[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARITIME NUCLEAR SMUGGLING THREAT AND OTHER PORT
SECURITY AND SMUGGLING RISKS IN THE UNITED STATES

=======================================================================

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Serial No. 114-48
Committee on Homeland Security
Serial No. 114-79

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION,

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

JULY 7, 2016

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure and the Committee on Homeland Security

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/
committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation

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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman

DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Vice Chair Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SAM GRAVES, Missouri EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
JEFF DENHAM, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky JANICE HAHN, California
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
ROB WOODALL, Georgia ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
TODD ROKITA, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
JOHN KATKO, New York CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
BRIAN BABIN, Texas JARED HUFFMAN, California
CRESENT HARDY, Nevada JULIA BROWNLEY, California
RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
MIMI WALTERS, California
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
CARLOS CURBELO, Florida
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
MIKE BOST, Illinois

7_____

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN GARAMENDI, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB GIBBS, Ohio CORRINE BROWN, Florida
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina JANICE HAHN, California
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CARLOS CURBELO, Florida JULIA BROWNLEY, California
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York Officio)
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)

(ii)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

LAMAR SMITH, Texas BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
PETER T. KING, New York LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
Chair BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania FILEMON VELA, Texas
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
JOHN KATKO, New York KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York
WILL HURD, Texas NORMA J. TORRES, California
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
MARK WALKER, North Carolina
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director
JOAN V. O'HARA, General Counsel
MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security

MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona, Chairman

LAMAR SMITH, Texas FILEMON VELA, Texas
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania NORMA J. TORRES, California
WILL HURD, Texas BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director
JOHN DICKHAUS, Subcommittee Clerk
ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director

(iii)

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure............................................. vi

TESTIMONY
Panel 1

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
Policy, and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard..................... 4
L. Wayne Brasure, Ph.D., Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office............................................... 4
Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection................. 4
Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration..... 4

Panel 2

Jennifer A. Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 24
Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National
Laboratories................................................... 24
David A. Espie, Director of Security, Maryland Port
Administration, Port of Baltimore, on behalf of the American
Association of Port Authorities................................ 24
James H.I. Weakley, President, Lake Carriers' Association........ 24

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hon. John Garamendi of California................................ 45

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan...................................... 49
L. Wayne Brasure, Ph.D........................................... 53
Todd C. Owen..................................................... 59
Anne Harrington.................................................. 69
Jennifer A. Grover............................................... 78
Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D......................................... 96
David A. Espie................................................... 104
James H.I. Weakley............................................... 109

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
Policy, and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, responses to
requests for information from the following Representatives:

Hon. Bob Gibbs of Ohio....................................... 17
Hon. Carlos Curbelo of Florida............................... 22
Article entitled, ``U.S. Ports Want More Action on Dirty Bomb
Prevention,'' Maritime Executive, July 6, 2016, submitted by
Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas............................... 116
Letter of July 1, 2016, to Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security, from 47 Members of Congress,
submitted by witness David A. Espie............................ 118
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARITIME NUCLEAR SMUGGLING THREAT AND OTHER PORT
SECURITY AND SMUGGLING RISKS IN THE UNITED STATES

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2016

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
joint with the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter
(Chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation) presiding.
Mr. Hunter. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the efforts of
the Department of Homeland Security to prevent the smuggling of
nuclear materials in U.S. ports and other port security risks.
This hearing follows last year's hearing which examined the
prevention and response to a dirty bomb at a U.S. port. And we
had a classified hearing yesterday. We are going to make sure
and skirt around those topics which we talked about yesterday
and we are not going to talk about today in an open hearing.
It seems clear that Islamic extremists aspire to carry out
a radiological or nuclear attack, so this is a threat that we
obviously need to take seriously. If anybody succeeds even
once, the consequences would be catastrophic. To be prepared,
we must ensure that we have the proper screening and response
protocols in place.
Today we will continue to review these efforts as well as
the broader governmental efforts to reduce threats to our ports
and our borders. I want to thank Chairwoman Martha McSally, who
will be here momentarily, and the House Committee on Homeland
Security for agreeing to explore this important topic in a
joint hearing.
The security of our maritime ports and borders remains a
serious concern for the United States. Our Nation relies on the
commerce that flows through our ports including the more than
41 percent of foreign trade that is moved on vessels every
year. Providing adequate security requires an innovative,
multifaceted approach which has to begin far from U.S. shores
and has to be flexible enough to keep pace with the ever-
changing threats to our national security.
After 9/11, security measures were enacted to better
protect our homeland by expanding efforts to detect and deter
threats overseas. These efforts include screening cargo
manifests before containers are loaded onto a U.S.-bound ship,
scanning shipping containers that have been determined to be
high-risk, screening ship personnel data, and tracking ships
and their cargo as they make their way to our shores. Despite
these efforts, we want to make sure that we are still employing
the best technology to detect the presence of nuclear or
radiological material in containerized cargo.
However, containers are not the only avenue for smuggling
harmful materials and weapons into the U.S. ports. Small
vessels pose an equally devastating threat and are just as
difficult as containers to determine legitimate uses from
potential threats. Commercial and recreational small vessels
can easily blend into the daily activity of U.S. waterways and
can be converted to stand-off weapons platforms, or used as
direct attacks to deliver a waterborne IED [improvised
explosive device].
We will hear from our witnesses today on how the Federal
Government deploys a whole-of-government, layered approach
including law enforcement, technology, and intelligence to
detect, deter, and interdict potential threats. These internal
measures are combined with treaties and agreements with foreign
governments to conduct cooperative enforcement efforts
overseas. That is one of the things that I found most
interesting about what we are going to hear about today, is how
far out we reach and the nations that work with us to make us
safe back here at home.
I look forward to continuing our discussion from last year
and learning more about the ongoing efforts to keep our ports
and Nation safe.
With that, I yield to Chairwoman McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for our
witnesses' comments today on this very important topic. We had
a good discussion in the classified realm yesterday, and look
forward to a good discussion today on this very serious threat.
We know that terrorist organizations, in my lifetime, in 26
years in the military, have been plotting and wanting to do the
maximum amount of harm to our country and our way of life and
our interests. The worst-case scenario that both my colleague
and I, as we served in the military, was always a combination
of terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction of
various kinds. And in my role in homeland security we have
addressed some of these other biological, chemical threats.
Today I appreciate that we are highlighting the radiological
and nuclear potential threats of that nexus between terrorist
organizations getting access to these deadly weapons.
We learned in my time in the military that threat equals
capability plus intent. We have seen, through open-source
reporting, that they clearly have the intent, you know, to
maximize harm against America, the West, and our way of life.
Certainly they have declared that intent through whatever means
possible, and the devastation that would come from having such
a capability in an attack would be severe, as we know, not just
for the death and the loss of life and the impact on the
economy, but also the fear that it would invoke, which is, you
know, certainly a motivation of the terrorists.
So, as we look at now the capability--and I know we are in
an unclassified realm--I look forward to hearing from our
experts today about what the threat is. Now, we don't want to
be tipping our hand or highlighting to the enemy any of our
vulnerabilities, so we need to be very careful as we are
highlighting what these threats are, so that we can make sure
that we are doing everything we can through a whole-of-society,
whole-of-government, with our partners, in order to address and
mitigate and detect and interdict these threats.
We need to make sure that we highlight this in hearings
like today so that we are doing all that we can to make sure
that we are stopping any sort of attack from a radiological or
a nuclear weapon from a terrorist organization like ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].
There are many pathways that these individuals could use in
order to bring a weapon like this into our country. I live in a
southern border district. That is certainly one pathway. Coming
in through air, coming in through maritime, through our
seaports of entry, small boats, all these types of things are
ones that--we have seen the drug supply come through. And so I
am interested to, you know, hear from our witnesses
specifically about the threat. And again, to the maximum extent
possible in the unclassified realm, you know, what we are doing
about it and what more we could do about it.
We do know that there has been just, again, recent reports
revealing radiological nuclear material being lost or stolen
several times a year, especially in Russia and other former
Soviet States. Just as an example, several years ago FBI
[Federal Bureau of Investigation] was involved in a sting
operation that disrupted the sale of cesium which would have
been enough to contaminate several city blocks. So this is the
type of threat.
The weapons-grade nuclear capability and the radiological
threat that we are very interested in investigating further
today, we appreciate the expertise and the service of our
witnesses. And I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Garamendi is
recognized. You are all lucky. You get four opening statements
instead of two today. You're welcome.
Mr. Garamendi. Reviewing my statement earlier today and
realizing there are four opening statements, Mr. Chairman, I
would ask unanimous consent that my statement be in the record,
and I will simply summarize very, very quickly, so that we can
get on with hearing from the witnesses.
We have got about 95,000 miles of coastal area in the
United States. We have got 360 ports of various sizes around
the Nation, and islands, and so forth, all of which present an
opportunity for bad things to happen. We are going to talk
about those nuclear issues, the biological issues, all of
those, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
A very complex issue in many, many ways, but one that we
have to deal with. Dirty bombs, real bombs, biological issues,
and quite possibly we are now learning with Zika and yellow
fever that it may just be a human that is infected coming in
from an African port or a South American port that could
initiate a major public health crisis in the United States.
And so these threats are real, they have to be addressed.
The witnesses are well versed in these issues, and I am looking
forward to hearing from them. And with that I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Vela is
recognized.
Mr. Vela. I would essentially adopt the comments of my
colleagues and, for the sake of time, I would just say that I
represent about 200 miles of the Gulf of Mexico along the--
right along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas. But for the
sake of time I would also yield back.
Mr. Hunter. All right. We begin our first panel today with
Rear Admiral Linda Fagan, the Coast Guard's Deputy Commandant
for Operations, Policy, and Capabilities.
Rear Admiral Fagan, you are recognized to make your
statement.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LINDA L. FAGAN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST GUARD; L.
WAYNE BRASURE, PH.D., ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE; TODD C. OWEN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION; AND ANNE HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

Admiral Fagan. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, thank you.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, it is my
pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's efforts
in preventing smuggling in U.S. ports. I thank you for your
strong support of the Coast Guard and our men and women in
uniform. It is a pleasure to be here alongside my Department of
Homeland Security colleagues, Assistant Commissioner Owen,
Director Brasure, as well as our Department of Energy partner,
Deputy Administrator Harrington.
My complete statement has been provided to the subcommittee
and I ask that it be entered into the record.
By leveraging our expansive legal authorities, offshore
maritime presence, and utilizing a layered approach to maritime
border security, the Coast Guard pushes maritime border
security and enforcement out well beyond the Nation's shoreline
and exclusive economic zones. As a member of the intelligence
community, and through strategic relationships with our
interagency and international partners, we detect, deter, and
counter threats as early and as far from the U.S. shores as
possible.
The persistent threats that we face include illegal
migration, human trafficking, illicit flow of drugs, and
smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. My testimony today
will focus on the layered Coast Guard efforts to prevent
smuggling of nuclear devices into U.S. ports. However, many of
the initiatives, programs, and capabilities I will highlight
enable the Coast Guard to prevent and respond to a multitude of
threats we face.
The Coast Guard's efforts to prevent smuggling of nuclear
devices into U.S. ports and shores begins overseas. By
leveraging international partnerships, as well as the
International Port Security Program, the Coast Guard performs
in-country port security assessments to determine the
effectiveness of security and antiterrorism measures of our
foreign training partners.
Since the program's inception in 2004, we have visited 150
countries and evaluated 1,200 port facilities. The Coast Guard
maintains more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement
agreements and 11 bilateral proliferation security initiative
ship-boarding engagements. These agreements facilitate
international cooperation and allow Coast Guard teams to board
and search vessels at sea suspected of carrying illicit
shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, or related materials.
The Coast Guard's membership within the intelligence
community provides global situation awareness, analysis,
interagency collaboration, opportunities with various
counterterrorism components, including the Central Intelligence
Agency, National Counterterrorism Center, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Direct, timely intelligence is a key
enabler across a broad spectrum of threats.
Cargo crosses the ocean and nears our shores. Coast Guard
personnel located with the Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center screens ship, crew, and passenger
information. In 2015 there were over 121,000 notice-of-arrivals
and 32 million crew and passenger records screened by this
team.
As ships arrive in American waters, our authorities through
the Maritime Transportation Security Act provide a robust
regime of security plan approval and compliance inspections for
both maritime facilities and vessels.
Area Maritime Security Committees provide a recurring forum
for key agencies and partners to address risks at each port.
Through these committees we have training programs that focus
on preventing and responding to transportation security
incidents, and these are regularly exercised in the ports. And,
for example, since 2003 the Coast Guard has partaken or
participated in over two dozen dirty bomb scenarios through
this exercise program.
Focusing specifically on the nuclear threat, in 2004 the
Coast Guard developed and implemented a Servicewide Maritime
Radiation Detection Program, partnering with the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office. We use their standards in all of our
ships, and boarding officers are equipped with detection
devices.
Providing significant and unique maritime response
capabilities, the Coast Guard's Maritime Security Response
Teams are able to detect and identify nuclear and radiological
material and protect personnel in both routine and hostile
situations. Should the country face a--knowledge of a
radiological or nuclear device being suspected of smuggling, we
would use the interagency maritime operational threat response
protocols to bring in interagency coordination together to
ensure an appropriate Government response.
The Coast Guard's response to a nuclear detonation in the
maritime domain would be part of a larger interagency effort to
bring the most appropriate national resources and capabilities
to bear. We focus on the safety of American lives and the swift
restoration of commerce. Our unique maritime authorities,
jurisdiction, and capabilities ensure the Coast Guard can
provide security, command-and-control, transportation, and
support to other agencies that need to operate in the maritime
today.
For over two centuries the U.S. Coast Guard has safeguarded
our Nation's maritime interests. A nuclear threat response
scenario would require a whole-of-government coordinated
interagency effort. The Coast Guard's layered security
strategy, day-to-day operations, and coordination across the
Government ensure that we are well-positioned to address the
broad range of offshore and coastal threats.
I have only touched on a few of these layers in my opening
comments, and I look forward to discussing these and other
vital work the men and women of the Coast Guard do every day
during your questions.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and thank you for your continued support of the United States
Coast Guard. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Admiral. Our next witness is Dr. Wayne
Brasure, the Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office.
Dr. Brasure, you are recognized.
Dr. Brasure. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman
McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi, Ranking Member Vela, and
distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here with my colleagues from the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Energy to discuss
efforts to prevent smuggling at U.S. ports.
An attack on U.S. territory with a nuclear device or
radiological dispersal device would have grave consequences. At
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, we have a
singular focus: preventing nuclear terrorism. It cannot be
accomplished by any one agency. In fact, it takes a whole-of-
enterprise approach. We work closely with our Federal, State,
local, tribal, territorial, and international partners, as well
as those in the national laboratories, industry and academia.
DNDO was established to develop, in coordination with the
interagency, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, or the
GNDA. The GNDA is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and
reporting nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out
of regulatory control.
In our work to enhance the GNDA we rely on a critical triad
of intelligence, law enforcement, and technical capabilities.
Our strategy is to provide effective technologies to well-
trained law enforcement and public safety officials as they
conduct intelligence-driven operations. Through a multilayered,
multifaceted defense-in-depth approach, our objective is to
make nuclear terrorism a prohibitively difficult undertaking
for the adversary. We take into account the geographic layers
of the GNDA, both international and domestic, as well as the
pathways through which the material can be transited, such as
the maritime and aviation pathways.
And so, our efforts to secure the homeland begin overseas,
working closely with our interagency partners which have
responsibility for implementing the international component of
the GNDA. With these partners and with multilateral
organizations, the DNDO works to develop and share guidance,
best practices, and training for the international community.
Ultimately, building a Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture relies on sovereign foreign partners developing
and enhancing their own national detection programs. The
collective efforts abroad help ensure that illicit nuclear or
other radioactive material or devices can be interdicted before
they arrive at our shores.
As part of DNDO's responsibilities to implement the
domestic component of the GNDA, we equip DHS [Department of
Homeland Security] operational components with radiation
detection systems for use at our ports of entry, along our land
and maritime borders, and within the United States. In
particular, DNDO equips both U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection with radiation detection equipment.
Today all Coast Guard boarding parties are equipped with
detection devices. At our seaports of entry, CBP [U.S. Customs
and Border Protection] scans nearly 100 percent of all incoming
containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO
has acquired systems for the Coast Guard and CBP to detect
threats when encountering small vessels. We recently procured a
new technology called Human Portable Tripwire to enable our
partners to more quickly detect, identify, and adjudicate
alarms relating to nuclear and other radioactive sources.
Building operational capability across the Federal, State,
and local enterprise is also critical. DNDO is presently
working with 36 of the Coast Guard's Area Maritime Security
Committees. Through these committees we can share information
and intelligence, assist with alarm adjudication, and provide
technical support to our operational partners as they build
their nuclear detection programs.
In the event of an interdiction of radioactive materials or
an act of radiological or nuclear terrorism, the U.S.
Government would need rampant accurate attribution based on
sound scientific evidence. For this reason, we enhance the
Nation's capabilities in technical nuclear forensics which,
when coupled with intelligence and law enforcement information,
support such determinations.
To bolster readiness of the U.S. Government's nuclear
forensics capability in the maritime environment, we recently
led the planning for and also participated in an exercise where
an interagency task force coordinated the collection of
simulated forensic evidence at sea.
Advancing the operational readiness of partners will ensure
that leadership has the evidence so they can hold fully
accountable any State, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor
that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use
weapons of mass destruction. An act of nuclear terrorism would
have profound consequences for our Nation and the world. With
your support, we will continue to work with our partners to
bolster defenses to secure maritime ports and our homeland from
nuclear terrorism.
Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Doctor. Our next witness is Mr. Todd
Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field
Operations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Mr. Owen, you are recognized.
Mr. Owen. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Hunter,
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Members Garamendi and Vela, and
esteemed members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today to discuss the role of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection in the prevention and detection
of smuggling activities at our ports of entry, an important
responsibility we share with our partners here today.
As the lead DHS agency for border security, CBP works
closely with our domestic and international partners to protect
the Nation from a variety of dynamic threats, including those
posed by containerized cargo arriving at our air, land, and sea
ports. Before my appointment as the Executive Assistant
Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations in February of
2015, I served in numerous capacities within CBP, most recently
as the Director of Field Operations for the Greater Los Angeles
area, including the L.A./Long Beach seaport. I have also served
as the Executive Director over all of CBP's cargo security
programs, and I know firsthand how complex cargo security
operations are, and how valuable our programs and partnerships
are to our national security.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, CBP has
established security partnerships, enhanced our targeting and
risk assessment programs, and invested in advance technology,
all essential elements to our multilayer approach to protecting
the Nation from the arrival of dangerous materials, including
radiological and nuclear materials, at our ports of entry. CBP
has several key programs that enhance our ability to assess
cargo for risk, examine high-risk shipments at the earliest
possible point, and increase the security of the supply chain.
And I would like to highlight just a few of these efforts
today.
First, CBP receives advanced information on every cargo
shipment, every vessel, and every person before they arrive at
our ports of entry.
Second, our advance targeting techniques use the advanced
data to enhance our ability to assess risk associated with
these cargo shipments and with the entities involved. The
National Targeting Center, using the Automated Targeting
System, has developed state-of-the-art capabilities to assess
cargo shipments before they are laid and on board vessels
destined for the United States.
Third, our partnerships, those with DHS and our other
Federal partners, private industry, and foreign counterparts,
increase information-sharing and enhance our domain awareness,
our targeting capabilities, and the ability to intercept
threats approaching our borders.
Pushing our security efforts outward, the Container
Security Initiative, which was established specifically to
prevent the use of maritime containerized cargo to transport a
weapon of mass effect or destruction, enables CBP to work with
foreign authorities to identify and examine potentially high-
risk maritime containers at the first foreign ports, before
they are laid and on board a vessel destined for the U.S. CBP
now has 60 Container Security Initiative ports in 35 countries,
and we screen over 80 percent of the maritime containerized
cargo before it heads to the United States.
And finally, in partnership with DNDO, CBP has deployed
nuclear and radiological detection equipment, including
radiation portal monitors, radio isotope identification
devices, and personal radiation detectors, nationwide. Using
radiation portal monitors at our ports of entry, CBP is able to
scan 100 percent of all mail and express consignment parcels,
100 percent of all truck cargo and personally owned vehicles
arriving from Canada and Mexico, and 100 percent of all
arriving maritime containerized cargo for the presence of
radiological or nuclear materials.
CBP's detection technology, targeting capabilities, and
partnerships are strategically aligned to prevent the arrival
of dangerous materials or a dangerous weapon at a U.S. port.
However, if such an event were to occur, CBP has established
contingency plans and standard procedures to ensure a
coordinated and effective response. In the event CBP detects a
suspected radioactive source, all personnel are trained in
secure, isolate, and notify protocols. The cargo is secured,
the immediate area is isolated, and the scientific experts are
notified. CBP scientists at the CBP Teleforensic Center in
northern Virginia will confer with the Department of Energy,
and, when necessary, refer the findings to the FBI to
coordinate the appropriate response. All of these elements are
part of a comprehensive cargo security strategy that enables
CBP to identify and address the potential use of containerized
cargo to transport radiologic weapons before they arrive at our
Nation's ports of entry.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will
be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Owen. Our next witness is Ms. Anne
Harrington, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Ms. Harrington, you are recognized.
Ms. Harrington. Thank you. Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman
McSally, Ranking Members Garamendi and Vela, and distinguished
members of the subcommittees, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to discuss the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration's efforts to detect, deter, and
investigate the illicit smuggling of nuclear and other
radioactive materials. My full statement has been provided and
I ask that it be entered into the record.
I am also very pleased to be appearing today with
colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security. You should
look at the four witnesses in front of you as a team, because
that is, indeed, how we work.
Securing nuclear and radiological materials from theft,
diversion, or trafficking is a critical element of U.S.
national security strategy. Despite significant progress over
the last 20 years by international cooperative programs, gaps
remain and interest in acquiring these materials persist.
The threat landscape as we see it today includes over 30
countries with weapon-usable nuclear material stored at
hundreds of sites, with the largest inventory in Russia; more
than 100 countries with radiological material stored at
thousands of sites, many of which lack adequate security; a
demonstrated black market for nuclear and radiological
materials, as shown by recent interdictions in Georgia and
Moldova; and terrorist groups that have taken root in
ungoverned or undergoverned spaces, compounded by the emergence
of Daesh or ISIL [Islamic State of Irag and the Levant], a
pseudostate with demonstrated capability to conduct
international terrorist operations and an expressed interest in
acquiring and using radiological and possibly nuclear materials
against Western interests.
We take our job seriously because the consequences are so
high. The use of a high-yield, improvised nuclear device, or
IND, in a major U.S. city would cause hundreds of thousands of
fatalities. The use of a radiological dispersal device, or RDD,
would not cause the same loss of human life, but would be
highly destabilizing, with broad physical, economic, and
psychological consequences, demanding significant resources and
a multifaceted response.
To counter this threat, the U.S. Government uses multiple
means to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear and
radiological materials. Within my organization, the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, our Global Material Security
program specializes in collaborating with partners worldwide to
build sustainable capacity to secure nuclear weapons, weapons-
usable materials, and radiological material, and to detect and
investigate illicit trafficking of those materials.
We serve as the farthest exterior ring of protection for
the United States. Our approach is simple: our first line of
defense is to secure nuclear and radiological material at the
source, and not allow it to be removed from regulatory control.
Recognizing that this may not be enough, we have a second line
of defense: our Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence
program, or NSDD.
NSDD is a critical component of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture. We deploy radiation detection systems
internationally at official crossing points along rugged,
unofficial borders in disputed territories which we call green
borders, and along maritime borders, or blue borders, and at
internal locations for law enforcement operations, working with
our foreign partners, much the way the Department of Homeland
Security works within the United States.
More importantly, our goal is to build the capacity,
infrastructure, and relationships necessary to sustain these
efforts into the future, and to cooperate with us in those
efforts. The GNDA is predicated on a layered defense of law
enforcement, intelligence, and technology to maximize a system
of detection and deterrence capability. In the words of DHS's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, NSDD is the largest single
program in the exterior layer, and provides significant
potential to stop a U.S.-bound terrorist attack outside our
borders.
We have equipped 585 sites, including 46 large-container
seaports, have provided 104 mobile radiation detection vans,
and countless other handheld equipment. With this technology
comes training, exercises, and sustainment support.
We also focus on sustainability, and have already
transitioned 85 percent of our installations to full support by
the host countries. We have taken important steps in countering
the nuclear and radiological smuggling threat by developing a
range of technologies, as already mentioned by our friends in
DNDO, and we work closely together to establish the standards
for those technologies.
NSDD's ability to adapt to an evolving threat, engage
diverse international partnerships, and its ongoing
collaboration with the interagency and with international
organizations uniquely position this program to remain a leader
in deploying and sustaining core elements of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, with the ultimate goal of preventing
the use of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb in the United States.
Thank you for your attention, and I will be happy to
respond to your questions.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Ms. Harrington. I am now going to
recognize Members for questioning.
I guess the one thing that I am going to comment on is
this. With terrorism and Islamic extremism where it is now, and
the ability for nonstate actors to get ahold of nuclear
weapons, or to get ahold of radiological weapons, or let's just
say weapons of mass destruction of any kind, to have it
nonattributable to any State, so there is no reciprocity, there
is no mutually assured destruction, there is no deterrent for a
nonstate actor to do something bad to the United States on a
grand scale, because we would have no answer. If they came from
Syria, we are not going to nuke Syria. If they came from a bad
part of the world and they were nonstate actors, there is
nothing we can do back to them as a deterrent. And these are
people that will kill themselves and blow themselves up to kill
20 Americans, let alone 20,000 Americans.
So I guess my question is this. Do you see--and this is for
everybody--do you see a weapon of mass destruction going off in
the United States as inevitable in the next 25 years? Do we
need to get right of the boom, as opposed to left of the boom?
We talk about getting left, going out as far as we can for the
materials and everything. But do you think that it is
inevitable that you will have a device go off at some point in
the United States by a nonstate actor, and there is nothing we
can do about it? So that is my question.
Dr. Brasure. I will begin to attempt to answer that
question. I would say my answer focuses on we are doing
everything we can to prevent that from happening. So in my
world, my strategy, our teamwork is designed to prevent that by
taking a holistic, risk-based, and multifaceted approach to
securing the materials domestically and abroad, as well as
setting up the detection and interdiction infrastructure to
preclude that from actually occurring.
I would also say that I cannot speak for the consequences,
but what I can speak to are the technical capabilities in the
national technical nuclear forensics arena, and I will assure
you we are developing and we have a capability that we continue
to improve to attribute the either interdicted materials or,
with our interagency colleagues and some of the other programs,
a post--you know, right-of-boom event to actually do the
attribution to find out the source of the material.
And so, I would say between those two elements, with
respect to the prevention as well as the very real threat of an
attribution through various means, including technical nuclear
forensics, that again we strive to avoid that scenario from
happening in the next 25 years and beyond.
Ms. Harrington. If I could add briefly to that, Mr.
Garamendi mentioned the biological threat in his opening
remarks, and that certainly is a very serious one. But unlike
biological and chemical and even conventional explosive
threats, where the material to make a weapon is so ubiquitous
that it is difficult to control, in our universe it is all
about the material. Without the material, nothing happens.
And you can have all the expertise and all the accompanying
technology you want, but without the material, the damage
doesn't happen. So our focus is, first and foremost,
identifying where the material is--and that, as we discussed
yesterday, is an issue between us and the intelligence
community, but that is a very close collaboration; identify
what the opportunities are to either eliminate the material,
preferably, all together, or if not eliminate it, secure it.
If we can't secure it, then make sure we have a detection
ring around that material or around that country to give us the
highest level of confidence that we will see that material move
if it is out of regulatory control. It doesn't necessarily mean
it always will be stopped, but as long as we know that
something is in motion, then we can work with our partners, you
know, in the United States in ports around the world, because
of the partnerships we have developed, for that early warning
system to kick in.
But that is why it is so absolutely critical to push this
protective ring that we are developing as far beyond our
borders as humanly possible.
Mr. Hunter. That is all I have got. If no one else has an
answer to that one, I am going to recognize Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I just want to
scope the threat again, just--based from your testimonies. So
we know there is, you know, basically 30 countries that we are
working with, or are available for nuclear material as source,
100 with radiological is what you mentioned. We have got a very
active black market, as you all mentioned. According to some
open source reports, since December 31, 2014, there have been
2,700 cases reported to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency] voluntarily by 100 countries of illicit trafficking of
nuclear and radiological material. So those are the ones that
are voluntarily reported.
Just, you know, one example, again, from an article in
Moldova, in 2011 an informant was able to buy a highly enriched
uranium in a green sack out of a Lexus parked near a circus in
Moldova's capital. This is just an example of the challenge
that we are dealing with.
ISIS is now present in--with affiliates, organized
affiliates--in at least 20 countries, with foreign fighters
coming from 120 different countries from all over the world. So
this is just scoping the challenge.
You talk about partnering with countries in order to make
sure we are preventing on the outer ring. So, in my mind, if--
who are the--I guess I would think Russia would be a big
challenge. I think Moldova is a country of concern. So, in your
expertise, who are the most challenging countries for either
lack of capacity, lack of positive control, or lack of
partnership that we are talking about here for source of
material?
And I don't know if--whoever wants to answer it, Ms.
Harrington or Dr. Brasure.
Ms. Harrington. Well, let me try to answer that in an
unclassified way.
One of the big challenges that we confront is, again, the
shifting nature of the challenge. So in the past, we have been
extremely focused, for example, on the very large stockpile of
defense-related material in Russia. And we invested over 20
years of cooperative activity. We feel that, as a result of
that cooperative activity, the standards and the practices were
improved significantly.
We don't have insight into how those are being sustained
any longer, and that causes us concern. But in response to that
we have significantly accelerated--and I would say done so with
a number of other partners, our European colleagues, Japan,
Australia--we have an organization called the Global
Partnership, where we bring funds and pool funds in order to
improve these capabilities, for example, in Moldova, in
Georgia, Ukraine, et cetera. So those activities are underway,
and----
Ms. McSally. So if I hear you, I mean, Russia is a concern
now due to lack of cooperation, mostly, lack of insight into
what is really going on, whether there is positive control or
not. Is that fair?
Ms. Harrington. That is a fair statement.
Ms. McSally. OK. And other countries of concern in the
unclassified realm--I mean Moldova--I mean, just looking at an
article why Moldova might be the most dangerous place on earth,
because of this issue. That is a concern to me. I mean can you
just share some other perspectives, whether you can in the
unclassified, of the countries of concern?
Ms. Harrington. Well, I would say, in general, we have
excellent cooperation, for example, with countries like
Moldova, like Georgia, like Ukraine, those perimeter countries,
because they don't want this----
Ms. McSally. Right.
Ms. Harrington [continuing]. Material passing through them,
either.
Ms. McSally. So that is a good cooperation, but maybe lack
of total positive control. But at least they are cooperating
with us, right?
Ms. Harrington. Absolutely.
Ms. McSally. OK.
Ms. Harrington. Absolutely.
Ms. McSally. Great. Mr. Owen, could we clarify? In your
testimony you talked about 100 percent of containers, 100
percent of vehicles are scanned when they are coming in to the
country. But you are talking about the radiological scanning.
But the physical, the x-ray scanning, is more like 3 or 4
percent, is what I understand. And concerns about shielding or
false positives, and what are we doing to maybe close the gap
between what is actually being physically scanned versus, you
know, what is being radiologically scanned, I just want to
clarify it.
Mr. Owen. Right, and that is correct, 100 percent of the
cargo does pass through a radiation portal monitor at whichever
border crossing it is coming through. So we do have 100 percent
coverage for the radiation scanning. A much smaller subset of
those containers that we determine to be higher risk are then
sent for an x ray, if you will, a large-scale--different types
of intrusive systems to see what is inside the containers.
Those decisions are based on the targeting information that
we receive, and our National Targeting Center has a very strong
protocol, if you will, where we take not only the manifest
information that the shipper provides, the importer information
that the importing company will provide, we marry that up with
our law enforcement databases, our trade databases, and most
importantly, the information that we have from our intelligence
community, as well as our international partners. All of those
factors will determine that smaller subset, which is about 3.7
percent right now of those containers that we look at for
highest risk.
Now, overseas we look at--of that 3.7 percent, about 1
percent of that is actually inspected overseas as part of our
Container Security Initiative.
Ms. McSally. Of the 3 percent, 1 percent----
Mr. Owen. Of the 3 percent, so it is about 1.1 percent
overseas before it heads our way, and about another 2.6 upon
arrival, so about 3.7 in total.
Ms. McSally. OK, great. My time has expired. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. The ranking member from
California is recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to thank the witnesses for all of
their testimony. There are so many pieces to this puzzle. The
outer ring, Ms. Harrington, and the work that you have done
there--my colleague, Congresswoman McSally, went into the
Russia issue in some detail. Just one additional question on
that.
What efforts, if any, are being made to reengage with
Russia on this issue?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for that question. We have never
completely disengaged from Russia, particularly in the
nonproliferation, disarmament, threat reduction sphere. We have
kept some of that interaction alive, mostly through technical
exchanges, best practices exchanges, because if the geopolitics
ever permit, we, of course, would want to be working with
Russia again, not only in Russia but perhaps teaming with
Russia to work in other challenging places of the world. We are
the two big players in the nuclear world.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, having said that, it appears as though
the engagement is at a very low level. That is, not terribly
active. Is that the case?
Ms. Harrington. It is at a marginal level right now, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. What steps are being made to--are being
undertaken to enhance the engagement?
Ms. Harrington. In----
Mr. Garamendi. Like, when is your next trip to Russia?
[Laughter.]
Ms. Harrington. I have not been to Russia in a while. But
we have staff on the ground in Russia, literally, every week.
So it is not that we are not present. We----
Mr. Garamendi. This issue of engagement with Russia goes
way beyond this particular set of concerns. And it seems to me
that it is in the interest of Russia and the United States to
enhance our engagement at every level: parliamentarian,
military, nuclear, and the rest. And so I would encourage you
to get on the airplane.
Next question, Mr. Owens. And maybe this goes beyond you to
Dr. Brasure also, and that has to do with the secure freight
initiative, which was at one point in six ports, and now
appears to be only one port. Could you describe that situation,
and why it has gone from six to one? And should it be more than
just the port in Pakistan?
Mr. Owen. Yes, absolutely. Back in 2006, 2007, we began to
explore the idea of 100 percent scanning, where you would have
the radiation screening as well as the x-ray screening before
the container was put on the ship. We piloted this in six
locations. We were in Qasim, Pakistan; we were in a terminal in
South Korea; a terminal in Hong Kong; Port of Cortes, Honduras;
Salalah, Oman; and in Southampton in the U.K.
Lots of different challenges that came up from the
diplomatic, to having our personnel overseas. There were
environmental issues, there was the biggest, which was the
throughput of the cargo and the impact at having 100 percent x
raying would take place.
The way these two systems work, the passive scanning of
radiation is very--quite simple. The container passes through.
If there is any radiation emitting, the technology will detect
that. The challenge becomes with the x raying of the cargo,
because that is a very manual process. Using the different
technologies, an operator has to do different things to try to
see if there is a threat. And that will slow down the process
of the cargo flowing through the ports.
When you have gate traffic--and some of these ports we
piloted in it was all gate traffic, so the cargo all arrived at
an entry gate in--you can set up a suite of technology that
will allow you to perform 100 percent scanning, realizing there
will be some impact.
However, in most of your largest container ports around the
world, it is transshipment ports. You have ship-to-ship, barge-
to-ship, rail-to-ship, which presents a whole other challenge
in terms of the flow of the cargo. So, after 4 years of testing
this, we documented all of the different challenges, again,
along the diplomatic, the operational, the impact, the
limitations to the technology, and we decided that we would
continue in the places that offer the greatest strategic
benefit, that being Qasim, Pakistan--68,000 containers last
year that came out of Qasim. Every one of those was scanned for
radiation and an x ray was performed, the data being sent to
our National Targeting Center here, in Virginia, where a U.S.
CBP officer makes that go/no-go decision if that cargo is
loaded on the vessel.
In the last year we have also expanded that same operation
to Port of Aqaba in Jordan for obvious reasons. So that is the
approach that we are taking. Where can 100 percent scanning add
the greatest value to enhance our overall security overseas?
Mr. Garamendi. And that takes us to yesterday's hearing on
the classified----
Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Piece of it. Good.
A question to all of you, and that is resources, as in
money. And I would like all of you to address this issue of
funding, which is our problem. Do you have adequate funding to
carry out the tasks that you have been assigned? Let's start
with the Coast Guard.
Admiral Fagan. Thank you. As you know, the Coast Guard
participates in this mission from a layered approach. And as
you go from the overseas international arena into the offshore,
the approach is in the transit zone, and you know we are
engaged in a major recapitalization of some of our aging cutter
fleet designed to deploy exactly into those approaches in the--
thinking specifically of the offshore patrol----
Mr. Garamendi. I don't need to hear all the task of the
Coast Guard. The question was do you have adequate funding for
this specific task that we are discussing today?
Admiral Fagan. We are doing everything that we can within
the mission zone with the resources that we have today.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, you danced around the answer. The
answer is not appreciated. Either you have adequate funding or
you do not. If you do not, we need to know. I mean that is our
job. It is our job to provide the funding necessary to protect
America, and your job is to carry it out. And right now your
job is to answer the question. Do you have adequate funding to
carry out this specific task?
Admiral Fagan. We have adequate funding to carry out the
task----
Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
Admiral Fagan [continuing]. As Coast Guard.
Dr. Brasure. Yes, sir. We also apply the resources we have.
And in DNDO we apply them using a risk-based strategy across
all areas. And we support the President's budget submission.
Mr. Owen. And we have a workload staffing model that
identifies the resources that we need, and the resource
staffing model shows that we are 2,107 officers below what we
need to carry out the resources. About 500 of those are
directed towards seaports. So, on the personnel side, we do
have a model that has been validated by independent groups that
show we need additional resources, about 500, for the seaports.
Also concerned about the aging technology that we have in
our ports of entry, as well.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Ms. Harrington. We have adequate funding for the mission
requirements, but I would point out that affecting the budget
of one piece of this layered defense affects how everybody is
able to implement, because this is really that integrated. So,
if the Coast Guard or Customs and Border Protection, or
particularly DNDO is affected in the budget world, then that
has an impact on our ability to execute.
Also, I don't want to get into this--it is as painful for
Congress as it is for us--but CRs [continuing resolutions] are
not a good way to plan and execute programs.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I yield.
Ms. McSally [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Gibbs from Ohio.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairwoman. I represent the Great
Lakes region, and I realize ports are their major economic
drivers, and understand it is important to make sure of port
security.
I want to talk a little bit about container security. In
2010 there was a GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office]
report that said that some countries are reluctant to comply
with the international port security code due to concerns over
sovereignty. And can you kind of give us--any one of you, I
guess--this international port security is now--is it uniformly
followed by our U.S. trading partners, or is there still
concerns with sovereignty?
Admiral Fagan. The--as I mentioned in my opening comments,
the--one of the programs the Coast Guard operates is the
International Port Security Liaison Officer Program, where we
have visited 150 countries and 1,200 ports, and have generally
found quite good compliance as we have made those visits. There
have been a small number of ports that have not adequately met
that international standard, and we have protocols in for
identifying those countries and increasing the scrutiny, the
inspection, and the screening regime for ships that would have
called from those particular ports.
But generally, compliance is generally good with a few
small exceptions.
Mr. Gibbs. What kind of numbers on an annual basis that,
you know--that--ships been refused entry or--you know, what is
kind of--how often has this occurred, it is a problem that they
are not in compliance?
And then also, you know, what--is there a particular
country or area that has been more of a problem for clients?
Admiral Fagan. I will get you the specifics on which
countries and what numbers of ship arrivals we experienced from
those countries. This is part of the advance notice of arrival
screening process. The last five ports of call we look at crew,
you know, passengers, containers, part of the National
Targeting Center--the Customs and Border Protection mentioned
we have a Coast Guard contingent over there. It becomes part of
a seamless screening process, looking at the risk profile of a
vessel before it comes to the United States, and decisions are
made as to whether that vessel needs to be boarded offshore,
allowed in port. Again, looking at the totality of the risk
profile.
I can get you specifics on what number of ship calls we
have had, particularly from the countries that have had a port
that is problematic from a compliance----
[The information follows:]

If a country is found to have poor implementation of the ISPS
code's security recommendations, it may be considered by the
Coast Guard as having inadequate antiterrorism measures and as
authorized by law, the Coast Guard may impose conditions of
entry (COE) on vessels arriving from that country or a
particular port or facility. Such vessels are subject to a
range of port State control actions, beginning with a COE
verification of their security measures to mitigate risks, up
to and including denial of entry.

In 2015, 8,925 individual foreign vessels from 81 different
flag administrations made 73,752 port calls to the United
States. The Coast Guard conducted 1,712 COE verifications. In
2015, the bulk of the COE verifications were aboard vessels
that visited Venezuela, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Equatorial
Guinea in their last five ports of call before arriving in the
United States. Of the 1,712 COE verifications, 24 vessels were
issued ``denial of entry'' operational controls. None of the 24
were issued due to the vessels' noncompliance with the COEs, or
due to noncompliance with the ISPS code.

With regards to ISPS compliance (not COE), there were 15 ``IMO-
related'' denial of entry operational controls since the ISPS
code was adopted. Only one was recorded as being issued to a
vessel for failure to implement the ISPS code. That occurred in
2011.

Mr. Gibbs. But you feel pretty comfortable that the program
is working, that compliance with our trading partners is
improving? Or is there something we can do more to enhance
that?
Admiral Fagan. No, the program is quite mature and is
working quite well, and I am very comfortable with the
interagency coordination and communication that occurs as that
vessel approaches the United States, and that there will not be
a--sort of no surprise when a ship actually arrives then in the
U.S. waters with regard to what the potential risk profile--be
it from a last port of call that may have had a compliance
issue.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you. I yield back, Chairman.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes Ms. Hahn from California.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. I appreciate us holding this hearing
today. Port security has really been my top issue since I have
come to Congress. I represent the Port of Los Angeles and the
complex of Long Beach in Los Angeles is within my backyard. So,
as America's port, you know, representing almost--you know, it
depends. Using around 42 percent of all the trade coming into
this country comes through our ports; Todd and I have worked
together on a number of issues.
But I will tell you, since 9/11 my concern has really
increased in terms of something happening at one of our ports.
Because of the nature of 9/11, certainly Congress has been more
focused on aviation security because that was the nature of the
attacks that day. And I think we have done a pretty amazing job
at really changing the way we behave, and changing the way
people fly.
But I really believe that we have not done the same for the
ports in this country. I take it very personal and very--I am
very responsible about keeping the people of my district safe,
but also understanding what an attack at one of our ports would
mean to our national and, dare I say, global economy.
I was happy 2012 that my legislation called the GAPS Act
[Gauging American Port Security Act], which would have required
DHS to identify remaining gaps in our Nation's port security,
passed the House. And in last year's appropriations bill, my
amendment requiring an assessment of cybersecurity risks at our
Nation's most at-risk ports was included and passed. And I am
looking forward to seeing the findings that are going to come
out in August of that report.
And I am hoping, after today's hearing, Congress will also
seriously take into consideration my other bill called the SCAN
Act [Scan Containers Absolutely Now Act], which would create a
pilot program to test the implementation of 100 percent
scanning technology at two selected ports in this country.
And Todd, I am going to direct my questions to you. It is a
little disturbing when you keep saying 100 percent scanning,
because that is really not the intent of the law that Congress
passed in 2006 called the SAFE Port Act [Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act]. That was 100 percent
scanning using radiation and x ray. So for you to keep saying
100 percent scanning of all containers coming in our ports is
really not accurate, and I wish you wouldn't say that, because
it makes people believe that we are following what Congress
intended.
And it was unfortunate that Secretary Jeh Johnson has said
100 percent screening and scanning is not the best use of
taxpayer resources, and they are delaying yet again Congress'
will by another 3 years.
You know, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimated
that meeting that mandate would cost about $22 billion to $32
billion over the course of 10 years, but we know--and that
seems like a lot of money, but we know in 2002, when the west
coast ports locked out the workers, we finally quantified that
it was a $1 billion- to $2 billion-per-day hit to our economy.
That lockout lasted 10 days, so there is your $20 billion right
there. And if something were to happen at one of our ports, I
think the economic risk, not to mention the loss of lives,
would be enormous to this country.
Let's say--you know, I really want to know what you think
about--because people say--you are included--most everybody
here said it would slow down commerce if we did 100 percent
scanning the way Congress intended. But I have never seen that
to be proven, one way or another. And my bill would say, fine,
let's test it at two ports. Let's have 100 percent scanning,
radiation and x ray. Let's see. Because I believe there is
technology that exists today that will accomplish both, that
will keep us safe but will not slow commerce down.
If Congress decided to pass my bill, and we had a pilot
program at two ports, what do you think--is there--do you think
there is equipment that you would recommend that we could
purchase or could use in testing this thing? I want somebody to
prove me wrong, because I don't think I am wrong on this one.
Mr. Owen. Well, again, with the--the way the law defined
100 percent scanning, it was the radiation and the x ray.
Ms. Hahn. Right.
Mr. Owen. The radiation piece is doable, we are already
doing that.
Ms. Hahn. Right.
Mr. Owen. We are doing that all around the world. It is the
x-ray piece.
Ms. Hahn. Right.
Mr. Owen. I have not seen a piece of x-ray technology that
has yet to offer automatic anomaly detection. Every piece that
I have seen still requires intervention from an operator to
identify where the anomalies are, and that takes time.
As you know, Los Angeles, Long Beach, 13,000 containers a
day. Under your act we would scan and x ray 13,000 containers a
day. U.S. Customs and Border Protection currently has 10 pieces
of nonintrusive inspection equipment to do that. We cannot do
13,000 containers a day in Los Angeles with the equipment that
we have.
So I think it is still an issue of the technology----
Ms. Hahn. Do you think there is technology out there that
could solve this problem that maybe you have not tried yet?
Mr. Owen. I have not yet seen technology that can solve the
problem. I know the vendors are working towards technology that
can solve the problem, but I have not yet seen it deployed or
in an operational setting, where it would not add to the
further congestion of the ports. So I think that is something
we need to keep in mind, too.
You mentioned the $22 billion to $32 billion that the CBO
report last month mentions. That does not include the
reciprocal costs if foreign governments require the same
actions in our ports. So if we had to scan every container
leaving the U.S. to go foreign--because that is the requirement
we have placed on them--I would argue there would be a
detrimental impact on the throughput of the commerce through
our ports, as well.
Ms. Hahn. You know, and I know my time is up, and--but, you
know, I will tell you I just don't buy that. And I am sorry,
and I will say every single day that I think our ports are some
of our most vulnerable entryways into this country. And until
we act on what Congress decided, 100 percent scanning, I don't
think we are going to have the safety and security we need. And
I think slowing down commerce is certainly not my first option,
but the alternative, what would happen to slow down commerce in
this country, nationally and globally, if one of our major
ports were to have an incident that shut them down, is
unthinkable to me.
And I hope we move forward with 100 percent scanning some
day. I think that that should be our goal. I think we should
move toward it. And I think there is technology out there. And
the more, by the way--and this is my last statement--but the
more, by the way, we begin to agree to that goal, we are
opening up a great opportunity for entrepreneurs and
businesspeople to begin developing technology. But as long as
we are shutting the door on that market, I don't think we are
going to see the kind of technology that I know we are capable
of creating to do both, keep us safe and move commerce.
Thank you very much for the extra time. You know my passion
about this.
Mr. Hunter [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady. And our
next panel is going to be a bunch of super-smart people on
technology. So I hope you will stick around for that.
With that, Mr. Curbelo is recognized.
Mr. Curbelo. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity,
and I thank all the witnesses for coming this morning.
Admiral, a question for you. What is the Coast Guard doing
to monitor potential risk from small-vessel attacks in U.S.
ports, and distinguish between legitimate vessel operators and
those engaged in illicit activities? This is of particular
interest to us in south Florida. We have many small vessels in
our waters. Please, go ahead.
Admiral Fagan. Thank you. As you know, the small-vessel
threat is exceedingly complex, and there is no one single
agency that can, you know, counter the threat from small
vessels and, you know, constant vigilance is a--is an important
element in the small-vessel threat realm.
Within the ports--and I can speak specifically from my time
as the captain of the port in New York--there are a number of,
you know, coordinating and communicating mechanisms through the
Area Maritime Security Committee and others that help bring the
other entities together to look at and understand what the risk
and the threat streams may be.
I am confident that within the law enforcement and the
intelligence information flow into those coordinating
communicating mechanisms, that we have got a whole-of-
government, including Federal, State, and local partner, look
at this threat stream, as well as others that may confront a
port community in the United States.
Mr. Curbelo. So it seems a daunting task to track small-
vessel activity. Can you get into the degree of coordination
you have with local authorities to help extend the Coast
Guard's reach and really monitor this as much as possible?
Admiral Fagan. Yes. So the Coast Guard coordination--you
know, we have talked about at the international level, I will
talk very specifically now at the port level. And again, to my
personal experience in the Port of New York, there were over
200 agencies that we were regularly coordinating and
communicating with. There are daily phone calls with some of
the key law enforcement partners and agencies to get at and
share information exactly on threat streams, small vessels or
otherwise.
That level of information and collaboration and
coordination has never been better. There are other--you know,
whether AIS [automatic identification system] and other
technical means that then also allow insights into the number
of vessels that are out there, and where that threat stream may
be. Intelligence and law enforcement information really become
powerful enablers as we look to counter threats from small
vessels.
Mr. Curbelo. Also your testimony states the Coast Guard
conducts over 400 routine inspections in general law
enforcement boardings every day to ensure vessels comply with
international maritime law and safety standards, applicable
U.S. law and regulations, and any control procedures required
to access the Nation's ports.
Well, what are the infractions that are typical of one of
these boardings or inspections?
Admiral Fagan. So if it is a large commercial vessel, we
have talked about the screening, the advance notice screening.
The infraction could be denial of entry into the United States
of the vessel. The captain of the port has a broad range of
authorities and responsibilities, and would be well within that
individual's authority to prevent a vessel from entering, to
hold a vessel in port requiring certain safety and security and
environmental compliance regulations be met before that vessel
moves, all the way down to--and in the small recreational
vessel community it could be a violation for failure to carry
lifejackets. It runs the full breadth of safety, security,
environmental, and the sort of follow-on actions are
commensurate with what----
Mr. Curbelo. Do you have a rough estimate of how many of
these approximately 400 daily boardings are small vessels?
Admiral Fagan. I do not have it, but I can get that for
you----
Mr. Curbelo. Sure.
Admiral Fagan [continuing]. Exactly what, you know, the
number of large-vessel boardings, the small-vessel--what we
call a 4100 boarding, how many of those are occurring each day.
And I will provide you a more detailed breakdown.
[The information follows:]

The Coast Guard averaged over 400 boardings or inspections per
day in FY15. The below table includes confirmed boardings of
small (less than 300 gross tons) and/or recreational vessels,
large (greater than 300 gross tons) vessels, and Safety/
Security/Compliance Inspections of U.S.-flagged or foreign-
flagged vessels.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Vsl Small Vsl U.S.-Flagged Vsl Foreign-Flagged
FY2015 Total Boardings Boardings Inspections Vsl Inspections
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual 157,169 15,512 52,495 56,378 33,079
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Daily Avg. 434 42 144 156 92
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Curbelo. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Torres is
recognized.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate
myself with the comments given by my colleague that represents
the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach. I represent the 35th
Congressional District. Everything that comes through those two
ports makes its way to my district. We have lots of warehouses.
Logistics is the business of the district.
So, yes, I am very, very concerned about containers coming
through, whether it is coming through the Alameda corridor or
it is coming through by truck on the I-10 or the Route 60
freeway, which are regularly overcrowded with commuters trying
to make their way to and from their jobs in Los Angeles to the
Inland Empire.
It is alarming to me that we have continued to ask for
extensions. In this last request to extend this 100-percent
check, is this your last request? I mean what assurances do we
have that you actually have the technical expertise to deliver
on your promise to Congress that you could meet the requirement
given?
Dr. Brasure. So what we are doing in response to the
Secretary's new look at the legislation is to--we have put out
an RFI, request for information, to look broadly at both
material and nonmaterial solutions to the 100-percent overseas
scanning. And we received--we targeted not just technology
solutions, but broadly look into the private sector, for
instance, to gain their insights, port operators, trade unions,
just broadly and innovatively across the overall enterprise.
We received approximately 30 responses back last month, and
my team at DNDO is right now evaluating those responses. And
indeed, they came from not only technology companies, but all
the entities I just mentioned, they responded.
So, once we evaluate those, we expect to hold meetings in
sessions with the successful respondents in the August-to-
September timeframe, and we would be happy to come back and
brief you on----
Mrs. Torres. So these 30 new responses, they are different
from what previously you have received? And how are they
different?
Dr. Brasure. So they are different because we looked,
again, more broadly beyond technology companies. And I would
like to point out that, with respect to technology companies,
we are currently piloting and evaluating technologies that
could be applied to 100 percent scanning, and we are in various
stages of evaluation in pilots for such technology solutions.
But again, the RFI is addressing more broadly inputs from,
again, the private sector and looking to them for their
solutions, and they are sharing in this 100-percent scanning
activity.
Mrs. Torres. Rear Admiral, in your testimony you state that
the Coast Guard conducts foreign port assessments and have
visited more than 1,200 port facilities. Does the Coast Guard
share those results of the security assessments with U.S.
ports, such as the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long
Beach?
Admiral Fagan. So the outcome of those port visits and port
assessments factor into our risk-based screening, as we
determine what the risk portfolio around a large commercial--
presenting to the United States from a passenger and cargo and
crew standpoint, and that is then factored in to, you know, the
decisions on whether you are going to do boarding offshore at
the anchorage, or into the port.
In cases where there is a particular concern, say, with a
crewmember that you are concerned may get off the ship, there
are then, you know, additional security measures that are
coordinated, you know, through the Coast Guard and the captain
of the port authorities. I am not sure how much is publicly
shared in the unclassified realm, but I do know it is very
fundamental to our valuation of risk associated with a ship
because of having called at one of those----
Mrs. Torres. I am more concerned----
Admiral Fagan [continuing]. A port that might not----
Mrs. Torres [continuing]. Ma'am, about sharing lessons
learned, you know, what you are learning about potential risks,
not necessarily attached to, you know, personnel, but logistics
types of risks, where we could do a better job sharing
information with the port authorities, as well as--I want to
make sure that you are including--and this is for all of you--
don't forget that, you know, the shipments that you are not
inspecting eventually make their way to districts like myself,
putting millions and millions of people at risk.
And I think, you know, we really need to look at and
consider what is the life--the cost of the lives of these
millions of people that are being put at risk when we fall down
and continue to ask for extensions? I understand, you know,
that there are technical challenges, but at some point we need
you to deliver on what Congress has asked you to do.
And with that I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. And I would like to
point out, too, to Ms. Hahn, we have the RFI that the
Department of Homeland Security has put out to--an open RFI
that said, ``Hey, come one, come all, bring your technology,
bring your best stuff, we want to see it, we want to do this,''
right? It is right here. If anybody would like to see this,
too, we have it on hand.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your time,
for your service to our Nation, and for doing what you do.
Because without you we wouldn't have--we would not be as safe
as we are now. And I just hope that you are always seeing the
new challenges coming up and--especially when, once again, when
people will kill themselves to kill 20 Americans, they will
happily sacrifice their lives to Allah to kill thousands of
Americans. I think that that raises the stakes. Like Ms.
McSally said, when you put in--when you combine terrorists with
weapons of mass destruction, it is a whole new ball game. And
that is where we are right now.
So thank you very much, and we can have our next panel of
witnesses come up. Thank you. And I will go ahead and introduce
them now.
On our second panel of witnesses, Ms. Jennifer Grover is
the Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the U.S. GAO.
She will be the first to present testimony. Then we have Dr.
Gregory Canavan, a senior fellow of the Los Alamos National
Laboratories; Mr. David Espie, the director of security at the
Port of Baltimore; and the final witness, Mr. James Weakley,
president of the Lake Carriers' Association.
And I would like to preface this next panel. I would hope
that everybody that was on the next panel was present here
during the first panel. And if you could, let's talk about what
we just heard. We had a classified hearing yesterday, we just
had this hearing now, and you just heard how our Government
offices are trying to treat any kind of weapons of mass
destruction, from the far-flung areas of Moldova and Georgia
and Ukraine all the way to our shores, checking small boats and
also checking with other countries and having them help us by
checking stuff as it leaves their nations.
So, Ms. Grover, if you would start, and I don't necessarily
have any questions specifically for this panel, but I would
like you to comment on what you just heard. Because, I mean,
that is the American security system you just saw for weapons
of mass destruction. They were just here, they just talked, so
I am curious what your take is. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER A. GROVER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY H.
CANAVAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL
LABORATORIES; DAVID A. ESPIE, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MARYLAND
PORT ADMINISTRATION, PORT OF BALTIMORE, ON BEHALF OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES; AND JAMES H.I.
WEAKLEY, PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS' ASSOCIATION

Ms. Grover. Yes, sir. Good morning, Chairman Hunter,
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi. I will focus most
of my comments today on the perspectives that you heard from
CBP.
With about 12 million cargo shipments arriving each year,
the U.S. maritime ports do indeed remain vulnerable to
smuggling. CBP has determined that it does not have the
resources to examine every shipment. So, instead, what they are
doing is counteracting the smuggling threat by identifying and
examining the high-risk shipments. Yet, ensuring that this
approach functions properly is indeed still a work in progress.
So, I will focus on two points. First of all, how does--how
well does CBP do in identifying those high-risk shipments for
examination? And then, secondly, how well do they do in
actually examining the high-risk shipments that have been
identified?
So, the automated targeted system is the heart of CBP's
ability to identify those high-risk shipments that could
contain weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs, counterfeit
goods, or other prohibited items. The system works by
designating every shipment as low, medium, or high risk, based
on a broad range of information that is submitted by importers,
vessel carriers, intelligence, and other Government and public
sources. It is used to identify the high-risk cargo before it
is loaded onto vessels at the foreign ports, as well as to
identify high-risk shipments approaching the U.S. ports. Thus,
it is essential that the system be accurate.
In 2012, GAO found that CBP updated this system without
evaluating the impact of the update on the accuracy of the
targeting. At the time, CBP's data on its targeting accuracy
suggested considerable room for improvement. Specifically, of
all the shipments found during examination to include
contraband, such as guns or drug shipments, only 6 percent had
been identified by the targeting system as high risk. Now, this
is data from 2011 and 2012, because this was from a 2012
report.
In other words, the remaining 94 percent of shipments that
were actually found to have contraband during examination had
been identified as low or medium risk by the system. Also, at
the time, CBP did not have a target accuracy rate, which was
limiting their ability to monitor progress in the area.
Now, last year, CBP responded to GAO's recommendations by
setting a target accuracy rate, and by requiring that future
system updates should evaluate the impact that it would have on
accuracy, as well as on workload. And therefore, they are in a
better position to monitor the accuracy, going forward. And I
can tell you that the targeting accuracy rate now is
significantly improved over where it was in 2012, and the
component continues to refine the targeting and the method for
analysis.
So now let me just take a minute or two and talk about how
well CBP does at ensuring that those high-risk shipments are
actually examined after they have been identified. So CBP's
policy is that every high-risk shipment must be examined,
unless the exam has been waived by a CBP officer. In a 2015
report we found that, of the roughly 120,000 high-risk maritime
shipments that are processed each year--that were processed
each year, 2009 through 2013, most, about 90 percent, were
actually examined.
But CBP did not have good data on the disposition of the
other 10 percent that should have been waived. Our review of
the data showed that some of those shipments weren't actually
high risk, so they would not have needed to be examined. Some
were examined and recorded improperly, but there were some that
were not waived, but also not examined, in violation of CBP
policy. And among those that had been waived, we found that the
CBP officers varied in their understanding of the waiver
categories and criteria, which could lead some shipments to be
examined unnecessarily in a waste of resources, and other
shipments waived that should have been examined.
So, we made several recommendations which CBP has
addressed. They have new guidance and policy that should
enhance consistency across CBP officers, thus leading to
greater assurances that all of the high-risk cargo will either
be examined or waived, as appropriate.
So just one or two other points on some of the issues that
came up today, and that is to acknowledge that maritime ports
are indeed vulnerable to smuggling by means other than cargo
containers.
Small-vessel securities was one of the topics that was
discussed by the previous panel; that does indeed remain a
challenge because small vessels are unregulated. They are just
hard to track.
Another example of a different type of vulnerability
besides the cargo containers is that ports remain vulnerable to
illegitimate access through weaknesses in the TWIC
[Transportation Worker Identification Credential] access card
program, which is the way that--the system that is used to
control access to the ports.
So DHS does have multiple initiatives in place to address
both of those issues. They are aware of the concerns, and they
are making progress, although more work needs to be done.
So, to conclude, DHS does indeed have multiple systems in
place intended to ensure port security, to identify and examine
cargo shipments at high risk for smuggling, but in this area of
Government operations, as in many others, it is essential that
the Department implement the programs as intended and, very
importantly, monitor outcomes to maximize security.
Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Ms. Grover.
Dr. Canavan, good to see you again. You are recognized.
Dr. Canavan. It is nice to be back. I am here to talk about
the detection of clandestine nuclear weapons.
The last time I was here I made the argument, which I think
has held up pretty well, that fast neutrons could be used to
detect bare nuclear weapons in things of the size of, say, a
TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit] or two TEU, for weapons that
were in with a manifest of ordinary things, normally in one of
those containers. This time I want to extend that to say I
believe that the same approach can be used to detect nuclear
weapons which are in TEUs, but instead of just the bare core
itself, something with a basketball size of moderator or
absorber around it to minimize its signatures to make it harder
to detect.
I am talking about nuclear weapons rather than the dirty
bombs which have been primarily discussed up to this point. And
I am emphasizing weapons, because nuclear weapon material--
uranium or plutonium--has essentially no useful and reliable
signature that can be detected passively. Uranium and plutonium
have a few gammas that are easily screened out by a thin layer
of lead. So you really do need to do something to excite the
system in order to get a signal out--in this case a fission, a
unique and discernable signature that leads to high-confidence
detection.
I am sorry Ms. Hahn left, because it is also a very fast
detection system. It has a very low false alarm ratio.
Therefore, it would be suitable to inspection of everything
that goes through a port, rather than just a fraction of it,
because it is fast and doesn't have the false alarm problems
for reasons that I will come back to in just a minute.
It is largely the same story as the previous testimony.
Fast neutrons scatter around inside the container. If they
encounter nuclear material, they produce fission. The fission
neutrons diffuse out as a distinct and pervasive signal that is
easily detected.
The reactions that produce the fission neutrons produce a
big separation in energy between the source neutrons and the
fission neutrons, which is the basis for high signal-to-noise
ratio detection. Filtering between the two energies detects the
signal.
A couple of quick points. One is that the fast neutrons
penetrate a large portion of material to produce this direct
signal. Even when something is buried in an enormous amount of
moderator, the high signal return from the moderator itself
still reveals the composition and thickness of that moderator,
which signals the object's intended purpose.
A related point that I thought would have come up the last
time, but didn't, is that when someone puts additional
moderator around a weapon to hide its signature from the
weapon, that increases its signature and criticality.
As an example, if you take a solid-core device, the kind
Pakistan has put into international commerce now, back off
about 10 percent margin for safety, but then add another 15
centimeters of moderator around it for signature reduction, you
return it right back up to criticality. That won't hurt us, but
might be a problem for the person who assembles it at the point
of origin.
A related point is that when you put fast neutrons into a
nuclear assembly, it produces fewer fast neutrons than you put
in. So you cannot generate a critical assembly, or a nuclear
explosion, by nuclear interrogation itself of a subcritical
device. So that is not an additional concern.
A related point is that when you interrogate a nuclear
assembly with a moderator around it, the neutrons bounce back
and forth between the core and moderator and produce fission
many times. The net result is that you get a signal that
persists many--10, 100--times longer than the length of the
exciting pulse. It is a distinct signal with high energy that
persists for long times and propagates long distances from the
device.
A technical point is that the detection on the basis of
energy depends on the ratio of the difference in energy between
the fission and the source neutrons divided by their variance.
I am sorry, this is statistics 101, I can see you are not
appreciating this, sir. No more math, no more math.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Canavan. But the point is that fission produces a big
energy separation, and for fundamental reasons, the variances
of the fission neutrons become smaller in time as they go down
in energy. Their signal-to-noise ratios get to be 100, 1,000,
10,000. With very high signal-to-noise, you have very low false
alarm ratios, which is what Ms. Hahn was alluding to.
And so, it is everything that you would like to have. Plus,
as it turns out, the way the statistics go together, the high
signal-noise ratios that you generate are quite insensitive to
the statistics of the noise, so the signals remain exceedingly
high.
To put this into context, x rays can tell you that there is
mass, but can't tell you what it is. Passive sensors can't
detect nuclear materials with low signals. There is nothing to
detect. And thermal neutrons, which is what the DOD [Department
of Defense] spent most of its money on after 9/11, produce
complicated detection schemes with low statistics that are easy
to counter measure.
Overall, fast neutron interrogation offers an approach that
would fit well with the sensors and mountings for these
existing systems, and would produce what I think is an
exceedingly high signal noise, low false alarm, high throughput
system, based on fairly straightforward physics that is used in
reactors and experiments every day, sensors that are used today
for down-hole well-hole logging, and detectors that are used
for reactors and experimental physics for measurements are made
at fairly low and benign energies.
Thank you very much, sir, and I am sorry about the math.
Ms. McSally [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Canavan. I am
having flashbacks to my physics classes at the Air Force
Academy. I won't sleep well tonight. But we got some good
questions based on the technology that you discussed.
And Mr. Espie, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Espie. Thank you, Chairmen Hunter and McSally, and
Ranking Member Garamendi, for convening this hearing today. I
am testifying today through your invitation, and on behalf of
the American Association of Port Authorities, where I am a
member of the Security Committee. This is a vital topic, which
could ultimately impact the safety and security of the United
States if not addressed in a cohesive and expedited manner.
In my role as director of security for the Port of
Baltimore, the prevention of maritime nuclear smuggling into
the United States is a top priority, and it requires a
multifaceted approach. It requires the input of diplomatic
resources, technical assets, human capital, and appropriate
funding to facilitate subsequent preventative methodologies.
All this requires a strong partnership with the Federal
Government.
As a retired FBI agent and former special agent with the
National Security Agency, I also view our security from a
national and international perspective that must empower ports
to be more engaged in our national security apparatus. In my
experience, it is vital that our Government have sound
diplomatic relationships with countries that will cooperate
with the United States in not only applying necessary security
measures to secure their own nuclear materials, but will also
assist in countering a neighboring country or one in the
certain region that may possess such material and may have
negative intentions against our country and others.
Global diplomacy and policies impact local port security
enforcement. Positive measures currently in play are the State
Department's Counter Nuclear Smuggling Unit, the Department of
Energy's partnership with nearly 50 countries providing
radiation detection and nuclear forensics equipment, and the
recent Nuclear Security Summit held here in Washington.
I cannot emphasize enough the importance of technical
aspects of our intelligence and Federal law enforcement
agencies that must be continually deployed and refined.
Existing capabilities and resources must be deployed and
fully capable in order to maximize our country's opportunity to
readily identify and neutralize potential threats. Development
and tasking of domestic and international sources must remain a
priority for intelligence agencies and services and our local
State and Federal law enforcement agencies. In some cases I
believe it would be beneficial for our port security directors
in the United States to receive FBI briefings.
The threat of maritime terrorist smuggling appears to be
increasing, possibly in correlation with the flight of Syrian
refugees to and from Europe. Recently, a stowaway on a roll-on,
roll-off vessel destined for the Port of Baltimore was located
by a ship's crew and taken into custody by CBP and HSI
[Homeland Security Investigations]. The stowaway admitted that
he boarded the vessel while it was docked at a German port.
Approximately 1 week prior to this event, a shipping lines
manager in Baltimore advised me that his lines had experienced
several stowaway attempts by Syrian nationals in Germany, as
well.
Directors of port security in the United States are not
routinely granted a security clearance with the Federal
Government, and hence are not provided classified briefings
regarding threats to their ports. In addition, port security
directors are unaware of any type of unique intelligence
centers wherein maritime nuclear smuggling intelligence is
specifically received and analyzed in an effort to connect the
dots, if you will, and prevent such an incident.
The suspects of maritime nuclear smuggling efforts are
numerous. The actions and aggressiveness of ISIL, for example,
are challenging all aspects of our port security procedures.
The threat from ISIL emerges on several fronts. First, the size
of ISIL's force is substantial. Secondly, ISIL is not a
congruent entity. Its leadership remains in a fractured state
and, subsequently, subfractions form that are very difficult to
identify or even trace. Third, ISIL's use of the Internet and
related systems to recruit both actual soldiers or lone wolves
has proven to be extremely successful.
As a former police officer, now as a port security
director, resources that can be utilized at the local level are
vitally important. FEMA's [Federal Emergency Management
Agency's] Port Security Grant Program has been instrumental in
coordinating port-specific security needs with national and
global threats.
The AAPA [American Association of Port Authorities]
encourages Congress to continue to fund the Port Security Grant
Program, but also insist that grant funding be directed to
ports and not diluted to other law enforcement entities that
are not associated specifically with ports.
Cybersecurity is also a prime example of emergency security
concerns since 9/11. Ports are working with stakeholders in
addressing this very complex issue. For example, in a recent
survey conducted by the AAPA, it was found that 52 percent of
our ports have conducted a cybersecurity assessment within the
last 3 years and 67 of our ports' Area Maritime Security
Committees have formed a cybersecurity working group.
Cargo containers have been identified as the most plausible
mechanism for smuggling nuclear material into the United
States. Over 11 million containers are shipped to our Nation's
300 sea and river ports on an annual basis. With the recent
completion of the Panama Canal expansion, the number of
containers from foreign ports will dramatically rise.
Congress previously mandated that all incoming containers
to the United States be screened overseas. To date, this law
has not procedurally been incorporated wherein exemptions have
been employed by the Department of Homeland Security. Recently,
an extension of the law's implementation was again approved by
DHS with the support of the AAPA and by also 100 supply chain
industry stakeholders. It has been estimated that it would cost
approximately $20 billion to deploy scanning procedures and
technology at the 700 foreign ports which ship cargo to the
United States.
And I mentioned containers. This does not cover what we
call roll-on, roll-off cargo--RoRo cargo--vehicles. In the Port
of Baltimore we receive over a half million vehicles a year.
They are not scanned as they come to the United States.
In sense of time, I would just like to go to the conclusion
to whereas--again, our--in summary, our Nation's strategy to
prevent maritime nuclear smuggling must utilize a holistic
approach. This strategy should continue to incorporate
diplomatic engagement; utilize the intelligence community,
human and technical assets; continue the examination of port
security protocols to include those which are federally
mandated and those imposed by port operators themselves;
increase funding of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's
Port Security Grant Program to ensure ports are and remain in
Federal compliance; and the investment of appropriate funding
levels for Federal agencies, particular CBP, in order for
current and future legislative mandates to be properly
implemented.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity, and I am glad to
answer any questions directly and explicitly.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Espie. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Weakley for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weakley. Good morning. There is a tremendous interest
in the intersection between our maritime industry and homeland
security. Our Nation's water borders far exceed our land
borders.
The Great Lakes demonstrate the importance of marine
homeland security. The southern land border of the United
States is about 2,000 miles long. However, the Canada-U.S.
border is three times as long, and much of that is water. I
represent 14 American companies who operate 56 vessels on the
Great Lakes. We carry the raw material that drives our economy:
iron ore and flux stone for steel, aggregate and cement for
construction, coal for power, and other cargoes. We transport
100 million tons of cargo a year, and employ 1,600 Americans.
Our cargoes generate 103,000 jobs with an economic impact of
$20 billion.
I will focus the majority of my testimony on how my members
transition their vessels from homeland security risks to
resources.
The Great Lakes are tied together by connecting channels
and locks. The St. Lawrence Seaway connects us to global trade.
The navigation channel crosses the U.S.-Canadian border 17
times in the Detroit-St. Clair River alone. Canadian and
American fleets compete for the cross-lake cargo. In 2013 it
was 37 million tons. Canadians carry 93 percent of it;
Americans carried only 3 million tons.
Foreign-flagged vessels primarily import steel and export
grain via the Great Lakes. DHS warns an interruption of
domestic shipping through a single lock in Michigan would have
catastrophic impacts on the regional and national economy, and
would plunge North America into a severe recession. DHS
estimates that 11 million Americans would become unemployed if
this lock were inoperable for 6 months. The resulting loss of
60 million tons of cargo would drive Michigan's unemployment to
22 percent, exceeding its peak unemployment rate of 15 percent
during the 2009 recession.
The Jones Act is the fundamental law of American maritime
industry, and also a fundamental law of American homeland
security. It requires that any cargo moving between our ports
be carried on U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-crewed vessels.
In other words, American vessels. One of the most important
benefits of the Jones Act is homeland security, which includes
the prevention of smuggling and much more.
Former Senator Slade Gorton wrote, ``helping to plug a
porous border is a benefit of the Jones Act that is far too
often overlooked.'' The single most important thing you can do
to promote maritime homeland security is to support the Jones
Act. I have worked for the Coast Guard, for an American
shipping company, and now for LCA [Lake Carriers' Association].
I strongly believe the Jones Act is our best line of maritime
homeland defense.
Risk is a combination of threat and vulnerability. The
Coast Guard uses the MARSEC [Maritime Security Threat Level]
system to relay threat levels. Once notified, we take action.
The second aspect of risk is vulnerability. LCA members use our
Coast Guard-approved alternative security plan to minimize our
vulnerability. We deploy many security measures, including
access control, perimeter expansion, personnel screening,
vessel security sweeps, random baggage searches, inspections of
cargo, and inspections of ship stores. We adjust our security
profile based on threat level, vessel operations, and
operational area.
Professional mariners recognize something afoul, and notify
the Coast Guard via the Eyes on the Water program. Shipboard
radars can detect and monitor uncooperative aircraft and
vessels. We are partnering with a vendor to record radar
screens and to allow remote access. Providing historical
pictures can reveal suspicious activity. Remote access provides
actionable information. These low-cost programs make our
homeland more secure. We are proud to be full partners.
Threats to homeland security are daunting. Every day we
execute security plans, cooperate with law enforcement,
implement innovative programs, and defend the Jones Act.
Our goal, as Americans, is to transition from security risk
to security resource. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter [presiding]. Thanks, Mr. Weakley. It is kind of
funny. We were talking about privateering, actually, when James
Madison--and how he gave--he basically deputized American
merchant mariners to go protect America's shores and ocean,
something we are looking at, a little bit tongue in cheek, but
not really. I mean, because that is what--in San Diego we had
the same thing, where our sport fishermen are out there on the
water every day, watching boats going in from Mexico, and they
know who is good and who is bad. And CBP relies on them
massively because a lot of these guys are former cops, former
security specialists, military, and they are on the water every
day. So thank you.
Two things. Ms. Grover, one, do you know--has GAO looked
at--let's look at this, let's look at 90 percent of what the
Coast Guard does in terms of interdicting drugs and stuff and
people, compared to what would happen if you have a nuclear
device go off. Have you looked at the percentage of resources,
time, and assets that are used for a--for homeland security,
meaning stopping a weapon of mass destruction, versus all the
other stuff that the Coast Guard does?
Ms. Grover. In terms of the Coast Guard's assets, I believe
that the intent was to dedicate about 18 percent of all of the
asset resource hours to the ports and coastal waterway security
missions. So roughly 20 percent off the top. Now, that would
include more than just port security, strictly.
So, for a $9 billion-a-year organization--that is just the
entity part of it, not the personnel part of it, but the people
go along with entity, so they--that is a significant area of
work for the Coast Guard.
Mr. Hunter. So 20 percent, then.
Ms. Grover. About 18 percent, yes, for 2016 was their
intent for the resource allocation for the assets.
Mr. Hunter. I am just trying to balance out the outcome of
a weapon of mass destruction going off versus what they--how
much time they spend on this. Because if you combine all the
other bad stuff that the Coast Guard stops coming in, I was
just--in Colombia you have got cocaine flowing in like water to
the U.S. Doesn't seem to be any way to stop it. And a lot of
the Members that were with us asked a question, ``Well, hey,
what if we took our focus off the drugs and put it on the
weapons of mass destruction? What more could we interdict, and
how much safer would we be?''
I am curious if the GAO would look at that at some point in
the future, saying if the Coast Guard spends 40 percent of its
time interdicting weapons of mass destruction, or trying to,
and keeping an eye out for those things specifically, how much
does that decrease the probability or likelihood of a weapon
like that being put on U.S. soil?
Ms. Grover. Yes, we would be happy to do that in the
future.
Mr. Hunter. That would be great. I think that is important,
because then the Coast Guard could look at what they are doing
and say, ``Hey, maybe we should spend more time on this.''
Dr. Canavan, I guess the big question is this. Ms. Hahn
asked--what is the gentleman's name from CBP? Mr. Owens. He
said that they have devices, they have technology right now to
be able to look at everything, but not without a human person
there, without a person there. And I have seen this stuff.
SAIC in San Diego has got a system that they are selling
all over the world--not to us, but all over the world, but it
still takes a person there, trained to recognize that that
thing--that there is something shielded, that the neutrinos are
acting weird around some circular device, or that there's
weapons or drugs or--it still takes a person. And I guess their
answer is, if you have a person that slows things down
massively--that was basically their answer to Ms. Hahn's
question was it makes things too slow, it is going to back it
up. It is going to be like TSA [Transportation Security
Administration] at the airport, but in our ports. And nobody
wants that. Nobody wants a TSA in our ports, right? They are
doing bad enough already, just with humans, right?
So I guess the question is what exists, if anything, right
now, where it doesn't take a person?
Dr. Canavan. Well, that is what I am saying. It is
unfortunate Ms. Hahn stepped out, because that----
Mr. Hunter. Turn your mic on, please.
Dr. Canavan. Have I done it again, sir? The--that is
exactly what I was shooting for, was a system that had a--if
you have a very high signal-to-noise ratio, which is what you
can get from math that I won't go into here----
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
Dr. Canavan. Then you have a very low false alarm rate to
where you don't have any need for a human intervention. So that
is----
Mr. Hunter. I see.
Dr. Canavan. At the top level, that is the answer. The
other answer is that whether you use x rays or whatever, the--
they are only sensitive to mass. They don't know what the mass
is. To them a bomb looks--has the same kind of material in it--
as a ball bearing. The reason you have a human operator there
to look at these from all different angles, having seen all
this many times before, to add human experience, is because you
have a lousy signal to start with. All you know is that
something bounced a lot of x rays back. With fast neutron
interrogation, you actually are stimulating the core of the
thing you are looking for to release fission neutrons, which
have a unique and specific and high signature, which can't be
confused with hardly anything else in the universe.
So you have a great signature to start with, a real
signature, and not just some x rays getting bounced around.
Plus you have a very high signal-to-noise ratio. That is why
the goal that I had was not only to find a nuclear weapon, but
to be able to candle everything that went through a port. And I
think that is what I have tried to demonstrate in the testimony
that I prepared.
Incidentally, I would like to ask that that be submitted
for the record. I forgot to ask before.
Mr. Hunter. Say again. Oh, without objection.
So I think my last thing is I think what the Coast Guard is
going to do, and what DHS is going to do, is try to get the
100-percent perfect solution, which will take them a decade. It
will take billions of dollars, and they are going to try to be
able to find everything from weapons to cocaine to weapons of
mass destruction, as opposed to just really narrowing it down
to weapons of mass destruction, which is what I think they
should totally focus on to the detriment of some of the other
sectors, like drug interdiction and human smuggling and
weapons.
But you are saying that it is possible to not have a human
to check for weapons of mass destruction, nuclear devices, with
a very low false positive rate, everything that comes in very
quickly?
Dr. Canavan. Yes, sir. That is what I was shooting at. And
like I say, there are two things. One thing is that there is a
real nuclear signature from a nuclear weapon. Nothing else
looks like it when you hit it with fast neutrons. So the one
thing is you have a real signature that you don't with all the
others. I am not criticizing what these other groups are doing.
You do what you can. If they just have systems that have very
indirect signatures, I think they are working very hard to get
the very best they can out of that.
What I am saying here is that for reasons that nobody
bothered to look at for some reason, there is a system that
gives you the combination of a unique nuclear signature and a
very high signal-to-noise ratio, low false alarm rate that sort
of gets you away from reliance on all of these other signatures
that are very indirect.
Mr. Hunter. What system is that?
Dr. Canavan. Sir?
Mr. Hunter. What system is that? Does that system exist? I
mean does a company make that?
Dr. Canavan. No. This is my own little research project.
Well, maybe I should form a company.
Mr. Hunter. You want to talk to Gene Ray in San Diego. They
have a neutrino system that I have seen tested. They had a
lead-encased nuclear device--not a nuclear device, but lead-
encased nuke stuff in a car, and they have a system where it
does exactly what you say. And they are selling it to other
countries, not to us.
Dr. Canavan. Well, the neutrinos are nice, but they don't
interact very well, and the sources are terrible. But the thing
that is popular right now, the closest thing, is muon
detection, and that is what a company is testing in Freeport,
in the Bahamas.
Mr. Hunter. Yes.
Dr. Canavan. And that works well. But again, it just
measures mass, it does not measure nuclear signatures.
And so, you know, I don't want to criticize what other
people are doing. You do--you try--everybody is trying to put
together a good system, based on whatever we have, which ain't
much. After 9/11 it was basically nothing, right?
Mr. Hunter. Right.
Dr. Canavan. So people are trying very hard to do the right
thing. I am just saying I think this is a very nice system
which, for some reason, we just skipped over. And I would like
to see somebody pick it up and do it.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Doctor.
Ms. McSally?
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Grover, CBP testified that they are scanning--although
there is limitations to that--3 to 4 percent of containers that
are coming in, based on their high-risk designation. You just
testified that in the sample that you were talking about from a
couple years ago, of the group that they called high risk, it
only successfully identified 6 percent accurately to be high
risk, missing 94 percent of the actual high-risk containers is
what I understood. That is a pretty dismal number.
You since said that they have improved. Are we now at 7
percent and we are missing 93 percent, or where are we right
now? That was very disconcerting to hear.
Ms. Grover. So let's take a minute and talk about this. The
3- to 4-percent scanning, I think what they were referring to
is the percentage of containers that are ultimately subject to
the x-ray exam, the nonintrusive inspection exam----
Ms. McSally. Right.
Ms. Grover [continuing]. Right, that takes an image----
Ms. McSally. But their whole briefing and everything
yesterday was based on them identifying high threat, high risk.
Ms. Grover. Right. So roughly 1 percent of the cargo
shipments are identified as high risk. And those are the ones
that then are required to go through the NII [nonintrusive
inspection] so that there is an image that is taken, and the
image has to be read by a person.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Ms. Grover. And the question is then do we unpack the
container to find out what this is, or does it look like it is
OK and we can let it go through, right? And the procedure
varies at the different ports, based on what the rules are.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Ms. Grover. So, I think we are all in agreement that that
is, for the most part, occurring as intended, right? Some room
for improvement in the accurate identification of high-risk----
Ms. McSally. But you said previously----
Ms. Grover. Right. Right, right----
Ms. McSally [continuing]. It was 94 percent missed.
Ms. Grover. Right. So this is a proxy measure that CBP uses
to get a handle on how well does this ATS [Advanced Targeting
System] do at identifying high-risk cargo, right? Because they
don't really know the true accuracy of that system, because you
don't know what you----
Ms. McSally. What you missed.
Ms. Grover [continuing]. Have missed, right?
Ms. McSally. Right.
Ms. Grover. Because 99 percent of the shipments----
Ms. McSally. Right.
Ms. Grover [continuing]. Are determined to be low or medium
risk, and generally speaking, moving on through. So we don't
actually know what we have missed.
Ms. McSally. So did I misunderstand----
Ms. Grover. But----
Ms. McSally [continuing]. That 6 percent and 94 percent?
Ms. Grover. So--well, of the containers that are unpacked,
right, of the shipments that are actually subject to physical
exam, some number of those have contraband. And CBP keeps
records of that. And then they go back and they look and they
say, OK, this shipment was unpacked for whatever reason,
because it was high-risk or random or for some other reason. Of
the ones that we actually looked at, how many had contraband?
And then let's go back to the original designation and say was
it originally designated as high risk by the system or not.
And so, yes, for the 9 months or so of data that we looked
at in 2011, 2012, the system had only identified 6 percent as
high risk. So 94 percent were not. Now, subsequent to that, in
the process of responding to our recommendations, the last two
quarters of data that I saw were somewhere more in the
neighborhood of 25 to 50 percent, which is significantly
better.
Ms. McSally. Twenty-five to fifty correctly? There are 50
to 75 percent still missed?
Ms. Grover. Yes, and that is data from the, you know,
roughly late 2014----
Ms. McSally. OK.
Ms. Grover [continuing]. Time period. So I don't have
current data. But, yes, those are the last numbers we----
Ms. McSally. So this is still a problem. If our whole model
is based on them identifying high risk, and we are still
somewhere in, you know, less than 50 percent being correctly
identified, then that is still a problem.
Ms. Grover. They are still working on it.
Ms. McSally. OK. Mr. Espie, what you shared about not
getting access to classified information, you know, port
directors not having a sense of what the risks are, we have
heard similar things across the private sector in homeland
security related to those running sports arenas and other
potential targets and vulnerabilities for terrorist attack or
terrorist activity. This has been of high interest to me.
So you have no access to fusion centers, no--I just want to
make sure we clarify. No access to fusion centers. Would you be
interested in having access to fusion centers, you know,
classified information briefings for appropriate people at the
port? I mean this seems like a gaping hole. We have done better
sharing information across Federal agencies, but where we are
really missing is Federal down to State and local, and then
with the private sector is the real gaping hole.
So, could you just clarify what you would desire, as a
solution?
Mr. Espie. Thank you, yes. I am fortunate, though. I will
note that I do have a secret clearance, and the only reason I
do is because I pushed for it through our Baltimore FBI office
and through my previous holdings of certain clearances. So I am
one of the fortunate ones, probably one of the maybe three or
four in the country that have a clearance, in terms of port
security directors. So I would look for a model following 9/11
when you saw local police departments at the captain level or
so gaining clearances through becoming members of the executive
JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force] structure within the FBI
offices. I would certainly support that.
But overall, even though I have that clearance, I receive
nothing. I do not--I am not invited to classified briefings, I
do not receive classified information via DHS, Coast Guard. The
Bureau, they have just recently offered me to come to
classified executive-type briefings. They are held once a
month, so I am going to take advantage of that.
I am confident that if there was information I needed to
know, that I would be provided that from our Maryland fusion
center. However, I have been here 5 years and have received
zero.
Ms. McSally. So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area to
follow up on. You know, we have been addressing this issue with
trying to increase access for the private sector. I think we
could probably work together across our committees to maybe
work on some initiatives on this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. That is an easy fix. That is a quick, easy fix,
fixing that.
Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. Chair McSally, you seem to always anticipate
my questions. And you were on to one that is very important. I
was just thinking as you were asking your question about the
recent report that was produced by the French Government on the
terrorist attack in France. And the one thing that was most
prominent in that report and in other reports is the inability
or the lack of sharing of information between the various
elements of the safety net, the various police, the
intelligence community, and the like. And this is a question
that Mr. Espie just raised, and it is one that really needs to
have our attention. In all of these situations it comes back to
the lack of information being passed on through the various
organizations.
Leaving that aside, which does require our continued
attention, I want to go to an issue that I know you raised, Mr.
Espie, and that is the funding for port security. We heard from
the earlier testimony from the Customs and Border Protection
that they needed additional funding. I think they talked some
500 personnel. It wasn't clear where they needed to use that. I
suspect that--I hope that that is in the ports.
Mr. Espie, can you speak directly to that issue?
Mr. Espie. Yes, sir. Two issues. CBP, first of all, at the
Port of Baltimore, particularly after the budget concerns a few
years ago to whereas it appeared that DHS was negating some of
their requests, we have a sense of feel at the Port of
Baltimore that CBP is very strapped. In their inspections of
cargo within the sheds at our marine terminal, number one,
the--we see personnel working the RPMs [radiation portal
monitors] during the day, it is a long day. I think they are
very bored. I don't think they have enough changeover during
the day.
So basically, when these containers leave our ports through
going through the RPMs, you are going to have a GS-11 or GS-12,
in terms of their morale, motivation, to safeguard a potential
nuclear weapon leaving our port and going out to Chicago or the
Midwest or--as far as the way we ship.
And also we have had issues at our cruise terminal. We have
over 115 cruises through Carnival and Royal Caribbean, through
our cruise terminal there. And when there is a shortage,
seemingly, when we have--we mandate more power, they advise
that they do not have the overtime to pay their officers. So
that is a concern. So that is where you see that CBP is going
to start potentially charging port operators for extra
services, to include the RPMs. We have been advised that if the
RPMs are replaced, that it will be the port operator paying for
those and not CBP. So right now we are going through the
maintenance phase. So those are concerns.
Secondly, the Federal Port Security Grant Program, we live
and die by that. That is our physical security. We would have
no physical security at the Port of Baltimore, or at least not
in the realm that we have now, which we feel we have one of the
most innovative physical security programs in the country. We
would be in desperate needs. The State budgeting for that right
now, we do--when we receive a match or a grant, it is 25
percent. So the State's ability to cover the physical security
necessary is very difficult and short. So we would hope that
that program would stay intact.
And also we see----
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to interrupt you.
Mr. Espie. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Because I am out of time, literally out of
time. I would appreciate it if the--your association, the Port
Security Association, could develop a specific memo to us on
those kinds of shortcomings, and it is nationally as well as
with the Port of Baltimore.
Mr. Espie. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. A final point is that the layer--the
security through layered operations, beginning way off in
Kazakhstan all the way back home, becomes really important.
There is a funding issue in each one of these layers, and we
really need to get at the funding issues, as well as the
efficiency of those particular units along the way.
And so, these kinds of hearings are very, very important,
and particularly important that we do the combined hearing that
the two chairmen have put together here. That is really an
important piece of this, so that we are--at least we are
coordinated and knowledgeable with what we are doing here. I
want to really focus--and I will ask a series of questions, if
the chairs would allow me to do so, to the various witnesses
about specific funding shortfalls and the efficiency of the
programs that you are operating.
Final point is, Mr. Canavan, you have been here twice and
you have talked about a specific type of detection advice--
device.
We had earlier Ms. Harrington from NNSA [National Nuclear
Security Administration] here. Now, as far as I know, Los
Alamos is part of NNSA. And I am curious, and I will get into
it from Ms. Harrington as well as from you, about your device
and the applicability of that and the utility of that
particular mechanism that you have talked about as a detection
mechanism.
So, with that, I yield.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Gibbs?
Mr. Gibbs. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I represent the Great
Lakes region, so I want to talk to Mr. Weakley.
Great to see you, Jim. In your testimony you talk about the
Great Lakes States, and the two Canadian provinces; if they
were an entity in themselves, they would be the third largest
economy. So we know how important the Great Lakes is, and all
the commerce you move. And I am really concerned.
And my other subcommittee, I am chairman of the
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment. I have
stressed so much with the Army Corps of Engineers about the
importance of the Soo lock and the Poe lock, and that is--Poe
lock is over 100 years old. And my understanding, they built
cofferdams years ago and it is just sitting--seems like there
is a reluctance with the administration to want to, you know,
build new locks there and replace them.
So there's kind of two questions here, two themes. We have
the infrastructure issue, and then we have security of the
locks. I want to get both of that. But the first part of that
is on the Poe lock or the Soo locks there, if that were to shut
down, what happens to the Great Lakes?
Mr. Weakley. Well, sir, according to the DHS report, if the
lock, a single lock--the Poe, as you point out--is down for 6
months, North America is in a recession equal to or greater
than the one that we just experienced.
And also in a resource-based recession there is no fiscal
policy you can do to countermand that. So the closest thing we
have experienced as a Nation is the oil embargo from the 1970s.
It will wipe out the automobile industry, it will wipe out the
domestic steel industry. And really, it is a--it is the most
critical piece of infrastructure----
Mr. Gibbs. I think we got the picture. I think during World
War II they were so concerned about that I think they had, I
don't know----
Mr. Weakley. I think it was 20,000 troops stationed in
Michigan----
Mr. Gibbs. 20,000 troops regarding that.
Mr. Weakley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. So I have stressed so much on the Army Corps how
important this is, and there is this reluctance.
Do you know if there has been any initial cost estimates to
do the work there?
Mr. Weakley. So where we are at now is the Corps is engaged
in a 2-year economic reevaluation report, basically to
recalculate the benefit to cost ratio. To give the Corps
credit, they have acknowledged that they made some egregious
false assumptions in their latest 2004 report. That was a 10-
year process for them to make that admission. And now they are
recalculating the ratio. They said they could condense the 3-
year process into 2 years, which means in December of 2017 they
should be done with their math, which means probably December--
--
Mr. Gibbs. I told Secretary Darcy in my subcommittee
hearing that we could sit down right now and in 15 minutes get
a cost estimate benefit ratio. That should be a no-brainer.
Mr. Weakley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibbs. There is just a huge reluctance, I think, with
the administration to want to move forward on that.
OK. So that is the infrastructure issue. We know what
happens. This ought to be a top priority for our national
economic security and security in general.
What are your thoughts in the Great Lakes are, in the St.
Lawrence and all that, on overall security of our--of those
assets? We know if that lock breaks the economic catastrophe it
would be to the country. But are you satisfied with the
security arrangements by the Coast Guard, whoever, to make sure
that the lock isn't attacked, or any of the locks?
Mr. Weakley. Well, I think they could do more. I know the
Coast Guard has a security zone in the area. The Corps owns the
facility, so they have got primary responsibility. I was just
up there a couple weeks ago. They are executing a new security
contract.
They do, to their credit, make a distinction between the
American-flag vessels and the foreign vessels that go through.
They don't allow the foreign sailors off the ships. We are
allowed off our ships to handle lines, and stuff like that.
Clearly, they don't have the 20,000 troops that they did in
World War II.
I think the Corps is beginning to recognize the criticality
of that piece of infrastructure. And from a--I am very excited
about what we are doing with our radar to create more of a
visibility and provide real actionable material to the----
Mr. Gibbs. And my last question--we are out of time, but
are you--your companies that you represent, I think you said 15
of them, I forget how many you represent, working with Customs
and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and all their law
enforcement moving this commerce from the Great Lakes, are you
satisfied with the relationship? What are your thoughts?
Mr. Weakley. So, as a former Coast Guard officer, I will
expose my bias. We work really well with the Coast Guard. I
think with CBP it varies from port to port, and actually it
varies from cargo to cargo, and sometimes the distance, whether
you are within the Federal-recognized port, as well. I think
that relationship could be better.
Giving the Coast Guard credit, they are more centralized.
So if there is a problem with the Coast Guard, we can go to the
district commander. With CBP there is no regional office. So
there is a headquarters level and then they are very autonomous
at the local level. I think there could be room for improvement
along the CBP from the relationship aspect, as well as the
ability to execute.
Mr. Gibbs. OK, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Thanks for your service.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. For a minute I thought
you were talking about Polacks.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. Now I know you weren't. Poe lock.
Mr. Gibbs. You know, I know San Diego is important, but
Great Lakes are really important, too.
Mr. Hunter. Ms. Jackson Lee, you are recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman and ranking member
for their courtesies, and thank the witnesses as well as the
witnesses on panel 1. I was delayed because of a markup in the
Judiciary Committee, which fell under my subcommittee. But this
is an important hearing, and I want to acknowledge panel 1 and
thank panel 2 for their testimony.
Let me start by just citing part of the words said by
Director Dave Espie in his testimony, that the threat of
maritime terrorist smuggling appears to be increasing, possibly
in correlation with the flight of Syrian refugees to Europe.
And he noted an incident, I think, that occurred in Baltimore.
But I believe that it is clearly an important hearing that we
are addressing today in an examination of the maritime nuclear
smuggling threat and other port security and smuggling risks in
the United States.
I think our challenge, as Members of Congress, is to find
the how-to's or how does, but also the solutions to protect the
American people. I am particularly interested, of course, as a
former ranking member of our Border and Maritime Security
Subcommittee, but as well as a Member of Congress that has as
part of her jurisdiction one of the major ports of the United
States, and that is the Houston port.
I am a strong supporter of the Securing the Cities program,
and as well the monies that you all need, Mr. Espie, in doing
your job. So let me start off first by saying we will not solve
this problem by ignoring the fact that resources are needed,
not throwing money away, but fully funding the potential of
what our ports and what the Nation faces.
The Securing the Cities program mandated legislation to
assist State, local, tribal, and territorial governments in
creating and implementing and perfecting existing structures
for coordinated and integrated detection and interdiction of
nuclear or other radiological materials that are out of
regulatory control, and to support a wide matrix to deal with
identifying reporting on nuclear and other radioactive
materials, provide resources for detection analysis
communication, facilitate the establishment of protocol and
processes of effectively responding to threats--responding to
threats is key--and designating participating jurisdiction from
high-risk areas.
Our city has now received $30 million over a 5-year period,
which I am very glad to advocate and secure under the Securing
the Cities grant, and just received $3.5 million. And in his
absence I want to thank Dr. Brasure, who was in my district, as
we announced this very important step by Houston, creating or
working with the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to build
a robust regional nuclear detection capability.
So, I am going to pursue a line of questioning in the time
that I have remaining, and let me quickly do so--is to Dr.
Canavan, if you can remember my questions, please, I would
appreciate it. How accurately can the signature of radiological
and nuclear material tell the source of that material? That is
very important because we are talking about ships and
smuggling.
To Ms. Grover, thank you for your work in the GAO. In your
testimony you cite GAO's 2013 report which concluded that CBP
had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risk to cargo
since 2005. It is my understanding that they have since
developed a port risk matrix and priority map to help assess
whether changes need to be made to contain a security in each
of their ports. Is CBP utilizing this matrix and map to assess
CSI [Container Security Initiative] ports? Are there other
changes that should be made to ensure the CSI program is
functioning as intended? There lies a source of potential
nuclear material.
And finally, to Mr. Espie, you are one of the first
responders outside of the beltway. All across America you are
dealing with port security, formerly with the FBI. Are
resources going to local entities like yourself crucial in
making sure that we have the cover, the resources, the
detection that needs to be in place for something as
particularly indicting, explosive, and, if you will,
catastrophic, as a particular or potential nuclear incident by
something being smuggled into your port?
I would yield first to Dr. Canavan. Thank you.
Dr. Canavan. To me, ma'am?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield first to you, sir, for the
question. Did you hear the question that I asked?
Dr. Canavan. Well, I thought the question had to do with--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me read your question, sir. How
accurately can the signature of radiological and nuclear
material tell the source of that material?
Dr. Canavan. With radiological material, it is a little bit
difficult, because that is just sort of nuclear garbage, and
there is lots of it around the world. And you might get lucky,
and you might make an attribution, but I find that unlikely.
With nuclear weapons material, attribution is a little bit
cleaner--particularly if you intercept it before detonation--
because with--particularly with plutonium, the different groups
that make plutonium have different preferred ways of doing it,
so there might be some intermediate group that got control of
it or delivered it, but you have a fighting chance of knowing
who made it in the first place.
So, the attribution is kind of all across the spectrum. I
would say very little likelihood of attribution on the garbage
side, reasonable chance on the plutonium. For uranium, which is
a big problem right now, you know, it is just how long you want
to spend your centrifuges, your--and they are all derivatives
of Urenco's. Some people try to argue that you can do an
attribution there on the basis of their details. I kind of
doubt it, although that last statement is just my personal
guess.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Not at all, Doctor, thank you. Just one
followup. Can the trash that is hardest to detect provide major
damage and danger?
Dr. Canavan. No, ma'am. I didn't mean to say it couldn't
cause damage.
Ms. Jackson Lee. No, I am just asking.
Dr. Canavan. The thing is that the radiological threats,
the dirty bombs that we----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Dr. Canavan [continuing]. We have been working on for quite
some time, can cause a lot of economic damage because you can
spread them on somebody's street, or throw them in a building,
and then that is a real cost problem. But once that happens,
people will generally get the heck out of the way, so the loss
of life is smaller for that kind of weapon.
I come from a place where we worry a little bit less about
radiological insults than other places.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Dr. Canavan. When I first went to Los Alamos, I think we
had the universe's only known open pit plutonium mine. We dug
up the old plutonium residue from the war, moved it out, and
covered it with a thick layer of dirt. It took time and effort,
but worked well. So I may have a more casual attitude than
others towards dirty bombs. They are a real problem because
their materials are more accessible than those for weapons, but
they are not as catastrophic--particularly in terms of loss of
life. But I have experts here, right?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy.
If I can just--thank you, Doctor--if I could just allow both
Ms. Grover and Mr. Espie to finish, and I would be happy to
yield back.
Ms. Grover, you heard my question?
Ms. Grover. Yes, your question was about CBP's Container
Security Initiative program?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Ms. Grover. Which is an initiative under which CBP
targeters are placed at foreign ports, and it is operating at
about 60 ports right now. And so your observation is that in
2013 GAO found that while those ports had initially been
selected based on volume and other risk factors that, indeed,
the circumstances across the world can change, and we found
that CBP had not revisited the risk issues since around 2005.
And so, when GAO went in and looked at the situation, we
found that there were--some of the ports participating were not
high risk and, in fact, that there were not CBP targeters at
other very high-risk ports.
And so, yes, as you noted, CBP has developed a port risk
matrix and a map. They plan to update it every year, and to
apply that knowledge against the locations of the 60 ports
where they are working. And so if they follow through on that,
and use it, then they will at least have a good understanding
of the extent to which the program was operating at the highest
risk ports. But that remains to be seen, going forward, and
then to the extent to which they can make adjustments as
appropriate.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we need to be monitoring that. And are
you going to be assessing them again?
Ms. Grover. We will continue to keep track of their use of
that, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Mr. Espie, on your----
Mr. Espie. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Comments along with
resources.
Mr. Espie. Regarding funding--yes, ma'am. Regarding
funding, of course, at the port we have certain mandates we
must follow, the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and then
we have Federal mandates that come under the CBP jurisdiction,
specifically screening for nuclear smuggling, for example.
Do we have the resources, Port of Baltimore? No. You heard
the percentages of the screening that takes place overseas, or
once it comes to the port. I am there every day. I watch this.
I see a container ship have 8,000 TEUs on it. How many do they
screen a day? Twenty-five, thirty, maybe. You line up in a row,
they go through the VACIS [Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System]
machine, the x-ray machine, and they--while the other ones are
put into storage and units and they are shipped out the next
couple days. So the only security device you have left is the
RPM machine, which in some cases is 10 years old, the quality
is a question, and so forth.
The manpower is certainly a question for CBP because,
again, you watch the VACIS, the screening operation going on.
You have usually two or three CBP personnel there, the rest are
at the screening sheds. And then you will have one or two or
three at the RPM exits out of the terminal. So it is a great
problem for us and CBP, for the State of Maryland, and really,
the citizens of the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On the overall issue, then, resources are
needed across--you are talking about your State, but if you are
an example, it would mean that it happens elsewhere, as well.
Mr. Espie. Yes, ma'am. I am a member of the AAPA Security
Committee. It is consistent throughout the United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like--
thank you for your testimony--Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
unanimous consent to put into the record an article by MarEx
dated July 6, ``U.S. Ports Want More Action on Dirty Bomb
Prevention.''
Mr. Hunter. Without objection.
[The article is on pages 116-117.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. Well, here is what we
are trying to do here. We are trying to shape what we feel is
going to be probably the most dangerous thing that we can
encounter as a country, which is a nuclear device on American
soil. It is worse than someone shooting up a mall, it is--I
mean that is catastrophic. We all agree on that. And I think we
are on the precipice of a--let's call it nuclear material being
ubiquitous, much more than it is now. Once the Iranians start
getting more material, once the North Koreans get better at
creating more bad stuff, you are going to have nuclear devices,
nuclear material, weaponized nuclear material, I think,
throughout the entire world.
And I think if we all focus on a lot of different stuff,
but nothing that can affect the American people in the country
like a nuclear device going off that is possibly attributable
to a nation-state or possibly not. We have no retaliation, no
way to get back at somebody--nonstate actors, of course--that
will easily and happily throw their lives away to kill
Americans.
Anyway, that is what we are doing here. That is why Ms.
McSally and I are trying to shape this, because we are--I think
we are still in a relative safe zone where there is not a lot
of material out there, and we know who has it, we know where
they have it, we know how to stop it in the furthest reaches of
the world before it even gets to the U.S. or gets in the hands
of bad actors, right? But I think that is coming to an end. I
think we probably have a 5- to 10-year window, and then we need
to have something where we check everything, because it only
takes once, right?
And with that, thank you all for being here. Thanks for
your testimony, thanks for traveling out here. And the hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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