[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRATEGY AND MISSION OF THE DHS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Serial No. 113-83
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Serial No. 113-91
__________
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 9, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and the
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
92-900 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Curtis Clawson, Florida
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan O'Hara, Acting Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Filemon Vela, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Chair (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Alex Manning, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Lamar S. Smith, Texas, Chairman
Dana Rohrabacher, California Eddie Bernice Johnson, Texas
Ralph M. Hall, Texas Zoe Lofgren, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Daniel Lipinski, Illinois
Wisconsin Donna F. Edwards, Maryland
Frank D. Lucas, Oklahoma Frederica S. Wilson, Florida
Randy Neugebauer, Texas Suzanne Bonamici, Oregon
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Eric Swalwell, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Dan Maffei, New York
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Alan Grayson, Florida
Mo Brooks, Alabama Joseph Kennedy III, Massachusetts
Randy Hultgren, Illinois Scott Peters, California
Larry Bucshon, Indiana Derek Kilmer, Washington
Steve Stockman, Texas Ami Bera, California
Bill Posey, Florida Elizabeth Esty, Connecticut
Cynthia Lummis, Wyoming Marc Veasey, Texas
David Schweikert, Arizona Julia Brownley, California
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Robin Kelly, Illinois
Kevin Cramer, North Dakota Katherine Clark, Massachusetts
Jim Bridenstine, Oklahoma
Randy Weber, Texas
Chris Collins, New York
Bill Johnson, Ohio
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
Larry Bucshon, Indiana, Chairman
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Daniel Lipinski, Illinois
Mo Brooks, Alabama Federica Wilson, Florida
Randy Hultgren, Illinois Zoe Lofgren, California
Steve Stockman, Texas Scott Peters, California
Cynthia Lummis, Wyoming Ami Bera, California
David Schweikert, Arizona Derek Kilmer, Washington
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Elizabeth Esty, Connecticut
Jim Bridenstine, Oklahoma Robin Kelly, Illinois
Chris Collins, New York Eddie Bernice Johnson, Texas
Bill Johnson, Ohio
Lamar S. Smith, Texas
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Larry Bucshon, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Research
and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Daniel Lipinski, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Illinois, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 9
The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 3
Witnesses
Mr. Reginald Brothers, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan and Chairman Larry Bucshon
for Reginald Brothers.......................................... 51
Questions From Chairman Lamar S. Smith for Reginald Brothers..... 56
Question From Ranking Member Daniel Lipinski for Reginald
Brothers....................................................... 58
Questions From Honorable Chris Collins for Reginald Brothers..... 58
Questions From Chairman Lamar S. Smith for David C. Maurer....... 59
STRATEGY AND MISSION OF THE DHS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
----------
Tuesday, September 9, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies, and
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies] presiding.
Present from Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies: Representatives Meehan,
Rogers, Perry, and Thompson.
Present from Subcommittee on Research and Technology:
Representatives Buschon, Hultgren, Collins, Johnson, Lipinski,
Peters, Esty, and Kelly.
Also present: Representatives Payne and Smith.
Mr. Meehan. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the
Committee of Homeland Security and the Subcommittee on Research
and Technology of the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order.
The subcommittees are jointly meeting today to examine the
strategy and mission of the Science and Technology Directorate
at the Department of Homeland Security. Good morning, and thank
you for being here this morning.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I would
like to thank everyone for attending this important joint
hearing on the strategy and mission of the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate. I would particularly like to thank
Ranking Member Payne as well as Chairman Bucshon and Ranking
Member Lipinski of the Science, Space, and Technology's
Research and Technology Subcommittee for their joint
participation. I often think that we do so much better work
when we can work together on these. Since both committees share
jurisdiction, it is helpful we are holding this oversight
hearing while we collaborate on writing an authorization bill.
I would also like that thank our witnesses: Dr. Reginald
``Reggie'' Brothers, the new under secretary for S&T; and David
Maurer from the GAO. I look forward to hearing from both of you
on the challenges facing the directorate and how we can help
ensure S&T is able to fulfill its mission.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate was established
by Congress to be the primary research and development arm of
the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, S&T manages
science and technology research and provides acquisition
support for the Department's operational components. It works
with partners to do basic research and provide technology
solutions to first responders.
It is no secret that the Science and Technology Directorate
has had its challenges since its creation. But despite several
restructuring and close Congressional oversight, the S&T
Directorate continues to face difficulties in fulfilling its
mission. Problems with priority setting and strategic planning
for the directorate's R&D programs, as well as balancing
incremental efforts with high-risk, high-reward research remain
a challenge. In addition, there continues to be challenges with
working with the operational components in both research and
acquisition support activities.
Our committees have been working together to develop
authorizing language for the S&T Directorate to give it the
clarity, structure, and tools it needs, while ensuring it
remains accountable. I look forward to working with everyone
here as we develop this legislation.
We appreciate that Dr. Brothers, who was just confirmed--
and congratulations on that--to his post as under secretary in
April. We don't expect all these problems to be solved
overnight. But that said, we are interested in hearing your
ideas on how to get, and to keep, the S&T Directorate on track.
Dr. Brothers recently briefed our staff and will discuss,
in his testimony, the establishment of four key visionary goals
in which the S&T will focus their efforts. While goals are
important, we are also interested in hearing the strategy and
implementation plan to make those goals a reality, including
time lines and metrics to the extent you feel that they can
be--those measurements can be attached to those goals. S&T has
a unique position and opportunity to be, as you said in your
written testimony, the glue between operational elements. I
look forward to hearing about specific successes that S&T has
accomplished working with operational components.
Just as important, we look forward to hearing how S&T
intends to balance the long-term research agenda with the
short-term operational technology development and acquisition
support.
Again, I would like to thank the witnesses, as well as our
Science Committee colleagues, for participating in the hearing
today.
[The statement of Chairman Meehan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Patrick Meehan
September 9, 2014
I would like to thank everyone for attending this important joint
hearing on the strategy and mission of the DHS Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate. I would particularly like to thank Ranking Member
Clarke as well as Chairman Bucshon and Ranking Member Lipinski of the
Science and Technology Research Subcommittee for their participation.
Since both committees share jurisdiction it is helpful that we are
holding this oversight hearing together while we collaborate on writing
an authorization bill. I would also like to thank our witnesses, Dr.
Reginald ``Reggie'' Brothers, the new under secretary for S&T and David
Maurer from GAO and I look forward to hearing from both of you on the
challenges facing the directorate and how we can help ensure S&T is
able to fulfill its mission.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate was established by
Congress to be the primary research and development arm of the
Department of Homeland Security. In this role, S&T manages science and
technology research and provides acquisition support for the
Department's operational components, and works with partners to do
basic research and provide technology solutions to first responders.
It is no secret that the Science and Technology Directorate has had
challenges since its creation. Despite several restructurings and close
Congressional oversight, the S&T Directorate continues to face
difficulties in fulfilling its mission. Problems with priority setting
and strategic planning for the directorate's R&D programs as well as
balancing incremental efforts with high-risk, high-reward research
remain a challenge. In addition, there continue to be challenges with
working with the operational components in both research and
acquisition support activities.
Our committees have been working together to develop authorizing
language for the S&T Directorate to give it the clarity, structure, and
tools it needs while ensuring it remains accountable. I look forward to
working with everyone here as we develop that legislation.
We appreciate that Dr. Brothers was just confirmed to his post as
Under Secretary in April and we don't expect all of these problems to
be solved overnight. That said, we are interested in hearing his ideas
on how to get and keep the S&T Directorate on track. Dr. Brothers
recently briefed our staff, and will discuss in his testimony, the
establishment of four key visionary goals on which S&T will focus their
efforts. And while goals are important, we are also interested in
hearing the strategy and implementation plan to make those goals a
reality including time lines and metrics as well.
S&T has a unique position and opportunity to be, as you said in
your written testimony, ``the glue between operational elements.'' We
look forward hearing about specific successes that S&T has accomplished
working with operational components. And just as important, we look
forward to hearing how S&T intends to balance the long-term research
agenda with short-term operational technology development and
acquisition support.
Again, I would like to thank the witnesses as well as our Science,
Space, and Technology Committee colleagues for participating in this
hearing today. With that, I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Meehan. With that, I yield back the balance of my time,
and I now recognize the Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman
who is representing the subcommittee today, from New Jersey,
Mr. Payne, for any opening comments he may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman Meehan, and to Chairman
Bucshon, to my Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. I have a statement
from the subcommittee Ranking Member, Yvette D. Clarke, who
apologizes for not being able to be here today. I'll read that
now.
Thank you, Chairman Meehan and Chairman Bucshon for
convening this joint hearing of the Science and Technology
Directorate. I want to especially welcome Ranking Member
Lipinski and our colleagues from the Subcommittee on Research
and Technology.
Dr. Brothers, it is good to have you back before this
subcommittee. Mr. Maurer, thank you for agreeing to give us
your perspective, and we are pleased to have you here today.
S&T is an essential component of the Department's efforts. I
know many of us are eager to hear about the new vision and
priorities at the directorate. The mission of the S&T
Directorate is to strengthen America's security and resiliency
by providing innovative science and technology solutions for
the homeland security enterprise.
In order to meet the needs of this diverse stakeholder, who
covers all of DHS missions in areas, S&T strives to rapidly
develop and deliver knowledge, analysis, and innovative
solutions that advance the mission of the Department. S&T also
leverages technical expertise to assist the efforts of the DHS
components to establish operational requirements and to select
and acquire needed technologies. The ultimate goal of S&T, as I
see it, is to strengthen the Homeland Security's first
responders' capabilities to protect the homeland and respond to
disaster.
Along the way, S&T must help foster a culture of innovation
and learning across DHS that speaks to the challenges with
scientist and technical rigor. In 2009, spurred by the findings
of several reports about S&T--especially one performed by the
National Academy of Public Administration--this subcommittee
initiated its own year-long comprehensive review of the
directorate. Our purpose was to identify areas within the
directorate that could use a fresh set of eyes and additional
oversight, or modifications, to legislative authorities. As a
result, we produced a comprehensive bipartisan bill which
passed the House unanimously in 2010.
In doing so, we reviewed the Homeland Security Act and the
Department's use of the authorities that Congress had vested in
it, and I am hoping that some of these things we learned during
that process can be used in future authorization efforts. One
of the things we did learn was that such a large and complex
portfolio and--the directorate has, it is difficult to craft a
cohesive strategy. Our analysis suggested that the Department
had not developed a clear risk-based methodology to determine
what research projects to fund, how much to fund, and how to
evaluate a project's effectiveness or usefulness. These
questions remain today.
In my opinion, the directorate will never achieve success
unless research rules and metrics are more fully established. I
am anxious to hear of any plans that the under secretary may
have in mind to keep the directorate moving forward during
these challenging times. Striving to do more with less is
always the hallmark of an efficiently-run effort of any type.
But trying to protect our citizens and the Nation, with
programs that are backed by unfunded and depleted science and
technology research assets is another matter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
September 9, 2014
Thank you Chairman Meehan and Chairman Bucshon for convening this
joint hearing on the Science and Technology Directorate, and I want to
especially welcome Ranking Member Lipinski and our colleagues from the
Subcommittee on Research and Technology. Dr. Brothers, it is good to
see you back before this subcommittee, and Mr. Maurer, thank you for
agreeing to give us your perspective, and we are pleased to have you
here today.
S&T is an essential component of the Department's efforts, and I
know many of us are eager to hear about a new vision and priorities at
the directorate. The mission of the S&T Directorate is to strengthen
America's security and resiliency by providing innovative science and
technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise.
In order to meet the needs of its diverse stakeholders who cover
all DHS mission areas, S&T strives to rapidly develop and deliver
knowledge, analyses, and innovative solutions that advance the mission
of the Department.
S&T also leverages technical expertise to assist the efforts of the
DHS components to establish operational requirements and to select and
acquire needed technologies. The ultimate goal of S&T, as I see it, is
to strengthen the Homeland Security First Responders' capabilities to
protect the homeland and respond to disaster.
Along the way, S&T must help foster a culture of innovation and
learning across DHS that speaks to challenges with scientific and
technical rigor. In 2009, spurred by the findings of several reports
about S&T, especially one performed by the National Academy of Public
Administration, this subcommittee initiated its own year-long
comprehensive review of the directorate.
Our purpose was to identify areas within the directorate that could
use a fresh set of eyes and additional oversight or modifications to
legislative authorities. As a result, we produced a comprehensive,
bipartisan bill, which passed the House unanimously in 2010.
In doing so, we reviewed the Homeland Security Act and the
Department's use of the authorities the Congress has vested in it. I am
hoping that some of the things we learned during that process can be
used in future authorization efforts.
One of the things we did learn was that with such a large and
complex portfolio, the directorate has found it difficult to craft a
cohesive strategy. Our analysis suggested that the Department had not
developed a clear risk-based methodology to determine what research
projects to fund, how much to fund, and how to evaluate a project's
effectiveness or usefulness. These questions remain today.
In my opinion, the directorate will never achieve success unless
research rules and metrics are more fully established, and I am anxious
to hear of any plans that the Under Secretary may have in mind to keep
the directorate moving forward during these challenging times.
Striving to do more with less is always the hallmark of an
efficiently-run effort--of any type--but trying to protect our citizens
and Nation with programs that are backed by underfunded and depleted
science and technology research assets, is another matter.
Mr. Meehan. I want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey.
Now I would like to recognize my co-chair for the hearing
today, the gentleman from Illinois, or from Indiana, Mr.
Bucshon, for any statement that he may have.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Chairman Meehan. I am happy to
welcome everyone to this joint hearing on the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. As we
work on the potential reauthorization of the S&T Directorate,
this hearing will provide us with background information needed
from the under secretary for science and technology, who
recently took on his post at the Department, and from the
Government Accountability Office that has produced a number of
reports focused on the directorate.
In July, the Research and Technology Subcommittee, which I
chair, held a hearing looking at the S&T Directorate's work
related to border security technology. That hearing, as well as
today's, should offer valuable details to inform our work on
our subcommittees. Established in 2002 in the Homeland Security
Act, the Directorate for Science and Technology has primary
responsibility for bringing new technologies to full readiness
at DHS. The mission of an S&T directorate is to, ``to
strengthen America's security and resilience by providing
knowledge, products, and innovative technology solutions for
the homeland security enterprise.''
My district in southwest Indiana is home to Naval Surface
Warfare Center Crane, whose personnel and facilities provide
the Department of Defense with state-of-the-art technology.
Given this, I am particularly interested in learning how
existing technologies perhaps used for the Department of
Defense purposes are being, and can be, utilized in different
ways for securing the homeland. Twelve years ago, the Homeland
Security Act tasked the S&T Directorate with the coordination
and integration of research, development, demonstration, and
testing and evaluation activities at DHS.
Unfortunately, the S&T Directorate has not yet been able to
accomplish this task. I look forward to hearing from both of
our witnesses about how the directorate can move forward to
carry out this important role. Today's hearing should provide
us with invaluable insights and oversight of the S&T
Directorate. I look forward to hearing from both of our
witnesses.
Thank you, Chairman Meehan, and I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman Bucshon follows:]
Statement of Chairman Larry Buschon
September 9, 2014
Thank you Chairman Meehan. I am happy to welcome everyone to this
joint hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate).
As we work on the potential reauthorization of the S&T Directorate,
this hearing will provide us with background and information needed
from the Under Secretary for Science and Technology who recently took
on his post at the Department, and the Government Accountability Office
that has produced a number of reports focused on the Directorate.
In July, the Research and Technology Subcommittee held a hearing
looking at the S&T Directorate's work related to border security
technology. That hearing, as well as today's, should offer valuable
details to inform our work.
Established in 2002 in the Homeland Security Act, the Directorate
for Science and Technology has primary responsibility for bringing new
technologies to full readiness at DHS.
The mission of the S&T Directorate is ``to strengthen America's
security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative
technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise.'' My
district in southwest Indiana is home to Naval Surface Warfare Center
Crane, whose personnel and facilities provide the Department of Defense
with state-of-the-art technology.
Given this, I am particularly interested in learning how existing
technologies, perhaps used for Department of Defense purposes, are
being and can be utilized in different ways for securing the Homeland.
Twelve years ago, the Homeland Security Act tasked the S&T
Directorate with the coordination and integration of the research,
development, demonstration, and testing and evaluation activities of
DHS. Unfortunately, the S&T Directorate has not yet been able to
accomplish this task. I look forward to hearing from both of our
witnesses about how the directorate can move forward to carry out this
important role.
Today's hearing should provide us with invaluable insights and
oversight of the S&T directorate. I look forward to hearing from both
of our witnesses. Thank you Chairman Meehan and I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. I want to thank the gentleman. I will now
recognize the gentleman from Illinois. But I recognize, as
well, that when you mix up Indiana and Illinois during Big 10
football season you do so at great peril.
But Mr. Lipinski, for any comments he may have.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I went to
Northwestern so Illinois isn't my team. But before I start, I
wanted to ask unanimous consent to insert in the record an
opening statement from Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson of
the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Mr. Meehan. Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement of Ranking Member Johnson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
September 9, 2014
Thank you Mr. Chairman. As the Ranking Member of the Science,
Space, and Technology Committee, I am pleased to see this collaborative
effort by these two committees as we hear from the Under Secretary for
Science and Technology at DHS and GAO. Thank you to the witnesses for
being here. I hope this cross-committee bipartisan collaboration
continues as we work to reauthorize the S&T Directorate.
The Department's research activities aim to deliver the latest
technologies and innovative solutions to the agents in the field. These
technologies act as a force multiplier to protect our borders, our
cities, and our communities. The homeland security threat landscape is
constantly changing and innovative research allows us to stay ahead of
those who wish to do us harm. This complex challenge requires the
greatest minds and most talented workforce. Dr. Brothers, I look
forward to hearing how you are tapping into and improving the DHS
workforce to ensure the best leaders and decision makers are at the
table to push the Department's research operations to new levels.
In addition to a strong workforce, DHS has five National
laboratories and access to the excellent facilities and strong
technical support at Department of Energy labs. DHS also has 12
university-based Centers of Excellence, an advanced research projects
agency, and a growing industrial base. The tools are all there. Where
S&T has fallen short is in carrying out the basics of good Government:
Strategic planning, coordination across the agency, and adequate
testing and evaluation. These problems must be fixed.
I look forward to hearing from you, Dr. Brothers, on the changes
you will be putting in place to ensure DHS R&D investments are well-
managed.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. I want to thank Chairman Meehan
and Chairman Bucshon for calling this hearing today. I welcome
the opportunity to join with my colleagues on the Homeland
Security Committee to discuss the important work being done at
the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate. I also want to thank our witnesses for being here.
Under Secretary Brothers, I look forward to hearing about your
plans and progress so far for the S&T Directorate. Mr. Maurer,
it is good to see you again. We had a good hearing back in the
Science, Space, and Technology Committee in July.
It is no secret that the creation of DHS as a single agency
constructed from several existing agencies with diverse
missions generated a number of management challenges. The S&T
Directorate's task of providing high-quality scientific and
technical support for all of the agency's missions is
undoubtedly a daunting one. Having said that, I am disappointed
that the success of the S&T Directorate continues to be limited
by a lack of effective strategy and a lack of coordination
resulting in some costly and, likely, preventable failures.
This must change.
Under Secretary Brothers, I am interested to hear from you
about the policy management changes you are putting in place to
shift the S&T Directorate toward a more focused and strategic
operation. I want to make sure everyone understands that, you
know, you are new to this--relatively new to this position. As
I said to you before we began, this is a very daunting task
that you have. But we are all happy to work with you to help
you succeed in that. As you put together a strategic plan for
S&T, I hope you will look critically at customer needs, your
relationship with the operational components, the balance
between short- and long-term research, and lessons learned from
past failures.
Visionary goals and detailed objectives can be helpful, but
those need to be coupled with effective policies and practices
to ensure success. The end-users of S&T Directorate research
are varied and have a wide range of technical and operational
needs. The end-users span from first responders and private
industry to Border Patrol Agents and TSA screeners. I would
like to hear how the directorate seeks to prioritize these end-
users and fit their needs into the broader R&D strategy, as
indicated by DHS risk analyses.
Successful technology development also requires researchers
and end-users to be communicating and collaborating at each
stage of the R&D process. I think it is fair to say that the
relationship between S&T and the operational components has not
always been productive. I look forward to hearing what S&T is
doing to improve these relationships and how they define their
role within each phase of the technology development process.
In addition, operational mission needs often demand tangible
outcomes and deliverables.
However, I am very concerned that DHS is not striking the
right balance between critical basic research and applied
technology development. Without long-term investment in the
Department, the Nation will not have the scientific foundation
for new homeland security technologies in the future.
Finally, as Science Committee Members heard at our July
hearing, social science has played an important role in the
technology development, testing, and evaluation processes. We
have seen how the most advanced technologies can end as
failures because the developers do not consider how the
operators in the field will use the technology.
I am interesting to hear what methods are in place now to
ensure that human factors are considered during technology
development and acquisition. Once again, Dr. Brothers, you have
quite a task before you. I look forward to working with you
and, hopefully, providing you with some of the tools you need
to improve the R&D efforts at DHS. Most importantly keep the
American homeland safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Lipinski follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Daniel Lipinski
September 9, 2014
Thank you to Chairman Meehan and Chairman Bucshon for calling this
hearing today. I welcome the opportunity to join with my colleagues on
the Homeland Security Committee to discuss the important work being
done at the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate.
I also want to thank our witnesses for being here. Under Secretary
Brothers, I look forward to hearing about your plans and progress so
far with the S&T Directorate. Mr. Maurer, it is good to see you again.
It is no secret that the creation of DHS as a single agency
constructed from several existing agencies with diverse missions
generated a number of management challenges. The S&T Directorate's task
of providing high-quality scientific and technical support for all of
the agency's missions is undoubtedly a daunting one. Having said that,
I am disappointed that the success of the S&T Directorate continues to
be limited by the lack of an effective strategy and a lack of
coordination, resulting in some costly and likely preventable failures.
This must change.
Under Secretary Brothers, I am interested to hear from you about
the policy and management changes you are putting in place to shift the
S&T Directorate toward a more focused and strategic operation. As you
put together a strategic plan for S&T, I hope you will look critically
at customer needs, your relationship with the operational components,
the balance between short- and long-term research, and lessons learned
from past failures. Visionary goals and detailed objectives can be
helpful, but those need to be coupled with effective policies and
practices to ensure success.
The end-users of S&T Directorate research are varied and have a
wide range of technical and operational needs. The end-users span from
first responders and private industry to Border Patrol Agents and TSA
Screeners. I would like to hear how the Directorate seeks to prioritize
these end-users and fit their needs into the broader R&D strategy as
indicated by DHS risk analyses.
Successful technology development also requires researchers and
end-users to be communicating and collaborating at each stage of the
R&D process. I think it is fair to say that the relationship between
S&T and the operational components has not always been productive. I
look forward to hearing what S&T is doing to improve these
relationships and how they define their role within each phase of the
technology development process.
In addition, operational mission needs often demand tangible
outcomes and deliverables. However, I am very concerned that DHS is not
striking the right balance between critical basic research and applied
technology development. Without long-term investments, the Department
and the Nation will not have the scientific foundation for new homeland
security technologies in the future.
Finally, as Science Committee Members heard at our July hearing,
social sciences play an important role in the technology development,
testing, and evaluation processes. We have seen how the most advanced
technologies can end as failures because the developers do not consider
how the operators in the field will use the technology. I am interested
to hear what methods are in place now to ensure that human factors are
considered during technology development and acquisition.
Once again, Dr. Brothers, you have quite the task before you. I
look forward to working with you and hopefully providing you with some
of the tools you need to improve the R&D efforts at DHS, and most
importantly keep the American homeland safe.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Meehan. Yes, I thank the gentleman. I know the Chairman
of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee expects to be
here and to make an opening statement, which I will recognize
him when he arrives. But we are also very grateful to have at
the hearing today the Ranking Member of the full Committee on
Homeland Security, the gentleman from Mississippi.
I invite the gentleman if he would like to make any
comments before we begin.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Promise you I will
be brief.
As I said, thank you and thank Chairman Bucshon for
convening this joint hearing on the Science and Technology
Directorate. I want to especially welcome Ranking Member
Lipinski and our colleagues from the Subcommittee on Research
and Technology. I join you in welcoming both Under Secretary
Brothers to the committee, and Mr. Maurer on the Government
Accountability Office, and look forward to today's testimony.
Research and development on technologies is a key component
of DHS's efforts to detect, prevent, and mitigate terrorist
threats. Given the size of DHS, its role in the Federal
Government, and the dynamics of the current threat picture R&D
should be a priority. DHS should have a cohesive policy that
defines responsibility for coordinating R&D and mechanisms to
attract all DHS R&D projects. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. Multiple entities across DHS conduct various types of R&D
in pursuit of their respective missions.
According to GAO, DHS does not have a Department-wide
policy defining R&D, or guidance directing components how to
report R&D activities and investments. Consequently, it leaves
Congress to question where the Science and Technology
Directorate fits in this picture. Does S&T have the ability to
maintain oversight of its investment in R&D across the
Department? Where are S&T's limitations on its ability to
oversee components of R&D efforts and align them with agency-
wide goals and priorities? This fragmented approach, to allow
R&D within S&T to be an easy target for all sets.
As my colleagues across the aisle continue to support
extreme budget cuts that affect the funding levels for the
Department, programs that are not clear in their mission do not
have metrics to illustrate their value heighten their
vulnerability. Congress recognizes that threat picture is
evolving. Accordingly, it should make sense to continue to
invest in innovation. However, these investments must be
justified. It has not been made clear to the committee if S&T
has a system to monitor research milestones and collect
feedback from customers and end-users on the effectiveness of
the services delivered by the directorate.
There have to be metrics to justify how S&T develops
security solutions. Mr. Under Secretary, you and I both know
the importance of innovation, and we have actually talked about
it. The next technology that could advance the Department's
goal could be in the hands of a small business owner.
Unfortunately, there have been instances where small companies
complain about their difficulty in working with S&T. I hope to
hear the strategy the director has to improve its relationship
with small and/or minority-owned businesses.
Mr. Chairman, I hope the committee will take these matters
seriously as we learn how the directorate will carry out its
strategic plans, management directives, and operational
programs going forward.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentleman. We are also similarly
grateful for having the presence of the Ranking Member, another
Ranking Member, and the Chairman of the full Science, Space,
and Technology Committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.
Thank you for being here.
I recognize you for any opening comment you may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman--both Chairs who are here today--for having this joint
hearing. Today, we have an opportunity to continue our
discussion about the work of the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate. In July, the
Science Committee's Research and Technology and Oversight
Subcommittees held a hearing on technologies that would help
secure the border. At that hearing, witnesses discussed the
need for a unified strategy and consistent metrics for
developing border technologies.
As with other Department components, the Science and
Technology Directorate has yet to provide the necessary
strategy and technology to control our Nation's borders. A
Nation that has lost control of its border has lost control of
its future. The Government Accountability Office found the
Department of Homeland Security's research and development
efforts to be, ``fragmented and overlapping.'' In previous
years, the GAO found hundreds of millions of dollars being
spent each year on duplicative R&D projects by other offices
within the Department.
The Science and Technology Directorate will spend $1.2
billion this year on numerous projects. The Science and
Technology Directorate is uniquely positioned to interact with
all of DHS components. It not only is in a position to help
secure our physical border, but also can better protect our
virtual borders related to network and information technology.
I am particularly interested in learning about the
directorate's work on cybersecurity issues. Dr. Brothers and
his team have made cybersecurity a centerpiece of their
recently-released visionary goals.
On a daily basis, our Nation's economy and security are
threatened by cyber criminals and hackers. Unfriendly foreign
governments launch regular cyber attacks to undermine our
National security and steal military and technological secrets.
Cyber attacks against U.S. Government and private-sector
networks continue to grow at an alarming rate. But the full
scope of the threat we face has yet to be realized.
Unfortunately, the Senate continues to sit on numerous bills
passed by the House that would make our cyber infrastructure
more secure.
Many of these bills were initiated by the Science, Space,
and Technology Committee and the Homeland Security Committee.
While the Senate remains immobile, we will continue our work on
solutions here in the House. Unsecure physical and virtual
borders threaten our National and economic security. Technology
can help us better secure our borders and determine our future.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and want,
again, to thank our Chairmen for conducting this hearing.
I will yield back.
[The statement of Chairman Smith follows:]
Statement of Chairman Lamar S. Smith
September 9, 2014
Thank you, Chairman Meehan and Chairman Bucshon for holding this
joint hearing. Today we have an opportunity to continue our discussion
about the work of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate.
In July, the Science, Space, and Technology Committee's Research
and Technology and Oversight Subcommittees held a hearing on
technologies that would help to secure the border.
At that hearing, witnesses discussed the need for a unified
strategy and consistent metrics for developing border technologies.
As with other Department components, the Science and Technology
Directorate has yet to provide the necessary strategy and technology to
control our Nation's borders. A Nation that has lost control of its
border has lost control of its future.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS's) research and development (R&D) efforts to
be ``fragmented and overlapping.''
In previous years, the GAO found hundreds of millions of dollars
being spent each year on duplicative R&D projects by other offices
within the Department. The Science and Technology Directorate will
spend $1.2 billion this year on numerous projects.
The Science and Technology Directorate is uniquely positioned to
interact with all of DHS's components. It not only is in a position to
help secure our physical border, but also can better protect our
virtual borders related to network and information technology.
I am particularly interested in learning about the Directorate's
work on cybersecurity issues. Dr. Brothers and his team have made
cybersecurity a centerpiece of their recently-released ``visionary
goals.''
On a daily basis, our Nation's economy and security are threatened
by cyber criminals and hackers. Unfriendly foreign goverments launch
regular cyber attacks to undermine our National security and steal
military and technological secrets.
Cyber attacks against U.S. Government and private-sector networks
continue to grow at an alarming rate. But the full scope of the threat
we face has yet to be realized.
Unfortunately, the Senate continues to sit on numerous bills passed
by the House that would make our cyber infrastructure more secure. Many
of these bills were initiated by the Science, Space, and Technology
Committee and the Homeland Security Committee.
While the Senate remains immobile, we will continue to work on
solutions here in the House. Unsecure physical and virtual borders
threaten our National and economic security. Technology can help us
better secure our borders and determine our future.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and will
continue to work on legislation to set priorities for the Science and
Technology Directorate.
Mr. Meehan. Let me thank the Chairman. Other Members of the
committee: A reminder that opening statements may be submitted
for the record.
Mr. Meehan. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this very important topic. Let me
begin by introducing Dr. Reginald Brothers. He is the under
secretary for science and technology at the Department of
Homeland Security. As under secretary, Dr. Brothers is the
science advisor to the Secretary and is responsible for
oversight and management of Science and Technology Directorate,
the Department's primary research and development arm.
Dr. Brothers is a science and technology leader, an expert
with more than 20 years of private- and public-sector
experience. Prior to joining DHS, Dr. Brothers served as the
deputy assistant secretary of defense for research. He was a
technical fellow, and director for mission applications at BAE
Systems, as well as a program manager for the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. Welcome, Dr. Brothers.
We are joined also by Mr. David Maurer. He is the director
in the United States Government Accountability Office's
Homeland Security and Justice team, where he leads GAO's work
reviewing DHS and DOJ management issues. As a former member of
the Department of Justice, I remember that oversight. I thank
you for your work. His past work includes reports and
testimonies on DHS research and development, DOJ grant
programs, the Federal prison system, Federal judgeships, DHS
morale, and DHS's overseas presence.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record, and I thank you for your extensive written statements
that give us a full spectrum on the issues before you. But in
the time you have, I hope that you will focus on your
priorities, Dr. Brothers.
I look forward to recognizing you for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF REGINALD BROTHERS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Under Secretary Brothers. Thank you, and good morning.
Chairman Meehan, Chairman Bucshon, Ranking Member Payne,
Ranking Member Lipinski, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman
Smith, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, I want
to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the mission and
strategy of the Department of Homeland Security Science and
Technology Directorate. I would also like to thank the Members
of the subcommittees for their long-standing interest in, and
support of, science technology, as evidenced recently by
legislation such as H.R. 2952 and 33696.
With this reauthorization, the committee has an opportunity
to help launch S&T as a 21st Century research and development
organization who will serve as a model for Federal R&D; one
that is hyper-connected, exploring the convergence of
scientific and technical disciplines, capable of meeting
increasing demand for return on taxpayer dollars, and tailored
to the new digital age. I would like to open with two
observations from my 4 months as under secretary.
First, it is apparent that technology and R&D are an
essential bridge to the future of homeland security. S&T will
be central to helping the Department make that future a
reality. Given current and projected threat environments,
technology-based solutions will be increasingly relied upon as
force multipliers to give operators and first responders the
operational advantage. Second, S&T is the right team for the
job. It is a dedicated, passionate workforce and solid
stakeholder base. Walking the halls and speaking to our
partners, I am invigorated by the wide-spread enthusiasm for
our mission. They are hungry to contribute, and we have the
technical breadth and depth to work with operators and end-
users across the full extent of the Department's missions.
Given these two observations, I am optimistic for S&T's
future. The objective is to help actualize S&T's potential and
make it a full-fledged enabler, innovator, and trusted
performer across the Department. To this end, I came to S&T
with five priorities: The creation and execution of visionary
goals; an actionable strategy; an empowered workforce; force-
multiplying solutions; and an energized homeland security
industrial base. I am proud to say that even after only 4
months we are well on our way.
Upon my arrival at S&T, I saw visionary goals that would
capitalize on creativity, improve transparency and morale, and
serve as north stars to drive innovation within S&T and our
broader community. R&D requires imagination. We must tap into
inventiveness across the entire S&T ecosystem of our
laboratories, industry, and academia at home and abroad. I
called on all S&T internal personnel and DHS components,
stakeholders, end-users, and industry partners to participate
in the process and provide their insights.
The visionary goals process has started a National
dialogue, one that we plan to continue, that has included 1,500
people participating on-line from industry, academia, and
Federal, State, and local entities. But the goals as an
ambitious end-state, our next step is the development of a
strategic plan for S&T, with a 5-year time horizon. This
nearer-term road map will lay out how our organization will
achieve our visionary end-goals and determine concrete metrics
for success. Upon completion of the S&T strategic plan later
this year, I look forward to sharing it with this committee,
the rest of Congress, and our stakeholders in industry and
academia.
Part of positioning S&T more strategically was shifting our
approach to R&D and including more aggressive, higher-potential
impact programs. A balanced R&D portfolio makes appropriate
trade-offs between technical feasibility and operational
impact, weighs threat probability, and appropriately
distributes investments across performance types and project
time lines. In recent years, S&T has not had this freedom or
flexibility. But if we focus entirely on incrementally
improving existing technology and systems we won't provide the
next generation the leap-ahead solutions our customers need.
To achieve our potential, S&T and our stakeholders need to
weigh these trade-offs and balance delivery of both near-term
and riskier, longer-term, game-changing capabilities to our
end-users. All the strategic planning and portfolio development
that we will describe today depends on identification of
capability gaps. We will continue refining our process for
generating these gaps based on the combination of conceptual
development, hands-on experimentation, analysis of future
threats and embedding directly with operators. Much of this is
already done informally. Some of it, like the embed program,
will be new.
To function in this new digital age and to generate
capability gaps and usable solutions to these gaps will depend
on program managers who can break down firewalls between R&D
and operations and become fluent in the language of operators.
S&T fills critical roles as the R&D engine of the homeland
security enterprise. A reauthorization is an opportunity to
shape the R&D organization for the 21st Century and to give S&T
the flexibility to empower our workforce, engage more
effectively with industry and other non-Government
stakeholders, and bring more and better solutions to our DHS
and first-responder customers.
Thank you for inviting me today to discuss S&T and share my
vision for the directorate. I am thrilled to be part of this
organization, and know that with your support in Congress we
will continue making great strides in finding new and better
ways to support homeland security operations.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Brothers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reginald Brothers
September 9, 2014
Good morning Chairman Meehan, Chairman Bucshon, Ranking Member
Clark, Ranking Member Lipinski, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today on re-authorization of the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). In this testimony, I
will discuss how S&T, one of a handful of components in the Department
created from whole cloth under the original Homeland Security Act of
2002, has grown in the last 11 years into a trusted partner for DHS
operators and State, local, Tribal, and territorial first responders.
With S&T's reauthorization, the committee has an opportunity to help
launch a 21st Century research and development (R&D) organization that
will serve as a model for Federal R&D--hyper-connected, exploiting the
convergence of scientific and technical disciplines, capable of meeting
increasing demand for return on taxpayer dollars, and tailored to the
new ``digital age.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A term borrowed from Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen's The New
Digital Age, which illustrates potential opportunities and challenges
in the emerging technological era that we will inhabit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To frame the conversation about S&T, I have two observations from
my time so far as under secretary. First, I believe given the current
and projected threat environments, technology-based solutions (materiel
and human-centric) will increasingly be an essential force multiplier
to providing operators and first responders the upper hand in their
respective operational spaces. Technology and R&D are the bridge to the
future of homeland security. For example, without harnessing advances
in science and technology, we simply cannot, with current resources,
screen and secure continuously rising flows of passengers and cargo and
counter sophisticated, motivated adversaries at land, air, and sea
Ports of Entry. The most effective and efficient changes come with
smart application of technical and analytical expertise. Though S&T's
value and capabilities are acknowledged by many throughout the
Department, we continue to seek new partners and help address the
growing need for technology in the Homeland Security Enterprise.
The second observation is that S&T has a passionate and dedicated
workforce. Walking the halls, I am invigorated by the wide-spread
enthusiasm for our mission. Our workforce is hungry to contribute, and
we have the technical breadth and depth to work with operators and end-
users across the breadth of the Department's missions.
I believe that given S&T's workforce and the rising urgency for
technology as a force multiplier, there is yet-to-be-realized potential
for S&T to support the Department and the Nation. In the coming years,
my objective is to help S&T actualize that potential and become a full-
fledged enabler and trusted performer across the Department. This
pursuit, and the ability for S&T to provide the bridge between present
and future homeland security capabilities, rest significantly on
whether we can transform the directorate into a 21st Century Federal
R&D organization. For that, we need help from Congress.
As under secretary, my thinking is influenced by lessons learned in
my time at the Department of Defense (DoD), in industry, and at
Federally-funded laboratories. Many corporate labs today are under
increased pressure to prove a direct impact to profits. Some
laboratories are seen by business unit leaders as imposing an
unjustified tax, and many surviving laboratories ensure that their
researchers have at minimum a baseline understanding of the business
context of their work. One way that these laboratories are enabling
this understanding is by cycling researchers between business units and
work in the lab. This is a straightforward, deceptively simple-sounding
concept, but it can make the difference between a lab disconnected from
its customers and one ultimately providing a strong return on
investment and expanding business through attunement to operational
reality and generation of usable, imaginative solutions. This is
precisely the model I intend to implement at S&T with DHS's operational
components.
After my confirmation, I came to S&T with five priorities to
execute--visionary goals, actionable strategy, an empowered workforce,
force multiplying solutions, and an energized Homeland Security
Industrial Base--to address how we plan as a directorate and to ensure
that we fully leverage all available resources. As I see it, there are
opportunities to further refine and improve how we work and what we
focus on as an organization. Those priorities split into two basic
categories: First, how we plan and prioritize at S&T and, second, how
to bring all available resources to bear in execution of our programs.
It is important to mention one item to provide additional strategic
context before covering specifics. To address the range of challenges
the Nation faces most collaboratively and effectively within the
Department, we have recently undertaken an initiative entitled
``Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort.'' In his April 22, 2014,
memorandum, Secretary Johnson directed a series of actions to enhance
the cohesiveness of the Department, while preserving the
professionalism, skill, and dedication of the people within, and the
rich history of, the DHS components.
There are two elements in this initiative: New senior leader forums
led by the Secretary and the Deputy, and Department-wide strategy,
requirements, and budget development and acquisition processes that are
tied to strategic guidance and informed by joint operational plans and
joint operations. These are building and maturing DHS into an
organization that is greater than the sum of its parts--one that
operates much more collaboratively, leverages shared strengths,
realizes shared efficiencies, and allows us to further improve our
important role as an effective domestic and international partner. DHS
S&T participates fully in the range of Unity of Effort initiative
activities directed by the Secretary, but just as significantly,
functions as a directorate with the same unifying principles.
a strategic focus for homeland security
Effective planning is how we as an organization will translate the
basis for our work (e.g., Component priorities, the Secretary's
initiatives, Congressional mandates, White House policy) into
functional programs that ultimately deliver novel or improved
capability. This includes a strategic vision spanning the near term,
including specific courses of action, through the long term and far
horizon, including ambitious goals.
Four Visionary Goals
As a first step, one of my priorities coming on-board was
establishing visionary goals that would serve as 30-year horizon points
to build toward. When Dr. George Heilmeier, one of the great technology
leaders of our time, was director of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, the organization and its stakeholders were invigorated
by his articulation of visionary goals, what he called his ``silver
bullets.'' Make the oceans transparent. Create an invisible aircraft.
Heilmeier's visionary goals strove for previously-unachieved
capabilities and lower-cost equivalents to existing capabilities. They
helped orient the organization and inspired stakeholders, including
operators, end-users, and performers in industry and academia.
R&D requires creativity and imagination, and we must tap into that
enthusiasm to spur big thinking. At S&T, I tasked a working group with
representatives from throughout the organization to draft vision
statements for consumption and feedback from the rest of the
directorate and our end-user stakeholders. Building off of existing
policy and doctrine (e.g., the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,
Secretary Johnson's priorities, existing Homeland Security Presidential
Directives), the group generated the four following draft goals:
Screening at Speed: Matching the Pace of Life.--Noninvasive
screening at speed will provide for comprehensive threat
protection while adapting security to the pace of life rather
than life to security. Whether screening people, baggage, or
cargo, unobtrusive technologies and improved processes will
enable the seamless detection of threats while respecting
privacy, with minimal impact to the speed of travel and the
pace of commerce.
A Trusted Cyber Future: Protecting Privacy, Commerce, and
Community.--In a future of increasing cyber connections, users
will trust that infrastructure is resilient, information is
protected, illegal use is deterred, and privacy is not
compromised. Frictionless security will operate seamlessly in
the background, based on self-detecting, self-protecting, and
self-healing cyber critical infrastructure--all without
disruption.
Enable the Decision Maker: Providing Actionable Information
Ahead of Incident Speed.--The decision maker has improved
situational awareness and is better able to understand risks,
weigh options, and take action--literally experience the
information. The essential element to making informed decisions
is access to timely, accurate, context-based information.
Supported by new decision support, modeling, and simulation
systems, critical decisions can be made based on relevant
information, transforming disparate data into proactive wisdom,
and ultimately improving operational effectiveness.
Responder of the Future: Protected, Connected, and Fully
Aware.--The responder of the future is threat-adaptive, able to
respond to all dangers safely and effectively. Armed with
comprehensive physical protection; interoperable, networked
tools; technology-enhanced threat detection and mitigation
capabilities; and timely, actionable information, the responder
of the future will be able to serve more safely and effectively
as an integral part of the Nation's resiliency.
Following the development of the initial draft set of visionary
goals by the working group, we opened them to Directorate-wide
discussion and development. Based on that feedback, changes were made
before a second wave of input from a wider group including the
Department and external stakeholders outside DHS.
One important note is that these are our visionary goals, but they
certainly do not capture our R&D portfolio in its entirety. The
homeland security mission space is broad, and many critical efforts are
not or are only indirectly included in these goals. That a particular
current effort is not captured in a 30-year vision does not necessarily
speak to the value of a potential project or place within S&T's
portfolio of investments. The visionary goals are devices to capitalize
on creativity and serve as North Stars to drive innovation within S&T
and our broader community.
An Actionable Strategy
With the visionary goals as an ambitious end-state, the next step
is a narrower, 5- to 10-year strategic plan for S&T. This will be a
nearer-term roadmap for how our organization seeks to achieve our
visionary end goals. Development of a strategy is a platform to think
through and communicate our plan internally and, as a result, make the
most of our investments. Externally, a good strategy also provides
critical signposts to industry, Congress, and other stakeholders for
where our priorities lie and the path we seek to reach for long-time
horizon deliverables. This is a standard tool in industry and
elsewhere. I look forward to using the same approach at S&T to make us
more accessible and to be the foundation for how we interface within
the Department, as an interagency partner, and with industry and our
other non-Federal partners.
Drawing on my experience in industry, a strategic plan must be
actionable and, in order to be useful, cannot simply be a reiteration
of our existing work and tally of our investments over the last 5 years
projected into the future. We need to lay out S&T's next 5 to 10 years
and determine concrete metrics for success. In order to keep the
strategy current and account for unanticipated changes or emergent
priorities, the strategy will also be revisited as part of a periodic
process. Upon completion of the S&T Strategic Plan later this year, I
look forward to sharing it with this committee, the rest of Congress,
and our stakeholders in industry and academia at home and abroad.
Delivering Force-Multiplying Solutions
In order to position the directorate more strategically, we are
updating our approach to R&D programs. A new approach will allow a more
focused, strategic relationship with our partners and will address the
need for a jointly-calibrated investment risk profile. At times, there
will rightly be pressure to fill immediate needs or invest in
incremental improvements, but a healthy portfolio must still allow for
a portion of projects to carry more technical risk and offer
proportionally greater potential returns. My vision for a balanced R&D
portfolio is one that makes appropriate trade-offs between technical
feasibility and operational impact of projects, weighs potential
event's probability and impact, and that distributes appropriately
across types of performers (including non-traditional) and project time
lines (less than 1 year vs. 5 years).
As such, I plan for a portfolio that spans quick success projects
integrating off-the-shelf technologies to potentially disruptive
technologies that, out of necessity, will be high-risk. S&T and our
stakeholders have to embrace the risk-capability trade-offs if we are
to achieve our potential to deliver both near-term and game-changing
capabilities to our end-users. There will also be three categories of
programs, outlined below, that will ultimately reduce S&T's total
number of programs but will increase overall impact, strategic focus,
and sustainability of the R&D portfolio.
The first category will be our Apex programs. Since S&T's first
Apex began with the Secret Service in 2010, Apex programs have been
some of our most successful and have generated a full range of lessons
learned including on front-end assessment and capability baselining,
working jointly with DHS operational partners, and joint program
execution. Much of the original Apex structure will remain--these will
still be cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary efforts intended to solve
problems of strategic operational importance--but the projects are
being scaled to apply to a wider portion of the portfolio and will
operate on longer 5-year time lines. The new Apexes will include some
current projects rolled up with expanded or new ones. With high-profile
programs, concrete deliverables, precise milestones and time lines, and
significant increases in dollar and workforce investment, we believe
that the new, scaled Apex efforts will bring substantial gains for our
operational partners involved with screening, cyber security, flood
resilience, biodetection, and emergency response.
The second category of programs will be what we currently refer to
as our Technology Engine programs. These will focus on technology
foraging and the development of specific core capabilities and systems
that cut across, and benefit, numerous programs and projects across
S&T's portfolio. We see these bringing a push-pull dynamic to the
directorate. They will be pulled as service providers to Apexes and
other efforts (e.g., numerous programs have data analytic or network
security needs), but they will also push for integration of universal
needs and capabilities like interoperability into projects throughout
S&T. These technology areas, including data analytics or modeling and
simulation as examples, will provide a critical mass of knowledge and
expertise to ensure efficiency and proper leverage of previous,
current, and future investments.
The final category includes many focused programs not captured
under the umbrella of Apexes or Technology Engines but which are still
critical for meeting the needs of DHS components and our Homeland
Security Enterprise partners. Example programs would include our
development of bioassays, which are a foundational element of the
Nation's biodefense and ability to screen and monitor for pathogens and
potential bio-attacks. This would also include investments in research
infrastructure and unique testbeds such as our cyber experimental
research testbed, which allows cybersecurity researchers to test and
refine their tools and technologies in large, internet-scale
conditions.
S&T's Process for Identifying Capability Gaps
There are two elements of S&T's work that are complementary but
distinct. The first, requirements, is for acquisition programs and
deals with physical characteristics and operational necessities (e.g.,
weight, dimension, ruggedness, look and feel). S&T's contributions in
this area include participation in the Department's joint capabilities
and requirements process. Operational capability gaps, which are the
second element, address missions, or subsets of missions that cannot be
met currently or efficiencies which significantly enhance performance;
these are based on customer and end-user input. These operational
capability gaps serve as S&T's primary driver for what we focus on in
R&D programs.
Regarding requirements, as you know, the Secretary established a
Department-wide Joint Requirements Council (JRC) in June as part of his
Unity of Effort Initiative. The JRC identifies common capability needs
and challenges across DHS components, and will work as an essential
input into S&T's own R&D process. In addition to JRC membership, S&T
currently provides the JRC's primary analytic resources. As such, S&T
is helping develop and refine JRC analysis, methodology, and process in
addition to partnering with topic-specific teams to conduct
capabilities-based assessments. Working under the direction of the JRC
Chair and with the other JRC stakeholders, we will establish a lasting
and functional framework for the Department's requirements process.
The JRC and corresponding DHS joint requirements process often
highlight capability gaps and can generate valuable input for S&T's
programs. However, acquisition-related input like physical requirements
is not the primary basis for R&D programs. For a successful R&D
organization, any programs, strategy, or visionary goals ultimately
must grow from and be tied to customers' and end-users' capability
gaps. A healthy process for identifying capability gaps is an R&D
organization's engine for understanding what our stakeholders need to
do their jobs, for knowing where and what services to provide (e.g.,
later-stage acquisition support, engineering services, subject-matter
expertise), and for validating the effectiveness and the value of the
investments that S&T is making.
Moving forward, S&T will formalize and integrate its framework for
communicating, documenting, addressing, and reviewing capability gaps
and R&D requirements. These generally grow from two complementary
categories. The first is conceptual development through embedding
directly with operators, analysis of future threats, or other
interaction with operators. The second is through hands-on
experimentation, also influenced by embedding with operators as well as
through types of events like those in the Joint Interagency Field
Exploration program.\2\ Those R&D requirements will then be the basis
for S&T's technology roadmaps and new start programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sponsored by S&T and the Department of Defense and conducted in
conjunction with the Naval Postgraduate School, Joint Interagency Field
Exploration events bring together operational end-users with technology
companies to explore the potential of new capabilities to address
challenges faced by Federal agencies. The environment facilitates a
collaborative working relationship between Government, academia,
industry, and non-Governmental organizations to promote the
identification and assessment of emerging and maturing technologies
with the primary goal of accelerating the delivery of enhanced
capabilities to the end-user.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are several driving principles as S&T locks in its formal
process for identifying capability gaps: Top-down prioritization by
leadership; bottom-up engagement with operational staff and end-users
for challenge statements, proposals, and validation; documents
capturing current efforts, challenges, and strategies; and periodic
engagement and review at both the executive and working levels of our
organizations. Though this process will feature many of the same
elements across our many partner organizations, it will be tailored to
each customer in order to ensure functional governance, appropriate
resource commitment, and mutual management of expectations.
A 21st Century R&D Workforce
Going back to the lessons learned from corporate labs that have
maintained their value to organizations, I look forward to
implementation of a much more robust process for S&T's workforce to
embed with operators and to allow operational staff to detail to S&T
and provide direct input to our R&D projects. To function in the new
digital age, we need scientists who break down firewalls between R&D
and operations and who become fluent in the language of operators and
end-users. These ``multi-lingual'' program managers that can slide
between operational and technical environments have the best track
records for successful projects and transition to use.
To achieve this, I would like more opportunities for staff to gain
first-hand understanding of DHS operations through a formal program to
embed technical subject-matter expertise experts in the field with
operators. We will have different durations for different purposes and
outcomes, perhaps a 2-week speed embed in some cases and in others a
more comprehensive 6-month or 1-year stint. There are considerable
obstacles to overcome in order to successfully launch such a program--
e.g., ensuring staff embed in the right places and see real operations,
that staff are in a position that does not disrupt law enforcement or
other sensitive operations--but the benefit of deeper connection to
customers and a reinforced R&D requirements process speak for
themselves.
I also believe that achieving this adaptable, ``multi-lingual''
workforce requires a more agile and modern hiring authority that is
suited to an R&D organization. Part of being responsive to end-user R&D
requirements is agility and adaptability in our workforce. This implies
that our program managers are able to work across the three categories
of programs detailed above and have skill sets that are not limited to
a specific line of business or type of project. That also means being
able to boost our talented career workforce with more strategic use of
our existing hiring authorities in the Homeland Security Act to fill
urgent needs and inject outside perspective into our programs. With a
fluid workforce strengthened through term-limited outside hires, our
external S&T stakeholders are more effectively connected to the
organization, we can foster technical engagement (including with STEM
students) on homeland security challenges, and our organization is
better-positioned to support the Department and first responders.
leveraging all available resources
In addition to more effective planning, we are also working to
ensure that S&T takes advantage of the full spectrum of resources
across what I refer to as the S&T ecosystem, which is the broad network
of technical expertise inside and outside of Government that can be
brought to bear for virtually any issue operators face. This S&T
ecosystem includes Department of Energy and DoD labs that are National
assets and global leaders in many research areas; our Nation's broad
base of universities, many of which are DHS Centers of Excellence; and
small businesses, the heart of our Nation's innovation, that we engage
through specialized vehicles like our Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) awards. Any potential R&D performer inside and outside
Government across industry, academia, Government-funded and private
laboratories, and in the United States or abroad is a part of the S&T
Ecosystem.
The Federal Government no longer provides the same share of funding
for research and development as it did in the Cold War era, and we can
no longer assume we have access to the best minds if we work
exclusively through who and what we already know.\3\ Though it is easy
to stovepipe and use known performers, a 21st Century R&D organization
must tap innovation engines in the venture capital world, Silicon
Valley, or universities to name a few. We face a vast homeland security
threat space and the entire Homeland Security Enterprise benefits from
a wider base of potential performers engaged in homeland security R&D.
The more vehicles to reach those potential performers (including DHS
Centers of Excellence and SBIR above, cooperative research and
development agreements, newly-delegated prize authority, and so on),
the more effectively and efficiently we can develop essential security
solutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Federal Government was the main provider of the Nation's
R&D accounting for 53.9 percent in 1953 and 66.8 percent in 1964. In
2011, Federal spending accounted for 29.6% of the Nation's R&D
spending. Source: National Science Foundation (http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/seind14/content/chapter-4/at04-06.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An Empowered S&T Workforce
Tapping the full potential of the S&T ecosystem will require
putting effort into improving coordination and collaboration within DHS
S&T. Across offices at S&T, we already cover most of the S&T Ecosystem
on a piece-by-piece basis with several offices actively engaged with
innovative potential performers. We can be doing more, however, to
ensure that S&T is internally unified and using those connections
toward a common purpose. I will foster an even greater Unity of Effort
between elements of S&T like the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency, our university-based Centers of Excellence, our five
operational homeland security labs, our Acquisition Support and
Operations Analysis group, or our Small Business Innovation Research
program. That will allow S&T to tailor our R&D portfolio performers to
those suited to greater innovation or greater feasibility based on
mission needs and demands.
Having that type of agile, cross-connected, and empowered workforce
means recognizing the value of taking a risk if the payout is a
disruptive capability, such as total situational awareness at all land
borders. In recent years, DHS S&T has not had this freedom or
flexibility. But for the long-term health of DHS and the Homeland
Security Enterprise, S&T and its stakeholders must be tolerant of more
risk in S&T's R&D portfolio. We will still pursue lower-risk, more
incremental projects where appropriate. But we will also foster
innovation at S&T with institutional allowance for more risky projects
that carry higher potential of failure but also significant potential
for reward if the project succeeds. An R&D organization is not
fulfilling its mission if it focuses on minor improvements to the last
great thing at the cost of failing to pursue the next great thing; we
must balance our workforce and our investments against that.
An Energized Homeland Security Industrial Base
Another aspect of leveraging the full S&T ecosystem is fostering
deeper engagement with an energized Homeland Security Industrial Base.
The Department of Defense has the Defense Industrial Base, a private-
sector engine for design, production, and maintenance of our military's
weapons and systems. When Defense needs a new missile, submarine, or
communications network, industrial machinery outside of Government
develops and delivers a product. While DHS cannot match the DoD's
resources, I know from my time in industry that companies of all sizes
are interested in doing business in homeland security.
Our Department, similar to much of Government, is often criticized
by industry for lack of transparency and failure to share information
to help private companies align their own investments to where
Government needs help. S&T will proactively address these criticisms. I
have already noted some instances--an updated and actionable S&T
Strategic Plan tailored to companies, a refined R&D requirements
process, more effective outreach and information sharing, and a more
transparent and informative web presence. My hope as under secretary
is, through sustained and effective engagement with the Homeland
Security Industrial Base, that we begin to see industry more closely
align their internal R&D budgets to homeland security priorities.
s&t's value to the department
Before I conclude, I think it is important to recognize that,
although R&D is the backbone of our organization, S&T has more
responsibilities and provides many more services to the Department than
a traditional R&D organization. We coordinate and oversee operational
test and evaluation for all major investments across DHS. We oversee
implementation of the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies Act of 2002, better known as the SAFETY Act, one of the
more innovative approaches to incentivizing private development of
homeland security-focused technology and services. With the DHS Office
of the General Counsel, we are responsible for the entire Department's
intellectual property portfolio. We work with all elements of the
Department to ensure DHS compliance with treaties such as the
Biological Weapons Convention. We operate laboratories, such as the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and Plum Island
Animal Disease Center, whose missions extend beyond R&D to supporting
operational homeland security missions. We provide technical support
that backstops major Departmental initiatives such as end-to-end
acquisition reform as part of the Secretary's Strengthening
Departmental Unity of Effort initiative. The list goes on.
Because of that wider role, and because our R&D work already
connects us with operators throughout the Department, we are one of the
elements of DHS that can serve as glue between operational elements. It
is critical we preserve this and continue to be viewed as an objective
arbiter and trusted partner, not an overseer or disrupter of
operations. As this committee contemplates potential new authorities
for S&T, please be mindful of this important dynamic. Achieving S&T's
mission, bringing technology to the fore for components and first
responders, supporting the Secretary's vision for the Department, and
fulfilling our Congressional mandates rest largely on being able to
leverage a positive relationship with our partners and end-users.
conclusion
Your commitment to S&T's re-authorization validates the role the
organization has grown into at DHS and is an important step to shedding
the role R&D organizations often fall into today as bill payers for
other shorter-term needs. Technology will be essential for answering
the challenges we face in homeland security today, and S&T has a
critical role to fill as the R&D engine of the Homeland Security
Enterprise.
I share a vision for the directorate to help highlight areas where
we need your help. S&T today, through considerable work and dedication
from its workforce, has made the most of an Industrial Age toolbox in a
Digital Age R&D landscape. Re-authorization of S&T is a chance to
empower an R&D organization for the 21st Century and to give us the
flexibility to empower our workforce, engage more effectively with
industry and other non-Government stakeholders, and bring more and
better solutions to our DHS and first responder customers.
Thank you for inviting me today to discuss S&T and share my vision
for the directorate. I am thrilled to be a part of this organization
and know that, with your support in Congress, we will continue making
great strides and finding new and better ways to support homeland
security operators. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Dr. Brothers.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Maurer for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Chairman
Bucshon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking
Member Lipinski, Ranking Member Payne, and other Members and
staff. I am pleased to be here today to discuss--I got
everybody, that is good. I am pleased to be here today to
discuss how the findings from GAO's recent work can help the
Science and Technology Directorate position itself for the
future.
Every year, the taxpayers provide DHS over a billion
dollars to support research and development. For that reason
alone, the Department needs to ensure its R&D activities work
as planned. R&D is also a crucial tool for helping DHS better
execute its various missions. At the same time, R&D is
inherently risky. Some projects will fail. S&T faces the
challenge of striking the right balance between helping end-
users meet their mission needs, while also taking informed
risks to push the boundaries of science.
In recent years, we found that S&T has made important
strides in taking a more strategic approach and tightening its
links with the rest of DHS. S&T's coordination with DHS
operational components is especially important. None of S&T's
ideas and work will see real-world use without working closely
with eventual end-users. In that regard, S&T's focus on
tightening collaboration with the components is a promising
sign. With that said, S&T clearly has a lot of work ahead to
bring coherence and structure to its research and development
efforts.
Our work identified three key areas for improvement. We
found that S&T needs to define R&D, do a better job tracking
R&D, and improve how it coordinates R&D. In September 2012, we
found a lot of activity across the Department that could be
considered research and development. By law, S&T is responsible
for overseeing and coordinating all of it. But they can't do
that if the various DHS components aren't working from the same
definition and agree on what should be coordinated.
Our work also found problems in DHS' efforts to centrally
track R&D. The Department struggled to answer basic questions,
such as: How much are you spending, what projects are currently
under way, and do completed projects meet the needs of their
customers? For example, we found that DHS did not know how much
its components invested in R&D. That makes it difficult to
oversee activities across the Department.
Our work also identified problems in coordination. Now, S&T
coordinates with components in may different ways at may
different levels. The problem is, some of these mechanisms need
to work better and, in some cases, new approaches are needed.
Specifically, the report we issued last year found that S&T
lacked a formal process to follow up with the end-users of its
deliverables. S&T customers were also much more likely to
report that S&T's work did not meet end-user needs. In some
instances, we were unable to locate an end-user for an S&T
project. So what does this mean for the future? Looking down
the road, it will be important for S&T to take action in three
areas.
First and foremost, we would like to see S&T and the
Department fully implement the recommendations from our prior
reports. DHS had recently issued a definition of R&D, and that
is a good first step. We look forward to action on our other
recommendations that will help S&T track and coordinate R&D
activities. Those are important building blocks for the second
action: Developing an updated strategy to guide S&T's future
direction. Not just what it wants to do, but why and how it
will be accomplished in a time of tight budget constraints. As
we heard, S&T is currently working on this, which is
encouraging. We look forward to seeing the results.
Third, S&T needs a motivated and engaged workforce to carry
out its mission. Unfortunately, last year, before Dr. Brothers
was under secretary, S&T ranked 299 out of 300 Federal entities
in the best places to work rankings. Understanding and
addressing the root causes of low morale will help support
successful implementation of any changes in strategic
direction.
S&T has an important role to play in identifying and
filling gaps in technological capacities at DHS. Implementing
GAO's recommendations, updating the strategic plan, and
addressing morale issues will better position S&T to translate
state-of-the-art science into usable tools that help enhance
homeland security.
That concludes my opening remarks. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify this morning. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Maurer
September 9, 2014
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-14-865T, a testimony before the Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies Subcommittee of
the Homeland Security Committee and the Research and Technology
Subcommittee of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and
mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the
Nation. Since its creation, DHS has spent billions of dollars
researching and developing technologies used to support its missions.
Within DHS, S&T conducts and is responsible for coordinating R&D across
the Department. Other components also conduct R&D to support their
respective missions.
This statement discusses: (1) How much DHS invests in R&D and the
extent to which DHS has policies and guidance for defining and
overseeing its R&D efforts across the Department, (2) the extent to
which R&D is coordinated across DHS, and (3) the results of DHS border
and maritime security R&D efforts and the extent to which DHS has
obtained and evaluated feedback on these efforts. This statement is
based on GAO's previously-issued work from September 2012 to July 2014,
and selected updates conducted in September 2014 on the status of GAO's
prior recommendations. To conduct the updates, GAO reviewed agency
documentation.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior reports, GAO recommended, among other things, that DHS
develop policies and guidance for defining, overseeing, coordinating,
and tracking R&D activities across the Department, and that S&T
establish time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating
feedback from its customers. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations
and has actions underway to address them.
department of homeland security.--actions needed to strengthen
management of research and development
What GAO Found
In September 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) did not know the total amount its components had
invested in research and development (R&D) and did not have policies
and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the
Department. According to DHS, its Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Coast Guard were
the only components that conducted R&D, and GAO found that these were
the only components that reported budget authority, obligations, or
outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget.
However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations
made by other DHS components. At the time of GAO's review, DHS did not
have a Department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing
components how to report all R&D activities. GAO recommended that DHS
develop policies and guidance to assist components in better
understanding how to report R&D activities and better position DHS to
determine R&D investments. DHS concurred with the recommendation and,
as of September 2014, had updated its guidance to include a definition
of R&D but efforts to develop a process for coordinating R&D with other
offices remain on-going and have not yet been completed. GAO will
continue to monitor DHS's efforts to develop its approach for
overseeing R&D at the Department.
GAO also reported in September 2012 that S&T had taken some steps
to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the Department's R&D efforts
were fragmented and overlapping, a fact that increased the risk of
unnecessary duplication. GAO recommended that DHS develop a policy
defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and establish
a mechanism to track all R&D projects to help DHS mitigate existing
fragmentation and overlap and reduce the risk of unnecessary
duplication. DHS concurred with the recommendation. As of September
2014, S&T has not fully implemented new policy guidance but, according
to S&T, is conducting portfolio reviews across the Department, as
directed by the fiscal year 2013 appropriations act, aimed at
coordinating R&D activities. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts
to develop a policy to better coordinate and track R&D activities at
the Department.
In September 2013, GAO reported that DHS border and maritime R&D
components reported producing 97 R&D deliverables from fiscal years
2010 through 2012 at an estimated cost of $177 million. GAO found that
the type of border and maritime R&D deliverables produced by S&T, the
Coast Guard, and DNDO varied, and R&D customers GAO met with had mixed
views on the impact of the deliverables. These deliverables included
knowledge products and reports, technology prototypes, and software.
For example, S&T developed prototype radar and video systems for use by
Border Patrol. However, GAO reported that S&T had not established time
frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback on the
extent to which deliverables met customers' needs. GAO recommended that
S&T establish time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating
such feedback from its customers to better determine the usefulness and
impact of its R&D projects and make better-informed decisions regarding
future work. As of September 2014, DHS had taken steps to address this
recommendation, including making plans to gather customer feedback on a
more consistent basis. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in
this area.
Chairman Meehan, Chairman Buschon, Ranking Member Clarke, Ranking
Member Lipinski, and Members of the committees: I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today about the results of the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) research and development (R&D) efforts,
including the extent to which its R&D efforts are coordinated within
and beyond DHS and the results of DHS's border and maritime security
R&D efforts. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
R&D activities comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis
in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of
man, culture, and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to
devise new applications.\1\ R&D is further broken down into the
categories of basic research, applied research, and development.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ OMB Circular No. A-11 Section 84.4. This definition includes
administrative expenses for R&D, but excludes physical assets for R&D
(such as R&D equipment and facilities), routine testing, quality
control mapping, collection of general-purpose statistics, experimental
production, routine monitoring and evaluation of an operational
program, and the training of scientific and technical personnel.
\2\ According to OMB, basic research is a systematic study directed
toward a fuller knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects
of phenomena and of observable facts without specific applications
toward processes or products in mind. Applied research is a systematic
study to gain knowledge or understanding to determine the means by
which a recognized and specific need may be met. Development is a
systematic application of knowledge or understanding, directed toward
the production of useful materials, devices, and systems or methods,
including design, development, and improvement of prototypes and new
processes to meet specific requirements. OMB Circular No. A-11 Section
84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and
mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the
Nation. DHS, through its Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and
other components, conducts research, development, testing, and
evaluation of new technologies that are intended to achieve a range of
homeland security goals, including detecting and preventing the
unauthorized entry of persons or contraband into the United States;
strengthening efforts to prevent and respond to nuclear, biological,
explosive, and other types of attacks; and securing U.S. ports and
inland waterways. DHS S&T has responsibility for coordinating and
integrating all R&D activities of the Department, as provided by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002.\3\ S&T has five technical divisions
responsible for managing the directorate's R&D portfolio and
coordinating with other DHS components to identify R&D priorities and
needs. Among those divisions, the Borders and Maritime Security
Division (BMD) is responsible for most of S&T's border- and maritime-
related R&D, and its primary DHS customer is Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). Also within S&T, the Office of University Programs
manages the DHS Centers of Excellence, which constitute a network of
universities that conduct research for DHS component agencies, with two
centers dedicated specifically to border and maritime R&D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, 302 (12), 116 Stat. 2135, 2163-64
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 182 (12)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although S&T conducts R&D and has responsibility for coordinating
R&D, other DHS components, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) and the U.S. Coast Guard, conduct R&D in support of their
respective missions. DNDO, for example, conducts R&D related to
detecting the use of an unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile
material, or radiological material in the United States.\4\ The U.S.
Coast Guard's R&D efforts support all of the various Coast Guard
missions, such as search and rescue, migrant interdiction, and marine
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DNDO was established by National Security Presidential
Directive 43, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14, and the
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act).
Pub. L. No. 109-347, 501(a), 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (codified at 6
U.S.C. 591-596).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since it began operations in 2003, DHS, through both S&T and other
components, has spent billions of dollars researching and developing
technologies used to support a wide range of missions. In June 2009,
the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) reported on S&T's
structure, processes, and the execution of its cross-Government
leadership role.\5\ NAPA reported that although S&T was charged by
statute to provide a leading role in guiding homeland-security-related
research, S&T has no authority over other Federal agencies that conduct
homeland-security-related research, and that the weaknesses in S&T's
strategic planning increased the risk for duplication of efforts. NAPA
recommended, among other things, that S&T follow OMB and GAO guidance
in formulating a strategic plan to guide its work. In July 2012, S&T
provided a draft strategy that identifies the roles and
responsibilities for coordinating homeland security science- and
technology-related functions across the U.S. Government to the White
House's Office of Science & Technology Policy for review. We reported
in July 2013 that the White House had not yet approved that draft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ National Academy of Public Administration, Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate: Developing
Technology to Protect America (Washington, DC: June 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To report R&D-related spending, DHS uses several mechanisms,
including budget authority (the legal authorization to obligate funds),
obligations (binding agreements to make a payment for services), and
outlays (payments to liquidate obligations representing amount
expended). Further, OMB requires agencies to submit data on R&D
programs as part of their annual budget submissions on investments for
basic research, applied research, development, R&D facilities
construction, and major equipment for R&D using OMB's definition of
R&D. R&D is further broken down into the categories of basic research,
applied research, and development.
My testimony today is based on previously-issued reports and
addresses: (1) How much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which it
has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources
and efforts across the Department; (2) the extent to which R&D is
coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, fragmentation, and
unnecessary duplication across the Department; and (3) the results of
DHS's border and maritime security R&D and the extent to which DHS
obtained and evaluated feedback on these efforts.
This statement is based on our previous reports and testimonies
issued from September 2012 to July 2014, with selected updates
conducted in September 2014 related to S&T's efforts to better manage
and coordinate its border and maritime R&D efforts.\6\ To conduct our
earlier work, among other things, we analyzed data related to DHS's R&D
budget authority for fiscal years 2010 through 2013, R&D contracts
issued by components to private industry and universities for fiscal
years 2007 through 2011, and the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
laboratories from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to identify how much
DHS components obligated for R&D-related work at the National
laboratories. We also met with selected R&D project managers and
customers. For the selected updates, we reviewed agency documentation
on DHS's progress in implementing our prior recommendations. The
reports cited provide detailed explanations of our scope and
methodology.\7\ The work upon which this statement is based was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and
Coordination of Research and Development Should Be Strengthened, GAO-
12-837 (Washington, DC: Sept. 12, 2012); 2013 Annual Report: Actions
Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve
Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2013);
Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen
Efficiency and Effectiveness, Achieve Cost Savings, and Improve
Management Functions, GAO-13-547T (Washington, DC: Apr. 26, 2013);
Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication Through Enhanced Performance
Management and Oversight, GAO-13-590T (Washington, DC: May 22, 2013);
Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Better Evaluate
and Coordinate Border and Maritime Research and Development, GAO-13-732
(Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2013); Department of Homeland Security:
Oversight and Coordination of Research and Development Efforts Could Be
Strengthened, GAO-13-766T (Washington, DC: July 17, 2013); Department
of Homeland Security: Continued Actions Needed to Strengthen Oversight
and Coordination of Research and Development, GAO-14-813T (Washington,
DC: July 31, 2014).
\7\ GAO-12-837 and GAO-13-732.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs does not know its total investment in r&d, but has taken some steps
to update guidance
In September 2012, we found that DHS did not know how much its
components have invested in R&D, making it difficult to oversee R&D
efforts across the Department. According to DHS budget officials, S&T,
DNDO, and the U.S. Coast Guard were the only components that conducted
R&D, and we found that they were the only components that reported
budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to OMB as
part of the budget process. However, we reported that the data DHS
submitted to OMB underreported DHS's R&D obligations because DHS
components obligated money for R&D contracts that were not reported to
OMB as R&D. Specifically, for fiscal year 2011, we identified an
additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components.
These obligations included DHS components providing S&T with funding to
conduct R&D on their behalf and components obligating funds through
contracts directly to industry, to universities, or with DOE's National
laboratories for R&D.
Further, we found that the data for fiscal years 2010 through 2013
DHS submitted to OMB also underreported DHS's R&D budget authority and
outlays because DNDO did not properly report at least $293 million in
R&D budget authority and at least $282 million in R&D outlays.\8\ We
reported that DHS budget officials agreed that DHS underreported its
R&D spending and when asked, could not provide a reason why the
omission was not flagged by DHS review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ At the time of our report, budget figures for fiscal year 2013
were agency estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, in our 2012 report, we found that DHS's R&D budget
accounts included a mix of R&D and non-R&D spending. For fiscal year
2011, we estimated that 78 percent of S&T's Research, Development,
Acquisition, & Operations account; 51 percent of DNDO's Research,
Development, & Operations account; and 43 percent of the Coast Guard's
R&D budget account funded R&D activities. As a result, this further
complicated DHS's ability to identify its total investment in R&D.
We also reported in September 2012 that DHS did not have a
Department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components
how to report R&D activities. As a result, we concluded that it was
difficult to identify the Department's total investment in R&D, a fact
that limited DHS's ability to oversee components' R&D efforts and align
them with agency-wide R&D goals and priorities, in accordance with
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.\9\ DHS
officials told us at the time that DHS used OMB's definition of R&D,
but the definition was broad and its application may not be uniform
across components, and thus, R&D investments may not always be
identified as R&D. We found that the variation in R&D definitions may
contribute to the unreliability of the reporting mechanisms for R&D
investments in budget development and execution, as discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states
that policies and mechanisms are needed to enforce management's
directives, such as the process of adhering to requirements for budget
development and execution and to ensure the reliability of those and
other reports for internal and external use. GAO, Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, DC: Nov. 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recommended that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance
for defining and overseeing R&D at the Department that include, among
other things, a well-understood definition of R&D that provides
reasonable assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D
resources and activities for internal and external use are achieved.
DHS agreed with our recommendation and stated that it planned to
evaluate the most effective path forward to guide uniform treatment of
R&D across the Department in compliance with OMB rules and was
considering a management directive, multicomponent steering committee,
or new policy guidance to help better oversee and coordinate R&D. As of
September 2014, DHS has updated its guidance to include a definition of
R&D, but, as discussed in more detail below, efforts to develop a
specific policy outlining R&D roles and responsibilities and a process
for overseeing and coordinating R&D with other offices remain on-going
and have not yet been completed. We will continue to monitor DHS's
efforts to implement these recommendations.
s&t has taken some actions to coordinate r&d across dhs, but r&d
activities are fragmented and overlapping
We reported in September 2012 that the Homeland Security Act of
2002 provides S&T with the responsibility for, among other things,
coordinating and integrating all research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities within DHS and establishing and
administering the primary R&D activities of the Department.\10\ S&T
developed coordination practices that fall into four general
categories: (1) S&T component liaisons, (2) R&D agreements between
component heads and S&T, (3) joint R&D strategies between S&T and
components, and (4) various R&D coordination teams made up of S&T and
component project managers, which are discussed in detail in our 2012
report and 2013 testimony.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 6 U.S.C. 182(11)-(12).
\11\ GAO-12-837. GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Oversight
and Coordination of Research and Development Efforts Could be
Strengthened, GAO-13-766T (Washington, DC: July 17, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite S&T's efforts to coordinate R&D activities, in September
2012, we reported that R&D at DHS was inherently fragmented because
several components within DHS--S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO--were
each given R&D responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may
pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities
are coordinated through S&T. Fragmentation among R&D efforts at DHS may
be advantageous if the Department determines that it could gain better
or faster results by having multiple components engage in R&D
activities toward a similar goal; however, it can be disadvantageous if
those activities are uncoordinated or unintentionally overlapping or
duplicative.
Specifically, we found at least six Department components involved
in R&D activities in our review of data on about 15,000 Federal
procurement contract actions coded as R&D taken by DHS components from
fiscal years 2007 through 2012. We examined 47 R&D contracts awarded by
these components--selected because they appeared to have activities
similar to those of another contract--and found 35 instances among 29
contracts in which the contracts overlapped with activities conducted
elsewhere in the Department. Taken together, these 29 contracts were
worth about $66 million. In one example of the overlap, we found that
two DHS components awarded 5 separate contracts that each addressed
detection of the same chemical.
While we did not identify instances of unnecessary duplication
among these contracts, in September 2012, we found that DHS had not
developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D
activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or
unnecessary duplication and did not have tracking mechanisms or
policies to help ensure that overlap is avoided and efforts are better
coordinated consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government.\12\ S&T officials told us at the time that a
process did not exist at DHS or within S&T to prevent overlap or
unnecessary duplication but that relationships with components mitigate
that risk. They also stated that S&T has improved interactions with
components over time. We concluded that the existence of overlapping
R&D activities coupled with the lack of policies and guidance defining
R&D and coordination processes was an indication that not all R&D
activities at DHS were coordinated to ensure that R&D is not
unnecessarily duplicative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
states that policies and procedures ensure that the necessary
activities occur at all levels and functions of the organization--not
just from top-level leadership. This ensures that all levels of the
organization are coordinating effectively and as part of a larger
strategy. Additionally, internal control standards provide that
agencies should communicate necessary information effectively by
ensuring that they are communicating with, and obtaining information
from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the
agency achieving its goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also found in September 2012 that neither DHS nor S&T tracked
all on-going R&D projects across the Department, including R&D
activities contracted through the National laboratories. As part of our
review, we identified 11 components that reimbursed the National
laboratories for R&D from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, but S&T's
Office of National Laboratories could not provide us with any
information on those activities and told us it did not track them.
According to S&T, the Office of National Laboratories' ability to
provide information on activities across the Department is limited by
components inconsistently operating within the defined process for
working with the National laboratories.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the authority to
use DOE laboratories to conduct R&D and established S&T's Office of
National Laboratories (ONL) to be responsible for coordinating and
using the DOE National laboratories. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 309, 116
Stat. 2135, 2172 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. 189). Additionally, DHS
Directive 143 further directs ONL to serve as the primary point of
contact to recommend contracting activity approval for work by the
National laboratories, and review all statements of work issued from
DHS and directed to the National laboratories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, we recommended that DHS develop and implement policies
and guidance for overseeing R&D that includes, among other things, a
description of the Department's process and roles and responsibilities
for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and efforts, and a
mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated costs
across the Department. DHS agreed with our recommendation and stated at
the time that S&T was implementing a collaborative, end-user-focused
strategy to coordinate and interact with components to better ensure
S&T's efforts aligned with components' needs and that it was
considering developing new policy guidance for R&D activities across
the Department. According to DHS officials, the Department implemented
an R&D portfolio review process, as directed by committee reports
accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS Appropriations Act, which is
aimed at better coordinating R&D activities by reviewing components'
individual R&D projects.\14\ In April 2014, DHS developed a definition
for R&D and stated that S&T was responsible for coordinating and
integrating R&D activities throughout the Department. However, as of
September 2014, not enough time has passed to determine whether this
process and new memorandum have improved coordination. Furthermore, to
better define and manage R&D across the Department, DHS should also
establish a mechanism to track R&D projects and costs, as we
recommended. Fully implementing our recommendation to develop a policy
that defines roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and
coordination processes, as well as a mechanism that tracks all DHS R&D
projects, could better position DHS to mitigate the risk of overlapping
and unnecessarily duplicative R&D projects. We will continue to monitor
DHS's efforts to develop a policy to better coordinate and track R&D
activities at the Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ H.R. Rep. No. 112-492, at 133; S. Rep. No. 112-169, at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
s&t has taken steps to obtain feedback and evaluate the impact of its
border and maritime r&d efforts
Costs and Types of Completed Border and Maritime R&D Projects Varied
In September 2013, we reported that DHS S&T, Coast Guard, and DNDO
reported producing 97 R&D deliverables at an estimated cost of $177
million between fiscal years 2010 and 2012. The type of border and
maritime R&D deliverables produced by these R&D entities were wide-
ranging in their cost and scale, and included knowledge products and
reports, technology prototypes, and software.\15\ For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ A complete list of all 97 projects for fiscal years 2010
through 2012 and their costs and project type can be found in appendix
I of GAO-13-732.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Knowledge products or reports.--One of the DHS Centers of
Excellence developed formulas and models to assist in
randomizing Coast Guard patrol routes and connecting networks
together to assist in the detection of small vessels.
Technology prototypes.--S&T BMD developed prototype radar
and upgraded video systems for use by Border Patrol Agents and
a prototype scanner to screen interior areas of small aircraft
without removing panels or the aircraft skin.
Software.--DNDO developed software that extracts data from
radiation portal monitors and uses the data to improve
algorithms used in detecting radioactive material.
As we reported in September 2013, R&D customers we met with had
mixed views on the impact of the R&D deliverables they received. For
example, we reviewed the 20 S&T BMD deliverables produced between
fiscal years 2010 and 2012 at a cost of $28.7 million. We found that
the customers of 7 deliverables stated that the deliverables met their
office's needs, customers of 7 did not, customers of 4 did not know,
and customers for 2 could not be identified.\16\ For example, customers
within CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition reported
that S&T's analysis and test results on aircraft-based use of wide area
surveillance technology helped CBP to make a decision on whether it
should pursue acquiring such technology. In cases where customers said
that the deliverables were not meeting their needs, the customers
explained that budget changes, other on-going testing efforts, or
changes in mission priorities were the reasons deliverables had not met
their needs, and customers pointed out that their relationship with S&T
had been positive and highly collaborative. In other cases, customers
pointed out that while the deliverable had not been used as intended,
it informed their office's decision making and helped to rule out
certain technologies as possibilities. In this regard, the customers
felt the R&D was successful, despite the fact that the deliverable had
not or was not being used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ This figure does not include projects from the S&T Office of
University Programs, which reported completing 18 border- and maritime-
related projects at a cost of $6.1 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&T BMD officials explained that some of its older projects did not
have identifiable customers because its former process for selecting
projects created the potential to engage in R&D without a clear
commitment from the customer. In February 2012, S&T issued a new
project management guide that requires project managers to specify the
customer by office and name, and to describe customer support for the
project, including how the customer has demonstrated commitment for and
support of the project. S&T officials said they believed this new
process would prevent future R&D funding from going toward projects
without a clear customer.
Additionally, we reported that from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal
year 2012, DNDO produced 42 deliverables at a cost of $115.9 million,
which included 6 discontinued projects and 36 projects that were either
transitioned to the next phase of R&D or were completed. DNDO R&D is
different from the R&D of S&T for many reasons. For one, a DNDO project
may start at a basic research level, and may end up being merged into
other similar efforts in order to achieve a higher project goal. In
these cases, the R&D customers are DNDO project managers rather than
another DHS customer, such as CBP. We discussed 5 DNDO R&D deliverables
at various R&D phases with DNDO officials--4 of which were deliverables
from on-going or completed projects and 1 of which was a discontinued
project. These officials said that the early-stage R&D at DNDO feeds
into the prioritized ranking of gaps in the global nuclear detection
architecture, as well as into the analysis-of-alternatives phase of
DNDO's solutions development process.\17\ Two of the 5 projects we
discussed had moved from early-stage R&D into other projects further
along in DNDO's project management process. Two of the 5 projects were
completed, with 1 project that was reported to have provided
information that further informed DNDO decision making and the other
project resulting in a commercialized product. With regard to the 1
discontinued project, DNDO officials said that the particular project's
technology was determined to be too expensive to continue pursuing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The global nuclear detection architecture is an integrated
system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to
combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and
inside the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&T Did Not Gather and Evaluate Feedback
We reported that although S&T project managers sought feedback from
their customers during the execution of projects, S&T did not gather
and evaluate feedback from its customers to determine the impact of its
completed R&D efforts and deliverables, making it difficult to
determine if the R&D met customer needs. Further, in some cases, the
customer of S&T's R&D was not clear or the results of the R&D were
unknown. For example, a CBP customer identified by S&T was aware of 2
R&D deliverables that S&T said were transitioned to his office, but the
official was unable to provide additional information on the project's
impact. According to S&T officials, since they deal with multiple DHS
components and are not within the same agencies as its customers, it is
sometimes difficult to identify who the customer of the R&D is and also
difficult to determine what the impact of the R&D was. S&T officials
also stated that in S&T's 2012 update to its project management guide,
in its project closeout process, S&T has included a step to collect
feedback from all relevant customers and a template for collecting this
feedback.
While we found in September 2013 that S&T had developed a process
and template to collect feedback at the end of each project and
incorporated this into its project management plan, we also found that
it did not plan to survey customers each time it provides a deliverable
to the customer. This is relevant because S&T projects are often
conducted over several years before they are concluded and these
projects also often produce multiple deliverables for a customer over
many years that are designed to meet a specific operational need. For
example, the Ground-Based Technologies project began in fiscal year
2006 and is slated to continue through fiscal year 2018. During this
period, S&T has provided multiple R&D deliverables to CBP--including
test results comparing different ground-based radar systems. The
National Academy of Sciences has stated that feedback from both R&D
failures and successes may be communicated to stakeholders and used to
modify future investments.\18\ At the time of our report, S&T had not
established time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating
feedback from its customers on the extent to which the deliverables it
provides were meeting its customers' needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ National Academy of Sciences, Best Practices in Assessment of
Research and Development Organizations. 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, we recommended that S&T establish time frames and
milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers to
determine the usefulness and impact of both its R&D projects and
project deliverables, and use it to make better-informed decisions
regarding future work. S&T officials concurred with the recommendation
at the time of our review, and reported that S&T was developing R&D
strategies with DHS components that would include strategic assessments
of components' R&D needs and be updated annually on the basis of
customer feedback. As of September 2014, S&T has completed strategic
plans with Border Patrol, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), and the Secret Service. Further, at the time of our review, S&T
reported that it was developing a new project management guide to
improve R&D management at all stages of development, and that the guide
would include a template for project managers to use to gather customer
feedback on a more consistent basis. In November 2013, S&T finalized
its guide, which includes a customer survey template to obtain feedback
on the quality and timeliness of a deliverable, as well as detailed
descriptions of actions project managers should take throughout the
project to ensure the R&D is aligned with customer needs. We will
continue to review the implementation of these actions and determine
whether they fully address our recommendation to S&T.
DHS Border and Maritime R&D Agencies Have Taken Action to Improve
Internal and External R&D Coordination
In September 2013, we also reported that S&T's BMD, the Coast
Guard, and DNDO reported taking a range of actions to coordinate with
one another and their customers to ensure that R&D is addressing high-
priority needs. Officials from BMD identified several ways in which it
coordinates R&D activities with its customers, which are primarily
offices within CBP. For example, BMD officials reported having a person
detailed to CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition and
identified its integrated product teams, such as its cross-border
tunnel threat team, and jointly-funded projects as ways in which the
division works to ensure its R&D efforts are coordinated with CBP. We
found that opportunities exist for DHS to enhance coordination with
universities conducting R&D on its behalf. Specifically, we reported
that the S&T Office of University Programs could help ensure that the
approximately $3 million to $4 million a year dedicated to each
university center is used more effectively by more carefully
considering data needs, potential access issues, and potential data
limitations with its Federal partners before approving projects. We
recommended that S&T ensure design limitations with regard to data
reliability, accessibility, and availability are reviewed and
understood before approving Center of Excellence R&D projects. S&T
Office of University Programs officials concurred with the
recommendation and discussed the variety of ways in which centers and
DHS components collaborate and share information. Office of University
Programs officials stated that the office's process for soliciting
research topics and evaluating proposals is good and that it keeps the
centers flexible. However, officials from DHS's primary land border
security Center of Excellence reported challenges with respect to a
lack of clarity regarding protocols for access to DHS information when
conducting R&D. Specifically, officials from this center reported that
they have been regularly unable to obtain data from CBP to complete
research it was conducting on CBP's behalf, which resulted in delays
and terminated R&D projects.
Given the challenges raised by officials from universities leading
the R&D for land border security, we recommended that S&T conduct a
more rigorous review of potential data-related challenges and
limitations at the start of a project in order to help R&D customers
(such as CBP) identify data requirements and potential limitations up
front so that money is not allocated to projects that potentially
cannot be completed. In concurring with our recommendation, S&T Office
of University Programs officials agreed that making sure their clients
take additional steps to identify data requirements up-front could help
address these challenges and following our review had started taking
steps to address this. For instance, in September 2013, the Office of
University Programs reported that it was working to develop standard
guidelines and protocols that would apply to all of its Centers of
Excellence. These protocols would describe how data sets must be
modified to enable their use in open-source research formats. In March
2014, the Office of University Programs and the National Center for
Border Security and Immigration, a DHS S&T Center of Excellence, co-
hosted a workshop to identify common problems the centers have in
accessing data from DHS, understand DHS constraints in sharing data,
and develop best practices for requesting and sharing data between the
Centers of Excellence and DHS. We believe this is a step in the right
direction and should move S&T closer toward meeting the intention of
our recommendation. We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in this
area.
Chairman Meehan, Chairman Buschon, Ranking Member Clarke, Ranking
Member Lipinski, and Members of the committees, this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you
may have at this time.
Mr. Meehan. I want to thank the witnesses for their opening
statements. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questioning.
I appreciate your laying out, in your written testimony,
Dr. Brothers, your visionary goals: Screening at speed, trust
in cyber future, enable the decision maker and responder of the
future. I think those really project some sense in a very
difficult environment, where you would like to sort-of see
empowerment, but you have just heard the testimony of your
oversight partner who is looking at--in the language, you know,
fragmented and overlapping activity, working on defining just
what research and development is.
But even if it finally gets to a point where people share
that definition, you know, how do you track it? So there are
some sort of fundamentals that are necessary in order for us to
have confidence that the over $1 billion is being--in research
funding is being appropriately focused. I applaud you for your
vigor with which you have taken on this challenge. Maybe you
can share with me your idea of how you take those visions and
combine them with the kind of structured plan, so to speak,
that will implement more fully the kinds of assurances that
there is focus and value associated with the research that is
being done.
Under Secretary Brothers. I want to thank you for giving me
the opportunity to talk about that. So you mentioned the
visions. The goal here was to give S&T, our workforce, to give
other stakeholders, to give this S&T ecosystem that we talk
about--industry, academia, and labs--a common north star, if
you will, of where we want to go as an ecosystem. All right,
altogether. I think those are 20- or 30-year kind of goals,
right? We all understand that.
So now you are getting at, how do we get there? I think
that is what--as we mentioned before, the strategy. So now we
have got these longer-term visions. Now we have to have to
develop a strategy that talks about the baseline of where we
are right now with respect to those longer-term visions. It
talks where do we want to be in 5 years. It articulates in an
actionable way, the ways and means we get there. So that is the
next step.
The next step is actually develop this strategy. The
framework that we are working on right now, at the end of this
year we will be completed of that. Then we should be getting
the full document to share. So that is the next step, is
getting the strategy going. Now, there are other parts of this
that have to work together. So if we look at the strategy, the
strategy is gonna have essentially three parts to it. We have
to talk about how do we generate capability gaps.
So I want to make a little distinction here between one
thing that was mentioned earlier in the opening comments: Our
role as providing support for acquisition, which we are doing
within the Secretary's Unity of Effort initiatives. Also our
responsibility to provide advanced science technology
capabilities. To do that, we define capability gaps. So let's
think of it this way. This is my favorite teacup. The
capability gap that I need to fill for this teacup was how to
keep the water for some number of hours, longer than most
meetings.
That is a capability gap. Research had to go into materials
that would enable us--enable somebody to do that affordably.
They had to come up with how heavy this thing should be, what
color it should be, all that. That is where we are getting into
requirements. So we now have requirements is associated with
the acquisition support, capability gaps with our R&D. So that
said, we ought to start thinking about, how do we do our
capability gap generation?
Here is what I would like to do. I talked to both Dr.
O'Toole----
Mr. Meehan. Can I ask you--you are talking about capability
gaps, and I get that. But one of the pieces that frustrates me,
but I think it is understandable, is when any of us contemplate
the universe of potential actions that could happen to us it is
easy to almost be overwhelmed when you think about the
thousands of ways in which we must protect ourselves. I think,
in reality, the smart approach is not to worry about every
single thing, but to be prioritizing and looking to identify
ways in which we can minimize the risks that we are facing and
focus, in a way.
How do you take these objectives, which are sort of far-
reaching, and put some discipline into the organization so that
we don't see what often happens in bureaucracies and other
things? People get a vested stake in what they are doing.
Under Secretary Brothers. That is absolutely right.
Mr. Meehan. They are saying this is important to me. It can
be directed by outside influences and get the ear of somebody
that says, hey, I got a great new technology, you guys got to
be researching this. Things get their own institutional
imperative. How do you ride herd over the big mass of movement
and give it focus and direction to say, hey, no, these are the
priorities and these are the things that we need to focus on to
maximize the potential as both to be a shield against potential
future harm with changing technologies that we know constantly
change the nature of that harm, as well as, you know, the needs
that we have to protect ourselves?
Under Secretary Brothers. So I think we have to look at
analytic capabilities to try to figure that out. Because, like
you said, you could have the threat of the day phenomenon. Or
you could have some--as you said, someone could have their
favorite project. So as you probably know, S&T does threat
assessments--threat risk assessments, TRAs, in different areas.
There are also a variety of analyses that have looked at what
are the probability of various threats versus their impact. So
if you look--if you think about this.
So you have got some set of threats, some probability it
will happen--whether it is not that likely versus very likely.
Then on the other axis, you might have high-impact. What we
should be looking at, I believe, are those things that are
high-impact. We can't just look at things that are low-
probability, high-impact because other things will happen. So I
think we first start with that. What are the things that are
high-impact, potentially high-impact? There is analysis that
look at that, right, both from the public--from the private
sector as well as from the Federal Government.
So we start winnowing down our portfolio based on those.
Now, internally, you see the apex. So internally we have got
these visions. What we have done, then, is talk to our
component partners to try to come up with, so what are the
things we should really focus on? When I first came to this
position, I asked the folks in directorate to give me a review
of the different projects, to understand really what we are
doing, what our investments are going towards.
We did that. It is a very good process. It is a very good
process, it helped in a number of ways. It helped for everyone
in the organization to understand what we are doing. But in
doing so, I understood that we have a lot of projects that some
of which are of lower investment value or potentially lower-
impact. So my goal is, then, to consolidate some of those
programs so we have higher impact in specifically-targeted
areas. So those are the areas that we are calling these Apex
programs.
So Dr. O'Toole, the prior Secretary, had Apex programs that
were primarily 2-year in extent, in time duration. I would like
to extend those to 5 years. But I would like to have those--
have more of them so that we can have real impact in the areas
that are high-impact in terms of threat, that we have buy-in
from operational partners. But not only that, that are in the
art of the possible, scientifically and technically, to come up
with a solution.
Mr. Meehan. So let me--already, thank you for that. I want
to be careful that I don't run over too significantly on my
time. I know you can develop that further in questions that
will be generated by my colleagues.
So in that line, allow me to recognize the gentleman from
New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Under Secretary, it is
really good to have you here, and congratulations for coming
through the confirmation process unscathed, maybe.
Under Secretary Brothers. I didn't say that.
Mr. Payne. Possibly. You know, over the years this
subcommittee has seen a number of direct reports to the under
secretary vary. There are benefits and costs of streamlining
the organizational structure to reduce the number of direct
reports to the under secretary. Have you had a chance to
evaluate the number of direct reports to you? If so, are you
planning any changes?
Under Secretary Brothers. So when I came into the
organization I was aware of kind of three guiding principles
for thinking about reorganization. The first one is form
follows function. Form follows function. So what I want to do
is, once we developed our strategy is then try to understand
what that implies with the organization. I don't want to come
in without that and start reorganizing for the sake of doing
so. So form follows function. We will have a strategy, we will
reorganize to effectively carry out that strategy.
The second principle is maximizing efficiencies, obviously.
So that is what we will have to look at, and we are doing some
of that right now within existing structures. The third part
is, reorganization leads to disruption. So my third guiding
principle is, minimize disruption. We have got some--not a lot
of time to deal with some very important threats. The more we
disrupt our workforce, the less efficiently and effectively we
will be able to carry out our mission. So my goal is to
minimize the disruption in working day-to-day of our workforce,
while simultaneously have an organization where form truly
follows function and we can most effectively achieve the
strategy that we will be building and sharing with you in the
near future.
Mr. Payne. But you--do you see a need for streamlining in
terms of the number of reports that----
Under Secretary Brothers. I can't say I see a need right
now.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Under Secretary Brothers. I can say that as we are looking
for the strategy I will have more information, going forward.
But I don't look for--I do not look for major reorganization.
Mr. Payne. Okay, in the area of basic research and
innovation----
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes.
Mr. Payne [continuing]. Could you give us an update on the
overview of the agreement between S&T Advanced Research
Projects Agency and TSA entitled ``Research and development
tests and evaluation strategic plan'' that was signed in 2013?
Under Secretary Brothers. So I can give you some sense of
that. For more detail, I will be more than glad to get back
with you on that. I actually met with the TSA CTO recently to
talk about our relationship. We have simultaneously worked on
strategies. So where we are--right now, S&T is working on road
maps, our technology road maps. These are influencing and have
been influenced by what our component partners do. For example,
the strategy at the TSA, the agreement that you mentioned.
We are currently working with TSA on--in fundamental
areas--including explosives detection. In more applied areas,
including actually developing devices. In the deployment phase,
as well. So we are looking--working with TSA across the full
life cycle, trying to understand how we can most quickly and
also effectively get new technologies out there to combat newer
threats.
Mr. Payne. Okay. You know, along those lines, you know the
committee has always asked that S&T develop and implement clear
and transparent processes and criteria for identifying basic
research and innovation, needs, prioritizing projects, and
selecting performers. However, it is always an issue of
contention that there is no clear basis for concluding that the
current allocation of basic research is appropriate S&T-wide
among the components or within the individual components.
What will be your plan and process in selecting basic and
innovation research projects? Will there be a transparent
process by which to prioritize basic research across components
and within the components?
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes. So--let me talk about some
mechanisms that exist now, and how I think we can scale across
the enterprise. So every year, S&T does a portfolio review. We
call this our ``navigant'' review. In this review, we have a
panel of experts, including S&T and from outside stakeholders,
and we brief our programs to this panel. During this process,
the panel weighs these projects according to a variety of
parameters, including customer buy-in, technical feasibility,
novel approach--these kind of metrics, or axes if you want to
put it on a graph, okay?
At the end of that, one of what I think significant scales
they come up with is one that plots feasibility versus impact.
Over the past few years, we have used this--or it has been used
by--in previous--by the previous under secretary to figure out
where, on this plot--you think about it, feasibility and
horizontal axis impact on a vertical axis where the project
should fall. How they should map. So if you think about the
upper right part of that, what you find is that is gonna be the
high-impact, high-feasibility projects. So it is more near-
term.
That is where the projects have been focused recently.
Listening to some of the opening statements here and my own
belief of having a more balanced portfolio, I think it is
important, as we go through that analytic process--that
navigant, that portfolio review process--I think it is
important to think about these other quadrants of that graph I
was mentioning to have our product--our investments. So in
answer to your question, I think it is important we go through
this analytic process and look across those areas.
Now, the Coast Guard is also using the same process. So
this process can be scaled to beyond just S&T. This is
something we can then use. The results of that process are then
something that we can use as a way of not just understanding
where our portfolio is, but trying to influence where the
portfolio should go in the future.
Now, there is another piece I want to mention, as well. We
started this with Chairman Meehan's comments, my comments with
Chairman Meehan. This has to do with how we are generating the
capability gaps.
What I would like to see is, where we actually have a model
based on what I have seen in the industry. Where you have a
central research facility, where you have a common--where you
have a centralized resources of staff, of infrastructure, et
cetera. Then these larger corporations also have research
capabilities in the business areas. Or in our case, these would
be our end-users, our components. So this could be DNDO, it
could be Coast Guard. Now, what we do that--what the
laboratories in industry that have been successful, what they
do is they embed their staff into their business units.
That gives their technical staff members the opportunity to
understand the context in which they work. So it is not just
designing something that an engineer thinks is useful. It is
designing something that the actual end-user, the Customs
Border Patrol Agent, thinks is useful. So that, and then we
will have liaisons from the components to come back. We hope to
actually pilot that starting in November.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am well over my
time.
So I will yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I thank the gentleman. If there is an
important question that you want to either have one of our
colleagues ask, or if we need to return to an issue that needs
to be clarified, we will certainly work with that.
At this point in time, let me turn it to my good friend and
colleague, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Bucshon.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since my time--I have
been here in Congress now almost 4 years, and I have been
surprised--somewhat surprised about how a lot of GAO reports
seem to be minimized by everyone, honestly. I have been a
little concerned recently, where some in the administration
have been overtly critical of the role the GAO serves on behalf
of the American people. I would suggest that a fair critique of
GAO reports is expected, however overt suggestions of political
motivation should be avoided by all.
With that said, Dr. Brothers, the GAO reported that the S&T
does not know its total investment in R&D, and described the
difficulty you have had in conducting basic Government audits
for how taxpayer funds are being spent. The GAO's initial audit
was completed 2 years ago. While DHS agreed with the findings
and recommendations, it doesn't seem much has been done to fix
the problem. This is where I am getting at not necessarily
being minimized or ignored, but it just seems like GAO reports
come and go and we don't do anything.
So why is it so difficult to answer the simple question of
how much is being spent on R&D? What efforts does S&T have
under way to reliably track costs associated with R&D
activities?
Under Secretary Brothers. So in the beginning, I think this
came out of the GAO report, was the first recommendation was
defining R&D. So the first part of the problem has happened in
the past. You know, in July we did release new--a definition of
R&D. But in the past, we didn't have that definition. So that
means different people that have different definitions of what
research and development really is.
Mr. Bucshon. Can I interrupt for a second?
Under Secretary Brothers. Absolutely.
Mr. Bucshon. It is amazing to me that after decades and
decades of the Government looking at these things that the
fundamental definition of what constitutes R&D is something
that we don't have.
Under Secretary Brothers. I understand. We do----
Mr. Bucshon. I am not blaming you. I am just--that is just
an editorial comment.
Under Secretary Brothers. So I think, you know, based on
OMB, based on DOD definitions, NASA definitions, as well, we
have crafted our own definition of what R&D is. So we have used
the same type of nomenclature--basic applied development--is
then banded into different areas--6-1, 6-2, 6-3, et cetera,
which allow us--which will allow us, going forward, to do a
better job of understanding, from a data call perspective, who
is doing what in R&D and where it lies.
Can I bring up another piece, too? That is a----
Mr. Bucshon. I will have one more question after you finish
your answer to this.
Under Secretary Brothers. Okay.
Mr. Bucshon. So if you could give me the time to do that.
Under Secretary Brothers. Speed it up? Okay. I would like
to address this issue of overlap a little bit. Because when I
was in DOD we sponsored a study. The study was looking at the
DOD laboratories. It was looking at the DOD laboratories to see
what kind of overlap there might be, whether innovative with
respect to private industry, those kinds of things. It was also
really interesting. Because what they showed was that there was
this taxonomy of R&D, at one level.
So maybe the level is--and I will make this quick--was
wireless communications. Maybe found that a lot of the
laboratories are doing wireless communications. But when the
study was complete, and then you could say at that level there
was a lot of overlap. What the study found, interesting enough,
was when you broke it down to a high-enough level of fidelity
they, indeed, weren't overlapped. There wasn't overlap. Because
one lab might be doing a lot of work in protocols, one work
might be doing a lot of work in, actually, the radio design
itself.
So part of the problem we have is the definition of R&D
itself. But also the taxonomy that we are using to describe
what the particular project is. So that becomes another
problem, as well, and you have to break it down into higher
fidelity. So I just want to say that.
Mr. Bucshon. Sure. I mean, I think you have a unique
opportunity, coming from DOD and now you are at DHS, to really
try to help coordinate these two agencies. Along that lines, I
am interested in what you might be able to do. For example,
there are mobile surveillance assets that DOD uses in
Afghanistan and other places that also may have a significant
role in protecting our borders, for example. We don't want to
reinvent the wheel here.
There are a lot of things that are currently at DOD that
probably can be used to protect us here in the homeland.
Whether it is at our borders or other--or internal surveillance
within our own country, where it is appropriate, to make sure
that we don't--aren't attacked. Can you just comment on what
you think you can do, having experience at both these agencies,
and how you can help coordinate that? Maybe look at how we can
use DOD assets for homeland security.
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes, I appreciate that question.
I have thought about this. I think right now there are
mechanisms to allow us to do this. We have the capabilities
development working group, which is DOD and DHS getting
together to talk about potentially joint efforts, what we might
be able to use from DOD. We also have something called the
Mission Executive Council. That is made up of members of DHS,
DOE, Office of Director of National Intelligence and--yes, I
think that is about it. So we have got--and, plus, we have got
the Committee on Homeland National Security, which is chaired
by the White House, myself, and ASDRNE, which is essentially
CTO of Department of Defense.
So we have these mechanisms. I think--well, I talked about
my priorities coming into the position--you know, the visions
of strategy, that type of thing. My priorities going forward,
starting out, are implementation. That is the first one. I
think in order to implement the kind of programs we are talking
about, these Apex programs, we have to do a good job of
leveraging what our agency partners possess, as well. I think
that is what you are getting at. I think we do have the
mechanism to do that, but I think we have to do a better job.
That is what I plan to do is align this.
So if we have some number of Apex projects, some number of
far-side that we are concentrating on, that has to be
communicated to these interagency groups. We have to pull folks
together to work on these important projects. So we actually
have a critical mass.
Mr. Bucshon. Yes, I think if we can get back--past the
proprietary nature that some different agencies have, and also
turf--you know, protecting your turf.
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes, yes.
Mr. Bucshon. You can really--you are in a unique position,
being both--at both places to really make a difference.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentleman.
Now I recognize Mr. Lipinski, from Illinois.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past few
years, DHS has eliminated much of the basic research in order
to produce more deliverables. I am wondering, and this is sort-
of following up from what Mr. Payne was saying, Under Secretary
Brothers, do you think that more work needs to be done on basic
research? Where do you see the importance of basic research for
the S&T Directorate at Homeland Security? Or do you see that
this basic research should be coming from elsewhere? I just was
wondering how important you think basic research is to--
directly to your mission.
I know it is--we all know it is important, but how much has
to be done, the basic research needs to be done, by you under
the S&T Directorate?
Under Secretary Brothers. So I think basic research is
important. I think that we have a unique opportunity because we
have nine Centers of Excellence. These Centers of Excellence
are university-based, they have university researchers that can
be focused on our priorities. Specific examples of where basic
research is important is phenomenological research. So if we
are starting to look at homemade explosives, and we need to
understand what are different detection modalities and
methodologies, that is where basic research can come in.
So it is important that we engage our university partners,
our Centers of Excellence, as well as outside universities in
this kind of research, but with the context of where we are
going. I think what I have seen in past roles has been that
university research sometimes can lead to a paper, a
publication. What we need is, we are to lead to a capability.
But if we give them the--if we give a universe research--and we
are actually doing this with our Office of University Programs
right now. Where our Centers of Excellence are aligned with our
goals.
So I think, to answer your question, it is important. I
think we do--we are doing it already right now. My second
priority--so my first priority, going forward, is
implementation. My second priority is alignment. That is part
of the alignment priority right there is getting our
universities more fundamentally aligned with where S&T is
trying to go.
Mr. Lipinski. Do you see any changes needed in the
university centers, or just in general with the process that--
the whole process of having the centers? Do you think this is
working well? I am not offering--I am not saying that it is
not. I just want to know what your thoughts were on it.
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes, yes. So, you know, it is
interesting. During my confirmation hearing I had a number of
briefings on that. I was immediately impressed with the
competence of our Office of University Programs. I was
impressed because I found that while it can be very difficult
sometimes for a Government agency to work with a university
because of the difference in time lines, because of the way
they have structured the program, our Office of University
Programs that is, I think we effectively and efficiently used
these universities to get some good capabilities.
Mr. Lipinski. Now, what about the--doing more to utilize
the DOE National labs. Do you think--do you believe DHS takes
adequate advantage of access to the DOE labs?
Under Secretary Brothers. I think we take adequate
advantage of access to DOE labs, which is in our authorization
language. I think, again, with alignment we could do a better
job with alignment. That is something I plan to do. But I think
there is a lot of exchange with the DOE laboratories and that
should continue. The DOE labs have unique capabilities that the
homeland security enterprise needs. I think we have to continue
to take advantage of that.
Mr. Lipinski. Do you see any obstacles that we could work
on eliminating? Are there any obstacles through your work with
the DOE labs?
Under Secretary Brothers. I don't know of any particular
obstacles right now, but I appreciate the question.
Mr. Lipinski. Okay. Well, as we move forward here, and I
know there is a lot of work that needs to be done, the
question, obviously, that continues to come up and has been
talked about--you talked about it and you have answered a
little bit in the questions--is the--determining and really
getting a handle on, as the GAO said, a handle on the money
that is spent on research by--in the S&T Directorates. I just
want to say that I think it is important that we continue to
work together on that, to do that. It is really critical that
we do take advantage of the great resources we have in this
country at universities and also at the DOE labs to help to do
this research, both basic and applied research.
So look forward to working with you on that, and I will
yield back the balance of my time.
Under Secretary Brothers. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentleman.
Now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for joining us today.
Dr. Brothers, given DHS S&T's relatively small budget and
the problems GAO has found to date, how confident are you that
DHS is producing the technologies that are most needed for
homeland security?
Under Secretary Brothers. I think we have the capability to
do that. I think that some of the processes that were talked a
little bit about this morning. The portfolio review, where we
can actually get strategic alignment across not just S&T, but
also the enterprise. I think we can do that. I think by having
a--the Unity of Effort the Secretary is championing. I think
that we can have much more effective and efficient acquisition
programs. I think by having the types of relationships with the
components we can generate solid capability gaps from which to
derive our research investment portfolio. So I think we can do
this. I think we have a capability, I think we have the
workforce that can do this.
Mr. Johnson. Okay, all right. Well, how do the--for both of
you--how do the DHS components in S&T determine which of their
technology needs can be bought off the shelf, and which require
research and development? What is the process by which common
needs across the components are evaluated, prioritized, and
then passed to S&T for implementation? You can decide who goes
first.
Mr. Maurer. Thanks for the question. That is an issue that
DHS has historically struggled with. Trying to determine the
common needs of the Department, working across components,
coming up with common requirements. We are encouraged by the
fact that the Secretary has this new focus on Unity of Effort
and is implementing different approaches to translating the
strategic priorities of the Department into acquisition
requirements as well as, hopefully, drive what R&D is going to
do to fill capabilities gaps. We have had a high-risk area for
a number of years for DHS management and this has been one of
the areas where, frankly, DHS still has some ways to go,
translating what they want to do into actual programs that meet
cost and schedule milestones.
Mr. Johnson. Okay.
Under Secretary Brothers. So I think that we have something
we call technology-foraging, where we have our staff members,
our stakeholders understand what is out there in the world, so
to speak. So, for example, our first responders group, they
have an effort where they meet with first responders directly.
They in a sense have a forum, where they meet with first
responders and understand what their priorities are. I have a
list right here of their priorities, of what they are. They go
from situational awareness, safety, protection, these kinds of
things.
So I think that is a great example of how one of the
organizations within S&T actually directly captures needs from
the actual end-users and can translate those into programs. I
think those are the kinds of ideas that have to be scaled
across S&T as well as the Department, as well. So I think that
is a case study of how it can work.
Mr. Johnson. Well, speaking of the first responders, I
assume that you are taking a lot of input from first responders
to find out what they think they need to respond to the
different types of threats and situations that they face. Is
that----
Under Secretary Brothers. That is absolutely correct. That
is part of that forum that I was mentioned a few minutes ago.
Where we get tremendous input from across the country from
first responders. We bring them in to talk to us about what
their needs are, and then we develop a prioritized list of what
they say they need. So I think it is very effective. In fact,
that is then being used to influence our first responder of the
future Apex program. Where we are looking at, how can we use
the current technology and emerging technology in wearables,
ruggedize it, and really apply it to the first responder
mission sets?
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Well, Mr. Maurer, and you might have
alluded to this. But I was wondering if you could expand on any
recommendations that you might make to ensure that technology
needs are properly vetted before S&T develops an R&D program to
support it.
Mr. Maurer. Yes, absolutely. I think we would really
underscore a couple of things. One is it is important that they
are developing a new strategy, a new strategic approach, going
forward. Because I think it is time to update that. The last
one was done in 2011. There has been a new Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review to drive strategic priorities. We want to see
that translated into how S&T does its line of business. So
strategy is important.
Tightening the coordination links between S&T and the
operational components is absolutely critical. Whatever S&T
works on, it is not going to be used in the real world unless
there is that hand-off to the components. There are a lot of
different forums that they are developing to enhance that and
improve that. The closer they can work with eventual end-users
the better off they are going to be.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Well, I thank you for your responses.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
Committee on Homeland Security.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Taking off from Mr.
Payne and Mr. Johnson's comments, Dr. Brothers, it would be an
understatement to say that the relationship with components and
S&T has been anything but cordial. So how do you plan, in your
new role at S&T, to bridge what some see as your lack of
respect for S&T or just total disregard for the work you do?
Take TSA, for example.
Under Secretary Brothers. So, yes, glad you mentioned that.
Because we are meeting regularly with TSA, both Administrator
Pistole and with CTO, to discuss what their needs are. I really
can report to you today that we are working hand-in-hand with
TSA, reporting up into headquarters on our work addressing some
emerging threats. So I think a lot of this has to do with
relationship building. In the 4 months I have been there I have
met with all the component heads, some of them more than one
time, to try to develop that kind of relationship. Really, a
lot of it is listening.
I mean, part of science and technology is that you have
smart engineers--and I saw this in industry--can come up with
an idea. But because they don't have the context for their
work, they don't have the relationship with the end-user, it is
not relevant. It is just not relevant. It is an interesting
thing, but it is not relevant. So our job, then, is to reach
out and help them understand what the art of the possible is
and we understand what their needs are, both near-term and
long-term. I think we have started that. I think TSA is a great
example. Because we really are working hand-in-hand with TSA
right now.
Mr. Thompson. So, Mr. Maurer, is this part of that hand-off
you were referring to in your earlier comments?
Mr. Maurer. Yes, absolutely. There needs to be the bridge
between ideas and technology and approaches that are being
researched within S&T and the operational components. You have
scientists and engineers who are coming up with good ideas,
developing new technologies, new softwares. That is all fine
and good. But eventually, at some point, the hope is it is
gonna be used in the real world to help secure the borders or
secure the homeland, execute DHS' missions. For that to happen
we have to have that bridge between S&T and the components.
That is gonna take--that is, frankly, gonna take some time
to work on. It is gonna include the high-level discussions that
the under secretary talked about. It is gonna include staff-
level discussions so that the folks down in the trenches know
what each other is--know what each other is working on. Even
S&T there is gonna be a renewed focus and a renewed emphasis on
filling capabilities gaps, developing bridges between filling
those gaps and supporting major acquisition programs.
Mr. Thompson. Let me add another component to that. If the
process is cumbersome, then you really only get big players in
the marketplace. Small, medium-sized businesses don't have the
capacity in terms of resources to stay in the marketplace in
the R&D mode rather than operational. How do you plan, Mr.
Brothers, to close that gap so small business can compete with
new ideas just like big businesses?
Under Secretary Brothers. So it is my belief that small--
that a lot of some of the most innovative and creative
solutions can come from small business. I believe that. I have
seen that happen. However, some of the small businesses aren't
familiar with the way that the Federal Government does
business. I think it is important that we reach out in
different ways, not just the standard ways that we do things.
One way to do this is through reaching out via social media. I
think an example of that where we have seen tremendous response
has been just sending out these visionary goals for comment and
review.
In the week we have had it, we have had about 1,500 people
sign up for the website. We have had comments that aren't just
about the visionary goals. They are comments about science and
technology across different capabilities that the community
thinks we should think about. What this has let me know is that
there is a conversation, a National conversation, about S&T and
Homeland Security that needs to take place. So we plan to
follow up on that.
So let me get back directly to your question. Those are the
types--that is the type of media outreach that we--that can
engage the small business community. I think that is what we
plan to keep doing. Now, the next question is, well, how do we
get to them? So that is where you can talk about our other
transactions authority. So right now, we have another
transaction authority that is appropriated every year. What
would be helpful is to have that permanent with us. But it is
those kinds of--so it is that kind of outreach, as well as the
mechanisms for working with small businesses, that can be very
helpful. That is what I hope to push forward on.
Mr. Thompson. Well--and I think, Dr. Brothers, if you can
get it out of the social media context and get it into an
operational context. Those small businesses say we get invited
to sessions all the time, but we can't translate the fluff of
people saying we are open for business from reality. The
reality is do I really have a chance to show my bright ideas,
or is this just another check-the-box kind-of event? I think--
and I don't really look for an answer, but I want you to think
about, as you try to broaden that participation that there are
really some actionable things at the end of it rather than just
1,500 social media contacts.
Under Secretary Brothers. I appreciate that feedback. I
think one of the things--I am gonna take a second to comment. I
appreciate the feedback a lot because I am trying to understand
ways to do better outreach to that community. I think we have
been thinking about having industry days. The Department of
Defense has days where they actually try to do match--
matchmaking between smaller businesses and larger businesses.
That may be a model. But I do appreciate the feedback because I
think we need to think hard about how to not just get folks
interested in what we are doing, but engage them in a
meaningful way, like you are getting at.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. If you want to pursue it
at some point, I would love to continue the discussion.
Under Secretary Brothers. Thank you, appreciate it.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Collins for his
questioning.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Brothers, I am
just curious. I mean, a lot of us were worried about every
dollar we spend, and if there is overlap that is probably,
there is some level of waste. So to me, an example is always
one of the best places to try to figure out what is going on.
If you look at DARPA and maybe in the bioterrorism world, and
then you look at DHS and your operation--and even pick one
thing like anthrax that has been going on now almost 15 years--
how does the department--DHS and your department overlap with
DARPA on something like a bioterrorism threat like anthrax?
Is--should there be two departments involved in something like
that?
Under Secretary Brothers. I think you--it would--the answer
depends. It depends on specifically what they are doing. I
think that goes back to what I was mentioning earlier about the
study that we had at DOD that looked at how different
laboratories were doing things that seemed like they were the
same. When you reach down in higher fidelity and actually look
at it, it is not the same. So one of the things that you can
think about is there may be different ways of solving the same
problem. Some may be shorter-term, some may be more effective
than others, some may be the 80 percent solution, some may be
going for the 100 percent solution.
So when you start looking at a different--an effort, for
example, in bioterrorism, you have to look very carefully along
all these different dimensions of the effort. So I think there
is space for different agencies to work in that domain. I think
it is important that there is some--there is visibility between
the agencies, and we--and DARPA, specifically, we do have that
kind of visibility. But I think that it is important, and I
think there is a space for different agencies in those kind of
areas.
Mr. Collins. So you wouldn't think if one agency, DOD, had
responsibility for something like bioterrorism, I would assume
that they would pursue all these different avenues. They don't
need another agency maybe duplicating people thinking through
the same problem. I think, in the private sector, we would
never have a case where you knowingly had two departments
working on the same thing and think that is a good thing.
Under Secretary Brothers. If we take another example, take
cyber. So we consider cyber, where as it is defined the DOD and
DHS have somewhat different areas. We are still doing research
in cyber and we are still collaborating in cyber. But our
spaces are, while overlapping--they are overlapping--while
overlapping, they are distinct in some ways. So it is important
to understand that and to work in those spaces like that.
Mr. Collins. So let's go back at anthrax for a second. So
after 15 years what would--do you think this country is ready
if there was an anthrax attack tomorrow?
Under Secretary Brothers. I guess I would have to say it
depends on the scope. I would also have to say that to get into
more details about this I would like to follow up with you in
that specific threat area to have a more detailed conversation.
Mr. Collins. Well, if you were talking about scope.
Somebody weaponizes anthrax, puts it into an air conditioning
system, blows it into a shopping mall. So there is no thought
that anyone is exposed. So not unlike the post office, where
you could use Cipro as a prophylactic to treat it before it
became symptomatic. But--so now you got a shopping center. It
blew through there, no one had any idea, now they are post-
symptomatic. I mean, best I know it is still 95 percent death.
Under Secretary Brothers. Like I said, I would like to come
back to you on that discussion. Appreciate that.
Mr. Collins. I would----
Under Secretary Brothers. Okay.
Mr. Collins [continuing]. As well. including some other
things, like Ebola now, the bird flu, SARS. I am--I think in
the bioterrorism area, DARPA is very, very involved. I wasn't,
until I read this, didn't even realize that the Department of
Homeland Security had involvement in that.
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes.
Mr. Collins. Yes, I would like to follow up.
Under Secretary Brothers. Please. Thank you. Appreciate
that.
Mr. Meehan. I am assuming you yield back. I don't want to
jump into your space, Mr. Collins, but I thank you for your
questioning.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Kelly from Illinois. Thank
you, Ms. Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Under Secretary Brothers. Good morning.
Ms. Kelly. We have seen, in multiple GAO reports--and have
heard from security and technical experts as well as other
outside stakeholders that DHS lacks a strategic plan for the
agency's research investments. This has been going on for some
time. So we have listened to a lot of things that you said you
are doing or want to do. What is your biggest sign that you are
on the right track? Also what are obstacles that you are
concerned about? Both of you can answer that.
Under Secretary Brothers. Sure. I think the signs I am on
the right track, the enthusiasm of the workforce, the
enthusiasm of components--so--I have got a lot of response on
the visionary goals in the components. I have got a lot of
interest in the components on having this embedding program.
You know, what I am interested in doing is having kind of a
virtual IPT. I think in the past, in terms of generating
capability gaps, there have been IPTs that have been formed. I
would like to do an embedded IPT, if you will. There has been a
lot of enthusiasm for that.
I have regular meetings with headquarters, with the deputy
secretary, with the component heads. I think we are getting--we
are involved with the Senior Leadership Council. So with the
Secretary's Unity of Effort, he has put together some
structure. The Senior Leadership Council, a deputies management
advisory group, and a joint requirements council. We have a
seat on all of those. So I think because of this Unity of
Effort initiative of the Secretary's, and because of
relationships we are building, I think we can--I think we will
be successful.
Mr. Maurer. Yes. I think in terms of positive notes on the
progress that the S&T is making, I think the fact that the
Department now has a definition for R&D is a good first step.
It shows they are being responsive to some of the
recommendations from our prior reports. The development of a
new strategy is also a positive step. The Secretary's approach
for a Unity of Effort which tries to align strategic priorities
down through the organization and tighten the linkage between
the components and the various operational units in the DHS,
those are all positive things.
In terms of challenges, there are a number of challenges. I
think first and foremost is the fact that I think what has
developed over the course of a number of years is that the
components don't necessarily think of S&T as their first-stop
shopping center for meeting their needs, their mission needs.
That is a challenge that is gonna have to be overcome. I think
the morale challenge within S&T is a significant one. You know,
299 out of 300 is not good. That is something that is gonna
have to be addressed as part of the overall effort to develop a
new strategic approach.
I think the other challenge is the fact that the S&T
Directorate is being pulled in a number of different
directions. They have a number of different initiatives, a
number of different priorities. Trying to address a number of
different threats with resources that are a little over a
billion dollars a year. A much smaller subset of that is
actually discretionary in the sense that they have a lot of
flexibility in where it goes. So trying to figure out the areas
where they can add the most value, while staying within the
confines of constrained budget realities is also gonna be a
major challenge going forward.
Ms. Kelly. Any comment on----
Under Secretary Brothers. I can comment on that because--I
am glad you mentioned the workforce. Because that is--I was--I
should mention that. What I have been doing recently has been
simple steps. I have been walking around a lot and talking to
people. We are gonna do a formal root cause analysis. We should
hopefully have that on contract shortly to get that done. But I
think in the interim, walking around talking to people,
understanding what some of the concerns have been in the past,
has been helpful. We have been trying to do more of empowering
our workforce in the decision-making process.
Given--giving more visibility in how decisions are made and
why decisions are made. I think all that is important. But I do
have to agree. That is a challenge. I think it is something
that we are very concerned about and putting some--a lot of
time into going forward. The other issue of the--you know, many
different projects going different ways. We are trying to
address that with this consolidation I mentioned earlier in the
Apex projects, and trying to have more focus. Again, that is a
priority going forward is--the second priority is alignment.
You know, aligning--you know, this--you know, it is about
aligning not just our HSARPA investment programs, not just the
first responders group investment programs. But it is also the
work we do in our small business innovator research program. It
is aligning what we are doing in our Centers of Excellence. So
it is all of this. It is our--alignment we do in our
laboratories. It is aligning what we do in our investments with
the Department of Energy laboratories that we were talking
about earlier.
So I think that that is all gonna be challenged. It is all
about the people. It is aligning people in your goals--in your
end goals. That, by itself, is a large challenge. But that is
what we have to do if we are gonna get the most out of S&T in
our investments.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
Under Secretary Brothers. Thank you.
Ms. Kelly. I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Thanks, Ms. Kelly.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Hultgren from Illinois. I
knew that.
Mr. Hultgren. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Really appreciate the witnesses for being here. This
is an important, timely discussion to be having so I really do
appreciate it. I think this is important for us to be having
this joint hearing today. So thank you so much for being here.
Border security certainly is becoming an increasingly
difficult problem to deal with. I believe our ability to deploy
better technologies to that effort works as, really, a force
multiplier that keeps not only our Nation, but also our boots
on the ground, more safe. It has been good to receive your
testimony as we continue to ensure that taxpayer dollars are
spent wisely with a clear strategy and set goal that must be
accomplished.
Dr. Brothers, I wanted to address my first question to you.
How does DHS define success for research and development
programs?
Under Secretary Brothers. So, first I want--let me make a
comment. That one of the things I want to institute more of is
fast failure. So I think one thing we have to understand as we
talk about having a balanced portfolio that goes from, you
know, low risk to higher right, with larger potential impact
is, there has to be acknowledgment that there will be failure.
So--however, the way to manage that is to fail quickly. So that
means, in the conversations earlier were about metrics, that
means having appropriate metrics for these programs so you can
determine when these programs should fail.
Now, in terms of success it depends on where you are in
that research spectrum. Because if you are doing basic research
you are probably not gonna say success is transitioning that
basic research directly to the component. But I think if you
look across the breadth of our research responsibilities, which
go from basic research all the way up to acquisition support, I
think success is that. It is transitioning a meaningful
capability to our end-users.
Mr. Hultgren. Really, following up on that and, again, Dr.
Brothers and also Mr. Maurer, what is the current system of
transfer technology from the research and development stage to
implementation? I wondered how long it typically takes to
deploy a new technology? Dr. Brothers, I will start with you
and then Mr. Maurer.
Under Secretary Brothers. Yes, sure. So that is another
``it depends.'' Because some of technologies--for example first
responder technologies--which the first responder group which
works more near-term, more integrating existing commercial
technologies, that is gonna be shorter-term. That might be in a
period of 18 months or so, something like that. However, some
of the more fundamentally research-based efforts, like these
maybe H, homemade, explosives detection--where you are actually
going from new modalities to actual equipment to actual
deployment in an airport--that could take years.
Because that--because part of the transition isn't just
understanding, does the science indeed work? It is not just
have I produced a prototype that can be tested effectively. It
is also by going through all the qualification/certification
testing and all that, as well as training of the end-users. So
while the front-end research can take some number of years, it
can take a significant amount of time to do qualification
testing and training, as well. So that can be years.
Mr. Hultgren. Mr. Maurer, any thoughts?
Mr. Maurer. Yes, absolutely. It is not a quick process to
translate ideas into real-life devices that are in the hands of
end-users. I agree with everything that Dr. Brothers mentioned.
I want to emphasize in particular, when you are thinking about
real-world deployment it is not just the technology itself. It
is also the training, it is the support, it is the maintenance.
There are a lot of things that are involved in turning an idea
into something that is being used to secure the homeland.
Mr. Hultgren. I understand it is not an easy process, but
it also is an important process. You have to make sure that if
there are bureaucratic hurdles that are slowing down the
process to getting something that literally could save lives,
we have got to make sure that that gets done and we address
those things, as well. Certainly, we want to do it the right
way.
Under Secretary Brothers. Sure.
Mr. Hultgren. But I also get frustrated when things take
longer than they should. That is our goal, that is our hope.
Dr. Brothers, in years past concerns were expressed that
sometimes the Department allows for security needs to be
defined by end-users who do not necessarily incorporate
technical or economic feasibility. How can you ensure that the
research enterprise is somewhat insulated from predetermined
outcomes allowing for the department--development, excuse me,
of transformational technologies that we can't even envision
today? That respond to threats that we aren't aware of today?
How can we get innovative solutions instead of just the next
gadget?
Under Secretary Brothers. So I think the reason why I
started out with my discussion of requirements versus
capability gaps, I think is my emphasis to make sure we have
the right lexicon for talking about it. Because I think we--
because of the Unity of Effort initiative, which has the Joint
Requirements Council on it, which were the principles from the
components and headquarters components--including S&T, MMPD, et
cetera--sit on, that is where the acquisition decisions are
made. So that actually has a component in it for developing
requirements--we sit on that board--for doing system analysis.
We provide staff for that, as well.
So from the acquisition perspective, the way the Secretary
has structured the organization now, with this Joint
Requirements Council, we are right there at the table to work
with the components in defining requirements and defining the
systems engineering piece of the acquisition process. As well
as doing the operational test evaluation. Along with that, it
turns out that a lot of the tests in programs is in the early
parts of it. That is something we might want to get involved
in, as well. Currently, we are not as involved. We might want
to get involved in that, as well.
Now let's go to the other part of the question. That is the
disruptive technologies, the capabilities that you were talking
about a moment ago. That is back to capabilities part and
capability gaps part. I think, with this embedded IPT that I
was talking about earlier, that will help us get to those needs
that aren't colored by, hey, I just want, you know, the next
thing like this. So I think by having the right lexicon by
talking about requirements and capability gaps, having a
willingness to accept risk from high--from potentially
disruptive programs, I think we can make the difference known.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you. I want to thank my Chairman and my
other Chairman. Larry, thank you.
Appreciate this.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Hultgren. Thanks for being here.
We have gone through a lot. I have a--just one pointed
question that I want to ask, and then if any other panelists
has a specific follow-up question. You have talked a lot today
about your work within the agency, so to speak, and the various
components. We have heard from the Ranking Member about--how
should I put it--competition within there that sometimes you
have to ride over. So, you know, how do you discipline the
organization to prevent these things?
You talk about sort-of the carrot approach, where you are
trying to get people together and talk. But how do you assure
that there is some kind of resolution of these competitions so
we really use the focus to get to the things that matter the
most? At the same time, how does the agency collaborate with
the private sector? I think about the issue of cyber, where the
thing changes by the day.
So research is being done at some of the most sophisticated
places because you have got the Googles of the world, there and
the Defense Department agencies, like McDonald Douglas or
others that are already at the cutting edge protecting their--
how do you collaborate with them to assure that your own house
isn't fighting among itself? Then that what you are doing is
working not in competition with the private sector, which may
be ahead of where we are?
Under Secretary Brothers. I think cyber is a great example
of the concern that you raise. I think we have done already--
reached out to the Googles, et cetera of the world to try to
understand, in this particular space, what we can do to try to
bring together capabilities. I think it is important to reach
out not just to small companies, as well. There is an awful lot
of work going on in the small company space that we can
leverage. But it is hard.
I mean, this is not an easy thing to do. But we are working
right now, through our advisory, our Homeland Security Science
and Advisory Committee, our HSSTAC. We are restructuring that
to be both technical advisory as well as management strategic
advisors. So we are putting--we are re-staffing that so that we
can have the kinds of advisory----
Mr. Meehan. Do you have private-sector members on that, as
well?
Under Secretary Brothers. We are working to get that, yes.
Yes.
Mr. Meehan. You are looking at it, or you----
Under Secretary Brothers. We are looking at that. We are
looking at that right now, yes. So that is how we are trying to
get that advice. Because, particularly, cyber is such a fast-
moving field, as you state, that it is important that we stay
in touch with this ever-increasing body of work going on. There
was a keynote speech at--one of the keynote speeches at the
recent Black Hat Symposium, the cyber symposium, the speaker
was talking about how it is almost impossible to be broad in
cyber any longer. It is a--you know, now, in order to get ahead
you have to be in a specific area because it is moving that
fast. No one person can get their arms around the whole space.
So that is why we have to reach out to our resources to do
that.
The first question you asked, which had to do with, how do
we influence? You mentioned----
Mr. Meehan. Well, you--I called it ``discipline influence''
that may be the same.
Under Secretary Brothers. I was trying to use the word
``influence''?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Meehan. Yes, I like that terminology, so long as the
result is the same.
Under Secretary Brothers. I think what I have learned from
both working in industry, we have a large corporation that has
different equities. So you have a large corporation where there
are different products, product lines, but there might be
common technologies that enable that. I think it is important
that we stress why we are important. Because it is hard for--it
is hard when you don't control someone else's budget, or
people, to really discipline them. The discipline comes, I
think, from saying--from being clear of why we are important. I
think we are doing a better job of that already.
But I think we can do a better job of that. I think that is
what we are gonna try to do. I know that is what we are gonna
try to do.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I wish you luck with that effort because
you know how critically important it is to make sure that the
resources are focused in the most effective manner and not turf
protection.
The gentleman now from New Jersey has some questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let's see. Under
Secretary Brothers, I am here at the behest of the Ranking
Member, Yvette Clarke, but I am the Ranking Member on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications. While I have you
here, I figured I would go down that road a bit. The BioWatch
program, we have been using Gen-2 for quite some time, and Gen-
3 was in development but has been scuttled after millions and
millions of dollars of research into the next generation.
Very interested in what your plans are in terms of the next
steps, now that we are back to go and starting over. The
relationship that you have with OHA which, apparently from what
I am understanding, issues there--in the two coming together.
Under Secretary Brothers. I think--in the 4 months that I
have been there, I think I get along pretty well with OHA,
actually.
Mr. Payne. So the relationship, you think, is----
Under Secretary Brothers. I think it is. I think OHA would
agree. In fact, I know they would, they have said this. So I
think the relationship is a lot better. We are also--one of our
Apex programs will be in this space. I am trying to go--we have
a chance to go on for more signature-based, phenomenally-based,
the same kind of thing that has been going in the cyber
community. Kind-of taking lessons learned from other
communities.
Mr. Payne. Right.
Under Secretary Brothers. But, yes. So we have not fully
defined that yet, but we will--we are in the process of doing
that.
Mr. Payne. I really think it is very important to move
forward on that space, and finding a solution to the next
generation of, you know, what could potentially be a
catastrophic issue if----
Under Secretary Brothers. I absolutely agree with that.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Under Secretary Brothers. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Any other Members have a question that they
would like to ask, at this point? Okay.
Well, hearing none, I want to thank you--both of the
panelists--not only for your testimony today, but for your
preparation and written materials. Under Secretary, I thank you
for your willingness to step into this space. You have an
important challenge ahead, and we appreciate the difficulty of
making the system work, the trains run on time, so to speak.
But it is--the value of that effort reflects directly on the
importance of the responsibility we have to protect the
homeland. I wish you the best of luck in that.
Mr. Maurer, thank you for your continuing oversight and
probing and finding the space, so to speak, for the mortar to
fill.
So I want to thank you for your testimony, and the Members
for their questions. The committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we ask if they are submitted
to you that you respond in writing.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan and Chairman Larry Bucshon for
Reginald Brothers
Question 1a. There has been quite a bit of discussion about Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) organizations across the U.S. Government,
including DHS, DOD, and the IC (intelligence community). How would you
define WMD? In other words, does it include chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosives? Would you also include cyber?
Anything else?
Given that definition of WMD, from a scientific and technical
perspective, what would you say is common to all the threats?
Conversely, from a scientific and technical perspective, what would you
say is different or unique?
Question 1b. In the Department, have you engaged in this type of
discussion to develop better R&D and operational strategies to address
these threats?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security Lexicon defines WMD as
``weapons capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used
in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people or an amount of
property.'' Even given this broad definition, there is a robust policy
debate surrounding what should or should not be labeled as WMD.
Traditionally, WMD describe chemical, biological, nuclear, and
radiological weapons. All of these types of weapons have international
treaties limiting their development and use, and much of the current
debate focuses on potential disruption of these treaties should WMD be
redefined to include explosives and/or cyber weapons. On the other
side, there are arguments that WMD ought to be defined by their extreme
level of disruption and that explosives and cyber weapons among others
are justifiably considered WMD.
From a scientific and technical perspective, the differences for
each of these threats (including cyber and explosives) include their
specific origins and effects and corresponding requirements for threat-
specialized technology and processes from initial detection through
response and recovery. Regardless of whether cyber or explosives
attacks are formally labeled as WMD, however, they are a priority for
the Department and resourced accordingly both within the Directorate
and DHS as a whole.
WMD and WMD-like events will all challenge the Homeland Security
Enterprise's ability to generate and deliver actionable information so
that senior decision makers and emergency managers can mitigate, to the
extent possible, or neutralize destruction, disruption, and loss of
life. At S&T and in the Department, we focus on both threat-specific
technologies and on development of analytic tools, training aids, and
decision-making aids that strengthen response across all WMD and WMD-
like events. These types of threat-agnostic tools are reflected in
S&T's recently-finalized visionary goals and in several of our Apex \1\
and Engine projects. More broadly, the Department is concerned with all
nefarious use of the causative agents and tends to use the label
``CBRN'' (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) to capture
them in a way that does not depend on the assumed scale of the attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Apex projects are cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary efforts
requested by DHS components that are high-priority, high-value, and
short turn-around in nature. They are intended to solve problems of
strategic operational importance identified by a component leader.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the Secretary's Unity of Effort initiative, the
Department continues to explore avenues to empower DHS components to
effectively execute their operations. S&T, the Office of Health
Affairs, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the rest of the
Department will continue to work together to develop better R&D and
operational strategies to address chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear threats.
Question 2a. According to authorities given to you in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, you have the responsibility for ``establishing
and administering the primary research and development activities for
the Department.''
How is this being accomplished? Should other components (other than
DNDO & Coast Guard which are already authorized in statute) be allowed
to conduct their own R&D? How are you encouraging other components to
work with S&T?
Answer. S&T is the primary provider of R&D for the Department.
There are clear delineations between S&T, DNDO, and Coast Guard's
missions, and DNDO and the Coast Guard also have clear authority to
conduct R&D.
As part of original authorizing language and in response to
subsequent Congressional requests, earlier this year, S&T finalized its
plan for implementing the definition of R&D found in Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-11. This mapping of the definition to
DHS's project system variables also aligns with the Department of
Defense designations tailored to DHS. It was signed by the Secretary as
an annex to S&T's delegation. The definition describes several areas of
later-stage development rightfully under the purview of operational
components. These include, among others, validation and demonstration;
improving on research prototypes; integration into systems and
subsystems; addressing manufacturing, producibility, and sustainability
needs; and independent operational test and evaluation. S&T cannot and
should not take away responsibility for this stage of development from
components. S&T provides assistance in these areas only when
appropriate and when requested by operational partners.
S&T's impact is tied to positive relationships with operational
components and S&T's image as an objective and trusted partner. S&T
uses numerous formal and informal mechanisms to engage with components
on R&D projects from identification of capability gaps, through project
execution, all the way to transition. Some programs, like our Apexes,
include formalized dialogue at the highest levels between S&T and our
component partners. Other programs rely principally upon coordination
at the program manager and Division leadership levels with approval
from respective senior leaders. S&T has strong existing relationships
with operators across the Homeland Security Enterprise, and we
continuously work to maintain and strengthen these relationships and to
find new opportunities and new potential work partners.
Question 2b. What specifically is DHS S&T doing to combat the cyber
threat? Is S&T collaborating with NPPD to define a research agenda?
Answer. S&T invests in civilian and law enforcement-focused
cybersecurity R&D solutions for the Department, U.S. critical
infrastructure, and the security of the internet as a whole. S&T's
cybersecurity R&D execution model encompasses the entire R&D life cycle
from capability gaps gathering to program management of R&D work and,
finally, to management of post-R&D technology transfer to ensure
developed solutions have a positive impact on operations. S&T's work
has improved the core infrastructure of the internet through efforts to
secure the internet's Domain Name System and routing infrastructures.
Since 2003, S&T has had more than 35 successful cybersecurity R&D
transitions in areas such as malware analysis, anti-phishing
technologies, data visualization, open-source intrusion prevention,
secure USB devices, and GPS forensic analysis tools for law
enforcement. Beyond the development of technologies, capabilities and
standards, S&T's cybersecurity R&D work also contributes to the
education and development of the cybersecurity workforce through
activities such as sponsorship of cybersecurity competitions at the
high school and collegiate levels (e.g., the National Collegiate Cyber
Defense Competition).
S&T takes a collaborative approach to defining and executing its
cybersecurity R&D agenda working with academia; DHS components (e.g.,
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), United States
Secret Service (USSS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Federal, State, and local government; private-sector partners (e.g.,
financial, energy); end-users; and numerous international partners.
NPPD in particular was a key contributor to the development of
requirements for a large-scale Broad Agency Announcement research
solicitation that S&T issued in 2011, of which the majority of the
resulting projects are completing in fiscal year 2015. The NPPD Office
of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) provided requirements for
the solicitation's Software Assurance topic area, and the U.S. Computer
Emergency Readiness Team provided requirements for the solicitation's
Modeling of Internet Attacks, Network Mapping and Measurement, and
Incident Response Communities topics. While developing a Cybersecurity
R&D Strategy in 2013, S&T received input from multiple Government
partners both from inside DHS (e.g., NPPD CS&C, USSS, Chief Information
Security Officer) and outside (e.g., the White House, General Services
Administration, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Energy)
of DHS. Additional recent R&D requirements have come from the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, the Federal
Cybersecurity R&D Strategic Plan, and the DHS Blueprint for a Secure
Cyber Future.
Question 2c. In times of declining budgets, how is S&T balancing
the pressure to have short-term technology impact versus the need to
invest in long-term technology solutions?
Answer. There is a natural and sometimes necessary temptation to
resource incremental operational capabilities ahead of higher-risk,
longer-term investments that are potentially much more innovative and
beneficial. S&T recognizes the delicate balance between satisfying
near-term requirements and keeping longer-term perspective and will
continue to work with our operational partners to invest appropriately.
Following the steep decline in S&T's R&D appropriation from fiscal
years 2010 to 2012, S&T was forced to make difficult decisions. Out of
necessity, this included shifting the R&D portfolio toward less risky
investments on shorter time lines that, as a tradeoff, were also
potentially less innovative solutions. Moving forward, in response to
feedback from our operational partners and homeland security
stakeholders, S&T is pushing its R&D portfolio to be more aggressive
with room for riskier investments that might yield revolutionary
advances. To this end, S&T has made strategic decisions to generate
visionary goals for the organization, expand Apex programs, and
implement twice-per-year prioritization of its Research, Development,
and Innovation (RD&I) portfolio.
S&T's long-term, visionary goals will serve as 30-year time line
North Stars for the organization:
Screening at Speed.--Security That Matches the Pace of Life
A Trusted Cyber Future.--Protecting Privacy, Commerce, and
Community
Enable the Decision Maker.--Actionable Information at the
Speed of Thought
Responder of the Future.--Protected, Connected, and Fully
Aware
Resilient Communities.--Disaster-Proofing Society.
The goals strive for previously-unachieved capabilities or
significantly lower-cost equivalents to existing capabilities. They
will help orient our organization and inspire stakeholders, including
operators, end-users, and performers in industry and academia, to focus
on potential leap-ahead capabilities.
These visionary goals will be supported by Apex programs. S&T's
existing Apex programs have been very successful. The core of the
original Apex structure will remain--these will still be cross-cutting,
multi-disciplinary efforts intended to solve problems of strategic
operational importance--but, so that S&T's R&D portfolio is more
balanced between near- and long-term outcomes, the programs will apply
to a wider portion of the portfolio and operate on a 5-year time line,
with interim deliverables planned in 2 to 3 years. To further amplify
the effectiveness of these projects, S&T's priorities moving forward
include better alignment of S&T resources like our Small Business
Innovation Research awards and university-based Centers of Excellence
and re-integration of basic scientific research that can be foundation
for cutting-edge homeland security solutions.
Finally, prioritization of the R&D portfolio ensures funding of the
highest-priority projects and gives an opportunity to balance the
portfolio between long-term visions and short-term solutions.
Continuous balancing ensures that S&T's investments will have the
greatest impact in an era of declining budgets.
Question 2d. How does DHS strategically utilize and leverage
expertise at the university and National laboratories?
Answer. Part of aligning all of S&T's resources moving forward will
be ensuring we take advantage of the full spectrum of resources across
what I refer to as the S&T Ecosystem, which is the broad network of
technical expertise inside and outside of Government that can be
brought to bear for virtually any issue operators face. Within this
ecosystem, certain performers are particularly suited to certain needs.
Universities and National Laboratories including S&T's internal
laboratory network, with deep wells of expertise and investments in
basic scientific research, are a critical part of the S&T Ecosystem.
The Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratory Complex is the
cornerstone of an integrated network of laboratory capabilities that
support the S&T and DHS missions. The National labs provide multi-
disciplinary, world-renowned capabilities that span all scientific and
engineering disciplines. These capabilities provide solutions to S&T's
and the DHS components' long-term technology challenges. In fiscal year
2013, DHS invested $262.7 million into the DOE labs to leverage these
capabilities. The laboratories provide sustained research and
development that support short- and long-term mission objectives. The
Department's mission areas span a broad suite of scientific and
technology disciplines, and National laboratories are adept at
deploying well-integrated, interdisciplinary teams for their execution.
Cooperation between S&T and DOE ranges from long-term capability
planning such as at the Mission Executive Council to shorter-term
tasking such as technology foraging to understand the current state of
relevant technologies and laboratory capabilities. The labs' status as
Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers permit the two
parties to work outside the traditional competitive contractor
framework for specialized strategic engagement.
In addition to DOE National laboratories, S&T manages five
laboratories that provide strategic capabilities within the homeland
security R&D portfolio including in biodefense, chemical security,
transportation security, and first responders. These laboratories
include the Chemical Security Analysis Center, providing chemical
threat characterization and identification; the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center, providing BSL-4 capability and
forensic analysis and characterization; the National Urban Security
Technology Laboratory, providing test and evaluation to first responder
technologies; the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, providing animal
disease characterization and identification; and the Transportation
Security Laboratory, providing advancement in explosive and contraband
detection. Each of these laboratories provides critical support to S&T,
to other DHS components, and to the Homeland Security Enterprise.
Many of S&T's research contracts include or are based on work done
with the Nation's best research universities. S&T also strategically
uses the DHS University Centers of Excellence (COEs) and their partner
networks in two ways. First, COEs conduct a wide range of R&D for S&T
in support of DHS mission priorities that have been articulated through
extensive partnerships with components. Second, through COEs, S&T
provides DHS components and other Federal agencies with direct access
to our universities' laboratories, expertise, and analytical
capabilities to conduct their own short- and long-term R&D. Their use
of the Centers is facilitated through streamlined contract and
financial assistance mechanisms in ten targeted research areas. The
COEs' successful research results, as well as S&T processes that allow
easy access to COEs, have attracted more than $96 million in additional
funding from DHS components and offices and other Federal agencies
since 2007. Each COE works with S&T, other Federal agencies, and end-
users to address user-identified challenges including resilience, law
enforcement, hurricanes, biodefense, risk assessment, terrorism, and
data analytics. More than 150 individual customers in offices across
DHS have relied on the Centers to address complex and persistent
challenges, deliver technical solutions, and build a highly specialized
workforce.
Question 2e. How can S&T ensure that it is aware of all of the R&D
activities occurring within the Department?
Answer. The establishment of an R&D definition was an important
first step. Moving forward, S&T will draft a directive and instruction
for formal coordination of R&D in the Department. This is still a work
in progress, but potential ideas include an annually updated overview
of R&D within the Department, cross-Department R&D strategic
information sharing similar to the Department of Defense, and formal
establishment of a two-way embed program between S&T and operational
elements. As this plan crystallizes further within DHS, we look forward
to sharing it with you and your fellow committee Members and staff.
Question 3a. According to CRS the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) with in S&T was originally developed
to be modeled after the DOD R&D agency DARPA.
Is this the proper model for HSPARA and should the two even be
compared given the dramatic differences in the scope, scale, and budget
of each organization?
Question 3b. How should HSARPA be designed and set up to fit the
needs and scale of DHS?
Answer. No, DARPA would not be an appropriate model for DHS's R&D
organization. Despite original authorizing language modeling HSARPA as
a DARPA-like R&D provider for DHS, several meaningful differences
between HSARPA and DARPA have emerged as the Department and S&T have
matured. In fiscal year 2014, DARPA was appropriated nearly $3 billion
compared to approximately $417 million for HSARPA. Unlike DARPA, HSARPA
is not backed by an industrial base equivalently resourced and capable
to the Defense Industrial Base. HSARPA also serves customer bases that,
unlike warfighters, operate at a much lower cost point and typically do
not have as much time available to train and integrate new technology
into their operations.
Perhaps most significantly, the role that S&T and HSARPA have grown
into within the Department is much less specialized than DARPA's role
within DOD. At DOD, R&D is a multi-faceted construct with different
organizations specialized to different stages of the process to nurture
technology to operational use. DARPA was originally chartered to
``prevent technological surprise''. As a result, while DARPA focuses
nearly exclusively on providing basic through applied research, S&T and
HSARPA are responsible for the full life cycle of technology
development and transition for not only the DHS operational components
but also the Homeland Security Enterprise as a whole. With about a
tenth of DARPA's discretionary budget (DARPA does not manage labs or
Centers of Excellence), S&T has a much broader mission. Additional
roles filled by S&T include understanding the mission and operational
need (in DOD, the role of a branch-specific organization like the
Office of Naval Research) and development of business requirements,
operational application, and transition (in DOD, the role of a
branch's-specific organization like the Naval Sea Systems Command).
HSARPA does not require drastic changes or new authorities to
fulfill its mission. The Under Secretary for Science and Technology has
sufficient latitude and authority to shape HSARPA to meet the needs of
both the Department and the wider Homeland Security Enterprise. We
recognize the critical differences between DARPA, HSARPA, and their
roles in their respective Departments and have adjusted how we conduct
ourselves accordingly.
For example, to meet the needs of our customers, our R&D portfolio
is generally much more geared toward near- and medium-term operational
application than DARPA. In addition, since operational partners also
rely on S&T for potential leap-ahead technology, we also ensure that
our portfolio still invests in projects with higher risk but
correspondingly higher reward. Examples will include S&T's expanded
Apex projects, which will be high-value, 5-year horizon projects
focused on a DHS component's unique mission and capability needs.
Recently-finalized visionary goals will help orient S&T and inspire
stakeholders, including operators, end-users, and performers in
industry and academia, toward the types of revolutionary capabilities
that the Directorate will focus on. In order to work meaningfully
toward these types of 30-year-horizon North Stars, we are also
expanding our Apex programs and focusing on alignment of all of S&T's
capabilities in support of those programs. Taken altogether, these are
examples of how S&T and HSARPA, despite being different from DARPA, are
aligned to meet the needs of the Department and the Homeland Security
Enterprise.
Question 4. Given GAO's concerns that DHS does not know how much it
invests in R&D, can S&T produce a reliable list of R&D projects and
associated costs occurring throughout the Department? If so, please
include that list in this response. If not, why not?
Answer. In fiscal year 2014, the Department's budget included
approximately $1.032 billion for R&D including $932 million at S&T
(including $433 million related to laboratory infrastructure
investments such as construction of the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility) and approximately $100 million more at Coast Guard's Research
and Development Center and in the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
research budget. In addition, S&T's Research, Development, Acquisition,
and Operations budget included $115 million for laboratory operations,
$42 million for acquisition and operations analysis, and $3 million for
Minority Serving Institutions.
Under the DHS-specific definition of R&D signed by the Secretary as
an annex to S&T's delegation, there are several additional areas of
later-stage development rightfully under the purview of operational
components including, among others, validation and demonstration;
improving on research prototypes; integration into systems and
subsystems; addressing manufacturing, producibility, and sustainability
needs; and independent operational test and evaluation.
The next step will be using this definition to develop a more
complete picture of the Department's R&D that includes on-going late-
stage development efforts by components. In fiscal year 2015, S&T is
helping write a Directive and Instruction, developed in partnership
with components, for more information sharing and tighter collaboration
between S&T and operational elements of DHS. S&T looks forward to
sharing this information with Congress when results have been
finalized.
Question 5. Does DHS S&T utilize relevant research from the
National Science Foundation, for instance research conducted related to
cybersecurity or behavioral research? If so, can you provide me with a
list of specific examples of NSF-sponsored work DHS S&T has utilized?
Answer. Yes, S&T works with the National Science Foundation (NSF)
in behavioral, biological, and cybersecurity research areas. In August
2010, the S&T Actionable Indicators and Countermeasures project entered
an interagency agreement with NSF to conduct research focused on the
U.S. public's attitudes toward terrorism and counterterrorism
activities. S&T provided NSF with funding to support several surveys on
this topic as part of the Time-Sharing Experiments for Social Sciences
project, leveraging an existing NSF-sponsored research infrastructure
to produce findings in the most cost-effective manner possible.
S&T is an affiliate in the NSF Center for Identity Technology
Research (CITeR), a NSF Industry/University Cooperative Research Center
(I/UCRC) that DHS has contributed to for the last 11 years. More than
250 university research projects have been jointly conducted through
CITeR jointly, including these examples:
Cross-Device and Cross-Distance Matching Face Recognition
Using Cell Phones with Enhanced Camera Capabilities (University
at Buffalo)
Fingerprint Identification: A Longitudinal Study (Michigan
State University)
Fusing Biometric and Biographic Information in
Identification Systems (Michigan State and West Virginia
Universities)
Touch DNA: Fusing Latent Fingerprint with DNA for Suspect
Identification (West Virginia University)
S&T's Cyber Security Division has several active efforts with NSF.
First, the Transition to Practice (TTP) program identifies mature
cybersecurity technologies developed with Government funding and then
funds test and evaluation and operational pilots for these technologies
to speed their path to operational use and/or commercialization.
Through TTP technology foraging with NSF, two NSF-funded cybersecurity
technologies, AMICO and ZeroPoint, have been brought into the portfolio
for potential pilot and transition to wider operational use. Second,
S&T and NSF will jointly fund three Cyber Physical Systems-related
research efforts with NSF--two focusing on the smart grid and a third
focusing on smart manufacturing. Finally, S&T funds software assurance
research projects through the Security and Software Engineering
Research Center (S2ERC), another NSF I/UCRC with projects including a
software quality assurance tool study to help identify gaps in current
software quality assurance tools and a technology to identify
architecturally significant code in systems and applications that could
lead to potential vulnerabilities.
In fiscal year 2007, DHS and NSF initiated joint funding for the
National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis (NIMBioS),
to promote the development of cross-disciplinary approaches and new
collaborations in mathematical biology, including infectious disease
dynamics. While the focus of NIMBioS is much broader than foreign
animal disease threats, or even infectious disease dynamics, many of
the new innovations that arise as a result of the Institute's
activities will be widely applicable in these areas. The Institute
sponsors a range of activities at the interface of mathematics and
biology, including research and education, collaborations with other
relevant scientific disciplines (e.g., computer science, ecology),
human resource development (e.g., science fairs for children and
parents), and questions concerned with public policy (e.g., animal
depopulation as a strategy for control of animal diseases).
Furthermore, NIMBioS engages a range of participants. While the
majority are academics (college or university faculty or staff,
graduate students, or undergraduates), a number of participants are
from Government, private sector, or non-profits. DHS's last year of
funding for NIMBioS was fiscal year 2012 (to refocus on more tool-
oriented modeling approaches), but NSF independently renewed the
Institute's funding for another 5-year term. S&T continues to
participate in reviews of the programs, and our programs continue to
benefit from the results of these investments.
Questions From Chairman Lamar S. Smith for Reginald Brothers
Question 1. Who are the entities/stakeholders responsible for
securing the border? How do they determine whether solutions require
technology, people, training, and/or policy and procedures?
Question 2. What activities is the S&T Directorate currently
undertaking to improve border security?
Answer. Securing the land, maritime, and air borders is a
collaborative effort among S&T, DNDO, and the operating components of
DHS, including the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). S&T is
the primary research and development arm for DHS and manages research,
from development through transition, for the Department's operational
components, with DNDO having the equivalent responsibility for nuclear
and radiological detection and forensics. S&T works with the DHS
operational components to identify capability gaps and to determine if
people, training, readily available commercial technologies, policy/
procedures, or new technology is needed to fulfill the requirement. S&T
will typically perform market research or technology foraging to
discover, adapt, and/or leverage technology solutions developed by
other Governmental and private-sector entities to address the gap. If
there are no existing solutions, S&T will seek to develop a new
solution through Federal and private partnerships and collaborations,
or on its own to fulfill the gap.
S&T's Borders and Maritime Security Division, in its pursuit of
technology to enhance border security, categorizes its efforts as
follows: (1) Land Border Security (between the Ports of Entry (POEs)),
(2) Maritime Border Security, and (3) Cargo Security (at the POEs). The
activities being undertaken in each category are discussed below.
land border security (between the poes)
In support of CBP's Offices of Border Patrol and Air and Marine
(OAM), S&T is pursuing technology solutions in the following areas:
Improved Utilization of Air Platform-Based Technologies.--
Identifying, testing, and evaluating air-based technologies to improve
CBP's ability to detect, classify, and track illicit activity. The use
of sensors on fixed and rotary wing, manned and unmanned aircraft will
provide improved situational awareness that will in turn improve
decision making at both the local and regional level.
Improved Ground-Based Technologies.--Developing technology to fill
capability gaps on both Northern and Southern Borders identified by the
Border Surveillance Working Group (made up of Border Patrol personnel
and other subject-matter experts). This includes work developing and
piloting border tripwires, unattended ground sensors, camera poles,
upgrades to mobile surveillance units, etc. These efforts will allow
for improved situational awareness of the U.S. terrestrial borders
resulting in higher interdiction rates and better utilization of Border
Patrol Agents and assets.
Rapid Prototyping.--Rapidly assessing and deploying commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) or near-COTS solutions in response to critical border
security needs identified by CBP. The project will result in rapid
adoption of technology, improving CBP's capabilities and/or reduce
operations and maintenance costs.
Improved Tunnel Detection and Tunnel Forensics.--Developing
technologies to detect and locate clandestine tunnels used to smuggle
drugs and contraband into the United States along the Southern Border.
This also includes developing tools to obtain forensic evidence from
discovered tunnels to support investigations and increase arrests and
prosecutions. Efforts will result in an increase in the number of
tunnels detected and will reduce the flow of contraband smuggled into
the United States.
Improved Border Situational Awareness (Apex Project).--Improving
border situational awareness along the Southwestern U.S. Border by: (1)
Integrating existing sensor and non-sensor data, (2) providing decision
support tools that will translate data into actionable information, and
(3) enabling data and information sharing across the Homeland Security
Enterprise (Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international). This
integrated border information enterprise will enable effective law
enforcement response at the local level while allowing risk-based
resource allocation at the local, sector, and National level. This will
result in more effective and efficient border security, improving
interdiction rates, keeping more drugs off of U.S. streets while
reducing human trafficking and illegal immigration.
maritime border security
In support of CBP's OAM and USCG, S&T is pursuing technology
solutions in the following areas:
Improved Arctic Communications Capability.--Identifying and
evaluating candidate terrestrial and space-based solutions to inform
the acquisition and implementation of reliable communications in the
Arctic. Reliable communications are essential for safe and effective
operations as the Coast Guard extends its mission into the Arctic.
Enhanced Port and Coastal Surveillance.--Developing solutions to
improve maritime situational awareness, information/data analytics, and
information sharing, which will enable appropriate and effective
response to maritime threats. Technical solutions will: (1) Enable
rapid tactical response resulting in increased interdiction efficiency,
(2) enable risk-based strategic planning/resource allocation, and (3)
enhance officer effectiveness, efficiency, and safety.
cargo security (at the poes)
In support of CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO), S&T is
pursuing technology solutions in the following areas:
Improved Cargo Container Security.--Developing technologies for
collecting additional cargo security data, while also investing in
analysis methods for transforming new and existing cargo security data
into actionable information in the form of improved targeting that will
lead to a higher probability of detecting illegal or hazardous
materials in cargo while expediting the delivery of legitimate cargo.
The impact will be a reduction of the number of containers requiring
scanning and/or manual inspection saving CBP millions annually in labor
and facility costs while increasing the throughput of legitimate cargo.
Enhanced Cargo Validation Capability.--Providing CBP with the
capability to detect the transport of contraband, counterfeit
merchandise, or invasive species in in-bound and out-bound cargo at the
POEs and detect and prosecute illegal activity through the forensic
analysis of material collected from suspicious cargo/packages. The
result will be an increase in throughput of legitimate cargo, an
increase in the availability of forensic evidence enabling enhanced
trade compliance enforcement, and a reduction in the cost to industry
caused by delays at the POE.
Improved Cargo Scanning Capability.--Developing software and
hardware upgrades for legacy cargo scanning units and infusing state-
of-the-art technology to enhance their detection performance and extend
their service life. S&T is also developing/prototyping tools to non-
intrusively scan structural voids for hidden contraband in automobiles
and other cargo conveyances. The technology will enhance CBP's
effectiveness in detecting contraband at POEs while increasing the
throughput of legitimate cargo. S&T is also working with the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office to develop and test new technology that fuses
nuclear detection with the detection of other contraband.
Should Members of the committee be interested in further
information about any of the above programs, S&T would be happy to
provide more detailed briefings.
Question From Ranking Member Daniel Lipinski for Reginald Brothers
Question. In your opening statement you said, ``With S&T's
reauthorization, the committee has an opportunity to help launch a 21st
Century research and development (R&D) organization that will serve as
a model for Federal R&D.'' In the context of reauthorizing S&T, what
would be your legislative recommendations to the committees that would
put you in a better position to launch a 21st Century R&D organization?
What are the top five high-priority items you would you like to see in
the reauthorization?
Answer. Empowering an R&D organization for the 21st Century means
providing organizational flexibility to empower a technical workforce
capable of more open and effective engagement with the full breadth of
industry and other non-Government stakeholders. Many of the mechanisms
and constraints that S&T and other Federal R&D organizations operate
under are the result of authorities suited to a different era with less
competition for technical expertise and less emphasis on organizational
agility and responsiveness to rapid change.
The homeland security mission space encompasses numerous complex
threats that evolve quickly and consistently strain operational
resources. Our partners rely on S&T to identify and exploit technology-
based opportunities to jump the threat curve and gain an advantage.
S&T, as the R&D organization supporting these operators, would achieve
its mission more effectively if it were given greater flexibility and
empowerment in re-authorization. Examples of revised or new authorities
include permanent Other Transaction Authority for S&T, which would
allow more strategic use by avoiding prolonged lapses in the authority,
and moving AD 1101 hiring authority out of the Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency to the Under Secretary for Science
and Technology level, which would grant hiring flexibility to meet
technical needs throughout the directorate.
Moving forward, endorsement by the committee of S&T's approach
would also help us maintain and expand upon progress made to date. That
includes our planned implementation of a robust process for S&T's
workforce to embed with operators and to allow operational staff to
detail to S&T and provide direct input to our R&D projects. That also
includes our modified approach to the R&D portfolio, which includes
expansion of our Apexes and establishment of cross-cutting Engines that
support R&D work throughout S&T.
Questions From Honorable Chris Collins for Reginald Brothers
Question 1. What different types of technologies are being pursued
by DHS for detection of infectious diseases?
Question 2. How is DHS ensuring the technologies they are
developing do not overlap with those of DoD when it comes to infectious
diseases (i.e. anthrax and other airborne toxins)?
Answer. S&T has several projects focused on improvements for
detection and identification of infectious diseases. These range from
laboratory assays to fieldable devices to data analytics for rapid
situational awareness.
S&T is working collaboratively with an interagency group that
includes DoD to develop, test, evaluate, and validate highly specific
and sensitive laboratory assays for the rapid detection of disease
agents. These assays are intended for both clinical diagnostic use as
well as environmental sample analysis, and will be deployed and
employed through the more than 150 CDC Laboratory Response Network
laboratories across the Nation for comprehensive coverage and rapid
response to a biological incident.
During a biological event, one potential problem will be pathogens
with resistance or immunity to existing medical countermeasures.
Overuse and inappropriate use of medical countermeasures in the United
States and internationally (i.e., use of antibacterial countermeasures
for viral infections) have resulted in many bacterial pathogens with
resistances that threaten the efficacy and utility of antibiotics. As a
result, the White House recently initiated a program called ``Combating
Antimicrobial Resistant Bacteria.'' S&T is supporting technology that
will rapidly determine whether infections are bacterial versus viral
and help medical professionals decide when antibiotics should be
prescribed. This will ultimately lead to prudent use of life-saving
medical countermeasures that will prolong their life span and utility
to the Nation and medical community in the case of a biological event.
Effective response to emerging infectious disease will also require
information sharing between local hospitals, State public health
departments, and Federal agencies. S&T is undertaking efforts to
evaluate information communication systems and data analytic techniques
that will facilitate rapid awareness of a disease emergence for
effective public safety communication and response.
In all of these programs, S&T engages key Federal partners,
including multiple organizations within DoD, to participate in
capability gap generation processes and program execution to ensure
that there is no duplication of effort. There are jointly funded DHS-
DoD projects, technical exchanges around biosurveillance and
biodetection activities, and a Memorandum of Understanding that
establishes a formal information-sharing mechanisms between S&T and DoD
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Question From Chairman Lamar S. Smith for David C. Maurer
Question. Who are the entities/stakeholders responsible for
securing the border? How do they determine whether solutions require
technology, people, training, and/or policy and procedures?
Answer. Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with other
Federal, State, local, and Tribal entities. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), a component within DHS that is the lead agency for
border security, is responsible, among other things, for preventing
terrorists and their weapons of terrorism from entering the United
States and for interdicting persons and contraband crossing the border
illegally. Within CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) is
responsible for securing the border at ports of entry (POE)\1\ and the
U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is the CBP component charged with
ensuring security along border areas between the POEs. Additionally,
CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) provides air and maritime support
to secure the National border between the POEs, within maritime
operating areas, and within the Nation's interior. The U.S. Coast Guard
executes its maritime security mission on and over the major waterways,
including the Great Lakes, using marine and air assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide
for the arrival at or departure from the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS and CBP and its components coordinate their border security
efforts with various Federal, State, local, Tribal, and foreign law
enforcement agencies that also have responsibilities to detect,
interdict, and investigate different types of illegal activity within
certain geographic boundaries. For example, U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Interior (DOI) agencies have
jurisdiction for law enforcement on Federal borderlands including
nearly 2,000 miles of Federally-owned or -managed land adjacent to the
international borders with Canada and Mexico administered by their
component agencies. These component agencies--including DOI's National
Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management
and USDA's Forest Service--are responsible for the protection of
natural and cultural resources, agency personnel, and the public on the
lands they administer. In addition, DOI's Bureau of Indian Affairs may
enforce Federal laws on Indian lands with the consent of Tribes and in
accordance with Tribal laws, and law enforcement personnel from
sovereign Indian nations located on the international borders also
conduct law enforcement operations related to border security.
International partners in securing the U.S. border include Canadian and
Mexican law enforcement agencies.
In addition, there are other Federal, State, and local partners in
securing the U.S. border. These partners include DHS's U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) which is responsible for investigating
the source of cross-border crimes and dismantling illegal operations.
Partners at the Department of Justice (DOJ) include the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), which conducts investigations of
priority drug-trafficking organizations, domestic and foreign, that can
include drug smuggling across the border or ports of entry and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has responsibility for
combating terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD), while not a
partner, also provides support as requested, such as personnel and
technology for temporary joint operations. Moreover, numerous State and
local law enforcement entities interdict and investigate criminal
activity on public and private lands adjacent to the border. Although
these agencies are not responsible for preventing the illegal entry of
aliens into the United States, they do employ law enforcement officers
and investigators to protect the public and natural resources on their
lands.
We have reported on CBP's processes for identifying border security
resource needs, specifically related to Border Patrol resources for
securing the Southwest Border between ports of entry, deployments of
air and marine resources by CBP's OAM, and technology deployment along
the Southwest Border. With regard to Border Patrol resource needs, in
December 2012 we reported on the extent to which Border Patrol
developed mechanisms to identify resources needed to secure the border
under its new strategic plan, issued in May 2012.\2\ We reported that
as the Border Patrol began transitioning to its new strategic plan, it
has been using an interim process for assessing the need for additional
personnel, infrastructure, and technology in agency sectors. Border
Patrol officials told us that under the risk management approach called
for in the Border Patrol's fiscal year 2012-2016 strategic plan, the
need for additional resources would be determined in terms of
unacceptable levels of risk caused by illegal activity across border
locations. Until a new process for identifying resource needs has been
developed, we reported that Border Patrol sectors would continue to use
annual operational assessments to reflect specific objectives and
measures for accomplishing annual sector priorities, as well as
identifying minimum budgetary requirements necessary to maintain the
current status of border security in each sector. We recommended, among
other things, that CBP establish milestones and time frames for
developing performance measures for assessing progress made in securing
the border and for informing resource identification and allocation
efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendation and is working to
establish such milestones and time frames.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet
in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25
(Washington, DC: Dec. 10, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to assessing Border Patrol's processes for identifying
resource needs, we have reported on identification and allocation of
resources for CBP's Office of Air and Marine. The Office of Air and
Marine provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of its
customers, primarily Border Patrol. In March 2012, we reported that the
Office of Air and Marine had not documented significant events, such as
its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across locations,
and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate that its decisions
to allocate resources were the most effective ones in fulfilling
customer needs and addressing threats.\3\ The Office of Air and Marine
issued various plans that included strategic goals, mission
responsibilities, and threat information. However, we were unable to
identify the underlying analyses used to link these factors to the mix
and placement of resources across locations because the Office of Air
and Marine did not have documentation that clearly linked the
deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats.
Similarly, we found that the Office did not document analyses
supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets across
locations. Office of Air and Marine headquarters officials stated that
they made deployment decisions during formal discussions and on-going
meetings in close collaboration with Border Patrol, and considered a
range of factors such as operational capability, mission priorities,
and threats. Officials said that while they generally documented final
decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources, they did not
have the resources to document assessments and analyses to support
these decisions. However, we reported that such documentation of
significant events could help the Office improve the transparency of
its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the effectiveness
of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs and
addressing threats. We recommended that CBP document analyses,
including mission requirements and threats that support decisions on
the mix and placement of the Office's air and marine resources. DHS
concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to provide
additional documentation of its analyses supporting decisions on the
mix and placement of air and marine resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More
Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518 (Washington,
DC: Mar. 30, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP also has a planning process for acquiring and deploying
surveillance technologies along the Southwest Border. For example, In
November 2011, we reported on CBP's plan to identify, acquire, and
deploy surveillance technologies along the Arizona border.\4\ This
plan, referred to as the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan,
is the first step in DHS's approach for acquiring and deploying border
security technologies, such as surveillance systems, hand-held
equipment, and unattended ground sensors, along the Southwest Border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information
on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington,
DC: Nov. 4, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We reported that CBP used a two-step process to develop the Arizona
Border Surveillance Technology Plan. First, CBP engaged the Homeland
Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of
alternatives beginning with Arizona.\5\ This analysis of alternatives
considered four technology alternatives: (1) Agent-centric hand-held
devices, (2) integrated fixed-tower systems, (3) mobile surveillance
equipment, and (4) unmanned aerial vehicles. In its analysis of
alternatives, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute
noted that its analysis did not, among other things, identify the
optimal combination of specific equipment and systems, measure the
contribution of situational awareness to achieving control of the
border, or quantify the number of apprehensions that may result from
the deployment of any technology solution. According to officials from
the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, the Institute
assembled an independent review team composed of senior subject-matter
experts with expertise in border security, operational testing,
acquisition, performance measurement, and the management and execution
of analyses of alternatives to evaluate the analysis of alternatives
for Arizona. In the results of the final report, the review team from
the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute concluded that the
analysis of alternatives for Arizona appeared to have successfully
answered the questions asked and drew appropriate conclusions and
insights that should be useful to DHS and CBP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute is a
Federally-funded research and development center to provide independent
analysis of homeland security issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, we reported that following the completion of the analysis
of alternatives, the Border Patrol conducted its operational
assessment, which included a comparison of alternative border
surveillance technologies and an analysis of operational judgments to
consider both effectiveness and cost. According to CBP officials, they
started with the results of the analysis of alternatives for Arizona,
noting that the analysis considered the technologies in terms of the
trade-offs between capability and cost--but did not document the
quantities of each technology needed, the appropriate mix of the
technologies, or how a proposed mix of technologies would be applied to
specific border areas. CBP officials stated that a team of Border
Patrol Agents familiar with the Arizona terrain determined the
appropriate quantity and mix of technologies by considering the terrain
in each area under consideration and which mix of technologies appeared
to work for that area and terrain.
We found that while the first step in CBP's process to develop the
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan--the analysis of
alternatives--was well documented, the second step--Border Patrol's
operational assessment--was not transparent because of the lack of
documentation. Specifically, CBP did not document its analysis
justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of
border surveillance technologies CBP proposed in its plan. We
recommended that CBP ensure that the underlying analyses of the plan
are documented. While DHS concurred with our recommendation, officials
noted that CBP was not planning further analyses or additional
documentation given that they consider their analyses to be
sufficiently documented in the final plan. Given that CBP has moved
forward in awarding contracts for the Plan's technology programs and
does not plan to conduct further analyses, we closed this
recommendation as not implemented. In addition, DHS noted that it
relies on Border Patrol field agents' expert judgment to select the
type and quantities of technologies best suited for their respective
geographic areas of responsibilities, and that technology selections
were verified for consistency with the major findings of the analysis
of alternatives.
[all]