[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CHARTING A COURSE:
EXPERT PERSPECTIVES ON NASA'S
HUMAN EXPLORATION PROPOSALS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
February 3, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-58
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., ZOE LOFGREN, California
Wisconsin DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
RANDY K. WEBER, Texas DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan PAUL TONKO, New York
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California MARK TAKANO, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
GARY PALMER, Alabama
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
DRAIN LAHOOD, Illinois
------
Subcommittee on Space
HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma AMI BERA, California
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BILL POSEY, Florida MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVE KNIGHT, California
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
February 3, 2016
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 10
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 18
Written Statement............................................ 20
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 22
Written Statement............................................ 24
Witnesses:
Mr. Tom Young, Former Director, Goddard Space Flight Center,
NASA; Former President and Chief Operating Officer, Martin
Marietta Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 25
Written Statement............................................ 29
Dr. John C. Sommerer, Chair, Technical Panel, Pathways to
Exploration Report, National Academy of Sciences
Oral Statement............................................... 38
Written Statement............................................ 41
Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Scientist, Lunar and Planetary Institute
Oral Statement............................................... 46
Written Statement............................................ 49
Discussion....................................................... 55
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Tom Young, Former Director, Goddard Space Flight Center,
NASA; Former President and Chief Operating Officer, Martin
Marietta Corporation........................................... 72
Dr. John C. Sommerer, Chair, Technical Panel, Pathways to
Exploration Report, National Academy of Sciences............... 76
Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Scientist, Lunar and Planetary Institute. 89
CHARTING A COURSE:
EXPERT PERSPECTIVES ON
NASA'S HUMAN EXPLORATION PROPOSALS
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian
Babin [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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Chairman Babin. Okay. The Subcommittee on Space will come
to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Subcommittee at any time.
Welcome to today's hearing titled ``Charting a Course:
Expert Perspectives on NASA's Human Exploration Proposals,''
and I would like to recognize myself for five minutes for an
opening statement.
Placing a man on the Moon and returning him safely is
widely considered one of humanity's greatest achievements. It
cemented America's leadership on the world stage and
demonstrated our technological superiority during the Cold War.
Since then, NASA has made steady progress towards learning to
live and work in space with the space shuttle and space
station.
Today we find ourselves at an intersection. Do we, as a
nation, retreat from the cosmos, or do we take that next first
step into the unknown? There appears to be a consensus that the
horizon goal of America's human exploration program is to land
on the surface of Mars. But how will we get there? What are the
intermediate stepping stones on that pathway to Mars? How do we
avoid costly and avoidable detours? How do we ensure a
sustainable program rather than a one-off stunt? And how do we
ensure the next Administration does not wipe the slate clean,
erasing all the hard work of the last five years? These are all
questions that we must address in this and future hearings.
The SLS and Orion systems are critical to the success of
our deep space human exploration program. Their development and
testing is of the utmost importance to the Committee, to
Congress, and to the nation. We have come too far now to see a
costly and destructive cancellation. However, the use of these
assets and the missions and mission sets on the journey to Mars
need to be better defined. As the NASA Advisory Council
recently stated in a recommendation to the Administrator, the
absence of a more fully developed plan would impair the ability
of the next Administration to propose a budget that adequately
supports NASA's human exploration program.
And while the administration has not provided many details
on the plan for the journey to Mars, it has proposed possible
mission options. For example, the Administration has proposed
an asteroid mission as the next step for human exploration.
This has been caveated and altered multiple times, but
generally speaking, the Administration believes human
astronauts should interact with an asteroid in cislunar space
sometime in the next decade as a next step on its journey to
Mars.
Despite opposition from space policy experts, scientists,
and engineers, the Administration as recently as last week
announced early design work for the asteroid mission's
spacecraft bus. With only nine meaningful months remaining in
this Administration, it is puzzling that they continue to press
ahead with the mission despite widespread criticism and doubt
over its efficacy.
The National Academy of Sciences released a study on human
exploration called the ``Pathways to Exploration.'' In this
report the Committee on Human Spaceflight determined that the
ARM mission largely contributed to dead-end technologies that
could not reasonably feed forward into a human mission to Mars.
Last year, the NASA Advisory Committee suggested to the
Administration that a more valuable use of NASA's time and
money would be a solar electric propulsion demonstration
mission to Mars and back as opposed to the asteroid mission.
Alternatives to the asteroid mission proposed by the
President have become ubiquitous in the policy discussions. For
example, Jan Woerner, the European Space Agency Director
General, has spent the last year advocating for an
international lunar base. The recent Humans Orbiting Mars
workshop presented a compelling, realistic, and affordable path
to Mars. Also, several members of this Committee have
suggestions and legislation as well to that effect. As the
Administration ignores these proposals despite a groundswell of
support from scientists and engineers, we must look beyond what
is politically expedient today and get ready for the next few
decades in spaceflight.
As we prepare for the next Presidents' Administration, we
must ensure that the plan in place for human exploration is
based on sound engineering, planning, design, and management
principles.
We have asked our witnesses today to give us their expert
opinions in the way forward. This hearing is an opportunity to
build consensus on the way forward for human spaceflight. Human
exploration has a long and storied history of being
nonpartisan. It is not a Republican, it is not Democrat; it is
an American issue. We need to get the politics out of these
important programs for our nation's sake.
There are thousands of men and women in this country whose
days are impacted by the decisions that we make in this very
building. It is easy for people confined to the beltway bubble
to forget that our pride as Americans comes from the hard work
and determination to make this world better. The men and women
at NASA working on our human exploration program are not pawns
to be moved around a chess board in the latest game of chicken
that the Administration chooses to play with Congress. We must
ensure NASA's work focuses on the will of the people, not the
political whims of whatever President is in office at that
particular time.
NASA's human exploration program has been through a
tumultuous seven years, and with a new President to be chosen
by the end of this year, we must ensure that there is a
constancy of purpose in our planning and a surefooted roadmap
in place for the future.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:]
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Chairman Babin. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentlewoman from Maryland, for an opening statement.
Ms. Edwards. Good morning, and thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I want to welcome our distinguished panel this
morning.
This truly is my passion. I want to thank Chairman Babin
for calling the hearing. I think it's really important, and
when I look at the young people out here, not only is it my
passion but it really is your future, and so I think the work
that we have to do today is incredibly important.
Each time we hold hearings on sending humans to Mars, my
colleagues and I don't just leave the room, although today I
will have to leave a little bit early. We don't leave the
subject behind, and I think that that is meaningful for the
American people. Instead, we leave with increased determination
to help find a way to get there as soon and as safely as
possible. I want the American people to share the collective
excitement in this room and to embrace the desire to send human
explorers farther into space than ever before.
This Committee's inquiries during recent hearings have
focused on the need for a clearly articulated plan and next
steps, such as the Human Exploration Roadmap that the
bipartisan, overwhelmingly bipartisan House-passed NASA
Authorization Act of 2015 directs NASA to develop. It took a
lot of work for all of us to come together as Republicans and
Democrats to embrace that roadmap. I recognize that it's not an
easy task given previous flat funding levels, uncertainty over
future budgets, and the need to allow flexibility in planning a
multi-decadal endeavor.
I also acknowledge that NASA has established a strategy for
achieving the goal and an evolvable Mars Campaign that will
allow for flexibility in its decisions and that can take
advantage of new knowledge and advances in technology. But
facets of that strategy, quite frankly, are not detailed enough
to inform mission planning and sequencing. That strategy cannot
answer questions about whether going to the lunar surface or an
asteroid is needed to reduce risk before sending humans to
Mars, nor does it allow us to assess whether NASA's approach
achieves the right balance of flexibility and definition.
The Congressionally mandated National Academies report,
Pathways to Exploration, recommends that NASA follow a pathway,
a specific sequence of intermediate accomplishments and
destinations that advance the technologies needed to reach the
horizon goal, which they conclude is Mars.
The NASA Advisory Council in its December 3rd, 2015,
recommendations to the Administrator said that they were
pleased that NASA was providing new information about its human
exploration architecture. However, they also recommended that
``In preparation for the 2017 transition of Administrations
NASA further develop their plan for future Human Exploration.''
Well, this is because of the importance of defining a baseline
architecture and plan that encompasses the entire human
exploration program.
Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that a plan of sufficient
detail can come to fruition, but we don't have time to spare if
we're to sustain a challenging endeavor across the upcoming
Presidential transition. Now it's the time for us to get rid of
the politics and actually match our goals with a plan, and
without agreement on the substance of a plan, the path forward
is less clear and the sustainability of progress toward the
Mars goal is left vulnerable to rehashing of interim
destinations or even redirection. We've seen that happen in the
past. This last decade, despite the concerns articulated by the
Chairman, this last decade has been fraught with confusion,
both from the Congress, Republicans and Democrats, and
Republican and Democratic Presidents, and it's time to put that
aside so that we can advance the science that's necessary.
And, make no mistake, we have to do our jobs here in
Congress and we have to be of a mind in providing NASA with the
necessary resources and budgetary stability to carry out such a
plan. The Congress's recent increase in appropriations for
fiscal year 2016 for NASA's exploration systems is a good
start, but they need to be sustained and built upon if we're to
reach that goal.
So Mr. Chairman, we have a lot to discuss this morning, and
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony, and what I would
urge us to do is, again, let's just put the politics aside. I
agree with the Chairman that going to space is not about
Republicans and Democrats, and when I look at these young
people out here and I see your future and I see the challenge
that you're going to take on, you don't care whether it's a D
or an R. We care that we advance the science to get us to our
goal, and I look forward to doing that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]
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Chairman Babin. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. I appreciate those
words. And I also would like to welcome all you young folks out
there as well as you not-so-young folks. Are you all from
Florida? Yes. Thank you for being here this morning. Louisiana?
Okay. Well, that's good. Almost to Texas.
And speaking of Texas, I now recognize the Chairman of the
full Committee from the great State of Texas, Chairman Lamar
Smith.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Americans are fascinated by space exploration. It fuels our
desire to push the boundaries of what is possible and to reach
beyond our own pale blue dot.
In the last few years, the flagship deep space exploration
programs at NASA, both robotic and human, have been under
attack by the Obama Administration. This Administration
cancelled the robotic ExoMars mission and the Constellation
program, and it continues to propose drastic cuts to the Space
Launch System and Orion programs. These programs were all
developed to support deep space exploration to destinations
like the Moon and Mars. The Obama Administration cannot claim
that it prioritizes Mars exploration if it refuses to
prioritize and support the programs that will get us there, and
the budget instability created by the Administration makes it
hard for NASA to plan and execute critical programs. For
example, NASA recently announced that the first crewed mission
for SLS and Orion was delayed by two years because the
Administration would not allow NASA to budget for the programs.
While the Administration regularly cuts SLS and Orion
budget requests, Congress continues to restore those cuts in a
bipartisan fashion, and there is bipartisan support within
Congress for SLS and the Orion crew vehicle. This Committee has
restored proposed cuts year after year in our authorization
bills, and the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees
restored funding for the SLS and Orion at the levels necessary
to keep their development on track.
The SLS and Orion programs represent what is most
impressive about the American spirit: the desire to explore.
The technologies that are developed for these programs
exemplify our greatest breakthroughs and demonstrate American
ingenuity. This Committee will not permit this Administration
to threaten the succession of these programs. Any efforts to
cancel these programs will be met with stiff opposition.
The Administration should develop solid plans for future
exploration missions that foster support from the science and
engineering communities. However, the Administration continues
to push plans for an uninspiring and unjustified Asteroid
Retrieval Mission. Just last week, NASA announced its strategy
to develop the spacecraft bus that will be used for the robotic
elements of that mission. The Administration continues to force
this mission on NASA without any connection to a larger
exploration roadmap and absent support from the scientific
community or NASA's own advisory committees. This is a
misguided mission without a budget, without a launch date, and
without ties to exploration goals. It is a mission without the
support necessary to make it a reality in the nine months
remaining in the Obama Administration. It is just a time-
wasting distraction but maybe that is what the Administration
really wants.
Instead, the Administration should follow the advice of the
NASA Advisory Council and more fully develop its human
exploration plans, including a human flyby mission to orbit
Mars. There are many options, but without a roadmap to guide
the agency, NASA will continue to be subject to indirection and
proposed budget cuts by the White House. For its part, Congress
will continue to ensure that space exploration will receive the
funding needed to stay on schedule and on budget.
Great nations do great things. Fortune favors the bold.
These next few years are critical. A trip to Mars can turn
science fiction into science fact before our eyes and within
our lifetime. The first flag to fly on the surface of Mars
should be ours. I hope the Administration will join Congress in
pursuing that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:]
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Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those
wise words.
Now I recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,
another person from Texas, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning to all, and let me welcome our distinguished panel, and
welcome our young people.
I have made it well known that I consider NASA to be a
critical national asset. NASA is a source of technological and
scientific innovation, an inspiration to generations of young
people, and a catalyst for economic growth. It is also a
positive symbol of American preeminence worldwide and a
demonstration of our commitment to international cooperation in
the peaceful uses of outer space.
Human exploration is a highly visible facet of NASA's
multi-mission portfolio. It is thus appropriate to continue to
examine the nation's human exploration strategy.
At a June 2014 Committee hearing, we heard from the co-
chairs of the National Academies' review of the future of human
exploration in the United States. That comprehensive review was
conducted at Congress's direction. As I said at that time of
the hearing, the Academies report did not mince words. It
provided us with an important wake-up call. The report's
conclusions were clear. We are not going to have a human space
exploration program worthy of this great nation if we continue
down the current path of failing to provide the resources
needed to make real progress and failing to embrace clear--a
clear goal and a pathway to achieving that goal. It rests with
this Committee and Congress, not the White House, on what is
authorized and what is appropriated in this Congress.
What we need now is a clearly articulated plan on how we
will get to Mars and what we called a roadmap in the House-
passed 2015 NASA Reauthorization Act and what the Academies
called a pathway in their report.
In just about one year, the nation will transition to a new
Presidential Administration. Such transitions have, in the
past, led to significant redirections in NASA's human
exploration programs. Mr. Chairman, if that were to happen
again, that would be a tragedy, and a wasteful one at that. It
is Congress's responsibility to listen to the reports and make
recommendations and authorizations accordingly.
NASA has made significant progress since 2010 NASA
reauthorization--Authorization Act was enacted. Fabrication of
the Space Launch System is underway, flight testing of the
Orion vehicle is confirming design objectives, ground systems
are being modernized, and ways of mitigating the effects of
long-term space travel are the subject of intense research on
the International Space Station. In that regard, Mr. Chairman,
I hope we can have an opportunity to hear from NASA, in the
not-too-distant future, on the progress of its journey to Mars
strategy and how investments in SLS, Orion, and ISS fit into
that strategy.
In conclusion, last week we honored the crews of Apollo-1,
STS-51L, and STS-107. These brave men and women paid the
ultimate price while furthering the cause of exploration and
discovery. We as a nation owe it to them to continue this grand
journey of exploration of the Universe. Future generations of
Americans depend on us. We cannot blame anybody else but us. We
must not let the nation down. We must not let our young people
down.
I thank you, and yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
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Chairman Babin. Thank you, Ranking Member Johnson.
Now let me introduce our worthy and expert witnesses at
this time. Mr. Tom Young, former Director of NASA's Goddard
Space Flight Center, former President and Chief Operating
Officer of Martin Marietta Corporation, and former Chairman of
SAIC. Mr. Young joined NASA in 1961 as a member of the Lunar
Orbiter Project Team and was Mission Director for the program
Viking. Prior to being named Director of Goddard Space Flight
Center, Mr. Young was Director of the Planetary Program at NASA
headquarters and Deputy Director of the Ames Research Center.
Mr. Young earned a bachelor of aeronautical engineering degree
and a bachelor of mechanical engineering degree in 1961 from
the University of Virginia. In 1972, he received a master's of
management degree from MIT.
Dr. John Sommerer is our second witness. Dr. Sommerer is a
Technologist with over 35 years of professional experience and
over 20 years of executive experience. He chaired the Technical
Panel of the Pathways to Exploration report at the National
Academy of Sciences. Dr. Sommerer received his B.S. and M.D.
degrees in system science and mathematics from Washington
University in St. Louis, an M.D. in applied physics from Johns
Hopkins University, and his Ph.D. in physics from the
University of Maryland.
Dr. Spudis is our final witness today. Dr. Paul Spudis is a
Senior Staff scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in
Houston, Texas. At LPI, Dr. Spudis's research focuses on the
geological processes of the terrestrial planets and the study
of the requirements for sustainable human presence on the Moon.
He is the recipient of numerous awards and has authored or co-
authored over 100 scientific papers and seven books. Dr. Spudis
received his B.S. and his Ph.D. from Arizona State University
and his master of science from Brown University.
I want to tell you how appreciative we are that you three
illustrious gentlemen have come to speak with us today.
I would now like to recognize Mr. Young for five minutes to
present his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. TOM YOUNG,
FORMER DIRECTOR,
GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, NASA;
FORMER PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION
Mr. Young. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Edwards, and
Committee members, I'm pleased to have the opportunity to
present my views on the United States' human spaceflight
program. While I'm a member of the NASA Advisory Council, my
participation in the hearing today is as an individual
representing only myself.
The United States human spaceflight program from Alan
Shepherd's initial suborbital flight and John Glenn's orbital
flight to today's International Space Station has been rich in
exploration excitement, scientific return and technological
accomplishments.
The success of the human spaceflight program for over five
decades can be traced to many factors. Clearly the integration
of the extraordinary NASA capabilities with the exceptional
implementation capabilities of industry has been a major
factor. NASA alone or industry alone could not have been
successful. This is an important lesson as we plan for the
future.
Today the future of the human spaceflight program is far
from clear. We know some critical parts of the puzzle,
including the ISS, Commercial Cargo, Commercial Crew, SLS and
Orion. There are many pieces that are yet to be defined and
funded. These include a habitat module, landing systems, a
solar electric propulsion tug, and a launch system for return
from the surface of the Moon or Mars. We have continual debate
as to whether our goal should be the Moon, Mars or both.
We have a 2016 budget that allocates approximately $9
billion for human spaceflight. The budget is divided roughly
equal between LEO and exploration. What we do not have is a
plan, strategy, or architecture with sufficient detail that
takes us from today to humans on the surface of Mars or the
Moon with a long-term goal of extended presence.
I would like to offer my views on the existing and missing
pieces of the puzzle, starting with the budget. If the 2016
amount of $9 billion remains constant with the addition of
inflation for the next two decades, there will be approximately
$180 billion with today's buying power available. With that
level of funding, significant progress can be made on a human
exploration program.
A study to define minimal architecture for human journeys
to Mars initiated by Scott Hubbard and conducted at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory provides a credible argument that a Mars
mission is feasible at these funding levels. I personally
believe increases in the budget will be necessary to support a
comprehensive program that includes appropriate precursor
activities and missions to realize a responsible funding level
for exploration. It's necessary also to make decisions between
low-Earth orbit and activities in low-Earth orbit and to have a
well-defined, highly focused plan that includes only those
activities necessary for the success of the endeavor.
Currently the human spaceflight budget supports both a LEO
program consisting of ISS, Commercial Cargo and Commercial Crew
and an exploration program consisting of SLS, Orion, and other
exploration activities. Future budgets will be required to
support the additional required pieces of the puzzle that I
discussed earlier. The combination of the current LEO program
and the desired exploration program are not affordable at
current budget levels. A choice is required between the two
programs.
A sustainable exploration program requires that the
necessary knowledge from ISS be obtained expeditiously followed
by diverting current ISS funds to exploration. An alternative
is to continue funding the LEO program and forego a credible
Moon or Mars exploration program that results in humans on the
surface within a reasonable schedule and budget. We cannot do
both without a major augmentation of the budget.
NASA has done an excellent job of maintaining a
conservative cargo transportation capability. This conservative
approach allows a mission failure or multiple failures to occur
without catastrophic consequences. It also allows a management
approach that relies heavily on the commercial partner with
modest NASA involvement.
Commercial Crew is much more challenging. A Commercial Crew
failure that involves loss of the crew will be a catastrophe.
This recognition requires Commercial Crew to be managed
significantly differently than Cargo. Commercial Crew requires
the full application of the NASA human spaceflight expertise in
combination with the extraordinary implementation capability of
industry to assure an acceptable probability of success. The
concept often stated to let the commercial world be responsible
for LEO activities with NASA responsible for exploration is not
valid for Commercial Crew.
The next topic I would like to address is the Moon-Mars
debate. Each option has merit. While a human to the Moon
program is highly challenging, a human to Mars program is much
more difficult, challenging and costly. This latter factor must
be taken into consideration in the debate. My opinion is that
Mars is a much more compelling option. I believe NASA, the
current Administration and the House in the NASA Authorization
Act of 2014 and 2015 have settled upon the human to Mars
option. It is clear again that we cannot do both and there is a
need to focus all attention, capabilities and resources upon
one option.
For the remainder of my comments, I assume the humans to
the surface of Mars option to be the choice. In my view, a plan
is required for the following reasons. One: A plan is required
for the implementation team to have a common focus. A plan is
necessary to obtain program support. Without a plan,
constituents cannot make an evaluation and know if they are
supportive. A new Administration will be in place in about a
year. Without a plan it will be difficult to obtain support and
avoid another redo of the content and focus of the United
States human spaceflight program. A plan is necessary to
effectively define required technologies, including the level
and schedule. A plan is necessary to effectively define
supporting information needed from ISS and the NASA science
program. A plan is necessary to identify the approximate level
of required resources. A plan is necessary to assure resources
are applied in the most effective manner. A plan is necessary
to define precursor missions that should be planned and
implemented. A plan is necessary to define the cislunar space/
proving ground activity that is currently evolving. It is
important to do what is required for a successful exploration
program and not what is possible. A plan is necessary to
effectively assess risk and develop mitigation plans.
An argument against a plan at the current time is that we
are not ready to finalize the necessary elements of the plan. I
believe a strength of NASA program management is to establish a
plan relatively early with the recognition that as new
information becomes available, the plan can be changed. I
believe we have the opportunity to set a direction for the
United States human exploration program that is exciting,
realistic, inspiring, and sustainable. I believe the most
compelling case is for the humans to the surface of Mars
option.
Decisions are required relative to LEO if a vigorous
exploration program is to be pursued. This includes the future
of ISS and Commercial Crew. Preparation is required for the
transition to the new Administration. A plan in sufficient
detail to maximize the probability of support and
sustainability is required. Above all else, a plan with
significant detail that takes us from today to humans on the
surface of Mars is required.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Young.
I now recognize Dr. Sommerer for five minutes to present
his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. JOHN C. SOMMERER,
CHAIR, TECHNICAL PANEL,
PATHWAYS TO EXPLORATION REPORT,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Dr. Sommerer. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Edwards, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the options for architectures and
intermediate steps to develop the capability to send humans to
Mars while maintaining constancy of purpose through the next
and necessarily many subsequent Administrations.
I had the privilege of chairing the Technical Panel of the
congressionally mandated National Research Council Committee on
Human Spaceflight, and I'm here to represent some 1 of the
salient features of the salient features of that panel's
conclusions about possible pathways to Mars, as well as some of
my own views.
The first, and by far most significant conclusion is that
while sending humans to Mars, and returning them safely to
Earth, may be technically feasible, it is an extraordinarily
challenging goal from physiological, technical, and
programmatic standpoints, and because of this extreme
difficulty, it is only with unprecedented cumulative
investment, and, frankly, unprecedented discipline in
development, testing, execution, and leadership, that this
enterprise is likely to be successful.
To be explicit and to set the scale of the problem, the
Technical Panel, aided by independent cost estimation
contractors, and using a process that respected the importance
of development risks based on technical challenges, capability
gaps, regulatory challenges, and programmatic factors, as well
as the need to maintain a reasonable operational tempo,
concluded that the first crewed Mars landing might be possible
20 to 40 years from now, after a cumulative expenditure of on
the order of half a trillion dollars. The actual time frame and
cost will depend greatly on the pathway chosen to achieve the
goal, and candidly, the fastest and least expensive pathway
that we examined comes with enormous risks to both the success
of the missions and the lives of the astronauts conducting
them.
Let me briefly and very superficially review the most
significant risks of attempting to send humans exploring in
deep space. We know that prolonged exposure of astronauts to
the space environment has the potential to harm them.
Astronauts on long missions such as we're conducting now on ISS
and have been conducted by the Soviets in the past with Mir
have experienced potentially debilitating effects caused by the
microgravity environment. Musculoskeletal deterioration has
been best studied, and while exercise has the potential to
mitigate its impact, the regimen needed over the long duration
of a human mission to Mars may not be realistic.
The radiation environment in space, especially deep space
beyond the protection of the Earth's magnetic field, has been
quantified largely in terms of increased cancer risk due to
galactic cosmos rays, against which shielding is ineffective
without prohibitive mass penalties. However, the non-
carcinogenic risks due to radiation such as cumulative neural
degeneration are much less well understood and may well prove
to be more limiting. It appears that with existing
architectures for Mars missions, which include greater-than-1-
year stays on the Martian surface, which brings with it its own
risks, physiological limits may not be prohibitive, although
risks to the astronauts would be very high. Long-duration
orbital missions at Mars, or on Mars' moons, may not be
feasible at all, because of radiation.
Few of the technological challenges of a crewed Mars
mission are insurmountable, but cumulatively, they represent a
huge gap relative to our current capabilities and our currently
available resources. The Committee's final report includes a
list of 15 high-priority technical capabilities, and most of
the intersections of those capabilities against the various
forms of challenge are red in risk assessment, things such as,
there's no technical solution known. There's no such system
that's ever been developed at the necessary scale. Current
regulations impose significant challenges and will be difficult
to change, and development to operational capability is on the
order of previous large, national programs. In short, there is
an awful lot of technical work to do.
Having spent my life as a technologist, I can say that a
large job list isn't altogether a bad thing but it does require
a great deal of discipline, and a certain ruthlessness in
pruning efforts that are not making needed progress or that
don't accumulate to the intended goal. I applaud the fact that,
with this Committee's and the Administration--appropriators'
help, NASA finally has a Space Technology Mission Directorate,
which has recently made some significant contributions to the
capabilities that my panel identified as highest priority.
However, in other areas that the panel identified as highest
priority such as in-space power and propulsion, NASA appears to
be maintaining the entire trade space of possible propulsion
challenges. SLS and Orion aren't the only things we'll need to
get to Mars.
I also wish to note that one of the foundational
conclusions of the technical panel is there's a very limited
set of places for humans in the solar system for the
foreseeable future given what we know about technology and
physiology. We've been to the Moon so we know that's possible.
We probably can go to some near-Earth asteroids, and as we've
discussed already today, maybe we can get to Mars. Given the
relative simplicity of the field of regard, there are
tremendous technical and programmatic advantages to deciding,
once and for all, where we're going, and in what order. Each of
these possible destinations has proponents to be what's next,
but given the size of the job jar, it's not helpful to keep
changing our minds.
The NRC Committee advocated that a defined pathway, with
missions to the different possible destinations in sequence has
some highly desirable properties such as that the sequence of
missions and destinations permits stakeholders to see progress,
that the pathway has a logical feed forward of technical
capabilities, that the pathway minimizes the use of dead-end
systems and equipment, that the pathway is affordable without
incurring unacceptable development risk, and the pathway
supports, in the context of the available budget, a reasonable
operational tempo.
The NRC did not recommend any particular pathway, but did
assess three notional pathways against these attributes. The
committee noted that the notional pathway that is closest to
NASA's current plans has serious deficiencies with regard to
the significance of the intermediate destinations, logical feed
forward, the number of dead-end systems, and exceedingly high
development risk. The committee also noted the two alternative
pathways that did not have these efficiencies failed against
the affordability and operational tempo attributes at current
expenditure levels. To quote the Technical Panel's final
briefing to the entire NRC Committee in 2013: ``In the current
fiscal environment, there are no good pathways to Mars.''
So I'd like to conclude briefly with some of my own views.
I understand that there is bipartisan support for a ``go as we
pay'' approach to human spaceflight. But just as it is not
feasible to take a cross-country trip on a child's allowance,
because of threshold costs, we may well never be able to get to
Mars at current expenditure levels. It might be better to stop
talking about Mars if there is no appetite in Congress and the
Administration for higher human spaceflight budgets and no
willingness to cut programs that do not contribute to progress.
At a minimum, we should agree on a pathway that is satisfying
to the public, even if it does not lead to Mars in the
foreseeable future. A pathway that includes the surface of the
Moon is one obvious possibility.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sommerer follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you, Dr. Sommerer. Those
are interesting words.
I now recognize Dr. Spudis for five minutes to present his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. PAUL SPUDIS,
SENIOR SCIENTIST,
LUNAR AND PLANETARY INSTITUTE
Dr. Spudis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Committee
for this opportunity to give you my thoughts on our nation's
program for human exploration of space. This testimony is my
personal opinion and does not necessarily represent the views
of my employer, the University Space Research Association.
America's space program is in disarray. We pretend that we
are on a journey to Mars but in fact possess neither the
technology nor the economic resources necessary to undertake a
human Mars mission now or within the foreseeable future. What
we need is a logically arranged set of short-term, realizable
space goal that are not only interesting in and of themselves,
but whose attainment will build capability in the long term.
Whatever goals are selected, significant milestones can be
reached on a regular and recurring basis. Only in such a
program can progress be mapped and resources allocated
accordingly. Thus, any program to extend human reach beyond
low-Earth orbit must be incremental, so that each step is small
and affordable, yet cumulative, so that the smaller steps
integrate into a larger coherent program.
In 2010, the United States abandoned the goal of lunar
return set by Vision for Space Exploration. Congress directed
the agency to continue building the Orion spacecraft and to
develop a new heavy lift launch vehicle, the Space Launch
System. As derivatives of the canceled project Constellation,
the new systems are optimized for missions to cislunar space,
the zone space between low-Earth orbit and the lunar surface.
To replace the Moon as a destination, several near-Earth
asteroids were examined, which for various reason all were
found to be unobtainable. Instead, NASA embraced the idea of
bringing a small asteroid back to cislunar space where the
Orion spacecraft visited, the so-called Asteroid Retrieval
Mission. This idea was neither fully developed conceptually nor
vetted through the scientific and engineering advisory
structures that we maintain to review and judge mission concept
proposals.
As study of the asteroid retrieval concept has proceeded,
the planned size of return object has continually decreased.
Initially it was planned to return an asteroid about seven
meters across. It is currently planned only to return a small
one- to two-meter boulder. More than 85 percent of all near-
Earth asteroids are ordinary chondrites, a rock type so
renowned for its uniformity that it is used as a compositional
standard in cosmic chemical studies, and we also possess tons
of this material as ordinary chondrites continually fall onto
the Earth's surface every day. As a result of limited power and
minimal loiter time, the Orion spacecraft does not possess the
capabilities necessary to experiment with extracting useful
resources from the asteroid. So the Asteroid Retrieval Mission
does not contribute to our learning how to process and use the
material resources of space.
The microgravity of the ARM will not prepare us for human
operations on the surface of Mars, which has approximately 1/3
the gravity of the Earth. The ARM offers no unique benefits
beyond providing a place for Orion to visit. In terms of
scientific and operational importance, it is barren of real
accomplishment and irrelevant to future deep space human
missions.
As for learning how to use space resources, it can only
perform rudimentary reconnaissance of the type already
accomplished or planned by a variety of robotic missions.
Although it is claimed that the ARM develops technology needed
for future Mars missions, specifically the High Power Solar
Electric Propulsion Unit, missions to cislunar space can
develop many of these technologies just as well and at the same
time emplace space-based infrastructure for future use.
Cislunar space, the space between Earth and Moon, is home
to 95 percent of our scientific, economic and national security
assets, satellites upon which we are critically dependent. We
can reach these orbital levels with unmanned systems. When a
satellite becomes obsolete or stops functioning, the only
solution is replacement. If we could move people and machines
throughout the various locales of cislunar space, we would be
able to emplace, construct, and upgrade and maintain these
satellites.
To create this routine access to cislunar space, we should
develop a permanent space-faring infrastructure including
transport vehicles, staging nodes, deep space habitats, power
stations, and fuel depots. In terms of the energy expended, all
destinations in cislunar are essentially equal. If we can go to
and from the Moon, we can go to and from all of the other
localities in cislunar space. Such a system creates not only
routine access to the Moon but to all of cislunar space, and it
enables human missions to the planets beyond.
To develop the system, it is vital that we learn how to
harvest the material and energy resources of space. Such
technology allows us to launch only the most technically
advanced and critical equipment from the Earth while large-
mass, low-information materials such as propellant and life-
support consumables can be obtained from local sources. Thanks
to a variety of robotic missions over the last decade, we now
know that the Moon possesses these resources in abundance. The
poles of the Moon contain billions of tons of water. In its
liquid form, this can support human life, and when broken into
its component hydrogen and oxygen, it is the most powerful
chemical rocket propellant known.
The United States thinks of itself as a world leader in
space but our current lack of focus and strategic confusion
undermine that claim. There is interest from Europe, India,
Russia and China in lunar missions. These efforts are not
undertaken merely to plant flags on another world but to reap
the benefits offered by the exploration and utilization of the
Moon. As the world beats a path to the Moon, we stand aside.
How can we claim technological and scientific leadership in
space when we shy from participation and seek no ownership in
this arena of cislunar space?
But there is another dimension to our abdication of
leadership. China is rapidly developing the capability to
travel throughout, loiter within, and intercept any target in
cislunar space. They have also demonstrated advanced anti-
satellite warfare capability most notoriously with their
interception and destruction of a target satellite in low-Earth
orbit in 2007. Future Chinese anti-satellites loitering at an
L-point in cislunar space could fly from the vicinity of the
Moon down to lower orbits and approach direction that's not
normally monitored and disable the satellites of other nations.
In such a scenario, we would be left with a decided
disadvantage as a result of our lack of commitment to the
establishment of a strong national presence in cislunar space.
America is at a critical juncture in the history of its
space program. Congressional leadership is needed to set us on
the correct strategic path. The development of the Moon and
cislunar space answers important national needs. It is an
incremental, affordable and useful direction, a sustainable
path that creates new capabilities in space faring. A return to
the lunar surface allows us to use the enabling asset of the
Moon to journey to and explore the planets beyond.
I thank the Committee for its attention, and I welcome your
comments and thoughts, and I'm happy to answer any questions
you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spudis follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Dr. Spudis, for those wise
words.
The Chair now recognizes himself for five minutes for
questioning.
The first one I'd like to direct to Dr. Spudis. Your
testimony highlights the need for a sustainable program rather
than one-off stunts, something that you have long espoused. In
reference to ARM, A-R-M, your testimony also states that in
terms of scientific and operational importance, it is barren of
real accomplishment and irrelevant to future human deep space
missions. Does ARM fit into the stunt category or is it in the
sustainable category?
Dr. Spudis. Well, put that way, I believe it falls into the
stunt category. I don't think that it necessarily leads on to
any permanent creation of capability, and that's what's needed.
We need to approach the development of cislunar in a strategic
manner so you have small pieces that build upon themselves to a
larger whole purpose, and performing the ARM doesn't really
gain you anything. It demonstrates that you can do it and
that's about it.
Chairman Babin. And Mr. Young, you testified that a new
Administration will be in place in about a year, and that
without a plan, it will be very difficult to obtain support and
avoid another redo of the context and focus of our U.S. human
spaceflight program. Will you please address the challenge of
maintaining continuity for NASA's human exploration program,
particularly during Administration changes, and what
recommendations do you have to address this issue?
Mr. Young. That's quite a good question. My first comment
is, it's hard to sell a plan until you have a plan, so that's
kind of step one in the process, in my view. My other comment
is, it's not just any plan, you know, it's a plan that people
both pro and con can recognize it as credible, and I think the
ingredients of the plan really exist. One is, as I stated, I
think there's a reasonable probability over the next two
decades we'll spend $180 billion on human exploration. That's
not a bad down payment, and so in my view, you know, that needs
to be a critical part of the plan. I do think that'll have to
be augmented.
The second thing that I think is really important is to
recognize that there is an interest horizon. There's a limit to
how long you can hold out the ultimate goal and expect people
to be excited about it. I think we could all debate what that
is but I'm going to throw out something like going to Mars is
two decades. I personally think if it's much beyond two
decades, sustainability is pretty difficult. Somebody may say
no, it's a decade and a half, but I will throw out two decades.
So I think the plan has to recognize that within like a two-
decade time period, accomplishments at Mars, if that's our
goal, really need to be happening.
I think the other thing that needs to be recognized is, a
plan encompasses leadership, and leadership is about making
choices, and I think we have to make choices between LEO and
the exploration program. I think we have to make choices
between the Moon and Mars, you know, as the objectives. So my
argument is that if a credible plan can be put together that
has a reasonable time frame that makes incredibly efficient use
of expected resources, if it's done in a manner that makes hard
choices, then I think you have the groundwork or the basic
input in order to be able to argue with the next Administration
as to why this should be the sustained activity that should be
the focus of the United States human spaced program. The
corollary is, without it, I don't think you have a chance.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Young.
For my final question directed to Dr. Spudis, your
testimony mentioned that Europe, India, Russia and China have
all planned missions to the surface of the Moon in recent
years. You also state that as the world beats a path to the
Moon, we stand aside. How can we claim leadership in a
technological and scientific movement in which we have no
participation and seek no ownership?
In 2010, President Obama attempted to cancel deep space
exploration and a return to the Moon by flippantly stating
``We've been there before.'' Thankfully, Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy did not take the same tack and wash their hands of
space exploration after we successfully placed a satellite in
space, a human in space, a human in orbit, and a human on the
Moon surface. Congress rightfully rebuked President Obama's
attempt to cancel deep space exploration with the passage of
the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, and as we transition to a
new Administration, what recommendations do you have for
maintaining our leadership in space?
Dr. Spudis. Well, I believe that it was a mistake to remove
the Moon from the critical path because the Moon basically
offers us the opportunity to create capability, and in fact,
that's why it was part of the Vision for Space Exploration to
begin with. The Moon is reachable, it's close, it's interesting
and it's useful. It's close enough so that you can send a
vehicle to the Moon any time. It's scientifically interesting
in that you can address a lot of problems of wide discipline
through lunar science studies and scientific studies to
undertake near the Moon. But most importantly, and in fact,
this I think is the critical thing to realize about the Moon,
is that it is an enabling asset. It's useful. And we've since
found in a variety of robotic missions that there is enormous
quantities of water in the form of ice at the poles of the
Moon. Water's the most useful substance you can have in space.
It supports human life. It can be used as rocket propellant. It
can be used as radiation shielding. It can be used as a medium
for energy storage. So it's an extremely useful substance to
have, and it's very heavy, and to launch it out of the Earth's
gravity well, which is the deepest gravity well in the inner
solar system, basically requires a lot of power, and that's why
we need heavy-lift vehicles. By going to the Moon and
developing those resources, you can actually create those
capabilities by using the local materials that you find there.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Dr. Spudis. I appreciate that.
I now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and panel, thank you
all for being here.
So we had a bunch of students. Do we have any students left
in the audience? Are you guys students? Where do you go to
school? And what year are you? And how old are you? Okay. So
you're 24. Twenty-four plus 17, you'd be 41 when this is when
we should get to Mars, and we had testimony, Dr. Sommerer, I
think in December, maybe it was in November, from another panel
that said that from an engineering and an astronomy standpoint,
that the star--the planets line up in 2033 to make it feasible
for us to land astronauts on the Moon, and so--pardon me--on
Mars. And so we put this bumper sticker together that says
2033, and on the bottom ``we can do this.'' And I know,
speaking as one but having listened to other members of this
Committee that Mars is this aspirational challenge that, you
know, sparked something in us, and Mr. Young, you're right. If
it's, you know, two centuries from now, we're all long gone,
but this young woman, she could be an astronaut and set foot on
Mars at that time.
So here are my questions, and I don't think, Dr. Spudis,
your testimony is contrary to getting us to Mars. It could be
that the way you put the building blocks together, Moon is a
key piece of this, and there is no question that it's going to
take extreme commitment and extreme understanding to be able to
do this well. Our job up here--and this is a quote that we
got--I got from astronaut Terry Virts: ``Getting to Mars is not
a question of rocket science but political science.''
So Dr. Sommerer, I'm going to start with you. You said that
in your research in the panel's investigation that this was 20
to 40 years, and at least a half a trillion dollars. How did
you come to that?
Dr. Sommerer. First of all, I don't want to get into
specious precision about half a trillion. It's on the order of
half a trillion.
Mr. Perlmutter. Fine.
Dr. Sommerer. Maybe we'd get by with $180 billion. I don't
think so.
Mr. Perlmutter. But it's a lot.
Dr. Sommerer. Yeah, it's a lot of money, and the reason
is--by the way, the planets line up every two years basically
for Mars, you know, 2033 is a nice round number to have in mind
but, you know, it could be two years after that, it could be
ten years after that. There's a lot of stuff you need to get
people to Mars and bring them back. We need to have a long-term
way of keeping them healthy on the way there. They need to
spend time on the surface in a potentially hazardous chemical
environment. We need to be able to launch them. We need to have
prepositioned things that will keep them alive and make it
possible to launch them. These are very complicated systems. We
can learn a lot in cislunar space. We could have people 3 days
away so that if something went wrong with their long-term life
support system, we'd have a chance at getting them back, as
indeed we did with Apollo 13. But if they're halfway to Mars
and something goes wrong because we don't have the experience
or we tried to do it a little too fast or a little too cheap,
those people are gone.
Mr. Perlmutter. But if you had----
Dr. Sommerer. So let me----
Mr. Perlmutter. If we somehow, Democrats, Republicans,
Congress and the Administrations--and I figure there're going
to be at least five Presidential elections between now and
2033--and I'm happy to give you one of these bumper stickers--
and there are going to be 10 Congressional elections between
now and then, but if we somehow all came together, said okay,
we're going to put a percent of the entire federal budget
towards getting us to Mars and that gets you $200, $300 billion
over the course of the next 17 years, can we do this?
Dr. Sommerer. Yes, but it takes, as Mr. Young has already
said, a plan, what we're going to do, what we're not going to
do, do the things that are necessary in a logical feed-forward
way from the standpoint of technology, don't do everything
because----
Mr. Perlmutter. I'm just a lawyer, all right? I'm just a
lawyer, and my senior partner had this little thing he put on
our desks: ``Begin. The rest is easy,'' and then in
parentheses, ``maybe.'' Okay? If we were to give you a date
that had some legitimate basis in science, 2033, because the
planets line up right, can the scientists and the engineers and
the technologists build us a program that gets us there by
2033?
Dr. Sommerer. If you give them a date and the money and
help with the discipline, the answer is yes. If any of those
three things is missing, the answer is almost certainly no.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. I yield back to the Chair.
Chairman Babin. I'd like to now recognize the gentleman
from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our friends on the
panel, I think we probably have a number of versions of the
same question here, and all of you have been before panels
before. You understand that's the nature of the body, but as we
try to address the issues.
I turn first, Mr. Young, to you. In just two years, the
United States will have the ability to return to the Moon with
the Space Launch System and Orion for the first time in 40
years, and for the first time ever go deeper into space,
providing a historic opportunity for American leadership and
exploration. Recently, of course, the NASA Director/
Administrator has stated that NASA would be doomed if the next
President changes course and deviates from the developments of
the Space Launch System and Orion, and if you could one more
time to reinforce the point, discuss with us the risks there
are in walking away from the investments made in these programs
over the last decade.
Mr. Young. First, and I think it's your point, there are no
goals that involve human exploration that are significant that
are not going to bridge Administrations today, so that's a fact
that we're going to have to deal with. And so with a little bit
repeating myself but it says that the current Administration
needs to approach very seriously the transition to the next
Administration in getting forward the rationale as to why
sustaining the endeavor across the Administration is an
important thing to do. As you're saying what are the downsides
if you don't do that, I talked about this $180 billion, and I
don't mean to treat that frivolously at all and I also don't
mean to say that's everything that's needed, but it's
reasonably logical that the activity will be sustained over the
next couple of decades at that level. It would be such a shame
if what we did was just waste that money and not have a
sustainable program really. We have a graveyard today that's
fairly extensive that has headstones of human spaceflight
programs that consumed a lot of resources and ended up with no
basic product, and I don't think we need any more headstones in
that cemetery. What we really need is monuments to
accomplishments.
Mr. Lucas. Well put, Mr. Young.
One more question. Part of your testimony indicated that
the recent Human Orbiting Mars Workshop organized by the
Planetary Society, the Space Policy Institute and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory provides a credible argument that a Mars
mission is feasible at constant funding levels. Is there any
reason that NASA could not use that as a baseline to plan
against? Just expand a little more, sir.
Mr. Young. Yeah. I was not a part of that activity, by the
way. I'm familiar with it, and I think that what that what they
focused on was a minimum mission. They were just trying to find
a minimum credible mission. But I think the real contribution
of that endeavor was, they got on the table, on the agenda a
plan that most people think have some credibility relative to
it to begin the process. Now, the pathway activity that the
Congress initiated and was done by the National Academy did a
similar thing. As it turns out, the budgeting--I don't know if
budgeting's the right way to say it. The cost estimating
activity that was done for this minimal mission we referred to
was done by the same people with the same process as was done
for the pathway activity. So my belief is, there're two options
that have a lot of bases behind them. Probably neither one are
the option that the country will converge upon but we should
put those on the table, and we really should charge the
leadership of this country to say look, you know, if we're
really serious about humans to Mars, we've got to have a plan,
and you know, and here are a couple of versions that says it's
not impossible to have a plan. It's not impossible to have a
good plan but what we've got to do is to converge on a plan
that those who are charged with executing the plan really have,
you know, have their own analysis involved in and their own
recognition of the importance of a plan.
Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Young, and Mr. Chairman, I yield
back the balance of my time.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Perlmutter, you had actually asked a question of one of
my interns back there. That's Alexandra Abney. She's a Texas
Aggie, and we're very happy to have her working in our office.
Mr. Perlmutter. Maybe she sets foot on Mars.
Chairman Babin. She might do that. I'm not sure you and I
will be around, though.
Mr. Perlmutter. Yeah, so carry it on.
Chairman Babin. Right. Okay. Thank you.
I'd now like to call on the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I wanted
to ask the panelists about partnerships and where would
international and commercial partnership for human exploration
in Mars make the most sense?
Dr. Sommerer. So Mr. Young has already talked to the very
effective partnership that NASA has had with industry and
achieving our exploration goals to date and that needs to
continue. You can't turn it over to industry. You can't just
have it done by NASA in-house centers, I think.
International partnership, the Technical Panel which I led
was very explicit that that could be a good thing from the
standpoint of sustaining commitment. It's credited as one of
the things that sustained ISS through some particularly dark
times. But what it probably doesn't do is save a lot of money.
Something like 15 percent of the cost of ISS was borne by our
international partners and the rest was paid for by U.S. tax
dollars. You would have to have unprecedented levels of
international contribution financially to substantially lower
the burden on U.S. funding to go anywhere significant, but
doing it collectively as a human species as opposed to a set of
countries makes a great deal of sense scientifically from the
standpoint of soft geopolitics, if you will, and other reasons.
So commercial space entities will always be a part of the
NASA program. I think that's necessary. But turning it over to
them I don't think makes a lot of sense.
Mr. Veasey. Are there international partners that we have
already identified or that NASA has already identified that
we've already begun to have very strong talks with to sort of
start laying the foundation for future travel to Mars?
Dr. Sommerer. I'm not in the Administration so I don't
know, okay. I am a member of an international academy of
astronautics. There's robust discussion amongst technologists
and scientists in that group and in its various conferences,
but you know, in terms of actual partners, I presume that we
think that the ISS coalition will continue in some form with
exploration. Europe has already expressed an interest in a
lunar base. There are other significant players out there and
some emerging players, and, you know, that's above my pay grade
to say whether we should be involved with China or Russia.
Mr. Veasey. Yes, sir?
Dr. Spudis. I'd like to point out that in fact there's
already international participation in the Orion SLS system
because the Europeans are building service module for Orion,
and Orion cannot do anything unless it has a service module.
One of the things that could've been looked at that wasn't in
2010 when the Moon--return to the Moon was dropped was getting
an international partner to help us build the Altair. The
argument of the Augustine Committee was that we couldn't afford
to build both the Orion and the Altair--the Altair is the lunar
lander part of the Constellation system--at the same time but
it was not explored to look at the possibility of having an
international participation in the building of the lander. So
in actual fact, if Orion and SLS is the future of human
spaceflight, we already have international participation.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I
yield back my time.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Chairman Babin. Let's see. I'd now like to recognize the
gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know if you're familiar with the economic news for
America that's come out recently, particularly with respect to
our deficit and debt, but it's taken a decided turn for the
worse. The first-quarter numbers reflect that our revenues went
up four percent but our spending went up seven percent
according to the Congressional Budget Office, relying on
Treasury Department numbers. Our first-quarter deficit was $36
billion worse in this fiscal year compared to the previous
fiscal year. If that were extrapolated out, that would mean
that our deficit has gone up $144 billion worse this year than
the previous fiscal year although the CBO projects that it will
probably be more likely in the $130 something billion range
worse. The CBO is also projecting that our total amount of debt
is now going to blow though the $30 trillion mark within a
decade, and the real question is whether America is going to be
able to survive that, whether we will go through a debilitating
insolvency and bankruptcy.
So with that as a little bit of an economic background as
to our country's finances, my question to you is, how do we
avoid a repeat of the Constellation program's demise in 2010 at
the hands of the Obama Administration, and a corollary to that
is, what lessons did we learn and how can we apply what we
learn to the Space Launch System and the Orion programs? The
floor is yours.
Mr. Young. I'll take a crack. The budget numbers that you
talked about or the economic numbers are sobering, so I don't
want to, you know, dismiss them at all. If I would look at
myself personally, I would call myself a fiscal conservative so
I worry about those kinds of numbers.
I equally worry about what great nations do, and I think
great nations do great things, and so I think that relative to
the country as a whole, as we go through challenging economic
times or challenge of whatever times there may be, I think that
we are fortunate that we live in a country that has the ability
to also do great things while we're meeting these challenges.
So I put myself in that category of advocating working today's
problem and planning for great things for the future.
Relative again, and looking a little bit redundant, nothing
troubles me more than to spend a reasonable amount of money to
come back to maybe my crazy analogy here for another tombstone,
and that's why I am personally am passionate about humans to
Mars but I'm equally passionate about a good, disciplined plan
that is not frivolous, and one of my colleagues commented, a
plan that does what is required but also does not do what is
not required, or maybe another way to say it, doesn't do just
do what is possible. So a disciplined, structured plan that
accomplishes what I'm calling what a great nation does a great
thing is important. It may be naive but it's my belief that
such a plan, well-constructed in a bipartisan, I guess, kind of
an effort, I think that kind of a plan should be stable across
Administrations, and if we as a country can't do things like
that across Administrations, you know, when they're well
thought out and well done, then shame on us. I'm an optimist--
--
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Young, let me please interrupt. We're
running short of time. So any of the other two gentlemen would
also like to respond, please feel free to do so.
Dr. Sommerer. Well, I'd like to reiterate Mr. Young's
point, that probably we're going to spend $180 billion on human
spaceflight in the country over the coming horizons unless that
just stops altogether. Let's spend the money as wisely as we
can.
You could make an argument, and some do, and I have from
time to time, that maybe we shouldn't have human spaceflight,
that we ought to rely entirely on robotic probes, which are
much more cost-effective for the scientific knowledge that's
adduced. That's a choice that in really grim financial straits
the country might be forced to make. But it doesn't seem to be
something that people want to stand up and proudly say let's
end the human space endeavor and rely on only robots, although
the robot stuff is pretty cool, Mars, Pluto, et cetera.
Dr. Spudis. I'll make this very brief, but we're compelled
to be present in space for a variety of reasons. Modern
civilization critically depends on the assets in cislunar
space, so what I've tried to envision is a way to make the
human program relevant to those critical needs, and what I've
identified is the fact that if you go to the Moon and develop
its resources to create a permanent transportation system that
can access not only low-Earth orbit but all the points in
between Earth and Moon, you've actually created a system that
can not only maintain those critical space assets that we use
every day but also inherently gives you the ability to go to
the planets when you have that.
So I am cognizant of the fact that we're in serious fiscal
trouble. We've been in serious fiscal trouble for my entire
adult life. But we've continued to spend money on space. We
just haven't spent in a focused manner with a clear strategic
direction, and I think that's what's needed.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Posey is not here so we will go to the gentleman from
Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to, number one, thank you, Dr. Spudis, for your
testimony. You mentioned three things I'd like to hit on.
Number one, you talked about three specific missions: cislunar
habitats, resource extraction from celestial bodies, and
rendezvous, and proximity operations as it relates to doing
servicing of satellites, and you were specifically talking
about the human components of each of those, and I would like
to bring up an issue that I think is important that we need to
be talking about here on this Committee, and that is this, that
there are commercial entities rising private capital right now
that are capable of doing these missions, willing to do these
missions, and these private companies. The risk is no longer
raising capital, the risk is no longer even technological,
although there is some risk there. Their major risk, from what
I hear as a member of this Committee, this Subcommittee, the
major risk is regulatory. They need certainty. They need to
know that when they develop these technologies there's not
going to be a government entity out there that says no, you
can't launch, or no, you can't do that mission. And these are
the challenges that we, I think, need to be addressing and
looking at.
When you think about remote sensing, NOAA has the authority
to license, you know, remote sensing satellites. When you think
about communications, the FCC has the ability to license
communication satellites. But those three missions that you
specifically mentioned, these are non-traditional kind of
missions that we haven't been doing commercially yet, and yet
right now we're raising capital--I say ``we''--private
companies are raising capital to do these missions, and we need
some kind of regulatory assurance that when they are ready,
that there is nobody that's going to put the halt on their
efforts. So thank you for bringing up those, and of course, I
think your vision for cislunar space is critically important.
I know a number of other people have touched on this but I
want to be really clear, and I know, Mr. Young, you're not here
representing the NASA Advisory Council. I know you're a member
of it but you're here, you know, operating independently. But
the NASA Advisory Committee warned that NASA runs the risk of
squandering precious national resources if they move forward
with the Asteroid Redirect Mission. Later, the NASA Advisory
Council unanimously adopted a finding that it thinks NASA
should change the Asteroid Redirect Mission into a mission that
would go all the way to Mars and thus be more closely aligned
with the goal of sending humans there.
Mr. Young, two years ago you went as far as to say that the
ARM proposal ``dumbed down NASA.''
Mr. Spudis, your testimony states that ``ARM offers few
scientific and scant operational benefits'' and that ``in terms
of scientific and operational importance, it is barren of real
accomplishments and irrelevant to the future human deep space
missions.''
Dr. Sommerer, your testimony highlights that the NRC panel
that you participated in found that NASA's current plans which
include ARM have ``serious deficiencies with regard to the
significance of intermediate destinations, logical feed
forward, dead-end systems and exceedingly high development
risk.''
That is not good testimony regarding the Asteroid Redirect
Mission from any one of you. My question is really simple. Why,
if there's this much consensus, why is the Administration still
trying to force this mission on NASA, the scientific community
and the American public? And I'd like you guys to speculate on
that if you would. I have 1 minute left, and I'll just leave it
to each of you. I'll start with you, Mr. Young, or you guys can
decide.
Dr. Sommerer. Fairly early in President Obama's
Administration, he said we're not going to the Moon, we're
going to an asteroid because we've been to the Moon. We did not
actually have the capability to go to the asteroid for the
foreseeable future for reasons that we've discussed. I think it
is likely that that's an embarrassing position to be in,
although I don't know what it's like to be President, and there
were some people who came up with an idea that sort of got
astronauts into the business of playing patty-cake with
something that came from an asteroid, at least, and that seemed
very attractive. But I agree with all of the statements that I
think it's a mission which has no real purpose, especially in
the context of deep space exploration.
Mr. Bridenstine. Mr. Young, did you want to add to that?
Mr. Young. No, I think I basically agree with the comment.
I don't really know the answer to your question obviously. The
reason for my comments and the other comments is that again I
feel so strongly that we need to be doing those things that are
critical to a successful human to Mars program and the mission,
the Asteroid Retrieval Mission, is far below threshold as to a
mission that contributes to that endeavor, in my view, and
again to come back to relevant to that, one of the things
that's argued is, well, out of that mission we got some
technology and the technology is on the solar electric
propulsion tug, and I think that's true, and the SES technology
is needed, so do the technology. Don't encumber it with all of
the other activities that's there, and I think that's why the
NAC said look, a terrific thing would be taking SES flight to
Mars, bringing it back and demonstrate the technology in a
manner that it'll ultimately use relative to Mars.
Mr. Bridenstine. And I'm out of time. Mr. Chairman, in
closing I would just like to say that going back to my original
statement, as these private companies are raising capital and
they're retiring technological risk and they're ready to
launch, we need to make sure this Committee is 100 percent
committed to enabling and allowing them to do what they're
supposed to be doing, which is advancing the human condition
with commercial and private-sector capabilities.
So thank you so much.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Posey, the gentleman from Florida, is back in here and
so I'd call on him for a line of questioning.
Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Spudis, in your testimony you stated that the United
States abandoned the strategic goals for space set by Vision
for Space Exploration in 2010 and eliminated the objective of a
lunar return. The elimination of lunar return has left a vacuum
in the National Space Exploration Policy that has yet to be
filled. Should the United States return to the Moon in cislunar
space and, if so, how does that fit, in your opinion, within a
longer-term human exploration strategy?
Dr. Spudis. Well, yes, sir, I do believe that, that the
Moon played a critical role in the original Vision for Space
Exploration in that it was a key enabler. It both enabled you
to create the technology you needed to go deeper into space
beyond low-Earth orbit and it also offered the ability to
create all new capabilities such as the provision of
consumables and propellant from lunar materials. So for this
reason, I've advocated lunar return for a long time. The more
we learn about it, the more promising it appears as a target,
and you have to be able to build a system in an incremental
manner using small steps so that you don't necessarily have a
big wedge of money that you need to get started but at the same
time you create long-term capability.
So in my opinion, focusing on the development of cislunar
space and specifically development of the resources of the Moon
actually can create new capabilities that we currently don't
have, and that includes the capability to go to the planets.
Mr. Posey. Virtually--and I may have forgotten who did it
but every witness we've ever had come before this Committee has
said we need to have a lunar basis as part of the
steppingstone. The only one we haven't got that from is NASA.
Dr. Spudis and Dr. Sommerer, can you discuss what are the
most important elements of the planned cislunar habitat that
feed into the longer-term plan for the journey to Mars? What
key technology development and scientific research can be done
that will feed the forward to a human mission to the Martian
system?
Dr. Sommerer. One of the salient features of a mission to
the Martian system is how long it takes, given our current
propulsion capability and those we foresee could take years, at
least a year. We've learned a great deal about environmental
control and life support systems as part of the ISS. However,
and I have this on authority from the engineers who are
responsible for that, it's kind of a kluge. There's a lot of
things that have been put together over time. They aren't
totally compatible. You would, I would think, if you're an
astronaut on your way to Mars, want to believe that that
environmental control and life support system was going to be
very reliable, not require constant maintenance, and was going
to get you there safely. That's one of the things that you
could do in cislunar space. You could develop that capability
in cislunar space where you're only three days away from help
if something does go wrong. That would be a very, very
important contributor to Mars.
The other thing that you can't do on the ISS is deal with
galactic cosmos rays because it's such low altitude and deep in
the Earth's magnetic field. We need to have a lot more
experience with what radiation does to people on long-duration
missions. That's something also that can happen in cislunar
space where people are pretty close to help if things are going
badly. Those are two things that I think are absolutely
critical.
Mr. Posey. Yeah, I'm a son of Apollo when they did all that
without computers. They did it with slide rules. You know, as
President Kennedy said, great nations do things because they're
difficult, because they're hard, actually, he said, not because
they're easy, and certainly this falls in that ballpark.
Dr. Spudis, it's my understanding that commercial lunar
mission backed by private-sector investors could be launched to
the Moon as early as next year. As an advocate of lunar
resource development, do you see value in commercial robotic
missions and do you think NASA could benefit from including
payloads on those missions?
Dr. Spudis. Yes, I do, and I should preface this by saying
I'm involved in one of those commercial companies. I advise
Moon Express Incorporated on possible payloads. But in actual
fact, there's a lot that you could accomplish with small
robotic missions to help prepare the way for both human return
and the development of lunar resources. For example, if you
were able to fly a set of instruments that could measure
surface hydrogen on a small lander and land it near the lunar
poles, that is a key critical piece of strategic information
that we don't have. It would also allow us to calibrate the
remote sensing data that we have. I think it would be a very
good investment of NASA funds to help provide instruments like
that to any of these commercial missions for the simple reason
that it's a cheap and inexpensive way to get very valuable
long-term strategic information.
Mr. Posey. Okay. And for you and Mr. Young, as seen with
the successes of Commercial Cargo program and the progress
being made with the Commercial Crew program, can you discuss in
more detail how NASA can leverage public-private partnerships
as human exploration program extends beyond the low-Earth
orbit?
Mr. Young. That's a broad question. As I said earlier,
industry is a critical component of the exploration program in
partnership with NASA. The commercial activity--I'm going to
use Commercial Cargo as an example--in that particular
circumstance, NASA or the country has turned a lot of the
responsibility over to the commercial supplier, and I think in
that instance, it was a good thing to do, and it was a good
decision.
I think we've got to be careful when we talk about
exploration as to how we use the term ``commercial,'' and what
I really mean by that is, I think it's going to take the best
of NASA, the government and industry to do a human to Mars
mission, and we should not do commercial experiments as a part
of that endeavor. So I don't know whether I've specifically
answered your question or not but I think there's a spectrum
where the real term commercial makes an awful lot of sense and
there are other activities where the nation has to provide the
leadership form government with industry being an implementing
partner to make things happen, so that's what I was trying to
say.
If I could--I know I'm cheating, but if I could make one
comment on cislunar space that you talked about. I think there
are and I agree with the Kennedy statement, which I think was
good, but I think there are things that can and should be done
in cislunar space that are necessary in order to have a human
to surface of Mars mission with an acceptable probability of
success. However, my caution would be, we don't need another
space station in cislunar space that is basically going to be
carrying on an R&D program there, and I think that was your
implication also. So I think that again the plan we keep
talking about will allow us to make the judgment as to in
cislunar space, what is required, and we need to separate that
from what we can do there because what we can do is probably--
not necessarily what needs to be done. I think cislunar space
needs to be planned very well or it itself can become an
enormous user of this resource that we're talking about.
Mr. Posey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Great line of questioning there.
Now I'd like to recognize the gentleman from California,
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for holding this hearing. I'd like to identify myself
with the comments of Congressmen Brooks and Bridenstine
earlier. They made some very good points, and I'd like to also
identify with our witness, Mr. Spudis. Is that how you
pronounce it? Okay, Mr. Spudis, who is admonishing us to do
things incrementally because it's affordable and getting
something accomplished as compared to laying down a 20-year
program of gigantic spending that will suck the money away from
all the other projects that--NASA comes to mind in the next 20
years. In the next 20 years, I'm sure we will have lots of
great ideas that may be more important than spending money on
getting a man to Mars and planting a flag and coming back. In
fact, if the Mars mission is to be successful, it appears to me
that we need,if we were to say our goal is to have an American
on Mars, we need to ask for volunteers and say you're not
coming back, that's the only way that would be affordable, and
that's just a thought.
In terms of the greatness challenge, I agree with you.
America needs to do great things, and we are doing great
things, but inspire young people--we now have reusable rocket
system being developed, and that came from the private sector,
and we have, you know, Virgin Galactic about ready to make
suborbital space a major part of Americans and western
civilization because it's going to spread us all over the world
in a matter of minutes. These are great things that these young
people are going to be able to participate in that didn't exist
before. Blue Horizon, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, they're doing
great and historic things.
Let me just note that if we do decide, and it looks like go
to Mars, I've heard this for 20 years, it looks like that's
what people are forcing into this mode of spending. Ten years
down the road, ten years down the road, if we have committed
ourselves to so many billion dollars every year that we're
spending and we end up spending $20 billion, $30 billion down
the road and let's say at that point a meteorite, instead of
skimming Russia like it did in 2013, a meteorite would hit a
city and kill hundreds of thousands of people, can I tell you
what that would do the priority of space spending for this
body? They would cut everything off because then the public
would demand that we were spending our money on global defense
rather than on planting the flag on Mars, and all of that money
that we'd spent then would've been wasted. What I just
described is not a scenario that will never happen. It may
never happen but it could well happen. There's nobody in this
room who believes that might not happen in the next 20 years.
So let's make sure that we do things incrementally so when
we are spending at least if we do have to change spending
priorities in the future, all of that money won't be wasted,
won't be right down the toilet. We can't afford to do that. As
Mr. Brooks pointed out, we can't afford to waste billions of
dollars. We just can't afford that. It will bring us down as a
country rather than uplift our country, which is what the space
program is supposed to do.
So I would suggest that maybe we need to calibrate our
plans. We have global defense, which I just mentioned, is
really an important thing. Clearing space debris--pretty soon
we're not going to be able to use space unless we actually
initiate a program that's going to clear the space debris that
will--again, when we're talking about our young people, our
young people, they're used to now living in a world where we
have GPS and we have telephones and we have all sorts of
utilizations of space, and unless we start clearing that
debris, there's going to be no more ideas about utilizing space
because there won't be any space up there to do this. It'll be
filled with debris.
So we have these challenges, and I would just hope that as
we're discussing manned missions to Mars, that we keep in mind
that if we end up defunding all these other programs, it'll
bring us down. It'll bring the American space program down.
So with that said, let me ask about the Moon. I guess I'm
already over. I'm sorry. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I was the
Chairman here of this Subcommittee years ago, and frankly, we
had to force NASA to go around the Moon by the poles in order
to find out if there was going to be water or not. We had to
basically force NASA to do that. They did not want to change
the pattern of just going around parallel.
Give us--and you already mentioned this in passing. Give us
an example--again, if we have water on the Moon and we've
expanded--now we know there's considerable water, that will
permit manned presence on the Moon and will then also permit us
to further manned use of space beyond the Moon. Is that
correct?
Dr. Spudis. Yes, sir. Effectively, the Moon has two
resources to offer at the poles. One is the water, which is in
the form of deposits of ice that have been stable for billions
of years, and apparently it's present in massive quantities. If
the estimates from our remote sensing are correct, there are at
least hundreds of millions of tons. I personally think there
are over billions of tons.
The second thing you have that's critical are zones on the
Moon near the poles which are in near permanent sunlight, which
allows you to essential stay on a sustainable basis on the
Moon. Now, water is useful both for sustaining human life--you
can drink it, you can use it for sanitation, you can protect
yourself from radiation--but more importantly, it's the most
powerful chemical rocket propellant we know of. If you split
water into its component atoms and then freeze that into a
liquid, you've got liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, which is
basically what the space shuttle main engine uses. There's
enough ice at the poles of the Moon to launch the equivalent of
a space shuttle every day for over 2,000 years. So that's a lot
of water. You're not going to run out of it soon. And if you're
able to access it and process it and store it and send it into
space, you've actually created a fueling depot that will allow
you to go Mars on a sustainable basis.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What would it cost--now, we're talking
about--we just mentioned the costs of going to Mars. What's the
cost of what you're talking about?
Dr. Spudis. It depends on how you approach it, and a lot of
people have published ideas on this. I have published a paper
on it. There was another paper this past summer. But I
certainly think it's less than $100 billion. The key is to use
robotic assets to get started, and then use people as they
become necessary. So you can do this on the Moon. You can't do
it on asteroids and you can't do it on Mars because the Moon is
close. So you're able to remotely control robots via
teleoperation from the Earth, and you can't do that on the more
distant targets.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I just note, Mr. Chairman, when I
talk about the potential of our space commercial sector and
space refueling is also something they could do more not from
Mars, and again, a private company might want to put up a space
refueling station, and that would enable us perhaps to bring
down the cost for space exploration and also for Moon missions.
And one last thought, and that is, I really think Elon Musk
is going to be on Mars before NASA gets there, and it's just a
thought. Thank you.
Chairman Babin. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
I'd like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Knight.
Mr. Knight. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
You know, there's been a good discussion here today. I
think that a lot of this does revolve around money. I think
much of it revolves around technology. I think that Mr.
Perlmutter might want to change that bumper sticker, and just
the first number. You don't have to change the second number
but the first number in the years there. It's not going to be
2033. We are a ways away from going to Mars and getting back.
We can go to Mars but getting back is going to be a problem.
I think that one of the discussions about Apollo 13, when
you're 100,000 miles away, it's a lot different than when
you're 25 million miles away. There is no help at 25 million
miles. So that is a distinct problem that Americans probably
will not take for their astronauts to be in that kind of peril
anytime soon.
The second thing is money. If we're going to spend $12
billion on this over the next 15 years or 17 years to get us
there, that will be an issue. Right now, NASA only spends about
three percent of their budget on aeronautics, and I have
complained about that and I'll complain about that as long as
I'm in Congress. I think that that is criminal that we spend
three percent of our budget on aeronautics when a lot of the
products that comes out of NASA is for us right here, either in
general aviation or in commercial aviation, and we still only
spend 3 percent.
We have been working on scramjet technology for 50 years.
We are still working on that. We are still a ways away from
that, and I think that that technology is part of a big
problem.
But I have a question, and that is on the lines of the
experiments we've done in the Space Station, and one of the
experiments that's happening right now with a twin on the
ground and a twin at the Space Station for a year. Do any of
you believe that at this point we can say that safely a man can
travel or a woman can travel to Mars and be returned to Mars in
maybe a two-and-a-half-year mission, and with what we know
today, do you believe that that is doable, feasible? Not
doable, but yes, we will get something back, that that person
will come back.
Dr. Sommerer. I think it poses a significant risk based on
what we know. NASA actually has a pretty good human research
program but given the resources that they're dealing with,
there are significant uncertainties about what the microgravity
and the radiation impact to say nothing of the chemical hazards
that Mars might do to the health of astronauts.
Mr. Knight. My second question, I think you hit on it
earlier, is the propulsion. Our propulsion hasn't changed in
many, many years from basically the beginning of rockets. It's
going to take us about a year to get to Mars today. Do you see
over the next 15 or 20 years some sort of propulsion system
that is going to speed that up dramatically so that we can get
to Mars in maybe a less than six-month period?
Dr. Sommerer. Certainly, I don't see it happening if we
don't work on it.
Mr. Knight. And I would make that statement to everything.
If we spend the money and we work on it, I believe that the
American ingenuity can do this. I believe that we can do this
in that time period. I don't think that there is a push to do
it, and I don't think there's a push to do it consistently. And
Mr. Rohrabacher talked about an awful lot of programs that--and
Mr. Young talked about the headstones in the cemetery. I
believe that, but I also believe that you get things from that.
There was a program in the late 1950s and early 1960s
called the X-20 Dinosaur. I think that that was the first space
shuttle that we would have ever built and it would have been
very successful. We abandoned that program for lack of a
mission and for funding, and we wanted to send a man to the
Moon.
I think that we learned an awful lot from the X-20
Dinosaur, and I think if Jeff Greeson was here today, he would
say we learned an awful lot because he's building something
that is very similar to the X-20 Dinosaur.
So just because a program was canceled or just because a
program never left the launching pad doesn't mean we didn't
learn something from it, doesn't mean that that money might not
have been well spent. But I will agree with Mr. Rohrabacher. If
we don't use the program and we spend hundreds of billions or
tens of billions, the taxpayers do feel at a loss.
So I think that NASA can do anything that they put their
mind to and anything that we can fund. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Babin. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Knight.
I think this has been an excellent exchange of ideas from
you expert witnesses. We really appreciate this, and--because
there's a great deal of question marks out there about what
we're going to do and the missions we're going to have, and the
old saying, do we have guns or butter or guns and butter, and
obviously today all three of you, if I'm reading you right, say
it's got to be either guns or butter in this situation about
whether we go to Mars or back to the Moon. And we have our work
cut out for us.
And I agree that whatever NASA puts their mind to, we can
do, but we do have the parameters of an almost $20 trillion
national debt that we have at this point in time, but I think
with what we gain from our space program, it is in great--as
you said a while ago, Mr. Young, great nations do great things,
so I think we have our marching orders. We just have to get
organized on this.
So I just want to say thank you to all three of you, and
thank you to the audience out there, and thank you for this
line of questioning. And so I adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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