[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[H.A.S.C. No. 114-120]

HEARING

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

THE MISSILE DEFEAT POSTURE AND

STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES--

THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST

__________

HEARING HELD
APRIL 14, 2016

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

______

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk

C O N T E N T S

----------
Page

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 0
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................1 deg.

WITNESSES

Cashman, RDML Edward, USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Organization
Gortney, ADM William E., USN, Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command, U.S. Northern Command
McKeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Department of Defense
Pike, Barry J., Program Executive Officer, Missiles and Space,
U.S. Army
Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency

APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

Cashman, RDML Edward......................................... 98
Gortney, ADM William E....................................... 39
McKeon, Hon. Brian P......................................... 29
Pike, Barry J................................................ 89
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 27
Syring, VADM James D......................................... 51

Documents Submitted for the Record:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

Mr. Garamendi................................................ 109

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

Mr. Bishop................................................... 129
Mr. Cooper................................................... 128
Mr. Forbes................................................... 129
Mr. Rogers................................................... 113

THE MISSILE DEFEAT POSTURE AND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES--THE
FISCAL YEAR 2017 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST

----------

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 14, 2016.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rogers. I call this hearing of the House Armed Services
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. Welcome everybody
here today. Today we are holding an oversight hearing on the
missile defeat posture strategy of the United States, the
fiscal year 2017 President's budget request.
And, unfortunately, votes are going to be called on the
House floor between 3:00 and 3:30. So in order to make sure we
can get to the meat of the hearing, which is the Q and A
period, the ranking member and I have agreed that we are going
to dispense with our opening statements and the witnesses'
opening statements, so they will be submitted for the record in
their entirety, and we will go straight to questions.
[The prepared statements can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 27.]
Mr. Rogers. We are very fortunate today to have a very
distinguished panel. The witnesses we have are the Honorable
Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense
Policy, Department of Defense; Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander,
North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Northern
Command; Vice Admiral James Syring, Director, Missile Defense
Agency; Mr. Barry Pike, Principal Executive Officer, Missiles
and Space, U.S. Army; and Rear Admiral Edward Cashman,
Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization.
And Lieutenant General Mann is here somewhere. Or maybe
not. I think--well, that is for the closed session. That is
right. We will have Lieutenant General Mann here for the closed
session.
All right. And with that, like I said, we will dispense
with the opening statements and I will go directly to
recognizing myself for the first series of questions.
This will be for Admiral Syring and Admiral Gortney. Is the
Iran ballistic missile threat to the region, including Israel
or the United States, slowing in any respect since last year?
Admiral Gortney, would you like to go first?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, we have seen, as a result of JCPOA
[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the nuclear issue
temporarily, potentially permanently, taken off the table, but
we see them to continue to develop the propellent, the rocket
motor, and we assume they are continuing to develop a reentry
vehicle. So we see, of the three pieces that they need, a
nuclear weapon miniaturized to put on it, a delivery-capable
booster, and a reentry vehicle. We don't see the latter two
being slowed.
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Syring, did you want to offer anything
in addition to that?
Admiral Syring. I agree. I do not see it slowing in any
way.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Admiral Syring, we often talk about the
combatant commanders and military services for the unfunded
requirements list. Do you have an unfunded requirements list?
Admiral Syring. So there are gaps in the BMDS [Ballistic
Missile Defense System], but our----
Mr. Rogers. Please pull the microphone closer.
Admiral Syring. Sure. There are gaps in the BMDS currently
that are not funded, and they include advanced technology, a
space layer, and additional sensor capability as well.
Mr. Rogers. What funding do you require to meet the
combatant command requirement for THAAD [Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense] and SM-3s [Standard Missile 3]?
Admiral Syring. I am building seven THAAD batteries. The
stated requirement from the Army is nine. So I have a two-
battery gap today to the stated requirement. I am building at a
rate to fill out the seven batteries by the end of the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Plan].
Mr. Rogers. What about the Aegis system?
Admiral Syring. The Aegis system, 33 BMD [ballistic missile
defense] ships today, going to over 40 by the end of 2020,
2021; SM-3s, IAs and IBs, about 170 on path to 415 through the
FYDP. I do not have an end inventory objective yet for Aegis.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Are you funded to develop and deploy
defense against boost-glide missiles like those being developed
by Russia and China? How much would such development cost?
Admiral Syring. I am not funded.
Mr. Rogers. How much would it cost to do that?
Admiral Syring. I have asked for $23 million to begin a
low-power laser demonstrator this year to demonstrate the
feasibility by 2021.
Mr. Rogers. And let's see. Mr. Pike, I would like to call
your attention to the screens. You will see red, yellow, and
green highlighted areas which represent different decades of
key systems to the current Patriot radar employed by the U.S.
forces. I note these are the systems employed by the U.S. and
not our partner nations in the Patriot program.
[The graphics referred to are retained in the subcommittee
files and can be viewed upon request.]
Mr. Rogers. If the green represents the radar hardware that
is with 1990s vintage, which are expected to be obsolete in
2010, and it is now 2016, of course, would I be correct to say
that even under your radar digital processor programs, some of
the newest equipment in the radar, in this radar, the green
shaded area, will be older than any air defender who uses it?
Mr. Pike. Sir, I haven't done the math on that, but it is
aging technology, sir.
Mr. Rogers. So if I am correct, and we are to assume that
2028 initial funding of a new Patriot radar will occur, we will
have a radar system with components, in some cases, that are 58
years old?
Mr. Pike. Sir, we are continuing to modify and request
funds to modify the existing Patriot radar until we are able to
field the lower tier air missile defense sensor. The schedule
is not really established yet. It is 2028. The Army is meeting
this afternoon as a part of the Army Requirements Oversight
Council to establish the actual operational requirement. And
once that operational requirement is established, we will be
able to assess the maturity of the technology against the
requirement. And so that schedule that you have seen is not set
in stone.
Mr. Rogers. But you see what I have described. It is
completely unacceptable. Aren't there systems that we have
available that have been developed already that could meet the
needs that this system should be meeting that are available for
us to access from the private marketplace?
Mr. Pike. Sir, the Army conducted an analysis of
alternatives. It was a very broad analysis across all the
department, assessed all the available radars within the
Department of Defense, modifications to those existing radars
and the new radars all together. That analysis of alternatives
is complete through the Army. However, it is within OSD [Office
of the Secretary of Defense] for a sufficiency evaluation. And,
again, once that analysis of alternatives is complete and
delivered to the Congress as a part of the law, then we will be
able to go forward with an acquisition strategy, and a formal
schedule, and a materiel solution, none of which we have
currently today.
Mr. Rogers. I just want to be clear. Speaking only for
myself, I am not turning loose of this one. It is going to have
to be remedied.
Admiral Syring, if MDA [Missile Defense Agency] was
developing and procuring these radars with the missile--with
the acquisitions authorities you have, how much time would it
take for you to take care--or take care of this problem?
Admiral Syring. Mr. Chairman, I haven't----
Mr. Rogers. Please pull the mike.
Admiral Syring. I haven't looked at their specific
technology, their specific schedule, but I can talk to what we
did with LRDR [Long Range Discrimination Radar], which is the
current radar that is under contract today, where we had a very
defined requirement from the Joint Staff and had that under our
umbrella, had the technology proven actually through the Navy's
AMDR [Air and Missile Defense Radar] competition. So we didn't
have to go through any of the Milestone A to B activity. It is
going to take us 6\1/2\ years from start to finish.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. With that, I yield to the ranking member
for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Syring, the level of funding for MDA is lower than
in previous years. Can you explain this reduction for fiscal
year 2017?
Admiral Syring. Sir, it is lower and it is part of the
overall DOD [Department of Defense] top line reduction as well.
My share of that has lowered, you know, not an equal
percentage, but a similar percentage.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral, do you support successfully flight
testing the redesigned kill vehicle before making a final
production decision?
Admiral Syring. Completely.
Mr. Cooper. Again, Admiral Syring, is the schedule-driven
requirement of deploying 44 ground-based interceptors driving
undue risk in concurrency for acquiring and upgrading the
interceptors?
Admiral Syring. No, sir. We will flight test the last
configuration that will complete the 44 by 2017 in a very
complex ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] intercept
test later this year.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral Gortney, do you remain confident in the
national missile defense system's capability? The Government
Accountability Office stated in its February 2016 report that,
quote, ``several key aspects of missile defense have not been
demonstrated through flight testing,'' end of quote. Do you
agree?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, I am confident of the systems that I
am responsible for, the ballistic missile defense for the
homeland, and that----
Mr. Cooper. Is your mike on?
Admiral Gortney [continuing]. And that--the ballistic
missile defense for the homeland that I work with MDA, and also
the National Capital Region-Integrated Air and Missile Defense
System, high confidence in its ability to engage the threats
that it is designed to go against.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral Gortney and Admiral Syring, how many
successful flight intercept tests are needed to demonstrate
that interceptors work as intended and are reliable?
Admiral Syring. Sir, going forward, we have scheduled and
it is funded in the program to test before we field. For
example, the version that will go in next year will be flight
tested later this year. For the redesigned kill vehicle, we
have a nonintercept flight test and then an intercept flight
test followed by a second intercept flight test in 2020 before
that configuration will be fielded.
Mr. Cooper. So two successful flight tests make it
reliable?
Admiral Syring. It will be one nonintercept test, which we
will learn a lot, and then two intercept tests. And based on
the engineering that we get from the flight tests, along with
the ground testing that we will do, it will be a complete body
of evidence that will give us confidence in a decision to go to
full production.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral Syring, what is the appropriate level
of investment for boost phase missile defense?
Admiral Syring. I don't know, is the answer, sir. And I
don't know because I need to get to a technology feasibility
demonstration with some confidence in the next 4 to 5 years to
go prove that it is, one, technically feasible and, two, the
cost estimates that I am getting from industry for a long-term
program are affordable.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Pike, it is kind of shocking that the plan
for Patriot modernization is expected to take 12 years, and
that is assuming, I guess, you get approval this afternoon from
your committee. I join in the chairman's assessment we need to
do what we can to make that much faster.
All witnesses, should we start building an east coast
missile defense site?
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Cooper, we are aware of the requirement in
the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to look at this
and have something for a radar by 2020, and we have done the
work on environmental impact statement [EIS] for a possible
east coast site pursuant to a prior NDAA. It is not where we
would spend our next dollar in this budget, but it is something
we will be postured to do after the EIS, if a decision is made
to do that.
Mr. Cooper. Any other opinions?
Admiral Syring. I will speak before the commander.
Not at this time. Not this year, is the way I would
respond.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral Syring, a final question. Would
upgrading the Hawaii-based Aegis Ashore testing facility to a
fully operational site improve U.S. missile defense in the
region?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, potentially. Any sensor
improvement for Hawaii and, frankly, in the kill chain for the
BMDS, you know, east and west will improve our sensor and
discrimination capability.
Mr. Cooper. But you are talking sensors, not missiles?
Admiral Syring. Sensors first, sir, yes.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Representative Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of
you. Thank you those that are wearing uniform for your
commitment to protecting America and human freedom. I never
want to miss that moment to tell you how much we appreciate
you.
Admiral Syring, I for one am very grateful that a man of
your acumen is in the position that he is in. In 2011, the
Institute for Defense Analyses conducted a study, and in it, it
concluded a space-based interceptor layer would help defend
against the more challenging missile threats, including direct
ascent antisatellite missiles and antiship missiles. Now, I
know that it is imperative that at the right times we time the
development of these things. It is always good to be looking at
them and being potentially aware of the challenges that we may
face. But can you explain to this committee why this capability
might someday be important and it might be helpful to defend
not only our satellites, but potentially against antiship
missiles?
Admiral Syring. Mr. Franks, we have not in the recent years
studied that in great detail. We have done some costing
analysis of what a program may take and have some idea of the
technical challenges to the said interceptor layer. Obviously,
fielded interceptors in space worldwide from 20, 30 years ago,
work had been done to show that that could help, but, sir, we
haven't looked at it in the Department other than costing it
against the range of alternatives. And, frankly, the cost has
been overwhelming on what it would take and the technical
challenges.
Mr. Franks. Yeah. Well, I guess that might be part of why
some of us would kind of like to begin to reorient at least our
awareness in that direction.
As detailed in a 2014 ``Defense One'' article, in both 2007
and 2014, China, as I know you well know, tested rockets to
launch kinetic kill vehicles against satellites in low and high
orbits respectively. And both of these tests appear to indicate
that they have the capability to attack our space assets. And
in defending U.S. space assets against those direct ascent
antisatellite weapons, is that something that defending these
assets is ultimately included in the MDA mission?
Admiral Syring. Sir, if we can defer the answer to
classified session, I think we would----
Mr. Franks. All right.
Admiral Syring [continuing]. Have a very constructive
discussion on that point.
Mr. Franks. Okay. Would it be appropriate to ask if any
other agency has any concurrent mission in research and
development against to--the means to defend against these types
of weapons?
Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can defer that to a classified
session as well.
Mr. Franks. Okay. So let me rephrase this here a little,
because I think you are absolutely right. But it is appropriate
in this setting to suggest that a ballistic missile defense
layer in space would provide not just the U.S. the ultimate
high ground, it could provide a means to defending our space
systems from these ballistic ASATs [antisatellite weapons]. Is
that correct?
Admiral Syring. Sir, if it could--if it was technologically
feasible and affordable, which I think both, in my mind----
Mr. Franks. Important question.
Admiral Syring [continuing]. At this point are no; the
answer would be yes to your question. I have serious concerns
about the technical feasibility of interceptors in space, and I
have serious concerns about the long-term affordability of a
program like that.
Admiral Gortney. But, sir, that does not mean that the
Department is not looking at another alternative to go after
that problem set. There may be another mechanism, another way
to do that, and I know the Department is working on that.
Mr. Franks. Would you suggest that there is some efficacy
in maintaining an eye on that possibility?
Admiral Gortney. It is a little bit out of my lane here,
but, of course. We are going to look at what is the requirement
and then what is the way, the mechanism that gives us the best
value that is the most effective in order to solve that
particular problem set. And sometimes one overarching system
may be technically very hard and very expensive. But we can
talk to the other mechanisms we are using when we go
classified, sir.
Mr. Franks. Okay. And at this time--well, yeah. Perhaps I
would be running into the same challenge.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back here. And thank
you all.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Representative Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. And first, I apologize for not
being here for the opening statements. So I may be covering
some turf already handled.
Missile defense can be done in a couple of different ways.
The one I want to really focus on is directed energy. We have
talked about that in both classified and in open hearing. In
this open hearing, can you bring me up to date on where we are
with the directed energy issue?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. Working on two primary
technologies within MDA, the DPALs [diode pumped alkali laser]
technology that is being risk mitigated out at Livermore and
fiber combined laser technology at MIT [Massachusetts Institute
of Technology]. And, frankly, industry has been brought in over
the last year to 18 months in a big way in terms of what they
could potentially do with laser technology. We have asked this
year for funding support for a low-power laser demonstrator to
start this year to test in the 2020, 2021 timeframe to go prove
directed energy in a boost phase mode.
Mr. Garamendi. How much money have you asked for?
Admiral Syring. $23 million in fiscal year 2017 budget.
Mr. Garamendi. Did you miss some zeros?
Admiral Syring. No, sir. The----
Mr. Garamendi. And what will the $23 million do?
Admiral Syring. The 5-year program is $278 million; $23
million is the initial increment of funding required to get
concepts and contractors awarded.
Mr. Garamendi. And that is requested for this year's
budget?
Admiral Syring. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I recall something--didn't we do that last
year also?
Admiral Syring. Last year as well, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Did you get it?
Admiral Syring. No, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. It was in----
Admiral Syring. It was not appropriated. It was supported
by this committee and the authorizers, both House and Senate,
but was not appropriated.
Mr. Garamendi. Did the House appropriate it?
Admiral Syring. I will have to take that for the record in
terms of what their mark was before conference, but in the end,
it was----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I guess I am looking for names.
Admiral Syring. Sir----
Mr. Garamendi. Who killed it?
Admiral Syring. So, sir, part of this is this is new, it
was new last year, and I think there has been an education
required on our part to go explain to people exactly what this
demonstrator will do and that it is not a new airborne laser
747 project, which actually had benefit. But this is a very
much smaller scale demonstration to inform a future program,
and that is all. There is nothing more, nothing less. And I
believe industry is capable of competing and fielding a
technology demonstrator.
Mr. Garamendi. We have a classified session. I will wait
till that point. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral Syring, I would like to ask you about foreign
military sales [FMS] of an advanced THAAD system to United Arab
Emirates [UAE], and then get the Department's perspective on
that afterwards. But is that something, if they are willing to
front some of the cost of that, that we can afford? And are
there people on record, and including yourself, perhaps, that
would be in favor of this project?
Admiral Syring. Sure. Right now in the budget, we are at
the beginning concept feasibility level in terms of funding. I
don't have a complete program even in my budget yet for THAAD-
ER [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense-Extended Range]. The--
or a follow-on THAAD. There is industry concepts on it and,
frankly, some good thinking on that, and that, you know, there
would be policy involvement with this question as well in terms
of either a cooperative development on it or a full FMS case on
a development program. But I don't have a stated requirement
yet from the UAE for this capability. But certainly if we got
it, we would consider that along with policy.
Mr. Lamborn. Yeah, Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Lamborn, as a matter of general policy, our
regional missile defense approach is to seek cooperative
partners. So in theory, we certainly would want to encourage
that kind of cooperation, and as Admiral Syring said, we don't
have a program to go market with the Emirates, and nor have we
gotten a request from them for this. So if we got to that
stage, we would obviously need to look at some technology
releasability issues and the funding issues on each side. But
in theory, it is something we would certainly be open to.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. That is helpful. Thank you both for
saying that.
And, Admiral Syring, let me shift gears and ask about
concurrency. Both the MDA and special forces have some unique
capabilities in terms of rapid acquisition processes, and I
believe concurrency is part of that. And can you talk about how
that has been helpful to the MDA and what your perspective is?
Admiral Syring. Sir, there has been some great examples
recently that the agency has delivered in terms of meeting both
policy and State Department requirements and combatant
commander requirements. The example that comes to mind is
Romania and how quickly we were able to design, build, produce,
test, and field a system from an announcement that was back in
2009. And to do that in a foreign country with the cooperation
of the Romanian government, and all of the work that went in
not just with MDA, but whole-of-department approach on this,
including the Army Corps of Engineers, including many parts of
OSD, OSD Policy, it was remarkable in terms of us being able to
do that quickly with contracts--requirements, contracts, award,
and production and fielding. And I believe our authorities
enabled that.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I for one will go on record and say that
I think this is something we need to examine to make broader
than just MDA and special forces as we talk about acquisition
reform, which the chairman of the full committee, to his
credit, is very much wanting to push. So I think that this is
something we need to look at and expand it within the
Department of Defense.
Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can just--you had also asked
about concurrency. I think that is an important point. I think
that is the risk of what I talked about, to make sure that we
are managing concurrency as we go fast properly and not taking
excessive risk with either technology or funding.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Very good.
Does anyone else want to comment on that concept?
Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Admiral Syring, you are very popular
this afternoon, but I will warn Secretary McKeon, I have a
question for you, so----
The first question, though, for admiral is back to Mr.
Cooper's question on RKV [redesigned kill vehicle]. And I
understand how you answered it, but I want you to take a little
bit different approach on this and I want to ask you how are
you reducing acquisition risk itself for the RKV?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. Great question. The first--the
first part of acquisition of risk starts with design and system
engineering. And if we rush the cycle we are in now without
proper maturity and without meeting the proper technology or
design gates in terms of deliverables at certain points in the
design, you will fail in the end.
So this foundation that we are building with rigor and
depth on the system engineering that are going into the design
of the RKV is, in my view, the most important part. And what my
direction has been to the team that is working this, which is a
fantastic team, cross-industry team working this, is that we
will not proceed past major design review points if the
deliverables have not been met, and not been delivered, and do
not meet our entrance and exit criterias. And, sir, I can get
this to you. There is a very lengthy entrance and exit criteria
list for all of our design reviews and all of the gates that
this design has to pass through.
And the design maturity in the end, sir, will drive when
this thing is ready for test. I am planning for an end of 2018
test, but if the design maturity is not such, I will not test
in 2018. And to me, that is where we need to hold the line
here, is early on. And rushing programs through the design
phase, they are absolutely doomed to fail.
Mr. Larsen. Also, we had a conversation earlier. And just
help me understand this issue on THAAD and South Korea from a
technical operational perspective.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. I will leave the policy and the
State Department discussion to the Secretary. I will speak to
it from a materiel standpoint. There is no doubt that the
system can provide fantastic coverage capability for not only
our ally there, but our U.S. deployed forces. And I am
confident in the design of that system and its intercept
record. And if the decision were to be made, I stand by that it
is the right materiel solution.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Great. Well, then the follow-up is on the
policy, especially now in light of the National Assembly
election yesterday where the president's party lost the
majority and what the implications are. And so where are we
from a policy perspective with the South Koreans?
Mr. McKeon. As you know, Congressman, I think even we
discussed it last time I was here, we have made a decision to
begin the formal consultations with our Korean partners. And I
know there have been some meetings out in Korea looking at the
siting and the funding issues. I am not an expert on Korean
politics. I don't think this changes things for President Park
and her approach to this. So I think we are optimistic we will
get to a decision. I just don't have a timeline for you.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Okay. All right.
GAO [Government Accountability Office]? Is GAO here? No.
Okay. So we just have a report from GAO on this. Okay. I have
it right here. That is fine.
Who can answer the question for me, the difference between
what used to be called spiral development and now seems to be
called concurrency? Are those the same things?
Admiral Syring. Let me take that, and then maybe Mr. Pike
can add. When we talk of--when I think about--I will give you
my view. When I think about spiral development, I think about
fielding a capability and then improving the capability over
time.
Concurrency is the initial problem in developing that
initial capability, in terms of assuming too much technical or
cost risk as you develop an end item. And to me, they are two
different things.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Pike.
Mr. Pike. Sir, I absolutely concur.
Mr. Larsen. You concur with concurrency?
All right. Well, I just--with the few seconds, I just don't
believe we had a very good experience with spiral development.
Others may disagree with me on that. It sort of became a
moniker for getting things in the ground before they were
ready. That is my definition of it. And so I guess I would
differ with a few folks here that concurrency is something that
is different than that.
Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can just comment on that. That we
have testified, I have testified in this committee that the
direction was given to field this system quickly, and that very
foundation that I talked about in terms of maybe doing another
design turn or two before it was fielded, everybody says would
have benefited that program. And everything that we are doing
now is to work to improve what has been fielded, and I believe
we are on the right path.
Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Gortney and Admiral Syring, am I correct that under
the current plan for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense [GMD]
system, there are no operational spare ground-based
interceptors and that there will not be for at least 5 or 6
years?
Admiral Syring. Sir, we are--that is a correct statement.
We are using everything that has been put under contract in
terms of materiel buys to make our 44 by 2017, and to have
enough interceptors to do the testing that we need to do over
the next 3 or 4 years. Again, the new design, Mr. Brooks, is
paramount to buying additional interceptors. I do not want to
buy more of the same--of the old design.
Mr. Brooks. In your judgment, when exactly will there be
operational spares based on whatever is best designed?
Admiral Syring. Sir, as part of this budget, our first
priority is to get the redesigned kill vehicle tested and get
the older interceptors, the CE-1 interceptors, recapped with
that new design. And then as we work through that upgrade and
fielding path, there will be spares that are generated in
procurement to have some margin against the current inventory.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have a judgment as to what calendar year
we are talking about before we start building up the inventory
and have operational spares?
Admiral Syring. It will be in the 2025 timeframe most
likely, with our priority being fixing what is in the field
first.
Mr. Brooks. Is there anything that we in Congress should be
doing to expedite the availability of operational spares over
the next 9 years?
Admiral Syring. Sir, I would ask you to wait until we prove
the new kill vehicle design and the new booster design and test
it, and then we can talk about buying beyond what is in the
budget today.
Mr. Brooks. Admiral Gortney, do you have anything to add to
what Admiral Syring has just stated?
Admiral Gortney. No, sir. Again, the priorities that
Admiral Syring has put in place, I fully support. We need to
make that which we have as good as we can possibly make it
while we then go to the next stage, and those are the proper
investments.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Back to Admiral Syring. Yesterday
you mentioned in the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
that MDA made the decision to pivot back to the GMD program and
to increase the capacity and capability of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system. With a decrease of $75 million for
fiscal year 2017, what aspect of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system will assume the most risk?
Admiral Syring. Sir, if I can, we pivoted back to 44 by
2017, the Secretary of Defense made that decision, and we are
implementing it as MDA. That was a 2013 announcement by
Secretary Hagel in March. The 70, I think it was $79 million,
in terms of less funding than what we requested in 2017 for
GMD, there are no components of that that are going to accept
any appreciable risk because of that reduction.
We requested a large amount of funding in 2016 to get many
of the efforts that had not been started in GMD started, and
you have been very supportive of that request. And then over
time, some of those estimates have been refined. In addition,
the cut that we took in the endgame, based on the budget
agreement, in late 2015 had some effect on the GMD program
carrying part of that cut.
Mr. Brooks. North Korea has been testing ballistic missiles
at an unprecedented rate. And with a projected $800 million
reduction to Future Years Defense Program, what capabilities
are we delaying into the future with respect to the ground
systems and fire control on the one hand and the program
operations on the other?
Admiral Syring. We are not delaying anything that we
planned for or programmed in 2016, based on that reduction.
What we are delaying is--or taking a risk with specifically was
increasing the SM-3 procurement. Nothing associated with the
GMD system in terms of the planned modernization of the ground
system, operations and support, safety, any of those aspects
that are mission critical, have not been affected by that.
Sir, I was planning in fiscal year 2016 for $7.8 billion in
2017. And based on the budget agreement that came down in the
end, at the end of 2015, my number in the President's budget
was reduced to $7.5 billion as my share of the Department cut.
So it is really not 8.3 to 7.5. My President's budget request
in 2016 was actually 8.1. What was enacted was 8.3. So it was--
my request was 8.1, 7.8. It was enacted at 8.3. I would have
been 7.8 without the budget agreement. Budget agreement kicked
me down $300 million, kicked us down $300 million.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Syring and Admiral Gortney.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Admiral Syring, what are the risks of legislating or
setting in stone a requirement to conduct a set number of tests
before the RKV final production decision?
Admiral Syring. Obviously, in this budget, we have a
proposal and in our acquisition strategy that was signed by Mr.
Kendall that there will be one nonintercept and one intercept
test conducted to inform a production decision by him, not me.
There will be another intercept in 2020 that will happen before
really anything is fielded.
I would ask that you let us go through where we are in the
early stages of design and some of the testing of the
components, all of it very methodical and very laid out in
terms of the ground testing that will accompany our confidence
before a flight test, before we legislate that it needs to be
three or four or five flight tests.
I think what will happen, sir, is that certainly at a
minimum of two, the third flight test will give the warfighter
the final confidence that the configuration is ready to be
fielded. And I would say the third flight test, although not
necessary for an acquisition decision, will be an important
point for us before we go start pulling CE-1 interceptors out
of the ground with new RKVs.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr.
Takai, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Takai. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral Syring, it
is great to see you.
I have questions for you, Admiral. The first is,
alarmingly, this year North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear
test and also launched a satellite into orbit using long-range
ballistic missile technology. From your perspective, is there a
gap when it comes to missile defense for Hawaii right now due
to this threat?
Admiral Syring. If I can ask the commander to speak to
that, sir.
Mr. Takai. Okay.
Admiral Gortney. No, sir, I do not think there is a gap to
that particular threat. We are prepared to engage and protect
Hawaii, Alaska, and all the rest of the States with the
existing system, and have high confidence in its success.
Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you.
An Advanced Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR, prototype is
being tested at PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] in 2016.
The AMDR radar would provide significant capability to detect
and track advanced long-range ballistic missile threats. The
prototype will be moved from PMRF for combat systems
integration in 2017 unless a replacement radar is funded. I
have submitted an amendment for advanced funding for planning
and design to get a discriminating radar to Hawaii faster.
Are you, Admiral Syring, supportive of this effort?
Admiral Syring. Sir, as you know, Admiral Harris has been
open about the need for additional sensor capability in Hawaii.
And we are obviously very well aware of that requirement and
are looking at what the sensor options could be. But right now
it is a test site, and it has been a very effective test site.
I think it is fair to say that we in the Department will look
at options, to include sensoring, to see if there is a way to
answer the combatant commander's requirement in this area.
Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you.
And my final question has to do with the transitioning of
this test site from a testing facility to an operational one.
So in order to operationalize the PMRF, and specifically the
Aegis Ashore facility at PMRF in Kauai, a capability already in
place, it must first be certified against the very ICBMs and
the long-range missile technology that North Korea is
developing and testing. What are the plans to do this?
Admiral Syring. Right now there are no plans to do it, sir,
simply. And I would just characterize it a little differently,
if I can, sir, in terms of the sensor sort of options in that
part of the discussion with Admiral Harris is what additional
sensor capability can we provide the existing Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system in terms of more capability against a
more complex threat for Hawaii specifically. And that is the
discussion that I think needs to happen. And right now there
are no plans moving forward outside the Department to do that.
Not that we haven't heard and don't understand the combatant
commander's desire; it is a matter of what materiel solutions
are available and when, and how much do they cost, frankly. And
then what are the operational impacts, what are the secondary
effects. Operationalizing an Aegis Ashore site is no easy step.
There would be many parts of that in that equation.
And, sir, I don't know if you want to add.
Admiral Gortney. We cover Hawaii today with the sensors
that we have. But one of our key investment strategies in the
way ahead is sensors improvement, because if we get sensor
improvement, not just for Hawaii, but for the entire system,
for the east coast as well, then we drive our effectiveness up,
which drives our reliability way up, which drives our costs
down, when we get that sensor discrimination that we need to
continue to outpace the threat. So where the threat is today,
with the investments that we have, we are confident we can
continue to protect all of the States. And should that change,
then we will adjust fires on that investment strategy.
Mr. Takai. Right. So for us in Hawaii, as well as
discussions occurring in the media, and I think Admiral Harris
has been part of those discussions, there is some indication of
support and interest in operationalizing the facility on Kauai,
number one, and, number two, to use the Aegis Ashore platform
as the way forward.
I guess my question is--oh. I don't have--let me just say
this. I think we can't wait until North Korea launches
something that has precision that can detect and hit something
similar to Hawaii. We have got to be a little bit more
proactive.
Admiral Syring. Sir, let me just add to finish, if I can,
Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Takai. Okay.
Admiral Syring [continuing]. That there is an ongoing
sensor analysis of alternatives, that is extensive, looking at
all sensor gaps around the world for not just us, but for other
agencies and services, and certainly the Hawaii sensor
capability is part of it.
Mr. Takai. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Chairman
Turner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, when you were asked about whether or not we need
an east coast missile defense site, your answer was, ``not at
this time,'' meaning we don't need it now, which is a good
thing we don't need it now, because we can't possibly have one,
because there is a long lead time within which we need to
construct one.
I would like to work with you to clarify your answer,
because I think there are those with your answer of ``we don't
need it at this time'' or ``we don't need it now,'' who might
use that as an answer to indicate that the preparation that
this committee has undertaken for an east coast missile defense
site is needless or unnecessary. You don't mean that, right?
You don't mean that the work that Congress has done to prepare
for an east coast missile defense site is needless or
unnecessary?
Admiral Syring. Absolutely not.
Mr. Turner. Secondly, as you have articulated, I think,
very, very well, the rising threats from North Korea and Iran
are increasing threats that we are seeing that are happening at
just almost a frightening pace. Do you foresee a time at which
we might need the capability to respond to these threats of an
east coast missile defense site?
Admiral Syring. If I----
Mr. Turner. I was asking you, Admiral, because, again, they
were asking in a manner, I think, to utilize----
Admiral Syring. Okay.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. Your statement----
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. To indicate that it is not
necessary.
Admiral Syring. Let me take that. We have a very systematic
investment plan, which we have talked about, in terms of how we
are improving the current fielded interceptors, and that is
extensive and has required funding and budget this committee
has supported, sir. And you are----
Mr. Turner. Well, you are looking out for the future----
Admiral Syring. Absolutely.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. You are looking out, and you do
see a time----
Admiral Syring. I do.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. Where that additional capability
would be?
Admiral Syring. I see a time when additional capacity will
need to be talked about----
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Admiral Syring [continuing]. Depending on where Iran goes
with their threat development.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. McKeon, this committee is charged with the
responsibility of looking at our architecture to be able to see
what our adversaries are doing and also respond to what our
adversaries see we are doing. One of the areas that we are
concerned with, obviously, is the Open Skies Treaty and Russia.
General Stewart, head of the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency],
testified that Russia gets, quote, ``incredible foundational
intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of
our facilities. So my perspective,'' again being his, ``it
gives them a significant advantage, and I would love to deny
the Russians having that capability.''
Mr. McKeon, is Russia permitting overflights of
Kaliningrad, which of course are permitted under the treaty?
Mr. McKeon. No. They have placed restrictions on flights
over Kaliningrad.
Mr. Turner. Is that a violation of the Open Skies Treaty?
Mr. McKeon. We have raised that as a compliance concern,
Mr. Turner, and I believe it is highlighted a little
differently in the compliance report we have just submitted to
you.
Mr. Turner. Have you personally advocated that, as in your
role, you make a recommendation that Russia be found in
violation?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, I hesitate to talk about what I recommend
to my Secretary in internal deliberations. What I can say to
you here, and I would be happy to discuss in a little more
detail in the closed session, is we have expressed concern as a
government about Russia's compliance with Open Skies. We have
taken a view within our government that while we have
obligations under the treaty, we will perform under those
obligations and no more; that is, we will not give them any
extra benefit.
Mr. Turner. Well, Mr. McKeon, obviously the concern that we
have is if there are those who believe, perhaps yourself even--
because our indication is that we are hearing that you do
believe that they are violating the Open Skies Treaty, and
there are others who do believe so as a result of issues like
Kaliningrad and overflights--that by our continued compliance,
especially in light of General Stewart saying that it puts it
as a distinct advantage, that we are in fact, you know, showing
all of our cards while we are allowing them to restrict our
capabilities. I mean, isn't that a significant concern, is we
are letting somebody else see what we are doing and we are not
getting to see what they are doing, supposedly that was
permitted under a treaty?
Mr. McKeon. Well, Congressman, we are overflying the
Russian Federation territory. In fact, we have more Open Skies
flights over Russia than Russia does over the United States.
There are restrictions, as you----
Mr. Turner. I think it isn't an issue just of number of
flights, but isn't it an issue of advanced sensors? I mean,
hasn't the Supreme Allied Commander indicated he has concerns
over the advanced sensors that might be used in overflights
over Europe?
Mr. McKeon. Yes. As you will recall, Congressman, a couple
of years ago, the Russians sought to certify an electro-optical
sensor on the plane they used to fly over Europe. It is a
digital rather than using wet film. And we went through the
certification process on that and learned a lot of lessons from
that for possible certification of a plane that would overfly
the United States with a similar capability.
Mr. Turner. Mr. McKeon, obviously since we have concerns
that Russia may be violating the Open Skies Treaty, and from
the testimonies we have been receiving, there are serious
concerns about what Russia learns in the Open Skies Treaty. And
also the administration now, although it took forever, is
finally acknowledging Russia's violating of the INF Treaty.
Shouldn't there be a concern for a pause in extending the
START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty for an additional 5
years? And could you please tell us if you believe it is
premature of the administration? I understand that they are
pushing for a 5-year extension of the New START Treaty. Is
there concern that we might be needing to evaluate Russia's
actions, especially in their aggressiveness that we are seeing
in Ukraine and the overflights? We all just watched the news
and watched their planes buzzing us. Is there a point where we
might--should be pausing?
Mr. McKeon. Congressman, as an administration, we have not
made a decision about whether to seek the extension of the New
START Treaty, which does not expire until 2021. I think----
Mr. Turner. Would your recommendation be that it is
premature to do that now?
Mr. McKeon. Again, sir, I don't want to give you what my
recommendation would be in internal deliberations. What I would
say is that one of the factors that we need to take into
account is the concerns that you have identified and----
Mr. Turner. Mr. McKeon, I just want you to know that----
Mr. McKeon [continuing]. We share.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. I think it is really difficult for
us as policymakers to have people like yourself that have such
important positions as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy to say that you don't want to tell us what
your recommendations are with respect to policy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Fleming, for 5 minutes.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admirals Gortney and Syring, this question is for you.
Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon reported
that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. And does
North Korea, in fact, have such capability and is it testing
solid rocket motors for such a missile?
Admiral Gortney. Sir, the Intel [Intelligence] Community
assesses the probability of North Korea fielding a successful
road-mobile ICBM with a miniaturized nuclear device that can
range the homeland as low.
As the commander accountable for defending the homeland, I
choose to assess that he does have that capability. And I think
it is the prudent course of action, it is what I think the
American people would like me to base my readiness assessment
on, to be prepared to engage it. So we are prepared to engage
it today, 24 hours a day, 365 days out of the year.
As it progresses, the real key piece here is he hasn't
tested the end-to-end capability in order to do it. He has
displayed the ability through the TD-2 space launch to put that
in there, but the reentry vehicle that needs to go with it, the
solid rocket fuel, we need to see that test, that end-to-end
test. But I am not waiting for that end-to-end test on my
assessment.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. And sort of an extension of that
question, can North Korea's KN-08 road-mobile ICBM target all
of the United States if indeed--or I guess a better way to put
it based on your response is, are you assuming that it can
target anywhere in the United States, including the continental
United States?
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. I assess that it can range the
homeland that I am tasked to defend, and we are prepared to
engage it for the area that we assess it to be able to reach.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. And can you remind this committee why
road-mobile missiles are a defense challenge for us?
Admiral Gortney. Because they are mobile and they are very
easy to conceal. Previously, you know, when North Korea
assembles a rocket, we have intel that we can detect through
all forms of intel. When you get into a road-mobile target, it
is very, very difficult to be able to track, quickly set up,
and shoot. Most of my career, I dropped bombs for a living, and
mobile targets are what always caused me pause. And that is
exactly why this is a tough challenge for us.
Dr. Fleming. So while it may be difficult to detect, you
suggested a little earlier that its payload may not be as
significant as something that would be ground based. Would that
be fair to say, or what is your opinion on that?
Admiral Gortney. No, sir. We assess that they have the
ability on the KN-08 to--I assess that he has the ability to
miniaturize a nuclear weapon and range to homeland with that
warhead.
Dr. Fleming. I see. Okay.
Admiral Gortney. Again, but we have not seen the end-to-end
test of that.
Dr. Fleming. Right. Okay. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKeon and Admiral Gortney, in your written statement,
you both mentioned, quote, ``left-of-launch,'' unquote,
capabilities. Can you elaborate? Are you talking about
destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before they are
launched at us? Is that the point?
Admiral Gortney. I can go into some detail at the unclass
[unclassified] level and I will go into much greater detail for
you in the classified level. But the current path that we are
on with both theater ballistic missile defense and ballistic
missile defense for the homeland against the ICBM threat is a
very expensive approach. We are shooting down with very
expensive rockets, potentially very inexpensive rockets, and we
are only engaging it in midcourse. For both types of threats it
is midcourse as we go forward.
What we need to be able to do is engage it throughout its
particular kill chain, so keep them from getting on the rails,
detect them, and get them on the rails, hit them while they are
still on the rails before launch, provided we have the rules of
engagement to do that; boost phase engagement, which is why the
laser designation--laser approach that MDA is doing is so
important, multiple times, knock down the raid count; and then
continue to engage it in midcourse, but with more warheads in
space, smarter, more reliable multi-object kill vehicle, maybe
five warheads in space that are actually communicating with
each other to drive the raid count down significantly. And
those are the investments that MDA, with your all's full
support, have put in place to see which of those technologies
throughout a flight of the missile is so important for us.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. What kind of intelligence would we need
for the President to order a preemptive attack against a state
preparing to launch a missile against the United States?
Admiral Gortney. I am going to have to take that at the
classified level.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. How well are we postured to execute
left-of-launch operations? Could we execute left-of-launch
operations today if we had to?
Admiral Gortney. I will defer to the classified session and
answer you there, sir.
Mr. Coffman. What more can Congress do to ensure our
military forces have the capabilities and intelligence they
would need to execute left-of-launch operations?
Admiral Gortney. Continue to make the investments from the
MDA realm, support those investments that we are asking for,
particularly the--make what we have the best as what we
possibly can make it, and then those investments in R&D
[research and development].
Now, there is another avenue that we can talk about in
classified for those same sorts of investments are absolutely
critical. But I also think it is important to highlight that
what Admiral Syring has put in the budget is research and
development to see what technologies will play out. Once we
make a decision of which of those are going to give us the best
value, then we will be having to come to your committee again
for investments to actually field those capabilities.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Admiral Syring, how much longer would it take and how much
more would it cost for you to develop, test, and field a long-
range discrimination radar in the 5000 series in a redesigned
kill vehicle?
Admiral Syring. If I can just clarify, Mr. Chairman, in DOD
5000?
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
Admiral Syring. Sir, I haven't done that analysis, but I
would be happy to. We were able to--and I will just reiterate
this. We were able to, with Mr. Kendall's help, Admiral
Winnefeld's help at the time, turn our requirement through the
JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] process in about 6
weeks, 6 weeks, and that is giving me the top cover for this
radar.
And our decision to use existing technology, I thought, was
huge in terms of not having to go through the risk reduction
phase between Milestone A and B, where we chose--and I think I
got a question over here--the similar GaN [gallium nitride], S-
band technology that is in the AMDR [Air and Missile Defense]
radar. So there were some decisions that we made both in the
requirement and in the technology that we chose that enabled us
to go to contract award in less than 2 years.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Admiral, recently the press reported that
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said he had obtained an
agreement with Secretary Kerry to launch a dialogue about the
U.S. missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Moscow argues
the system is a threat to its security.
As the director of Missile Defense Agency, what do you know
about this dialogue and what has the United States signed up to
discuss?
Admiral Syring. I am not aware of the dialogue, and my
answer is, nothing.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. McKeon, what can you tell us about that, if
anything?
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, we have been talking to the
Russians on and off since 2009 about what the EPAA [European
Phased Adaptive Approach] is and is not. And I think they have
a pretty clear understanding of the system, but they continue
to make various arguments that it is a threat to them or a
violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces]
Treaty, or other statements that we don't agree with and find
unacceptable. Just in the last couple of days, there was an
assertion made by some senior Russian security official that we
were going to put nuclear warheads on missiles at the site in
Romania and threaten Russia, which is just nonsense.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. McKeon, do you understand that in any way
that the United States is willing to depart from its current
position on the EPAA, what we will have laid out to happen with
that?
Mr. McKeon. No.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Admiral Syring, Secretary Kerry has been
spending quite a bit of time focused on missile defense lately.
He has also invited the People's Republic of China to receive
technical briefings on the capability of THAAD, including if
deployed in South Korea. What do you know about the briefings
the Secretary has offered, if anything?
Admiral Syring. Nothing, sir. We haven't been asked.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Admiral, you are aware of MDA or MDA
contractors being targeted or, quote, ``hacked,'' by groups or
entities linked to China or the Chinese military?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. You are. Can you tell us anything about that in
open session?
Admiral Syring. Let me just give you the answer
unclassified, and then we can go deeper classified, if that is
okay, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Admiral Syring. I testified yesterday that I viewed the
cyber threat that I specifically faced with MDA and the systems
that we are fielding on par with any intercontinental ballistic
missile threat that either Iran or North Korea possess. We have
taken inordinate steps to protect both our classified and
unclassified networks from attack, constant 24/7 monitoring
with teams in place, plus good materiel protections of those
systems.
My biggest concern remains in our cleared defense
contractor base and their protections. I think my view is, is
that they are continuing to try to attack my government
networks every day, classified and unclassified, but where they
are going next, and we have gotten examples of this, is to my
cleared defense contractors with the unclassified controlled
technical information. And what we have got to do is get them
up to where we are in terms of our protection levels. And I
view it as a very near term, very real requirement across the
BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System].
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The ranking member is recognized for any additional
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
expeditious nature of this public portion of the hearing. I am
going to hold my further questions to the classified session.
Mr. Rogers. Are there any other members that have questions
in this open session?
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, I could address the question you
gave to Admiral Syring about----
Mr. Rogers. Please do.
Mr. McKeon [continuing]. Secretary Kerry and China and
THAAD.
Mr. Rogers. Please.
Mr. McKeon. Similar to the Russians, we have offered to
explain to them what THAAD is and is not and why it is not a
threat to their deterrent were we to deploy it in the Republic
of Korea. They have not taken us up on this offer. We have a
firm view, as expressed previously, this is about protecting
our deployed forces and our Korean partners, and has nothing to
do with China or China's deterrent, and they shouldn't worry
about it.
Mr. Rogers. But we are going to talk more about that in the
classified session, but I appreciate that comment.
We are supposed to be called for votes at any minute, so I
think what I will do is rather than get us into the classified
setting and then have to be pulled away, we will just adjourn
until 10 minutes after the next vote series concludes. If they
call us in the next 5 or 6 minutes, you are looking at about 45
minutes after that, so it will be around 3:45 to 3:50 when we
reconvene for the classified portion of this hearing.
And with that, this hearing is suspend--no, it is not
adjourned. We are not----
Admiral Gortney. Recessed.
Mr. Rogers. Recessed. There you go. I knew you was good for
something.
[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]

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A P P E N D I X

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 14, 2016

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING

April 14, 2016

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Admiral Syring. Yes, the House Appropriations Committee supported
MDA's PB16 Request of $19.9 million for Directed Energy Prototype
Development in the Technology Maturation Initiatives program element.
[See page 7.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

April 14, 2016

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. Rogers. Is the United States willing to depart in any way from
the EPAA as laid out and planned today?
Mr. McKeon. Our commitment to EPAA remains firm. The approach is
specifically designed to be able to adapt to the ballistic missile
threat posed to our deployed forces and allies in Europe. That said, we
have no plans to depart from the deployment and sustainment of the
missile defense sites in Europe, or any other part of the EPAA, as it
is planned today.
Mr. Rogers. As the ranking DOD witness here today, does the
Department support a partnership between the UAE and the U.S. to
develop a missile defense capability to respond to emerging threats
(e.g., an evolved extended-range THAAD system)?
Mr. McKeon. DOD does support a partnership between UAE and the
United States to develop or acquire missile defense capabilities to
respond to emerging threats. It is premature to speculate on the
specific systems that might be appropriate for addressing those
threats.
Mr. Rogers. I understand the U.S. is discussing a Foreign Military
Sales case with Qatar for THAAD. Why is this case important for Qatar
and THAAD? Can we work together to accelerate this case to make sure
Qatar has these critical missile defense systems prior to the World Cup
in 2022? How?
Mr. McKeon. Qatar is an important partner in missile defense
activities in the Gulf region that has demonstrated its commitment to
acquiring a layered missile defense architecture by purchasing PATRIOT
PAC-3 systems and exploring the possibility of buying the Terminal
High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system and an early warning radar.
Qatar has expressed a desire to phase acquisition of these elements.
Qatar signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case with the United States
Army for PATRIOT PAC-3 and is in ongoing discussions concerning an
early warning radar. The Department will continue to support Qatar's
acquisition of ballistic missile defense capabilities. Additionally, we
will continue working with Qatar within the context of the Gulf
Cooperation Council to increase interoperable regional missile defense
capabilities.
Mr. Rogers. Why is it important that the European Phased Adaptive
Approach reach its Initial Operating Capability, especially the Romania
Aegis Ashore Site, at the Warsaw Summit this summer? Why is that
important for the United States, our allies, and the NATO alliance
itself?
Mr. McKeon. NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) remains critical
to U.S. and Allied security. As long as Iran continues to develop and
deploy ballistic missiles, the United States will work with our allies
and partners to defend against this threat. The aim of NATO BMD is to
provide full coverage and protection of all NATO European populations
and U.S. forces in Europe from ballistic missiles originating from the
Middle East. Moreover, NATO's declaration of BMD Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) at Warsaw sends three important messages: first, that
the United States is committed to the defense of our deployed forces
and Allies by increasing the capability of NATO BMD; second, that
Allies recognize the importance of this contribution; third, that NATO
follows through on its commitments to field a missile defense command
and control capability.
Mr. Rogers. What is left-of-launch capability? In other words,
you're talking about destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before
they're launched at us?
Mr. McKeon. Left-of-launch capabilities contribute to defeating or
degrading ballistic missiles before they are launched. These
capabilities may be non-kinetic or kinetic; they span a wide range of
tools developed across the Department, and include both active and
passive activities. These capabilities provide U.S. decision-makers
additional tools and opportunities to defeat missiles across the entire
kill-chain. This reduces the burden on our ``right-of-launch''
ballistic missile defenses. Taken together, ``left-of-launch'' and
``right-of-launch'' capabilities will lead to a more effective and
resilient approach to defeat adversary ballistic missile threats.
Mr. Rogers. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or
war games you have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic
missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was
observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out
such capability? If so, please identify and describe such observed
areas needing policy guidance from OSD.
Mr. McKeon. Although I have not personally participated in a policy
wargame involving left-of-launch missile defense, the recently-
completed NIMBLE TITAN 16 wargame examined left-of-launch missile
defeat, to include the circumstances under which several partners and
allies would support left-of-launch efforts.
I believe we have sufficient policy guidance at this time to carry
out left-of-launch ballistic missile defeat successfully.
Mr. Rogers. Can the KN-08 road-mobile ICBM target all of the United
States, including the continental United States? Please reply in
detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum
extent possible.
Admiral Gortney. DIA assesses at the unclassified level that the
KN08 ICBM has a maximum range of over 12,000 kilometers, which would
enable it to strike all of the continental United States if
successfully deployed.
Mr. Rogers. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon has
reported that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. Does
North Korea have a new road-mobile ICBM? Is it testing solid-rocket
motors for such a missile? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your
response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Gortney. During a parade in October 2015, North Korea
displayed a multi-stage missile that differed in design from the KN08
ICBMs that were featured in previous parades. However, we don't know
how the new missile is configured, what propulsion system it uses, or
whether it represents a workable missile design.
Mr. Rogers. Can you remind this committee why road-mobile missiles
are a defense challenge for us? And what about such missiles with solid
fuel?
Admiral Gortney. Mobile missiles increase an adversary's
operational flexibility and survivability. This complicates active
defense planning. Changes to fuel types indicate some level of
programmatic advancement, potentially increasing their reliability.
Mr. Rogers. Who is integrating the homeland cruise missile defense
program for the DOD? We have Army systems, Air Force systems, Navy
systems. Who is in charge? Is there a single acquisition authority?
Admiral Gortney. NORAD conducts aerospace warning and control of
North America and, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, determines the
operational requirements for defense against aerospace threats, to
include cruise missiles. In turn, the Services provide the capabilities
to meet the approved defense requirements, and NORAD operationally
integrates the homeland cruise missile defense capabilities for the
U.S. and Canada. Recommend your acquisition authority questions be
addressed to OUSD (AT&L).
Mr. Rogers. Is JLENS important? Why? Is there a gap in our security
architecture without it? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your
response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Gortney. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Am I correct that under the current plan for the
ground-based midcourse defense system, there are no operational spares
GBIs for, is it 5 or 6 years? It's well into the 2020s, right? What
happens if there is an unplanned failure? Please reply in detail.
Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent
possible.
Admiral Gortney. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is leading this
effort and thus we recommend contacting VADM Syring for sparing
specifics. MDA remains on track for 44 GBIs emplaced and available by
2017, in accordance with Secretary of Defense direction.
Mr. Rogers. Is this reality (the lack of operational spares
referenced in the previous question) an artifact of years of under-
investment in the GMD system? What is the best way to mitigate this
risk?
Admiral Gortney. This question is specific to Ballistic Missile
Defense System programmatics; recommend contacting the Missile Defense
Agency regarding investments in the GMD system.
Mr. Rogers. What is left-of-launch capability? In other words,
you're talking about destroying ballistic missiles on the ground before
they're launched at us?
Admiral Gortney. Left-of-launch capabilities encompass all military
efforts to deny the adversary the ability to launch ballistic missiles.
The development of left-of-launch capabilities provides the U.S.
decision-makers additional tools and opportunities to defeat ballistic
missiles before they are launched.
Mr. Rogers. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or
war games you have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic
missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was
observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out
such capability? If so, please identify and describe such observed
areas needing policy guidance from OSD.
Admiral Gortney. USNORTHCOM participated in the Joint Staff-hosted
NIMBLE STAR II TTX (March 2015), as well as the PACAF-hosted NEPTUNE
HAWK TTX (July 2015). For execution of our homeland Ballistic Missile
Defense mission, we have sufficient policy guidance.
Mr. Rogers. What kind of intelligence do we need to possess in
order for the President to order a preemptive attack on a state
possessing nuclear weapons?
Admiral Gortney. The President would likely need timely and
reliable intelligence on the adversary's intentions, as well as
persistent tracking of the adversary's strategic assets to ensure
preemptive attack success and also to mitigate risk of retaliation.
Mr. Rogers. Are we outpacing the threat? How do you evaluate
``outpacing'' the threat? Based on what criteria? Please provide a
detailed list of adversary developments regarding ballistic missile
capability that affected our ability to ``outpace'' the threat. What
developments by adversaries, if any, have surprised you? Please reply
in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum
extent possible.
Admiral Gortney. The Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system
is capable of defeating the ICBM threat currently posed by North Korea.
However, the North Korean threat continues to mature, while
developments within the Iranian missile program could lead to the
emergence of an ICBM threat from that country in the coming years as
well. We believe that continued funding of programs, such as the Re-
designed Kill Vehicle, Long Range Discrimination Radar, two/three-stage
selectable Ground-based Interceptor, and the Space-based Kill
Assessment experiment, is necessary to maintain our strategic
advantage.
Mr. Rogers. It has been widely asserted that one of the most likely
ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces would be a raid scenario
involving several enemy ballistic missiles fired near simultaneously.
How is the MDA preparing for this scenario and what testing is planned
to validate our BMDS capabilities against this threat?
Admiral Syring. The BMDS and each of the elements (including
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD); Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD); Aegis; and Command and Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC)) are designed and tested to provide performance
against raids with multiple ballistic missile threats in the air
simultaneously. The BMDS Specification includes raid requirements that
are allocated to element-level specifications.
MDA has demonstrated raid defense capability in both ground tests
and flight tests at the system and element levels. MDA has successfully
conducted testing for homeland and regional defense against raids in
numerous integrated ground tests that incorporate hardware-in-the-loop
assets and threat injection, as well as distributed ground tests that
incorporate deployed operational assets. MDA has conducted Flight Test
Standard Missile (FTM) 13, demonstrating Aegis against two near
simultaneous missile launches. For the THAAD system, MDA conducted
Flight Test THAAD (FTT) 12, successfully demonstrating THAAD against
multiple near simultaneous missile launches. At the system level, MDA
conducted Flight Test Integrated (FTI) 01 in 2012 with Aegis, THAAD,
and Patriot engaging three ballistic missile targets and two cruise
missile targets. MDA conducted Flight Test Operational (FTO)-01 in 2013
with Aegis and THAAD each engaging a ballistic missile target. MDA
conducted Flight Test Operational (FTO) 02 Event 2a in 2015 with Aegis
and THAAD engaging two ballistic missile targets and one cruise missile
target.
MDA will continue to validate BMDS capabilities against raids in
future ground testing. In addition, MDA has planned several flight
tests in the Integrated Master Test Plan version 17.1 that involve
ballistic missile raid scenarios. FTO 03 Event 1 will test Aegis and
Aegis Ashore against two ballistic missiles. FTO 03 Event 2 will test
Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot against three ballistic missiles and two
cruise missiles. FTO 04 will test GMD simultaneously engaging two long-
range ballistic missiles.
Mr. Rogers. We know that the MDA has utilized several low cost
target options to meet schedule and testing requirements against short-
range and medium-range range threats in recent years. What steps is the
MDA taking to identify and develop new low cost target options to meet
emerging testing requirements for intermediate-range (IRBM) and inter-
continental (ICBM) ballistic missile threat scenarios.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is coordinating
with the Intelligence Community to understand assessments related to
emerging threats in order to establish requirements for all target
development and testing needs using intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class
targets. Regarding lowering the costs of the current IRBM and ICBM
targets, MDA has implemented innovative solutions to address near-term
threat changes by leveraging previously incurred non-recurring
engineering and making incremental upgrades to meet target requirements
related to evolving missions and threat. Additionally, MDA is
conducting market research through a request for information to
determine interest and capability to design, develop, produce, and
launch multiple range-class targets. The market research will shape
future target acquisition decisions to reduce the cost of flight tests.
Mr. Rogers. We understand that the MDA has successfully flown low
cost, subscale targets utilizing surplus solid rocket motor assets to
meet specific mission requirements and critical schedule milestones. Is
the MDA taking steps to assure that solid rocket motors will continue
to be available to be used for low cost targets in support of BMDS
testing?
Admiral Syring. Current Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Integrated
Master Test Plan baseline includes low cost targets utilizing surplus
solid rocket motors through fiscal year 2022. As a part of the MDA
objective to reduce the cost of targets, the program continually
monitors U.S. Government surplus and solid rocket motor industry
production for applicability to meet MDA's testing requirements to meet
current and future acquisition needs.
Mr. Rogers. Please identify and summarize the studies MDA has
conducted or participated in evaluating missile defense options and
limitations against boost-glide systems and maneuvering systems.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Are you funded to develop and deploy a defense against
boost-glide missiles, like those being developed by Russia and China?
What are the anticipated ranges of potential defensive options that
have been considered?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Please identify each CAPE review of an MDA program or
proposed program over the past five years and the length/duration of
such review and its cost to MDA.
Admiral Syring. The CAPE reviews from 2006 through 2014 are listed
below. The total cost to MDA is approximately $430,000.

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.epsMr. Rogers. What are current requirements for CAPE AOAs of MDA
programs or proposed programs? What document, memoranda, or regulation
requires such CAPE AOA review of an MDA program?
Admiral Syring. There are no requirements that require CAPE led
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for MDA programs. However, MDA and CAPE
periodically receive guidance, and mutually agree to conduct analysis
of MDA programs. In addition, Congress periodically mandates CAPE led
studies of MDA programs.
Mr. Rogers. How much do GAO reviews cost MDA each year?
Admiral Syring. The total approximate annual amount that MDA spends
on GAO reviews is $1,754,008. This calculation is based on total man
hours needed to support varying requirements for audits, including
activities such as composing answers to numerous questions, locating
and transmitting previously approved documentation, and supporting
various meetings and reviews.
Mr. Rogers. Are there duplicative reporting requirements that could
be consolidated or eliminated? If yes, please identify.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) does not currently
have any duplicative congressional reporting requirements. However,
proposed language in the House FY 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act, H.R. 4909, Section 1664, would place significant duplicative
reporting requirements on MDA. This provision requires semi-annual
reporting on the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test plan,
costs and test plan changes and rationale, which duplicates existing
reporting accomplished through annual submission of the Integrated
Master Test Plan and BMDS Accountability Report, the BMDS Quarterly
Update briefings and annual Staffer Day presentations.
Mr. Rogers. We often ask the combatant commanders and military
services for their unfunded requirements list. Do you have an unfunded
requirements list? What capabilities were requested in the cocom IPLs
for FY13-FY17 that didn't appear on the coordinated PCL or ACL? Please
reply in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the
maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. What would be the total funding required, by system, to
meet the combatant command requirement for THAAD and SM-3s and Aegis
BMD software and hardware sets? Please reply in detail. Please ensure
your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Are there program gaps in ballistic missile defense?
Are there gaps you have not yet focused on? Please reply in detail.
Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent
possible.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. If MDA was developing and procuring these new Patriot
radars with the acquisition authorities you have, how much time would
it take you to do it?
Admiral Syring. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary
considerably depending on the maturity of the components being
developed and the amount of integration and testing required prior to
deployment. It is difficult to predict acquisition schedules without a
prior knowledge of these variables. For example, Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is developing and integrating relatively
mature technology. The LRDR program plan for development and
integration is less than five years from contract award to Initial
Fielding.
Mr. Rogers. During a recent hearing before the House Armed Services
Committee, Under Secretary Sean Stackley testified that, because of the
MDA's unique acquisition authorities, you were able to successfully
deploy in almost record time the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Do you
agree with this assessment?
Admiral Syring. Yes, MDA's streamlined acquisition authorities
contributed to the rapid development, installation, and deployment of
the Romania Aegis Ashore site. Another significant contributor to the
shortened timeline is the close collaborative relationship between the
MDA Aegis Ashore program office and Navy, including leveraging existing
Navy contracts for acquisition of Aegis Ashore weapon system equipment
common with Aegis BMD ships.
Mr. Rogers. How much longer would it take and how much more would
it cost to develop, test and field Poland Aegis Ashore site on the
planned timeline in the normal 5000 series rules and regulations? Would
MDA be able to meet the President's 2018 goal?
Admiral Syring. It is difficult to assess the additional cost and
schedule required to field the Poland Aegis Ashore site under standard
5000-series ``rules.'' Poland-specific activity is estimated to be
completed within four years. Initial hardware components were procured
in 4th quarter fiscal year 2014 (4QFY14) and first fabrication on site
was 1QFY16 with planned operations in 1QFY18. Fielding the Poland site
is accelerated because of lessons learned from developing and deploying
Aegis Ashore sites at the Hawaiian Pacific Missile Range Facility and
Romania. Without this advantage and MDA's streamlined processes and
decision making authority, it would be difficult to maintain the
aggressive timeline to meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase
3 requirement of December 2018.
Mr. Rogers. How much longer would it take and how much more would
it cost to develop, test and field Long-Range Discrimination Radar in
the normal 5000 series and the Redesigned Kill Vehicle?
Admiral Syring. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary
considerably depending on the maturity of the components being
developed and the amount of integration and testing required prior to
deployment. It is difficult to specify the exact differences but MDA
estimates development programs such as LRDR and RKV would take at least
25 percent longer without the streamlined and tailored MDA acquisition
processes.
In the case of RKV, the formal OUSD(AT&L) gated reviews required by
DOD 5000 series acquisition requirements are estimated to add
approximately one year and $200M to the development effort and initial
deployment costs. The RKV Acquisition Strategy signed by USD(AT&L) in
October, 2015 accounts for streamlined acquisition processes.
Mr. Rogers. I think you're aware of the planned radar modernization
of the Patriot system, which will take as long as 12 years to provide
an improved radar to our soldiers; how long would a comparable effort
take MDA? I ask you to answer this using in your role as the technical
integration authority for IAMD.
Admiral Syring. Acquisition timelines for development programs vary
considerably depending on the maturity of the components being
developed and the amount of integration and testing required prior to
deployment. It is difficult to predict acquisition schedules without a
prior knowledge of these variables. For example, Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR) is developing and integrating relatively
mature technology. The LRDR program plan for development and
integration is less than five years from contract award to Initial
Fielding.
Mr. Rogers. Please provide a detailed explanation of changes to MDA
AQ processes with respect to the 5000 series AQ regulations or JCIDS
process in your tenure as Director.
Admiral Syring. MDA's processes are completely consistent with the
principles of DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02, but
tailored to match Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)-unique
acquisition and requirements characteristics.
The BMDS warfighter requirements generation is explicitly exempt
from JCIDS (SecDef memorandum dated January 2, 2002). The BMDS
requirements generation process is the USSTRATCOM-led Warfighter
Involvement Process (WIP) (ref: STRATCOM Special Instruction 538-1).
The WIP is focused on BMD and Integrated Air and Missile Defense.
No significant changes were made to MDA's acquisition or
requirements generation processes during my tenure; however several
improvements and tailoring updates have been implemented the past
several years to include:
Incorporation of guidance from the recent Defense
Acquisition of Services Instruction (DOD Instruction 5000.74, dated
January 5, 2016) into MDA acquisition policy and processes.
Validated that same streamlined processes outlined in the
recent update to DOD Instruction 5000.02 (January 7, 2015) are
incorporated in MDA processes. For example, the new DOD Instruction
5000.02 describes several acquisition ``models'' or ``tracks'' that
development programs may follow. Several of these tracks have been in
MDA acquisition policy and process since 2009.
STRATCOM increased frequency of updates to the
Prioritized Capability List (annual vice biannual) to better
synchronize with the POM cycle.
Generation of a BMD Homeland Defense Capability Document
(CD) which was endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC). The VCJCS-signed JROC Memorandum (October 28, 2014)
acknowledged that MDA is not bound by JCIDS. This CD specifically
addressed Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and redesigned kill
vehicle capability. The CD will be periodically reviewed for update.
Incorporation of LRDR program reporting in the Defense
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) on-line reporting system. LRDR is
a pilot program for BMDS reporting in DAES.
Mr. Rogers. Please provide the full list of NDPC-approved BMDS
information and sharing with Russia and China?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) submitted three
requests for Exception to United States National Disclosure Policy
(ENDP) from 2007-2011 seeking authority to disclose classified
information to the Russian Federation (RF) relating to three ballistic
missile defense flight test events. In each case, authority granted by
the NDPC was limited to oral and visual disclosure only under
controlled conditions. The RF sent attendees to two of the three test
events (in 2007 and 2010). No invitations were extended for the third
event (in August 2011), and no disclosure occurred. MDA has not
submitted any further requests for ENDP for the RF.
MDA has not sought ENDP for release of any information to the
People's Republic of China.
Mr. Rogers. Is the Russian Federation, under current NDPC policy,
permitted to receive any FOUO, ITAR, UCTI, SECRET or TOP SECRET
information about any U.S. missile defense system? If your answer is
other than ``no,'' please reply in detail.
Admiral Syring. No. National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC)
policy prohibits the release of classified information with a foreign
government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to
United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an
information sharing agreement. No such agreement exists with the
Russian Federation (RF).
We are not aware of any policy permitting the release of any
controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified
information to the RF on any U.S. missile defense system. We defer
further response to the Defense Technology Security Administration.
Mr. Rogers. Is the People's Republic of China, under current NDPC
policy, permitted to receive any FOUO, ITAR, UCTI, SECRET or TOP SECRET
information about THAAD? Any U.S. missile defense system? If your
answer is other than ``no,'' please reply in detail.
Admiral Syring. No. National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC)
policy prohibits the release of classified information with a foreign
government without an explicit authorization, such as an Exception to
United States (U.S.) National Disclosure Policy (ENDP), and an
information sharing agreement. No such agreement exists with the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
We are not aware of any policy permitting the release of any
controlled unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified
information to the PRC on THAAD or any other U.S. missile defense
system. We defer further response to the Defense Technology Security
Administration.
Mr. Rogers. Do you support providing the People's Republic of China
with any detailed technical information on THAAD, including classified
information? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is
unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. We have not approved release of any controlled
unclassified information (such as FOUO) or classified information to
the Peoples Republic of China on THAAD or any other missile defense
system.
Mr. Rogers. Are you aware of MDA or MDA contractors being targeted
or ``hacked'' by groups or entities linked to China or the Chinese
military? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is
unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. If a loss, theft, or spillage of MDA Unclassified
Controlled Technical Information (UCTI) occurs, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) reviews whether the contractor was in compliance with the
contract terms and conditions established for cybersecurity. If the
review determines the contractor is non-compliant, they are assessed
penalties based on the performance assessment tools defined by the
contract. Penalties have ranged from award fee reductions to contract
termination based on the severity of the incident. MDA has also
utilized the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS)
to rate contractors who do not manage in accordance with their contract
terms and conditions. CPARS is the Government-wide repository of
contractor performance information. A CPAR, required at least annually
during contract performance per Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
42.1502, provides an official record of both positive and negative
contractor contract performance during a specific period of time. Past
performance information (including the ratings and supporting
narratives) is relevant information, for source selection purposes (FAR
Part 15), regarding a contractor's actions under previously awarded
contracts or orders.
MDA is teaming with our industry partners to strengthen network
protections and associated business practices to improve protection of
UCTI. MDA is working with industry to implement multiple cyber-related
efforts that will improve both the government and our industry partners
safeguard Ballistic Missile Defense System information.
Mr. Rogers. What are the capability gaps that could be filled by a
space sensor layer for the BMDS? Please reply in detail. Please ensure
your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Please identify the studies MDA has carried out on its
own or with other agencies or entities on space-based missile defense
sensors?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. What are the options MDA has studied or is studying to
host a missile defense payload on a USG, allied, or commercial space
vehicle?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Is it practical to expect MDA to develop and deploy a
missile defense-only space-based sensor architecture?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Can you please describe for me why we see reductions in
SM-3 procurement quantities in your budget request for fiscal year
2017. Is this budgetary maneuver or is there something else this
committee should be aware of?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) PB16 input
contained an SM-3 Block IB Multi-Year Procurement plan. The decision
was made in PB17 to transition back to single year procurement as the
Agency completed Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM) Engineering Change
Proposal (ECP) verification and testing, and quantities were reduced to
remain within the Department's overall funding limits. To address SM-3
manufacturing quality to ensure readiness for continued procurement, a
comprehensive quality, safety, and mission assurance assessment was
recently conducted. This assessment supported continued production of
SM-3s.
In addition, PB16 included procurement of 8 SM-3 Block IIA guided
missiles in FY17. Included in PB17 is a revised completion plan for SM-
3 Block IIA, and under this plan the 8 rounds planned for FY17 were
deferred to FY18 to match development milestones. FY17 funds were
realigned from Defense Wide Procurement to Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation in support of remaining SM-3 Block IIA development to
meet the European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3 timeline.
Mr. Rogers. What liability does the contractor bear for quality
control failures? Does that liability include costs of failed tests?
How much do those cost the taxpayer?
Admiral Syring. Specific liability is dependent on individual
contract terms and conditions including incentive structure. Most BMDS
testing is part of developmental tests conducted under cost plus-type
contracting vehicles. Tests failed as a result of contractor
performance or quality control issues reduce contractor award fee and/
or incentive fee and potentially impact Contractor Performance
Assessment Report ratings. Additionally, MDA has delayed acceptance of
Contractor-produced hardware due to known quality issues.
Mr. Rogers. What is the current DOD regulation and policy
concerning MDA's role to develop and maintain BMD capability and its
transfer to the military services? Please detail what systems have been
transitioned to the military services and what systems are currently
undergoing transition study with the military services.
Admiral Syring. The Department is using the Deputy Secretary of
Defense's September 25, 2008, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
Life Cycle Management Process (LCMP), and June 10, 2011 memorandum on
``Funding Responsibilities for BMDS Elements'' to guide program
planning and the transfer process.
Under the BMDS LCMP, DOD continues to transition BMDS capabilities
to the lead Military Departments. The lead Military Departments are
responsible for doctrine, organization, training, leadership,
education, personnel and facilities associated with those elements. MDA
retains the materiel acquisition responsibilities, unless a decision is
made to transfer all responsibilities (full Title 10 Transfer) to the
Military Department.
Figure 1 lists the fielded BMDS elements, lead Military Departments
and the dates elements entered the transition phase. The Department
uses the following terms and definitions to clarify the process, roles
and responsibilities:

Entered Transition Phase: The BMDS element normally enters
the transition phase when the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or
delegated authority, designates a lead Military Department. If
not previously approved, entry into the transition phase is
coincident with the completion of the lead Military Department-
MDA overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA).

Capability Transfer: The BMDS element capability is
transferred to the lead Military Department once the Military
Department accepts operational responsibility. After the
capability transfer, the Military Department and MDA will
assume responsibilities as agreed in the Military Department-
MDA overarching MOA and respective element annexes. Normally,
MDA will retain materiel responsibilities, including Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation, production, and sustainment
of BMD specific equipment. The lead Military Department
normally assumes responsibility for military pay and
allowances, base operations and operations, and sustainment of
common support equipment.

Title 10 Transfer to Lead Service: BMDS element
responsibilities are transferred from MDA to the lead Military
Department. Unless otherwise specified, the lead Military
Department assumes all doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
responsibilities. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, or a
delegated authority, approves the transfer.

Figure 1: BMDS Element Transition and Capability Transfer Status, October 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entered Transition Title 10 Transfer
Element or Capability Lead Service Phase Capability Transfer to Lead Service
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC Army N/A N/A February 2003 \1\
3)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AN/TPY-2 (Forward Based Mode) Army February 2006 October 2013 Study ongoing \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Army November 2006 October 2014 Study ongoing \2\
(THAAD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground Based Mid-Course Defense Army November 2006 N/A \3\ Not planned \3\
(GMD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Navy November 2006 October 2008 Not planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD 3.6.X Navy November 2006 October 2008 Not planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD 4.0.X Navy March 2007 March 2012 Not planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD 5.0 (Capability Upgrade) Navy January 2008 December 2015 Not planned \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis BMD 5.1 Navy January 2008 FY 18 Not Planned \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aegis Ashore (Romania) Navy January 2010 December 2015 Not planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX) Navy December 2008 December 2011 Not planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cobra Dane Air Force February 2006 February 2009 N/A \5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) Air Force November 2006 September 2008 N/A \5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command and Control, Battle N/A \6\ N/A N/A N/A \6\
Management and Communications
(C2BMC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes:
\1\ PAC 3 was already fielded by the Army when MDA was established
in 2002 and was immediately transferred back to the Army by mutual
agreement.
\2\ Army and MDA have completed a study on the merits of a Title 10
Transfer. DOD is reviewing the study results.
\3\ The GMD will not be transferred in the foreseeable future. Army
and MDA will coordinate on terms of transition and transfer when the
program is technically mature.
\4\ BMD 5.0CU and 5.1 software packages are integrated into Navy's
Aegis Baseline 9 combat system suite. MDA retains materiel developer
responsibilities for the BMD software.
\5\ Not applicable. Cobra Dane and the Upgraded Early Warning
Radars are previously fielded U.S. Air Force assets that were upgraded
and adapted by MDA for use with the BMDS. A Title 10 transfer is
therefore, unnecessary,
\6\ The C2BMC Tri-Service Structure was approved by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in March 2014.

Mr. Rogers. Virtually every part of DOD has been the subject of
cyber attacks, whether for espionage or other purposes. Is MDA any
different? Can you describe what you've done to keep MDA ahead of this
threat? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is
unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been targeted
for cyber-attack like the rest of DOD; however, MDA has successfully
defended or mitigated cyber threats against our internal government
networks and systems. Similar to other DOD programs, persistent cyber
threats directed against defense industry base operated or owned
unclassified networks are a continual vulnerability. MDA is very
cognizant of the growing cyber threat and is aggressively working to
ensure the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) information is
protected, and that missile defenses can operate in a highly contested
cyber environment. To keep MDA ahead of the threat, we have implemented
a rigorous cybersecurity program as described below.
MDA is using and sharing cyber intelligence to reduce our
vulnerabilities. We use cyber intelligence to tune our cyber defenses
and focus our information protection efforts. These efforts are
accomplished in concert with DOD cyber forces (especially U.S.
Strategic Command's USCYBERCOM), intelligence community assets, and law
enforcement authorities.
MDA is improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense
capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the
latest security upgrades and patches. MDA continually assesses our
systems, suppliers, and overall acquisition processes. We are ensuring
robust and secure configurations of our critical software and hardware
to reduce the risk of malicious activities. MDA also has a rigorous
cyber and Supply Chain Risk Management inspection program to examine
everything about our systems from the trusted supply chain to the
fielded capability. This ensures the highest possible levels of
compliance.
MDA is instituting the DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation
Plan to mitigate risks for the information systems we own and manage.
MDA's program implements the DOD four Lines of Effort campaign: Strong
Authentication (to degrade the adversaries' ability to maneuver on DOD
information networks); Device Hardening (to reduce internal and
external attack vectors into DOD information networks); Reducing the
Attack Surface (to reduce external attack vectors into MDA information
networks); and Alignment to Cybersecurity/Computer Network Defense
Services (to improve detection of and response to adversary activity).
These efforts run across all facets of MDA and the BMDS mission systems
and general services infrastructures.
MDA has established an Insider Threat Program in accordance with
the DOD Directive 205.16, ``The DOD Insider Threat Program.'' MDA is
leveraging computer network defense capabilities, in addition to other
information streams, to proactively detect, mitigate, and defeat
potential insider threats. This program also ensures that only trusted
individuals have access to MDA program information and systems.
The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) continues to
provide Computer Network Defense (CND) services as an accredited Tier
II CND Service Provider to MDA Programs of Record. The MDA CERT
executes a battle rhythm that includes daily monitoring and
collaboration with USCYBERCOM, Joint Force Headquarters-Department of
Defense Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN), and other sources for the
latest threats to DOD and MDA. As a result MDA CERT tracked and managed
109 cyber taskings in fiscal year 2015 and approximately 77 cyber
taskings to date in fiscal year 2016, contributing to the overall
cybersecurity posture of MDA networks and resources.
MDA is incorporating cybersecurity requirements early into our
acquisition lifecycle. We are designing and building cybersecurity into
missile defenses, rather than adding it after the fact. MDA is ensuring
that we build cyber resilience into our systems and verifying
cybersecurity protection of deployed systems through realistic
cybersecurity testing.
We are working closely with our industry partners in the Defense
Industry Base (DIB) to ensure they can protect both classified and
unclassified information stored on their systems to prevent exposure to
potential adversaries. MDA knows that malicious cyber actors are
constantly attempting to exfiltrate information from U.S. Industry. We
will continue to work with our DIB partners, the FBI, and other
associates, to identify these issues and reduce the chances of success
for those responsible, in coordination with U.S. National Authorities
and in accordance with U.S. National Policy.
MDA continues to execute a rigorous cybersecurity controls
validation testing program on MDA networks and the BMDS in compliance
with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
Publication 800-53, Revision 4, ``Security and Privacy Controls for
Federal Information Systems and Organizations.'' We recently
established a mandatory baseline set of technical cybersecurity
controls for implementation within the BMDS system specification.
Moreover, MDA is supporting BMD Warfighters with the joint
development of the Cyber BMD Concept of Operations (with Joint
Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense and Joint
Functional Component Command-Space) to ensure cyber threats can be
rapidly detected, contained, and defeated. These efforts ensure the
Agency remains a strong mission partner, protects and defends MDA
information systems and networks, and optimizes cybersecurity
management and processes at a level commensurate with our critical
national defense mission.
Mr. Rogers. What consequences have there been for contractor
responsibility for such data loss/theft/spillage?
Admiral Syring. Available tools to address Contractor liability
include reducing award and incentive fee, negative Contractor
Performance Assessment Report ratings, decision to not exercise
contract options, and potential debarment from receiving Government
contracts. MDA has used these tools recently to hold Contractors
responsible for data lost/theft/spillage. MDA mandates the inclusion of
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement clause 252.204-7012
(Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical Information) in
existing and future contracts and other MDA-specific requirements
Mr. Rogers. How concerned are you that it is too easy for the bad
guys to get access to ``unclassified controlled technical information''
about our missile defense systems? Have you seen examples of where they
have improved their systems thanks to this sort of U.S. data? If yes,
including if based on your suspicion, please provide as much detailed
information as possible concerning such examples.
Admiral Syring. We are very concerned about protecting Unclassified
Controlled Technical Information (UCTI). The Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) is working to ensure our Critical Covered Defense information is
appropriately protected and working Defense contractor supply chain to
implement oversight of defense contractor unclassified and development,
manufacturing, and administrative networks.
The Department issued a new Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement clause in August 2015 to protect UCTI, which MDA is
incorporating into every new contract we award.
We have held an MDA Industry Day to discuss protection of UCTI and
appropriate program protection and cybersecurity controls. MDA has
formed an alliance with our key prime contractors and government
partners to assess both technical and non-technical protection
countermeasures that can be implemented to reduce the risk of
information loss and to help mitigate the risks of potential for cyber
exploitation.
A key part of this effort is the requirement to implement the
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-
71 security requirements by December 2017 and to implement appropriate
supply chain risk management countermeasures throughout our Defense
Industrial Base. These efforts should assist in providing enhanced
protection measures that are both cost-effective and reduce the risk of
critical information loss. MDA is leading an effort with our primes and
sub-contractors to identify where MDA specific covered defense
information (CDI) has the greatest protection risk and ensuring
additional security protection measures are implemented where
appropriate to provide better protection for both MDA and our industry
partners' critical information.
MDA defers to the Intelligence Community on how other countries
improve their systems.
Mr. Rogers. In a response to a request for information, MDA
indicated that planned Patriot-THAAD integration will consist of being
able to pass planning data between units via compact disc. It is
understandable that the document describes this as ``very limited THAAD
integration with IBCS''. Is that correct? Is that acceptable? Does this
demonstrate the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of integrated air
and missile defense?
Admiral Syring. MDA's response was accurate in that THAAD battle
plans are currently passed via compact discs to Army units. The
capability MDA and the Army are building for future increments does not
use CDs. The Army and MDA have jointly developed an initial integration
plan to provide shared defense design/battle planning and situational
awareness improvements by 2020.
The first integration step includes modification of THAAD software;
adding the Common Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) XML Schema
(CIXS) 3.6 interface to the THAAD Portable Planner; modification of the
IBCS Integrated Defense Design algorithms and user interface; and
remoting of THAAD workstations into a collocated IBCS Engagement
Operations Center functioning as the THAAD Battery command post.
Subsequent integration steps will be defined as part of the
requirements analysis in conjunction with the development of the Army
IAMD System of Systems Increment 3 Capabilities Production Document in
2018. This plan supports the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of
integrated air and missile defense.
Mr. Rogers. I understand the United Arab Emirates has indicated its
willingness to make a considerable investment in development of an
evolved extended-range THAAD system. Can you afford an extended-range
THAAD given your current budget profile?
Admiral Syring. The Department recently received a letter from the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) expressing interest in the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Extended Range (ER) concept. In response,
the Department clarified that while THAAD ER is not currently a program
of record, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is conducting a THAAD
follow-on study to assess alternative future capabilities to further
enhance the THAAD weapon system against current and future threats. The
Department committed to continue to keep the UAE informed through
ongoing dialogue. MDA is assessing affordability as part of the THAAD
follow-on study.
Mr. Rogers. Is it the case the Army Vice Chief of Staff and
STRATCOM have both stated that they need such a capability (e.g., an
evolved extended-range THAAD system)? What capability gaps have they
identified to MDA? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response
is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Do you support such a partnership between the UAE and
the U.S. (e.g., to develop an evolved extended-range THAAD system)?
Admiral Syring. The United Arab Emirates is an important partner in
ballistic missile defense and leader in the region as the first country
to purchase THAAD batteries and interceptors through the Foreign
Military Sales program. While the Department of Defense is not
currently pursuing THAAD ER as a program of record, we are conducting a
THAAD follow-on study to assess alternative future capabilities to
further enhance the THAAD weapon system. As the Department evaluates
findings from the THAAD follow-on study, we have committed to keeping
the UAE informed and ensure that dialogue remains open.
Mr. Rogers. I understand the U.S. is discussing a Foreign Military
Sales case with Qatar for THAAD. Why is this case important for Qatar
and THAAD? Can we work together to accelerate this case to make sure
Qatar has these critical missile defense systems prior to the World Cup
in 2022? How?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Recently, Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon has
reported that North Korea has displayed a new road-mobile ICBM. Does
North Korea have a new road-mobile ICBM? Is it testing solid-rocket
motors for such a missile? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your
response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department
of Defense Intelligence Community.
Mr. Rogers. Can you remind this committee why road-mobile missiles
are a defense challenge for us? And what about such missiles with solid
fuel?
Admiral Syring. Mobile ballistic missile technology advances and
associated proliferation poses a growing threat to United States, our
allies, and partner forces and territory including the homeland. Road
mobile launchers enable potential adversaries to launch missiles from
unexpected locations. Solid fuel provides more flexibility to the
threats we face by reducing the time required to prepare and launch
these missiles
Mr. Rogers. Am I correct that under the current plan for the
ground-based midcourse defense system, there are no operational spares
GBIs for, is it 5 or 6 years? It's well into the 2020s, right? What
happens if there is an unplanned failure? Please reply in detail.
Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum extent
possible.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will not have
operational spare Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) until 2020. In
President's Budget 2017, MDA plans to deliver three initial production
Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) units in fiscal year 2020 (FY20) and two
initial production Configuration 3 (C3) boost vehicles in FY23. One of
the RKVs and one of the C3 boosters will be designated as an
operations/test spare.
In the event of an unplanned failure for one of the operational
GBIs, Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program Manager for Readiness
would task the GBI contractor to repair the interceptor. During the
timeframe for the repair, the warfighter would lose one interceptor
from inventory.
Mr. Rogers. Is this reality (the lack of operational spares
referenced in the previous question) an artifact of years of under-
investment in the GMD system? What is the best way to mitigate this
risk?
Admiral Syring. The lack of operational spares is due to
significantly increasing the amount of operational Ground-based
Interceptors (GBIs). To achieve the SECDEF mandate of fielding 44 GBIs
by the end of calendar year 2017, MDA is emplacing all previously
planned spares in the operational fleet. The following table
illustrates the current program plan and the utilization of GBIs to
meet operational and test requirements.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Legacy contract (-0001) Deliveries 47
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Development and Sustainment Contract 11 .............................................
(DSC) Deliveries
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Deliveries 58 .............................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtract Flight Tests and Stockpile (12) FTG-06, BVT-01, FTG-06a, CTV-01, CTV-02+, FTG-
Reliability Program (SRP) 07, FTG-06b, FTG-11a, FTG-11b, SRP (2), FTG-
15
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Available 46 .............................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emplace 30 ..................... (Original GM Plan)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF: 30 are emplaced; THEN: Subtract 30 RESULT: 16 GBIs available to support future
from 46 total Flight Tests, Spares and SRP. Provides 10
available; 46-30=16 Flight Test assets for fiscal year 2020
(FY20) through FY28 and 6 for Spares and SRP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emplace 44 ..................... (March 2013 SECDEF Mandate)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF: 44 are emplaced; THEN: Subtract 44 RESULT: 2 GBIs are available to support
from 46 total flight tests in FY20 and FY21
available; 46-44=2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Our President's Budget 2017 plan mitigates this risk by providing
redesigned kill vehicle spares beginning in FY20 and Configuration 3
spares in FY23.
Mr. Rogers. Please detail any exercises, table top exercises, or
war games you have participated in concerning left-of-launch ballistic
missile defeat. In such exercises, were there any areas in which it was
observed that policy guidance was required to successfully carry out
such capability? If so, please identify and describe such observed
areas needing policy guidance from OSD.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA's) wargame and
exercise support is primarily limited to providing modeling and
simulation focusing on right-of-launch ballistic missile defeat for
Warfighter-sponsored wargames and exercises.
MDA defers to the respective combatant commands for specific
details or questions regarding policy guidance observations or
requirements for executing Left-of-Launch activities.
Mr. Rogers. What kind of intelligence do we need to possess in
order for the President to order a preemptive attack on a state
possessing nuclear weapons?
Admiral Syring. This question would be best addressed by the U.S.
Strategic Command.
Mr. Rogers. What do potential adversaries like Russia, China, Iran
and other states know about THAAD and PATRIOT? Do they know more than
they should? What does that tell us about the security of data about
U.S. missile defense? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your
response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department
of Defense Intelligence Community.
Mr. Rogers. How much do the TD-2 and KN-08 have in common, in terms
of technology and systems? How much of the KN-08 is it safe to say has
been tested? Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is
unclassified to the maximum extent possible
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency defers to the Department
of Defense Intelligence Community.
Mr. Rogers. Are we outpacing the threat? How do you evaluate
``outpacing'' the threat? Based on what criteria? Please provide a
detailed list of adversary developments regarding ballistic missile
capability that affected our ability to ``outpace'' the threat. What
developments by adversaries, if any, have surprised you? Please reply
in detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum
extent possible.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. How much control do you have over LCMD? How much
insight do you have over something that will go into a system for which
you are responsible?
Admiral Syring. Since 2015, the Missile Defense Agency has provided
technical support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Sandia
National Laboratory Low Cost Missile Defeat team, to include systems
engineering, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system design,
sensors, and cost estimating. We have also provided technical deep
dives and guidance on the Ballistic Missile Defense System
architecture, system requirements, concept of operations, safety and
mission assurance, and integration information. We will continue to
provide technical support through 2016 in support of a Systems
Requirements Review in July and activities leading to a Preliminary
Design Review. We participate in all of the major reviews and weekly
tag up meetings.
Mr. Rogers. Are there any other missile defense capabilities you
are aware of that are being developed outside of MDA? For example, by
the Strategic Capabilities Office? What is your level of insight and
technical authority over such capability developments.
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is an active team
member of the Hypervelocity Gun Weapon System (HGWS) Project sponsored
by the Office of Secretary of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office
(SCO). MDA supports the HGWS systems engineering efforts and is
developing a Prototype Fire Control Radar to support system level
demonstrations in the fiscal year 2018-2019 time frame. MDA actively
participates in Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture and
requirements development, ballistic missile defense mission performance
analysis, and HGWS system-level test planning, as well as 3-Star-level
Sensor Steering Committee meetings.
In addition, MDA is partnering with SCO on other projects at higher
classification levels.
Mr. Rogers. I would like to give you an opportunity to clarify a
response to a question during the 14 April hearing, are you funded to
develop and deploy defense against boost-glide missiles like those
being developed by Russia and China? How much would such development
cost?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Am I correct that, if we assume a 2028 initial fielding
of a new Patriot radar, we will have a radar system with components, in
some cases, that are 58 years old?
Mr. Pike. The average age of all Patriot ground equipment including
the radars and their components across the U.S. Army fleet is 7.5
years. This average age is achieved through the Patriot
recapitalization program and the Patriot modification efforts and is
cost-effectively enabled by new radar production for foreign partners
and continuous obsolescence management. The Patriot recapitalization
program is a complete depot overhaul effort that returns one battalion
set of Patriot ground system equipment per year (including radars) to
like-new (zero miles/zero hours) condition. The recapitalization
program is conducted at the Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania and
is funded with Operations and Maintenance Army funding. While the
original design heritage of Patriot goes back to the 1970s, the Army
has implemented a continuous and robust hardware and software
modification effort over the years to address performance, readiness,
and obsolescence. These modification efforts not only replace older
components, but also leverage the substantial investment of our foreign
partners and most recently included the new Radar Digital Processor,
new Modern Adjunct Processor, and the new Modern Man Station. These
components also enable adaptation to the Army's Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS).
The materiel solution for the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense
Sensor (LTAMDS) has not been determined nor has a program baseline
(cost, schedule, performance) been established. The LTAMDS effort could
result in an upgrade to the current Patriot radar or a new radar to
replace the Patriot radar. The Army's plan is to conduct a full and
open competition to allow industry to propose and demonstrate materiel
solutions that address the approved LTAMDS requirements. While LTAMDS
is being developed and fielded, Patriot readiness and performance will
be maintained through the recapitalization, modification, and
obsolescence management efforts described above.
Mr. Rogers. How many requirements or objectives can Patriot not
meet today due to obsolescence or adversary threat developments? Please
provide me the complete list. Please reply in detail. Please ensure
your response is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Mr. Pike. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. When you testified, you stated the Army Requirements
Oversight Council was meeting that week to establish an actual
operational requirement for the LTAMD radar. Did it? Please provide
such AROC-approved requirement if so.
Mr. Pike. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Please provide the operational availability information
for each Patriot battery for the most recent year for which it is
available. Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response is
unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Mr. Pike. Over the last twelve months, Operational Readiness was
the driver of availability of Patriot units. Operational Readiness is
reported monthly for the worldwide U.S. Army Patriot fleet and is also
broken out by the following regions: Korea, Pacific Command (PACOM),
Continental United States (CONUS), Europe (USAREUR), and Southwest Asia
(SWA).
The Army's Operational Readiness goal for Patriot is 90 percent.
The most current Operational Readiness data available for the last
twelve months is provided below ending May 2016:

Worldwide 92.67%
Korea 97.75%
PACOM 79.83%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PACOM failures were in radar, heavy and medium wheeled
vehicles, and trailers. There were three separate months that affected
the PACOM Operational Readiness rate. Radar faults occurred in August
2015 and were corrected by the end of the month. Issues with vehicles
occurred in October 2015 and were corrected by the end of that month.
Radar faults and trailer issues occurred in APR 2016 and were corrected
later that same month. The most recent month's (May 2016) Operational
Readiness rate for PACOM was reported as 96 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONUS 93.42%
USAREUR 91.17%
SWA 93.25%

Mr. Rogers. What is the risk that, due to obsolescence, the Army
will not be able to keep the Patriot radar fully functional to your
planned 2028 initial fielding plan? Please explain your answer in
detail and cite Army analysis/analyses that has been conducted to
inform your answer. Please reply in detail. Please ensure your response
is unclassified to the maximum extent possible.
Mr. Pike. Due to the recapitalization program, the modification
efforts, and continuous monitoring as well as the extensive new
production for our foreign partners, the Army categorizes the risk to
Patriot radar functionality (performance and operational readiness) as
low.
The Army continuously monitors component obsolescence in all
Patriot end items. Commercially-available databases are utilized to
assess the availability of electronic components used in the
manufacture, modification, and recapitalization of the radar. The
modification efforts to maintain performance and readiness against the
evolving threat (functionality) produce the latest configuration of the
Patriot ground system (including radars) for the U.S. Army fleet called
Configuration 3+ (C3+). The C3+ modification effort results in a 49.3
percent reduction in obsolete parts associated with the Patriot radar
compared to the previous radar configuration. The overall obsolescence
percentage of the C3+ radar is assessed at 4.3 percent of the total
radar parts. The Army also monitors field failure data to ensure that
spare and repair programs are not affected by obsolescence issues.
Although the U.S. Army does not currently plan to procure any new
Patriot radars, there is an extensive C3+ production program for our
foreign partners. The new production enables a cost-effective supply
chain to support performance, readiness, and sustainment of the U.S.
Army capability, resolves certain obsolescence issues, and provides
opportunity to reduce obsolescence even further.
Mr. Rogers. Can you please tell me, if you begin fielding the new
radar in 2028, when will it be fully deployed to our Army air
defenders?
Mr. Pike. The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor effort has
not yet been established/approved as an acquisition program. Therefore,
the program baseline (cost, schedule, performance) has not yet been
established. The program baseline will be informed by results of the
full and open competition using the Army's approved operational
requirements.
Mr. Rogers. As the acquisition lead for the Army for Patriot, can
you please assure us that at the end of the Lower Tier Army Missile
Defense radar modernization program that all, all, capability and
objective requirements gaps will be closed so that they are covered for
our soldiers and joint warfighters who depend upon this system? If not,
what capability and requirement gaps will not be met? Please reply in
detail. Please ensure your response is unclassified to the maximum
extent possible.
Mr. Pike. The Army's approved operational requirement for the Lower
Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) addresses all of the known
capability gaps based on current threat projections for future years.
The LTAMDS program will be structured to achieve the Army's operational
requirements which will close the gaps. However, threat projections are
simply that--today's predictions of the future threat which may or may
not accurately reflect the threat in the future. Threat projections and
capability gaps are updated on a recurring basis. As the threat
evolves, additional capability gaps and objective requirements may be
identified during development, production, fielding, and/or sustainment
of LTAMDS. Any necessary improvements to address the updated threat
projections/emergent gaps will likely be implemented through
evolutionary software development and hardware modifications (or
product improvement programs) if required based on operational risk
assessments. This is the same process that has been successfully
accomplished in Patriot for decades.
Mr. Rogers. In a response to a request for information, MDA
indicated that planned Patriot-THAAD integration will consist of being
able to pass planning data between units via compact disc. It is
understandable that the document describes this as ``very limited THAAD
integration with IBCS''. Is that correct? Is that acceptable? Does this
demonstrate the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of integrated air
and missile defense?
Mr. Pike. Planned Patriot-THAAD integration does not consist of
passing planning data between units via compact disc. Missile Defense
Agency's (MDA) response was accurate in that THAAD battle plans are
currently passed via compact discs to Army units for non-real time
planning purposes. Near real-time target data and engagement status is
currently shared between THAAD and Army mission command elements
automatically via tactical data links. Additionally, the Army and MDA
are building capabilities for future increments of non-real time battle
planning that eliminates the need for compact discs. The Army and the
MDA have jointly developed an initial integration plan to provide
shared defense design/battle planning and situational awareness
improvements by 2020. The work includes modification of THAAD software;
adding the Common IAMD Extensible Markup Language Schema 3.6 interface
to the THAAD Portable Planner; modification of the IBCS Integrated
Defense Design algorithms and user interface; and remoting of THAAD
workstations into a collocated IBCS Engagement Operations Center
functioning as the THAAD battery command post. Subsequent integration
steps will be defined as part of the requirements analysis in
conjunction with the development of the Army IAMD System of Systems
Increment 3 Capabilities Production Document in 2018. This plan
supports the Chairman of the Joint Chief's vision of integrated air and
missile defense.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Please give us your views on the efforts to change the
decades-long missile defense policy of defending against a limited
missile defense attack. Would expanding this policy to defense against
all missile defense attacks, including large-scale attacks from China
or Russia, be possible and cost-effective? What would the strategic
stability implications be of such a change in policy? Is there an
operational requirement for this? How do we deter Russian and Chinese
attacks?
Mr. McKeon. It has been long-standing U.S. policy not to seek to
build missile defense capabilities that could threaten China's or
Russia's strategic deterrent. Every U.S. Administration has instead
relied on our nuclear Triad to ensure credible deterrence against
Chinese and Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack
against our homeland. Changing this policy would raise profound
questions about whether the United States is now pursuing the
development and deployment of large-scale, advanced missile defense
capabilities to negate either Russia's or China's strategic deterrent.
This development could undermine strategic stability with regard to
both countries, and could lead them to respond by accelerating and
expanding their strategic nuclear forces, or by developing a more
advanced asymmetrical response capability.
Furthermore, the technical challenges and interceptor inventories
associated with building missile defenses to cope with a large-scale,
sophisticated Russian or Chinese missile attack would make the project
cost-prohibitive.
DOD continues to believe that the most effective and reliable means
to deter an attack on the United States by a major nuclear power is to
sustain and modernize our strategic nuclear Triad.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral Syring, you noted that Space Based Interceptors
are neither technically nor financially feasible. Please explain these
feasibility concerns.
Admiral Syring. At a conceptual level, Space Based Interceptors
(SBI) could provide on-demand boost and early post-boost access against
certain classes of threats even in places where terrestrial weapons
would be geographically constrained or politically precluded. However,
the basic feasibility of an SBI layer with operational utility has not
yet been shown in the relevant environment of space and on the
compressed engagement timelines required.\1\ Essential SBI technologies
have been worked only sporadically over the years and consequently are
not feasible to procure, deploy, or operate in the near- to mid-term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: Delta 180 (Vector Sum) did demonstrate in 1986 the
principle of intercepting in space a target during powered flight
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost has traditionally been a barrier to space based defenses.
Feasible solutions would depend upon aggressive incorporation of light-
weight technologies, low-cost access to orbit, and selection of a
mission that is bounded enough to be affordable and at the same time
militarily useful. The 2011 IDA report showed costs ranging from $26B
for a limited mission, to greater than $60B for a ``medium'' capability
system that could perform against near-term threats, to over $200B for
a full global defense.
Mr. Cooper. Please give us your views on the efforts to change the
decades-long missile defense policy of defending against a limited
missile defense attack. Would expanding this policy to defense against
all missile defense attacks, including large-scale attacks from China
or Russia, be possible and cost-effective? Is it technologically
feasible? What would the cost be?
Admiral Syring. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy
is the most appropriate organization to respond to questions concerning
a change in missile defense policy.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. We understand that the Department of Defense is
considering deploying JLENS in the Mid-Atlantic region. Would Wallops
Island, Virginia, be a suitable location to deploy JLENS in support of
NORTHCOM/NORAD missions?
Admiral Gortney. A number of sites were considered when planning
for the three-year JLENS Operational Exercise (OPEX) from FY15 through
FY17. Wallops Island was one of the sites considered; however, due to a
number of variables, including current availability of restricted
airspace and the timeframe required to develop new restricted airspace,
Wallops Island was not deemed suitable to support the OPEX in the given
timeframe. The objective of the JLENS OPEX was to assess JLENS
contribution to cruise missile defense within the National Capital
Region and inform an enduring mission decision. If the OPEX results had
supported an enduring mission requirement, an assessment of optimal
JLENS locations, including additional site surveys if necessary, would
be part of the JLENS enduring mission decision.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. It is my understanding that you are on schedule to
ensure that 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) are fielded by the end
of 2017. Can you describe for the committee how many back-up boosters
and kill vehicles MDA plans to acquire to support the 44 GBI fleet?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency is on track to field 44
GBIs by the end of 2017. The Agency plans to acquire three spare
redesigned kill vehicles and two spare Configuration 3 boosters from
calendar years 2020-2025 to support the 44 GBI fleet.
Mr. Bishop. Do you believe that you are on schedule to ensure that
the upgraded booster, known as C3, will be able to support the new
Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) fielding in the 2020-2022 time frame? How
much funding in FY17 is requested to begin C3 development?
Admiral Syring. No, the Configuration 3 (C3) booster will not be
delivered to support RKV fielding from 2020-2022. In order to maximize
system reliability as quickly as possible and to meet the 2016 National
Defense Authorization Act requirement to replace all Capability
Enhancement-1 (CE-I) exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV) by 2022, the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will initially recap C1 boosters with
RKVs. Beginning in 2023, MDA will deliver C3 boosters with RKVs and
continue until all CE-2 EKVs are replaced. Beginning in 2024, the first
18 RKVs that were placed on C1 boosters will receive their C3 booster.
This strategy focuses resources on the highest priority GBI component
(replacing all CE-I kill vehicles) while phasing in the C3 booster in
an efficient manner. In PB17, the Agency has requested $20.8 million in
fiscal year 2017 to begin C3 development.

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