U.S.
diplomatic, economic, political, and security priorities in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Strategic Use of Visa Policy and Other Diplomatic
Measures. Congress and the Administration should work together
to better implement existing laws that restrict visa access for
individuals responsible for severe human rights violations and
ensure that U.S. consular officials know how to apply such laws
consistently, including Section 604 of the International
Religious Freedom Act, Section 801 of the Admiral James W.
Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, and
the relevant parts of Section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Congress should consider whether additional
legislation is needed to address ongoing human rights
challenges in China, including such issues as restrictions on
the free flow of news and information, visa delays or denials
for journalists and scholars, allegations of organ harvesting,
mistreatment or forced repatriation of asylum-seekers, and
egregious discrimination and violence in ethnic minority areas.
Congress should consider allocating resources to compile,
document, and identify individuals and Chinese government
officials responsible for severe human rights violations.
The Administration should consider seeking revisions to the
U.S.-China Consular Convention to clarify that Americans
detained in China should be allowed to meet with a lawyer and
discuss the details of their case with U.S. consular officials.
Engaging in Multilateral Action. The
Administration should continue coordinating with like-minded
partners on monitoring human rights concerns in China and
encouraging Chinese officials to fulfill their commitments in
accordance with international standards. The Administration
should lead, as circumstances on the ground dictate,
initiatives that highlight human rights concerns in China at
the UN Human Rights Council and other multilateral forums where
the United States and China are members.
Individual Political Prisoner Cases. In meetings
with Chinese officials, the President, Cabinet Secretaries,
other administration officials, and Congressional leaders
should raise relevant cases, both publicly and privately, of
individual victims of religious or political repression. U.S.
Embassy and consular officials, including the Ambassador,
should regularly seek visits and engagements with relevant
Chinese authorities to raise the cases of prominent prisoners
and should maintain contact with family members and associates
of those unjustly detained or imprisoned.
Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged
to consult the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for
credible information on individual prisoners or groups of
prisoners.
Internet Freedom. The Administration and Congress
should continue to work together to support a consistent and
coordinated policy approach to Internet governance that
counters efforts by the Chinese government to promote
``Internet sovereignty.''
Congress should consider expanding Internet freedom
programs that track, preserve, and recirculate media and
Internet content produced within China that is deleted by
government censors.
Congress should consider allocating funds for programs that
help Chinese human rights advocates and civil society
organizations circumvent Internet restrictions and enhance
digital security training and capacity building. In addition,
Members of Congress should urge the Broadcasting Board of
Governors to use all allocated Internet freedom funds to
support technologies that provide or enhance access to the
Internet, including circumvention tools that bypass Internet
blocking, filtering, and other forms of censorship.
Press Freedom. The Administration should consider
giving greater priority to the Chinese government's harassment
of foreign journalists, blocking of news media websites, and
limiting of press freedom. During regular diplomatic
interactions, a diverse range of U.S. officials should promote
freedom of the press and freedom of expression as vital
foundations of an innovative economy, a vibrant civil society,
and the rule of law, all of which contribute to sustainable
prosperity for modern nations.
Congress should consider whether legislation or other
measures are needed to address potential trade barriers in
China, including the ongoing and persistent restrictions on the
free flow of news and information which affect foreign media
companies attempting to access the Chinese market and investors
seeking uncensored information about China's political and
business climate.
Congress should consider whether additional legislation is
needed to protect foreign journalists, including the
possibility of limiting the number of visas allowed to
executives or administrative personnel from Chinese state-owned
media enterprises operating in the United States if foreign
journalists continue to face visa restrictions, police
harassment and surveillance, censorship, or other egregious
constraints.
Ending China's Population Control Policies. The
Administration should integrate the provisions of the Girls
Count Act (Public Law No. 114-24) into foreign assistance
programs and consider appointing a Special Advisor at the U.S.
Department of State to oversee the creation and coordination of
technical assistance and capacity-building projects. Projects
should seek to strengthen property and inheritance rights for
Chinese women and girls and protect women and their families
from the most coercive aspects of China's population control
policies.
The Administration should discuss problems linked to the
Chinese government's population control policies and dramatic
sex ratio imbalance as part of security, legal, trafficking,
human rights, medical, public health, and ``People-to-People''
dialogues.
The Administration and Congress should work together with
intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to develop cooperative programs to address
the demographic problem of China's ``missing women,'' and seek
ways to support and bolster China's own efforts.
Congress should continue to consider prohibition of U.S.
contributions to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) for use in
China until all birth limitation and coercive population
control policies are rescinded.
North Korean Refugees. Congress should reauthorize
the North Korean Human Rights Act for fiscal year 2018.
The Administration should consider incorporating human
rights into its broader sanctioning authority by using the
existing U.S. Department of State designations of both North
Korea and China as a ``Country of Particular Concern'' for
international religious freedom as well as the trafficking-in-
persons designations of ``Tier 3'' for North Korea and ``Tier 2
Watchlist'' for China.
Congress and the Administration should work to establish
regional multilateral ``First Asylum'' arrangements for North
Korean refugees and seek unfettered access to North Korean
asylum-seekers in China for the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and humanitarian organizations.
Human Trafficking, Forced Labor, and Child Labor.
Congress and the Administration should work together to ensure
that the U.S. Department of State's Office to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons and the U.S. Department of
Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs have sufficient
resources and status within their departments to effectively
combat human trafficking and accurately report on current
conditions.
The Administration and Congress should work together to
ensure that expanded powers given to the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection agency are used to prevent the import of
goods suspected of being made with forced or prison labor.
Congress should consider whether additional legislation or
other measures are needed to prevent human trafficking in the
supply chains of businesses with U.S. Government procurement
contracts and to enforce existing laws prohibiting the
procurement of goods made with forced labor, prison labor, or
child labor from China.
Congress should consider legislation that improves U.S.
Government data collection and reporting on the issue of human
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal, globally and in
China. To reduce demand for organs obtained through force or
coercion, such legislation should also focus U.S. diplomatic
resources toward the creation of international legal norms that
promote the establishment of voluntary organ donation systems
with effective enforcement mechanisms.
Ethnic Minorities. The Administration should
consider raising issues of human rights in China's ethnic
minority areas in bilateral and multilateral dialogues on
security, legal, and counterterrorism issues with Chinese
military, public security, or government officials.
The Administration and Congress should work together to
press for unrestricted access to ethnic minority regions and to
facilitate implementation of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002,
including establishing a diplomatic office in Lhasa,
encouraging development projects that comply with the Tibet
Project Principles, and urging renewed dialogue between Chinese
government officials and the Dalai Lama's representatives.
The Administration should instruct the U.S. executive
director of each international financial institution to oppose
the financing of projects in Tibetan autonomous areas, the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and other ethnic minority
areas if such projects have the anticipated effect of
facilitating large-scale migrations into ethnic minority areas,
fail to promote economic self-sufficiency of ethnic minorities,
or do not respect their culture, religion, or traditions.
Congress should continue to allocate funding for democratic
leadership training for Tibetans, and Members of Congress and
their staff should seek inter-parliamentary dialogues with
Tibetan legislators to raise the profile, professionalism, and
capacity of the Tibetan government-in-exile.
Commercial Rule of Law. The Administration should
continue to designate China as a non-market economy until the
Chinese government makes concrete improvements to policies
detailed in this report that violate China's existing
international trade obligations. Congress should consider
legislation requiring that both the House and Senate consent to
any changes made to China's designation.
The Administration should work through the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its member states to encourage and
enforce the elimination of China's barriers to the free flow of
news and information to facilitate market growth, including by
considering initiation of additional WTO disputes that seek the
elimination of trade-restrictive Internet censorship and other
restrictions to market access online.
The Administration should ensure that the objectives of
non-discrimination, fairness, and transparency are incorporated
into the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) negotiations, and
that any BIT with China is a mutually beneficial and high-
standard agreement that effectively facilitates and enables
market access and market operation, and that represents on each
side an open and liberalized investment regime.
Congress should consider whether legislation or other
measures are needed to require that market access for Chinese
investors in news, online media, and the entertainment sectors
is conditioned on a reciprocal basis in order to provide a
level playing field for U.S. investors. In addition, Members of
Congress should press for the protection of U.S. companies
investing in these sectors during BIT negotiations.
Technical Assistance Programs. The Administration
should look for creative ways to continue existing aid and
grant programs to individuals and civil society groups working
to encourage human rights improvements, genuine democratic
governance, and the rule of law, and work with foreign NGOs,
the United Nations, and other countries on a unified response
to the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China, the PRC Charity
Law, and other legislation drafted or enacted in the past year.
The Administration and Congress should look to expand
technical assistance and capacity-building programs in areas
where Chinese officials have made commitments, such as curbing
torture and wrongful convictions and implementing the PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law.
Congress should consider requesting briefings or a one-time
report from the Administration to review U.S.-funded rule-of-
law programs in China to determine their effectiveness, the
pressures faced during operations in China, and whether new
guidelines or resources are needed to advance U.S. interests in
the development of rule of law in China.
Hong Kong. The Administration should continue to
issue annually the report outlined in Section 301 of the United
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, subject to Congressional
directives.
The Administration and Congress should work together to
determine whether legislation or other measures are needed to
revise the Hong Kong Policy Act if Hong Kong's autonomy and
rule of law continue to be threatened.
Congress should consider ways to express through public
statements, official visits, and resolutions the important
connection between maintaining a free press, a vibrant civil
society, an independent judiciary, and transparent governance
in Hong Kong and the mutual interests shared by the United
States and China in maintaining Hong Kong as a center of
business and finance in Asia.
Developing a More Robust Parliamentary Diplomacy.
Congress should foster cooperation among parliamentarians and
legislators committed to advancing the rule of law and the
rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
by participating in existing institutions such as the
International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion
and the Parliamentary Friends of Tibet or by working with
relevant NGOs to convene a global parliamentarians group on
human rights in China.
Encouraging the Protection of Academic Freedom.
The Administration should assist American universities and
educational institutions in negotiations of memoranda of
understanding and contracts with Chinese government entities to
ensure that they include protections for academic freedom; the
universally recognized rights of faculty, students, and staff;
intellectual property rights; and Internet freedom.
------------------------
The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated
in and supported the work of the Commission. The content of
this Annual Report, including its findings, views, and
recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of
individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the
Administration.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 21 to
0.
Voted to adopt: Representatives Smith, Pittenger, Franks,
Hultgren, Black, Walz, Kaptur, Honda, and Lieu; Senators Rubio,
Lankford, Cotton, Daines, Sasse, Feinstein, Merkley, and Peters; and
Deputy Secretary Lu, Under Secretary Sewall, Assistant Secretary
Russel, and Assistant Secretary Malinowski.
Specific Findings and Recommendations
A summary of specific findings follows below for each
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
Freedom of Expression
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
restrict expression in contravention of international
human rights standards, including Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. While such standards permit states in limited
circumstances to restrict expression to protect
interests such as national security and public order,
official Chinese restrictions covered a broader range
of activity, including peaceful dissent and expression
critical of the government and Party.
Government and Party control of the press
continued to violate international press standards with
censorship and propaganda instructions to limit the
scope of news content. In a February 2016 speech,
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping
declared that the media ``must be surnamed Party''
(bixu xing dang) and called for ``absolute loyalty'' to
the Party from official media outlets and personnel.
Chinese authorities continued to broadcast
prerecorded confessions on state-run television.
Chinese Human Rights Defenders said that the government
used televised confessions on state media ``to denounce
individuals or groups,'' ``control public narratives
about government-perceived `political threats,''' and
retaliate against government critics. Authorities also
countered criticism by shutting down microblog
accounts, and by harassing and detaining media
professionals and several China-based family members of
Chinese journalists and bloggers living overseas.
Chinese citizens and journalists challenged
the Party's control of news media and propaganda work,
some specifically in response to Xi's February speech.
Family members of rights defenders, labor groups, and
lawyers brought, or planned to bring, defamation suits
against official media outlets.
In May 2016, China was one of 10 countries to
vote against the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
receiving accreditation for non-consultative status at
the United Nations. CPJ is a prominent international
advocacy group for press freedom and the rights of
journalists and maintains a list of imprisoned Chinese
journalists and bloggers. Chinese authorities targeted
citizen journalists from the human rights website 64
Tianwang for harassment and detention, including Wang
Jing, Sun Enwei, and Huang Qi. In addition, authorities
did not grant permission to elderly journalist Gao Yu
to travel abroad for medical treatment, instead
harassing her and restricting her movements while she
serves a five-year sentence on medical parole in
Beijing municipality.
The scale of Internet and social media use
continued to grow in spite of government and Party
censorship. There were 710 million Internet users in
China at the end of June 2016, including 656 million
who accessed the Internet from mobile devices. A
European scholar observed that the government and Party
brought Internet governance ``into the cent[er] of
political decision-making'' in recent years.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Give greater public expression, including at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and
detention of both domestic and foreign journalists, the
denial, threat of denial, or delay of visas for foreign
journalists, and the censoring or blockage of foreign
media websites. Consistently link press freedoms to
U.S. interests, noting how censorship and restrictions
on journalists and media websites prevent the free flow
of information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, food safety
problems, and corruption, and act as a trade barrier
for foreign media and companies attempting to access
the Chinese market. Raise these issues with Chinese
officials during future rounds of the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue. Assess the extent to which China's
treatment of foreign journalists contravenes its WTO or
other obligations.
Sustain, and where appropriate expand, programs that
develop and distribute widely technologies that will
assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society
organizations in circumventing Internet restrictions,
in order to access and share content protected under
international human rights standards. Continue to
maintain Internet freedom programs at the U.S.
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors for China to provide digital security
training and capacity-building efforts for bloggers,
journalists, civil society organizations, and human
rights and Internet freedom activists in China.
Raise with Chinese officials, during all appropriate
bilateral discussions, the costs to U.S.-China
relations and to the Chinese public's confidence in
government institutions that occur when the Chinese
government restricts political debate, advocacy for
democracy or human rights, and other forms of peaceful
political expression. Emphasize that such restrictions
exceed international standards for the restrictions on
free expression, particularly those contained in
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Emphasize that such
restrictions erode confidence in media and government
institutions. Submit questions for China's next UN
Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, asking
China to explain what steps it will take to ensure its
restrictions on free expression conform to
international standards.
Urge Chinese officials to end unlawful detention and
official harassment of Chinese activists, lawyers, and
journalists subject to reprisal for exercising their
right to freedom of expression. Call on officials to
end the illegal home confinement of individuals such as
Liu Xia; and release or confirm the release of
individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising
freedom of expression, such as Liu Xiaobo, Zhang
Haitao, Drukar Gyal (Shogjang), Gao Zhisheng, Xie
Wenfei, and Wang Mo. Raise this issue in bilateral
dialogues, such as the U.S.-China Human Rights
Dialogue, U.S.-China Legal Experts Dialogue, and
Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well as through
multilateral institutions, such as China's UN Human
Rights Council Universal Periodic Review and the UN
Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention.
Worker Rights
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)
remained the only trade union organization permitted
under Chinese law, and leading union officials held
concurrent positions in the Communist Party and
government. Restrictions on workers' rights to freely
establish and join independent trade unions violate
international standards set forth by the International
Labour Organization (ILO), Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Workers' right to collective bargaining
remains limited in law and in practice, violating
China's obligations as a member of the ILO. Chinese
laws designate the Party-controlled ACFTU as
responsible for negotiating with employers and signing
collective contracts on behalf of workers, but the
ACFTU and its lower level branches reportedly more
often represented the interests of government or
enterprises. At the enterprise level, union leaders
were often company managers.
In 2015, China's economy grew at its slowest
rate in 25 years. Major steel and coal enterprises
announced plans for layoffs, and some workers in these
industries had reportedly already lost their jobs in
recent years. Employment in manufacturing reportedly
had declined for 25 consecutive months as of late 2015.
Service sector jobs increased in 2015, but these jobs
reportedly paid less on average than manufacturing
jobs. Wages continued to rise overall in China, though
workers faced slower wage growth, and in some cases
stagnant or reduced wages.
Chinese government officials and international
observers reported a significant increase in worker
actions such as strikes and protests. Although some of
the observed increase may have been due to better data
collection, China Labour Bulletin documented 2,773
worker actions in 2015, more than double the total from
2014. The majority of workers' actions involved
disputes over wage arrears.
The situation of labor rights advocates and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has worsened in
recent years. On December 3, 2015, public security
officials in Guangzhou and Foshan municipalities,
Guangdong province, detained at least 18 labor rights
advocates affiliated with several labor NGOs. As of
January 8, procuratorates in Foshan and Panyu district,
Guangzhou, had approved the arrests of Zeng Feiyang,
Zhu Xiaomei, He Xiaobo, and Meng Han, releasing Zhu on
bail on February 1 and He on bail on April 7. In June,
the Panyu district procuratorate reportedly began
reviewing the cases of Zeng, Zhu, Meng, and also Tang
Jian in preparation for a possible trial. According to
Chinese and international observers, authorities
targeted these individuals due to their labor rights
advocacy and ties to NGOs.
This past year, the Commission continued to
observe reports of the use of child labor in China,
including a 14-year-old factory worker in Guangdong
province who reportedly died in his sleep and a case in
Zhejiang province of at least eight children forced to
work for years making socks. The ILO Country Office for
China and Mongolia noted that the Chinese government
has not released official statistics on child labor in
China nor has it reported any cases to the ILO.
The Commission continued to observe reports of
the over-reliance on and misuse of dispatch and intern
labor during the reporting year, in violation of
domestic laws and regulations meant to prevent such
abuses. Workers above the legal retirement age
continued to enjoy fewer legal protections than other
workers under Chinese law. Workers above the retirement
age reportedly faced difficulties obtaining
compensation and other benefits.
Chinese government data showed continued
declines in workplace accidents and deaths, while
reported cases of occupational illness, particularly
pneumoconiosis, increased. Workers reportedly faced
difficulties obtaining compensation for workplace
illnesses. Despite relevant laws and regulations,
international observers continued to express concern
regarding workplace safety in China.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to release labor
rights advocates Zeng Feiyang and Meng Han. Raise their
cases in public and in private meetings with Chinese
officials. Urge authorities to drop all charges against
those labor NGO staff detained in December 2015 and
subsequently released on bail.
Condemn the crackdown on labor advocacy NGOs in
China, and call on Guangdong provincial authorities in
particular to end the harassment of labor NGO staff.
Encourage authorities to cooperate with labor NGOs,
noting the positive role such organizations play in
encouraging workers to address their grievances
peacefully and through legal channels.
Call on the Chinese government to respect
internationally recognized rights to freedom of
association and collective bargaining, and allow
workers to organize and establish labor unions. Convey
support in all appropriate bilateral and multilateral
dialogues for genuine collective bargaining and direct
elections of trade union representatives, emphasizing
that increased worker representation can be beneficial
for resolving workplace grievances and preventing
strikes.
Encourage Chinese officials through all appropriate
bilateral discussions to publish information on
measures taken to prevent the employment of children
under the age of 16. Call on the Chinese government to
collect and publish detailed statistical data on
working children, including on child labor and
hazardous work, in order to better understand the
prevalence and nature of child labor in China and to
effectively target efforts to address this problem.
Promote and support bilateral and multilateral
exchanges among government officials, academics, legal
experts, and civil society groups to focus on labor
issues such as collective bargaining, employment
discrimination, and occupational health and safety,
including, particularly, prevention of pneumoconiosis.
Seek opportunities to support capacity-building
programs to strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid
organizations involved in defending the rights of
workers.
When appropriate, integrate meaningful civil society
participation into bilateral and multilateral
dialogues, meetings, and exchanges. Invite
international unions and labor NGOs as well as domestic
civil society groups from all participating countries
to observe relevant government-to-government dialogues.
Although participation of the ACFTU or Chinese
government-organized NGOs (so-called GONGOs) may be
constructive in some cases, ensure such organizations
are not treated as independent civil society groups.
Support China's increased engagement and cooperation
with the International Labour Organization (ILO)
through funding for ILO technical cooperation projects
with China. Request that the ILO increase its work with
China on observing core labor standards, including
freedom of association and the right to organize.
Criminal Justice
Findings
During the 2016 reporting year, the Commission
observed continued reports of the Chinese government
using ``black jails'' and other forms of extralegal and
extrajudicial measures to arbitrarily detain targeted
individuals. In particular, a ``black jail'' in
Heilongjiang province, which was closed around April
2014, reportedly resumed operation during the past
year. A China-based human rights monitoring group also
reported increased use of involuntary commitment to
psychiatric hospitals as a political tool.
After the reeducation through labor system was
abolished in 2013, Chinese officials reportedly
continued to use ``black jails''--detention sites that
operate outside of China's judicial and administrative
detention systems--to suppress individuals such as
petitioners, rights advocates, and religious
practitioners.
The Chinese government continued to apply
broadly defined criminal provisions such as ``picking
quarrels and provoking trouble'' and ``gathering a
crowd to disturb order in a public place'' to punish
rights advocates, petitioners, lawyers, dissidents, and
ethnic minorities.
Some provisions in the Ninth Amendment to the
PRC Criminal Law, which became effective on November 1,
2015, may have a negative impact on human rights
conditions in China in areas such as freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of
religion, access to justice, and rights advocacy.
The UN Committee against Torture issued its
concluding observations on China's compliance with and
implementation of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. The Committee called on China to abolish
the coercive detention measure ``residential
surveillance at a designated location'' and censured
the Chinese government for failing to provide
disaggregated information about torture, criminal
justice, and related issues.
The Chinese government used charges of
``endangering state security'' crimes in its crackdown
against rights lawyers and advocates, a category of
crimes that carry heavy penalties. The PRC Criminal
Procedure Law permitted the use of ``residential
surveillance at a designated location'' against those
accused of ``endangering state security'' crimes. The
UN Committee against Torture criticized this coercive
measure because it may amount to incommunicado
detention that puts detainees at a high risk of torture
or ill-treatment.
Despite legislative and regulatory enactments
by the Chinese government, the Commission continued to
observe cases of coerced confession. The Commission
also observed the Chinese government broadcasting
prerecorded ``confessions,'' a practice that could
violate international human rights standards.
In the past year, individuals died in
detention under circumstances that raised concerns
regarding abuse and torture. Officials reportedly
denied adequate medical care to detainees. In the case
of imprisoned rights advocate Yang Maodong, better
known as Guo Feixiong, officials reportedly arranged a
rectal examination that officials recorded and
threatened to post online.
The Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law
reduced the number of capital crimes, but the number of
executions in China remained high. One human rights
group estimated the number of executions in 2015 to be
in the thousands. The Chinese government's continued
withholding of statistical data on executions may
impede monitoring of Chinese authorities' compliance
with international standards on the use of capital
punishment.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to publicly commit to
a specific timetable for ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which the Chinese government signed in 1998
but has not yet ratified.
Urge Chinese officials to end all forms of
extrajudicial detention--such as ``custody and
education,'' confinement in drug detoxification
centers, and extralegal home confinement--that are
imposed without meeting the standards for a fair trial
as set forth in the ICCPR and other international human
rights instruments.
Raise with Chinese officials, during all appropriate
bilateral discussions, individual cases where the
investigation of allegedly criminal activity has been
used to target government critics and rights advocates.
Publicly convey support for human rights advocates
who have been deprived of liberty on unsubstantiated
criminal charges and for political or religious
reasons.
Encourage Chinese officials to adopt the
recommendations made by the UN Committee against
Torture in relation to China's compliance with the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, such as the call to
repeal the provisions allowing ``residential
surveillance at a designated location.'' Further
encourage Chinese officials to extend invitations to
all UN special rapporteurs and other special procedures
that have requested to visit China.
Stress to the Chinese government the need for greater
transparency on the number and circumstances of
executions, and urge Chinese officials to further limit
the crimes to which the death penalty is applicable.
Continue and, where appropriate, expand support for
programs involving U.S. entities engaging with reform-
minded Chinese organizations and individuals (both
within and outside the government) in hopes of drawing
on comparative experience to improve the criminal
justice process. For example, the experience of the
United States and other jurisdictions can inform China
as it charts a path toward reducing reliance on
confessions, enhancing the role of witnesses at trials,
and creating more reliable procedures for reviewing
death penalty cases.
Freedom of Religion
Findings
In both law and practice, the Chinese
government continued to violate the rights of its
citizens to religious freedom, violating both the
Chinese government's international obligations and the
standards set by China's Constitution. Chinese
Communist Party and government officials have broad
discretion over religious practice, internal affairs,
and interpretations of faith, which is often exercised
based on Party and government policy interests.
Government and Party officials convened the
first National Conference on Religious Work in 15 years
in April 2016, signaling that officials aim to
prioritize religious affairs. Chinese President and
Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping declared
religious affairs to be an area of ``special
importance'' and directed government and Party
authorities to ensure that religious believers are
``patriotic, preserve national unity, and serve the
overall interests of the Chinese nation.'' Xi
emphasized the Party view that religious groups are a
``bridge'' connecting the Party and government to
religious believers and that groups must therefore
support the ``leadership of the Party'' and the Chinese
political system.
Chinese authorities deny members of various
religious communities the right to practice their faith
freely and without fear of government reprisal. The
2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs continue to
require religious groups to register with the
government and report on their religious activities.
Registration is a significant obstacle for some groups:
officials may deny registration applications of groups
they believe to be adverse to Party and government
interests, and some groups refuse to register because
they believe that the conditions associated with
registration compromise principles of their faith.
Official recognition of groups falling outside the
``main'' religions--Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam,
Taoism, and Protestantism--is limited. Unregistered
religious and spiritual communities are especially
vulnerable to government harassment, detention, and
other abuses, but groups may be sanctioned regardless
of registration status when authorities view them as
posing a challenge to official authority. The
government has also continued to ban some belief
systems outright.
The government and Party continued to exert
political influence over the activities of Buddhist and
Taoist religious groups. As in past years, this
influence manifested in extensive government regulation
and sponsorship of religious activity.
The government and Party continued efforts to
control Chinese Catholic leadership and religious
practice. The government continued to deny Catholics in
China the freedom to be ministered to by bishops
independently approved by the Holy See, instead
continuing to require Catholic bishops to be selected
and ordained by state-controlled organizations without
Holy See approval. The government also continued to
harass, detain, or hold incommunicado certain Catholic
leaders.
The government and Party continued a campaign
initiated in 1999 of extensive, systematic, and in some
cases violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong
practitioners to renounce their belief in and practice
of Falun Gong.
The government and Party continued to enforce
regulations controlling the religious activities of
Muslim believers. Officials and state-sponsored
scholars also made a number of statements against the
popularization of practices and symbols associated with
Islam. Concurrent with these statements, experts noted
significant online commentary hostile to Islam, raising
concerns about rising anti-Muslim sentiment in China.
Chinese authorities continued to prevent many
Protestant Christians from worshiping freely, taking a
range of actions that experts believe are connected to
the national-level ``sinicization'' campaign. In
particular, authorities in Zhejiang province continued
to target Protestants with harassment and close
monitoring in the past reporting year, for example, by
continuing to implement a campaign launched in 2014
that has resulted in the removal of an estimated 1,500
church crosses from state-sanctioned churches, and in
more than 20 cases, the complete demolition of
churches. Some Protestant leaders have been sentenced
to prison terms, and officials also detained those
providing legal assistance to churches facing forced
cross removal. In other regions of China, government
officials detained Protestant believers and conducted
raids on church buildings and gatherings, with churches
in Guangdong province hit especially hard. In Guizhou
province, the Guiyang municipal government designated
the Living Stone Church an ``illegal social group.''
Religious communities that do not fall within
China's five ``main'' religions continue to exist
within China, some practicing openly and with tacit
government approval, while others, such as the local
Jewish community in Kaifeng municipality, Henan
province, have reportedly begun to experience
government restrictions on religious activity.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all
citizens freedom of religion in accordance with China's
international human rights obligations. Stress to
Chinese authorities that freedom of religion includes
the right to freely adopt beliefs and practice
religious activities without government interference,
particularly interference based on political goals.
Stress to the Chinese government that the right to
freedom of religion includes, but is not limited to:
the right of Buddhists and Taoists to carry out
activities in temples and select monastic teachers
independent of state controls over religion; the right
of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See
in matters relating to the practice of their faith,
including to make bishop appointments; the right of
Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong
inside China; the right of Muslims to freely preach,
undertake overseas pilgrimage, select and train
religious leaders, and wear clothing with religious
significance; the right of Protestants to worship free
from state controls over doctrine and worship, and to
be free from harassment, detention, and other abuses
for public and private manifestations of their faith,
including the display of crosses; and the right of
members of other religious communities, such as
Judaism, to be free of state control and harassment.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined,
detained, or imprisoned for peacefully pursuing their
religious beliefs, as well as people confined,
detained, or imprisoned in connection to their
association with them. Such prisoners include Bishop
Thaddeus Ma Daqin, who has been under extralegal
confinement since July 2012 for renouncing his
affiliation with the Chinese Catholic Patriotic
Association; Pastors Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang of
Jinhua municipality, Zhejiang province; those
affiliated with the Living Stone Church in Guizhou
province, including its pastor, Li Guozhi (also known
as Yang Hua); and other prisoners mentioned in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Call on the Chinese government to fully implement
accepted recommendations from its October 2013 UN Human
Rights Council Universal Periodic Review, including
taking necessary measures to ensure that rights to
freedom of religion, religious culture, and expression
are fully observed and protected; cooperating with the
UN human rights system, specifically UN special
procedures and mandate holders; facilitating visits for
UN High Commissioners to China; taking steps to ensure
lawyers working to advance religious rights can
practice their profession freely and promptly
investigating allegations of violence and intimidation
impeding their work; and considering possible revisions
to legislation and administrative restrictions to
provide better protection of freedom of religion.
Call on China to abolish Article 300 of the PRC
Criminal Law, which criminalizes ``organizing and using
a cult to undermine implementation of the law,'' and
Article 27 of the PRC Public Security Administration
Punishment Law, which stipulates detention or fines for
organizing or inciting others to engage in ``cult''
activities and for using ``cults'' or the ``guise of
religion'' to disturb social order or to harm others'
health.
Encourage U.S. political leaders to visit religious
sites in China to raise awareness of and promote
freedom of religion.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
During the 2016 reporting year, central
government officials in China continued to stress the
importance of ``ethnic unity'' and of ethnic
minorities' identification with ``the motherland'' and
``Chinese culture.'' An Australian scholar outlined
concerns regarding the impact of assimilation on ethnic
minorities' cultures and languages.
For a third consecutive year, Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) authorities implemented a
``mass line'' campaign, which promotes ``ethnic unity''
and requires officials working at the grassroots level
to monitor and control Muslim residents' religious
practices.
In addition to projects aimed at integrating
Han majority and ethnic minority populations, central
government officials pushed both development and
securitization in places such as Tibetan autonomous
areas and the XUAR, in an effort to maintain
``stability.''
As in past reporting years, Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR) authorities detained herders
who engaged in peaceful protests related to grasslands,
including herders who reportedly used online forums or
spoke to foreign journalists about their grievances.
As in past reporting years, authorities in the
IMAR continued to harass Mongol rights advocate Hada
and his family. IMAR officials imprisoned Hada for 15
years beginning in 1995, and subsequently extralegally
detained him for an additional 4 years, after he
organized peaceful protests for Mongol rights and for
his role in founding the banned Southern Mongolian
Democratic Alliance. According to Hada and his wife,
Xinna, as of October 2015, public security personnel
have maintained a constant presence in their apartment
building in order to surveil Hada's activities at home,
and have followed him whenever he has gone out. In
addition, in October 2015, public security authorities
in Qingshan district, Baotou municipality, IMAR,
detained Hada and Xinna's son Uiles for 10 days on the
charge of ``obstructing official business.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to build the capacity of Mongol, Uyghur, and
Tibetan groups working to advance human rights,
environmental protection, economic development, and
rule of law in China through U.S. foreign assistance
funding and by encouraging additional support from both
UN and non-governmental sources.
Convey to the Chinese government the importance of
respecting and protecting ethnic minority cultures and
languages. Urge Chinese officials to provide ethnic
minority students and parents a choice of what language
or languages of instruction should be used at schools
they attend in accordance with the PRC Regional Ethnic
Autonomy Law.
Support rule of law programs and exchange programs
that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different
models for governance that protect ethnic minorities'
rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy
over their affairs, in line with both Chinese law and
international human rights standards.
Call on the Chinese government to allow Mongol
herders to exercise their fundamental rights of freedom
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, as
well as the right to be free from arbitrary detention.
Urge Chinese authorities to end restrictions on the
freedom of movement and other unlawful restrictions
against Hada, his wife, Xinna, and their son, Uiles.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants
``everyone . . . the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.''
Population Control
Findings
Chinese authorities continue to actively
promote and implement coercive population planning
policies that violate international standards,
including the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994
Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development. Controls
imposed on Chinese women and their families, and
additional abuses engendered by the system, including
coerced abortion and discriminatory policies against
``out-of-plan'' children, also violate standards set
forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. China is a State Party to these
treaties and has committed to upholding their terms.
The Chinese government's population planning policies
continue to exacerbate the country's demographic
challenges, which include an aging population,
diminishing workforce, and sex ratio imbalance.
In November 2015, the UN Committee against
Torture conducted its fifth periodic review of China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. In its concluding observations, the
Committee stated its concerns about China's coercive
implementation of the population policy, such as
coerced sterilization and forced abortion, and the lack
of information on investigations into such allegations.
As the November 2013 policy revision of
allowing couples to bear a second child if one parent
is an only child (dandu erhai policy) failed to meet
the intended birth target, and amid demographic and
economic concerns voiced by population experts and
research institutions, central Party authorities issued
a decision in October 2015 to adopt a ``universal two-
child policy'' (quanmian erhai) at the Fifth Plenum of
the 18th Communist Party Central Committee, allowing
all married couples to have two children.
Central government authorities stated that the
universal two-child policy is the Party's ``major
initiative'' to ``promote balanced population
development'' and to address demographic concerns China
currently faces. Central government officials
emphasized repeatedly that family planning will remain
the long-term ``basic national policy.'' On December
27, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress amended the PRC Population and Family
Planning Law, which became effective nationwide on
January 1, 2016. As of August 2016, at least 29
provincial-level jurisdictions reportedly had revised
their population and family planning regulations in
accordance with the amended national law. Human rights
advocates, demographic experts, and others, however,
expressed concerns that coercive implementation of
family planning measures and human rights abuses will
persist despite the adoption of the universal two-child
policy.
The National Health and Family Planning
Commission predicted that the universal two-child
policy, if fully implemented, will result in population
growth. Population experts, citing the tepid response
to the previous policy revision, suggested that the
universal two-child policy likely will not lead to
significant population growth in the long term. Experts
urged central government authorities to introduce
supporting policy measures that will further encourage
couples to have two children. Central government
authorities pledged to promote ``family planning
service management reform'' and to introduce
``supporting policy measures'' to help implement the
universal two-child policy. This past year, government
authorities also took steps to further relax the birth
registration system, allowing married couples to
register their first two children without going through
a complicated approval or application process.
The amended PRC Population and Family Planning
Law contains provisions that prohibit officials from
infringing upon the ``legitimate rights and interests''
of citizens while implementing family planning
policies. Some provincial population planning
regulations continued to explicitly instruct officials
to implement abortions for ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies,
often referred to as a ``remedial measure.'' Local
authorities continued to promote ``family planning
work'' that entailed harsh and invasive family planning
measures.
Officials employed various methods of
punishment to enforce family planning policies,
including levying heavy fines, job termination,
arbitrary detention, and coerced abortion. Authorities
in some localities denied household registration
(hukou) to children whose parents violated local family
planning requirements. People who lack hukou in China
face considerable difficulties accessing social
benefits compared to registered citizens.
During this reporting year, central Party and
government authorities took steps to address the issue
of 13 million ``illegal residents'' (heihu), that is,
those without hukou, in China. In January 2016, the
State Council issued the Opinion on Resolving Issues of
Hukou Registration for Individuals Without Hukou, which
specified eight types of ``illegal residents'' newly
eligible to register for hukou without preconditions.
Unregistered individuals whose parents failed to pay
``social compensation fees,'' however, were not
included in this list. Some parents, fearing that
authorities might forcibly collect social compensation
fees from them retroactively, remain deterred from
registering their children born in violation of family
planning policies.
This past year, international media reports
continued to suggest a link between China's large
number of ``surplus males'' and the trafficking of
foreign women into China for forced marriage or
commercial sexual exploitation. Reports also indicate
that China's population planning policies have
contributed to illegal adoptions, as a traditional
preference for sons combined with birth limits is
thought to encourage a black market for illegal
adoptions.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Press Chinese government officials to bring the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law into conformance
with international standards set forth in international
agreements, including the 1995 Beijing Declaration, the
1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. Urge the Chinese government to address the
concerns the UN Committee against Torture raised in its
concluding observations on the fifth periodic review of
China's compliance with the Convention against Torture.
Highlight the looming demographic challenges
currently facing China in bilateral meetings with
Chinese government officials--including a rapidly aging
population, shrinking workforce, and sex ratio
imbalance. Urge the Chinese government to take the new
universal two-child policy further and heed the
recommendations of domestic and international
demographic experts by ending all birth restrictions on
families and abolishing ``social compensation fees.''
Urge the Chinese government to expand its existing
efforts to register all children to include those whose
parents failed to pay the ``social compensation fees''
associated with their births. In line with the Girls
Count Act of 2015, the U.S. State Department and the
U.S. Agency for International Development should
support training and programs that contribute to
improvements in the registration of girls, in order to
increase rights and opportunities for women and girls
in China.
Call on China's central and local governments to
vigorously enforce provisions of Chinese law that
provide for punishment of officials and other
individuals who violate the rights of citizens when
implementing population planning policies, and to
clearly define what these rights entail. Urge the
Chinese government to establish penalties, including
specific criminal and financial penalties, for
officials and individuals found to have committed
abuses such as coercive abortion and sterilization.
Publicly link, with supporting evidence, the sex
ratio imbalance exacerbated by China's population
planning policies with potential regional humanitarian
and security concerns--human trafficking, crime,
increased internal and external migration, and other
possible serious social, economic, and political
problems--and discuss and address these issues in
bilateral dialogues.
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Findings
The Chinese government continued use of the
household registration (hukou) system established in
1958. The hukou system limits the right of Chinese
citizens to freely choose their place of residence. The
hukou system classifies Chinese citizens as either
rural or urban, conferring legal rights and access to
public services based on their classification.
Implementation of hukou regulations discriminates
against rural hukou holders and migrants to urban areas
by denying them equitable access to public benefits and
services enjoyed by registered urban residents. The
hukou system conflicts with international human rights
standards guaranteeing freedom of residence and
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ``national
or social origin, . . . birth or other status.''
The Chinese central government and provincial
and municipal authorities continued to implement
reforms to the hukou system. As of August 2016, at
least 29 province-level jurisdictions had issued
implementing proposals governing local hukou reform
planning. Local governments' reform plans did not
generally remove the link between residence and
provision of public benefits.
After issuing draft measures on residence
permits in December 2014, in November 2015, the State
Council issued provisional regulations on residence
permits. The provisional regulations are intended to
``fully cover basic public services and benefits'' for
urban residents, but the provisional regulations extend
fewer benefits to permit holders than the 2014 draft
measures would have, and contain restrictive conditions
on who may apply for residence permits.
Chinese authorities continued to deny some
Chinese citizens who criticize the government their
internationally recognized right to leave the country.
Officials justified preventing some rights lawyers and
their family members from leaving China by saying their
leaving the country ``could endanger state security.''
Chinese officials prevented at least seven individuals
from traveling to Geneva in November 2015 to take part
in the UN Committee against Torture's review of China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. Chinese authorities refused to allow
disabled former lawyer and housing rights advocate Ni
Yulan to travel to the United States in March 2016 to
receive a U.S. State Department award.
The Commission continued to observe reports of
Chinese government officials punishing rights advocates
and their families and associates and targeting some
members of ethnic minority groups by restricting their
freedom of movement in violation of Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Authorities increased restrictions on movement during
politically sensitive periods, and placed particularly
strict controls on Uyghurs and Tibetans, as well as
residents of some ethnic minority areas.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on Chinese authorities to accelerate reforms to
the hukou system, including fully relaxing restrictions
on migration to major cities and centers of economic
opportunity; equalizing the level and quality of public
benefits and services afforded by local hukou and
residence permits; and implementing laws and
regulations to provide equal treatment for all Chinese
citizens, regardless of place of birth or residence.
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with
Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged
in research and outreach to migrants, in order to
advance legal and anti-discrimination assistance for
migrants and their families, and encourage policy
debates aimed at eliminating inequality and
discrimination connected to the hukou system.
Emphasize in meetings with Chinese officials that the
Chinese government's noncompliance with international
standards on freedom of movement and travel diminishes
confidence in the Chinese government's commitment to
broader international standards. Call on the Chinese
central government to combat local authorities'
arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions on the
ability of residents of some ethnic minority areas,
particularly Uyghurs and Tibetans, to move freely
inside China.
Raise specifically Chinese authorities' restrictions
on the freedom of movement and the right to leave the
country of rights defenders, lawyers, critics of the
government, and their family members and associates,
including, among others: the son of rights lawyer Liu
Xiaoyuan and the wife of detained lawyer Xie Yang; Yang
Jisheng, a historian and former journalist; Gao Yu, a
journalist serving a five-year prison sentence for
``leaking state secrets''; and Ni Yulan, a disabled
former lawyer and housing rights advocate.
Status of Women
Findings
The Chinese government restricted many women's
rights advocates from providing services and engaging
in advocacy, violating China's obligations under
international standards. For example, on February 1,
2016, the widely known and respected Beijing Zhongze
Women's Legal Counseling and Service Center ceased
operations after government authorities reportedly
ordered the organization to shut down.
The Chinese government continued to target
individual women's rights advocates with criminal
prosecution and other forms of harassment. Wang Yu--a
high-profile human rights lawyer whom Beijing
municipality security officials detained in July 2015
and Tianjin municipality authorities subsequently
arrested on suspicion of ``subversion of state power''
in January 2016--reportedly was released on bail in
August 2016 following the broadcast of a prerecorded
confession that members of the Chinese human rights
community believe was coerced. In April 2016, the
Foshan Intermediate People's Court in Guangdong
province put on trial women's rights and democracy
activist Su Changlan on the charge of ``inciting
subversion of state power.'' As of August 2016, she
remained in custody, awaiting a verdict. Police in
Beijing lifted bail conditions for five women's rights
advocates--referred to as the Feminist Five--who were
detained and subsequently released in 2015 in
connection with a planned anti-sexual harassment
campaign. The women, however, are still considered
suspects in an investigation for the crime of
``gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public
place.''
Despite the legal framework prohibiting
employment discrimination, employers in China continued
to discriminate against women in recruiting, hiring,
compensation, and other employment practices. A March
2016 article in Xinhua stated that ``job discrimination
against women still pervades Chinese society.'' More
women are suing employers, or prospective employers,
for gender-based discrimination. Female plaintiffs
prevailed in two separate employment discrimination
cases, each claiming that a prospective employer
refused to hire her because she was a woman.
Employment discrimination against women based
on pregnancy continues to be a serious problem, despite
laws protecting the rights of pregnant workers. Results
from a recent survey of nearly 1,000 female employees
indicated that over 52 percent of the respondents
experienced discrimination when they were pregnant, on
maternity leave, or breastfeeding and, as a result,
suffered pay cuts, forced transfers, lost promotion and
training opportunities, or were pressured to resign.
The PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law became
effective on March 1, 2016. The National People's
Congress passed the legislation in December 2015 after
more than a decade of advocacy and organizing by
women's rights advocates and Chinese officials. Many
women's rights advocates hailed the application of the
law to non-married, cohabiting partners and the fact
that the definition of domestic violence specifies both
physical and psychological abuse. Rights advocates,
nevertheless, expressed concerns about the omission of
sexual violence and economic coercion from the
definition of domestic violence and about the law's
silence with respect to same-sex couples.
Officials in China reportedly continued to use
coercion and violence against women while implementing
family planning policies, in contravention of
international standards. The UN Committee against
Torture, in its November 2015 review of China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture,
expressed concern about reports of coerced
sterilization and forced abortions, and noted the
Chinese government's failure to provide requested
information on such reports and on redress provided to
past victims.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Publicly and privately urge the Chinese government to
drop any and all remaining charges against the Feminist
Five, release rights activist Su Changlan from
detention, and clarify the status of rights lawyer Wang
Yu whose whereabouts remain unknown despite her
purported release on bail.
Facilitate and support technical assistance programs
that would assist law enforcement and judicial
personnel as well as lawyers and women's rights
organizations in effectively enforcing the PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law, including best practices for
implementing protection orders and handling domestic
violence cases in court.
Support international exchanges among academics,
legal advocates, non-governmental organizations, and
others that focus on gender-based employment
discrimination, including pregnancy-related
discrimination.
Call on the Chinese government to stop coercion and
violence against women during population planning
implementation and to provide the UN Committee against
Torture with the information it requested on coerced
sterilization and forced abortions and on redress to
past victims.
Human Trafficking
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
China remained a country of origin and destination for
the trafficking of men, women, and children, as defined
under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
(UN TIP Protocol). In addition to domestic human
trafficking, criminal networks reportedly drove an
increase in human trafficking of Chinese nationals to
Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa. Women from
Southeast Asia and Nepal reportedly were trafficked to
China for forced marriage or sexual exploitation.
The Commission observed reports of North
Korean laborers in China working under conditions
experts described as forced or slave labor. These
workers earned income for the North Korean government
and reportedly worked long hours in substandard
conditions for little or no pay. The U.S. State
Department and the UN TIP Protocol include forced labor
in their respective definitions of human trafficking.
Although the Chinese government abolished the
reeducation through labor system in 2013, authorities
continue the use of similar forms of arbitrary
detention, including ``custody and education'' and
compulsory drug detoxification, in which detainees
perform forced labor.
China's ongoing human trafficking problem
stems from a variety of social, economic, and political
factors. Within China, internal migrant workers were
vulnerable to being trafficked for forced labor, and
their children reportedly were at risk for forced
labor, forced marriage, and sexual exploitation.
Individuals with disabilities were at risk for forced
labor and forced begging. Poverty and political
instability contributed to trafficking from Southeast
Asia into China. North Korean refugees in China
remained at risk for human trafficking. China's sex
ratio imbalance created a demand for marriageable women
that may contribute to human trafficking for forced
marriage. Experts disagreed over the extent to which
the new universal two-child policy would affect the sex
ratio imbalance.
In March 2016, the Supreme People's Court
reported an almost 56-percent decline in the number of
human trafficking cases handled in Chinese courts and a
nearly 63-percent decline in the number of convictions
in 2015 compared to 2010.
The PRC Criminal Law prohibits human
trafficking, but China's domestic legislation remains
inconsistent with UN TIP Protocol standards. The
current definition of trafficking under Chinese law
does not clearly cover offenses against male victims.
Chinese law identifies illegal adoptions as human
trafficking, which under the UN TIP Protocol are
considered trafficking only if the end purpose is
exploitation.
During the reporting year, Hong Kong was a
destination for human trafficking, with migrant workers
particularly at risk of exploitation for forced labor.
One alleged victim of human trafficking challenged the
Hong Kong government in court, arguing that Hong Kong's
Bill of Rights Ordinance requires the Hong Kong
government to enact stronger anti-trafficking
legislation.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
commitments under the UN TIP Protocol and to bring
anti-trafficking legislation into alignment with
international standards, specifically with regard to
China's legal definition of human trafficking. Call on
the Chinese government to extend coverage of the UN TIP
Protocol to include Hong Kong. Urge the Chinese
government to end its policy of forcibly repatriating
undocumented North Korean migrants.
Work with regional governments, multilateral
institutions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
to encourage and support the collection of more
accurate data in order to better assess the scale and
root causes of human trafficking in Asia and monitor
the effectiveness of anti-trafficking measures.
Encourage and engage in continued regional
cooperation to combat human trafficking through
multilateral agreements and meetings such as the
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against
Trafficking, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the
East Asia Summit. Such regional cooperation should
address migration and the flow of refugees, poverty,
sex ratio imbalances, and other risk factors that
contribute to human trafficking.
Pursue cooperation on anti-trafficking efforts
through the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on Law
Enforcement Cooperation. Facilitate international
exchanges among civil society groups and industry
associations to raise awareness of best practices for
identifying and combating human trafficking in supply
chains. Support NGOs working on anti-trafficking
education and victims' services throughout Asia.
Incorporate language into bilateral and multilateral
economic agreements requiring member countries to
improve data collection on human trafficking and to
take concrete steps toward eliminating human
trafficking within their borders.
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
the Chinese government's policy of detaining North
Korean refugees and repatriating them to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remained in place, in
violation of its obligations under international human
rights and refugee law.
In November 2015, the UN Committee against
Torture (Committee) conducted its fifth periodic review
of China's compliance with the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment. In its concluding observations, the
Committee stated its concerns about China's lack of
``national asylum legislation and administrative
procedures'' for determining refugee status and China's
``rigorous policy of forcibly repatriating all
nationals of the [DPRK] on the ground that they have
illegally crossed the border solely for economic
reasons.'' The Committee also urged China to adopt
measures to address these concerns.
Heightened security measures along the China-
North Korea and China-Southeast Asia borders increased
the risks North Korean refugees face. The number of
refugees who reached South Korea decreased from 1,397
in 2014 to 1,277 in 2015, continuing the trend of a
significant decline in the number of refugees entering
South Korea since 2011.
Chinese authorities continued to crack down on
organizations and individuals that have played a
crucial role in assisting and facilitating the movement
of North Korean refugees outside the DPRK, including
Canadian citizen Kevin Garratt who was reportedly
involved in assisting North Korean refugees.
The Commission observed reports of North
Korean laborers in China working under exploitative
conditions. According to one expert, the DPRK
government subjected these workers to ``very harsh
conditions of work'' that ``amount to forced labor.''
This past year, some North Korean restaurant workers
escaped to South Korea from their work sites in China.
North Korean women who enter China illegally
remained particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.
The majority of North Korean refugees leaving the DPRK
are women, many of whom are trafficked from the DPRK
into or within China for the purposes of forced
marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.
Many children born to Chinese fathers and
North Korean mothers remained deprived of basic rights
to education and other public services owing to a lack
of legal resident status in China, contravening China's
obligations under international law.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Consider using the suite of sanctions that are
available, where appropriate, against Chinese
government agencies and individuals involved in the
repatriation of North Korean refugees, and press for
increased international monitoring of and
accountability for China's treatment of refugees.
Call on the Chinese government to address the
concerns of the UN Committee against Torture by
incorporating the principle of non-refoulement into
domestic legislation and allowing UN High Commissioner
for Refugees personnel unimpeded access to North Korean
refugees in China.
Urge Chinese officials to abide by China's
obligations under international human rights
instruments and to prosecute human traffickers
operating in China and along the China-North Korea
border.
Urge Chinese authorities to recognize the legal
status of North Korean women who marry or have children
with Chinese citizens, and ensure that all such
children are granted resident status and access to
education and other public services in accordance with
Chinese law and international standards.
Ask the U.S. Special Envoy on North Korean Human
Rights Issues to work with South Korean counterparts--
including the newly established South Korean Ambassador
for International Cooperation on North Korean Human
Rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the North
Korean Human Rights Foundation under the Ministry of
Unification--to coordinate efforts related to
humanitarian assistance and human rights promotion for
North Korean refugees in China, in accordance with the
North Korean Human Rights Act.
Public Health
Findings
The Chinese government and Communist Party
advanced health care reform priorities with a merger of
two of China's three health insurance schemes announced
in January 2016. The merger will affect health
insurance coverage for more than 1 billion Chinese
citizens. The government also sought to address the
ongoing problem of ``commotions at hospitals'' (yi'nao)
related to patient-doctor disputes with measures to
improve security for hospital staff and a revision to
the PRC Criminal Law that imposes harsher penalties for
``social order'' disturbances at hospitals.
The Party propaganda department issued
censorship directives to prohibit or limit news about
public health matters deemed politically sensitive,
including news stories about patient-doctor disputes,
challenges in accessing medical care, and apparently
contaminated pharmaceutical products. Parents who
advocated for government accountability over harm to
their children's health and well-being through public
protests and filing lawsuits encountered a range of
official responses, including detention.
Forcibly committing individuals without mental
illness to psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) as
a ``form of retaliation and punishment by Chinese
authorities against activists and government critics''
reportedly remains a serious problem in China despite
the PRC Mental Health Law's (MHL) prohibition of such
abuse. The Commission observed reports during the past
year on the forcible institutionalization of
individuals including Xing Shiku, Xia Funian, Wang
Hedi, Xu Dajin, Wang Shou'an, and Zhang Wenhe.
Chinese officials and domestic and
international experts have observed a range of
challenges in the implementation of the MHL since it
took effect in 2013. During the reporting year,
localities issued plans to implement the National
Mental Health Work Plan (2015-2020), including pilot
projects to provide more rehabilitation services for
individuals with psychosocial disorders. A focus on
individuals with severe mental disorders deemed at risk
of violent behavior is evident in national policy and
local mental health work agendas.
Provisions on anti-employment discrimination
and the right to work in the PRC Law on the Protection
of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities were cited
in a model case featuring the protection of the rights
of persons with disabilities published by the Supreme
People's Court in May 2016. In addition, in May, a
court in Guizhou province awarded financial
compensation to the plaintiff in a case that legal
experts noted was the first in which a court found in
favor of a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination
due to HIV/AIDS. Persons with disabilities and health-
related conditions in China, nevertheless, continued to
face obstacles in attaining equal access to employment
and education. In July and August 2016, official media
reported on two cases in which individuals with visual
impairments were denied university enrollment and
government employment based on physical eligibility
standards.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to strengthen
implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) and
stop using forcible psychiatric commitment to retaliate
against and silence persons with grievances against the
government or persons with dissenting opinions and
preferences. Urge the Chinese government to establish
panels made up of legal, medical, and security
professionals from within and outside the government to
monitor and report on implementation of the MHL and
initiatives planned under the National Mental Health
Work Plan (2015-2020) to ensure that local
implementation consistently meets standards of care and
rights protection stipulated in the MHL, the PRC Law on
the Protection of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, and international standards.
Continue to support technical assistance and exchange
programs in the area of public health, including but
not limited to cardiac care and breast cancer
prevention that were identified during the seventh
annual U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People
Exchange in June 2016. Require that U.S.-China
cooperative programs include the participation of U.S.
and Chinese non-governmental organizations.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of laws and regulations that
prohibit health-based discrimination in access to
employment and education, including revision of the
national physical eligibility standards for civil
servants and teachers that discriminate against persons
with health conditions. Where appropriate, share the
United States' ongoing experience with and efforts to
promote the rights of persons with disabilities in
education, employment, and public life, through non-
governmental advocacy and services, and legal and
regulatory means.
The Environment
Findings
During the 2016 reporting year, reports
indicated the severity of China's air, water, and soil
pollution, and scientists published new research
linking air pollution to 1.6 million premature deaths
per year. Chinese authorities continued to censor and
control media reporting on the environment, including
on environmental emergencies, such as the August 2015
explosion in Tianjin municipality, the December 2015
landslide in Shenzhen municipality, and the summer 2016
floods and their aftermath.
The non-transparent and extralegal detention
of Chinese government officials handling environmental
matters and data raised concerns about China's
commitments to transparency and the rule of law in
environmental protection. Significant cases of concern
during the reporting year included the reported torture
of Xu Yongsheng, the former director of the National
Energy Administration; the detention of Zhang Lijun, a
retired vice minister of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP); and the detention of Wang Bao'an, the
director of the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Since the revised PRC Environmental Protection
Law took effect in January 2015, official government
and media reports indicated that there have been some
improvements in public participation and an increase in
the number of environment-related public interest
lawsuits. During 2015, Chinese courts reportedly
accepted 53 public interest lawsuits.
The PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control
Law passed in August 2015 and took effect on January 1,
2016. The MEP continued to implement 2015 revisions to
the PRC Environmental Protection Law that allow for the
imposition of daily fines for violating emissions
standards; the MEP, however, reportedly only issued
daily fines in a limited number of cases. The National
People's Congress passed an amendment to the PRC Wild
Animal Protection Law in July 2016, and central
government officials reportedly have plans to draft a
PRC Soil Pollution Law and revise the PRC Environmental
Impact Assessment Law.
During the reporting year, Chinese authorities
continued to harass and detain environmental advocates.
In April 2016, a court in Liaoning province reportedly
accepted a retrial request after a November 2015
judgment that imposed a 12-year prison sentence on
environmentalist Tian Jiguang for ``extortion,''
``embezzlement,'' and ``misappropriation of funds,''
although the retrial decision did not suspend the
initial judgment. Tian founded a non-governmental
organization to protect spotted seals, and Chinese
authorities reportedly detained him in connection with
a blog post criticizing water pollution by a state-
owned enterprise.
During the reporting year, China remained the
largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. The
United States and China continued many dialogues and
exchanges related to the environment and climate
change. In April 2016, China signed the Paris Agreement
under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, affirming its June 2015 commitment to
lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60 to
65 percent from the 2005 level by 2030.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to support U.S.-China technical and legal
collaboration on environmental protection. U.S.-China
cooperation should focus on programs aimed at
increasing media freedom; improving transparency and
the rule of law; reducing air, water, and soil
contamination; and improving government accountability.
Raise concerns regarding the censorship of the
documentary ``Under the Dome'' and transparency
surrounding important environmental data.
Raise questions with Chinese officials about the lack
of transparency and due process in the detentions of
energy, environmental, and statistics bureau officials,
including Xu Yongsheng, Zhang Lijun, and Wang Bao'an.
Urge Chinese authorities to fully implement
provisions in Chinese law providing for public
participation in environmental policy and project
decisions. Support programs intended to increase the
scientific, technical, legal, and operational capacity
of Chinese environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), including programs that assist NGOs in taking
full advantage of opportunities to file environmental
public interest lawsuits and submit open government
information requests. Raise the detention of Tian
Jiguang in meetings with Chinese officials.
Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups working to
expand awareness of citizens' environmental rights in
China and the protection of those rights. Include
environmental law and transparency issues in bilateral
human rights and legal expert dialogues. Include
discussion of human rights dimensions of climate change
in the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group.
Civil Society
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
deepen a crackdown that began in 2013 against non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society
advocates. Targets of the crackdown included staff from
the Panyu Workers' Services Center and other labor
rights NGOs and the Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal
Counseling and Service Center. An international rights
NGO reported that authorities detained 22 human rights
defenders in 2015 on suspicion of ``inciting subversion
of state power,'' equal to the recorded total for the
three previous years combined under the same charge.
These detentions, some of which are linked to the
government's ``unprecedented attack'' beginning in and
around July 2015 against rights lawyers and advocates,
reportedly have contributed to a ``chilling effect'' on
civil society in China.
Chinese authorities also targeted an
international staff member of a legal rights advocacy
group during this reporting year. Authorities detained
Peter Dahlin, a Swedish rights advocate who cofounded
the Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, an
organization that trains and supports Chinese rights
defenders, for three weeks before expelling him from
the country. On January 19, 2016, while Dahlin was
still in detention, state television aired a
prerecorded confession, which Dahlin later stated was
scripted by Chinese authorities.
The National People's Congress passed the PRC
Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in
Mainland China in April 2016. The law covers a wide
range of international NGOs (INGOs), grants authority
over INGO registration to the Ministry of Public
Security and provincial-level public security agencies,
and restricts the activities of INGOs in China through
registration and reporting requirements. International
observers called on the Chinese government to repeal
the legislation, and warned that the law could be used
to intimidate and suppress dissenting views and to
exert greater control over civil society.
The National People's Congress passed the PRC
Charity Law in March 2016. If fully implemented, the
legislation paves the way for easier registration for
qualifying charitable organizations, permits registered
charities to engage in public fundraising, requires
public disclosure of organizations' activities and use
of funds, and forbids embezzlement and misuse of funds.
Observers reported concerns over provisions in the law
that allow authorities to prosecute and shut down
groups deemed to ``endanger state security,'' a vague
charge that rights groups say authorities can use to
crack down on human rights advocacy.
During the past year, the central government
released draft revisions to the three major regulations
governing the registration and management of domestic
civil society organizations. Following the February
2016 State Council administrative revision to the
Regulations on the Registration and Management of
Social Organizations, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(MCA) released a revised draft for public comment in
August 2016, which would permit direct registration for
business associations, research organizations,
charities, and service organizations. The MCA also
released a revised draft for public comment of the
Regulations on the Management of Non-Governmental, Non-
Commercial Enterprises changing the name to the
Regulations on the Management of Social Service
Organization Registration, and renaming ``non-
governmental, non-commercial units'' as ``social
service organizations.'' Provisions in the draft
Regulations on the Management of Foundations specify
how charitable foundations should be classified and
regulated.
The regulatory environment for Chinese NGOs
continued to be challenging to navigate. Authorities
continued to require some NGOs to secure the
sponsorship of a governmental or quasi-governmental
organization in order to be eligible for registration.
This ``dual management system'' subjects NGOs to
differentiated treatment based on authorities'
perception of a group's political sensitivity. Experts
noted that NGOs without government affiliation are at a
disadvantage compared to quasi-governmental or
government-organized non-governmental organizations
(GONGOs) with respect to public fundraising and
government procurement.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to hasten the enactment
of legal provisions pertaining to civil society that
are consistent with China's Constitution as well as
China's international obligations. Urge China to ratify
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Urge the Chinese government to revise
or repeal the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO
Activities in Mainland China and revise the PRC Charity
Law to reflect the principles of the ICCPR.
Call on the Chinese government to cease harassment of
civil society advocates and NGOs. Integrate civil
society issues into bilateral discussions and
agreements and strengthen U.S. Government-funded
programs and exchanges in China.
Take measures to facilitate the participation of
Chinese civil society advocates in relevant
international conferences and forums, and support
international training to build their leadership
capacity in non-profit management and best practices,
public policy advocacy, strategic planning, and media
relations.
Urge the Chinese government to establish a fair and
transparent framework for the implementation and
regulation of government procurement of social services
from NGOs. Where appropriate, support civil society
leaders and advocates in visiting other signatories to
the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government
Procurement in order to observe best practices in
government procurement of services from NGOs.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
This past year, the Chinese Communist Party
continued to direct and influence politics and society
at all levels, including in the military, economy,
media, civil society, and family life. State media
outlets reported that Chinese President and Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the Party's
claims to wide-ranging leadership at a senior-level
Party meeting in January 2016. The Party and government
adopted the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) for
economic and social development, which reiterates a
vision to ``spur a great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation'' in line with the ``Chinese dream.''
The Commission observed a continued emphasis
on Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping's
leading role in guiding decisionmaking in Party,
government, and military affairs. Reports suggested
that Xi used the ongoing anticorruption campaign,
intensified Party disciplinary measures, promoted his
speeches as ideological guidance, and continued his
chairmanship of at least six leading small groups in
the Party Central Committee to strengthen his power
within the Party. Following central Party meetings that
featured calls to strengthen the Party's role, several
provincial and local Party leaders referred to Xi as
the ``core'' (hexin) of Party leadership.
This past year, Chinese officials' wide-
reaching anti-
corruption campaign to reduce graft and strengthen
Party discipline continued snaring so-called ``tigers''
and ``flies''--high- and low-level Party officials in
the government, military, media, and business--in a
manner that one scholar called selective in
enforcement, non-transparent, and politicized. The
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection targeted
officials through use of the non-transparent and
extralegal disciplinary process of shuanggui, about
which the UN Committee against Torture expressed
concern during its fifth periodic review of China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
Chinese officials continued a broad
ideological and political crackdown on the Party and
bureaucracy, human rights lawyers, business leaders,
and rights advocates. Some representative cases of
advocates whom authorities targeted this past year
included Qin Yongmin, Zhao Suli, Wang Su'e, Xu Qin, Yin
Weihe, and Liu Shaoming. Authorities detained and in
some cases sentenced individuals in connection with
their commemoration of the violent suppression of the
1989 Tiananmen protests. Such individuals included Zhao
Changqing, Zhang Baocheng, Xu Caihong, Li Wei, Ma
Xinli, Liang Taiping, Fu Hailu, Tang Jingling, Yuan
Chaoyang, Wang Qingying, and Pu Zhiqiang.
This past year, central Party authorities did
not undertake any substantial political liberalization,
but instead pledged to continue improving China's
``socialist political democratic consultative system''
with the aim of strengthening Party leadership. Sources
from this past year highlighted several examples in
which officials interfered with or inhibited meaningful
public participation in local elections, undermining
the ability of Chinese political institutions to meet
the standards for ``genuine'' elections outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In June 2016, international and Chinese
official media outlets reported a new round of protests
in Wukan, a village in Donghai subdistrict, Lufeng
city, Shanwei municipality, Guangdong province, over
the detention of the village committee's Party
Secretary Lin Zulian. Media reports indicated that
authorities detained Lin after he announced a public
meeting to protest the lack of official progress in the
government's pledge to return farmland. On June 21,
Shanwei officials released a prerecorded confession of
Lin admitting to taking bribes, which local residents
reportedly found unconvincing, and formally arrested
him on July 21.
Chinese authorities reiterated their intent to
improve open government affairs and aim for a higher
level of public information disclosure. The Party
Central Committee and State Council issued an opinion
in February 2016 to further strengthen work on the open
government information system, stipulating that
government agencies must effectively improve
disclosure, civic participation, and public trust.
The Chinese government continued plans to
establish the national social credit system this past
year. In June 2016, the State Council issued a guiding
opinion on building the social credit system, directing
national and provincial government agencies to
construct an ``interregional and cross-departmental
mechanism for encouraging trustworthiness and punishing
dishonesty.''
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support U.S. research programs that seek to document
and analyze the governing institutions and ideological
campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as
its influence over companies, government agencies,
legislative and judicial bodies, and non-governmental
organizations.
Employ a ``whole-of-government'' approach to
encourage Chinese authorities to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and release individuals detained or imprisoned for
exercising their rights to freedom of speech,
association, and assembly. Such political prisoners may
include those who sought to hold memorials for victims
of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests, those engaged in anticorruption advocacy, or
other individuals mentioned in this report and in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support joint U.S.-China cooperative programs to
develop independent village committee and people's
congress election monitoring systems and encourage
central and local Party and government leaders to
implement free and fair elections across China.
Continue to support democracy promotion and rule of law
programs that are adapted to China.
Support organizations working in China that seek to
work with local governments and non-governmental
organizations to improve transparency, especially in
efforts to expand and improve China's government
information disclosure initiatives. Urge Party
officials to further increase the transparency of Party
affairs.
Call on the Chinese government to improve procedures
through which citizens may hold their officials
accountable. Urge Chinese officials to strengthen and
expand protections for corruption informants,
investigate irregularities associated with corruption-
related detentions, and release detained anti-
corruption and democracy advocates.
Commercial Rule of Law
Findings
As of December 11, 2016, China will have been
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for 15
years. The Chinese government, however, has failed to
fulfill many of its WTO commitments, including its
legal commitments related to the rule of law, market
prices, transparency, non-discrimination against
foreign companies, and preferential treatment and
subsidies for state-owned enterprises. During the
reporting year, the United States and Chinese
governments' negotiation for a Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) continued, and the U.S. Government's
objectives for the treaty included ``non-
discrimination, fairness and transparency.''
The Chinese government continued to impose
restrictions on economic reporting and control access
to commercial information. The websites of the New York
Times, Bloomberg News, Wall Street Journal, and Reuters
remained blocked in China. In March 2016, the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative listed Chinese Internet
censorship as a trade barrier for the first time. As of
August 2016, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, a non-profit corporation established by the U.S.
Congress to oversee public company audits, reportedly
remained unable to obtain legal and financial documents
from China-based companies listed on U.S. stock
exchanges. A report indicated that between January 2010
and November 2015, Chinese companies reportedly raised
US$36.7 billion from U.S. investors in initial public
offerings.
In August 2015, Chinese authorities detained
Caijing financial reporter Wang Xiaolu after he
reported that the Chinese government might reduce
financial support for stabilizing stock prices. In or
around February 2016, authorities reportedly released
Wang from detention. In January 2016, authorities
detained Wang Bao'an, director of the National Bureau
of Statistics of China, hours after he had defended
China's economic performance and official economic data
at a news conference.
In March 2015, American businesswoman Sandy
Phan-Gillis disappeared as she was about to travel from
Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province, to Macau. In
June 2016, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
issued an opinion that Phan-Gillis's detention was
arbitrary due to violations of her right to legal
counsel and the lack of a prompt, independent review of
her detention. In July 2016, international media
reported that Phan-Gillis had been, or would soon be,
indicted. According to the U.S. State Department, the
Chinese government's restrictions on communication
between U.S. consular officials and Phan-Gillis are
``inconsistent'' with China's obligations under the
U.S.-China Consular Convention.
During the reporting year, China remained a
non-market economy. In 2015, China's 150,000 state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) held over 100 trillion yuan
(US$16 trillion) in assets and employed more than 30
million people. ``State-owned holding'' enterprises
accounted for the majority of the total equity of the
Chinese stock market, and the Chinese government was
reportedly a majority shareholder in 99 of the 100
largest publicly listed companies.
Cyber theft of intellectual property supported
by the Chinese government reportedly continued during
the reporting year, despite President Barack Obama and
President Xi Jinping's agreement in September 2015 that
``neither country's government will conduct or
knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property with the intent of providing competitive
advantages to companies or commercial sectors.''
Inadequate protection for intellectual property and
discriminatory and non-transparent antimonopoly
enforcement in China continued to negatively affect
American companies, although there were some positive
judicial and regulatory developments.
Foreign investments by Chinese companies in
the United States, with the support of the Chinese
government and Chinese government-controlled financial
institutions, continued to grow during the 2016
reporting year. In January 2016, the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, a multilateral
development bank headquartered in Beijing municipality,
formally opened.
In November 2015, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) decided to include the yuan as part of the
Special Drawing Rights, despite concerns over
restrictions on convertibility of the yuan. In February
2016, the Wall Street Journal reported that the IMF was
unsatisfied with the lack of economic information
provided by the Chinese government. According to state-
run news agency Xinhua, IMF officials later denied the
report.
In October 2015, the PRC Food Safety Law
became effective; an American company, however,
expressed concern with the Chinese government's
enforcement processes. During the reporting year, a
vaccine scandal involving the sale of improperly stored
vaccines caused significant public concern.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government, in Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) negotiations and other forums, to stop
blocking access to U.S. commercial and media companies
in China, including the New York Times, Bloomberg News,
and the Wall Street Journal. The Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative should ensure that the BIT
includes protection for investments in news agency
services and online media, as well as protection for
cross-border data flows that are at least as strong as
those in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. The
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should provide
a list of U.S. commercial websites blocked in China in
its annual Special 301 Report.
Study ways to respond to the Chinese government's
increased funding of international investment projects.
The United States should consider approving the
December 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform
measures to increase IMF funding and increase
representation of emerging economies.
Consider revisions to the U.S.-China Consular
Convention to ensure that Americans detained in China
are allowed to discuss the details of their case with
U.S. consular officials and meet with a lawyer. U.S.
Government officials should raise the case of Sandy
Phan-Gillis in meetings with Chinese officials. Provide
additional support to U.S. companies facing criminal
and administrative enforcement actions in China and
litigating significant intellectual property cases.
Increase reporting on intellectual property theft and
cyber espionage from China. The U.S. Department of
Justice should consider reporting intellectual property
cases involving foreign companies and foreign
nationals, including those originating from China, on
an annual basis.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission should
require full access to corporate documents for Chinese
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, and raise
challenges regarding corporate transparency in
discussions with Chinese officials.
Access to Justice
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
the Chinese government made some progress in
implementing various judicial reforms but continued to
fall short in meeting certain international human
rights standards such as equal access to impartial
tribunals.
Despite purported efforts to shield courts
from political influence, the Chinese government and
Communist Party continued to exert influence over the
judiciary. Although reports indicated that more
citizens had their cases accepted by courts this past
year, some courts continued to deny rights advocates
access to the court system.
The implementation of a trial-centered
litigation system, which is aimed at ensuring the
legality of evidence obtained during the pre-trial
process, was at the planning stage during this
reporting year. The effectiveness of this system,
however, may be hampered by the low rate of legal
representation in criminal cases before courts of first
instance, which dropped from 30 to 20 percent in the
past two years.
The Chinese court system continued to make
judicial opinions available online and issue ``guiding
cases'' toward the goal of promoting judicial
transparency and uniformity in court judgments.
In the past year, central and local government
reports showed an overall increase in funding for and
access to the legal aid system since 2010, and media
reports illustrated progress and challenges in efforts
toward further expansion.
The Chinese government took steps to improve
the overburdened petitioning system in part by
requiring administrative agencies to specify petition
subject matters within their respective jurisdictions,
using the two newly established circuit tribunals to
resolve petitioners' grievances, and diverting some
cases from the petitioning system to judicial and other
administrative channels. Some believe, however, that
these measures may not be able to effectively address
issues that are traditionally handled by the
petitioning system due to the costs and processing time
involved. In the past year, petitioners continued to
face reprisals for seeking redress from local
governments, such as being prosecuted for extortion and
other criminal charges.
During the reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to detain rights lawyers and
advocates whom it targeted during a nationwide and
coordinated crackdown that began in and around July
2015. Authorities denied many of the advocates access
to counsel and did not inform their families about the
detention location. Authorities also detained and
harassed family members of the detained advocates.
Authorities appeared to target non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals whose
legal aid work overlapped with rights advocacy.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to eliminate all forms of
influence on the court system, including of the
Communist Party and the central government.
Raise concerns about the fact that some local courts,
despite the new case filing system, refused to accept
cases submitted by petitioners and rights advocates,
thereby denying them equal access to justice.
Encourage the Chinese government to improve legal
representation of criminal defendants and to take
substantive action to implement the trial-centered
litigation system that is designed to ensure the
legality of evidence obtained during the pre-trial
process.
Increase support for programs that promote dialogue
between U.S. and Chinese legal experts regarding how
China can structure and implement legal reforms.
Concomitantly increase support for collaboration
between U.S. and Chinese academic and non-governmental
entities to foster programs that enhance the Chinese
legal system's potential to be a vehicle for protecting
citizens' rights.
Urge the Chinese government to stop all forms of
persecution or prosecution of petitioners who use the
petitioning system to seek redress for their
grievances.
Urge the Chinese government to protect the
fundamental civil and professional rights of China's
lawyers, to investigate all allegations of abuse, and
to ensure that those responsible are brought to
justice.
Urge the Chinese government to unconditionally
release the rights lawyers and advocates detained
during the crackdown that began in and around July
2015, to investigate allegations of sexual assault
against Zhao Wei while in custody, and to vacate the
convictions of the individuals already sentenced.
Xinjiang
Findings
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
central and regional authorities continued to implement
repressive security measures targeting Uyghur
communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR). Reports from international media and rights
advocates documented arbitrary detentions, oppressive
security checkpoints and patrols, the forcible return
of Uyghurs to the XUAR from other provinces as part of
heightened security measures, and forced labor as a
means to ``ensure stability.'' In addition, Meng
Jianzhu, head of the Communist Party Central Committee
Political and Legal Affairs Commission, repeatedly
stressed the need for authorities to ``eradicate
extremism''--in particular, ``religious extremism''--in
the XUAR in conjunction with security measures. The
U.S. Government and international observers have
asserted that XUAR officials have justified limits on
Uyghurs' religious freedom by equating them with
efforts to combat extremism.
The Commission observed fewer reports of
violent incidents involving ethnic or political
tensions in the XUAR in the 2016 reporting year than in
previous reporting years, though it was unclear whether
less violence occurred, or if Chinese authorities
prevented public disclosure of the information.
International media and rights advocates raised
concerns about Chinese authorities' failure to report
and attempts to suppress information regarding deadly
clashes involving Uyghurs, including information about
a September 2015 attack in Aksu prefecture.
On December 27, 2015, the National People's
Congress passed the PRC Counterterrorism Law. The
legislation, which took effect on January 1, 2016,
contains provisions that expand police authority,
including the authority to use weapons. Human rights
organizations and other observers criticized the law as
repressive and expressed fears that it expanded
officials' authority to punish peaceful activities and
target ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs.
On July 29, 2016, the XUAR People's Congress
approved regional measures to implement the PRC
Counterterrorism Law that contain more detailed
definitions than the national legislation regarding
terrorist activities and how to punish religious
extremists. A human rights advocate cited in an
international news report expressed concern that under
the new regional measures, authorities could label
Uyghurs' ordinary religious activities as extremism and
terrorism.
Uyghur political prisoners remaining in
detention in the XUAR during the reporting year include
Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti; Tudaxun Hoshur, brother of
Uyghur-American reporter Shohret Hoshur; and Uyghur-
Canadian imam Huseyin Celil.
During this reporting year, central and XUAR
officials continued to focus on the role of economic
growth and development initiatives in the XUAR in
promoting stability. Through the ``Silk Road'' and
``One Belt, One Road'' development strategies
introduced in recent years, government authorities
sought to attract overseas investment and investment
from other areas of China, and to develop the XUAR as a
production and logistics hub. Critics of XUAR
development strategies outlined authorities' failure to
address persistent tensions involving socio-economic
inequality, ethnic tension, and assimilation. In
addition, an April 2016 Greenpeace briefing on air
quality in China reported that the five cities with the
highest average PM2.5 concentration were
located in the XUAR--the result of the westward shift
of industries such as coal-fired power plants.
Following XUAR authorities' November 2014
amendment of regional regulations governing religious
affairs, central and XUAR officials continued to use
new legislation and other measures that narrowed the
scope of Uyghur Muslims' ability to peacefully practice
their religious faith and express their Muslim cultural
identity. Authorities in locations throughout the XUAR
also enforced controls on Uyghur Muslims in mosques and
in their homes, and sought to restrict Islamic teaching
outside of state control.
During the reporting year, central and
regional officials placed restrictions on journalists
covering XUAR-related issues, detained Uyghurs who
wrote for websites, enforced controls on online
communications tools in the XUAR, and restricted public
information on violent incidents in the XUAR. In one
example of officials restricting news media from
opposing the state's narrative on the XUAR and
counterterrorism, in December 2015, authorities failed
to renew the press credentials of Beijing municipality-
based French reporter Ursula Gauthier, effectively
expelling her from China. Gauthier, who had criticized
Chinese counterterrorism policies, was the first
foreign journalist Chinese authorities expelled since
Al Jazeera reporter Melissa Chan in 2012.
During the reporting year, XUAR authorities
linked social policies in the areas of education and
employment in the XUAR to political goals such as the
``sinicization'' of ethnic minority populations. In
November 2015, XUAR Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian
noted the importance of ``bilingual education'' in the
region, alongside ``ethnic blending'' and students'
acceptance of the ``five identifies,'' that is,
identifying with the country, Chinese nationality,
Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and
``socialism with Chinese characteristics.'' Reports
indicated the existence of ethnic tensions amid an
influx of Han Chinese workers in the XUAR, and in spite
of some official efforts to create jobs for Uyghur
residents of the XUAR, some government and private
employers within the XUAR discriminated against non-Han
job applicants.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support efforts to raise greater public awareness of
human rights conditions in the XUAR, support
initiatives to protect Uyghur culture, increase avenues
for Uyghurs to protect their human rights, and
undertake more frequent human rights-focused visits to
the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to allow diplomats,
domestic and international journalists, and observers
greater freedom to report on XUAR-related issues, and
to allow domestic and international journalists to
freely express their views on government policy in the
XUAR, as provided for under Chinese and international
law.
Call on the Chinese government to adhere to domestic
laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of religious
belief as well as international standards guaranteeing
religious practice free from state restrictions.
Call on the Chinese government to consult with non-
Han Chinese parents, teachers, and students regarding
which language or languages of instruction should be
used in XUAR schools, from the preschool to the
university level. Call on Chinese officials to provide
parents and students a choice of instruction in the
Uyghur language and other non-Chinese languages
prevalent in the XUAR, as mandated in Article 4 of
China's Constitution and Article 10 of the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law.
Encourage U.S. companies conducting business or
investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to
promote equal opportunity employment for ethnic
minorities and to support development projects that
incorporate consultation with ethnic minorities
regarding the economic, political, and social impact of
such projects. Encourage U.S. companies investing in
XUAR business opportunities to actively recruit ethnic
minority candidates for employment positions, implement
mechanisms to eliminate hiring and workplace
discrimination, and urge Chinese counterparts to
provide equal opportunity employment to ethnic
minorities.
Encourage U.S. companies conducting business or
investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to use
environmentally friendly business practices in their
operations and business strategies, and to promote
environmental preservation efforts in the region.
Tibet
Findings
Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's
representatives and Chinese Communist Party and
government officials has remained stalled since the
January 2010 ninth round, the longest interval since
such contacts resumed in 2002. The Commission observed
no indication during the 2016 reporting year of
official Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that
takes into account the concerns of Tibetans who live in
the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.
The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation
reportedly focusing on political and religious issues
during the 2016 reporting year declined substantially.
The approximately seven-month period between monk Sonam
Tobyal's self-immolation in July 2015 and monk Kalsang
Wangdu's self-immolation in February 2016 is the
longest since the period between the first two such
self-immolations in February 2009 and March 2011.
Government provisions imposing collective punishment on
self-immolators' family members or communities may have
deterred potential self-immolators from putting persons
close to them at risk.
The Party and government rely on regulation of
Tibetan Buddhism to compel its transformation into a
state-managed institution. In November 2015, Zhu
Weiqun, formerly a senior Party official and
counterpart in dialogue with the Dalai Lama's envoys,
described reincarnation as ``first and foremost an
important political matter in Tibet and an important
manifestation of the Chinese central government's
sovereignty over Tibet.'' A senior Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR) Party official said in March 2016 that the
Dalai Lama was ``no longer a religious leader after he
defected [from] his country and betrayed its people.''
Tibetans continued to face Party and
government pressure on Tibetan culture and language.
Reports emerged showing that officials at times treated
Tibetan efforts to sustain their culture and language
as illegal or as a threat to social stability. Tibetans
continued either to attempt to arrange for Tibetan
language training--sometimes successfully--or to
protest the lack of it. Security officials continued to
detain Tibetans who advocated on behalf of Tibetan
culture and language, or who sought to publish their
views. President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping
stressed in the August 2015 Sixth Tibet Work Forum the
requisite promotion of a common culture and identity
that would serve ``social stability.''
The Commission observed no evidence during its
2002 to 2016 period of reporting that the Party or
government solicited systematic or representative input
from the Tibetan population on economic development in
the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. TAR officials
asserted that the Sichuan-Tibet railway, upon which
construction began in December 2014, would bring ``even
more prosperity'' and denied that it would result in
environmental harm. Commission access this past year to
Chinese 2010 ethnic census data showed a 50-percent
increase in the Han population of Lhasa municipality
from 2000 to 2010--a period that included the 2006
completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railway. TAR total
population increased by about 15 percent, while its Han
population increased by about 55 percent.
As of August 1, 2016, the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database contained records of 650
Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed
currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 640 are
records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10,
2008; 43 percent of them are Tibetan Buddhist monks,
nuns, teachers, or trulkus. Officials imprisoned or
detained cultural advocates such as Tashi Wangchug and
Drukar Gyal. The UN Committee against Torture released
its Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic
Report of China in February 2016. With respect to
torture, and specifically to death believed to have
resulted from abuse while detained or imprisoned, as of
August 1, 2016, the PPD contained records of 23
Tibetans taken into police custody on or after March
10, 2008, who reportedly died as a result of such
circumstances.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to resume contact with
the Dalai Lama or his representatives and engage in
dialogue without preconditions. Such a dialogue should
aim to protect the Tibetan culture, language, religion,
and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region and the
Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai,
Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. A Chinese
government decision to engage in dialogue can result in
a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for the
government and Tibetans that will benefit local and
regional security in coming decades.
Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into
account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
planning infrastructure, natural resource development,
and settlement or resettlement projects in the Tibetan
areas of China. Encourage the government to engage with
appropriate experts in assessing the impact of projects
and in advising the government on the implementation
and progress of projects.
Urge the Chinese government to recognize the role of
government regulatory measures and Party policies in
Tibetan protests and self-immolations. Stress to
Chinese officials that strengthening measures and
policies that Tibetans resent is unlikely to promote
``social stability'' or a ``harmonious society.'' Urge
the government to refrain from using security and
judicial institutions to intimidate Tibetan communities
by prosecuting and imprisoning Tibetans with alleged
links to a self-immolator or other protesters, or for
sharing information about protests.
Stress to Chinese officials that increasing pressure
on Tibetan Buddhists by aggressive use of regulatory
measures, ``patriotic'' and ``legal'' education, and
anti-Dalai Lama campaigns is likely to harm social
stability, not protect it. Urge the government to cease
treating the Dalai Lama as a security threat instead of
as Tibetan Buddhism's principal teacher. Urge the
government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
identify and educate religious teachers, including the
Dalai Lama, in a manner consistent with Tibetan
Buddhist preferences and traditions.
Stress to the Chinese government the importance of
respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and
language. Stress the importance of respecting Tibetan
wishes to maintain the role of both the Tibetan and
Chinese languages in teaching modern subjects, and to
refrain from criminalizing Tibetans' passion for their
language and culture. Urge Chinese officials to promote
a vibrant Tibetan culture by honoring China's
Constitution's reference to the freedoms of speech,
association, assembly, and religion, and refrain from
using the security establishment, courts, and law to
infringe upon Tibetans' exercise of such rights.
Continue to condemn the use of security campaigns to
suppress human rights. Request the government to
provide complete details about Tibetans detained,
charged, or sentenced for protest-related and self-
immolation-related ``crimes.'' Continue to raise in
meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the
cases of Tibetans who remain imprisoned as punishment
for the peaceful exercise of human rights.
Encourage the Chinese government to respect the right
to freedom of movement of Tibetans who travel
domestically, including for the purpose of visiting
Tibetan economic, cultural, and religious centers,
including Lhasa; to provide Tibetans with reasonable
means to apply for and receive documents necessary for
lawful international travel; to respect the right of
Tibetan citizens of China to reenter China after
traveling abroad; and to allow access to the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China to international journalists,
representatives of non-governmental organizations,
representatives of the United Nations, and U.S.
Government officials.
Urge the Chinese government to invite a
representative of an international organization to meet
with Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the
Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, so that he can express
to the representative his wishes regarding privacy.
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Findings
The disappearance, alleged abduction, and
detention in mainland China of five Hong Kong
booksellers, including two foreign nationals, in
October and December 2015 compromised the ``one
country, two systems'' framework enshrined in the Basic
Law, which prohibits mainland Chinese authorities from
interfering in Hong Kong's internal affairs, and raised
concerns that Hong Kong's rule of law and autonomy were
increasingly threatened by Chinese authorities.
International human rights groups and non-governmental
organizations; Hong Kong activists, lawyers, and
legislators; and foreign governments condemned the
disappearances of Gui Minhai, Lee Bo, Lui Bo, Cheung
Chi-ping, and Lam Wing-kei in October and December 2015
and the televised ``confessions'' of four of the men in
January and February 2016. Lam Wing-kei alleged that
central government officials had ordered the five men's
detentions.
The Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau confirm
the applicability of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to both territories,
and guarantee both regions ``a high degree of
autonomy'' from mainland China. The Basic Law of Hong
Kong provides specifically for universal suffrage in
electing the Chief Executive and Legislative Council,
but Macau's does not.
Some political groups and activists in Hong
Kong called for greater self-determination or
independence for Hong Kong, due in part to perceptions
that Chinese government control over Hong Kong and
mainland Chinese economic and cultural influence in
Hong Kong are increasing. Activists, students, and
veterans of the 2014 pro-democracy demonstrations
founded new political organizations that contested
local elections.
The Chinese central and Hong Kong governments
expressed opposition to increasing calls for political
self-determination in Hong Kong, including independence
from China. Some Chinese and Hong Kong officials
suggested that the act of advocating for Hong Kong's
independence violated Hong Kong criminal statutes and
the Basic Law. Lawyers, political groups, and others
criticized the Hong Kong government's disqualification
of six Legislative Council candidates for their pro-
independence views, calling it ``political
censorship.''
In Hong Kong's September 4, 2016, Legislative
Council election, opposition parties, including both
pro-democrats and candidates seen as ``localist'' or
supportive of self-determination for Hong Kong, won a
total of 30 out of 70 seats. Localist candidates
reportedly received 19 percent of the popular vote and
won 6 seats.
Hong Kong journalists and media organizations
reported a continuing decline in press freedom in Hong
Kong, citing government restrictions, violence against
journalists, and pressure on reporters and editors from
media ownership, including owners with financial ties
to mainland China. According to a Hong Kong media non-
governmental organization, 85 percent of Hong Kong
reporters believed that press freedom had deteriorated
in the past year. Concerns over editorial independence,
journalistic integrity, and management decisions
continued to grow during the past year, including at
media companies with financial connections to mainland
China. The purchase of the South China Morning Post
(SCMP) by Chinese company Alibaba Group raised concerns
that Hong Kong media could face increased pressure to
self-censor or avoid reporting on topics deemed
``sensitive.'' SCMP was one of several Hong Kong media
outlets to publish alleged interviews with individuals
detained in mainland China or televise their
``confessions'' this past year.
The Commission observed no progress in Macau
toward ``an electoral system based on universal and
equal suffrage . . .'' in line with provisions of the
ICCPR, as recommended by the UN Human Rights Committee.
Macau's Legislative Assembly passed revisions to an
electoral law that did not alter the composition of the
Legislative Assembly or the methods for Chief Executive
elections provided for in the Basic Law.
Macau officials continued negotiations with
Chinese authorities on an agreement governing
extraditions to and from mainland China. The Macau and
Hong Kong governments also pursued an interregional
extradition agreement. Activists, lawyers, and the UN
Committee against Torture cautioned against potential
abuses under the proposed agreements. In May 2016, the
Macau legislature rejected the government's extradition
bill.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese central government to ensure Hong
Kong residents' rights and to guarantee non-
interference in Hong Kong's affairs by Chinese
officials or government entities. Raise issues relating
to Hong Kong's autonomy and freedom in meetings with
central government officials.
Raise specifically, in meetings with Chinese and Hong
Kong officials, the cases of five Hong Kong residents
detained, disappeared, or under investigation in
mainland China: Gui Minhai, Lee Bo, Lui Bo, Cheung Chi-
ping, and Lam Wing-kei. Inquire as to the charges
against them and the legal basis for those charges.
Inquire as to the legal status, condition, and
whereabouts of Gui Minhai.
Urge the Chinese and Hong Kong governments to restart
the electoral reform process and work toward
implementing Chief Executive and Legislative Council
elections by universal suffrage with a meaningful
choice of candidates, in accordance with the
aspirations of the Hong Kong people, provisions of the
Basic Law, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
Urge the Chinese and Macau governments to set a
timeline for implementing elections for Chief Executive
and the Legislative Assembly by universal suffrage, as
required by Article 25 of the ICCPR and repeatedly
urged by the UN Human Rights Committee.
Urge the Chinese, Hong Kong, and Macau governments to
guarantee the rights of and protections for fugitives
and offenders under proposed mutual extradition
agreements. Urge the Hong Kong and Macau governments to
specifically prohibit extradition to China of
individuals likely to be subjected to torture or
mistreatment in custody, and individuals likely to be
subjected to political or religious detention or
imprisonment.
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD)
(http://ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date
information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners.
Consult a prisoner's database record for more detailed
information about the prisoner's case, including his or
her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials
have violated, stage in the legal process, and location
of detention or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations
traveling to China to present Chinese officials with
lists of political and religious prisoners compiled
from database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and
private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-
city relationships with China to explore the database,
and to advocate for the release of political and
religious prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's 2016 Annual Report provides information
about Chinese political and religious prisoners \1\ in the
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many
of the abuses result from the Chinese Communist Party's and
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare
summaries of information about political and religious
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific
Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual
Report, and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at
http://ppdcecc.gov. (Information about the PPD is available at
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/political-prisoner-database.)
The PPD received approximately 139,300 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31,
2016--an increase of approximately 19 percentage points over
the 117,200 requests reported in the Commission's 2015 Annual
Report for the 12-month period ending August 31, 2015.\2\
During the 12-month period ending in July 2016, the United
States returned to the position of being the country of origin
for the largest share of requests for information, with
approximately 39.0 percent of such requests. During the
Commission's 2015 reporting year, China had been for the first
time the country of origin of the largest share of requests for
PPD information, with approximately 40.4 percent of such
requests \3\--a 78-percent increase over the 22.7 percent of
requests reported for China in the Commission's 2014 Annual
Report.\4\ During the Commission's 2016 reporting year,
however, China resumed the second position with approximately
25.4 percent of such requests (a decrease of 15.0 percent
compared to the 2015 reporting year),\5\ followed by Ukraine
with 6.6 percent (an increase compared to 4.1 percent in the
2015 reporting period),\6\ Germany (3.2 percent), the United
Kingdom (3.0 percent), the Russian Federation (3.0 percent),
France (1.9 percent), Japan (1.6 percent), Poland (1.1
percent), and Canada (0.8 percent).
Worldwide commercial (.com) domains, which for the first
time were the source of the largest share of online requests
for information during the Commission's 2015 reporting year,\7\
retained that position this past year. Approximately 42.9
percent of the 139,300 requests for information during the 12-
month period ending in July 2016 originated from .com domains--
an increase compared to the 38.4 percent reported for such
requests during the 2015 reporting year.\8\ Numerical Internet
addresses that do not provide information about the name of the
registrant or the type of domain were second with approximately
23.9 percent of requests for PPD information. That figure
represents a decrease of 7.9 percentage points from the 31.8
percent reported for such addresses during the Commission's
2015 reporting year,\9\ and followed previous decreases of 6.6
percentage points reported for the Commission's 2014 reporting
year \10\ and 18.4 points for the Commission's 2013 reporting
year.\11\
Worldwide network (.net) domains were third during the
Commission's 2016 reporting year with approximately 11.9
percent of online requests for PPD information (an increase of
3.5 percentage points compared to the 2015 reporting year),\12\
followed by U.S. Government (.gov) domains with 7.0 percent,
then by domains in Germany (.de) with 2.4 percent, in Ukraine
(.ua) with 2.2 percent, in the European Union (.eu) with 1.3
percent, in the United Kingdom (.uk) with 0.7 percent, and in
Japan (.jp), in France (.fr), and educational domains (.edu)
with approximately 0.6 percent each. Non-profit organization
domains (.org) accounted for 0.4 percent of requests for PPD
information. Domains in China (.cn) during the Commission's
2016 reporting year accounted for only 0.2 percent of online
requests for PPD information compared to 5.9 percent of such
requests during the 2015 reporting year \13\ and 19.5 percent
during the 2014 reporting year.\14\
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the
staff member's area of expertise. The staff seek to provide
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners,
and about events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of August 1, 2016, the PPD contained information on
8,394 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,383 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
7,011 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon
after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there
are considerably more than 1,383 cases of current political and
religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on
an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious
imprisonment to the PPD.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational
institutions, and individuals who research political and
religious imprisonment in China, or who advocate on behalf of
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly
leveraged the capacity of the Commission's information and
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and
advocacy.
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to handle the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These types include violations of the right to
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association,
and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful
social or political change and to criticize government policy
or government officials.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
RECENT POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE FEATURES
In 2015, the Commission enhanced the functionality of the
PPD to empower the Commission, the U.S. Congress and
Administration, other governments, NGOs, and individuals to
strengthen reporting on political and religious imprisonment in
China and advocacy undertaken on behalf of Chinese political
prisoners.
The PPD full text search and the basic search
both provide an option to return only records that
either include or do not include an image of the
prisoner.
PPD record short summaries accommodate more
text as well as greater capacity to link to external
websites.
Notes to Section I--Political Prisoner Database
\1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to
advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize
government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative,
not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or
imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by
China's Constitution and law, or by international law, or both. Chinese
security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to
distract attention from the political or religious nature of
imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner
under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases
defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce
confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of
evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone
to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel
adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access
to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a
defense.
\2\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 61.
\3\ Ibid., 61.
\4\ Ibid., 61; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 58.
\5\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 61.
\6\ Ibid., 61.
\7\ Ibid., 62.
\8\ Ibid., 62.
\9\ Ibid., 62.
\10\ CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 59.
\11\ CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 55.
\12\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 62.
\13\ Ibid., 62.
\14\ CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 59.
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
International Standards on Freedom of Expression
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
restrict expression in contravention of international human
rights standards, including Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 19
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\1\ According to
the ICCPR--which China signed \2\ but has not ratified \3\--and
as reiterated by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
under Article 19(3), countries may impose certain restrictions
or limitations on freedom of expression, if such restrictions
are provided by law and are necessary for the purpose of
respecting the ``rights or reputations of others'' or
protecting national security, public order, public health, or
morals.\4\ An October 2009 UN Human Rights Council resolution,
however, provides that restrictions on the ``discussion of
government policies and political debate,'' ``peaceful
demonstrations or political activities, including for peace or
democracy,'' and ``expression of opinion and dissent'' are
inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.\5\ The UN Human
Rights Committee specified in a 2011 General Comment that
restrictions on freedom of expression specified in Article
19(3) should be interpreted narrowly and that the restrictions
``may not put in jeopardy the right itself.'' \6\
Freedom of the Press
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE NEWS MEDIA
International experts have cautioned that media serving
``as government mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies
operating in the public interest'' are a major challenge to
free expression.\7\ The Chinese Communist Party's longstanding
position that the media is a political tool--functioning as a
``mouthpiece'' for its official positions and in shaping public
opinion \8\--received high-profile promotion \9\ during the
Commission's 2016 reporting year. President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping reiterated the primacy of the Party's
control of the media in China during widely publicized visits
on February 19, 2016, to Xinhua, People's Daily, and China
Central Television (CCTV)--the three flagship state and Party
media outlets--and in a speech on media policy at a Party forum
the same day.\10\ During the speech, Xi reportedly declared
that the media ``must be surnamed Party'' (bixu xing dang) \11\
and called for ``absolute loyalty'' to the Party from official
media outlets and personnel.\12\ The range of media outlets in
Xi's speech, according to some commentators, also extended to
more market-oriented media in China, requiring that these media
convey ``positive'' news about China in conformity with Party
ideology.\13\
Although freedom of speech and the press are guaranteed in
China's Constitution,\14\ the legal parameters for the
protection of the news media in gathering and reporting
information are not clearly defined, particularly in the
absence of a national press law.\15\ The Party and Chinese
government continued to use complex and vague legal and
regulatory provisions \16\ and a powerful propaganda system
\17\ to exert political control over journalists and news
coverage in China. Chinese and international media reports
during the year indicated that government efforts since 2013
and the changing media marketplace have led to tightened
management of the news industry \18\ and further decreased the
space for investigative journalism.\19\ An amendment to the PRC
Criminal Law that became effective in November 2015, moreover,
may place journalists at risk of being criminally charged for
``fabricating false reports'' \20\ in their coverage of
``hazards, epidemics, disasters, and situations involving
police.'' \21\
The Party regularly issues propaganda directives to control
news media through the Central Propaganda Department and its
lower level bureaus.\22\ Experts at Freedom House, a U.S.-based
organization that monitors press and Internet freedom, analyzed
dozens of such directives from 2015 and found that topic areas
were ``far broader than mere criticism of the regime, dissident
activities, or perennially censored issues . . .'' such as
Tibet, Taiwan, and Falun Gong.\23\ These directives restricted
information on public health and safety, economic policy,
official wrongdoing, regulations on and instances of media
censorship, civil society issues, and the Party's
reputation.\24\ In March 2016, journalists also faced increased
government censorship compared to previous years when covering
the annual sessions of the National People's Congress and its
advisory body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, as illustrated by a lengthy censorship directive
\25\ and limited access to delegates.\26\ The establishment of
``news ethics committees'' during the reporting year
highlighted the government's intention to enhance official
mechanisms to ``maintain and intensify press censorship.'' \27\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Media's ``Supervision by Public Opinion''
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debate over the news media's ``supervision by public opinion'' (yulun
jiandu)--an official term that affirms a role for the media to report
critically in the public interest and to monitor those in power, which
has been likened to investigative journalism \28\--was featured in
reports during the year about the detention of an investigative
journalist and the resolution of a defamation litigation case.
In October 2015, authorities in Jiangxi province detained Liu Wei, an
investigative journalist on assignment from Southern Metropolitan
Daily, on suspicion of ``obtaining state secrets,'' for his coverage of
the story of a local traditional healer allegedly involved in the death
of a provincial legislator.\29\ After public security authorities
released Liu on bail following a ``confession'' televised on state-run
China Central Television, fellow journalists reportedly stated that the
``space for supervision by public opinion . . . was seriously
constrained.'' \30\ Southern Metropolitan Daily editors reprinted a
Xinhua editorial that contained Liu's ``confession,'' but prefaced the
editorial by discussing the difficulties journalists face in conducting
their work: ``[I]n-depth investigation is how the media gets at the
truth of the matter, and it's a necessary and effective practice. But
news investigations, nevertheless, do not enjoy legal impunity . . ..''
\31\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Media's ``Supervision by Public Opinion''--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Journalists and media companies have been frequent targets of
defamation suits in China.\32\ One observer called the verdict in a
defamation case adjudicated in November 2015 a ``historic'' judicial
endorsement of media oversight.\33\ A court in Beijing municipality
reversed a verdict, on appeal, of two media companies accused of having
harmed the reputation of a luxury goods business in articles published
in 2012.\34\ The verdict stated, ``News media have a right and a
responsibility to properly carry out critical supervision.'' \35\ In
his work report to the National People's Congress in March 2016,
Supreme People's Court President Zhou Qiang specifically raised this
case, remarking that the court's decision ``in effect, protect[s] the
rights [quan] of news media to supervise public opinion.'' \36\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHALLENGES TO THE MEDIA'S ``OFFICIAL'' ROLE
Chinese citizens and journalists challenged the Party's
news media control and propaganda work during this reporting
year, sometimes specifically in response to President Xi
Jinping's speech on Party primacy over news media. A prominent
social media commentator \37\ and the unknown authors of a
letter to Xi who identified themselves as ``loyal Party
members,'' \38\ for example, criticized Xi's February 2016
statements for devaluing the media's responsibility to report
on behalf of the public.\39\ An editor at a market-oriented
newspaper in Guangdong province quit his job, making note in
his March 2016 resignation paperwork that he had ``no way to go
along with your surname,'' in reference to Xi's injunction to
``follow the Party's surname.'' \40\ Other challenges to
censorship came from Caixin media,\41\ a Xinhua staff
member,\42\ and a former deputy editor of People's Daily.\43\
Authorities countered criticism by shutting down microblog
accounts,\44\ removing critical content from the Internet and
social media,\45\ and detaining media professionals \46\ and
several China-based family members of Chinese journalists and
bloggers living overseas.\47\
Chinese authorities continued to broadcast prerecorded
confessions on state-controlled media,\48\ including those of a
journalist,\49\ at least two rights lawyers,\50\ the Swedish
cofounder of a legal advocacy group in Beijing
municipality,\51\ and the co-owner of a Hong Kong publishing
company.\52\ The international NGO Chinese Human Rights
Defenders asserted that the government used the broadcast of
confessions on state media outlets ``to denounce individuals or
groups,'' ``control public narratives about government-
perceived `political threats,' '' and retaliate against
government critics.\53\ Two Chinese officials publicly noted
concerns of fairness and access to justice in cases of
televised confessions prior to trial.\54\ [For more information
on televised confessions during the reporting year, see Section
II--Criminal Justice.]
Family members of rights defenders, labor rights groups,
and lawyers also brought, or planned to bring, lawsuits against
official media outlets, with some claiming that the state-run
media outlets' defamatory statements in newspapers and
television were politically motivated.\55\ The mother of Zeng
Feiyang--a labor rights advocate in Guangdong province detained
in December 2015--reportedly withdrew a lawsuit against the
state-run news service Xinhua after family members received
threats that they would lose their jobs if the lawsuit went
forward.\56\ In December 2015, a court in Beijing municipality
postponed holding the trial in former defense lawyer Li
Zhuang's defamation lawsuit against the Party-run China Youth
Daily (CYD),\57\ reportedly due to the presiding judge's back
injury.\58\ Li's legal counsel in the case, Peking University
law professor He Weifang, noted that Li wanted to bring legal
proceedings against CYD in 2011 but was only able to file the
case in June 2015 following reform of the judiciary's case
filing system.\59\ As of August 2016, the Commission had not
observed reports that the case had come to trial.
HARASSMENT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT OF DOMESTIC JOURNALISTS
The number of professional and citizen journalists detained
in China increased in 2015,\60\ making China ``the world's
worst jailer of the press'' for the second year in a row,
according to the international advocacy group Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ).\61\ A significant percentage of
individuals on CPJ's list were ethnic Tibetans and Uyghurs with
backgrounds as freelance or citizen journalists and
bloggers,\62\ but the number of imprisoned journalists from
mainstream media also increased in 2015.\63\ In May 2016, China
was 1 of 10 countries to vote against CPJ's accreditation for
non-governmental consultative status at the United Nations,\64\
a move criticized by rights groups \65\ and UN \66\ and foreign
government officials.\67\ The international press freedom
organization Reporters Without Borders ranked China 176th out
of 180 countries in its 2016 World Press Freedom Index, which
assesses the ``independence of the media, quality of
legislative framework and safety of journalists,'' and also
gave China the worst score under the category ``abuse'' of all
180 countries covered in the index.\68\
The Chinese government used a variety of legal and
extralegal measures to target journalists, editors, and
bloggers who covered issues authorities deemed to be
politically sensitive. The Commission observed reports of
dismissal or disciplinary action over alleged criticism of
government policy \69\ and editorial ``mistakes,'' \70\
official harassment,\71\ physical violence,\72\ detention,\73\
and prison sentences.\74\ [For information on media
developments and cases in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
and in Hong Kong, see Section IV--Xinjiang--Freedom of the
Press and Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau--
Press Freedom.] Selected cases of such harassment and detention
included:
Gao Yu. In November 2015, the Beijing High
People's Court reduced the April 2015 sentence of Gao
Yu--a 72-year-old journalist whose 2014 televised
confession of ``revealing state secrets'' reportedly
had been made under duress \75\--from seven years to
five years.\76\ Although released on medical
parole,\77\ authorities continued to harass Gao,
including by demolishing a small study in her garden
and assaulting her son in March 2016,\78\ forcing her
to leave her home in Beijing municipality for a
``vacation'' during the annual meeting of the National
People's Congress,\79\ and not granting her permission
to travel to Germany for medical treatment.\80\
Li Xin. In February 2016, the family of Li
Xin, a former journalist with the Southern Metropolitan
Daily, learned that Li was at an unidentified detention
site in China after going missing from Thailand in
January.\81\ Thai authorities reportedly stated that
they had a record of Li's entry into Thailand, but not
his exit.\82\ Li left China in October 2015, alleging
public security bureau officials pressured him to
inform on fellow journalists and rights advocates.\83\
Li also provided details on how media censorship
operates in China in a November 2015 interview with
Radio Free Asia.\84\
Wang Jing and 64 Tianwang citizen journalists.
In April 2016, authorities in Jilin province sentenced
Wang Jing to 4 years and 10 months in prison for her
volunteer reporting for the human rights news website
64 Tianwang,\85\ including a report on a self-
immolation protest in Tiananmen Square in 2014.\86\
Chinese authorities also continued to harass and detain
other 64 Tianwang contributors \87\ during this
reporting year. In September 2015, authorities in
Zhejiang province arrested Sun Enwei, who had reported
on inadequate pension benefits for demobilized
soldiers.\88\ Authorities in Sichuan province
reportedly harassed Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang's founder,
after he accompanied two Japanese journalists to report
on sites in Sichuan province affected by the 2008
earthquake.\89\
HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND NEWS MEDIA
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to use
a range of methods to restrict and harass foreign journalists
and news media outlets reporting in China. According to the
Foreign Correspondents' Club of China's (FCCC) most recent
annual report (2015) on working conditions for foreign
reporters in China,\90\ these methods included official
harassment of reporters,\91\ news assistants, and sources; \92\
attempts to block coverage of issues that authorities deemed
sensitive; restrictions on travel to areas along China's border
and ethnic minority regions; visa renewal delays and denials;
and blocking foreign media outlets' websites \93\ and
journalists' social media accounts in China.\94\ Examples of
harassment during the reporting year included:
October 2015. Plainclothes police in Ulanhot
city, Hinggan (Xing'an) League, Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region, forced journalists from Australian
and Japanese news publications to stay at a local
public security bureau for hours to verify their press
credentials.\95\ The journalists had planned, but were
unable, to interview Bao Zhuoxuan,\96\ the son of
detained human rights lawyers Wang Yu \97\ and Bao
Longjun,\98\ at his grandmother's home in Ulanhot.\99\
December 2015. Security agents reportedly
assaulted foreign journalists on assignment outside a
court in Beijing municipality who were reporting on the
trial of public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang.\100\
February and April 2016. Authorities in
Sichuan province prevented Japanese journalists from
the Asahi Shimbun from investigating conditions in
areas affected by the 2008 earthquake.\101\
Unidentified individuals temporarily detained the
journalists during the February incident.\102\
Based on the FCCC's annual survey on foreign journalists'
experiences obtaining press credentials and work visas, the
processing time for annual renewals of press cards (through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and residence visas (through
public security bureaus) was shorter in 2015 compared to prior
years and a relatively small percentage of correspondents
reported problems with their visa renewals.\103\ The FCCC,
however, emphasized that authorities continued to use visa
applications and renewals as a political tool against foreign
journalists,\104\ illustrated during this reporting year by the
Chinese government's effective expulsion of French journalist
Ursula Gauthier by not renewing her visa in December 2015.\105\
In a November 2015 article, Gauthier had criticized the
government's counterterrorism policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.\106\
Internet and Social Media Communications
The scale of Internet and social media use continued to
grow in China during this reporting year, while the government
and Party continued to expand censorship of content. According
to the China Internet Network Information Center, there were
710 million Internet users in China by June 2016,\107\ 656
million of whom accessed the Internet from mobile phones.\108\
As of April 2016, WeChat, an instant messaging platform,
reportedly had more than 700 million monthly active users.\109\
Sina Weibo, a microblogging platform similar to Twitter,
reportedly had 400 million monthly active users.\110\ One
scholarly assessment found that government efforts to control
social media and telecommunications have resulted in ``an
exodus from public microblogging platforms to private messaging
apps.'' \111\
GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CONTROL
The Chinese government and Communist Party further
entrenched institutional oversight and regulatory mechanisms to
control Internet governance in China, and reiterated an
Internet policy based on China's claims of ``Internet
sovereignty.'' \112\ According to scholar Rogier Creemers,
under President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping,
government and Party leaders have shifted responsibility for
Internet governance away from ``technocratic'' state entities
and brought Internet governance ``into the cent[er] of
political decision-making.'' \113\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyberspace Administration of China
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The expanding influence of the Cyberspace Administration of China
(CAC), designated by the State Council in 2014 as the agency
responsible for the ``governance of all online content'' in China,
illustrates the government and Party's shifting priorities in Internet
governance.\114\ Formerly known as the State Internet Information
Office, the CAC is subordinate to the State Council but is directly
supervised by the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and
Informatization, a combined government and Party leadership group
headed by Xi Jinping.\115\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyberspace Administration of China--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Draft revisions of regulations managing Internet news services issued
in January 2016 \116\ appear to grant responsibility to the CAC for all
news-related online content and supervision of news websites'
licensing, editorial liability, and disciplinary decisions.\117\ The
definition of ``Internet news information'' in the draft revisions
encompasses reporting and commentary on public affairs, including
politics, economics, military affairs, and diplomacy, as well as
reporting and commentary on emergent or ``sudden social incidents''
(shehui tufa shijian).\118\ The scope of the draft revisions, moreover,
extends beyond news websites to include ``applications, discussion
forums, blogs, microblogs, instant messaging tools, search engines, and
other applications that contain news, public opinion, or social
mobilization functions.'' \119\ At least one Chinese source described
the draft revisions as the ``toughest'' ever, aimed at further
restricting the space for the public to discuss the news.\120\ In July,
the Beijing branch of the CAC reportedly directed domestic Internet
companies, including Sohu, Sina, and Netease, to discontinue online
news programs producing original content that violated a provision in
the 2005 version of the regulations on Internet news services'
management that limits the reposting or republishing of news from
``central news units'' and those directly under the central
government.\121\ In March 2016, Caixin, a market-oriented media outlet
known for its investigative work, reportedly referred to the CAC as ``a
government censorship organ,'' following the deletion of an article
that discussed restrictions on airing opinions during the annual
meetings of China's legislature and its advisory entity.\122\ The CAC,
moreover, moved to impose ``eight requirements'' to further online news
control, including 24-hour monitoring of online news content and
holding editors-in-chief responsible for content.\123\ The ``eight
requirements'' were imparted at an August 2016 meeting attended by
representatives from official media outlets as well as commercial
websites such as Tencent and Baidu.\124\
In June 2016, CAC's prominent director Lu Wei stepped down from his
position as China's ``Internet czar,'' though he still held a senior
position at the Party's Central Propaganda Department.\125\ An August
2016 report in Hong Kong's South China Morning Post speculated that Lu
Wei's departure ``came after a spate of errors about politically
sensitive topics made their way online . . ..'' \126\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Punishing Citizens' Free Expression
The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to
violate the international standards noted at the beginning of
this section as well as to exploit vague provisions in Chinese
law to prosecute citizens for exercising their right to freedom
of speech.\127\ Human Rights Watch, for example, asserted that
official statistics from the Supreme People's Court on
prosecutions on state security and terrorism charges in 2015
signaled that the government had intensified efforts to
``smother peaceful dissent.'' \128\ During the UN Committee
against Torture's review in November 2015 of China's compliance
with the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, a member of the official
Chinese delegation claimed that ``[t]he efforts of the Chinese
judicial authorities were aimed at fighting criminal behaviour
that truly undermined national security, not at criminalizing
free speech exercised in accordance with the law.'' \129\
Contrary to this claim, Chinese authorities put individuals on
trial during this reporting year who had been detained over the
past three years for peaceful assembly and online advocacy for
a range of issues such as press freedom, commemorating the
violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, officials'
financial disclosure, the ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), support for the
2014 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and discussing ethnic
minority rights and policy. Many of these individuals spent
months in pre-trial detention without access to lawyers and
reported suffering abuse and maltreatment while in
custody,\130\ in violation of rights accorded in the ICCPR and
Chinese law.\131\ Examples included the following cases.
Beijing municipality. In December 2015, the
Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court sentenced
lawyer Pu Zhiqiang to three years' imprisonment,
suspended for three years, on the charges of ``inciting
ethnic hatred'' and ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble'' based on seven microblog posts that
criticized government officials and China's ethnic
policy.\132\ Beijing authorities took Pu into custody
following his attendance at an event in May 2014 to
commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen
protests and their violent suppression.\133\ The
conditions of Pu's suspended sentence included
restrictions on his activities.\134\ In addition, in
April 2016, the Beijing municipal justice bureau
reportedly sent written notification to Pu on his
permanent disbarment from legal practice, a consequence
of the criminal conviction.\135\
Guangdong province. Authorities in Guangdong
imposed prison sentences on Yang Maodong (commonly
known as Guo Feixiong) (six years),\136\ Sun Desheng
(two years and six months),\137\ Liu Yuandong (three
years),\138\ Wang Mo (four years and six months),\139\
Xie Wenfei (four years and six months),\140\ and Liang
Qinhui (one year and six months).\141\ Authorities
charged Guo, Sun, and Liu with ``gathering a crowd to
disturb order in a public place.'' \142\ The judge in
Guo's case added the charge of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble'' while sentencing Guo on November
27, 2015.\143\ Security officials in Guangzhou
municipality had detained Guo, Sun, and Liu in 2013 in
connection with their protests against press
censorship,\144\ and also for Guo and Sun's advocacy of
government officials' asset disclosure and China's
ratification of the ICCPR.\145\ Authorities charged
Wang, Xie, and Liang with ``inciting subversion of
state power,'' a crime of ``endangering state
security'' in the PRC Criminal Law.\146\ Although Wang
also reportedly was involved in the protests against
press censorship in 2013, authorities detained him and
other mainland Chinese advocates--including Xie--for
their support of the pro-democracy protests in Hong
Kong in October of that year.\147\ Liang, an online
commentator, shared his critiques of Chinese President
and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on the
social media network QQ prior to his detention.\148\
Qinghai province. In February 2016,
authorities in Qinghai sentenced Tibetan writer Drukar
Gyal (also known as Druglo and by the pen name
Shogjang) to three years in prison on the charge of
``inciting separatism.'' \149\ Shogjang had written a
blog post about security force deployments in Tongren
(Rebgong) county, Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture, Qinghai, in the days prior to his detention
in March 2015.\150\ According to the Tibetan Buddhist
monk Jigme Gyatso (also known as Golog Jigme), Shogjang
also wrote about the corporal punishment of students in
Haibei (Tsojang) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
Qinghai.\151\
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In
January 2016, the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court in
Urumqi municipality, XUAR, sentenced Zhang Haitao, an
electronics tradesman and rights defender, to serve a
total of 19 years in prison for ``inciting subversion
of state power'' \152\ and ``stealing, spying, buying
and illegally supplying state secrets or intelligence
for an overseas entity'' \153\ for more than 200
microblog posts and content he provided to allegedly
``hostile'' overseas media outlets.\154\ In his appeal,
Zhang argued that the court verdict had unreasonably
equated dissent with spreading rumors and peaceful
expression with serious social harm.\155\
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo remained in prison,
serving year 7 of his 11-year sentence on the charge of
``inciting subversion of state power'' for several of his
essays and his co-authorship of Charter 08, a treatise
advocating political reform and human rights that was
circulated online.\156\ Advocacy organizations continued to
call for his release from prison \157\ and for the release of
his wife, poet and artist Liu Xia,\158\ whom authorities have
detained under extralegal detention at the couple's home in
Beijing since October 2010.\159\
Freedom of
Expression
Freedom of
Expression
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
\1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of
10 December 48, art. 19.
\2\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last visited 26
July 16. China signed the covenant on October 5, 1998.
\3\ State Council Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human
Rights in 2012,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 14 May 13, sec. 6; State Council
Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014,''
reprinted in Xinhua, 8 June 15. According to the 2012 white paper on
human rights, the Chinese government ``actively works for approval of
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.'' The State
Council, however, did not mention the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights in its 2014 human rights white paper.
\4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/17/27, 16 May
11, para. 24.
\5\ Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16 of 12
October 09, para. 5(p)(i).
\6\ UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Article 19,
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 11, para.
21.
\7\ UN Human Rights Council, Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration:
Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade,
Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/
14/23/Add.2, 25 March 10, art. 1(a).
\8\ David Schlesinger et al., ``How To Read China's New Press
Restrictions,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 17 July 14; David
Bandurski, ``Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,'' University of Hong Kong,
China Media Project, 22 February 16; Jun Mai, ``Communist Party Warns
of Gap Between `Public and Official Opinion,' '' South China Morning
Post, 21 February 16. Bandurski, for example, points to former Chinese
Communist Party leaders' pronouncements, such as Mao Zedong's
injunction that ``politicians run the newspapers,'' Jiang Zemin's
``guidance of public opinion,'' and Hu Jintao's ``channeling of public
opinion,'' to illustrate the Party's expectation that the media serve
as its ``mouthpiece'' and shaper of public opinion.
\9\ ``Xi Jinping's View on News and Public Opinion'' [Xi jinping de
xinwen yulun guan], People's Daily, 25 February 16; ``Party Principle
Guides Media Innovation,'' Global Times, 22 February 16; ``Xi's Speech
on News Reporting Resonates With Domestic Outlets,'' Xinhua, 22
February 16; ``People's Daily Chief Yang Zhenwu: Properly Grasp the
Needs in the Current Age for Government Officials Running Newspapers''
[Renmin ribao she shezhang yang zhenwu: bawo hao zhengzhijia banbao de
shidai yaoqiu], People's Daily, 21 March 16. See also Edward Wong, ``Xi
Jinping's News Alert: Chinese Media Must Serve the Party,'' New York
Times, 22 February 16; China Digital Times, ``Xi's State Media Tour:
`News Must Speak for the Party,' '' 19 February 16.
\10\ ``Xi Jinping's View on News and Public Opinion'' [Xi jinping
de xinwen yulun guan], People's Daily, 25 February 16; ``Xi's Speech on
News Reporting Resonates With Domestic Outlets,'' Xinhua, 22 February
16; China Digital Times, ``Xi's State Media Tour: `News Must Speak for
the Party,' '' 19 February 16.
\11\ ``Xi Jinping's View on News and Public Opinion'' [Xi jinping
de xinwen yulun guan], People's Daily, 25 February 16; Zeng Xiangming,
``How To Grasp Three Key Points of `Party Media Are Surnamed Party' ''
[Ruhe bawo ``dangmei xing dang'' san ge guanjian], People's Daily, 9
March 16; David Bandurski, ``How Xi Jinping Views the News,''
University of Hong Kong, China Media Project, 3 March 16.
\12\ ``Xi Jinping's View on News and Public Opinion'' [Xi jinping
de xinwen yulun guan], People's Daily, 25 February 16; ``Xi's Speech on
News Reporting Resonates With Domestic Outlets,'' Xinhua, 22 February
16; ``Xi Jinping Asks for `Absolute Loyalty' From Chinese State
Media,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian, 19 February 16.
\13\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``Xi Wants Chinese Media To Be `Publicity
Fronts' for the CCP,'' The Diplomat, 20 February 16; Lin Feiyun, ``In
Imparting the News Media `Is Surnamed Party,' Xi Jinping Launches an
Era of Total Control'' [Chuanmei ``xing dang,'' xi jinping kaiqi
quanfangwei kongzhi shidai], Initium Media, 23 February 16.
\14\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
\15\ Yang Lixin, ``Research on Judicial Parameters in Media Tort
Liability and Media Rights Protection: Examining the Concept of Soft
Standards on Privacy and Judicial Practice in a `Guide on the
Application of the Tort Liability Law in Cases Involving the Media' ''
[Meiti qinquan he meiti quanli baohu de sifa jiexian yanjiu: you
``meiti qinquan zeren anjian falu shiyong zhiyin'' de zhiding tantao
siyu ruan guifan de gainian he sifa shijian gongneng], Journal of Law
Application, Issue 9 (2014), 45, 46; Xu Hao, ``Looking at the Media's
Responsibility for Reasonable Review in the World Luxury Association
Defamation Case'' [Xu hao: cong shishehui mingyu qinquan kan meiti de
heli shencha yiwu], Southern Media Net, last visited 18 February 16.
The status of the national press legislation is unclear. See, e.g.,
``Journalist Raises Question About Press Legislation, Official
Intentionally Evades It and Adjourns Press Conference'' [Jizhe tiwen
xinwen fa lifa guanyuan gu zuoyou er yan ta xuanbu sanhui], Radio Free
Asia, 11 March 16.
\16\ The State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film
and Television webpage for Chinese reporters includes a section on
``relevant documents, laws, and regulations,'' at http://
press.gapp.gov.cn/reporter/channels/250.html, last visited 11 April 16.
See, e.g., PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo baoshou guojia mimi fa], passed 5 September 88, amended 29
April 10, effective 1 October 10, arts. 9, 27; Supreme People's Court,
Several Provisions on the People's Court Accepting Supervision of News
Media [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan jieshou xinwen meiti
yulun jiandu ruogan guiding], issued 8 December 09. Other key
regulations touching on news publications and journalists include the
PRC Administrative Licensing Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng
xuke fa], passed 28 August 03, effective 1 July 04; State Council,
Regulations on the Management of Publications [Chuban guanli tiaoli],
issued 25 December 01, amended and effective 19 March 11; State
Council, Regulations on the Management of Audiovisual Products
[Yinxiang zhipin guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, amended and
effective 19 March 11; State Administration of Press, Publications,
Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), Measures on Managing Information
Obtained by Press Personnel Through Professional Conduct [Xinwen congye
renyuan zhiwu xingwei xinxi guanli banfa], issued 30 June 14. For
Commission analysis on the SAPPRFT Measures of June 2014, see CECC,
``China's Media Regulator Places New Restrictions on Journalists and
News Organizations,'' 5 November 14.
\17\ ``Chinese Media Outlets `Take Daily Orders' From Government:
Journalist,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 November 15.
\18\ ``Annual Oversight: Industry Standards Frequently Involve
Heavy Strikes, 5 Items of Targeted Work Causing Concern'' [Niandu
jianguang: hangye guifan pinchu zhongquan, 5 xiang zhongdian gongzuo
reren guangzhu], Donghe Information Net, 14 April 16; ``Central News
Units Clean-Up and Consolidate Journalist Stations: More Than 30
Percent Eliminated or Merged'' [Zhongyang xinwen danwei qingli zhengdun
jizhezhan: chebing jigou guo sancheng], Procuratorial Daily, 28 January
16; Zhuo Hongyong, ``Newspaper Industry Keywords in 2015'' [2015 nian
baoye guanjian ci], People's Daily, 7 April 16.
\19\ Tom Phillips, ``China's Young Reporters Give Up on Journalism:
`You Can't Write What You Want,'' Guardian, 11 February 16; Sarah Cook,
``The Decline of Independent Journalism in China,'' The Diplomat, 7
January 16; Jingrong Tong, ``Is Investigative Journalism Dead in China?
'' University of Nottingham China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 20
November 15.
\20\ Yaqiu Wang, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``In China,
Harsh Penalties for `False News' Make It Harder for Reporters To
Work,'' Committee to Protect Journalists (blog), 30 October 15.
\21\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 291.
\22\ ``Chinese Media Outlets `Take Daily Orders' From Government:
Journalist,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 November 15. China Digital Times, a
U.S.-based Web portal that aggregates English and Chinese language
media, features translations of leaked censorship directives at its
Ministry of Truth, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/directives-from-
the-ministry-of-truth/. For examples of directives censoring media- and
press-related news during the Commission's 2016 reporting year, see,
e.g., China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Don't Hype Journalist's
Detention,'' 21 October 15; China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: 21st
Century Media Verdicts,'' 24 December 15.
\23\ Sarah Cook, ``Chinese Journalism, Interrupted,'' Foreign
Policy, Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 6 January 16.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: 21 Rules on Coverage of the
Two Sessions,'' 8 March 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``What Chinese Media
Mustn't Cover at the `2 Sessions,' '' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 9 March 16.
\26\ Nectar Gan, ``No More Idle Chatter in the Great Teahouse of
the People,'' South China Morning Post, 12 March 16.
\27\ David Bandurski, ``Pulitzer's `Lookout on the Bridge' vs.
China's `News Ethics Committees,' '' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 20
November 15.
\28\ David Bandurski, ``Mirror, Mirror on the Wall,'' University of
Hong Kong, China Media Project, 22 February 16; Li-Fung Cho, ``The
Emergence of China's Watchdog Reporting,'' in Investigative Journalism
in China: Eight Cases in Chinese Watchdog Journalism, eds. David
Bandurski and Martin Hala (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
2010), 166-67.
\29\ Keira Lu Huang, ``Jailed and Refused Bail, Chinese
Investigative Journalist Detained After Exposing High Profile
Corruption Scandal,'' South China Morning Post, 19 October 15;
International Federation of Journalists, ``Chinese Reporter Held on
`State Secret' Charges,'' 20 October 15.
\30\ ``Southern Metropolitan Reporter Liu Wei Shows Penitence on
CCTV, Released on Bail'' [Nandu jizhe liu wei shang yangshi huizui huo
qubao houshen], Radio Free Asia, 31 October 15.
\31\ ``Investigation Into the Truth of the Wang Lin Case'' [Wang
lin anzhong an zhenxiang diaocha], Xinhua, 30 October 15, reprinted in
Southern Metropolitan Daily, 31 October 15.
\32\ Benjamin L. Liebman, ``Innovation Through Intimidation: An
Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China,'' Harvard
International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 16 (Winter 2006), 54-57.
\33\ Feng Yuding, ``After Three Years of the World Luxury
Association's Lawsuit, Southern Weekend Wins on Appeal'' [Yu shishehui
suzhan sannian, nanfang zhoumo zhongshen shengsu], Southern Weekend, 9
November 15.
\34\ Zhao Fuduo, ``World Luxury Association Loses Defamation
Lawsuit Against Media on Appeal'' [Shishehui su meiti mingyu qinquanan
zhongshen baisu], Caixin, 9 November 15.
\35\ Ibid.; Lin Ye, ``World Luxury Association's Defamation Lawsuit
Against Beijing News Verdict Revised on Appeal, World Luxury
Association Loses Lawsuit'' [Shishehui su xinjingbao mingyu qinquan an
zhongshen gaipan shishehui baisu], Beijing News, 9 November 15.
\36\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], People's Daily, 13 March 16, sec. 2, para. 6.
\37\ ``Outspoken Chinese Real Estate Mogul Becomes Latest Target of
Party Wrath,'' China Change, 25 February 16.
\38\ ``Loyal Party Members Urge Xi's Resignation,'' March 2016,
translated in China Digital Times, 16 March 16.
\39\ Ibid.; ``Outspoken Chinese Real Estate Mogul Becomes Latest
Target of Party Wrath,'' China Change, 25 February 16.
\40\ Austin Ramzy, ``Editor Says He Is Resigning Over Media
Controls in China,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 29 March 16;
China Digital Times, `` `Unable To Bear the Party Surname,' Editor
Resigns,'' 28 March 16.
\41\ Michael Forsythe, ``Chinese Publication, Censored by
Government, Exposes Article's Removal,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 8 March 16; ``Caixin Media's Display of Courage Against China's
Censors,'' Washington Post, 9 March 16.
\42\ Chris Buckley, ``China's Censors Denounced in Online Attack,''
New York Times, 11 March 16.
\43\ Zhou Ruijin, ``Ideological Work Also Needs Reform and
Innovation'' [Yishi xingtai gongzuo ye yao gaige chuangxin], Phoenix
Review, 2 February 16; Nectar Gan, `` `Censors Have Gone Too Far':
Influential Voice of Deng Xiaoping Era Accuses China's Propaganda
Chiefs of Too Much Intervention,'' South China Morning Post, 4 February
16.
\44\ Edward Wong, ``China Deletes Microblog of Critic of President
Xi Jinping,'' New York Times, 28 February 16; Kenneth Tan, ``SCMP's
Online Presence in Mainland China Completely Wiped Out,'' Shanghaiist,
9 March 16. See also ``Outspoken Chinese Real Estate Mogul Becomes
Latest Target of Party Wrath,'' China Change, 25 February 16.
\45\ Michael Forsythe, ``Chinese Publication, Censored by
Government, Exposes Article's Removal,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 8 March 16; ``Caixin Media's Display of Courage Against China's
Censors,'' Washington Post, 9 March 16.
\46\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Chinese Journalist Jia Jia
Disappears, Whereabouts Unknown,'' 17 March 16; Edward Wong and Chris
Buckley, ``China Said To Detain Several Over Letter Criticizing Xi,''
New York Times, 25 March 16; John Sudworth, ``China `Detained 20 Over
Xi Resignation Letter,' '' BBC, China Blog, 25 March 16.
\47\ Amnesty International, ``China: Prominent Blogger's Family
Detained Over Letter Lambasting President Xi,'' 25 March 16; John
Sudworth, ``China `Detained 20 Over Xi Resignation Letter,' '' BBC,
China Blog, 25 March 16; Chang Ping, ``My Statement About the Open
Letter to Xi Jinping Demanding His Resignation,'' China Change, 27
March 16.
\48\ Steven Jiang, ``Trial by Media? Confessions Go Prime Time in
China,'' CNN, 26 January 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China:
Forced TV Confessions Violate Principle of Presumed Innocence Before
Trial, Constitute Cruel & Degrading Punishment,'' 12 March 16. See also
Zheping Huang, ``China Is Using Televised Confessions To Shame Detained
Lawyers, Journalists, and Activists,'' Quartz, 15 July 15.
\49\ ``Southern Metropolitan Reporter Liu Wei Shows Penitence on
CCTV, Released on Bail'' [Nandu jizhe liu wei shang yangshi huizui huo
qubao houshen], Radio Free Asia, 31 October 15. For coverage of the
case of Caijing reporter Wang Xiaolu's televised confession at the end
of the Commission's 2015 reporting year, see Amie Tsang, ``Caijing
Journalist's Shaming Signals China's Growing Control Over News Media,''
New York Times, 6 September 15. For more information on Wang Xiaolu,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00319.
\50\ Josh Chin, ``Chinese Activist Wang Yu Seen `Confessing' in
Video,'' Wall Street Journal, 1 August 16; Tom Phillips, ``Anger as
Christian Lawyer Paraded on Chinese State TV for `Confession,' ''
Guardian, 26 February 16. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2015-00252 on Wang Yu and 2015-
00318 on Zhang Kai.
\51\ Edward Wong, ``China Uses Foreigners' Televised Confessions To
Serve Its Own Ends,'' New York Times, 21 January 16. For more
information on Peter Dahlin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2016-00024.
\52\ Steven Jiang, ``Trial by Media? Confessions Go Prime Time in
China,'' CNN, 26 January 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China:
Forced TV Confessions Violate Principle of Presumed Innocence Before
Trial, Constitute Cruel & Degrading Punishment,'' 12 March 16.
\53\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Forced TV Confessions
Violate Principle of Presumed Innocence Before Trial, Constitute Cruel
& Degrading Punishment,'' 12 March 16.
\54\ Jia Shiyu, ``Zhu Zhengfu: Suspects Making Confessions on
Television Does Not Mean They Are Actually Guilty'' [Zhu zhengfu
xianfan dianshili renzui budengyu zhen you zui], Beijing News, 2 March
16; Mimi Lau, `` `Pull Plug on China's Televised Confessions' Urges Top
Political Adviser Ahead of Meeting of Country's Legislature,'' South
China Morning Post, 1 March 16; Josh Chin, ``Chinese Judge Criticizes
Televised Confessions,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report
(blog), 15 March 16.
\55\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Labor Group Vows To Sue Over State Media
Report on Detained Activists,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 January 16; China
Labour Bulletin, ``Mother of Detained Labour Activist Zeng Feiyang Sues
China's State Media,'' 12 April 16; ``Civil Complaint by Wang Qiaoling,
Wife of Lawyer Li Heping, Against Xinhua News Agency and Eight Other
Media Organizations for Defaming Her Husband,'' translated in Human
Rights in China, 3 August 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Defamation
Lawsuit of Female Rights Defender in Hunan, Teacher Chen Wenzhong,
Against `Changsha Evening News' Will Go to Trial on the 7th'' [Hunan nu
weiquan renshi chen wenzhong laoshi zhuanggao ``changsha wanbao''
mingyu qinquan yi an jiang yu 7 ri kaiting], 6 September 15; ``Zhang
Wuzhou Seeks Justice on Behalf of Younger Brother Zhang Liumao, Plans
To Sue CCTV'' [Zhang wuzhou wei didi zhang liumao shenzhang zhengyi ni
qisu yangshi], Radio Free Asia, 6 May 16.
\56\ Pablo Wang and Echo Hui, ``The Family of a Well-Known Chinese
Activist Was Harassed Into Dropping a Lawsuit Against Xinhua,'' Quartz,
2 May 16; Mimi Lau, ``Mother of Detained Labour Activist Takes on State
Media--and Forced Into Hardest Decision of Her Life,'' South China
Morning Post, 1 May 16.
\57\ ``Li Zhuang Sues China Youth Daily for Defamation of
Character, Case Filed After 3 and a Half Years of Trying'' [Li zhuang
su zhongqingbao mingyu qinquan an shige 3 nian ban zai qisu huo li'an],
The Paper, reprinted in Sohu, 8 June 15; Zhao Fuduo, ``Former Lawyer Li
Zhuang Sues Publisher of `China Youth Daily' for Defamation of
Character, Goes to Court on December 4'' [Qian lushi li zhuang su
``zhongguo qingnian bao'' she mingyu qinquan an 12 yue 4 ri kaiting],
Caixin, 1 December 15. Li claimed that China Youth Daily reporters
failed to conduct investigative journalism in a 2009 article they wrote
about Li's work as counsel in a high-profile criminal case in Chongqing
municipality. See also Sida Liu, Lily Liang, and Terence C. Halliday,
``The Trial of Li Zhuang: Chinese Lawyers' Collective Action Against
Populism,'' Asian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 1 (2014).
\58\ Luo Ya, ``Li Zhuang's Defamation Lawsuit Against China Youth
Daily Postponed Because Presiding Judge Sprained Back'' [Li zhuang su
zhongqingbao mingyu qinquan an yin shenpanzhang yao niushang tuichi],
Epoch Times, 6 December 15.
\59\ Zhao Fuduo, ``Former Lawyer Li Zhuang Sues Publisher of `China
Youth Daily' for Defamation of Character, Goes to Court on December 4''
[Qian lushi li zhuang su ``zhongguo qingnian bao'' she mingyu qinquan
an 12 yue 4 ri kaiting], Caixin, 1 December 15.
\60\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), ``China,
Egypt Imprison Record Numbers of Journalists,'' 15 December 15;
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), ``China's Great Media
Wall: The Fight for Freedom,'' 30 January 16, 10; ``China Holds 23
Journalists, 84 Bloggers in 2015: Press Freedom Report,'' Radio Free
Asia, 30 December 15. While variance in the data reflects differing
approaches to whether citizen journalists and bloggers are included in
the data, China's detention numbers are high as measured by leading
press freedom organizations: CPJ reported on 49 detained journalists in
2015; IFJ reported 41; and, according to Radio Free Asia, Reporters
Without Borders (RSF) reported on the detention of 23 journalists and
84 bloggers in 2015.
\61\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China, Egypt
Imprison Record Numbers of Journalists,'' 15 December 15; Shazdeh
Omari, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China Is World's Worst
Jailer of the Press; Global Tally Second Worst on Record,'' 17 December
14.
\62\ Elana Beiser, Committee to Protect Journalists, ``China, Egypt
Imprison Record Numbers of Journalists,'' 15 December 15. See also
China country report in Freedom House, ``Freedom of the Press 2016,''
25 April 16.
\63\ Freedom House, ``Freedom of the Press 2016,'' 25 April 16.
\64\ Somini Sengupta, ``Press Freedom Group's Application for U.N.
Accreditation Is Rejected,'' New York Times, 26 May 16. On June 14,
2016, China was elected to a new three-year term on the UN Economic and
Social Council. UN General Assembly, ``General Assembly Elects 18
Members of Economic and Social Council, Also Adopts Texts, Including
One Designating 29 June International Day of Tropics,'' 14 June 16; UN
Watch, ``China, Russia, UAE, Venezuela, Wins Seats on UN Organ
Overseeing Human Rights,'' 14 June 16.
\65\ Committee to Project Journalists (CPJ), ``CPJ Denied ECOSOC
Consultative Status After Vote in UN NGO Committee,'' 26 May 16;
Freedom House, `` `Shameful' Decision To Deny CPJ Access to United
Nations,'' 27 May 16.
\66\ Ban Ki-moon, United Nations, ``Secretary-General's Remarks at
the Opening of the 66th UN DPI/NGO Conference,'' 30 May 16; ``UN Rights
Office Concerned Over Denial of Participation for Journalist's Group,
LGBT Organizations,'' UN News Service, 31 May 16; Tracy Wilkinson,
``Nations With Poor Human Rights Records Block UN Status for Press-
Rights Group,'' Los Angeles Times, 26 May 16.
\67\ Tracy Wilkinson, ``Nations With Poor Human Rights Records
Block UN Status for Press-Rights Group,'' Los Angeles Times, 26 May 16;
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York, ``CPJ
Application for UN Accreditation,'' 27 May 16. See also Department of
International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa,
``South Africa Has No Objection to CPJ Being Granted Observer Status by
ECOSOC.,'' 27 May 16.
\68\ Reporters Without Borders, ``2016 World Press Freedom Index,''
last visited 20 April 16; Reporters Without Borders, ``China: Great
Firewall and Systematic Imprisonment,'' last visited 6 July 16. For
general data on China, select the ``China'' country page; for the abuse
score for all countries ranked in 2016, select the ``Index Details''
page; and for an explanation of the Press Freedom Index, select the
page headed ``The World Press Freedom Index: What Is It? ''
\69\ ``Zhao Xinyu, Former Editor-in-Chief of Xinjiang Daily, Doubly
Expelled'' [Xinjiang ribaoshe yuan zongbianji zhao xinyu bei
shuangkai], People's Daily, 2 November 15; Tom Phillips, ``Chinese
Newspaper Editor Sacked for Criticising Beijing's `War on Terror,' ''
Guardian, 2 November 15.
\70\ See, e.g., Nectar Gan, ``Editor at Liberal Chinese Newspaper
Fired Over Xi Front Page,'' South China Morning Post, 2 March 16;
``[Xinhua News Blunder] Report Mistakenly Called Xi Jinping `Last
Leader' Alleged To Be `Political Mistake,' Editor Dismissed and Loses
Status as Probationary Party Member'' [(Xinhuashe cuoshi) cuocheng xi
jinping ``zuihou lingdaoren'' baodao zhi ``zhengzhi cuowu'' fagao
bianji tingzhi ji quxiao yubei dangyuan zige], Ming Pao, 16 March 16;
Choi Chi-yuk, ``Beijing Clamps Down on News Portals, Ordering Round the
Clock Monitoring,'' South China Morning Post, 19 August 16.
\71\ See, e.g., ``Media: What Do Journalists' Ordinary Reports Have
To Do With State Security? '' [Meiti: jizhe zhengchang baodao yu guojia
anquan he gan?], Beijing News, reprinted in Sina.com, 10 April 16; Cao
Guoxing, ``CPPCC Delegate Song Xin Intimidates Journalist Raising
Questions at Two Sessions: `Be Careful, or You'll Be Taken Away' ''
[Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan song xin weixie lianghui tiwen jizhe:
``xiaoxin ba ni zhuaqilai''], Radio France Internationale, 16 March 16.
\72\ See, e.g., ``Fire at Zhengzhou Property Causes 2 Deaths,
Journalists Interviewing Are Hit and Taken Away by Police'' [Zhengzhou
loupan zhaohuo zhi 2 si jizhe caifang bei da bing zao jingcha daizou],
Henan TV, reprinted in Sohu, 31 October 15; ``Police Station Chief
Revealed To Have Beaten Female Reporter Behind Closed Doors, Police at
Doorway Blocked Other Journalists From Entering'' [Paichusuozhang bei
bao guanmen da nu jizhe menkou jingcha zuzhi jizhe jinru], Harbin
Broadcast TV, reprinted in Global Times, 21 April 16.
\73\ See, e.g., Keira Lu Huang, ``Jailed and Refused Bail, Chinese
Investigative Journalist Detained After Exposing High Profile
Corruption Scandal,'' South China Morning Post, 18 October 15; Lan
Tianming, ``3 Journalists From Wuwei, Gansu, Remain in Custody:
Detained Journalist Denies Extortion Accusation'' [Gansu wuwei 3 jizhe
bei juxu: zaiya jizhe dui qiaozha zhikong yuyi fouren], China Youth
Daily, 22 January 16; Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Arrests
Approved for Lu Yuyu, Founder of `Not the News' Site Documenting Civil
Society Rights Defense Incidents, and Li Tingyu, on Suspicion of
Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, by Dali Procuratorate'' [Jilu
minjian weiquan shijian ``fei xinwen'' chuangbanren lu yuyu ji li
tingyu liang ren bei dali jianchayuan yi shexian xunxin zishi zui
pizhun daibu], 22 July 16; Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, ``China Said
To Detain Several Over Letter Criticizing Xi,'' New York Times, 25
March 16.
\74\ Several international media rights organizations maintain
lists of detained and imprisoned journalists, writers, and bloggers
from China. See, e.g., Committee to Protect Journalists, ``2015 Prison
Census: 199 Journalists Jailed Worldwide,'' last visited 6 May 16;
International Federation of Journalists, ``China's Great Media Wall:
The Fight for Freedom,'' last visited 6 May 16; Independent Chinese PEN
Center, Writers in Prison, last visited 6 May 16. In addition, the
Commission maintains a Political Prisoner Database at ppdcecc.gov from
which individual case data is available.
\75\ Amnesty International, China Human Rights Lawyers Concern
Group, Committee to Protect Journalists et al., ``Joint Letter to
President Xi Jinping,'' reprinted in Human Rights Watch, 5 August 15.
For more information on Gao Yu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2004-05037.
\76\ ``Gao Yu Admitted Guilt and Showed Remorse for Crime, May
Temporarily Serve [Sentence] Outside Jail Based on Decision Made
According to Law'' [Gao yu renzui huizui bei yifa jueding zanyu jianwai
zhixing], Xinhua, 26 November 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Today Gao
Yu's Case Verdict Changed on Appeal to Five-Year Prison Term and One-
Year Deprivation of Political Rights, Freedom of Speech Again Trampled
On'' [Gao yu an jin zhongshen gaipan youqi tuxing wu nian, boduo
zhengzhi quanli yi nian, yanlun ziyou zai zao cubao jianta], 26
November 15.
\77\ ``Gao Yu `Forced To Travel' During Two Sessions'' [Gao yu
lianghui qijian ``bei luyou''], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 16.
\78\ ``Chinese Journalist Gao Yu in Hospital After Demolition Raid
on Home,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 April 16; `` `Today, I Must Break My
Silence': Veteran Journalist Gao Yu,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 April 16;
Reporters Without Borders, ``RSF Appalled by Harassment of Journalist
Gao Yu's Family,'' 31 March 16.
\79\ ``Gao Yu `Forced To Travel' During Two Sessions'' [Gao yu
lianghui qijian ``bei luyou''], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 16.
\80\ ``Gao Yu's Lawyer Calls on Authorities To Follow Through on
Promise To Allow Gao To Go Abroad for Medical Treatment'' [Gao yu lushi
huyu dangju luxing nuoyan pizhun gao dao haiwai jiuyi], Radio Free
Asia, 4 February 16; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Detained Activist,
Journalist Denied Needed Health Care,'' 6 May 16.
\81\ Chris Buckley, ``Journalist Who Sought Refuge in Thailand Is
Said To Return to China,'' New York Times, 3 February 16; Tom Phillips
and Oliver Holmes, ``Activist Who Vanished in Thailand Is Being Held in
China, Says Wife,'' Guardian, 3 February 16.
\82\ Chris Buckley, ``Journalist Who Sought Refuge in Thailand Is
Said To Return to China,'' New York Times, 3 February 16.
\83\ ``Li Xin: Applies for Political Asylum So That He Doesn't
Split Himself Further'' [Li xin: shenqing zhengzhi bihu shi bu xiang
ren'ge fenliu xiaqu], BBC, 11 November 15.
\84\ ``Chinese Media Outlets `Take Daily Orders' From Government:
Journalist,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 November 15.
\85\ ``Tianwang Citizen Journalist Wang Jing Sentenced to Prison
for 4 Years'' [Tianwang gongmin jizhe wang jing bei pan qiu 4 nian],
Radio Free Asia, 25 April 16; ``China Reissues Charges Against Citizen
Journalist,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 February 16. Wang began to document
petitioners' activities for 64 Tianwang in 2013 after years of seeking
government assistance for information on her elder sister's
disappearance from a factory work shift in 1993. Chuanying District
People's Court of Jilin Municipality, Jilin Province, ``Criminal
Verdict No. 132 (2015)'' [(2015) chuan xing chuzi di 132 hao], 20 April
16, 4, reprinted in ``Criminal Verdict for Tianwang Citizen Journalist
Wang Jing'' [Tianwang gongmin jizhe wang jing xingshi panjueshu], 64
Tianwang, 24 April 16. For more information on Wang Jing, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00104.
\86\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Three Journalists Detained
After Reporting on Tiananmen,'' 18 March 14.
\87\ ``Tianwang Citizen Journalist Wang Jing Sentenced to Prison
for 4 Years'' [Tianwang gongmin jizhe wang jing bei pan qiu 4 nian],
Radio Free Asia, 25 April 16.
\88\ Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang, ``Old War Veteran Sun Enwei Faces
Criminal Detention, 11 Citizen Journalists From Tianwang Detained''
[Canzhan laobing sun enwei zao xingju tianwang 11 gongmin jizhe zaiya],
29 August 15; Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang, ``Zhejiang Arrests Old Soldiers'
Rights Defense Representative Sun Enwei, Police Threaten His Wife To
Keep It a Secret'' [Zhejiang daibu laobing weiquan daibiao sun enwei
jingfang weixie qizi baomi], 30 September 15; ``Old Soldier Sun Enwei
Criminally Detained, Fellow Soldiers Will Go to Yangjiang for Rights
Defense'' [Laobing sun enwei zao xingju zhanyou ni yangjiang weiquan],
Radio Free Asia, 29 August 15. See also ``More Than 4,000 Retired
Soldiers Gather at Central Military Commission Holding Banners To
Protect Rights'' [4000 yu tuiyi junren ju zhongyang junwei la hengfu
weiquan], New Tang Dynasty Television, 19 July 16. For more information
on Sun Enwei, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2016-00075.
\89\ ``Interview: `The Authorities Fear We Will Expose the Scandal
of Post-Quake Reconstruction,' '' Radio Free Asia, 4 March 16;
``[Xinhua News Agency Blunder] Mistakenly Calling Xi Jinping the `Last
Leader,' Report Accused of Being `Politically Incorrect,' Editor
Dismissed and Loses Status as Probationary Party Member'' [(Xinhuashe
cuoshi) cuo cheng xi jinping ``zuihou lingdao ren'' baodao zhi
``zhengzhi cuowu'' fagao bianji tingzhi ji quxiao yubei dangyuan zige],
Ming Pao, 16 March 16.
\90\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``FCCC Annual Working
Conditions Report 2015,'' reprinted in Wall Street Journal, May 2015.
\91\ Ibid. See, e.g., Eric Fish, `` `I Don't Want To Think About
Activating Change': NYT's David Barboza on Reporting in China,'' Asia
Society, Asia Blog, 28 January 16. David Barboza, former Shanghai
correspondent for the New York Times and the lead author of a 2012
expose on the financial holdings of the family of then-premier, Wen
Jiabao, indicated in this January 2016 Asia Society interview that
Chinese authorities had increased harassment against him in 2015.
\92\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``FCCC Annual Working
Conditions Report 2015,'' reprinted in Wall Street Journal, May 2015.
See, e.g., Edward Wong, ``Tibetan Entrepreneur Has Been Illegally
Detained, Family Says,'' New York Times, 10 March 16; Edward Wong,
``Tibetans Fight To Salvage Fading Culture in China,'' New York Times,
28 November 15. For more information on Tashi Wangchug, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00077.
\93\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``FCCC Annual Working
Conditions Report 2015,'' reprinted in Wall Street Journal, May 2015.
See, e.g., Emily Feng, ``China Blocks Economist and Time Websites,
Apparently Over Xi Jinping Articles,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 8 April 16; Jonathan Kaiman, ``There's a New BBC in China--And
There's Nothing British About It,'' Los Angeles Times, 11 April 16;
Greatfire.org, ``The New York Times vs. The Chinese Authorities,'' 7
May 16. Western media blocked in China during the 2016 reporting year
included the New York Times, Bloomberg News, the Wall Street Journal,
Le Monde, El Pais, Time, and the Economist. Chinese censors blocked
Reuters in 2015. ``Reuters Websites Become Inaccessible in China,''
Reuters, 20 March 15; Alistair Charlton, ``Reuters News Banned in
China: English and Chinese Versions Inaccessible,'' International
Business Times, 20 March 15.
\94\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``FCCC Annual Working
Conditions Report 2015,'' reprinted in Wall Street Journal, May 2015.
\95\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Incident Report:
Reporters, Chinese Assistant Detained in Inner Mongolia, Blocked From
Interviewing Teenage Son of Rights Lawyer,'' 13 October 15; Philip Wen,
`` `You Are in Danger. We Are Being Monitored,' '' Sydney Morning
Herald, 14 October 15.
\96\ For more information on Bao Zhuoxuan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00345.
\97\ For more information on Wang Yu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00252.
\98\ For more information on Bao Longjun, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00253.
\99\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Incident Report:
Reporters, Chinese Assistant Detained in Inner Mongolia, Blocked From
Interviewing Teenage Son of Rights Lawyer,'' 13 October 15; Philip Wen,
`` `You Are in Danger. We Are Being Monitored,' '' Sydney Morning
Herald, 14 October 15.
\100\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (fccchina), ``FCCC
Statement on Journalists Assaulted,'' TwitLonger post, 14 December 15;
``Police Detain Supporters, Bar Journalists Outside Pu Zhiqiang
Trial,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 December 15.
\101\ ``May 12 Disaster Reconstruction and Corruption in Sichuan
Becomes Forbidden Zone for Reporting, Japanese Journalists Obstructed
From Interviewing Individuals Affected by Disaster'' [Sichuan 512
zaihou chongjian yan tanfu cheng baodao jinqu rimei caifang zaimin
shouzu], Radio Free Asia, 28 April 16.
\102\ ``Interview: `The Authorities Fear We Will Expose the Scandal
of Post-Quake Reconstruction,' '' Radio Free Asia, 4 March 16.
\103\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Annual Survey of
Visa Issues,'' April 2016, reprinted in Committee to Protect
Journalists (blog), 4 April 16; Committee to Protect Journalists,
``Foreign Press in China Face Fewer Visa Delays but Obstacles Remain,
FCCC Finds,'' Committee to Protect Journalists (blog), 4 April 16.
\104\ Ibid.
\105\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on December 28, 2015,'' 28 December
15; Tom Phillips, ``Ursula Gauthier: Foreign Media Must Fight China
Censorship, Says Expelled Journalist,'' Guardian, 31 December 15.
\106\ Ursula Gauthier, ``Following the Attacks, China's Solidarity
Isn't Without Ulterior Motives'' [Apres les attentats, la solidarite de
la chine n'est pas sans arriere-pensees], L'Obs, 18 November 15.
Chinese official media heavily criticized Gauthier. See, e.g.,
``Opinion: Press Freedom No Excuse for Advocating Terrorism,'' Xinhua,
28 December 15; ``State Media Supports Expulsion of French Journalist
for Xinjiang Reporting,'' Feichangdao (blog), 11 January 16.
\107\ China Internet Network Information Center, ``The 38th
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 38 ci
zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao], July 2016,
1.
\108\ Ibid.
\109\ ``WeChat Blasts Past 700 Million Monthly Active Users, Tops
China's Most Popular Apps,'' Tech in Asia, 17 April 16.
\110\ Ibid.
\111\ Rogier Creemers, ``The Pivot in Chinese Cybergovernance,''
China Perspectives, No. 5 (2015), 9.
\112\ Dan Levin, ``At UN, China Tries To Influence Fight Over
Internet Control,'' New York Times, 16 December 15; Zhuang Pinghui,
``The World Needs New Rules for Cyberspace, Says China's President Xi
Jinping,'' South China Morning Post, 17 December 15; ``Xi Jinping: Let
the Internet Enrich the Nation and the People Even More'' [Xi jinping:
rang hulianwang genghao zaofu guojia he renmin], Xinhua, 19 April 16.
For an unofficial translation of Xi's speech, see ``Xi Jinping Gives
Speech at Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference,'' China
Copyright and Media Blog, 28 April 16. See also CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 66, on ``Promoting `Internet Sovereignty.' ''
\113\ Rogier Creemers, ``The Pivot in Chinese Cybergovernance,''
China Perspectives, No. 4 (2015), 8.
\114\ Ibid., 8.
\115\ Ibid., 6-8.
\116\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Internet News Information
Services Management Regulations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of
Comments) [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding (xiuding
zhengqiu yijian gao), 11 January 16.
\117\ ``China's New Internet Regulations: Internet News Gathering
Requires Establishing Chief Editor'' [Zhongguo hulianwang xin gui:
wangluo xinwen caibian xu she zongbianji], BBC, 13 January 16; Qian
Junke, ``Admirable Items in the Revised Draft of the Internet News
Information Services Management Regulations'' [Wei xiuding hulianwang
xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding dianzang], Guangming Daily, 16 January
16.
\118\ Cyberspace Administration of China, Internet News Information
Services Management Regulations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of
Comments) [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guangli guiding (xiuding
zhengqiu yijian gao), 11 January 16, art. 2.
\119\ Ibid., art. 6.
\120\ Zhao Chenting, ``Solicitation of Comments on Management
Regulations Released, Internet News Industry Faces Major Reshuffling''
[Guanli guiding zhengqiu yijian chulu hulianwang xinwenye mianlin da
xipai], China Business News, reprinted in IResearch, 14 January 16.
\121\ ``China Shuts Down Many Online Programs Producing Original
News, Sina, Sohu and Netease Included Among Names of Those [Shut
Down]'' [Zhongguo guanting duo wangzhan yuanchuang shiwen lanmu,
xinlang wangyi, sohu bang shang youming], Initium Media, 25 July 16;
David Bandurski, ``Convergent Control,'' University of Hong Kong, China
Media Project, 25 August 16.
\122\ Michael Forsythe, ``Chinese Publication, Censored by
Government, Exposes Article's Removal,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 8 March 16.
\123\ Zhu Jichai, ``Cyberspace Administration of China Presents
Eight Requirements To Fulfill Main Responsibilities Online'' [Guojia
wangxinban tichu wangzhan luxing zhuti zeren ba xiang yaoqiu], Xinhua,
17 August 16; ``Watchdog Asks Websites To Strictly Manage Online
Content,'' Global Times, 18 August 16.
\124\ Zhu Jichai, ``Cyberspace Administration of China Presents
Eight Requirements To Fulfill Main Responsibilities Online'' [Guojia
wangxinban tichu wangzhan luxing zhuti zeren ba xiang yaoqiu], Xinhua,
17 August 16.
\125\ Jane Perlez and Paul Mozur, ``Lu Wei, China's Internet Czar,
Will Step Down From Post,'' New York Times, 29 June 16.
\126\ Choi Chi-yuk, ``Beijing Clamps Down on News Portals, Ordering
Round the Clock Monitoring,'' South China Morning Post, 19 August 16.
\127\ Stanley Lubman, ``China's Criminal Law Once Again Used as
Political Tool,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 1
December 15.
\128\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: State Security, Terrorism
Convictions Double,'' 16 March 16.
\129\ UN Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 1371st
Meeting (18 November 2015), CAT/C/SR.1371, 23 November 15, para. 23.
\130\ `` `Tortured' Guangzhou Activist Refuses Food in Detention
Center,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 January 15.
\131\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 7, 9, 14.
\132\ Jane Perlez, ``Chinese Rights Lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, Is Given
Suspended Prison Sentence,'' New York Times, 21 December 15; ``Verdict
in Pu Zhiqiang's First Instance Trial, Prison Term of 3 Years Suspended
for 3 Years'' [Pu zhiqiang yishen xuanpan jianjin 3 nian huanxing 3
nian], Radio Free Asia, 22 December 15. Radio Free Asia reported that,
according to Pu's lawyer Mo Shaoping, the three-year sentence was
divided into two years for the charge of ``inciting ethnic hatred'' and
one year for ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' See also CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 68. For more information on Pu
Zhiqiang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-
00174.
\133\ Austin Ramzy, ``Rights Lawyer Detained Ahead of Tiananmen
Anniversary,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 6 May 14.
\134\ Verna Yu, ``Beijing `Silencing' Outspoken Rights Lawyer With
Restrictions on Suspended Jail Term,'' South China Morning Post, 4
January 16.
\135\ ``Pu Zhiqiang's Lawyer's License Revoked, Lawyer Cheng Hai
Summoned Prior to Annual License Renewal'' [Pu zhiqiang bei quxiao
lushi zige cheng hai lushi wei nianjian bei chuanhuan], Radio Free
Asia, 14 April 16; Ben Blanchard, ``Prominent Chinese Rights Lawyer
Says He Is Formally Disbarred,'' Reuters, 14 April 16; ``Pu Zhiqiang:
China Rights Lawyer Has Licence Revoked,'' BBC, 14 April 16.
\136\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Rights Advocate Known as Guo
Feixiong Convicted of Unexpected New Charge,'' New York Times, 27
November 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Tianhe District Court in
Guangzhou Municipality Separately Sentences Guo Feixiong to Six Years,
Sun Desheng to Two Years and Six Months, and Liu Yuandong to Three
Years in Prison'' [Guangzhou shi tianhe qu fayuan jin fenbie panjue guo
feixiong liu nian, sun desheng liang nian liu ge yue, liu yuandong san
nian youqi tuxing], 27 November 15. For more information on Guo
Feixiong (also known as Yang Maodong), see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2005-00143.
\137\ Rights Defense Network, ``Tianhe District Court in Guangzhou
Municipality Separately Sentences Guo Feixiong to Six Years, Sun
Desheng to Two Years and Six Months, and Liu Yuandong to Three Years in
Prison'' [Guangzhou shi tianhe qu fayuan jin fenbie panjue guo feixiong
liu nian, sun desheng liang nian liu ge yue, liu yuandong san nian
youqi tuxing], 27 November 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Rights
Defender Sun Desheng Today Completes Sentence and Leaves Prison, He
Faced Torture, Abuse, and Beatings in Prison'' [Renquan hanweizhe sun
desheng jinri xing man chuyu yuzhong zao kuxing nuedai ouda], 28
February 16. For more information on Sun Desheng, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00313.
\138\ Rights Defense Network, ``Tianhe District Court in Guangzhou
Municipality Separately Sentences Guo Feixiong to Six Years, Sun
Desheng to Two Years and Six Months, and Liu Yuandong to Three Years in
Prison'' [Guangzhou shi tianhe qu fayuan jin fenbie panjue guo feixiong
liu nian, sun desheng liang nian liu ge yue, liu yuandong san nian
youqi tuxing], 27 November 15. For more information on Liu Yuandong,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00333.
\139\ Rights Defense Network, ``Wang Mo, Xie Fengxia (Xie Wenfei)
Today Both Sentenced to 4 Years and 6 Months' Imprisonment'' [Wang mo,
xie fengxia (xie wenfei) jin jun huoxing 4 nian 6 ge yue youqi tuxing],
8 April 16. For more information on Wang Mo, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00328.
\140\ Ibid. For more information on Xie Wenfei, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00209.
\141\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhang Rongping (Zhang Shengyu) and
Liang Qinhui Were Separately Sentenced Today to 4 Years and 1 Year and
6 Months in Prison'' [Zhang rongping (zhang shengyu), liang qinhui jin
fenbie huoxing 4 nian he 1 nian 6 ge yue], 8 April 16. For more
information on Liang Qinhui, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00045.
\142\ ``Lawyers' Account: Court in China Adds Last-Minute Charge in
Heavy Sentence Against Rights Leader Guo Feixiong,'' China Change, 27
November 15 (Guo and Sun); ``Liu Yuandong Sentenced to Three Years for
`Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Order in a Public Place' '' [Liu yuandong
bei yi ``juzhong raoluan gonggong changsuo zhixu'' zui pan san nian],
Boxun, 27 November 15 (Liu); PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1
October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28
December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February
11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 291.
\143\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Rights Advocate Known as Guo
Feixiong Convicted of Unexpected New Charge,'' New York Times, 27
November 15; ``Lawyers' Account: Court in China Adds Last-Minute Charge
in Heavy Sentence Against Rights Leader Guo Feixiong,'' China Change,
27 November 15; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15,
effective 1 November 15, art. 293.
\144\ ``Translation: Police Indictment Opinion for Guo Feixiong &
Sun Desheng,'' Siweiluozi's Blog, 26 December 13; ``Liu Yuandong
Sentenced to Three Years for `Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Order in a
Public Place'' [Liu yuandong yi ``juzhong raoluan gonggong changsuo
zhixu'' zui pan san nian], Boxun, 27 November 15. For more information
on the anti-press censorship protests, see the box ``January 2013
Southern Weekend Protests'' in CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13,
64.
\145\ ``Translation: Police Indictment Opinion for Guo Feixiong &
Sun Desheng,'' Siweiluozi's Blog, 26 December 13.
\146\ Rights Defense Network, ``Wang Mo, Xie Fengxia (Xie Wenfei)
Today Both Sentenced to 4 Years and 6 Months' Imprisonment'' [Wang mo,
xie fengxia (xie wenfei) jin jun huoxing 4 nian 6 ge yue youqi tuxing],
8 April 16 (Wang and Xie); Rights Defense Network, ``Zhang Rongping
(Zhang Shengyu) and Liang Qinhui Were Separately Sentenced Today to 4
Years and 1 Year and 6 Months in Prison'' [Zhang rongping (zhang
shengyu), liang qinhui jin fenbie huoxing 4 nian he 1 nian 6 ge yue], 8
April 16 (Liang); PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15,
effective 1 November 15, part 2, chap. 1, art. 105.
\147\ Mo Zhixu, ``The Southern Street Movement: China's Lonely
Warriors,'' China Change, 13 April 16.
\148\ ``Guangzhou Netizen Liang Qinhui Faces Criminal Detention for
Speech and Online Essays That Supposedly Defamed the Country's
Leaders'' [Guangzhou wangyou liang qinhui yin yan huozui zao xingju
wangluo wenzhang bei zhi dihui guojia lingdaoren], Radio Free Asia, 5
February 15.
\149\ ``CCP Sentences Tibetan Writer Involved in 2008 Tibetan
Uprising to Three Years in Prison'' [Zhonggong panchu sheji 2008 nian
xizang kangbao zangren zuojia sannian tuxing], Tibet Post
International, 19 February 16; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1
October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28
December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February
11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 103. For more
information on Drukar Gyal, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2010-00153.
\150\ Canadian Journalists for Free Expression et al., ``Free
Imprisoned Blogger Shokjang, Civil Society Groups Tell Chinese
Authorities,'' reprinted in Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, 8
April 16; ``CCP Sentences Tibetan Writer Involved in 2008 Tibetan
Uprising to Three Years in Prison'' [Zhonggong panchu sheji 2008 nian
xizang kangbao zangren zuojia sannian tuxing], Tibet Post
International, 19 February 16.
\151\ ``CCP Sentences Tibetan Writer Involved in 2008 Tibetan
Uprising to Three Years in Prison'' [Zhonggong panchu sheji 2008 nian
xizang kangbao zangren zuojia sannian tuxing], Tibet Post
International, 19 February 16. See also PRC Compulsory Education Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyu fa], passed 12 April 86, amended
29 June 06, effective 1 September 06, art. 29. The PRC Compulsory
Education Law prohibits corporal punishment in schools.
\152\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 105.
\153\ Ibid., art. 111.
\154\ Rights Defense Network, ``Xinjiang Rights Defender Zhang
Haitao Sentenced by Urumqi Intermediate Court to 15 Years for `Inciting
Subversion of State Power' and 5 Years for `Providing Intelligence
Overseas,' To Serve 19 Years in Total'' [Xinjiang renquan hanweizhe
zhang haitao bei wulumuqi zhongyuan yi ``shandong dianfu guojia zui''
chu youqi tuxing 15 nian, ``wei jingwai tigong qingbao zui'' panchu
youqi tuxing 5 nian, hebing zhixing 19 nian], 18 January 16; Yaxue Cao,
``Appeal Begins of Harsh 19-Year Prison Term Given Xinjiang-Based
Activist Zhang Haitao,'' China Change, 21 February 16. Zhang's sentence
is divided into 15 years for the ``inciting'' charge and 5 years for
the ``illegal provision'' charge even though authorities ordered him to
serve 19 years. For more information on Zhang Haitao, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00343.
\155\ ``Harshly Sentenced to 19 Years, Zhang Haitao Submits
`Appeal,' Family Members in Dire Need of Assistance'' [Bei pan 19 nian
zhongxing de zhang haitao shaochu ``shangsushu'' jiashu jixu jiuzhu],
Boxun, 31 January 16; Yaxue Cao, ``Appeal Begins of Harsh 19-Year
Prison Term Given Xinjiang-Based Activist Zhang Haitao,'' China Change,
21 February 16.
\156\ ``International PEN Calls for the Immediate Release of Liu
Xiaobo'' [Guoji bihui yaoqiu liji shifang liu xiaobo], Voice of
America, 9 December 15; PEN International, ``China: Seven Years After
His Arrest PEN Writers Urge China To Release Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia,'' 8 December 15; PEN American Center,
``Dear President Xi: A Message From America's Writers,'' 18 September
15; Yaqiu Wang, ``Amid Crackdown, China's Dissidents Fight To Keep the
Spirit of Tiananmen Alive,'' World Politics Review, 7 June 16. For more
information on Liu Xiaobo, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2004-03114.
\157\ ``International PEN Calls for the Immediate Release of Liu
Xiaobo'' [Guoji bihui yaoqiu liji shifang liu xiaobo], Voice of
America, 9 December 15; PEN International, ``China: Seven Years After
His Arrest PEN Writers Urge China To Release Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia,'' 8 December 15; PEN American Center,
``Dear President Xi: A Message From America's Writers,'' 18 September
15.
\158\ ``International PEN Calls for the Immediate Release of Liu
Xiaobo'' [Guoji bihui yaoqiu liji shifang liu xiaobo], Voice of
America, 9 December 15; PEN American Center, ``Dear President Xi: A
Message From America's Writers,'' 18 September 15; ``Five Years On, Liu
Xiaobo's Wife Stays Silent, Under House Arrest,'' Radio Free Asia, 8
October 15.
\159\ Amnesty International, ``Liu Xia,'' 12 November 14; ``Liu
Xia. A Photographer from China,'' Wall Street International, last
visited 5 July 16. For more information on Liu Xia, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00629.
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Introduction
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, Chinese law
continued to restrict workers' rights to freely establish and
join independent trade unions. Workers' right to collective
bargaining remained limited, and Chinese law did not protect
workers' right to strike. In the face of slowing economic
growth, Chinese firms and government officials warned of
impending layoffs in troubled sectors. Wages continued to rise
in China, but workers faced slower wage growth. Chinese
government officials and international observers reported a
significant increase in worker actions such as strikes and
protests, and the majority of these actions involved disputes
over wage arrears. The situation of labor rights advocates and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has worsened in recent
years, particularly in Guangdong province, where authorities
detained over a dozen labor rights advocates and NGO staff,
arresting four. Labor abuses related to dispatch and intern
labor, as well as workers above the retirement age, continued.
According to government data, workplace accidents and deaths
continued to decline, while reported cases of occupational
illness increased. International observers continued to express
concern regarding workplace safety in China.
Trade Unions
ALL-CHINA FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) remains
the only trade union organization permitted under Chinese
law.\1\ The ACFTU constitution describes the ACFTU as a ``mass
organization'' \2\ under the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party and ``an important social pillar of state
power.'' \3\ This past year, leading union officials held
concurrent positions in the Communist Party and government.\4\
For example, Li Jianguo, Chairman of the ACFTU, was also Vice
Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee
and a member of the Communist Party Central Committee Political
Bureau.\5\ Chinese labor advocates reported that local trade
unions rarely stood up for workers' rights and interests.\6\
During the reporting year, investigations by international NGOs
into 10 Chinese factories in Guangdong province found that many
workers did not know whether or not their factory had a
union.\7\ Restrictions on workers' rights to freely establish
and join independent trade unions violate international
standards set forth by the International Labour Organization
(ILO),\8\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights,\9\
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\10\ and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.\11\
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Workers' right to collective bargaining remains limited in
law and in practice. Provisions in the PRC Labor Law, PRC Labor
Contract Law, and PRC Trade Union Law provide a legal framework
for negotiating collective contracts,\12\ but these laws
designate the Party-controlled ACFTU as responsible for
negotiating with employers and signing collective contracts on
behalf of workers.\13\ The PRC Trade Union Law requires trade
unions to ``whole-heartedly serve workers''; \14\ in practice,
however, the ACFTU and its lower level branches reportedly more
often represented the interests of government or
enterprises.\15\ At the enterprise level, union leaders were
often company managers.\16\ One commentator at the ACFTU-
affiliated Henan Workers' Daily noted that many workers were
indifferent to collective negotiations because they felt
enterprise bosses ultimately determined the outcome.\17\
Restrictions on collective bargaining violate China's
obligations as a member of the ILO.\18\
Impact of Slower Economic Growth on China's Workers
In 2015, China's economy grew at its slowest rate in 25
years.\19\ According to the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, China's rate of GDP growth was 6.9 percent in 2015,
compared to 7.4 percent in 2014 and 7.7 percent in 2013.\20\
Some economists and other observers raised doubts regarding the
accuracy of China's economic data, suggesting GDP growth in
2015 may have been even slower.\21\ Slower growth has affected
sectors of the economy unevenly,\22\ but economic indicators in
2016 suggested a declining growth rate overall.\23\
UNEMPLOYMENT
In the face of slowing economic growth, Chinese firms and
government officials warned of impending layoffs. At a February
2016 press conference, Minister of Human Resources and Social
Security Yin Weimin predicted firms would need to lay off
workers in the coming year due to overcapacity, saying that the
coal and steel industries would likely lay off 1.8 million
workers.\24\ The director of China's Employment Research
Institute, Zeng Xiangquan, and others warned of additional
layoffs, particularly in state-owned enterprises.\25\ Major
steel and coal enterprises announced plans for layoffs, and
some workers in these industries had reportedly already lost
their jobs in recent years.\26\ Employment in manufacturing
reportedly had declined for 25 consecutive months as of late
2015, with factories closing or relocating due to slowing
economic growth and rising wages.\27\ Service sector jobs
increased in 2015, but these jobs reportedly paid less on
average than manufacturing jobs.\28\ In the annual work report
to the National People's Congress in March, Premier Li Keqiang
pledged 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion) in ``rewards and
subsidies'' to assist workers laid off due to economic
restructuring.\29\ Some observers attributed government
inaction on economic reforms to concerns that unemployment
could contribute to instability.\30\
Although the official urban unemployment rate at the end of
2015 was 4.05 percent,\31\ scholars and economists cautioned
that official unemployment statistics did not accurately
reflect realities in the labor market, arguing that the true
unemployment rate was likely higher than the official
figure.\32\ Yu Jianrong, Director of the Rural Development
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warned of
``hidden unemployment,'' meaning that many of China's nominally
employed workers were in reality unemployed or
underemployed.\33\ The 2010 PRC Social Insurance Law stipulated
that workers and employers contribute to an unemployment
insurance fund; \34\ the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, however, reported that as of late 2015, only around 22
percent of workers had unemployment insurance.\35\
WAGES
Wages reportedly continued to rise overall during the
reporting year, though workers faced slower wage growth, and in
some cases stagnant or reduced wages. Average overall wage
growth in 2015 reportedly was 8.4 percent, down from a peak of
11.6 percent in 2011.\36\ In 2015, 27 provincial-level regions
and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone raised minimum wages,
with an average increase of 14 percent.\37\ This represented a
smaller increase than the four previous years.\38\ The
government of Guangdong province, an industrial hub, announced
it would not raise its minimum wage in 2016 or 2017.\39\ Some
workers in the steel and manufacturing sectors reported
receiving lower wages.\40\ The Ministry of Labor and the Vice
President of the China Association for Labor Studies, Su
Hainan, reportedly warned local governments to be cautious in
raising minimum wages.\41\ In February 2015, Finance Minister
Lou Jiwei argued that in recent years China's wages had grown
faster than workers' productivity, making Chinese enterprises
less competitive.\42\ Su Hainan responded in March that while
wages had increased quickly in recent years, 10 to 20 years ago
wage growth was slower than productivity growth.\43\ National
People's Congress delegate Zhang Xiaoqing argued that migrant
workers' wages should increase further, saying recent increases
had not kept up with rising prices.\44\
SOCIAL INSURANCE
During the reporting year, workers' rates of social
insurance coverage remained low,\45\ and the central government
called for lowering mandatory contribution rates for
employers.\46\ According to the PRC Social Insurance Law,
workers are entitled to five forms of social insurance: basic
pension insurance, medical insurance, work-related injury
insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity insurance.\47\
Under the law, employers and workers are required to contribute
to basic pension, medical, and unemployment insurance; in
addition, employers are required to contribute to work-related
injury and maternity insurance on workers' behalf.\48\
According to statistics from the Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security (MOHRSS), while workers' insurance coverage
rates increased in 2015, they remained low, particularly among
migrant workers.\49\ For example, MOHRSS figures showed
employment-based pension insurance coverage rates of
approximately 46 percent for all workers, and 20 percent for
migrant workers.\50\ For work-related injury insurance,
coverage rates were 28 percent for all workers and 3 percent
for migrant workers.\51\ In addition to low levels of coverage,
experts also noted that many migrants face difficulties
transferring their social insurance benefits after moving to
new jurisdictions.\52\ During the reporting year, the central
government called on local governments to reduce social
insurance costs for employers by gradually lowering
contribution rates,\53\ and as of June 2016, at least 16
province-level jurisdictions reportedly had done so.\54\
Worker Actions
Chinese government officials and international observers
reported a significant increase in worker actions such as
strikes and protests during the reporting year.\55\ In a
December 2015 article in the Party-run People's Daily, Minister
of Human Resources and Social Security Yin Weimin wrote that
labor relations conflicts had become more prominent and more
frequent.\56\ The Hong Kong-based non-profit organization China
Labour Bulletin (CLB),\57\ which compiles data on worker
actions gathered from traditional and social media,\58\
reported increasing numbers of worker strikes and protests in
2015.\59\ Although some of the observed increase may have been
due to better data collection,\60\ CLB documented 2,773 worker
actions in 2015, more than double the total from 2014.\61\
During 2015, a majority of worker actions reportedly
involved disputes over wage arrears. According to CLB data,
wage arrears-related worker actions accounted for 76 percent of
all strikes and protests in 2015, compared to 52 percent in
2014 and 25 percent in 2013.\62\ People's Daily reported 11,007
``sudden incidents'' (tufa shijian) \63\ regarding migrant
workers' wage arrears in the third quarter of 2015, a 34-
percent increase from the third quarter of 2014.\64\ The
Wickedonna blog, which, until authorities detained its
administrators, collected information on protests in China,\65\
documented 9,107 wage arrears-related protests--the single
biggest cause of protests in China in 2015--accounting for 31.5
percent of all protests documented on their website.\66\
According to commentary in People's Daily, wage arrears were a
common problem for migrant workers.\67\
According to CLB, worker actions related to layoffs, though
far fewer, reportedly increased in 2015, accounting for 6
percent of worker actions, compared to 3 percent in 2014 and 1
percent in 2013.\68\ The proportion of worker actions over
unpaid social insurance contributions decreased slightly in
2015, accounting for 6 percent of worker actions compared to 8
percent in 2014 and 7 percent in 2013.\69\ The Wickedonna blog
documented 193 protests demanding unemployment compensation and
101 protests over unpaid social insurance benefits.\70\
CLB data showed that the proportion of worker actions in
the manufacturing sector decreased in 2015 compared to previous
years, while the proportion of worker actions in construction
increased significantly in both 2014 and 2015.\71\ The
Wickedonna blog similarly reported that construction workers'
protests accounted for the largest number of worker
protests.\72\ According to the State Council, wage arrears are
a notable problem within the construction sector.\73\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Involving
Year Total Involving Wage Involving Social Manufacturing Construction
Arrears Layoffs Insurance Sector Sector
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 656 161 (25%) 8 (1%) 49 (8%) 280 (43%) 20 (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014 1,379 719 (52%) 47 (3%) 110 (8%) 559 (41%) 256 (19%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015 2,773 2,108 (76%) 153 (6%) 158 (6%) 885 (32%) 993 (36%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: China Labour Bulletin as of June 2016. Note that percentages indicate percentage of total worker actions
for that year.
Government responses to worker strikes and protests were
mixed. In some cases, worker actions resulted in local branches
of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and
governments offering support, compensation, or concessions to
workers.\75\ In other cases, however, local governments
reportedly responded to worker actions by sending police,
detaining protesters, and physically assaulting workers.\76\ In
one instance in March 2016, a court in Langzhong city, Nanchong
municipality, Sichuan province, held a public sentencing
``rally'' for eight workers.\77\ The court sentenced them to
six to eight months in prison for their role in a protest over
unpaid wages.\78\ According to CLB data, in 2015, police
responded to about 30 percent of all worker actions, and
authorities detained participants in about 7 percent of all
worker actions.\79\ Chinese law does not protect workers' right
to strike, in violation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\80\
Selected worker actions this past year included the
following:
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Guangdong
province. In October 2015, the Shenzhen Fu Chang
Electronic Technology Company (Fu Chang) shut down.\81\
Fu Chang issued a statement to workers and suppliers
announcing its closure and citing legal and financial
troubles but did not offer severance pay to laid-off
workers.\82\ For several days, over 1,000 workers and
suppliers reportedly gathered outside Fu Chang's gates
demanding compensation.\83\ The Wall Street Journal
reported that Fu Chang eventually offered some
compensation to the workers, though some remained
dissatisfied with the settlement.\84\
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province. In
late September 2015, a labor dispatch agency providing
sanitation workers to a local government informed its
employees that they would be required to resign their
positions and instead work in another district of
Guangzhou.\85\ The workers refused to resign without
severance pay, and when the company ignored their
demands, the workers gathered at the local garbage
collection center in protest.\86\ Local authorities
organized negotiations between the company and the
workers' elected representatives.\87\ The dispatch
company agreed to give the workers severance pay, and
the local government's new contractor agreed to hire
the sanitation workers under direct contracts rather
than as dispatch laborers.\88\ [For more information,
see Dispatch Labor in this section.]
Shuangyashan municipality, Heilongjiang
province. On March 6, 2016, while discussing reforms to
Heilongjiang's largest state-owned enterprise, Longmay
Group (Longmay), Governor of Heilongjiang Lu Hao
claimed Longmay had not missed wage payments to the
coal mining company's 80,000 underground workers.\89\
Beginning March 9, at least 1,000 workers across
Shuangyashan protested for about six days, criticizing
Lu Hao and demanding their unpaid wages.\90\ Workers
reported large wage cuts, and some said Longmay had not
paid them for months.\91\ On March 13, Lu Hao admitted
his mistake to Chinese media, and by March 15 Longmay
reportedly began issuing some payments to workers.\92\
Following the protests, local authorities reportedly
detained some of the participants, and international
media reported a large police presence in
Shuangyashan.\93\
Civil Society
The situation of labor rights advocates and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) has worsened in recent years,
particularly in Guangdong province, a manufacturing hub and
home to many of China's labor NGOs.\94\ The Financial Times
reported in March 2015 that over 30 grassroots labor NGOs
operated in the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong.\95\
These NGOs helped injured workers seek compensation, provided
educational and other services to migrant workers, and trained
workers in collective bargaining and defending their legal
rights.\96\ Authorities have long subjected labor NGOs to
various forms of harassment,\97\ but labor rights advocates
reported increased pressure from authorities beginning in late
2014.\98\ For example, labor NGO staff noted greater
difficulties registering their organizations and increased
restrictions on foreign funding.\99\ Unidentified assailants
beat labor advocates Zeng Feiyang in December 2014 \100\ and
Peng Jiayong in April 2015.\101\
In December 2015, Guangdong authorities began a crackdown
on labor NGO staff that domestic and international observers
described as ``unprecedented'' and ``more serious'' than
previous actions.\102\ [See box titled Detentions of Labor NGO
Staff in Guangdong Province on next page.] Following the
detention of staff from several labor NGOs in December 2015,
Guangdong authorities reportedly threatened other labor NGO
personnel with arrest, and many labor NGOs shut down.\103\
Chinese rights advocates and international observers noted that
government suppression of a wide range of rights advocacy
groups has intensified in recent years.\104\ The Chinese
government's restrictions on labor NGOs contravene
international standards on freedom of association, including
Articles 20 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and Article 2(a) of the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.\105\ [For more
information on NGOs in China and the crackdown on rights
advocacy groups, see Section III--Civil Society.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detentions of Labor NGO Staff in Guangdong Province
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 3, 2015, public security officials in Guangzhou and Foshan
municipalities detained at least 18 labor rights advocates affiliated
with several labor NGOs.\106\ According to the international advocacy
NGO Rights Defense Network (RDN), local police criminally detained Zeng
Feiyang, Zhu Xiaomei, He Xiaobo, Peng Jiayong, and Deng Xiaoming, and
took Meng Han into custody.\107\ Authorities also reportedly detained
Tang Jian in Beijing municipality on December 4.\108\ All seven were
current or former employees of Guangdong-based labor NGOs.\109\ As of
January 8, 2016, procuratorates in Panyu district, Guangzhou, and
Foshan had approved the arrests of Zeng, Zhu, and Meng for ``gathering
a crowd to disturb social order'' \110\ and He for ``embezzlement.''
\111\ Authorities released Deng and Peng on bail on January 9, Zhu on
bail on February 1, and He on bail on April 7.\112\ On January 31, Tang
reportedly announced his release from detention via social media.\113\
By releasing Deng, Peng, Zhu, and He on bail (qubao houshen or
``guarantee pending further investigation''), authorities may continue
to restrict their freedom of movement, summon them for further
questioning, and monitor them for up to 12 months.\114\ In June, the
Panyu District People's Procuratorate reportedly began reviewing the
cases of Zeng, Zhu, Meng, and Tang in preparation for a possible trial,
but, as of August, the Commission had not observed further news
regarding the status of these cases.\115\
According to Chinese and international observers, authorities targeted
these individuals due to their labor rights advocacy and ties to
NGOs.\116\ Radio Free Asia (RFA) quoted one labor rights advocate who
said authorities seemed to be focusing on the NGO Panyu Workers'
Services Center (Panyu), an organization established in 1998.\117\ A
December 22, 2015, article by the state-run news agency Xinhua accused
Panyu's director Zeng Feiyang of taking money from workers and
mismanaging funds.\118\ The article claimed Panyu was an ``illegal
organization'' that had received foreign funding, ``seriously disturbed
social order,'' and ``trampled on the rights and interests of
workers.'' \119\ Several workers disputed the Xinhua report, saying
that Zeng had never taken their money.\120\ One labor advocate said to
RFA, ``The labor movement and Zeng Feiyang [were] doing what the ACFTU
should have done.'' \121\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor Abuses
CHILD LABOR
This past year, the Commission continued to observe reports
of the use of child labor in China.\122\ Domestic laws
generally prohibit the employment of minors under 16,\123\ and
China has ratified the two fundamental International Labour
Organization (ILO) conventions on the elimination of child
labor.\124\ Yet, a June 2016 report by the Center for Child
Rights & Corporate Social Responsibility found that 71 percent
of auditors surveyed in China had observed suspected cases of
child labor in the past two years.\125\ In April, official
media reported that a 14-year-old factory worker in Foshan
municipality, Guangdong, died in his sleep.\126\ In August,
authorities in Zhuji city, Shaoxing municipality, Zhejiang
province, reportedly approved the arrest of an employer who had
forced at least eight children to work for years making
socks.\127\ The ILO Country Office for China and Mongolia noted
that the Chinese government has not released official
statistics on child labor in China, nor has it reported any
cases to the ILO.\128\
DISPATCH LABOR
The Commission continued to observe reports of the over-
reliance on and misuse of dispatch labor during the reporting
year, in violation of domestic laws and regulations \129\ meant
to prevent such abuses. Firms have long used dispatch labor
(laowu paiqian)--workers hired through subcontracting
agencies--to cut costs.\130\ The PRC Labor Contract Law
stipulates that dispatch workers be paid the same as full-time
workers doing similar work, and only perform work on a
temporary, auxiliary, or substitute basis.\131\ The 2014
Interim Provisions on Dispatch Labor further require that
dispatch labor make up no more than 10 percent of a firm's
total workforce by March 2016.\132\ In March 2016, however,
Vice President of the China Association for Labor Studies Su
Hainan noted that some enterprises were getting around these
new rules by firing dispatch workers and instead using
``outsourced'' labor,\133\ another form of subcontracted
labor.\134\
Chinese media reports detailed multiple cases of
enterprises violating the PRC Labor Contract Law and the 2014
interim provisions by allowing dispatch workers to exceed 10
percent of the workforce or perform the work of permanent
employees.\135\ An investigation published in October 2015 by
the U.S.-based non-governmental organization China Labor Watch
and Norway-based environmental organization The Future in Our
Hands found that roughly half of the tens of thousands of
employees at a major electronics manufacturer were dispatch
workers.\136\ In one case in December 2015, a group of
protesting railway workers said they had been ``temporary''
employees for over 20 years.\137\
INTERN LABOR
During the reporting year, reports continued to emerge of
labor abuses involving interns.\138\ In October 2015, the
Danish NGO Danwatch issued a report on vocational student
interns working on assembly lines at Wistron Corporation
(Wistron) in Zhongshan municipality, Guangdong, which
manufactures computer servers for several large technology
companies.\139\ Danwatch found that interns were performing
assembly line work unrelated to their studies and that interns
often worked more than the legal limit of eight hours per
day.\140\ Some students told Danwatch that if they refused to
intern with Wistron, they would not be allowed to
graduate.\141\ In December 2015, a former employee of the ride-
hailing company Uber alleged the company relied on low-paid
interns working long hours in its office in Guangzhou
municipality, Guangdong.\142\ A former Uber intern in Tianjin
municipality made similar accusations, telling a reporter that
interns far outnumbered employees in the Tianjin office, and
that interns worked more than eight hours per day.\143\
Although regulations governing intern labor vary by
locality,\144\ the PRC Education Law encourages work-study
programs provided they do not interfere with students'
education.\145\ In 2007, the Ministries of Education and
Finance issued regulations defining internships as relevant to
students' plans of study and prohibiting interns from working
more than eight hours per day.\146\ In April 2016, the Ministry
of Education and several other central government entities
jointly issued additional regulations on vocational school
interns.\147\ The regulations stipulate that interns doing the
work of regular employees may not exceed 10 percent of a
workplace's total employees, and task vocational schools with
ensuring that workplaces accepting interns comply with relevant
laws and regulations.\148\
WORKERS ABOVE THE RETIREMENT AGE
During the reporting year, Chinese workers above the legal
retirement age \149\ continued to enjoy fewer legal protections
than other workers under Chinese law.\150\ According to the PRC
Labor Contract Law and the law's implementing regulations, once
workers reach retirement age or receive pensions their labor
contracts should be terminated.\151\ A 2010 Supreme People's
Court interpretation stated that when handling disputes between
employers and workers who received pensions, the courts should
treat the two sides as having a ``labor service relationship''
(laowu guanxi).\152\ Workers above the retirement age with
``labor service contracts'' (laowu hetong) reportedly received
fewer legal protections and benefits than typical workers.\153\
China Labour Bulletin (CLB) reported that workers above the
retirement age often faced difficulty obtaining compensation
and other benefits due to their status as labor service
providers.\154\ According to the Supreme People's Court
Research Office, while court cases involving labor disputes
increased roughly 25 percent in 2015, court cases involving
labor service contract disputes increased nearly 39 percent in
2015.\155\
Occupational Health and Safety
This past year, government data showed continued declines
in workplace accidents and deaths, while reported cases of
occupational illness increased. The State Administration of
Work Safety (SAWS) reported in January 2016 that workplace
accidents and deaths declined 7.9 and 2.8 percent,
respectively, in 2015 compared to 2014.\156\ SAWS reported that
accidents and deaths in the coal industry decreased 32.3 and
36.8 percent, respectively, during the same period.\157\ Coal
industry accidents reportedly declined in recent years as coal
production fell and the government shut down smaller, more
dangerous mines.\158\ According to CLB, the construction
industry had the largest number of accidents in 2015, though
these accidents caused relatively few deaths.\159\ In December
2015, the National Health and Family Planning Commission
released statistics on occupational illnesses for 2014, finding
that total reported cases of occupational illness increased
13.6 percent in 2014 compared to 2013.\160\ Pneumoconiosis
accounted for roughly 90 percent of all cases of occupational
illness, with 26,873 reported cases in 2014, a 16.1-percent
increase from 2013.\161\ The Party-run Workers' Daily reported
that pneumoconiosis sufferers found applying for compensation
difficult and expensive, with long wait times and few
applicants successfully obtaining compensation.\162\
Despite relevant laws and regulations,\163\ international
observers continued to express concern regarding workplace
safety in China.\164\ Central government agencies issued
several regulations regarding occupational health and safety
during the reporting year,\165\ and SAWS released for public
comment a second draft of implementing regulations for the PRC
Work Safety Law in November 2015.\166\ Nevertheless, CLB
specifically identified lax enforcement of safety regulations
in the coal industry as well as poorly constructed factories in
areas prone to tornadoes.\167\ China Labor Watch investigations
into toy and kitchenware factories found inadequate fire safety
measures and failures to provide sufficient protective
equipment.\168\ International labor NGOs reported that
employers often provided little or no safety training for new
employees, despite Chinese regulations requiring a minimum of
24 hours' pre-employment safety training.\169\
Worker Rights
Worker Rights
Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
\1\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, arts. 9-11; ``
`They Tore Through Everything': Labour Activists Increasingly Targeted
in Civil Rights Crackdown in China, Say Supporters,'' Agence France-
Presse, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 30 May 16; Zhang Yu,
``Chinese Activists Struggle To Establish Independent Trade Unions,''
Global Times, 2 December 15. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic
Report of China, including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China, adopted
by the Committee at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 13
June 14, para. 23.
\2\ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal
Democratic Republic of Nepal, ``Major Mass Organizations,'' 27 October
04; Anthony J. Spires, ``Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an
Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of China's Grassroots
NGOs,'' American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 117, No. 1 (July 2011), 9;
Karla Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework From Ancient
Times to the ``New Reform Era'' (New York: Oxford University Press,
2013), 167-74. ``Mass organizations'' are organizations under the
Chinese Communist Party such as the All-China Women's Federation,
Communist Youth League of China, and All-China Federation of Industry
and Commerce. The Chinese embassy in Nepal described these
organizations as ``a bridge linking the CPC [Communist Party of China]
and government with the people.'' According to scholar Anthony J.
Spires, in practice ``mass organizations'' have functioned as ``one-way
conduits for instructions from the top to the bottom.''
\3\ Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions [Zhongguo gonghui
zhangcheng], issued 22 October 13, General Principles.
\4\ ``Liu Guozhong, All-China Federation of Trade Unions Vice
Chairman, Secretary of the Secretariat'' [Liu guozhong quanguo zong
gonghui fu zhuxi, shujichu shuji], All-China Federation of Trade
Unions, last visited 15 April 16; ``Guangdong Provincial Federation of
Trade Unions Convenes Third Meeting of the Thirteenth Full Committee in
Guangzhou'' [Guangdong sheng zong gonghui shisan jie san ci quanweihui
zai sui zhaokai], Southern Worker, reprinted in Guangzhou Municipal
Federation of Trade Unions, 7 March 16; ``Chengdu Trade Unions''
[Chengdu gonghui], Chengdu Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, last
visited 9 March 16.
\5\ ``Li Jianguo, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions'' [Li jianguo quanguo zong gonghui zhuxi], All-China Federation
of Trade Unions, last visited 9 March 16.
\6\ Rights Defense Network, ``Letter From Labor and Other Sectors
to CPC, NPC, and State Council on Strike Hard Campaign Against
Guangdong Labor NGO Employees'' [Zhongguo laogong jie he shehui ge jie
renshi jiu guangdong laogong NGO gongzuozhe zaoyu yanli daji zhi
zhonggong zhongyang, quanguo renda, guowuyuan yijian shu], 11 December
15; ``Chinese Workers at Walmart Campaign for Higher Wages, Union
Elections,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 November 15; ``Guangdong Labor NGOs
`Were Doing the Job of a Trade Union': Activists,'' Radio Free Asia, 23
December 15.
\7\ China Labor Watch and Solidar Suisse, ``Dirty Frying Pans,'' 4
February 16, 2-3, 19, 36, 44, 57, 71; China Labor Watch, ``The Other
Side of Fairy Tales,'' 20 November 15, 2, 14, 32, 48, 68, 94.
\8\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 87)
Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right To
Organise, 4 July 50, arts. 2, 3, 5.
\9\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
23(4).
\10\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22(1); United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, last visited 20 May 16. China has signed but not
ratified the ICCPR.
\11\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1; United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 11 March 16. China
has signed and ratified the ICESCR.
\12\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 16-35; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07,
amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, arts. 51-56; PRC Trade
Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], passed and effective
3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, arts. 6, 20.
\13\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 33; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07,
amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, arts. 6, 51, 56; PRC Trade
Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa], passed and effective
3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, arts. 6, 20.
\14\ PRC Trade Union Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gonghui fa],
passed and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01, art. 6.
\15\ ``Chinese Workers at Walmart Campaign for Higher Wages, Union
Elections,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 November 15; Shawn Shieh, ``The Fight
Against Inequality: Martin Luther King and China's Labor Activists,''
NGOs in China (blog), 29 February 16; Anita Chan, ``The Chinese Trade
Union Federation at the Crossroads--Relaxing Control Over Labour or
Risking Labour Instability? '' in China at the Crossroads: What the
Third Plenum Means for China, New Zealand and the World, ed. Peter
Harris (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2015), 64-71.
\16\ `` `They Tore Through Everything': Labour Activists
Increasingly Targeted in Civil Rights Crackdown in China, Say
Supporters,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning
Post, 30 May 16; China Labor Watch and Solidar Suisse, ``Dirty Frying
Pans,'' 4 February 16, 19; China Labour Bulletin, ``Increasingly Angry
Workers in Chongqing Take to the Streets Once Again,'' 4 March 16.
\17\ Jin Bei, ``Workers Should See the Importance of Collective
Wage Negotiations'' [Laodongzhe ying zhongshi gongzi jiti xieshang],
Henan Workers' Daily, 25 February 16.
\18\ International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up, 18 June
98, art. 2(a). Article 2 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work states that ``all Members, even if they
have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining . . ..'' International Labour Organization, ``China,''
NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards, last
visited 14 March 16. China became a member of the ILO in 1919.
\19\ Mark Magnier, ``China's Economic Growth in 2015 Is Slowest in
25 Years,'' Wall Street Journal, 19 January 16; ``China Economic Growth
Slowest in 25 Years,'' BBC, 19 January 16; International Labour
Organization, ``ILO World Employment and Social Outlook (WESO)--Trends
2016,'' 20 January 16.
\20\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Achieved Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin jingji yunxing
wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, ``2014 National Economy Running Smoothly Under the
New Normal'' [2014 nian guomin jingji zai xin changtai xia pingwen
yunxing], 20 January 15; National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2013
National Economy Development Stable and Improved'' [2013 nian guomin
jingji fazhan wenzhong xianghao], 20 January 14.
\21\ See, e.g., Andreas Illmer, ``China's Growth Data-Can You Trust
It? '' BBC, 19 January 16; Edward Wong and Neil Gough, ``As China's
Economic Picture Turns Uglier, Beijing Applies Airbrush,'' New York
Times, 25 February 16; Mike Bird and David Scutt, ``Why Economists
Don't Trust China's GDP Figures,'' Business Insider, 19 October 15. See
also ``Inspection Team Alarmed That Many Northeastern Localities
Fabricated GDP, Size of County Economies Exceeds Hong Kong'' [Dongbei
duo di GDP zaojia jingdong xunshi zu xianyu jingji guimo chao
xianggang], Beijing News, 11 December 15.
\22\ ``China's Two-Speed Economy Stays Intact as Factories Slump,
Services Gain,'' Bloomberg, 4 January 16; Mandy Zuo and Zhou Xin, ``The
Hidden Cracks in China's Employment Figures,'' South China Morning
Post, 25 January 16.
\23\ See, e.g., Caixin and Markit, ``China General Services PMI
Chinese Service Sector Expands at Weaker Pace in February,'' 3 March
16; Duncan Hewitt, ``Fear of Slowing Economic Growth in China Spreads
to Prosperous Pearl River Delta Region,'' International Business Times,
22 December 15.
\24\ ``Record of February 29 Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security Press Conference'' [Renshebu 2 yue 29 ri fabuhui shilu], China
Internet Information Center, reprinted in Sina, 29 February 16. For
more information on overcapacity in the Chinese economy, see European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``Overcapacity in China: An
Impediment to the Party's Reform Agenda,'' 22 February 16.
\25\ ``Expert Says China May See a Second Wave of Lay-Offs,''
People's Daily, 11 November 15; Benjamin Kang Lim et al., ``Exclusive:
China To Lay Off Five to Six Million Workers, Earmarks at Least $23
Billion,'' Reuters, 3 March 16.
\26\ Duncan Hewitt, ``China Miners' Strike Highlights Challenges
for Government in Reducing Overcapacity in Loss-Making Industries,''
International Business Times, 14 March 16; ``Death and Despair in
China's Rustbelt,'' Bloomberg, 1 March 16; Tom Phillips, ``Glory Days
of Chinese Steel Leave Behind Abandoned Mills and Broken Lives,''
Guardian, 21 January 16.
\27\ Mark Magnier, ``China's Workers Are Fighting Back as Economic
Dream Fades,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 December 15; Duncan Hewitt,
``Fear of Slowing Economic Growth in China Spreads to Prosperous Pearl
River Delta Region,'' International Business Times, 22 December 15;
Mandy Zuo and Zhou Xin, ``The Hidden Cracks in China's Employment
Figures,'' South China Morning Post, 25 January 16; Yu Nakamura,
``China's Manufacturing Hub To Freeze Minimum Wage,'' Nikkei Asian
Review, 8 March 16; Simon Denyer, ``Strikes and Workers' Protests
Multiply in China, Testing Party Authority,'' Washington Post, 25
February 16.
\28\ ``Record of February 29 Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security Press Conference'' [Renshebu 2 yue 29 ri fabuhui shilu], China
Internet Information Center, reprinted in Sina, 29 February 16; Brenda
Goh, ``China Shifts Axed Miners to Lower-Paid Jobs in Farming,
Cleaning,'' Reuters, 20 March 16; Duncan Hewitt, ``Fear of Slowing
Economic Growth in China Spreads to Prosperous Pearl River Delta
Region,'' International Business Times, 22 December 15.
\29\ State Council, ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 5 March 15. See also Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security et al., Opinion on Resettling Workers in the Process of
Resolving Steel and Coal Sector Overcapacity and Turning Around
Development [Renli ziyuan shehui baozhangbu guojia fazhan gaigewei deng
qi bumen guanyu zai huajie gangtie meitan hangye guosheng channeng
shixian tuokun fazhan guocheng zhong zuo hao zhigong anzhi gongzuo de
yijian], issued 7 April 16.
\30\ Elizabeth C. Economy, ``The Fits and Starts of China's
Economic Reforms,'' Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound (blog),
25 January 16; William Ide and Saibal Dasgupta, ``Worries About China's
Economic Reform Progress Grow,'' Voice of America, 10 March 16; George
Magnus, ``Should We Be Worried by Economic Warnings of a Bear in the
China Shop? '' Guardian, 20 January 16.
\31\ ``Record of February 29 Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security Press Conference'' [Renshebu 2 yue 29 ri fabuhui shilu], China
Internet Information Center, reprinted in Sina, 29 February 16.
\32\ Fathom Consulting, ``News in Charts: China's Hidden
Unemployment Problem,'' Thomson Reuters, 3 June 16; Zhang Jun, ``The
Truth About Chinese Unemployment Rates,'' Project Syndicate, 14 April
16; Yu Jianrong, ``Worries Underlying China's Hidden Unemployment
Problem'' [Zhongguo yinxing shiye wenti yinyou], People's Tribune, 18
January 16. For more information on the unreliability of China's
official unemployment statistics, see Shuaizhang Feng et al., ``Long
Run Trends in Unemployment and Labor Force Participation in China,''
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 21460, August 2015.
\33\ Yu Jianrong, ``Worries Underlying China's Hidden Unemployment
Problem'' [Zhongguo yinxing shiye wenti yinyou], People's Tribune, 18
January 16.
\34\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui
baoxian fa], passed 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, art. 44.
\35\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2015 National
Economic and Social Development Statistics Bulletin'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao], 29 February 16. See also China
Labour Bulletin, ``China's Social Security System,'' last visited 6
June 16.
\36\ Li Tangning, ``28 Regions Raise Minimum Wage, Average Increase
Around 14 Percent'' [28 diqu tigao zuidi gongzi biaozhun pingjun zengfu
yue 14%], Economic Information Daily, 29 December 15.
\37\ Ibid.
\38\ Ibid. The average increase in minimum wages reportedly was 22
percent in 2011, 20.2 percent in 2012, 17 percent in 2013, and 14.1
percent in 2014.
\39\ Guangdong Provincial People's Government, Guangdong Province
Supply-Side Structural Reforms Action Plan on Reducing Costs (2016-
2018) [Guangdong sheng gongji ce jiegou xing gaige jiang chengben
xingdong jihua (2016-2018 nian)], issued 28 February 16, item 2(2)1;
Wang Jing, ``Guangdong Province Will Freeze Minimum Wage for Two
Years'' [Guangdong sheng jiang lianxu liang nian bu tiaozheng zuidi
gongzi biaozhun], Caixin, 2 March 16; Peter Wong, ``How China's Pearl
River Delta Went From the World's Factory Floor to a Hi-Tech Hub,''
South China Morning Post, 6 October 15; Lisa Jucca, ``HSBC Renews Push
in China's Pearl River Delta With Train Sponsorship,'' Reuters, 6 April
16.
\40\ Tom Phillips, ``Glory Days of Chinese Steel Leave Behind
Abandoned Mills and Broken Lives,'' Guardian, 21 January 16; Simon
Denyer, ``Strikes and Workers' Protests Multiply in China, Testing
Party Authority,'' Washington Post, 25 February 16.
\41\ Chun Han Wong, ``China May Rein in Wage Rises To Boost
Economy,'' Wall Street Journal, 10 March 16; Li Tangning, ``28 Regions
Raise Minimum Wage, Average Increase Around 14 Percent'' [28 diqu tigao
zuidi gongzi biaozhun pingjun zengfu yue 14%], Economic Information
Daily, 29 December 15.
\42\ Wang Jing, ``Guangdong Province Will Freeze Minimum Wage for
Two Years'' [Guangdong sheng jiang lianxu liang nian bu tiaozheng zuidi
gongzi biaozhun], Caixin, 2 March 16.
\43\ Zhang Moning, ``Renewed Debate Over `Labor Contract Law' ''
[``Laodong hetong fa'' zhengyi zaiqi], South Reviews, 16 March 16.
\44\ Guo Chao et al., ``Lou Jiwei: Current Labor Contract Law Does
Not Suit Flexible Employment'' [Lou jiwei: xianxing laodong hetong fa
bu shihe linghuo yonggong], Beijing News, 8 March 16.
\45\ For information on workers' low levels of social insurance
coverage in previous reporting years, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8
October 15, 87-88; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 75; CECC,
2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 69-70.
\46\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and Ministry
of Finance, Circular on Gradually Reducing Social Insurance Rates
[Renli ziyuan shehui baozhangbu caizhengbu guanyu jieduanxing jiangdi
shehui baoxian feilu de tongzhi], issued 14 April 16.
\47\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui
baoxian fa], passed 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11, arts. 1-4.
\48\ Ibid., arts. 10, 23, 33, 44, 53. See also China Labour
Bulletin, ``China's Social Security System,'' last visited 19 August
16.
\49\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2015 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2015 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 30 May 16, secs. 1-2. See also Li Zewei, ``All-
China Federation of Trade Unions Vice Chair: Hopes Migrant Workers Can
Also Receive Pensions'' [Quanguo zonggong hui fu zhuxi: xiwang nenggou
wei nongmingong ye shang yanglao baoxian], Beijing Youth Daily, 4 March
16; Guo Chao et al., ``Lou Jiwei: Current Labor Contract Law Does Not
Suit Flexible Employment'' [Lou jiwei: xianxing laodong hetong fa bu
shihe linghuo yonggong], Beijing News, 8 March 16.
\50\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, ``2015 Annual
Statistics Bulletin on Human Resources and Social Security
Developments'' [2015 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye
fazhan tongji gongbao], 30 May 16, secs. 1-2.
\51\ Ibid.
\52\ Min Qin et al., ``Old Age Insurance Participation Among Rural-
Urban Migrants in China,'' Demographic Research, Vol. 33 (13 November
15), 1059-60; China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Social Security
System,'' last visited 19 August 16.
\53\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and Ministry
of Finance, Circular on Gradually Reducing Social Insurance Rates
[Renli ziyuan shehui baozhangbu caizhengbu guanyu jieduanxing jiangdi
shehui baoxian feilu de tongzhi], issued 14 April 16.
\54\ Li Tangning, ``14 Provinces Lower Pension Contribution Rates
by 1 Percent, Social Insurance Participants Not Affected'' [14 shengfen
xiatiao yanglao baoxian feilu 1% can bao renyuan shebao bu shou
yingxiang], Economic Information Daily, 17 June 16. See also Bureau of
Human Resources and Social Security and Bureau of Finance, Beijing
Municipality, Circular on Gradually Reducing Municipality's Social
Insurance Rates [Guanyu jieduanxing jiangdi benshi shehui baoxian feilu
de tongzhi], issued 31 May 16, reprinted in Beijing Municipality Social
Insurance Online Service Platform, last visited 26 August 16; ``Gansu
Gradually Reducing Social Insurance Rates'' [Gansu jieduanxing jiangdi
shehui baoxian feilu], Western Economic Daily, 1 July 16; Department of
Human Resources and Social Security and Department of Finance, Sichuan
Province, Circular on Issues Related to Gradually Reducing Sichuan
Province's Social Insurance Rates [Sichuan sheng renli ziyuan he shehui
baozhangting sichuan sheng caizhengting guanyu jieduanxing jiangdi
wosheng shehui baoxian feilu youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 28 April
16, reprinted in Sichuan Province Human Resources and Social Security
Department, 29 April 16.
\55\ See, e.g., ``Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security:
Guarantee Migrant Workers' Wages Before the Spring Festival,
Maliciously Withholding Wages Will Bring Consequences'' [Renshebu:
chunjie qian baozhang nongmingong gongzi zhifu eyi qian xin jiang la
hei], People's Daily, 21 November 15; China Labour Bulletin, ``Strikes
and Protests by China's Workers Soar to Record Heights in 2015,'' 7
January 16; Pete Sweeney, ``China's Labour Law Under Fire as
Restructuring Threatens Jobs,'' Reuters, 12 March 16.
\56\ Yin Weimin, ``Promote Employment and Entrepreneurship (Study
and Implement the Spirit of the 18th Party Congress's 5th Plenum)''
[Cujin jiuye chuangye (xuexi guanche dang de shiba jie wu zhong quanhui
jingshen)], People's Daily, 15 December 15.
\57\ China Labour Bulletin, ``About Us,'' last visited 22 August
16.
\58\ China Labour Bulletin, ``An Introduction to China Labour
Bulletin's Strike Map,'' 29 March 16.
\59\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strikes and Protests by China's
Workers Soar to Record Heights in 2015,'' 7 January 16; China Labour
Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 8 June 16.
\60\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Strikes and Protests by China's
Workers Soar to Record Heights in 2015,'' 7 January 16.
\61\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 8 June
16.
\62\ Ibid. Note that worker actions involving wage arrears may also
involve other grievances.
\63\ The Commission could not determine the precise nature of these
``sudden incidents''; authorities in China have long used this term to
refer to protests. See, e.g., Ben Blanchard, ``China Warns Spectators
Off Xinjiang Torch Relay,'' Reuters, 16 June 08; Human Rights Watch, ``
`A Great Danger for Lawyers': New Regulatory Curbs on Lawyers
Representing Protesters,'' December 2006, 17; John Kamm, Dui Hua
Foundation, ``Statement on China's Initial Report Under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,'' 25
April 05.
\64\ ``Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security: Guarantee
Migrant Workers' Wages Before the Spring Festival, Maliciously
Withholding Wages Will Bring Consequences'' [Renshebu: chunjie qian
baozhang nongmingong gongzi zhifu eyi qian xin jiang la hei], People's
Daily, 21 November 15.
\65\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Two Chinese Journalists
Detained for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble,' '' 28 June 16;
Oiwan Lam, Global Voices Advocacy, ``Founder of Protest Reporting
Outlet Goes Missing in China,'' 23 June 16; Human Rights Campaign in
China, ``Arrests of Lu Yuyu, Founder of `Not the News' Site Documenting
Civil Society Rights Defense Incidents, and Li Tingyu, on Suspicion of
Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble, Approved by Dali
Procuratorate'' [Jilu minjian weiquan shijian ``fei xinwen''
chuangbanren lu yuyu ji li tingyu liang ren bei dali jianchayuan yi
shexian xunxin zishi zui pizhun daibu], 22 July 16. In June 2016,
authorities in the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province,
detained Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu, the citizen journalists who ran the
Wickedonna blog, and formally arrested them in July. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2016-00177 on Lu Yuyu and 2016-00190 on Li Tingyu. The Wickedonna blog
can be found at newsworthknowingcn.blogspot.com. For more information
about Lu Yuyu and Li Tingyu's efforts to document protests in China,
see Wu Qiang, ``What Do Lu Yuyu's Statistics of Protest Tell Us About
the Chinese Society Today? '' China Change, 6 July 16; Yaqiu Wang,
``Meet China's Protest Archivist,'' Foreign Policy, Tea Leaf Nation
(blog), 3 April 14.
\66\ ``2015 Statistics'' [2015 nian tongji], Wickedonna (blog), 5
January 16.
\67\ Bi Shicheng, ``People's Daily Commentary: Joint Effort Needed
To Cure `Year-End Wage Demands' '' [Renmin ribao renmin shiping: genzhi
``nianmo tao xin'' xu gongtong shijin], People's Daily, 20 January 16.
\68\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 8 June
16. Note that worker actions involving layoffs may also involve other
grievances.
\69\ Ibid. Note that worker actions involving social insurance
contributions may also involve other grievances.
\70\ ``2015 Statistics'' [2015 nian tongji], Wickedonna (blog), 5
January 16.
\71\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 8 June
16.
\72\ ``2015 Statistics'' [2015 nian tongji], Wickedonna (blog), 5
January 16.
\73\ State Council, Opinion on Comprehensively Managing the Problem
of Migrant Workers' Wage Arrears [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu quanmian
zhili tuoqian nongmingong gongzi wenti de yijian], issued 19 January
16. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Wage Arrears Protests Erupt at
Wanda Plazas Across China,'' 13 November 15.
\74\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 8 June
16.
\75\ See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, ``Suntory Brewery Workers in
China Force Their Trade Union To Take a Stand,'' 30 October 15; ``
`Hungry' Workers Sleep on Street, Protest After Shenzhen Toy Factory
Boss Absconds,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 November 15; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Collective Action Gets Guangzhou Sanitation Workers Direct
Employment Contracts,'' 5 November 15.
\76\ See, e.g., ``Police Open Fire on Protesting Taxi Drivers in
China's Shandong,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 December 15; ``China Mine
Workers Detained After Protesting Unpaid Wages,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in Newsmax, 18 March 16; China Labour Bulletin, ``Guangdong's
Workers Mobilize To Protect Leaders From Arrests and Reprisals,'' 13
October 15.
\77\ ``Public Sentencing of Workers Demanding Pay Degrades the
Judiciary'' [Gongpan taoxin mingong xiaojie sifa zunyan], Beijing News,
18 March 16; Chun Han Wong, ``Chinese City Publicly Shames Migrant
Workers Who Protested Unpaid Wages,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real
Time Report (blog), 18 March 16.
\78\ Ibid.
\79\ China Labour Bulletin, ``CLB Strike Map,'' last visited 8 June
16.
\80\ Cherie Chan, ``Labor Rights Movements Gaining Momentum in
China,'' Deutsche Welle, 5 January 16; International Trade Union
Confederation, ``The 2015 ITUC Global Rights Index,'' 10 June 15, 72;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.1(d); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 11 March 16. China
has signed and ratified the ICESCR.
\81\ Zhao Yibo, ``Shenzhen Fuchang Company Closure Prompts Rights
Defense'' [Shenzhen fuchang gongsi daobi yinfa weiquan], Beijing News,
10 October 15; Wang Cong and Huang Ge, ``Device Maker's Closure Sparks
Protests,'' Global Times, 11 October 15.
\82\ Wang Cong and Huang Ge, ``Device Maker's Closure Sparks
Protests,'' Global Times, 11 October 15; Zhao Yibo, ``Shenzhen Fuchang
Company Closure Prompts Rights Defense'' [Shenzhen fuchang gongsi daobi
yinfa weiquan], Beijing News, 10 October 15; Mark Magnier, ``China's
Workers Are Fighting Back as Economic Dream Fades,'' Wall Street
Journal, 14 December 15.
\83\ Mark Magnier, ``China's Workers Are Fighting Back as Economic
Dream Fades,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 December 15; Wang Cong and Huang
Ge, ``Device Maker's Closure Sparks Protests,'' Global Times, 11
October 15; Zhao Yibo, ``Shenzhen Fuchang Company Closure Prompts
Rights Defense'' [Shenzhen fuchang gongsi daobi yinfa weiquan], Beijing
News, 10 October 15.
\84\ Mark Magnier, ``China's Workers Are Fighting Back as Economic
Dream Fades,'' Wall Street Journal, 14 December 15.
\85\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Collective Action Gets Guangzhou
Sanitation Workers Direct Employment Contracts,'' 5 November 15;
``Guangzhou Panyu Shatou Street Sanitation Workers Collectively Defend
Rights, Reach Initial Agreement With Management'' [Guangzhou panyu
shatou jie huanwei gongren jiti weiquan yu zifang dacheng chubu xieyi],
Boxun, 29 October 15.
\86\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Collective Action Gets Guangzhou
Sanitation Workers Direct Employment Contracts,'' 5 November 15.
\87\ Ibid.; ``Guangzhou Panyu Shatou Street Sanitation Workers
Collectively Defend Rights, Reach Initial Agreement With Management''
[Guangzhou panyu shatou jie huanwei gongren jiti weiquan yu zifang
dacheng chubu xieyi], Boxun, 29 October 15.
\88\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Collective Action Gets Guangzhou
Sanitation Workers Direct Employment Contracts,'' 5 November 15.
\89\ Li Wenying, ``Heilongjiang Governor Lu Hao: Longmay's 80,000
Pit Workers Have Not Missed a Month's Wages'' [Heilongjiang shengzhang
lu hao: longmei jingxia zhigong 8 wan, zhijin mei shao fa 1 ge yue
gongzi], The Paper, 6 March 16. See also China Labour Bulletin,
``Heilongjiang Coal Miners' Strike Forces Government To Pay Wage
Arrears,'' 14 March 16.
\90\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Heilongjiang Coal Miners' Strike
Forces Government To Pay Wage Arrears,'' 14 March 16; Chris Buckley,
``Official Admits He Gave Misleading Account of Chinese Miners'
Plight,'' New York Times, 13 March 16; Chun Han Wong and Mark Magnier,
``China Mixes Cash, Coercion To Ease Labor Unrest,'' Wall Street
Journal, 15 March 16.
\91\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Heilongjiang Coal Miners' Strike
Forces Government To Pay Wage Arrears,'' 14 March 16; Duncan Hewitt,
``China's Miners' Strike Highlights Challenges for Government in
Reducing Overcapacity in Loss-Making Industries,'' International
Business Times, 14 March 16; Sue-Lin Wong et al., ``Coal Miners Protest
in Northeastern China, Claiming Unpaid Wages,'' Reuters, 13 March 16;
Chun Han Wong and Mark Magnier, ``China Mixes Cash, Coercion To Ease
Labor Unrest,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 March 16; Chris Buckley,
``Official Admits He Gave Misleading Account of Chinese Miners'
Plight,'' New York Times, 13 March 16.
\92\ Wen Jing, `` `This Was Wrong, Now It Must Be Corrected' ''
[``Zhege shi cuo le, zhi cuo jiu yao gai''], Beijing Times, 13 March
16; Chun Han Wong and Mark Magnier, ``China Mixes Cash, Coercion To
Ease Labor Unrest,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 March 16.
\93\ ``Statement on Shuangyashan Incident'' [Guanyu shuangyashan
shijian de shengming], Boxun, 17 March 16; ``China Mine Workers
Detained After Protesting Unpaid Wages,'' Agence France-Presse,
reprinted in Newsmax, 18 March 16; Gerry Shih, ``Anger in China's Coal
Country as Miners Feel Left Behind,'' Associated Press, 18 March 16.
\94\ For information on the role of labor NGOs in Guangdong
province, see Feng Renke and Li Linjin, ``The Plight of Chinese Labor
Rights NGOs'' [Zhongguo laogong weiquan NGO de kunjing], Financial
Times, 2 March 15; Anita Chan, ``China's Factory Workers Are Becoming
More Restive,'' Yale Global Online, 21 May 15.
\95\ Feng Renke and Li Linjin, ``The Plight of Chinese Labor Rights
NGOs'' [Zhongguo laogong weiquan NGO de kunjing], Financial Times, 2
March 15.
\96\ Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of
Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China Change, 10 December
15. See also Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services Center, `` `Dead End,' an
Open Letter From Labor Rights Defense Organization Nan Fei Yan'' [``Ci
lu butong'' zhi laogong weiquan zuzhi nan fei yan de gongkai xin],
reprinted in New Citizens' Movement (blog), 19 October 15.
\97\ Tom Phillips, ``Call for China To Free Labour Activists or
Risk Backlash From Frustrated Workforce,'' Guardian, 9 December 15; Eli
Friedman, Aaron Halegua, and Jerome A. Cohen, ``Cruel Irony: China's
Communists Are Stamping Out Labor Activism,'' Washington Post, 3
January 16; Ivan Franceschini, ``Revisiting Chinese Labour NGOs: Some
Grounds for Hope? '' Made in China, Issue 1 (January-March 2016), 17.
See also CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 59, 122.
\98\ Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services Center, `` `Dead End,' an
Open Letter From Labor Rights Defense Organization Nan Fei Yan'' [``Ci
lu butong'' zhi laogong weiquan zuzhi nan fei yan de gongkai xin],
reprinted in New Citizens' Movement (blog), 19 October 15; Feng Renke
and Li Linjin, ``The Plight of Chinese Labor Rights NGOs'' [Zhongguo
laogong weiquan NGO de kunjing], Financial Times, 2 March 15; Alexandra
Harney, ``China Labor Activists Say Facing Unprecedented
Intimidation,'' Reuters, 21 January 15. For information on the
harassment of labor rights advocates and NGOs in the previous reporting
year, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 85-86.
\99\ Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services Center, `` `Dead End,' an
Open Letter From Labor Rights Defense Organization Nan Fei Yan'' [``Ci
lu butong'' zhi laogong weiquan zuzhi nan fei yan de gongkai xin],
reprinted in New Citizens' Movement (blog), 19 October 15; Feng Renke
and Li Linjin, ``The Plight of Chinese Labor Rights NGOs'' [Zhongguo
laogong weiquan NGO de kunjing], Financial Times, 2 March 15; Alexandra
Harney, ``China Labor Activists Say Facing Unprecedented
Intimidation,'' Reuters, 21 January 15.
\100\ Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member
Zhu Xiaomei Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application
Rejected, Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15; Feng Renke and Li Linjin, ``The Plight of
Chinese Labor Rights NGOs'' [Zhongguo laogong weiquan NGO de kunjing],
Financial Times, 2 March 15. Zeng Feiyang is the director of the Panyu
Workers' Services Center in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province.
For more information on Zeng Feiyang, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2015-00427.
\101\ Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member
Zhu Xiaomei Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application
Rejected, Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong Labor
Rights Advocates Suffer Consecutive Attacks at Entrance to Police
Station'' [Guangdong laogong weiquan renshi lianxu zai paichusuo menkou
yu xi], 4 April 15. Peng Jiayong is director of the Laborer Mutual Aid
Group in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province. For more
information on Peng Jiayong, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00437. For additional examples of the harassment
of labor advocates and labor NGOs from the previous reporting year, see
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 85.
\102\ Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, ``China Arrests at Least
3 Workers' Rights Leaders Amid Rising Unrest,'' New York Times, 5
December 15; Tom Phillips, ``Call for China To Free Labour Activists or
Risk Backlash From Frustrated Workforce,'' Guardian, 9 December 15; Eli
Friedman, Aaron Halegua, and Jerome A. Cohen, ``Cruel Irony: China's
Communists Are Stamping Out Labor Activism,'' Washington Post, 3
January 16. For more information on government suppression of labor
NGOs in previous years, see CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12,
59, 122; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 85-86.
\103\ Geoffrey Crothall, ``Refusing To Honor Labor Rights Backfires
in China,'' New York Times, 12 May 16; ``Activists See Bleak Future for
China's NGOs Amid Ongoing Crackdown,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 January 16.
\104\ Yaqiu Wang, ``Amid Crackdown, China's Dissidents Fight To
Keep the Spirit of Tiananmen Alive,'' World Politics Review, 7 June 16;
Eli Friedman, Aaron Halegua, and Jerome A. Cohen, ``Cruel Irony:
China's Communists Are Stamping Out Labor Activism,'' Washington Post,
3 January 16; ``Activists See Bleak Future for China's NGOs Amid
Ongoing Crackdown,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 January 16; Yaxue Cao,
``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in
Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China Change, 10 December 15.
\105\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts.
20(1), 23(1), 23(4); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22(1); International
Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, 18 June 98, art. 2(a).
\106\ Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member
Zhu Xiaomei Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application
Rejected, Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15; Tom Phillips, ``Call for China To Free
Labour Activists or Risk Backlash From Frustrated Workforce,''
Guardian, 9 December 15; Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate
Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China
Change, 10 December 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Police Suddenly Crack
Down on Four Guangdong Labor NGOs, `Haige Labor Services Center,'
`Panyu Workers' Services Center,' `Sunflower Women Workers' Center,'
`Nan Fei Yan,' Directors and Staff Disappear After Being Taken Away''
[Guangdong si laogong NGO ``hai ge laogong fuwu bu'', ``panyu
dagongzu'', ``xiangyanghua nugong zhongxin'', ``nan fei yan'' turan
zaodao jingfang daya, fuzeren ji yuangong bei daizou hou shilian], 3
December 15. See also ``Guangdong Authorities Arrest Labor Rights
Advocates,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 January
16.
\107\ Rights Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member
Zhu Xiaomei Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application
Rejected, Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15. For more information on the labor rights
advocates and their cases, see the following records in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2014-00026 on Meng Han, 2015-
00427 on Zeng Feiyang, 2015-00428 on Zhu Xiaomei, 2015-00431 on He
Xiaobo, 2015-00435 on Deng Xiaoming, and 2015-00437 on Peng Jiayong.
\108\ Ibid. For more information on Tang Jian, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00017.
\109\ Rights Defense Network, `` `12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Case'
Arrests Approved Today for Four Individuals, One Released, Whereabouts
of Two Unknown'' [``12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an'' jin si ren bei
pizhun daibu, yi ren huoshi, liang ren wu xialuo], 8 January 16; Rights
Defense Network, ``Detained Guangdong Labor NGO Member Zhu Xiaomei
Applies for Bail Because Child Still Nursing, Application Rejected,
Currently Five NGO Members Criminally Detained, Two Forcibly
Disappeared (Introduction to 7 Detained NGO Members Attached)''
[Guangdong bei zhua laogong NGO chengyuan zhu xiaomei yin haizi reng
zai buru qi shenqing qubao bei ju muqian gong wu ming NGO chengyuan zao
xingju, liang wei zao qiangpo shizong (fu 7 wei bei zhua NGO chengyuan
jianjie)], 15 December 15; Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate
Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China
Change, 10 December 15; Red Balloon Solidarity, ``Sunday Topic: They
Promoted the Rights and Interests of Migrants, but Spent Migrants' Day
in a PSB Detention Center'' [Zhouri huati: tamen wei yimingong
shenzhang quanyi yiminri que zai kanshousuo duguo], Ming Pao, 19
December 15.
\110\ Rights Defense Network, `` `12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Case'
Arrests Approved Today for Four Individuals, One Released, Whereabouts
of Two Unknown'' [``12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an'' jin si ren bei
pizhun daibu, yi ren huoshi, liang ren wu xialuo], 8 January 16; Sui-
Lee Wee, ``China Arrests Four Labor Activists Amid Crackdown:
Lawyers,'' Reuters, 10 January 16; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1
October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28
December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February
11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 290.
\111\ Rights Defense Network, `` `12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Case'
Arrests Approved Today for Four Individuals, One Released, Whereabouts
of Two Unknown'' [``12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an'' jin si ren bei
pizhun daibu, yi ren huoshi, liang ren wu xialuo], 8 January 16; ``Four
Detained Labor Rights Defenders Arrested, Two Out on Bail, Attack Aimed
at Panyu Workers' Services Center'' [Bei zhua lao wei renshi si pibu
liang qubao maotou zhi zhi panyu dagongzu], Radio Free Asia, 10 January
16; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July
79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December
99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29
June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1
November 15, art. 183.
\112\ ``Four Detained Labor Rights Defenders Arrested, Two Out on
Bail, Attack Aimed at Panyu Workers' Services Center'' [Bei zhua lao
wei renshi si pibu liang qubao maotou zhi zhi panyu dagongzu], Radio
Free Asia, 10 January 16 (on Deng and Peng's release); Human Rights
Campaign in China, ``Guangdong Labor NGO Case--Zhu Xiaomei Released on
Bail, Returns Home'' [Guangdong laogong NGO an zhu xiaomei yi qubao
houshen huijia], 2 February 16 (on Zhu's release); China Labour
Bulletin, ``Labour Activist He Xiaobo Released on Bail After Four
Months in Detention,'' 8 April 16 (on He's release).
\113\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Guangdong Labor NGO Case--
Zhu Xiaomei Released on Bail, Returns Home'' [Guangdong laogong NGO an
zhu xiaomei yi qubao houshen huijia], 2 February 16. On January 31,
2016, Tang indicated via WeChat that he had been out of detention for
several days.
\114\ For a description of bail (qubao houshen), also translated as
``guarantee pending further investigation,'' under Chinese legal
provisions, see Human Rights in China, ``HRIC Law Note: Five Detained
Women Released on `Guarantee Pending Further Investigation,' '' 13
April 15. For relevant Chinese legal provisions, see PRC Criminal
Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13,
arts. 65-72, 77; Ministry of Public Security, Public Security
Procedural Provisions on Handling Criminal Cases [Gong'an jiguan banli
xingshi anjian chengxu guiding], issued 13 December 12, effective 1
January 13, arts. 77, 85, 86, 89.
\115\ ``Guangdong NGO's Zeng Feiyang and Three Others' Labor Rights
Defense Cases Will Be Referred to Court in Late July'' [Guangdong NGO
zeng feiyang deng si ren laogong weiquan an qiyue xiaxun yisong
fayuan], Radio Free Asia, 6 July 16; Labor Partners 521, ``Guangdong
Labor NGO Case Development: Zeng Feiyang, Meng Han, Zhu Xiaomei, and
Tang Huanxing Cases Under Review for Prosecution'' [Guangdong laogong
NGO an jinzhan: zeng feiyang, meng han, zhu xiaomei, tang huanxing bei
yisong shencha qisu], reprinted in Rights Defense Network, 14 July 16.
\116\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Persecution of Labor Activists
Escalates,'' 13 January 16; Cherie Chan, ``Labor Rights Movements
Gaining Momentum in China,'' Deutsche Welle, 5 January 16; Yaxue Cao,
``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in
Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China Change, 10 December 15;
``Guangdong Labor NGOs `Were Doing the Job of a Trade Union':
Activists,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 December 15.
\117\ ``Four Detained Labor Rights Defenders Arrested, Two Out on
Bail, Attack Aimed at Panyu Workers' Services Center'' [Bei zhua lao
wei renshi si pibu liang qubao maotou zhi zhi panyu dagongzu], Radio
Free Asia, 10 January 16. For additional information on Panyu Workers'
Services Center, see Zhen Jinghui, ``Zeng Feiyang: A Labor NGO's Fight
for Survival'' [Zeng feiyang: yi ge laogong NGO de jiafeng shengcun],
South Reviews, 27 March 10, reprinted in Sina, 5 December 13.
\118\ Zou Wei, ``Behind the Halo of the `Star of the Labor
Movement'--`Panyu Workers' Services Center' Director Zeng Feiyang and
Others Investigated as Suspects in Serious Crimes'' [Jiekai ``gongyun
zhi xing'' guanghuan de beihou--``panyu dagongzu wenshu chuli fuwu bu''
zhuren zeng feiyang deng ren shexian yanzhong fanzui anjian diaocha],
Xinhua, 22 December 15.
\119\ Ibid.
\120\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workers Speak Out in Support of
Detained Labour Activists in Guangdong,'' 5 January 16.
\121\ ``Guangdong Labor NGOs `Were Doing the Job of a Trade Union':
Activists,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 December 15.
\122\ For information on child labor from previous reporting years,
see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 86; CECC, 2014 Annual
Report, 9 October 14, 76-77; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13,
70-71.
\123\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 15; PRC Law on the Protection
of Minors [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wei chengnian ren baohu fa],
passed 4 September 91, amended 29 December 06, effective 1 June 07,
art. 38. Article 15 of the PRC Labor Law prohibits the employment of
minors under 16, with exceptions for literature and the arts, sports,
and special handicrafts, provided the employer undergoes inspection and
approval and guarantees the child's right to compulsory education.
\124\ International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 138)
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73;
International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99; International Labour Organization,
``Ratifications of C138--Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138),'' last
visited 6 September 16; International Labour Organization,
``Ratifications of C182--Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
(No. 182),'' last visited 6 September 16.
\125\ Center for Child Rights & Corporate Social Responsibility,
``Best Response: Auditors' Insights on Child Labor in Asia,'' June
2016, 4.
\126\ Zheng Caixiong, ``Boy's Sudden Death Prompts Campaign Against
Child Labor,'' China Daily, 26 April 16. See also China Labor Watch,
``Sudden Death of a 14 Year Old Child Worker From a Factory in
Foshan,'' 27 April 16.
\127\ Yuan Lingzhi, ``Child Laborers Cruelly Trapped Making Socks
for Five Years Rescued, Worked Nearly 16 Hours Per Day'' [Tonggong bei
kun heixin wazi zuofang 5 nian bei jiu meiri gongzuo jin 16 xiaoshi],
Justice Net, 18 August 16.
\128\ International Labour Organization, Country Office for China
and Mongolia, ``Child Labour in China and Mongolia,'' last visited 6
September 16.
\129\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Interim
Provisions on Dispatch Labor [Laowu paiqian zanxing guiding], issued 24
January 14, effective 1 March 14; PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07, amended 28
December 12, effective 1 July 13, arts. 58, 63, 66; National People's
Congress Standing Committee, Decision on Amending the ``PRC Labor
Contract Law'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu
xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa'' de jueding],
issued 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13.
\130\ Fair Labor Association, ``Issue Brief: Labor Dispatch Workers
in China,'' March 2016; Lu Binyang, ``Temporary Railroad Workers Stage
Sit-in Over Equal Pay,'' Caixin, 10 December 15; Jenny Chan et al.,
``Interns or Workers? China's Student Labor Regime,'' Asia-Pacific
Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 26, No. 1 (August 2015), 3; Liu Genghua,
International Labour Organization, ``Private Employment Agencies and
Labour Dispatch in China,'' Sector Working Paper No. 293, 2014, 6. For
information on contract or dispatch labor from previous reporting
years, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 92; CECC, 2014
Annual Report, 9 October 14, 75-76; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10
October 13, 71-72.
\131\ PRC Labor Contract Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong
hetong fa], passed 29 June 07, amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July
13, arts. 63, 66; National People's Congress Standing Committee,
Decision on Amending the ``PRC Labor Contract Law'' [Quanguo renmin
daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong hetong fa'' de jueding], issued 28 December 12,
effective 1 July 13.
\132\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Interim
Provisions on Dispatch Labor [Laowu paiqian zanxing guiding], issued 24
January 14, effective 1 March 14, arts. 4, 28. Article 28 includes an
exception allowing firms with dispatch labor agreements that were
signed prior to, and set to expire within two years of, the effective
date of the amendment to the PRC Labor Contract Law to continue the use
of dispatch labor at existing levels until those contracts expire.
\133\ Zhang Moning, ``Renewed Debate Over `Labor Contract Law' ''
[``Laodong hetong fa'' zhengyi zaiqi], South Reviews, 16 March 16.
\134\ Allan Xu, ``China's Labor Dispatch Laws Come Into Effect,
Signaling Sweeping Change for Employment Structures,'' China Briefing
(blog), 8 March 16; Zhang Xin, ``Number of Dispatch Workers at Big Four
Banks Down to 28,700, Yet Rural Commercial Banks Still Recruiting'' [Si
da hang laowu paiqiangong jiang zhi 2.87 wan ren nong shanghang reng
zai nishi zhaopin], Securities Daily, 20 October 15; Lucy Lu and Dai
Zhengcao, ``Is Labor Dispatch Fading Away? Not That Simple,'' King &
Wood Mallesons, China Law Insight (blog), 4 May 15.
\135\ See, e.g., Lu Hui et al., ``Hi-Tech Industrial Park Predicts
Output To Reach 28 Billion by Year End'' [Gaoxin keji chanye yuan yuji
niandi chanzhi da 280 yi], Southern Daily, 7 July 16; Zhan Wenping,
``Reforms Must Be Completed by End of Next Month, Otherwise New
Dispatch Workers Cannot Be Hired'' [Xia yuedi qian xu wancheng zhenggai
fouze bude xin yong bei paiqian laodongzhe], Xin Kuai Bao, 28 January
16; Lu Binyang, ``Temporary Railroad Workers Stage Sit-in Over Equal
Pay,'' Caixin, 10 December 15.
\136\ China Labor Watch and The Future in Our Hands, ``Something's
Not Right Here: Poor Working Conditions Persist at Apple Supplier
Pegatron,'' 22 October 15, 8, 10.
\137\ Lu Binyang, ``Temporary Railroad Workers Stage Sit-in Over
Equal Pay,'' Caixin, 10 December 15.
\138\ For information on the abuse of student labor in previous
reporting years, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 87; CECC,
2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 77; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10
October 13, 70-71.
\139\ Danwatch, ``Servants of Servers: Rights Violations and Forced
Labour in the Supply Chain of ICT Equipment in European Universities,''
October 2015, 5, 8.
\140\ Ibid., 3, 6-10; Ministry of Education and Ministry of
Finance, Measures on Managing Secondary Vocational School Student
Internships [Zhongdeng zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi guanli banfa],
issued 26 June 07, art. 5. Article 5 of the Measures on Managing
Secondary Vocational School Student Internships prohibits interns from
working more than eight hours per day.
\141\ Danwatch, ``Servants of Servers: Rights Violations and Forced
Labour in the Supply Chain of ICT Equipment in European Universities,''
October 2015, 3, 5, 6, 15.
\142\ Li Yifan (Guodong de shaozi), ``Why Uber Wants To Kill Me--
The Secret Behind the 50-Billion-Dollar Valuation'' [Wo weishenme bei
uber zhuisha--500 yi guzhi beihou buweirenzhi de mimi], Weibo post, 4
December 15, 2:18 p.m.; Josh Horwitz and Echo Huang, ``Uber's Business
in China Is Built on Exploiting Armies of Underpaid, Overworked
Interns,'' Quartz, 16 December 15.
\143\ Kai Maying (DOOM kai), ``I Am an Intern Uber Fired, Today I
Have Something To Say'' [Wo shi yi ge bei uber kaichu de shixisheng,
jintian wo you hua shuo], Weibo post, 6 December 15, 19:19 p.m.; Josh
Horwitz and Echo Huang, ``Uber's Business in China Is Built on
Exploiting Armies of Underpaid, Overworked Interns,'' Quartz, 16
December 15.
\144\ Grace Yang, ``Student Interns in China: The China Employment
Law Issues,'' China Law Blog, 20 December 15.
\145\ PRC Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu fa],
passed 18 March 95, amended 27 August 09, 27 December 15, effective 1
June 16, art. 58.
\146\ Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, Measures on
Managing Secondary Vocational School Student Internships [Zhongdeng
zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi guanli banfa], issued 26 June 07, arts. 3,
5.
\147\ Ministry of Education et al., Provisions on Managing
Vocational School Student Internships [Zhiye xuexiao xuesheng shixi
guanli guiding], issued 11 April 16.
\148\ Ibid., arts. 6, 9.
\149\ State Council, Provisional Measures on Workers' Retirement
and Withdrawal From Office [Guowuyuan guanyu gongren tuixiu, tuizhi de
zanxing banfa], issued 2 June 78, art. 1; ``China Focus: China's Plan
To Raise Retirement Age Meets Mixed Reactions,'' Xinhua, 4 March 16.
Currently, the retirement age is 50 or 60 for male workers and 45 or 50
for female workers depending on the type of job; the government,
however, plans to raise the retirement age in coming years.
\150\ Susan Finder, ``Data From the Supreme People's Court on 2015
Labor/Employment Disputes,'' Supreme People's Court Monitor (blog), 27
March 16; China Labour Bulletin, ``Elderly Sanitation Worker's Death
Shows Need for Collective Action and Solidarity,'' 14 December 15.
\151\ State Council, PRC Labor Contract Law Implementing
Regulations [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa shishi
tiaoli], issued 18 September 08, art. 21; PRC Labor Contract Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong hetong fa], passed 29 June 07,
amended 28 December 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 44(2). The PRC Labor
Contract Law stipulates that if a worker receives a pension, his or her
labor contract terminates (zhongzhi), but the implementing regulations
require that contracts be terminated for all workers upon reaching the
legal retirement age.
\152\ Supreme People's Court, Interpretation Regarding Various
Issues in Using Appropriate Laws When Accepting Labor Dispute Cases
(Three) [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli laodong zhengyi anjian
shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jishi (san)], issued 13 September 10, art.
7.
\153\ Susan Finder, ``Data From the Supreme People's Court on 2015
Labor/Employment Disputes,'' Supreme People's Court Monitor (blog), 27
March 16; Lu Cheng, ``Many Older People Return To Work in Services''
[Laoren zai jiuye duoshu zuo fuwu], Yunnan Net, 3 May 16; Yang Lincong,
``Rehired and Returning to Work Unit After Retirement--Is a Traffic
Accident Considered a Workplace Injury'' [Tuixiu hou fanpin hui danwei
shangban chu le jiaotong shigu suan bu suan gongshang], Jinhua Evening
Paper, reprinted in Zhejiang News, 22 March 16. See also Owen Haacke,
``China's Mandatory Retirement Age Changes: Impact for Foreign
Companies,'' US-China Business Council (blog), 1 April 15.
\154\ China Labour Bulletin, ``China's Elderly Street Sweepers at
Risk as Temperatures Plummet,'' 22 January 16; China Labour Bulletin,
``Elderly Sanitation Worker's Death Shows Need for Collective Action
and Solidarity,'' 14 December 15.
\155\ Supreme People's Court Research Office, ``2015 Situation of
Judgments and Enforcement Nationwide'' [2015 nian quanguo fayuan
shenpan zhixing qingkuang], 18 March 16, item 3(5). See also Susan
Finder, ``Data From the Supreme People's Court on 2015 Labor/Employment
Disputes,'' Supreme People's Court Monitor (blog), 27 March 16.
\156\ Man Zhaoxu, ``38 Serious or Very Serious Accidents in 2015,
768 Killed or Missing in 21 Provinces'' [2015 nian quanguo fasheng 38
qi zhong te da shigu she 21 shengfen 768 ren sangsheng shizong], China
National Radio, 15 January 16.
\157\ Ibid.
\158\ ``Coal Mine Accident Kills 19 Workers in Northern China,'' Al
Jazeera, 24 March 16; ``Shaft of Light,'' Economist, 18 July 15;
Michael Lelyveld, ``China Cuts Coal Mine Deaths, but Count in Doubt,''
Radio Free Asia, 16 March 15; China Labour Bulletin, ``Coal Mine
Accidents in China Decrease as Production Stagnates,'' 3 April 14. See
also David Stanway, ``China April Coal Output Down 11 Percent on Year:
Stats Bureau,'' Reuters, 14 May 16.
\159\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Calls To Improve China's Work Safety
Go Unheeded in 2015,'' 18 January 16.
\160\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``2014 Report
on Occupational Illness Nationwide'' [2014 nian quanguo zhiye bing
baogao qingkuang], 3 December 15; Hu Hao, ``China Had Over 26,000
Reported Cases of Occupational Illness in 2013, Over 73 Percent of
Cases in Coal, Non-Ferrous Metal, Machinery, and Construction
Industries'' [Woguo 2013 nian baogao zhiye bing 2.6 wan yu li meitan
youse jinshu jixie jianzhu hangye bingli chao 73%], Xinhua, 30 June 14.
\161\ Ibid.
\162\ Zheng Li, ``Longest Wait for Migrant Workers To Obtain
Compensation for Pneumoconiosis Is Seven Years'' [Chenfeibing
nongmingong huo pei zuichang hao shi qi nian], Workers' Daily, 10
December 15.
\163\ See, e.g., PRC Work Safety Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
anquan shengchan fa], passed 29 June 02, amended 31 August 14,
effective 1 December 14; State Administration of Work Safety,
Production and Operations Work Unit Safety Training Provisions
[Shengchan jingying danwei anquan peixun guiding], issued 17 January
06, effective 1 March 06; Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology et al., Measures on Managing the Restricted Use of Harmful
Materials in Electrical and Electronic Goods [Dianqi dianzi chanpin
youhai wuzhi xianzhi shiyong guanli banfa], issued 21 January 16,
effective 1 July 16.
\164\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Calls To Improve China's Work Safety
Go Unheeded in 2015,'' 18 January 16; Chris Buckley, ``Before Debris
Collapse in China, Safety Fears Were Discussed,'' New York Times, 16
January 16; China Labor Watch, ``The Other Side of Fairy Tales,'' 20
November 15, 14, 19, 31, 47-48, 67.
\165\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology et al.,
Measures on Managing the Restricted Use of Harmful Materials in
Electrical and Electronic Goods [Dianqi dianzi chanpin youhai wuzhi
xianzhi shiyong guanli banfa], issued 21 January 16, effective 1 July
16; National Health and Family Planning Commission et al., Opinion on
Strengthening Prevention and Treatment Work on Pneumoconiosis Among
Migrant Workers [Guanyu jiaqiang nongmingong chenfeibing fangzhi
gongzuo de yijian], issued 8 January 16; State Administration of Work
Safety, Circular on Drawing Profound Lessons From Accidents To Further
Prevent and Limit Serious and Very Serious Coal Mining Accidents
[Guanyu shenke xiqu shigu jiaoxun jinyibu fangfan he ezhi meikuang
zhong te da shigu de tongzhi], issued 28 March 16.
\166\ State Administration of Work Safety, Provisions on
Implementing the ``PRC Work Safety Law'' (Trial) (Draft for
Solicitation of Comments) [Guojia anquan shengchan jiandu guanli zongju
shishi ``anquan shengchan fa'' ruogan guiding (shixing) (zhengqiu
yijian gao)], issued 25 November 15; State Administration of Work
Safety, Certain Decisions on Implementing the PRC Work Safety Law
(September 2015 Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo anquan shengchan fa shishi ruogan jueding (zhengqiu yijian
gao 2015 nian 9 yue)], issued 11 September 15.
\167\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Northeast China Sees Two Coal Mine
Disasters in Two Days,'' 18 December 15; China Labour Bulletin,
``Factory Workers Feel the Full Impact of China's `Natural Disasters,'
'' 27 October 15.
\168\ China Labor Watch, ``The Other Side of Fairy Tales,'' 20
November 15, 31, 48; China Labor Watch and Solidar Suisse, ``Dirty
Frying Pans,'' 4 February 16, 2.
\169\ Students & Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour and Labour
Action China, ``Unveiling the Labour Rights Violations,'' February
2016, 2; China Labour Bulletin, ``Calls To Improve China's Work Safety
Go Unheeded in 2015,'' 18 January 16; China Labor Watch and Solidar
Suisse, ``Dirty Frying Pans,'' 4 February 16, 5; State Administration
of Work Safety, Production and Operations Work Unit Safety Training
Provisions [Shengchan jingying danwei anquan peixun guiding], issued 17
January 06, effective 1 March 06, art. 13.
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party officials continued to abuse
criminal law and police power to further their priorities in
``maintaining social stability'' and perpetuating one-party
rule at the expense of individual freedoms.\1\ Representative
examples discussed in this section include the criminal
prosecution of Yang Maodong, better known as Guo Feixiong, who
participated in peaceful rights advocacy and called for
political reform; Tang Jingling, who promoted non-violent civil
disobedience; and Zhang Haitao, who advocated for ethnic
minority rights.
The Commission observed that many of the concerns raised by
the UN Committee against Torture (Committee) during its
November 2015 review of China's compliance with the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment also were raised by the Committee during its
previous review of China in 2008. The Committee remained
concerned about a wide range of issues, including the use of
extralegal and extrajudicial detention,\2\ harassment of rights
lawyers and advocates,\3\ restrictions on detainees' access to
legal counsel,\4\ and excessive time in detention for
individuals held without formal charges.\5\ The Committee also
expressed regret that the follow-up recommendations to the
Chinese government identified in its 2008 concluding
observations ``have not yet been implemented.'' \6\
Ongoing Use of Arbitrary Detention
Extralegal and extrajudicial forms of detention that
restrict a person's liberty without judicial oversight \7\
violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
\8\ and Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).\9\ Some commonly used forms of
extralegal and extrajudicial detention in China include the
following.
BLACK JAILS
``Black jails'' are detention sites that operate outside of
China's judicial and administrative detention systems.\10\
After the Chinese government abolished the reeducation through
labor (RTL) system in 2013,\11\ the Commission continued to
observe Chinese authorities' use of ``black jails'' \12\ to
suppress individuals such as petitioners,\13\ rights
advocates,\14\ and those resisting the government's crackdown
on Christianity.\15\ In one example, in March 2016, local
police from Beijing municipality reportedly detained rights
advocate Yin Huimin \16\ for seven days in a ``black jail,''
during which time an officer punched and repeatedly slapped
her, breaking her ear drum and causing permanent deafness in
one ear.\17\ The Commission further observed multiple reports
of Chinese authorities detaining petitioners in ``black jails''
prior to and during the National People's Congress and Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference meetings in March
2016.\18\
Local-level government and Communist Party officials
reportedly used ``legal education centers''--a type of ``black
jail'' \19\--to detain individuals such as Falun Gong
practitioners, in an effort to force them to renounce their
beliefs,\20\ and petitioners, in order to prevent them from
making complaints to the central government.\21\ [For more
information on Falun Gong practitioners and petitioners, see
Section II--Freedom of Religion and Section III--Access to
Justice.] In one example, in October 2015, authorities in
Jiansanjiang, Fujin city, Jiamusi municipality, Heilongjiang
province, detained a farm worker in a legal education center
that reportedly closed around April 2014.\22\ In addition, Shi
Mengwen continued to serve a three-year prison sentence in
Jiansanjiang in apparent connection with his advocacy--along
with three other Falun Gong practitioners--for the release of
Falun Gong practitioners who had been arbitrarily detained at
the Jiansanjiang ``legal education center.'' \23\
PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS
Chinese authorities continued to forcibly commit
individuals to psychiatric facilities as a tool of political
repression \24\ despite provisions in the PRC Mental Health Law
aimed at protecting citizens from such abuse.\25\ Civil Rights
& Livelihood Watch, a human rights monitoring group based in
China, noted an increase in reporting of such forcible
commitments in 2015, stating that the options available for
government officials to restrict citizens' liberty in the name
of ``maintaining social stability'' became more limited after
the 2013 abolition of the RTL system.\26\ [For more information
on implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law, see Section
II--Public Health.]
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY DISCIPLINARY PROCESS (SHUANGGUI)
Under an investigation process known as ``double
designation'' (shuanggui), Party investigators may summon Party
members \27\ to appear for interrogation at a designated time
and place for alleged Party discipline violations.\28\ The
shuanggui process is within the Party's control and outside
China's legal system; it is a form of extralegal detention \29\
that contravenes rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the ICCPR.\30\ Investigators detain Party
members for three to six months on average \31\ and generally
do not notify the detainee's family nor permit family visits or
meetings with legal counsel.\32\ Investigators reportedly have
employed torture and other coercive means to extract
information and confessions during the investigation
process.\33\ Human Rights Watch reported in February 2016 that
prolonged solitary confinement, ill treatment, and threats
against family members during shuanggui remained common.\34\ In
February 2016, former Deputy Director of the National Energy
Administration Xu Yongsheng retracted a confession he
previously made while detained under shuanggui, asserting that
investigators had tortured him while in custody.\35\
Criminal Law
Some provisions in the Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal
Law, which became effective on November 1, 2015,\36\ may have a
negative impact on human rights practices in China \37\ in
areas such as freedom of speech,\38\ freedom of the press,\39\
freedom of assembly,\40\ freedom of religion,\41\ access to
justice,\42\ and rights advocacy.\43\
USE OF CRIMINAL LAW TO PROSECUTE RIGHTS ADVOCATES
In the past year, the Chinese government continued to use
broadly defined crimes to punish rights advocates, petitioners,
lawyers, and members of some ethnic minority groups.\44\
Picking quarrels and provoking trouble. This
past year, authorities prosecuted rights advocates for
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' \45\ under
Article 293 of the PRC Criminal Law.\46\ A U.S.-based
legal scholar observed that the vagueness of this crime
potentially allowed police ``unlimited discretion to
detain and arrest offenders for almost any action.''
\47\ The Chinese government expressly expanded this
provision to cover Internet activities in 2013 \48\ and
has since used it to prosecute individuals for online
speech.\49\ In December 2015, Chinese authorities
convicted public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang \50\ on
charges of ``picking quarrels and provoking trouble''
and ``inciting ethnic hatred'' \51\ in connection with
his posting of several online messages critical of the
Chinese government.\52\ Pu was disbarred following his
conviction.\53\
Gathering a crowd to disturb order in a public
place. The Chinese government applied Article 291 of
the PRC Criminal Law under circumstances that could
constitute a restriction on freedom of assembly.\54\
Article 291 provides for criminal sanctions--including
imprisonment of up to five years--for the main
organizer who gathers a crowd to disturb order in a
public place.\55\ In November 2015, a court in
Guangdong province sentenced rights advocate Yang
Maodong, better known as Guo Feixiong, to six years'
imprisonment under both this provision and Article 293,
reportedly in connection with his peaceful rights
advocacy and calls for official transparency and
political reform.\56\ As part of the same case, the
court also sentenced Sun Desheng to two years and six
months' imprisonment under Article 291.\57\
Organizing and using a cult to undermine
implementation of the law. The Commission observed that
in the past year, Chinese authorities used Article 300
of the PRC Criminal Law \58\ to prosecute
Buddhists,\59\ Christians,\60\ and Falun Gong
practitioners,\61\ among others, under circumstances
that could constitute a restriction on the freedom of
religion under international law.\62\ The Ninth
Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law added the possibility
of life imprisonment to Article 300.\63\ [For more
information on Chinese authorities' treatment of
religious groups, see Section II--Freedom of Religion.]
Endangering state security. During this
reporting year, the Chinese government used
``endangering state security'' charges in a crackdown
against rights lawyers and advocates.\64\ Articles 102
to 112 of the PRC Criminal Law--listing offenses
including ``subversion of state power,''
``separatism,'' and ``espionage''--are collectively
referred to as crimes of ``endangering state security''
(ESS), some of which carry the death penalty.\65\ The
U.S.-based human rights organization Dui Hua Foundation
noted a significant drop in the number of ESS trials in
2015, which it attributed to the Chinese government's
use of non-ESS charges to prosecute political and
religious activism.\66\ In January 2016, a court in
Guangdong province convicted Tang Jingling,\67\ Yuan
Chaoyang,\68\ and Wang Qingying \69\ of ``inciting
subversion of state power,'' an ESS charge, in
connection with their promotion of non-violent civil
disobedience, sentencing them to prison terms ranging
from two years and six months to five years.\70\ In the
same month, a court in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region sentenced Zhang Haitao,\71\ an advocate for
ethnic minority rights, to 19 years' imprisonment on
ESS charges.\72\ In addition, as of July 2016,
authorities filed ESS charges against at least 16
rights lawyers and advocates who were detained or
disappeared in connection with the crackdown that began
in and around July 2015.\73\ [For more information
about the 2015 crackdown on human rights lawyers and
advocates, see Section III--Access to Justice.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN Committee against Torture's Review of China's Compliance With the
Convention against Torture
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 17 and 18, 2015, the UN Committee against Torture
(Committee) held sessions in Geneva, Switzerland, to assess China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture).\74\
In response to Committee members' questions, the Chinese delegation
claimed that ``[t]here were no cases of political imprisonment'' and
that ``interrogation chairs were used to prevent detainees from
escaping, attacking others or self-harming and were padded for comfort
and safety.'' \75\ Recent reports from international human rights
organizations referred to these chairs as ``tiger chairs'' and detailed
their use as torture devices.\76\
In its concluding observations, the Committee noted certain positive
developments in the Chinese government's efforts to reform the criminal
justice system, including the recognition of the infliction of mental
suffering as a form of torture and the 2013 abolition of the
reeducation through labor system.\77\
The Committee, however, censured the Chinese government, noting that
``the practice of torture and ill-treatment is still deeply entrenched
in the criminal justice system . . ..'' \78\ Specific concerns included
that the definition of torture under Chinese law did not conform to
that of the Convention against Torture\79\ and that Chinese authorities
used broadly defined charges against rights advocates and religious
practitioners and subjected them to ill-treatment, torture,\80\ ``black
jails,'' and other forms of administrative detention without
accountability.\81\ The Committee further criticized China for failing
to provide disaggregated information about torture, criminal justice,
and related issues by invoking state secrets provisions.\82\ Among its
recommendations, the Committee called on China to repeal provisions of
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law that allow de facto incommunicado
detention known as ``residential surveillance at a designated
location.'' \83\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN Committee against Torture's Review of China's Compliance With the
Convention against Torture--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese government reportedly barred at least seven rights
advocates from exiting China to prevent them from attending the
review.\84\ The Chinese government also reportedly denied citizens'
disclosure requests for information omitted from China's written report
to the Committee, including details of cases where the government had
awarded compensation to victims of torture and coerced confession, the
punishment that the perpetrators received, and the charges for which
they were prosecuted.\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ongoing Challenges in the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law
COERCED CONFESSIONS
Despite legislative and regulatory enactments by the
Chinese government to prevent coerced confession, the problem
continued during the reporting year. A November 2015 Amnesty
International report noted that the extraction of confessions
through torture remained widespread in pre-trial detention,
especially in cases that the government considered to be
politically sensitive.\86\
The 2012 amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)
provided for the exclusion of evidence obtained through illegal
means such as torture, force, or threat, and required
audiovisual recording of the interrogation process in serious
cases involving life imprisonment or the death penalty.\87\ In
September 2015, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) announced
that the implementation of the audiovisual recording system, as
prescribed by the CPL, was still in progress and that it
planned eventually to expand the scope of the system to cover
all criminal cases.\88\ In March 2016, the MPS issued
disciplinary rules to hold police officers accountable for
misconduct and subject them to criminal, administrative, and
disciplinary sanctions, including for obtaining confessions by
torturing detainees and retaliating against whistleblowers or
complainants.\89\
Chinese and international rights organizations expressed
concerns about the implementation and effectiveness of existing
preventive measures, as did a member of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).\90\ Lawyer and CPPCC
delegate Shi Jie observed that written interrogation notes
sometimes were inconsistent with or even contradicted
audiovisual recordings.\91\ Shi suggested that the National
People's Congress specify, through legislation or judicial
interpretation, that defense lawyers have the right to copy the
recording of the entire interrogation session, whether or not
the procuratorate decides to transfer it to the court.\92\ A
U.S.-based legal expert observed that ``recording
interrogations [was] not significantly changing the culture of
extreme reliance on confessions as the primary form of evidence
in criminal cases.'' \93\ Human Rights Watch also questioned
the effectiveness of the supervisory mechanism.\94\
TELEVISED CONFESSIONS
The Chinese government's practice of broadcasting on
television prerecorded ``confessions'' in high-profile cases
\95\ continued during the past reporting year.\96\ Examples of
individuals subjected to televised ``confessions'' included the
cofounder of a legal advocacy NGO,\97\ rights lawyers,\98\
media professionals,\99\ booksellers,\100\ and other
individuals.\101\ Such practices contravene international human
rights standards, including the right to a fair trial \102\ and
due process,\103\ the presumption of innocence,\104\ and the
right against self-incrimination.\105\ The international NGO
Chinese Human Rights Defenders noted that ``[w]hen suspects are
held incommunicado, without access to lawyers, and `confess' on
TV--a cruel and degrading humiliation in itself--it is
impossible to verify if they have confessed willingly or have
been tortured, threatened, or intimidated.'' \106\ Zhu Zhengfu,
a CPPCC member and Deputy Director of the All China Lawyers
Association, reportedly said that televised confessions worked
against the principle of the presumption of innocence.\107\ A
senior judge in Henan province reportedly echoed this opinion,
noting, ``Outside of a court, no one has the right to decide
whether someone is guilty of a crime.'' \108\
RESIDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE AT A DESIGNATED LOCATION
Under Article 73 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law,
authorities can enforce a form of coercive detention known as
``residential surveillance at a designated location'' \109\ to
detain a person at an undisclosed location for up to six months
for cases involving ``endangering state security'' (ESS),
terrorism, and serious bribery.\110\ An international human
rights group questioned the legality of ``residential
surveillance at a designated location'' and noted that the six-
month period far exceeded the 30-day time limit for police to
submit an arrest request to the procuratorate in cases where
individuals were held at a detention center.\111\
The UN Committee against Torture criticized this coercive
measure because it ``may amount to incommunicado detention in
secret places, putting detainees at a high risk of torture or
ill-treatment.'' \112\ In December 2015, with the stated goal
of supervising the enforcement of ``residential surveillance at
a designated location,'' the Supreme People's Procuratorate
issued provisions requiring procuratorate officials to issue an
``opinion to correct'' upon discovering noncompliant or
unlawful conduct such as corporal punishment and torture
committed by officials carrying out the coercive measure.\113\
A lawyer based in Shanghai municipality, however, questioned
the effectiveness of the provisions because they did not
provide for any penalty.\114\ Two China-based legal scholars
also cautioned that since ``residential surveillance at a
designated location'' is enforced outside a detention center,
the lack of effective supervision could lead to illegal
evidence gathering.\115\
Access to Counsel
In the past year, the Chinese government denied access to
legal counsel to some individuals detained in politically
sensitive cases. Individuals charged with ESS crimes--which the
government often used against rights advocates \116\--continued
to face difficulty in meeting with their lawyers.\117\ Article
33 of the PRC Lawyers Law as amended in 2012 \118\ deprives
detainees of the right to meet with their lawyers in ESS,
terrorism, and serious bribery cases (``three categories of
cases,'' or sanlei anjian \119\) unless an application for that
purpose has been approved by the agency investigating the
case.\120\ The CPL, however, does not provide for a specific
timeframe within which authorities must decide on such an
application.\121\ Authorities reportedly obstructed or denied
access to counsel for those detained during a major crackdown
on rights lawyers and advocates that began in and around July
2015 \122\ and in other cases involving rights advocacy.\123\
After the 2012 amendment of the CPL, some lawyers reported
that defendants had improved access to legal counsel,\124\ even
though lawyers continued to experience difficulties in meeting
with their clients, for reasons including the following:
insufficient numbers of lawyer meeting rooms in detention
facilities; \125\ authorities' invocation of the ``three
categories of cases'' to deny a detainee
access to counsel irrespective of the actual charge; \126\
authorities' detention of individuals under ``residential
surveillance at a designated location'' instead of at a
detention center; \127\ and authorities' refusal to allow
lawyer-client meetings without prior permission.\128\
Torture and Abuse in Custody
During this reporting year, authorities at detention
facilities continued to abuse detainees. For example, in
November 2015, Zhang Liumao,\129\ founder of a literary
magazine, died in a detention center in Guangzhou municipality,
Guangdong province, after authorities had detained him for
about two months on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble.'' \130\ A lawyer who viewed Zhang's body
observed evidence of physical abuse,\131\ but procuratorate
officials denied the family's demand for a copy of the full
autopsy report.\132\
In April 2016, the sister of imprisoned rights advocate
Yang Maodong, better known as Guo Feixiong, requested that
prison officials provide Guo with medical examination and
treatment for his deteriorating health, which included
intermittent bloody diarrhea and bleeding in his mouth and
pharynx.\133\ In May, officials in charge of Guo's custody
forced Guo to have a rectal examination, which officials
reportedly filmed and threatened to post online.\134\
In May 2016, Lei Yang, an environmentalist and new father,
died shortly after police officers in Beijing municipality
placed him in custody.\135\ In June, Beijing procuratorial
officials approved the arrest of two of the officers involved
on the charge of ``dereliction of duty.'' \136\ Authorities
reportedly censored a news article about Lei's family accusing
the police officers of causing Lei's death by intentional
infliction of injury.\137\
In August 2016, family members of detained lawyer Xie Yang
issued a statement saying that in August 2015, officials
reportedly beat Xie unconscious after Xie was tortured and
called out for help from a window of the holding place where
``residential surveillance at a designated location'' was
enforced.\138\ In July 2016, officials at the Changsha
Municipal No. 2 PSB Detention Center reportedly held Xie in a
cell with a death row inmate who attacked Xie with handcuffs,
causing serious injuries.\139\
Wrongful Conviction
In March 2016, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the
Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) reported continuing to
make efforts to prevent wrongful convictions,\140\ and courts
in Jilin, Zhejiang, and Yunnan provinces overturned convictions
in some cases involving torture allegations.\141\ Nevertheless,
reports of coerced confessions continued to surface this past
year.\142\ In June 2016, the SPP released a guiding case in
which a local procuratorate did not approve the arrest of a
murder suspect when it determined that authorities had
illegally obtained the suspect's confession and that other
evidence was insufficient to establish criminal conduct.\143\
In March 2016, a procuratorate in Guizhou province agreed to
investigate the 2003 murder convictions of two individuals who
alleged that they were tortured during the police
investigation, but the court that rendered the guilty verdict
declined the procuratorate's request to retrieve the case
materials for review.\144\
The Chinese government and Communist Party previously have
called for an end to the use of quotas for arrests,
indictments, guilty verdicts, and case conclusions in
performance evaluations.\145\ Depending on the implementation
of such a plan,\146\ this change could reduce pressure on
police to extract confessions \147\ and on courts to issue
guilty verdicts.\148\ In February 2016, state-funded newspaper
Beijing Times published a commentary in which the author
anticipated that this change would result in an increase in
not-guilty verdicts.\149\ According to the SPC work report
released in March 2016, the not-guilty verdict rate for 2015
was 0.084 percent,\150\ representing an increase from 0.066
percent for 2014,\151\ but below 0.10 and 1.02 percent for 2010
and 2000, respectively.\152\ Chinese news agency Caixin
reported that more than half of the 26 annual work reports
published by provincial-level high courts in 2016 continued to
list statistical data of these quotas as performance
indicators.\153\
Death Penalty
The Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law removed the
death penalty from 9 non-violent crimes,\154\ leaving 46 crimes
that still carried the death penalty.\155\ While two UN special
rapporteurs welcomed this move,\156\ one human rights group
viewed it as a modest improvement,\157\ and another questioned
its practical impact on reducing the number of executions.\158\
Despite the trend of a reduction in the number of executions in
China--from an estimated 12,000 in 2002 to 2,400 in 2013
\159\--the number of executions reportedly remained high
relative to other countries.\160\ In April 2016, Amnesty
International estimated that the number of executions in China
in 2015 was still in the thousands, exceeding the number for
all other countries combined.\161\
WITHHOLDING OF STATISTICS RELATED TO THE DEATH PENALTY
The Chinese government continued to withhold statistical
data on executions \162\ and treat the data as a state
secret.\163\ In its review of China's compliance with the
Convention against Torture, the UN Committee against Torture
requested that the Chinese government provide information on
the number of executions carried out.\164\ In its response to
the Committee, China merged the statistical data on the death
penalty with other criminal sentences, rather than providing
disaggregated data on executions alone.\165\
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY CASES
Some scholars expressed concerns about the death penalty
review process, specifically its lack of clear legal
standards,\166\ transparency,\167\ and adequate procedures to
ensure meaningful participation by legal counsel.\168\ At a
criminal law forum in October 2015, Zhou Guangquan, a Tsinghua
University law professor and a member of the National People's
Congress Legal Affairs Committee, called on the SPC to
promulgate death penalty sentencing guidelines and to disclose
statistical data on death penalty reviews.\169\
The U.S.-based human rights organization Dui Hua Foundation
examined 525 death penalty review decisions issued between
April 2011 and November 2015 and inferred from these decisions
that, in determining whether to approve a death sentence, the
SPC considered several mitigating factors, including remorse,
good behavior, severity of the crime, and the defendant's
economic situation and role in the crime.\170\ The Dui Hua
Foundation did not cite and the Commission did not observe any
published legal standards governing death penalty review.\171\
Although the SPC in 2013 promulgated a general rule
requiring courts to post judgments online,\172\ an SPC official
explained that the SPC would publish only selected death
penalty review decisions.\173\ The Dui Hua Foundation reported
an inconsistency between the 2-percent reversal rate based on
the cases it examined \174\ and the figure provided by a former
SPC judge, which was around 10 percent in 2014.\175\ The Dui
Hua Foundation further noted that the SPC published a small
fraction of the death penalty review decisions.\176\
ORGAN HARVESTING
Huang Jiefu, a senior Chinese health official, announced in
late 2014 that harvesting organs from executed prisoners would
completely cease on January 1, 2015,\177\ but he later
characterized death row prisoners as citizens who were eligible
to give consent to organ donation.\178\ In November 2015, Huang
again affirmed the ban on harvesting organs from executed
prisoners but when asked, did not deny that the practice
continued.\179\ In June 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a resolution expressing concerns about organ harvesting
in China and noting that Huang's 2014 announcement did not
directly address organ harvesting from ``prisoners of
conscience.'' \180\ Ahead of an August 2016 global conference
on transplantation, its organizer, the Transplantation Society,
rejected 10 out of 28 clinical papers submitted from China for
presentation at the conference because of concerns over the
sources of the transplanted organs discussed in these
papers.\181\
According to Chinese doctors interviewed by the New York
Times, the Communist Party called for Party members to donate
organs and bring media attention to organ donation, which
reportedly resulted in an increase in donations.\182\ China
Daily, a state-run media outlet, reported a 60-fold increase in
voluntary organ donations between 2010 and 2014.\183\ According
to a state-funded news outlet, as of July 2016, the number of
patients waiting for organ transplantation (approximately
300,000) remained significantly higher than those who actually
received it (approximately 10,000).\184\
Criminal
Justice
Criminal
Justice
Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
\1\ Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: China Should End
Deaths in Police Custody,'' Dispatches (blog), 27 May 16; Ako Tomoko,
``Why Is China Muzzling Its Lawyers? '' Tokyo Foundation, 1 February
16; Margaret Lewis, ``A Review of China's Record on Torture,''
University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 9
February 16. See also James Leibold, ``China Tightens Its Security
Screws,'' East Asia Forum, 22 December 15; Minxin Pei, ``The Twilight
of Communist Party Rule in China,'' American Interest, Vol. 11, No. 4,
12 November 15; Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of
State, ``China 2016 Crime & Safety Report: Shenyang,'' 16 May 16.
\2\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture--China, adopted by the Committee at its 864th
Meeting (21 November 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 14;
UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 42. See also Human Rights Watch, `` `An Alleyway in Hell,' '' 12
November 09.
\3\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture--China, adopted by the Committee at its 864th
Meeting (21 November 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para.
15(b); UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 18.
\4\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture--China, adopted by the Committee at its 864th
Meeting (21 November 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para.
11(c); UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 12.
\5\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture--China, adopted by the Committee at its 864th
Meeting (21 November 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para.
11(a); UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 10.
\6\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 6.
\7\ Harry Wu and Cole Goodrich, ``A Jail by Any Other Name: Labor
Camp Abolition in the Context of Arbitrary Detention in China,'' Human
Rights Brief, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Winter 2014), 4.
\8\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9.
\9\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 9(1). See also CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9
October 14, 81; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, last
visited 20 May 16. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. State
Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action Plan of
China (2009-2010),'' 13 April 09, Introduction, sec. V(1). The 2009-
2010 National Human Rights Action Plan issued by the Chinese government
in April 2009 stated that the ``essentials'' of the ICCPR were some of
the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan was framed, and that
the government ``will continue legislative, judicial and administrative
reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and
prepare the ground for ratification of the ICCPR.'' See also
International Justice Resource Center, ``Increased Oppression of
Chinese Human Rights Defenders Draws International Criticism,'' 22
February 16.
\10\ Harry Wu and Cole Goodrich, ``A Jail by Any Other Name: Labor
Camp Abolition in the Context of Arbitrary Detention in China,'' Human
Rights Brief, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (Winter 2014), 4; Amnesty International,
``China: Submission to the United Nations Committee against Torture
59th Session, 9 November-9 December 2015,'' October 2015, 16; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``We Can Beat You to Death With Impunity,''
October 2014, 6. See also ``Guo Gai and Wang Jianfen: Details of Black
Jails in Wuxi: Rescue and Torture Reenactment'' [Guo gai, wang jianfen:
wuxi hei jianyu shimo: yingjiu he kuxing yanshi], Charter 08 (blog), 23
December 15.
\11\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Abolishing Laws and Regulations Regarding Reeducation Through Labor
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu feizhi youguan
laodong jiaoyang falu guiding de jueding], issued and effective 28
December 13; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 82-84.
\12\ Amnesty International, ``China: Submission to the United
Nations Committee against Torture 59th Session, 9 November-9 December
2015,'' October 2015, 16; ``Black Jails Still in Vogue in Mainland,
Reeducation Through Labor Continues To Exist Under a Different Name''
[Dalu hei jianyu shengxing laojiao huan tang bu huan yao], Radio Free
Asia, 3 November 15. A petitioner reported that ``black jails''
provided no procedural protection and that human rights conditions had
deteriorated after the abolition of RTL.
\13\ Amnesty International, ``China: Submission to the United
Nations Committee against Torture 59th Session, 9 November-9 December
2015,'' October 2015, 16; ``Chinese Petitioner `Tortured' During
Detention by Beijing Police,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 October 15; ``Wuxi
`Fascism,' `Black Jail,' `Torture,' `Human Rights' '' [Wuxi ``faxisi''
``hei jianyu'' ``kuxing'' ``renquan''], Boxun, 20 April 16; ``Black
Jails Still in Vogue in Mainland; Reeducation Through Labor Continues
To Exist Under a Different Name'' [Dalu hei jianyu shengxing laojiao
huan tang bu huan yao], Radio Free Asia, 3 November 15.
\14\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] CHRD Urges
International Intervention To Gain Release of Human Rights Defenders in
China (10/5-10/9/2015),'' 9 October 15.
\15\ Carey Lodge, ``China: 20 Christians Sentenced to `Black Jail'
in Last Two Months,'' Christian Today, 3 November 15; Carey Lodge,
``China: Pastor Released From `Black Jail' After Opposing Cross
Demolitions,'' Christian Today, 9 February 16.
\16\ For more information on Yin Huimin, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00015.
\17\ ``Yin Huimin, Placed in Black Jail During the Two Sessions,
Faced Torture and Violent Beating by Evil Police, Causing Permanent
Deafness'' [Yin huimin lianghui qijian bei guan hei jianyu zao kuxing
bei e jing baoda zhi zhongshen er long], Boxun, 19 March 16.
\18\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Two Sessions Stability
Maintenance: Hebei Petitioner Zhao Chunhong Held in Black Jail''
[Lianghui weiwen, hebei nu fangmin zhao chunhong bei guan hei jianyu],
4 March 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Two Sessions Stability
Maintenance: Shanghai Rights Defender Ding Juying Held in Black Jail in
Beijing, Zhou Xuezhen Administratively Detained'' [Lianghui weiwen,
shanghai renquan hanweizhe ding juying zai beijing zao guan hei jianyu,
zhou xuezhen bei xingzheng juliu], 6 March 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Shanghai Petitioner Sun Hongqin Sent Back to Shanghai From Beijing
and Held in Black Jail'' [Shanghai fangmin sun hongqin bei cong beijing
qiansong huidao shanghai bei guan hei jianyu], 28 February 16; Xiong
Bin and Shu Can, ``Interception for the Two Sessions Began on the
Fourth Day, Number of Petitioners in Beijing Decreased'' [Lianghui jie
fang chusi kaishi zai jing fangmin jianshao], New Tang Dynasty
Television, 15 February 16.
\19\ Teng Biao, ``What Is a `Legal Education Center' in China,''
China Change, 3 April 14.
\20\ Amnesty International, ``China: Submission to the United
Nations Committee against Torture 59th Session, 9 November-9 December
2015,'' October 2015, 16.
\21\ Rights Defense Network, ``Rights Defense Network:
Investigative Report Regarding Mainland China's `Legal Education
Centers' (Black Jails)'' [Weiquan wang: zhongguo dalu ``fazhi xuexi
ban'' (hei jianyu) diaoyan baogao], 6 January 16.
\22\ ``Black Jails Still in Vogue in Mainland, Reeducation Through
Labor Continues To Exist Under a Different Name'' [Dalu hei jianyu
shengxing laojiao huan tang bu huan yao], Radio Free Asia, 3 November
15; ``Jiansanjiang `Black Jail' Closed'' [Jiansanjiang ``hei jianyu''
guanbi], Deutsche Welle, 2 May 14; ``Heilongjiang Human Rights Case
Follow-up: Four Falun Gong Practitioners Illegally Tried,'' Clear
Wisdom, 21 December 14.
\23\ ``Heilongjiang Human Rights Case Follow-up: Four Falun Gong
Practitioners Illegally Tried,'' Clear Wisdom, 21 December 14;
``Jiansanjiang Case Verdict Announced, Lawyers and Family Members
Intercepted, Defendants Don't Accept Verdict and Will Bring Appeals''
[Jiansanjiang an xuanpan lushi, jiashu zao lanjie dangshiren bufu
panjue tichu shangsu], Radio Free Asia, 22 May 15. For prior Commission
reporting on the legal education center in Jiansanjiang, see CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 124; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October
14, 83. For more information on the cases of the four Falun Gong
practitioners, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2015-00301 on Li Guifang, 2015-00302 on Meng Fanli, 2015-00303 on Wang
Yanxin, and 2015-00304 on Shi Mengwen.
\24\ ``China Continues To Use Psychiatric `Treatment' on Its
Critics: Report,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 February 16; ``Shanghai
Petitioner Sent to Psychiatric Hospital in Beijing, Wuxi Using
Psychiatric Hospitals To Replace Black Jails To Detain Petitioners''
[Shanghai yi fangmin zai beijing bei song jingshenbing yuan wuxi yi
jingshenbing yuan daiti hei jianyu qiu fangmin], Radio Free Asia, 11
February 16; An Jing, ``Psychiatric Hospitals Take the Place of Black
Jails To Suppress Aggrieved Citizens Who Have Been Prevented From
Petitioning'' [Jingshenbing yuan qudai hei jianyu zhuan zhi jiefang
yuanmin], Renmin Bao, 11 February 16. Authorities in different
localities across China reportedly continued the practice of holding
petitioners and rights advocates in psychiatric institutions. See,
e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 Year-End Report on Mental
Health and Human Rights (Forced Psychiatric Commitment)'' [2015 nian
zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong
zongjie], 8 February 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB]
Forced Psychiatric Commitment of Dissidents Continues as Police Act
Above Enacted Law (4/29-5/5, 2016),'' 5 May 16; Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch, ``More Than 20 Petitioners Welcomed Lu Liming of
Shanghai Upon His Discharge From the Hospital, Concluding His Life of
Forcible Psychiatric Commitment'' [20 yu fangmin yingjie shanghai lu
liming chuyuan jieshu bei jingshenbing yuan shenghuo], 11 February 16
(Beijing municipality); Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Qi Qianping
From Guangzhou Forcibly Committed to Psychiatric Hospital Again for
Over a Hundred Days'' [Guangzhou qi qianping zaici bei guan
jingshenbing yuan yu bai tian], 5 May 16 (Guangdong province); Civil
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Petitioner He Fangwu From Yongzhou City,
Hunan Province, Forcibly Committed to Psychiatric Hospital Again''
[Hunan sheng yongzhou shi fangmin he fangwu zaici bei guan jingshenbing
yuan], 17 April 16 (Hunan province); Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Gu Xianghong From Hunan Committed to Psychiatric Hospital During the
Two Sessions and to Date Has Not Been Released'' [Hunan gu xianghong
lianghui qijian bei touru jingshenbing yuan zhijin wei fang], 21 March
16 (Hunan province); Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Petitioner
Zhang Chunyan From Inner Mongolia Certified To Have Mental Disorder,
but Procuratorate Still Approved Her Arrest'' [Neimeng fangmin zhang
chunyan bei jianding you jingshenbing reng bei jianchayuan pizhun
daibu], 16 March 16 (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region); Civil Rights &
Livelihood Watch, ``Petitioner Wang Shou'an From Zhushan County, Hubei
Province, Committed to Psychiatric Hospital for the First Time'' [Hubei
sheng zhushan xian fangmin wang shou'an shouci bei guan jingshenbing
yuan] 30 November 15 (Hubei province).
\25\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13, arts. 27, 30,
75(5), 78(1).
\26\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 Year-End Report on
Mental Health and Human Rights (Forced Psychiatric Commitment)'' [2015
nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei jingshenbing) nianzhong
zongjie], 8 February 16.
\27\ Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, Provisions for Investigative Work of Cases by Disciplinary
Investigation Agencies [Zhongguo gongchandang jilu jiancha jiguan
anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli], issued and effective 25 March 94, art.
28. Article 28 of the 1994 provisions requires any person or
organization having information about a case under investigation to
comply with the shuanggui process. Chinese Communist Party Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, Opinion on Strengthening the
Coordination Mechanisms in Case Investigation and on Further Regulating
the Measure of ``Double Designation'' [Zhongyang jiwei guanyu wanshan
cha ban anjian xiediao jizhi jinyibu gaijin he guifan ``lianggui''
cuoshi de yijian], issued 20 January 05, item 2(1); Flora Sapio,
``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,'' China Information,
Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2008, 14-15. The 2005 Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection opinion limits the application of shuanggui to
Party members.
\28\ Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, Provisions for Investigative Work of Cases by Disciplinary
Investigation Agencies [Zhongguo gongchandang jilu jiancha jiguan
anjian jiancha gongzuo tiaoli], issued and effective 25 March 94, arts.
10, 28(3), 39. Article 39 of the 1994 provisions limits the initial
investigation period to three months but allows the unit that opened
the case to extend it for an unspecified length of time in ``serious or
complex'' cases. Chinese Communist Party Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection, Opinion on Strengthening the Coordination
Mechanisms in Case Investigation and on Further Regulating the Measure
of ``Double Designation'' [Zhongyang jiwei guanyu wanshan cha ban
anjian xiediao jizhi jinyibu gaijin he guifan ``lianggui'' cuoshi de
yijian], issued 20 January 05, item 2(3). The 2005 opinion limits the
initial investigation period to three months with an extension period
not exceeding three months. Amnesty International, ``No End in Sight:
Torture and Forced Confessions in China,'' 11 November 15, 34.
\29\ Flora Sapio, ``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,''
China Information, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2008, 24.
\30\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 9. See also CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October
15, 102-3; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 87-88.
\31\ Flora Sapio, ``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China,''
China Information, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2008, 8, 16. Based on a sample
of 380 cases between 1990 and 2005, Flora Sapio found that the period
of detention ranged from two days to over a year with an average period
of three to six months.
\32\ Liu Hai and Sun Yizhen, ``When an Official Goes Missing, What
Should Their Family Do? '' [Guanyuan shilian le, jiashu zenme ban?],
Wujie News, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 13 December 15.
\33\ Amnesty International, ``No End in Sight: Torture and Forced
Confessions in China,'' 11 November 15, 34; Zhong Ruoxin, ``Zhong
Ruoxin: Which Officials Suffered Torture in the Anticorruption Storm''
[Zhong ruoxin: fanfu fengbao zhong naxie zaoyu xingxun de guanyuan],
Criminal Affairs Net, 26 March 16.
\34\ Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: A Top Chinese
Banker's Mysterious Death,'' Dispatches (blog), 3 February 16.
\35\ Austin Ramzy, ``Ex-Official in China Blames Torture for Graft
Confession,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 25 February 16; Luo
Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former National Energy Administration Deputy
Director Xu Yongsheng on Trial, While in Court Asserts Innocence and
Says Was Tortured'' [Guojia nengyuanju yuan fu juzhang xu yongsheng
shoushen dang ting hanyuan cheng zao bigong], Caixin, 24 February 16.
\36\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal
Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa xiuzheng'an
(jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15.
\37\ ``Twenty Newly Added Crimes in PRC Criminal Law Are Said To Be
Aimed at Suppressing Rights Defenders'' [Zhongguo xingfa xin zeng 20
xiang zuiming bei zhi yizai daya weiquan minzhong], Radio Free Asia, 2
November 15.
\38\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 120(1-6), 286(1); Rights Defense Network,
``Request To Withdraw Unconstitutional Provisions in the Criminal Law
Amendments--Suggestions for Amendment Proposed by Rights Defense
Network Concerning PRC Criminal Law Amendment (9) (Second Reading
Draft)'' [Chexiao weixian qinquan de xingfa xiuzheng'an youguan
tiaowen--weiquanwang dui xingfa xiuzheng'an (jiu) (cao'an erci shenyi
gao) youguan tiaowen xiugai jianyi], 4 August 15.
\39\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 291(1); Human Rights Watch, ``China: New Ban on
`Spreading Rumors' About Disasters,'' 2 November 15; Cai Xiaoying,
``International Federation of Journalists: Worsening Environment for
Journalists in China'' [Guoji jizhe lianhui: zhongguo meiti huanjing
riyi yanjun], BBC, 30 January 16.
\40\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 290; Rights Defense Network, ``Request To Withdraw
Unconstitutional Provisions in the Criminal Law Amendments--Suggestions
for Amendment Proposed by Rights Defense Network Concerning PRC
Criminal Law Amendment (9) (Second Reading Draft)'' [Chexiao weixian
qinquan de xingfa xiuzheng'an youguan tiaowen--weiquanwang dui xingfa
xiuzheng'an (jiu) (cao'an erci shenyi gao) youguan tiaowen xiugai
jianyi], 4 August 15.
\41\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300; Guo Baosheng, ``Rights Lawyers and Religious
Freedom in China'' [Weiquan lushi yu zhongguo de zongjiao ziyoudu],
Human Rights in China Biweekly, No. 151 (20 February 15-5 March 15).
\42\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 308(1); Rights Defense Network, ``Request To
Withdraw Unconstitutional Provisions in the Criminal Law Amendments--
Suggestions for Amendment Proposed by Rights Defense Network Concerning
PRC Criminal Law Amendment (9) (Second Reading Draft)'' [Chexiao
weixian qinquan de xingfa xiuzheng'an youguan tiaowen--weiquanwang dui
xingfa xiuzheng'an (jiu) (cao'an erci shenyi gao) youguan tiaowen
xiugai jianyi], 4 August 15.
\43\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 309; `` `Disrupting Court Order?' Several Hundred
Lawyers Protested in a Jointly Signed Letter'' [``Raoluan fating
zhixu''? shubai lushi lian shu fandui], Deutsche Welle, 28 November 14;
Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Lawyer Zhang Lei: Record of Verdict
Announcement in Guo Feixiong and Sun Desheng Case'' [Zhang lei lushi:
guo feixiong, sun desheng an xuanpan ji], 16 December 15. The presiding
judge in this case characterized the lawyer's advocacy on behalf of his
client as an ``attack,'' as reflected in the following exchange between
the lawyer and the judge: ``[Lawyer] Zhang Lei: [. . .] The protesters
were exercising their right of free speech. By treating citizens'
exercise of their free speech right as causing commotion and trouble,
the judiciary is in fact the one that is `causing commotion and
trouble.' When it makes this kind of determination, it is the judiciary
that is `picking quarrels and provoking trouble' with each individual
citizen and their rights. [Judge] Zheng Xin: Do not attack the
judiciary; otherwise, your speech will be terminated.''
\44\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 36.
\45\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Fujian Rights Defender
and Lawyer Ji Sizun Was Prosecuted for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Trouble and Gathering a Crowd To Disturb Public Order' After Having
Been in Custody for Nearly 11 Months'' [Fujian renquan hanweizhe ji
sizun lushi zao jiya jin 11 ge yue hou bei yi ``xunxin zishi he juzhong
raoluan gonggong zhixu zui'' qisu], 20 September 15; Rights Defense
Network, ``Lawyer Liu Zhengqing: Three Gentlemen of Chibi Case Report--
After More Than 2 Years, New Charge of `Picking Quarrels and Provoking
Trouble' Added Today'' [Liu zhengqing lushi: chibi san junzi an
tongbao--lishi 2 nian duo jin zai zeng zuiming ``xunxin zishi''], 20
October 15.
\46\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 293.
\47\ Stanley Lubman, `` `Picking Quarrels' Casts Shadow Over
Chinese Law,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 30
June 14.
\48\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Interpretation of Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
the Handling of Criminal Cases Including Defamation by Means of the
Internet [Liang gao fabu guanyu banli wangluo feibang deng xingshi
anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 10 September 13.
\49\ Edward Wong, ``China Uses `Picking Quarrels' Charge To Cast a
Wider Net Online,'' New York Times, 26 July 15 (quoting Professor Zhang
Qianfan).
\50\ For more information on Pu Zhiqiang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00174.
\51\ ``Pu Zhiqiang: China Rights Lawyer Gets Suspended Jail
Sentence,'' BBC, 22 December 15.
\52\ Ibid.; John M. Glionna, ``Mao's Grandson, Promoted to Major
General, Faces Ridicule,'' Los Angeles Times, 4 August 10; Chris
Buckley, ``Comments Used in Case Against Pu Zhiqiang Spread Online,''
New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 29 January 15.
\53\ ``Pu Zhiqiang: China Rights Lawyer Has Licence Revoked,'' BBC,
14 April 16.
\54\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
20(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 21.
\55\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 291.
\56\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Lawyer Zhang Lei: Record of
Verdict Announcement in Guo Feixiong and Sun Desheng Case'' [Zhang lei
lushi: guo feixiong, sun desheng an xuanpan ji], 16 December 15; Human
Rights in China, ``Guo Feixiong and Sun Desheng Indictment,'' 19 June
14. For more information on Yang Maodong, also known as Guo Feixiong,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00143.
\57\ Ibid. For more information on Sun Desheng, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00313.
\58\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300. Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law prohibits
the ``use of secret societies, cults, or superstition to undermine the
implementation of the law.'' The article, as amended in 2015, provides
for life imprisonment if the circumstances are ``particularly
serious.''
\59\ Wei Meng, ``Wu Zeheng, Leader of Evil Cult `Huazang Dharma,'
Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Court of First Instance'' [Xiejiao
zuzhi ``huazang zongmen'' toumu wu zeheng yishen bei panchu wuqi
tuxing], Xinhua, 31 October 15; ``China Harshly Sentences Founder of
Huazang Dharma,'' China Change, 3 November 15; Zhuhai Intermediate
People's Court, ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in Case of
Wu Zeheng and Four Others [Charged With] Organizing and Using Cult
Organization To Undermine Implementation of the Law'' [Wu zeheng deng 5
ren zuzhi, liyong xiejiao zuzhi pohuai falu shishi an yishen xuanpan],
30 October 15.
\60\ Guo Baosheng, ChinaAid, ``House Churches Are the Next Target
of Sinicization of Christianity'' [Jiating jiaohui shi jidujiao
zhongguohua de xia yi ge mubiao], 2 December 15.
\61\ ``New Development in the Case in Which Lawyer Zhang Zanning
Defended Wu Hongwei, a Falun Gong Practitioner From Heyuan, Guangdong''
[Zhang zanning lushi wei guangdong heyuan falun gong xueyuan wu hongwei
bianhu xin jinzhan], Boxun, 12 December 15.
\62\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 18.
\63\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal
Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa xiuzheng'an
(jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 33.
\64\ See, e.g., Chris Buckley, ``3 Rights Advocates Are Sentenced
to Prison in China,'' New York Times, 28 January 16; ``Xinjiang Rights
Defender Zhang Haitao Sentenced to 19 Years--With Real Estate
Confiscated, Where Will Wife and Infant Son Live? '' [Xinjiang weiquan
renshi zhang haitao zao zhongpan 19 nian fangchan jiang moshou qi yu
qiangbao er hechu wei jia?], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 16; ``Chinese
Law Enforcement Uncovers Endangering State Security Cases; Peter
[Dahlin] and Other Suspects Placed Under Criminal Coercive Measures''
[Woguo zhifa bumen pohuo yi qi weihai guojia anquan anjian bide deng
fanzui xianyiren bei yifa caiqu xingshi qiangzhi cuoshi], Xinhua, 19
January 16.
\65\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 54(2), 56, 102-113. All ESS crimes carry a
mandatory supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights,
which include the rights of speech, publication, assembly, association,
procession, and demonstration. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March
96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 73; UN Committee against
Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China,
adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2-3
December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16, para. 14. In addition to
the severe criminal penalty, ESS offenses trigger the criminal
procedure provision permitting ``residential surveillance at a
designated location,'' which in practice could amount to incommunicado
detention.
\66\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``China State Security Trials Fell 50
Percent in 2015, Official Data Suggest,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal,
6 April 16.
\67\ For more information on Tang Jingling, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00255.
\68\ For more information on Yuan Chaoyang, also known as Yuan
Xinting, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-
00221.
\69\ For more information on Wang Qingying, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00180.
\70\ Chris Buckley, ``3 Rights Advocates Are Sentenced to Prison in
China,'' New York Times, 28 January 16; Human Rights in China,
``Sentencing Document of Tang Jingling, Yuan Chaoyang, Wang Qingying,
`The Three Gentlemen of Guangzhou' '' [``Guangzhou san junzi'' tang
jingling, yuan chaoyang, wang qingying de panjue shu], 29 January 16.
\71\ For more information on Zhang Haitao, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00343.
\72\ ``Xinjiang Rights Defender Zhang Haitao Sentenced to 19
Years--With Real Estate Confiscated, Where Will Wife and Infant Son
Live? '' [Xinjiang weiquan renshi zhang haitao zao zhongpan 19 nian
fangchan jiang moshou qi yu qiangbao er hechu wei jia?], Radio Free
Asia, 18 January 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Urumqi Intermediate
Court Sentenced Xinjiang Rights Defender Zhang Haitao to Fixed-Term
Imprisonment of 15 Years for `Inciting Subversion of State Power' and
Fixed-Term Imprisonment of 5 Years for `Supplying Foreign Entities With
State Intelligence,' To Serve 19 Years Combined'' [Xinjiang renquan
hanwei zhe zhang haitao bei wulumuqi zhong yuan yi ``shandong dianfu
guojia zui'' chu youqi tuxing 15 nian, ``wei jingwai tigong qingbao
zui'' panchu youqi tuxing 5 nian, hebing zhixing 19 nian], 18 January
16.
\73\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``[`709 Crackdown']
Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 4 July 2016,'' 4 July
16; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on the 709
Crackdown,'' 6 July 16, 27. See also Human Rights Watch, ``China:
Subversion Charges Target Lawyers,'' 14 January 16. For more
information on the 16 individuals detained during the July 2015
crackdown who were charged with ESS crimes, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2004-02053 on Hu Shigen, 2010-00348
on Wu Gan (also known as Tufu), 2015-00252 on Wang Yu, 2015-00253 on
Bao Longjun, 2015-00272 on Zhou Shifeng, 2015-00276 on Liu Sixin, 2015-
00277 on Zhao Wei, 2015-00278 on Wang Quanzhang, 2015-00284 on Li
Heping, 2015-00295 on Xie Yang, 2015-00308 on Xie Yanyi, 2015-00311 on
Li Chunfu, 2015-00331 on Gou Hongguo (also known as Ge Ping), 2015-
00333 on Liu Yongping (also known as Laomu), 2015-00344 on Lin Bin
(also known as Monk Wang Yun), and 2016-00115 on Zhai Yanmin.
\74\ UN Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 1368th
Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1368, 20 November 15; UN Committee against Torture,
Summary Record of the 1371st Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1371, 23 November 15;
Nick Cumming-Bruce, ``China Faces Sharp Questioning by U.N. Panel on
Torture,'' New York Times, 17 November 15.
\75\ UN Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 1371st
Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1371, 23 November 15, paras. 29, 67. For more
information about interrogation chairs, also known as ``tiger chairs,''
see Human Rights Watch, ``Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police Torture
of Criminal Suspects in China,'' May 2015, 40. Human Rights Watch
reported that ``[p]olice officers regularly use restraints--known as
the ``tiger chair''--to immobilize suspects during interrogations.
Former detainees told Human Rights Watch that they were strapped in
this metal chair for hours and even days, deprived of sleep, and
immobilized until their legs and buttocks were swollen.''
\76\ Human Rights Watch, ``Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police
Torture of Criminal Suspects in China,'' May 2015; Amnesty
International, ``No End in Sight: Torture and Forced Confessions in
China,'' 11 November 15, 6.
\77\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 5.
\78\ Ibid., para. 20.
\79\ Ibid., paras. 8-9.
\80\ Ibid., para. 18.
\81\ Ibid., para. 42.
\82\ Ibid., paras. 22, 30.
\83\ Ibid., paras. 14-15.
\84\ Ibid., para. 38. ``The Committee is concerned at allegations
that seven human rights defenders, who were planning to cooperate with
the Committee in connection with the consideration of the fifth
periodic report of the State party, were prevented from travelling or
were detained on the grounds that their participation could `endanger
national security.' '' ``Chinese Lawyer's Solitary Confinement Amounts
to `Slow Torture': Wife,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 November 15; Stephanie
Nebehay, ``U.N. Torture Watchdog Questions China Over Crackdown on
Activists, Lawyers,'' Reuters, 17 November 15; Sui-Lee Wee and
Stephanie Nebehay, ``At U.N., China Uses Intimidation Tactics To
Silence Its Critics,'' Reuters, 5 October 15.
\85\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Rights Defender
Yin Huimin Received a Reply From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Entitled `Reply Concerning an Open Government Information (OGI)
Application,' in Which It Claimed That the Information Sought Was
Beyond the Scope of OGI'' [Shanghai renquan hanweizhe yin huimin
shoudao waijiaobu ``guanyu zhengfu xinxi gongkai shenqing de fuhan''
cheng shenqing gongkai neirong bu shuyu qi zhengfu xinxi gongkai
fanchou], 21 September 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Rights
Defender Ding Juying Commenced an Action Against the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Concerning Her Request for Information Relating to the
Torture Report Made Under the Open Government Information Regulations''
[Shanghai renquan hanweizhe ding juying jiu kuxing baogao xinxi gongkai
shiyi qisu waijiaobu], 26 October 15; Rights Defense Network,
``Shanghai Rights Defender Zheng Peipei Contests the Reply Issued by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Torture Report and
Commenced an Administrative Litigation Action Against It'' [Shanghai
renquan hanweizhe zheng peipei bufu waijiaobu jiu kuxing baogao de
fuhan dui qi tiqi xingzheng susong], 19 October 15; Lin Yunfei,
``Citizen Li Wei: Administrative Litigation Complaint'' [Gongmin li
wei: xingzheng qisu zhuang], New Citizen Movement, 19 August 15.
\86\ Amnesty International, ``No End in Sight: Torture and Forced
Confessions in China,'' 11 November 15, 9.
\87\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 54, 121.
\88\ Xing Shiwei, ``Audiovisual Recording Will Be Implemented in
All Criminal Cases'' [Suoyou xing'an xunwen jiang quan luyin luxiang],
Beijing News, 22 September 15.
\89\ Ministry of Public Security, Provisions on Accountability for
Public Security Agencies and People's Police in Law Enforcement
Misconduct [Gong'an jiguan renmin jingcha zhifa guocuo zeren zhuijiu
guiding], issued 24 February 16, effective 1 March 16, arts. 12, 19.
\90\ Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders & A Coalition of
Chinese NGOs, ``Civil Society Report Submitted to the Committee against
Torture for Its Review at the 56th Session of the Fifth Periodic Report
(CAT/C/CHN/5) by the People's Republic of China on Its Implementation
of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,'' 26 October 15, 4.
\91\ Zhao Fuduo, ``Shi Jie, Member of the CPPCC: Proposing Rules To
Expressly Include Audiovisual Recordings as Evidence'' [Quanguo
zhengxie weiyuan shi jie: jianyi mingque xunwen luyin luxiang wei
zhengju], Caixin, 26 February 16.
\92\ Ibid.
\93\ China's Pervasive Use of Torture, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 April 16, Margaret K.
Lewis, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2.
\94\ Human Rights Watch, ``Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police
Torture of Criminal Suspects in China,'' May 2015, 94.
\95\ CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 87, box on ``Televised
Confessions.''
\96\ ``Ministry of Truth: A Brief History of Televised
`Confessions' in China,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 8 February 16; ``Top
China Lawyer Calls for End to Televised Confessions,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, 4 March 16.
\97\ Tom Phillips, ``Swedish Activist Peter Dahlin Paraded on China
State TV for `Scripted Confession,' '' Guardian, 19 January 16. For
more information on Peter Dahlin, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2016-00024.
\98\ Abby Seiff, ``China's Latest Crackdown on Lawyers Is
Unprecedented, Human Rights Monitors Say,'' ABA Journal, 1 February 16;
``US Condemns Zhang Kai `Confession' on Chinese State TV,'' BBC, 27
February 16. For more information, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2015-00272 on Zhou Shifeng and 2015-00318 on
Zhang Kai.
\99\ ``China Court Jails Former Journalist After Televised
`Confession,' '' Hong Kong Free Press, 24 December 15; Engen Tham and
Paul Carsten, ``China State Media Announce Confessions in Stock Market
Investigations,'' Reuters, 31 August 15; Tom Phillips, ``Chinese
Reporter Makes On-Air `Confession' After Market Chaos,'' Guardian, 31
August 15. For more information on Wang Xiaolu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-0319.
\100\ Ned Levin, ``Hong Kong Booksellers Confess to Illegal Sales
in China,'' Wall Street Journal, 29 February 16. For more information,
see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00090 on
Gui Minhai, 2016-00164 on Lui Bo, 2016-00165 on Cheung Chi-ping, and
2016-00166 on Lam Wing-kei.
\101\ ``Chinese Tycoon Admits $800m Fraud in TV Confession,'' Japan
Times, 16 May 16; ``Chinese State TV Airs Confessions by Taiwan Fraud
Suspects,'' Reuters, 15 April 16.
\102\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 14.
\103\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
11(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 9.
\104\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
11(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 14(2).
\105\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 14(3)(g).
\106\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Forced TV
Confessions Violate Principle of Presumed Innocence Before Trial,
Constitute Cruel & Degrading Punishment,'' 12 March 16.
\107\ Jia Shiyu, ``Zhu Zhengfu: Suspects Making Confessions on
Television Does Not Mean They Are Actually Guilty'' [Zhu zhengfu
xianfan dianshi li renzui bu dengyu zhen youzui], Beijing News, 2 March
16.
\108\ Josh Chin, ``Chinese Judge Criticizes Televised
Confessions,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 15
March 16.
\109\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 73; Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Issues
Oversight Rules for `Non-Residential' Residential Surveillance,'' Dui
Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 February 16. The Dui Hua Foundation
translates the term ``residential surveillance at a designated
location'' as ``designated-location residential surveillance.'' See
also UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and
1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 14. The UN Committee against Torture uses the translation
``residential surveillance at a designated location.''
\110\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 73, 77. See also Eva Pils et al., ``
`Rule by Fear? ' '' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 18 February 16.
Scholar Eva Pils wrote: `` . . . whereas in 2011, the authorities made
people disappear stealthily and generally without admitting that this
was happening, forced disappearances have now effectively become part
of the system, and the authorities carry them out `in accordance with
law.' ''
\111\ The Rights Practice, ``Prevention of Torture: Concerns With
the Use of `Residential Confinement in a Designated Residence,' ''
October 2015.
\112\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 14.
\113\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, ``SPP Issues Provisions
Concerning People's Procuratorates Carrying Out Supervision of
Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location To Strengthen and
Standardize Procuratorial Supervision of Residential Surveillance at a
Designated Location'' [Zuigaojian fabu renmin jianchayuan dui zhiding
jusuo jianshi juzhu shixing jiandu de guiding jiaqiang he guifan dui
zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu de jiancha jiandu], 28 December 15.
\114\ Cui Xiankang and Shan Yuxiao, ``There Is Hope for Correcting
[Problem of] Families Not Being Notified Promptly of Residential
Surveillance at a Designated Location'' [Zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu
yuqi bu tongzhi jiashu youwang bei jiuzheng], Caixin, 29 December 15.
\115\ Liu Yachang and Wang Chao, ``Interpreting and Improving the
Constitutionality of the Residential Surveillance at a Designated
Location System'' [Liu yachang, wang chao: zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu
zhidu de hexianxing jiedu yu wanshan], Journal of Central South
University (Social Sciences Edition) 2015 No. 5, reprinted in China
Criminal Procedure Law Net, 29 April 16.
\116\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To Call
Ourselves Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016, 5-6; Tom Hancock and
Felicia Sonmez, ``China Steps Up Political Arrests, Prosecutions:
Rights Group,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Sino Daily, 8
January 15; Dui Hua Foundation, ``China: State Security Indictments Hit
Record High in 2014,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 21 December 15.
See also Human Rights Watch, ``China's Rights Defenders,'' last visited
on 10 May 16.
\117\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To
Call Ourselves Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016, 15; Hai Yan,
``Chinese Rights Lawyer Zhou Shifeng Prosecuted for `Subversion' ''
[Zhongguo weiquan lushi zhou shifeng bei yi `dianfu zui' qisu], Voice
of America, 13 June 16; ``In July 9 Case, Liu Sixin's Arrest on
`Subversion' Charge Approved'' [709 an liu sixin she ``dianfu zui'' bei
pibu], Radio Free Asia, 14 January 16; Lin Feng, ``Legal Assistant Born
in the 90s Accused of Subversion of State Power, Family Says It's
Ridiculous'' [90 hou lushi zhuli bei kong dianfu zhengquan, jiaren
cheng huangmiu], Voice of America, 14 January 16.
\118\ PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lushi fa], passed
28 October 07, amended 26 October 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 33.
For the prior version, see PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
lushi fa], passed 28 October 07, effective 1 June 08, art. 33.
\119\ Tai Jianlin, ``Lawyers' Meeting Rooms at PSB Detention Center
Increased From Two to Nine'' [Kanshousuo lushi huijian shi liang jian
bian jiu jian], Xinhua, 24 May 16.
\120\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 37. See also Supreme People's Court,
Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry
of State Security, and Ministry of Justice, Provisions Concerning the
Legal Protection of Lawyers' Rights To Practice [Guanyu yifa baozhang
lushi zhiye quanli de guiding], issued and effective 16 September 15,
art. 9.
\121\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, art. 37; Amnesty International, ``China:
Submission to the United Nations Committee against Torture 59th
Session, 9 November-9 December 2015,'' October 2015, 9.
\122\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Report on 709 Mass
Crackdown: Lawyers' Request To Meet With Client Was Dodged by
Supervisor Li Bin'' [709 da zhuabu an tongbao: lushi yaoqiu huijian
dangshiren zao zhuguan li bin duobi], 28 April 16; Rights Defense
Network, ``Lawyer Li Yuhan: Report Concerning Lawyer Wang Yu's Case and
My Current Precarious Situation'' [Li yuhan lushi: guanyu wang yu lushi
an he wo xianzai de weiji chujing tongbao], 15 March 16; ``No News
Regarding Li Heping; Legal Representative Sues Tianjin Public Security
Bureau'' [Li heping yin xun quan wu daili lushi konggao tianjin shi
gong'anju], Radio Free Asia, 6 April 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Lawyer Huang Hanzhong: Report on Bao Longjun's Case'' [Huang hanzhong
lushi: bao longjun an jinzhan tongbao], 23 April 16; `` `709 Mass
Crackdown': Lawyers' Request for Meeting With Wang Quanzhang and Zhao
Wei Denied Again'' [``709 da zhuabu'': lushi huijian wang quanzhang,
zhao wei zai zao jujue], Radio Free Asia, 3 June 16; ``Detained Lawyer
Xie Yang Allegedly Tortured, His Wife Accused the Government of
Corrupting the Law'' [Bei kou lushi xie yang yi shou nue qi kong dangju
xun si wangfa], Radio Free Asia, 15 August 16.
\123\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Mr. Zhang Jianping,
Hired by Mother of Jiangsu Women's Rights Defender Ms. Shan Lihua as
Daughter's Defense Counsel, Faces Difficulty'' [Jiangsu nuquan
hanweizhe shan lihua nushi muqin weituo zhang jianping xiansheng zuo
nu'er bianhuren zao diaonan], 6 February 16; ``Guizhou Police Refuse To
Let Lawyer Meet With Detained Pastor in `Pastor Yang Hua Case,' Church
Sues State Administration for Religious Affairs, Court Refuses To
Accept Case'' [Guizhou jingfang ju lushi huijian beibu ``yang hua mushi
an'' mushi jiaohui gao zongjiaoju fayuan bu shouli], Radio Free Asia,
10 March 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Weifang Case Bulletin: Five
Individuals--Zhang Wanhe, Liu Xing, Li Yanjun, Yao Jianqing, and Zhai
Yanmin--Still Held in Weifang PSB Detention Center'' [Weifang an
tongbao: weifang kanshousuo reng you zhang wanhe, liu xing, li yanjun,
yao jianqing, zhai yanmin wu ren zai ya], 25 March 16; Human Rights
Campaign in China, ``In `December 3rd Labor NGO Incident,' Guangzhou
No. 1 PSB Detention Center Denies Zeng Feiyang and Deng Xiaoming
Meetings With Lawyers for Suspected Endangerment of State Security''
[``12.3 laogong NGO shijian'' guangzhou di yi kanshousuo yi zeng
feiyang he deng xiaoming shexian weihai guojia anquan wei you jujue
lushi huijian], 9 December 15.
\124\ Wang Yu, ``Third Anniversary Since the Implementation of the
New Criminal Procedure Law, Protection of Defense Rights Still Awaiting
Improvement'' [Xin xingsufa shishi san zhounian bianhu quanli baozhang
reng dai wanshan], 21st Century Business Herald, 24 March 16; Human
Rights Campaign in China, ``Lawyer Ge Yongxi: Notes of He Xiaobo's
Lawyer About Meeting--`Arrangements Will Be Made Within 48 Hours' ''
[Ge yongxi lushi: he xiaobo daili lushi huijian shouji--``bei sishiba
xiaoshi''], 9 December 15; Zhou Jianwei and Wei Wei, ``Causes and
Strategies for Difficulty in Lawyers' Meetings Under the New Criminal
Procedure Law'' [Xin xingsufa xia lushi huijian nan chengyin yu duice],
Shandong Lawyers Net, 7 November 14. See also Yi Xiaohong, ``Shenzhen:
Great Improvement in `Lawyers' Difficulties in Meeting and Viewing
Documents' '' [Shenzhen: lushi ``huijian nan, yue juan nan'' wenti da
you gaishan], Shenzhen Evening News, 18 December 15; ``Taiwan
Delegation Toured PSB Detention Center Where Taiwanese Suspects Were
Held: Their Rights Were Fully Protected, 45 Individuals All Admitted
Guilt'' [Taiwan daibiaotuan canguan jiya taiwan xianfan kanshousuo:
quanli dedao chongfen baozhang 45 ren jun yi renzui], Xinhua, 21 April
16.
\125\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Lawyer Ge Yongxi: Notes of
He Xiaobo's Lawyer About Meeting--`Arrangements Will Be Made Within 48
Hours' '' [Ge yongxi lushi: he xiaobo daili lushi huijian shouji--``bei
sishi ba xiaoshi''], 9 December 15. See also Zhang Yangqiu, ``Proposal
Regarding Full Protection of Lawyers' Meeting Rights'' [Guanyu chongfen
baozhang lushi huijian quan de ti'an], Proposal Committee Office,
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Shaanxi Provincial
Committee, 31 March 16.
\126\ See, e.g., UN Committee against Torture, Concluding
Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the
Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/
CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16, para. 12; Wu Fatian, ``My Encounter at the
Yiyang Public Security Bureau Today'' [Jintian wo zai yiyang shi
gong'anju de zaoyu], Weibo post, 22 June 16, 10:10 p.m.; Human Rights
Campaign in China, ``In the `December 3rd Labor NGO Incident,'
Guangzhou No. 1 PSB Detention Center Denied Zeng Feiyang and Deng
Xiaoming Meetings With Lawyer on Endangering State Security Grounds''
[``12.3 laogong NGO shijian'' guangzhou di yi kanshousuo yi zeng
feiyang he deng xiaoming shexian weihai guojia anquan wei you jujue
lushi huijian], 9 December 15. See also Rights Defense Network,
``Lawyer Cheng Hai: Defense Statement Presented Before the Court of
Second Instance in Jia Lingmin's Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble
Case'' [Cheng hai lushi: jia lingmin xunxin zishi an ershen bianhu ci],
5 April 16.
\127\ Wu Fatian, ``My Encounter at the Yiyang Public Security
Bureau Today'' [Jintian wo zai yiyang shi gong'anju de zaoyu], Weibo
post, 22 June 16, 10:10 p.m.; PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, arts. 37, 72,
73. ``Residential surveillance at a designated location'' is a coercive
measure under the CPL that allows authorities to hold a person at an
undisclosed location if the case relates to endangering state security,
terrorism, or serious bribery cases (three categories), or if the
detainee does not have a fixed place of abode. Meeting with defense
counsel is subject to approval by the investigating agency if the case
falls under one of the three categories.
\128\ Yi Shenghua, ``Lawyer Yi Shenghua: Complete Strategy for
Lawyer Meeting in Criminal Cases'' [Yi shenghua lushi: xingshi anjian
lushi huijian quan gonglue], Weibo post, 7 March 16, 10:30 p.m.; Yu
Weipeng, ``Measures Protecting Lawyers' Right To Meet With Their
Clients During the Investigation Phase Must Be Properly Implemented''
[Baozhang lushi zhencha jieduan huijian quan xu luodao shichu], Chinese
Lawyer, December 2015, 97-98; Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Cheng
Hai: Defense Statement Presented Before the Court of Second Instance in
Jia Lingmin's Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble Case'' [Cheng hai
lushi: jia lingmin xunxin zishi an ershen bianhu ci], 5 April 16.
\129\ For more information on Zhang Liumao, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00358.
\130\ ``Official News Media Said Zhang Liumao Was Involved in
`Armed Riot,' Family Protested at Funeral Home When They Could Not See
the Body After Death'' [Guanmei zhi zhang liumao ``wuzhuang baodong''
jiashu si bujian shi binyiguan kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 7 November 15;
Edward Wong, ``Backers of Detained Chinese Activist Demand Explanation
for His Death,'' New York Times, 6 November 15; Rights Defense Network,
``Announcement on Joining the Citizens' Monitoring Group on the Death
of Zhang Liumao of Guangdong at the Guangzhou No. 3 PSB Detention
Center'' [Lianshu jiaru guangdong zhang liumao guangzhou san kan siwang
an gongmin jiandu tuan gonggao], 5 November 15.
\131\ ``Chinese Activist's Body `Covered' in Injuries After Death
in Detention,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 November 15.
\132\ ``Procuratorate Refuses To Provide Zhang Liumao's Autopsy
Report, Family Not Satisfied and Intend To Request Review''
[Jianchayuan ju tigong zhang liumao shijian baogao jiashu buman ni ti
fuyi], Radio Free Asia, 24 February 16.
\133\ Yang Maoping, ``Request From Family for Immediately Carrying
Out Diagnosis and Treatment for Yang Maodong'' [Guanyu liji dui yang
maodong jinxing zhenduan zhiliao de jiashu yaoqiu shu], reprinted in
Human Rights in China, 27 April 16.
\134\ ``Open Letter by Guo Feixiong's Wife Zhang Qing Addressed to
President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang (May 19, 2016)'' [Guo
feixiong qizi zhang qing zhi xi jinping zhuxi, li keqiang zongli
gongkaixin (2016 nian 5 yue 19 ri)], 19 May 16, reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 20 May 16; Zhang Qing, ``Guo Feixiong on Hunger Strike
in Prison, Wife Details Degrading Treatment in an Open Letter to Xi
Jinping and Li Keqiang,'' China Change, 19 May 16.
\135\ Wang Heyan et al., ``Witnesses Say Lei Yang Was Chased by
Plainclothes Officers and There Was a Fight, Public Security Bureau
Says Autopsy Will Be Performed Today or Tomorrow'' [Mujizhe cheng lei
yang bei bianyi zhuigan bing you da dou gong'an jin ming liang tian
shijian ], Caixin, 10 May 16; Lin Feiran, Li Yutong, and Zhu Zhuolin,
``Holder of Master's Degree Dies After He Is Detained on `Suspicion of
Soliciting a Prostitute,' Was the Same Day as His Wedding Anniversary''
[Shuoshi ``shexian piaochang'' bei kongzhi hou shenwang dangtian shi qi
jiehun jinian ri], Beijing News, 10 May 16; ``Man Suspected of
Soliciting a Prostitute Dies Suddenly While in Custody, Procuratorate
Already Involved'' [Shexian piaochang nanzi bei ya tuzhong cusi
jianfang yi jieru], Qianjiang Evening News, 10 May 16; Beijing
Municipal Procuratorate, ``The Fourth Sub-Procuratorate of Beijing
Municipal People's Procuratorate Announces and Publishes Lei Yang's
Autopsy in Accordance With Law'' [Beijing shi renmin jianchayuan di si
fenyuan yifa gaozhi he gongbu lei yang shijian jianding yijian], 30
June 16; Gao Xin and Yu Xiao, ``Conversation With Beijing Procuratorate
Forensic Medical Examiner: Expert Forensic Medical Examiner Explains
Lei Yang's Autopsy'' [Duihua beijing jianfang fayi: fayi zhuanjia jiedu
lei yang shijian jianding yijian], Procuratorial Daily, 1 July 16.
\136\ Beijing Municipal Procuratorate, ``The Fourth Sub-
Procuratorate of Beijing Municipal People's Procuratorate Announces and
Publishes Lei Yang's Autopsy in Accordance With Law'' [Beijing shi
renmin jianchayuan di si fenyuan yifa gaozhi he gongbu lei yang shijian
jianding yijian], 30 June 16; ``Beijing Procuratorate Announced Lei
Yang's Autopsy Results: Cause of Death Is Suffocation'' [Beijing
jianfang gongbu lei yang an shijian jieguo: xi zhixi siwang], Radio
Free Asia, 30 June 16.
\137\ Yu Mengtong, ``Caixin's Report on Lei Yang's Family Accusing
Police of Intentional Infliction of Injury Was Deleted'' [Caixin wang
lei yang jiashu kong jingfang guyi shanghai baodao bei shan], Voice of
America, 17 May 16.
\138\ Xie Huicheng et al., ``Xie Yang's Family Joint Statement
Condemning Torture (August 12, 2016)'' [Xie yang jiazu jiu kuxing de
lianhe qianze shengming (2016 nian 8 yue 12 ri)], reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 12 August 16. See also ``Detained Lawyer Xie Yang
Allegedly Tortured, His Wife Accused the Government of Corrupting the
Law'' [Bei kou lushi xie yang yi shou nue qi kong dangju xun si wang
fa], Radio Free Asia, 15 August 16. Xie Yang's wife reported that Xie
told his lawyer that officials had tortured him to confess. For more
information on Xie Yang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00295.
\139\ Xie Huicheng et al., ``Xie Yang's Family Joint Statement
Condemning Torture (August 12, 2016)'' [Xie yang jiazu jiu kuxing de
lianhe qianze shengming (2016 nian 8 yue 12 ri)], reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 12 August 16.
\140\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 3; ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work
Report'' [Zuigao renmin jianchayuan gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 7-8.
\141\ See, e.g., Li Xianfeng, ``18 Years of Injustice and 7 Days
and 7 Nights of Torture'' [18 nian yuan'an bei xingxun de 7 tian 7 ye],
Beijing Youth Daily, 8 May 16; Wang Jian, ``Chen Man, Wrongfully
Convicted and Jailed for the Longest Time Known in the Country, Is
Declared Innocent After 23 Years'' [``Guonei yizhi bei guan zuijiu de
yuanyu fan'' chen man 23 nian hou xuangao wuzui], The Paper, 1 February
16; Zhang Manshuang, ``Upstream News' Exclusive Interview With Qian
Renfeng: Felt Despair When Tortured To Confess'' [Shangyou xinwen dujia
duihua qian renfeng: bei xingxun bigong shi gandao zui juewang],
Upstream News, 21 December 15. See also Supreme People's Court,
``Supreme People's Court Granted Retrial in the Nie Shubin Intentional
Homicide and Rape Case'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan jueding yifa zaishen nie
shubin guyi sharen, qiangjian funu yi an], 8 June 16; Luo Sha and Bai
Yang, ``Supreme People's Court Granted Retrial in the Nie Shubin
Intentional Homicide and Rape Case'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan jueding yifa
zaishen nie shubin guyi sharen, qiangjian funu yi an], Xinhua, 8 June
16.
\142\ ``China's `Youngest' University President Sentenced to Life:
Justice Served or Grave Wrong Being Done? '' [Zhongguo ``zui nianqing''
daxue xiaozhang pan wuqi, zhengyi shenzhang huo yuan shen si hai?],
Voice of America, 31 December 15; ``Second Instance Hearing Near for
Former Editor-in-Chief of Guangzhou Daily, Niece of Zeng Qinghong's
Wife Becomes the Focus'' [Guangzhou ribao qian shezhang ershen zaiji,
zeng qinghong qi zhinu cheng jiaodian], Voice of America, 3 December
15; Austin Ramzy, ``Ex-Official in China Blames Torture for Graft
Confession,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 25 February 16.
\143\ Supreme People's Procuratorate, ``Supreme People's
Procuratorate Issues Seventh Set of Guiding Cases'' [Zuigao renmin
jianchayuan fabu di qi pi zhidaoxing anli], 6 June 16, 7.
\144\ Youling Jueshi, ``Two `Murder Convicts' Have Been Crying
Injustice for 13 Years; Murky Evidence and Possible Confession Through
Torture'' [Liang ``sharenfan'' hanyuan 13 nian zhengju buqing yi zao
xingxun bigong], Tencent News, 1 April 16.
\145\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion Regarding Establishing a
Robust System To Prevent Wrongful Criminal Cases [Zuigao renmin fayuan
guanyu jianli jianquan fangfan xingshi yuanjia cuo'an gongzuo jizhi de
yijian], issued 9 October 13, art. 22. See also Josh Chin, ``China's
Communist Party Sounds Death Knell for Arrest, Conviction Quotas,''
Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22 January 15;
Ministry of Public Security, Circular Regarding Further Strengthening
and Improving Criminal Law Enforcement and Case Handling To Actually
Prevent Wrongful Cases [Gong'anbu guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin
xingshi zhifa ban'an gongzuo qieshi fangzhi fasheng yuanjia cuo'an de
tongzhi], issued 5 June 13; Wang Zhiguo, ``SPP Issues Opinion
Requesting: Earnestly Perform the Procuratorate's Function, Prevent and
Correct Wrongful Cases'' [Gao jian yuan fawen yaoqiu: qieshi luxing
jiancha zhineng fangzhi he jiuzheng yuanjia cuo'an], Procuratorate
Daily, 6 September 13; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 107.
\146\ Stanley Lubman, ``Why Scrapping Quotas in China's Criminal
Justice System Won't Be Easy,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 30 January 15.
\147\ Shannon Tiezzi, ``In China, a Move Away From Conviction
Quotas,'' The Diplomat, 23 January 15; Human Rights Watch, ``Tiger
Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police Torture of Criminal Suspects in China,''
May 2015, 33-34.
\148\ Chen Fei and Zou Wei, ``Retired Beijing Judge: Abolishing
Guilty Verdict Rate Will Reduce the Occurrence of Miscarriages of
Justice'' [Beijing cizhi faguan: quxiao youzui panjue lu hui jianshao
yuan'an de fasheng], Beijing Youth Daily, 22 January 15.
\149\ Wang Lin, ``Not Guilty Verdict Rate Rises Again, Are You
Ready'' [Wuzui panjue lu huisheng, zhunbei hao le ma], Beijing Times,
23 February 16.
\150\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 2, 3.
\151\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 12 March 15.
\152\ Chen Xuequan, ``Examination of Issues Faced by Courts When
Issuing a Not Guilty Verdict for Insufficiency of Evidence'' [Zhengju
buzu shi fayuan zuo wuzui panjue nan suo she wenti yanjiu], Journal of
Law Application, No. 6 (2015), reprinted in Procedural Law Research
Institute, China University of Political Science and Law.
\153\ Shan Yuxiao, ``Courts Continued To `Boast' Unreasonable
Judicial Evaluation Targets'' [Fayuan reng ``shai'' bu heli sifa kaohe
zhibiao], Caixin, 25 February 16. See also Liu Zhan, ``Commentary: Why
Is Homicide Case Resolution Rate Still Being Ranked? '' [Pinglun:
ming'an po'an lu weihe hai zai paihang?], China National Radio, 18
April 16.
\154\ ``National People's Congress Standing Committee Work Report
(Summary)'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui gongzuo
baogao (zhaiyao)], Xinhua, 19 March 16; National People's Congress
Standing Committee, PRC Criminal Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xingfa xiuzheng'an (jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1
November 15, items 9, 11, 12, 42, 50, 51. See also ``Zhang Dejiang:
Improve the Criminal Law System, Remove Death Penalty From 9 Crimes
That Are Infrequently Used'' [Zhang dejiang: wanshan xingshi falu zhidu
quxiao 9 ge jiaoshao shiyong de sixing zuiming], China Radio
International, 9 March 16; ``China's Criminal Law Amended Again, Death
Penalty for 9 Crimes Removed'' [Zhongguo xingfa zai xiuzheng quxiao 9
xiang sixing zuiming], Radio Free Asia, 30 August 15; ``Member of the
Legislative Affairs Commission: Strictly Controlling Death Penalty and
Progressively Reducing the Number of Executions Is the Direction of
China's Criminal Law'' [Fagongwei: yankong sixing, zhubu jianshao
sixing shi zhongguo xingfa de fangxiang], China News Service, reprinted
in Xinhua, 29 August 15.
\155\ Xie Sufang, ``Legislation in 2015 That Directly Benefited the
Public'' [2015 nian naxie rang baixing zhijie shouyi de lifa], National
People's Congress of China Magazine, No. 3, 1 February 16.
\156\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN
Human Rights Experts Welcome Encouraging Steps Away From Death Penalty
in China and India,'' 11 September 15.
\157\ Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2016, Events of 2015,''
last visited 27 July 16, 175.
\158\ Amnesty International, ``Amnesty International Report on
China 2015/16,'' 2016, 119.
\159\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Executed 2,400 People in 2013,''
20 October 14.
\160\ Amnesty International, ``Death Penalty 2015: Facts and
Figures,'' 6 April 16. According to Amnesty International, ``China
remained the world's top executioner--but the true extent of the use of
the death penalty in China is unknown as this data is considered a
state secret; the figure of 1,634 excludes the thousands of executions
believed to have been carried out in China.''
\161\ Ibid.; Wen Shan and Ren Chen, ``Sharp Increase in Global
Executions'' [Quanqiu sixing shuliang jizeng], Deutsche Welle, 6 April
16.
\162\ UN Committee against Torture, China's Reply to the Committee
against Torture's List of Issues, CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.2, 1 October 15,
para. 37.
\163\ Amnesty International, ``Death Penalty 2015: Facts and
Figures,'' 6 April 16.
\164\ UN Committee against Torture, List of Issues in Relation to
the Fifth Periodic Report of China, CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.1, 15 June 15,
para. 37.
\165\ UN Committee against Torture, China's Reply to the Committee
against Torture's List of Issues, CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.2, 1 October 15,
para. 37.
\166\ Shan Yuxiao, ``Tsinghua Scholar Calls on the Supreme People's
Court To Make Public Annual Data on Death Penalty Review Cases''
[Qinghua xuezhe huyu zuigao fayuan gongkai sixing fuhe anjian niandu
shuju], Caixin, 19 October 15; Zhao Bingzhi and Xu Wenwen,
``Observations and Reflections on Death Penalty Reform in the `Ninth
Amendment to the Criminal Law' '' [``Xingfa xiuzheng'an (jiu)'' sixing
gaige de guancha yu sikao], Legal Forum, No. 1 (2016), 34; Li Wenchao,
``The Flaws and Ways of Improving the Death Penalty Review Process''
[Sixing fuhe chengxu de quexian yu wanshan], Journal of Hubei
Correspondence University, Vol. 29, No. 9 (2016), 92.
\167\ Shan Yuxiao, ``Tsinghua Scholar Calls on the Supreme People's
Court To Make Public Annual Data on Death Penalty Review Cases''
[Qinghua xuezhe huyu zuigao fayuan gongkai sixing fuhe anjian niandu
shuju], Caixin, 19 October 15; Li Wenchao, ``The Flaws and Ways of
Improving the Death Penalty Review Process'' [Sixing fuhe chengxu de
quexian yu wanshan], Journal of Hubei Correspondence University, Vol.
29, No. 9 (2016), 92.
\168\ Tang Tong, ``Research on the Supervision of the Death Penalty
Review Process by the Procuratorate'' [Sixing fuhe jiancha jiandu zhidu
yanjiu], Culture and History Vision (March 2016), 45; Li Wenchao, ``The
Flaws and Ways of Improving the Death Penalty Review Process'' [Sixing
fuhe chengxu de quexian yu wanshan], Journal of Hubei Correspondence
University, Vol. 29, No. 9 (2016), 92; Feng Yun, ``Discussion of the
Right of Defense in the Death Penalty Review Process'' [Lun sixing fuhe
chengxu zhong de bianhu quan], People's Tribune, April 2016, 124; Wang
Yanling, ``Thoughts on the Current Status and Ways To Improve Our
Nation's Death Penalty Review Procedure'' [Guanyu woguo sixing fuhe
chengxu de xianzhuang ji wanshan de sikao], Shanxi Youth, No. 5 (2016),
102.
\169\ Shan Yuxiao, ``Tsinghua Scholar Calls on the Supreme People's
Court To Make Public Annual Data on Death Penalty Review Cases''
[Qinghua xuezhe huyu zuigao fayuan gongkai sixing fuhe anjian niandu
shuju], Caixin, 19 October 15.
\170\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Can Recognizing Poverty Reduce
Executions in China? '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 June 16; Dui
Hua Foundation, ``China's Average `Death Row' Prisoner Waits 2 Months
for Execution,'' Dui Hua Reference Materials, 27 April 16.
\171\ Ibid.
\172\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Releasing Opinions
Online by People's Courts [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan
zai hulianwang gongbu caipan wenshu de gui-
ding], issued 13 November 13, effective 1 January 14, arts. 2, 3.
\173\ Yang Weihan, ``The Supreme People's Court Explains in Detail
the Hot Topic About the SPC's Posting of Judgments Online'' [Zuigao
renmin fayuan xiang jie zuigao fayuan caipan wenshu shangwang redian
wenti], Xinhua, reprinted in Central People's Government, 2 July 13.
\174\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``China's Average `Death Row' Prisoner
Waits 2 Months for Execution,'' Dui Hua Reference Materials, 27 April
16; Dui Hua Foundation, ``Can Recognizing Poverty Reduce Executions in
China? '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 June 16.
\175\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Can Recognizing Poverty Reduce
Executions in China? '' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 9 June 16; Ren
Zhongyuan, ``Eight Years After the SPC Reclaimed Authority Over Death
Penalty Review, How Has [the SPC] Spared People's Lives'' [Sixing fuhe
quan shangshou ba nian zuigao fayuan ruhe daoxia liuren], Southern
Weekend, 16 October 14.
\176\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``China's Average `Death Row' Prisoner
Waits 2 Months for Execution,'' Dui Hua Reference Materials, 27 April
16.
\177\ Ye Jingsi, ``China Confirms That Organs From Death Row
Prisoners To End on January 1, 2015'' [Zhongguo mingque 2015 nian
yuandan tingzhi caiyong siqiu qiguan], BBC, 4 December 14; Kirk C
Allison et al., ``China's Semantic Trick With Prisoner Organs,''
British Medical Journal, 8 October 15; Transplant Experts of the
National Organ Donation and Transplantation Committee et al., ``The New
Era of Organ Transplantation in China,'' Chinese Medical Journal, Vol.
129, No. 16, 5 August 16, 1891.
\178\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``China Bends Vow on Using Prisoners'
Organs for Transplants,'' New York Times, 16 November 15; Kirk C
Allison et al., ``China's Semantic Trick With Prisoner Organs,''
British Medical Journal, 8 October 15.
\179\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Transplant Chief in China Denies
Breaking Vow To Ban Prisoners' Organs,'' New York Times, 25 November
15. See also China Organ Transplantation Development Foundation,
``Organ Transplantation Q&A (Fifty),'' [Qiguan yizhi wenda (wushi)], 5
May 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Debate Flares on China's Use of
Prisoners' Organs as Experts Meet in Hong Kong,'' New York Times, 17
August 16. The New York Times reported that ``Prisoners can still
donate organs, according to an entry dated May 5, 2016, on the website
of the China Organ Transplantation Development Foundation, a group
tasked with managing the transition.''
\180\ U.S. House of Representatives, ``Expressing Concern Regarding
Persistent and Credible Reports of Systematic, State-Sanctioned Organ
Harvesting From Non-Consenting Prisoners of Conscience in the People's
Republic of China, Including From Large Numbers of Falun Gong
Practitioners and Members of Other Religious and Ethnic Minority
Groups,'' H. Res. 343, 13 June 16. See also T. Trey et al.,
``Transplant Medicine in China: Need for Transparency and International
Scrutiny Remains,'' American Journal of Transplantation (accepted for
publication 13 August 16). The authors of the August 13, 2016, article
echoed the concern raised in House Resolution 343 and further pointed
out that verifiable evidence to date did not show that ``ethical
practices have replaced unethical ones.''
\181\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Choice of Hong Kong for Organ
Transplant Meeting Is Defended,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 18
August 16.
\182\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Transplant Chief in China Denies
Breaking Vow To Ban Prisoners' Organs,'' New York Times, 25 November
15.
\183\ Wang Xiaodong, ``Record High for Organ Donations,'' China
Daily, 8 March 16. See also T. Trey et al., ``Transplant Medicine in
China: Need for Transparency and International Scrutiny Remains,''
American Journal of Transplantation (accepted for publication 13 August
16). According to transplantation experts, the sudden dramatic increase
in volunteer organ donors is implausible. See also CECC, Annual Report
2015, 8 October 15, 202.
\184\ Chen Sisi, ``The Ratio of Supply to Demand for Organ
Transplants in China Is 1:30, Donation Requires Consent of Parents,
Children, and Spouse'' [Zhongguo qiguan yizhi gongxu bi 1:30, juanxian
xu fumu, zinu, banlu dou tongyi], The Paper, 6 July 16.
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of Religion
International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued to violate the rights
of Chinese citizens to religious freedom, which are guaranteed
under Chinese and international law. Article 36 of China's
Constitution guarantees ``freedom of religious belief,'' \1\
providing state protection to ``normal religious activities''
but leaving ``normal'' undefined.\2\ This article, nonetheless,
prohibits discrimination based on religion and forbids state
agencies, social organizations, and individuals from compelling
citizens to believe or not believe in any religion.\3\ China
has also signed \4\ and stated its intent to ratify \5\ the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which obligates China to refrain in good faith from acts that
would defeat the treaty's purpose.\6\ Article 18 of the ICCPR
upholds a person's right to religious belief individually or in
community with others; it also prohibits coercion that impairs
an individual's ability to freely hold or adopt a religion or
belief.\7\ The Constitution allows limitations on religious
practice that ``disturbs public order, impairs the health of
citizens, or interferes with the educational system of the
state,'' and the ICCPR contains exceptions allowing states to
impose some limitations on religious practice for public safety
reasons.\8\ As this section documents, however, in practice,
Party and government officials exercise broad discretion over
religious practice, internal affairs, and interpretations of
faith, often restricting particular religious practices based
on Party interests. Such restrictions constitute state-
sponsored religious discrimination as well as undue state
influence on the right to believe freely.
Religious Affairs Regulation and Policy
The Chinese government's regulatory framework for religious
affairs does not guarantee the religious freedom of Chinese
citizens. The key regulation on religious affairs, the 2005
Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), requires religious
groups to register with the government and report on their
religious activities.\9\ Registration is a significant obstacle
for some groups: officials may deny registration applications
of groups they believe to be adverse to Party and government
interests,\10\ and some groups refuse to register because they
believe that the conditions associated with registration
compromise principles of their faith.\11\ Official recognition
of groups falling outside the ``main'' religions--Buddhism,
Catholicism, Islam, Taoism, and Protestantism--is limited.\12\
Article 12 of the RRA requires religious activities to be
conducted at registered sites by approved personnel,\13\ but
scholars observe that officials may tolerate the religious
activities of unregistered groups, especially if officials
believe that the activities promote social or economic
development interests.\14\ As this section documents, while
unregistered religious and spiritual communities are
particularly vulnerable to government harassment, detention,
and other abuses, groups may be sanctioned regardless of
registration status when officials view them as posing a
challenge to government authority. Some religious groups and
practices have been banned outright.\15\
The RRA provides limited protection for the ``normal
religious activities'' of registered religious groups and
authorizes state control over religious affairs.\16\ The
government and Party primarily control religious affairs
through a national agency under the State Council, the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and lower level
religious affairs bureaus.\17\ These government agencies
control religious affairs through their effective authority
over the ``patriotic'' religious associations representing the
five ``main'' religions in China.\18\ The religious affairs
bureaus work with the Party's United Front Work Department
(UFWD) to select religious leaders for the official
associations.\19\ A series of legislative measures targeting
``cults'' in the summer of 2015 \20\ included an amendment to
the PRC Criminal Law that extended the maximum sentence for
violating Article 300 (``organizing and using a cult to
undermine implementation of the law'') \21\ from 15 years to
life in prison; \22\ as of August 2016, the Commission had not
observed any sentence greater than 15 years solely for the
violation of Article 300.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2016 National Conference on Religious Work
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 2016, the Party and government convened the first National
Conference on Religious Work in 15 years, signaling that officials aim
to prioritize religious affairs. Chinese President and Communist Party
General Secretary Xi Jinping designated religious affairs as an area of
``special importance'' and directed government and Party authorities to
ensure that religious believers are ``patriotic, preserve national
unity, and serve the overall interests of the Chinese nation.'' \23\ Xi
characterized religious groups as a ``bridge'' connecting the Party and
government to religious believers, emphasizing that groups must
therefore support the ``leadership of the Party'' and the Chinese
political system.\24\ In recent years, local patriotic organizations
issued open letters stating that their ability to act as a ``bridge''
has been compromised as government policies have become more intolerant
of their religious practices.\25\
A key approach Xi identified for realizing these policy goals involved
compelling believers to interpret religious doctrines in a way that
adheres to ``social harmony,'' ``progress,'' and ``traditional
culture.'' \26\ Xi invoked the goal of ``national rejuvenation''
several times in his address and identified ``overseas [religious]
infiltration'' and ``religious extremism'' as threats.\27\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officials continued a long-term policy of regulating
religion as an instrument for promoting national unity and
``social stability.'' \28\ Official rhetoric this past year
characterized Buddhism and Taoism as embodying essential
aspects of Chinese culture.\29\ In contrast, official rhetoric
emphasized the foreign origins of other religions, including
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, and highlighted their
potential for ``inciting separatism'' and ``social unrest.''
\30\ Official speeches and policies referred to the goal of
bringing religions into alignment with Party interests as
``sinicization,'' which is linked in official rhetoric to the
``national rejuvenation'' campaign.\31\ In one indication this
year that officials continue to view religious belief in
general as competing with Party loyalty, in February 2016, the
Communist Party expanded the long-standing ban on religious
belief for Party members \32\ to include retired members.\33\
Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) and Taoism
Despite official statements that Buddhism and Taoism
exemplify Chinese values, authorities continued to exert
political influence over the activities of non-Tibetan Buddhist
and Taoist religious groups. [For information on Tibetan
Buddhists, see Section V--Tibet.] As in past years,\34\ this
influence manifested in the form of extensive government
regulation \35\ and sponsorship of religious activity.\36\
Officials indicated plans to continue such influence: shortly
after the National Conference on Religious Work in April 2016,
the president of the state-controlled Buddhist Association of
China (BAC) called on members to work toward government and
Party goals, including ``joining with the nation's legal regime
to form a modern institutional system for Buddhism.'' \37\ Yang
Shihua, a deputy secretary general of the state-sponsored
Chinese Taoist Association, issued a statement saying that the
government's support of numerous Taoist religious institutions
would allow for ``cultivating an increasing number of patriotic
and devout Taoist clergy.'' \38\
This past year, authorities continued to implement a 2012
central government directive calling for comprehensive
monitoring and registration of Buddhist and Taoist sites,
activities, and personnel.\39\ In December 2015, the State
Administration for Religious Affairs announced that it had
published a comprehensive Internet database of registered
Buddhist and Taoist religious venues and that it continues
efforts to certify all Buddhist and Taoist venues.\40\ The
stated purpose for the database is to prevent donation-seeking
by those ``falsely claiming affiliation with either of the two
religious denominations.'' \41\ It is unclear whether the
database may subject religious venues to increased scrutiny.
This past year, believers practicing at unregistered venues
reported feeling pressured to limit their activities for fear
of government sanction.\42\
This past year, authorities continued to characterize
certain religious groups identifying with Buddhist and Taoist
traditions as ``cult organizations.'' For instance, an article
published in state media in March 2016 warned readers against
cult organizations that ``misappropriate the teachings of
Buddhism and Taoism,'' including Falun Gong and the Guangdong
province-based Buddhist group Huazang Dharma.\43\ [For more
information, see Falun Gong in this section.] In October 2015,
the Zhuhai Intermediate People's Court in Zhuhai municipality,
Guangdong, sentenced the leader of Huazang Dharma, Wu Zeheng,
to life imprisonment, deprivation of political rights for life,
and a fine \44\ for violating Article 300 of the PRC Criminal
Law (``organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation
of the law''),\45\ as well as fraud, rape, and producing and
selling harmful and poisonous food.\46\ The court also
sentenced four other Huazang Dharma members to prison terms of
up to four years and fines.\47\ [For more information on
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, see Section II--Criminal
Justice.]
Catholicism
During the 2016 reporting year, the Chinese government and
Communist Party continued efforts to control Chinese Catholic
leadership and religious practice. The Chinese government
continued to deny Catholics in China the freedom to be
ministered to by bishops independently approved by the Holy
See, which Catholics view as essential to their faith.\48\ At
the April 2016 National Conference on Religious Work, an
official characterized the Holy See's competing control over
Catholic church hierarchy as a ``[problem] that need[s] to be
urgently solved.'' \49\ At a February 2016 meeting of the two
state-controlled Catholic organizations, the Catholic Patriotic
Association (CPA) and the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic
Church in China (BCCCC), leaders emphasized the importance of
working toward ``national rejuvenation'' through the
``sinicization'' of church practice and doctrine.\50\
The Chinese government continued to require that Catholic
bishops be selected through the state-controlled national
religious organizations.\51\ After the February meeting, CPA
and BCCCC leaders reportedly said that they would continue to
follow government guidance in ordaining bishops and to bring
unregistered clergy into their organizations.\52\ According to
the Hong Kong Diocese's Holy Spirit Study Center, there are
approximately 99 active bishops in China, 29 of whom are not
approved by the government and minister to the underground
church.\53\ After Pope Francis assumed the papacy in 2013, the
Holy See and the Chinese government reportedly began a series
of discussions regarding the system of bishop appointments in
China.\54\ In October 2015, shortly after one meeting in
Beijing municipality, the Holy See approved the election of
Tang Yuange,\55\ who had been elected through a government-
sponsored election in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province,
in May 2014.\56\ In April 2016, Chinese and Holy See
representatives formed a working group to discuss the selection
and ordination of bishops in China; \57\ as of July 2016, both
sides reportedly acknowledged that talks were continuing.\58\
At the local level, government actions restricting freedom
of religion for Catholics varied:
According to U.S.-based non-governmental
organization ChinaAid, by the end of 2015 officials in
Zhejiang province had authorized the demolition of over
20 churches and the removal of 1,500 crosses, targeting
both Protestant and Catholic churches.\59\ This state-
sanctioned activity has taken place under the ``Three
Rectifications and One Demolition'' campaign launched
in 2014.\60\ [For more information on the cross-removal
campaign, see Protestantism in this section.]
In Sichuan province, government officials
reportedly required priests to submit reports on their
understanding of ``sinicization'' and its relation to
the church, according to an October 2015 Catholic news
media report.\61\
In Hebei province, where according to
government figures, the community of Catholics was
around 1 million as of 2010,\62\ Catholic news
organizations reported that five underground Catholic
priests went missing under suspicious circumstances in
April 2016; authorities later released two of the
priests.\63\ The Commission did not observe any updates
as to the status of the other three as of July 2016.
Authorities in Hebei also have not given any
information as to the whereabouts or condition of three
underground Hebei bishops: Coadjutor Bishop Cui Tai of
Xuanhua district, Zhangjiakou municipality (detained in
August 2014); \64\ Bishop Cosmas Shi Enxiang (missing
since 2001; in February 2015 officials denied an
unconfirmed report that he had passed away); \65\ and
Bishop James Su Zhimin of Baoding municipality
(detained in 1996; last seen in public in 2003).\66\
Family members of Bishop Su reportedly appealed to
authorities for his release following a general amnesty
granted to disabled elderly prisoners; following one
appeal to a national-level official in January 2015,
authorities subjected the family to several days of
home confinement.\67\
In Shanghai municipality, Bishop Thaddeus Ma
Daqin of the Diocese of Shanghai continued to be held
under extralegal confinement at Sheshan seminary.\68\
Authorities have restricted Ma's freedom of movement
since his public resignation from the CPA during his
ordination ceremony in July 2012 \69\ and reportedly
shut down his microblogging account around May
2016.\70\ In June 2016, Bishop Ma published a post on
his personal blog stating that Christians should defer
to national laws conflicting with religious doctrine
and calling his ``words and actions'' toward the CPA a
``mistake.'' \71\ Several Chinese Catholic believers
and priests stated that they believed Bishop Ma posted
these statements due to government pressure.\72\
Falun Gong
The Commission noted reports of continued harassment and
abuse of Falun Gong practitioners as part of a campaign
launched in 1999; \73\ this included official propaganda \74\
and censorship \75\ targeting the group, and harassment,
arbitrary detention, abuse, and prosecution of individual
practitioners.\76\ The campaign has been directed by policies
issued by top-level government and Party officials \77\ and is
overseen by the ``610 Office,'' an extralegal, Party-run
security apparatus with branches at provincial and local
levels.\78\
As in previous years, authorities continued to pressure
Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their beliefs in a process
termed ``transformation through reeducation.'' \79\ To this
end, officials reportedly subjected practitioners to extreme
physical and psychological coercion in prisons and in
administrative detention facilities such as ``legal education
centers'' and compulsory drug detoxification centers.\80\ Human
rights organizations \81\ and practitioners have documented
coercive and violent practices against Falun Gong practitioners
during custody, including electric shocks,\82\ sleep
deprivation,\83\ food deprivation,\84\ forced feeding,\85\
forced drug administration,\86\ beatings,\87\ sexual abuse,\88\
and forcible commitment to psychiatric facilities.\89\
Authorities also harassed, detained, and arrested those
with associations with Falun Gong that ranged from social media
activity to legal representation of practitioners. For example,
in November 2015, the Ganyu District People's Court in
Lianyungang municipality, Jiangsu province, reportedly tried
Wang Dushan for ``using the Internet to undermine national
law,'' a charge that his lawyer said does not exist in Chinese
law.\90\ According to family members, Wang's father was a Falun
Gong practitioner, but Wang himself had never practiced Falun
Gong.\91\ He was living in Beijing municipality when
authorities from his home district of Ganyu took him into
custody on July 11, 2015.\92\ Wang had forwarded several
pictures over social media, two of which included imagery and
expressions associated with Falun Gong.\93\
Lawyers defending Falun Gong practitioners continued to do
so at great personal risk:
The Ministry of Public Security reportedly
harassed and threatened law professor Zhang Zanning
following his representation of Falun Gong practitioner
Wu Hongwei in November 2015.\94\ The Ministry of
Justice also investigated Zhang, reportedly due to his
representation of multiple Falun Gong practitioners in
court.\95\
Tianjin municipality police formally arrested
prominent human rights lawyer Wang Yu on January 8,
2016, on suspicion of ``subversion of state power.''
\96\ Shortly after being detained in July 2015, state
media broadcast footage of Wang ``verbally abusing''
court officials while representing Falun Gong
practitioners in a trial in April 2015.\97\ Independent
reports indicate that she was reacting to courtroom
bailiffs after they physically assaulted her client and
choked her co-counsel until he was close to
suffocation.\98\ Authorities reportedly released Wang
on bail in early August 2016, coinciding with the
airing of a prerecorded ``confession'' that members of
the Chinese human rights community believe was
coerced.\99\
Officials continued to subject Gao Zhisheng,
who was among the first attorneys to represent Falun
Gong practitioners, to harassment, restriction of
movement, and denial of necessary medical
treatment.\100\ In 2006, authorities sentenced Gao to
three years' imprisonment, suspended for five years,
for ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \101\
Authorities reportedly harassed and tortured him during
his suspended sentence, which a Beijing court revoked
in December 2011, ordering Gao to serve the original
three-year sentence.\102\ During his detention and
imprisonment, Gao was held in solitary confinement,
given little food, and beaten, including with an
electric baton.\103\
Courts and public security officials also committed
numerous violations of legal procedure in cases involving Falun
Gong practitioners this reporting year. Defense lawyers were
often unable to provide adequate defense for Falun Gong
practitioners: authorities in some cases denied client
meetings,\104\ adequate notice of trial,\105\ and adequate time
and opportunity to present a defense during trial.\106\
Authorities also have pressured families into dismissing
independently hired attorneys.\107\
International observers,\108\ including the U.S. House of
Representatives \109\ and the European Parliament,\110\
expressed concern over reports that numerous organ
transplantations in China have used the organs of detained
prisoners, including Falun Gong practitioners.\111\ In a
November 2015 interview, Huang Jiefu, the chairman of the
committee responsible for reforming China's organ procurement
system, denied that the new system allowed the transplantation
of organs from executed prisoners.\112\ International medical
professionals noted that such claims are impossible to verify
given the lack of transparency \113\ and expressed skepticism
of reforms \114\ raised by discrepancies in official data.\115\
[For more information on organ transplantation issues in China,
see Section II--Criminal Justice.]
Islam
During the reporting year, regulations controlling the
religious activities of Muslim believers remained in effect,
while President Xi Jinping \116\ and state-sponsored Islamic
leaders \117\ called for the ``sinicization'' of Islam.
Continued government restrictions included regulating the
confirmation of religious personnel \118\ and maintaining the
national ``patriotic'' Islamic group's responsibility for
organizing Hajj pilgrimages for all Chinese Muslims.\119\
During a July 2016 visit to the Muslim community of the Ningxia
Hui Autonomous Region, President Xi encouraged Muslims to
practice their religion in conformity with Chinese society
\120\ and to resist extremist religious influence.\121\
Officials also made a number of statements against the
popularization of practices and symbols associated with
Islam.\122\ In one example, Ye Xiaowen, administrator of a
state-affiliated political research institute and former State
Administration for Religious Affairs director,\123\ published a
statement in state-sponsored media in May 2016 linking the
popularization of halal products and Arabic street signs in
certain regions to an ``infiltration'' of religious
extremism.\124\ Ye characterized such phenomena as ``harboring
an enormous threat to national unity and inciting ethnic
antagonism, imperiling the present situation of stable
solidarity, social harmony, and friendly relations between
ethnic groups.'' \125\ At the national level, state-affiliated
researchers campaigned against standardized regulations for the
halal food industry, reportedly contributing to the abandonment
of draft regulations in April 2016.\126\ Concurrent to the
statements and actions of officials and researchers, experts
noted significant online commentary hostile to Islam, raising
concerns about rising anti-Muslim sentiment in China.\127\ In
addition, overseas media reported that the November 2015
criminal detention of Ma Jun, an influential Salafi imam,
indicated that the government was adopting a more restrictive
attitude toward religious groups.\128\ Ma reportedly had
``close ties'' to the government \129\ and official media had
featured him as a model of a moderate Islamic leader months
before his detention.\130\ [For information on official
controls on Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see
Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Protestantism
During the reporting year, Chinese government and Communist
Party officials continued to prevent many Protestant Christians
from worshipping freely, taking a range of actions that experts
believed were connected to the national-level ``sinicization''
campaign.\131\ The government and Party continued to pressure a
large number of unregistered house church Protestants to join
the two state-controlled organizations that manage Protestant
religious practice--the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM)
and the Chinese Christian Council.\132\ Authorities in some
areas, however, targeted existing members of the patriotic
religious organizations, particularly in Wenzhou municipality,
Zhejiang province,\133\ a region with a high concentration of
Protestants.\134\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Sinicization'' of Christianity
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As national-level officials called for the ``sinicization'' of several
religions this past year, their rhetoric emphasized a need for
believers to alter their beliefs and activities to align with the
Chinese political system and culture.\135\ Following the National
Conference on Religious Work in April 2016,\136\ Gao Feng, president of
the state-sponsored Chinese Christian Council, stated that Chinese
Christianity must ``be persistent in developing in the direction of
sinicization, and actively guide Christianity to be compatible with
socialist society.'' \137\ One of the primary figures responsible for
developing the theory of ``sinicization,'' government official and
scholar Zhuo Xinping,\138\ has elaborated that ``sinicization'' for
Chinese Christians requires ``endorsing the Chinese political system,
conforming to Chinese society, and embodying Chinese culture.'' \139\
Zhuo asserted that Western values are ``directly opposed to and a
repudiation of China's current political system'' and as a result,
Chinese Protestantism is in a position of conflicting political
loyalties and commitments.\140\
As a primary example of ``sinicization'' policy at the local level,
experts pointed to the ``Five Introductions and Five Transformations''
(wujin wuhua) campaign ongoing in Zhejiang since 2015.\141\ The policy
calls for ``introducing'' the following five concepts into churches:
(1) laws and regulations, (2) health and medicine, (3) science, (4)
charity, and (5) the promotion of social harmony; and for applying the
following five ``transformations'': (1) to assimilate religious
practices to local settings, (2) to standardize church management, (3)
to adapt theology to conform to Chinese culture, (4) to make finances
transparent, and (5) to render church doctrines compatible with Chinese
political values.\142\ One Wenzhou church leader believed that the
campaign was aimed at circumscribing church social activities and
gaining control over church management, finances, and doctrine.\143\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTINUED CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHURCHES IN ZHEJIANG PROVINCE
In the past year, authorities in Zhejiang province
continued to harass and closely monitor Christians. In one
example, officials continued to implement a campaign launched
in 2013 purportedly to address ``illegal structures,'' but
which appeared to target Christian sites and crosses, many of
which were state-approved.\144\ As of September 2016, officials
reportedly had removed more than 1,500 crosses (an estimated 90
percent of all church crosses in the province) and destroyed
more than 20 churches.\145\ Officials also appeared to have
increased government presence within churches; officials in
Pingyang county, Wenzhou municipality, reportedly monitored
church gatherings in person so as to prevent discussion of
cross removals or other government policies.\146\ Other local
governments in Zhejiang reportedly required churches to promote
Party policies aligning doctrine with official ideology by
displaying propaganda or allowing officials to speak during
church services.\147\
Many Protestants in Zhejiang defied or protested these
measures, and officials reacted by increasing pressure on
individuals; leaders of registered churches who defended
churches against cross removals received especially harsh
treatment. For example, in February 2016, authorities sentenced
government-appointed pastors Bao Guohua and Xing Wenxiang of
Jinhua municipality to 14 and 12 years in prison, respectively,
on charges of ``misappropriation of funds,'' ``gathering a
crowd to disturb social order,'' ``illegal business activity,''
and ``concealing accounting and financial documents.'' \148\ In
January 2016, Hangzhou municipal authorities detained Pastor Gu
Yuese after he wrote two open letters in 2015 opposing the
cross demolition campaign; he was released on bail in March
2016.\149\ Prior to his detention, Gu had served as the leader
of China's largest government-sanctioned church and the head of
the Zhejiang Province Christian Council.\150\
Other local government actions against Protestant believers
this past year included reported threats \151\ and a ban on
religious activities, including prayer, in hospitals.\152\
Protestant believers reported that local Party officials also
conducted investigations of Party members to identify whether
they were Christians and organized groups to study Marxist
religious views.\153\
Officials also targeted those providing legal assistance to
churches facing forced cross removal. For example, in August
2015, authorities detained lawyer Zhang Kai, who had provided
legal counsel to over 100 churches in Wenzhou.\154\ During his
detention, authorities reportedly forced Zhang to give a
televised ``confession'' of his crimes, which included
``endangering state security.'' \155\ In March 2016, Zhang
announced on social media that he had returned to his parents'
home in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; he was reportedly
released on bail pending investigation for one year.\156\ [For
more on televised confessions, see Section II--Criminal
Justice.]
RESTRICTION OF PROTESTANT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN OTHER PROVINCES
Authorities in other regions of China also restricted
Protestant religious observance this past year. Government
officials detained Protestant believers,\157\ conducted raids
on church buildings and gatherings,\158\ and pressured
landlords to evict churches from meeting spaces.\159\ According
to ChinaAid, churches in Guangdong province were hit especially
hard, with numerous house churches subjected to government
raids and many ultimately closed down.\160\ In Guizhou
province, the Guiyang municipal government designated one of
the municipality's largest unregistered house churches, Living
Stone Church, as an ``illegal social group.'' \161\ Guiyang
authorities detained Living Stone pastor Li Guozhi (also known
as Yang Hua) and several others in December 2015 and arrested
Li on the charge of ``intentionally leaking state secrets'' in
January 2016; as of August 2016, Li still awaited trial at the
Nanming District People's Court in Guiyang.\162\ In August
2016, the Tianjin No. 2 Intermediate People's Court tried and
sentenced Hu Shigen, an advocate for religious freedom and
democracy \163\ to seven years and six months'
imprisonment.\164\ Hu's friends believe that Hu was coerced
into pleading guilty \165\ to the charge of ``subversion of
state power.'' \166\ Hu had led several underground churches
\167\ and state media reported that he had ``used illegal
religious activities as a platform'' to promote subversion of
the Chinese government and the socialist system.\168\
Other Religious Communities
Religious communities that do not fall within China's five
``main'' religions continue to exist in China; some enjoy
official support, while others face suppression from
authorities. For example, despite lacking formal recognition at
the national level,\169\ some Eastern Orthodox Christian
communities are recognized at the local level.\170\ In Harbin
municipality, Heilongjiang province, the Eastern Orthodox
community is led by a Chinese priest who was ordained by the
Russian Orthodox Church in October 2015 with the tacit approval
of the Chinese government.\171\ In contrast, authorities in
Kaifeng municipality, Henan province, reportedly shut down a
Jewish educational center, banned foreign Jewish tour groups
from visiting the city, destroyed a well used by local Jewish
believers for ritual bathing, and placed community members
under surveillance.\172\ The Chinese government also maintained
its official policy of allowing some foreign religious
communities to hold religious services for foreign
nationals.\173\
Freedom of
Religion
Freedom of
Religion
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
\1\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 83, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
\2\ Ibid., art. 36; Liu Peng, ``Crisis of Faith,'' China Security,
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), 30.
\3\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 83, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
\4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76; United Nations Treaty Collection,
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, last visited 28 July 16. China has signed but not ratified the
ICCPR.
\5\ State Council Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human
Rights in 2012,'' reprinted in Xinhua, 14 May 13, chap. VI; Permanent
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, ``Aide Memoire,''
reprinted in United Nations, 13 April 06, para. IV; State Council,
European Council, Prime Minister's Office of Sweden, and European
Commission, ``Joint Statement of the 12th China-EU Summit,'' reprinted
in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 November 09, para. 8. Upon
presenting its candidacy for the 2013 UN Human Rights Council
elections, China reportedly promised to ``further protect civil and
political rights,'' although it did not specifically state intent to
ratify the ICCPR. UN General Assembly, Sixty-Eighth Session, Item
115(c) of the Preliminary List, Elections To Fill Vacancies in the
Subsidiary Organs and Other Elections: Election of Fourteen Members of
the Human Rights Council, Note Verbale Dated 5 June 2013 from the
Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the General Assembly, A/68/90, 6 June 13.
\6\ United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, ``Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,'' adopted 22 May 69, entry into
force 27 January 80, arts. 18, 26.
\7\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 18.
\8\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29
March 83, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) on 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18.
\9\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 8, 13-
16, 27. See, e.g., art. 6 (requiring religious organizations to
register in accordance with the Regulations on the Management of the
Registration of Social Organizations); art. 8 (requiring an application
to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) to establish
an institute for religious learning); arts. 13-16 (imposing an
application procedure to register venues for religious activity); art.
27 (requiring the appointment of religious personnel to be reported to
the religious affairs bureau at or above the county level and requiring
reporting the succession of Tibetan living Buddhas for approval of the
religious affairs bureau at the level of a city divided into districts
or higher, and requiring reporting for the record the appointment of
Catholic bishops to SARA).
\10\ See, e.g., Liu Peng, ``How To Treat House Churches: A Review
of the Beijing Shouwang Church Incident,'' Pu Shi Institute for Social
Sciences, 16 February 12. Shouwang Church repeatedly applied for
registration and was denied by the local state agency in charge of
religious affairs.
\11\ Neil Connor, ``China's Catholics: `Rome May Betray Us, but I
Won't Join a Church Which Is Controlled by the Communist Party,' ''
Telegraph, 4 April 16; Emily Rauhala, ``Christians in China Feel Full
Force of Authorities' Repression,'' Washington Post, 23 December 15.
See also Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Church in Huaqiu Township, Tongzi
County, Guizhou Lost Lawsuit Against Land Bureau, Church To Be Seized''
[Guizhou tongzi huaqiu zhen jiaohui gao guotuju baisu, jiaotang jiang
bei moshou], 4 January 16; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Shenzhen's Huaqiao
City Church Forced To Relocate, Contract for Renting Another Site
Broken'' [Shenzhen huaqiao cheng jiaohui bei bi qian, ling zu changdi
zai bei huiyue], 23 December 15; Richard Madsen, China's Catholics
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 37-
38.
\12\ State Council Information Office, ``The Situation of Religious
Freedom in China'' [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang],
October 1997, sec. I. The central government has referred to the five
religions as China's ``main religions,'' stating that the religions
citizens ``mainly'' follow are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism,
and Protestantism. Henan Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Henan Province Regulations on Religious Affairs [Henan sheng zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05, effective 1 January 06, art. 2;
Shaanxi Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Shaanxi Province
Regulations on Religious Affairs [Shaanxi sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 23 September 00, amended 30 July 08, art. 2. Some local
regulations on religious affairs define ``religion'' to mean only these
five religions. See, e.g., Zhejiang Province Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Committee, Zhejiang Province Measures for the Management of
Registration of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Zhejiang sheng minjian
xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao guanli banfa], issued 19
October 14, effective 1 January 15; Taizhou Municipality Bureau of
Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Circular Concerning the 2016 Launch of
Registration Work of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Guanyu kaizhan
2016 minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji bianhao gongzuo de
tongzhi], issued 13 April 16; Hunan Province Religious Affairs
Committee, Hunan Province Measures for the Management of Registration
of Venues for Folk Belief Activity [Hunan sheng minjian xinyang huodong
changsuo dengji guanli banfa], issued and effective 20 August 09;
Shaoxing Municipality Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Shaoxing
Municipality Implementing Plan for Registration of Venues for Folk
Belief Activity [Shaoxing shi minjian xinyang huodong changsuo dengji
bianhao gongzuo shishi fang'an], issued 14 May 15; Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences Institute for World Religions, ``State Administration
for Religious Affairs Convenes Expert Scholars' Forum on Folk Beliefs''
[Guojia zongjiao shiwuju zhaokai minjian xinyang zhuanjia xuezhe
zuotanhui], 21 March 16. See also Vincent Goossaert and David A.
Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011), 343, 346. There is limited official tolerance
outside this framework for ethnic minority and ``folk'' religious
practices. See, e.g., Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's
Government General Office, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious
Activity [Neimenggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi
banfa], issued 23 November 95, art. 2; State Council Information
Office, ``The Situation of Religious Freedom in Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang de
zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], reprinted in Xinhua, 2 June 16,
secs. 1, 3. The Orthodox Christian church has also been recognized to
varying degrees at the local government level. See also discussion in
this section on Other Religious Communities.
\13\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 12.
\14\ Tim Oakes and Donald S. Sutton, ``Introduction,'' in Faiths on
Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 15-17; Richard Madsen, ``Church State
Relations in China--Consequences for the Catholic Church,'' Religions
and Christianity in Today's China, Vol. 5 (2015), 66.
\15\ Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2004), 9, 144-53; Vincent Goossaert and David A.
Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011), 339.
\16\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05. The
Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA) contains provisions authorizing
official intervention into religious practices, beliefs, and
organization, e.g., Article 6 (requiring ``religious groups'' to
register with the government); Article 7 (providing official guidelines
for the content and distribution of religious publications); Article 8
(requiring institutions for religious education to apply for government
approval); Article 11 (requiring the religious pilgrimage to be
organized through the national religious body of Islam); Article 12
(requiring religious activities to be held at state-approved sites);
Article 17 (requiring sites for religious activities to set up
management organizations and exercise democratic management); Article
18 (requiring sites for religious activities to set up particular
management systems for personnel, finance, accounting, sanitation,
etc.); and Article 27 (subjecting religious personnel to qualification
by a religious body).
\17\ Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question
in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 153-54,
346-48.
\18\ Ibid., 153. The ``patriotic'' religious associations are
state-controlled institutions that represent the five ``main''
religions of China: the Buddhist Association of China; the China
Islamic Association; the China Taoist Association; the Chinese Catholic
Patriotic Association and the National Conference of Bishops (an
organization led by Catholic clergy); and the Three-Self (for ``self-
governing, self-financing, and self-propagating'') Patriotic Movement
and the Chinese Christian Council (the latter two organizations have
overlapping membership and represent Protestants). Although nominally
independent, the ``patriotic'' religious associations are effectively
under the authority of the State Council's agency for religious
affairs.
\19\ Ibid., 154.
\20\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 120.
\21\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300.
\22\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal
Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa xiuzheng'an
(jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, item 33; ``China
Focus: China Adopts Amendments to Criminal Law,'' Xinhua, 29 August 15;
Dui Hua Foundation, ``China Mulls Harsher Penalties for Protesters,
`Cults'; Fewer Capital Crimes,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, 6 August
15. See also CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 120.
\23\ ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve the Level of Religious
Work Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshi
xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23 April 16.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ Zhejiang Province Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and
Zhejiang Province Chinese Catholic Religious Affairs Committee,
``Statement Strongly Urging the Immediate Cessation of Cross Removals''
[Guanyu qianglie yaoqiu liji tingzhi chaichu jiaotang shizijia de
baogao], 5 July 15, reprinted in ChinaAid, 29 July 15; Zhejiang
Province Chinese Christian Council, ``Open Letter to the Zhejiang
Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau'' [Zhi zhejiang sheng
minzu zongjiao shiwu weiyuanhui de gongkai xin], 10 July 15.
\26\ ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve the Level of Religious
Work Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshi
xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23 April 16. Authorities often
use ``social harmony'' in official rhetoric to refer to containment of
domestic instability, while Chinese cultural values are often
emphasized in the official discourse of ``national rejuvenation,''
which argues that a distinctly ``Chinese'' form of national power will
restore China to its historical supremacy. China scholars note that the
``national rejuvenation'' discourse legitimizes the current political
system while discrediting Western liberal democratic values by linking
them to perceptions of foreign influence. See, e.g., Jinghan Zeng, The
Chinese Communist Party's Capacity To Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and
Party Cohesion (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), sec. 5.3.3.
\27\ ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve the Level of Religious
Work Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshi
xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23 April 16.
\28\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``The Basic
Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question During China's Socialist
Period'' [Guanyu woguo shehui zhuyi shiqi zongjiao wenti de jiben
guandian he jiben zhengce], reprinted in China Ethnicity and Religion
Net, 31 March 82; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Document
6: On Some Problems Concerning Further Improving Work on Religion,'' 5
February 91, translated in Asia Watch Committee, ``Freedom of Religion
in China,'' January 1992, 35-42. See also Vincent Goossaert and David
A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2011), 325; State Council, Regulations on Religious
Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1
March 05, art. 3. The RRA states that ``Religious groups, sites for
religious activities and religious citizens shall . . . safeguard
unification of the country, unity of all nationalities, and stability
of society.''
\29\ Xi Jinping, ``Speech by H. E. Xi Jinping President of the
People's Republic of China at UNESCO Headquarters,'' reprinted in
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 14; Yang Shihua and Zhao Lixiu,
Chinese Taoist Association ``Buddhist, Taoist Communities Study the
Spirit of the National Conference on Religious Work: Seminar
Highlights'' [Fojiao, daojiao jie xuexi quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi
jingshen yantaoban jiaoliu gao xuandeng], May 2016. See also Tim Oakes
and Donald S. Sutton, ``Introduction,'' in Faiths on Display: Religion,
Tourism, and the Chinese State (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010) 1-
25; Xue Cheng, Buddhist Association of China, ``President Xue Cheng:
Speech to the Committee on Buddhist Affairs of the Ninth Conference of
the Buddhist Association of China'' [Xue cheng huizhang: zai zhongguo
fojiao xiehui di jiu jie lishihui hanchuan fojiao jiaowu jiaofeng
weiyuanhui shang de jianghua], 9 April 16.
\30\ For the association between Christianity, foreign influence,
and social unrest, see Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With `Cultural
Renaissance' Raises Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 8 February 16, 4. See also
the discussion in this section on Catholicism and Protestantism. For
the association between Islam, foreign influence, and social unrest,
see ``Ye Xiaowen: Warning Against the `Extremism' Underlying Religious
`Expansion' '' [Ye xiaowen: jingti zongjiao ``fanhua'' houmian de
``jiduanhua''], Huanqiu Net, 7 May 16.
\31\ Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With `Cultural Renaissance' Raises
Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,'' Jamestown Foundation, China
Brief, Vol. 16, No. 3, 8 February 16, 4. For more on the ``national
rejuvenation'' campaign, see Zheng Wang, ``Not Rising, but
Rejuvenating: The `Chinese Dream,' '' The Diplomat, 5 February 13. See
also Jinghan Zeng, The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity To Rule:
Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2016), sec. 5.3.3.
\32\ Zhu Weiqun, ``Communist Party Members Cannot Be Religious
Believers'' [Gongchandang yuan buneng xinyang zongjiao], Seeking Truth,
15 December 11.
\33\ ``Party Organization Department: Comprehensively Improving
Work on Retired Cadres'' [Zhongzubu: quanmian zhuohao li tuixiu ganbu
gongzuo], Xinhua, 4 February 16.
\34\ Lawrence C. Reardon, ``The Party Giveth, and the Party Taketh
Away: Chinese Enigmatic Attitudes Towards Religion,'' in Religious
Transformation in Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement, ed. David W.
Kim (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 34.
\35\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 8,
13-15, 27. See, e.g., RRA, art. 6 (requiring religious organizations to
register in accordance with the Regulations on the Management of the
Registration of Social Organizations); art. 8 (requiring an application
to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) to establish
an institute for religious learning); arts. 13-15 (imposing an
application procedure to register venues for religious activity); and
art. 27 (requiring the appointment of religious personnel to be
reported to the religious affairs bureau at or above the county level
and requiring reporting the succession of living Buddhas for approval
to governments at the level of a city divided into districts or higher,
and requiring reporting for the record the appointment of Catholic
bishops to SARA). For measures regulating Taoist religious activity,
see, e.g., Chinese Taoist Association, Measures for the Management of
Taoist Temples [Daojiao gongguan guanli banfa], issued 23 June 10,
amended 29 June 15, reprinted in State Administration for Religious
Affairs, 15 October 15; Chinese Taoist Association, Measures for the
Appointment of Key Religious Personnel in Taoist Temples [Daojiao
gongguan zhuyao jiaozhi renzhi banfa], issued 23 June 10, amended 29
June 15, reprinted in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 15
October 15. For measures regulating Buddhist religious activity, see,
e.g., Buddhist Association of China, Measures for the Appointment of
the Heads of Theravada Buddhist Monasteries [Nanchuan fojiao siyuan
zhuchi renzhi banfa], issued 3 November 11, reprinted in State
Administration for Religious Affairs, 21 December 11; Buddhist
Association of China, National Measures for the Management of Monastic
Vows in Chinese Buddhist Monasteries [Quanguo hanchuan fojiao siyuan
chuanshou santan dajie guanli banfa], issued 3 November 11, reprinted
in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 21 December 11. See also
Yang Siqi, ``Life in Purgatory: Buddhism Is Growing in China, but
Remains in Legal Limbo,'' Time, 16 March 16.
\36\ Buddhist Association of China, Buddhist Association of China
Charter [Zhongguo fojiao xiehui zhangcheng], issued 21 April 15. The
charter for the Buddhist Association of China states that it is funded
in part by the government. See also Yang Shihua and Zhao Lixiu, Chinese
Taoist Association, ``Buddhist, Taoist Communities Study the Spirit of
the National Conference on Religious Work: Seminar Highlights''
[Fojiao, daojiao jie xuexi quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi jingsheng
yantaoban jiaoliu gao xuandeng], 8 June 16.
\37\ Xue Cheng, Buddhist Association of China, ``President Xue
Cheng: Speech to the Committee on Buddhist Affairs of the Ninth
Conference of the Buddhist Association of China'' [Xue cheng huizhang:
zai zhongguo fojiao xiehui di jiu jie lishihui hanchuan fojiao jiaowu
jiaofeng weiyuanhui shang de jianghua], 9 April 16.
\38\ Yang Shihua and Zhao Lixiu, Chinese Taoist Association,
``Buddhist, Taoist Communities Study the Spirit of the National
Conference on Religious Work: Seminar Highlights'' [Fojiao, daojiao jie
xuexi quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi jingsheng yantaoban jiaoliu gao
xuandeng], 8 June 16.
\39\ State Administration for Religious Affairs et al., Opinion
Regarding Issues Related to the Management of Buddhist Monasteries and
Taoist Temples [Guanyu chuli sheji fojiao simiao, daojiao gongguan
guanli youguan wenti de yijian], issued 8 October 12.
\40\ Xu Wei, ``Religious Venue List Completed,'' China Daily, 19
December 15.
\41\ Ibid.
\42\ Yang Siqi, ``Life in Purgatory: Buddhism Is Growing in China,
but Remains in Legal Limbo,'' Time, 16 March 16.
\43\ Henan Province Anti-Cult Association, ``The Allure of Cult
Organizations and How To Protect Oneself'' [Xiejiao de mihuoxing ji
fangfan cuoshi], reprinted in Xinhua, 29 March 16.
\44\ Wei Meng, ``Wu Zeheng, Leader of Evil Cult `Huazang Dharma'
Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Court of First Instance'' [Xiejiao
zuzhi ``huazang zongmen'' toumu wu zeheng yishen bei panchu wuqi
tuxing], Xinhua, 31 October 15.
\45\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 300.
\46\ Wei Meng, ``Wu Zeheng, Leader of Evil Cult `Huazang Dharma'
Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Court of First Instance'' [Xiejiao
zuzhi ``huazang zongmen'' toumu wu zeheng yishen bei panchu wuqi
tuxing], Xinhua, 31 October 15.
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Neil Connor, ``China's Catholics: `Rome May Betray Us, but I
Won't Join a Church Which Is Controlled by the Communist Party,' ''
Telegraph, 4 April 16. See also Richard Madsen, China's Catholics
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 37-
38.
\49\ Kou Jie, ``Meeting Calls for Religions With Chinese
Characteristics,'' Global Times, 25 April 16.
\50\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Chinese Catholic
Patriotic Association and Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in
China Convene Coalition Leadership Meeting To Study 2016 Work
Implementation'' [Zhongguo tianzhujiao yihui yituan zhaokai fuzeren
lianxi huiyi yanjiu bushu 2016 nian gongzuo], 29 February 16.
\51\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 27.
\52\ ``China Church Officials Endorse Government Plans for 2016,''
Union of Catholic Asian News, 2 March 16. See also State Administration
for Religious Affairs, ``Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and
Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China Convene Coalition
Leadership Meeting To Study 2016 Work Implementation'' [Zhongguo
tianzhujiao yihui yituan zhaokai fuzeren lianxi huiyi yanjiu bushu 2016
nian gongzuo], 29 February 16.
\53\ ``Mainland China Has 112 Bishops, 99 in Active Ministry,''
Union of Catholic Asian News, 28 April 16.
\54\ Victor Gaeten, ``The Pope and the Politburo: The Vatican's
Chinese Diplomacy,'' Foreign Affairs, 24 March 16.
\55\ ``Vatican Approves China's Elected Bishop Candidate,'' Union
of Catholic Asian News, 28 April 16.
\56\ Gerard O'Connell, ``Bishop Candidates Elected for Two Catholic
Dioceses in Central China,'' America, 1 May 15.
\57\ Lisa Jucca et al., ``After Decades of Mistrust, Pope Pushes
for Diplomatic Breakthrough With China,'' Reuters, 14 July 16.
\58\ Ibid.
\59\ ChinaAid, ``2015 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution
of Christians and Churches in China January-December 2015,'' March
2016, sec. II(ii).
\60\ Lawrence C. Reardon, ``The Party Giveth, and the Party Taketh
Away: Chinese Enigmatic Attitudes Towards Religion,'' in Religious
Transformation in Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement, ed. David W.
Kim (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 39; ChinaAid, ``2015 Annual Report: Chinese
Government Persecution of Christians and Churches in China January-
December 2015,'' March 2016, sec. II(ii).
\61\ ``Sources Confirm Vatican-China Meeting in Beijing,'' Union of
Catholic Asian News, 16 October 15.
\62\ Hebei Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau,
``Catholicism'' [Tianzhujiao], 6 December 10, last visited 29 July 16;
``Hebei's Catholics Stand Out Amid Wider Crackdown,'' Union of Catholic
Asian News, 28 January 16.
\63\ ``China: Catholic Priests Missing; Woman Killed in Church
Demolition,'' Independent Catholic News, 19 April 16; Victoria Ma,
``Baoding Catholics Call for Safe Return of Missing Father Yang,'' Asia
News, 16 April 16.
\64\ ``Chinese Catholics Appeal for Release of Long-Imprisoned
Bishop,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 1 September 15; Bernardo
Cervellera, ``Two Chinese Bishop Martyrs Recognised as `Illustrious
Unknown' for 2011,'' Asia News, 30 December 11.
\65\ Ibid.; Michael Forsythe, ``Questions Rise on Fate of Chinese
Bishop,'' New York Times, 13 February 15. For more information on
Bishop Cosmas Shi Enxiang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2004-05378.
\66\ ``Chinese Catholics Appeal for Release of Long-Imprisoned
Bishop,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 1 September 15; Bernardo
Cervellera, ``Two Chinese Bishop Martyrs Recognised as `Illustrious
Unknown' for 2011,'' Asia News, 30 December 11. For more information on
Bishop James Su Zhimin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2004-05380.
\67\ ``Chinese Catholics Appeal for Release of Long-Imprisoned
Bishop,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 1 September 15.
\68\ ``Chinese Bishop's Weibo Account Blocked, Movement
Restricted,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 3 May 16; John Sudworth,
``China's Detained Bishop Ma `Given Political Lessons,' '' BBC, 24
December 13. See also CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 88-89;
CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 92; CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8
October 15, 122. For more information on Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00336.
\69\ ``Shanghai Ordination Under Investigation,'' Union of Catholic
Asian News, 11 July 12; ``Chinese Bishop's Weibo Account Blocked,
Movement Restricted,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 3 May 16; John
Sudworth, ``China's Detained Bishop Ma `Given Political Lessons,' ''
BBC, 24 December 13. See also CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13,
88-89.
\70\ ``Chinese Bishop's Weibo Account Blocked, Movement
Restricted,'' Union of Catholic Asian News, 3 May 16.
\71\ Thaddeus Ma Daqin, ``He Teaches Us To Follow the Path of
Loyalty to Our Country and Loyalty to Our Church--Written on the
Occasion of the 100th Anniversary of Bishop Jin Luxian's Birth (5)''
[Ta jiaodao women zou aiguo aijiao de daolu--xieyu jin luxian zhujiao
danchen yi bai zhounian zhi ji (wu)], Thaddeus Ma Daqin's Blog, 12 June
16; ``Full Text of Bishop Ma Daqin's `Confession' '' [Ma daqin zhujiao
``zibai'' quanwen], Asia News, 17 June 16. See also Gerard O'Connell,
``Shanghai's Bishop Ma in Surprise Reversal on `Official' Church
Group,'' America, 14 June 16; Lisa Jucca et al., ``After Decades of
Mistrust, Pope Pushes for Diplomatic Breakthrough With China,''
Reuters, 14 July 16.
\72\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``China and the Vatican: Bishop Ma's
`About-Face' Arouses Incredulity and Disappointed Reactions'' [Zhongguo
he fandigang: ma zhujiao ``bianlian'' jiqi nanyi zhixin he lingren
jusang de fanying], Asia News, 17 June 16.
\73\ Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2004), 9.
\74\ Henan Province Anti-Cult Association, ``The Allure of Cult
Organizations and How To Protect Oneself'' [Xiejiao de mihuoxing ji
fangfan cuoshi], reprinted in Xinhua, 29 March 16; Bengbu Municipal Law
and Politics Committee, ``Bengbu Municipality Mobilizes Launch of Anti-
Cult Public Opinion and Propaganda Work'' [Bengbu shi jizhong kaizhan
fan xiejiao yulun xuanchuan gongzuo], Anhui Chang'an Net, 18 May 16.
\75\ GreatFire.org, ``Censorship of Falungong in China,'' last
visited 3 August 16.
\76\ ``Minghui Human Rights Reports 2015: Nearly 20,000 Incidents
of Citizens Targeted in 2015 for Their Faith in Falun Gong,'' Clear
Wisdom, 9 May 16. Based on data collected by the Falun Gong
practitioner website Clear Wisdom, there were at least 19,095 incidents
of harassment, being taken into custody, or detainment for belief in
Falun Gong. ``158 Newly Reported Cases of Falun Gong Practitioners
Sentenced for Their Faith,'' Clear Wisdom, 22 May 16. Data collected by
Clear Wisdom documents 158 Falun Gong practitioners sentenced to prison
in China between November 2015 and April 2016. More than 90 percent
were reportedly tried without an open trial, among other alleged
violations of legal procedure. Courts imposed sentences between 3
months and 10 years as well as heavy fines.
\77\ ``The General Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council Issue a
Circular Calling for Strict Observance of Policy Demarcation Lines and
for Promoting the Conversion and Extrication of the Great Majority of
Falun Gong Practitioners,'' Xinhua, 24 August 99, reprinted and
translated in China Law and Government, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September-
October 1999), 52-55; ``Decision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of
the People's Republic of China Concerning the Banning of the Research
Society of Falun Dafa,'' Xinhua, 22 July 99, reprinted and translated
in Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September-October 1999),
31; ``Notice of the Ministry of Public Security of the People's
Republic of China,'' Xinhua, 22 July 99, reprinted and translated in
Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September-October 1999),
31-32; ``Resolutely Implement the Central Government's Decisions; Abide
by State Laws in Exemplary Fashion: Talk Given to Reporters by the
Person in Charge of the Department of Organization of the Chinese
Communist Party's (CCP) Central Committee,'' People's Daily, 23 July
99, reprinted and translated in Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 32,
No. 5 (September-October 1999), 46-50. See also Ming Xia and Shiping
Hua, ``Guest Editors' Introduction,'' Chinese Law and Government, Vol.
32, No. 5 (September-October 1999), 5-13; Human Rights Watch,
``Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against Falungong,'' January
2002, sec. 3; ``2,024 More People Sign Petitions Supporting Prosecution
of Jiang Zemin,'' Epoch Times, 19 June 16; Amnesty International,
``China: `Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-
Education Through Labour in China,'' 17 December 13, 14; The Origins
and Long-Term Consequences of the Communist Party's Campaign Against
Falun Gong, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
18 December 12, Testimony of Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst for
East Asia, Freedom House.
\78\ Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish, ``The 610 Office: Policing the
Chinese Spirit,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 11, Issue 17,
16 September 11; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 82.
\79\ Falun Dafa Information Center, ``Overview of Persecution,'' 9
April 15. See, e.g., Bengbu Municipal Law and Politics Committee,
``Bengbu Municipality Mobilizes Launch of Anti-Cult Public Opinion and
Propaganda Work'' [Bengbu shi jizhong kaizhan fan xiejiao yulun
xuanchuan gongzuo], Anhui Chang'an Net, 18 May 16. See also ``Communist
Party Calls for Increased Efforts To `Transform' Falun Gong
Practitioners as Part of Three-Year Campaign,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 22 March 11.
\80\ ``Minghui Human Rights Report: Nearly 20,000 Incidents of
Citizens Targeted in 2015 for Their Faith in Falun Gong,'' Clear
Wisdom, 9 May 16; Amnesty International, ``China: `Changing the Soup
but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in
China,'' 17 December 13, 9, 18-25; Chinese Human Rights Defenders,
``Civil Society Information Submission to the Committee against Torture
for the Review of the Fifth Periodic Report of China (CAT/C/CHN/5):
Specific Information on the Implementation of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,'' 9 February 15, para. 11.
\81\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Civil Society Information
Submission to the Committee against Torture for the Review of the Fifth
Periodic Report of China (CAT/C/CHN/5): Specific Information on the
Implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,'' 9 February 15, para.
11; Amnesty International, ``China: `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17
December 13.
\82\ Leo Timm, ``Man Killed in Chinese Jail Now Joined in Death by
Younger Brother,'' Epoch Times, 4 May 16; Amnesty International,
``China: `Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-
Education Through Labour in China,'' 17 December 13, 20.
\83\ ``Overcoming Sleep Deprivation at a Brainwashing Center,''
Clear Wisdom, 8 March 16; Amnesty International, ``China: `Changing the
Soup but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in
China,'' 17 December 13, 20.
\84\ ``CCP Torture Method: `Hunger Therapy,' '' Clear Wisdom, 2
March 16.
\85\ Leo Timm, ``Chinese Practitioners of Falun Gong Tell Harrowing
Accounts of Brutality by Mainland Regime,'' Epoch Times, 16 May 16;
Amnesty International, ``China: `Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17
December 13, 20.
\86\ ``Woman, 63, Dies After Abuse and Forced Drug Injections
Wreaked Havoc on Her Health,'' Clear Wisdom, 19 May 16; Amnesty
International, ``China: `Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine?':
Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' 17 December 13, 20,
22, 30, 31.
\87\ ``Lawyers Highlight Police Beating of Handicapped
Practitioner,'' Clear Wisdom, 16 January 15; Amnesty International,
``China: `Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-
Education Through Labour in China,'' 17 December 13, 20.
\88\ Xiuli Zhang, ``Memory Loss, Sexual Assault, and Broken Arm--
Woman Recounts Suffering at the Hands of Police,'' Clear Wisdom, 18
November 15; China's Pervasive Use of Torture, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 April 16, Testimony of
Yin Liping, Falun Gong Practitioner and Survivor of Torture, Forced
Labor, and Sexual Violence at the Masanjia Labor Camp.
\89\ Mingde, ``Dark Secrets of China's `Ankang' Psychiatric
Hospitals,'' Clear Wisdom, 11 January 15; Network of Chinese Human
Rights Defenders and a Coalition of Chinese NGOs, ``Civil Society
Report Submitted to the Committee against Torture for Its Review at the
56th Session of the Fifth Periodic Report (CAT/C/CHN/5) by the People's
Republic of China on Its Implementation of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,'' 26 October 15, para. 57; Amnesty International, ``China:
`Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education
Through Labour in China,'' 17 December 13, 20, 27-29.
\90\ ``18-Year-Old Jiangsu Adolescent Tried Illegally'' [Jiangsu 18
sui shaonian bei feifa tingshen], Epoch Times, 11 November 15; Jenny Li
and Larry Ong, ``20-Year-Old Chinese Man Put on Trial for Sharing
Picture of Lotus Flower,'' Epoch Times, 17 November 15. See also PRC
Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31
August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06,
28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15.
For more information on Wang Dushan, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2016-00169.
\91\ Jenny Li and Larry Ong, ``20-Year-Old Chinese Man Put on Trial
for Sharing Picture of Lotus Flower,'' Epoch Times, 17 November 15.
\92\ Ibid.
\93\ Ibid.
\94\ Yan Qingliu, ``Lawyer Zhang Zanning Mounts Not Guilty Defense,
Faces Threats From CCP Public Security Officials'' [Lushi zhang zanning
zuo wuzui bianhu, zao zhonggong gong'an weixie], Vision Times, 30
January 16. See also Lin Feng, ``Lawyer of Guangdong Falun Gong
Practitioner Accuses Jiang Zemin of Undermining Rule of Law''
[Guangdong falun gong xueyuan lushi dangting zhi jiang zemin pohuai
fazhi], Voice of America, 2 January 16.
\95\ Yan Qingliu, ``Lawyer Zhang Zanning Mounts Not Guilty Defense,
Faces Threats From CCP Public Security Officials'' [Lushi zhang zanning
zuo wuzui bianhu, zao zhonggong gong'an weixie], Vision Times, 30
January 16.
\96\ Rights Defense Network, ``In July 9 Crackdown, Arrests
Approved for Fengrui Lawyer Wang Yu for `Subversion of State Power,'
Gao Yue for `Helping Destroy Evidence,' Bao Longjun for `Inciting
Subversion of State Power' '' [709 da zhuabu shijian zhong fengrui suo
wang yu lushi bei yi shexian ``dianfu guojia zhengquan zui'' gao yue
bei yi shexian ``bangzhu huimie zhengju zui,'' bao longjun bei yi
shexian ``shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui'' pizhun daibu], 13
January 16; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15,
effective 1 November 15, art. 105. For more information on Wang Yu, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database Record 2015-00252.
\97\ Matthew Robertson and Yaxue Cao, ``The Vilification of Lawyer
Wang Yu and Violence by Other Means,'' China Change, 27 July 15; ``In
and Out of the Courtroom, On and Off Line, an Outrageous Legal
Defense'' [Tingnei tingwai wangshang wangxia ruci bianhu wei naban],
CCTV, reposted by Sina, 19 July 15.
\98\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``A Statement About
Recent Cases of Violence Against Lawyers and Interference of Their
Rights To Practice,'' 27 April 15.
\99\ Emily Rauhala, ``Jailed Chinese Lawyer Reappears To Deliver a
`Confession,' but the Script Seems Familiar,'' Washington Post, 1
August 16; ``China Releases Prominent Human Rights Lawyer on Bail,''
Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times, 1 August 16; Josh Chin,
``Chinese Activist Wang Yu Seen `Confessing' in Video,'' Wall Street
Journal, 1 August 16; American Bar Association, ``Chinese Lawyer Wang
Yu To Receive Inaugural ABA International Human Rights Award,'' 8 July
16.
\100\ ``Misery Endures for Chinese Rights Lawyer Gao Zhisheng,
`Freed' After Three Years in Solitary Confinement,'' South China
Morning Post, 15 June 16; ``Just Where Should Gao Zhisheng Live?--
Questions for China's Thuggish Government,'' 10 November 15, translated
in China Change, last visited 21 July 16. For more information on Gao
Zhisheng, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-
00291.
\101\ Isolda Morillo and Didi Tang, ``Leading China Lawyer Says He
Was Tortured,'' Associated Press, 24 September 15.
\102\ Geng He, ``Press Statement by Wife of Gao Zhisheng, on 9/8/
2014,'' 8 September 14, reprinted in China Change, 12 September 14.
\103\ China's Pervasive Use of Torture, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 14 April 16, Written
Testimony of Geng He, Wife of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng; Isolda Morillo and
Didi Tang, ``Leading China Lawyer Says He Was Tortured,'' Associated
Press, 24 September 15; ``Gao Zhisheng: Chinese Lawyer Describes
`Torture,' '' BBC, 24 September 15; Geng He, ``Press Statement by Wife
of Gao Zhisheng, on 9/8/2014,'' China Change, 12 September 14.
\104\ ``Minghui Human Rights Reports 2015: Illegal Sentencing and
Imprisonment,'' Clear Wisdom, 17 January 16.
\105\ Ibid.
\106\ Matthew Robertson and Yaxue Cao, ``The Vilification of Lawyer
Wang Yu and Violence by Other Means,'' China Change, 27 July 15; Lin
Feng, ``Lawyer of Guangdong Falun Gong Practitioner Accuses Jiang Zemin
of Undermining Rule of Law'' [Guangdong falun gong xueyuan lushi
dangting zhi jiang zemin pohuai fazhi], Voice of America, 2 January 16.
\107\ ``Minghui Human Rights Reports 2015: Illegal Sentencing and
Imprisonment,'' Clear Wisdom, 17 January 16; Yan Qingliu, ``Lawyer
Zhang Zanning Mounts Not Guilty Defense, Faces Threats From CCP Public
Security Officials'' [Lushi zhang zanning zuo wuzui bianhu, zao
zhonggong gong'an weixie], Vision Times, 30 January 16.
\108\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 50(b). See also T. Trey et al., ``Transplant Medicine in China:
Need for Transparency and International Scrutiny Remains,'' American
Journal of Transplantation, accepted 13 August 16 (forthcoming).
\109\ U.S. House of Representatives, Expressing Concern Regarding
Persistent and Credible Reports of Systematic, State-Sanctioned Organ
Harvesting From Non-Consenting Prisoners of Conscience in the People's
Republic of China, Including From Large Numbers of Falun Gong
Practitioners and Members of Other Religious and Ethnic Minority
Groups, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, H. Res. 343, passed 13 June 16.
\110\ European Parliament, Written Declaration of 27 July 2016 on
Stopping Organ Harvesting From Prisoners of Conscience in China, 0048/
2016, 27 July 16. See also Matthew Robertson, ``Europe Takes Another
Step To Censure Organ Harvesting in China,'' Epoch Times, 5 August 16.
\111\ See, e.g., David Kilgour, Ethan Gutmann, and David Matas,
``Bloody Harvest/The Slaughter: An Update,'' International Coalition to
End Organ Pillaging in China, 22 June 16; Matthew Robertson and Sophia
Fang, ``Investigative Report: A Hospital Built for Murder,'' Epoch
Times, 21 June 16; Matthew Robertson, ``At Congressional Hearing,
China's Organ Harvesting Seen Through Rose-Colored Glasses,'' Epoch
Times, 29 June 16.
\112\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Transplant Chief in China Denies
Breaking Vow To Ban Prisoners' Organs,'' New York Times, 25 November
15.
\113\ T. Trey et al., ``Transplant Medicine in China: Need for
Transparency and International Scrutiny Remains,'' American Journal of
Transplantation, accepted 13 August 16 (forthcoming). See also Didi
Kirsten Tatlow, ``Choice of Hong Kong for Organ Transplant Meeting Is
Defended,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 18 August 16.
\114\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Claim That World Accepts Its
Organ Transplant System Is Rebutted,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 19 August 16; Matthew Robertson, ``Acrimony Mars Transplant
Conference in Hong Kong,'' Epoch Times, 20 August 16.
\115\ T. Trey et al., ``Transplant Medicine in China: Need for
Transparency and International Scrutiny Remains,'' American Journal of
Transplantation, accepted 13 August 16 (forthcoming). See also Didi
Kirsten Tatlow, ``Debate Flares on China's Use of Prisoners' Organs as
Experts Meet in Hong Kong,'' New York Times, 17 August 16.
\116\ Miao Zi and Le Ran, Reuters, ``Xi Jinping Demands `Firm
Resistance Against Illegal Religious Infiltration' '' [Xi jinping
yaoqiu ``jianjue diyu feifa zongjiao shentou''], Deutsche Welle, 21
July 16.
\117\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``How To View the
National Conference on Religious Work? The First Collection of
Statements From the Five Major Religious Organizations!'' [Quanguo
zongjiao gongzuo huiyi zenme kan? wu da zongjiao tuanti shouci jiti
fasheng!], reprinted in China Religion Journal, 24 May 16.
\118\ Islamic Association of China, Measures for Confirming the
Credentials of Islamic Professional Religious Personnel [Yisilan jiao
jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], issued 7 August 06, art. 3; ``In
Yunnan Province, 162 Pass Standardized Provincial Accreditation Test
for Islamic Religious Personnel'' [Yunnan sheng 162 ren tongguo
quansheng yisilan jiaozhi renyuan zige tongyi kaoshi], China Muslim
Information, reprinted in Window Into Islam, 19 January 16; Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region Agriculture Office, ``Explanation of `Certain
Opinions Regarding Further Strengthening and Perfecting Islamic Work'
'' [``Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he wanshan yisilan jiao gongzuo de ruogan
yijian'' jiedu], 27 January 16; Qinghai Province Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Committee, ``Qinghai Province Holds Islamic Religious Personnel
Accreditation Test'' [Qinghai sheng jinxing yisilan jiaozhi renyuan
zige rending kaoshi], 24 May 16, reprinted in China Ethnicity News.
\119\ State Council, Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 11;
Islamic Association of China, ``2016 Hajj Organization Service Work
Communication Forum Convened in Lanzhou'' [2016 nian chaojin zuzhi fuwu
gongzuo goutong yanshanghui zai lanzhou zhaokai], reprinted in Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region Islamic Association, 21 March 16.
\120\ Miao Zi and Le Ran, Reuters, ``Xi Jinping Demands `Firm
Resistance Against Illegal Religious Infiltration' '' [Xi jinping
yaoqiu ``jianjue diyu feifa zongjiao shentou''], Deutsche Welle, 21
July 16; Li Xiaokun, ``Xi Urges Muslims To Merge Faith, Culture,''
China Daily, 21 July 16.
\121\ Miao Zi and Le Ran, Reuters, ``Xi Jinping Demands `Firm
Resistance Against Illegal Religious Infiltration' '' [Xi jinping
yaoqiu ``jianjue diyu feifa zongjiao shentou''], Deutsche Welle, 21
July 16.
\122\ See, e.g., ``Ningxia HAR Party Committee Studies the Spirit
of the National Religious Work Conference'' [Ningxia zizhiqu dangwei
xuexi quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Central United Front
Work Department Net, reprinted in Sina, 28 April 16; ``Qinghai Province
Disposes of `Muslim Symbol,' `Halal Symbol' Problem'' [Qinghai sheng
qingli zhengdun ``musilin biaozhi,'' ``qingzhen biaozhi'' wenti],
Qinghai Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, reprinted in
Phoenix Net, 6 May 16. See also James Leibold, ``Creeping Islamophobia:
China's Hui Muslims in the Firing Line,'' Jamestown Foundation, China
Brief, Vol. 16, No. 10, 20 June 16.
\123\ Yue Huairang, ``Ye Xiaowen No Longer the Party Secretary of
the Central Institute of Socialism, Now the First Vice-President'' [Ye
xiaowen buzai danren zhongyang shehui zhuyi xueyuan dangzu shuji, di yi
fu yuanzhang], The Paper, 22 February 16.
\124\ Ye Xiaowen, ``Ye Xiaowen: Warning Against the `Extremism'
Behind Religious `Expansion' '' [Ye xiaowen: jingti zongjiao ``fanhua''
houmian de ``jiduanhua''], Global Times, 7 May 16.
\125\ Ibid.
\126\ Li Ruohan, ``Halal Food Law Dropped From 2016 Legislation
Plan,'' Global Times, 18 April 16; James Leibold, ``Creeping
Islamophobia: China's Hui Muslims in the Firing Line,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 10, 20 June 16.
\127\ Wai Ling Yeung, ``Is China Moving To Restrict Religious
Freedom for the Hui Muslims? '' China Change, 13 May 16; James Leibold,
``Creeping Islamophobia: China's Hui Muslims in the Firing Line,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 10, 20 June 16.
\128\ ``Special Topic: Ethnic Minorities Repeatedly Suppressed,
Herders, Religious Leader Strictly Controlled'' [Zhuanti: shaoshu
minzhu luzao daya mumin, zongjiao lingxiu bei yankong], Radio Free
Asia, 9 March 16. See also Jonathan Kaiman, ``In China, Rise of
Salafism Fosters Suspicion and Division Among Muslims,'' Los Angeles
Times, 1 February 16.
\129\ Jonathan Kaiman, ``In China, Rise of Salafism Fosters
Suspicion and Division Among Muslims,'' Los Angeles Times, 1 February
16. See also ``Special Topic: Ethnic Minorities Repeatedly Suppressed,
Herders, Religious Leader Strictly Controlled'' [Zhuanti: shaoshu
minzhu luzao daya mumin, zongjiao lingxiu bei yankong], Radio Free
Asia, 9 March 2016. Ma was the Vice President of the Lanzhou
Municipality Islamic Association in Gansu province.
\130\ Rong Qihan, ``How `Modern' Imam Ma Jun Observes Friday
Prayers During Ramadan'' [``Xiandai'' ahong ma jun de zhaiyue zhu ma
ri], Xinhua, 13 July 15. See also ``Imam Ma Jun Released After Being
Detained for 27 Days in the Keping County, Aksu, Xinjiang PSB Detention
Center'' [Ma jun ahong bei xinjiang akasu keping xian kanshousuo guanya
27 tian hou huoshi], Boxun, 6 December 15.
\131\ Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With `Cultural Renaissance'
Raises Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 3, 8 February 16, 4; Cao Yaxue, ``Cao Yaxue:
Interview With a Wenzhou Pastor, Suppression and Transformation of
Christianity'' [Cao yaxue: fangtan wenzhou mushi: dui jidujiao de daya
yu gaizao], Voice of America, 27 November 15. For discussion of the
Party's discourse on religion and foreign influence, see Lawrence C.
Reardon, ``The Party Giveth, and the Party Taketh Away: Chinese
Enigmatic Attitudes Towards Religion,'' in Religious Transformation in
Modern Asia: A Transnational Movement, ed. David W. Kim (Leiden: Brill,
2015), 43-45.
\132\ See, e.g., Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Officials Coerced
Jinshuixia Church of Wuhan To Join the Three-Self Church, China's
Religious Freedom Environment Continues To Deteriorate'' [Wuhan
jinshuixia jiaohui zai bei guanfang weibi jiaru sanzi, zhongguo
zongjiao ziyou huanjing riqu ehua], 8 October 15; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid,
``Tongzi County, Guizhou, Officials Gather 14 Village Party Secretaries
for Meeting, Forcing House Church To Merge With Three-Self Church''
[Guizhou tongzi xian guanyuan zhaoji 14 cun zhishu kaihui, qiangpo
jiating jiaohui guiru sanzi], 9 November 15. See also ChinaAid, ``2015
Annual Report,'' March 2016.
\133\ Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With `Cultural Renaissance'
Raises Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 3, 8 February 16, 4; Cao Yaxue, ``Cao Yaxue:
Interview With a Wenzhou Pastor, Suppression and Transformation of
Christianity'' [Cao yaxue: fangtan wenzhou mushi: dui jidujiao de daya
yu gaizao], Voice of America, 27 November 15.
\134\ David Volodzko, ``The Boss Christians of Wenzhou,'' The
Diplomat, 6 March 15; Marie-Eve Reny, ``Nanlai Cao, Constructing
China's Jerusalem: Christians, Power and Place in the City of
Wenzhou,'' China Perspectives, Issue 2 (2012), 92.
\135\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``How To View the
National Conference on Religious Work? The First Collection of
Statements From the Five Major Religious Organizations!'' [Quanguo
zongjiao gongzuo huiyi zenme kan? wu da zongjiao tuanti shouci jiti
fasheng!], reprinted in China Religion Journal, 24 May 16. See also
Zhuo Xinping, ``The Three Essentials of `Sinicizing' Christianity: To
Endorse the Chinese Political System, To Be Compatible With Chinese
Society, and To Embody Chinese Culture'' [Jidujiao zhongguohua de san
yaosu: dui zhongguo zhengzhi de rentong, dui zhongguo shehui de
shiying, dui zhongguo wenhua de biaoda], China Ethnicity News, 17 March
15.
\136\ ``Xi Jinping: Comprehensively Improve the Level of Religious
Work Under the New Situation'' [Xi jinping: quanmian tigao xin xingshi
xia zongjiao gongzuo shuiping], Xinhua, 23 April 16. For more on the
April 2016 National Conference on Religious Work, see the discussion in
this section under Religious Affairs Regulation and Policy.
\137\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``How To View the
National Conference on Religious Work? The First Collection of
Statements From the Five Major Religious Organizations!'' [Quanguo
zongjiao gongzuo huiyi zenme kan? wu da zongjiao tuanti shouci jiti
fasheng!], reprinted in China Religion Journal, 24 May 16.
\138\ Guo Baosheng, ChinaAid, ``Understanding the Official Theory
of `Sinicizing Christianity' Through Zhuo Xinping's Remarks'' [Cong
zhuo xinping yanlun kan guanfang jidujiao zhongguohua lilun], 23 March
16; Cao Yaxue, ``Cao Yaxue: Interview With a Wenzhou Pastor,
Suppression and Transformation of Christianity'' [Cao yaxue: fangtan
wenzhou mushi: dui jidujiao de daya yu gaizao], Voice of America, 27
November 15; Zhuo Xinping, ``The Three Essentials of `Sinicizing'
Christianity: To Endorse the Chinese Political System, To Be Compatible
With Chinese Society, and To Embody Chinese Culture'' [Jidujiao
zhongguohua de san yaosu: dui zhongguo zhengzhi de rentong, dui
zhongguo shehui de shiying, dui zhongguo wenhua de biaoda], China
Ethnicity News, 17 March 15. Zhuo Xinping is the director of a group
focused on religious research within the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) and a member of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress.
\139\ Zhuo Xinping, ``The Three Essentials of `Sinicizing'
Christianity: To Endorse the Chinese Political System, To Be Compatible
With Chinese Society, and To Embody Chinese Culture'' [Jidujiao
zhongguohua de san yaosu: dui zhongguo zhengzhi de rentong, dui
zhongguo shehui de shiying, dui zhongguo wenhua de biaoda], China
Ethnicity News, 17 March 15.
\140\ Ibid.
\141\ Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With `Cultural Renaissance'
Raises Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,'' Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 3, 8 February 16, 4-5; Yaxue Cao and Pastor
L, ``Second Interview With the Wenzhou Pastor: After the Demolition
Come the `Transformations,' '' 15 December 15.
\142\ Ibid.
\143\ Cao Yaxue, ``Cao Yaxue: Interview With a Wenzhou Pastor,
Suppression and Transformation of Christianity'' [Cao yaxue: fangtan
wenzhou mushi: dui jidujiao de daya yu gaizao], Voice of America, 27
November 15.
\144\ Zhejiang Province People's Government, Circular on the
Launching of a Province-Wide Three-Year ``Three Rectifications and One
Demolition'' Operation [Zhejiang sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu zai
quansheng kaizhan ``san gai yi chai'' san nian xingdong de tongzhi],
issued 21 February 13; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 96-97.
\145\ For data on the number of cross removals, see ChinaAid,
``2015 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Christians and
Churches in China January-December 2015,'' March 2016; Cao Yaxue, ``Cao
Yaxue: Interview With a Wenzhou Pastor, Suppression and Transformation
of Christianity'' [Cao yaxue: fangtan wenzhou mushi: dui jidujiao de
daya yu gaizao], Voice of America, 27 November 15. See also Ian
Johnson, ``Church-State Clash in China Coalesces Around a Toppled
Spire,'' New York Times, 29 May 14; Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With
`Cultural Renaissance' Raises Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 3, 8 February 16, 4.
\146\ Yaxue Cao and Pastor L, ``Second Interview With the Wenzhou
Pastor: After the Demolition Come the `Transformations,' '' China
Change, 15 December 15.
\147\ Ibid. See also Willy Lam, ``Xi's Obsession With `Cultural
Renaissance' Raises Fears of Another Cultural Revolution,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, No. 3, 8 February 16, 4.
\148\ For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2016-00088 on Bao Guohua and 2016-00089 on Xing
Wenxiang.
\149\ For more information on Gu Yuese, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00100.
\150\ Ibid.
\151\ ChinaAid, ``2015 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Christians and Churches in China January-December
2015,'' March 2016; Yaxue Cao and Pastor L, ``Second Interview With the
Wenzhou Pastor: After the Demolition Come the `Transformations,' ''
China Change, 15 December 15.
\152\ ``China's Zhejiang Bans Religious Activities in Hospitals as
Crackdown Widens,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 August 16.
\153\ Cao Yaxue, ``Cao Yaxue: Interview With a Wenzhou Pastor,
Suppression and Transformation of Christianity'' [Cao yaxue: fangtan
wenzhou mushi: dui jidujiao de daya yu gaizao], Voice of America, 27
November 15.
\154\ Hai Yan, ``Missing Beijing Lawyer Under `Residential
Surveillance,' Outside World Fears Torture'' [Shizong beijing lushi zai
wenzhou ``jianju'' waijie danxin kuxing], Voice of America, 13 August
15. For more information on Zhang Kai, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2015-00318.
\155\ Tom Phillips, ``Anger as Christian Lawyer Paraded on Chinese
State TV for `Confession,' '' Guardian, 26 February 16.
\156\ ChinaAid, ``Lawyer Zhang Kai Already Returned to Family Home
in Inner Mongolia'' [Zhang kai lushi yijing huidao neimenggu laojia],
23 March 16.
\157\ In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Qiao Nong,
ChinaAid, ``One Church's Gathering of 66 People in Yili, Xinjiang
Raided, 3 Believers Detained'' [Xinjiang yili yi jiating jiaohui 66 ren
juhui bei chongji, 3 xintu bei juliu], 25 December 15. In Anhui
province: Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Pastor Lu Jingxiang of Mingguang,
Anhui, Released After 15 Days of Detention'' [Anhui mingguang lu
jingxiang mushi bei juliu 15 tian huoshi], 6 October 15. In Beijing
municipality: ``Beijing Shouwang Church Worships Outdoors, Four
Believers Administratively Detained for Ten Days'' [Beijing shouwang
jiaohui huwai jingbai si ming xintu zao xingzheng juliu shi tian],
Radio Free Asia, 26 October 15. In Guizhou province: Qiao Nong,
ChinaAid, ``Three More Believers of the Daguan Church in Qianxi,
Guizhou, Detained'' [Guizhou qianxi daguan jiaohui zai you san xintu
bei ju], 22 October 15; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Cases of Five Believers
of Guizhou's Daguan Church Transferred to the Procuratorate'' [Guizhou
daguan jiaohui wu xintu an zai yisong jianchayuan], 25 January 16. In
Henan province: ChinaAid, ``House Church Gathering Raided in Luoyang
Municipality, Henan Province, Five People Including Pastor Shen
Zhenguo, a Taiwanese Foreign National, and Wife Administratively
Detained for 15 Days'' [Henan sheng luoyang shi jiating jiaohui juhui
shou chongji, waiji taiwanren shen zhenguo lao mushi ji shimu deng 5
ren bei xingzheng juliu 15 tian], 9 November 15; ``Church Leader Li
Baocheng Sentenced to 4 Years, Four Coworkers Also Sentenced'' [Jiaohui
lingxiu li baocheng bei pan 4 nian si ming tonggong yi huoxing], Radio
Free Asia, 17 February 16. In Guangdong province: ``A Christian in
Shantou Detained for Proselytizing, Dongguan House Church Sues
Officials, Loses'' [Shantou yi jidutu chuan fuyin bei zhua, dongguan
jiating jiaohui gaoguan baisu], Radio Free Asia, 11 February 16. For
more reporting on detentions of Christian believers, see ChinaAid,
``2015 Annual Report: Chinese Government Persecution of Christians and
Churches in China January-December 2015,'' March 2016.
\158\ In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Qiao Nong,
ChinaAid, ``One Church's Gathering of 66 People in Yili, Xinjiang
Raided, 3 Believers Detained'' [Xinjiang yili yi jiating jiaohui 66 ren
juhui bei chongji, 3 xintu bei juliu], 25 December 15. On December 10,
authorities raided a church in Kashgar prefecture and criminally
detained one member. In Henan province: ChinaAid, ``House Church
Gathering Raided in Luoyang Municipality, Henan Province, Five People
Including Pastor Shen Zhenguo, a Taiwanese Foreign National, and Wife
Administratively Detained for 15 Days'' [Henan sheng luoyang shi
jiating jiaohui juhui shou chongji, waiji taiwanren shen zhenguo lao
mushi ji shimu deng 5 ren bei xingzheng juliu 15 tian], 9 November 15.
In Luoyang municipality, Henan province, authorities raided a house
church and detained two people for 15 days. For more reporting on house
church raids, see ChinaAid, ``2015 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Christians and Churches in China January-December
2015,'' March 2016.
\159\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Shenzhen Huaqiao Church Forced To
Relocate, Contract for Another Venue Rescinded'' [Shenzhen huaqiao
cheng jiaohui bei bi qian, ling zu changdi zai bei huiyue], 23 December
15. In Shenzhen, the Huaqiao Church was evicted from its meeting space
and had a subsequent lease revoked.
\160\ ChinaAid, ``2015 Annual Report: Chinese Government
Persecution of Christians and Churches in China January-December
2015,'' March 2016; Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Guangdong Becomes the
Province Where House Churches Are Hardest Hit, Guangzhou House Churches
Raided by Public Security for Two Consecutive Days'' [Guangdong yi
cheng daji jiating jiaohui zhongdian shengfen guangzhou jiating jiaohui
lianxu liang ri bei gong'an chongji], 8 December 15.
\161\ Yaxue Cao, ``Living Stone: A Portrait of a House Church in
China,'' China Change, 21 December 15.
\162\ Qiao Nong, ChinaAid, ``Updated: Guizhou Pastor Possibly
Tortured in Detention; Church Group Evicted,'' 20 May 16. For more
information on Li Guozhi (also known as Pastor Yang Hua), see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00001.
\163\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Sentences Hu Shigen, Democracy
Advocate, to 7 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, 3 August 16. For more
information on Hu Shigen, see Political Prisoner Database record 2004-
02053.
\164\ Wang Yeshe, ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in
Subversion of State Power Case Concerning Hu Shigen, Defendant
Sentenced to Seven Years and Six Months' Imprisonment'' [Hu shigen
dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen dangting xuanpan beigaoren bei
panxing qi nian ban], Xinhua, 3 August 16.
\165\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Sentences Hu Shigen, Democracy
Advocate, to 7 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, 3 August 16.
\166\ Wang Yeshe, ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in
Subversion of State Power Case Concerning Hu Shigen, Defendant
Sentenced to Seven Years and Six Months' Imprisonment'' [Hu shigen
dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen dangting xuanpan beigaoren bei
panxing qi nian ban], Xinhua, 3 August 16.
\167\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``China Sentences Hu Shigen, Democracy
Advocate, to 7 Years in Prison,'' New York Times, 3 August 16.
\168\ Wang Yeshe, ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in
Subversion of State Power Case Concerning Hu Shigen, Defendant
Sentenced to Seven Years and Six Months' Imprisonment'' [Hu shigen
dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen dangting xuanpan beigaoren bei
panxing qi nian ban], Xinhua, 3 August 16.
\169\ State Council Information Office, ``The Situation of
Religious Freedom in China'' [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou
zhuangkuang], October 1997, sec. I. The central government has referred
to the five religions as China's ``main religions,'' stating that the
religions citizens ``mainly'' follow are Buddhism, Taoism, Islam,
Catholicism, and Protestantism. Henan People's Congress, Henan Province
Regulations on Religious Affairs [Henan sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 30 July 05, effective 1 January 06, art. 2; Shaanxi Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Shaanxi Province Regulations on
Religious Affairs [Shaanxi sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 23
September 00, amended 30 July 08, art. 2. Some local regulations on
religious affairs define ``religion'' to mean only these five
religions.
\170\ See, e.g., Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's
Government General Office, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious
Activity [Neimenggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi
banfa], issued 23 January 95, art. 2; State Council Information Office,
``The Situation of Religious Freedom in Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang de
zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], reprinted in Xinhua, 2 June 16,
secs. 1, 3.
\171\ Hannah Gardner, ``Ordination of Russian Orthodox Priest in
China Sign of Warming Ties Amid U.S. Tensions,'' USA Today, 22 October
15.
\172\ Sam Kestenbaum, ``Is China Cracking Down on Jewish Community
in Kaifeng? '' Forward, 3 May 16; Anson Laytner, ``Jewish Troubles in
Kaifeng, China,'' Times of Israel, The Blogs, 28 April 16.
\173\ State Council, Provisions on the Management of Religious
Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued and
effective 31 January 94, art. 4; State Administration for Religious
Affairs, Implementing Details of Rules for the Provisions on the
Management of Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli
guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, amended 29 November 10,
effective 1 January 11, arts. 7, 17(5).
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority Rights
Introduction
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, Chinese
government and Communist Party officials failed to adhere to
Chinese and international law in their treatment of ethnic
minority populations. The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law
contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and
customs of the country's 55 recognized minority
``nationalities,'' \1\ in addition to a system of regional
autonomy in designated areas.\2\ Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
China has signed and declared an intention to ratify, contains
safeguards for the rights of ``ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities'' within a state.\3\ In practice, however, Chinese
authorities enforced restrictions that some observers said
prevented members of ethnic minority groups from maintaining
their own cultural practices.\4\ [See Section IV--Xinjiang and
Section V--Tibet for additional information on these areas.]
State Minority Policy
Central government officials in China continued to stress
the importance of ``ethnic harmony'' or ``ethnic unity'' \5\
and of ethnic minorities' identification with ``the
motherland'' and ``Chinese culture.'' \6\ At the National
People's Congress in March 2016, Premier Li Keqiang stressed
the need to promote contact, exchanges, and ``ethnic blending''
(minzu jiaorong) between ethnicities.\7\ For a third
consecutive year, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
authorities implemented a ``mass line'' campaign,\8\ which
promotes ``ethnic unity'' \9\ and requires officials working at
the grassroots level to monitor and control Muslim residents'
religious practices.\10\ An Australian scholar outlined
concerns regarding the impact of assimilation on ethnic
minorities' cultures and languages.\11\ In addition to projects
aimed at integrating Han majority and ethnic minority
populations, government officials pushed both development \12\
and securitization \13\ in places such as Tibetan autonomous
areas and the XUAR in an effort to maintain ``stability.''
International media reports published during this reporting
year highlighted disparities in official policies toward and
treatment of Hui Muslims and Uyghur Muslims, stressing
comparative tolerance of Hui Muslim religious practices and
government programs incentivizing Hui-owned business
ventures.\14\ Reports, however, also indicated officials'
growing fears over the rise of Salafism, an ultra-conservative
Sunni sect, in both the Hui and Uyghur Muslim communities, and
described government actions to limit the growth of Salafism in
China due to concerns over its alleged ties to extremism.\15\
In addition, a report published by an American research
institute argued that fears over Islam in Chinese official and
scholarly circles had led to the April 2016 dismissal of ethnic
Hui Wang Zhengwei from his positions as Chairman of the State
Ethnic Affairs Commission and Executive Deputy Head of the
United Front Work Department.\16\ Wang had advocated for the
preservation of China's regional ethnic autonomy system and had
championed ethnic diversity in the face of Chinese officials
who support the dilution of ethnic and religious identities,
such as Zhu Weiqun, Chairperson of the Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference.\17\ [For more information on official
policies toward and treatment of Uyghur Muslims, see Section
II--Freedom of Religion and Section IV--Xinjiang.]
Grasslands Protests in Inner Mongolia
Mongol herders and villagers in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR) protested against the state-led
demolition of herders' homes \18\ and killing of their
livestock; \19\ state exploitation of their traditional grazing
lands \20\ and resulting environmental damage; \21\ and
inadequate compensation for the loss of grazing lands.\22\ As
in past reporting years, IMAR authorities detained herders who
engaged in peaceful protests related to grasslands, including
herders who reportedly used online forums or spoke to foreign
journalists about their grievances.\23\
Representative examples of protests by Mongol herders and
villagers included the following:
In October 2015, in Haliut (Hailiutu)
township, Urad (Wulate) Middle Banner, Bayannur
(Bayannao'er) municipality, IMAR, dozens of herders
protested in front of banner government offices
regarding a dispute over officials' sale of grasslands,
hoping to attract the attention of visiting IMAR Party
Secretary Wang Jun.\24\ Security officials reportedly
detained five of the herders.\25\ For at least two
weeks beginning February 23, 2016, herders again
gathered in front of government offices in Haliut,
demanding ``adequate compensation and immediate return
of their grazing lands.'' \26\
On December 17, 2015, in Dalain-Huv (Dalahubu
or Dalain Hob) township, Eznee (Eji'na) Banner, Alshaa
(Alashan) League, IMAR, close to 100 herders protested
in front of the Eznee Banner government building.\27\
The herders called upon officials to protect
traditional grazing lands from ``trespassers'' from
Gansu province who they said destroyed the grasslands,
and sought an explanation for an attack by assailants
from Gansu on an Eznee Banner checkpoint.\28\
On June 10, 2016, in Bieligutai township, Abag
(Abaga) Banner, Xilingol (Xilinguole) League, IMAR, a
group of herders blocked the road leading to a highway
under construction in protest over what they alleged
was an encroachment on their traditional grazing
lands.\29\ According to the herders, their village
chief had commissioned construction of the highway
without their knowledge or consent, and this was the
second time highway builders had encroached upon their
grazing lands this year.\30\
Instances of IMAR officials detaining Mongol herders for
using the Internet and giving interviews related to grasslands-
related grievances included the following:
On November 25, 2015, security officials in
Haliut township, Urad Middle Banner, detained
Odongerel, a leading figure in organizing herders'
protests, for using the messaging service WeChat to
communicate with others.\31\ Authorities detained
Odongerel again on March 24, 2016, after she used
WeChat to express concern over the detention of other
herders.\32\
On January 25, 2016, security officials in
Darhan-Muumingan (Da'erhanmaoming'an) United Banner,
Baotou municipality, IMAR, detained at least a dozen
herders for several hours for contacting ``overseas
news media and hostile forces'' and engaging in
``separatism.'' \33\ The detention was reportedly
related to a protest staged the previous week by
``dozens'' of herders in the banner related to
compensation they had requested for an official ban on
livestock grazing.\34\ Following the protest, some of
the herders published pictures and video on social
media, in addition to speaking to foreign reporters and
human rights organizations.\35\
In February and March 2016, security officials
in Urad Middle Banner detained at least 20 herders for
allegedly ``giving interviews to foreign news media,''
among other allegations.\36\ On March 4, authorities
detained one of the herders, Saishingaa, for
``resisting arrest and providing information to foreign
news media and organizations.'' \37\ On March 7,
authorities detained two others from among these
herders, Munkh and Tuyaa.\38\
On March 21, 2016, security officials in Right
Uzumchin (Xiwuzhumuqin) Banner, Xilingol (Xilinguole)
League, IMAR, detained herder Enkhbat, and security
officials in Left Uzumchin (Dongwuzhumuqin) Banner,
Xilingol League, detained herders Burdee and Achilalt
for ``instigating illegal gatherings via the
Internet.'' \39\
Continued Restrictions on Hada and Family
As in past reporting years,\40\ authorities in the IMAR
continued to harass Mongol rights advocate Hada and his
family.\41\ IMAR officials imprisoned Hada for 15 years
beginning in 1995 and subsequently extralegally detained him
for an additional 4 years,\42\ after he organized peaceful
protests for Mongol rights and for his role in founding the
banned Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance.\43\ According to
Hada and his wife, Xinna, as of October 2015, public security
personnel maintained a constant presence in their apartment
building in order to surveil Hada's activities at home, and
have followed him whenever he has gone out.\44\ Beginning
October 15, 2015, public security authorities in Qingshan
district, Baotou municipality, IMAR, detained Hada and Xinna's
son Uiles for 10 days, on the charge of ``obstructing official
business.'' \45\ Security authorities reportedly beat Uiles and
Xinna prior to detaining Uiles.\46\
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Ethnic Minority
Rights
Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
\1\ ``Ethnic Minorities, Women, Children, Disabled Effectively
Protected: Report,'' Xinhua, 14 June 16.
\2\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
minzu quyu zizhi fa], passed 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended
28 February 01. For protections related to languages, religious
beliefs, and customs, see Articles 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, and 53.
\3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 27.
\4\ See, e.g., ``Controls on Uyghur Villages, Mosques Continue Into
New Year,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 January 16; ``Officials Demolish Ethnic
Mongolian Herders' Homes Amid `Upgrade' Plan,'' Radio Free Asia, 11
January 16; ``Tibetan, Muslim Students Join in Protest for Equal
Education,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 January 16.
\5\ ``Li Keqiang: Increase Support for Development for Ethnic
Minorities With Smaller Populations, Let People of All Ethnicities
Together Move Toward Prosperity'' [Li keqiang: jiada fuchi renkou
jiaoshao minzu fazhan lidu rang ge zu renmin gongtong maixiang
xiaokang], People's Daily, 5 March 16; Zhu Xiaolong and Hou Lijun,
``Zhu Weiqun: `Embedded' Thinking Is an Important Innovation in Ethnic
Work'' [Zhu weiqun: ``qianru shi'' silu shi minzu gongzuo de zhongyao
chuangxin], Xinhua, 7 March 16.
\6\ James Leibold, ``China's Ethnic Policy Under Xi Jinping,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 15, Issue 20, 19 October 15, 7.
\7\ ``Li Keqiang: Increase Support for Development for Ethnic
Minorities With Smaller Populations, Let People of All Ethnicities
Together Move Toward Prosperity'' [Li keqiang: jiada fuchi renkou
jiaoshao minzu fazhan lidu rang ge zu renmin gongtong maixiang
xiaokang], People's Daily, 5 March 16.
\8\ Cao Xu, ``Xinjiang's Third Round of `Visit the Masses' Working
Groups Go Into the Villages'' [Xinjiang di san pi ``fang hui ju''
gongzuo zu zhu cun jin dian], China Economic Weekly, 25 February 16;
Sui Yunyan, ``Third Summary of XUAR 2015 `Visit the Masses' Activity''
[Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 2015 nian ``fang hui ju'' huodong zongshu
zhi san], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in China Internet Information
Center, 24 February 16. These articles refer to the ``mass line''
campaign in the XUAR. For more information on this education and
ideology campaign, see CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 42, 100,
140, 168.
\9\ See, e.g., Tom Phillips, ``China Launches Massive Rural
`Surveillance' Project To Watch Over Uighurs,'' Telegraph, 20 October
14.
\10\ Sui Yunyan, ``Third Summary of XUAR 2015 `Visit the Masses'
Activity'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 2015 nian `fang hui ju' huodong
zongshu zhi san], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in China Internet
Information Center, 24 February 16; Tom Phillips, ``China Launches
Massive Rural `Surveillance' Project To Watch Over Uighurs,''
Telegraph, 20 October 14; Reza Hasmath, ``Ethnic Violence in Xinjiang:
Causes, Responses, and Future Outlook,'' University of Nottingham,
China Policy Institute Policy Paper, No. 7, 27 October 14, 3. These
articles refer to the ``mass line'' campaign in the XUAR.
\11\ James Leibold, ``China's Minority Report,'' Foreign Affairs,
23 March 16.
\12\ Liu Xin, ``China Vows Frontier Boom,'' Global Times, 18 March
16; Li Hong, Economic Research Institute of the XUAR Development and
Reform Commission, ``Comments and Suggestions Regarding How To Carry
Out the Plans Organized by the XUAR's `13th Five-Year Plan' '' [Zuohao
zizhiqu ``shisan wu'' guihua bianzhi de yijian yu jianyi], 16 October
15; Zhao Shubin, ``TAR Leaders and State Railways Administration Travel
to Tibet for Investigation and Research Group Forum, Losang Jamcan and
Lu Dongfu Attend and Give Speeches'' [Zizhiqu lingdao yu guojia tielu
ju fu zang diaoyan zu zuotan luosang jiangcun lu dong fu chuxi bing
jianghua], Tibet Daily, 15 May 16; Emily Rauhala, ``China's Plan To
`Liberate' a Cradle of Tibetan Culture,'' Washington Post, 14 December
15.
\13\ James Leibold, ``China's Ethnic Policy Under Xi Jinping,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 15, Issue 20, 19 October 15, 6-
10; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tightening of an Invisible Net:
New Security Measures in Eastern Tibet Heighten Surveillance,
Control,'' 16 February 16; Andrew Jacobs, ``Xinjiang Seethes Under
Chinese Crackdown,'' New York Times, 2 January 16.
\14\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Light Government Touch Lets China's Hui
Practice Islam in the Open,'' New York Times, 1 February 16. See also
Jonathan Kaiman, ``In China, Rise of Salafism Fosters Suspicion and
Division Among Muslims,'' Los Angeles Times, 1 February 16.
\15\ Jonathan Kaiman, ``In China, Rise of Salafism Fosters
Suspicion and Division Among Muslims,'' Los Angeles Times, 1 February
16. See also Andrew Jacobs, ``Light Government Touch Lets China's Hui
Practice Islam in the Open,'' New York Times, 1 February 16; James
Leibold, ``Creeping Islamophobia: China's Hui Muslims in the Firing
Line,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, Issue 10, 20 June
16.
\16\ James Leibold, ``Creeping Islamophobia: China's Hui Muslims in
the Firing Line,'' Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 16, Issue
10, 20 June 16.
\17\ Ibid.
\18\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``China Demolishes Mongolian Herders' Houses in Freezing Cold,'' 8
January 16.
\19\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Anthrax Vaccine Overdosed, Livestock Wiped Out,'' 4 November 15.
\20\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Herders Protest Government Officials' Illegal Occupation of Grazing
Land,'' 23 February 16; ``Ethnic Mongolians Protest Missile Tests on
Grasslands, Lack of Income,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 January 16.
\21\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Herders Blocked Mines, Six Arrested and Detained,'' 19 March 16;
``China Holds Five Ethnic Mongolian Herders Who Protested Mining
Pollution,'' Radio Free Asia, 21 March 16; ``Officials Demolish Ethnic
Mongolian Herders' Homes Amid `Upgrade' Plan,'' Radio Free Asia, 11
January 16.
\22\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Herders Protest Government Officials' Illegal Occupation of Grazing
Land,'' 23 February 16; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information
Center, ``Herders Detained for Involvement in `Framing and Denouncing
the Socialist Regime,' '' 8 March 16; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Herders Blocked Mines, Six Arrested and
Detained,'' 19 March 16.
\23\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Herders' Leader Detained for `Chatting Via WeChat,' '' 27 November
15; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Taken Away by
Police, Herders Accused of `National Separatism,' '' 26 January 16;
``Ethnic Mongolians Protest Missile Tests on Grasslands, Lack of
Income,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 January 16; Southern Mongolian Human
Rights Information Center, ``Herders Detained for Involvement in
`Framing and Denouncing the Socialist Regime,' '' 8 March 16; ``China
Detains Dozens of Ethnic Mongolians Amid Ongoing Grassland Protest,''
Radio Free Asia, 9 March 16; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Crackdown Escalates, More Herders Arrested for
`Inciting Illegal Gatherings Via the Internet,' '' 24 March 16.
\24\ ``Chinese Police Detain Mongolian Dissident's Son Amid Ongoing
Protests Over Grasslands,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 October 15.
\25\ Ibid.
\26\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders
Protest Government Officials' Illegal Occupation of Grazing Land,'' 23
February 16; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Herders Detained for Involvement in `Framing and Denouncing the
Socialist Regime,' '' 8 March 16.
\27\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Riding
Horses and Camels, Herder [sic] Took to the Streets in Southern
Mongolia,'' 17 December 15.
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ ``Herders Blockade Disputed Highway Project in China's Inner
Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 June 16.
\30\ Ibid.
\31\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders'
Leader Detained for `Chatting Via WeChat,' '' 27 November 15.
\32\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Crackdown Escalates, More Herders Arrested for `Inciting Illegal
Gatherings Via the Internet,' '' 24 March 16.
\33\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Taken
Away by Police, Herders Accused of `National Separatism,' '' 26 January
16; ``Ethnic Mongolians Protest Missile Tests on Grasslands, Lack of
Income,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 January 16.
\34\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Taken
Away by Police, Herders Accused of `National Separatism,' '' 26 January
16.
\35\ Ibid.
\36\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders
Detained for Involvement in `Framing and Denouncing the Socialist
Regime,' '' 8 March 16; ``China Detains Dozens of Ethnic Mongolians
Amid Ongoing Grassland Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 March 16.
\37\ Ibid.
\38\ Ibid.
\39\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Crackdown Escalates, More Herders Arrested for `Inciting Illegal
Gatherings Via the Internet,' '' 24 March 16.
\40\ See, e.g., CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 139-40;
CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 102; CECC, 2013 Annual Report,
10 October 13, 97.
\41\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``After 19
Years of Imprisonment Hada Still Treated as Prisoner,'' 22 October 15;
`` `My Husband Remains in Prison, Long After His Release': Dissident's
Wife,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 October 15; Southern Mongolian Human Rights
Information Center, ``Mongolian Dissident's Son Arrested and Detained
for `Obstructing Official Business,' '' 16 October 15; ``Chinese Police
Detain Mongolian Dissident's Son Amid Ongoing Protests Over
Grasslands,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 October 15.
\42\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Dissident's Son Arrested and Detained for `Obstructing
Official Business,' '' 16 October 15.
\43\ ``Inner Mongolian Dissident's Family Targeted,'' Radio Free
Asia, 5 December 10; Hada, Xinna, and Uiles, Southern Mongolian Human
Rights Information Center, ``Open Letter From Hada and His Family
Members,'' 2 July 14; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information
Center, ``SMHRIC Statement to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights
to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association,'' 19 February 14. For
Commission analysis on Hada, Xinna, and Uiles, see ``Authorities
Heighten Persecution of Detained Mongol Rights Advocate's Wife and
Son,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 3 January
13, 2. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2004-02045 on Hada, 2010-00704 on Xinna, and 2010-
00705 on Uiles.
\44\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``After 19
Years of Imprisonment Hada Still Treated as Prisoner,'' 22 October 15;
`` `My Husband Remains in Prison, Long After His Release': Dissident's
Wife,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 October 15.
\45\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Dissident's Son Arrested and Detained for `Obstructing
Official Business,' '' 16 October 15. See also ``Chinese Police Detain
Mongolian Dissident's Son Amid Ongoing Protests Over Grasslands,''
Radio Free Asia, 15 October 15.
\46\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center,
``Mongolian Dissident's Son Arrested and Detained for `Obstructing
Official Business,' '' 16 October 15; ``Chinese Police Detain Mongolian
Dissident's Son Amid Ongoing Protests Over Grasslands,'' Radio Free
Asia, 15 October 15.
Population
Control
Population
Control
Population Control
International Standards and China's Coercive Population Policies
Chinese authorities continue to actively promote and
implement coercive population planning policies that violate
international standards. During the Commission's 2016 reporting
year, Communist Party and central government authorities
adopted a universal two-child policy and amended the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law, allowing all married
couples to have two children.\1\ Authorities continued to place
an emphasis on birth limits and adherence to family planning as
a ``basic national policy.'' \2\ The PRC Population and Family
Planning Law and provincial-level regulations limit couples'
freedom to build their families as they see fit,\3\ and include
provisions that require couples be married to have children and
limit them to bearing two children.\4\ Exceptions allowing for
additional children exist for couples who meet certain
criteria, which vary by province,\5\ including some exceptions
for ethnic minorities,\6\ remarried couples, and couples who
have children with disabilities.\7\ Officials continue to
enforce compliance with population planning targets using
methods including heavy fines,\8\ job termination,\9\ arbitrary
detention,\10\ and coerced abortion.\11\
Coercive controls imposed on Chinese women and their
families, and additional abuses engendered by China's
population and family planning system, violate standards set
forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
\12\ and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo
International Conference on Population and Development.\13\
China was a state participant in the negotiation and adoption
of both.\14\ Acts of official coercion committed in the
implementation of population planning policies \15\ contravene
provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention),\16\
which China has ratified.\17\ In November 2015, the UN
Committee against Torture conducted its fifth periodic review
of China's compliance with the Convention.\18\ In its
concluding observations, the Committee stated its concerns
about China's coercive implementation of the population policy,
such as coerced sterilization and forced abortion, and the lack
of information on investigations into such allegations.\19\
Furthermore, discriminatory policies against some children
whose parents fail to comply with population planning policies
\20\ contravene the Convention on the Rights of the Child \21\
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.\22\ China is a State Party to these treaties and has
committed to uphold their terms.\23\
Policy Revisions and Implementation
At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee
held in November 2013,\24\ Party authorities issued the
Decision on Certain Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms, which called for a broad range of
reforms,\25\ including the provision of an exception to China's
population planning policy aimed at addressing the demographic
challenges facing China.\26\ The exception allowed couples to
have two children if one of the parents is an only child (dandu
erhai policy).\27\ The National Health and Family Planning
Commission (NHFPC) had initially predicted that the policy
revision would result in approximately 2 million additional
births per year.\28\
Government statistics, however, revealed the limited impact
of the policy revision. As of October 2015, approximately two
years after the policy revision became effective, roughly 1.85
million out of 11 million eligible couples nationwide (16.8
percent) had applied to have a second child.\29\ Moreover, data
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China showed that the
number of total births in 2015 decreased to 16.55 million,
320,000 less than the 2014 figure.\30\ An NHFPC official
attributed the decline to two main factors: some were waiting
to have children in 2016, the Year of the Monkey, which in the
traditional zodiac calendar is considered more auspicious for
having children than the previous year; and the decline in the
number of women of child-bearing age.\31\
As the policy revision failed to meet the intended birth
target and amid demographic and economic concerns voiced by
population experts and research institutions,\32\ central Party
authorities issued a decision at the Fifth Plenum of the 18th
Party Central Committee in October 2015 to adopt a ``universal
two-child policy'' (quanmian erhai), allowing all married
couples to have two children.\33\ According to an NHFPC
statement, the universal two-child policy is the Party's
``major initiative'' to ``promote balanced population
development'' and to address demographic concerns currently
facing China.\34\ The NHFPC noted that the new policy would be
conducive to ``optimizing the demographic structure, increasing
labor supplies, and easing the pressure of an aging population;
promoting healthy economic development for achieving the goal
of building a moderately prosperous society; and implementing
the family planning policy as a basic national policy in order
to promote family well-being and social harmony.'' \35\ Central
government officials emphasized repeatedly that family planning
policy will ``remain'' a long-term ``basic national policy''
(jiben guoce).\36\
On December 27, 2015, the National People's Congress
Standing Committee amended the PRC Population and Family
Planning Law, which became effective nationwide on January 1,
2016.\37\ The NHFPC estimated that approximately 90 million
couples nationwide became eligible to bear a second child under
the new policy.\38\ As of August 2016, at least 29 provincial-
level jurisdictions reportedly had revised their population and
family planning regulations in accordance with the amended
national law.\39\ Human rights advocates, demographic experts,
and others, however, expressed concerns that the coercive
implementation of family planning measures and human rights
abuses will persist despite the adoption of the universal two-
child policy.\40\
Government officials and population experts differ over the
potential impact of the universal two-child policy. The NHFPC
predicted that the universal two-child policy, if fully
implemented, will result in population growth,\41\ with an
additional 3 million children born per year \42\ and an
estimated total of 17.5 to 21 million children born per year
within the next five years.\43\ NHFPC Director Li Bin also
suggested that by 2050 the working-age population will increase
by 30 million.\44\ Officials also noted an apparent increase in
some localities in the number of women making medical or other
appointments linked to pregnancy, giving an indication that
more births are expected in 2016.\45\
Population experts, citing the tepid response to the
previous policy revision, suggested that the universal two-
child policy likely would not lead to significant population
growth in the long term.\46\ Yao Meixiong, a population expert
and Deputy Director of the Fujian Province Bureau of
Statistics, predicted that China could see a population
decrease by 2025, as the population of women of child-bearing
age continues to decline.\47\ Some experts noted that the
impact of the universal two-child policy would be limited to
urban areas, as the rural population was already allowed to
have two children under previous policy revisions.\48\ Many
married couples, however, especially those in urban areas,\49\
were reportedly reluctant to have a second child due to a
number of factors, including the high cost of rearing an
additional child,\50\ lack of adequate child care and education
options,\51\ lack of energy to look after children,\52\
disruption to career development,\53\ and the perception that
having one child is enough due to decades-long government
propaganda.\54\ To boost population growth, some experts urged
central government authorities to introduce supporting policy
measures that would encourage couples to have two children.\55\
Experts also suggested abolishing ``social compensation fees,''
\56\ further relaxing family planning policies to allow all
couples to have three children if the universal two-child
policy is ineffective,\57\ or ending family planning policies
entirely.\58\
Central government authorities pledged to promote ``family
planning service management reform'' (jihua shengyu fuwu guanli
gaige) and introduce ``supporting policy measures'' to
facilitate the implementation of the universal two-child
policy,\59\ including efforts to enhance existing public
services for women and children's health care,\60\ reproductive
health,\61\ child care,\62\ and education.\63\ This past year,
government authorities also took steps to further relax the
birth registration system, allowing married couples to register
their first two children without going through a complicated
approval or application process.\64\ An approval process,
however, is still in place for eligible couples who intend to
have a third child, though local family planning authorities
are to promote ``optimization'' and ``simplification'' of that
process.\65\
Coercive Implementation
The amended PRC Population and Family Planning Law contains
provisions that prohibit officials from infringing upon the
``legitimate rights and interests'' of citizens while
implementing family planning policies.\66\ Despite these
provisions, abuses committed during the implementation of
family planning policies continued during the Commission's 2016
reporting year. Some provincial-level population planning
regulations continued to explicitly instruct officials to carry
out abortions, often referred to as ``remedial measures''
(bujiu cuoshi), for ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies.\67\
OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS
Language used in official speeches and government reports
from jurisdictions across China continued to reflect an
emphasis on the harsh enforcement of family planning measures.
During this reporting year, as in previous years,\68\ official
reports from several provinces across China--including
Anhui,\69\ Fujian,\70\ the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region,\71\ Henan,\72\ Hubei,\73\ Hunan,\74\ Shandong,\75\ and
Shanxi \76\--continued to promote ``family planning work'' that
entailed harsh and invasive family planning measures. Phrases
such as ``fight the family planning work battle'' (dahao jihua
shengyu gongzuo de gongjian zhan),\77\ ``resolutely implement''
(hen zhua),\78\ and ``use all means necessary'' (qian fang bai
ji) \79\ appeared in official speeches and government reports,
indicating the aggressive nature of these family planning
campaigns.
Some local government authorities stated in their reports
that the goal of ``family planning work'' is to ``maintain a
low birth rate'' (wending di shengyu shuiping),\80\ and touted
their successes in meeting this goal by compelling women to
undergo the invasive ``three inspections'' (intrauterine device
(IUD), pregnancy, and health inspections) \81\ and ``four
procedures'' (IUD insertion, first-trimester abortion, mid- to
late-term abortion, and sterilization),\82\ and the forcible
collection of ``social compensation fees'' (shehui fuyang
fei).\83\ For example, a December 2015 government report from
Wolong district, Nanyang municipality, Henan province,
indicated that Wolong authorities had achieved the goal of
``maintaining a low birth rate'' within the district by
carrying out two ``high-quality reproductive health service''
campaigns in 2015.\84\ According to the same report, by the end
of November 2015, Wolong family planning authorities had
carried out 13,178 ``four procedures'' operations--11,590 IUD
insertions, 169 IUD removals, 915 sterilizations, and 504
abortions.\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Cases of Coercion
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a July 2016 report by state-funded news outlet
Sixth Tone, government employers in Meizhou municipality, Guangdong
province, pressured a remarried couple--a local resident surnamed Zhong
and her husband--to have an abortion or face losing their jobs.\86\
Both Zhong and her husband were government employees, and each had a
child from their previous marriages.\87\ Under family planning
regulations in Guangdong, a couple in their circumstances are not
allowed to have another child,\88\ while family planning regulations in
other provinces allow such remarried couples to have a third child.\89\
Many couples in Guangdong reportedly were facing similar
situations.\90\ In August 2016, China Business Network reported a
similar case in which an employer pressured a remarried couple to
undergo an abortion.\91\ In its response to the report, the Guangdong
Health and Family Planning Commission issued a statement urging
employers not to force remarried couples to have abortions or dismiss
them from their jobs.\92\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Cases of Coercion--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2015, women's rights advocate Sarah Huang
(pseudonym) testified before the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China regarding official demands to abort her second child.\93\ When
Huang was four months pregnant in October 2015, government authorities
at a school where Huang's husband worked as a teacher pressured her to
undergo a ``mandatory health checkup'' to ensure that there was no
``unlawful pregnanc[y].'' \94\ Authorities later threatened her with
the loss of her husband's job if she did not have an abortion.\95\
Huang expected that they would be fined approximately US$36,000 in
``social compensation fees'' if they decided to give birth to the
child.\96\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PUNISHMENT FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of
punishment to enforce citizens' compliance with population
planning policies. In accordance with national-level legal
provisions,\97\ local governments have directed officials to
punish noncompliance through heavy fines, termed ``social
compensation fees,'' \98\ which reportedly compel many couples
to choose between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring
a fine much greater than the average annual income in their
locality.\99\ In January 2016, Chinese media outlet Jiemian
reported on one such case in which local authorities in Jianli
county, Xingzhou municipality, Hubei province, demanded that
Wang Mali (pseudonym) pay ``social compensation fees'' in the
amount of 97,800 yuan (approximately US$15,000) for the May
2015 birth of her second child, which violated national and
local family planning regulations.\100\ The fine imposed on
Wang reportedly was nearly 10 times the annual average income
in her locality.\101\ Hubei's provincial family planning
regulations, however, mandated a much lighter fine based on
local average income.\102\ On January 18, 2016, Wang filed a
lawsuit against the county population and family planning
bureau.\103\ According to the same report, local family
planning and public security officials subsequently went to
Wang's home, pressuring her to pay ``social compensation fees''
and to delete her microblog posts that denounced local family
planning authorities' alleged ``illegal actions.'' \104\ On
January 25, 2016, the Jianli County People's Court accepted
Wang's lawsuit, the first such lawsuit in Hubei in 2016.\105\
The court tried her case on April 28, and announced that it
would issue a verdict at a later date.\106\ As of July, the
court had not issued a verdict.\107\
This past year, National People's Congress delegates,
family planning officials, and experts from demographic, legal,
economic, sociological, civil society, media, and other fields
called on central government authorities to abolish ``social
compensation fees.'' \108\ Some experts questioned the need to
continue collecting ``social compensation fees,'' expecting
very few policy violators after the universal two-child policy
is implemented.\109\ According to a February 2016 China
Business News report, approximately 5 percent (800,000) of the
total newborn population in 2015 were third children born in
violation of family planning policies, a number many experts
considered too low to justify the significant costs associated
with collecting ``social compensation fees.'' \110\ A National
Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) official also
predicted that ``fewer and fewer families will violate family
planning [policies] in the future.'' \111\
NHFPC officials, however, repeatedly emphasized that
``social compensation fees'' will not be abolished,\112\ saying
that the fines will remain in place to ``restrict'' policy
violations \113\ and that abolition would be ``unfair to those
who comply with family planning policies.'' \114\ Local
authorities are to collect fines from policy violators who give
birth to a second child prior to the January 1, 2016, effective
date of the universal two-child policy,\115\ as well as from
policy violators who give birth to more than two children after
the same effective date.\116\ During this reporting year, some
women reportedly attempted to postpone the delivery of their
second child until after January 1, 2016, in order to avoid
large fines.\117\
In November 2014, the State Council issued the draft
Regulations on the Collection and Management of Social
Compensation Fees (Regulations) for public comment.\118\ The
draft Regulations marked several significant changes from the
2002 Measures for Collection of Social Compensation Fees,
including the proposal of a unified national collection
standard that limits the amount of fines authorities may
collect to no more than three times the local average annual
income.\119\ As of August 2016, the Commission had not observed
reports of the Chinese government issuing the Regulations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hukou Reform Addressing the Issue of ``Illegal Residents''
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
During this reporting year, authorities in some areas withheld
household registration (hukou) from children whose parents violated
local family planning policies--including children born in excess of
birth quotas and children born to unmarried parents--demanding that
their parents first pay the necessary ``social compensation fees''
associated with their births in order to obtain hukou.\120\ People who
lack hukou in China are commonly referred to as ``illegal residents''
(heihu) \121\ and face considerable difficulty accessing social
benefits typically afforded to registered citizens, including health
insurance, public education, and state welfare.\122\ According to 2010
national census data, there were approximately 13 million ``illegal
residents'' in China,\123\ of whom over 60 percent were children born
in violation of family planning policies.\124\ Discriminatory hukou
policies preventing parents from registering their children violate the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which China is a State
Party.\125\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hukou Reform Addressing the Issue of ``Illegal Residents''--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year, central authorities took steps to address the issue of
``illegal residents.'' On December 9, 2015, the Chinese Communist
Party's Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,
chaired by President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, issued an
opinion to ``delink family planning policies from hukou registration,
to strengthen the management of hukou registration, [and] to
comprehensively resolve the issue of hukou registration for individuals
without hukou.'' \126\ On January 14, 2016, the State Council General
Office issued the Opinion on Resolving Issues of Hukou Registration for
Individuals Without Hukou.\127\ The opinion called for ``safeguarding
the legitimate right of every citizen to register for hukou according
to law,'' and prohibited ``the establishment of any preconditions that
are not in conformity with hukou registration regulations.'' \128\ The
opinion also specified eight types of ``illegal residents'' newly
eligible to register for hukou without preconditions, including those
born in violation of family planning policies and those without birth
certificates.\129\ Unregistered individuals whose parents failed to pay
``social compensation fees,'' however, were not included in this
list.\130\ At a January 2016 press conference, an NHFPC official
claimed that ``the issue of 13 million [illegal residents] has largely
been addressed,'' and that ``very few people still lack hukou due to
factors related to family planning policies.'' \131\
Provincial-level authorities also made efforts to address the issue of
``illegal residents'' by loosening hukou registration requirements. The
Party-run media outlet Legal Evening News reported that as of November
2015, at least 13 provincial-level jurisdictions had removed ``social
compensation fee'' payments as a precondition for obtaining hukou.\132\
For example, Guangdong province authorities no longer require ``social
compensation fee'' payments from family planning policy violators as a
precondition for obtaining hukou; \133\ instead, authorities will
collect ``social compensation fee'' payments after hukou
registration.\134\ Some parents, fearing that authorities might
forcibly collect ``social compensation fees'' from them retroactively,
remain deterred from registering their children who were born in
violation of family planning policies.\135\ Some provincial-level
jurisdictions, including Beijing and Shanghai municipalities, continue
to require ``social compensation fee'' payments \136\ and family
planning paperwork \137\ as preconditions for hukou registration. [For
more information on China's hukou system, see Section II--Freedom of
Residence and Movement.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to fines, officials imposed or threatened other
punishments for family planning violations. These punishments
included job termination,\138\ arbitrary detention,\139\ and
abortion.\140\ The PRC Population and Family Planning Law
prohibits and provides punishments for officials' infringement
on citizens' personal, property, and other rights while
implementing population planning policies.\141\ In June 2015,
the UN Committee against Torture asked the Chinese government
to provide information for the Committee's fifth periodic
review of China's compliance with the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, including on ``the total number of investigations
or prosecutions launched against officials and other persons
responsible for resorting to coercive and violent measures,
such as forced sterilization and forced abortions, to implement
the population policy . . . [and] details as to the types of
punishment and disciplinary measures applied, and any relevant
redress provided.'' \142\ In its October 2015 response to the
Committee, however, the Chinese government did not provide all
the relevant data the Committee requested.\143\
Demographic Consequences of Population Control Policies
The Chinese government's population planning policies
continue to exacerbate the country's demographic challenges,
which include a rapidly aging population, shrinking workforce,
and sex ratio imbalance. Affected in recent decades by
government restrictions on the number of births per couple,
China's total fertility rate has dropped from 6 births per
woman in the early 1970s \144\ to an estimated 1.4 to 1.6
births per woman in 2016,\145\ below the replacement rate of
2.1 births per woman necessary to maintain a stable
population.\146\ The fertility rate is even lower in some major
cities, such as Shanghai municipality, which has a fertility
rate of approximately 0.7 births per woman, reportedly one of
the lowest in the world.\147\
China's low fertility rate has contributed to a rapidly
aging population and a shrinking workforce. According to a
January 2016 National Bureau of Statistics of China report,
from 2014 to 2015, China's working-age population (persons
between the ages of 16 and 59) declined by a record 4.87
million people to 910.96 million,\148\ continuing a downward
trend from the previous year.\149\ Experts expect the working-
age population to rapidly decline further in the next several
decades.\150\ At the same time, the elderly population (persons
aged 60 or older) increased by approximately 9.58 million in
2015 to 222 million people, or 16.1 percent of the total
population.\151\ According to a 2015 blue book on aging
published by research entities affiliated with the Party and
government, China's elderly population is estimated to reach
371 million, or approximately a quarter of the population, by
2030.\152\ A People's Daily report suggested that the elderly
population will reach 483 million by 2050, approximately one-
third of China's total population.\153\ These demographic
trends are likely to burden China's health care, social
services, and retirement systems,\154\ and may weaken China's
economy as labor costs rise and its competitiveness erodes,
according to demographic expert Yi Fuxian.\155\
The Chinese government's restrictive family planning
policies also have exacerbated China's sex ratio
imbalance.\156\ Although Chinese authorities continue to
implement a ban on ``non-medically necessary sex determination
and sex-selective abortion,'' \157\ some people reportedly
continue the practice in response to government-imposed birth
limits and in keeping with a traditional cultural preference
for sons.\158\ According to a National Bureau of Statistics of
China report, China's sex ratio at birth in 2015 was 113.51
males to 100 females (compared with a normal ratio of 103 to
107 males per 100 females).\159\ The overall sex ratio in 2015
was 105.02 males to 100 females, and there were approximately
33.66 million more males than females in China (704.14 million
males to 670.48 million females).\160\
International and domestic demographic experts have
expressed concerns that the sex ratio imbalance in China could
lead to ``anti-social behavior,'' \161\ ``violent crime,''
\162\ ``sex crime,'' \163\ ``prostitution,'' \164\ and
``trafficking of women and children.'' \165\ This past year,
international media reports continued to suggest a link between
China's large number of ``surplus males'' and the trafficking
of foreign women--from countries including Cambodia,\166\ Burma
(Myanmar),\167\ Nepal,\168\ North Korea,\169\ and Vietnam
\170\--into China for forced marriage or commercial sexual
exploitation.
Reports also indicate that decades of birth limits under
China's population planning policies combined with a
traditional preference for sons have helped create a black
market for illegal adoptions.\171\ In January 2016, authorities
in Henan province executed Tan Yongzhi, the head of an illegal
adoption ring, for his involvement in acquiring and selling
more than 20 infants, and 17 buyers also received criminal
punishments.\172\ As of February 2016, authorities had not been
able to locate the parents of these children.\173\ Chen Shiqu,
Director of the Ministry of Public Security Anti-Trafficking
Office, expressed optimism that the implementation of the
universal two-child policy would prevent ``trafficking of
children'' by reducing the ``demand for purchasing children.''
\174\ [For more information on cross-border trafficking and the
Chinese government's conflation of child trafficking with
illegal adoption, see Section II--Human Trafficking.]
Population
Control
Population
Control
Notes to Section II--Population Control
\1\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Implement the
Universal Two-Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population Development''
[Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng fazhan], 29
October 15; Peng Xiaofei et al., ``China To Adopt the Universal `Two-
Child' Policy'' [Woguo quanmian fangkai ``erhai'' zhengce], Beijing
Youth Daily, 30 October 15; National People's Congress Standing
Committee, Decision Regarding the Population and Family Planning Law
[Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua shengyu fa de
jueding], issued 27 December 15; PRC Population and Family Planning Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29
December 01, amended 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 18.
\2\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Implement the
Universal Two-Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population Development''
[Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng fazhan], 29
October 15; Yang Qingshan, ``NHFPC Responds to the Timeframe of the
Family Planning Policies: To Persist for at Least 20 Years'' [Weijiwei
huiying jihua shengyu guoce shixian: qima haiyao jianchi 20 nian],
China Youth Net, 11 January 16; ``State Council Information Office
Holds Press Conference on Situation Related to Implementation of the
Universal Two-Child Policy and Reform and Improvement of Family
Planning Services Management: Text Record'' [Guoxinban jiu shishi
quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de
youguan qingkuang juxing fabuhui wenzi shilu], reprinted in National
Health and Family Planning Commission, 11 January 16.
\3\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 18; National People's
Congress Standing Committee, Decision Regarding the Population and
Family Planning Law [Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu xiugai renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa de jueding], issued 27 December 15. Article 18 of the
Population and Family Planning Law stipulates, ``the state advocates
two children per couple.'' For provincial-level regulations limiting
how many children married couples may bear see, e.g., Guangdong
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangdong Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Guangdong sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2 February 80, amended 17 May 86, 28
November 92, 1 December 97, 18 September 98, 21 May 99, 25 July 02, 28
November 08, 27 March 14, 30 December 15, effective 1 January 16,
reprinted in Huazhou City Health and Family Planning Bureau, art. 18;
Zhejiang Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhejiang
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Zhejiang sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 3 September 02, amended 28
September 07, 13 January 14, 14 January 16, reprinted in Zhejiang
Province Health and Family Planning Commission, art. 17; Sichuan
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Sichuan Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2 July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17
October 97, 26 September 02, 24 September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January
16, art. 13.
\4\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 18. For provincial
population policies that require couples be married to have children
and limit them to bearing two children, see, e.g., Guangdong Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangdong Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Guangdong sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 2 February 80, amended 17 May 86, 28 November 92, 1
December 97, 18 September 98, 21 May 99, 25 July 02, 28 November 08, 27
March 14, 30 December 15, effective 1 January 16, reprinted in Huazhou
City Health and Family Planning Bureau, art. 18; Zhejiang Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhejiang Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Zhejiang sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 3 September 02, amended 28 September 07, 13 January 14,
14 January 16, reprinted in Zhejiang Province Health and Family
Planning Commission, arts. 17, 41(4); Sichuan Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Sichuan Province Population and Family
Planning Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli],
issued 2 July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17 October 97, 26 September
02, 24 September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January 16, arts. 13, 34.
\5\ National People's Congress, ``Answering Journalists' Questions
`Regarding the Decision of Amending the Population and Family Planning
Law' '' [``Guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua shengyu fa de jueding'' da
jizhe wen], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning
Commission, 27 December 15. For provincial population planning
provisions that allow exceptions for having an additional child, see,
e.g., Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Guangdong sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2 February 80,
amended 17 May 86, 28 November 92, 1 December 97, 18 September 98, 21
May 99, 25 July 02, 28 November 08, 27 March 14, 30 December 15,
effective 1 January 16, reprinted in Huazhou City Health and Family
Planning Bureau, art. 19; Zhejiang Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Zhejiang Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Zhejiang sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 3 September 02,
amended 28 September 07, 13 January 14, 14 January 16, reprinted in
Zhejiang Province Health and Family Planning Commission, art. 18;
Sichuan Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Sichuan Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2 July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17
October 97, 26 September 02, 24 September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January
16, art. 13.
\6\ See, e.g., Fujian Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 29 April 88,
amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18 November 00, 26 July 02, 14
December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16, art. 9(4-5); Heilongjiang
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Heilongjiang Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Heilongjiang sheng renkou
yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 18 October 02, amended 13 December 13,
22 April 14, 17 April 15, 21 April 16, art. 13.
\7\ National People's Congress, ``Answering Journalists' Questions
`Regarding the Decision of Amending the Population and Family Planning
Law' '' [``Guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua shengyu fa de jueding'' da
jizhe wen], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning
Commission, 27 December 15. For provincial population planning
provisions that allow exceptions for having an additional child, see,
e.g., Zhejiang Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Zhejiang
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Zhejiang sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 3 September 02, amended 28
September 07, 13 January 14, 14 January 16, reprinted in Zhejiang
Province Health and Family Planning Commission, art. 18(1-4); Sichuan
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Sichuan Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2 July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17
October 97, 26 September 02, 24 September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January
16, art. 13(1); Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region People's Congress
Standing Committee, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu renkou he jihua
shengyu tiaoli], issued 23 March 12, amended 13 January 14, 15 January
16, art. 14(1-5); Jiangxi Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 16 June 90,
amended 30 June 95, 20 June 97, 29 July 02, 27 March 09, 16 January 14,
20 January 16, reprinted in People's Daily, art. 9(2-3).
\8\ See, e.g., Kiki Zhao, ``Chinese Who Violated One-Child Policy
Remain Wary of Relaxed Rules,'' New York Times, 8 February 16; Julia
Glum, ``As China's One-Child Policy Ends, Parents Protest Fines Charged
for Additional Kids,'' International Business Times, 5 January 16;
China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive Crimes
Against Women and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang, Activist.
\9\ See, e.g., Kiki Zhao, ``Chinese Who Violated One-Child Policy
Remain Wary of Relaxed Rules,'' New York Times, 8 February 16; China's
New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive Crimes Against
Women and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang, Activist.
\10\ See, e.g., China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation
of Massive Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony
of Sarah Huang, Activist.
\11\ See, e.g., China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation
of Massive Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony
of Sarah Huang, Activist; Wang Lu and Long Feihu, ``Take Multiple
Measures To Attack `Two Unnecessary Procedures' '' [Duocuo bingju daji
``liang fei''], Jingzhou Daily, reprinted in Hanfeng Net, 1 April 16.
See also Wolong District Population and Family Planning Commission,
``Wolong District 2015 Family Planning Work Summary and 2016 Work
Plan'' [Wolong qu renkou jisheng gongzuo 2015 nian zongjie ji 2016 nian
gongzuo guihua], 25 December 15.
\12\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted by the
Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 95, endorsed by UN
General Assembly resolution 50/203 of 22 December 95, paras. 9(Annex
1), 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments which
participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their
commitment to ``Ensure the full implementation of the human rights of
women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and indivisible
part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; . . .'' (para. 9)
and ``are convinced that . . . [t]he explicit recognition and
reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of their
health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their
empowerment; . . .'' (para. 17).
\13\ Programme of Action adopted by the Cairo International
Conference on Population and Development, 13 September 94, paras. 7.2,
8.25. Paragraph 7.2 states that, ``Reproductive health therefore
implies that people . . . have the capability to reproduce and the
freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this
last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to
have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of
family planning of their choice . . ..'' Paragraph 8.25 states, ``In no
case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.''
\14\ United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, 27 October 95, chap. II, para. 3; chap. VI,
para. 12. China was one of the participating States at the Fourth World
Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action. United Nations Population Information Network, Report of
the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), A/
Conf.171/13, 18 October 94, chap. II, sec. C; chap. VI, sec. 1. China
was one of the participating States at the ICPD, which reached general
agreement on the Programme of Action. The Programme of Action is
provided as an annex to the above ICPD report.
\15\ China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive
Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang,
Activist; Wang Lu and Long Feihu, ``Take Multiple Measures To Attack
`Two Unnecessary Procedures' '' [Duocuo bingju daji ``liang fei''],
Jingzhou Daily, reprinted in Hanfeng Net, 1 April 16. See also Zhima
Township People's Government, ``2015 Population and Family Planning
Work Report'' [2015 niandu renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang
tongbao], 17 January 16; Dongshahe Township People's Government,
``Dongshahe Township: Solidify the Family Planning Foundation, Improve
Service'' [Dongshahe zhen: hangshi jisheng jichu tisheng fuwu
shuiping], 28 January 16; Wolong District Population and Family
Planning Commission, ``Wolong District 2015 Family Planning Work
Summary and 2016 Work Plan'' [Wolong qu renkou jisheng gongzuo 2015
nian zongjie ji 2016 nian gongzuo guihua], 25 December 15.
\16\ UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art.
1; UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the
Committee against Torture: China, adopted by the Committee at its 864th
Meeting (3-21 November 2008), CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 21.
In 2008, the UN Committee against Torture noted again with concern
China's ``lack of investigation into the alleged use of coercive and
violent measures to implement the population policy (A/55/44, para.
122).''
\17\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, last visited 8 July 16. China signed the
Convention on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988.
\18\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16.
\19\ Ibid., para. 51.
\20\ Zhou Xiaoyang, ``Feature Story: China's Illegal Residents''
[Texie zhongguo heihu], Jiemian, 27 January 16; Kiki Zhao, ``Chinese
Who Violated One-Child Policy Remain Wary of Relaxed Rules,'' New York
Times, 8 February 16; ``Chinese Parents With Two Children Petition To
Have Second Registered,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Japan Times, 5
January 16.
\21\ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, arts. 2, 7-8, 24, 26, 28. Article 2 of the CRC calls upon
State Parties to ``respect and ensure the rights set forth . . . to
each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any
kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal
guardian's . . . national, ethnic or social origin . . . birth or other
status''; and that ``State Parties shall respect and ensure the rights
set forth in the present Convention to each child within their
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the
child's or his or her parents' or legal guardian's race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or
social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.'' Article
24 sets forth the right of the child to access health care; Article 26
sets forth the right of the child to social security; and Article 28
sets forth the right of the child to free primary education and
accessible secondary education and higher education. United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Rights
of the Child, last visited 8 July 16. China signed the CRC on August
29, 1990, and ratified it on March 2, 1992.
\22\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 10(3). Article 10(3)
calls upon States Parties to recognize that ``Special measures of
protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and
young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or
other conditions.'' United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human
Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
last visited 8 July 16. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997,
and ratified it on March 27, 2001.
\23\ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human
Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, last visited 8 July 16.
China signed the CRC on August 29, 1990, and ratified it on March 2,
1992. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last visited 8 July 16. China
signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27,
2001.
\24\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain
Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong
zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding], reprinted in Xinhua, 15 November 13; ``China To Ease One-
Child Policy,'' Xinhua, 15 November 13.
\25\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain
Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong
zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding], reprinted in Xinhua, 15 November 13. See also David
Shambaugh, ``Breaking Down China's Reform Plan,'' National Interest, 2
December 13; Christopher K. Johnson, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, ``China Announces Sweeping Reform Agenda at
Plenum,'' 15 November 13.
\26\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain
Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong
zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding], reprinted in Xinhua, 15 November 13, para. 46; National
Health and Family Planning Commission, ``National Health and Family
Planning Commission Deputy Director Wang Pei'an Answers Reporters'
Questions About Maintaining the Basic National Family Planning Policy
and Launching the Implementation of the Dandu Erhai Two-Child Policy''
[Guojia weisheng jisheng wei fu zhuren wang peian jiu jianchi jihua
shengyu jiben guoce qidong shishi dandu erhai zhengce da jizhe wen], 16
November 13; Marcus Roberts, ``Why Aren't Chinese Couples Keen To Have
More Children? '' MercatorNet, 6 February 15; Elizabeth C. Economy,
``Time for Xi To Reform His Reforms,'' Forbes, 6 February 15.
\27\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Certain
Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reforms [Zhonggong
zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de
jueding], reprinted in Xinhua, 15 November 13, para. 46. See also
``Chinese Communist Party Announces Revision to Population Planning
Policy,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 16 December 13.
\28\ Lu Nuo, ``Relevant NHFPC Officials Interpret Adjustment to the
Family Planning Policy'' [Weisheng jishengwei xiangguan fuzeren jiedu
jihua shengyu tiaozheng zhengce], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central
People's Government, 6 December 13; Liu Yang, ``Two Million Additional
Births Per Year After Implementation of `Dandu Erhai [Policy]' ''
[``Dandu erhai'' shishi hou nian zeng xingsheng er yue 200 wan],
Beijing Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 18 April 14; Huang Wenzheng
and Liang Jianzhang, ``NHFPC, Please Do Not Continue To Mislead Policy
Making'' [Qing weiji wei buyao jixu wudao juece], Caixin, 14 January
15; ``Scholar: Official Figure Incorrect, `Dandu Erhai [Policy]' Will
Have Very Limited Impact on the Number of Births'' [Xuezhe: guanfang
shuju bu zhun ``dandu erhai'' dui chusheng renshu yingxiang shen wei],
Phoenix Net, 11 February 15.
\29\ Wang Ling, ``Two Children for Only-Child Couples Policy
Ineffective, the Number of Births Last Year Did Not Increase but
Decreased'' [Dandu erhai yu leng qunian chusheng renkou bu zeng fan
jiang], China Business Network, 19 January 16; ``Beyond the Ifs and
Buts of Fertility Rate,'' China Daily, reprinted in China News Service,
21 December 15.
\30\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Moved in the Direction of Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16, sec.
15; National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Department of
Community Family Planning Official Answers Questions From Health News
and China Population Daily Journalists Regarding the Number of Births
in 2015'' [Zhidaosi fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da
jiankang bao, zhongguo renkou bao jizhe wen], 20 January 16.
\31\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Department
of Community Family Planning Official Answers Questions From Health
News and China Population Daily Journalists Regarding the Number of
Births in 2015'' [Zhidaosi fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da
jiankang bao, zhongguo renkou bao jizhe wen], 20 January 16; ``Sub-
Anchor: Number of Chinese Newborns Drops in 2015,'' CCTV, 24 January
16.
\32\ Xu Heqian and Zhao Han, ``One-Child Policy Said To Change
Because Earlier Easing Failed,'' Caixin, 30 October 15; Wang Ling,
``Population Report to the Decision-Making Level, Proposes To
Immediately Implement Universal Two-Child Policy'' [Renkou baogao
shangdi juece ceng jianyi liji fangkai quanmian sheng erhai], China
Business Network, 16 October 15; Olivia Lowenberg, ``Why China Is
Shifting to a `Two-Child' Policy,'' Christian Science Monitor, 21
October 15.
\33\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, ``Chinese Communist
Party 18th Party Congress Fifth Plenum Announcement'' [Zhongguo
gongchandang di shiba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi
gongbao], 29 October 15; Peng Xiaofei et al., ``China To Adopt
Universal `Two-Child' Policy'' [Woguo quanmian fangkai ``erhai''
zhengce], Beijing Youth Daily, 30 October 15.
\34\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Implement
the Universal Two-Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population
Development'' [Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng
fazhan], 29 October 15.
\35\ Ibid.
\36\ ``Xi Stresses Adherence to Family Planning Policy,'' Xinhua,
19 May 16; National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``First
National County-Level Family Planning Bureau Directors' Training Class
for Studying and Implementing the Central Government's `Decision' Held
in Chengdu'' [Quanguo xianji weisheng jishengwei zhuren xuexi guanche
zhongyang ``jueding'' peixun ban (di yi qi) zai chengdu juban], 26 May
16; Yang Qingshan, ``NHFPC Responds to the Timeframe of the Family
Planning Policies: To Persist for at Least 20 Years'' [Weijiwei huiying
jihua shengyu guoce shixian: qima haiyao jianchi 20 nian], China Youth
Net, 11 January 16; ``State Council Information Office Holds Press
Conference on Situation Related to Implementation of the Universal Two-
Child Policy and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Services
Management: Text Record'' [Guoxinban jiu shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de youguan qingkuang
juxing fabuhui wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and Family
Planning Commission, 11 January 16; ``Text Record of Director Li Bin
and Others Answering Journalists' Questions Regarding `The
Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren
deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi
shilu], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning Commission, 8
March 16; National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Implement
the Universal Two-Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population
Development'' [Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng
fazhan], 29 October 15.
\37\ National People's Congress, National People's Congress
Standing Committee Decision Regarding the Population and Family
Planning Law [Quanguo renda changweihui guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua
shengyu fa de jueding], 27 December 15; PRC Population and Family
Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa],
passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15, effective 1 January 16.
\38\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16.
\39\ Wang Ling, ``Guangdong Two-Child Policy Rules for Remarried
Couples Still Not Issued, Pregnant Woman Plans To Get an Abortion in
Order To Keep Her Job'' [Guangdong zaihun erhai zhengce xize chi wei
chutai yunfu wei bao gongzuo ni yinchan], China Business Network, 1
August 16.
\40\ China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive
Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang,
Activist; Mairead McArdle, ``Chinese Human Rights Activist on Two-Child
Policy: `Now They Will Kill Any Baby After Two,' '' CNS News, 3
November 15; Bob Unruh, ``Media Hiding Horror of Continued Forced
Abortion,'' WND, 1 January 16; Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch,
``Dispatches: Ending the One-Child Policy Does Not Equal Reproductive
Freedom in China,'' Dispatches (blog), 29 October 15; Sheng Keyi,
``Still No Dignity for Chinese Women,'' New York Times, 10 November 15;
`` `Two Kids' Not `Two Pregnancies,' Those Who Rush To Have Additional
Baby Will Be Fined, Scholar Doubts the Necessity of `13th Five-Year
Plan' '' [``Erhai'' fei ``ertai'' qiang sheng yao fakuan xuezhe zhiyi
``shisanwu'' guihua biyaoxing], Radio Free Asia, 30 October 15;
Masahiro Okoshi, ``Outlook Hazy for Approaching 2-Child Policy,''
Nikkei Asian Review, 22 December 15; Tom Phillips, ``China Ends One-
Child Policy After 35 Years,'' Guardian, 29 October 15.
\41\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16.
\42\ ``Chinese Officials Say, Three Million Additional Births per
Year With the Universal Two-Child Policy'' [Zhongguo guanfang shuo,
kaifang ertai meinian duo sheng sanbaiwan ren], Radio Free Asia, 10
November 15.
\43\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Department
of Community Family Planning Official Answers Questions from Health
News and China Population Daily Journalists Regarding the Number of
Births in 2015'' [Zhidaosi fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da
jiankang bao, zhongguo renkou bao jizhe wen], 20 January 16.
\44\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; ``Family Planning Policy To
Stay for Now,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Shanghai Daily, 9 March 16.
\45\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Department
of Community Family Planning Official Answers Questions from Health
News and China Population Daily Journalists Regarding the Number of
Births in 2015'' [Zhidaosi fuzeren jiu 2015 nian chusheng renkou shu da
jiankang bao, zhongguo renkou bao jizhe wen], 20 January 16; Desiree
Sison, ``Beijing Expects 300,000 Newborns in Year of the Monkey,''
China Topix, 19 February 16; ``China Focus: Hospitals Under Pressure
Amid New Year Baby Boom,'' Xinhua, 3 March 16.
\46\ Wang Ling, ``Two Children for Only-Child Couples Policy
Ineffective, the Number of Births Last Year Did Not Increase but
Decreased'' [Dandu erhai yu leng qunian chusheng renkou bu zeng fan
jiang], China Business Network, 19 January 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow,
``Yi Fuxian, Critic of China's Birth Policy, Returns as an Invited
Guest,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 24 March 16. See also
Stuart Gietel-Basten, ``Two-Child Policy Alone Can't Fix Aging
Problem,'' China Daily, 3 February 16; Li Dandan, ``China To Implement
Universal Two-Child Policy, Experts Suggest Formulating Policy To
Encourage [Having Two Children]'' [Woguo quanmian fangkai erhai
zhuanjia jianyi zhiding guli zhengce], Beijing News, 29 October 15.
\47\ Wang Ling, ``Two Children for Only-Child Couples Policy
Ineffective, the Number of Births Last Year Did Not Increase but
Decreased'' [Dandu erhai yu leng qunian chusheng renkou bu zeng fan
jiang], China Business Network, 19 January 16. See also Li Dandan,
``China To Implement Universal Two Child Policy, Experts Suggest
Formulating Policy To Encourage [Having Two Children]'' [Woguo quanmian
fangkai erhai zhuanjia jianyi zhiding guli zhengce], Beijing News, 29
October 15.
\48\ Dong Le, ``China Officially Announced the End of Over Three-
Decades-Long One-Child Policy'' [Zhongguo zhengshi xuanbu jieshu 30 duo
nian de yitai zhengce], BBC, 29 October 15; ``He Qinglian: What Is the
Relationship Between the Universal Two-Child Policy, Pension Policy and
Labor Supply? '' [He qinglian: quanmian fangkai erhai yu yanglao ji
laodong li gongji youhe guanxi], Voice of America, 2 November 15. See
also Heilongjiang Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Heilongjiang Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Heilongjiang sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 18 October
02, amended 13 December 13, 22 April 14, art. 13; Fujian Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 29 April 88, amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18
November 00, 26 July 02, 14 December 12, 29 March 14, art. 10(3).
\49\ Tang Shuxin, ``Understanding China's `Two-Child Policy,' ''
CCTV, 6 November 15; ``He Qinglian: What Is the Relationship Between
the Universal Two-Child Policy, Pension Policy and Labor Supply? '' [He
qinglian: quanmian fangkai erhai yu yanglao ji laodong li gongji youhe
guanxi], Voice of America, 2 November 15; Amy L. Nathan, ``Why China's
New `Two Child' Policy Means Zero in Its Big Cities,'' Huffington Post,
1 November 15.
\50\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; Amy L. Nathan, ``Why China's
New `Two Child' Policy Means Zero in Its Big Cities,'' Huffington Post,
1 November 15; Tang Shuxin, ``Understanding China's `Two-Child Policy,'
'' CCTV, 6 November 15; ``Lack of Caregivers Biggest Obstacle to Second
Child: Survey,'' Xinhua, 22 March 16.
\51\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; Amy L. Nathan, ``Why China's
New `Two Child' Policy Means Zero in Its Big Cities,'' Huffington Post,
1 November 15; ``Lack of Caregivers Biggest Obstacle to Second Child:
Survey,'' Xinhua, 22 March 16.
\52\ Luo Bin, `` `Two-Child' Policy To Be Released Next Year,''
China Radio International, 22 December 15.
\53\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; Luo Bin, `` `Two-Child' Policy
To Be Released Next Year,'' China Radio International, 22 December 15;
Liu Lili, Central Party School, ``Abolishing China's One-Child Policy
Won't Help,'' East Asia Forum, 20 November 15; Alexis Villarias,
``Having Second Child Worries Many Chinese Women,'' China Topix, 27
February 16.
\54\ Yimian Wu, ``Asia Faces Fertility Crisis,'' U.S. News & World
Report, 11 November 15.
\55\ Deng Qi, ``Expert: `Post-70s Generation' To Benefit the Most
From the Universal Two Child Policy'' [Zhuanjia: quanmian fangkai erhai
``70 hou'' shouyi zui da], Beijing News, 29 October 15; Li Dandan,
``China To Implement Universal Two Child Policy, Experts Suggest
Formulating Policy To Encourage [Having Two Children]'' [Woguo quanmian
fangkai erhai zhuanjia jianyi zhiding guli zhengce], Beijing News, 29
October 15; Wang Ling, ``Two Children for Only-Child Couples Policy
Ineffective, the Number of Births Last Year Did Not Increase but
Decreased'' [Dandu erhai yu leng qunian chusheng renkou bu zeng fan
jiang], China Business Network, 19 January 16; Li Yan et al., ``Two-
Child Policy Won't Bring Desired Baby Boom, Experts Say,'' Caixin, 13
November 15.
\56\ Li Dandan, ``China To Implement Universal Two Child Policy,
Experts Suggest Formulating Policy To Encourage [Having Two Children]''
[Woguo quanmian fangkai erhai zhuanjia jianyi zhiding guli zhengce],
Beijing News, 29 October 15; Luo Ruiyao and Sheng Menglu, ``One-Child
Policy Ended, but Violators Still Need To Pay Fines'' [Dusheng zinu
zhengce meiyou le, dan weifan zhengce de ren reng yao fu fakuan],
Caixin Weekly, reprinted in AsiaNews, 10 March 16; Luo Ruiyao,
``Scholars Collectively Suggest Overhauling the Population and Family
Planning Law, Call for Abolishing Social Compensation Fees'' [Xuezhe
jiti jianyan da xiu jisheng fa yu feichu shehui fuyang fei], Caixin, 7
December 15; Zhou Xin, ``China Must Scrap Remaining Birth Control
Policies To Avert Demographic Crisis, Says Medical Researcher,'' South
China Morning Post, 4 May 16.
\57\ Peng Xiaofei et al., ``China To Adopt Universal `Two-Child'
Policy'' [Woguo quanmian fangkai ``erhai'' zhengce], Beijing Youth
Daily, 30 October 15.
\58\ Dong Le, ``China Officially Announced the End of Over Three-
Decades-Long One-Child Policy'' [Zhongguo zhengshi xuanbu jieshu 30 duo
nian de yitai zhengce], BBC, 29 October 15; Peng Xiaofei et al.,
``China To Adopt Universal `Two-Child' Policy'' [Woguo quanmian fangkai
``erhai'' zhengce], Beijing Youth Daily, 30 October 15.
\59\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council,
Decision Regarding the Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Service Management
[Guanyu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu
fuwu guanli de jueding], issued 31 December 15, sec. 2(5); ``Text
Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering Journalists' Questions
Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy' '' [Li
bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce'' da jizhe wen
wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning
Commission, 8 March 16; National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``Implement the Universal Two-Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population
Development'' [Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng
fazhan], 29 October 15; National People's Congress, ``Answering
Journalists' Questions `Regarding the Decision of Amending the
Population and Family Planning Law' '' [``Guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua
shengyu fa de jueding'' da jizhe wen], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 27 December 15.
\60\ National People's Congress, ``Answering Journalists' Questions
`Regarding the Decision of Amending the Population and Family Planning
Law' '' [``Guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua shengyu fa de jueding'' da
jizhe wen], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning
Commission, 27 December 15; ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others
Answering Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the
Universal Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi
quanmian lianghai zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; National
Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Implement the Universal Two-
Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population Development'' [Shishi
quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng fazhan], 29 October 15;
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, Decision
Regarding the Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy and
Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Service Management [Guanyu
shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu fuwu
guanli de jueding], issued 31 December 15, sec. 3(10).
\61\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Implement
the Universal Two-Child Policy, Promote Balanced Population
Development'' [Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng
fazhan], 29 October 15.
\62\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; National Health and Family
Planning Commission, ``Implement the Universal Two-Child Policy,
Promote Balanced Population Development'' [Shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce, cujin renkou junheng fazhan], 29 October 15.
\63\ ``Text Record of Director Li Bin and Others Answering
Journalists' Questions Regarding `The Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy' '' [Li bin zhuren deng jiu ``shishi quanmian lianghai
zhengce'' da jizhe wen wenzi shilu], reprinted in National Health and
Family Planning Commission, 8 March 16; Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee and State Council, Decision Regarding the Implementation of
the Universal Two-Child Policy and Reform and Improvement of Family
Planning Service Management [Guanyu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce
gaige wanshan jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de jueding], issued 31 December
15, sec. 3(10).
\64\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council,
Decision Regarding the Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Service Management
[Guanyu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu
fuwu guanli de jueding], issued 31 December 15, sec. 3(8); National
Health and Family Planning Commission, ``January 15, 2016, NHFPC's
Regular Press Conference Text Record'' [2016 nian 1 yue 15 ri guojia
weisheng jisheng wei lixing xinwen fabu hui wenzi shilu], 15 January
16. Previous birth registration reform allowed married couples to
register their first child without going through an approval or
application process. CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 145.
\65\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council,
Decision Regarding the Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Service Management
[Guanyu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua shengyu
fuwu guanli de jueding], issued 31 December 15, sec. 3(8).
\66\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 39.
\67\ For some specific examples, see Jiangxi Province People's
Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Province Population and Family
Planning Regulations [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli],
issued 16 June 90, amended 30 June 95, 20 June 97, 29 July 02, 27 March
09, 16 January 14, 20 January 16, art. 15; Shenzhen Municipality
People's Congress Standing Committee, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Shenzhen jingji tequ renkou
yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 30 October 12, amended 24 December 15,
art. 18; Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou
yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08,
30 July 10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 12.
\68\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 146; CECC, 2014 Annual
Report, 9 October 14, 104; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13,
100; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 91; CECC, 2011 Annual
Report, 10 October 11, 111; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10,
118.
\69\ Guichi District Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Tangxi
Township 2015 Work Summary and 2016 Work Plans'' [Tangxi zhen 2015 nian
gongzuo zongjie he 2016 nian gongzuo jihua], last visited 28 March 16.
\70\ Zhima Township People's Government, ``2015 Population and
Family Planning Work Report'' [2015 niandu renkou he jihua shengyu
gongzuo qingkuang tongbao], 17 January 16.
\71\ Beishi Township People's Government, ``2015 Beishi Township
Government Work Report'' [2015 nian beishi zhen zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 22 January 16; Li Shengwen, ``Xu Gui Attends Municipal Health
and Family Planning Work Meeting'' [Xu gui chuxi quanshi weisheng
jisheng gongzuo huiyi], Qinzhou Daily, reprinted in Qinzhou
Municipality People's Government, 14 March 16.
\72\ Wolong District Population and Family Planning Commission,
``Wolong District 2015 Family Planning Work Summary and 2016 Work
Plan'' [Wolong qu renkou jisheng gongzuo 2015 nian zongjie ji 2016 nian
gongzuo guihua], 25 December 15.
\73\ Yunyang District Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``District
Health and Family Planning Bureau Regulates Family Planning Firmly''
[Qu weisheng ju zhengzhi shengyu zhixu bu shouruan], 1 December 15;
Yiling District Women and Children Hospital, ``District Women and
Children Health Family Planning Center's Work Affirmed by the
Assessment Team of the District Health and Family Planning Commission''
[Qu fubao jisheng zhongxin ge xiang gongzuo shou dao qu weiji ju kaohe
zu kending], 7 January 16.
\74\ ``Yongding District Carries Out Inspection for Spring Family
Planning Centralized Service Activity'' [Yongding qu kaizhan chunji
jihua shengyu jizhong fuwu huodong ducha], Zhangjiajie Online, 25
February 16.
\75\ Dongshahe Township People's Government, ``Dongshahe Township:
Solidify the Family Planning Foundation, Improve Service'' [Dongshahe
zhen: hangshi jisheng jichu tisheng fuwu shuiping], 28 January 16.
\76\ ``Gu County Makes Efforts To Create an Advanced County in
National Family Planning Quality Service'' [Gu xian zhuoli chuangjian
guojia jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu xianjin xian], Gu County News, 5 March
16.
\77\ Lei Ming, ``Countywide Family Planning Work Promotion Meeting
Requirements: Fight Well the Family Planning Work Battle and Quickly
Reverse the Passive Situation'' [Quan xian jihua shengyu gongzuo tuijin
hui yaoqiu: dahao jihua shengyu gongzuo gongjian zhan xunsu niuzhuan
beidong jumian], Luotian News, 12 May 16. See also Liu Weiping,
Yongfeng Township People's Government, ``Yongfeng Township
Comprehensively Coordinates Work Regarding Population and Family
Planning and Opinion Polls'' [Yongfeng zhen quanmian bushu renkou yu
jisheng ji mindiao gongzuo], 7 April 16.
\78\ ``Gu County Makes Efforts To Create an Advanced County in
National Family Planning Quality Service'' [Gu xian zhuoli chuangjian
guojia jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu xianjin xian], Gu County News, 5 March
16.
\79\ Dongshahe Township People's Government, ``Dongshahe Township:
Solidify the Family Planning Foundation, Improve Service'' [Dongshahe
zhen: hangshi jisheng jichu tisheng fuwu shuiping], 28 January 16; Li
Shengwen, ``Xu Gui Attends Municipal Health and Family Planning Work
Meeting'' [Xu gui chuxi quanshi weisheng jisheng gongzuo huiyi],
Qinzhou Daily, reprinted in Qinzhou Municipality People's Government,
14 March 16.
\80\ Yunyang District Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``District
Health and Family Planning Bureau Regulates Family Planning Firmly''
[Qu weisheng ju zhengzhi shengyu zhixu bu shouruan], 1 December 15;
Wolong District Population and Family Planning Commission, ``Wolong
District 2015 Family Planning Work Summary and 2016 Work Plan'' [Wolong
qu renkou jisheng gongzuo 2015 nian zongjie ji 2016 nian gongzuo
guihua], 25 December 15; Zhima Township People's Government, ``2015
Population and Family Planning Work Report'' [2015 niandu renkou he
jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang tongbao], 17 January 16; Dongshahe
Township People's Government, ``Dongshahe Township: Solidify the Family
Planning Foundation, Improve Service'' [Dongshahe zhen: hangshi jisheng
jichu tisheng fuwu shuiping], 28 January 16.
\81\ Yunyang District Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``District
Health and Family Planning Bureau Regulates Family Planning Firmly''
[Qu weisheng ju zhengzhi shengyu zhixu bu shouruan], 1 December 15;
``Gu County Makes Efforts To Create an Advanced County in National
Family Planning Quality Service'' [Gu xian zhuoli chuangjian guojia
jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu xianjin xian], Gu County News, 5 March 16.
See also Ma Jianwen, ``Investigation Into the `Three Inspections' of
Rural Family Planning'' [Nongcun jihua shengyu zhong de ``san cha''
qingkuang diaocha], Women's Rights in China, reprinted in Boxun, 15
April 09.
\82\ ``Gu County Makes Efforts To Create an Advanced County in
National Family Planning Quality Service'' [Gu xian zhuoli chuangjian
guojia jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu xianjin xian], Gu County News, 5 March
16; Guichi District Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Tangxi
Township 2015 Work Summary and 2016 Work Plans'' [Tangxi zhen 2015 nian
gongzuo zongjie he 2016 nian gongzuo jihua], last visited 28 March 16;
Yunyang District Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``District Health
and Family Planning Bureau Regulates Family Planning Firmly'' [Qu
weishengju zhengzhi shengyu zhixu bu shouruan], 1 December 15; Wolong
District Population and Family Planning Commission, ``Wolong District
2015 Family Planning Work Summary and 2016 Work Plan'' [Wolong qu
renkou jisheng gongzuo 2015 nian zongjie ji 2016 nian gongzuo guihua],
25 December 15; Zhima Township People's Government, ``2015 Population
and Family Planning Work Report'' [2015 niandu renkou he jihua shengyu
gongzuo qingkuang tongbao], 17 January 16; Dongshahe Township People's
Government, ``Dongshahe Township: Solidify the Family Planning
Foundation, Improve Service'' [Dongshahe zhen: hangshi jisheng jichu
tisheng fuwu shuiping], 28 January 16. See also ``Chinese People Suffer
From Family Planning [Policy's] Forced Sterilizations and Abortions''
[Jihua shengyu qiangzhi jieza renliu hai ku le zhongguo ren], Tencent,
15 June 12.
\83\ Yunyang District Health and Family Planning Bureau, ``District
Health and Family Planning Bureau Regulates Family Planning Firmly''
[Qu weisheng ju zhengzhi shengyu zhixu bu shouruan], 1 December 15;
``Gu County Makes Efforts To Create an Advanced County in National
Family Planning Quality Service'' [Gu xian zhuoli chuangjian guojia
jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu xianjin xian], Gu County News, 5 March 16;
Zhima Township People's Government, ``2015 Population and Family
Planning Work Report'' [2015 niandu renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo
qingkuang tongbao], 17 January 16; Dongshahe Township People's
Government, ``Dongshahe Township: Solidify the Family Planning
Foundation, Improve Service'' [Dongshahe zhen: hangshi jisheng jichu
tisheng fuwu shuiping], 28 January 16. ``Social compensation fees'' are
also known as ``social maintenance fees.''
\84\ Wolong District Population and Family Planning Commission,
``Wolong District 2015 Family Planning Work Summary and 2016 Work
Plan'' [Wolong qu renkou jisheng gongzuo 2015 nian zongjie ji 2016 nian
gongzuo guihua], 25 December 15.
\85\ Ibid.
\86\ Ni Dandan, ``Guangdong Families Told To Have Abortion or Lose
Job,'' Sixth Tone, 22 July 16.
\87\ Ibid.
\88\ Ibid.; Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning
Regulations [Guangdong sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 2
February 80, amended 17 May 86, 28 November 92, 1 December 97, 18
September 98, 21 May 99, 25 July 02, 28 November 08, 27 March 14, 30
December 15, effective 1 January 16, reprinted in Huazhou City Health
and Family Planning Bureau, art. 19. Article 19 of the Guangdong
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations allows a couple to
have an additional child if their child(ren) dies, or if a couple meets
other criteria that conform to laws and regulations.
\89\ Ni Dandan, ``Guangdong Families Told To Have Abortion or Lose
Job,'' Sixth Tone, 22 July 16. For provincial family planning
regulations that allow remarried couples to have an additional child,
see, e.g., Zhejiang Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Zhejiang Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Zhejiang
sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 3 September 02, amended
28 September 07, 13 January 14, 14 January 16, reprinted in Zhejiang
Province Health and Family Planning Commission, art. 18(1-3); Jiangxi
Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Jiangxi Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 16 June 90, amended 30 June 95, 20 June
97, 29 July 02, 27 March 09, 16 January 14, 20 January 16, reprinted in
People's Daily, art. 9(3). See also Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
People's Congress Standing Committee, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Guangxi zhuangzu zizhiqu
renkou he jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 23 March 12, amended 13 January
14, 15 January 16, art. 14(1-5).
\90\ Ni Dandan, ``Guangdong Families Told To Have Abortion or Lose
Job,'' Sixth Tone, 22 July 16.
\91\ Wang Ling, ``Remarried Pregnant Woman Plans To Get an Abortion
in Order To Keep Her Job, Guangdong Health and Family Planning
Commission Issues a New Statement'' [Zaihun yunfu wei bao gongzuo ni
yinchan guangdong sheng weijiwei zuo zuixin biaotai], China Business
Network, 2 August 16; Wang Ling, ``Guangdong Two-Child Policy Rules for
Remarried Couples Still Not Issued, Pregnant Woman Plans To Get an
Abortion in Order To Keep Her Job'' [Guangdong zaihun erhai zhengce
xize chi wei chutai yunfu wei bao gongzuo ni yinchan], China Business
Network, 1 August 16.
\92\ Wang Ling, ``Remarried Pregnant Woman Plans To Get an Abortion
in Order To Keep Her Job, Guangdong Health and Family Planning
Commission Issues a New Statement'' [Zaihun yunfu wei bao gongzuo ni
yinchan guangdong sheng weijiwei zuo zuixin biaotai], China Business
Network, 2 August 16; Zheng Caixiong, ``Couples Not Waiting for 2nd-
Child Rule,'' China Daily, 3 August 16.
\93\ China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive
Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang,
Activist. See also June Cheng, ``Pro-Life Activist Faces Pressure To
Abort,'' World News Group, 26 October 15.
\94\ June Cheng, ``Pro-Life Activist Faces Pressure To Abort,''
World News Group, 26 October 15.
\95\ China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive
Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang,
Activist.
\96\ Ibid.
\97\ PRC Measures for Administration of Collection of Social
Maintenance Fees [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli banfa], issued 2
August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7. See also PRC
Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu
jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended 27 December 15,
effective 1 January 16, arts. 18, 41.
\98\ See, e.g., Fujian Province People's Congress Standing
Committee, Fujian Province Population and Family Planning Regulations
[Fujian sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 29 April 88,
amended 28 June 91, 25 October 97, 18 November 00, 26 July 02, 14
December 12, 29 March 14, 19 February 16, art. 42. In Fujian province,
individuals in violation of local population planning regulations can
each be fined up to six times the amount of the average income of a
resident in their locality, sometimes more, based on the number of
children born in violation of local regulations and their income
compared to the local average disposable income of the previous year.
See also Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou
yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08,
30 July 10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 37; ``Who Do the Social
Compensation Fees Actually `Support'? '' [Shehui fuyang fei jiujing
``yang'' le shei?], People's Daily, 22 September 13; Chuan Jiang,
``National Health and Family Planning Commission: Social Compensation
Fee Arrears To Be Dealt With by Local Governments'' [Zhongguo weijiwei:
shehui fuyangfei qiankuan you difang zhengfu chuli], BBC, 11 January
16.
\99\ ``Forced Abortions Alive and Well in China,'' Malta Today, 5
May 16; Shen Lu and Katie Hunt, ``China's One-Child Policy Goes but
Heartache Remains,'' CNN, 31 December 15. For provincial regulations
that mandate the collection of social compensation fees, see, e.g.,
Fujian Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Fujian Province
Population and Family Planning Regulations [Fujian sheng renkou yu
jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 29 April 88, amended 28 June 91, 25
October 97, 18 November 00, 26 July 02, 14 December 12, 29 March 14, 19
February 16, art. 42. In Fujian province, individuals in violation of
local population planning regulations can be fined up to six times the
amount of the average income of a resident in their locality, sometimes
more, based on the number of children born in violation of local
regulations and their income compared to the local average income of
the previous year. Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Hubei Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29
November 08, 30 July 10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 37.
\100\ Zhou Xiaoyang, ``Feature Story: China's Illegal Residents''
[Texie zhongguo heihu], Jiemian, 27 January 16.
\101\ Ibid.; Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee,
Hubei Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29
November 08, 30 July 10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 37.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Zhou Xiaoyang, ``Feature Story: China's Illegal Residents''
[Texie zhongguo heihu], Jiemian, 27 January 16.
\104\ Ibid.
\105\ Ibid.
\106\ Zhou Xiaoyang, `` `First Case of Non-Single-Child [Parent
Having Out-of-Plan Birth] Being Fined Social Compensation Fees' Tried
in Court Today, Court To Issue Verdict at a Later Date'' [``Fei du
qiang sheng shehui fuyang fei di yi an'' jinri kaiting fayuan jiang
zeri xuanpan], Jiemian, 28 April 16.
\107\ Fu Yao, ``What Now for China's 13 Million `Illegal
Residents?' '' [Zhongguo 1300 wan ``heihu'' de zuihou hequ hecong?],
China Newsweek, reprinted in Chuansong, New Fortune, 10 July 16.
\108\ Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are Regulations on
the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not Issued? ''
[Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli weihe
nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16; Luo Ruiyao,
``Scholars Collectively Suggest Overhauling the Population and Family
Planning Law, Call for Abolishing Social Compensation Fees'' [Xuezhe
jiti jianyan da xiu jisheng fa yu feichu shehui fuyang fei], Caixin, 7
December 15; Luo Ruiyao and Sheng Menglu, ``One-Child Policy Ended, but
Violators Still Need To Pay Fines'' [Dusheng zinu zhengce meiyou le,
dan weifan zhengce de ren reng yao fu fakuan], Caixin, reprinted in
AsiaNews, 26 February 16.
\109\ Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are Regulations on
the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not Issued? ''
[Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli weihe
nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16; Wang Ling, ``China
Remains at Long-Term Low Fertility Level, Last Year Only 800,000 Third
Children Born in Excess of Birth Quotas'' [Zhongguo yi changqi chuyu di
shengyu lu shuiping qunian sanhai yishang chaosheng renkou jin 80 wan],
China Business Network, reprinted in Caijing, 1 February 16; ``Does the
Collection of Social Compensation Fees Still Need `Regulations?' ''
[Zhengshou shehui fuyang fei hai xuyao ``tiaoli'' ma], Beijing Youth
Daily, 28 February 16.
\110\ Wang Ling, ``China Remains at Long-Term Low Fertility Level,
Last Year Only 800,000 Third Children Born in Excess of Birth Quotas''
[Zhongguo yi changqi chuyu di shengyu lu shuiping qunian sanhai yishang
chaosheng renkou jin 80 wan], China Business Network, reprinted in
Caijing, 1 February 16; Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are
Regulations on the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not
Issued? '' [Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli
weihe nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16.
\111\ Wang Ling, ``China Remains at Long-Term Low Fertility Level,
Last Year Only 800,000 Third Children Born in Excess of Birth Quotas''
[Zhongguo yi changqi chuyu di shengyu lu shuiping qunian sanhai yishang
chaosheng renkou jin 80 wan], China Business Network, reprinted in
Caijing, 1 February 16.
\112\ Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are Regulations on
the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not Issued? ''
[Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli weihe
nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16; Luo Ruiyao and Sheng
Menglu, ``One-Child Policy Ended, but Violators Still Need To Pay
Fines'' [Dusheng zinu zhengce meiyou le, dan weifan zhengce de ren reng
yao fu fakuan], Caixin, reprinted in AsiaNews, 26 February 16; ``State
Council Information Office Holds Press Conference on Situation Related
to Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy and Reform and
Improvement of Family Planning Services Management: Text Record''
[Guoxinban jiu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan jihua
shengyu fuwu guanli de youguan qingkuang juxing fabuhui wenzi shilu],
reprinted in National Health and Family Planning Commission, 11 January
16.
\113\ ``State Council Information Office Holds Press Conference on
Situation Related to Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Services Management: Text
Record'' [Guoxinban jiu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan
jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de youguan qingkuang juxing fabuhui wenzi
shilu], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning Commission, 11
January 16.
\114\ Luo Ruiyao and Sheng Menglu, ``One-Child Policy Ended, but
Violators Still Need To Pay Fines'' [Dusheng zinu zhengce meiyou le,
dan weifan zhengce de ren reng yao fu fakuan], Caixin, reprinted in
AsiaNews, 26 February 16; Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are
Regulations on the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not
Issued? '' [Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli
weihe nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16.
\115\ ``State Council Information Office Holds Press Conference on
Situation Related to Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Services Management: Text
Record'' [Guoxinban jiu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan
jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de youguan qingkuang juxing fabuhui wenzi
shilu], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning Commission, 11
January 16; Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are Regulations on
the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not Issued? ''
[Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli weihe
nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16.
\116\ Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are Regulations on
the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not Issued? ''
[Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli weihe
nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16.
\117\ ``Women Pregnant With Second Children Defer Delivery Date To
Break `Policy Gate' '' [Erhai yunfu tuo yuchanqi chuang ``zhengce
guan''], Beijing Times, 3 January 16; Lee Min Kok, ``Pregnant Woman
Lies Motionless for 5 Days To Avoid Giving Birth Before China's Two-
Child Policy Took Effect,'' Straits Times, 7 January 16; ``Pregnant
Woman Delays Birth To Avoid 500,000 Yuan Fine,'' China Internet
Information Center, 6 January 16.
\118\ Wang Ling, ``Reporter Observations: Why Are Regulations on
the Management of Social Compensation Fee Collection Not Issued? ''
[Jizhe guancha: shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli weihe
nanchan?], China Business Network, 17 February 16.
\119\ ``Regulations on the Collection and Management of Social
Compensation Fees, Soliciting Comments and Proposing Unified Collection
Standards'' [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli tiaoli zhengqiu yijian
ni tongyi zhengshou biaozhun], People's Daily, 20 November 14, art. 6;
Zhang Ran, ``Fines for Second Child Not To Exceed Three Times the Per
Capita Income of One's Hukou Locale'' [Chaosheng ertai fakuan bu gao yu
huji di sanbei renjun shouru], Beijing Times, 21 November 14; Wen Ru,
``Social Compensation Fees Expected To Lower in Beijing'' [Beijing
shehui fuyang fei you wang jiangdi], Beijing News, 22 November 14.
\120\ Tang Lihan et al., ``Obtaining Hukou for Children Born in
Excess of Birth Quotas: 9 Provinces and Municipalities Require Social
Compensation Fee Certificate'' [Chaosheng luohu 9 sheng shi xuyao
shehui fuyang fei zhengming], Legal Evening News, 24 November 15; Zhou
Xiaoyang, ``Feature Story: China's Illegal Residents'' [Texie zhongguo
heihu], Jiemian, 27 January 16; Chen Wei, ``Careless, Fearless,'' News
China, February 2016.
\121\ Tang Lihan et al., ``Obtaining Hukou for Children Born in
Excess of Birth Quotas: 9 Provinces and Municipalities Require Social
Compensation Fee Certificate'' [Chaosheng luohu 9 sheng shi xuyao
shehui fuyang fei zhengming], Legal Evening News, 24 November 15; Wang
Mengyao, ``Hukou Application Planned To Be Opened to `Illegal
Residents' '' [Hukou banli ni xiang ``heihu'' kaifang], Beijing News, 3
December 15; Zhou Xiaoyang, ``Feature Story: China's Illegal
Residents'' [Texie zhongguo heihu], Jiemian, 27 January 16.
\122\ Liu Jingyao, ``Resolving `Illegal Resident' Problem Manifests
People-Oriented Concept'' [Jiejue ``heihu'' wenti zhangxian yi ren wei
ben linian], Xinhua, 15 January 16; Chen Wei, ``Careless, Fearless,''
News China, February 2016; Zhou Xiaoyang, ``Feature Story: China's
Illegal Residents'' [Texie zhongguo heihu], Jiemian, 27 January 16;
Stephanie Gordon, ``China's Hidden Children,'' The Diplomat, 12 March
15.
\123\ Tang Lihan et al., ``Obtaining Hukou for Children Born in
Excess of Birth Quotas: 9 Provinces and Municipalities Require Social
Compensation Fee Certificate'' [Chaosheng luohu 9 sheng shi xuyao
shehui fuyang fei zhengming], Legal Evening News, 24 November 15; Wang
Ling, ``Barriers to Resolving the Problem of Illegal Residents: Some
Areas Require Social Compensation Fee Back Payments Before Obtaining
Hukou'' [Jiejue heihu wenti yu zu: bufen diqu yaoqiu bu jiao shehui
fuyang fei cai neng luohu], China Business Network, 10 March 16.
\124\ Wang Ling, ``Barriers to Resolving the Problem of Illegal
Residents: Some Areas Require Social Compensation Fee Back Payments
Before Obtaining Hukou'' [Jiejue heihu wenti yu zu: bufen diqu yaoqiu
bu jiao shehui fuyang fei cai neng luohu], China Business Network, 10
March 16.
\125\ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, arts. 2, 7-8, 24, 26, 28; United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, last visited 8 July 16. China signed the CRC on August 29, 1990,
and ratified it on March 2, 1992. See also UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth
Periodic Reports of China, Adopted by the Committee at its Sixty-Fourth
Session (16 September-4 October 2013), CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4, 29 October 13,
paras. 39, 40(a-b). In September 2013, the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child conducted a periodic review of China's compliance with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. In its Concluding Observations,
the Committee stated its concern about low rates of birth registration
in China--in part due to China's family planning policies--and
recommended that China ``reform family planning policies in order to
remove all forms of penalties and practices that deter parents or
guardians from registering the birth of their children'' and ``abandon
the hukou system in order to ensure birth registration for all children
. . ..''
\126\ Jiao Ying, ``Family Planning Policies To Be Delinked From
Hukou Registration, To Comprehensively Resolve the Issue of `Illegal
Resident' '' [Jihua shengyu deng zhengce jiang yu hukou dengji tuogou
quanmian jiejue ``heihu'' wenti], China National Radio, 10 December 15.
\127\ State Council General Office, Opinion on Resolving Issues of
Hukou Registration for Individuals Without Hukou [Guanyu jiejue wu
hukou renyuan dengji hukou wenti de yijian], issued 31 December 15.
\128\ Ibid., sec. 1(2-3); Liu Jingyao, ``Resolving `Illegal
Resident' Problem Manifests People-Oriented Concept'' [Jiejue ``heihu''
wenti zhangxian yi ren wei ben linian], Xinhua, 15 January 16.
\129\ State Council General Office, Opinion on Resolving Issues of
Hukou Registration for Individuals Without Hukou [Guanyu jiejue wu
hukou renyuan dengji hukou wenti de yijian], issued 31 December 15,
sec. 2.
\130\ Ibid., sec. 2.
\131\ ``State Council Information Office Holds Press Conference on
Situation Related to Implementation of the Universal Two-Child Policy
and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Services Management: Text
Record'' [Guoxinban jiu shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce gaige wanshan
jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de youguan qingkuang juxing fabuhui wenzi
shilu], reprinted in National Health and Family Planning Commission, 11
January 16.
\132\ Tang Lihan et al., ``Obtaining Hukou for Children Born in
Excess of Birth Quotas: 9 Provinces and Municipalities Require Social
Compensation Fee Certificate'' [Chaosheng luohu 9 sheng shi xuyao
shehui fuyang fei zhengming], Legal Evening News, 24 November 15.
\133\ ``Delinking Hukou and Family Planning Policies, Still Need To
Pay Fee for Having Excess Children'' [Luohu yu jisheng yi tuogou
chaosheng reng yao jiaofei], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 January
16; Kiki Zhao, ``Chinese Who Violated One-Child Policy Remain Wary of
Relaxed Rules,'' New York Times, 8 February 16.
\134\ ``Delinking Hukou and Family Planning Policies, Still Need To
Pay Fee for Having Excess Children'' [Luohu yu jisheng yi tuogou
chaosheng reng yao jiaofei], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 15 January
16.
\135\ Wang Mengyao, ``Hukou Application Planned To Be Opened to
`Illegal Residents' '' [Hukou banli ni xiang ``heihu'' kaifang],
Beijing News, 3 December 15; Wang Ling, ``Barriers to Resolving the
Problem of Illegal Residents: Some Areas Require Social Compensation
Fee Back Payments Before Obtaining Hukou'' [Jiejue heihu wenti yu zu:
bufen diqu yaoqiu bu jiao shehui fuyang fei cai neng luohu], China
Business Network, 10 March 16.
\136\ Wang Ling, ``Barriers to Resolving the Problem of Illegal
Residents: Some Areas Require Social Compensation Fee Back Payments
Before Obtaining Hukou'' [Jiejue heihu wenti yu zu: bufen diqu yaoqiu
bu jiao shehui fuyang fei cai neng luohu], China Business Network, 10
March 16.
\137\ ``Commentary: China Registers Individuals Without Hukou,
Showing a People-Oriented Concept'' [Shuping: zhongguo wei wu hukou
renyuan yifa luohu zhangxian yiren weiben linian], Xinhua, 14 January
16; Chuan Jiang, ``China Allows 8 Types of `Illegal Residents' To
Register for Hukou Without Conditions, Delinking [Hukou] From Family
Planning Policies'' [Zhongguo yunxu 8 lei ``heihu'' wu tiaojian shang
hu yu jisheng tuogou], BBC, 14 January 16.
\138\ Kiki Zhao, ``Chinese Who Violated One-Child Policy Remain
Wary of Relaxed Rules,'' New York Times, 8 February 16; China's New
``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of Massive Crimes Against Women
and Children, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, 3 December 15, Testimony of Sarah Huang, Activist.
\139\ China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the Continuation of
Massive Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15, Testimony
of Sarah Huang, Activist.
\140\ Ibid. See also Wang Lu and Long Feihu, ``Take Multiple
Measures To Attack `Two Unnecessary Procedures' '' [Duocuo bingju daji
``liang fei''], Jingzhou Daily, reprinted in Hanfeng Net, 1 April 16.
\141\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, arts. 4, 39. Article 4 of the
PRC Population and Family Planning Law states that officials ``shall
perform their family planning work duties strictly in accordance with
the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not
infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.''
Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal or
administrative punishment if he ``infringe[s] on a citizen's personal
rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and interests'' or
``abuse[s] his power, neglect[s] his duty, or engage[s] in malpractice
for personal gain'' in the implementation of population planning
policies.
\142\ UN Committee against Torture, List of Issues in Relation to
the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its
54th session (20 April-15 May 2015), CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.1, 15 June 15,
para. 26.
\143\ UN Committee against Torture, China's Responses to the
Committee against Torture's List of Issues [Zhongguo guanyu jinzhi
kuxing weiyuanhui wenti dan de dafu cailiao], CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.2, 1
October 15, para. 26.
\144\ Martin King Whyte, ``The True History of China's Disastrous
One-Child Policy,'' Foreign Affairs, 5 November 15; ``Another One on
the Way,'' China Daily, reprinted in The Star, 3 May 15.
\145\ Ibid.; Chen Wei, ``China Commentaries: Universal Two-Child
Policy Facing Challenges'' [Dianping zhongguo: quanmian lianghai
shengyu zhengce mianlin de tiaozhan], BBC, 8 February 16.
\146\ Zhu Changjun, ``Raising Fertility Rate Is Never an Easy
Task'' [Tisheng shengyu lu conglai bu shi jiandan shi], China Youth
Daily, 21 January 16; Karen Zraick, ``China Will Feel One-Child
Policy's Effects for Decades, Experts Say,'' New York Times, 30 October
15.
\147\ Brook Larmer, ``The Long Shadow of China's One-Child
Policy,'' New York Times, 6 November 15; ``To Adopt Universal Two-Child
Policy, Fines Must Be Imposed for Violation of Birth Quota'' [Quanmian
fangkai erhai shengyu chaosheng fakuan bu neng mian dan], Radio Free
Asia, 15 January 16.
\148\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Moved in the Direction of Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16; Laurie
Burkitt, ``China's Working-Age Population Sees Biggest-Ever Decline,''
Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22 January 16.
\149\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``China's Economy
Realized a New Normal of Stable Growth in 2014,'' 20 January 15; Laurie
Burkitt, ``China's Working-Age Population Sees Biggest-Ever Decline,''
Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22 January 16.
\150\ ``China Facing Labor Shortage Due to One-Child Policy,''
Xinhua, reprinted in Shanghai Daily, 21 October 15; ``China's
Demographic Crisis Already Apparent, Problems in Labor Shortage,
Finding Wives, and Elderly Retirement May Explode in 5 Years''
[Zhongguo renkou weiji yi xian zhaogong quqi yanglao nanti huo 5 nian
hou baofa], China Business Network, reprinted in Boxun, 20 October 15;
Luo Juan, ``What Is the Impact of Delaying Retirement? '' [Yanchi
tuixiu yingxiang ji he?], Workers' Daily, reprinted in Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security, 26 July 16; ``China's Working Age
Population To Fall 23 Percent by 2050,'' Xinhua, 22 July 16.
\151\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Moved in the Direction of Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16;
National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``China's Economy Realized a
New Normal of Stable Growth in 2014,'' 20 January 15.
\152\ ``As First Domestic Blue Book on Aging Suggests, the [Need]
for Developing Suitable Living Environment for the Elderly Is
Imminent'' [Guonei shou bu laoling lanpi shu tichu, laonian yiju
huanjing jianshe pozai meijie], Xinhua, 24 February 16.
\153\ ``Development Report on Suitable Living Environment for
Chinese Elderly Issued'' [Zhongguo laonian yiju huanjing fazhan baogao
fabu], People's Daily, 25 February 16.
\154\ Will Martin, ``China's Rapidly Ageing Population Is an
Economic Ticking Timebomb,'' Business Insider, 4 May 16; ``China's
Demographic Crisis Already Apparent, Problems in Labor Shortage,
Finding Wives, and Elderly Retirement May Explode in 5 Years''
[Zhongguo renkou weiji yi xian zhaogong quqi yanglao nanti huo 5 nian
hou baofa], China Business Network, reprinted in Boxun, 20 October 15.
\155\ Zhou Xin, ``China Must Scrap Remaining Birth Control Policies
To Avert Demographic Crisis, Says Medical Researcher,'' South China
Morning Post, 4 May 16. See also ``China's Demographic Crisis Already
Apparent, Problems in Labor Shortage, Finding Wives, and Elderly
Retirement May Explode in 5 Years'' [Zhongguo renkou weiji yi xian
zhaogong quqi yanglao nanti huo 5 nian hou baofa], China Business
Network, reprinted in Boxun, 20 October 15; Laurie Burkitt, ``China's
Working-Age Population Sees Biggest-Ever Decline,'' Wall Street
Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22 January 16.
\156\ National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``Interpretation of the `Circular on Strengthening the Fight,
Prevention, and Control of Fetal Gender Identification by Blood Test'
'' [``Guanyu jiaqiang daji fangkong caixue jianding tai'er xingbie
xingwei de tongzhi'' wenjian jiedu], 21 January 15; Sun Xiaobo, ``Price
of Women Driven Up by Gender Imbalance,'' Global Times, 27 February 16;
``Why 30 Million Chinese Men Could End Up as Perpetual Bachelors,''
CCTV, 26 January 16.
\157\ For national regulations prohibiting the practices of non-
medically necessary gender determination testing and sex-selective
abortion, see PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], passed 29 December 01, amended
27 December 15, effective 1 January 16, art. 35; National Health and
Family Planning Commission et al., Regulations on Prohibiting Non-
Medically Necessary Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion
[Jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de taier xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie
rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], passed 28 March 16, issued 12
April 16, effective 1 May 16. For provincial regulations that ban non-
medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abortion, see,
e.g., Hubei Province People's Congress Standing Committee, Hubei
Province Population and Family Planning Regulations [Hubei sheng renkou
yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 1 December 02, amended 29 November 08,
30 July 10, 27 March 14, 13 January 16, art. 31; Sichuan Province
People's Congress Standing Committee, Sichuan Province Population and
Family Planning Regulations [Sichuan sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu
tiaoli], issued 2 July 87, amended 15 December 93, 17 October 97, 26
September 02, 24 September 04, 20 March 14, 22 January 16, art. 23.
\158\ See, e.g., China's New ``Two-Child Policy'' & the
Continuation of Massive Crimes Against Women and Children, Hearing of
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 December 15,
Testimony of Sarah Huang, Activist; Frank Fang, ``Chinese Woman,
Pregnant With a Girl, Dies After 9th Abortion Because Her Mother-in-Law
Wants a Grandson,'' Epoch Times, 1 March 16; Wang Lu and Long Feihu,
``Take Multiple Measures To Attack `Two Unnecessary Procedures' ''
[Duocuo bingju daji ``liang fei''], Jingzhou Daily, reprinted in
Hanfeng Net, 1 April 16.
\159\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Moved in the Direction of Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16; United
Nations Population Fund, Population and Development in Viet Nam, last
visited 11 May 16; United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, The
World's Women 2015 Trends and Statistics, last visited 11 May 16;
``Gender Imbalance in China Causing Many Men `Difficulty in Finding
Wives' '' [Zhongguo dalu nan nu bili shiheng ling daliang nanxing
``hunpei nan''], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 16.
\160\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``National Economy
Moved in the Direction of Steady Progress in 2015'' [2015 nian guomin
jingji yunxing wenzhong youjin, wenzhong youhao], 19 January 16;
``Gender Imbalance in China Causing Many Men `Difficulty in Finding
Wives' '' [Zhongguo dalu nan nu bili shiheng ling daliang nanxing
``hunpei nan''], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 16.
\161\ ``China's Demographic Crisis Already Apparent, Problems in
Labor Shortage, Finding Wives, and Elderly Retirement May Explode in 5
Years'' [Zhongguo renkou weiji yi xian zhaogong quqi yanglao nanti huo
5 nian hou baofa], China Business Network, reprinted in Boxun, 20
October 15; Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, 30 April 14.
\162\ Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks
of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, 30 April 14.
\163\ ``China's Demographic Crisis Already Apparent, Problems in
Labor Shortage, Finding Wives, and Elderly Retirement May Explode in 5
Years'' [Zhongguo renkou weiji yi xian zhaogong quqi yanglao nanti huo
5 nian hou baofa], China Business Network, reprinted in Boxun, 20
October 15; ``Gender Imbalance in China Causing Many Men `Difficulty in
Finding Wives' '' [Zhongguo dalu nan nu bili shiheng ling daliang
nanxing ``hunpei nan''], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 16.
\164\ ``Study: China To Enter `Era of Bachelors' in Five Years,''
CCTV, 30 September 15; Ryan Kilpatrick, ``China Begins Countdown to
`Bachelor Crisis' as Over 33 Million Extra Men Come of Age,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 2 October 15; Andrea den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The
Security Risks of China's Abnormal Demographics,'' Washington Post, 30
April 14.
\165\ ``Study: China To Enter `Era of Bachelors' in Five Years,''
CCTV, 30 September 15; Ryan Kilpatrick, ``China Begins Countdown to
`Bachelor Crisis' as Over 33 Million Extra Men Come of Age,'' Hong Kong
Free Press, 2 October 15; ``China's Demographic Crisis Already
Apparent, Problems in Labor Shortage, Finding Wives, and Elderly
Retirement May Explode in 5 Years'' [Zhongguo renkou weiji yi xian
zhaogong quqi yanglao nanti huo 5 nian hou baofa], China Business
Network, reprinted in Boxun, 20 October 15; Wang Ling, ``China's
Bachelor Crisis May Explode in 2020: Over 10 Million Bare Branch Men''
[Zhongguo guanggun weiji 2020 nian huo quanmian baofa: guanggun nanxing
shang qian wan], China Business Network, 29 September 15; Andrea den
Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, ``The Security Risks of China's Abnormal
Demographics,'' Washington Post, 30 April 14.
\166\ Alice Cuddy and Neil Loughlin, ``Weddings From Hell: The
Cambodian Brides Trafficked to China,'' Guardian, 1 February 16; Saing
Soenthrith and Aria Danaparamita, ``Trilateral Agreement Signed To
Combat Human Trafficking,'' Cambodia Daily, 18 January 16.
\167\ Akkyaw, ``Trafficking Hits 10-Year Peak,'' Eleven, 7 January
16.
\168\ Gopal Sharma, ``Rise in Nepali Women Trafficked to China,
South Korea--Rights Commission,'' Reuters, 27 April 16.
\169\ Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea: Events of 2015,'' 27
January 16; Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon Park, European Alliance for Human
Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible Children: The Stateless Children of
North Korean Refugees,'' 6 December 15; Elizabeth Shim, ``More North
Korean Women Risking Arrest, Abuse To Sneak Into China for Work,''
United Press International, 19 November 15.
\170\ Saing Soenthrith and Aria Danaparamita, ``Trilateral
Agreement Signed To Combat Human Trafficking,'' Cambodia Daily, 18
January 16; Soc Trang, ``Three Vietnamese Jailed for Trafficking Women
to China,'' Thanh Nien News, 26 January 16.
\171\ Xie Wenting, ``2-Child Policy To Ease Kid Snatching,'' Global
Times, 4 November 15; Lucy Hornby, ``FT Seasonal Appeal: China's
Missing Children,'' Financial Times, 2 December 15; ``More Than 40
Percent of Trafficked Children Sold by Biological Parents'' [Chao
sicheng bei guaimai ertong xi bei qinsheng fumu suo mai], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, 13 October 15.
\172\ Xing Shiwei, ``The Main Criminal Who Trafficked 22 Children
in Henan Executed'' [Henan guaimai 22 ming ertong zhufan bei zhixing
sixing], Beijing News, 30 January 16; Wang Bing and Zhao Lei, ``Updates
on Tang Yongzhi's Execution for Child Trafficking: Unable To Locate the
Parents of 27 Trafficked Victims'' [Tang yongzhi guaimai ertong huo
sixing houxu: 27 ming bei guai zhe fumu wei zhaodao], CCTV, reprinted
in China News Service, 1 February 16.
\173\ Xing Shiwei, ``The Main Criminal Who Trafficked 22 Children
in Henan Executed'' [Henan guaimai 22 ming ertong zhufan bei zhixing
sixing], Beijing News, 30 January 16.
\174\ Xie Wenting, ``2-Child Policy To Ease Kid Snatching,'' Global
Times, 4 November 15.
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Freedom of Residence
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the Chinese
government continued to unduly restrict the freedom of
residence through use of the household registration (hukou)
system established in 1958.\1\ The hukou system classifies
Chinese citizens as rural or urban, conferring legal rights and
access to public services based on their classification.\2\
Implementation of these regulations discriminates against rural
hukou holders and migrants to urban areas by denying them
equitable access to public benefits and services enjoyed by
registered urban residents.\3\ The hukou system contravenes
international human rights standards guaranteeing freedom of
residence and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
``national or social origin, . . . birth or other status.'' \4\
This past year, the Chinese central government and local
authorities continued to implement reforms to the hukou system.
In 2015, an estimated 292 million people lived outside of the
locality where their hukou was registered.\5\ The central
government reiterated its intent for 100 million people to
obtain urban hukou by 2020,\6\ and provincial and local
governments continued to issue implementing opinions on hukou
system reform \7\ in line with the State Council's July 2014
reform opinion.\8\ As of August 2016, at least 29 province-
level jurisdictions had issued proposals regarding local hukou
reform planning.\9\ These reform efforts did not generally
remove the link between residence and provision of public
benefits; under many province-level reform opinions, access to
benefits remains tied to holding a local residence permit or
hukou.\10\
As part of the Chinese government's hukou reforms, the
State Council General Office issued an opinion in December 2015
on providing hukou to individuals (known as ``illegal
residents'' or heihu) lacking one altogether.\11\ The opinion
lists eight categories of individuals who can apply for hukou
under the new policy.\12\ In January 2016, the Chinese
government and state media reported that the new policy ``had
largely already addressed'' hukou registration problems for 13
million people,\13\ approximately 60 percent of whom are
reported to be people born in violation of local population
planning policies.\14\ [For more information on the hukou
system and population planning policy, see ``Hukou Reform
Addressing the Issue of `Illegal Residents''' in Section II--
Population Control.]
While central government plans relaxed the conditions
required for migrants to apply for hukou in small- and medium-
sized cities,\15\ the criteria for applying for hukou in large
cities remained restrictive.\16\ For example, in August 2016,
the Beijing municipal government issued provisional measures
governing a points system by which migrants can apply for and
obtain Beijing hukou.\17\ Under the provisional measures,
applicants receive points toward qualifying for hukou according
to several factors, including length of residence in
Beijing,\18\ education level,\19\ employment history,\20\ and
desired residential location.\21\ The provisional measures also
limit applicants' eligibility based on age,\22\ contributions
to social insurance,\23\ compliance with population planning
policy,\24\ and criminal record.\25\ The provisional measures
additionally require applicants to already hold Beijing
residence permits.\26\ The provisional measures do not specify
a minimum point value needed to obtain Beijing hukou, but allow
local officials to determine the value each year ``according to
the population control situation.'' \27\ One expert criticized
the provisional measures for discriminating against applicants
with less education or working in low-skill fields.\28\ Other
experts had expressed pessimism about a draft of the measures
issued in December 2015,\29\ saying the points system benefited
a small, relatively affluent population, leaving out poorer
migrant workers who do not share the same qualifications.\30\
After issuing draft measures on residence permits in
December 2014,\31\ in November 2015, the State Council issued
provisional regulations on residence permits.\32\ The
provisional regulations, effective from January 1, 2016, aim to
``fully cover basic public services and benefits for the urban
resident population,'' including compulsory education, health
services, and legal aid, among others.\33\ The provisional
regulations maintain the 2014 draft measures' criteria \34\ for
how restrictive cities' conditions for applicants may be,
allowing larger cities to establish more stringent conditions
for those applying for residence permits.\35\
Two articles from the 2014 draft measures were not
included, however, in the provisional regulations.\36\ The
articles would have extended to residence permit holders
benefits and services including educational assistance, elder
care services, housing protections, and the right of children
of permit holders to take college-entrance exams locally,\37\
and would have allowed permit holders' relatives to apply for
local hukou if the permit holder met hukou application
requirements.\38\
International Travel
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and committed
to ratify, provides that ``[e]veryone shall be free to leave
any country . . ..'' \39\ Under Article 12, countries may
restrict this right, but only ``to protect national security,
public order,'' and other select public interests.\40\ Chinese
laws provide officials the authority to prevent from leaving
the country those deemed threatening to state security or whose
``exit from China is not allowed.'' \41\ Chinese officials used
this authority to arbitrarily keep government critics, rights
defenders, advocates, and others from leaving China.\42\
The Commission observed the following representative cases
during the 2016 reporting year:
As part of a nationwide crackdown on human
rights lawyers and rights advocates beginning in and
around July 2015,\43\ from July 2015 through January
2016, Chinese authorities prevented at least 24 rights
lawyers from leaving the country because, according to
authorities, their departure from China ``could
endanger state security.'' \44\ Authorities also
prevented family members of some lawyers from leaving
China.\45\ Rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan reported that
public security bureau officials in Nanchang
municipality, Jiangxi province, refused his son a
passport to study abroad.\46\
In April 2016, Chen Guiqiu, wife of detained
lawyer Xie Yang,\47\ attempted to sue several
government agencies after authorities in Shenzhen
municipality, Guangdong province, kept her from
traveling to Hong Kong.\48\ The Shenzhen Intermediate
People's Court \49\ and Guangdong High People's Court
refused to accept her lawsuit.\50\ The Shenzhen court
did not provide a reason,\51\ but two Guangdong court
judges said they did not have jurisdiction over border
control decisions because the decisions were part of a
criminal investigation.\52\
Chinese authorities continued \53\ to restrict
lawyers, rights advocates, and civil society
representatives from leaving the country to participate
in international human rights events. Officials
prevented at least seven rights defenders from
attending the November 2015 review of China's
compliance with the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Convention against Torture) in Geneva.\54\
[For more information on ongoing repression of lawyers,
see Section III--Access to Justice.]
In February 2016, state news agency Xinhua
reportedly prohibited a former employee, journalist
Yang Jisheng, from traveling to the United States to
receive a journalism award.\55\ Yang was to attend an
award ceremony recognizing his work documenting China's
mass famine from 1958 to 1962.\56\ His account of the
famine, ``Tombstone,'' is banned in mainland China.\57\
Chinese authorities refused to allow disabled
former lawyer and housing rights advocate Ni Yulan to
travel to the United States in March 2016 to receive a
U.S. State Department award recognizing her rights
advocacy and work to promote the rule of law in
China.\58\ Ni said that authorities banned her from
leaving the country because she had been in contact
with rights lawyers who were detained in Tianjin
municipality as part of the crackdown on rights lawyers
and others beginning in and around July 2015.\59\ Ni
reported that after barring her from leaving China,
authorities placed her and her husband under ``soft
detention'' (ruanjin), a form of extralegal home
confinement,\60\ and pressured Ni's landlord and real
estate agent to force them to move.\61\
On August 6, 2016, Chinese customs officials
in Guangdong reportedly prevented Falun Gong
practitioner Wang Zhiwen from traveling to the United
States, canceling his passport on orders from public
security authorities.\62\ Authorities detained Wang in
1999 in connection with a Falun Gong protest in Beijing
municipality.\63\ He served 15 years of a 16-year
prison sentence on the charge of ``organizing and using
a cult to undermine implementation of the law'' until
his early release in October 2014, after which
authorities reportedly kept Wang under constant
surveillance.\64\
Domestic Movement
During its 2016 reporting year, the Commission continued to
observe reports of Chinese government officials punishing
rights advocates and their families and associates, and
targeting some members of ethnic minority groups by restricting
their freedom of movement. Article 12 of the ICCPR provides
that ``[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement . . ..'' \65\ Authorities increased restrictions on
freedom of movement during politically sensitive periods
throughout the year.
In December 2015, shortly after the UN Committee against
Torture's review of China's compliance with the Convention
against Torture, organizers of an anti-torture conference for
rights lawyers in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region canceled
the event after police interference and harassment.\66\
During the March 2016 meetings of the National People's
Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference in Beijing,\67\ Chinese authorities repeatedly
intercepted petitioners who sought meetings in Beijing with
government officials and temporarily restricted their movement,
placed them under ``soft detention,'' or forcibly returned them
to their places of residence.\68\ Local authorities reportedly
criminally or administratively detained many of the petitioners
upon their return.\69\ Authorities forced prominent journalist
Gao Yu to leave Beijing during March 2016.\70\ Gao is on
medical parole while serving a five-year prison sentence on the
charge of ``leaking state secrets.'' \71\
As in previous years,\72\ before and during the June
anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and their violent
suppression, Chinese authorities held rights advocates,
activists, and veterans of the 1989 protests in ``soft
detention'' or forced them to leave their homes to prevent them
from gathering and commemorating the protests.\73\
Residents of some ethnic minority areas, in particular
Uyghurs and Tibetans, faced strict controls on their freedom of
movement. Authorities in parts of the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) reportedly placed some Uyghurs under
surveillance and limited their ability to attend mosques.\74\
XUAR authorities also abolished the ``convenience contact
card'' system \75\ that had restricted Uyghurs' ability to
freely move within the XUAR.\76\ Reports in the past year
indicated that authorities in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu
(Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), placed
heavy restrictions on Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns,
including banning them from traveling without prior government
authorization.\77\ Chinese authorities reportedly prohibited
Tibetan residents of some western provinces from traveling to
Lhasa municipality, TAR, in March 2016, around the anniversary
of the 2008 Tibetan protests and the Dalai Lama's 1959 flight
from Tibet.\78\ [For more information on government
restrictions on Uyghurs and Tibetans, see Section IV--Xinjiang
and Section V--Tibet.]
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Freedom of
Residence and
Movement
Notes to Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement
\1\ PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.
\2\ Kam Wing Chan, ``Crossing the 50 Percent Population Rubicon:
Can China Urbanize to Prosperity? '' Eurasian Geography and Economics,
Vol. 53, No. 1 (2012), 67; China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and
Their Children,'' last visited 15 July 16.
\3\ Kam Wing Chan, ``Crossing the 50 Percent Population Rubicon:
Can China Urbanize to Prosperity? '' Eurasian Geography and Economics,
Vol. 53, No. 1 (2012), 67; UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report
of China, Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the
Committee at its 40th Meeting (23 May 2014), E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, 23 June
14, para. 15. See also Chun Han Wong and Laurie Burkitt, ``China Moves
To Normalize the Status of Millions of People on Margins,'' Wall Street
Journal, 10 December 15; China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Workers and
Their Children,'' last visited 15 July 16.
\4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General
Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1).
\5\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Announcement of Major
Data From 2015 National 1 Percent Population Sample Survey'' [2015 nian
quanguo 1% renkou chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju gongbao], 20 April 16.
\6\ State Council, Certain Opinions on Deeply Carrying Out New-Type
Urbanization Construction [Guowuyuan guanyu shenru tuijin xinxing
chengzhenhua jianshe de ruogan yijian], issued 2 February 16; State
Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration System
Reform [Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de yijian],
issued 24 July 14, para. 3. See also National People's Congress, PRC
Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan
di shisan ge wu nian guihua gangyao], issued 17 March 16, sec. 8.
\7\ See, e.g., Zhejiang Province People's Government, Implementing
Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration System Reform
[Zhejiang sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige
de shishi yijian], issued 10 December 15, reprinted in Jingning She
Autonomous County People's Government, 25 December 15; Hainan Province
People's Government, Implementing Opinion on Further Carrying Out
Household Registration System Reform [Hainan sheng renmin zhengfu
guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 24
December 15, reprinted in Sanya Municipal People's Government, 29
December 15.
\8\ State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household
Registration System Reform [Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu
gaige de yijian], issued 24 July 14, para. 15.
\9\ ``NDRC: 28 Provinces, Regions, and Municipalities Have Already
Put Forward Concrete Proposals for Household Registration System
Reform'' [Fagaiwei: yi you 28 ge sheng qu shi chutai huji zhidu gaige
de juti fang'an], People's Daily, 19 April 16; Tibet Autonomous Region
People's Government, Implementing Opinion on Further Carrying Out
Household Registration System Reform [Xizang zizhiqu renmin zhengfu
guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 25 May
16. See also ``29 Provincial Residence Permits Systems Set, Each
Residence Permit's Value Has Differences'' [29 shengfen juzhuzheng
zhidu luodi juzhuzheng hanjin liang ge you butong], People's Daily, 29
January 16.
\10\ See, e.g., Hubei Provincial People's Government, Implementing
Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household Registration System Reform
[Sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de shishi
yijian], issued 6 September 15, reprinted in Hubei Province People's
Government Information Transparency Directory, paras. 9-10; Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Government, Implementing Opinion on
Further Carrying Out Household Registration System Reform [Neimenggu
zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de shishi
yijian], issued 8 September 15, secs. 3(2), 4(2.6); Zhejiang Province
People's Government, Implementing Opinion on Further Carrying Out
Household Registration System Reform [Zhejiang sheng renmin zhengfu
guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 10
December 15, reprinted in Jingning She Autonomous County People's
Government, 25 December 15, sec. 4; Hainan Province People's
Government, Implementing Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household
Registration System Reform [Hainan sheng renmin zhengfu guanyu jinyibu
tuijin huji zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 24 December 15,
reprinted in Sanya Municipal People's Government, 29 December 15, 3(9).
\11\ State Council General Office, Opinion on Resolving Issues of
Hukou Registration for Individuals Without Hukou [Guowuyuan bangongting
guanyu jiejue wu hukou renyuan dengji hukou wenti de yijian], issued 31
December 15; Chun Han Wong and Laurie Burkitt, ``China Moves To
Normalize the Status of Millions of People on Margins,'' Wall Street
Journal, 10 December 15; Liu Jingyao, ``Resolving `Illegal Resident'
Problems Manifests People-Centered Concept'' [Jiejue ``heihu'' wenti
zhangxian yi ren wei ben linian], Xinhua, 15 January 16.
\12\ State Council General Office, Opinion on Resolving Issues of
Hukou Registration for Individuals Without Hukou [Guowuyuan bangongting
guanyu jiejue wu hukou renyuan dengji hukou wenti de yijian], issued 31
December 15, sec. 2.
\13\ Liu Jingyao, ``Resolving `Illegal Resident' Problems Manifests
People-Centered Concept'' [Jiejue ``heihu'' wenti zhangxian yi ren wei
ben linian], Xinhua, 15 January 16; ``State Council Information Office
Press Conference Text Record Regarding Implementation of the Universal
Two-Child Policy and Reform and Improvement of Family Planning Service
Management'' [Guoxinban jiu shishi quanmin liang hai zhengce gaige
wanshan jihua shengyu fuwu guanli de youguan qingkuang juxing fabuhui
wenzi shilu], National Health and Family Planning Commission, 11
January 16.
\14\ Wang Ling, ``Barriers to Resolving the Problem of Illegal
Residents: Some Areas Require Social Compensation Fee Payments Before
Hukou Registration'' [Jiejue heihu wenti yuzu: bufen diqu bu jiao
shehui fuyang fei cai luohu], First Financial, reprinted in Sina, 10
March 16.
\15\ State Council, Opinion on Further Carrying Out Household
Registration System Reform [Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu tuijin huji zhidu
gaige de yijian], issued 24 July 14, paras. 4-5; Xinping Guan,
``Paulson Policy Memorandum: How To Better Support China's Migrant
Population,'' Paulson Institute, November 2015, 7.
\16\ ``Except for a Few Megacities, Household Registration
Restrictions To Be Completely Relaxed'' [Chu ji shaoshu chaoda chengshi
quanmian fangkai luohu xianzhi], Beijing News, 25 January 16; ``29
Provincial Residence Permits Systems Set, Each Residence Permit's Value
Has Differences'' [29 shengfen juzhuzheng zhidu luodi juzhuzheng hanjin
liang ge you butong], People's Daily, 29 January 26.
\17\ Beijing Municipality People's Government, Beijing Municipal
Measures for Management of Obtaining Household Registration by Points
(Provisional) [Beijing shi jifen luohu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued
11 August 16, effective 1 January 17.
\18\ Ibid., art. 5(2).
\19\ Ibid., art. 5(3).
\20\ Ibid., art. 5(5).
\21\ Ibid., art. 5(4).
\22\ Ibid., art. 4(2).
\23\ Ibid., art. 4(3).
\24\ Ibid., art. 9. See also Beijing Municipality People's
Government, Beijing Municipal Measures for Management of Obtaining
Household Registration by Points (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Beijing shi jifen luohu guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 10
December 15, art. 4(4). The draft measures required applicants to
comply with family planning policies, while the provisional measures
allow successful applicants to bring with them only those children born
according to family planning policies.
\25\ Beijing Municipality People's Government, Beijing Municipal
Measures for Management of Obtaining Household Registration by Points
(Provisional) [Beijing shi jifen luohu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued
11 August 16, effective 1 January 17, arts. 4(4), 5(9). Article 4(4)
prohibits individuals with a criminal record (xingshi fanzui jilu),
while article 5(9) subtracts points from applicants with a record of
administrative detention (xingzheng juliu chufa) in Beijing.
\26\ Ibid., art. 4(1).
\27\ Ibid., art. 8.
\28\ Wang Luyi, ``Lu Ming: Household Registration Points Policy
Must Continue To Improve'' [Lu ming: jifen luohu zhengce xuyao jixu
gaijin], Caixin, 12 August 16.
\29\ Beijing Municipality People's Government, Beijing Municipal
Measures for Management of Obtaining Household Registration by Points
(Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Beijing shi jifen luohu guanli
banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 10 December 15.
\30\ Wang Shan, ``Points of No Return,'' News China, April 2016;
Jamie Martines, ``Despite Policy Reforms, Barriers to Obtaining Hukou
Persist,'' The Diplomat, 27 February 16; Sun Wenjing, ``Nie Riming: Who
Benefits From Beijing's `Choose the Best' Points Systems for Settling?
'' [Nie riming: beijing ``xuanba zhi'' jifen luohu huiji shei], Caixin,
11 December 15.
\31\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Measures for
Management of Residence Permits (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Juzhuzheng guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 4 December 14.
\32\ State Council, Provisional Regulations on Residence Permits
[Juzhuzheng zanxing tiaoli], issued 26 November 15, effective 1 January
16.
\33\ Ibid., arts. 1, 12, 13.
\34\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Measures for
Management of Residence Permits (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Juzhuzheng guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 4 December 14,
art. 16.
\35\ State Council, Provisional Regulations on Residence Permits
[Juzhuzheng zanxing tiaoli], issued 26 November 15, effective 1 January
16, art. 16.
\36\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Measures for
Management of Residence Permits (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Juzhuzheng guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 4 December 14,
arts. 14, 15; State Council, Provisional Regulations on Residence
Permits [Juzhuzheng zanxing tiaoli], issued 26 November 15, effective 1
January 16.
\37\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Measures for
Management of Residence Permits (Draft for Solicitation of Comments)
[Juzhuzheng guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 4 December 14,
art. 14.
\38\ Ibid., art. 15.
\39\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(2).
\40\ Ibid., art. 12(3).
\41\ PRC Passport Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huzhao fa], passed
29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 13(7); PRC Exit and Entry
Administration Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chujing rujing guanli
fa], passed 30 June 12, effective 1 July 13, art. 12(5).
\42\ See, e.g., ``After Refusing To Allow Activist Home, China Now
Bans Him From Leaving,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 October 15; ``China Slaps
Exit Ban on Wife, Son of Defected Former Journalist,'' Radio Free Asia,
7 December 15.
\43\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 50-51, 272.
\44\ Rights Defense Network, ``Feng Zhenghu: Citizen's Right To
Leave Country--33 Lawyers and Others Prevented From Leaving Country and
Rights Defense Work'' [Feng zhenghu: gongmin chujing quan--33 ming
lushi deng ren bei xianzhi chujing ji weiquan biaoxian], 5 February 16;
PRC Exit and Entry Administration Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
chujing rujing guanli fa], passed 30 June 12, effective 1 July 13, art.
12(5).
\45\ Rights Defense Network, ``Feng Zhenghu: Citizen's Right To
Leave Country--33 Lawyers and Others Prevented From Leaving Country and
Rights Defense Work'' [Feng zhenghu: gongmin chujing quan--33 ming
lushi deng ren bei xianzhi chujing ji weiquan biaoxian], 5 February 16.
\46\ Liu Xiaoyuan, ``Lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan: My Son Has Also Been
Unable To Obtain a Passport To Study Abroad'' [Liu xiaoyuan lushi: wo
de haizi ye bu neng ban huzhao chuguo liuxue], Human Rights Campaign in
China, 15 October 15. For more information on Liu Xiaoyuan, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00355.
\47\ For more information on Xie Yang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00295.
\48\ Rights Defense Network, ``Explanation for July 9 Detained
Lawyer Xie Yang's Wife and Professor Chen Guiqiu Being Restricted From
Leaving Country'' [709 bei bu lushi xie yang qizi chen guiqiu jiaoshou
bei xianzhi chujing de shuoming], 6 April 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Chen Guiqiu, Wife of July 9 Lawyer Xie Yang, Sues PSB and Other
Agencies Over Restriction on Leaving Country'' [709 xie yang lushi qizi
chen guiqiu jiu bei zuzhi chujing qisu gong'anbu deng jigou], 11 April
16.
\49\ Rights Defense Network, ``Chen Guiqiu, Wife of July 9 Lawyer
Xie Yang, Sues PSB and Other Agencies Over Restriction on Leaving
Country'' [709 xie yang lushi qizi chen guiqiu jiu bei zuzhi chujing
qisu gong'anbu deng jigou], 11 April 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court Rejects Chen Guiqiu's (Wife of
Lawyer Xie Yang) Materials for Administrative Lawsuit Over Restriction
on Leaving Country, Trampling on the `Administrative Procedure Law' ''
[Shenzhen shi zhongji fayuan ju shou chen guiqiu (xie yang lushi de
qizi) yin bei zu chujing xingzheng susong cailiao jianta ``xingzheng
susong fa''], 11 April 16.
\50\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Zhang Lei: Guangdong High
People's Court Rejects Chen Guiqiu's (Wife of Lawyer Xie Yang) Suit
Over Exit Ban Against Public Security Bureau, Shenzhen Border
Inspection, and Other Agencies'' [Zhang lei lushi: guangdong sheng
gaoji fayuan jujue shouli chen guiqiu (xie yang lushi qizi) qisu
gong'anbu, shenzhen bianjian deng jigou zuzhi chujing yi an], 18 April
16.
\51\ Rights Defense Network, ``Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court
Rejects Chen Guiqiu's (Wife of Lawyer Xie Yang) Materials for
Administrative Lawsuit Over Restriction on Leaving Country, Trampling
on the `Administrative Procedure Law' '' [Shenzhen shi zhongji fayuan
ju shou chen guiqiu (xie yang lushi de qizi) yin bei zu chujing
xingzheng susong cailiao jianta ``xingzheng susong fa''], 11 April 16.
\52\ Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyer Zhang Lei: Guangdong High
People's Court Rejects Chen Guiqiu's (Wife of Lawyer Xie Yang) Suit
Over Exit Ban Against Public Security Bureau, Shenzhen Border
Inspection, and Other Agencies'' [Zhang lei lushi: guangdong sheng
gaoji fayuan jujue shouli chen guiqiu (xie yang lushi qizi) qisu
gong'anbu, shenzhen bianjian deng jigou zuzhi chujing yi an], 18 April
16.
\53\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 166.
\54\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 38; ``Rights Lawyer Confirms Civil Society Representatives
Forbidden To Attend Torture Hearing'' [Weiquan lushi zhengshi minjian
daibiao bei jin chuxi kuxing lingxun], Radio Free Asia, 18 November 15;
Rights Defense Network, ``Lawyers Zhang Keke, Lin Qilei Not Allowed by
`Border Control' To Leave Country, Border Inspection Police Refuse To
Issue Any Written Documents'' [Zhang keke lushi, lin qilei lushi zao
``bianjing kongzhi'' buzhun chujing bianjian jingcha ju bu chuju renhe
shumian falu wenjian], 10 November 15. The vice-chair of the UN
Committee against Torture questioned the ``endangering state security''
justification Chinese authorities reportedly gave for preventing their
travel. UN Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the 1368th
Meeting, CAT/C/SR.1368, 20 November 15, para. 92; Nick Cumming-Bruce,
``China Faces Sharp Questioning by UN Panel on Torture,'' New York
Times, 17 November 15.
\55\ Tom Phillips, ``Chinese Journalist Banned From Flying to U.S.
To Accept a Prize for His Work,'' Guardian, 15 February 16; ``Yang
Jisheng Blocked From Traveling to U.S. To Accept Award'' [Yang jisheng
bei zu fu mei lingjiang], Radio Free Asia, 16 February 16.
\56\ Nieman Foundation for Journalism, ``Chinese Author Yang
Jisheng Wins Louis M. Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in
Journalism,'' Harvard University, 7 December 15; Tom Phillips,
``Chinese Journalist Banned From Flying to U.S. To Accept a Prize for
His Work,'' Guardian, 15 February 16; ``Yang Jisheng Blocked From
Traveling to U.S. To Accept Award'' [Yang jisheng bei zu fu mei
lingjiang], Radio Free Asia, 16 February 16.
\57\ Michael Forsythe, ``Chinese Writer Says He's Forbidden From
Traveling to U.S. for Harvard Prize,'' New York Times, 16 February 16;
Tom Phillips, ``Chinese Journalist Banned From Flying to U.S. To Accept
a Prize for His Work,'' Guardian, 15 February 16.
\58\ ``Chinese `Woman of Courage' Faces Eviction, Travel Ban Ahead
of Award,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 March 16; Office of Global Women's
Issues, U.S. Department of State, ``Biographies of 2016 Award
Winners,'' 28 March 16. For more information on Ni Yulan, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2005-00285.
\59\ ``Chinese `Woman of Courage' Faces Eviction, Travel Ban Ahead
of Award,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 March 16. See also CECC, 2015 Annual
Report, 8 October 15, 50-51, 272.
\60\ ``Ni Yulan Still Being Suppressed, Again Placed Under Soft
Detention After Forced Travel'' [Ni yulan xu shou daya bi qian hou fu
zao ruanjin], Radio Free Asia, 19 April 16; Megha Rajagopalan and
Michael Martina, ``Chinese Authorities Hold Disabled Rights Lawyer
Under House Arrest,'' Reuters, 25 April 16.
\61\ ``Ni Yulan Again Placed Under Soft Detention by Authorities,
Friend Detained Three Hours for Visiting Her'' [Ni yulan zai zao dangju
ruanjin hao you tanshi bei ju san xiaoshi], Radio Free Asia, 20 April
16.
\62\ Leo Timm, ``Steps Away From Freedom, American Family Loses Bid
To Rescue Father From China,'' Epoch Times, 18 August 16; ``United
States Calls on China To Allow Falun Gong Practitioner To Leave
Country'' [Meiguo huyu zhongguo yunxu yi ming falun gong xueyuan ziyou
chujing], Voice of America, 12 August 16. See also Office of Press
Relations, U.S. Department of State, ``Daily Press Briefing--August 11,
2016,'' 11 August 16. For more information on Wang Zhiwen, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Record 2004-02191.
\63\ Tian Jing and Tang Rui, ``After 15 Years of Unjust
Imprisonment, Wang Zhiwen Released, Returns Home, but Still Monitored''
[Yuanyu 15 zai wang zhiwen bei shifang huijia reng zao jianshi], New
Tang Dynasty Television, 26 October 14.
\64\ ``United States Calls on China To Allow Falun Gong
Practitioner To Leave Country'' [Meiguo huyu zhongguo yunxu yi ming
falungong xueyuan ziyou chujing], Voice of America, 12 August 16; Tian
Jing and Tang Rui, ``After 15 Years of Unjust Imprisonment, Wang Zhiwen
Released, Returns Home, but Still Monitored'' [Yuanyu 15 zai wang
zhiwen bei shifang huijia reng zao jianshi], New Tang Dynasty
Television, 26 October 14.
\65\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 12(1).
\66\ ``Chinese Police Ban Anti-Torture Conference by Rights
Lawyers,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 December 15.
\67\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Shanghai
Authorities Carry Out Two Sessions Clearances, Gao Xuekun and Other
Petitioners Detained or Put in Soft Detention'' [Shanghai dangju wei
lianghui qingchang gao xuekun deng duo ming fangmin bei juliu huo
ruanjin], 28 February 16; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Two
Sessions Begin, Zhangzhou, Fujian, Petitioner Li Honghua Held Under
Stability Control Conditions at Home'' [Lianghui zhaokai fujian
zhangzhou fangmin li honghua bei wenkong zai jia], 6 March 16; Civil
Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``People From Qianjiang Municipality, Hubei
Province, in Soft Detention for Two Sessions Again Go to Beijing''
[Hubei sheng qianjiang shi lianghui ruanjin renyuan zaici dao jing], 26
March 16.
\68\ See, e.g., ``Two Sessions Petitioner Interceptions Begin
February 11, Decrease in Petitioners in Beijing'' [Lianghui jie fang
chusi kaishi zai jing fangmin jianshao], New Tang Dynasty Television,
15 February 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Two Sessions Stability
Maintenance, Hebei Petitioner Zhao Chunhong Held in Black Jail''
[Lianghui weiwen, hebei nu fangmin zhao chunhong bei guan hei jianyu],
4 March 16; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xu Nailai and His
Daughter in Soft Detention in Tianjin Hotel Because of Two Sessions
Convening'' [Xu nailai funu yin lianghui zhaokai bei ruanjin zai
tianjin yi jia binguan], 4 March 16; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Zhanjiang Municipality, Guangdong, Petitioner Chen Jianmei Held in
Baoding, Hebei, Hotel'' [Guangdong zhanjiang shi fangmin chen jianmei
bei guanya zai hebei baoding binguan], 4 March 16; Rights Defense
Network, ``Changsha, Hunan, Rights Defender Xie Fulin Sent Back After
Legally Going to Beijing To Petition'' [Hunan changsha weiquan renshi
xie fulin yifa dao beijing shangfang bei qianhui], 4 March 16; Rights
Defense Network, ``Rights Defense Bulletin: Wuxi Citizens Decipher
Origin of `Zero Petitioning' in Wuxi During 2016's National `Two
Sessions'--Encirclement and Interception, Extralegal Detention,
Detention in Black Jails, Paying To Shut Down Accounts, Trafficking
Petitioners'' [Weiquan jianbao: wuxi gongmin jiemi 2016 nian quanguo
``lianghui'' qijian wuxi ``ling shangfang'' youlai--weizhui dujie,
wangfa juliu, guan hei jianyu, huaqian xiaohao, fanmai fangmin], 3
April 16.
\69\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xin'an County,
Henan, Petitioner Pei Zhanying Criminally Detained for Going to Beijing
To Petition During Two Sessions'' [Henan xin'an xian fangmin pei
zhanying lianghui qijian jin jing shangfang bei xingju], 20 March 16;
Rights Defense Network, ``As Two Sessions Draw Near, Shanghai Casts
Wide Net and Detains 4 Rights Defenders; Ding Deyuan Ordered To Serve 7
Days' Administrative Detention'' [Lianghui jiangjin, shanghai dasi
juliu 4 wei renquan hanweizhe ding deyuan bei chu xingzheng juliu 7
ri], 23 February 16. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database records 2016-00245 on Pei Zhanying and
2016-00054 on Ding Deyuan.
\70\ ``Gao Yu `Forced To Travel' During Two Sessions'' [Gao yu
lianghui qijian ``bei luyou''], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 16; ``Veteran
Chinese Journalist Gao Yu Seen `on Vacation' in Yunnan,'' Radio Free
Asia, 17 March 16. For more information on Gao Yu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-05037.
\71\ Chris Buckley, ``China To Release Journalist Gao Yu From
Prison Over Illness,'' New York Times, 26 November 15; Jun Mai,
``Jailed Chinese Journalist Gao Yu Granted Medical Parole After Appeal
in State Secrets Case,'' South China Morning Post, 27 November 15.
\72\ See, e.g., CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 111; CECC,
2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 166-67.
\73\ See, e.g., ``On Eve of June Fourth, Beijing Scholars' Dinner
Obstructed, Daughter of Xie Tao and Others `Under Guard' '' [Liusi
qianxi beijing xueshe jucan shouzu xie tao zhi nu deng duo ren bei
``shanggang''], Radio Free Asia, 20 May 16; ``China Clamps Down on
Memorial Events Ahead of Tiananmen Crackdown Anniversary,'' Radio Free
Asia, 26 May 16; ``As June Fourth Approaches, Many Places Strengthen
Monitoring, Yu Shiwen Plans Hunger Strike Protest'' [Liusi linjin gedi
jiaqiang jiankong yu shiwen ni jueshi kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 27 May
16; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``As June Fourth Approaches, Sun
Dongsheng, Li Xuehui Forced To Leave Beijing, Shanghai's Chen Baoliang
Criminally Detained'' [Liusi linjin sun dongsheng, li xuehui bei po li
jing shanghai chen baoliang bei xingju], 3 June 16; Rights Defense
Network, ``Xu Yonghai: I Spent These Last Few Days Around June Fourth
2016 in Soft Detention'' [Xu yonghai: wo zai ruanjin zhong duguo 2016
nian liusi zhe ji tian], 6 June 16.
\74\ ``Controls on Uyghur Villages, Mosques Continue Into New
Year,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 January 16; Andrew Jacobs, ``Xinjiang
Seethes Under Chinese Crackdown,'' New York Times, 2 January 16.
\75\ Yao Tong, ``Xinjiang Introduces a Series of Initiatives To
Resolve Outstanding Problems Among the Masses'' [Xinjiang chutai yi
xilie jucuo jiejue qunzhong fanying tuchu wenti], Xinjiang Daily,
reprinted in Tianshan Net, 30 March 16.
\76\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Xinjiang Seethes Under Chinese Crackdown,''
New York Times, 2 January 16; Bai Tiantian, ``Xinjiang To End
`Convenience Contact Cards,' '' Global Times, 31 March 16; CECC, 2014
Annual Report, 9 October 14, 111.
\77\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Mass
Expulsion of Nuns and Land Grabbing in Tibet's Diru County,'' 13
October 15; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Document
Exposes Intensification of State-Sanctioned Religious Repression in
Troubled Tibetan County,'' 9 November 15. See also Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2015: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau),'' 13 April 16, 88.
\78\ ``Tibetans in Chinese Provinces Blocked From Travel to Lhasa
in March,'' Radio Free Asia, 24 March 16.
Status of Women
Status of Women
Status of Women
Public Participation
POLITICAL DECISIONMAKING
The Chinese government is obligated under its international
commitments \1\ and domestic laws \2\ to ensure gender-equal
political participation; however, women continue to be
underrepresented in political decisionmaking positions. Female
representation remains low or non-existent in key Chinese
Communist Party and government leadership positions.\3\
Overall, representation at upper and lower levels of government
continues to fall short of the 30 percent target recommended by
the UN Commission on the Status of Women.\4\
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ADVOCACY
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the Chinese
government restricted many women's rights advocates from
providing services and engaging in activism, violating China's
obligations under international standards.\5\ One prominent
example was the closure, on February 1, 2016, of the Beijing
Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service Center (Zhongze),
after government authorities reportedly ordered the
organization to shut down.\6\ Founded in 1995, Zhongze focused
on such issues as domestic violence, gender equality, and
sexual harassment in the workplace, and had received widespread
recognition and praise for its work, including from the Chinese
government and state media.\7\ Observers viewed Zhongze's
closure, which occurred amid an ongoing crackdown on non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), as a notable sign of the
shrinking space for civil society in China.\8\
The Chinese government continued to target individual
women's rights advocates with criminal prosecution and other
forms of harassment and intimidation. On July 9, 2015, at the
onset of the Chinese government's nationwide crackdown on human
rights lawyers and advocates,\9\ authorities took prominent
female human rights lawyer Wang Yu into custody, and in January
2016, formally arrested her on suspicion of ``subversion of
state power.'' \10\ Wang worked on a wide range of rights
issues, including the representation of Li Tingting, one of
five women's rights advocates detained in the spring of 2015,
and the women's rights activist Ye Haiyan (also known as
Hooligan Sparrow).\11\ In early August 2016, reports emerged
that authorities had released Wang Yu on bail, coinciding with
the airing of a prerecorded confession that members of the
Chinese human rights community believe was coerced.\12\ In
April 2016, women's rights and democracy activist Su Changlan--
who has been in custody since October 2014--was put on trial in
Foshan municipality, Guangdong province, for ``inciting
subversion of state power.'' \13\ As of August 2016,
authorities had not yet announced a verdict.\14\ The indictment
issued in Su's case alleged that she had engaged in online
``rumor-mongering'' and ``libel'' to ``attack the Chinese
Communist Party and the socialist system.'' \15\
As discussed in the Commission's 2015 Annual Report, in
March 2015, Beijing municipal authorities criminally detained
five women's rights advocates (also known as the Feminist Five)
\16\ in connection with a planned anti-sexual harassment
campaign. Following widespread domestic and international
outcry, authorities released the five on bail in April 2015,
and subjected them to restrictions on their movement and tight
police surveillance.\17\ In April 2016, police lifted bail
conditions for the women, but they are still considered
suspects in an investigation for the crime of ``gathering a
crowd to disturb order in a public place.'' \18\ Li Tingting,
one of the five, described the environment for the feminist
movement in China in late 2015 as being at an ``all-time low.''
\19\
Employment Discrimination
China's labor laws require equal treatment of women in
employment practices. The Chinese government is obligated to
address discrimination in the workplace under its international
commitments \20\ and domestic laws.\21\ Despite the legal
framework prohibiting employment discrimination, a March 2016
article in Xinhua stated that ``job discrimination against
women still pervades Chinese society.'' \22\ According to the
World Economic Forum's 2015 survey, women in China remained
underrepresented in management positions \23\ and female
employees earned 65 percent of male employees' earnings for
similar work.\24\ The National People's Congress Committee on
Finance and Economic Affairs noted at a November 2015 meeting
that employment discrimination became ``increasingly serious in
the wake of China's rapid economic development,'' and announced
plans to draft legislation to address existing discrimination
based on factors such as gender.\25\
During this reporting year, employers in China continued to
discriminate against women in recruiting, hiring, compensation,
and other employment practices.\26\ Chinese law prohibits
businesses from posting discriminatory advertisements for
recruitment,\27\ but observers noted that weak enforcement
enables employers to impose discriminatory conditions,\28\ and
businesses continued to post advertisements specifying gender,
personality, and physical appearance requirements.\29\
More women are suing employers, or prospective employers,
for gender-based discrimination.\30\ In what is believed to be
the third gender-based employment discrimination legal case in
China, and the first reported discrimination case against a
state-owned enterprise to be heard in court, in November 2015,
a court in Beijing municipality ruled for plaintiff Ma Hu
(pseudonym) in her suit against the Beijing Postal Express and
Logistics Co., Ltd.\31\--an affiliate of the national postal
service China Post--finding that the defendant had refused to
hire Ma because she was a woman.\32\ Ma had sought 57,570 yuan
(US$8,653) in compensation and an apology, but the court only
awarded her 2,000 yuan (US$300), and rejected her request for
an apology.\33\ In August 2015, Gao Xiao (pseudonym), a female
cook in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, sued a
local company for refusing to hire her for a chef's apprentice
position because of her gender.\34\ After she filed suit,
authorities threatened her and her landlord evicted her.\35\ In
April 2016, a Guangzhou court ruled in her favor, but awarded
her only 2,000 yuan in compensation.\36\ The Guangzhou
Intermediate People's Court heard Gao's appeal of the ruling in
August 2016.\37\ In June 2016, the Yuexiu District People's
Court in Guangzhou heard an administrative suit Gao filed
against the Guangzhou Human Resources and Social Security
Bureau for failing to address workplace discrimination in the
city.\38\
Employment discrimination against women based on pregnancy
continues to be a serious problem, despite laws protecting the
rights of pregnant workers.\39\ Results from a survey of nearly
1,000 female employees in government and private workplaces
conducted by the Xicheng district, Beijing, branch of the All-
China Women's Federation and the Law Research Center for Women
and Children indicated that over 52 percent of the respondents
experienced discrimination when they were pregnant, on
maternity leave, or breastfeeding, and as a result, suffered
pay cuts, forced transfers, lost promotion and training
opportunities, or were pressured to resign.\40\ In one such
case, Yin Jing, a shopping mall counter manager in Beijing, was
pushed out of her job in 2014 soon after she told her
supervisor she was pregnant.\41\ In November 2015, a Beijing
appeals court awarded Yin Jing 62,237 yuan (US$9,354) in
compensation after she provided evidence that her employer knew
she was pregnant when the company transferred her to a location
three hours away and then fired her when she refused to
transfer.\42\
Violence Against Women
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law (Anti-DV Law) went into
effect on March 1, 2016.\43\ The National People's Congress
passed the legislation in December 2015 after more than a
decade of advocacy and organizing by women's rights advocates
and Chinese officials.\44\ Challenging the long-held view that
domestic violence is a private ``family matter,'' the law
requires police and courts to take action in cases of domestic
violence.\45\ According to the All-China Women's Federation,
nearly 25 percent of married Chinese women have experienced
violence in their marriage.\46\
Women's rights advocates celebrated the passage of the law
but also expressed concerns.\47\ For example, advocates
heralded a range of positive measures in the law, including
that it applies to non-married, co-habiting partners in
addition to married couples,\48\ and that the definition of
domestic violence specifies both physical and psychological
abuse.\49\ The law clarifies, moreover, a range of legal
protections for victims, and requires public security officers
to respond immediately to reports of domestic violence.\50\
Rights advocates, nevertheless, criticized the law for omitting
two common forms of abuse--sexual violence and economic
coercion--from the definition of domestic violence, and for the
law's silence with respect to same-sex couples.\51\
The Anti-DV Law authorizes courts to issue protection
orders (also referred to as restraining orders) as stand-alone
rulings to domestic violence victims or those facing a ``real
danger'' (xianshi weixian) of domestic violence.\52\ The law
stipulates that courts must rule on a protection order
application within 72 hours, or within 24 hours in urgent
situations.\53\ Such orders may include a variety of
protections for the applicant, including requiring the abuser
to move out of the residence.\54\
STATE-AUTHORIZED VIOLENCE
Officials in China reportedly continued to use coercion and
violence against women while implementing family planning
policies, in contravention of international standards.\55\ The
UN Committee against Torture (Committee) noted in the
concluding observations following its November 2015 review of
China's compliance with the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment that
it was ``concerned at reports of coerced sterilization and
forced abortions.'' \56\ The Committee also expressed regret
that the Chinese government had failed to provide information
the Committee requested on investigations of such reports, as
well as information on redress provided to past victims.\57\
[For more information, see Section II--Population Control.]
During the course of the Committee's review, the Chinese
government also failed to respond to questions posed by the
Committee relating to reports of violence inflicted on women in
``black jails,'' including the rape of Li Ruirui in 2009 and
the suspicious deaths of Li Shulian in 2010 and Wang Delan in
2013.\58\ The Chinese government similarly ignored the
Committee's request for information about the cases of eight
women who had been detained and abused at the Masanjia Women's
Reeducation Through Labor Center in Yuhong district, Shenyang
municipality, Liaoning province, and whom authorities
subsequently imprisoned in 2014 after the women attempted to
seek justice.\59\ [For more information on ``black jails'' and
other forms of arbitrary detention, see Section II--Criminal
Justice.]
Status of Women
Status of Women
Notes to Section II--Status of Women
\1\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180
of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 7. Under
Article 7(b) of CEDAW, China, as a State Party, is obligated to
``ensure to women, on equal terms with men,'' the right ``[t]o
participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public
functions at all levels of government[.]'' United Nations Treaty
Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited 13 July 16.
China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified it on
November 4, 1980, thereby committing to undertake the legal rights and
obligations contained in these articles.
\2\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92,
amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral
Law of the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji
renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 10 December
82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 6.
Both of these laws stipulate that an ``appropriate number'' of female
deputies should serve at all levels of people's congresses.
\3\ ``China Political Leaders'' [Zhongguo zhengyao], People's
Daily, Chinese Communist Party News, last visited 20 July 16; ``Chinese
Communist Party 17th Congress Central Leadership Organization Members''
[Zhongguo gongchandang di shiqi jie zhongyang lingdao jigou chengyuan],
China Internet Information Center, last visited 13 July 16. Within
Party leadership, only 2 of the 25 members of the Political Bureau of
the Communist Party Central Committee (Politburo) are women, and there
are no women among the 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee--
the most powerful governing body in China. There are no women serving
as Party secretaries at the provincial level. In government leadership,
women hold 2 out of 25 national-level ministerial positions and 2 out
of 31 governorships of provinces, provincial-level municipalities, and
special autonomous regions (1 of the 2 female governors has
provisional, or ``acting,'' status as of July 2016). In the 12th
National People's Congress, which began in 2013, women held 699 out of
the 2,987 seats (23.4 percent). Women's Studies Institute of China,
``The Shadow Report of Chinese Women's NGOs on the Combined Seventh and
Eighth Periodic Report Submitted by China Under Article 19 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women: Temporary Special Measures and the Political and Public Life
(Article 4 & 7),'' September 2014, 1-2. For more information on female
members of the Politburo since 1945, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8
October 15, 176, endnote 5.
\4\ Women's Studies Institute of China, ``The Shadow Report of
Chinese Women's NGOs on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report
Submitted by China Under Article 19 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Temporary
Special Measures and the Political and Public Life (Article 4 & 7),''
September 2014, 1-2. Women made up 23.4 percent of the 12th National
People's Congress and 22.6 percent of all village committee members.
Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN,
``Introductory Statement by H.E. Mme. Song Xiuyuan, Head of the Chinese
Delegation, Consideration of China's Combined Seventh and Eighth
Periodic Reports by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women,'' 23 October 14, sec. 3. The target of 30 percent female
representation in leadership positions by 1995 was recommended by the
UN Commission on the Status of Women at its 34th session in 1990.
``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to Women by 1995--United
Nations Commission on the Status of Women,'' UN Chronicle, Vol. 27, No.
2, June 1990.
\5\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art.
20(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 21, 22(1); United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, last visited 14 July 16. China has signed
but not ratified the ICCPR.
\6\ Rights Defense Network, ``Authorities Force China Women's
Rights NGO `Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service Center' To
Shut Down'' [Zhongguo nuquan NGO ``zhongze funu falu zixun fuwu
zhongxin'' zao dangju qiangpo xuangao jiesan], 29 January 16. See also
Yaxue Cao, ``Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of Women in
China,'' China Change, 14 February 16.
\7\ Yaxue Cao, ``Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of Women
in China,'' China Change, 14 February 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``China
Is Said To Force Closing of Women's Legal Aid Center,'' New York Times,
Sinosphere (blog), 29 January 16.
\8\ Rights Defense Network, ``Authorities Force China Women's
Rights NGO `Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service Center' To
Shut Down'' [Zhongguo nuquan NGO ``zhongze funu falu zixun fuwu
zhongxin'' zao dangju qiangpo xuangao jiesan], 29 January 16; Didi
Kirsten Tatlow, ``China Is Said To Force Closing of Women's Legal Aid
Center,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 29 January 16. See also
Yaxue Cao, ``Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of Women in
China,'' China Change, 14 February 16.
\9\ American Bar Association, ``Chinese Lawyer Wang Yu To Receive
Inaugural ABA International Human Rights Award,'' 8 July 16. For more
information on Wang Yu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00252. For further information about the crackdown
on rights lawyers and advocates that began in and around July 2015, see
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 272.
\10\ Human Rights Watch, ``Arrests Reflect Xi Jinping's Broader
Repression of Rights Activism,'' 14 January 16.
\11\ Chris Buckley, ``China Arrests Rights Lawyer and Her Husband
on Subversion Charges,'' New York Times, 13 January 16; ``A Human
Rights Film China Wants Canned,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in
Straits Times, 9 June 16. For more information on Li Tingting, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00116.
\12\ Emily Rauhala, ``Jailed Chinese Lawyer Reappears To Deliver a
`Confession,' but the Script Seems Familiar,'' Washington Post, 1
August 16; ``China Releases Prominent Human Rights Lawyer on Bail,''
Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times, 1 August 16; Josh Chin,
``Chinese Activist Wang Yu Seen `Confessing' in Video,'' Wall Street
Journal, 1 August 16. See also American Bar Association, ``Chinese
Lawyer Wang Yu To Receive Inaugural ABA International Human Rights
Award,'' 8 July 16.
\13\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``For Four Essays, Foshan's Su
Changlan To Be Tried April 21 for Inciting Subversion of State Power''
[Yi si pian wenzhang wei you bei shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui
qisu de foshan su changlan an jiang yu 4 yue 21 ri kaiting shenli], 19
April 16. For more information on Su Changlan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00406.
\14\ ``Trials Postponed Again for Foshan Rights Defenders Su
Changlan, Chen Qitang'' [Foshan weiquan renshi su changlan, chen qitang
shenxun zai bei yanqi], Radio Free Asia, 10 August 16.
\15\ Human Rights Campaign in China, ``For Four Essays, Foshan's Su
Changlan To Be Tried April 21 for Inciting Subversion of State Power''
[Yi si pian wenzhang wei you bei shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui
qisu de foshan su changlan an jiang yu 4 yue 21 ri kaiting shenli], 19
April 16.
\16\ Amid the domestic and international outcry for the release of
the five women's rights advocates, ``Feminist Five'' emerged as a label
and social media hashtag to identify them. See, e.g., ``Before
International Women's Day, Feminist Five and Their Lawyers Are Called
in by Police,'' China Change, 6 March 16; ``Chinese Police Step Up
Pressure on Feminist Five,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 September 15.
\17\ ``One Year On, China's Five Feminists Remain Under Tight
Surveillance,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 March 16.
\18\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Police Remove Bail Conditions on 5
Chinese Feminists Detained Last Year,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 13 April 16; ``One Year On, China's Five Feminists Remain Under
Tight Surveillance,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 March 16; Human Rights in
China, ``Supporting Women's Rights in China,'' 14 April 16; CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 173. For more information on the ``five
feminists,'' see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2015-00114 on Wei Tingting, 2015-00115 on Wang Man, 2015-00116 on Li
Tingting, 2015-00117 on Wu Rongrong, and 2015-00118 on Zheng Churan.
\19\ Philip Wen, ``China's Few Defiant Feminists Jailed, Harassed,
Watched,'' Sydney Morning Herald, 12 December 15.
\20\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 11(1); United
Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, last visited
3 August 16. China signed the convention on July 17, 1980, and ratified
it on November 4, 1980. International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7;
United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, last
visited 14 July 16. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and
ratified it on March 27, 2001.
\21\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 48; PRC Labor Law
[Zhongghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5 July 94, effective 1
January 95, art. 13; PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and
Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3
April 92, amended 28 August 05, effective 1 December 05, art. 2.
\22\ ``Discrimination Against Pregnant Woman Riles Netizens,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 5 March 16.
\23\ World Economic Forum, ``The Global Gender Gap Report 2015:
China,'' 18 November 15. Eighteen percent of firms have women in senior
management positions, according to the World Economic Forum Global
Gender Gap Report.
\24\ Ibid.
\25\ ``NPC Deputies Recommended the Development of an Employment
Anti-Discrimination Law To Improve Mechanisms for Protecting Equal
Employment Rights'' [Renda daibiao jianyi zhiding fan jiuye qishi fa,
wanshan pingdeng jiuye quan baozhang jizhi], China Internet Information
Center, 4 November 15.
\26\ ``Discrimination Against Pregnant Woman Riles Netizens,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 5 March 16; ``Women Complain About
Gender Discrimination in Workplace,'' China Daily, 8 March 16;
``Catalyst Quick Take: Women in the Workforce: China,'' Catalyst, 8
July 16. See also CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 173.
\27\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed 5
July 94, effective 1 January 95, arts. 12, 13. Gender-based
discrimination against employees or applicants for employment is
prohibited under Articles 12 and 13 of the PRC Labor Law. See also
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Decision Regarding
Revising ``PRC Employment Services and Employment Management
Regulations'' [Guanyu xiugai ``jiuye fuwu yu jiuye guanli guiding'' de
jueding], issued 29 December 14, effective 1 February 15, arts. 20, 58.
\28\ ``Building a Society With Equal Employment for Women,'' Sina,
translated in Women of China, 6 February 15; China Labour Bulletin,
``Workplace Discrimination,'' last visited 5 August 16; Jonathan
Kaiman, ``In China, Feminism Is Growing--And So Is the Backlash,'' Los
Angeles Times, 15 June 16.
\29\ ``Chinese Activists Probe Colleges Over Sexist Job Adverts,''
Radio Free Asia, 31 March 16; China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace
Discrimination,'' last visited 5 August 16; Luo Wangshu, ``Woman Sues
Logistics Firm for Discrimination,'' China Daily, 29 September 15;
``Women Complain About Gender Discrimination in Workplace,'' China
Daily, 8 March 16; Mao Kaiyun, `` `Already Nourished' Becomes the
Standard To Measure Suspected Employment Discrimination'' [``Yiyu''
cheng jiuye fama shexian qishi], Beijing Morning Post, reprinted in
Sina, 8 March 16.
\30\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last
visited 5 August 16.
\31\ Nuquan Zhi Sheng (genderinchina), ``She Was the First Woman To
Sue a State-Owned Enterprise for Gender-Based Employment
Discrimination, Then Won'' [Ta shi zhongguo di yi ge zhuanggao guoqi
jiuye xingbie qishi de nusheng, ranhou ying le], Weibo post, 3 November
15, 10:59 a.m.; Maria Siow, ``Gender Discrimination Lawsuit in China
Creates Buzz Among Activists,'' Channel NewsAsia, 20 September 15; Luo
Wangshu, ``Woman Sues Logistics Firm for Discrimination,'' China Daily,
29 September 15.
\32\ Nuquan Zhi Sheng (genderinchina), ``She Was the First Woman To
Sue a State-Owned Enterprise for Gender-Based Employment
Discrimination, Then Won'' [Ta shi zhongguo di yi ge zhuanggao guoqi
jiuye xingbie qishi de nusheng, ranhou ying le], Weibo post, 3 November
15, 10:59 a.m.; Maria Siow, ``Gender Discrimination Lawsuit in China
Creates Buzz Among Activists,'' Channel NewsAsia, 20 September 15;
``Waiting for Verdict in China Gender-Based Employment Discrimination
Case'' [Zhongguo jiuye xingbie qishi an dengdai fayuan panjue], Radio
Free Asia, 25 September 15; China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace
Discrimination,'' last visited 5 August 16.
\33\ Nuquan Zhi Sheng (genderinchina), ``She Was the First Woman To
Sue a State-Owned Enterprise for Gender-Based Employment
Discrimination, Then Won'' [Ta shi zhongguo di yi ge zhuanggao guoqi
jiuye xingbie qishi de nusheng, ranhou ying le], Weibo post, 3 November
15, 10:59 a.m.; China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,''
last visited 5 August 16.
\34\ Lin Jie, ``Woman Rejected for Kitchen Apprenticeship Due to
Gender'' [Yi nusheng yingpin chufang xuetu yin xingbie zao ju], China
Youth Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 18 September 15; Jonathan
Kaiman, ``In China, Feminism Is Growing--And So Is the Backlash,'' Los
Angeles Times, 15 June 16.
\35\ Jonathan Kaiman, ``In China, Feminism Is Growing--And So Is
the Backlash,'' Los Angeles Times, 15 June 16.
\36\ Ibid.
\37\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Guangzhou Chef Goes to Court Again in
Gender Discrimination Battle,'' 22 August 16.
\38\ Ibid.
\39\ ``Women Complain About Gender Discrimination in Workplace,''
China Daily, 8 March 16; China Labour Bulletin, ``Workplace
Discrimination,'' last visited 5 August 16; China Labour Bulletin,
``Pregnant Women Workers Struggle To Defend Their Rights in China's
Factories,'' 1 December 15; ``Discrimination Against Pregnant Woman
Riles Netizens,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 5 March 16;
``Gender Inequality Still Exists in the Workplace,'' China Women's
News, reprinted in Women of China, 3 August 16; PRC Law on the
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
funu quanyi baozhang fa], passed 3 April 92, amended 28 August 05,
effective 1 December 05, art. 27. An employer may not rescind the labor
contract of an employee during ``pregnancy, childbirth, or while
nursing.'' PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], passed
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 29(3).
\40\ ``Gender Inequality Still Exists in the Workplace,'' China
Women's News, reprinted in Women of China, 3 August 16.
\41\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Pregnant Women Workers Struggle To
Defend Their Rights in China's Factories,'' 1 December 15; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Workplace Discrimination,'' last visited 5 July 16.
\42\ Ibid.
\43\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16.
\44\ ``Legislators Approve China's First Law Against Domestic
Violence,'' Xinhua, 27 December 15; ``China's Domestic Violence Law
Gets Mixed Reception,'' Voice of America, 29 December 15; Wang
Xiaodong, ``Law To Get Tough on Domestic Violence,'' China Daily, 5
March 15; Robin Runge, ``Operating in a Narrow Space To Effect Change:
Development of a Legal System Response to Domestic Violence in China,''
in Comparative Perspectives on Gender Violence: Lessons From Efforts
Worldwide, eds. Rashmi Goel and Leigh Goodmark (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 31. In her essay detailing the advocacy
efforts and challenges leading up to the final adoption of the PRC
Anti-Domestic Violence Law, Robin Runge notes that anti-domestic
violence advocates and women's rights scholars in China have been
advocating for the past 25 years for the Chinese government to
recognize domestic violence as a crime in both law and policy. For more
background regarding the drafting of the law, see also CECC, 2015
Annual Report, 8 October 15, 174-75.
\45\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, arts.
15, 23; ``China Exclusive: China's Anti-Domestic Violence Laws To
Protect Wives,'' Xinhua, 30 December 15; China Law Translate, ``Thicker
Than Water: An Overview of China's New Domestic Violence Law,'' 31
December 15.
\46\ ``China Exclusive: China's Anti-Domestic Violence Laws To
Protect Wives,'' Xinhua, 30 December 15; Emily Rauhala, ``Domestic
Abuse Is Thriving in China's Culture of Silence,'' Washington Post, 2
May 16. According to the All-China Women's Federation, only a fraction
of abused wives report domestic violence.
\47\ Emily Rauhala, ``China's Domestic Violence Law Is a Victory
for Feminists. But They Say It Doesn't Go Far Enough,'' Washington
Post, 29 December 15; ``China's Domestic Violence Law Gets Mixed
Reception,'' Voice of America, 29 December 15; ``Activists Welcome
China's 1st Domestic Violence Law,'' Associated Press, 28 December 15;
``China's First Anti-Domestic Violence Law Is Formally Unveiled''
[Zhongguo shoubu fan jiabao fa zhengshi chutai], Radio Free Asia, 28
December 15.
\48\ Emily Rauhala, ``China's Domestic Violence Law Is a Victory
for Feminists. But They Say It Doesn't Go Far Enough,'' Washington
Post, 29 December 15; ``China's Domestic Violence Law Gets Mixed
Reception,'' Voice of America, 29 December 15; ``China's First Anti-
Domestic Violence Law Is Formally Unveiled'' [Zhongguo shoubu fan
jiabao fa zhengshi chutai], Radio Free Asia, 28 December 15; PRC Anti-
Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan jiating baoli fa],
passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, arts. 2, 37.
\49\ ``Activists Welcome China's 1st Domestic Violence Law,''
Associated Press, 28 December 15; PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December
15, effective 1 March 16 art. 2.
\50\ ``China Exclusive: China's Anti-Domestic Violence Laws To
Protect Wives,'' Xinhua, 30 December 15; ``China's First Anti-Domestic
Violence Law Is Formally Unveiled'' [Zhongguo shoubu fan jiabao fa
zhengshi chutai], Radio Free Asia, 28 December 15; PRC Anti-Domestic
Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan jiating baoli fa], passed
27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, arts. 2, 13, 15-17, 19, 23-32,
37.
\51\ Emily Rauhala, ``China's Domestic Violence Law Is a Victory
for Feminists. But They Say It Doesn't Go Far Enough,'' Washington
Post, 29 December 15; ``China's Domestic Violence Law Gets Mixed
Reception,'' Voice of America, 29 December 15; ``China's First Anti-
Domestic Violence Law Is Formally Unveiled'' [Zhongguo shoubu fan
jiabao fa zhengshi chutai], Radio Free Asia, 28 December 15;
``Activists Welcome China's 1st Domestic Violence Law,'' Associated
Press, 28 December 15; PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo fan jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1
March 16.
\52\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, arts.
23, 28; China Law Translate, ``Thicker Than Water: An Overview of
China's New Domestic Violence Law,'' 31 December 15.
\53\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, art.
28; ``Activists Welcome China's 1st Domestic Violence Law,'' Associated
Press, 28 December 15.
\54\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, art.
29; China Law Translate, ``Thicker Than Water: An Overview of China's
New Domestic Violence Law,'' 31 December 15.
\55\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the
Fourth World Conference on Women on 27 October 95, and endorsed by UN
General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 22 December 95, paras. 115,
124(b); UN Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, General Recommendations Made by the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, last
visited 24 June 16, General Recommendation No. 19 (11th Session, 1992),
paras. 22, 24(m); General Recommendation No. 21 (13th Session, 1994),
paras. 21-23.
\56\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 51.
\57\ Ibid., paras. 51, 52.
\58\ UN Committee against Torture, List of Issues in Relation to
the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its
54th Session (20 April-15 May 2015), CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.1, 15 June 15,
paras. 17(a), 18; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD and Coalition
of NGOs Information Submission to the UN Committee Against Torture for
Consideration in List of Issues--February 2015,'' 9 February 15, paras.
8(b) (including endnote 16), 14(a). For background on the types of
abuse female detainees face in black jails, see Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, `` `We Can Beat You to Death With Impunity': Secret
Detention & Abuse of Women in China's `Black Jails,' '' October 2014,
1, 8-16.
\59\ UN Committee against Torture, List of Issues in Relation to
the Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its
54th Session (20 April-15 May 2015), CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.1, 15 June 15,
para. 17(a); Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CHRD and Coalition of
NGOs Information Submission to the UN Committee Against Torture for
Consideration in List of Issues--February 2015,'' 9 February 15, para.
8(b) (including endnote 16). For more information on the eight former
detainees of the Masanjia Women's Reeducation Through Labor (RTL)
Center who were subsequently imprisoned, see the following records in
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database: 2015-00307 on Shi Junmei,
2015-00347 on Su Dezhen, 2015-00348 on Sun Rongyou, 2015-00349 on Zhao
Lifen, 2015-00350 on Shi Guiying, 2015-00351 on Zhong Shujuan, 2015-
00352 on Zhu Jianyun, and 2015-0353 on Li Li. For more information on
Masanjia and the RTL system, see CECC, ``Special Topic Paper: Prospects
for Reforming China's Reeducation Through Labor System,'' 9 May 13.
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Human Trafficking
Trends and Developments
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, China remained
a country of origin \1\ and destination \2\ for the trafficking
of men, women, and children, as defined under the UN Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol).\3\ According
to United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in
Persons (UN-ACT), men, women, and children reportedly were
trafficked within China's borders for forced labor, forced
marriage, and sexual exploitation.\4\ UN-ACT specifically
highlighted the problems of forced marriage as well as forced
begging and street performing in China.\5\ In addition to
domestic human trafficking,\6\ cross-border trafficking was a
significant concern.\7\ The International Organization for
Migration (IOM) and International Labour Organization (ILO)
reported that international criminal networks were driving an
increase in human trafficking of Chinese nationals,
particularly women, to Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.\8\
UN-ACT also reported that anecdotal evidence pointed to an
increase in cross-border trafficking from China to Southeast
Asia.\9\ The Commission observed media reports of an increase
in the trafficking of women from Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia,
Vietnam, and Nepal to China for forced marriage or sexual
exploitation.\10\
Experts noted a dearth of accurate statistics on the scale
of human trafficking in the region due to a variety of factors,
including the hidden and often disorganized nature of the
crime, governments' collusion with human traffickers, confusion
over the definition of human trafficking, and the use of
problematic methodologies in data collection.\11\
FORCED LABOR AND NORTH KOREAN WORKERS IN CHINA
This past year, the Commission observed reports of North
Korean laborers in China working under conditions experts
described as forced or slave labor.\12\ According to a
September 2015 report by Marzuki Darusman, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in recent years
the DPRK government sent over 50,000 North Korean nationals to
work abroad in conditions that ``amount[ed] to forced labor.''
\13\ The Asan Institute for Policy Studies estimated in 2013
that 19,000 such workers were in China.\14\ According to Greg
Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea, the overseas workers earned between
US$150 and US$230 million per year for the DPRK government.\15\
North Korean workers reportedly worked long hours in
substandard conditions for low pay, and in some cases workers
received no pay.\16\ According to the UN report, DPRK security
agents accompanied the workers abroad, restricted their freedom
of movement, confiscated their passports, and subjected them to
constant surveillance.\17\ The U.S. State Department and the UN
TIP Protocol include forced labor within their respective
definitions of human trafficking.\18\ [For more information on
North Korean refugees and the risk of human trafficking, see
Risk Factors in this section and Section II--North Korean
Refugees in China.]
FORCED LABOR IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION CENTERS
Although the Chinese government abolished the reeducation
through labor (RTL) system in 2013,\19\ similar forms of
arbitrary detention employing forced labor remain in place. The
RTL system was a form of administrative punishment in which
detainees were detained without trial \20\ and subjected to
forced labor.\21\ RTL detainee labor constituted human
trafficking as defined by the UN TIP Protocol.\22\ Following
the abolition of RTL, authorities have reportedly continued to
use similar forms of administrative detention, including
``custody and education'' and compulsory drug
detoxification,\23\ in which detainees perform forced
labor.\24\ Zhang Sujun, Vice Minister of the Ministry of
Justice, said in November 2014 that most RTL facilities were
converted to compulsory drug detoxification centers,\25\ and in
June 2015 he reported that the number of individuals held in
detoxification centers had increased by about 29 percent
compared to the previous year.\26\ In February 2016, the China
National Narcotics Control Commission (CNNCC) reported that
although the number of drug users remained stable in 2015, the
total number of individuals investigated and detained for drug
use increased compared to 2014.\27\ CNNCC did not report the
number of suspected drug users being held in compulsory drug
detoxification centers.\28\
Risk Factors
China's ongoing human trafficking problem stems from a
variety of social, economic, and political factors. According
to UN-ACT, internal migrant workers in China were vulnerable to
being trafficked for forced labor.\29\ Migrant workers'
children, often unable to migrate with their parents, were
reportedly at risk for forced labor, forced marriage, and
sexual exploitation.\30\ Individuals with disabilities were at
risk for forced labor and forced begging.\31\ The IOM and ILO
reported that poor rural women were vulnerable to trafficking
from China to Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.\32\ Poverty
and political instability contributed to human trafficking from
Southeast Asia to China for forced labor and sexual
exploitation.\33\
North Korean refugees who escaped into China also remained
at risk of human trafficking. The Chinese government continued
to treat North Korean refugees as economic migrants,
repatriating all undocumented North Korean migrants.\34\
Although border crossings have reportedly decreased in recent
years,\35\ the majority of North Koreans who crossed the border
into China were women, and their reliance on smugglers left
them vulnerable to trafficking for forced marriage and sexual
exploitation.\36\ A UN report noted that female North Korean
workers sent to China were also at risk of sexual
exploitation.\37\ [For more information, see Section II--North
Korean Refugees in China.]
China's sex ratio imbalance--exacerbated by government-
imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional bias for
sons \38\--created a demand for marriageable women that may
contribute to human trafficking for forced marriage and sexual
exploitation.\39\ According to estimates by the National Bureau
of Statistics of China, in 2015, China had 33.66 million more
men than women.\40\ The official sex ratio at birth, while
lower than previous years,\41\ remained high at approximately
113.5 boys born for every 100 girls.\42\ According to
demographers, a typical sex ratio at birth is within the range
of 103 to 107 boys born for every 100 girls.\43\ In December
2015, the Chinese government adjusted its population policy to
allow all married couples to have two children.\44\ Experts
disagreed over the extent to which this new policy would
further reduce the sex ratio imbalance.\45\ [For more
information on China's population policies, see Section II--
Population Control.]
Anti-Trafficking Efforts
The Chinese government increased punishments for buyers of
trafficked women and children under domestic law, but the
number of human trafficking convictions fell. On November 1,
2015, an amendment to the PRC Criminal Law took effect \46\
that included a change to Article 241 regarding buyers of
trafficked women and children.\47\ Previously, buyers could
avoid criminal liability if they did not harm the victim or
prevent authorities from rescuing the victim.\48\ The amended
law provides that buyers will face criminal liability,\49\
although they may receive lighter or reduced punishments.\50\
In March 2016, the Supreme People's Court announced that in
2015, courts nationwide handled 853 human trafficking cases and
convicted 1,362 individuals.\51\ This represented an almost 56-
percent decline in the number of cases and a nearly 63-percent
decline in the number of convictions compared to 2010.\52\ [For
information on how the definition of human trafficking under
Chinese law contributes to the unreliability of government
trafficking statistics, see Anti-Trafficking Challenges in this
section.]
During this reporting year, the Chinese government
continued to participate in regional efforts to combat human
trafficking. In November 2015, the governments of China and
Cambodia drafted a Memorandum of Understanding to address the
trafficking of Cambodian women to China for forced
marriage.\53\ The Chinese government continued its involvement
in the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against
Trafficking (COMMIT),\54\ participating in a joint workshop of
COMMIT and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
in December 2015.\55\
Anti-Trafficking Challenges
Although the PRC Criminal Law prohibits human
trafficking,\56\ China's domestic legislation remains
inconsistent with UN TIP Protocol standards.\57\ The UN TIP
Protocol definition of human trafficking involves three
components: the action of recruitment, transfer, harboring, or
receipt of persons; the means of force, coercion, fraud,
deception, or control; and ``the purpose of exploitation,''
including sexual exploitation or forced labor.\58\ The
definition of trafficking under Chinese law \59\ does not
clearly cover all forms of trafficking covered under Article 3
of the UN TIP Protocol,\60\ such as certain types of non-
physical coercion \61\ or offenses against male victims.\62\
Although the China Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons
(2013-2020), issued by the State Council in January 2013,
revised the Chinese term for trafficking to include all persons
(guaimai renkou),\63\ the amended PRC Criminal Law, which took
effect on November 1, 2015, referred to only women and children
(guaimai funu ertong).\64\
The PRC Criminal Law is also overly broad compared with the
UN TIP Protocol in that its definition of trafficking includes
the purchase or abduction of children for subsequent sale
without specifying the end purpose of these actions.\65\ Under
the UN TIP Protocol, illegal adoptions are considered
trafficking only if the end purpose of the sale is
exploitation, such as sexual exploitation or forced labor.\66\
According to the U.S. State Department, the inconsistencies
between China's legal definition of human trafficking and
international standards contributed to the unreliability of
data in official reports and statistics on the number of
trafficking cases China's criminal justice system handles.\67\
Hong Kong
During the reporting year, Hong Kong was a destination for
human trafficking, with migrant domestic workers particularly
at risk of exploitation for forced labor.\68\ According to the
Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department's 2015 annual
digest, as of 2014, there were over 330,000 migrant domestic
workers working in households in Hong Kong, the majority of
whom came from the Philippines and Indonesia.\69\ In December
2015, the UN Committee against Torture noted its concern ``over
numerous reports of cases of exploitation of migrant domestic
workers.'' \70\ In March 2016, the migrants' rights non-
governmental organization Justice Centre Hong Kong (JCHK) \71\
released findings from a survey of over 1,000 migrant domestic
workers, finding that 17 percent of respondents were working
under conditions of forced labor.\72\ JCHK also found that 66.3
percent of respondents showed ``strong signs of exploitation''
such as excessive working hours.\73\
The UN Committee against Torture as well as domestic and
international non-governmental organizations expressed concern
that Hong Kong's laws did not adequately address human
trafficking.\74\ While China acceded to the UN TIP Protocol in
2010, the Chinese central government has not extended the
Protocol to apply to Hong Kong.\75\ Moreover, the definition of
human trafficking in Hong Kong's Crimes Ordinance covered only
the cross-border movement of persons ``for the purpose of
prostitution,'' not forced labor or other forms of
trafficking.\76\ The UN Committee against Torture and JCHK
further noted that two regulations--requiring migrant domestic
workers to live with their employers \77\ and to leave Hong
Kong within two weeks of termination of a contract \78\--
contributed to migrants' risk of exploitation for forced
labor.\79\
In January 2016, one alleged victim of human trafficking
challenged the Hong Kong government in court, arguing that Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance requires the Hong Kong
government to enact stronger anti-trafficking legislation.\80\
The man who brought the legal challenge reportedly took a
position in Hong Kong as a domestic worker, but his employer
instead forced him to work in an office from 2007 to 2010.\81\
During this time, his employer and the employer's family
physically abused him, withheld his passport, and refused to
pay him.\82\ A labor tribunal reportedly awarded the man less
than 15 percent of the HK$220,000 (US$28,000) he claimed the
employer owed him.\83\ The Hong Kong High Court heard testimony
about the case in January 2016.\84\ As of August 2016, the
Commission had not observed any further information on the
status of the legal challenge. [For more information on Hong
Kong, see Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.]
Human
Trafficking
Human
Trafficking
Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
\1\ See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016,
130; International Organization for Migration and International Labour
Organization, ``Overview: Project Activities Throughout the Year and
the Way Forward,'' EU-China Dialogue on Migration and Mobility Support
Project Newsletter, Issue 2, January 2016, 4; ``Brussels Warns That
Mass Migration to EU May Exacerbate Human Trafficking,'' Deutsche
Welle, 19 May 16.
\2\ See, e.g., United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime,
``Protecting Peace and Prosperity in Southeast Asia: Synchronizing
Economic and Security Agendas,'' February 2016, 26; Taylor O'Connell
and Ben Sokhean, ``Human Trafficking Up, Spurred by Migration,''
Cambodia Daily, 26 February 16; Pratichya Dulal, ``When Danger Lurks
Close to One's Home,'' Kathmandu Post, 15 December 15.
\3\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force
25 December 03, art. 3(a). This protocol is also commonly referred to
as the Palermo Protocol because it was adopted in Palermo, Italy, in
2000. China acceded to the Protocol on February 8, 2010. United Nations
Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, 12.a, Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, last visited 10 June 16. For information
on how international standards regarding forced labor fit into the
framework of the UN TIP Protocol, see International Labour
Organization, International Labour Office, ``Human Trafficking and
Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidance for Legislation and Law
Enforcement,'' 2005, 10; International Labour Organization,
International Labour Office, ``Hard To See, Harder To Count: Survey
Guidelines To Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children,'' 2012,
12, 19.
\4\ ``China,'' United Nations Action for Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), last visited 15 April 16.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ See, e.g., Jun Mai, ``Women Held in a China Pigsty To Be Sold
as Brides by Trafficking Gang Had Mental Impairments,'' South China
Morning Post, 15 October 15; Mimi Lau, ``Diary of a Sex Slave: Police
Rescue 5 Girls, Including a 12-Year-Old, From Sex Ring in West China;
Five More Still Missing,'' South China Morning Post, 2 November 15.
\7\ See, e.g., International Organization for Migration and
International Labour Organization, ``Overview: Project Activities
Throughout the Year and the Way Forward,'' EU-China Dialogue on
Migration and Mobility Support Project Newsletter, Issue 2, January
2016, 4; ``China,'' United Nations Action for Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), last visited 15 April 16; Gopal
Sharma, ``Rise in Nepali Women Trafficked to China, South Korea--Rights
Commission,'' Thomson Reuters Foundation, 27 April 16.
\8\ International Organization for Migration and International
Labour Organization, ``Overview: Project Activities Throughout the Year
and the Way Forward,'' EU-China Dialogue on Migration and Mobility
Support Project Newsletter, Issue 2, January 2016, 4.
\9\ ``China,'' United Nations Action for Cooperation against
Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), last visited 15 April 16.
\10\ Soe Maung and Swan Ye Htut, ``Police Colonel Addresses Child
Abduction Rumours, Human Trafficking,'' Myanmar Times, 3 February 16;
Saing Soenthrith and Aria Danaparamita, ``Trilateral Agreement Signed
To Combat Human Trafficking,'' Cambodia Daily, 18 January 16; Taylor
O'Connell and Ben Sokhean, ``Human Trafficking Up, Spurred by
Migration,'' Cambodia Daily, 26 February 16; Lucy Nguyen, ``Vietnamese
Woman Jumps Out of Car in China To Escape Human Traffickers,'' Thanh
Nien News, 15 March 16; Gopal Sharma, ``Rise in Nepali Women Trafficked
to China, South Korea--Rights Commission,'' Thomson Reuters Foundation,
27 April 16.
\11\ See, e.g., Jessie Brunner, East-West Center, ``Inaccurate
Numbers, Inadequate Polices: Enhancing Data To Evaluate the Prevalence
of Human Trafficking in ASEAN,'' 2015, vi-vii; Dan Southerland,
``Progress in Fight Against Human Trafficking in Asia Hard To
Measure,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 April 16; Janie A. Chuang, ``Exploitation
Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law,'' American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 108, No. 4 (October 2014), 609-10; United
Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT),
``UN-ACT Research Strategy: Vulnerabilities, Trends and Impact,'' 2015,
1. For publication date of UN-ACT report, see United Nations Action for
Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), ``Research,'' last
visited 23 July 16.
\12\ See, e.g., Michael Larkin, ``Interview: Behind North Korea's
Use of `Slave Labor,''' The Diplomat, 8 October 15; Edith M. Lederer,
``UN Investigator: North Koreans Doing Forced Labor Abroad,''
Associated Press, 28 October 15; ``North Koreans Endure `Forced Labor'
in China To Earn Money for the Regime,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 November
15.
\13\ UN General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/70/362, 8 September 15, paras.
24, 26. See also Shin Chang-Hoon and Go Myong-Hyun, Asan Institute for
Policy Studies, ``Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in DPRK,''11
December 14, 21-30; International Network for the Human Rights of North
Korean Overseas Labor, ``The Conditions of the North Korean Overseas
Labor,'' December 2012, 19-21.
\14\ Shin Chang-Hoon and Go Myong-Hyun, Asan Institute for Policy
Studies, ``Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in DPRK,'' 11
December 14, 30.
\15\ Michael Larkin, ``Interview: Behind North Korea's Use of
`Slave Labor,''' The Diplomat, 8 October 15.
\16\ Ibid.; Brian Padden, ``Activists Seek Better Conditions for
North Korean Migrant Laborers,'' Voice of America, 23 December 15;
``North Koreans Endure `Forced Labor' in China To Earn Money for the
Regime,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 November 15; UN General Assembly,
Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
A/70/362, 8 September 15, para. 27.
\17\ UN General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/70/362, 8 September 15, para.
27. See also Seol Song Ah, ``North Korean Restaurants in Dandong
Failing To Pay Workers' Salaries,'' Daily NK, 28 March 16; Brian
Padden, ``Activists Seek Better Conditions for North Korean Migrant
Laborers,'' Voice of America, 23 December 15.
\18\ U.S. Department of State, ``What Is Modern Slavery?'' last
visited 11 April 16; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). For information on how
international standards regarding forced labor fit into the framework
of the UN TIP Protocol, see International Labour Organization,
International Labour Office, ``Human Trafficking and Forced Labour
Exploitation: Guidance for Legislation and Law Enforcement,'' 2005, 7-
15; International Labour Organization, International Labour Office,
``Hard To See, Harder To Count: Survey Guidelines To Estimate Forced
Labour of Adults and Children,'' Second Edition, 2012, 12, 19.
\19\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision on
Abolishing Laws and Regulations Regarding Reeducation Through Labor
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu feizhi youguan
laodong jiaoyang falu guiding de jueding], issued and effective, 28
December 13; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 130.
\20\ Amnesty International, ```Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' ASA 17/
042/2013, 17 December 13, 5; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully Abolish
Re-Education Through Labor,'' 8 January 13; State Council, Decision on
the Issue of Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu laodong
jiaoyang wenti de jueding], issued 3 August 57, item 3; State Council,
Supplementary Provisions on Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu
laodong jiaoyang de buchong guiding], issued 29 November 79, items 1-2.
\21\ Amnesty International, ```Changing the Soup but Not the
Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in China,'' ASA 17/
042/2013, 17 December 13, 17-18; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Fully
Abolish Re-Education Through Labor,'' 8 January 13; State Council,
Decision on the Issue of Reeducation Through Labor [Guowuyuan guanyu
laodong jiaoyang wenti de jueding], issued 3 August 57, item 2.
\22\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force
25 December 03, art. 3(a). Reeducation through labor (RTL) inmate labor
can be viewed as constituting trafficking under Article 3(a) of the UN
TIP Protocol, as RTL facility authorities engaged in the ``harbouring''
and ``receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force . . .
for the purpose of exploitation.'' According to Article 3(a),
exploitation includes ``forced labour.'' ILO Convention (No. 29)
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 28 June 30, art. 2. Article 2.1
of the Forced or Compulsory Labour Convention defines ``forced or
compulsory labour'' as ``all work or service which is exacted from any
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person
has not offered himself voluntarily.'' Article 2.2(c) makes an
exception for ``Any work or service extracted from any person as a
consequence of a conviction in a court of law . . ..'' As RTL inmates
were detained without trial, this exception did not apply. For more
information on conditions RTL inmates faced, including ``the threat or
use of force,'' see, e.g., Amnesty International, ```Changing the Soup
but Not the Medicine?': Abolishing Re-Education Through Labour in
China,'' ASA 17/042/2013, 17 December 13, 17-33; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Fully Abolish Re-Education Through Labor,'' 8 January 13. See
also Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 130.
\23\ Amnesty International, ``China: Submission to the United
Nations Committee Against Torture,'' 28 October 15, 17; Alexandra
Harney et al., ``U.S. Downplayed Evidence of Abuses in Chinese
Detention Camps,'' Reuters, 30 December 15; Chi Yin and Jerome A.
Cohen, ``Lack of Due Process Mars China's War on Drugs,'' East Asia
Forum, 20 July 15; Huang Qi, 64 Tianwang, ``He Peng of Xichang,
Sichuan, Escorted From Two Sessions, Sent to Drug Detoxification
Center'' [Sichuan xichang he peng lianghui yafan song jiedusuo], 14
March 16. For relevant legal provisions, see PRC Narcotics Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jindu fa], passed 29 December 07, effective
1 June 08, arts. 38, 41, 43, 47; State Council, Drug Detoxification
Regulations [Jiedu tiaoli], issued 26 June 11; Ministry of Justice,
Judicial and Administrative Bureaus Compulsory Drug Detoxification Work
Regulations [Sifa xingzheng jiguan qiangzhi geli jiedu gongzuo gui-
ding], issued 3 April 13, effective 1 June 13; State Council, Measures
on Custody and Education of Prostitutes [Maiyin piaochang renyuan
shourong jiaoyu banfa], issued 4 September 93, amended 8 January 11.
\24\ Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Administrative Bureaus
Compulsory Drug Detoxification Work Regulations [Sifa xingzheng jiguan
qiangzhi geli jiedu gongzuo guiding], issued 3 April 13, effective 1
June 13, art. 43; Alexandra Harney et al., ``U.S. Downplayed Evidence
of Abuses in Chinese Detention Camps,'' Reuters, 30 December 15. See
also Human Rights Watch, ```Where Darkness Knows No Limits':
Incarceration, Ill-Treatment, and Forced Labor as Drug Rehabilitation
in China,'' January 2010, 27-31; Asia Catalyst, ```Custody and
Education': Arbitrary Detention for Female Sex Workers in China,''
December 2013, 8, 25-27.
\25\ Sun Ying, ``Ministry of Justice: Vast Majority of Nation's
Former Reeducation Through Labor Centers Have Been Turned Into
Compulsory Drug Detoxification Centers'' [Sifabu: quanguo jueda duoshu
yuan laojiao changsuo zhuan wei qiangzhi geli jiedu changsuo], China
National Radio, 5 November 14.
\26\ Sun Chunying, ``Establish and Improve Judicial-Administrative
Drug Detoxification System With Chinese Characteristics'' [Jianli he
wanshan zhongguo tese sifa xingzheng jiedu zhidu], Legal Daily, 1 June
15.
\27\ China National Narcotics Control Commission, ``2015 Report on
Narcotics Trends in China'' [2015 nian zhongguo dupin xingshi baogao],
18 February 16, reprinted in China Narcotics Net, 18 February 16.
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in
Persons (UN-ACT), ``China,'' last visited 7 April 16.
\30\ Lucy Hornby, ``FT Seasonal Appeal: China's Missing Children,''
Financial Times, 2 December 15.
\31\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 130;
Supreme People's Procuratorate and China Disabled Persons' Federation,
Opinion on Procuratorial Work To Ensure Protection of the Legal Rights
and Interests of Persons With Disabilities [Guanyu zai jiancha gongzuo
zhong qieshi weihu canji ren hefa quanyi de yijian], issued 8 December
15, para. 4.
\32\ International Organization for Migration and International
Labour Organization, ``Overview: Project Activities Throughout the Year
and the Way Forward,'' EU-China Dialogue on Migration and Mobility
Support Project Newsletter, Issue 2, January 2016, 4.
\33\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Protecting Peace and
Prosperity in Southeast Asia: Synchronizing Economic and Security
Agendas,'' February 2016, 21; Anemi Wick, ``Trafficked Vietnamese
Brides'' [Bei guaimai de yuenan xinniang], Deutsche Welle, 13 February
16; Andrew R.C. Marshall, ``Led by China, Mekong Nations Take on Golden
Triangle Narco-Empire,'' Reuters, 15 March 16; Get It Right This Time:
A Victims-Centered Trafficking in Persons Report, Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House
of Representatives, 22 March 16, Testimony of Matthew Smith, Executive
Director of Fortify Rights. See also United Nations Action for
Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), ``COMMIT SOM/IMM
Concluded,'' 5 May 15.
\34\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
paras. 46-47; Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2016: Events of
2015,'' 2016, 430.
\35\ Anna Fifield, ``Just About the Only Way To Escape North Korea
Is if a Relative Has Already Escaped,'' Washington Post, 31 March 16;
Human Rights Watch, ``North Korea--World Report 2016: Events of 2015,''
2016, 429-30; Chun Su-jin and Kim So-hee, ``More Elite Flee Though
Pyongyang Tightens Up,'' Korea JoongAng Daily, 13 April 16.
\36\ Elizabeth Shim, ``More North Korean Women Risking Arrest,
Abuse To Sneak Into China for Work,'' United Press International, 19
November 15; Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2016: Events of 2015,''
2016, 429-30.
\37\ UN General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, A/70/362, 8 September 15, para.
42.
\38\ Dan Southerland, ``Progress in Fight Against Human Trafficking
in Asia Hard To Measure,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 April 16; Liberty Asia
and Thomson Reuters Foundation, ``From Every Angle: Using the Law To
Combat Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia,'' November 2014, 44;
Population Reference Bureau, ``PRB Discuss Online: Will China Relax Its
One-Child Policy? '' 22 February 11.
\39\ Dan Southerland, ``Progress in Fight Against Human Trafficking
in Asia Hard To Measure,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 April 16; Get It Right
This Time: A Victims-Centered Trafficking in Persons Report, Hearing of
the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House
of Representatives, 22 March 16, Testimony of Mark Lagon, President,
Freedom House; Liberty Asia and Thomson Reuters Foundation, ``From
Every Angle: Using the Law To Combat Human Trafficking in Southeast
Asia,'' November 2014, 44.
\40\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2015 National
Economy Steadily Progressing and Stable'' [2015 nian guomin jingji
yunxin wen zhong you jin, wen zhong you hao], 19 January 16.
\41\ Hu Hao, ``China's Sex Ratio at Birth Falls Sixth [Year] in a
Row'' [Woguo chusheng renkou xingbie bi liu lian jiang], Xinhua, 4
February 15; Chen Xianling, ``China's Sex Ratio Highest in the World,
[In] 34 Years 30 Million `Extra' Men Born'' [Woguo xingbie bi pian gao
shijie di yi 34 nian ``duo'' chu 3000 wan nanxing], Southern
Metropolitan Daily, 11 February 15; ``China's Sex Ratio at Birth
Declines 4 Years in a Row,'' Xinhua, 5 March 13.
\42\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``2015 National
Economy Steadily Progressing and Stable'' [2015 nian guomin jingji
yunxin wen zhong you jin, wen zhong you hao], 19 January 16.
\43\ See, e.g., UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ``The
World's Women 2015: Trends and Statistics,'' 2015, 6; Christophe Z.
Guilmoto, ``Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in
China and India, 2005-2100,'' Demography, Vol. 49 (2012), 77-78; Stuart
Basten and Georgia Verropoulou, ```Maternity Migration' and the
Increased Sex Ratio at Birth in Hong Kong SAR,'' Population Studies,
Vol. 67, No. 3 (2013), 325; Population Control in China: State-
Sponsored Violence Against Women and Children, Hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 30 April 15, Testimony of
Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2.
\44\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision
Regarding Amending the Population and Family Planning Law [Quanguo
renda changweihui guanyu xiugai renkou yu jihua shengyu fa de jueding],
issued 27 December 15.
\45\ Shen Lu and Katie Hunt, ``China's One-Child Policy Goes but
Heartache Remains,'' CNN, 31 December 15; ``Sex Ratio Imbalance in
China Giving Many Men `Difficulty With Marriage''' [Zhongguo dalu nannu
bili shiheng ling daliang nanxing ``hunpei nan''], Radio Free Asia, 19
January 16; Dan Southerland, ``Progress in Fight Against Human
Trafficking in Asia Hard To Measure,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 April 16.
\46\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal
Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa xiuzheng'an
(jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15.
\47\ Ibid., item 15.
\48\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 241; International
Organization for Migration and International Labour Organization,
``Recent Migration-Related Policy Developments,'' EU-China Dialogue on
Migration and Mobility Support Project Newsletter, Issue 2, January
2016, 2.
\49\ ``Xinhua Insight: Infant Trafficking Rooted in Poverty,
Ignorance of Law,'' Xinhua, 24 January 16; ``It's a Crime, I Tell Ya:
Major Changes in China's Criminal Law Amendment 9,'' China Law
Translate (blog), 27 September 15; International Organization for
Migration and International Labour Organization, ``Recent Migration-
Related Policy Developments,'' EU-China Dialogue on Migration and
Mobility Support Project Newsletter, Issue 2, January 2016, 2; Chen
Liping, ``Pointing Out Seven Major Highlights of the Criminal Law
Amendment (Nine) Draft'' [Dianji xing fa xiuzheng'an (jiu) cao'an de qi
da liangdian], Legal Daily, 28 October 14.
\50\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal
Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa xiuzheng'an
(jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, item 15. This
wording is slightly different from earlier drafts of the amendment. The
first draft provided that buyers of trafficked women who did not
prevent the women from returning home and buyers of children who had
not harmed them could receive a light or reduced punishment, or be
``exempt'' from punishment. The second draft provided that buyers could
receive a light or reduced punishment in cases involving trafficked
children, or be ``exempt'' from punishment in cases that involved
trafficked women. National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC
Criminal Law Amendment (Nine) (Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing
fa xiuzheng'an (jiu) (cao'an)], 3 November 14, item 13; National
People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal Law Amendment (Nine)
(Draft) (Second Reading) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa xiuzheng'an
(jiu) (cao'an) (er ci shenyi gao)], 6 July 15, item 15.
\51\ Xu Jun, ``High Incidence of Trafficking in Women and Children
Beginning To Be Contained'' [Guaimai funu ertong fanzui gaofa taishi
chubu ezhi], People's Daily, 8 March 16.
\52\ Ibid.
\53\ Chhay Channyda, ``China-Kingdom MOU Targets Illicit Bride
Market,'' 12 March 16; Caitlin Richards, United Nations Action for
Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), ``Cambodia and
China Partnering To Protect Vulnerable Migrant Women,'' UN-ACT (blog),
10 December 15.
\54\ Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation against Trafficking
in Persons in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region, signed 29 October 04,
reprinted in UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons,
last visited 14 July 16. The six signatories to the MOU were Cambodia,
China, Lao PDR, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and Vietnam.
\55\ United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in
Persons (UN-ACT), ``UN-ACT Project Updates,'' UN-ACT Newsletter,
January 2016; ``Police To Attend Anti-Trafficking Meeting,'' Myanmar
Times, 13 October 15.
\56\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 240.
\57\ Topics that need to be addressed in domestic legislation to
bring it into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol include the
protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking (see UN TIP
Protocol, Article 6.3), the addition of non-physical forms of coercion
into the legal definition of trafficking (see UN TIP Protocol, Article
3(a)), and the trafficking of men (covered under the definition of
``trafficking in persons'' in Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol). See
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force 25
December 03.
\58\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What Is Human
Trafficking?'' last visited 22 June 16; UN Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by General
Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entered into force 25
December 03, art. 3(a, c, d). Note that for children under age 18, the
means described in Article 3(a) are not required for an action to
constitute human trafficking. For information on how international
standards regarding forced labor fit into the framework of the UN TIP
Protocol, see International Labour Office, International Labour
Organization, ``Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation:
Guidance for Legislation and Law Enforcement,'' 2005, 7-15;
International Labour Office, International Labour Organization, ``Hard
To See, Harder To Count: Survey Guidelines To Estimate Forced Labour of
Adults and Children,'' Second Edition, 2012, 12, 19.
\59\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as
``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or
transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.''
\60\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November
00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). See also United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``What Is Human Trafficking?'' last
visited 22 June 16.
\61\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 240, 244, 358. For additional information on this
topic, see Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' 19 June 13,
130. According to this report, ``it remains unclear whether [articles
240, 244, and 358] have prohibited the use of common non-physical forms
of coercion, such as threats of financial or reputational harm, or
whether acts such as recruiting, providing, or obtaining persons for
compelled prostitution are covered.''
\62\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as
``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or
transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.''
\63\ State Council General Office, ``China Action Plan To Combat
Trafficking in Persons (2013-2020)'' [Zhongguo fandui guaimai renkou
xingdong jihua (2013-2020 nian)], 2 March 13.
\64\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Criminal
Law Amendment (Nine) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa xiuzheng'an
(jiu)], issued 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15; PRC Criminal Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February
09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective 1 November 15, art. 240.
The amendment did not include a change to Article 240 of the PRC
Criminal Law, which defines human trafficking using the term
``trafficking in women and children'' (guaimai funu ertong). Item 15 of
the PRC Criminal Law Amendment revising Article 241 of the PRC Criminal
Law refers only to women and children.
\65\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, art. 240. The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as
``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or
transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.''
\66\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN TIP
Protocol), adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November
00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a, c). The end result of
exploitation is one of the required elements of a trafficking case
under Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol. See also UN General Assembly,
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to
Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the Official
Records (Travaux Preparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols
Thereto, A/55/383/Add. 1, 3 November 00, para. 66.
\67\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S.
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016, 131.
For examples of the conflation of illegal adoption with human
trafficking during the Commission's 2016 reporting year, see, e.g.,
``Key Figure in Guangxi Cross-Border Infant Trafficking Case Executed''
[Guangxi teda kuaguo fan ying an zhu fan bei zhixing sixing], Legal
Daily, reprinted in People's Daily, 17 August 16; Xu Jun, ``High
Incidence of Trafficking in Women and Children Beginning To Be
Contained'' [Guaimai funu ertong fanzui gaofa taishi chubu ezhi],
People's Daily, 8 March 16; ``Xinhua Insight: Infant Trafficking Rooted
in Poverty, Ignorance of Law,'' Xinhua, 24 January 16; ``Death Penalty
Implemented for Trafficker of 22 Children'' [Guaimai 22 ming ertong
zuifan bei zhixing sixing], Xinhua, 29 January 16.
\68\ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Protecting Peace and
Prosperity in Southeast Asia: Synchronizing Economic and Security
Agendas,'' February 2016, 34; Justice Centre Hong Kong, ``Coming Clean:
The Prevalence of Forced Labour and Human Trafficking for the Purpose
of Forced Labour Amongst Migrant Domestic Workers in Hong Kong,'' March
2016, 6-7, 52, 64; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report,'' June 2016,
194.
\69\ Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, ``Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics''
[Xianggang tongji niankan], October 2015, 43. See also Justice Centre
Hong Kong, ``Coming Clean: The Prevalence of Forced Labour and Human
Trafficking for the Purpose of Forced Labour Amongst Migrant Domestic
Workers in Hong Kong,'' March 2016, 6, 20. Note that the Hong Kong
government refers to migrant domestic workers as ``foreign domestic
helpers.''
\70\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China With Respect to Hong Kong, China,
adopted by the Committee at its 1392nd and 1393rd Meetings (3 December
2015), CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5, 3 February 16, para. 20.
\71\ Justice Centre Hong Kong, ``Who We Are,'' last visited 15 July
16.
\72\ Justice Centre Hong Kong, ``Coming Clean: The Prevalence of
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking for the Purpose of Forced Labour
Amongst Migrant Domestic Workers in Hong Kong,'' March 2016, 7, 33, 52.
\73\ Ibid., 7, 54.
\74\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China With Respect to Hong Kong, China,
adopted by the Committee at its 1392nd and 1393rd Meetings (3 December
2015), CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5, 3 February 16, para. 20; Justice Centre Hong
Kong, ``Coming Clean: The Prevalence of Forced Labour and Human
Trafficking for the Purpose of Forced Labour Amongst Migrant Domestic
Workers in Hong Kong,'' March 2016, 26; Liberty Asia and Reed Smith
Richards Butler, ``Legal Overview of Human Trafficking in Hong Kong,''
2015, 7-8.
\75\ United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, 12.a., Penal
Matters, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, last visited
23 July 16. See also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and
Eighth Periodic Reports of China, adopted by the Committee at its 59th
session (20 October-7 November 2014), CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8, 14 November
14, para. 56.
\76\ Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) [Di 200 zhang xingshi zuixing
tiaoli], amended 2 August 12, sec. 129(1); Hong Kong Bar Association,
``Hong Kong Bar Association's Submission to the United Nations
Committee Against Torture,'' 17 October 15, para. 22; Liberty Asia and
Reed Smith Richards Butler, ``Legal Overview of Human Trafficking in
Hong Kong,'' 2015, 15.
\77\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Visa/Extension of Stay Application Form for
Domestic Helper From Abroad, last visited 18 July 16, 6(ii); Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government, Immigration Department,
Employment Contract (for a Domestic Helper Recruited From Abroad), last
visited 18 July 16, 3; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government, Immigration Department, ``Foreign Domestic Helpers,'' last
visited 18 July 16, Q30. See also Danny Lee, ``Hong Kong Domestic
Helpers Arrested in Crackdown on `Live-Out' Maids,'' South China
Morning Post, 29 January 15.
\78\ Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government,
Immigration Department, Visa/Extension of Stay Application Form for
Domestic Helper From Abroad, last visited 18 July 16, 6(vi); Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government, Immigration Department,
``Conditions of Employment for Foreign Domestic Helpers: A General
Guide to the Helper,'' last visited 18 July 16, 3; Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government, Immigration Department, ``Foreign
Domestic Helpers,'' last visited 18 July 16, Q33, Q44. See also
Adrienne Chum, ``Helping Hands: The Two-Week Rule,'' HK Magazine, 30
July 15.
\79\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China With Respect to Hong Kong, China,
adopted by the Committee at its 1392nd and 1393rd Meetings (3 December
2015), CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5, 3 February 16, para. 20; Justice Centre Hong
Kong, ``Coming Clean: The Prevalence of Forced Labour and Human
Trafficking for the Purpose of Forced Labour Amongst Migrant Domestic
Workers in Hong Kong,'' March 2016, 23.
\80\ Adam Severson, ``Reviewing Hong Kong's Human Trafficking
Case,'' Justice Centre Hong Kong (blog), 15 January 16; Justice Centre
Hong Kong, ``Coming Clean: The Prevalence of Forced Labour and Human
Trafficking for the Purpose of Forced Labour Amongst Migrant Domestic
Workers in Hong Kong,'' March 2016, 26; Eddie Lee, ``South Asian in
Judicial Review Had To Return to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages, High Court
Hears,'' South China Morning Post, 15 January 16; Legislative Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383) [Di 383 zhang xianggang renquan fa'an
tiaoli], amended 30 June 97, sec. 8, art. 4. See also Astrid Zweynert,
``Trafficking Victim To Challenge Hong Kong's Lack of Forced Labor Law
in Court,'' Thomson Reuters Foundation, 16 July 15.
\81\ ``Man Tricked Into Working in Hong Kong, Then Forced To Work
Unpaid, Beaten: Lawyers,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Straits
Times, 12 January 16; Eddie Lee, ``South Asian in Judicial Review Had
To Return to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages, High Court Hears,'' South
China Morning Post, 15 January 16; Justice Centre Hong Kong, ``Coming
Clean: The Prevalence of Forced Labour and Human Trafficking for the
Purpose of Forced Labour Amongst Migrant Domestic Workers in Hong
Kong,'' March 2016, 26.
\82\ Roland Lim, ``Landmark Case To Test Human Trafficking Laws in
Hong Kong,'' Channel News Asia, 12 January 16; Eddie Lee, ``South Asian
in Judicial Review Had To Return to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages, High
Court Hears,'' South China Morning Post, 15 January 16; Eddie Lee, ``I
Have Faith in Hong Kong Government, South Asian Seeking Trafficking
Review Tells Court,'' South China Morning Post, 12 January 16.
\83\ ``Man Tricked Into Working in Hong Kong, Then Forced To Work
Unpaid, Beaten: Lawyers,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Straits
Times, 12 January 16; Eddie Lee, ``South Asian in Judicial Review Had
To Return to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages, High Court Hears,'' South
China Morning Post, 15 January 16.
\84\ Roland Lim, ``Landmark Case To Test Human Trafficking Laws in
Hong Kong,'' Channel NewsAsia, 13 January 16; Eddie Lee, ``South Asian
in Judicial Review Had To Return to Hong Kong for Unpaid Wages, High
Court Hears,'' South China Morning Post, 15 January 16.
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean Refugees in China
Introduction
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the Chinese
government's policy of detaining North Korean refugees and
repatriating them to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) remained in place, despite substantial evidence that
repatriated persons face torture, imprisonment, execution, and
other inhuman treatment.\1\ The Chinese government regards
North Koreans who enter China without proper documentation as
illegal economic migrants \2\ and maintains a policy of
forcible repatriation based on a 1986 border protocol with the
DPRK.\3\ China's repatriation of North Korean refugees
contravenes its international obligations under the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention)
and its 1967 Protocol, to which China has acceded.\4\
China is obligated under the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to
refrain from repatriating persons if there are ``grounds for
believing that [they] would be in danger of being subject to
torture.'' \5\ In November 2015, the UN Committee against
Torture (Committee) conducted its fifth periodic review of
China's compliance with the Convention.\6\ In its concluding
observations, the Committee stated its concerns about China's
lack of ``national asylum legislation and administrative
procedures'' for determining refugee status, as well as China's
``rigorous policy of forcibly repatriating all nationals of the
[DPRK] on the ground that they have illegally crossed the
border solely for economic reasons.'' \7\ The Committee urged
China to address these concerns by incorporating the
``principle of non-refoulement'' into domestic legislation,
``immediately ceas[ing] forcible repatriation of undocumented
migrants and victims of trafficking'' to the DPRK, and allowing
``UNHCR personnel unimpeded access to nationals of the [DPRK] .
. . in order to determine if they qualify for refugee status.''
\8\
Repatriation of Refugees and Border Conditions
This past year, heightened security measures along the
China-North Korea and China-Southeast Asia borders increased
the risks North Korean refugees face. In November 2015, Human
Rights Watch reported an October 2015 case in which Vietnamese
authorities detained nine North Korean refugees--including an
11-month-old infant--near the China-Vietnam border and later
transferred them to Chinese authorities in the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region.\9\ Chinese authorities subsequently
transferred the group to a military base in Tumen city, Yanbian
Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, near the China-
North Korea border, causing concerns that authorities planned
to repatriate them.\10\ China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
refused to answer a media inquiry from Radio Free Asia
regarding the condition of these nine North Korean
refugees.\11\ As of August 2016, the Commission had not
observed any updates about the group.
Heightened border security may be limiting the outflow of
refugees from the DPRK, as demonstrated by the smaller number
of refugees reaching South Korea.\12\ South Korean Ministry of
Unification data reportedly showed that the number of refugees
who reached South Korea decreased from 1,397 in 2014 to 1,277
in 2015,\13\ continuing the trend of a significant decline in
the number of refugees entering South Korea since 2011.\14\
Crackdown on Foreign Aid Workers
During this reporting year, Chinese and North Korean
authorities continued to crack down on organizations and
individuals--including foreign aid workers, Christian
missionaries and churches, and non-governmental organizations--
that have played a crucial role in assisting and facilitating
the movement of North Korean refugees outside the DPRK.\15\ In
January 2016, Chinese authorities indicted Canadian citizen
Kevin Garratt, accusing him of ``spying and stealing China's
state secrets.'' \16\ Garratt and his wife operated a coffee
shop near the North Korean border in Dandong municipality,
Liaoning province, and were reportedly involved in assisting
North Korean refugees.\17\
North Korean Workers in China
During this reporting year, the Commission observed reports
of North Korean laborers in China working under exploitative
conditions. According to Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of
the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, the DPRK
government sent about 50,000 North Korean nationals to work
overseas and subjected them to ``very harsh conditions of
work'' that ``amount to forced labor.'' \18\ These ``harsh''
work conditions reportedly include long working hours with
little or no time off,\19\ ``strict supervision'' by North
Korean agents,\20\ confiscation of pay,\21\ violence,\22\
health and safety hazards,\23\ and sexual harassment and
exploitation.\24\ [For more information on North Korean workers
in China, see Section II--Human Trafficking.]
This past year, some North Korean restaurant workers
escaped to South Korea from their work sites in China.
According to media reports, the DPRK government operated more
than 130 restaurants overseas, about 100 of which were located
in China, earning approximately US$10 million per year for the
DPRK government.\25\ One South Korean media outlet reported
that about 350 to 400 North Koreans, including 50 minors,
worked at these restaurants in China.\26\
April 2016. According to South Korean media
reports, a group of 13 North Korean restaurant workers
in Ningbo municipality, Zhejiang province, escaped to
South Korea via a Southeast Asian country.\27\ On April
11, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lu
Kang confirmed the incident at a press conference, and
emphasized that the restaurant workers left China with
valid passports.\28\
May 2016. Three North Korean restaurant
workers in Weinan municipality, Shaanxi province,
reportedly escaped to South Korea via Thailand without
passports.\29\
Trafficking of North Korean Women
North Korean women who enter China illegally remain
particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. The demand for
trafficked North Korean women has been linked to a sex ratio
imbalance in China exacerbated by the Chinese government's
population planning policies.\30\ Sources indicate that the
majority of North Korean refugees leaving the DPRK are
women,\31\ many of whom are trafficked by force or deception
from the DPRK into or within China for the purposes of forced
marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.\32\ The Chinese
government's refusal to recognize these women as refugees
denies them legal protection and encourages the trafficking of
North Korean women and girls within China.\33\ China is
obligated under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women and the UN Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children to take measures to safeguard trafficking victims
and suppress all forms of trafficking in women.\34\
Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents
Many children born to Chinese fathers and North Korean
mothers remain deprived of basic rights to education and other
public services, owing to a lack of legal resident status in
China. According to some estimates, the population in China of
children born to North Korean women ranges between 20,000 and
30,000.\35\ The PRC Nationality Law provides that all children
born in China are entitled to Chinese nationality if either
parent is a Chinese citizen.\36\ Despite this stipulation and a
December 2015 policy change to register 13 million ``illegal
residents'' (heihu) who lack household registration (hukou) in
China,\37\ Chinese authorities reportedly continue to largely
deprive these children of their rights to birth registration
and nationality,\38\ and their North Korean mothers remain
deterred from registering these children due to fear of
repatriation.\39\ Without proof of resident status, these
children are unable to access education and other public
services.\40\ In some cases, bribery of local officials has
reportedly allowed a very small number of children to obtain
identification documents.\41\ The denial of nationality rights
and access to education for these children contravenes China's
obligations under international law, including the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\42\
North Korean
Refugees in
China
North Korean
Refugees in
China
Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
\1\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 46. In the Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report
of China, the UN Committee against Torture noted ``over 100 testimonies
received by United Nations sources . . . in which nationals of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicate that persons forcibly
repatriated to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been
systematically subjected to torture and ill-treatment.'' Sophie
Richardson, Human Rights Watch, ``Dispatches: China's Tired Line on
Human Rights in North Korea,'' Dispatches (blog), 15 March 16; Zhang
Mengyuan, ``Thailand Complains That North Korean Refugees Are a Heavy
Burden, Over Two Thousand North Koreans Entered Into [Thailand]
Illegally'' [Taiguo baoyuan tuobeizhe cheng zhongfu nian yu liang qian
chaoxianren feifa rujing], Hudu News, reprinted in Sohu, 26 January 16;
Choe Sang-Hun, ``South Korea Says It's Working To Halt Refugees' Return
to North,'' New York Times, 26 November 15; Xu Jiadong, ``If Forcibly
Repatriated by the CCP, [They] Could Face Torture and Death''
[Tuobeizhe ruo bei zhonggong qiangxing qianfan jiang mianlin kuxing he
siwang], Aboluowang, 26 November 15.
\2\ Christine Chung, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
``China Responds to the Committee against Torture,'' HRNK Insider
(blog), 4 December 15; Choe Sang-Hun, ``South Korea Says It's Working
To Halt Refugees' Return to North,'' New York Times, 26 November 15;
``Human Rights Watch Calls on China To Not Repatriate Nine North Korean
Refugees'' [Renquan guancha yu zhongguo wu qianfan jiu ming chaoxian
nanmin], Radio Free Asia, 21 November 15.
\3\ Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of State
Security, People's Republic of China Ministry of Public Security,
Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National
Security and Social Order in the Border Areas, signed 12 August 86,
art. 4(1), reprinted in North Korea Freedom Coalition. The protocol
commits each side to treat as illegal those border crossers who do not
have proper visa certificates, except in cases of ``calamity or
unavoidable factors.'' See also ``China's Policy Change Toward North
Korea Disastrous for Defectors'' [Zhongguo dui chao zhengce chuxian
bianhua yangji tuobeizhe de chujing], Radio Free Asia, 24 November 15.
\4\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28
July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly
resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, entry into force 22 April 54,
arts. 1(A2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by the
1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, `` . . . owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country . . ..'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that,
``No Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.'' Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2198 (XXI) of 16 December 66,
entry into force 4 October 67. See also UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, ``UNHCR, Refugee Protection and
International Migration,'' 17 January 07. According to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, ``People who leave their own country for
non-refugee related reasons may nevertheless acquire a well-founded
fear of persecution in their own country following their departure. An
economic migrant may . . . become a `refugee sur place', when there is
an armed conflict or violent change of regime in that person's country
of origin, or when the government or other actors in that country begin
to inflict human rights violations on the community of which that
migrant is a member.''
\5\ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art.
3. Article 3 states that, ``No State Party shall expel, return
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.'' The Chinese government ratified the Convention
on October 4, 1988.
\6\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 1.
\7\ Ibid., para. 46.
\8\ Ibid., para. 47.
\9\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Return Nine North Korean
Refugees,'' 21 November 15; Choe Sang-Hun, ``South Korea Says It's
Working To Halt Refugees' Return to North,'' New York Times, 26
November 15; ``Human Rights Watch Calls on China To Not Repatriate Nine
North Korean Refugees'' [Renquan guancha yu zhongguo wu qianfan jiu
ming chaoxian nanmin], Radio Free Asia, 21 November 15.
\10\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Return Nine North Korean
Refugees,'' 21 November 15; ``China's Policy Change Toward North Korea
Disastrous for Defectors'' [Zhongguo dui chao zhengce chuxian bianhua
yangji tuobeizhe de chujing], Radio Free Asia, 24 November 15; Xu
Jiadong, ``If Forcibly Repatriated by the CCP, [They] Could Face
Torture and Death'' [Tuobeizhe ruo bei zhonggong qiangxing qianfan
jiang mianlin kuxing he siwang], Aboluowang, 26 November 15.
\11\ ``China's Policy Change Toward North Korea Disastrous for
Defectors'' [Zhongguo dui chao zhengce chuxian bianhua yangji tuobeizhe
de chujing], Radio Free Asia, 24 November 15.
\12\ Lee Jin-a, ``High Cost Puts Squeeze on Would-Be NK
Defectors,'' Korea Times, 19 April 16; Chun Su-jin and Kim So-hee,
``More Elite Flee Though Pyongyang Tightens Up,'' Korea JoongAng Daily,
13 April 16; Susan Cheong, ``North Korean Defections Drop Under Kim
Jong-un,'' Australia Broadcasting Corporation, 4 May 16.
\13\ ``North Korean Defectors Arriving in South Korea in 2015 About
Half the Number Compared to Before Kim Jong-un's Rule'' [2015 nian di
han tuobeizhe jiao jin zheng'en zhizheng qian jian ban], Yonhap News
Agency, 4 January 16; Lin Senhai, ``Korean Media: Under Kim Jong-un's
Rule in North Korea, `Defectors' Entering South Korea Reduced by Half''
[Hanmei: jin zheng'en zhizheng chaoxian hou jinru hanguo de
``tuobeizhe'' jian ban], Global Times, 5 January 16; ``South Korea: The
Number of North Korean Defectors Who Arrived in South Korea This Past
Year Reduced to Half Compared to Before Kim Jong-un's Rule'' [Han:
qunian di han tuobeizhe renshu jiao jin zheng'en shangtai qian shao
yiban], South China Morning Post, 5 January 16.
\14\ ``North Korean Defectors Arriving in South Korea in 2015 About
Half the Number Compared to Before Kim Jong-un's Rule'' [2015 nian di
han tuobeizhe jiao jin zheng'en zhizheng qian jian ban], Yonhap News
Agency, 4 January 16. The number of North Koreans who defected to the
South was 2,706 in 2011. Lin Senhai, ``Korean Media: Under Kim Jong-
un's Rule in North Korea, `Defectors' Entering South Korea Reduced by
Half'' [Hanmei: jin zheng'en zhizheng chaoxian hou jinru hanguo de
``tuobeizhe'' jian ban], Global Times, 5 January 16; ``South Korea: The
Number of North Korean Defectors Who Arrived in South Korea This Past
Year Reduced to Half Compared to Before Kim Jong-un's Rule'' [Han:
qunian di han tuobeizhe renshu jiao jin zheng'en shangtai qian shao
yiban], South China Morning Post, 5 January 16; Chun Su-jin and Kim So-
hee, ``More Elite Flee Though Pyongyang Tightens Up,'' Korea JoongAng
Daily, 13 April 16.
\15\ Elizabeth Shim, ``More North Korean Women Risking Arrest,
Abuse To Sneak Into China for Work,'' United Press International, 19
November 15; ``North Korean Refugees Come in Contact With the Christian
Faith Near the Chinese Border, First Taste of Freedom'' [Tuobeizhe zai
zhongguo bianjing jiechu jidu xinyang, chu chang ziyou ziwei], Union of
Catholic Asian News, 19 October 15; Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North
Korean Children Living in Limbo in China,'' Guardian, 5 February 16;
Stefan J. Bos, ``Breaking News: Korean Christian Worker Feared
Kidnapped by North Korea,'' BosNewsLife, 21 April 16.
\16\ Catherine E. Shoichet, ``China Indicts Canadian Kevin Garratt
on Spying Charges,'' CNN, 28 January 16; ``Canadian Citizen Indicted in
China on Charges of Stealing State Secrets,'' Xinhua, 28 January 16.
\17\ ``North Korean Refugees Come in Contact With the Christian
Faith Near the Chinese Border, First Taste of Freedom'' [Tuobeizhe zai
zhongguo bianjing jiechu jidu xinyang, chu chang ziyou ziwei], Union of
Catholic Asian News, 19 October 15; ``Canadian Man Kevin Garratt
Charged in China Over State Secrets,'' BBC, 29 January 16; Chris
Buckley, ``China To Try Canadian on Spying Charges,'' New York Times,
28 January 16.
\18\ Greg Scarlatoiu, ``Loyal but Exploited: North Korea's Overseas
Laborers,'' Washington Times, 30 March 16. See also Seol Song Ah, ``N.
Korean Workers in China Spread Even Thinner,'' Daily NK, 31 May 16.
\19\ Greg Scarlatoiu, ``Loyal but Exploited: North Korea's Overseas
Laborers,'' Washington Times, 30 March 16; Adam Taylor, ``The Weird
World of North Korea's Restaurants Abroad,'' Washington Post, 8 April
16; Seol Song Ah, ``Pay Cuts, Longer Hours for N. Korean Workers in
China,'' Daily NK, 25 April 16.
\20\ Greg Scarlatoiu, ``Loyal but Exploited: North Korea's Overseas
Laborers,'' Washington Times, 30 March 16. See also Hyun-jin Kim, ``N.
Koreans: Brutal Work Abroad Better Than Life Back Home,'' Associated
Press, 12 April 16; Anna Fifield, ``North Korean Restaurant Workers
Defect En Masse to South Korea,'' Washington Post, 8 April 16; ``N.K.
Hit by Int'l Sanctions Closes Over 30 Restaurants Abroad: Source,''
Yonhap News Agency, 12 July 16.
\21\ Greg Scarlatoiu, ``Loyal but Exploited: North Korea's Overseas
Laborers,'' Washington Times, 30 March 16; Hyun-jin Kim, ``N. Koreans:
Brutal Work Abroad Better Than Life Back Home,'' Associated Press, 12
April 16; Seol Song Ah, ``Pay Cuts, Longer Hours for N. Korean Workers
in China,'' Daily NK, 25 April 16. See also Alastair Gale, ``North
Korea's Largest Recent Defector Group Arrives in South Korea,'' Wall
Street Journal, 8 April 16.
\22\ Hyun-jin Kim, ``N. Koreans: Brutal Work Abroad Better Than
Life Back Home,'' Associated Press, 12 April 16.
\23\ Greg Scarlatoiu, ``Loyal but Exploited: North Korea's Overseas
Laborers,'' Washington Times, 30 March 16.
\24\ Hyun-jin Kim, ``N. Koreans: Brutal Work Abroad Better Than
Life Back Home,'' Associated Press, 12 April 16.
\25\ ``N. Korean Restaurant Staff Who Defected En Masse Worked in
China: Source,'' Yonhap News Agency, 10 April 16; ``N.K. Hit by Int'l
Sanctions Closes Over 30 Restaurants Abroad: Source,'' Yonhap News
Agency, 12 July 16; Kim So-hee and Kim Hyoung-gu, ``More Overseas
Workers of North May Flee,'' Korea JoongAng Daily, 11 April 16.
\26\ ``N.K. Hit by Int'l Sanctions Closes Over 30 Restaurants
Abroad: Source,'' Yonhap News Agency, 12 July 16.
\27\ Kim So-hee and Kim Hyoung-gu, ``More Overseas Workers of North
May Flee,'' Korea JoongAng Daily, 11 April 16; ``13 Defectors Fled
Restaurant While Supervisor Was Away,'' Chosun Ilbo, 12 April 16;
Rachel Lee, ``Defections May Fray China-NK Ties,'' Korea Times, 10
April 16.
\28\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``On April 11, 2016, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lu Kang Holds Regular Press Conference''
[2016 nian 4 yue 11 ri waijiaobu fayanren lu kang zhuchi lixing
jizhehui], 11 April 16.
\29\ Elizabeth Shim, ``Two North Korea Restaurant Workers in
Thailand Detention, Report Says,'' United Press International, 25 May
16; Elizabeth Shim, ``Three North Korean Waitresses Defect to South
Korea,'' United Press International, 1 June 16; Kim Jin-cheol, ``S.
Korea Taking Very Different Approach to Latest Defection of N. Korean
Restaurant Staff,'' Hankyoreh, 3 June 16.
\30\ Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in
Limbo in China,'' Guardian, 5 February 16; Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon
Park, European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible
Children: The Stateless Children of North Korean Refugees,'' December
2015; Elizabeth Shim, ``More North Korean Women Risking Arrest, Abuse
To Sneak Into China for Work,'' United Press International, 19 November
15; Sun Xiaobo, ``Price of Women Driven Up by Gender Imbalance,''
Global Times, 27 February 16.
\31\ Sokeel Park, Liberty in North Korea, ``Most North Korean
Refugees Are Women. Here's Why.,'' 8 March 16; Lin Senhai, ``Korean
Media: Under Kim Jong-un's Rule in North Korea, Defectors Entering
South Korea Reduced by Half'' [Hanmei: jin zheng'en zhizheng chaoxian
hou jinru hanguo de ``tuobeizhe'' jian ban], Global Times, 5 January
16; Elizabeth Shim, ``More North Korean Women Risking Arrest, Abuse To
Sneak Into China for Work,'' United Press International, 19 November
15.
\32\ Park Ji-hyun, ``Women Who Live Under Another Sky--Demanding
the Chinese Government Prohibit Trafficking of North Korean Women and
Stop Repatriating North Korean Defectors'' [Huo zai ling yi tiankong
xia de nuxing--yaoqiu zhongguo zhengfu jinzhi fanmai beihan funu
huodong ji tingzhi qianfan tuobeizhe], InMediaHK, 1 October 15; Jenna
Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in Limbo in China,''
Guardian, 5 February 16; Elizabeth Shim, ``More North Korean Women
Risking Arrest, Abuse To Sneak Into China for Work,'' United Press
International, 19 November 15. See also Sokeel Park, Liberty in North
Korea, ``Most North Korean Refugees Are Women. Here's Why.,'' 8 March
16.
\33\ Park Ji-hyun, ``Women Who Live Under Another Sky--Demanding
the Chinese Government Prohibit Trafficking of North Korean Women and
Stop Repatriating North Korean Defectors'' [Huo zai ling yi tiankong
xia de nuxing--yaoqiu zhongguo zhengfu jinzhi fanmai beihan funu
huodong ji tingzhi qianfan tuobeizhe], InMediaHK, 1 October 15; Sylvia
Kim and Yong Joon Park, European Alliance for Human Rights in North
Korea, ``Invisible Children: The Stateless Children of North Korean
Refugees,'' December 2015.
\34\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18
December 79, entry into force 3 September 81, art. 6; Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03,
arts. 6, 9.
\35\ Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon Park, European Alliance for Human
Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible Children: The Stateless Children of
North Korean Refugees,'' December 2015, 4; Emma Batha, Thomson Reuters
Foundation, ``China Urged To Give Citizenship to Stateless Children of
Trafficked North Koreans,'' 9 December 15; Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000
North Korean Children Living in Limbo in China,'' Guardian, 5 February
16.
\36\ PRC Nationality Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoji fa],
passed, issued, and effective 10 September 80, art. 4. Article 4 of the
PRC Nationality Law provides that, ``Any person born in China having
both a father and mother who are Chinese nationals or having one parent
who is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality.''
\37\ Jiao Ying, ``Family Planning Policies To Be Delinked From
Hukou Registration, To Comprehensively Resolve the Issue of `Illegal
Residents' '' [Jihua shengyu deng zhengce jiang yu hukou dengji tuogou
quanmian jiejue ``heihu'' wenti], China National Radio, 10 December 15;
Wang Ling, ``Barriers To Resolving the Problem of Illegal Residents:
Some Areas Require Social Compensation Fee Payments Before Obtaining
Hukou'' [Jiejue heihu wenti yu zu: bufen diqu yaoqiu bujiao shehui
fuyangfei cai neng luohu], Chinese Business Network, 10 March 16.
\38\ Emma Batha, Thomson Reuters Foundation, ``China Urged To Give
Citizenship to Stateless Children of Trafficked North Koreans,'' 9
December 15; Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in
Limbo in China,'' Guardian, 5 February 16; Park Ji-hyun, ``Women Who
Live Under Another Sky--Demanding the Chinese Government Prohibit
Trafficking of North Korean Women and Stop Repatriating North Korean
Defectors'' [Huo zai ling yi tiankong xia de nuxing--yaoqiu zhongguo
zhengfu jinzhi fanmai beihan funu huodong ji tingzhi qianfan
tuobeizhe], InMediaHK, 1 October 15.
\39\ Jenna Yoojin Yun, ``30,000 North Korean Children Living in
Limbo in China,'' Guardian, 5 February 16; Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon
Park, European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible
Children: The Stateless Children of North Korean Refugees,'' December
2015.
\40\ Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon Park, European Alliance for Human
Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible Children: The Stateless Children of
North Korean Refugees,'' December 2015, 8; Park Ji-hyun, ``Women Who
Live Under Another Sky--Demanding the Chinese Government Prohibit
Trafficking of North Korean Women and Stop Repatriating North Korean
Defectors'' [Huo zai ling yi tiankong xia de nuxing--yaoqiu zhongguo
zhengfu jinzhi fanmai beihan funu huodong ji tingzhi qianfan
tuobeizhe], InMediaHK, 1 October 15; Emma Batha, Thomson Reuters
Foundation, ``China Urged To Give Citizenship to Stateless Children of
Trafficked North Koreans,'' 9 December 15.
\41\ Sylvia Kim and Yong Joon Park, European Alliance for Human
Rights in North Korea, ``Invisible Children: The Stateless Children of
North Korean Refugees,'' December 2015, 88.
\42\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2
September 90, arts. 2(1), 7, 28(1a). Under the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, China is obligated to register children born within the
country immediately after birth and also provide all children with
access to education without discrimination on the basis of nationality.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 3 January 76, art. 13. Under Article 13, China recognizes
that everyone has a right to education, including a free and compulsory
primary education.
Public Health
Public Health
Public Health
Health Care Reform
The Chinese government and Communist Party advanced policy
priorities for health care reform during the Commission's 2016
reporting year.\1\ Among them was a January 2016 announcement
merging the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS) and
the Urban Resident-Based Basic Medical Insurance Scheme
(URBMI), two of China's three health insurance schemes,\2\ to
improve medical access and resources in rural areas for 802
million people covered by NRCMS \3\ and the distribution of
benefits for 314 million people covered by URBMI.\4\ While
precursor pilot projects that consolidated NRCMS and URBMI
reported positive effects,\5\ uniform management of the merged
schemes may be a challenge, according to one health official,
because local-level governments are authorized to choose the
government agency responsible for local oversight.\6\ In
addition, migrant workers may lack adequate coverage under the
merger unless the government addresses the limited portability
of insurance benefits across provincial lines.\7\
Government entities also addressed the problem of
``commotions at hospitals'' (yi'nao) that have flared up over
patient-doctor disputes and grievances with medical
treatment,\8\ some of which have become violent and resulted in
fatalities of medical personnel.\9\ Four ministries issued
measures in March 2016 to improve hospital security.\10\ In
addition, in the Ninth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which
became effective in November 2015, impeding medical care was
specified as a ``social order'' disturbance under Article 290,
thereby strengthening the legal basis to impose harsher
criminal penalties in the prosecution of yi'nao.\11\
Transparency and Accountability
Propaganda officials issued censorship directives to media
outlets \12\ to prohibit reporting on health-related issues
deemed politically sensitive--such as patient-doctor disputes
\13\ and scalping tickets to shorten patients' wait times in
hospital lines \14\--or to limit coverage to authorized
versions of the news--such as the U.S. Government's blocking
two shipments of contaminated pharmaceutical products from
Tianjin municipality for import to the United States.\15\ A
state-funded news outlet's article in March 2016 about a
business in Shandong province that distributed unrefrigerated
vaccines in more than 20 provinces since 2010 \16\ was ``taken
offline,'' and a censorship directive instructed that there be
no further reprints or ``hyp[ing]'' of the article.\17\ The
news about the vaccines generated considerable public
concern,\18\ including joint letters from lawyer groups to
high-level government entities that demanded government
accountability, access to information, and stronger legal
remedies.\19\ Official media and the government later reported
on the government's actions to investigate the perpetrators of
the illegal vaccine business as well as possible health risks
from tainted vaccines.\20\
Parents who advocated for government accountability over
harm to their children's health and well-being encountered a
range of official responses. In March 2016, for example, public
security officials in Beijing municipality criminally detained
five parent advocates for 30 days for protesting problematic
vaccines.\21\ In April, authorities reportedly transferred
1,000 parents participating in a protest outside the National
Health and Family Planning Commission in Beijing to an
unofficial detention center.\22\ Some of the parents at that
protest reportedly filed lawsuits before being detained.\23\
Implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law
Forcibly committing individuals without mental illness to
psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing) as a ``form of
retaliation and punishment by Chinese authorities against
activists and government critics'' \24\ reportedly remains a
serious problem in China \25\ despite the PRC Mental Health
Law's (MHL) prohibition of such abuse.\26\ Prior to the UN
Committee against Torture's review of China's compliance with
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention) in November
2015, a network of human rights organizations highlighted the
case of the ongoing psychiatric hospitalization of a former
factory worker, Xing Shiku, as an example of the Chinese
government's disregard for its obligations as a State Party to
the Convention.\27\ Other cases of individuals who remain
detained in psychiatric facilities against their will for
reportedly politically motivated reasons include Xia Funian,
Wang Hedi, Xu Dajin, Wang Shou'an, and Zhang Wenhe.\28\
The Chinese government has prioritized mental health policy
as part of the ``right to health'' in national human rights
efforts in recent years,\29\ yet officials and experts have
observed a range of challenges in the implementation of the MHL
since it became effective in 2013. These challenges include
gaps in the legal framework regarding compulsory treatment \30\
and involuntary hospitalization procedures; \31\ a need for
more psychiatric facilities \32\ and community-based
rehabilitation services,\33\ and the psychiatrists and mental
health specialists to staff them; \34\ poor coordination of
responsibilities among the government agencies tasked with
mental health work; \35\ and the financial burdens of accessing
medical treatment without adequate insurance.\36\ Some
localities issued plans to implement the National Mental Health
Work Plan (2015-2020) \37\ with the launch of pilot projects in
37 municipalities \38\ and the drafting of new or revised local
mental health regulations.\39\ A focus on individuals with
severe mental disorders deemed at risk of violent behavior \40\
is evident in the national and local mental health policy
agendas.\41\ Wang Guoqiang, Vice Minister of the National
Health and Family Planning Commission, reportedly stated in
June 2016 that new pilot projects should ``strengthen the
management work of those with severe mental disorders who are
at risk of causing disruptive incidents and troubles [zhaoshi
zhaohuo].'' \42\ A Party-run media outlet, however, reported
that the rate of ``disruptive'' incidents committed by
individuals with mental illness is lower than that of the
population at large, yet public stigma against those with
psychosocial disorders persists.\43\
Rights Protection and Health-Based Discrimination
Although Chinese laws and regulations contain provisions to
prohibit discrimination due to disability and some health-based
conditions,\44\ two Chinese scholars observed a gap between law
and practice in rights protection for persons with disabilities
in a law review article of March 2016, noting the ``phenomenon
of `heavy legislation, light implementation' '' and infrequent
citation in court decisions to laws protecting the rights of
persons with disabilities.\45\ Provisions on employment
discrimination and the right to work in the PRC Law on the
Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities were
cited in a case dating from 2014 among a group of 10 model
cases published by the Supreme People's Court in May 2016, all
of which featured the protection of the rights of persons with
disabilities.\46\ In the 2014 case's second instance (appeals)
court decision, those provisions were used as the legal basis
to dismiss the employer-defendant's claim that the employee-
plaintiff had misled the company by not stating she had a
disability when she signed a labor contract.\47\ In May, a
court in Guizhou province awarded financial compensation to the
plaintiff in a case that legal experts noted was the first in
which a court found in favor of a plaintiff claiming employment
discrimination due to HIV/AIDS.\48\ The court verdict
reportedly did not acknowledge the incident as employment
discrimination.\49\
Persons with disabilities and health-related conditions in
China continued to face obstacles in attaining equal access to
employment \50\ and education.\51\ In July and August 2016, for
example, official media outlets reported on two cases in which
individuals with visual impairments were denied university
enrollment \52\ and government employment \53\ based on
physical eligibility standards.\54\ Five lawyers subsequently
called for a governmental review of the physical eligibility
standards for university enrollment.\55\ Rights Defense
Network, moreover, reported on blind individuals who faced
harassment and detention for advocacy. In November 2015,
authorities in Hefei municipality, Anhui province, took at
least five blind advocates into custody for blocking an
elevator while they sought to meet with the director of the
Hefei branch of the China Disabled Persons Federation about
access to welfare and social services.\56\
Public Health
Public Health
Notes to Section II--Public Health
\1\ China's 13th Five-Year Plan, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 27 April 16, Testimony of Yanzhong
Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations
and Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton
Hall University, 2.
\2\ State Council, Opinion on the Integration of Urban-Rural
Residents' Basic Health Care Insurance System [Guowuyuan guanyu zhenghe
chengxiang jumin jiben yiliao baoxian zhidu de yijian], issued 3
January 16; ``Reconciling City and Country: China's Lessons for a
Divided World,'' Lancet, Vol. 387, 23 January 16, 311; Xiong-Fei Pan,
Jin Xu, and Qingyue Meng, ``Correspondence: Integrating Social Health
Insurance Systems in China,'' Lancet, Vol. 387, 26 March 16, 1274-75.
The State Council Opinion stipulates that provinces and provincial-
level municipalities and regions should develop comprehensive plans for
the merger by June 2016 and detailed implementation plans by the end of
2016.
\3\ ``Reconciling City and Country: China's Lessons for a Divided
World,'' Lancet, Vol. 387, 23 January 16, 311; Qingyue Meng et al.,
``Consolidating the Social Health Insurance Schemes in China: Towards
an Equitable and Efficient Health System,'' Lancet, Vol. 386, 10
October 15, 1485, Table 1. Data are from 2013 official statistics.
\4\ State Council, Opinion on the Integration of Urban-Rural
Residents' Basic Health Care Insurance System [Guowuyuan guanyu zhenghe
chengxiang jumin jiben yiliao baoxian zhidu de yijian], issued 3
January 16, sec. 1; ``Reconciling City and Country: China's Lessons for
a Divided World,'' Lancet, Vol. 387, 23 January 16, 311; Liu Jiaying
and Shi Rui, ``Urban-Rural Residents' Health Insurance Merged, but
Jurisdiction of Management Authority Unknown'' [Chengxiang jumin yibao
binggui guanli quan guishu bukezhi], Caixin, 13 January 16.
\5\ Qingyue Meng et al., ``Consolidating the Social Health
Insurance Schemes in China: Towards an Equitable and Efficient Health
System,'' Lancet, Vol. 386, 10 October 15, 1487.
\6\ Liu Jiaying and Shi Rui, ``Urban-Rural Residents' Health
Insurance Merged, but Jurisdiction of Management Authority Unknown''
[Chengxiang jumin yibao binggui guanli quan guishu bukezhi], Caixin, 13
January 16.
\7\ Xiong-Fei Pan, Jin Xu, and Qingyue Meng, ``Correspondence:
Integrating Social Health Insurance Systems in China,'' Lancet, Vol.
387, 26 March 16, 1274-75.
\8\ ``[Editorial] Curing `Medical Commotions' Once and for All Will
Necessarily Depend on Rational Communication Between Doctors and
Patients'' [[Shelun] genzhi ``yi'nao'' xu kao yihuan lixing goutong
pingtai], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 1 April 16; Sarah Biddulph,
``Resolving Medical Disputes and Causing Havoc in Hospitals (Yinao)''
in The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in China (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2015), 126-28, 135-36, 144-70.
\9\ Chris Buckley, ``A Danger for Doctors in China: Patients' Angry
Relatives,'' New York Times, 18 May 16; China Digital Times,
``Translation: Why One Doctor Put Down the Scalpel,'' 19 May 16. See
also CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 124.
\10\ Hu Hao, ``Four Ministries Jointly Issue Circular To Strengthen
the Protection of Medical Order'' [Si bumen lianhe xiafa tongzhi
jiaqiang weihu yiliao zhixu], Xinhua, 30 March 16. See also Sarah
Biddulph, ``Resolving Medical Disputes and Causing Havoc in Hospitals
(Yinao)'' in The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in China
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 160-61.
\11\ Wu Liufeng, ``Amendments to Criminal Law (Ninth) Will Be
Implemented Next Month, for Disturbances at Hospitals and Substituting
for Test-Takers, Criminal Sentences of at Most 7 Years'' [Xing fa
xiuzheng'an (jiu) xia yue shishi yi'nao, tikao zuigao huoxing 7 nian],
Western China Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in China News Net, 19
October 15; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15,
effective 1 November 15, art. 290. See also Sarah Biddulph, ``Resolving
Medical Disputes and Causing Havoc in Hospitals (Yinao)'' in The
Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in China (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2015), 150, 161-63.
\12\ China Digital Times, a news aggregation website based in
California, translates propaganda directives and posts them to its
website under the heading Ministry of Truth at http://
chinadigitaltimes.net/china/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth/.
\13\ ``Minitrue: 21 Rules on Coverage of the Two Sessions,'' 6
March 16, reprinted in China Digital Times, 8 March 16, item 3; Didi
Kirsten Tatlow, ``What Chinese Media Mustn't Cover at the `2 Sessions,'
'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 9 March 16.
\14\ ``Minitrue: 21 Rules on Coverage of the Two Sessions,'' 6
March 16, reprinted in China Digital Times, 8 March 16, item 19; Didi
Kirsten Tatlow, ``What Chinese Media Mustn't Cover at the `2 Sessions,'
'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 9 March 16.
\15\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Don't Hype Tainted Tianjin
Pharma Products,'' 24 December 15.
\16\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Unrefrigerated Vaccines Worth
Hundreds of Millions of Yuan Flow Into 18 Provinces: Possibly Affecting
Human Life'' [Zhenlibu: shuyi yuan yimiao wei lengcang liuru 18
shengfen: huo yingxiang renming], 22 March 16; Li Jing, ``Vaccine
Scandal: Hundreds Involved Across 24 Provinces in China,'' South China
Morning Post, 20 March 16.
\17\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Don't Hype Article on Illegal
Vaccines,'' 22 March 16.
\18\ Chris Buckley, ``China's Vaccine Scandal Threatens Public
Faith in Immunizations,'' New York Times, 18 April 16.
\19\ ``Wang Shengsheng and 12 Other Lawyers' Letter to China's
State Council: Request for the Protection of the Public's Right To Know
and Right to Relief in the Vaccines Criminal Case'' [Wang shengsheng
deng 13 wei lushi zhi zhongguo guowuyuan: guanyu zai yimiao fanzui an
zhong baohu zhiqing quan he jiuji quan de yaoqiu], 28 March 16,
reprinted in Rights Defense Network; ``Volunteer Lawyers Group Working
on the Problem Vaccines Incident Make Suggestions Regarding
Certification and Remedial Measures in the Problematic Vaccines
Incident--Permit Collective Lawsuits and Establish Relief Funds for
Those Harmed by Medicine'' [Wenti yimiao shijian zhiyuan lushi tuan
guanyu yimiao anjian jianding yu jiuji jizhi de jianyi--yunxu jiti
susong, jianli yao hai jiuji jijin], 9 April 16, reprinted in Rights
Defense Network, 10 April 16; Michael Woodhead, ``Illegal Vaccine
Fallout: Clinics Deserted as Public Lose [sic] Confidence; Lawyers
Support Patients' Rights; Failure Blamed on `Private Market,' '' China
Medical News (blog), 29 March 16.
\20\ Chen Fei, ``SPP To Supervise Handling of Illegal Vaccine
Business Cases'' [Zuigaojian guapai duban feifa jingying yimiao xilie
an], Xinhua, 22 March 16; ``Illegal Vaccine Business Case in Ji'nan,
Shandong, Investigative Group From Multiple Agencies Arrives in
Shandong and Starts Handling Investigative Work'' [Shandong ji'nan
feifa jingying yimiao xilie anjian bumen lianhe diaocha zu fu shandong
kaizhan anjian diaocha chuli gongzuo], Xinhua, 29 March 16; National
Health and Family Planning Commission, ``Risk Assessment Report on
Safety and Effectiveness of Suspect Vaccines From the Cases of the
Illegal Vaccine Business in Ji'nan, Shandong'' [Shandong ji'nan feifa
jingying yimiao xilie anjian she'an yimiao jiezhong anquanxing he
youxiaoxing fengxian pinggu baogao], 13 April 16.
\21\ Rights Defense Network, ``Vaccine Victim Yi Wenlong, Accused
of `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' Was Among Five Criminally
Detained, All Were Released'' [Bei kong ``xunxin zishi'' zao xingju de
yimiao shouhaizhe yi wenlong deng wu ren yi quanbu shifang], 12 April
16. For an example of an individual detained for discussing the tainted
vaccines on social media, see Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Because
Hunan Citizen Liu Junjun Discussed the Tainted Vaccines Incident in a
WeChat Friend Group, Authorities Administratively Detained Him for Six
Days for Intentionally Disrupting Public Order'' [Hunan gongmin liu
junjun yin zai weixin pengyou quan taolun du yimiao shijian zao dangju
yi guyi raoluan gonggong zhixu zui xingzheng juliu liu tian], 6 April
16.
\22\ ``Chinese Parents Sue Amid Protests Over Tainted Vaccines,''
Radio Free Asia, 19 April 16.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 Year-End Summary on
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [2015 nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], February 2016; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``[CHRB] Forced Psychiatric Commitment of Dissidents
Continues as Police Act Above Enacted Law (4/29-5/5, 2016),'' 5 May 16.
\25\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``2015 Year-End Summary on
Mental Health and Human Rights in China (Forced Psychiatric
Commitment)'' [2015 nian zhongguo jingshen jiankang yu renquan (bei
jingshenbing) nianzhong zongjie], February 2016.
\26\ PRC Mental Health Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingshen
weisheng fa], passed 26 October 12, effective 1 May 13, arts. 27, 30,
75(5), 78(1).
\27\ Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders et al., ``Civil
Society Report Submitted to the Committee against Torture,'' 26 October
15, para. 58. In 2014, a UN expert group that examines cases of
arbitrary detention asserted that Xing's detention in a psychiatric
facility in Harbin municipality, Heilongjiang province, for more than
seven years violated international legal norms. See UN Human Rights
Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 69th Sess., No. 8/2014
(China), A/HRC/WGAD/2014/xx, 20 May 14, paras. 41, 42, 47; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``UN Working Group Finds China's Psychiatric
Detention of Petitioner `Arbitrary,' '' 21 July 14. For more
information on Xing Shiku, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2011-00093.
\28\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] Forced Psychiatric
Commitment of Dissidents Continues as Police Act Above Enacted Law (4/
29-5/5, 2016),'' 5 May 16.
\29\ State Council Information Office, ``Assessment Report on the
Implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-
2015),'' 14 June 16, sec. 4.
\30\ ``Open Solicitation of Comments on Compulsory Treatment Center
Regulations, Standardizing System To Control Persons With Mental
Illness Who Cause Disturbances'' [Qiangzhi yiliaosuo tiaoli gongkai
zhengqiu yijian guifan zhaoshi zhaohuo jingshenbingren guanzhi zhidu],
China National Radio, 10 June 16; Shen Fan and Zhao Fuduo, ``Prevent
`Forcible Commitment to Psychiatric Facilities,' Scholar Recommends
Compulsory Treatment Be Incorporated Into Human Rights Protection
System'' [Fangzhi ``bei jingshenbing'' xuezhe jianyi qiangzhi yiliao
naru renquan baozhang tixi], Caixin, 15 June 16.
\31\ Shen Fan and Zhao Fuduo, ``Prevent `Forcible Commitment to
Psychiatric Facilities,' Scholar Recommends Compulsory Treatment Be
Incorporated Into Human Rights Protection System'' [Fangzhi ``bei
jingshenbing'' xuezhe jianyi qiangzhi yiliao naru renquan baozhang
tixi], Caixin, 15 June 16; Zhou Shenghao, ``Under Laws and Regulations,
Protecting the Rights of and Preventing Risks From Persons With Mental
Illness'' [Falu guizhi xia jingshen zhang'ai huanzhe de quanyi baozhang
he fengxian fangkong], Sanming Municipality Public Security Bureau,
last visited 15 May 16; Yang Shao and Bin Xie, ``Approaches to
Involuntary Admission of the Mentally Ill in the People's Republic of
China: Changes in Legislation From 2002 to 2012,'' Journal of the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March
2015), 35-44.
\32\ Wei Fangchao, ``Mental Health Work Plan Issued, Will Seek
Responsibility When Persons With Severe Mental Disorders Cause
Incidents'' [Jingshen weisheng gongzuo guihua fabu yanzhong jingshen
zhang'ai huanzhe zhaoshi jiang zhuize], China Internet Information
Center, 18 June 15; National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``October Regular Press Release Material: Situation on Progress
Throughout Country on Mental Health Work'' [10 yue lixing fabuhui
cailiao: quanguo jingshen weisheng gongzuo jinzhan qingkuang], 9
October 15. According to official statistics, there are 1,650
psychiatric facilities and approximately 20,000 psychiatrists in China.
\33\ Li Hongmei, ``In China, Individuals With Severe Mental Illness
Reach 4.3 Million Persons'' [Woguo yanzhong jingshenbing huanzhe da 430
wan ren], People's Daily, 13 January 16; ``Society Needs [Them], but No
Way To Get a Business Registration'' [Shehui you xuqiu dan gongshang
zhuce meifa tongguo], China Youth Daily, 3 April 16.
\34\ Shiwei Liu and Andrew Page, ``Reforming Mental Health in China
and India,'' Lancet, 18 May 16.
\35\ National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``October
Press Release Material: Situation on Progress Throughout Country on
Mental Health Work'' [10 yue lixing fabuhui cailiao: quanguo jingshen
weisheng gongzuo jinzhan qingkuang], 9 October 15; Zhou Shenghao,
``Under Laws and Regulations, Protecting the Rights of and Preventing
Risks From Persons With Mental Illness'' [Falu guizhi xia jingshen
zhang'ai huanzhe de quanyi baozhang he fengxian fangkong], Sanming
Municipality Public Security Bureau, last visited 15 May 16.
\36\ Fiona J. Charlson et al., ``The Burden of Mental,
Neurological, and Substance Use Disorders in China and India: A
Systematic Analysis of Community Representative Epidemiological
Studies,'' Lancet, 18 May 16, 12; Zhou Shenghao, ``Under Laws and
Regulations, Protecting the Rights of and Preventing Risks From Persons
With Mental Illness'' [Falu guizhi xia jingshen zhang'ai huanzhe de
quanyi baozhang he fengxian fangkong], Sanming Municipality Public
Security Bureau, last visited 15 May 16.
\37\ State Council General Office, ``National Mental Health Work
Plan (2015-2020)'' [Quanguo jingshen weisheng gongzuo guihua (2015-2020
nian)], 18 June 15. For examples of local implementing plans, see,
e.g., ``Sichuan Establishes Comprehensive Mental Health Services
Management System'' [Sichuan jianli jingshen weisheng zonghe fuwu
guanli jizhi], Sichuan Daily, 18 April 16; Hangzhou Municipal People's
Government, Implementing Opinion on Further Strengthening Integrated
Management Work on Mental Health [Hangzhou shi renmin zhengfu guanyu
jinyibu jiaqiang jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli gongzuo de shishi
yijian], issued 17 February 16; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
People's Government General Office, ``Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Implementing Plan for the `National Mental Health Work Plan (2015-
2020)' '' [Neimenggu zizhiqu shishi ``quanguo jingshen weisheng gongzuo
guihua (2015-2020 nian)'' fang'an], 5 May 16.
\38\ Li Huifang, ``Chaoyang District, Beijing, Launches National
Mental Health Integrated Management Pilot Project'' [Beijing shi
chaoyang qu quanguo jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli shidian gongzuo
qidong], People's Daily, 20 October 15. According to the People's Daily
report, there are 37 pilot sites throughout the country. For examples
of pilot sites, see Wenquan Township People's Government, ``Haidian
District, Beijing Municipality, Implementation Plan for Wenquan
Township Fulfilling `Haidian District's Launch of the National Mental
Health Integrated Management Pilot Project' '' [Guanyu wenquan zhen
luoshi ``haidian qu kaizhan quanguo jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli
shidian gongzuo fang'an'' de shishi fang'an], 25 April 16, reprinted in
Haidian District People's Government, 27 April 16; Yangpu District
Health and Family Planning Commission et al., Shanghai Municipality,
``Yangpu District, Shanghai Municipality Mental Health Integrated
Management Pilot Project Implementing Plan (2015-2017)'' [Shanghai shi
yangpu qu jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli shidian gongzuo shishi
fang'an (2015-2017)], 9 October 15; Huangpi District People's
Government Office, Wuhan Municipality, Hubei Province, ``Implementing
Plan for Huangpi District's Launch of the National Mental Health
Integrated Management Pilot Project'' [Huangpi qu kaizhan quanguo
jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli shidian gongzuo shishi fang'an], 22
January 16; Taicang City People's Government, Suzhou Municipality,
Jiangsu Province, ``Taicang City Mental Health Integrated Management
Pilot Project'' [Taicang shi jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli shidian
gongzuo fang'an], 14 March 16.
\39\ Hangzhou Municipality People's Congress, Zhejiang Province,
Public Announcement on the Open Solicitation of Opinions on ``(Draft)
Decision on Revisions to `Hangzhou Municipality Mental Health
Regulations' '' [Guanyu gongkai zhengqiu ``guangyu xiugai `hangzhou shi
jingshen weisheng tiaoli' de jueding (cao'an)'' yijian de gonggao], 29
April 16; Gansu Province People's Government Legal Affairs Office,
Gansu Province Mental Health Regulations (Review Draft) [Gansu sheng
jingsheng weisheng tiaoli (songshen gao)], 24 February 16.
\40\ Wei Fangchao, ``Mental Health Work Plan Issued, Will Seek
Responsibility When Persons With Severe Mental Disorders Cause
Incidents'' [Jingshen weisheng gongzuo guihua fabu yanzhong jingshen
zhang'ai huanzhe zhaoshi jiang zhuize], China Internet Information
Center, 18 June 15; ``Seeking Responsibility When National Standards
and Regulations Are Not Effective in the Management of Individuals With
Serious Psychiatric Disorders'' [Guanli zhaoshi zhaohuo deng yanzhong
jingsheng zhang'ai huanzhe you le guobiao, jianguan buli jiang zhuize],
The Paper, 28 January 16; ``Enter the Inner World of an `Armed, Crazy
Person,' Seeing a Psychiatric Hospital's Current Conditions'' [Zoujin
``wu fengzi'' de neixin shijie tanfang jingshen bingyuan xianzhuang],
Chinese Business Review, reprinted in CNWest, 9 May 16.
\41\ See, e.g., Taicang City People's Government, Suzhou
Municipality, Jiangsu Province, ``Taicang City Mental Health Integrated
Management Pilot Project'' [Taicang shi jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli
shidian gongzuo fang'an], 14 March 16, sec. 1(2.2, 7); Huangpi District
People's Government Office, Wuhan Municipality, Hubei Province,
``Implementing Plan for Huangpi District's Launch of the National
Mental Health Integrated Management Pilot Project'' [Huangpi qu kaizhan
quanguo jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli shidian gongzuo shishi
fang'an], 22 January 16, sec. 1(2); Yangpu District Health and Family
Planning Commission et al., Shanghai Municipality, ``Yangpu District,
Shanghai Municipality, Mental Health Integrated Management Pilot
Project Implementing Plan (2015-2017)'' [Shanghai shi yangpu qu
jingshen weisheng zonghe guanli shidian gongzuo shishi fang'an (2015-
2017)], 9 October 15, sec. 3(2.4(3)); Liu Yang, ``For Taking Good Care
of Persons Suffering From Mental Disorders, Annual Stipend of 2,400
Yuan'' [Kanhu hao jingshen zhang'aizhe nian jiang 2400 yuan], Beijing
Youth Daily, 15 March 16.
\42\ National Health and Family Planning Commission,
``Teleconference Convened in Beijing To Launch National Mental Health
Integrated Management Pilot Projects'' [Quanguo jingshen weisheng
zonghe guanli shidian gongzuo qidong shipin huiyi zai jing zhaokai], 12
June 15. For more on the term zhaoshi zhaohuo, see Wei Xiong and
Michael R. Phillips, translators, ``Translated and Annotated Version of
the 2015-2020 National Mental Health Work Plan of the People's Republic
of China,'' Shanghai Archives of Psychiatry, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2016),
endnote 24.
\43\ Yin Li, ``The Difficult Road `Back Home' for Those Recovering
From Mental Illness'' [Jingshen jibing kangfuzhe jiannan ``huijia''
lu], Legal Daily, 16 May 16.
\44\ National laws and regulations that promote equal access to
employment and education and prohibit health-based discrimination
include the PRC Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canji ren baozhang fa], passed 28 December
90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 30-40; PRC
Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa],
passed 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 3, 29, 30; State
Council, Regulations on the Treatment and Control of HIV/AIDS [Aizibing
fangzhi tiaoli], issued 18 January 06, effective 1 March 06, art. 3;
State Council, Regulations on the Employment of Persons with
Disabilities [Canji ren jiuye tiaoli], issued 14 February 07, effective
1 May 07, arts. 3, 4, 13, 27. See also Li Jing and Li Jianfei,
``Current Trends in the Development of the Chinese Social Security
System for People With Disabilities,'' Frontiers of Law in China, Vol.
11, No. 1 (March 2016), 9-11.
\45\ Li Jing and Li Jianfei, ``Current Trends in the Development of
the Chinese Social Security System for People With Disabilities,''
Frontiers of Law in China, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2016), 19.
\46\ Supreme People's Court (SPC), ``Kong X and Beijing X
Management Company Labor Dispute Case'' [Kong mou yu beijing mou wuye
guanli gongsi laodong zhengyi jiufen an], 13 May 16. Commission staff
observed that the summary of the Kong X case on the SPC China Court Net
website cited to the provisions on the right to work and anti-
employment discrimination from the old version of the PRC Law on the
Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (1990) rather
than the current version of the law (revised in 2008). See PRC Law on
the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo canji ren baozhang fa], passed 28 December 90,
effective 15 May 91, arts. 27, 34; PRC Law on the Protection of Persons
with Disabilities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canji ren baozhang fa],
passed 28 December 90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts.
30, 38. In May, the SPC issued 10 model cases featuring rights
protection of persons with disabilities. These cases included civil
disputes over property rights, divorce, and employment, among others,
and a criminal case of sexual violence. See Yang Qing, ``Supreme
People's Court Publicizes 10 Model Cases on Protecting the Rights and
Interests of Persons With Disabilities'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongbu
10 qi canji ren quanyi baozhang dianxing anli], China Court Net, 13 May
16; Li Wanxiang, ``SPC Publishes 10 Model Cases, Fulfills Laws and
Regulations To Prohibit Discrimination Against Persons With
Disabilities'' [Zuigaofa gongbu 10 qi dianxing anli luoshi jinzhi qishi
canji ren falu guiding], China Economic Net, 13 May 16.
\47\ Beijing Municipality No. 2 Intermediate People's Court,
Beijing Zhongshui Products Management Co., Ltd., and Kong X Labor
Dispute Civil Appeal Judgment [Beijing zhongshui wuye guanli youxian
gongsi yu kong x laodong zhengyi er shen minshi panjueshu], 19 August
14, reprinted in OpenLaw. Commission staff observed that the second
instance (appeals) court decision in the Kong X case cited to the
provisions on the rights to work and anti-employment discrimination
from the old version of the PRC Law on the Protection of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (1990) rather than the current version of the
law (revised in 2008). See PRC Law on the Protection of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo canji ren baozhang
fa], passed 28 December 90, effective 15 May 91, arts. 27, 34; PRC Law
on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo canji ren baozhang fa], passed 28 December 90, amended 24
April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 30, 38. For the first instance
trial verdict, which did not cite to the PRC Law on the Protection of
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, see Beijing Municipality
Xicheng People's Court, Kong Xia and Beijing Zhongshui Products
Management Co., Ltd., Labor Dispute First Instance Civil Judgment [Kong
xia yu beijing zhongshui wuye guanli youxian gongsi laodong zhengyi
yishen minshi panjueshu], 19 March 14, reprinted in OpenLaw.
\48\ Han Linjun, ``Plaintiff Wins Lawsuit in HIV/AIDS Employment
Discrimination Case in Guizhou'' [Guizhou aizibing jiuye qishi an
yuangao shengsu], Beijing Times, 12 May 16.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ See, e.g., Tan Jun, ``Person With Disability From Hunan Ranked
First in Civil Servant Exam Ultimately Not Hired, Physical Eligibility
Standards Are Said To Be Employment Discrimination'' [Hunan yi canji
ren kao gongzhi chengji di yi zuizhong luoxuan, tijian biaozhun bei zhi
jiuye qishi], The Paper, 17 August 16; ``Eliminate Systemic Employment
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities'' [Xiaochu canji ren
jiuye de zhiduxing qishi], Securities Times, 19 August 16; ``Refused
Employment Due to Being HIV-Positive, Young Guy in Jiangxi Sues Human
Resources Department'' [Yin ganran aizi qiuzhi zao ju, jiangxi xiao huo
qisu rensheju], China Free Press, 14 April 16.
\51\ See, e.g., Luo Ruiyao, ``China Still Has 83,000 Disabled
Children Deprived of an Education, Special Education Situation Is
Difficult'' [Zhongguo reng you 8.3 wan canji ertong shixue tejiao
xingshi jianju], Caixin, 1 December 15; Tan Jun, ``Person With
Disability From Hunan Ranked First in Civil Servant Exam Ultimately Not
Hired, Physical Eligibility Standards Are Said To Be Employment
Discrimination'' [Hunan yi canji ren kao gongzhi chengji di yi zuizhong
luoxuan, tijian biaozhun bei zhi jiuye qishi], The Paper, 17 August 16.
\52\ Wang Xiaofang, ``Parents Questioned Medical School's Refusal
To Admit Student With Low Vision'' [Yixueyuan jushou shican kaosheng
zao jiazhang zhiyi], Beijing Youth Daily, 26 July 16. See also Zhang
Min and Jiang Xin, ``Admissions Refused for Henan Student With Weak
Color Vision, University Says It's Fair and Legal'' [Henan seruo
kaosheng bei tuidang suobao daxue cheng heli hefa], China Youth Daily,
20 July 16.
\53\ Tan Jun, ``Person With Disability From Hunan Ranked First in
Civil Servant Exam Ultimately Not Hired, Physical Eligibility Standards
Are Said To Be Employment Discrimination'' [Hunan yi canji ren kao
gongzhi chengji di yi zuizhong luoxuan, tijian biaozhun bei zhi jiuye
qishi], The Paper, 17 August 16; Qian Fengwei, ``Calling for Equal
Treatment in Employment of Persons With Disabilities'' [Canji ren jiuye
huhuan pingdeng duidai], Beijing Morning Post, reprinted in Xinhua, 18
August 16.
\54\ See Ministry of Education, Guiding Opinion on Regular
University-Level Student General Admissions Physical Eligibility Work
[Putong gaodeng xuexiao zhaosheng tijian gongzuo zhidao yijian], 3
March 03; Ministry of Human Resources and Ministry of Health, Civil
Servant General Recruitment Physical Eligibility Standards (Trial)
[Gongwuyuan luyong tijian tongyong biaozhun (shixing)], issued 17
January 05, reprinted in State Administration of Civil Service, 29
October 08.
\55\ ``Discussing the Problem of Chinese Disabled Persons'
Enjoyment of the Right to Higher Education'' [Tantao zhongguo canzhang
renshi xiangshou gaodeng jiaoyu quanli de wenti], Radio Free Asia, 12
August 16. See also CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 122-23;
CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 112.
\56\ Rights Defense Network (RDN), ``Blind Persons From Hefei
Criminally Detained at Province's Disability Federation Office While
Asking To Meet With Director, Family Members of the Blind Persons Say
Disability Federation Is Making Local Police Harass Disabled Persons''
[Hefei shi mang ren dao sheng canlian yaoqiu jian canlian lingdao bei
xingju, mang ren jiaren zhi canlian zhishi jingcha zhenya canji ren],
25 March 16. According to RDN, in December 2015, authorities in Hefei
municipality, Anhui province, arrested five of the blind advocates on
the charge of ``gathering a crowd to disturb social order.'' RDN
reported that authorities released one individual (unnamed in the
article) on bail (``release on guarantee pending investigation''). For
information on the other four cases, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database records 2016-00244 on Li Xiaojun, 2016-00246 on Gao
Junkai, 2016-00247 on Xu Zimao, and 2016-00248 on Fei Qinxu.
The Environment
The Environment
The Environment
Introduction
While the Chinese government pointed to areas of progress
in environmental protection and enforcement during the
Commission's 2016 reporting year,\1\ air,\2\ water,\3\ and soil
pollution \4\ challenges remained and continued to be a source
of public discontent.\5\ The Chinese government and Communist
Party took regulatory \6\ and policy action \7\ to increase
environmental protection and combat climate change; however,
officials continued to tightly control media reporting and
commentary on the environment,\8\ and extralegally detained
environmental \9\ and statistics bureau officials.\10\ A former
energy official alleged that Chinese authorities used torture
to force him to confess to corruption.\11\ Official government
and media reports indicated that there were some improvements
in public participation,\12\ yet authorities continued to
harass, and in some cases detain, environmental advocates.\13\
U.S.-China cooperation on environmental and climate change
issues continued.\14\
Health Effects and Economic Costs of Pollution
Chinese and international media reports focusing on air
pollution this past year revealed that the problem remains
severe, with ongoing economic \15\ and public health \16\
implications. Government-published statistics from 2015
indicated that 80 percent of monitored cities failed to meet
national air quality standards,\17\ and one international study
estimated that 1.6 million premature deaths per year in China
were linked to air pollution.\18\ According to one Chinese
researcher, the government's current emissions reduction
targets are inadequate and ``more aggressive policies are
urgently needed.'' \19\ The Chinese Academy of Environmental
Planning estimated that the costs of pollution in China were
3.5 percent of GDP as of 2010, totaling 1.54 trillion yuan
(approximately US$238 billion),\20\ while a non-profit
institution estimated the costs of air pollution in China as
totaling at least 6.5 percent of GDP (approximately US$442
billion).\21\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Pollution in Beijing Municipality: ``Red Alerts'' and Changing
Benchmarks
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In one example of costly government action taken this past year,
authorities in Beijing municipality issued air pollution ``red alerts''
from December 8 to 10 \22\ and December 19 to 22, 2015,\23\
implementing emergency measures such as shutting down schools,
prohibiting the driving of cars, and advising Beijing residents to wear
face masks outside.\24\ In February 2016, however, authorities raised
the threshold for ``red alerts.'' \25\ One Chinese environmental expert
noted that if the threshold had not been raised, the number of ``red
alerts'' per year would have resulted in ``high social and economic
cost[s].'' \26\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Pollution in Beijing Municipality: ``Red Alerts'' and Changing
Benchmarks--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese and international experts have expressed concern that Chinese
government reporting on air pollution is misleading and that
authorities have ``manipulated'' public information on air quality ``in
order to influence people's expectations.'' \27\ In September 2013, for
example, the Beijing municipal government set a target that fine
particulate concentrations would decrease by around 25 percent from
2012 levels by 2017.\28\ In 2015, the Beijing government reported
improvement in the city's annual fine particulate concentrations
compared to 2014 levels.\29\ Beijing's fine particulate concentration
levels, however, had not improved from the original 2012 benchmark.\30\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Media and research reports this past year also showed that
water and soil pollution in China remained areas of significant
concern.\31\ In April 2016, the Ministry of Water Resources
reported that nearly 50 percent of ground water was of
``extremely bad'' quality and another 30 percent was ``bad.''
\32\ According to a prominent Chinese environmental expert,
water designated as ``bad'' is not safe for human contact.\33\
With regard to soil pollution in China, a senior government
official cautioned that the problem is ``serious,'' stating
``it's not easy to be optimistic.'' \34\ In May 2016, the State
Council issued an Action Plan for Soil Pollution Prevention and
Control with a goal that 90 percent of polluted land would be
safe for use by 2020.\35\
Environmental Censorship and Environmental Emergencies
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued
to censor reporting (``guide public opinion'') on the
environment and environmental emergencies.\36\ In February
2016, China's Minister of Environmental Protection, Chen
Jining, avoided answering a question about the March 2015 film
``Under the Dome,'' which examined air pollution in China and
received over 200 million views in China before authorities
ordered its removal.\37\ Chen had previously praised the
film.\38\ During the annual meetings of the National People's
Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
in March 2016, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly
prohibited Chinese media from reporting on the smog.\39\
Chinese authorities also restricted reporting on environmental
emergencies, including the August 2015 explosion of a hazardous
goods warehouse in Tianjin municipality,\40\ the December 2015
landslide in Shenzhen municipality,\41\ and widespread flooding
across China in summer 2016.\42\ In 2015, the officially
reported number of ``environmental emergencies'' declined to
330,\43\ down from 471 in 2014 and 712 in 2013.\44\
Anticorruption Campaign Targeting Environmental Officials
During the reporting year, Chinese authorities extralegally
detained and investigated senior environmental and statistics
bureau officials for alleged corruption-related offenses, and
one former energy official alleged that he had been tortured.
In November 2015, Minister of Environmental Protection Chen
Jining said that China ``must strengthen the legal construction
over environmental protection and protect the environment in a
lawful manner.'' \45\ Chinese authorities, however, utilized
shuanggui procedures \46\ to investigate officials for
corruption in cases involving alleged offenses that may have
affected the environment and statistical data.\47\ Shuanggui is
an extralegal form of detention used for Party officials that
violates Chinese law \48\ and contravenes international
standards on arbitrary detention.\49\ [For more information on
shuanggui, see Section II--Criminal Justice.] In February 2016,
a former senior National Energy Administration official alleged
that government authorities tortured him to confess to
corruption.\50\ Recent examples from the anticorruption
campaign included:
Zhang Lijun. In July 2015, Party authorities
detained Zhang Lijun, a former Vice Minister of the
Ministry of Environmental Protection.\51\ His detention
reportedly was linked to accepting bribes to manipulate
state emissions standards to permit the sale of
vehicles that would not otherwise have complied with
emissions standards.\52\ In December, Party authorities
expelled Zhang from the Party.\53\
Wang Bao'an. In January 2016, Party
authorities detained the Director of the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) Wang Bao'an.\54\
Although some media reports indicated that Wang's
detention may have been due to his previous work at the
Ministry of Finance,\55\ other reports noted that
Wang's detention raised questions about the
government's energy and economic reporting.\56\ In
February, state-run news agency Xinhua reported that
the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection had
found that ``some leading [NBS] cadres'' were ``seeking
personal gains through abuse of powers including data
fabrication.'' \57\ Wang previously met with a senior
U.S. energy official to discuss cooperation regarding
energy statistics work.\58\
Xu Yongsheng. In February 2016, Xu Yongsheng,
a former deputy director of the National Energy
Administration, reportedly claimed during his trial at
the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court that
authorities had used torture to force him to sign a
confession.\59\ Authorities alleged that Xu, who was
first detained in May 2014, had accepted 5.6 million
yuan (approximately US$800,000) from eight state-owned
enterprises in exchange for licenses for 27 power
plants.\60\
Progress and Challenges in Environmental Enforcement
Official reports indicated that amid ongoing challenges,
authorities strengthened environmental enforcement in some
areas. For example, according to the Supreme People's Court,
Chinese courts concluded 78,000 civil and 19,000 criminal
environmental cases in 2015.\61\ The criminal cases concluded
represented an increase of 18.8 percent over 2014.\62\
According to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), in
2015, environmental authorities punished 191,000 firms for
violating environmental regulations and fined polluters 4.25
billion yuan (approximately US$654 million)--a 34-percent
increase over 2014.\63\ MEP reportedly faced challenges in
collecting fines from state-owned enterprises and other
politically connected companies.\64\ In some cases, MEP
attempted to put pressure on provincial and local officials by
summoning them to Beijing \65\ to discuss environmental
violations and pollution in person.\66\ MEP also continued to
implement 2015 revisions \67\ to the PRC Environmental
Protection Law (EPL) that allow for the imposition of daily
fines for violating emissions standards. A Chinese expert,
however, criticized MEP for issuing daily fines in an
insufficient number of cases.\68\ In one example that drew
national criticism,\69\ in March 2016, local environmental
officials in Gaoyou city, Yangzhou municipality, Jiangsu
province, penalized the Guangming Chemical Plant with a fine of
603 yuan (approximately US$92) after it reportedly released
pollution into the water in violation of legal standards,
causing significant fish deformities.\70\
Local government officials showed concern about the cost of
environmental protection against the backdrop of a slowing
economy and overcapacity.\71\ In one example, the mayor of
Shijiazhuang municipality in Hebei province reportedly
criticized environmental protection efforts, lamenting that
government measures, including those taken against inefficient
industry and heavily polluting industry, had cost the city
government 12 billion yuan (approximately US$1.8 billion) in
revenue due to decreased industrial production.\72\
Regulatory Developments
During the reporting year, there were some encouraging
environmental regulatory developments, but also areas of
significant concern.\73\ In October 2015, the Chinese
government reportedly announced plans to revise the PRC
Environmental Impact Assessment Law and the Regulations on
Planning Environmental Impact Assessments.\74\ In December
2015, the National People's Congress (NPC) released draft
revisions to the PRC Wild Animal Protection Law.\75\ Experts in
China and abroad raised concerns \76\ that the draft revisions
could provide a legal basis for animal exploitation for the
purposes of captive breeding, Chinese traditional medicine, and
wildlife shows.\77\ In July 2016, the NPC passed an amended PRC
Wild Animal Protection Law.\78\ An international non-
governmental organization described the amended law as a
``missed opportunity'' and expressed concern that the amendment
provides a legal basis for the sale of products from endangered
species including tigers and elephants.\79\ Amid serious
concerns about air quality in China,\80\ the PRC Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Law, which the NPC passed on August 29,
2015, took effect on January 1, 2016.\81\
Public Participation and Harassment of Environmental Advocates
The revised PRC Environmental Protection Law (EPL), which
took effect on January 1, 2015, provided a stronger legal basis
for public participation in environmental public interest
lawsuits,\82\ yet citizens continued to face obstacles in their
pursuit of environmental justice.\83\ According to one Chinese
law professor, Chinese courts showed ``major progress'' in 2015
in their acceptance of 53 environmental public interest
lawsuits.\84\ In October 2015, in the first case filed under
the revised EPL, the Nanping Intermediate People's Court in
Nanping municipality, Fujian province, issued a 1.46 million
yuan (US$230,000) verdict against a quarry for illegally
dumping waste material in a suit brought by the environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Friends of Nature and
Fujian Green Home.\85\ In January 2016, the Supreme People's
Court upheld a judgment greater than 160 million yuan (US$26
million) in water pollution litigation brought by the Taizhou
City Environmental Protection Association, a government-
organized NGO, against six chemical companies in Taizhou
municipality, Jiangsu province.\86\
Chinese authorities detained and harassed some
environmental advocates who challenged government actions on
the environment. Examples from the past reporting year
included:
In November 2015, the Panjin Intermediate
People's Court in Panjin municipality, Liaoning
province, reportedly upheld a first-instance judgment
that imposed a 12-year prison sentence on
environmentalist Tian Jiguang for extortion,
embezzlement, and misappropriation of funds.\87\ Tian
is the founder and leader of the Panjin City
Association of Volunteers for the Protection of the
Spotted Seal. Chinese authorities reportedly detained
him in October 2013 for a blog post he wrote
criticizing water pollution by a state-owned
enterprise.\88\ In April 2016, the Panjin Intermediate
People's Court issued a decision accepting a retrial
request filed by Tian's wife; however, during the
retrial the prior judgment remained effective.\89\
The Chinese public also expressed their
frustrations in a number of environmental protests
during the reporting year. In October 2015, Chinese
authorities detained a large number of people during
protests outside a cement factory in Guangdong
province.\90\ In March 2016, authorities in Urad
(Wulate) Middle Banner, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, reportedly detained 20 protesters for giving
interviews to foreign reporters about their efforts to
protect their grazing lands.\91\ In April 2016, parents
in Changzhou municipality, Jiangsu, protested and
environmental groups filed litigation concerning a
school built next to three chemical factories that
reportedly illegally dumped hazardous substances near a
school site, allegedly causing some students to become
seriously ill.\92\ In June 2016, two individuals were
detained for protesting a waste incineration plant in
Ningxiang county, Changsha municipality, Hunan
province.\93\ In August 2016, thousands of people
reportedly protested government-approved plans to build
a nuclear processing plant in Lianyungang municipality,
Jiangsu.\94\
Climate Change and International Cooperation
This past year, although China remained the largest emitter
of carbon dioxide, the Chinese government committed to
increasing efforts to address climate change and environmental
protection. In 2015, China was the largest source of carbon
dioxide emissions in the world,\95\ and the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (NBS) reportedly released revised data
indicating that China's annual coal consumption over the past
decade had been as much as 17 percent greater than previously
reported.\96\ In March 2016, as part of the 13th Five-Year
Plan, Chinese authorities announced a 2020 target for total
energy consumption.\97\ According to one media report,\98\ the
target announced in March 2016 \99\ represented an increase
from an official target announced in November 2014.\100\ In
2015, China's power sector reportedly added 64 gigawatts of
coal-fired generating capacity, compared to an increase of
around 35 gigawatts in 2014, after central government officials
transferred approval authority over new power plants to local
governments.\101\
During this reporting year, the governments of the United
States and China closely cooperated on climate change and
environmental protection, including the following examples:
In June 2016, 39 of the 120 reported outcomes
of the eighth round of the U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue Strategic Track were related to
cooperation on climate change and energy (27 outcomes)
and cooperation on environmental protection (12
outcomes).\102\
In September 2015, during Chinese President Xi
Jinping's visit to Washington, D.C., President Barack
Obama and President Xi issued a joint statement
reaffirming their commitment to addressing climate
change.\103\
In April 2016, China signed the Paris
Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change.\104\ The Chinese government
submitted, in June 2015, an Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change for the Paris Agreement to
``lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of Gross
Domestic Product by 60-65 percent from the 2005 level''
by 2030.\105\
The Environment
The Environment
Notes to Section II--The Environment
\1\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``2015 Bulletin on the
State of the Environment in China'' [2015 zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang
gongbao], 20 May 16, 1-6; ``Report on the Work of the Government,''
Xinhua, 17 March 16; Beijing Municipality Environmental Protection
Bureau, ``2015 Bulletin on the State of the Environment in Beijing
Municipality'' [2015 beijing shi huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao], April
2016, 1.
\2\ Ma Tianjie, ``China's Environment in 2015: A Year in Review,''
China Dialogue, 23 December 15; Robert A. Rohde and Richard A. Muller,
``Air Pollution in China: Mapping of Concentrations and Sources,'' PLOS
ONE, Vol. 10(8), 20 August 15; Rachael Jolley, ``China Must Stop
Censoring the Debate on Killer Air Pollution,'' New Scientist, 28
October 15.
\3\ Li Jing, ``80 Per Cent of Groundwater in China's Major River
Basins Is Unsafe for Humans, Study Reveals,'' South China Morning Post,
12 April 16; Chris Buckley and Vanessa Piao, ``Rural Water, Not City
Smog, May Be China's Pollution Nightmare,'' New York Times, 11 April
16; ``Xinhua Insight: China Thirsts for Change as Water Crisis Hits,''
Xinhua, 21 January 16.
\4\ ``Action Plan Targets Soil Pollution,'' China Daily, reprinted
in Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2 June 16; ``Chen Jining:
Ministry of Environmental Protection Currently Drafting Soil Pollution
Law'' [Chen jining: huanbaobu zheng zai qicao turang wuran fangzhi fa],
People's Daily, 7 March 15; Li Jing and Ting Yan, ``Parents Unconvinced
as Chinese Authorities Pledge Investigations Into Soil Blamed for
Students' Health Problems, Including Cancer,'' South China Morning
Post, 19 April 16; Ben Blanchard, ``Amid `Serious' Situation, China
Eyes Soil Pollution Law in 2017,'' Reuters, 9 March 16.
\5\ Li Jing and Ting Yan, ``Parents Unconvinced as Chinese
Authorities Pledge Investigations Into Soil Blamed for Students' Health
Problems, Including Cancer,'' South China Morning Post, 19 April 16;
``Guangdong Riot Police Crack Down on Two Waste Pollution Protests,''
Radio Free Asia, 14 October 15.
\6\ PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo daqi wuran fangzhi fa], passed 5 September 87, amended 29
August 95, 29 April 00, 29 August 15, effective 1 January 16.
\7\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year
Plan for National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua
gangyao], issued 17 March 16.
\8\ See, e.g., Cary Huang, ``Press Freedom Needed To Win China's
Choking Air Pollution Battle,'' South China Morning Post, 8 December
15; Matthew Auer and King-wa Fu, ``Clearing the Air: Investigating
Weibo Censorship in China: New Research To Show Censorship of
Microbloggers Who Spoke Out About Pollution Documentary,'' Index on
Censorship, Vol. 44, No. 3 (September 2015), 76-79; China Digital
Times, ``Minitrue: 21 Rules on Coverage of the Two Sessions,'' 8 March
16; China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Media Directives on Tianjin Port
Explosion,'' 13 August 15.
\9\ ``CPC Expels Former Environment Official for Corruption,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 31 December 15; ``Zhang Lijun Sacking
Reveals Chain of Environmental Interests, Number of Other Officials
Also Reported'' [Zhang lijun luoma jiekai huanbao liyi lian duo
guanyuan tong bei jubao], China Business Journal, reprinted in Sohu, 9
August 15.
\10\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of
Supervision, ``National Bureau of Statistics Communist Party Secretary
and Bureau Chief Wang Bao'an Under Investigation for Serious Violations
of Discipline'' [Guojia tongjiju dangzu shuji, juzhang wang bao'an
shexian yanzhong weiji jieshou zuzhi diaocha], 26 January 16; Saibal
Dasgupta, ``Probe Targeting China's Statistic Head Sparks Concern,''
Voice of America, 11 February 16; Jun Mai, ``China's Statistics Chief
Wang Baoan Detained in Graft Investigation,'' South China Morning Post,
26 January 16.
\11\ Austin Ramzy, ``Ex-Official in China Blames Torture for Graft
Confession,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 25 February 16; Luo
Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former National Energy Administration Deputy
Director Xu Yongsheng on Trial, Asserts Innocence in Court and Says
Confession Forced'' [Guojia nengyuanju yuan fu juzhang xu yongsheng
shoushen dang ting hanyuan cheng zao bigong], Caixin, 24 February 16.
\12\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``2015 Bulletin on the
State of the Environment in China'' [2015 zhongguo huanjing zhuangkuang
gongbao], 20 May 16, 4; Beijing Municipality Environmental Protection
Bureau, ``2015 Bulletin on the State of the Environment in Beijing
Municipality'' [2015 beijing shi huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao], April
2016, 33; Zhang Chun, ``China Court Rules in Favour of First Public
Interest Environmental Lawsuit,'' China Dialogue, 11 November 15; Liu
Qin, ``Will China's Environmental Law Help To Win `War on Pollution?'
'' China Dialogue, 22 March 16.
\13\ Yaxue Cao, ``12 Years in Prison for Trying To Protect Spotted
Seals,'' China Change, 16 November 15; ``Shanghai Pollution Fee Scheme
Doesn't Attack the Causes of Smog: Commentators,'' Radio Free Asia, 17
December 15; ``China Holds Lawyers, Threatens Activist Amid Mongolian
Pollution Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 April 16; ``Officials Call for
Calm Amid Mass Pollution Protests in China's Hubei,'' Radio Free Asia,
27 June 16.
\14\ U.S. Department of State, ``U.S.-China Strategic & Economic
Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,'' 24 June 15; Beth Walker,
``Interview: China's Environmental Challenges,'' China Dialogue, 9
February 16.
\15\ Keith Crane and Zhimin Mao, RAND, ``Costs of Selected Policies
To Address Air Pollution in China,'' 2015.
\16\ Robert A. Rohde and Richard A. Muller, ``Air Pollution in
China: Mapping of Concentrations and Sources,'' PLOS ONE, Vol. 10(8),
20 August 15; Li Jing, ``80 Per Cent of Groundwater in China's Major
River Basins Is Unsafe for Humans, Study Reveals,'' South China Morning
Post, 12 April 16; Li Jing and Ting Yan, ``Parents Unconvinced as
Chinese Authorities Pledge Investigations Into Soil Blamed for
Students' Health Problems, Including Cancer,'' South China Morning
Post, 19 April 16.
\17\ Greenpeace, ``A Summary of the 2015 Annual PM2.5 City
Rankings,'' 20 January 16; ``Ministry Says China Air Quality `Improved'
in 2015,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 4 February 16.
\18\ Robert A. Rohde and Richard A. Muller, ``Air Pollution in
China: Mapping of Concentrations and Sources,'' PLOS ONE, Vol. 10(8),
20 August 15. See also Dan Levin, ``Study Links Polluted Air in China
to 1.6 Million Deaths a Year,'' New York Times, 13 August 15.
\19\ Alan Yuhas, ``Scientists: Air Pollution Led to More Than 5.5
Million Premature Deaths in 2013,'' Guardian, 12 February 16. As noted
in the Guardian report, ``[Qiao Ma] said coal burned for electricity
was the largest polluter in the country, and that China's new targets
to reduce emissions, agreed at the Paris climate talks last year, do
not go far enough . . .. `We think that more aggressive policies are
urgently needed,' Ma said.''
\20\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Who Says Green GDP Was
Short-Lived? From a Focus, to Temporary Suspension, to Starting the
Process Yet Again'' [Luse GDP shui shuo shi tanhua? cong redian dao
zanshi tingbai, zai dao you yici ta shang zhengcheng], reprinted in
Xinhua, 25 March 16. See American Chamber of Commerce in China, ``2016
American Business in China White Paper,'' April 2016, 188.
\21\ Keith Crane and Zhimin Mao, RAND, ``Costs of Selected Policies
To Address Air Pollution in China,'' 2015.
\22\ Beijing Municipality Environmental Protection Bureau,
``Beijing Initiates First Heavy Air Pollution Red Alert'' [Woshi shouci
qidong kongqi zhong wuran hongse yujing], 7 December 15.
\23\ Beijing Municipality Environmental Protection Bureau,
``Beijing Again Initiates Heavy Air Pollution Red Alert'' [Woshi zaici
qidong kongqi zhong wuran hongse yujing], 18 December 15.
\24\ Te-Ping Chen and Brian Spegele, ``China's Red Alert on Air
Pollution Puts Focus on Regulators,'' Wall Street Journal, 8 December
15; ``China Smog: Beijing Issues Second Ever Pollution Red Alert,''
BBC, 18 December 15; Barbara Finamore, ``What China's Second Red Alert
Means for the Future of Clean Energy,'' Fortune, 6 January 16. See also
Beijing Municipal People's Government, ``Beijing Municipality Heavy Air
Pollution Emergency Plan'' [Beijing shi kongqi zhong wuran yingji
yu'an], issued 16 March 15.
\25\ Ministry of Environmental Protection and China Meteorological
Administration, ``Letter Regarding Unifying Heavy Pollution Alert
Classifying Standards in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei and Strengthening
Heavy Pollution Response Work'' [Guanyu tongyi jing jin ji chengshi
zhong wuran tianqi yujing fenji biaozhun qianghua zhong wuran tianqi
yingdui gongzuo de han], 2 February 16; Owen Guo, ``Beijing To Raise
Threshold on Red Alerts for Smog,'' New York Times, 22 February 16.
\26\ Owen Guo, ``Beijing To Raise Threshold on Red Alerts for
Smog,'' New York Times, 22 February 16.
\27\ Yana Jin et al., ``China, Information and Air Pollution,'' Vox
EU, 2 December 15. See also Steven Q. Andrews, ``China's Air Pollution
Reporting Is Misleading,'' China Dialogue, 27 March 14.
\28\ Beijing Municipal People's Government General Office,
``Beijing Municipality 2013-2017 Clean Air Action Plan Major Task
Breakdown'' [Beijing shi 2013-2017 nian qingjie kongqi xingdong jihua
zhongdian renwu fenjie], issued 23 August 13.
\29\ Beijing Municipality Environmental Protection Bureau, ``2015
Bulletin on the State of the Environment in Beijing Municipality''
[2015 beijing shi huanjing zhuangkuang gongbao], April 2016, 3. In
2015, the annual average PM2.5 concentration in Beijing
municipality was reported as 80.6 micrograms per cubic meter. See also
Beijing Municipal People's Government General Office, ``Beijing
Municipality 2013-2017 Clean Air Action Plan Major Task Breakdown''
[Beijing shi 2013-2017 nian qingjie kongqi xingdong jihua zhongdian
renwu fenjie], issued 23 August 13. In 2012, the annual average
PM2.5 concentration in Beijing was approximately 80
micrograms per cubic meter.
\30\ Ibid.
\31\ Li Jing, ``80 Per Cent of Groundwater in China's Major River
Basins Is Unsafe for Humans, Study Reveals,'' South China Morning Post,
12 April 16; Ministry of Water Resources, ``Groundwater Quality Monthly
Report'' [Dixia shui dongtai yuebao], April 2016, 1; Ben Blanchard,
``Amid `Serious' Situation, China Eyes Soil Pollution Law in 2017,''
Reuters, 9 March 16.
\32\ Ministry of Water Resources, ``Groundwater Quality Monthly
Report'' [Dixia shui dongtai yuebao], April 2016, 1; Li Qin, ``Clear as
Mud: How Poor Data Is Thwarting China's Water Clean-Up,'' China
Dialogue, 18 May 16; Li Jing, ``80 Per Cent of Groundwater in China's
Major River Basins Is Unsafe for Humans, Study Reveals,'' South China
Morning Post, 12 April 16.
\33\ Li Jing, ``80 Per Cent of Groundwater in China's Major River
Basins Is Unsafe for Humans, Study Reveals,'' South China Morning Post,
12 April 16. See also Ministry of Water Resources, ``Groundwater
Quality Monthly Report'' [Dixia shui dongtai yuebao], April 2016.
\34\ Ben Blanchard, ``Amid `Serious' Situation, China Eyes Soil
Pollution Law in 2017,'' Reuters, 9 March 16.
\35\ State Council, ``Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Action
Plan'' [Turang wuran fangzhi xingdong jihua], issued 28 May 16; Karl S.
Bourdeau and Sarah A. Kettenmann, ``China Announces Action Plan To
Tackle Soil Pollution,'' Beveridge and Diamond, P.C., Environmental Law
Portal, 6 June 16.
\36\ See, e.g., Cary Huang, ``Press Freedom Needed To Win China's
Choking Air Pollution Battle,'' South China Morning Post, 8 December
15; Matthew Auer and King-wa Fu, ``Clearing the Air: Investigating
Weibo Censorship in China: New Research To Show Censorship of
Microbloggers Who Spoke Out About Pollution Documentary,'' Index on
Censorship, Vol. 44, No. 3 (September 2015), 76-79; China Digital
Times, ``Minitrue: 21 Rules on Coverage of the Two Sessions,'' 8 March
16; China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Media Directives on Tianjin Port
Explosion,'' 13 August 15; David Bandurski, ``Taming the Flood: How
China's Leaders `Guide' Public Opinion,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile
(blog), 20 July 15.
\37\ Te-Ping Chen, ``China Is Winning Environmental Clean-Up Race,
Minister Says,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 19
February 16; Daniel K. Gardner, ``Why `Under the Dome' Found a Ready
Audience in China,'' New York Times, 18 March 15.
\38\ Te-Ping Chen, ``China Is Winning Environmental Clean-Up Race,
Minister Says,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 19
February 16. See also Pan Yue, ``The Environment Needs Public
Participation,'' China Dialogue, 5 December 06.
\39\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: 21 Rules on Coverage of the
Two Sessions,'' 8 March 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``What Chinese Media
Mustn't Cover at the `2 Sessions,' '' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 9 March 16.
\40\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Media Directives on Tianjin
Port Explosion,'' 13 August 15; Gabriel Dominguez, ``China's Official
Response to Emergencies Is `Censorship,' '' Deutsche Welle, 18 August
15; Stanley Lubman, ``The Tianjin Explosions: A Signal for Reform,''
Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 7 September 15.
\41\ ``A Deadly Landslide Exposes the Depths of China's Corruption
and Censorship,'' Washington Post, 29 December 15; Joyce Hwang, ``China
Trying To Determine Culpability for Massive Landslide,'' Voice of
America, 23 December 15; Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ``Before
Shenzhen Landslide, Many Saw Warning Signs as Debris Swelled,'' New
York Times, 22 December 15; Kim Kyung-Hoon, ``China Makes Five More
Arrests Over Deadly Shenzhen Landslide--Xinhua,'' Reuters, 9 January
16.
\42\ China Digital Times, ``Media & Censors Promote Positivity on
Deadly Floods,'' 11 July 16; Oiwan Lam, ``Chinese Censors Are Making
Sure Social Media Only Shows Positive Flooding News,'' Global Voices,
11 July 16; Echo Huang Yinyin and Zheping Huang, ``The Chinese
Government's Incompetence Caused Flooding Deaths in Hebei, Villagers
Say,'' Quartz, 27 July 16; Xingtai Announcements (Xingtai fabu),
``Xingtai Municipality Public Security Bureau Handling Case of Three
Online Rumor Disseminators According to Law'' [Xingtai shi gong'anju
dui san ming wangshang sanbu yaoyanzhe yifa jinxing chuli], Weibo post,
26 July 16, 10:44 a.m. Chinese authorities punished three individuals
for posting ``rumors'' about death tolls.
\43\ ``MEP: In 2015, Total of 330 Environmental Emergencies Took
Place in China'' [Huanbaobu: 2015 nian quanguo gong fasheng tufa
huanjing shijian 330 qi], Xinhua, 13 April 16; Ministry of
Environmental Protection, ``MEP Releases a Report on the Facts of Major
Environmental Emergencies in 2015,'' 27 April 16.
\44\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Bulletin on the Basic
Situation of Emergency Environmental Incidents in 2014'' [Huanjing
baohubu tongbao 2014 nian tufa huanjing shijian jiben qingkuang], 23
January 15.
\45\ Chen Jining, Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Reforming
Eco-Environmental Protection Institutional Setup and Upgrading
Environmental Treatment Capacity Remarks Made at the 2015 Annual
General Meeting of China Council for International Cooperation on
Environment and Development,'' 9 November 15.
\46\ See, e.g., Orville Schell, ``Crackdown in China: Worse and
Worse,'' New York Review of Books, 21 April 16; Ye Zhusheng, ``
`Shuanggui' Between Discipline and the Law '' [Jilu yu falu zhijian de
``shuanggui''], South Reviews, reprinted in Consensus Net, 10 June 13;
David Wertime, ``Inside China's Blackest Box,'' Foreign Policy, Tea
Leaf Nation (blog), 2 July 14.
\47\ ``Zhang Lijun Doubly Dismissed on the Last Day of This Year,
Reported To Be `Black Hand Behind the Smog' '' [Zhang lijun jinnian
zuihou yi tian bei shuangkai ceng bei jubao shi wumai beihou heishou],
China News Service, 31 December 15. Zhang's alleged corrupt actions
regarding vehicle emissions standards reportedly negatively impacted
national air quality. Michael Lelyveld, ``China Downplays Energy
Efficiency Gain,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 February 16; ``Power Use,
Railway Freights Signal Economic Restructuring: NBS Chief,'' Global
Times, 8 October 15. These articles report on the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (NBS), NBS director Wang Bao'an, and environmental
data. ``CCDI Warns of Corruption Risks After Inspections,'' Xinhua, 5
February 16. Xinhua reported that the Communist Party of China Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection had found that NBS officials had
been involved in ``data fabrication.'' Nicolas Jenny, ``Panama Papers
Lay Bare China's Corruption, Environmental Woes,'' Global Risk
Insights, 15 April 16. This article describes how corruption and
environmental damage are connected. Zheng Jinran, ``Ex-Environment
Official Charged With Corruption,'' China Daily, 28 November 15.
\48\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 37; PRC Legislation Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15 March 00, amended and
effective 15 March 15, art. 8(5). See also Donald Clarke, ``Discipline
Inspection Commissions and Shuanggui Detention,'' Chinese Law Prof
Blog, 5 July 14.
\49\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 23 March 76, art. 9.
\50\ Austin Ramzy, ``Ex-Official in China Blames Torture for Graft
Confession,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 25 February 16; Luo
Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former National Energy Administration Deputy
Director Xu Yongsheng on Trial, Asserts Innocence in Court and Says
Confession Forced'' [Guojia nengyuanju yuan fu juzhang xu yongsheng
shoushen dang ting hanyuan cheng zao bigong], Caixin, 24 February 16.
\51\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of
Supervision, ``Former Vice Minister of Environmental Protection and
Communist Party Member Zhang Lijun Under Investigation for Serious
Violations of Party Discipline'' [Huanjing baohubu yuan fubuzhang,
dangzu chengyuan zhang lijun shexian yanzhong weiji weifa jieshou zuzhi
diaocha], 30 July 15; ``Zhang Lijun Sacking Reveals Chain of
Environmental Interests, Number of Other Officials Also Reported''
[Zhang lijun luoma jiekai huanbao liyi lian duo guanyuan tong bei
jubao], China Business Journal, reprinted in Sohu, 9 August 15; Feng
Jun, ``Ministry of Environmental Protection `First Tiger' Sacked,
Leading to Ministry of Environmental Protection Corruption Scandal''
[Huanbaobu ``shou hu'' luoma jiang yinchu huanbaobu fanfu wo an],
Tencent Finance, Prism, 3 August 15.
\52\ Mimi Lau, ``Focus Turns to Subordinates in Graft Probe Into
China's Environment Vice-Minister Zhang Lijun,'' South China Morning
Post, 4 August 15; ``Zhang Lijun Sacking Reveals Chain of Environmental
Interests, Number of Other Officials Also Reported'' [Zhang lijun luoma
jiekai huanbao liyi lian duo guanyuan tong bei jubao], China Business
Journal, reprinted in Sohu, 9 August 15.
\53\ ``CPC Expels Former Environment Official for Corruption,''
China Daily, 31 December 15.
\54\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of
Supervision, ``National Bureau of Statistics Communist Party Secretary
and Bureau Chief Wang Bao'an Under Investigation for Serious Violations
of Party Discipline'' [Guojia tongjiju dangzu shuji, juzhang wang
bao'an shexian yanzhong weiji jieshou zuzhi diaocha], 26 January 16;
Jun Mai, ``China's Statistics Chief Wang Baoan Detained in Graft
Investigation,'' South China Morning Post, 26 January 16.
\55\ Ed Zhang, ``Appointment Shows Desire for More Effective
Communication,'' China Daily, 1 March 16; Gabriel Wildau, ``China's
Statistics Chief Wang Baoan Accused of Corruption,'' Financial Times,
26 January 16.
\56\ Nick Butler, ``Treat China's Dubious Energy Data With
Caution,'' Financial Times, 8 February 16; Michael Lelyveld, ``China
Downplays Energy Efficiency Gain,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 February 16;
Keith Bradsher, ``Inquiry in China Adds to Doubt Over Reliability of
Its Economic Data,'' New York Times, 26 January 16; Jan Ivar Korsbakken
et al., ``China's Coal Consumption and CO2 Emissions: What Do We Really
Know,'' China Dialogue, 31 March 16.
\57\ ``CCDI Warns of Corruption Risks After Inspections,'' Xinhua,
5 February 16. See also Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
and Ministry of Supervision, ``Central Eighth Inspection Group Reports
Back to National Bureau of Statistics Party Group Regarding the Special
Inspection Situation'' [Zhongyang di ba xunshizu xiang guojia tongjiju
dangzu fankui zhuanxiang xunshi qingkuang], 4 February 16.
\58\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``Mr. Wang Baoan Met
With the Administrator of the U.S. Energy Information Administration,''
30 July 15.
\59\ Luo Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former Energy Official Says
Police Tortured Him Into Confessing,'' Caixin, 25 February 16; Austin
Ramzy, ``Ex-Official in China Blames Torture for Graft Confession,''
New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 25 February 16.
\60\ Luo Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former Energy Official Says
Police Tortured Him Into Confessing,'' Caixin, 25 February 16; Luo
Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former National Energy Administration Deputy
Director Xu Yongsheng on Trial, Asserts Innocence in Court and Says
Confession Forced'' [Guojia nengyuanju yuan fu juzhang xu yongsheng
shoushen dang ting hanyuan cheng zao bigong], Caixin, 24 February 16.
Xu Yongsheng allegedly received bribes to approve 27 power plants,
including thermal power plants. See also Robert A. Rohde and Richard A.
Muller, ``Air Pollution in China: Mapping of Concentrations and
Sources,'' PLOS ONE, Vol. 10(8), 20 August 15. Power plants that use
fossil fuel are a significant source of air pollution in China.
\61\ ``Chinese Courts Conclude 19,000 Criminal Cases on
Pollution,'' Xinhua, 13 March 16.
\62\ Ibid.
\63\ ``Chinese Polluters Fined US$654 Million in 2015,'' Xinhua, 11
March 16.
\64\ Alex Wang, ``Chinese State Capitalism and the Environment,''
Social Science Research Network, updated 21 April 15, 11-12.
\65\ ``China's Green Push Gives Clout to Once `Embarrassing'
Ministry,'' Reuters, 1 March 16.
\66\ Zhang Yan, ``Ministry Summons Local Officials for `Talk' Over
Problems on Nature Reserves,'' Caixin, 15 January 16.
\67\ PRC Environmental Protection Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
huanjing baohu fa], passed 26 December 89, amended 24 April 14,
effective 1 January 15, art. 58.
\68\ Liu Qin, ``Will China's Environmental Law Help To Win `War on
Pollution?' '' China Dialogue, 22 March 16.
\69\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``MEP Pays High
Attention to the 603 Yuan Penalty in Gaoyou,'' 18 March 16; ``China
Orders Probe After Polluting Factory Fined Just $90,'' Reuters, 18
March 16; ``Large Number of Deformed Fish in Gaoyou, Jiangsu, Fish
Ponds, MEP: Pollution Not Above Standards'' [Jiangsu gaoyou yu tang
xian daliang jixing yu huanbaoju: wuran wu hanliang wei chaobiao],
China News Service, reprinted in Sina, 14 October 15.
\70\ Ibid.
\71\ European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``Overcapacity in
China: An Impediment to the Party's Reform Agenda,'' 22 February 16,
13; Te-ping Chen, ``China's Antipollution Push Brings Costs for Its
Provinces,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 March 16.
\72\ Te-ping Chen, ``China's Antipollution Push Brings Costs for
Its Provinces,'' Wall Street Journal, 11 March 16.
\73\ Barbara Finamore et al., ``Tackling Pollution in China's 13th
Five Year Plan: Emphasis on Enforcement,'' Natural Resources Defense
Council (blog), 11 March 16; Deborah Seligsohn and Angel Hsu, ``How
China's 13th Five-Year Plan Addresses Energy and the Environment,''
Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 10 March 16; Ma Tianjie, ``China's
Environment in 2015: A Year in Review,'' China Dialogue, 23 December
15.
\74\ Ma Tianjie, ``China's Environment in 2015: A Year in Review,''
China Dialogue, 23 December 15.
\75\ PRC Wild Animal Protection Law (Draft Revision) [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo yesheng dongwu baohu fa (xiuding cao'an)], December
2015.
\76\ Liu Su'nan, ``Wild Animal Protection Law Under Revision,
Experts Say Outdated Law Needs To Be Updated'' [Yesheng dongwu baohu fa
zai xiuding zhuanjia cheng linian guoshi jianyi li xin fa], Jiemian, 31
December 15.
\77\ Shaojie Huang, ``Exploitation of Endangered Species Feared as
China Revisits Wildlife Law,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 1
February 16.
\78\ PRC Wild Animal Protection Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
yesheng dongwu baohu fa], passed 8 November 88, amended 28 August 04,
27 August 09, 2 July 16, effective 1 January 17.
\79\ Environmental Investigation Agency, ``China's Wildlife
Protection Law,'' last visited 19 August 16. See also Vicky Lee,
``Uncertainty for Tigers Under China's New Wildlife Law,'' China
Dialogue, 12 July 16; Laney Zhang, Law Library of Congress, ``China:
New Wildlife Protection Law,'' Library of Congress, Global Legal
Monitor, 5 August 16.
\80\ Ma Tianjie, ``China's Environment in 2015: A Year in Review,''
China Dialogue, 23 December 15.
\81\ PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo daqi wuran fangzhi fa], passed 29 August 15, effective 1
January 16; State Council Legislative Affairs Office, ``Xia Yong:
Conscientiously Implement Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law''
[Xia yong: renzhen shishi daqi wuran fangzhi fa], 29 December 15.
\82\ PRC Environmental Protection Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
huanjing baohu fa], passed 26 December 89, amended 24 April 14,
effective 1 January 15, art. 58. For more information, see Supreme
People's Court, Interpretation Regarding Certain Issues Related to
Application of the Law in Environmental Civil Public Interest
Litigation [Guanyu shenli huanjing minshi gongyi susong anjian shiyong
falu ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 6 January 15, effective 7 January
15.
\83\ Yaxue Cao, ``12 Years in Prison for Trying To Protect Spotted
Seals,'' China Change, 16 November 15.
\84\ Liu Qin, ``Will China's Environmental Law Help To Win `War on
Pollution?' '' China Dialogue, 22 March 16; Karl Bourdeau and Dan
Schulson, `` `Citizen Suits' Under China's Revised Environmental
Protection Law: A Watershed Moment in Chinese Environmental Litigation?
'' Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., 9 March 16.
\85\ Zhang Chun, ``China Court Rules in Favor of First Public
Interest Environmental Law,'' China Dialogue, 11 November 15. The case
was filed on January 1, 2015. Karl Bourdeau and Dan Schulson, ``
`Citizen Suits' Under China's Revised Environmental Protection Law: A
Watershed Moment in Chinese Environmental Litigation? '' Beveridge &
Diamond, P.C., 9 March 16.
\86\ Cao Yin, ``Top Court Upholds Record Penalty of $26m for Water
Pollution,'' China Daily, 22 January 16.
\87\ Yaxue Cao, ``12 Years in Prison for Trying To Protect Spotted
Seals,'' China Change, 16 November 15; Dawa County People's Court,
Liaoning Province, ``Criminal Verdict No. 00001 (2015)'' [Liaoning
sheng dawa xian renmin fayuan xingshi panjue shu (2015) dawa xing chuzi
di 00001 hao], 3 August 15, 29, reprinted in ``Dawa County People's
Court, Liaoning Province, Criminal Verdict (20150803)'' [Liaoning sheng
dawa xian renmin fayuan xingshi panjue shu (20150803)], Sina, 10
November 15.
\88\ Yaxue Cao, ``12 Years in Prison for Trying To Protect Spotted
Seals,'' China Change, 16 November 15. See also Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2015: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau)'' 13 April 16, 48. In April 2016, the Panjin Intermediate
People's Court reportedly accepted Tian's request for a retrial,
although he remained in prison. Guo Rui, ``Retrial for the Number One
`Protector of Spotted Seals,' Tian Jiguang, First Instance Sentence of
12 Years Shocked Environmental World'' [``Baohu ban haibo'' di yi ren
tian jiguang an zaishen yishen bei pan 12 nian zhenjing huanbao jie],
Phoenix Net, 29 April 16.
\89\ Panjin Intermediate People's Court, Liaoning Province,
``Retrial Decision, Criminal Appeal No. 3 (2016)'' [Liaoning sheng
panjin shi zhongji renmin fayuan zaishen jueding shu (2016) liao 11
xing shen 3 hao], 15 April 16, reprinted in Guo Rui, ``Retrial for the
Number One `Protector of Spotted Seals,' Tian Jiguang, First Instance
Sentence of 12 Years Shocked Environmental World'' [``Baohu ban haibo''
di yi ren tian jiguang an zaishen yishen bei pan 12 nian zhenjing
huanbao jie], Phoenix Net, 29 April 16. Phoenix Net reprinted the
retrial decision in the article from April 29, 2016.
\90\ ``Guangdong Riot Police Crack Down on Two Waste Pollution
Protests,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 October 15.
\91\ ``China Detains Dozens of Ethnic Mongolians Amid Ongoing
Grassland Protest,'' Radio Free Asia, 9 March 16.
\92\ ``Middle School Moves to New Address as 500 Students Have
Health Irregularities, Some Found To Have Leukemia'' [Zhongxue ban
xinzhi 500 xuesheng shenti yichang gebie cha chu baixiebing], Sina, 17
April 16; Tom Phillips, ``China's Toxic School: Officials Struggle To
Contain Uproar Over Sick Students,'' Guardian, 19 April 16; Yu Zhuang,
``Friends of Nature (China)'s Fight Against Soil Pollution in China,''
Vermont Law School, Asia Environmental Governance Blog, 13 May 16; Shi
Yi, ``Chinese NGOs Sue Chemical Companies Over Contaminated School,''
Sixth Tone, 29 April 16; ``Sickness at a Chinese High School Blamed on
Toxic Waste Dumped Nearby,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 April 16.
\93\ Rights Defense Network, ``Ningxiang County, Hunan Province,
Residents Ou Quanjiang and Zhang Hailong Criminally Detained for
Opposing Construction of Waste Incinerator Projects, Two Other
Participants Wanted by Authorities'' [Hunan ningxiang xian gongmin ou
quanjiang, zhang hailong yin fandui xingjian lese fenshao fadian
xiangmu jing zao xingju dangju tongji ling liang ming canyuzhe], 29
June 16; Ningxiang County Public Security Bureau (Ningxiang gong'an),
``Ningxiang County Public Security Bureau Notice on the Investigation
Situation of the June 27 Group Petitioning Incident'' [Ningxiang xian
gong'anju guanyu 6.27 ji fang shijian chachu qingkuang tonggao], WeChat
post, 28 June 16; Catherine Lai, ``Two Detained After Third
Environmental Protest in Central China in 3 Days,'' Hong Kong Free
Press, 29 June 16.
\94\ Chris Buckley, ``Thousands in Eastern Chinese City Protest
Nuclear Waste Project,'' New York Times, 8 August 16; ``Thousands
Protest Plans for Nuclear Processing Plant in China's Jiangsu,'' Radio
Free Asia, 8 August 16.
\95\ International Energy Agency, ``Decoupling of Global Emissions
and Economic Growth Confirmed,'' 16 March 16; ``Global CO2 Emissions
Are Set To Stall in 2015,'' Economist, Graphic Detail (blog), 8
December 15. See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ``Global
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data,'' last visited 25 August 16.
\96\ Chris Buckley, ``China Burns Much More Coal Than Reported,
Complicating Climate Talks,'' New York Times, 3 November 15; Tom
Phillips, ``China Underreporting Coal Consumption by up to 17%, Data
Suggests,'' Guardian, 4 November 15; Ayaka Jones, Today in Energy,
``Recent Statistical Revisions Suggest Higher Historical Coal
Consumption in China,'' Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S.
Department of Energy, 16 September 15. The September 2015 EIA report
noted an upward revision in China's previously reported coal
consumption figures of up to 14 percent based on new preliminary
Chinese government data. In November 2015, the New York Times reported
an upward revision of up to 17 percent based on the final Chinese
government data.
\97\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua
gangyao], issued 17 March 16, chap. 43(1).
\98\ Michael Lelyveld, ``China Raises Energy Consumption Cap,''
Radio Free Asia, 28 March 16.
\99\ Ibid.; National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian
guihua gangyao], issued 17 March 16, chap. 43(1). In March 2016, the
National People's Congress set a 2020 target for annual primary energy
consumption of 5 billion tons of standard coal equivalent.
\100\ Michael Lelyveld, ``China Raises Energy Consumption Cap,''
Radio Free Asia, 28 March 16; State Council General Office, ``Energy
Development Strategic Action Plan (2014-2020)'' [Nengyuan fazhan
zhanlue xingdong jihua (2014-2020 nian)], issued 7 June 14; ``China
Unveils Energy Strategy, Targets for 2020,'' Xinhua, 19 November 14. In
November 2014, the State Council set a target for annual primary energy
consumption of 4.8 billion tons of standard coal equivalent for 2020.
\101\ ``China's Coal-Fired Power Producers Set To Play the
`Rebalancing' Game,'' South China Morning Post, 17 April 16.
\102\ Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, ``U.S.-
China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,''
7 June 16, items 40-78.
\103\ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ``U.S.-China
Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change,'' 25 September 15;
``Full Text: Outcomes List of President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the
United States,'' Xinhua, 25 September 15.
\104\ UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the
Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12 December 15; ``China Signs
Paris Agreement on Climate Change,'' Xinhua, 23 April 16.
\105\ ``China Submits Its Climate Action Plan Ahead of 2015 Paris
Agreement,'' United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN
Climate Change Newsroom, 30 June 15; UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12
December 15; ``Spotlight: China Makes Active Contribution for
Breakthrough at Paris Climate Talks,'' Xinhua, 13 December 15.
Civil Society
Civil Society
III. Development of the Rule of Law
Civil Society
Introduction
Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) vary in scope
and focus, and illustrate complex levels of organization in an
evolving regulatory environment. Government-registered NGOs are
one subset of Chinese NGOs. According to the Ministry of Civil
Affairs, at the end of 2015, China had 661,861 registered
``social organizations'' (shehui zuzhi)--the official term for
NGOs--that consisted of 329,122 non-governmental, non-
commercial organizations (minban feiqiye danwei), a 12.6-
percent increase from the previous year; 4,762 foundations
(jijinhui); and 327,977 social associations (shehui tuanti).\1\
Whereas many registered NGOs in China are government-organized
non-governmental organizations (GONGOs),\2\ organizations
founded by citizens who have few or no ties with the state,
nevertheless, make up a significant subset of Chinese NGOs.\3\
Many of these NGOs remain unregistered or are registered as
business entities due to restrictions and barriers to
registration.\4\ In 2010, a Chinese scholar estimated that 90
percent of NGOs are unregistered,\5\ while more recent
estimates from 2014 range from 40 to 70 percent.\6\ The number
of unregistered NGOs in China reportedly ranges from 1 million
to 8 million.\7\ While recent regulatory developments have
strengthened the legal basis for public participation in some
ways,\8\ the Chinese government continued to limit the space in
which civil society groups are permitted to work.\9\
Continued Crackdown and the ``Chilling Effect'' on Civil Society
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, the Chinese
government and Communist Party continued to deepen a crackdown
that began in 2013 on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
civil society advocates \10\ working on labor,\11\ women's
rights,\12\ and rights defense advocacy.\13\ In addition to the
government's ``unprecedented attack'' on more than 300 rights
lawyers and advocates beginning in and around July 2015,\14\
the international NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)
reported that authorities detained 22 human rights defenders
for ``political'' crimes in 2015 on suspicion of ``inciting
subversion of state power,'' equal to the number of individuals
reportedly detained under the same charge from 2012 to
2014.\15\ [For more information and updates on cases from the
July 2015 crackdown on Chinese lawyers, see Section III--Access
to Justice.] CHRD also recorded 11 cases of human rights
defenders arrested on suspicion of ``subversion of state
power'' in January 2016, ``surpassing the documented number
from 2012 to 2014 combined.'' \16\ The intensified pressure
from central and local government authorities reportedly had a
``chilling effect'' \17\ on the media,\18\ labor NGOs,\19\
charity workers,\20\ and academics,\21\ as well as on
international NGOs.\22\ As one international labor expert
noted, the crackdown on civil society appears to be
``specifically aimed at the pillars of civil society that have
been most effective in pushing the government to do things.''
\23\
During the reporting year, authorities targeted some
domestic NGOs and their staff, as illustrated in the following
examples:
In December 2015, public security officials
harassed or detained at least 25 labor advocates
affiliated with labor NGOs in Guangdong province,\24\
including staff from the Panyu Workers' Services
Center,\25\ the Nan Fei Yan Social Work Services
Center,\26\ Haige Labor Services Center,\27\ and the
Panyu Workers' Mutual Assistance Group.\28\ In January
2016, authorities formally arrested Zeng Feiyang,\29\
Zhu Xiaomei,\30\ Meng Han,\31\ and He Xiaobo \32\
reportedly for their organizing work and activities;
and released Zhu Xiaomei and He Xiaobo on bail in
February \33\ and April 2016,\34\ respectively.
In January 2016, public security authorities
from Beijing municipality reportedly ordered the
Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service
Center (Zhongze) to close.\35\ Zhongze, founded by
lawyer Guo Jianmei in 1995 as the Center for Women's
Law Studies and Legal Services of Peking University,
pioneered impact litigation in domestic violence,
sexual harassment, and other women's rights issues.\36\
Zhongze also implemented projects in rural women's land
rights \37\ and submitted reports to the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women that
reviewed the Chinese government's compliance with the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women.\38\ Despite ongoing
difficulties over the years,\39\ such as in 2010 when
Peking University rescinded its sponsorship of the
organization, Guo's work is recognized domestically and
internationally.\40\
Chinese authorities also targeted an international staff
member of a legal rights advocacy group during this reporting
year. In January 2016, authorities detained Peter Dahlin, a
Swedish rights advocate who cofounded the Chinese Urgent Action
Working Group, an organization based in Beijing municipality
that trained and supported Chinese rights defenders,\41\ for
three weeks under suspicion of ``funding criminal activities
harmful to China's national security'' before expelling him
from the country.\42\ On January 19, while Dahlin was in
detention, state television aired a prerecorded confession of
him admitting to ``[violating] Chinese law'' and ``[causing]
harm to the Chinese government.'' \43\ Dahlin later stated in
an interview with the New York Times that Chinese authorities
had scripted the confession.\44\ Officials accused Dahlin's
group of receiving foreign funding to train ``agents'' to
``endanger state security.'' \45\ Chinese state media
highlighted Dahlin's partnership with Wang Quanzhang,\46\ a
lawyer at the Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing,\47\ whom authorities
detained during the crackdown on lawyers and rights advocates
that began in and around July 2015.\48\ Official state media
also linked Dahlin's detention to Xing Qingxian, a rights
advocate accused of aiding human rights lawyer Wang Yu's son in
his attempt to leave China.\49\
The Chinese government's crackdown on NGOs and staff
violates rights guaranteed in China's Constitution,\50\ as well
as international standards on freedom of speech and association
set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights \51\ and the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.\52\
In response to China's crackdown on civil society, in February
2016, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al
Hussein raised concerns and sought clarification from the
Chinese government about the recent arrests of lawyers and
harassment of NGO workers.\53\ In March 2016, the United States
and 11 other nations issued a joint statement at the UN Human
Rights Council that expressed concern regarding ``China's
deteriorating human rights record.'' \54\ A U.S. Department of
State spokesperson reportedly remarked that the joint statement
was ``the first collective action taken regarding China at the
Human Rights Council since its inception in 2007.'' \55\
Legislative Developments
In the past year, the National People's Congress passed two
major laws that pertain to civil society--the PRC Charity Law
and the PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in
Mainland China. A labor expert called the new laws ``the most
consequential nonprofit laws passed in the history of the
PRC.'' \56\ Observers noted that the Charity Law may promote
philanthropy in China and foster better accountability and
credibility as the charity sector develops.\57\ Yet, they also
expressed concerns that the laws' tighter restrictions \58\
will likely limit NGOs' access to domestic and international
funding, thereby jeopardizing the survival of some NGOs.\59\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC Charity Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National People's Congress (NPC) passed the PRC Charity Law in
March 2016 \60\ after issuing two drafts for public comment in October
2015 and January 2016.\61\ Chinese officials released the law against
the backdrop of several highly publicized charity-related scandals.\62\
Chinese leaders expressed hope that the law will help fight poverty
\63\ and encourage charitable giving.\64\ Chinese experts have
expressed hope that it may improve governance and transparency.\65\
Key provisions include the following:
Registration. While observers noted that the Charity Law
removes the requirement for charities to find a supervisory
organization to register with civil affairs departments,\66\ Article
20 defers the authority to stipulate specific registration management
methods to the State Council.\67\
Fundraising. Articles 22 and 23 permit registered charities
to engage in public fundraising, including through radio, television,
newspapers, and the Internet, after obtaining a public fundraising
qualification certificate, which organizations can apply for after
being lawfully registered for two years.\68\
Transparency. Articles 72 and 73 require organizations to
publicly disclose information on the organization's charter, members,
plans, activities, fundraising, and the use of funds.\69\
Preventing misconduct. Provisions prohibit and provide
punishment for embezzlement and misuse of funds, including revocation
of registration, by any organization or individual associated with an
organization.\70\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC Charity Law--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
International human rights organizations and media reports have
highlighted concerns over certain provisions of the law, as follows:
Endangering state security. Article 104 provides the legal
basis for authorities to criminally prosecute and shut down groups
deemed to ``endanger state security,'' \71\ a vague charge human
rights groups say authorities can use to crack down on human rights
advocacy \72\ and limit sources of funding for independent
groups.\73\
Registration. One media report suggested that some charitable
organizations may choose not to register due to authorities'
suspicions regarding their activities.\74\
Implementation. Some reports noted that while the law
includes positive provisions, implementation at the local level will
determine its impact on Chinese civil society groups.\75\
Tax benefits. Articles 79 to 84 \76\ provide what experts
worry are vaguely defined rules entitling beneficiaries,
organizations, and donors to tax benefits.\77\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in Mainland China
\78\
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 28, 2016, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the PRC
Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in Mainland China,\79\
scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2017,\80\ after much
deliberation and two drafts.\81\ The final version of the law appeared
to address some concerns expressed during the public comment
process.\82\ Revisions included more specificity in the definition of
``overseas NGOs,'' \83\ which an expert interpreted to encompass
``industry and trade associations, chambers of commerce, [and]
development and human rights NGOs . . .''; \84\ allowing more than one
representative office per organization in China; \85\ and extending the
length of time that a representative office's registration is
valid.\86\
International observers, nevertheless, continued to raise concerns
with several of the new law's provisions, including:
Registration authority given to Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) and provincial-level public security offices. Whereas the
Ministry of Civil Affairs has management authority over domestic
NGOs,\87\ Article 41 authorizes public security officials to manage
registration, conduct annual inspections, and investigate ``illegal
activities'' of international NGOs (INGOs).\88\ Article 11 requires
the formal consent of a government-approved professional supervisory
unit (PSU) in order for INGOs to register with MPS.\89\ Articles 46
and 47 provide for public security officials--under specific
conditions--to shut down INGO activities, confiscate property, detain
INGO personnel, and criminally prosecute ``illegal activities.'' \90\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRC Law on the Management of Overseas NGO Activities in Mainland China--
Continued \78\
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Endangering national security. Article 5 prohibits INGOs
from carrying out activities that ``endanger China's national unity,
security, [or] ethnic unity'' or ``harm China's national interests
and the public interest . . ..'' \91\ It also prohibits INGOs from
engaging in or funding ``for-profit'' or ``political'' activities, as
well as ``illegally engaging in and funding religious activities.''
\92\
Additional registration requirement. Article 9 requires that
INGOs set up and register a representative office or, if they want to
carry out temporary activities, they must ``file a record according
to law'' (yi fa bei'an).\93\ Foreign organizations that have not
registered or ``filed a record'' are forbidden from funding or
partnering with domestic NGOs.\94\
Restrictions on temporary activity. Articles 16 and 17
require INGOs without representative offices in China to partner with
``Chinese partner units,'' which include state agencies, mass
organizations, public institutions, or social organizations, in order
to ``file a record.'' \95\ The duration of temporary activities is
limited to one year, and extensions are dependent on making new
filings.\96\
Reporting requirement. Articles 19 and 31 require that
representative offices of INGOs submit an annual activity plan for
the following year by December 31 \97\ and work reports on the
previous year--including financial information, activities, and
personnel and institutional changes--by January 31 to their PSUs for
annual inspections by the relevant public security offices.\98\
Possible exemptions. Article 53 provides ambiguous language
for how ``overseas schools, hospitals, science and engineering
technology research institutions, and academic organizations'' are
treated under the law, and places them under the authority of
``relevant national provisions.'' \99\ Experts questioned whether
this exempts these organizations from the provisions of the law.\100\
International observers called on the Chinese government to repeal the
legislation, and warned that the law could be used as a tool of
intimidation and suppression of dissenting views; \101\ a mechanism for
exerting greater control over civil society; \102\ and an intensified
effort to ``stifle'' groups in certain civil society sectors.\103\ The
U.S. Government expressed concern that the law may constrain U.S.-China
people-to-people exchanges and relations.\104\ A Chinese lawyer called
the law a form of ``national security legislation,'' and said it
signaled a ``fundamental change'' in China's regulation of INGOs to a
``national-security focused model'' that discourages INGOs' ``presence
and activity.'' \105\ A Chinese professor at Tsinghua University's
School of Public Policy and Management cautioned that the concentration
of approval authority and the new and complex approval process within
the public security bureaucracy could result in a ``stagnation effect''
on INGO activity in China.\106\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Regulatory Developments
During the past year, the Chinese government released plans
and draft revisions to the three major regulations that pertain
to the registration and management of civil society
organizations as part of a broad decision on revising
regulations.\107\ The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) released
revised drafts for public comment of all three
regulations.\108\ Following the February 2016 State Council
administrative revision of the Regulations on the Registration
and Management of Social Organizations,\109\ the MCA released a
revised draft of the same regulation for public comment in
August 2016 which would permit direct registration for business
associations, research organizations, charities, and service
organizations.\110\ Drafters changed the title of the
Regulations on the Management of Non-Governmental, Non-
Commercial Enterprises to Regulations on the Management of
Social Service Organization Registration, renaming ``non-
governmental, non-commercial units'' as ``social service
organizations.'' \111\ Provisions in the draft Regulations on
the Management of Foundations specify how charitable
foundations should be classified and regulated.\112\ In
addition, Article 4 of all three draft regulations stipulates
that Communist Party groups must be established within
organizations.\113\ In August 2016, the Party Central Committee
and State Council jointly released an opinion on reforming
social organization management, emphasizing the Party's
leadership over civil society and setting 2020 as the target
year for establishing a uniform registration and management
system throughout the country.\114\
Regulatory Environment
The regulatory environment for Chinese NGOs continues to be
challenging to navigate. Authorities continue to require some
NGOs to secure the sponsorship of a governmental or quasi-
governmental organization in order to be eligible for
registration at civil affairs bureaus.\115\ This ``dual
management system'' \116\ subjects NGOs to differentiated
treatment based on authorities' perception of a group's
political sensitivity.\117\ Facing strict government control
and barriers to registering as social organizations,\118\ many
Chinese NGOs register instead as business entities or remain
unregistered.\119\ Without registered status, NGOs have
difficulty obtaining government funding or receiving donations
from the private sector \120\ and often rely more heavily on
international funding, which has become more difficult to
secure in the new regulatory environment.\121\
Experts noted that NGOs without government affiliation are
at a disadvantage compared to quasi-governmental or government-
organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) with respect
to public fundraising and government procurement. A 2014 China
Academy of Social Sciences report highlighted GONGOs' monopoly
over fundraising as one of the reasons independent NGOs receive
little funding.\122\ According to a government official,
government procurement of services may contribute to the uneven
development of government-affiliated and grassroots NGOs.\123\
Amid the concern about the lack of a fair assessment mechanism
for procurement,\124\ in February 2016, officials in Chengdu
municipality, Sichuan province, reportedly released the first
guidelines in China for the evaluation of government
procurement of public services.\125\
Civil Society
Civil Society
Notes to Section III--Civil Society
\1\ Pan Yue, ``MCA Registered a Total of 661,861 Social
Organizations,'' People's Daily, 15 April 16.
\2\ Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,'' in NGO
Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J.
Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 48.
\3\ Ibid., 52-53; Deng Guosheng, ``The State of and Obstacles to
Chinese Grassroots NGO Development'' [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de
xianzhuang yu zhang'ai], Social Outlook, reprinted in Shanda 960, Vol.
5 (June 2010). These organizations are often referred to as grassroots
(caogen) organizations.
\4\ Isabel Hilton et al., ``The Future of NGOs in China: A
ChinaFile Conversation,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 14 May 15;
Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,'' in NGO
Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J.
Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 52-53.
\5\ Deng Guosheng, ``The State of and Obstacles to Chinese
Grassroots NGO Development'' [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de xianzhuang
yu zhang'ai], Social Outlook, reprinted in Shanda 960, Vol. 5 (June
2010).
\6\ Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,'' in NGO
Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J.
Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 53.
\7\ Deng Guosheng, ``The State of and Obstacles to Chinese
Grassroots NGO Development'' [Zhongguo caogen NGO fazhan de xianzhuang
yu zhang'ai], Social Outlook, reprinted in Shanda 960, Vol. 5 (June
2010). In 2010, Tsinghua University professor Deng Guosheng estimated
that there were 1 to 1.5 million grassroots NGOs in China, of which 90
percent were unregistered. ``Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the
Glacier,'' Economist, 12 April 14; Kristie Lu Stout, ``People Power in
the People's Republic of China,'' CNN, 26 June 14. In 2014, the
Economist estimated that there were 1.5 million unregistered groups
while CNN reported 2 million. Li Fan, ``The Current State of Civil
Society in China'' [Woguo gongmin shehui de xianzhuang], Tianze
Economic Research Institute (Unirule), Biweekly Forum, 12 September 14.
Li Fan, director of World and China Institute, a Chinese NGO research
center, claimed that China has 8 million unregistered NGOs, while Hu
Xingdou, an economics professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology,
and Xu Xin, a law professor at Beijing Institute of Technology, both
questioned Li's claim, saying that Li's definition of what constitutes
an NGO was too broad. His calculations included groups such as quasi-
governmental mass organizations, spin-off government units, business
associations, recreational clubs, virtual groups, and rural mutual aid
groups.
\8\ Karl Bourdeau and Daniel Schulson, `` `Citizen Suits' Under
China's Revised Environmental Protection Law: A Watershed Moment in
Chinese Environmental Litigation? '' JD Supra Business Advisor, 10
March 16; Shawn Shieh, ``Grassroots NGOs Win Landmark Environmental
Public Interest Lawsuit,'' NGOs in China (blog), 17 November 15; Cui
Zheng and Kong Lingyu, ``Progress for NGOs Battling Polluters in
Court,'' Caixin, 3 December 15. Despite potential progress for
environmental grassroots NGOs to bring public interest lawsuits, few
NGOs have the capacity and resources to file cases and courts have
rejected more cases than they have accepted.
\9\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To Call Ourselves
Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016.
\10\ ``China Steps Up Crackdown on Civil Society, Rights
Advocates,'' Democracy Digest, 13 January 16.
\11\ ``Chinese Police Raid Labor Rights Groups, Detain at Least
Five Activists,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 December 15; China Labour
Bulletin, ``Labour Activists Detained for Doing the Job of the Trade
Union,'' 5 December 15; ``Guangdong Authorities Arrest Labor Rights
Advocates,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 21 January
16.
\12\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``China Is Said To Force Closing of
Women's Legal Aid Center,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 29
January 16.
\13\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To Call
Ourselves Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016.
\14\ Ibid.; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``[`709
Crackdown'] Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 4 July
2016,'' 4 July 16. See also CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15,
272.
\15\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To Call
Ourselves Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016.
\16\ Ibid.
\17\ Timothy Hildebrandt, Social Organizations and the
Authoritarian State in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 58. Hildebrandt explains use of the term ``chilling effect'' in
the context of civil society as the internalization of the fear of a
negative state response to the point that civil society actors do not
contemplate taking actions that might put themselves in jeopardy.
\18\ Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2015: China Report,''
October 2015.
\19\ Mimi Lau, ``Mother of Detained Labour Activist Takes on State
Media--And Forced Into Hardest Decision of Her Life,'' South China
Morning Post, 1 May 16.
\20\ Verna Yu, ``Charity Workers in China Say NGOs Being `Pulled
Out by the Roots,' '' South China Morning Post, 22 January 16.
\21\ Orville Schell, ``Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,'' New
York Review of Books, 21 April 16.
\22\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Repeal Overseas NGO
Law & Protect Freedom of Association,'' 28 April 16.
\23\ James Griffiths, ``China on Strike,'' CNN, 29 March 16.
\24\ ``Guangdong Police `Root Out' Labor NGOs, Provoking Serious
Concern'' [Guangdong jingfang ``saodang'' laogong NGO yinfa yanzhong
guanzhu], Voice of America, 6 December 15; Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese
Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong,
Arresting Leaders,'' China Change, 10 December 15; ``Guangdong
Authorities Arrest Labor Rights Advocates,'' Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, 21 January 16.
\25\ ``Four Detained Labor Rights Defenders Arrested, Two Out on
Bail, Attack Aimed at Panyu Workers' Services Center'' [Bei zhua lao
wei renshi si pibu liang qubao maotou zhi zhi panyu dagongzu], Radio
Free Asia, 10 January 16.
\26\ ``Guangdong Police `Root Out' Labor NGOs, Provoking Serious
Concern'' [Guangdong jingfang ``saodang'' laogong NGO yinfa yanzhong
guanzhu], Voice of America, 6 December 15.
\27\ Rights Defense Network, ``Police Suddenly Crack Down on Four
Guangdong Labor NGOs, `Haige Labor Services Center,' `Panyu Workers'
Services Center,' `Sunflower Women Workers' Center,' `Nan Fei Yan,'
Leaders and Workers Disappear After Being Taken Away'' [Guangdong si
laogong NGO ``haige laogong fuwu bu'', ``panyu dagongzu'',
``xiangyanghua nugong zhongxin'', ``nan fei yan'' turan zaodao jingfang
daya, fuzeren ji yuangong bei daizou hou shilian], 3 December 15.
\28\ Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities Orchestrate Surprise Raid of
Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting Leaders,'' China Change, 10 December
15.
\29\ Rights Defense Network, `` `12/3 Guangzhou Labor NGO Cases'
Arrests Approved Today for Four Individuals, One Released, Two
Disappeared'' [``12.3 guangzhou laogong NGO an'' jin si ren bei pi
daibu, yi ren huoshi, liang ren wuxialuo], 8 January 16. For more
information on Zeng Feiyang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database record 2015-00427.
\30\ Ibid. For more information on Zhu Xiaomei, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00428.
\31\ Ibid. For more information on Meng Han, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00026.
\32\ Ibid. For more information on He Xiaobo, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00431.
\33\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Labour Activist Zhu Xiaomei Released
After Two Months in Detention,'' 4 February 16.
\34\ Guo Rui, ``One of Those Arrested in Guangdong Labor NGO Case,
He Xiaobo Released on Bail'' [Guangdong laogong NGO an beibu ren zhi yi
he xiaobo yi qubao houshen], Phoenix News, 8 April 16.
\35\ Rights Defense Network, ``Authorities Force China Women's
Rights NGO `Zhongze Women's Legal Aid Center' To Shut Down'' [Zhongguo
nuquan NGO ``zhongze funu falu zixun fuwu zhongxin'' zao dangju qiangpo
xuangao jiesan], 29 January 16; Jiang Jie and Chen Heying, ``Women's
Legal Aid Center in Beijing Closed,'' Global Times, 2 February 16.
\36\ Hai-Ching Yang, ``An Alternative to Impact Litigation in
China: The Procurator as a Legal Avenue for Cases in the `Private
Family Sphere' of Domestic Violence,'' Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 2011), 244-45.
\37\ Yaxue Cao, ``Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of
Women in China,'' China Change, 14 February 16.
\38\ See, e.g., Anti-Domestic Violence Network/Beijing FanBao,
Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Consulting Services Center, and China
Women's University, ``The Shadow Report of Chinese Women's NGOs on the
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report Submitted by China under
Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women: Violence Against Women (General
Recommendation No. 19),'' September 2014; Beijing Zhongze Legal
Consulting Services Center, China Association for Employment Promotion,
and Women's Studies Institute of China, ``The Shadow Report of Chinese
Women's NGOs on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report
Submitted by China under Article 18 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,'' September
2014; Women Human Rights Defenders International Coalition, ``China:
WHRDIC Condemns Closure of Women's Legal Aid Center in China,''
reprinted in World Organisation Against Torture, February 2016.
\39\ Human Rights in China, ``Women's Rights NGO Responds to
Cancellation by Peking University,'' 7 April 10.
\40\ Yaxue Cao, ``Guo Jianmei, Zhongze, and the Empowerment of
Women in China,'' China Change, 14 February 16; Lu Congcong and Chen
Rui, ``Guo Jianmei, Alumna From Entering Class of '79: I'm Very Happy
To Be a Public Interest Lawyer'' [79 ji xiaoyou guo jianmei zuo gongyi
lushi, wo hen kuaile], Peking University Law School, Alumni Affairs,
last visited 25 July 16.
\41\ Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ``Urgent Action:
Statement on the Detention of Peter Dahlin,'' China Change, 12 January
16.
\42\ Ibid.; Chris Buckley, ``China To Expel Peter Dahlin, Swedish
Human Rights Advocate,'' New York Times, 25 January 16.
\43\ Edward Wong, ``China Uses Foreigners' Televised Confessions To
Serve Its Own Ends,'' New York Times, 21 January 16; Chris Buckley,
``China To Expel Peter Dahlin, Swedish Human Rights Advocate,'' New
York Times, 25 January 16.
\44\ Edward Wong, ``Inside China's Secret 23-Day Detention of a
Foreign Nonprofit Chief,'' New York Times, 9 July 16.
\45\ ``China Tamps Dissent With Trumped Up `State Security' and
`Terrorism' Charges,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 16.
\46\ ``Police Smashes Illegal Organization Jeopardizing China's
National Security,'' Xinhua, 19 January 16; Simon Lewis, ``Swedish
Activist Peter Dahlin Concerned Over Colleagues in Chinese Prisons,''
Time, 26 January 16.
\47\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To Call
Ourselves Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016, 12; Edward Wong,
``Inside China's Secret 23-Day Detention of a Foreign Nonprofit
Chief,'' New York Times, 9 July 16. For more information on Wang
Quanzhang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2015-00278.
\48\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, `` `Too Risky To Call
Ourselves Defenders': CHRD Annual Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in China (2015),'' February 2016.
\49\ ``Police Smashes Illegal Organization Jeopardizing China's
National Security,'' Xinhua, 19 January 16; Simon Lewis, ``Swedish
Activist Peter Dahlin Concerned Over Colleagues in Chinese Prisons,''
Time, 26 January 16. For more information on Xing Qingxian, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2009-00113.
\50\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88,
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
\51\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 19, 21, 22. China signed the
ICCPR in 1998 and the Chinese government has stated its intent to
ratify it. During the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic
Review of the Chinese government's human rights record in October 2013,
China stated it is ``making preparations for the ratification of ICCPR
and will continue to carry out legislative and judicial reforms.'' UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/25/5, 4 December 13, para. 153.
\52\ Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society To Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 53/144 of
8 March 99, art. 5(a-c).
\53\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``UN
Human Rights Chief Deeply Concerned by China Clampdown on Lawyers and
Activists,'' 16 February 16.
\54\ ``Joint Statement on China's Human Rights Situation,''
reprinted in HumanRights.gov, 10 March 16. The joint statement was read
aloud at the UN Human Rights Council meeting on March 10, 2016, by the
U.S. Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council, Keith Harper, on behalf
of Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
See also Simon Denyer, ``Is China Heading in the Wrong Direction? For
Once, the West Calls Beijing Out,'' Washington Post, 23 March 16.
\55\ Nike Ching, ``Unprecedented UNHRC Joint Statement Condemns
China's Problematic Violations,'' Voice of America, 10 March 16.
\56\ Shawn Shieh, ``2016: The Year of Regulation and a New Future
for Civil Society,'' NGOs in China (blog), 11 June 16.
\57\ See, e.g., Mark Sidel, ``Permissive or Restrictive? A Mixed
Picture for Philanthropy in China,'' Alliance Magazine, 14 March 16;
Louis Thivierge, ``China's New Charity Law: A Legal Framework To
Incentivise Philanthropy and Achieve a `Moderately Prosperous Society,'
'' Tsinghua China Law Review, 24 March 16; Reza Hasmath, ``The Pros and
Cons of China's NGO Laws,'' The Diplomat, 23 March 16; Narada
Foundation, ``Charity Law: 8 Major Advances and 10 Major Expectations''
[Cishan fa: 8 da jinbu yu 10 da qidai], 9 March 16.
\58\ See, e.g., Reza Hasmath, ``The Pros and Cons of China's NGO
Laws,'' The Diplomat, 23 March 16; Yimei Chen, ``An Interview With Mark
Sidel: Engaging With Chinese Philanthropy From a Global Perspective,''
China Development Brief, 23 February 16; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil
Society in China (March 21-31/2016),'' 31 March 16.
\59\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] New
Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March
21-31/2016),'' 31 March 16; Human Rights Watch, ``Human Rights Watch
Letter to China NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang,'' 3 March 16.
\60\ ``China Adopts Charity Law,'' Xinhua, 16 March 16; PRC Charity
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16,
effective 1 September 16. See also the following unofficial translation
``2016 Charity Law,'' translated in China Law Translate (blog), 16
March 16.
\61\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Charity Law
(Draft) [Cishan fa (cao'an)], 31 October 15; National People's Congress
Standing Committee, Charity Law Draft Second Review Revised Draft
[Cishan fa cao'an erci shenyi gao xiugai gao], 11 January 16.
\62\ ``Parties Hotly Discuss Six Main Issues of Charity Law Draft''
[Gefang reyi cishan fa cao'an liu da jiaodian], Xinhua, 30 October 15;
Josh Chin, ``China Charity Law Seeks To Make Giving Easier,'' Wall
Street Journal, 14 March 16.
\63\ See, e.g., ``Xinhua Insight: NPC Hopes Charity Law Can Help
Poverty Fight,'' Xinhua, 9 March 16. See also ``China Hopes To Improve
Philanthropy Through Charity Law: Spokeswoman,'' Xinhua, 4 March 16.
\64\ See, e.g., ``NPC Passes China's First Charity Law To Encourage
Participation,'' China Radio International, 16 March 16.
\65\ See, e.g., Shi Rui et al., ``China Builds Legal Basis for
Charitable Giving,'' Caixin Net, 18 December 15; ``NPC Passes China's
First Charity Law To Encourage Participation,'' China Radio
International, 16 March 16.
\66\ PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed
16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 8-20. See, e.g., Xu
Yongguang, ``Highlighting China's First Charity Law,'' CCTV, 10 March
16; Shawn Shieh, ``Charity Law FAQs,'' NGOs in China (blog), 29 March
16.
\67\ Dong Zijin, ``Five Considerations Regarding the Charity Law''
[Dong zijin: guanyu cishan fa de wu ge tixing], Caijing, 15 April 16;
PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March
16, effective 1 September 16, art. 20.
\68\ PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed
16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 22-23.
\69\ Ibid., arts. 71-75.
\70\ Ibid., arts. 52, 98, 108.
\71\ Ibid., art. 104. In addition, Articles 4 and 15 prohibit
activities and funding for activities that ``endanger state security''
and ``social public interests.'' Megha Rajagopalan, ``China Charity Law
To Forbid Activity That `Endangers National Security,' '' Reuters, 9
March 16; Shawn Shieh, ``Charity Law FAQs,'' NGOs in China (blog), 29
March 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] New Charity Law Will
Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21-31/2016),''
31 March 16.
\72\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: State Security,
Terrorism Convictions Double,'' 16 March 16; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``[CHRB] New Charity Law Will Further Isolate & Weaken Civil
Society in China (March 21-31/2016),'' 31 March 16.
\73\ Shawn Shieh, ``Charity Law FAQs,'' NGOs in China (blog), 29
March 16; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] New Charity Law Will
Further Isolate & Weaken Civil Society in China (March 21-31/2016),''
31 March 16.
\74\ Josh Chin, ``The Good--And Bad--About China's New Charity
Law,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 16 March 16.
\75\ See, e.g., Shannon Van Sant, ``China Approves Comprehensive
Law on Charities, Nonprofits,'' Voice of America, 23 March 16; Josh
Chin, ``The Good--And Bad--About China's New Charity Law,'' Wall Street
Journal, China Real Time (blog), 16 March 16. See also Yimei Chen, ``An
Interview with Mark Sidel: Engaging With Chinese Philanthropy From a
Global Perspective,'' China Development Brief, 23 February 16.
\76\ PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed
16 March 16, effective 1 September 16, arts. 79-84.
\77\ See, e.g., Josh Chin, ``The Good--And Bad--About China's New
Charity Law,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time (blog), 16 March
16; Dong Zijin, ``Five Considerations Regarding the Charity Law'' [Dong
zijin: guanyu cishan fa de wu ge tixing], Caijing, 15 April 16.
\78\ CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 227-28.
\79\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17; ``China Releases Law on Management of
Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China''
[Woguo chutai jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa],
Xinhua, 28 April 16.
\80\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17, art. 54; ``China Releases Law on Management
of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland
China'' [Woguo chutai jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli
fa], Xinhua, 28 April 16.
\81\ ``China Releases Law on Management of Overseas Non-
Governmental Organizations' Activities in Mainland China'' [Woguo
chutai jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], Xinhua, 28
April 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``China Wrestles With Draft Law on
Nongovernmental Organizations,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 11
March 16; National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Overseas
Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law (Draft) (Second Reading
Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa
(cao'an) (er ci shenyi gao)], 5 May 15. For an unofficial English
translation of the draft version, see China Development Brief, ``CDB
English Translation of the Overseas NGO Management Law (Second
Draft),'' 21 May 15.
\82\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``Submission by Human Rights
Watch to the National People's Congress Standing Committee on the
Second Draft of the Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations Management
Law,'' 2 June 15; Amnesty International, ``China: Submission to the NPC
Standing Committee's Legislative Affairs Commission on the Second Draft
Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law,'' June 2015, 3-
4; China Development Brief, ``Feedback and Suggestions on the `Overseas
NGO Management Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft)' (Second
Reading),'' May 2015, 2-7.
\83\ ``Draft Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China Submitted for Third
Review'' [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa cao'an
tiqing san shen], Xinhua, 25 April 16; ``Changes Anticipated in the New
FNGO Law,'' China Law Translate (blog), 25 April 16; PRC Law on the
Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities in
Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi
jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April 16, effective 1 January 17,
art. 2; National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Overseas
Non-Governmental Organizations Management Law (Draft) (Second Reading
Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa
(cao'an) (er ci shenyi gao)], 5 May 15, art. 2. The definition of
overseas NGOs in the final version of the law states overseas NGOs are
``not-for-profit, non-governmental social organizations lawfully
established outside of mainland China such as foundations, social
associations, and think tanks.'' The second draft law released for
public comment in May 2015 defined overseas NGOs as ``not-for-profit,
non-governmental social organizations formed outside mainland China.''
\84\ Shawn Shieh, ``Overseas NGO Law FAQs,'' NGOs in China (blog),
1 May 16; PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17, art. 2.
\85\ ``Draft Law on Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China Submitted for Third
Review'' [Jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa cao'an
tiqing san shen], Xinhua, 25 April 16; ``Changes Anticipated in the New
FNGO Law,'' China Law Translate (blog), 25 April 16.
\86\ Ibid.
\87\ Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society,'' in NGO
Governance and Management in China, eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer.
Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 51-52; International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law, ``NGO Law Monitor: China,'' last updated 20 June
16.
\88\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17, art. 41; Simon Denyer, ``China Passes Tough
Law To Bring Foreign NGOs Under Security Supervision,'' Washington
Post, 28 April 16.
\89\ PRC Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations' Activities in Mainland China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa], passed 28 April
16, effective 1 January 17, art. 11. Article 11 states that public
security and government offices are tasked with publishing a directory
of approved professional supervisory units (PSUs).
\90\ Ibid., arts. 46-47.
\91\ Ibid., art. 5.
\92\ Ibid., art. 5.
\93\ Ibid., art. 9.
\94\ Ibid., art. 9.
\95\ Ibid., arts. 16-17.
\96\ Ibid., art. 17.
\97\ Ibid., arts. 6, 19, 31.
\98\ Ibid., arts. 6, 31.
\99\ Ibid., art. 53; Shawn Shieh, ``Overseas NGO Law FAQs,'' NGOs
in China (blog), 1 May 16.
\100\ Shawn Shieh, ``Overseas NGO Law FAQs,'' NGOs in China (blog),
1 May 16; ``Changes Anticipated in the New FNGO Law,'' China Law
Translate (blog), 25 April 16.
\101\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China:
Newly Adopted Foreign NGO Law Should Be Repealed, UN Experts Urge,'' 3
May 16.
\102\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China: Repeal Overseas NGO
Law & Protect Freedom of Association,'' 28 April 16; Tom Phillips,
``China Passes Law Imposing Security Controls on Foreign NGOs,''
Guardian, 28 April 16; Charlie Campbell, ``China's New Foreign NGO Law
Is Threatening Vital Advocacy Work,'' Time, 26 April 16; Mark Sidel,
``It Just Got Harder To Make a Difference in China,'' Foreign Policy,
Tea Leaf Nation (blog), 29 April 16.
\103\ Freedom House, ``China's NGO Law Aims To Stifle `Foreign'
Influence, Basic Rights,'' 29 April 16.
\104\ The White House, ``Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on
China's Foreign NGO Management Law,'' 28 April 16; John Kerry, U.S.
Department of State, ``China's Passage of the Law on the Management of
Foreign NGO Activities Inside Mainland China,'' 28 April 16.
\105\ Sebastian Heilmann et al., ``How Should Global Stakeholders
Respond to China's New NGO Management Law? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile
(blog), 5 May 16.
\106\ Jia Xijin, ``Jia Xijin: Where Will the Second Boot Fall in
the Legislation for Overseas NGOs? '' [Jia xijin: lifa jingwai NGO, di
er zhi xuezi ruhe luodi?], Caijing, 27 November 15.
\107\ State Council General Office, State Council's 2016
Legislative Work Plan [Guowuyuan 2016 nian lifa gongzuo jihua], 17
March 16, 1. See also CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 133.
\108\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial
Enterprises (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Minban
feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for
Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations
(Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji
guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16.
\109\ State Council, Decision on Amending Some Administrative
Regulations [Guowuyuan guanyu xiugai bufen xingzheng fagui de jueding],
issued and effective 6 February 16, 18; ``State Council Revises the
Administrative Regulations for the Registration of Social
Organizations,'' China Development Brief, 3 March 16; Wang Yong,
``State Council Amends the `Regulations for the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations' '' [Guowuyuan xiugai ``shehui
tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli''], China Philanthropy Times, reprinted in
Syntao, 4 March 16. The revisions allow applicant organizations that
have appropriate sponsors to apply directly for registration rather
than first having to apply to prepare for registration at the relevant
government agency.
\110\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Registration
and Management of Social Organizations (Revised Draft for Solicitation
of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16, 20. See also Ben Blanchard, ``China
Proposes Tightening Grip on NGOs,'' Reuters, 1 August 16.
\111\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial
Enterprises (Revised Draft for Public Comment) [Minban feiqiye danwei
dengji guanli tiaoli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhenqiu yijian
gao)], 26 May 16, Introduction. According to Article 10, ``social
organizations'' categorized as ``non-governmental, non-commercial
enterprises'' under these regulations include science and technology
research groups, philanthropic groups, and community service groups.
\112\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Regulations on the Management of
Foundations (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui
guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16,
Explanations.
\113\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial
Enterprises (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Minban
feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, art. 4; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Regulations on the Management of Foundations (Revised Draft for
Solicitation of Comments) [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an
zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, art. 4; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations
(Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) [Shehui tuanti dengji
guanli tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 1 August 16, art.
4.
\114\ ``Party Central Committee General Office and State Council
General Office Publish `Opinion on Reforming Management System of
Social Organizations To Promote Social Organizations' Healthy and
Orderly Development' '' [Zhongban guoban yinfa ``guanyu gaige shehui
zuzhi guanli zhidu cujin shehui zuzhi jiankang youxu fazhan de yijian],
Xinhua, 21 August 16, 2(2-3); Ben Blanchard, ``China To Strengthen
Communist Party's Role in Non-Govt Bodies,'' Reuters, 21 August 16.
\115\ State Council, Regulations on the Registration and Management
of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued 25
October 98, amended and effective 6 February 16, art. 6; Ministry of
Civil Affairs, Temporary Regulations on the Registration and Management
of Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Enterprises (Revised Draft for
Solicitation of Comments) [Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli tiaoli
zanxing tiaoli (xiuding cao'an zhengqiu yijian gao)], 26 May 16, art.
10.
\116\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``NGO Law
Monitor: China,'' last updated 20 June 16; Shawn Shieh, ``Mapping the
Dynamics of Civil Society,'' in NGO Governance and Management in China,
eds. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Y.J. Hsu (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016),
52. Shieh refers to the management system of NGOs as ``dual
supervision'' by relevant-level entities within the civil affairs
bureaucracy and by professional supervisory units. Dong Zijin, ``Five
Considerations Regarding the Charity Law'' [Guanyu cishan fa de wu ge
tixing], Caijing, 15 April 16.
\117\ Teng Biao, ``Assessment of the Drafts of the `Foreign NGO
Management Law' and `National Security Law' '' [Ping ``jingwai
feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa'' he ``guojia anquan fa'' cao'an],
Independent Chinese PEN Center (blog), 30 June 15; Fengshi Wu and Kin-
man Chan, ``Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO
Relations,'' China Perspectives, 2012, No. 3, 10-11.
\118\ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ``NGO Law
Monitor: China,'' last updated 20 June 16. Some other barriers to
registration include extensive documentation requirements; broad
prohibitions of certain activities such as advocacy, legal assistance,
labor, religion, and ethnic minority affairs; and authorities'
extensive discretion to deny registration.
\119\ Ibid.; Wan Yanhai, ``Wan Yanhai Special Column: Sounding the
Alarm on Transition Institute's Alleged Crime of `Illegal Business
Activity' '' [Wan yanhai zhuanlan: chuanzhixing ``feifa jingying zui''
qiaoxiang de jingzhong], Storm Media, 1 May 15. See also Teng Biao,
``Assessment of the Drafts of the `Foreign NGO Management Law' and the
`National Security Law' '' [Ping ``jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi guanli fa''
he ``guojia anquan fa'' cao'an], Independent Chinese PEN Center (blog),
30 June 15.
\120\ Nala, ``Non-Profit Organizations in China and Their Future
Prospects,'' Washington Institute of China Studies, Business and Public
Administration Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2014), 30.
\121\ Verna Yu, ``Overseas Funding: The `Original Sin' of Mainland
Independent NGOs? '' [Jingwai zizhu neidi duli NGO de ``yuanzui''?],
South China Morning Post, 22 January 16.
\122\ Jiang Tao, ``CASS Report: China's Civil Society Groups Face
Five Dilemmas'' [Shekeyuan baogao: zhongguo minjian zuzhi mianlin wu da
kunjing], China News Service, 25 December 14.
\123\ Wang Changbao, ``How Government Procurement of Services Can
Effectively Advance'' [Zhengfu goumai gonggong fuwu ruhe youxiao
tuijin], China Government Procurement Net, 25 January 16.
\124\ Ibid.
\125\ Zhu Hong, ``The First `Guidelines for the Evaluation of the
Management of Government Services Procurement' Released'' [Quanguo
shouge ``zhengfu goumai shehui zuzhi fuwu xiangmu jixiao pinggu caozuo
zhiyin'' fabu], People's Daily, 2 February 16.
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Political Power of the Chinese Communist Party Under General Secretary
Xi Jinping
In China's one-party, authoritarian political system,\1\
the Chinese Communist Party plays a leading role in the state
and society.\2\ Observers note that the central role of the
Party in governing the state appears to have strengthened since
Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping came into
power in November 2012,\3\ a development that has further
``blurred'' the lines between Party and government, according
to some experts.\4\ During the Commission's 2016 reporting
year, under Xi's leadership, the Party demanded absolute
loyalty \5\ and continued to direct and influence politics and
society at all levels, including in the military,\6\
economy,\7\ media,\8\ civil society,\9\ and family life.\10\
State-run media outlets reported that President Xi emphasized
the Party's claims to leadership over ``political, military,
civil, and academic--east, west, south, north, and center'' at
a senior-level Party meeting in January 2016.\11\ After the
18th Party Central Committee approved the Proposal on Drafting
the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development at its Fifth Plenum in October 2015,\12\ the
government adopted the plan during the annual legislative and
political advisory sessions in March 2016.\13\ The 13th Five-
Year Plan reiterates a vision to ``spur a great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation'' in line with the ``Chinese dream.'' \14\
Xi introduced the concept of the ``Chinese dream'' in 2013,\15\
promoting a Party- and government-centric model of ``socialism
with Chinese characteristics'' in economics, politics, and
society \16\ that rejects so-called ``Western values'' \17\ and
``hostile forces.'' \18\
XI JINPING'S LEADING ROLE
This past year, the Commission observed a continued
emphasis on Xi's leading role in guiding decisionmaking in
Party, government, and military affairs. Reports suggested that
Xi used the ongoing anticorruption campaign,\19\ intensified
Party disciplinary measures,\20\ promoted his speeches as
ideological guidance,\21\ and continued his chairmanship of at
least six leading small groups (lingdao xiaozu) in the Party
Central Committee to strengthen his power within the Party.\22\
Following central Party meetings that featured calls to
strengthen the Party's role as the ``core'' (hexin) of Chinese
government and society,\23\ several provincial and local Party
leaders referred to Xi as the ``core'' of Party leadership
\24\--a term previously used to characterize Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin, former Party General Secretaries.\25\ In a
development that observers assert further signals Xi's
increased power over the military,\26\ in April 2016, Xi gained
a new title as the commander-in-chief of the Central Military
Commission's Joint Battle Command Center and urged the command
system to be ``absolutely loyal.'' \27\ Reports this past year
noted official propaganda efforts focusing on Xi's leadership
style and policies that some observers found reminiscent of
Chairman Mao Zedong's ``cult of personality,'' \28\
highlighting Xi's efforts to amass personalized power.\29\ An
Australian academic characterized Xi as the ``chairman of
everything,'' noting that Xi's leadership style represented a
departure from previous leaders' adherence to the concerns of
Party elders and the post-Mao model of collective
decisionmaking.\30\ Xi's restrictive media policies reportedly
elicited criticism from property tycoon and popular social
media commentator Ren Zhiqiang,\31\ Chinese media outlet
Caixin,\32\ and anonymous sources.\33\ [For more information on
critiques of Xi's media policy, see Section II--Freedom of
Expression.] Moreover, the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, the Party institution that has spearheaded the
anticorruption campaign closely associated with Xi,\34\
published an essay in March 2016 on its website titled, ``A
Thousand Yes-Men Cannot Equal One Honest Advisor,'' \35\ which
appeared to criticize Xi's suppression of dissent within the
Party, according to observers.\36\
Party-Building in Civil Society Organizations
The Communist Party continued to prioritize expanding its
presence in civil society through ``Party-building,'' \37\ a
policy of establishing groups of Party members within civil
society organizations.\38\ A Party Central Committee opinion
from September 2015 guided local-level Party committees to
ensure that Party groups in non-governmental social
organizations (shehui zuzhi) ``guarantee the political
direction'' of such organizations by promoting the Party line,
implementing Party decisions, studying Xi's important speeches
and thought, and ensuring that social organizations follow
national law.\39\ Provincial Party committees and officials in
Anhui,\40\ Guizhou,\41\ Gansu,\42\ and Liaoning provinces \43\
released plans that assign greater personal responsibility to
Party officials to develop active Party groups in social
organizations.\44\
Anticorruption Campaign and Challenges
This past year, President and Party General Secretary Xi
Jinping's wide-reaching anticorruption campaign \45\ to reduce
graft and strengthen Party discipline \46\ continued snaring
so-called ``tigers'' and ``flies''--high- and low-level Party
officials \47\--in a manner that one scholar called selective
in enforcement, non-transparent, and politicized.\48\ The
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) targeted
officials in the government,\49\ military,\50\ state security
apparatus,\51\ media,\52\ and business \53\ this past year. By
the end of 2015, CCDI authorities had reportedly investigated
at least one high-level official from every provincial-level
administrative area \54\ and, according to Xinhua, administered
disciplinary penalties for nearly 300,000 officials.\55\ The
Supreme People's Procuratorate investigated a total of 40,834
cases of professional misconduct involving 54,249 people in
2015,\56\ numbers comparable to the previous year.\57\ The CCDI
announced plans to boost the efficiency of discipline
inspection within central Party and government entities \58\ by
expanding the scope of monitoring to lower levels,\59\
strengthening intra-Party accountability mechanisms,\60\ and
setting up more ``resident supervisor offices'' within central,
provincial-, and local-level departments.\61\ Reports in
domestic and international media outlets during this reporting
year raised allegations of torture \62\ and the unnatural
deaths of officials,\63\ including alleged suicides.\64\ The
CCDI also continued to administer the non-transparent and
extralegal disciplinary process of shuanggui (``double
designation''), which requires Party members to appear for
interrogation at a designated time and place.\65\ Following its
November 2015 review of China's compliance with the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, the UN Committee against Torture expressed
concern in its concluding observations that Party members held
under shuanggui may be denied access to counsel and are at risk
of torture, and recommended that the system be abolished.\66\
Despite the anticorruption efforts directed by central
Party officials, corruption remains a major problem.\67\ In
April 2016, the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists published internal documents from a Panamanian law
firm containing information on offshore companies tied to nine
families of high-level Party officials, including President Xi
Jinping.\68\ In the same month, Xi announced that a pilot
program banning business operations of family members of senior
Party officials will be expanded from Shanghai municipality to
Beijing and Chongqing municipalities, Guangdong province, and
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as part of the
anticorruption campaign.\69\
``Rule by Fear'': Continued Crackdown on Free Speech and Assembly and
Democracy Advocacy
Officials continued a broad ideological and political
crackdown on the Party and bureaucracy, human rights lawyers,
business leaders, and bloggers, generating what one scholar
called a climate of ``rule by fear.'' \70\ The Chinese
government employed the use of ``fear techniques'' by
televising and ``advertising'' \71\ the suppression of both
Chinese and foreign nationals.\72\ Notable televised
confessions in this past year include those of legal advocacy
non-governmental organization (NGO) cofounder and Swedish human
rights advocate Peter Dahlin; \73\ lawyers Zhang Kai and Wang
Yu; \74\ elected village Party committee chief Lin Zulian; \75\
and four Hong Kong booksellers--Swedish citizen Gui Minhai,\76\
Cheung Chi-ping,\77\ Lam Wing-kei,\78\ and Lui Bo.\79\ In
addition to what observers believed were forced
confessions,\80\ the alleged cross-jurisdiction abductions and
arbitrary detentions of Chinese and foreign nationals during
this past year \81\ violated Article 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that ``no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.''
\82\ [For more information on the cases of the Hong Kong
booksellers, see Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and
Macau.]
Chinese authorities also continued to harass, detain, and
impose prison sentences on democracy advocates who exercised
their rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and demonstration.
Representative cases of advocates whom authorities targeted
this past year included:
Qin Yongmin and Zhao Suli. In January 2015,
authorities in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province,
detained Qin, a founder of the banned China Democracy
Party and the domestic NGO China Human Rights Watch,
and his wife Zhao.\83\ In May 2016, another rights
advocate confirmed Qin's detention in Wuhan.\84\ As of
June 2016, Zhao's whereabouts and the charges against
her, if any, remained unknown.\85\ After holding Qin
incommunicado for 17 months, authorities indicted Qin
on the charge of ``subversion of state power'' in June
2016.\86\
Authorities in Beijing municipality detained
protesters gathered outside the Beijing No. 2
Intermediate People's Court during public interest
lawyer Pu Zhiqiang's trial in December 2015.\87\
Authorities reportedly detained Zhang Zhan,\88\ Wang
Su'e,\89\ Qu Hongxia,\90\ Ran Chongbi,\91\ Li
Meiqing,\92\ Wen Rengui,\93\ and Sheng Lanfu \94\ on
suspicion of ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble,'' \95\ and released them in January 2016.\96\
Xu Qin. In January 2016, authorities in
Beijing detained and arrested Xu, acting secretary-
general of China Human Rights Watch and member of an
affiliated group, Rose China,\97\ on suspicion of
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' ahead of a
planned gathering of hundreds of petitioners in
Beijing.\98\ Authorities released Xu on February 2.\99\
Yin Weihe. Authorities in Xiangxiang city,
Xiangtan municipality, Hunan province, detained Yin in
September 2013 on suspicion of ``picking quarrels and
provoking trouble,'' reportedly for sharing information
on the 1989 Tiananmen protests and official
corruption.\100\ Authorities tried him in January 2014
\101\ and released him on bail in October 2014,\102\
before detaining him again in December 2015.\103\ In
March 2016, the Xiangxiang Municipal People's Court
sentenced Yin to three years' imprisonment for
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble.'' \104\
Liu Shaoming. Police in Guangzhou
municipality, Guangdong province, criminally detained
labor rights advocate Liu in May 2015 and charged him
in July 2015 with ``inciting subversion of state
power'' for writing and sharing political essays online
related to the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\105\ The
Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court heard Liu's case
in April 2016,\106\ but as of July 2016 had not issued
a verdict.\107\
In June 2016, a court in Hangzhou
municipality, Zhejiang province, convicted democracy
advocates Lu Gengsong and Chen Shuqing of ``subversion
of state power'' and sentenced them to prison terms of
11 years and 10 years and 6 months, respectively, for
writing pro-democracy essays and for involvement with
the China Democracy Party.\108\
This past year, authorities persecuted individuals for
participating in memorial events in remembrance of the violent
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. According to one
report, authorities questioned, held in custody, criminally
detained, sent on forced ``vacation,'' or harassed at least 53
individuals.\109\ Cases included:
On May 31, 2016, police in Beijing
municipality criminally detained Zhao Changqing, Zhang
Baocheng, Xu Caihong, Li Wei, Ma Xinli, and Liang
Taiping \110\ after they had attended a private
gathering at Zhao's home on May 30 to commemorate the
Tiananmen protests and call for the release of Guo
Feixiong and Yu Shiwen.\111\ The six were all
subsequently released on bail in June and July.\112\
Fu Hailu. Public security authorities in
Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, detained Fu on
May 28, 2016,\113\ and formally arrested him on July 5
on suspicion of ``inciting subversion of state power''
\114\ after he posted pictures online of satirically
labeled liquor bottles commemorating the 1989
protests.\115\ Authorities also reportedly detained and
formally arrested Chen Bing, Luo Fuyu, and Zhang
Juanyong on suspicion of ``inciting subversion of state
power'' in connection with Fu's case.\116\
Authorities also pursued criminal cases against people
detained in 2014, prior to the 25th anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests and their violent suppression, including:
In January 2016, the Guangzhou Intermediate
People's Court in Guangdong sentenced democracy
advocates Tang Jingling,\117\ Yuan Chaoyang,\118\ and
Wang Qingying\119\--nicknamed the ``Three Gentlemen of
Guangzhou''--to five years; three years and six months;
and two years and six months in prison, respectively,
for ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \120\
Pu Zhiqiang. In December 2015, the Beijing No.
2 Intermediate People's Court sentenced prominent
public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang to three years'
imprisonment, suspended for three years, for ``inciting
ethnic hatred'' and ``picking quarrels and provoking
trouble'' \121\ for seven microblog posts that
criticized government officials and China's ethnic
policies.\122\
Promoting ``Socialist Political Democratic Consultative Processes''
This past year, central Communist Party authorities did not
undertake any substantial political liberalization,\123\ but
instead pledged to continue improving China's ``socialist
political democratic consultative system'' with the aim of
strengthening Party leadership.\124\ Chinese officials have
described China's political system as a ``socialist democracy''
with ``multi-party cooperation'' and ``political consultation''
under the leadership of the Communist Party.\125\ In the past,
types of ``consultation'' have included intraparty input on
decisions about Party cadre appointments, development projects
at grassroots levels, and some draft laws, as well as
discussions between Party representatives and the national
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and
the eight ``democratic'' minor parties under the CPPCC
umbrella.\126\ In March 2016, state-run media published
commentary emphasizing the role of the CPPCC and promoting the
CPPCC's importance as the official channel for ``democratic
consultations'' and increasing public trust.\127\
Democratic Governance in China's One-Party State
Sources from this past year highlighted several instances
in which officials interfered with or inhibited meaningful
public participation in local elections,\128\ undermining the
ability of Chinese political institutions to meet the standards
for ``genuine'' elections outlined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights \129\ and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.\130\ Chinese advocates for fair elections
called for the National People's Congress to guarantee judicial
protection of voters' legal rights as defined by the PRC
Organic Law of Village Committees.\131\ Reports from a human
rights organization highlighted problems with local elections,
including local officials' unlawful establishment of working
groups to influence outcomes,\132\ lack of public participation
in the nomination process,\133\ and lack of official response
to citizens' complaints regarding election malfeasance.\134\ As
an example of official harassment of an election participant,
in June 2016, public security authorities in Yongjing county,
Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, criminally
detained rights advocate Qu Mingxue--along with Zhang Lujun,
Liu Mingxue, and Wang Mingzhu, who were released on the same
day--on suspicion of ``disrupting elections'' \135\ for
recommending Liu as an independent write-in candidate in a June
20 local people's congress election in Yongjing and supporting
his independent candidacy on social media.\136\ Authorities
formally arrested Qu on July 2 \137\ but decided not to indict
him, releasing him on July 28.\138\ In addition, in August
2016, Zixi county, Fuzhou municipality, Jiangxi province,
public security officials ordered Yang Wei to serve 10 days'
administrative detention after he requested forms from local
government offices to run as an independent candidate in the
provincial people's congress elections.\139\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A New Round of Protests in Wukan Village \140\
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2016, international and Chinese official media outlets
reported a new round of protests in Wukan, a village in Donghai
subdistrict, Lufeng city, Shanwei municipality, Guangdong province,
over the detention of the village committee's Communist Party Secretary
Lin Zulian.\141\ Wukan was the site of major protests in 2011 over land
expropriation issues and the death of a village protest leader while in
custody.\142\ Provincial-level authorities subsequently allowed a
village committee election in March 2012 in which protest leaders were
directly elected to the committee, including Lin.\143\ Further protest
broke out in Wukan in 2014 when local villagers claimed government
interference in village elections following the detention of two
candidates who helped to organize the 2011 protests and who had been
elected to the village committee in 2012.\144\
According to an official notice from the Lufeng public security
bureau, on June 17, 2016, Lufeng authorities imposed ``coercive
measures'' against Lin for allegedly ``accepting bribes.'' \145\ Media
reports, however, indicated that authorities detained Lin after he
announced a public meeting to protest the lack of official progress in
the government's pledge to return farmland.\146\ On June 21, Shanwei
officials released a prerecorded confession of Lin admitting to taking
bribes, which local residents reportedly found unconvincing,\147\ and
formally arrested him on July 21.\148\ The Hong Kong-based newspaper
South China Morning Post reported that authorities warned two prominent
rights lawyers not to work on the case.\149\ After Lin's detention,
local authorities placed Lin's family members under 24-hour
surveillance, conditions that reportedly led Lin's grandson to attempt
suicide in early August.\150\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation of Open Government and Citizen Access to Information
Chinese authorities reiterated their intent to improve open
government affairs and to aim for a higher level of information
disclosure to the public.\151\ Following official guidance from
the Communist Party \152\ and State Council \153\ that called
on government agencies to improve transparency, promote
administrative reform, and restrain officials from arbitrarily
exercising their authority, the Party Central Committee General
Office and State Council General Office issued an opinion in
February 2016 to further strengthen work on the open government
information (OGI) system.\154\ The opinion stipulated that
government agencies must effectively improve disclosure,
achieve a high level of civic participation, elevate access to
information, and foster public trust.\155\
Despite progress on policy and regulatory measures,
transparency and access to government data are still lacking
and implementation of the 2008 Open Government Information
Regulations \156\ remain problematic. Chinese authorities
reportedly denied or ignored OGI requests, including in cases
related to land dispossession and forcible relocation,\157\
government spending,\158\ and criminal matters.\159\ Several
rights advocates filed lawsuits against government agencies
after officials denied their OGI requests for data submitted to
the UN Committee against Torture.\160\ Authorities also
rejected OGI requests on the grounds of ``state secrets.''
\161\ Government agencies are required to develop ``negative
lists'' that specifically enumerate the types of information
that are not subject to disclosure, including information that
may ``endanger state security, economic security, public
security, or social stability.'' \162\ A lack of transparency
in trade-related regulations \163\ and clarity in policy
regulating Chinese stock markets reportedly has contributed to
difficulties for investors in China.\164\ In addition to calls
for improved transparency, reports noted that central
authorities have admitted to publishing unreliable information
in the past year.\165\ [For more information on lack of
transparency in China's commercial environment, see Section
III--Commercial Rule of Law.]
Social Credit System
In an effort to address the lack of trust in Chinese
society, in 2014, the State Council released a planning outline
for the creation of a national social credit system to measure
and improve the credibility of government agencies,
organizations, and individuals in four main areas:
administrative affairs, business, society, and justice.\166\
According to the planning outline, laws, regulations, and a
standard system of supervision and management for administering
social credit should be in place by 2020.\167\ Media reports
speculate that by 2020 every individual will have a
personalized social credit score.\168\ Each individual's score
will reflect a wide range of information, including financial
data, criminal records, traffic violations, social media
activity, and consumer purchases.\169\ While the State Council
planning outline includes the goals of increasing government
transparency and accountability and reducing official
misconduct,\170\ critics have raised concerns about negative
privacy implications of this nationwide system,\171\ noting
that the social credit system is part of the Chinese
government's ongoing efforts to counter perceived threats and
shape citizens' behavior through massive data-gathering and
surveillance.\172\
The Chinese government continued plans to establish the
national social credit system this past year.\173\ In June
2016, the State Council issued a guiding opinion on building
the social credit system, directing national and provincial
government agencies to construct an ``interregional and cross-
departmental mechanism for encouraging trustworthiness and
punishing dishonesty.'' \174\ The opinion outlined four main
areas of ``dishonest'' behavior punishable under a unified
social credit mechanism: ``severely endangering'' public health
and safety, including in medicine, the environment, industry,
and manufacturing; ``severely harming fair market competition
and order and normal social order,'' including bribery, tax
evasion, loan evasion, and wage payment violations; ``refusal
to fulfill legal obligations,'' including failing to comply
with judicial sentences or administrative decisions; and
``refusal to fulfill national defense obligations,'' including
declining or evading military service.\175\ The opinion also
called for government and public organizations, financial
institutions, credit and rating agencies, and professional
associations to create and publish ``red lists'' of those who
exhibit ``model trustworthiness'' and ``blacklists'' of those
who are ``severely dishonest,'' and provide them to government
departments.\176\
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Institutions of
Democratic
Governance
Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
\1\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2016--China,'' last
visited 7 July 16; Jidong Chen et al., ``Sources of Authoritarian
Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China,'' American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April 2016), 383; David Shambaugh,
China's Future (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 98. Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: China (Includes Tibet, Hong
Kong, and Macau),'' 13 April 16, 1.
\2\ David Shambaugh, China's Future (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016), 115, 121-22. See also Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin,
``Understanding China's Political System,'' Congressional Research
Service, 20 March 13, summary; Chinese Communist Party Constitution
[Gongchandang zhangcheng], adopted 6 September 82, amended 1 November
87, 18 October 92, 18 September 97, 14 November 02, 21 October 07, 14
November 12, General Program. For English translation, see ``Full Text
of Constitution of Communist Party of China,'' Xinhua, 18 November 12.
The Party Constitution states that, ``Acting on the principle that the
Party commands the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all
quarters, the Party must play the role as the core of leadership among
all other organizations at the corresponding levels.'' PRC
Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93,
15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 37; PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo lifa fa], passed 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, preface.
\3\ ``Xi Jinping's Leadership: Chairman of Everything,'' Economist,
2 April 16; Will Edwards, ``The Chinese Communist Party Under Xi
Jinping,'' Cipher Brief, 21 June 16; ``Xi Jinping: Party, Political,
Military, Civil, and Academic; East, West, South, North, and Center;
The Party Leads Everything'' [Xi jinping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong
xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao yiqie de], The Paper, 30 January 16.
\4\ Christopher K. Johnson and Scott Kennedy, ``China's Un-
Separation of Powers: The Blurred Lines of Party and Government,''
Foreign Affairs, 24 July 15.
\5\ ``Li Zhanshu: Agencies Should Always Maintain a High Degree of
Consistency With Party Center'' [Li zhanshu: zhong zhi jiguan yao
shizhong tong dang zhongyang baochi gaodu yizhi], Xinhua, 27 January
16; Jun Mai, `` `Absolute Loyalty': Top Xi Jinping Aide Demands
Communist Party Units Toe the Line,'' South China Morning Post, 27
January 16.
\6\ ``Xi Jinping: Full Implementation of Reform Strategy To
Strengthen Military: Unswervingly Taking the Road To Build a Strong
Army With Chinese Characteristics'' [Xi jinping: quanmian shishi gaige
qianjun zhanlue jianding bu yizou zhongguo tese qiangjun zhilu],
Xinhua, 26 November 15; Cheng Li, ``Promoting `Young Guards': The
Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part II: Expansion and
Escalation),'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, No. 49 (Winter 2016), 1. The Party used the military
organizational reshuffle in early 2016 to elevate its leading role.
\7\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua
gongyao], issued 17 March 16, chap. 1; Elizabeth C. Economy, ``The Fits
and Starts of China's Economic Reforms,'' Council on Foreign Relations,
Asia Unbound (blog), 25 January 16.
\8\ ``Xi Completes Media Tour, Stresses Party's Leadership,''
Xinhua, 20 February 16.
\9\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office,
Opinion on Strengthening Party-Building Work in Social Organizations
(Provisional) [Guanyu jiaqiang shehui zuzhi dang de jianshe gongzuo de
yijian (shixing)], issued 28 September 15.
\10\ ``China To Adopt Universal `Two-Child' Policy'' [Woguo
quanmian fangkai ``erhai'' zhengce], Beijing Youth Daily, 30 October
15; National Health and Family Planning Commission, ``To Implement
Universal Two-Child Policy, To Promote Balanced Population
Development'' [Shishi quanmian lianghai zhengce, cujin renkou junheng
fazhan], 29 October 15.
\11\ ``Xi Jinping Presides Over the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Politburo Standing Committee Meeting'' [Xi jinping zhuchi
zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju changwei hui huiyi], Xinhua, 7 January
16; ``Xi Jinping: Party, Political, Military, Civil, and Academic;
East, West, South, North, and Center; The Party Leads Everything'' [Xi
jinping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi
lingdao de yiqie de], The Paper, 30 January 16; Eva Pils et al., `Rule
by Fear?' A ChinaFile Conversation,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog),
18 February 16.
\12\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 18th Party Central
Committee Fifth Plenum Communique [Zhongguo gongchandang di shiba jie
zhongyang weiyuanhui di wu ci quanti huiyi gongbao], 29 October 15.
\13\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua
gongyao], issued 17 March 16. See also State Council, ``2016 Two
Sessions: NPC & CPPCC: Annual Legislative and Political Advisory
Sessions,'' last visited 16 June 16.
\14\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 13th Five-Year
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wunian guihua
gongyao], issued 17 March 16, chap. 1.
\15\ ``Profile: Xi Jinping: Pursuing Dream for 1.3 Billion
Chinese,'' Xinhua, 17 March 13; ``Xi Jinping: Party, Political,
Military, Civil, and Academic; East, West, South, North, and Center;
The Party Leads Everything'' [Xi jinping: dang zheng jun min xue, dong
xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao de yiqie de], The Paper, 30 January
16.
\16\ Ibid. See also Liu Shaohua, ``Xi Jinping Governing Ideological
Keyword 2: Chinese Dream, 1.3 Billion People's Dream of Rejuvenation''
[Xi jinping zhiguo lizheng guanjianci 2: zhongguo meng 13 yi ren de
fuxing mengxiang], People's Daily, 16 January 16. Xi has reportedly
mentioned ``Chinese dream'' more than 200 times in public speeches and
interviews. ``Chinese Road: Chinese Dream'' [Zhongguo daolu: zhongguo
meng], Xinhua, last visited 16 June 16.
\17\ Liu Yizhan, ``Yuan Guiren: College Teachers Must Observe the
Political, Legal, and Moral Triple Baseline'' [Yuan guiren: gaoxiao
jiaoshi bixu shouhao zhengzhi, falu, daode santiao dixian], Xinhua, 29
January 15; Megha Rajagopalan, ``China Is Waging a `Hidden War' Against
the West,'' Reuters, reprinted in Business Insider, 20 May 15.
\18\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and
State Council General Office Release Opinion on Further Strengthening
and Improving Propaganda and Ideology Work in Higher Education Under
New Circumstances'' [Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, guowuyuan
bangongting yinfa guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin xin xingshi xia
gaoxiao xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo de yijian], Xinhua, 19 January 15.
For an unofficial English translation of the opinion cited, see
``Opinions Concerning Further Strengthening and Improving Propaganda
and Ideology Work in Higher Education Under New Circumstances,'' China
Copyright and Media (blog), 16 February 15. See also ``China Pledges
New Crackdown on `Hostile Forces,' '' Associated Press, reprinted in Al
Jazeera, 16 March 16; Yu Zhiguo, ``General Secretary Xi Jinping
Emphasizes the Profound Meaning of `Grasping the Truth' '' [Xi
zongshuji qiangdiao ``zhua shi'' yu shenyi], People's Daily, 29 June
16.
\19\ Orville Schell, ``Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,'' New
York Review of Books, 21 April 16; Minxin Pei, ``The Twilight of
Communist Party Rule in China,'' American Interest, Vol. 11, No. 4, 12
November 15; Robert Daly, ``The Mixed Rationales and Mixed Results of
Xi Jinping's Anticorruption Campaign,'' Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 11 May 16. See CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10
October 13, 143-44; CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 143-44;
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 242-43.
\20\ Wei Pu, ``Xi Jinping: Is China on the Road to Total
Dictatorship? '' Radio Free Asia, 8 February 16; Simon Denyer,
``China's Xi Tells Grumbling Party Cadres: `Don't Talk Back,' ''
Washington Post, 29 December 15; Chun Han Wong, ``China's Xi Jinping
Puts Loyalty to the Test at Congress,'' Wall Street Journal, 16 March
16. For examples of intensified Party discipline, see Jiang Jie,
``Party Rules Ban Groundless Comments on Major Policies,'' Global
Times, 23 October 15; ``China's Anti-Graft Body To Supervise More
Central Organs,'' Xinhua, 20 September 15.
\21\ Si Zhitong, ``How To Study Xi's Series of Major Speeches, From
Looking at Misuse of the Concept of `The New Normal' '' [Cong lanyong
``xin changtai'' gainian kan ruhe xuexi xilie zhongyao jianghua],
Seeking Truth, 11 May 16; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
General Office, ``Regarding the Overall Launch of `Learn Party
Constitution and Party Rules, Study Speech Series, Be an Up-to-Standard
Party Member' Education Program'' [Guanyu zai quanti dangyuan zhong
kaizhan ``xue dang zhang dang gui, xue xilie jianghua, zuo hege
dangyuan'' xuexi jiaoyu fang'an], Communist Party Member Net, 29
February 16; Neil Conner, `` `Read My Speeches, Study Marx,' China's Xi
Jinping Tells Party Members in Latest Drive Against Wrongdoing,''
Telegraph, 7 April 16.
\22\ Alice Miller, ``More Already on the Central Committee's
Leading Small Groups,'' China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, No. 44 (Summer 2014), 28 July 14, 6. Miller noted
that Xi was the director of at least six leading small groups as of
July 2014. Andrew J. Nathan, ``Who Is Xi? '' New York Review of Books,
12 May 16. Nathan indicated in a New York Review of Books essay that Xi
was the chairman of seven leading small groups, but did not list the
groups. Bai Mo, ``Observation: What Other Titles Does `Chairman of
Everything' Xi Jinping Want? '' [Guancha: ``quanmian zhuxi'' xi jinping
hai yao shenme touxian?], BBC, 21 April 16. Bai Mo also reported that
Xi was the director of seven leading small groups. However, one of the
groups--the National Security Commission--is not technically considered
a leading small group.
\23\ ``Xi Jinping Presides Over Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Politburo Standing Committee Meeting'' [Xi jinping zhuchi
zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju changweihui huiyi], Xinhua, 7 January
16; ``Li Zhanshu: Agencies Reporting to the Center Must Always Maintain
a High Degree of Consistency With Party Central Committee'' [Li
zhanshu: zhong zhi jiguan yao shizhong tong dang zhongyang baochi gaodu
yizhi], Xinhua, 27 January 16.
\24\ Du Baojun, ``Many Provincial Party Committees Declare: Firmly
Maintain General Secretary Xi Jinping as the Core'' [Duo sheng dangwei
biaotai: jianjue weihu xi jinping zongshuji zhege hexin], Phoenix Net,
31 January 16; Jun Mai, `` `Absolute Loyalty': Top Xi Jinping Aide
Demands Communist Party Units Toe the Line,'' South China Morning Post,
27 January 16.
\25\ Ting Shi, ``Xi's New Title Highlights China's Power
Struggle,'' Bloomberg, 2 February 16; Chris Buckley, ``Xi Jinping
Assuming New Status as China's `Core' Leader,'' New York Times, 4
February 16.
\26\ Minnie Chan, ``China's President Xi Steps Out With a New
Military Title--And the Uniform To Match,'' South China Morning Post,
21 April 16; Andrew Nathan and Tai Ming Cheung, ``Xi Jinping's New
Military Position,'' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 1 May 16.
\27\ ``Xi Jinping's New Tilte [sic] Announced: The `Commander in
Chief of the Central Military Commission Joint Battle Command Center,'
'' People's Daily, 21 April 16.
\28\ Jonathan Landreth et al., ``Xi Jinping: A Cult of Personality?
'' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 4 March 16; ``Beware the Cult of
Xi,'' Economist, 2 April 16; Andrew Browne, ``Xi Embraces Mao's Radical
Legacy,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 May 16.
\29\ Orville Schell, ``Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,'' New
York Review of Books, 21 April 16; Andrew J. Nathan, ``Who Is Xi? ''
New York Review of Books, 12 May 16; Carl Minzner, ``Is China's
Authoritarianism Decaying Into Personalised Rule? '' East Asia Forum,
24 April 16; Hannah Beech, ``China's Chairman Builds a Cult of
Personality,'' Time, 31 March 16; Philip Wen, ``China's Great Leap
Backwards: Xi Jinping and the Cult of Mao,'' Sydney Morning Herald, 15
May 16.
\30\ ``Chairman of Everything,'' Economist, 2 April 16; Ryan
Manuel, ``Will Xi Always Be Obeyed? '' East Asia Forum, 1 September 15.
\31\ Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Tycoon Criticizes Leader, and Wins
Surprising Support,'' New York Times, 18 March 16; Edward Wong, ``China
Puts a Tycoon, Ren Zhiqiang, on Probation for Criticizing Policies,''
New York Times, 2 May 16.
\32\ Michael Forsythe, ``Chinese Publication, Censored by
Government, Exposes Article's Removal,'' New York Times, Sinosphere
(blog), 8 March 16.
\33\ China Digital Times, ``Loyal Party Members Urge Xi's
Resignation,'' 16 March 16; Chris Buckley, ``Anonymous Call for Xi To
Quit Rattles Party Leaders in China,'' New York Times, 29 March 16.
\34\ Willy Lam, ``China's Anti-Graft Campaign in Review,''
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 23, 7 December 15. See
also Ling Li, ``The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection Commission
1927-2012: Anticorruption Investigation and Decision-Making in the
Chinese Communist Party,'' Modern China, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2016), 448.
\35\ Lei Si, ``A Thousand Yes-Men Cannot Equal One Honest Advisor''
[Qian ren zhi nuonuo, buru yi shi zhi e'e], Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection, 1 March 16. For an unofficial translation, see
``A Thousand Yes-Men Cannot Equal One Honest Advisor,'' translated in
Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 21 March 16.
\36\ Andrew J. Nathan et al., ``Cracks in Xi Jinping's Fortress? ''
Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 21 March 16; Simon Denyer, ``Grumbling
Mounts in China, Even in the Party. Is President Xi Losing His Grip? ''
Washington Post, 29 March 16; Freedom House, ``China Media Bulletin,''
No. 114, April 2016, 3-4.
\37\ See, e.g., ``Party Central Committee General Office, State
Council General Office Publish `Opinion on Reforming Management System
of Social Organizations To Promote Social Organizations' Healthy and
Orderly Development' '' [Zhongban guoban yinfa ``guanyu gaige shehui
zuzhi guanli zhidu cujin shehui zuzhi jiankang youxu fazhan de yijian],
Xinhua, 21 August 16, 2(2-3). See also Ben Blanchard, ``China To
Strengthen Communist Party's Role in Non-Govt Bodies,'' Reuters, 21
August 16.
\38\ Zheng Qi, ``Several Problems Worth Considering With Party-
Building in Social Organizations'' [Shehui zuzhi dangjian zhide
zhongshi de jige wenti], Study Times, reprinted in People's Daily, 29
October 15. See also Patricia M. Thornton, ``The Advance of the Party:
Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society? '' China
Quarterly, Vol. 213 (March 2013), 2, 7; CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10
October 13, 132, 139.
\39\ ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office
Releases `Opinion on Strengthening Party-Building Work in Social
Organizations (Provisional)' '' [Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting yinfa
``guanyu jiaqiang shehui zuzhi dang de jianshe gongzuo de yijian
(shixing)''], Xinhua, 28 September 15, item 2.4(1).
\40\ ``Truly Grasp [Party] Organization [Department] Building
Comprehensive Coverage, Resolutely Take on Responsibility'' [Zhenzhua
zujian fugai, yingzhao yashi zeren], China Organization and Personnel
News (Zhongguo zuzhi renshi bao), 21 March 16.
\41\ ``Congjiang, Guizhou: `Four Modern Standardizations' Advance
Tangible and Effective Party-Building Coverage in Non-Public and Social
Organizations'' [Guizhou congjiang: ``sihua biaozhun'' tuijin feigong
he shehui zuzhi dangjian youxing youxiao fugai], People's Daily,
Chinese Communist Party News Net, 17 March 16.
\42\ ``Gansu Province Chinese Communist Party Committee General
Office Issues `Opinion on Implementing the Work of Strengthening
Province-Wide Party-Building in Social Organizations (Trial)' ''
[Zhonggong gansu shengwei bangongting yinfa ``guanyu jiaqiang quansheng
shehui zuzhi dang de jianshe gongzuo de shishi yijian (shixing)''],
Gansu Daily, 8 January 16.
\43\ ``Strengthen the Political Function and Service Capacity of
Party Groups in Social Organizations, Lead Social Organizations in
Developing the Correct Orientation'' [Qianghua shehui zuzhi dangzu
zhengzhi gongneng he fuwu gongneng yinling shehui zuzhi zhengque fazhan
fangxiang], Liaoning Daily, 11 March 16.
\44\ ``Truly Grasp [Party] Organization [Department] Building
Comprehensive Coverage, Resolutely Take on Responsibility'' [Zhenzhua
zujian fugai, yingzhao yashi zeren], China Organization and Personnel
News (Zhongguo zuzhi renshi bao), 21 March 16. In Anhui province's
five-year plan for establishing Party groups in social organizations,
local Party officials' success in meeting benchmarks for Party-building
work in social organizations will be included as performance review
criteria.
\45\ ``Visualizing China's Anti-Corruption Campaign,'' Asia
Society, ChinaFile (blog), 21 January 16.
\46\ Ling Li, ``The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection
Commission 1927-2012: Anticorruption Investigation and Decision-Making
in the Chinese Communist Party,'' Modern China, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2016),
448; Willy Lam, ``China's Anti-Graft Campaign in Review,'' Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 23, 7 December 15.
\47\ Zhang Yan, ``New Data Shows China's Fight on Corruption,''
China Daily, 13 March 16; Michael Forsythe, ``Database Tracks `Tigers
and Flies' Caught in Xi Jinping's Corruption Crackdown,'' New York
Times, Sinosphere (blog), 21 January 16. For data on ``snared''
officials, see ``Visualizing China's Anti-Corruption Campaign,'' Asia
Society, ChinaFile (blog), 21 January 16.
\48\ Bai Mo, ``Focus: Xi Jinping's Anticorruption, Victory in Sight
or Danger Lurking Below? '' [Jiaodian: xi jinping fanfu shengli zaiwang
haishi weiji sifu?], BBC, 8 March 16.
\49\ James T. Areddy, ``Governor of Key China Province Under
Investigation,'' Wall Street Journal, 8 October 15.
\50\ ``Former Military Leader Guo Boxiong Confesses to Taking
Bribes,'' Xinhua, 5 April 16.
\51\ ``Former Vice Governor of Hainan Sentenced to 12 Years for
Corruption,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Economic Net, 30 March 16.
\52\ Yunnan Province Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``Yunnan
Television Internet Group Corporation Former Party Committee Secretary,
CEO Wang Jianyou, Investigated'' [Yunnan guangdian wangluo jituan
youxian gongsi yuan dangwei shuji, dongshizhang wang jianyou jieshou
zuzhi diaocha], reprinted in Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection, 9 May 16.
\53\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, ``CCDI Gave 10
Central Management Cadres Heavy Disciplinary Measures and Significantly
Adjusted Their Job Responsibilities'' [Zhongyang jiwei 2015 nian jiyu
10 ming zhongguan ganbu dangji zhong chufen bing zuochu zhongda zhiwu
tiaozheng], 29 January 16.
\54\ Zheping Huang, ``China's Corruption Crackdown Is So Vast, Top
Officials From Every Province Have Been Nabbed,'' Quartz, 12 November
15.
\55\ ``Graft Busters Discipline Nearly 300,000 Officials in 2015,''
Xinhua, 6 March 16.
\56\ ``In 2015, Procuratorial Agencies Filed 40,834 Cases Involving
54,249 People for Investigation of Professional Misconduct'' [2015 nian
jiancha jiguan li'an zhencha zhiwu fanzui anjian 408374 jian 54249
ren], Procuratorial Daily, reprinted in Supreme People's Procuratorate,
13 March 16.
\57\ ``China Enhances Crackdown on Corruption: Reports,'' Xinhua,
12 March 15. In 2014, the Supreme People's Procuratorate investigated
55,101 people in 41,487 cases of professional misconduct.
\58\ ``China's Streamlined Inspection System Targets Central
Organs,'' Xinhua, 5 January 16.
\59\ Nectar Gan, ``China's Communist Party Graft-Busters To Widen
Political Watch in 2016,'' South China Morning Post, 14 January 16.
\60\ ``Wang Qishan's Work Report at the 18th Party CCDI Sixth
Plenary Session'' [Wang qishan zai shiba jie zhongyang jiwei liuci
quanhui shang de gongzuo baogao], Xinhua, 12 January 16, reprinted in
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 24 January 16, sec. 3(2).
\61\ ``China's Anti-Graft Body To Supervise More Central Organs,''
Xinhua, 20 September 15.
\62\ Luo Jieqi and Cui Houjian, ``Former National Energy
Administration Deputy Director Xu Yongsheng on Trial, While in Court
Claims Innocence, Says Was Tortured'' [Guojia nengyuan ju yuan
fujuzhang xu yongsheng shoushen, dang ting hanyuan cheng zao bigong],
Caixin, 24 February 16; Austin Ramzy, ``Ex-Official in China Blames
Torture for Graft Confession,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 25
February 16.
\63\ Brian Spegele, ``China Probes a Senior Oil Official's
Mysterious Death,'' Wall Street Journal, 2 December 15; Scott
Cendrowski, ``Apparent Suicides Multiply in China's Anti-Corruption
Campaign,'' Fortune, 3 December 15; Zheng Wei, ``China Commentary:
Chinese Officials' Morale Falls to Freezing Point'' [Dianping zhongguo:
shiqi jiang zhi bingdian de zhongguo guanyuan], BBC, 27 June 16.
\64\ Ibid.
\65\ Orville Schell, ``Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse,'' New
York Review of Books, 21 April 16. For a scholarly analysis of
``shuanggui,'' see Flora Sapio, ``Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in
China,'' China Information, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), 7-37. See also
CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 102-03; CECC, 2014 Annual
Report, 9 October 14, 87-88.
\66\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
paras. 44-45.
\67\ Transparency International, ``Corruption Perceptions Index
2015,'' 27 January 16. China's score improved by one point from 2014 to
2015 from 36 to 37, ranking 83 out of 163 countries surveyed. See,
e.g., ``The Panama Papers Embarrass China's Leaders,'' Economist, 7
April 16; ``Central Gov't Bodies Criticized for Violating Frugality
Rules,'' Xinhua, 29 June 16.
\68\ Michael Forsythe and Austin Ramzy, ``China Censors Mentions of
`Panama Papers' Leaks,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 5 April 16;
``The Panama Papers Embarrass China's Leaders,'' Economist, 7 April 16.
\69\ ``Xinhua Insight: China Pilots Regulations on Officials'
Family Businesses,'' Xinhua, 20 April 16; Cary Huang, ``Xi Jinping
Tightens Reins on Business Ties of Chinese Officials' Families in Wake
of Panama Papers,'' South China Morning Post, 19 April 16.
\70\ Eva Pils, ``The Rise of Rule by Fear,'' University of
Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 15 February 16;
Minxin Pei, ``China's Rule of Fear,'' Project Syndicate, 8 February 16.
\71\ Eva Pils, ``The Rise of Rule by Fear,'' University of
Nottingham, China Policy Institute: Analysis (blog), 15 February 16.
\72\ Steven Jiang, ``Trial by Media? Confessions Go Prime Time in
China,'' CNN, 26 January 16; ``Hong Kong Bookseller Gui Minhai
Suspected of Illegal Business Activity, Changing Cover To Evade
Inspection'' [Xianggang shushang gui minhai shexian feifa jingying,
huan fengmian guibi jiancha], Phoenix Net, 28 February 16.
\73\ Steven Jiang, ``Trial by Media? Confessions Go Prime Time in
China,'' CNN, 26 January 16. For more information on Peter Dahlin, see
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00024.
\74\ Tom Phillips, ``Anger as Christian Lawyer Paraded on Chinese
State TV for `Confession,' '' Guardian, 26 February 16; Emily Rauhala,
``Jailed Chinese Lawyer Reappears To Deliver a `Confession,' but the
Script Seems Familiar,'' Washington Post, 1 August 16; ``China Releases
Prominent Human Rights Lawyer on Bail,'' Associated Press, reprinted in
New York Times, 1 August 16; Josh Chin, ``Chinese Activist Wang Yu Seen
`Confessing' in Video,'' Wall Street Journal, 1 August 16; For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2015-00252 on Wang Yu and 2015-00318 on Zhang Kai.
\75\ Chun Han Wong, ``Skepticism in China After Wukan Confession,''
Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22 June 16. Lin is
also known as Lin Zuluan.
\76\ For more information on Gui Minhai, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00090.
\77\ For more information on Cheung Chi-ping, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00165.
\78\ For more information on Lam Wing-kei, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00166.
\79\ For more information on Lui Bo, see the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database record 2016-00164.
\80\ Ed Flanagan, ``Disappearances, Forced Confessions: China
Targets Dissent,'' NBC, 31 January 16; ``Hong Kong Bookseller: China TV
Confession was `Forced,' '' BBC, 16 June 16.
\81\ Ilaria Maria Sala, ``Four Hong Kong Publishers Known for Books
Critical of Chinese Regime Missing,'' Guardian, 9 November 15; Hermina
Wong, ``Bookseller Lee Bo Feared `Political Reasons' Behind Colleague's
Disappearance, Before Vanishing Himself,'' Hong Kong Free Press, 8
March 16; Rishi Iyengar, ``Hong Kong To Send Delegation to Beijing To
Discuss Detention of Local Booksellers,'' Time, 4 July 16.
\82\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9.
\83\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Husband and Wife Qin
Yongmin and Zhao Suli Disappeared for Nearly One Year, Worrying Many''
[Qin yongmin, zhao suli fufu shizong jijiang man yi nian yin gejie
danyou], 1 January 16. For more information, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2004-02138 on Qin Yongmin and 2016-
00069 on Zhao Suli.
\84\ Rights Defense Network, ``Well-Known Democracy Activist Qin
Yongmin Confirmed in Detention at Wuhan No. 2 PSB Detention Center,
Case With Procuratorate'' [Zhuming minyun renshi qin yongmin queren zao
jiya zai wuhan di er kanshousuo anjian zai jianchayuan], 11 May 16.
\85\ ``Fears Grow for `Disappeared' Wife of Detained Chinese
Activist,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 June 16.
\86\ Rights Defense Network, ``Qin Yongmin Indictment'' [Qin
yongmin qisu shu], 2 July 16.
\87\ Rights Defense Network, ``Because of Supporting Pu Zhiqiang
Outside His Trial, Four Citizen Rights Defenders, Zhang Zhan, Wang Su'e
(F), Qu Hongxia (F), Ran Chongbi (F) Held, All Criminally Detained''
[Yin tingshen xianchang shengyuan pu zhiqiang renquan hanweizhe zhang
zhan, wang su'e (nu), qu hongxia (nu), ran chongbi (nu), si gongmin bei
zhuabu dou zao xingju], 18 December 15.
\88\ For more information on Zhang Zhan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00473.
\89\ For more information on Wang Su'e, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00470.
\90\ For more information on Qu Hongxia, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00472.
\91\ For more information on Ran Chongbi, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00361.
\92\ For more information on Li Meiqing, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00036.
\93\ For more information on Wen Rengui, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00261.
\94\ For more information on Sheng Lanfu, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00188.
\95\ Rights Defense Network, ``Because of Supporting Pu Zhiqiang
Outside His Trial, Four Citizen Rights Defenders, Zhang Zhan, Wang Su'e
(F), Qu Hongxia (F), Ran Chongbi (F) Held, All Criminally Detained''
[Yin tingshen xianchang shengyuan pu zhiqiang renquan hanweizhe zhang
zhan, wang su'e (nu), qu hongxia (nu), ran chongbi (nu), si gongmin bei
zhuabu dou zao xingju], 18 December 15; Amnesty International, ``China:
Seven Activists Released (UA 293/15),'' 22 January 16.
\96\ Rights Defense Network, ``6 Citizens Criminally Detained in
`Supporting Pu Zhiqiang Case' All Released'' [``Shengyuan pu zhiqiang
an'' bei xingju 6 gongmin yijing quanbu huoshi], 21 January 16; Amnesty
International, ``China: Seven Activists Released (UA 293/15),'' 22
January 16.
\97\ Rights Defense Network, ``China Human Rights Watch
(Registration Pending) Acting Secretary General Ms. Xu Qin Detained,
More Than Ten People From Rose China Missing or Detained'' [Zhongguo
renquan guancha (chou) daili mishuzhang xu qin nushi bei zhuabu meigui
tuandui yijing shi yu ren shilian huo beibu], 13 January 16; ``Missing
for Days, China Human Rights Watch's Xu Qin Arrested for `Picking
Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' '' [Shizong shu ri zhongguo renquan
guancha xu qin she ``xunxin zishi'' bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 14
January 16.
\98\ ``Missing for Days, China Human Rights Watch's Xu Qin Arrested
for `Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble' '' [Shizong shu ri
zhongguo renquan guancha xu qin she ``xunxin zishi'' beibu], Radio Free
Asia, 14 January 16; Yaqiu Wang, ``Members of Petitioners Group `Rose
China' Detained,'' China Change, 18 January 16. For more information on
Xu Qin, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-
00015.
\99\ Rights Defense Network, ``China Human Rights Watch Acting
Secretary General Xu Qin Released Today After 26 Days Missing''
[Zhongguo renquan guancha daili mishuzhang xu qin shilian 26 tian hou
jinri huoshi], 2 February 16.
\100\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Hunan's Yin Weihe
Criminally Detained for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble Due to
`Internet Rumors' '' [Hunan yin weihe yin ``wangluo yaoyan'' bei yi
xunxin zishi zui xingju], 27 September 13.
\101\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``After Four Years,
Xiangxiang, Hunan, Rights Defender Yin Weihe Sentenced to Three Years
for Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble'' [Lijing si nian hunan
xiangxiang weiquan renshi yin weihe bei yi xun zi zui panxing san
nian], 30 March 16.
\102\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Breaking: Hunan Rights
Defender Yin Weihe Released'' [Kuaixun: hunan weiquan renshi yin weihe
huode shifang], 25 October 14.
\103\ Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Xiangxiang, Hunan, Rights
Defender Yin Weihe Detained Again'' [Hunan xiangxiang weiquan renshi
yin weihe bei chongxin shoujian], 7 December 15.
\104\ ``Hunan Rights Defender Yin Weihe Sentenced to Three Years'
Imprisonment for Crimes of `Inciting Others To Petition' and
`Distorting Facts Online' '' [Hunan weiquan renshi yin weihe bei panqiu
san nian zuiming wei ``shandong shangfang'' ``zai wangshang waiqu
shishi''], Radio Free Asia, 31 March 16.
\105\ Rights Defense Network, ``Guangdong Labor Rights Defender Liu
Shaoming Allowed To Meet Lawyer for First Time in `Inciting Subversion
of State Power Case' '' [Guangdong laogong weiquan renshi liu shaoming
``shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui an'' di yi ci huozhun huijian
lushi], 7 November 15; Human Rights Campaign in China, ``Guangdong
Authorities Indict Labor Rights Advocate Liu Shaoming for Inciting
Subversion of State Power on the Basis of Articles Shared on WeChat and
QQ'' [Yi zai weixin ji QQ qun fenxiang wenzhang wei you guangdong
dangju yi shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan zui qisu laogong weiquan
renshi liu shaoming], 12 April 16; Yaxue Cao, ``Chinese Authorities
Orchestrate Surprise Raid of Labor NGOs in Guangdong, Arresting
Leaders,'' China Change, 10 December 15; Human Rights in China,
``Activist Tried for `Inciting Subversion' With Essays Disseminated
Online,'' 15 April 16. For more information on Liu Shaoming, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00216.
\106\ Human Rights in China, ``Activist Tried for `Inciting
Subversion' With Essays Disseminated Online,'' 15 April 16.
\107\ Ibid.
\108\ Rights Defense Network, ``Zhejiang Democracy Party Members Lu
Gengsong, Chen Shuqing Today Sentenced by Hangzhou Intermediate
People's Court to 11 Years and 10 Years, 6 Months'' [Zhejiang
minzhudang ren lu gengsong, chen shuqing jin zao hangzhou zhongji
fayuan panxing 11 nian he 10 nian 6 ge yue], 17 June 16. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2007-00089 on Lu Gengsong and 2006-00509 on Chen Shuqing.
\109\ Rights Defense Network, ``Situation Report on June Fourth
Rights Defender Arrests, Detentions, Forced Disappearances, Soft
Detentions, Forced Vacations, Chats, and Forced Relocations'' [Liusi
min'gan ri zao jingfang zhuabu xingju, juliu, qiangpo shizong, ruanjin,
bei luyou, yuetan, beipo banjia de renquan hanweizhe, weiquan gongmin
de qingkuang tongbao], 4 June 16.
\110\ Rights Defense Network, ``Because of June Fourth
Commemoration and Support for Guo Feixiong and Yu Shiwen, Six `New
Citizens' Movement' Members Criminally Detained, One Disappeared'' [Yin
jinian liusi, shengyuan guo feixiong, yu shiwen, ``xin gongmin
yundong'' 6 ren bei xingju, 1 ren shilian], 3 June 16; `` `Six
Noblemen' Criminally Detained for Commemorating `June Fourth' Finally
Meet With Lawyers, Xu Caihong Subjected to Prolonged Interrogation''
[Jinian ``liusi'' bei xingju ``liu junzi'' zhong jian lushi xu caihong
zao pilao shenxun], Radio Free Asia, 7 June 16; Rights Defense Network,
`` `Commemorating June Fourth Case' Bulletin: Zhang Baocheng, Zhao
Changqing Released on Bail Today'' [``Jinian liusi an'' tongbao: zhang
baocheng, zhao changqing jin qubao huoshi], 7 July 16. For more
information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records
2004-05226 on Zhao Changqing, 2013-00132 on Zhang Baocheng, 2016-00156
on Xu Caihong, 2013-00308 on Li Wei, 2013-00133 on Ma Xinli, and 2016-
00157 on Liang Taiping.
\111\ `` `Six Noblemen' Criminally Detained for Commemorating `June
Fourth' Finally Meet With Lawyers, Xu Caihong Subjected to Prolonged
Interrogation'' [Jinian ``liusi'' bei xingju ``liu junzi'' zhong jian
lushi xu caihong zao pilao shenxun], Radio Free Asia, 7 June 16.
\112\ Rights Defense Network, `` `Commemorating June Fourth Case'
Bulletin: Among Six Criminally Detained Citizens, Xu Caihong, Liang
Taiping, Ma Xinli, and Li Wei Released on Bail, Zhao Changqing and
Zhang Baocheng Still Detained'' [``Jinian liusi an'' tongbao: bei
xingju liu gongmin zhong xu caihong, liang taiping, ma xinli, li wei si
ren jin bei qubao huoshi, zhao changqing, zhang baocheng liang ren reng
zaiya], 29 June 16; Rights Defense Network, `` `Commemorating June
Fourth Case' Bulletin: Zhang Baocheng, Zhao Changqing Released on Bail
Today'' [``Jinian liusi an'' tongbao: zhang baocheng, zhao changqing
jin qubao huoshi], 7 July 16.
\113\ Xin Yun, ``Fu Hailu and Ma Qing Detained for Commemorating
`June Fourth,' Liu Shugui and Zhang Qi Disappeared'' [Fu hailu, ma qing
yin jinian ``liusi'' bei juliu liu shugui, zhang qi bei shizong], China
Free Press, 30 May 16; Chris Buckley, ``Chinese Worker Detained for
Photos of Liquor Labels Marking Tiananmen Crackdown,'' New York Times,
Sinosphere (blog), 30 May 16.
\114\ `` `June Fourth Liquor Case' Arrests Approved for 4
Individuals, Lawyer Meetings Not Approved'' [``Liusi jiu an'' 4 ren bei
pibu lushi bu zhun huijian], Radio Free Asia, 6 July 16.
\115\ Catherine Lai, ``China Charges Tiananmen Massacre Alcohol
Label Activists With `Inciting Subversion of State Power,' '' Hong Kong
Free Press, 7 July 16.
\116\ Rights Defense Network, ``Chengdu `June Fourth Liquor Case'
Report: Fu Hailu, Zhang Juanyong, Luo Yufu [sic], and Chen Bing
Formally Arrested Today'' [Chengdu ``liusi jiu an'' tongbao: fu hailu,
zhang juanyong, luo yufu, chen bing si ren jin zao zhengshi daibu], 6
July 16. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database records 2016-00240 on Fu Hailu, 2016-00241 on Chen Bing, 2016-
00242 on Luo Fuyu, and 2016-00243 on Zhang Juanyong.
\117\ Human Rights in China, ``Verdicts for Tang Jingling, Yuan
Chaoyang, and Wang Qingying--The `Three Gentleman [sic] of Guangzhou,'
'' 26 January 16. For more information on Tang Jingling, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2011-00255.
\118\ Ibid. For more information on Yuan Chaoyang, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00221.
\119\ Ibid. For more information on Wang Qingying, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00180.
\120\ Ibid.
\121\ ``Beijing Municipal No. 2 Intermediate Court Publicly
Announces Verdict in Pu Zhiqiang Case'' [Beijing shi er zhong yuan dui
pu zhiqiang an yishen gongkai xuanpan], Xinhua, 22 December 15; Office
of Press Relations, U.S. Department of State, ``Trial of Pu Zhiqiang,''
22 December 15.
\122\ ``Charges Against Top Chinese Rights Lawyer Based on Seven
Tweets,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 December 15; ``Beijing No. 2 Intermediate
Court Publicly Announces Verdict in Pu Zhiqiang Case'' [Beijing shi er
zhong yuan dui pu zhiqiang an yishen gongkai xuanpan], Xinhua, 22
December 15. For more information on Pu Zhiqiang, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00174.
\123\ David Shambaugh, China's Future (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016), 117-22; Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2016--China,''
last visited 7 July 16.
\124\ See, e.g., ``Xi Jinping's Remarks on Political Consultative
Work Since the 18th Party Congress: Socialist Consultative Democracy Is
Not an Act'' [Shibada yilai xi jinping tan zhengxie gongzuo: shehui
zhuyi xieshang minzhu bu shi zuo yangzi], The Paper, 3 March 16.
\125\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on China's
Political Party System,'' reprinted in China Internet Information
Center, 15 November 07, preface.
\126\ David Shambaugh, ``Let a Thousand Democracies Bloom,'' New
York Times, 6 July 07; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Europe China Research and
Advice Network, ``The Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC): Its Role and Its Future,'' Short Term Policy Brief
25, October 2011, 2.
\127\ Qi Weiping, ``The New Role of the CPPCC in Strengthening
Socialist Consultative Democracy'' [Renmin zhengxie zai shehui zhuyi
xieshang minzhu tixi zhong de xin dingwei], People's Political
Consultative News, 2 March 16.
\128\ See, e.g., ``Gansu: Many People Taken Away by Police Because
of Support and Recommendation for Independent Candidate for People's
Congress'' [Gansu: duoren yin zhichi tuijian duli canxuan renda daibiao
bei jingfang daizou], BowenPress, 20 June 16; Rights Defense Network,
``China Election Monitor No. 3: Illegal Election Organization Emerged
in Lan County, Shanxi'' [Zhongguo xuanju guancha zhi san: shanxi
lanxian chuxian feifa xuanju gongzuo jigou], 12 April 16; Rights
Defense Network, ``China Election Monitor (2016) No. 4: Contents of the
Wuxi Municipality Liangxi District Election Committee `Voter Notice'
Suspected To Be Illegal (No. 1)'' [Zhongguo xuanju guancha (2016) zhi
si: wuxi shi liangxi qu xuanju weiyuanhui sanfa de ``xuanmin xuzhi''
deng de neirong shexian weifa (zhi yi)], 18 April 16.
\129\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) on 10 December 48, art.
21. ``Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives . . .. The
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.''
\130\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry
into force 23 March 76, art. 25.
\131\ ``Yao Lifa and Others Send Joint Letter, Demand NPC Revise
Election Law'' [Yao lifa deng ren fa lianming xin yaoqiu renda xiugai
xuanju fa], Radio Free Asia, 16 March 16; PRC Organic Law of Village
Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa],
passed 4 November 98, amended 28 October 10, art. 13.
\132\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``China Election Monitor
No. 3: Illegal Election Organization Emerged in Lan County, Shanxi''
[Zhongguo xuanju guancha zhi san: shanxi lanxian chuxian feifa xuanju
gongzuo jigou], 12 April 16; ``Lan County Convenes Village Leading
Group Elections Work Meeting'' [Lanxian zhaokai xiangzhen lingdao banzi
huanjie gongzuo hui], Lan County Government, 24 March 16.
\133\ See, e.g., Yao Lifa, Rights Defense Network, ``China Election
Monitor (2016) No. 1: Shanxi Elections Near, Provincial NPC Standing
Committee Vice Chair Said `Must Have Good Candidates Enter Race . . .'
'' [Zhongguo xuanju guancha (2016) zhi yi: shanxi huanjie zaiji, sheng
renda changweihui fu zhuren shuo ``yao ba hao daibiao houxuanren rukou
guan . . .''], 31 March 16.
\134\ See, e.g., Yao Lifa, Rights Defense Network, ``China Election
Monitor (2016) No. 2: More Than a Thousand Farmers in Shan County,
Shandong, Submit Joint Complaint Regarding Lack of Autonomy to the
Ministry of Civil Affairs'' [Zhongguo xuanju guancha (2016) zhi er:
shandong shan xian qianyu nongmin lianming xiang minzheng bu konggao wu
zizhi quan], 4 April 16.
\135\ Rights Defense Network, ``Rights Defense Commentary: Why
Isn't Anyone Interested in Suspicions Behind `Qu Mingxue's Yongjing,
Gansu, Election Case? ' '' [Weiquan pinglun: ``gansu yongjing qu
mingxue xuanju an'' beihou yidian weihe wuren guowen?], 3 July 16.
\136\ ``Gansu: Many People Taken Away by Police Because of Support
and Recommendation for Independent Candidate for People's Congress''
[Gansu: duo ren yin zhichi tuijian duli canxuan renda daibiao bei
jingfang daizou], BowenPress, 20 June 16.
\137\ Rights Defense Network, ``Gansu Rights Defender Qu Mingxue
Formally Arrested on Suspicion of Disrupting Election'' [Gansu weiquan
renshi qu mingxue bei yi shexian pohuai xuanju zui zhengshi daibu], 2
July 16.
\138\ Xin Yun, ``Yongjing, Gansu's Qu Mingxue Released, `Yanhuang
Chunqiu' Lawsuit Not Accepted for Case-Filing'' [Gansu yongjing qu
mingxue bei shifang, yanhuang chunqiu qisu buyu shouli], China Free
Press, 29 July 16. For more information on Qu Mingxue, see the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00228.
\139\ Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangxi People's Congress
Independent Candidate Yang Wei (Yang Tingjian) Administratively
Detained for Ten Days by Zixi County, Jiangxi Province, Public Security
Bureau'' [Jiangxi renda daibiao duli houxuanren yang wei (yang
tingjian) zao jiangxi sheng zixi xian gong'anju xingzheng juliu shi
tian], 24 August 16.
\140\ CECC, 2014 Annual Report, 9 October 14, 142-43.
\141\ Lin is also known as Lin Zuluan. James Pomfret, ``China
`Democracy' Village Chief Arrested for Graft, Riot Police Deployed,''
Reuters, 18 June 16; Austin Ramzy, ``Protests Return to Wukan, Chinese
Village That Once Expelled Its Officials,'' New York Times, 20 June 16;
``Solving Wukan Case Needs Authority of Law,'' Global Times, 20 June
16. See also Zhan Yijia and Mao Yizhu, ``Lufeng City Government: Solve
Wukan Village Land Problems According to Laws and Regulations'' [Lufeng
shi zhengfu: yifa yigui jiejue wukan cun tudi wenti], Xinhua, 20 June
16.
\142\ Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Service, ``Human Rights in
China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 113th Congress,'' 19 June 13, 5;
``Wukan: After the Uprising,'' Al Jazeera, 26 June 13.
\143\ ``China's Wukan Village Elects Protest Leaders To Run
Council,'' Bloomberg, 4 March 12; ``China's Wukan Continues To Elect
Village Leaders,'' Xinhua, 4 March 12.
\144\ Teddy Ng, ``Suspicion Clouds Wukan Leader's `Bribery'
Arrest,'' South China Morning Post, 20 March 14; ``Chinese Village
Official's Detention Sparks Fears of Poll Rigging,'' Radio Free Asia,
17 March 14; ``Second Wukan Leader Held Ahead of Closed-Door
Elections,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 March 14.
\145\ Lufeng City Public Security Bureau, ``Lufeng City Public
Security Bureau Open Letter to All of the Villagers of Wukan Village''
[Lufeng shi gong'anju zhi wukan cun guangda cunmin de gongkai xin], 17
June 16, reprinted in Safe Lufeng (Ping'an lufeng), Weibo post, 18 June
16, 5:12 a.m.
\146\ ``Solving Wukan Case Needs Authority of Law,'' Global Times,
20 June 16; James Pomfret, ``China `Democracy' Village Chief Arrested
for Graft, Riot Police Deployed,'' Reuters, 18 June 16.
\147\ Chun Han Wong, ``Skepticism in China After Wukan
Confession,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time Report (blog), 22
June 16.
\148\ ``Former Wukan, Guangdong, Village Committee Chief Lin Zulian
Arrested on Suspicion of Taking Bribes'' [Guangdong wukan yuan cun
weihui zhuren lin zulian shexian shouhui zui bei daibu], China News
Service, 22 July 16.
\149\ ``Chinese Lawyers Say Judicial Officials Barred Them From
Advising Wukan Protest Chief,'' South China Morning Post, 22 June 16.
\150\ ``Unable To Stand Pressure, Lin Zulian's Grandson Rescued
From Taking Drugs in Suicide Attempt, `I Can't Handle It Any More'
Broadcast Live on Weixin Prior to Incident'' [Bukan yali lin zulian sun
fuyao zisha huojiu chushi qian weixin zhibo ``wo kang buzhu le''], Ming
Pao, 5 August 16. See also Gene Lin, ``Grandson of Arrested Leader in
Wukan `Rebel' Village Survives Suicide Attempt,'' Hong Kong Free Press,
5 August 16.
\151\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and
State Council General Office, Opinion on Comprehensively Advancing Work
on Open Government Affairs [Guanyu quanmian tuijin zhengwu gongkai
gongzuo de yijian], reprinted in Xinhua, 17 February 16; ``Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee General Office and State Council
General Office Publish `Opinion on Comprehensively Advancing Work on
Open Government Affairs' '' [Zhongban guoban yinfa ``guanyu quanmian
tuijin zhengwu gongkai gongzuo de yijian''], Xinhua, 17 February 16;
Jamie P. Horsley, ``China Promotes Open Government as It Seeks To
Reinvent Its Governance Model,'' Freedominfo.org, 22 February 16. The
February 2016 opinion stipulated the improvement of ``open government
affairs'' (zhengwu gongkai), which one expert noted is broader in scope
than ``open government information'' (zhengfu xinxi gongkai).
\152\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on
Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the
Country According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin
yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], issued 28 October 14,
item 3(6). See also the following unofficial translation: Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee, ``CCP Central Committee Decision
Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the
Country According to the Law Forward,'' translated in China Copyright
and Media (blog), 30 October 14, item 3(6).
\153\ State Council General Office, Opinion Regarding Strengthening
Information Infrastructure of Government Websites [Guanyu jiaqiang
zhengfu wangzhan xinxi neirong jianshe de yijian], issued 17 November
14; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and State
Council General Office, Guiding Opinion on Carrying Out the System of
Listing the Powers of Local Government Work Departments at All Levels
[Guanyu tuixing difang geji zhengfu gongzuo bumen quanli qingdan zhidu
de zhidao yijian], reprinted in Xinhua, 24 March 15, preface, paras. 1,
3, 4, 7.
\154\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and
State Council General Office, Opinion on Comprehensively Advancing Work
on Open Government Affairs [Guanyu quanmian tuijin zhengwu gongkai
gongzuo de yijian], reprinted in Xinhua, 17 February 16; ``Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee General Office and State Council
General Office Publish `Opinion on Comprehensively Advancing Work on
Open Government Affairs' '' [Zhongban guoban yinfa ``guanyu quanmian
tuijin zhengwu gongkai gongzuo de yijian''], Xinhua, 17 February 16.
\155\ Ibid.
\156\ State Council, PRC Regulations on Open Government Information
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli], issued 5
April 07, effective 1 May 08. See also ``China Commits to `Open
Government Information' Effective May 1, 2008,'' CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
\157\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Representative of
Shanghai Petitioner Xie Jinhua in Open Government Information Suit
Against Pudong New District Bureau of Planning and Land Management
Driven Away by Judge'' [Shanghai fangmin xie jinhua su pudong xin qu
guihua he tudi guanliju zhengfu xinxi gongkai an daili ren zao faguan
qugan], 29 June 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Wuxi Government Refuses
To Publish Government Information, Farmer Lu Guoyan Applies to
Provincial Government for Reconsideration'' [Wuxi zhengfu ju bu gongkai
zhengfu xinxi, nongmin lu guoyan xiang sheng zhengfu shenqing fuyi], 18
October 15.
\158\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Finance Bureau Refuses
To Disclose Three Pieces of Public Information, Changzhou's Wang Xiaoli
Raises Administrative Lawsuit'' [Caizhengju jujue gongkai san gong
xinxi, changzhou wang xiaoli tiqi xingzheng susong], 13 May 16.
\159\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``Jiangsu's Nantong
Municipality Public Security Bureau Refuses To Disclose Seven Details
of Human Rights Defender Shan Lihua's Hunger Strike Incident'' [Jiangsu
nantong shi gong'an jujue gongkai renquan hanweizhe shan lihua jueshi
shijian de 7 fen xinxi], 19 May 16.
\160\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``[CHRB] Chinese Government
Refuses To Disclose Data on Torture for UN Review, Citizens Face
Reprisals for Seeking Information (10/22-29, 2015),'' 29 October 15;
Lin Yunfei, ``Citizen Li Wei: Administrative Litigation Complaint''
[Gongmin li wei: xingzheng qisu zhuang], New Citizens' Movement (blog),
19 August 15; Rights Defense Network, ``Shanghai Rights Defender Zheng
Peipei Contests Reply Issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding
Torture Report and Files Administrative Lawsuit Against It'' [Shanghai
renquan hanweizhe zheng peipei bufu waijiaobu jiu kuxing baogao de
fuhan dui qi tiqi xingzheng susong], 19 October 15; Rights Defense
Network, ``Shanghai Rights Defender Ding Juying Sues Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Over Open Information Matters Relating to Torture
Report'' [Shanghai renquan hanweizhe ding juying jiu kuxing baogao
xinxi gongkai shiyi qisu waijiaobu], 26 October 15; Rights Defense
Network, ``Shanghai Rights Defender Yin Huimin Receives `Reply
Concerning an Open Government Information Application' From Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Saying Information Sought Does Not Fall in Category of
Open Government Information'' [Shanghai renquan hanweizhe yin huimin
shoudao waijiaobu ``guanyu zhengfu xinxi gongkai shenqing de fuhan''
cheng shenqing gongkai neirong bu shuyu qi zhengfu xinxi gongkai
fanchou], 21 September 15.
\161\ See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, ``State Council Official
Document Called State Secret, Nantong's Liu Xiyun Files for
Administrative Reconsideration'' [Guowuyuan piwen bei cheng guojia
mimi, nantong liu xiyun tiqi xingzheng fuyi], 29 May 16; Feng Zhenghu,
``Leaving the Country (8): Feng Zhenghu Asks Ministry of Public
Security for Written Decision Not Allowing Him To Leave the Country''
[Chujing (8): feng zhenghu xiang gong'anbu suoqu buzhun chujing de
jueding shu], Feng Zhenghu's Blog, 8 December 15.
\162\ Wang Mengyao, ``Implement a System of Negative Lists for Open
Government Affairs by 2020'' [Dao 2020 nian shixing zhengwu gongkai
fumian qingdan zhidu], Beijing News, 18 February 16.
\163\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 19-20.
\164\ Chao Deng and Shen Hong, ``Chinese Investors' Wish List:
Policy Clarity, More Communication,'' Wall Street Journal, 10 January
16.
\165\ See, e.g., ``Inflated Statistics Wreak Havoc on Economies of
Northeast China,'' Global Times, 14 December 15; Jeremy Wallace,
``Here's Why It Matters That China Is Admitting That Its Statistics Are
`Unreliable,' '' Washington Post, Monkey Cage (blog), 28 December 15.
\166\ State Council, ``Social Credit System Construction Program
Outline (2014-2020)'' [Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao
(2014-2020 nian)], 14 June 14; ``China Outlines Its First Social Credit
System,'' Xinhua, 27 June 14. For an unofficial English translation,
see ``Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System
(2014-2020),'' translated in China Copyright and Media (blog), 25 April
15.
\167\ State Council, ``Social Credit System Construction Program
Outline (2014-2020)'' [Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao
(2014-2020 nian)], 14 June 14, sec. 1(3). For an unofficial English
translation, see ``Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social
Credit System (2014-2020),'' translated in China Copyright and Media
(blog), 25 April 15.
\168\ Fokke Obbema et al., ``China Rates Its Own Citizens--
Including Online Behaviour,'' de Volkskrant, 25 April 15; Celia Hatton,
``China `Social Credit': Beijing Sets Up Huge System,'' BBC, 26 October
15.
\169\ Ibid.
\170\ State Council, ``Social Credit System Construction Program
Outline (2014-2020)'' [Shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao
(2014-2020 nian)], 14 June 14, sec. 2(1). For an unofficial English
translation, see ``Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social
Credit System (2014-2020),'' translated in China Copyright and Media
(blog), 25 April 15.
\171\ Julie Makinen, ``China Prepares To Rank Its Citizens on
`Social Credit,' '' Los Angeles Times, 22 November 15; Fokke Obbema et
al., ``China Rates Its Own Citizens--Including Online Behaviour,'' de
Volkskrant, 25 April 15.
\172\ Mirjam Meissner, Rogier Creemers, Pamela Kyle Crossley, Peter
Mattis, and Samantha Hoffman, ``Is Big Data Increasing Beijing's
Capacity for Control? '' Asia Society, ChinaFile (blog), 12 August 16.
See also Fokke Obbema et al., ``China Rates Its Own Citizens--Including
Online Behaviour,'' de Volkskrant, 25 April 15.
\173\ ``State Council Publishes `Guiding Opinion on Establishing
and Perfecting System of Uniform Encouragement for Integrity and
Discipline for Dishonesty To Speed Up Advancing Construction of Social
Trustworthiness' '' [Guowuyuan yinfa ``guanyu jianli wanshan shouxin
lianhe jili he shixin lianhe chengjie zhidu jiakuai tuijin shehui
chengxin jianshe de zhidao yijian''], Xinhua, 12 June 16.
\174\ State Council, Guiding Opinion on Establishing and Perfecting
System of Uniform Encouragement for Integrity and Discipline for
Dishonesty To Speed Up Advancing Construction of Social Trustworthiness
[Guanyu jianli wanshan shouxin lianhe jili he shixin lianhe chengjie
zhidu jiakuai tuijin shehui chengxin jianshe de zhidao yijian], issued
30 May 16, sec. 1.
\175\ Ibid., sec. 9.
\176\ Ibid., sec. 19.
Commercial Rule
of Law
Commercial Rule
of Law
Commercial Rule of Law
World Trade Organization Commitments
On December 11, 2016, China will have been a member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) for 15 years,\1\ yet the Chinese
government and Communist Party continue to fail to honor many
of China's fundamental WTO commitments.\2\ China's commitments
when it joined the WTO included to ``apply and administer in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws,
regulations and other measures,'' \3\ to allow for ``impartial
and independent'' tribunals for review of administrative
actions,\4\ to allow ``prices for traded goods and services in
every sector to be determined by market forces,'' \5\ and to
ensure non-discrimination against foreign enterprises.\6\
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and other
high-level Chinese officials asserted during the Commission's
2016 reporting year that China is fully adhering to its
international trade obligations.\7\ U.S. businesses \8\ and the
U.S. Government,\9\ however, expressed concerns regarding the
Chinese government's continued failure to follow through on its
WTO commitments, noting specific challenges such as restricted
market access, discrimination against foreign companies,
inadequate intellectual property protection, subsidies for
state-owned enterprises, and the general absence of the rule of
law.\10\
World Trade Organization Disputes and Internet Censorship
The U.S. Government has initiated a number of WTO disputes
regarding the Chinese government's failure to comply with its
WTO commitments, with the majority of disputes initiated since
2009 remaining unresolved. In 2015, the U.S. Government
initiated two new WTO disputes against the Chinese government
while five earlier WTO disputes initiated against the Chinese
government since 2009 remain active.\11\ In April 2016, China
and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding
that, if fully implemented by the Chinese government, will
resolve a dispute on Chinese export subsidies that the U.S.
Government initiated in February 2015.\12\ In July 2016, the
U.S. Government initiated a WTO dispute against Chinese export
duties on nine types of raw materials used in manufacturing;
\13\ U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman described the
duties as ``China's attempt to game the system so that raw
materials are cheaper for their manufacturers, and more
expensive for ours.'' \14\ When China acceded to the WTO in
2001, it committed to eliminating all export duties ``unless
specifically provided for'' in an annex to its accession
agreement or ``applied in conformity with'' WTO rules; \15\ in
2009 and 2012, however, the United States initiated prior WTO
disputes against Chinese export duties on other products.\16\
Under WTO rules, the U.S. Government has requested detailed
information about, but has not yet formally challenged, the
Chinese government's Internet censorship regime. In October
2011, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
requested information from the Chinese government on Internet
restrictions that allow Chinese authorities to block websites
of U.S. companies.\17\ In December 2015, USTR reported that it
had continued its outreach to the Chinese government to discuss
its ``arbitrary'' censorship (``blocking of websites'').\18\ In
March 2016, USTR identified Internet censorship in China as a
barrier to trade for the first time,\19\ reporting that the
problem appears to ``have worsened over the past year, with 8
of the top 25 most trafficked global sites now blocked in
China.'' \20\
Non-Market Economy Status and Trade Negotiations
Under China's 2001 WTO accession protocol, other countries
are permitted to treat China as a non-market economy; during
the reporting year, the Chinese government sought a change to
market economy status. In December 2016, a provision relating
to China's designation as a non-market economy in its WTO
accession protocol will expire.\21\ The Chinese government has
reportedly pressed that, starting on December 11, 2016, the
United States and other countries should no longer designate
China a non-market economy.\22\ Some American manufacturers may
be negatively affected if the U.S. Government designates China
a market economy because American manufacturers may lose
protection against subsidized Chinese imports.\23\ In
determining whether a country is a market economy, the U.S.
Commerce Department is required by law to consider factors
including the extent to which the country's currency is
convertible; foreign investment is limited; the government owns
or controls the means of production; and the government
controls price and output decisions of enterprises.\24\ As of
May 2016, the U.S. Commerce Department reportedly had not made
a decision on whether to grant China market economy status.\25\
In May 2016, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
opposing a European Union designation of market economy status
for China.\26\
Negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
between China and the United States progressed in 2016, and
China monitored Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
developments.\27\ In 2016, BIT negotiations were a ``top
economic priority'' of the U.S. Government, with the objectives
of ``non-discrimination, fairness and transparency.'' \28\ As
of August 2016, ongoing U.S.-China BIT negotiations focused on
a ``negative list''--a list of sectors in which U.S. investment
in China would remain prohibited.\29\ The Chinese government
was not part of the TPP negotiations \30\ due in part to
challenges the Chinese government would face in meeting some
TPP standards, including those related to the treatment of
state-owned enterprises and Internet censorship.\31\ The
Chinese government may seek to join the TPP in the future,\32\
and the U.S. Government has indicated that it would be open to
the idea.\33\
Commercial Transparency and Censorship
During the reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to
control access to commercial information and impose
restrictions on economic reporting, targeting negative reports
on the Chinese economy. When China acceded to the WTO, the
Chinese government committed to ``apply and administer in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws,
regulations and other measures of the central government as
well as local regulations, rules and other measures issued or
applied at the sub-national level . . ..'' \34\ Reports from
this past year indicate, however, that the Chinese government
does not uniformly apply laws and regulations, especially those
that limit media censorship and promote transparency.\35\ The
U.S.-based news-media-monitoring website China Digital Times
identified seven different censorship directives issued between
August 2015 and April 2016 related to economic reporting.\36\
In April 2016, Reporters Without Borders ranked China 176th out
of 180 countries for press freedom.\37\ During the reporting
year, the websites of the New York Times, Bloomberg News, the
Wall Street Journal, and Reuters remained blocked in China.\38\
Significant developments demonstrating Chinese authorities'
continued disregard for transparency, impartiality, and freedom
of the press included:
On August 25, 2015, Chinese authorities
detained Caijing reporter Wang Xiaolu, later placing
him under ``criminal compulsory measures'' on suspicion
of ``colluding with others and fabricating and
spreading fake information on [the] securities and
futures market.'' \39\ Wang had reported that the
Chinese government might reduce financial support for
stabilizing stock prices.\40\ In or around February
2016, authorities reportedly released Wang from
detention at an unknown location in Shanghai
municipality, although sources did not report on the
conditions of his release.\41\
Between January 2010 and November 2015,
Chinese companies raised US$36.7 billion from U.S.
investors in initial public offerings, according to
analysis by Bloomberg News.\42\ As of August 2016,
however, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), a non-profit corporation established by the
U.S. Congress to oversee public company audits,\43\
reportedly remained unable to obtain legal and
financial documents from China-based companies listed
on U.S. stock exchanges.\44\ Although U.S. and Chinese
regulators announced a pilot inspection program in June
2015,\45\ inspections have not taken place because
Chinese authorities only permit limited access to
documents.\46\
In December 2015, Chinese official media
reported that, in order to explain current ``dramatic
economic drops'' in local growth figures, several
officials in northeast China had admitted to ``faking''
GDP and other statistical data in previous years, with
some local counties having reported GDP rivaling that
of Hong Kong.\47\ According to a Xinhua report, ``very
few'' officials have lost their jobs due to
manipulating data despite provisions in the PRC
Statistics Law that stipulate termination as punishment
for such violations.\48\
On January 26, 2016, Communist Party
authorities extralegally detained Wang Bao'an, the
Director of the National Bureau of Statistics of
China,\49\ hours after he defended China's economic
performance and GDP figures at a news conference.\50\
According to international media reports, Wang's
detention increased concern about the reliability of
the Chinese government's GDP statistics.\51\
In April 2016, a consortium of journalists
published an expose on international tax avoidance
schemes, revealing that a Panamanian law firm had set
up 16,300 secret offshore companies through its offices
in China and Hong Kong,\52\ including companies owned
by family members of eight current or past members of
the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Central
Committee Political Bureau.\53\ Chinese authorities
censored reporting by Chinese media and postings on
social media about the disclosure of offshore
accounts.\54\
Chinese government and Communist Party
authorities reportedly investigated executives in the
banking and financial sectors in the aftermath of the
2015 Chinese stock market fluctuations.\55\ Some
executives were reportedly ``disappeared'' or
temporarily detained without transparent reporting on
their whereabouts.\56\ According to media reports,
these unexplained absences affected investor confidence
and stock prices.\57\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disappearance and Arbitrary Detention of an American Businesswoman
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2015, American businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis disappeared as
she was about to travel from Zhuhai municipality, Guangdong province,
into Macau.\58\ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese
authorities placed Phan-Gillis ``under investigation `on suspicion of
activities harmful to Chinese national security.' '' \59\ After holding
Phan-Gillis under ``residential surveillance at a designated location''
\60\ for six months at an undisclosed location in the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region, authorities reportedly transferred her to the
Nanning No. 2 PSB Detention Center in Nanning municipality, Guangxi in
September.\61\ The Guangxi procuratorate reportedly approved her arrest
on October 26, but officials did not provide her with any details of
the charges.\62\ The U.S. State Department reported that she met with
consular officials on a monthly basis, but Chinese authorities
reportedly have prohibited her from speaking openly with consular
officials or from meeting with her lawyer.\63\ The U.S.-China Consular
Convention (Convention) provides that consular officials are entitled
``to converse and to exchange correspondence'' with detained
individuals and ``may assist in arranging for legal representation.''
\64\ According to the U.S. State Department, the Chinese government's
restrictions on communication between U.S. consular officials and Phan-
Gillis are ``inconsistent'' with China's obligations under the
Convention.\65\ In June 2016, the United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention rendered an opinion that Phan-Gillis had been
arbitrarily detained.\66\ The opinion was based on a determination that
Phan-Gillis had been deprived of her right to legal counsel, and that
she had not promptly been brought before a judicial or other
independent authority since her detention began.\67\ In July 2016,
international media reported that Phan-Gillis had been, or was soon
expected to be, indicted.\68\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-Owned Enterprises
This past year, in spite of the Chinese government's
continued promotion of structural reforms to state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), American and European companies expressed
concerns that SOEs continued to be run in a non-commercial
manner. When China acceded to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Chinese government committed that ``all state-owned
and state-invested enterprises would make purchases and sales
based solely on commercial considerations . . ..'' \69\ In
September 2015, the State Council issued a guiding opinion on
the reform of SOEs \70\ that would categorize SOEs as public-
class and commercial-class, and encourage market-based reforms
and mixed ownership for commercial-class SOEs.\71\ Chinese
media reported that this effort to promote mixed ownership will
increase the efficiency of the 150,000 SOEs, which hold more
than 100 trillion yuan (approximately US$16 trillion) in assets
and employ more than 30 million people.\72\ A U.S. business
association, however, reported that the impact of the reforms
would likely be limited as it does not address ``core SOE
issues.'' \73\ In the 2015 Fortune Global 500 list, 76 out of
98 Chinese companies included were SOEs,\74\ and according to
the World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review Body, the
Chinese government is a majority shareholder in 99 of the 100
largest publicly listed companies.\75\ As of May 2015, 1,012
``state-owned holding'' enterprises reportedly accounted for 68
percent of the total equity of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
markets according to Chinese authorities.\76\ In July 2016,
Chinese and international media reported on listed SOEs that
had amended their articles of association to give internal
Party committees greater control over corporate decisions
following September 2015 demands by the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee.\77\ Xinhua noted that the Party constitution
stipulates that foreign companies in China with more than three
Party members ``should have'' Party branches and that the
numbers of Party branches at foreign companies ``are growing.''
\78\ During the reporting year, Chinese authorities continued
to exercise significant influence over all types of firms.\79\
According to Xinhua, although the number of SOEs may be
decreasing, the ``influence and dominance'' of SOEs is growing
in strength.\80\ The Chinese government's support for SOEs
reportedly has resulted in ``severe overcapacity'' in
industries, including steel, cement, aluminum, flat glass, and
shipbuilding, which has resulted in low global prices and trade
tensions with the United States and Europe.\81\ According to
the U.S. International Trade Commission, as of August 15, 2016,
the United States had 140 antidumping (102) and countervailing
(38) duty orders in force that targeted Chinese imports, \82\
an increase from the 129 antidumping (98) and countervailing
(31) duty orders in force as of September 1, 2015.\83\
Chinese Government Support of Cyber Theft
Cyber theft and the theft of intellectual property by, or
with the support of, the Chinese government remained of
significant concern. In August 2015, the Washington Post
reported that the U.S. Government was considering imposing
sanctions on Chinese companies that had benefited from Chinese-
government-supported theft of U.S. intellectual property.\84\
According to the Washington Post report, Chinese SOEs State
Nuclear Power Technology, Baosteel Group, and the Aluminum
Corporation of China likely would have been subject to
sanctions, although the U.S. Government did not officially name
them.\85\ In September 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama and
Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed that ``[N]either country's
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled
theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or
other confidential business information, with the intent of
providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial
sectors.'' \86\ One analyst surmised the agreement was ``a
tactical maneuver by China, an effort to prevent [the United
States] from levying sanctions.'' \87\ In October, a
cybersecurity firm reported that Chinese attacks had continued
the day after as well as in the weeks following the
agreement.\88\ During the reporting year, dialogue between the
United States and China on cyber theft continued, and in
December 2015, the U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security and China's State Council agreed to guidelines for
requesting information on cyber crimes.\89\ In April 2016, the
United States Steel Corporation filed a complaint with the U.S.
International Trade Commission, alleging that the Chinese steel
industry had benefited from Chinese government-sponsored cyber
theft in January 2011 of trade secrets related to advanced
steels.\90\
Intellectual Property Rights and Antimonopoly Law Enforcement
During the reporting year, American companies continued to
experience the negative consequences of the Chinese
government's inadequate protection for intellectual property
(IP), although Chinese officials made some positive judicial
and regulatory developments. According to the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative's Special 301 Report, China continued
to ``present a complex and contradictory environment for
protection and enforcement of IPR [intellectual property
rights],'' noting significant problems including ``rampant
piracy and counterfeiting'' and ``unchecked trade secret
theft.'' \91\ In February 2016, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
identified ``growing online counterfeiting'' as a key area of
weakness for intellectual property protection in China.\92\
Despite these challenges, Chinese authorities continued to
affirm the importance of intellectual property protection and
of implementing legal reforms.\93\ In 2015, China's new
specialized IP courts in Beijing and Shanghai municipalities,
and Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, reportedly
concluded 9,872 cases.\94\ According to the Supreme People's
Court, as of February 2016, Chinese courts had publicly
released more than 15 million case decisions, of which civil,
commercial, and IP cases totaled approximately 10.5 million
decisions.\95\ In December 2015, the State Council Legislative
Affairs Office made available for public comment draft
revisions to the PRC Patent Law.\96\ The draft revisions
included changes such as extending protection for design
patents from 10 to 15 years and increasing damages for
intentional infringement.\97\
Chinese authorities' discriminatory and non-transparent
antimonopoly enforcement remained an area of concern for
American companies. According to a US-China Business Council
survey, 80 percent of surveyed American companies were
concerned about antimonopoly law enforcement in China,
including lack of transparency, target enforcement, and lack of
due process.\98\ In August 2015, the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) Provisions on the Prohibition of
Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abusing
Intellectual Property Rights took effect.\99\ According to one
USTR official, ``there is a concern that China's existing and
draft antimonopoly law enforcement guidelines could be used to
improperly value intellectual property rights, which calls into
doubt the seriousness of China's avowed intentions to create a
system that promotes and protects intellectual property
rights,'' potentially resulting in artificially low
prices.\100\ In February 2016, SAIC published for public
comment its seventh draft Guidelines on Anti-Trust Enforcement
Against IP Abuse,\101\ which contains provisions that place
restrictions on licensing certain types of intellectual
property.\102\ In February 2016, the State Council Legislative
Affairs Office published a draft revision to the PRC Anti-
Unfair Competition Law, which contains provisions that, if
implemented, could strengthen trade secret protection in China
by increasing administrative fines and adopting other
measures.\103\
The International Monetary Fund and Chinese Outbound Investment
During the reporting year, the Chinese government reached
its goal of increased international use of the yuan, and
foreign investment by Chinese companies continued to increase.
In November 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided
to add the yuan to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), effective
October 1, 2016.\104\ Although the yuan is not fully
convertible to other currencies, the IMF determined that the
yuan satisfied a requirement that a SDR currency is ``freely
usable.'' \105\ President Xi Jinping reportedly said that the
yuan's new status ``will improve the international monetary
system and safeguard global financial stability.'' \106\
According to a January 2016 Wall Street Journal report, ``the
IMF stamp of approval puts the yuan in the same league as the
dollar, yen and sterling,'' and Chinese officials have
reportedly begun to weaken the value of the yuan to increase
exports.\107\ In March 2016, another Wall Street Journal
article reported that the IMF requested China to release more
data related to the Chinese government's intervention in the
yuan's exchange rate,\108\ although IMF officials later denied
the report, according to the state-run news agency Xinhua.\109\
Foreign investments by Chinese companies, with the support
of the Chinese government and Chinese government-controlled
financial institutions, continued to grow during the 2016
reporting year. According to an analysis conducted by a
research firm and non-profit organization, as of April 2016,
Chinese companies had US$30 billion in pending investment deals
and projects in the United States, indicating that total
Chinese foreign investment likely will increase in 2016 from
US$15 billion in 2015.\110\ In the first three months of 2016,
Chinese companies announced the largest planned acquisition of
a U.S. company to date--Anbang's US$14.3 billion purchase of
Starwood Hotels--as well as what would be five of the six
largest acquisitions, including Tianjin Tianhai's US$6.3
billion purchase of Ingram Micro, Qingdao Haier's US$5.4
billion purchase of General Electric Appliance Business,
Zoomlion's US$5.4 billion purchase of Terex, and Dalian Wanda's
US$3.5 billion purchase of Legendary Entertainment.\111\ In
March 2016, Anbang withdrew its bid for Starwood Hotels,\112\
and in May 2016, Zoomlion announced it was no longer pursuing
Terex.\113\ In January 2016, the Chinese-led multilateral
development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB), officially opened.\114\ The AIIB may be a funding
mechanism for Chinese foreign investment.\115\ One American
expert said that the AIIB may adopt standards similar to the
World Bank and other multilateral institutions, but cautioned
that ``the key is if and how these standards will be
enforced.'' \116\
Food and Drug Safety
The Chinese government continued to take steps to address
food and drug safety challenges this past year. In October
2015, the amended PRC Food Safety Law took effect, which
included stronger penalties for violations and additional
monitoring requirements.\117\ In December 2015, the State Food
and Drug Administration (SFDA), State Council, Ministry of
Public Security, Supreme People's Court, and Supreme People's
Procuratorate jointly issued a set of measures on facilitating
inter-agency work on food- and drug-related crime.\118\
Events surrounding a major drug safety scandal this past
year highlighted the ongoing tension between authorities'
efforts to enforce drug safety measures and to silence those
who question government oversight. In March 2016, the SFDA
reportedly stated that 29 companies and 16 clinics had
illegally distributed more than 20,000 vaccines, leading
authorities to detain 130 suspects.\119\ In April 2016, a media
report indicated that 192 criminal cases had been filed, and
357 government officials punished.\120\ Another media report,
meanwhile, indicated that authorities detained as many as 1,000
parents gathered to protest in front of a government agency in
Beijing municipality, following a vaccine scandal that they
claim caused a range of negative health consequences.\121\ An
April report in the Economist described the vaccine scandal as
China's biggest in years, involving ``tens of millions of
dollars-worth of black-market, out-of-date and improperly
stored vaccines.'' \122\ The total number of faulty vaccines
was estimated at two million.\123\ In response to the illegal
vaccine reports, Premier Li Keqiang reportedly said the case
``exposed many regulatory loopholes.'' \124\ The Economist
article quoted a statement President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping reportedly had made in 2013 in which he
linked the Party's legitimacy to its ability to oversee food
safety, saying, ``If our party can't even handle food-safety
issues properly, and keeps on mishandling them, then people
will ask whether we are fit to keep ruling China.'' \125\
Subsequently, the Economist's website was blocked in China,
allegedly in response to an image of Xi on the magazine's
coverage accompanying the report.\126\
The Chinese government's non-transparent food safety
regulations and enforcement negatively affected at least one
American company this reporting year, and may affect American
consumers who purchase goods originating in or processed in
China. According to one American attorney who focuses on food
safety, ``China has a very complex uncodified body of hundreds
of standards . . . along with a separate body of equally
complex procedural regulations overlaying them.'' \127\ On
February 1, 2016, the Jiading District People's Court in
Shanghai municipality fined two Chinese subsidiaries of the
American meat processor OSI Group 1.2 million yuan each
(approximately US$190,000) and sentenced an Australian citizen
and nine local employees to prison terms of up to three years
and fines of up to 80,000 yuan (approximately US$12,000), for
the production and sale of substandard food products.\128\
Although OSI Group had acknowledged problems in their
production process \129\ and tried to cooperate with local
authorities,\130\ OSI Group criticized the judgment as
``inconsistent with the facts and evidence,'' claiming
authorities had recognized that the case was ``never'' about
food safety, but was influenced by accusations made in
misleading media reports.\131\ The Wall Street Journal
described OSI Group's press release as an ``unusual move'' that
``vehemently disputed'' the ruling.\132\ OSI Group's subsidiary
Shanghai Husi Food had reportedly won recognition from the
Chinese government for safe food production and been
successfully audited by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) in 2004 and 2010 to potentially allow Chinese poultry
exports to the United States.\133\
Food safety experts have expressed concern that imports of
potentially unsafe Chinese food products may increase due to
recent U.S. Government action. In March 2016, the USDA's Food
Safety Inspection Service published an audit that found China's
poultry slaughter inspection system equivalent to that of the
United States, allowing the rulemaking process to proceed for
raw poultry from China to be imported into the United
States,\134\ despite concerns in the United States.\135\
According to Food & Water Watch, a U.S. non-profit organization
that advocates for food safety, potentially unsafe poultry
exports from China will ``seriously endanger'' American
consumers.\136\
Commercial Rule
of Law
Commercial Rule
of Law
Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law
\1\ World Trade Organization, ``Protocols of Accession for New
Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Good and Services,'' last
visited 15 June 16. China became a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001. A list of members and their
dates of membership is available on the WTO website.
\2\ Stephen J. Ezell and Robert D. Atkinson, ``False Promises: The
Yawning Gap Between China's WTO Commitments and Practices,''
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 17 September 15, 5;
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to Congress on
China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 23-28, 95. See also American
Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China, ``American
Business in China 2016 White Paper,'' April 2016, II. According to the
American Chamber of Commerce, ``serious and systematic challenges''
remain in China. ``10 Commitments China Made When It Joined the WTO and
Has Not Respected,'' AEGIS Europe, last visited 15 June 16.
\3\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(A)2.
\4\ Ibid., Part I, 2(D)1.
\5\ Ibid., Part I, 9(1).
\6\ Ibid., Part I, 3.
\7\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on February 16, 2016,'' 16 February
16. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson: ``China has
been earnestly honoring each and every [sic] of its legal obligations
since its accession . . ..'' ``Full Text of Xi Jinping's Speech on
China-U.S. Relations in Seattle,'' Xinhua, 24 September 15. In
September 2015, Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary
Xi Jinping said that China observes ``the [WTO] principle of national
treatment,'' and treats ``all market players including foreign-invested
companies fairly . . ..'' Michael Martina, ``China Internet Regulator
Says Web Censorship Not a Trade Barrier,'' Reuters, 11 April 16. In
April 2016, China's Internet regulator reportedly said that ``China
scrupulously abides by World Trade Organization principles and its
accession protocols . . ..''
\8\ Stephen J. Ezell and Robert D. Atkinson, ``False Promises: The
Yawning Gap Between China's WTO Commitments and Practices,''
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 17 September 15, 5.
\9\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 23-28, 95. See
also Ambassador Robert W. Holleyman II, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative, ``Remarks by Deputy USTR Robert Holleyman to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce Global Intellectual Property Center 2015 Global IP
Summit,'' 6 November 15.
\10\ Stephen J. Ezell and Robert D. Atkinson, ``False Promises: The
Yawning Gap Between China's WTO Commitments and Practices,''
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 17 September 15, 5;
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to Congress on
China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 23-28, 95. See also Ling Li,
``The Chinese Communist Party and People's Courts: Judicial Dependence
in China,'' American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2016).
\11\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 34, 38. In
addition to the active disputes initiated since 2009, a WTO dispute
initiated by the United States in April 2007 against China concerning
market access for books, movies, and music also remained active.
\12\ Memorandum of Understanding Between the People's Republic of
China and the United States of America Related to the Dispute: China--
Measures Related to Demonstration Bases and Common Service Platforms
(DS489), 14 April 16; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Fact
Sheet: Agreement To Terminate Export Subsidies Under China's
Demonstration Bases--Common Service Platform Program,'' April 2016. As
part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), China agreed to
``exchange further information related to future actions taken pursuant
to [this] MOU.'' See also Timothy Webster, ``Paper Compliance: How
China Implements WTO Decisions,'' Michigan Journal of International
Law, Vol. 35, Issue 3 (2014), 574.
\13\ World Trade Organization, DS508, China--Export Duties on
Certain Raw Materials, Dispute Settlement, last visited 22 August 16.
\14\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``United States
Challenges China's Export Duties on Nine Key Raw Materials To Level
Playing Field for American Manufacturers,'' July 2016.
\15\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 11(3).
\16\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 53-55. See also
World Trade Organization, DS394, China--Measures Related to the
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, Dispute Settlement, last visited
22 August 16; World Trade Organization, DS431, China--Measures Related
to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, Dispute
Settlement, last visited 22 August 16.
\17\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), ``United
States Seeks Detailed Information on China's Internet Restrictions,''
19 October 11. USTR made the information request to China under
paragraph 4 of Article III of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services.
\18\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 150.
\19\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,'' March 2016, 91. See also
James Zimmerman, ``Censorship in China Also Blocks Business Growth,''
Wall Street Journal,'' 17 May 16; Susan Shirk et al., ``It's Official:
Washington Thinks Chinese Internet Censorship Is a `Trade Barrier,' ''
Foreign Policy, China File, 14 April 16.
\20\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,'' March 2016, 91.
\21\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 15(d).
The provision states ``Once China has established, under the national
law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the
provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the
importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of
the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph
(a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession. In addition,
should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing
WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular
industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph
(a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector.''
\22\ Tom Mitchell, ``China Revs Up Its Bid for WTO Market Economy
Status,'' Financial Times, 20 September 15; Lucy Hornby and Shawn
Donnan, ``China Fights for Market Economy Status,'' Financial Times, 9
May 16.
\23\ ``Coalition of U.S. Manufacturers Calls on Department of
Commerce To Fairly Assess China's Economic Status,'' Manufacturers for
Trade Enforcement (blog), 16 March 16; Wayne Morrison, ``China's Status
as a Nonmarket Economy (NME),'' Congressional Research Service, 23 June
16; Adam Behsudi, ``Manufacturers Form Coalition Against China `Market
Economy' Status,'' Politico, Morning Trade (blog), 16 March 16. See
also Robert E. Scott and Xiao Jiang, Economic Policy Institute (EPI),
``Unilateral Grant of Market Economy Status to China Would Put Millions
of EU Jobs at Risk,'' EPI Briefing Paper, No. 407, 18 September 15.
\24\ U.S. Code, Title 19--Customs Duties, Chap. 4, Subtitle IV,
Part IV, Sec. 1677(18)(B)(2016).
\25\ U.S. Senate, China Market Economy Status Congressional Review
Act, 114th Congress, 2nd session, S. 2906, introduced 9 May 16; U.S.
House of Representatives, China Market Economy Status Congressional
Review Act, 114th Congress, 2nd session, H. Res. 4927, introduced 13
April 16. Members of U.S. Congress introduced legislation in the Senate
and House to require congressional approval to change China's
designation as a nonmarket economy. See also Wayne Morrison, ``China's
Status as a Nonmarket Economy (NME),'' Congressional Research Service,
23 June 16.
\26\ European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 12 May
2016 on China's Market Economy Status, 2016/2667(RSP), 12 May 16;
European Parliament, ``China's Proposed Market Economy Status: Defend
EU Industry and Jobs, Urge MEPS,'' European Parliament News, 12 May 16;
Jonathan Stearns, ``Lowering of EU Tariffs on China Opposed by European
Parliament,'' Bloomberg, 12 May 16.
\27\ See, e.g., ``What You Need To Know About the TPP'' [Guanyu TPP
ni xuyao zhidao de shi], Xinhua, 6 October 15; Wang Qingyun, ``No
Single Country Can Determine Trade Rules, Ministry Says,'' China Daily,
5 February 16.
\28\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2015 Report to
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2015, 6.
\29\ ``U.S.-China BIT Offer Exchange Expected Before G20 as
Engagement Ramps Up,'' China Trade Extra, 17 August 16. See also ``Lew:
China's Commitment to Fair Investment Rules Key To Open Economy,''
China Trade Extra, 20 January 16.
\30\ See, e.g., Liu Zhen and Wendy Wu, ``40 Per Cent of World's
Economy Signs Up to TPP Trade Pact That Obama Says `Allows US, Not
China To Write the Rules of the Road,'' South China Morning Post, 5
February 16.
\31\ Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam, Trans-Pacific
Partnership, signed 4 February 16, reprinted in Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, last visited 14 August 16, arts. 14.11, 17.4.
Chapter 14, Article 14.11(2) states ``Each Party shall allow the cross-
border transfer of information by electronic means, including personal
information, when this activity is for the conduct of the business of a
covered person.'' See also Li Chunding and John Whalley, ``China and
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,'' Center for International
Governance Innovation (CIGI), CIGI Paper No. 102, May 2016, 9.
\32\ Kai Ryssdal, ``President Obama Says China Open to Joining
Trade Partnership,'' Marketplace, 3 June 15.
\33\ Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Department of State, ``Delivering
on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,'' 17 November 12.
\34\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(A)2.
\35\ State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and
Television and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
Provisions on the Administration of Online Publishing Services [Wangluo
chuban fuwu guanli guiding], issued 2 February 16, effective 10 March
16; Provisions on Network Publication Services Administration and
Articles 291 and 253 of the PRC Criminal Law were of particular
concern. For more information on the new Provisions, see Thomas M.
Shoesmith and Julian Zou, ``China Imposes Broad New Restrictions on
Publication of Internet Content,'' Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP,
Client Alert, 24 February 16, 1; Kou Jie, ``Analysts Downplay Impact of
China's Online Publishing Rules on Foreign Investors,'' Global Times, 1
March 16; Bien Perez and Nikki Sun, ``Apple iTunes and Disney Services
Shut Down by New Mainland Chinese Rules,'' South China Morning Post, 23
April 16; PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 253, 291. For more information on Article 291 of
the PRC Criminal Law, see Yaqiu Wang, ``In China, Harsh Penalties for
`False News' Make It Harder for Reporters To Work,'' Committee to
Protect Journalists, China (blog), 30 October 15; ``This Article Is
Guilty of Spreading Panic and Disorder,'' Economist, 5 December 15. For
more information on Article 253 of the PRC Criminal Law, see Richard K.
Wagner et al., ``Are You Ready for Visits From Chinese State
Authorities? '' Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 26 October 15; Paul de Hert and
Vagelis Papakonstantinou, European Parliament, Directorate-General for
Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, ``The Data Protection Regime in China,''
October 2015, 17-18. See also Donald C. Clarke, George Washington
University School of Law, ``The Peter Humphrey/Yu Yingzeng Case and
Business Intelligence in China,'' Social Science Research Network, 5
August 15, 3-5.
\36\ China Digital Times, ``China Presses Economists To Brighten
Their Outlooks,'' 6 May 16.
\37\ Reporters Without Borders, ``World Press Freedom Index 2016,''
last visited 20 April 16.
\38\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2016--China,'' last
visited 20 June 16.
\39\ ``Journalist, Securities Regulatory Official Held for Stock
Market Violation,'' Xinhua, 31 August 15; Cao Guoxing, `` `Caijing'
Reporter Wang Xiaolu Held in `Residential Surveillance at a Designated
Location' Quietly Released After Half a Year'' [``Caijing'' jizhe wang
xiaolu bei ``zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu'' bannian hou didiao shifang],
Radio France Internationale, 17 March 16. Amie Tsang, ``Caijing
Journalist's Shaming Signals China's Growing Control Over News Media,''
New York Times, 6 September 15; China Digital Times, ``In Crackdown on
Rumors, Journalist `Confesses,' '' 30 August 15. For more information
on Wang Xiaolu, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record
2015-00319.
\40\ China Digital Times, ``In Crackdown on Rumors, Journalist
`Confesses,' '' 30 August 15; Neigh Gough, ``As Markets Flail, China
Investigates Large Brokerage Firms,'' New York Times, DealBook (blog),
26 August 15.
\41\ Cao Guoxing, `` `Caijing' Reporter Wang Xiaolu Held in
`Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location' Quietly Released
After Half a Year'' [``Caijing'' jizhe wang xiaolu bei ``zhiding jusuo
jianshi juzhu'' bannian hou didiao shifang], Radio France
Internationale, 17 March 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Detained
`Caijing' Reporter Wang Xiaolu and Hong Kong's `Life News' Shi Yuqun
Separately Released Before New Year'' [Bei zhua ``caijing'' jizhe wang
xiaolu, xianggang ``minsheng bao'' shi yuqun yi fenbie yu chunjie qian
huoshi], 18 March 16.
\42\ Dave Michaels, ``U.S. Investors Have Another Reason To Fret
Over China Firms,'' Bloomberg, 3 November 15.
\43\ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204, 30 July 02,
sec. 101. See also Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, ``About
the PCAOB,'' last visited 1 July 16.
\44\ Kathy Chu et al., ``U.S. May Finally Get a Peek at the Books
of Alibaba, Baidu,'' Wall Street Journal, 18 August 16. The article
reported that ``PCAOB is expected to gain access in coming months to
audit firms' records of the work they did to review Alibaba's and
Baidu's books'' but noted that the ``inspections might not proceed.''
The article also cautioned that even if inspections occur, the PCAOB
may only be able to review ``heavily redacted'' documents and ``may
face other restrictions . . ..'' See also ``Chinese Inspection Pact
Remains Out of Reach,'' Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting News,
Checkpoint Daily Newsstand (blog), 10 June 16.
\45\ Dena Aubin, ``U.S. Regulators Plan First-Ever Inspection of
Audit Firm in China,'' Reuters, 29 June 15.
\46\ ``Chinese Inspection Pact Remains Out of Reach,'' Thomson
Reuters Tax & Accounting News, Checkpoint Daily Newsstand (blog), 10
June 16; Dave Michaels, ``U.S. Investors Have Another Reason To Fret
Over China Firms,'' Bloomberg, 3 November 15. See also ``After
Inspection Impasse, Chinese Auditors May Face Disciplinary Actions,''
Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting News, Checkpoint Daily Newsstand
(blog), 24 December 15.
\47\ ``Officials Admit to Faking Economic Figures,'' China Daily,
14 December 15; Mark Magnier, ``Northern Exposure: China Names and
Shames Provinces for Fudging GDP,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real
Time (blog), 15 December 15; ``Many Northeastern Localities Fabricated
GDP Statistics, Size of County Economies Exceeded Hong Kong'' [Dongbei
duodi GDP zaojia xianyu jingji guimo chao xianggang], Beijing News, 11
December 15.
\48\ Liu Huang et al., `` `Over-Inflated Statistics' Cause
Significant Harm, Require Serious `Deflation' '' [``Zhushui shuju''
yihai da ``ji chu shuifen'' xu jiaozhen], Xinhua, 10 December 15. See
also PRC Statistics Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tongji fa], passed 8
December 83, amended 15 May 96, 27 June 09, effective 1 January 10,
arts. 37-39.
\49\ Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of
Supervision, ``National Bureau of Statistics Communist Party Secretary
and Bureau Chief Wang Bao'an Under Investigation for Serious Violations
of Discipline'' [Guojia tongjiju dangzu shuji, juzhang wang bao'an
shexian yanzhong weiji jieshou zuzhi diaocha], 26 January 16.
\50\ Keith Bradsher, ``Inquiry in China Adds to Doubt Over
Reliability of Its Economic Data,'' New York Times, 26 January 16;
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Ministry of
Supervision, ``National Bureau of Statistics Communist Party Secretary
and Bureau Chief Wang Bao'an Under Investigation for Serious Violations
of Discipline'' [Guojia tongjiju dangzu shuji, juzhang wang bao'an
shexian yanzhong weiji jieshou zuzhi diaocha], 26 January 16; Saibal
Dasgupta, ``Probe Targeting China's Statistic Head Sparks Concern,''
Voice of America, 11 February 16; Jun Mai, ``China's Statistics Chief
Wang Baoan Detained in Graft Investigation,'' South China Morning Post,
26 January 16.
\51\ Keith Bradsher, ``Inquiry in China Adds to Doubt Over
Reliability of Its Economic Data,'' New York Times, 26 January 16; Bo
Zhiyue, ``China's National Bureau of Statistics Chief Falls Under
Corruption Probe,'' The Diplomat, 27 January 16; Ye Xie and Phil Kuntz,
``China's GDP Data Shows a Very Predictable Pattern,'' Bloomberg, 12
April 16.
\52\ Alexa Olesen, ``Leaked Files Offer Many Clues to Offshore
Dealings by Top Chinese,'' International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists, 6 April 16; ``The Panama Papers Embarrass China's
Leaders,'' Economist, 7 April 16.
\53\ Ibid. The Panama Papers reportedly provided ``clear evidence
of covert financial dealings by leaders' families.''
\54\ China Digital Times, ``Minitrue: Panama Papers and Foreign
Media Attacks,'' 16 April 16; Michael Forsythe and Austin Ramzy,
``China Censors Mentions of `Panama Papers' Leaks,'' New York Times,
Sinosphere (blog), 5 April 16; Tom Phillips, ``China Steps Up Panama
Papers Censorship After Leaders' Relatives Named,'' Guardian, 7 April
16.
\55\ Zheping Huang, ``The Disappeared: China's Top Bankers Who
`Disappeared,' Were Detained, or Died Unnaturally This Year,'' Quartz,
11 December 15; Karishma Vaswani, ``The Mystery Behind China's Missing
Bosses,'' BBC, 11 December 15; Zhou Xin, ``Dead, Detained, or Missing:
China's Businessmen Are Disappearing,'' South China Morning Post, 13
December 15.
\56\ Patti Waldmeir, ``Another Chinese Billionaire Goes Missing,''
Financial Times, 7 January 16; L. Gordon Crovitz, ``China Disappears
Information,'' Wall Street Journal, 10 January 16; Michael Posner,
``China's Disappearing Billionaires--An Alarming Trend,'' CNBC, 1
February 16.
\57\ ``China's Opaque Investigations Into Corporate Corruption Only
Dent Investor Confidence,'' South China Morning Post, 16 December 15;
Sophia Yan, ``Shares Plunge After `China's Warren Buffett' Caught in
Probe,'' CNN, 14 December 15. CNN reported that the share price of
Fosun International and Fosun Pharmaceutical declined after Guo
Guangchang's detention. ``China Disappearances Highlight Ruling Party
Detention System,'' Bloomberg, 11 December 15; Kelvin Chan, ``Vanishing
China Execs a Vexatious Mystery for HK Market,'' Associated Press,
reprinted in Yahoo!, 25 November 15. The share price of Guotai Junan
International Holdings reportedly declined after the detention of Yim
Fung.
\58\ Chris Buckley, ``China Formally Arrests U.S. Citizen Accused
of Spying,'' New York Times, 22 September 15. See also UN Human Rights
Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its Seventy-Fifth Session (18-
27 April 2016), Opinion No. 12/2016 Concerning Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis
(People's Republic of), A/HRC/WGAD/2016, Advance Unedited Version, 3
June 16, para. 5.
\59\ Chris Buckley, ``China Formally Arrests U.S. Citizen Accused
of Spying,'' New York Times, 22 September 15.
\60\ Lomi Kriel, ``One Year Later, China Still Won't Release
Houston Businesswoman,'' Houston Chronicle, 20 March 16. For a
description of ``residential surveillance at a designated location,''
see The Rights Practice, ``Prevention of Torture: Concerns With the Use
of `Residential Confinement in a Designated Residence,' '' October
2015, 2.
\61\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its
Seventy-Fifth Session (18-27 April 2016), Opinion No. 12/2016
Concerning Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis (People's Republic of), A/HRC/WGAD/
2016, Advance Unedited Version, 3 June 16, para. 7. See also Chris
Buckley, ``China Formally Arrests U.S. Citizen Accused of Spying,'' New
York Times, 22 September 15.
\62\ Lomi Kriel, ``One Year Later, China Still Won't Release
Houston Businesswoman,'' Houston Chronicle, 20 March 16.
\63\ Letter From Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Christopher Smith, Member, U.S.
House of Representatives, 2 December 15.
\64\ Consular Convention Between the United States of America and
the People's Republic of China, signed 17 September 80, art. 35(4). See
also Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S.
Policy, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3
August 10, Written Statement Submitted by Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of
Law and Co-Director, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University. U.S.
consular officials were previously restricted in communicating with an
American geologist, Xue Feng, whom Chinese authorities detained and
later sentenced in China for work done on behalf of a U.S. company.
\65\ Letter From Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary, Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Christopher Smith, Member, U.S.
House of Representatives, 2 December 15.
\66\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its
Seventy-Fifth Session (18-27 April 2016), Opinion No. 12/2016
Concerning Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis (People's Republic of), A/HRC/WGAD/
2016, Advance Unedited Version, 3 June 16, paras. 18, 19. See also
Edward Wong, ``China Violated Rights of Detained American, U.N. Panel
Says,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 7 July 16.
\67\ UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its
Seventy-Fifth Session (18-27 April 2016), Opinion No. 12/2016
Concerning Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis (People's Republic of), A/HRC/WGAD/
2016, Advance Unedited Version, 3 June 16, para. 23. See also Edward
Wong, ``China Violated Rights of Detained American, U.N. Panel Says,''
New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 7 July 16.
\68\ Michael Hagerty, ``The Fate of Sandy Phan-Gillis, Houstonian
Detained in China,'' Houston Matters, 19 July 16, 1:52; Jeff Stein,
``China To Charge American Businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis With
Spying,'' Newsweek, 14 July 16. See also Jeff Stein, ``Mark Swidan,
American Jailed on `Flimsy' Charges in China, Holds Little Hope,''
Newsweek, 19 August 16. According to Newsweek, Mark Swidan is an
American citizen who was tried on drug charges, but, as of August 2016,
three years had reportedly passed since the trial without a verdict
being issued.
\69\ World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 01 October 01, 46.
\70\ State Council General Office, Guiding Opinion on Deepening the
Reform of State-Owned Enterprises [Zhongguo zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu
shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de zhidao yijian], 13 September 15.
\71\ Wendy Leutert, ``Challenges Ahead in China's Reform of State-
Owned Enterprises,'' National Bureau of Asian Research, Asia Policy,
No. 21, January 2016, 85; State Council General Office, Guiding Opinion
on Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises [Zhongguo zhongyang,
guowuyuan guanyu shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de zhidao yijian], 13
September 15, 4-5.
\72\ ``Mixed Ownership Will Boost SOE Vitality: Experts,'' Global
Times, 20 September 15.
\73\ US-China Business Council, ``USCBC China Economic Reform
Scorecard--Progress Remains Limited, Pace Remains Slow,'' February
2016, 47. See also Donald Clarke, ``Central Committee and State Council
Issue Document on State-Enterprise Reform,'' Chinese Law Prof Blog, 21
September 15.
\74\ Scott Cendrowski, ``China's Global 500 Companies Are Bigger
Than Ever--And Mostly State Owned,'' Fortune, 22 July 15.
\75\ World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade
Policy Review, China Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June
16, 97.
\76\ Ibid., 96.
\77\ ``Corporate Articles Strengthen CPC Role in SOE Decision-
Making,'' Global Times, 2 July 16; Xu Hongwen, ``Listed Companies Amend
Articles of Association To Add Party Building Clause: Party Committees
To Participate in Major Corporate Decisionmaking'' [Shangshi guoqi
zhangcheng fenfen zengshe dangjian tiaokuan: dangwei jiang canyu qiye
zhongda wenti juece], The Paper, 1 July 16; ``Xi Boosts Party in
China's $18 Trillion State Company Sector,'' Bloomberg, 7 July 16;
Shirley Yam, ``Regulators' Silence on Communist Party Presence in
Listed State Companies Is Deafening,'' South China Morning Post, 22
July 16. See also ``Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General
Office Issues Requirements on Upholding Party Leadership During the
Deepening of Reform of State-Owned Enterprises'' [Zhongban fawen yaoqiu
shenhua guoyou qiye gaige jianchi dang de lingdao], Xinhua, 20
September 15.
\78\ ``Xinhua Insight: Red Stars at Foreign Companies,'' Xinhua, 1
July 16. Xinhua noted that ``CPC branches at foreign companies are not
common, although the Party constitution stipulates that organizations
of more than three [Party] members should have one. However, their
numbers are growing.''
\79\ Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, ``Paulson Policy
Memorandum: Why Mixed-Ownership Reforms Cannot Fix China's State
Sector,'' Paulson Institute, 14 January 16.
\80\ ``Big State-Owned Enterprises Pillar of Economy in China,''
Xinhua, 23 August 15.
\81\ European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, ``Overcapacity in
China: An Impediment to the Party's Reform Agenda,'' 22 February 16.
\82\ U.S. International Trade Commission, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders in Place as of August 15, 2016, 15 August
16.
\83\ U.S. International Trade Commission, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders in Place as of September 1, 2016, 1
September 15.
\84\ Ellen Nakashima, ``U.S. Developing Sanctions Against China
Over Cyber Thefts,'' Washington Post, 30 August 15.
\85\ Ellen Nakashima and William Wan, ``U.S. Announces First
Charges Against Foreign Country in Connection With Cyberspying,''
Washington Post, 19 May 14. See also U.S. House of Representatives,
Chinese Communist Economic Espionage Sanctions Act, 113th Congress, 2nd
Session, H.R. 5103, introduced 14 July 14.
\86\ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ``Fact Sheet:
President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the United States,'' 30 September
15.
\87\ Adam Segal, ``The Top Five Cyber Policy Developments of 2015:
United States-China Cyber Agreement,'' Council on Foreign Relations,
Net Politics (blog), 4 January 16.
\88\ Paul Mozur, ``Cybersecurity Firm Says Chinese Hackers Keep
Attacking U.S. Companies,'' New York Times, 19 October 15.
\89\ Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, ``First
U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues
Summary of Outcomes,'' 2 December 15.
\90\ United States Steel Corporation, Complainant, In the Matter of
Certain Carbon and Alloy Steel Products: Complaint Under Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended, U.S. International Trade
Commission, reprinted in Crowell and Moring, 26 April 16, 31-33, paras.
115-120. See also Sonja Elmquist, ``U.S. Steel Seeking China Import Ban
After Alleged Hacking,'' Bloomberg, 26 April 16.
\91\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Special 301
Report,'' April 2016, 29.
\92\ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ``Infinite Possibilities,'' Fourth
Edition, February 2016, 46.
\93\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2016 Special 301
Report,'' April 2016, 29.
\94\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 11.
\95\ Ibid., 14, 19; Mark Cohen, ``The `Supremes' Talk About Rule of
Law and IP,'' China IPR (blog), 17 March 16.
\96\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, PRC Patent Law
Amended Draft (Draft for Review) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhuanli fa
xiuding cao'an (songshen gao)], issued 2 December 15.
\97\ Ibid., arts. 42, 68. See also Michael Lin, ``China Releases
New Proposed Amendments to Patent Laws,'' IP Watchdog (blog), 18
December 15.
\98\ US-China Business Council, ``2015 USCBC Member Survey
Report,''10 September 15, 29. See also Mark Cohen, ``Slouching Towards
Innovation--A Survey of the Surveys on China's IP Environment,'' China
IPR (blog), 25 January 16.
\99\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Provisions on
the Prohibition of Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition by
Abusing Intellectual Property Rights [Guanyu jinzhi lanyong zhishi
chanquan paichu, xianzhi jingzheng xingwei de guiding], issued 7 April
15, effective 1 August 15. See also ``China Antitrust Review 2015,''
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 19 January 16, 4-5.
\100\ Ambassador Robert W. Holleyman II, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative, ``Remarks by Deputy USTR Robert Holleyman to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce Global Intellectual Property Center 2015 Global IP
Summit,'' 6 November 15.
\101\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce, ``Guide on
Anti-Trust Enforcement Against Intellectual Property Abuse (State
Administration for Industry and Commerce Seventh Draft) [Guanyu lanyong
zhishi chanquan de fan longduan zhifa zhinan (guojia gongshang zongju
di qi gao)], 4 February 16.
\102\ Ibid., arts. 22, 24; U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Chamber of Commerce in China, ``U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
the American Chamber of Commerce in China Joint Comments to the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce on the Guideline on
Intellectual Property Abuse (Draft for Comments 7th Version),''
February 2016, 1, 7-8, 10-11. Mark Cohen, ``IPR Abuse and Refusals To
License,'' China IPR (blog), 13 March 16.
\103\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, PRC Anti-Unfair
Competition Law (Amended Draft for Review) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
fan bu zhengdang jingzheng fa (xiuding cao'an songshen gao)], issued 25
February 16, art. 22; PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo fan bu zhengdang jingzheng fa], passed 2 September 93,
effective 1 December 93, art. 25. See also ``China Proposes a Revamp to
Its Anti-Unfair Competition Law,'' Hogan Lovells, 14 March 16.
\104\ International Monetary Fund, ``IMF's Executive Board
Completes Review of SDR Basket, Includes Chinese Renminbi,'' Press
Release No. 15/540, 30 November 15; Keith Bradsher, ``China's Renminbi
Is Approved by IMF as a Main World Currency,'' New York Times, 30
November 15.
\105\ International Monetary Fund, ``Q and A on 2015 SDR Review,''
30 November 15. See also ``China Knocks on the Reserve-Currency Door,''
Economist, Free Exchange (blog), 5 August 15; Ian Talley, ``Is the IMF
Cutting Corners for China? '' Wall Street Journal, 29 March 16.
\106\ Keith Bradsher, ``China's Renminbi Is Approved by I.M.F. as a
Main World Currency,'' New York Times, 30 November 15.
\107\ Lingling Wei and Anjani Trivedi, ``Why China Shifted Its
Strategy for the Yuan, and How It Backfired,'' Wall Street Journal, 7
January 16.
\108\ Lingling Wei, ``IMF Pressing China To Disclose More Data on
Currency Operations,'' Wall Street Journal, 21 March 16.
\109\ ``IMF Denies Pressing China for More Currency Data,'' Xinhua,
reprinted in China Daily, 22 March 16.
\110\ National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and Rhodium Group,
``New Neighbors 2016 Update--Chinese Investment in the United States by
Congressional District,'' April 2016, Executive Summary, 1. See also
William Mauldin, ``China Investment in U.S. Economy Set for Record, but
Political Concerns Grow,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 April 16.
\111\ Stephen Gandel, ``The Biggest American Companies Now Owned by
the Chinese,'' Fortune, 18 March 16. See also Matt Krantz, ``The 11 Top
U.S. Companies Targeted by China,'' USA Today, 18 March 16.
\112\ Craig Karmin and Dana Mattioli, ``China's Anbang Drops Bid
for Starwood Hotels,'' Wall Street Journal, 31 March 16.
\113\ Bob Tita and Kane Wu, ``China's Zoomlion Abandons Pursuit of
Crane Maker Terex,'' Wall Street Journal, 27 May 16.
\114\ ``Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's Address at AIIB
Inauguration Ceremony,'' Xinhua, 16 January 16.
\115\ ``China Outlook 2016,'' KPMG, Global China Practice, 2 March
16, 27; Daniel C.K. Chow, ``Why China Established the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank,'' The Ohio State University College of
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 333, 25
February 16, 27.
\116\ Wang Liwei, ``Closer Look: How AIIB, BRICS Bank Are Facing Up
to Early Challenges,'' Caixin, 24 September 15.
\117\ PRC Food Safety Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shipin anquan
fa], passed 28 February 09, amended 24 April 15, effective 1 October
15; ``China's Legislature Passes Toughest Food Safety Law Amendment,''
Xinhua, 24 April 15.
\118\ China Food and Drug Administration, Ministry of Public
Security, Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, and
State Council Food Safety Office, Measures on Joint Administrative and
Criminal Food Safety Enforcement Work [Shipin yaopin xingzheng zhifa yu
xingshi sifa xianjie gongzuo banfa], issued and effective 22 December
15.
\119\ Fanfan Wang and Laurie Burkitt, ``China's Vaccine Scandal
Reveals System's Flaws,'' Wall Street Journal, 25 March 16.
\120\ ``China Punishes 357 Officials Over Vaccine Scandal,''
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 13 April 16; ``Chinese Parents Sue
Amid Protests Over Tainted Vaccines,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 April 16.
\121\ Charlie Campbell, ``China Has Begun Cracking Down on Parents
Protesting Substandard Vaccines,'' Time, 21 April 16.
\122\ ``Beware the Cult of Xi,'' Economist, 2 April 16.
\123\ Chris Buckley, ``China's Vaccine Scandal Threatens Public
Faith in Immunizations,'' New York Times, 18 April l6.
\124\ ``A Vaccine Scandal in China Causes an Outcry,'' Economist, 1
April 16.
\125\ ``Beware the Cult of Xi,'' Economist, 2 April 16.
\126\ Josh Horwitz, ``Blocked in China,'' Quartz, 7 April 16.
\127\ John Balzano, ``Lingering Food Safety Regulatory Issues for
China in 2016,'' Forbes, 10 January 16.
\128\ People's Court of Jiading District, Shanghai [Municipality]
(Shanghai jiading fayuan), OSI Sentence in First Instance Trial of
Producing and Selling False Products Case [Fuxi gongsi shengchan,
xiaoshou weilie chanpin an yishen xuanpan], Weibo post, 1 February 16,
3:41 p.m.
\129\ ``Statement from the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and
Owner of the OSI Group--Sheldon Lavin,'' OSI Group, 23 July 14.
\130\ ``February 1, 2016,'' OSI Group, 1 February 16; ``OSI China
Statement in Response to the Shanghai Municipal Food and Drug
Administration's (Shanghai FDA) January 4 Disposal of Shanghai Husi
Food Products,'' OSI Group, 5 January 15; Laurie Burkitt, ``U.S. Food
Firm OSI Challenges Chinese Verdict in Meat Scandal,'' Wall Street
Journal, 1 February 16.
\131\ ``February 1, 2016,'' OSI Group, 1 February 16.
\132\ Laurie Burkitt, ``U.S. Food Firm OSI Challenges Chinese
Verdict in Meat Scandal,'' Wall Street Journal, 1 February 16.
\133\ ``Food Safety: Not Yum!'' Economist, Analects China (blog),
23 July 14; ``Shanghai Husi Rotten-Meat Scandal Blows the Lid on a Huge
Problem for China's Food Processing Industry,'' Reuters, reprinted in
South China Morning Post, 31 July 14.
\134\ Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, ``Final Report of an Audit Conducted in the People's
Republic of China, May 8 to May 28, 2015--Evaluating the Food Safety
Systems Governing Slaughtered Poultry for Export to the United States
of America,'' 17 February 16.
\135\ Letter From Wenonah Hauter, Executive Director, Food & Water
Watch, to Tom Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 28
January 16; Nancy Fink Huehnergarth, ``Chicken Raised in China Moves
One Step Closer to Your Dinner Plate,'' Forbes, 7 March 16; Food &
Water Watch, ``Food & Water Watch Denounces Move To Push Ahead With
Food Imports From China,'' reprinted in CommonDreams.org, 4 March 16.
\136\ Food & Water Watch, ``Food & Water Watch Denounces Move To
Push Ahead With Food Imports From China,'' reprinted in
CommonDreams.org, 4 March 16.
Access to
Justice
Access to
Justice
Access to Justice
Introduction
While many Chinese citizens persist in seeking redress for
violations of their rights,\1\ the Commission continued to
observe a significant discrepancy between official statements
that affirm the importance of laws \2\ or that promote recent
legal developments \3\ and the actual ability of citizens to
access justice.\4\ Developments during this reporting year also
continued to demonstrate that individuals and groups who
attempt to help citizens advocate for their rights do so at
significant personal risk.
Judicial Reform Efforts
During the 2016 reporting year, the Commission observed
both progress and continued challenges as Chinese courts and
local governments implemented certain key areas of the judicial
reforms outlined in the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Fourth Plenum Decision on Several Major Issues in
Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country According
to Law (Fourth Plenum Decision) from October 2014.\5\ Key
developments included the following:
Judicial independence. Despite purported
efforts to promote judicial independence from local
officials acting to protect their interests, the
Chinese government and Party continued to exert
influence over the judiciary.\6\ In March 2015, the
State Council and Party Central Committee issued a set
of provisions prohibiting government and Party
officials from interfering with the judicial
process,\7\ and in September 2015, the Supreme People's
Court (SPC) issued an opinion directing judges to
record instances of such interference.\8\ In early
2015, the SPC, partly as a measure to counter
interference by local officials,\9\ established the
first and second circuit tribunals (xunhui fating) \10\
that employ a system to randomly assign cases to
judges.\11\ Nevertheless, the SPC opinion requires
courts to follow the Party's leadership,\12\ and
government and Party officials reportedly continued to
instruct courts not to accept politically sensitive
cases.\13\ Sources reported that many judges resigned
from their posts in recent years, citing interference
with their work and heavy case loads.\14\
Judicial accountability. The September 2015
SPC opinion imposes lifetime accountability on judicial
officers, requiring them to sign and issue judgments in
cases that they handle.\15\ The opinion prohibits
various types of misconduct, including bribery,
evidence tampering, and errors in litigation documents
due to gross negligence.\16\ In April 2016, a court in
Haikou municipality, Hainan province, ordered a judge
to issue an amended civil judgment and apologize to the
parties after confirming that a civil judgment for
which he was responsible contained mistakes.\17\
Uniform application of the law. In November
2015, the SPC issued its 11th set of guiding cases,
bringing the total number of such cases to 56.\18\ The
SPC initiated the guiding case system in 2010 to
promote uniformity in the application of the law,\19\ a
goal that the Party Central Committee reiterated in the
Fourth Plenum Decision in October 2014.\20\ A leading
Chinese legal information website reported that as of
November 2015, courts had cited guiding cases 241 times
in total, noting their apparent low rate of application
by lower courts.\21\
Case filing. Although reports indicated that
more citizens had their cases accepted by courts this
past year, some courts continued to deny rights
advocates access to the court system. Based on the
Fourth Plenum Decision,\22\ the SPC issued a set of
provisions in April 2015 that requires courts to accept
all cases meeting certain procedural requirements,\23\
instead of first subjecting them to substantive
review.\24\ The PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law, which
took effect in March 2016, also requires courts to file
every case involving a protection order
application.\25\ The number of cases filed nationwide
reportedly increased by approximately 30 percent
between May and December 2015 compared to the same
period in 2014.\26\ While some reports from this past
year indicated that courts may be responding to the new
filing requirements by accepting some cases that they
may not have previously,\27\ other reports showed that
courts continued the practice of refusing to file or
failing to file cases considered ``politically
sensitive.'' \28\
Trial-centered litigation system. As specified
in the Fourth Plenum Decision, the Party Central
Committee promoted a shift toward a trial-centered
litigation system that includes improving the practice
of having witnesses and experts testify at trial; \29\
the Commission, however, did not observe the Chinese
judiciary taking substantive steps toward this goal
this past year. Some scholars observed that under
existing trial practice, witnesses almost never appear
in court to testify, making cross-examination difficult
and raising concerns about the court's ability to
assess the facts.\30\ In the Supreme People's
Procuratorate (SPP) March 2016 work report, Procurator-
General Cao Jianming reiterated the general direction
of the reform but did not detail any concrete steps
that the SPP had taken or planned to take to implement
the reform.\31\ A Chinese legal expert commented in
March that the rate of witnesses appearing in court
remained too low and that he had not observed any
instance of a court compelling a witness to appear in
court.\32\ A Chinese law professor, moreover, noted
that plans for reform of the litigation process
neglected the role of defense lawyers \33\ and
expressed concern that effective implementation could
be hampered by the low rate of legal representation in
criminal cases, which reportedly dropped from 30
percent to approximately 20 percent in the past two
years for cases heard by courts of the first
instance.\34\
Judicial transparency. During the reporting
year, the Chinese judiciary made an effort to improve
the availability of case judgments. In February 2016,
the SPC announced that the court system had published
more than 15 million judgments online,\35\ consistent
with the goal of increased judicial transparency set
forth in the Fourth Plenum Decision.\36\ One Chinese
legal scholar noted that such disclosure would force
judges to exercise more care in decisionmaking, and a
Chinese prosecutor reportedly used the database to
develop a method of detecting judicial corruption.\37\
In addition to the nationwide database of judgments,
the SPC \38\ and local courts \39\ have created online
platforms through which parties may obtain litigation-
related information or services.\40\ In a March 2016
report, researchers noted that many of these platforms
were outside the courts' official websites, making it
difficult to determine their authenticity and to obtain
information.\41\
Legal Aid
This past year, official sources showed an overall increase
of funding and access to the legal aid system since 2010, and
media reports illustrated progress and challenges in efforts
toward further expansion.\42\ According to Ministry of Justice
statistics, the total national spending on legal aid services
between 2010 and 2015 was 7.04 billion yuan (US$1.06 billion)
\43\--an average annual increase of 15.2 percent--of which
about 96.6 percent was from government appropriation.\44\
During the same period, a total of 5.58 million individuals
received legal aid and 29 million received legal consultation,
an average annual increase in legal consultation of 8.7
percent.\45\ Some local governments reportedly tried to improve
legal aid services by increasing access for the rural
population,\46\ collaborating with law firms,\47\ extending
services to prison inmates and detainees at drug detoxification
centers,\48\ lowering financial hardship eligibility
standards,\49\ and waiving eligibility review for applicants
already determined to be from a disadvantaged group.\50\ Some
local governments also planned to extend legal aid coverage to
individuals seeking redress from the government if their cases
could be resolved using the legal system.\51\ Nevertheless,
legal aid funding and staffing reportedly were insufficient in
some localities, including rural areas.\52\
Citizen Petitioning
The petitioning system (xinfang), also known as the
``letters and visits system,'' has been a popular mechanism
outside of the formal judicial and administrative systems for
citizens to present their grievances to authorities, either in
writing or in person.\53\ The petitioning system reportedly has
been ineffective in addressing citizens' grievances partly due
to the large number of petitions and the limited authority of
local xinfang offices.\54\ In an effort to improve the system,
the Chinese government in early 2015 implemented a pilot
program requiring 37 state agencies to list petition subject
matter under their respective jurisdictions and limit the use
of the petitioning system to handle issues that cannot be
resolved through judicial and administrative systems.\55\ In
another effort to relieve the burden on the petitioning system,
the Supreme People's Court (SPC) established the first and
second circuit tribunals in January 2015 in part to resolve
local disputes,\56\ and the tribunals reportedly received more
than 40,000 petitions in their first year.\57\ In January 2016,
the State Bureau of Letters and Visits, the central-level
government agency responsible for overseeing the petitioning
system, reported a decrease in both the number of new petitions
and backlogged cases.\58\ The Party Central Political and Legal
Affairs Commission and the SPC further planned to work with
lawyers to help divert some cases away from the petitioning
system.\59\ Citizens expressed concerns about the shift of
cases into judicial and administrative systems, however, citing
the likelihood of high litigation costs and lengthened
processes for time-sensitive cases.\60\
During this reporting year, petitioners continued to face
reprisals. A rights lawyer noted an increase in local
government prosecutions of petitioners under extortion charges
in the past year.\61\ In June 2015, government authorities in
Heilongjiang province lodged extortion charges against Ge
Limei, a petitioner who had sought information about her
husband's suspected unnatural death in prison, even though the
local officials involved reportedly made payments to Ge between
2013 and 2014 of their own accord.\62\ Authorities in other
localities across China reportedly also have detained
petitioners or accused them of extortion \63\ and other
charges.\64\
Harassment of Human Rights Lawyers and Advocates
DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE JULY 2015 CRACKDOWN
This past year, the Chinese government continued to detain
and, in some cases, prosecute rights lawyers and advocates whom
it targeted during a nationwide, coordinated crackdown that
began in and around July 2015 (July 2015 crackdown).\65\ As of
May 2016, authorities had formally arrested at least 20
individuals,\66\ 16 of them on ``endangering state security''-
related charges,\67\ which carry serious criminal penalties,
including life imprisonment.\68\ Many of the detained lawyers
previously had provided legal representation for individuals
targeted by the Chinese government for peacefully exercising
their rights and freedoms.\69\ A multinational group of 20
lawyers, judges, and jurists issued a public joint letter in
January 2016 addressed to Chinese President and Party General
Secretary Xi Jinping, criticizing the unprecedented crackdown
as a violation of China's domestic laws and of international
standards.\70\ In February 2016, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights urged the Chinese government to unconditionally
release the rights lawyers.\71\
Between July 2015 and January 2016, authorities held 21
rights lawyers and advocates under ``residential surveillance
at a designated location,'' \72\ a coercive measure that allows
for detention at an undisclosed location for up to six
months.\73\ The UN Committee against Torture concluded in
December 2015 that this coercive measure ``may amount to
incommunicado detention in secret places, putting detainees at
a high risk of torture or ill-treatment.'' \74\ Initially,
authorities reportedly did not admit their involvement in the
disappearances of some of the individuals.\75\ When authorities
did give notice confirming the enforcement of ``residential
surveillance at a designated location,'' they did not disclose
the detention location.\76\
In some of the July 2015 crackdown cases, authorities
interfered with detainees' legal representation by denying
lawyer-client meeting requests \77\ or telling family-appointed
lawyers that the detainees had voluntarily dismissed them and
chosen other representation.\78\ Legal scholars in the United
States observed that, in many of these cases, authorities did
not provide reasons for their denial of lawyer-client meetings,
in violation of Chinese regulations.\79\ Yu Wensheng, a lawyer
for detained lawyer Wang Quanzhang, said in April 2016 that the
authorities had appointed lawyers for all but one of the
individuals detained in connection with the July 2015
crackdown.\80\ Authorities generally did not provide formal
notice to the families regarding the detainees' purported
dismissal of the lawyers and refused to identify or provide the
contact information of the alleged new lawyers.\81\
On July 7, 2016, the Tianjin Municipal Public Security
Bureau announced the decision to release on bail Zhao Wei,\82\
a legal assistant of detained rights lawyer Li Heping.\83\
Zhao's husband, however, said he could not confirm Zhao's
whereabouts, expressing doubt that she was truly free.\84\ On
July 8, police in Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province,
reportedly detained Ren Quanniu, a lawyer hired by Zhao's
family.\85\ Previously, Ren requested that the procuratorate in
Tianjin investigate an alleged sexual assault against Zhao
while she was in custody.\86\
The Paper, a state-funded news outlet, reported that
authorities had released rights lawyer Wang Yu on bail several
days before August 1, 2016, when it posted online a recorded
interview, believed to be coerced,\87\ showing Wang expressing
remorse for her work.\88\ According to reports published
shortly after the purported release, individuals close to Wang
said they had not seen her,\89\ and Wang's mother reportedly
was not aware of her release.\90\
From August 2 to August 5, 2016, the Tianjin No. 2
Intermediate People's Court tried four of the detained
individuals, sentencing Zhai Yanmin to three years'
imprisonment, suspended for four years; \91\ Hu Shigen to seven
years and six months' imprisonment; \92\ Zhou Shifeng to seven
years' imprisonment; \93\ and Gou Hongguo to three years'
imprisonment, suspended for three years.\94\
Chinese officials also violated the rights of the children
\95\ and other family members \96\ of the individuals detained
in the July 2015 crackdown. In October 2015, a group of
individuals \97\ reportedly seized Bao Zhuoxuan,\98\ the 16-
year-old son of detained lawyers Wang Yu and Bao Longjun,\99\
in Burma (Myanmar) after he fled from China.\100\ Chinese
authorities also prevented the children of at least four other
lawyers and advocates from traveling,\101\ arbitrarily detained
a rights lawyer's brother,\102\ and prosecuted a rights
advocate's father for a reportedly unsubstantiated
``embezzlement'' charge.\103\
HARASSMENT OF LEGAL AID WORKERS
This past year, authorities appeared to target non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals whose legal
aid work overlapped with rights advocacy. In January 2016, the
Chinese government detained Swedish national Peter Dahlin, the
cofounder of a legal advocacy organization based in Beijing
municipality, and deported him from China.\104\ Also in
January, Chinese authorities reportedly ordered the closure of
the Beijing Zhongze Women's Legal Counseling and Service
Center, an NGO that had provided legal aid services to women
for more than 20 years.\105\ Authorities did not provide a
public explanation for the closure, but observers noted that it
likely was part of a wider government crackdown on civil
society.\106\ In March, the organizers of a domestic foundation
that provided travel funding for lawyers engaged in legal aid
work announced that it would cease operation, citing
restrictions under the new PRC Charity Law.\107\ In April,
authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region detained
four lawyers and several scholars who planned to provide legal
advice to a group of herdsmen regarding their pollution claim
against aluminum factories operating in an industrial park
built by the local government.\108\
Access to
Justice
Access to
Justice
Notes to Section III--Access to Justice
\1\ See, e.g., Dong Liu, ``End of the Year Approaching, Method To
Claim Back Wages'' [Nian guan jiang zhi, zhuitao qian xin you fa men],
Yangcheng Evening News, 14 January 16; ``Plaintiff Prevailed in the
First Public Interest Environmental Litigation Under the New PRC
Environmental Protection Law'' [Zhongguo xin huanbao fa hou de huanjing
gongyi susong di yi an yuangao shengsu], Voice of America, 30 October
15; ``Administrative Review Application Filed by Shenzhen Rights
Defender Wang Long, Whose Household Registration Was Involuntarily
Transferred, Was Denied'' [Shenzhen weiquan renshi wang long zao qiang
qian hukou shenqing xingzheng fuyi bei bohui], Radio Free Asia, 22
March 16.
\2\ Shi Chang, ``Let Rule of Law Be the Convoy for the Chinese
Dream'' [Rang fazhi wei zhongguo meng huhang], People's Daily, 11 April
16; State Council, ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao],
5 March 16; ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin
fayuan gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 3.
\3\ ``National People's Congress Standing Committee Work Report''
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao], 19
March 16; State Council, ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo
baogao], 5 March 16.
\4\ See, e.g., ``[Those Who] Traveled to Beijing for Petitioning
and Rights Defense Were Beaten and Sustained Serious Injuries, Rights
Defenders' Family Members Illegally Detained and Retaliated Against''
[Shang jing xinfang weiquan bei ouda zhongshang, feifa juliu ji daji
baofu weiquan jiashu], People's Daily Forum, 28 June 16; ``200 Herders
From Inner Mongolia Petitioned Higher Authorities, 6 of Them Were
Detained on Their Way Back, Special Police From Heshigten Banner Fired
Shots To Warn Herders'' [Neimeng 200 mumin shangfang 6 ren hui cheng
tuzhong bei ju keshiteng qi tejing kaiqiang jinggao mumin], Radio Free
Asia, 22 April 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Over Ten Petitioning
Veterans From Hunan Were Detained in a Black Jail in Beijing'' [Hunan
shi yu ming shangfang tuiwu junren bei guan zai beijing hei jianyu], 5
March 16.
\5\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14; ``Xi Stresses
Boosting Public Confidence in Judicial System,'' Xinhua, 25 March 15;
Luo Shuzhen, ``Have Strength To Reform and Innovate, Continue To
Improve Judicial Credibility, Allow the People in Each Judicial Case To
Have the Feeling of Fair Justice'' [Yongyu gaige chuangxin buduan tigao
sifa gongxinli rang renmin qunzhong zai mei yi ge sifa anjian zhong dou
ganshou dao gongping zhengyi], China Court Net, 8 May 15; State Council
Information Office, ``Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014,''
reprinted in Xinhua, 8 June 15. For more information on the Fourth
Plenum Decision, see CECC, 2015 Annual Report, 8 October 15, 267-69.
\6\ Anthony H.F. Li, ``Centralisation of Power in the Pursuit of
Law-Based Governance,'' China Perspectives, No. 2 (2016), 68.
\7\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and
State Council General Office, Provisions for the Recording,
Circulating, and Holding Leaders Accountable for Interference in
Judicial Actions and Meddling in Cases [Lingdao ganbu ganyu sifa
huodong, chashou juti anjian chuli de jilu, tongbao he zeren zhuijiu
guiding], 30 March 15, art. 2. For the outline set forth in the Fourth
Plenum Decision, see Chinese Communist Party Central Committee,
Decision on Several Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing
Governance of the Country According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu
quanmian tuijin yifa zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28
October 14, item 4.1.
\8\ Supreme People's Court, Certain Opinions on Improving Judicial
Accountability of the People's Courts [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu
wanshan renmin fayuan sifa zerenzhi de ruogan yijian], 21 September 15,
art. 39.
\9\ Ren Zhongyuan, ``First Circuit Tribunal: `Court Is Where Reason
Should Be Valued Most' '' [Di yi xunhui fating: fayuan yinggai shi zui
jiangli de difang], Southern Daily, 3 February 16.
\10\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Concerning Certain Issues
Relating to Circuit Tribunals' Case Adjudication [Zuigao renmin fayuan
guanyu xunhui fating shenli anjian ruogan wenti de guiding], issued 5
January 15, effective 1 February 15, art. 3; Li Jing, ``Chief Judge of
the SPC's First Circuit Tribunal: There Have Not Been Any Cases [of
Interference] by Leaders in the First Circuit'' [Zuigaofa di yi xunhui
fating tingzhang: yixun wei chuxian lingdao dui anjian jinxing pizhuan
de qingxing], People's Daily, 1 February 16.
\11\ Li Jing, ``Chief Judge of the SPC's First Circuit Tribunal:
There Have Not Been Any Cases [of Interference] by Leaders in the First
Circuit'' [Zuigaofa di yi xunhui fating tingzhang: yixun wei chuxian
lingdao dui anjian jinxing pizhuan de qingxing], People's Daily, 1
February 16. People's Daily reported that the chief judge of the First
Circuit Tribunal said that there had not been any reports of
interference by local officials during the first year after the circuit
court was established. See also PRC Civil Procedure Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa], passed 9 April 91, amended 28
October 07, 31 August 12, art. 39.
\12\ Supreme People's Court, Certain Opinions on Improving Judicial
Accountability of People's Courts [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu wanshan
renmin fayuan sifa zerenzhi de ruogan yijian], 21 September 15, art.
2(1). See also Jerome A. Cohen, ``A Looming Crisis for China's Legal
System: Talented Judges and Lawyers Are Leaving the Profession, as
Ideology Continues To Trump the Rule of Law,'' Foreign Policy, 22
February 16; Polly Botsford, ``China's Judicial Reforms Are No
Revolution,'' IBA Global Insight, 10 August 16.
\13\ Jerome A. Cohen, ``A Looming Crisis for China's Legal System:
Talented Judges and Lawyers Are Leaving the Profession, as Ideology
Continues To Trump the Rule of Law,'' Foreign Policy, 22 February 16;
``Lawyers and Citizens Question the SPC's Claim of Judicial Reform
Success'' [Zhongguo zuigaofa cheng sifa gaige qude chengguo lushi
gongmin qi zhiyi], Radio Free Asia, 1 March 16.
\14\ Jerome A. Cohen, ``A Looming Crisis for China's Legal System:
Talented Judges and Lawyers Are Leaving the Profession, as Ideology
Continues To Trump the Rule of Law,'' Foreign Policy, 22 February 16;
Zhou Dongxu, ``Xu Shenjian: The Reason Behind Why Judges' Resigning
Became a Hot Topic of Discussion'' [Xu shenjian: faguan cizhi wei he
hui ``bei kan renao''], Caixin, 25 February 16; Stanley Lubman,
``China's Exodus of Judges,'' Wall Street Journal, China Real Time
Report (blog), 4 May 15; Ian Johnson, ``China Grants Courts Greater
Autonomy on Limited Matters,'' New York Times, 3 January 16. See also
Ji Shi, ``A Hubei Judge Who Would Have Soon Become Court President
Resigned To Be a Lawyer: I Am Not Suited to Networking at Official
Events'' [Hubei yi faguan mashang yao dang yuanzhang cizhi zuo lushi:
wo bu shiying guanchang yingchou], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 19
November 16. Some judges reportedly resigned for other reasons such as
low pay and lack of professional satisfaction. Ni Dandan, ``From Bench
to Bar: Meet China's Ex-Judges,'' Sixth Tone, 5 May 16.
\15\ Supreme People's Court, Certain Opinions on Improving Judicial
Accountability of People's Courts [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu wanshan
renmin fayuan sifa zerenzhi de ruogan yijian], 21 September 15, arts.
15(2), 17, 25.
\16\ Ibid., art. 26.
\17\ Fu Yongtao, ``A Judgment Contains 12 Mistakes, Judge in Haikou
Criticized in an Internal Bulletin'' [Yifen panjueshu 12 chu chacuo
haikou yi faguan bei tongbao piping], Xinhua, 14 April 16.
\18\ Supreme People's Court, Circular Regarding the Issuance of the
11th Set of Guiding Cases [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu fabu di 11 pi
zhidaoxing anli de tongzhi], 19 November 15.
\19\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Guiding Cases [Zuigao
renmin fayuan guanyu anli zhidao gongzuo de guiding], issued and
effective 26 November 10, art. 1. See also Supreme People's Court,
Implementation Details for the ``Provisions on Guiding Cases''
[``Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu anli zhidao gongzuo de guiding'' shishi
xize], issued 13 May 15.
\20\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item 4(3).
\21\ Chinalawinfo, ``Annual Report on the Use of Guiding Cases
Issued by the SPC (2015)'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan zhidao xing anli sifa
yingyong niandu baogao (2015)], 22 December 15.
\22\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item 4(2).
\23\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions on Certain Issues Related
to Case-Filing Registration [Zuigaoyuan guanyu dengji li'an ruogan
wenti de guiding], issued 13 April 15, effective 1 May 15, arts. 2, 4-
6; Supreme People's Court, Opinion on People's Courts' Implementation
of the Case-Filing Registration System Reform [Guanyu renmin fayuan
tuixing li'an dengji zhi gaige de yijian], issued 15 April 15,
effective 1 May 15, items 2.1-2.5; Supreme People's Court, Judicial
Reform of Chinese Courts [Zhongguo fayuan de sifa gaige], February
2016, 30.
\24\ Ren Rong et al., Beiguan District Court, Anyang Municipality,
Henan Province, ``How To Develop the Functions and Operations of Case-
Filing Courts'' [Guanyu li'an ting de zhineng jiqi zhineng fahui],
Minsheng Legal Weekly, 20 December 15; Fan Chunsheng, ``Findings of a
Court That Pioneered the Case-Filing Review System: Litigation Is No
Longer Difficult'' [Yi jia li'an dengji zhi gaige xianxing fayuan de
tansuo: da guansi buzai nan], Xinhua, 26 January 16.
\25\ PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan
jiating baoli fa], passed 27 December 15, effective 1 March 16, art.
23; Fan Li, ``A Woman in Lanzhou Suffered Domestic Violence, Applied
for Protection Order'' [Zaoyu jiabao lanzhou yi nuzi shenqing renshen
baohu ling], Gansu Daily, 12 May 16.
\26\ Supreme People's Court, ``Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts''
[Zhongguo fayuan de sifa gaige], February 2016, 30; Li Hongpeng and
Zhang Enjie, ``With the Number of Judges Decreasing, How Can Case
Adjudication Be Expedited? '' [Faguan jianshao shen'an ruhe tisu?]
Legal Evening Report, 8 March 16; Wang Qian, ``China's Case-Filing
Registration System Solves the Problem of `Filing Difficulty' ''
[Zhongguo li'an dengji zhi gaige pojie ``li'an nan''], Xinhua, 29
February 16. Xinhua reported that the number of cases filed increased
by 29.54 percent from May to December 2015 compared to the same period
the year before. See also Li Lin and Wang Shujing, ``Good and Bad News
After Six Months Into `Judicial Reform' in Beijing, Cases Flooded in
Under the Case-Filing Registration System'' [Beijing ``si gai'' bannian
youxi youyou li'an dengji zhi hou anjian jingpen], China Youth Daily, 9
October 15.
\27\ Zhou Xiaoyan, `` `Feature Story' on China's Illegal
Residents'' [``Texie'' zhongguo heihu], Jiemian.com, 27 January 16;
Edward Wong and Vanessa Piao, ``Judge in China Rules Gay Couple Cannot
Marry,'' New York Times, 13 April 16; ``Filing Was Successful in a Case
Where Dozens of Parents of Vaccine Victims Sued the National Health and
Family Planning Commission'' [Shushi yimiao shouhai jiazhang qisu
weijiwei huo li'an], Radio Free Asia, 19 April 16.
\28\ See, e.g., China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, `` `In
the Case of the Defense Lawyer Suing the PSB for Depriving Him of His
Rights To Meet and Communicate With His Client,' Court Decided `[Case]
Didn't Fall Within Scope of Administrative Litigation and Didn't Grant
Case-Filing' '' [``Bianhu lushi qisu gong'an boduo huijian quan,
tongxin quan an'' bei fayuan caiding ``bu shuyu xingzheng susong
shou'an fanwei, buyu li'an''], 31 March 16; ``Guizhou Police Refused To
Let Lawyer Meet With Detained Pastor in `The Pastor Yang Hua Case,'
Church Sued the [Guizhou] Religious Affairs Bureau but Court Didn't
Accept Lawsuit'' [Guizhou jingfang ju lushi huijian beibu ``yang hua
mushi an'' mushi jiaohui gao zongjiaoju fayuan bu shouli], Radio Free
Asia, 10 March 16; ``Zhu Jindi: Government Should Immediately Stop
Extralegal Jail and Stop Persecuting Petitioners'' [Zhu jindi: zhengfu
ying liji tingzhi fawai jianyu tingzhi pohai fangmin], Boxun, 29
February 16; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Woman's Mundane Query Turns
Into Surreal Court Scuffle,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 4 May
16; Rights Defense Network, ``Shenzhen Intermediate Court Rejects Chen
Guiqiu's (Lawyer Xie Yang's Wife) Materials for Administrative Lawsuit
Over Restriction on Leaving the Country, Trampling on the
`Administrative Procedure Law' '' [Shenzhen shi zhongji fayuan ju shou
chen guiqiu (xie yang lushi de qizi) yin bei zu chujing xingzheng
susong cailiao jianta ``xingzheng susong fa''], 11 April 16; ``Suppress
and Support,'' Economist, 13 August 16.
\29\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item 4(3).
\30\ Wang Minyuan, ``From `Investigation-Centered' to `Trial-
Centered' '' [Cong ``yi zhencha wei zhongxin'' dao ``yi shenpan wei
zhongxin''], Procuratorial Daily, 31 March 16; Lu Leyun, ``People's
Daily New Perceptions: Trial-Centered System Creates New Mode of
Operation for the Procuratorate'' [Renmin ribao xinzhi xinjue: yi
shenpan wei zhongxin chuangxin jiancha gongzuo moshi], People's Daily,
18 May 16.
\31\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin
jianchayuan gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 19. See also Supreme People's
Procuratorate, Opinion on Strengthening Public Prosecution Work in
Court [Zuigao renmin jianchayuan guanyu jiaqiang chuting gongsu gongzuo
de yijian], issued 23 June 15, reprinted in People's Procuratorate of
Dengfeng City, 17 July 15, paras. 7-18.
\32\ Wang Yu, ``Third Anniversary Since the Implementation of the
New Criminal Procedure Law, Protection of Defense Rights Still Awaiting
Improvement'' [Xin xingsufa shishi san zhounian bianhu quanli baozhang
reng dai wanshan], 21st Century Business Herald, 24 March 16.
\33\ Shan Yuxiao, ``New Reform in Litigation Process Aims To Expand
Participation for Criminal Defense Lawyers'' [Xin yi lun susong zhidu
gaige ni kuoda xing bian lushi canyu], Caixin, 19 October 15.
\34\ Xing Bingyin, ``Expert: Representation in Criminal Defense
Cases Is as Low as Twenty Percent, Scope of Appointed Defense Should Be
Expanded'' [Zhuanjia: lushi canyu bianhu de xing an di zhi liang cheng,
ying kuoda zhiding bianhu fanwei], The Paper, 18 October 15;
``Conversation Between Professor Chen Weidong and Lawyer Wang Zhaofeng
About Lawyer Ranking System Reform'' [Chen weidong jiaoshou, wang
zhaofeng lushi duihua lushi fenji zhidu gaige], Sina, 24 November 15.
\35\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan
gongzuo baogao], 13 March 16, 14; Supreme People's Court, ``Judicial
Reform of Chinese Courts'' [Zhongguo fayuan de sifa gaige], February
2016, 23.
\36\ Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision on Several
Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance of the Country
According to Law [Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quanmian tuijin yifa
zhiguo ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding], 28 October 14, item. 4(4).
\37\ Wang Yong, ``How Far Can Technicality-Based Reforms Go''
[Jishu zhuyi de sifa gaige keyi zou duo yuan], Caixin, 25 March 16.
\38\ Li Xiang, ``Comprehensive Judicial Transparency Takes a Big
Step Forward'' [Quan fangwei sifa gongkai maichu yidabu], Legal Daily,
21 January 16; Zhang Yanling, ``Map of China's Judicial Transparency
Index Published: High in the East and Low in the West, Marked
Improvement by the SPC'' [Zhongguo sifa touming zhishu ditu gongbu:
dong gao xi di zuigaofa jinbu mingxian], China Internet Information
Center, 18 March 16. See also China Judicial Process Information Online
[Zhongguo shenpan liucheng xinxi gongkai wang], last visited 15 July
16.
\39\ Xu Jun, ``What Changes Have `Smart Courts' Brought About''
[``Zhihui fayuan'' dailai zenyang de biange], People's Daily, 6 April
16; Li Xiang, ``Comprehensive Judicial Transparency Takes a Big Step
Forward'' [Quan fangwei sifa gongkai maichu yidabu], Legal Daily, 21
January 16.
\40\ Supreme People's Court, Several Opinions on Promoting the
Building of Three Major Platforms for Open Justice [Zuigao renmin
fayuan guanyu tuijin sifa gongkai san da pingtai jianshe de ruogan
yijian], issued 22 November 13, reprinted in China Court Net, 28
November 13, art. 10; Supreme People's Court, Guiding Opinion on
Comprehensively Promoting the Building of the People's Court Litigation
Service Centers [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu quanmian tuijin renmin
fayuan susong fuwu zhongxin jianshe de zhidao yijian], issued 15
December 14, sec. 3(1).
\41\ Annual Report on China's Rule of Law, No. 14 (2016) [Zhongguo
fazhi fazhan baogao No. 14 (2016)], eds. Li Lin et al. (Beijing: Social
Sciences Academic Press (China), 2016), 239. See also Zhang Yanling,
``Map of China's Judicial Transparency Index Published: High in the
East and Low in the West, Marked Improvement by the SPC'' [Zhongguo
sifa touming zhishu ditu gongbu: dong gao xi di zuigaofa jinbu
mingxian], China Internet Information Center, 18 March 16.
\42\ Wu Aiying, ``Unswervingly Use General Secretary Xi Jinping's
Important Instructions on Legal Aid Work To Steer Legal Aid Work''
[Jianchi yi xi jinping zongshuji guanyu falu yuanzhu gongzuo zhongyao
zhishi zhidao falu yuanzhu gongzuo], Legal Daily, 11 October 15;
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General Office and State
Council General Office, Opinion on the Improvement of the Legal Aid
System [Zhongban guoban yinfa ``guanyu wanshan falu yuanzhu zhidu de
yijian''], issued 30 June 15.
\43\ Liu Ziyang, ``Sum of Nationwide Legal Aid Funding for the Past
Five Years Reached 7.04 Billion Yuan'' [Wu nian quanguo falu yuanzhu
jingfei zong'e dadao 70.4 yi yuan], Legal Daily, 17 September 15.
\44\ Wu Aiying, ``Unswervingly Use General Secretary Xi Jinping's
Important Instructions on Legal Aid Work To Steer Legal Aid Work''
[Jianchi yi xi jinping zongshuji guanyu falu yuanzhu gongzuo zhongyao
zhishi zhidao falu yuanzhu gongzuo], Legal Daily, 11 October 15.
\45\ Ibid.; ``Last Year, 1.32 Million Legal Aid Cases Handled
Nationwide'' [Qunian quanguo banli falu yuanzhu an 132 wan jian], Legal
Daily, 25 January 16.
\46\ Zhou Bin, ``Justice Administration Agencies Established
Improved Public Legal Services System; Every Citizen Enjoys Equal
Access to Quality Legal Services'' [Sifa xingzheng jiguan jianli
wanshan gonggong falu fuwu tixi meiwei gongmin ke xiang tongdeng youzhi
falu fuwu], Legal Daily, 30 November 15.
\47\ See, e.g., ``Legal Aid Opens a Blue Sky for Vulnerable
Groups'' [Falu yuanzhu wei ruoshi qunti cheng qi yipian lantian],
Sichuan Daily, 16 December 15; ``First Group of Aid Lawyers Enter Hall
and Launch Legal Consultation Services Work'' [Shou pi yuanzhu lushi
jinru dating kaizhan falu zixun fuwu gongzuo], Qinghai Judicial Affairs
General Office, reprinted in Qinghai Chang'an Net, 6 July 16; Sichuan
Zhongqia Law Firm, ``Legal Aid Center in Jiangyang District, Luzhou
City, and Sichuan Zhongqia Law Firm Fully Cooperated and Recovered More
Than 930,000 Yuan in Remuneration for 76 Migrant Workers'' [Luzhou shi
jiangyang qu falu yuanzhu zhongxin he sichuan zhongqia lushi shiwusuo
jingguo tong li hezuo wei 76 ming nongmingong zhui hui laodong baochou
93 wan yu yuan], 30 June 16; Luan Weiqiang, ``Jilin Lawyers Participate
in Legal Services, Bring Innovation to Workers' Rights Advocacy
Mechanism'' [Jilin lushi canyu falu fuwu chuangxin zhigong weiquan
jizhi], China Labor Union Net, reprinted in All China Lawyers
Association, 12 June 16; Lin Miaomiao, ``Beijing: Government Purchases
Services To Allow Lawyers To Help Elderly in Rights Advocacy''
[Beijing: zhengfu goumai fuwu rang lushi zhu laonianren weiquan],
Xinhua, 8 July 16.
\48\ See, e.g., Dafeng District Justice Bureau, ``Dafeng District
Justice Bureau Launches Legal Aid Informational Services Activities in
Prison'' [Dafeng qu sifaju kaizhan falu yuanzhu xuanchuan fuwu jin
jianyu huodong], 25 March 16; Dafeng District Justice Bureau, ``Dafeng
District Justice Bureau Launches Legal Aid Services Activity in Drug
Detoxification Center'' [Dafeng qu sifaju kaizhan falu yuanzhu fuwu jin
jiedusuo huodong], 15 April 16; Zhang Xin, ``Eight Prisons, Drug
Detoxification Centers in Xi'an Establish Legal Aid Workstations''
[Xi'an shi 8 suo jianyu, jiedusuo chengli falu yuanzhu gongzuozhan], CN
West, 30 March 16; Ma Fang, `` `Sending Law Into the High Walls':
Prison Legal Aid Difficulties and Countermeasures'' [``Song fa jin
gaoqiang'' jianyu falu yuanzhu de kunjing yu duice], Democracy and
Legal Times, reprinted in China Legal Aid Net, 27 January 16;
``Liupanshui Prison Legal Aid Workstations Established and Open''
[Liupanshui jianyu falu yuanzhu gongzuozhan guapai chengli], China
Liupanshui Net, reprinted in China Legal Aid Net, 21 December 16;
``Zhangzhou Prison Launches Legal Aid Activity for Inmates'' [Zhangzhou
jianyu kaizhan fuxing renyuan falu yuanzhu huodong], reprinted in
Fuzhou Province Prisons Administration Bureau, 8 December 15.
\49\ Zhou Bin, ``Justice Administration Agencies Established
Improved Public Legal Services System; Every Citizen Enjoys Equal
Access to Quality Legal Services'' [Sifa xingzheng jiguan jianli
wanshan gonggong falu fuwu tixi meiwei gongmin ke xiang tongdeng youzhi
falu fuwu], Legal Daily, 30 November 15.
\50\ Anhui Province People's Government General Office,
Interpretation of ``Implementing Opinion on Improving the Legal Aid
System'' [``Guanyu wanshan falu yuanzhu zhidu de shishi yijian''
jiedu], issued 9 March 16.
\51\ See, e.g., Zhang Yujie and Fu Yongtao, ``Hainan Intermediate
and Higher People's Courts To Establish Legal Aid Workstations''
[Hainan zhongji yishang renmin fayuan jiang sheli falu yuanzhu
gongzuozhan], Xinhua, 13 November 15; Liu Jia, ``Exploring New Methods
for Petitioning Work, Provincial People's Congress Plans To Establish
Petitioning Matters in the Legal Aid System'' [Tansuo xinfang gongzuo
xin fangfa sheng renda ni jian xinfang shixiang falu yuanzhu zhidu],
Sichuan Daily, 31 March 16.
\52\ Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee Fourth
Evaluation and Investigation Group, ``Report on the Evaluation and
Investigation Situation of the Municipal Justice Bureau's Work''
[Guanyu dui shi sifaju gongzuo pingyi diaocha qingkuang de baogao],
Luoyang Municipality People's Congress Standing Committee, 28 June 16;
Wang Yihong, ``Work Hard To Solve the Five Big Problems and To Upgrade
the Level of Grassroots Legal Services--Reflections on and Exploration
of Problems in Village Judicial Work'' [Zhuoli pojie wu da nanti
tisheng jiceng falu fuwu shuiping--guanyu nongcun sifa gongzuo wenti de
sikao he tansuo], Gansu Justice Net, 20 June 16; Dangchang County
Justice Bureau and Zhe Pengliang, ``Investigative Report on Rural Legal
Aid Work in Dangchang County'' [Guanyu dui dangchang xian nongcun falu
yuanzhu gongzuo de diaoyan baogao], Legal Daily, 27 June 16; Wu Xinqi,
``Ili Prefecture Justice Bureau Launches Justice Administration Reform
To Help Push Forward Increased Quality and Speed in Legal Aid Work''
[Yili zhou sifaju kaizhan sifa xingzheng gaige zhu tui falu yuanzhu
gongzuo zeng zhi tisu], Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Justice
Bureau, 11 July 16; Chinese Communist Party Guangdong Province
Committee General Office and Guangdong Province People's Government
General Office, Implementing Opinion on Improving the Legal Aid System
[Guanyu wanshan falu yuanzhu zhidu de shishi yijian], issued 16
February 16.
\53\ Benjamin L. Liebman, ``A Populist Threat to China's Courts? ''
in Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China,
eds. Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); Liang Shibin, ``Resolutely Fight To Win the
Battle on Clearing Backlog of Petitioning Cases'' [Jianjue da ying
huajie xinfang ji'an gong jian zhan], Legal Daily, 27 April 16. Such
grievances reportedly include cases concerning demolition or
expropriation of property, social security, agriculture, land and
resources, and environmental protection.
\54\ See, e.g., Liu Yuguo, ``Chengdu Establishes a New Platform for
`Transparent Petitioning' '' [Chengdu dazao ``yangguang xinfang'' xin
pingtai], People's Daily, 4 May 16; Liu Guiying, ``Problems and
Improvements of the Grassroots Petitioning System'' [Jiceng xinfang
zhidu cunzai de wenti ji wanshan], People's Tribune, 23 March 16; Xu
Dandan, ``Discussion of Shortcomings of China's Petitioning System and
Their Solutions'' [Qiantan zhongguo xinfang zhidu de biduan ji qi
jiejue tujing], Feiyang Net, 27 February 16.
\55\ Zhang Wei, ``37 Ministries and Commissions Roll Out List for
Handling Classification of Petitions'' [37 buwei chutai xinfang fenlei
chuli qingdan], Legal Daily, 20 February 16. See also ``34 Provincial-
Level Agencies in Shanxi Province Test the Waters of the `Petitioning
List' System'' [Shanxi sheng 34 ge shengji bumen shi shui ``xinfang
qingdan'' zhidu], Shanxi Daily, reprinted in State Bureau of Letters
and Visits, 5 January 16 (listing three broad categories of petitions:
applications seeking a decision, complaining about or exposing
misconduct, and requests for information disclosure); Shen Yin and Zhu
Xuheng, ``How Does the Government Handle Classification of Problems
Reported by the Masses? The Petition List Can Tell You'' [Qunzhong
fanying wenti, zhengfu zenyang fenlei chuli? xinfang qingdan gaosu ni],
Zhejiang Daily, 26 July 16; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
and the State Council, Implementing Outline on Establishing Law-Based
Government (2015-2020) [Fazhi zhengfu jianshe shishi gangyao (2015-2020
nian)], issued 28 December 15, para. 36; 2015 China Law Yearbook [2015
zhongguo falu nianjian], (Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 2015),
123; Xu Guanying, ``38 Provincial-Level Agencies and 10 Municipalities
in Jiangsu Introduce Petition Classification Handling List'' [Jiangsu
10 ge shi 38 ge shengji jiguan chutai xinfang fenlei chuli qingdan],
Xinhua, reprinted in Xinhua Daily (Jiangsu), 25 July 16. Government
agencies in Taizhou municipality, Jiangsu province, reported that they
received a total of about 120,000 petitions from the public in the past
year and that all but 2,000 were diverted to the judicial and
administrative systems.
\56\ Ma Xueling, ``Liu Guixiang of the Supreme People's Court:
Circuit Tribunal Effectively Alleviated Pressure on the Petitioning
System'' [Zuigao fayuan liu guixiang: xunhui fating youxiao huanjie
xinfang yali], China News Service, 10 March 16. See also Supreme
People's Court, Provisions Concerning Certain Issues Relating to
Circuit Tribunals' Case Adjudication [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu
xunhui fating shenli anjian ruogan wenti de guiding], issued 28 January
15, effective 1 February 15, art. 3.
\57\ Ye Zhusheng, ``Don't Be Pessimistic About Circuit Tribunals
Because of Large Volume of Petitions'' [Buyao yinwei xinfang liang da,
jiu beiguan kandai xunhui fating], Beijing News, 4 February 16.
\58\ Li Honglei, ``State Bureau of Letters and Visits: Encourage
the `Complete Clearance' of the Backlog in Petitioning Cases This
Year'' [Guojia xinfangju: jinnian licu xinfang ji'an ``qingcang
jiandi''], State Council, 25 January 16.
\59\ Tang Wei, ``Participation by Lawyers Contributes to Solving
[Problem of] Petitioning [Instead of] Trusting in Law'' [Lushi canyu
youzhu yu huajie xinfang bu xin fa], China Youth Daily, 11 November 15;
Li Jing, ``Chief Judge of the SPC's First Circuit Tribunal: There Have
Not Been Any Cases of [Interference] by Leaders in the First Circuit''
[Zuigaofa di yi xunhui fating tingzhang: yixun wei chuxian lingdao dui
anjian jinxing pizhuan de qingxing], People's Daily, 1 February 16.
\60\ ``Government Gradually Promotes Lawyers as Intermediaries To
Replace Petitioning, Lawyers Say This Is Suppression'' [Dangju zhubu
tui lushi zhongjie qudai xinfang lushi zhi shi daya], Radio Free Asia,
19 November 15.
\61\ ``Crime of Extorting the Government Becomes New Method To
Suppress Petitioners'' [Qiaozha zhengfu zuiming cheng daya fangmin xin
zhaoshi], Radio Free Asia, 26 November 15.
\62\ Ibid.
\63\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Inner Mongolia
Petitioner Song Yuefang Arrested for Extortion'' [Neimeng fangmin song
yuefang bei yi qiaozha lesuo zui pibu], 5 February 16; Huang Qi, 64
Tianwang, ``Tianwang Volunteer Wu Youming Faces Compulsory Expulsion
From PSB Detention Center in Hubei'' [Tianwang yigong wu youming zao
qiangzhi ganchu hubei kanshousuo], 14 December 15; Guo Tianli, ``The
Reason for `Extortion Cases' Against Petitioners Is Defects in the
Petitioning System Design; Courts Nationwide Currently Do Not Have
Uniform Standards for Ruling in These Kinds of Cases'' [Fangmin
``qiaozha an'' genyuan zaiyu shangfang zhidu sheji de bugou wanbei,
muqian quanguo gedi fayuan dui ci lei anjian panli bing wu tongyi
biaozhun], Phoenix Weekly, 25 February 16; ``Guo Hongwei Receives a
Heavy Sentence of 13 Years, Family Is Enraged'' [Guo hongwei bei
zhongpan 13 nian jiashu fennu], Radio Free Asia, 2 February 16.
\64\ See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Petitioner He
Chaozheng of Chongqing Detained for Ten Days'' [Chongqing fangmin he
chaozheng bei juliu shi ri], 13 April 16; Civil Rights & Livelihood
Watch, ``No Verdict in `Picking Quarrels' Case of Petitioner Cao
Yongliang From Fenxi County, Shanxi, Several Months After Trial''
[Shanxi fenxi xian fangmin cao yongliang xunzi an kaiting shuyue wei
pan], 8 April 16; ``Two Petitioners From Sichuan and Shandong Detained
After Being Sent Back, Seventy-Year-Old Man Threw Flyers in Street at
Motorcade During Two Sessions'' [Chuan lu liang fangmin bei qianfan hou
juliu qi xun laoren dangjie xiang lianghui chedui pao chuandan], Radio
Free Asia, 11 March 16; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, ``Zhou Zhiyin
of Shaanxi Accused by Local Media of Being Criminally Detained for
Seeking Inappropriate Benefits and Stubbornly Petitioning Higher Levels
of Government'' [Shanxi zhou zhiyin zao dangdi meiti baoguang zhi qi
mouqu budang liyi renxing shangfang bei xingju], 12 March 16; Huang Qi,
64 Tianwang, ``Seeking Xi Jinping at Tiananmen, Li Zhaoxiu and Liu
Zhizhong of Chengdu Are Seized'' [Tiananmen zhao xi jinping chengdu li
zhaoxiu liu zhizhong bei qin], 7 March 16; Rights Defense Network,
``Shanghai Rights Defender Ding Deyuan Still Under Surveillance After
Release From Detention, Huang Yuehua's Whereabouts Unknown After 10
Days' Administrative Detention'' [Shanghai renquan hanwei zhe ding
deyuan juliu huoshi reng zao jianshi huang yuehua bei xingzheng juliu
10 ri hou xialuo buming], 1 March 16; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch,
``Shanghai Authorities Carry Out Two Sessions Clearances, Gao Xuekun
and Other Petitioners Detained or Put in Soft Detention'' [Shanghai
dangju wei lianghui qingchang gao xuekun deng duo ming fangmin bei
juliu huo ruanjin], 28 February 16.
\65\ For information on the July 2015 crackdown, see, e.g., Josh
Chin and Te-Ping Chen, ``China Targets Human-Rights Lawyers in
Crackdown,'' Wall Street Journal, 12 July 15; Human Rights Watch,
``China: Secretly Detained Lawyers at Risk of Torture,'' 20 July 15.
For Chinese state media coverage of the crackdown, see, e.g., Huang
Qingchang and Zou Wei, ``Revealing the Dark Secrets of `Rights Defense'
Incidents'' [Jiekai ``weiquan'' shijian de heimu], Xinhua, 11 July 15.
\66\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``[`709 Crackdown']
Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 6 May 2016,'' 6 May 16.
For more information on the individuals detained during the July 2015
crackdown, see the following records in the Commission's Political
Prisoner Database: 2004-02053 on Hu Shigen, 2010-00348 on Wu Gan (also
known as Tufu), 2015-00252 on Wang Yu, 2015-00253 on Bao Longjun, 2015-
00272 on Zhou Shifeng, 2015-00278 on Wang Quanzhang, 2015-00276 on Liu
Sixin, 2015-00277 on Zhao Wei, 2015-00284 on Li Heping, 2015-00295 on
Xie Yang, 2015-00308 on Xie Yanyi, 2015-00310 on Wang Fang, 2015-00311
on Li Chunfu, 2015-00331 on Gou Hongguo (also known as Ge Ping), 2015-
00333 on Liu Yongping (also known as Laomu), 2015-00335 on Yin Xu'an,
2015-00344 on Lin Bin (also known as Monk Wang Yun), 2015-00451 on
Zhang Chongzhu, 2016-00115 on Zhai Yanmin, 2016-00116 on Zhang Wanhe
(also known as Zhang Weihong), 2016-00146 on Li Yanjun, 2016-00160 on
Yao Jianqing, and 2016-00214 on Liu Xing (also known as Ren Jiancai).
\67\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``[`709 Crackdown']
Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 6 May 2016,'' 6 May 16.
Ten were charged with ``subversion of state power,'' five with
``inciting subversion of state power,'' and one with a charge involving
the disclosure of state secrets.
\68\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, 29 August 15, effective
1 November 15, arts. 105, 111.
\69\ ``Writer Tie Liu Met With Lawyer for First Time After He Had
Been Detained for Half a Month, Old Man in Worrisome Health but
Insisted on His Innocence'' [Zuojia tie liu bei bu ban yue hou shou hui
lushi maodie laoren jiankang kanyou jianxin ziji wuzui], Radio Free
Asia, 26 September 14; Chris Buckley, ``Beijing Formally Charges Writer
Who Published Memoirs of Victims of Mao Era,'' New York Times, 23
October 14. For example, in 2014, Zhou Shifeng defended the government
critic Huang Zerong, better known by his pen name Tie Liu, against
``illegal business activities'' charges. Jonathan Kaiman, ``China
Accused of Using Ilham Tohti Case To Halt Criticism of Ethnic
Policies,'' Guardian, 18 September 14; Michael Martina et al., ``China
Decries Foreign Interference in Detained Academic Case,'' Reuters, 17
January 14. In 2014, Wang Yu represented Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti,
who had criticized the Chinese government's policies in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, in a case in which authorities charged him
with ``separatism.'' Liu Xiaoyuan and Wang Quanzhang, ``Defense
Statement for Qi Chonghuai, Accused of Extortion and Embezzlement'' [Qi
chonghuai shexian qiaozha lesuo zui, zhiwu qinzhan zui bianhuci],
reprinted in Human Rights in China, 6 June 11; Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, ``Qi Chonghuai,'' last visited 20 May 16. In 2011, Wang
Quanzhang defended Qi Chonghuai, a journalist known for exposing
corruption and human rights violations, against embezzlement charges.
\70\ Dominique Attias et al., ``Letter From Legal Experts on
Detained Chinese Lawyers,'' reprinted in Human Rights Watch, 18 January
16.
\71\ ``China's Clampdown on Lawyers and Activists Draws Concern of
UN Human Rights Chief,'' UN News Centre, 16 February 16.
\72\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``[`709 Crackdown']
Latest Data and Development of Cases as of 1800 30 December,'' 30
December 15.
\73\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi
susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12,
effective 1 January 13, arts. 64, 72-77.
\74\ UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the
Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st
and 1392nd Meetings (2-3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, 3 February 16,
para. 14. See also The Rights Practice, ``Prevention of Torture:
Concerns With the Use of `Residential Confinement in a Designated
Residence,' '' October 2015.
\75\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Report on the 709
Crackdown,'' 6 July 16, 15.
\76\ See, e.g., China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, `` `709
Crackdown' Lawyers and Activists' Case Update* (2015.10.16-
2015.10.23),'' 23 October 15; ``Request From Lawyer in Wang Quanzhang's
Case To See Client Rejected by Police'' [Wang quanzhang an lushi yaoqiu
jian dangshiren zao jing jujue], Radio Free Asia, 10 September 15.
\77\ Jerome A. Cohen, ``Lawyer-Client Meeting in `National
Security' Cases in China,'' Jerry's Blog, 8 February 16; Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, ``Forced `Switch' to Police-Appointed Lawyers Further
Erodes Protections for Detained Rights Defenders (3/15-3/21, 2016),''
21 March 16.
\78\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Forced `Switch' to Police-
Appointed Lawyers Further Erodes Protections for Detained Rights
Defenders (3/15-3/21, 2016),'' 21 March 16.
\79\ Jerome A. Cohen, ``Lawyer-Client Meeting in `National
Security' Cases in China,'' Jerry's Blog (blog), 8 February 16; Supreme
People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public
Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice,
Provisions on the Protection of Lawyers' Rights To Practice According
to Law [Guanyu yifa baozhang lushi zhiye quanli de guiding], issued and
effective 16 September 15, art. 9. See also PRC Criminal Procedure Law
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79,
amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 37(3).
\80\ ``Fengrui Law Firm Apprentice Lawyer, Li Shuyun, Released on
Bail'' [Fengrui shiwusuo shixi lushi li shuyun qubao huoshi], Radio
Free Asia, 9 April 16.
\81\ ``A Recommendation Letter Sincerely Urging All Participating
Representatives, the Presidium, and Delegations of the Fourth Session
of the Twelfth National People's Congress To Establish a Special
Investigative Committee on the `709' Mass Detentions Incident'' [Dun
qing di shi'er jie quanguo renda di si ci huiyi ge can hui daibiao,
zhuxituan, daibiaotuan jiu ``709'' da zhuabu shijian chengli tebie
diaocha weiyuanhui de jianyi shu], reprinted in Rights Defense Network,
5 March 16; Rights Defense Network, `` `July 9 Detentions' Report: Zhao
Wei (Kaola) Suspected of Having Been Forced To Dismiss Lawyer and Write
Guilty Plea'' [``709 da zhuabu an'' tongbao: zhao wei (kaola) yi zao
zhemo beipo jiechu lushi, bing xie renzui shu], 29 January 16; Chinese
Human Rights Defenders, ``Forced `Switch' to Police-Appointed Lawyers
Further Erodes Protections for Detained Rights Defenders (3/15-3/21,
2016),'' 21 March 16. In the case of Zhao Wei, a legal assistant to
detained rights lawyer Li Heping, two lawyers approached Zhao's mother
and identified themselves as appointees of a Party-controlled committee
and presented a confession letter that Zhao's mother believed was
obtained under coercion. See also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)
of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 14(1), (3)(d).
Denial of access to legal counsel violates Article 14(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides:
``In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.'' It also violates Article 14(3)(d), which
provides: ``In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality: . . . To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing . . ..'' PRC
Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa],
passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January
13, art. 32. PRC Criminal Procedure Law confers on defendants the right
to legal counsel.
\82\ Tianjin Municipal Public Security Bureau (Ping'an tianjin),
Weibo post, 7 July 16, 11:10 a.m.
\83\ Su Zhimin, ``Zhao Wei's Whole Family Disappeared, You Minglei
Firmly Believes Wife Not Yet Free'' [Zhao wei quanjia xiaoshi you
minglei shenxin qizi wei ziyou], Botan Net, 14 July 16.
\84\ Ibid.; ``Complaint Letter Signed by `Zhao Wei' Called Into
Question, Husband You Minglei's Search for Wife Unsuccessful'' [``Zhao
wei'' qianming jubao xin shou zhiyi zhangfu you minglei xun qi wei
guo], Radio Free Asia, 13 July 16.
\85\ Rights Defense Network, ``In July 9 Case, Zhao Wei's Defense
Lawyer Ren Quanniu Criminally Detained Today by Zhengzhou, Henan,
Police'' [709 an zhao wei bianhu lushi ren quanniu lushi jin zao henan
zhengzhou jingfang xingshi juliu], 8 July 16; ``Lawyer Meets With Ren
Quanniu, Revealing Police Lies, Ren's Wife Backs Husband's Innocence''
[Lushi huijian ren quanniu jie jingfang zaojia ren qi cheng zhangfu
wuzui], Radio Free Asia, 12 July 16; Zhengzhou Public Security Bureau
(Ping'an zhengzhou), ``Case Details Bulletin'' [Anqing tongbao], Weibo
post, 8 July 16, 6:47 p.m.
\86\ ``Zhao Wei, Assistant to Chinese Rights Lawyer, Is Granted
Bail'' [Zhongguo weiquan lushi zhuli zhao wei huozhun qubao houshen],
BBC, 7 July 16.
\87\ ``Wang Yu's Friend Liang Bo: The Wang Yu Who Admitted Guilt
and Expressed Remorse Is Not the Same Wang Yu, She Is the Wang Yu Who
Has Been Destroyed by Torture'' [Wang yu de youren liang bo: renzui
huiguo de wang yu bu shi yuanlai de wang yu, shi kuxing cuican hou de
wang yu], Radio Free Asia, 3 August 16.
\88\ Zhuang An, ``Beijing Fengrui Law Firm Lawyer Wang Yu
Interviewed After Release on Bail: No Matter What Prize Is Awarded by
Overseas Entities, I Will Not Accept [It]'' [Beijing fengrui lusuo
lushi wang yu qubao hou shoufang: wulun jingwai ban shenme jiang dou bu
jieshou], The Paper, 1 August 16; Zhuang An, ``Fengrui Law Firm Lawyer
Wang Yu: If Overseas Organizations Confer `Human Rights Award' by
Force, It Would Be Trampling on and Violating Human Rights'' [Fengrui
suo lushi wang yu: ruo jingwai jigou qiang ban ``renquan jiang,'' shi
jianta qinfan renquan], The Paper, 5 August 16.
\89\ Gerry Shih, ``China Releases Prominent Human Rights Lawyer on
Bail,'' Associated Press, reprinted in U.S. News & World Report, 1
August 16; Philip Wen, ``A Confession Few Believe: Chinese Rights
Lawyer Wang Yu Is `Freed,' '' Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 16.
\90\ Gerry Shih, ``China Releases Prominent Human Rights Lawyer on
Bail,'' Associated Press, reprinted in U.S. News & World Report, 1
August 16.
\91\ ``Court of First Instance Publicly Announces Verdict in Court
in the Subversion of State Power Case of Zhai Yanmin, Defendant Pleads
Guilty, Submits to Law, and Will Not Appeal'' [Zhai yanmin dianfu
guojia zhengquan an yishen dang ting gongkai xuanpan beigaoren biaoshi
renzui fufa bu shangsu], Xinhua, 2 August 16.
\92\ Wang Yeshe, ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in
Court in Subversion of State Power Case of Hu Shigen, Defendant
Sentenced to Seven Years and Six Months' Imprisonment'' [Hu shigen
dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen dang ting xuanpan beigaoren bei
panxing qi nian ban], Xinhua, 3 August 16.
\93\ ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in Court for Zhou
Shifeng, Guilty of Subversion of State Power, Sentenced to Seven Years'
Imprisonment'' [Zhou shifeng an yishen dang ting xuanpan dianfu guojia
zhengquan zuiming chengli panchu youqi tuxing qi nian], Xinhua, 4
August 16.
\94\ ``Court of First Instance Announces Verdict in Subversion of
State Power Case of Gou Hongguo; Defendant Says in Court He Will Not
Appeal'' [Gou hongguo dianfu guojia zhengquan an yishen xuanpan
beigaoren dang ting biaoshi bu shangsu], Xinhua, 5 August 16.
\95\ The mistreatment of the children in this case violates at
least two provisions under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by UN General Assembly
resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90,
arts. 2(2) (``States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination
or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family
members.''), 19(1) (``States Parties shall take all appropriate
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect
the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or
abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation,
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.''),
37(b) (``No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or
arbitrarily . . ..''), 37(d) (``Every child deprived of his or her
liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality
of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other
competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt
decision on any such action.'').
\96\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``As of 18:00, March
4, 2016, at Least 317 Lawyers, Law Firm Staff, Rights Defenders, and
Family Members Have Been Invited To Talk, Summoned, Banned From Leaving
the Country, Put in Soft Detention, Placed Under Residential
Surveillance, Arrested, or Disappeared'' [Jiezhi 2016 nian 3 yue 4 ri
18:00, zhishao 317 ming lushi, lusuo renyuan, renquan hanweizhe he
jiashu bei yuetan, chuanhuan, xianzhi chujing, ruanjin, jianshi juzhu,
daibu huo shizong], 4 March 16; Rights Defense Network, ``Liu Ermin,
Wife of Rights Defense Citizen Zhai Yanmin, Was Violently Beaten by
Beijing Police'' [Weiquan gongmin zhai yanmin zhi qi liu ermin bei
beijing jingyuan baoli ouda], 7 June 16.
\97\ Sources provided conflicting accounts about the identity of
the individuals who seized Bao Zhuoxuan. He Shenquan et al., ``Anti-
China Forces' Transnational Network Forces 16-Year-Old Boy To Sneak
Across Border, Chinese Police Quickly Solve Case'' [Fan hua shili
kuaguo chuanlian guoxie 16 sui nanhai toudu zhongguo jingfang xunsu
po'an], Global Times, 15 October 15. The Global Times, a Party-run news
publication, reported that Bao Zhuoxuan was apprehended by Burmese
police who then transferred Bao to Chinese authorities. Philip Wen,
``Bao Zhuoxuan, Teenage Son of Chinese Rights Lawyer, Back Under
Surveillance in China,'' Sydney Morning Herald, 12 October 15. The
Sydney Morning Herald reported that the Burmese government denied any
involvement. Xu Jing, ``Bao Zhuoxuan, a Youth Who Became the
Government's Hostage'' [Bao zhuoxuan, yi ge chengwei zhengfu renzhi de
shaonian], China in Perspective, 20 October 15. Another report
indicated that Burmese authorities carried out the operation together
with Chinese public security personnel.
\98\ For more information on Bao Zhuoxuan, see the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database record 2015-00345.
\99\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``As of 18:00, March
4, 2016, at Least 317 Lawyers, Law Firm Staff, Rights Defenders, and
Family Members Have Been Invited To Talk, Summoned, Banned From Leaving
the Country, Put in Soft Detention, Placed Under Residential
Surveillance, Arrested, or Disappeared'' [Jiezhi 2016 nian 3 yue 4 ri
18:00, zhishao 317 ming lushi, lusuo renyuan, renquan hanweizhe he
jiashu bei yuetan, chuanhuan, xianzhi chujing, ruanjin, jianshi juzhu,
daibu huo shizong], 4 March 16; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern
Group, ``What Happened to the Children of Rights Lawyers? '' [``Weiquan
lushi de zinu jiujing zaoyu le shenme? ''], 12 October 15.
\100\ Xu Jing, ``Bao Zhuoxuan, a Youth Who Became the Government's
Hostage'' [Bao zhuoxuan, yi ge chengwei zhengfu renzhi de shaonian],
China in Perspective, 20 October 15; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern
Group, ``What Happened to the Children of Rights Lawyers? '' [``Weiquan
lushi de zinu jiujing zaoyu le shenme? ''], 12 October 15; ``Detained
for Helping Wang Yu's Son Escape; Family Protest Overseas During
Lantern Festival'' [Zhu wang yu erzi taowang bei kou jiashu yuanxiao
jie yue yang kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 23 February 16; Ye Jingsi,
``Chinese Rights Lawyer Wang Yu's Son Bao Zhuoxuan Escorted Back to
Inner Mongolia From Myanmar'' [``Zhongguo weiquan lushi wang yu erzi
bao zhuoxuan cong miandian ya fan neimenggu''], BBC, 13 October 15.
\101\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``As of 18:00,
March 4, 2016, at Least 317 Lawyers, Law Firm Staff, Rights Defenders,
and Family Members Have Been Invited To Talk, Summoned, Banned From
Leaving the Country, Put in Soft Detention, Placed Under Residential
Surveillance, Arrested, or Disappeared'' [Jiezhi 2016 nian 3 yue 4 ri
18:00, zhishao 317 ming lushi, lusuo renyuan, renquan hanweizhe he
jiashu bei yuetan, chuanhuan, xianzhi chujing, ruanjin, jianshi juzhu,
daibu huo shizong], 4 March 16.
\102\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by
July 9 Crackdown on Rights Lawyers,'' 13 July 15, updated 18 July 16;
Dominique Attias et al., ``Letter From Legal Experts on Detained
Chinese Lawyers,'' reprinted in Human Rights Watch, 18 January 16.
\103\ Rights Defense Network, ``Xu Xiaoshun Accused of
`Embezzlement' by Association With His Son Wu Gan (Tufu), Fuqing City
Court Holds Third Hearing'' [Xu xiaoshun zao erzi wu gan (tufu) zhulian
bei kong ``zhiwu qinzhan'' yu fuqing shi fayuan di san ci kaiting
shenli], 23 March 16.
\104\ ``China Releases Swedish Rights Activist Peter Dahlin,'' BBC,
26 January 16.
\105\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``China Is Said To Force Closing of
Women's Legal Aid Center,'' New York Times, Sinosphere (blog), 29
January 16.
\106\ Ibid.; Verna Yu, ``Leading Woman's Rights Group To Shut Down
as China Tightens Squeeze on Civil Society,'' South China Morning Post,
30 January 16.
\107\ ``First Non-Governmental Legal Fund Announces Cessation of
Operations Following Passage of the PRC `Charity Law' '' [Zhongguo
``cishan fa'' tongguo hou shou ge minjian falu jijin xuanbu tingzhi
yunxing], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 16; PRC Charity Law [Zhonghua
renmin gongheguo cishan fa], passed 16 March 16, effective 1 September
16.
\108\ ``Many Lawyers and Scholars Providing Legal Aid to Inner
Mongolian Herders Placed Under Control by IMAR Police'' [Wei neimeng
mumin tigong falu yuanzhu duo ming lushi ji xuezhe bei neimeng jingfang
kongzhi], Radio Free Asia, 16 April 16; ``Herders From Zaruud Banner,
Inner Mongolia, Detained for Uploading Videos About Pollution-Affected
Livestock'' [Nei menggu zhalute qi mumin yin shangchuan shengchu shou
wuran shipin bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 12 April 16.
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
IV. Xinjiang
Security Measures and Conflict
During the Commission's 2016 reporting year, central and
regional authorities continued to implement repressive security
measures targeting Uyghur communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR). In October 2015, Yu Zhengsheng, a
member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Central
Committee Political Bureau, said authorities should focus on
counterterrorism in order to achieve stability in the XUAR.\1\
Reports from international media and rights advocates
documented arbitrary detentions,\2\ oppressive security
checkpoints \3\ and patrols,\4\ the forcible return of Uyghurs
to the XUAR from other provinces as part of heightened security
measures,\5\ and forced labor as a means to ``ensure
stability.'' \6\ Meng Jianzhu, head of the Party Central
Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission, repeatedly
stressed the need for authorities to ``eradicate extremism,''
in particular ``religious extremism,'' in the XUAR in
conjunction with security measures.\7\ The U.S. Government and
international observers have asserted that XUAR officials have
justified restrictions on Uyghurs' religious freedom by
equating them with efforts to combat extremism.\8\
The Commission observed fewer reports of violent incidents
involving ethnic or political tensions in the XUAR in the 2016
reporting year than in previous reporting years,\9\ though it
was unclear whether less violence occurred, or Chinese
authorities prevented public disclosure of the information.
International media and rights advocates raised concerns about
Chinese authorities' failure to report and attempts to suppress
information regarding deadly clashes involving Uyghurs,
including information about a September 2015 attack in Aksu
prefecture.\10\ [See the Freedom of Expression sub-section
below for more information on these concerns.]
On September 18, 2015, in Bay (Baicheng) county, Aksu
prefecture, more than 50 people died, and dozens more were
injured, during an attack by assailants with knives at a coal
mine complex.\11\ Chinese official media confirmed the attack
in November 2015, but indicated that the attackers killed only
16 people.\12\ The attackers were reportedly Uyghurs, and most
of those they attacked were Han Chinese workers; five others
killed were reportedly security personnel.\13\ According to
official media and international reports, authorities conducted
a 56-day operation to find the attackers, ending in a raid in
which police killed 28 people.\14\ According to an
international news report, 11 of those whom police killed were
women and children traveling with the suspected attackers.\15\
A front-page People's Liberation Army Daily article reported
that police had used a flamethrower in the November 2015 raid
on the group that included the suspected attackers.\16\ State
media later reported that a senior public security official
died in the raid.\17\
Legal and Counterterrorism Developments
On December 27, 2015, the National People's Congress passed
the PRC Counterterrorism Law.\18\ The legislation, which took
effect on January 1, 2016, contains provisions that expanded
police authority, including the authority to use weapons.\19\
In addition, the law seeks to define what constitutes terrorist
activity, and lays out a framework for establishing
counterterrorism institutions, enhancing security, and
coordinating intelligence gathering and emergency response,
among other areas.\20\ Human rights organizations and other
observers criticized the law as excessively broad and
repressive, and expressed fears that it expanded officials'
authority to punish peaceful activities and target ethnic
minorities, including Uyghurs.\21\ A U.S. State Department
spokesperson stated that the ``broad, vaguely phrased
provisions and definitions'' in the law ``could lead to greater
restrictions on the exercise of freedoms of expression,
association, peaceful assembly, and religion within China.''
\22\ In February 2016, XUAR officials launched region-wide
activities to study and publicize the new legislation, and
directed officials to make use of entertainment and media
networks throughout the XUAR in order to bring about ``social
stability.'' \23\
On July 29, 2016, the XUAR People's Congress adopted
regional measures to implement the PRC Counterterrorism
Law,\24\ which contain more detailed definitions than the
national legislation regarding terrorist activities and how to
punish religious extremists.\25\ The implementing measures
include the following provisions that were not contained in the
national legislation:
Solitary confinement can be used for prisoners
or individuals held at police detention centers who
lead a terrorist or extremist organization, incite
other prisoners to commit crimes, or resist education
and reform programs as well as display ``violent
tendencies''; \26\
The use of cell phones, the Internet, or other
media devices to disseminate terrorism or extremism or
to teach terrorist methods is considered a terrorist
activity; \27\ and
Those organizing, forcing, instigating,
encouraging, or enticing minors to participate in
religious activities may be detained between 5 and 15
days and fined up to 10,000 yuan (approximately
US$1,500).\28\
A human rights advocate, cited in an international news
report, expressed concern that under the new regional measures,
authorities could label Uyghurs' ordinary religious activities
as extremism and terrorism.\29\
In February 2016, state media reported authorities' pledge
to offer up to 100,000 yuan (approximately US$15,000) for tip-
offs regarding online ``terrorist'' content, and said
authorities had given out more than 2 million yuan
(approximately US$300,000) in rewards in 2015.\30\ In April
2016, Radio Free Asia reported that XUAR officials had begun
offering rewards of up to 5 million yuan (approximately
US$750,000) for information about terrorist activity, as well
as cash rewards for reporting ``illegal religious activity.''
\31\
XUAR officials used Party rules and regulations combating
corruption in the Party to target ``terrorism'' and Party
members' opposition to Party and government policy. In January
2016, Xu Hairong, the Secretary of the XUAR Commission for
Discipline Inspection, reported that some Party officials in
the region had ``supported, participated in and organized
terror acts'' in 2015, and that authorities would take measures
against these officials.\32\ Xu had made similar comments in
November 2015, when he stated that some Party officials in the
XUAR had ``criticised high-level policies'' and openly
expressed opinions that differed from those mandated by the
Party.\33\ The November comments followed the Party's removal
earlier that month of Xinjiang Daily editor-in-chief Zhao Xinyu
from his post and expulsion of Zhao from the Party \34\ after
he had opposed government policy in the XUAR \35\ and had
disagreed with Party views on ``ethnic separatism, terrorism,
and religious extremism.'' \36\ [See the Freedom of Expression
sub-section for more information on Zhao Xinyu.] XUAR
Commission for Discipline Inspection officials punished a
number of senior Party officials for corruption during the
reporting year, including Zhao's predecessor at the Xinjiang
Daily, Alimjan Maimaitiming, who had served as secretary
general of the XUAR government as well as in a Party leadership
group.\37\
``ENDANGERING STATE SECURITY'' CASES
According to research the Dui Hua Foundation published in
April 2016 \38\ and the XUAR annual work report on the region's
courts for 2015,\39\ the number of ``endangering state
security'' (ESS) trials the region's courts heard in 2015
decreased by approximately two-thirds from the previous two
years, from about 300 to about 100 trials. Dui Hua Foundation
analysis indicated that a corresponding rise in trials in the
region for crimes related to ``cults'' and ``terrorism'' in the
latest XUAR annual work report showed that these trials were
previously handled as ESS trials.\40\
Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti remained in prison, where he is
serving a life sentence on the charge of ``separatism,'' \41\
which falls under the category of ESS.\42\ According to a U.S.-
based news and advocacy website, in February 2016, authorities
did not give Tohti's brother permission to visit him.\43\ Some
observers expressed concern that Tohti may have been in ill
health, and that this caused authorities to deny a visit, since
Tohti's brother had reportedly planned to visit him that
month.\44\
Other political prisoners who remained in detention during
the reporting year include:
Tudaxun Hoshur.\45\ Tudaxun Hoshur, the
brother of Uyghur-American Radio Free Asia (RFA)
reporter Shohret Hoshur, is serving a five-year
sentence on a charge involving ``endangering state
security.'' \46\ In December 2015, authorities released
two other Hoshur brothers, Shawket and Rexim, from
detention, reportedly following international advocacy
on their behalf.\47\ In January 2015, international
reports cited a statement from RFA that Chinese
authorities had sentenced Tudaxun Hoshur to prison in
2014 on ``state security'' charges, likely in
retaliation for Shohret's coverage of news in the XUAR,
though RFA did not release Tudaxun's name at that
time.\48\
Huseyin Celil.\49\ Officials in Uzbekistan
detained Uyghur-Canadian imam Celil in March 2006 when
he was traveling there, and in June 2006 extradited him
to China.\50\ In April 2007, a court in Urumqi
municipality reportedly sentenced Celil to life in
prison \51\ for ``the crime of separating the country
and organizing and leading a terrorist organization.''
\52\ In February 2016, judicial authorities reportedly
reduced Celil's sentence to between 19 years and 6
months, and 20 years.\53\
In addition, authorities reportedly released Uyghur Patigul
Ghulam \54\ from detention in May 2016.\55\ Authorities
detained Ghulam in May 2014, and subjected her to a closed
trial on April 7, 2016, for ``leaking state secrets'' in an
interview she gave to RFA.\56\ Ghulam had unsuccessfully
pressed officials in Urumqi for information about her son,
Imammemet Eli, whom authorities detained in July 2009,
following demonstrations and riots that took place in
Urumqi.\57\ Fellow detainees reportedly said authorities had
``severely tortured'' Eli.\58\
According to a June 18, 2016, RFA report, authorities in
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, detained at least
10 Uyghur students on June 9 on terrorism-related charges.\59\
A spokesperson for a Uyghur rights organization expressed
concern that authorities had not provided any details regarding
the students' whereabouts.\60\ The students, who were
originally from the southern part of the XUAR, had reportedly
finished taking their college entrance examinations the day
before their detentions, and were studying in Guangzhou as part
of ``Xinjiang classes,'' a government program to send Uyghur
students to schools in the eastern part of China.\61\
UYGHURS DEPORTED FROM THAILAND
An international media report supported rights groups'
concerns that Chinese authorities would persecute Uyghurs whom
authorities had forcibly deported from Thailand in July
2015.\62\ In October 2015, RFA reported that authorities in
Awat county, Aksu prefecture, had forced 2 of the 109 Uyghurs
forcibly deported from Thailand to participate in a film ``as a
deterrent to others in the area not to flee the country and
seek asylum elsewhere.'' \63\ Although it is unclear how widely
the film was distributed, it follows a pattern of authorities'
use of filmed or televised confessions across China, a tactic
many in the legal profession have criticized as being in
violation of Chinese law.\64\ [For more information on the use
of televised ``confessions'' in China, see Section II--Criminal
Justice.] RFA cited a local Party official as saying that an
Awat county court had tried the two Uyghurs, who he suggested
had ``illegally cross[ed] borders to join the holy war,'' and
who he said ``would likely receive long prison sentences.''
\65\ In November 2015, Human Rights Watch expressed concern
over the Chinese government's failure to provide information
about the location or health of the group of deported
Uyghurs.\66\
Development Policy
During this reporting year, central and regional officials
continued to focus on the role of economic growth and
development initiatives in promoting stability in the XUAR.\67\
Through the ``Silk Road'' and ``One Belt, One Road''
development strategies they introduced in recent years,
government authorities sought to attract overseas investment
and investment from other areas of China, and to develop the
XUAR as a production and logistics hub.\68\ Critics of XUAR
development strategies outlined authorities' failure to address
persistent tensions involving socio-economic inequality, ethnic
tension, and assimilation.\69\
Criticism of regional development ventures also included
concern over their ecological effects.\70\ An April 2016
Greenpeace briefing on air quality in China for the first
quarter of 2016 reported that the five cities with the highest
average PM