[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

JIHADIST SAFE HAVENS: EFFORTS TO DETECT AND DETER TERRORIST TRAVEL

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HEARING

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE

of the

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

JULY 24, 2014

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Serial No. 113-80

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Curtis Clawson, Florida
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan O'Hara, Acting Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE

Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Vice Loretta Sanchez, California
Chair William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Curtis Clawson, Florida (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director

C O N T E N T S

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Page

Statements

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5

Witnesses

Mr. Frederick W. Kagan, Director, Critical Threats Project,
American Enterprise Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson Society:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs,
Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The
Heritage Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Seth G. Jones, Director, International Security and Defense
Policy Center, The Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24

JIHADIST SAFE HAVENS: EFFORTS TO DETECT AND DETER TERRORIST TRAVEL

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Thursday, July 24, 2014

U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Broun, Clawson, Higgins, and
Thompson.
Mr. King. Good morning. First of all, thank you for being
here. It is really--it is very much appreciated. I know I speak
for the Ranking Member, as well.
The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony examining
jihadist safe havens and efforts to detect and deter terrorist
travel. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Today we know at least 100 Americans have traveled or
attempted to travel to Syria for the purpose of joining an
Islamist extremist group, either al-Nusra Front, the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or another. We also know that
several thousand individuals from European nations have flocked
to Syria, and likely now Iraq, for the same purpose.
Fifteen months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on the
growing threat posed to the homeland from al-Qaeda, which
focused on foreign fighters from around the world converging on
the war zone in Syria. Since that time, from all accounts, the
situation has dramatically worsened. The number of al-Qaeda-
affiliated and jihadist groups has multiplied.
In May 2014, FBI Director Comey noted that the current
Syrian conflict, ``is an order of magnitude'' worse than
Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. With stunning velocity, the
group formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq has evolved into the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, and established what it
calls a caliphate that spans across portions of Iraq and Syria.
While core al-Qaeda leadership may have diminished
capacity, in recent months, it has sought to rebuild as U.S.
forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda affiliates
around the world are as strong as ever. ISIS has ruthlessly
captured cities, killed indiscriminately, and mobilized
thousands of foreign fighters to its cause. It moves its men
and arms at will into safe havens on both sides of the Iraqi-
Syrian border.
At least one American has died as a suicide bomber after
spending 2 months in a training camp operated by al-Nusra Front
in Aleppo. Twenty-two-year-old Moner Mohammed Abusalha, who was
born and raised in Florida and reportedly traveled to Syria in
late 2013, blew himself up in an attack in Syria on May 25,
2014.
The threat is not limited to U.S. persons fighting and
being radicalized overseas or constrained to battlefields in
Syria and Iraq. On May 24, French jihadist and Syrian war
veteran Mehdi Nemmouche attacked a Jewish museum in Brussels.
Compounding the threat is the potential for terror groups
to coordinate and share expertise, as well as fighters. Last
month, we all followed press reports that members of al-Nusra
had possibly linked up with bomb-making experts from AQAP, al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The potent combination of
AQAP's bomb-making expertise and al-Nusra's large pool of
radical converts, including U.S. and European passport-holders,
poses a severe threat to the homeland.
These concerns recently caused the United States to require
additional security measures to enhance screening of travelers
and luggage on U.S.-bound flights. Attorney General Holder's
comments that, ``the Syrian conflict has turned that region
into a cradle of violent extremism,'' are important. As he
said, the world cannot let it become a training ground from
which our nationals can return and launch attacks.
Unfortunately, as we have seen too often, words from key
administration officials have not translated into plans and
action. Political instability and American disengagement in the
region has created the conditions allowing radical jihadism to
regenerate and metastasize. It is essential that the White
House articulates American interests in the region and elicits
greater cooperation from European and foreign partners to
identify and track individuals seeking to join extremist
groups.
As the diaspora of fighters and ideology spreads, there
will be long-term consequences and a direct threat to the
United States and to the West. It is time for the
administration and the Congress to implement a plan to
safeguard the homeland before Westerners who have become
further radicalized in these conflicts are sent home to carry
out attacks.
I especially want to thank Dr. Simcox and Dr. Jones, who
have previously testified before our committee. We also want to
welcome Fred Kagan, who I had the opportunity of meeting, I
guess, 7 or 8 years ago now when you were in the process of
formulating the surge policy in Iraq, you and General Keane. I
remember that meeting very well. And Peter Brookes, who has
been a long-time warrior in this fight against terrorism.
So you are here to put ISIS's growth in perspective, a
group which was not even discussed a year ago, but now controls
large portions of territory in Syria and Iraq and poses a
significant threat to the United States. I look forward to the
panel's update and would like to thank our distinguished panel
of witnesses in advance.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
Today we know that at least 100 Americans have traveled or
attempted to travel to Syria for the purpose of joining an Islamist
extremist group, either al-Nusrah Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham (ISIS), or another. We also know that several thousand
individuals from European nations have flocked to Syria, and likely now
Iraq, for the same purpose.
Fifteen months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on the growing
threat posed to the homeland from al-Qaeda, which focused on foreign
fighters from around the world converging on the war zone Syria. Since
that time, from all accounts the situation has dramatically worsened.
The number of al-Qaeda-affiliated and jihadist groups have multiplied.
In May 2014, FBI Director Comey noted that the current Syrian conflict
``is an order of magnitude'' worse than Afghanistan in the 1980s and
1990s. And with stunning velocity, the group formerly known as al-Qaeda
in Iraq has evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, and
established what it calls a caliphate that spans across portions of
Iraq and Syria.
While core al-Qaeda leadership may have diminished capacity, in
recent months they have sought to rebuild as U.S. forces withdraw from
Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda affiliates around the world are as strong as
ever. ISIS has ruthlessly captured cities, killed indiscriminately, and
mobilized thousands of foreign fighters to its cause. It moves its men
and arms at will into safe havens on both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian
border.
At least one American has died as a suicide bomber after spending 2
months in a training camp operated by al-Nusrah Front in Aleppo.
Twenty-two-year-old Moner Mohammed Abusalha, who was born and raised in
Florida and reportedly traveled to Syria in late 2013, and blew himself
up in an attack in Syria on May 25, 2014.
The threat is not limited to U.S. persons fighting and being
radicalized overseas, or constrained to battlefields in Syria and Iraq.
On May 24, French jihadist and Syrian war veteran Mehdi Nemmouche
attacked a Jewish museum in Brussels.
Compounding the threat is the potential for terror groups to
coordinate and share expertise, as well as fighters. Last month, we all
followed press reports that members of al-Nusrah had possibly linked up
with bomb-making experts from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The potent combination of AQAP's bomb-making expertise and al-Nusrah's
large pool of radical converts including U.S. and European passport
holders, poses a significant threat to the homeland. These concerns
recently caused the United States to require additional security
measures at certain foreign airports to enhance screening of travelers
and luggage on U.S.-bound flights.
Attorney General Eric Holder's comments that ``the Syrian conflict
has turned that region into a cradle of violent extremism,'' are
important. As he said, ``the world cannot let it become a training
ground from which our nationals can return and launch attacks.''
Unfortunately, as we have seen far too often, words from key
administration officials, including the President, have not translated
into plans and action. Political instability and American disengagement
in the region has created the conditions allowing radical jihadism to
re-generate and metastasize.
It is essential that the White House articulates American interests
in the region, and elicits greater cooperation from European and
foreign partners to identify and track individuals seeking to join
extremist groups. As the diaspora of fighters and ideology spreads,
there will be long-term consequences and a direct threat to the United
States and the West. It is time for the administration to implement a
plan to safeguard the homeland before Westerners who have become
further radicalized in these conflicts are sent home to carry out
attacks.
I would like to welcome back Mr. Simcox and Dr. Jones, who
testified at our hearing last year. It appears that over the last year
the situation on the ground have gotten substantially worse for
American interests in the region. To put ISIS's growth in perspective--
a group not discussed a year ago now controls large portions of
territory in Syria and Iraq and poses a significant threat to the
United States.
I look forward to the panel's update, with the additional input
from Dr. Kagan and Dr. Brookes, on the spreading conflict and would
like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses in advance.

Mr. King. With that, I yield to the Ranking Member from New
York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Chairman King, for holding this
hearing. This hearing is a timely and necessary follow-up to
our hearing last May regarding al-Qaeda operations in both Iran
and Syria. I would also--I think that is supposed to be Iraq.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to
testify as we expand our understanding about travel patterns of
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and how they continue to
impact the United States homeland. U.S. intelligence officials
report that at least 7,000 fighters from more than 50 countries
across the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Asia, including
dozens of volunteers from the United States, have traveled to
Syria to support armed opposition groups there.
Other estimates by non-governmental sources suggested over
100,000 pro-opposition foreign fighters have traveled to Syria.
Overall, the United States Government estimates place the
strength of armed opposition forces, including foreign
fighters, between 75,000 and 110,000 persons. Some of these
opposition groups are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations,
and a subset of dedicated extremist fighters may pose an
outsized threat. Thousands of other non-Syrian fighters
reportedly are fighting in Syria to support the government of
Bashar al-Assad, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah, the
Iranian military, and Iraq-Shia militias.
Foreign fighters contribute to the persistence of the armed
conflict in Syria, and they also pose external security risks
now or in the near future. To date, the FBI has arrested a
handful of U.S. citizens and residents on charges of providing
material support to terrorist groups and using certain weapons
in connection with the conflict in Syria.
Officials in European and Asian governments have also made
several arrests of would-be foreign fighters, returned foreign
fighters or their recruiters and facilitators. It is imperative
that the United States focus not only on the United States
persons traveling to and from Syria, but also persons traveling
to and from our neighboring countries, as well.
On April 22, 2013, the Canadian police announced the arrest
of two people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on
a passenger train that travels from Toronto through Niagara
Falls, New York, and into New York City. According to Canadian
officials, the alleged terrorists were receiving assistance
from al-Qaeda elements in Iran. Last year's plot in Canada
raises questions both about whether al-Qaeda operatives in Iran
and Syria have access to a broader terror network and whether
Canada is a target for terrorist activity or recruitment.
Today, in addition to their testimony on the larger issues
of foreign fighters, I would ask our witnesses to provide
information on foreign fighters in Canada and the potential for
these individuals to enter the United States via Canada after
returning from Syria or Iraq.
Again, I look forward to today's testimony. With that, I
will yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
July 24, 2014
This hearing is a timely and necessary follow-up to our hearing
last May regarding al-Qaeda operations in both Iran and Syria. I would
also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify as we expand
our understanding about travel patterns of foreign fighters in Syria
and Iraq and how they continue to impact on the U.S. homeland.
U.S. intelligence officials report that at least 7,000 fighters
from more than 50 countries across the Middle East, North Africa,
Europe, Asia, including dozens of volunteers from the United States,
have traveled to Syria to support armed opposition groups there. Other
estimates by non-Government sources suggest that over 10,000 pro-
opposition foreign fighters have travelled to Syria. Overall, U.S.
Government estimates place the strength of armed opposition forces--
including foreign fighters--between 75,000 and 110,000 persons.
Some of these opposition groups are U.S.-designated terrorist
organizations, and a subset of dedicated extremist fighters may pose an
outsized threat. Thousands of other non-Syrian fighters reportedly are
fighting in Syria to support the government of Bashar al Assad,
including members of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iranian military, and
Iraqi Shia militias.
Foreign fighters contribute to the persistence of the armed
conflict in Syria and may also pose external security risks now or in
the near future. To date, the FBI has arrested a handful of U.S.
citizens and residents on charges of providing material support to
terrorist groups and using certain weapons in connection with the
conflict in Syria.
Officials in European and Asian governments have also made several
arrests of would-be foreign fighters, returned foreign fighters, or
their recruiters and facilitators. It is imperative that United States
focus not only on U.S. persons traveling to and from Syria, but also
persons traveling to and from our neighboring countries as well.
On April 22, 2013, the Canadian Police announced the arrest of two
people in connection with plotting a terrorist attack on a passenger
train that travels from Toronto, through Niagara Falls, New York, into
New York City. According to Canadian officials, the alleged terrorists
were receiving assistance from al-Qaeda elements in Iran.
Last year's plot in Canada raises questions both about whether al-
Qaeda operatives in Iran and Syria have access to a broader terror
network, and whether Canada is a target for terrorist activity or
recruitment.
Today, in addition to their testimony on the larger issues of
foreign fighters, I would like our witnesses to provide information on
foreign fighter transit in Canada, and the potential for these
individuals, to enter the United States via Canada after returning from
Syria or Iraq.

Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 24, 2014
As the committee continues examine the homeland security
implications of foreign fighting, it is important to revisit the facts
that have lead us to this point. As fighting continues across Syria,
government forces and their allies are being pitted against a range of
anti-government insurgents. The disorder is so rampant that at times,
many of these insurgent groups are even fighting amongst themselves.
While the total population of Syria is more than 22 million, the
Civil War has driven more than 2.8 million Syrians into neighboring
countries as refugees, since March 2011. Millions more Syrians are
internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance, of which
the United States remains the largest bilateral provider, with more
than $2 billion in funding.
The United States also has allocated a total of $287 million to
provide non-lethal assistance to select groups. While it is difficult
to know exactly what is happening on the ground in Syria, as it changes
day-to-day, it seems neither pro-Assad forces nor their opponents are
capable of achieving outright victory in the short term.
In the interim, conflict between the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) and other anti-Assad forces has also caused an increase
in war fighting. Outside of Syria, the Syrian Civil War has caused an
increase of religious-sect and political group conflicts in Iraq and
Lebanon. It is clear that the Syrian conflict has national security
implications that can be felt across the globe.
However, the current humanitarian and security crises within Syria
are beyond the power of any single actor to resolve, including the
United States. Top U.S. officials have made public statements warning
that Syria-based extremists may pose a direct terrorist threat to the
United States, including some foreign fighters who hold U.S., Canadian,
or European passports.
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has stated that an
al-Qaeda-affiliated group within Syria ``does have aspirations for
attacks on the homeland.''
Central Intelligence Agency Director, John Brennan, has publically
identified al-Qaeda-tied groups and the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) within Syria as a concern for the recruitment of
individuals and the development of capabilities to be able to carry out
attacks inside of Syria and also to use Syria as a launching pad.
In February of this year, as his first public address as Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson acknowledged that
Syria has become a matter of homeland security.
He did so because U.S. law-enforcement and intelligence officials
know individuals from North America and Europe are heading to Syria and
will be exposed to radical and extremist influences before possibly
returning to their home countries with intent to do harm.
Amid all the human suffering, in-fighting, and homeland security
implications, it may seem lost that the Syrian conflict was once a mass
civic movement advocating for greater political freedom.
It is imperative for us to focus diplomatic efforts on coordinating
with foreign fighter source, transit, and returnee destination
countries to strengthen shared responses and preventive measures. I
hope our conversation today provides insight into the full scope of the
foreign fighter issues and how both U.S. and international officials
can work to coordinate both intelligence and response efforts.

Mr. King. We are--as I said before--pleased to have a very
distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this
important topic.
Our first witness will be Dr. Fred Kagan, who is the
Christopher DeMuth chair and director of the American
Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project. This project
is dedicated to tracking and analyzing key and emerging
National security threats to our Nation in order to inform on-
going policy discussions. Prior to joining AEI, Dr. Kagan was a
professor of military history at West Point. As I mentioned
before, my first dealing with Dr. Kagan was back in 2007 when
he I thought presented the most cogent analysis--you and
General Keane--of the situation in Iraq and really laid out a
battle plan and message which did succeed. Unfortunately, that
has not been followed-up on, but I want to thank you for your
service and I look forward to your testimony.
Dr. Kagan, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS
PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. Kagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member, and
thanks to the committee for holding this hearing. One of the
things that has struck me is that in the midst of a public
policy debate that is sometimes not well-moored in reality, the
discussions that I have had about these topics on the Hill have
been very serious and very thoughtful and very bipartisan. I
think that that is a testimony to the seriousness with which
you all take the security of the United States, and I am
grateful to you for it.
The establishment and expansion of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria represents a step change in the threat to
American homeland security and National security generally.
This is the first time that an al-Qaeda-affiliated group has
made the leap from stateless terrorist organization to a quasi-
state with a combat-effective army and the resources of a
modern urban region at its disposal.
The Islamic State has declared its intention of attacking
Americans and is actively recruiting U.S. and European
passport-holders. It has acquired radioactive material from
Mosul University and many millions of dollars from banks in
Mosul and Anbar. We have never seen an al-Qaeda threat of this
magnitude before, and we must face it squarely now or face the
consequences later.
The Islamic State's relationship with al-Qaeda and its
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is complex and fraught. The Islamic
State evolved from the organization known as al-Qaeda in Iraq,
which was a formal and recognized al-Qaeda affiliate. The group
changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and al-
Qaeda leadership accepted that change, although grudgingly.
When it began calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham, ISIS, in 2013, however, asserting its control over the
operations of al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria,
Zawahiri balked. Jabhat al-Nusra protested vigorously and
appealed to Zawahiri, who ruled on its behalf and ordered ISIS
to confine itself to Iraq.
The ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now styling himself
as Caliph Ibrahim, rejected Zawahiri's order, leading to an
escalating rhetorical fight that ended with Zawahiri expelling
ISIS from al-Qaeda, at least the portion of ISIS that was in
Syria in early 2014. It was never clear, however, that Zawahiri
was denying the continued validity of the al-Qaeda franchise in
Iraq. It is my assessment that ISIS, the Islamic State, that
is, remains a part of the larger al-Qaeda family, whatever its
formal affiliation with the group might be.
Other groups within the larger al-Qaeda-associated family
have established statelets and armies before. The Afghan
Taliban had both in the 1990s. Al-Shabaab had much more
constrained versions in Somalia after 2009. Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula briefly ruled parts of Abyan and Shabwah
provinces in Yemen, although its rule and its conventional
military capabilities proved too tenuous to hold.
None of these situations were remotely as dangerous to the
United States as the Islamic State is today, largely because
they occurred in areas of the world that were impoverished,
lacked basic resources, let alone the advanced technological,
human capital, and financial resources of the areas they now
control in Iraq and Syria.
Recognizing the danger is not the same as seeing a
solution, however. The Islamic State was able to advance
rapidly because hollowed-out and demoralized Iraqi security
forces in the north collapsed. Its advance ceased for the
moment in large part because of the mobilization of Iranian-
backed Shia militias and an armed populace. Even so, Iran has
had to deploy probably hundreds of members of its own IRGC, the
commander of its Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, and elements of
the IRGC air force, as well, to stave off the Islamic State's
attacks.
The situation remains tenuous, and the security of Baghdad
is by no means as certain as many appear to believe. The
Islamic State is not 10 feet tall, but neither is it
negligible, and nor is its collapse inevitable.
The Iranian presence and obvious fear of the Islamic State
has led some Americans to muse on the feasibility of either
letting the Iranians fight this fight for us or even actively
cooperating with Tehran against a common enemy. This
superficially plausible strategy will not survive contact with
the reality that the Iranian leadership sees the Islamic State
as an American-created and -supported tool for retaining U.S.
influence in the region having abandoned Iraq and Afghanistan
and lost in Syria.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his closest
associates have categorically rejected cooperation with the
United States in Iraq, even in the midst of the nuclear
negotiations. Even if we could somehow persuade Khamenei to
work with us, the results would not be satisfactory. It is,
after all, Iranian policy and strategy that helped get us to
this point. Iran consistently pursues a sectarian approach to
the conflict that fuels the flames of the insurgency and
creates fertile ground for recruitment for al-Qaeda.
The prospect of sending American ground forces back into
Iraq is distasteful, to say the least. Some have argued for a
sort of expanded drone campaign--expanded from nothing, by the
way, because until the fall of Mosul, we were taking reportedly
absolutely no actions against growing al-Qaeda franchises in
Iraq and Syria, creating one of the largest safe havens for
those two groups anywhere in the world.
But even an expanded drone campaign will fail. Even air
strikes will fail. As Brett McGurk recently testified, we are
now looking at a full-blown army with a state, not a terrorist
organization. The track record of these kinds of attacks even
against terrorist organizations is extremely limited.
We need to do a few things to address this problem right
now, and then we need to think hard about what the long-term
solutions are going to be. It starts, of course, with
recognizing the magnitude of the threat. Of course, ISIS, or
the Islamic State, is only part of that threat.
It starts with recognizing that we have to stop the process
of disarming ourselves. We have to reverse the defense cuts
that were made in the name of an austerity that seemed to have
affected only the defense budget and that are out of touch with
the reality of our time, when the tide of war is not receding,
but rather flowing.
We also have to make the very unpalatable choice to
recognize that we cannot continue to attack our intelligence
community to strip it of its capabilities to watch growing
threats and to provide warning in an era when the threats are
growing and our capabilities for dealing with them have
diminished.
I firmly believe in the principles of privacy and civil
liberties and I believe that we must do everything in our power
to defend those core principles of the American way of life,
but we also need to recognize that nothing is more dangerous to
that way of life and to our civil liberties over the long run
than the prospect of renewed terrorist attacks that will drive
fear and stampede us into eliminating all of those protections.
If we want to protect our way of life, we have to protect
ourselves against attack now, and that means that we have to
invest in and support our armed forces and our intelligence
community, while simultaneously developing a very complicated
and very difficult, probably expensive strategy for dealing
with an extremely serious threat.
I thank the committee for its time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederick W. Kagan
July 24, 2014
The establishment and expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (IS) represents a step-change in the threat to American homeland
security and National security generally. This is the first time that
an al-Qaeda-affiliated group has made the leap from stateless terrorist
organization to a quasi-state with a combat-effective army and the
resources of a modern urban region at its disposal. The Islamic State
has declared its intention of attacking Americans and is actively
recruiting U.S. and European passport holders. It has acquired
radioactive material from Mosul University and many millions of dollars
from banks in Mosul and Anbar. We have never seen an al-Qaeda threat of
this magnitude before and we must face it squarely now--or face the
consequences later.
The Islamic State's relationship with al-Qaeda and its leader,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, is complex and fraught. The IS evolved from the
organization known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was a formal and
recognized al-Qaeda affiliate. The group changed its name to the
Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and al-Qaeda leadership accepted that
change, although grudgingly. When it began calling itself the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2013, however, asserting its
control over the operations of al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in
Syria, Zawahiri balked. Jabhat al-Nusra protested vigorously and
appealed to Zawahiri, who ruled on its behalf and ordered ISIS to
confine itself to Iraq. The ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdad (now
styling himself as Caliph Ibrahim), rejected Zawahiri's order, leading
to an escalating rhetorical fight that ended with Zawihiri expelling
ISIS from al-Qaeda--at least, the portion of ISIS that was in Syria in
early 2014. It was never clear that Zawahiri was denying the continued
validity of the al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq.
This dispute led to commentary suggesting that ISIS was no longer
part of al-Qaeda, which has led to a certain confusion in policy
discussions. But the intra-al Qaeda tensions are actually of interest
only to students of al-Qaeda and those who parse the 2001 Authorization
to Use Military Force (AUMF) with a microscope. In reality, IS remains
a part of the global al-Qaeda movement. It is pursuing the same
ideology--the argument, in fact, was over the fact that Zawahiri thinks
that Caliph Ibrahim is moving too fast along the path toward the global
caliphate. It continues to draw on the same pool of financial
supporters, recruiters, and would-be suicide bombers or transnational
fighters. It remains, in other words, a serious threat to the United
States and the West.
Other groups within the larger al-Qaeda-associated family have
established statelets and armies before. The Afghan Taliban had both in
the 1990s. Al-Shabaab had much more constrained versions in Somalia
after 2009. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula briefly ruled parts of
Abyan and Shabwah Provinces in Yemen, although its rule and its
conventional military capabilities proved too tenuous to hold. None of
these situations were remotely as dangerous to the United States as the
Islamic State is today.
The Afghan Taliban ruled Afghanistan, to be sure, a fact that has
made fighting its insurgency more difficult. But it was not an al-Qaeda
franchise and did not espouse or pursue goals beyond Afghanistan. The
country it ruled, moreover, was a war-shattered, poverty-stricken land
that offered little in the way of advanced resources, or even basic
resources, for that matter. Al-Shabaab was an al-Qaeda affiliate
(although a secret one until 2012), but it also ruled one of the
poorest regions of the world and, at that, its rule was heavily
contested. Iraq is an advanced, urban society with a highly literate
and technically-educated population, vast natural resources, and
excellent infrastructure, even after many years of war. And the Islamic
State has already demonstrated that its aims transcend Iraq and even
Syria. It has set its immediate sights on Jordan and Lebanon and
threatened Iran and us. The danger is unprecedented.
Recognizing the danger is not the same as seeing a solution,
however. The IS was able to advance rapidly because hollowed-out and
demoralized Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the north collapsed. Its
advance was halted in large part because of the mobilization of
Iranian-backed Shi'a militias and an armed populace. Even so, Iran has
had to deploy probably hundreds of members of its own Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the commander of its Quds Force,
Qassem Soleimani, and elements of the IRGC Air Force as well to stave
off the Islamic State's attacks. The situation remains tenuous and the
security of Baghdad is by no means as certain as many appear to
believe. The Islamic State is not 10 feet tall, but neither is it
negligible.
The Iranian presence and obvious fear of the IS has led some
Americans to muse on the feasibility of either letting the Iranians
fight this fight for us or even actively cooperating with Tehran
against a common enemy. This superficially plausible strategy will not
survive contact with the reality that the Iranian leadership sees the
IS as an American-created and--supported tool for retaining U.S.
influence in the region having abandoned Iraq and Afghanistan and lost
in Syria. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his closest
associates have categorically rejected cooperation with the United
States in Iraq--even in the midst of the nuclear negotiations when
friendly overtures might have been expected--and ceaselessly repeat the
mantra that the United States is backing the Islamic State.
Even if we could somehow persuade Khamenei to work with us in Iraq,
the results would not be satisfactory. Iranian rhetoric is pan-Islamic,
but its tools and techniques are narrowly sectarian. Khamenei is now
backing Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki for a third term, despite
the insistence of the United States and all but the most sectarian
Iraqi actors that he step aside. The Shi'a militias that are Iran's
primary action arm in Iran also conduct sectarian killings that fan the
flames of Sunni resentment and are important elements of the Islamic
State's recruitment efforts. Iranian involvement in Iraq will make the
situation worse, not better, and rapidly.
The prospect of sending American ground forces back into Iraq is
distasteful, to say the least. Some have argued for a sort-of expanded
drone campaign (expanded from nothing, by the way, since the United
States had not been targeting al-Qaeda in Iraq or Syria at all before
the fall of Mosul) or direct air support to Iraqi forces instead. This
approach will fail. To begin with, air campaigns alone have never done
more than disrupt terrorist organizations. Even the extremely
aggressive drone program that decimated al-Qaeda in Pakistan was unable
to destroy the group. But the IS is not a terrorist organization
anymore. It is a small state and it has a small army. Targeted strikes
will have even less effect on it, and they are likely to backfire.
The Iraqi Security Forces (to say nothing of Bashar al Assad's
Syrian troops) have become sectarian. Iraqi social media refers to them
as ``Jaish al Maliki,'' Maliki's army, simultaneously dismissing the
notion that they are Iraqi forces and equating them with the Jaish al
Mahdi, the sectarian and Iranian-backed Shi'a militia formed by Moqtada
al Sadr. If the United States simply provides air support to the ISF we
will be seen as taking Maliki's (and Iran's) side against the Sunni. It
is far from clear, moreover, that the ISF could retake the territories
it has lost even with U.S. air support and without U.S. support on the
ground. The United States had an extremely hard time, we should
remember, driving al-Qaeda in Iraq from Baghdad and Mosul with 150,000
troops on the ground. The Iraqis will find it harder, not easier,
because the ISF is regarded with such suspicion by many Sunni.
We may well face a simple and extremely unpalatable choice: Send at
least some U.S. ground forces back to Iraq or watch the consolidation
of the first-ever effective al-Qaeda state and army. There is no
guarantee at all that sending U.S. forces back would eliminate the
threat. Neither is there any reason for confidence that an al-Qaeda
state in Iraq and Syria will not launch a campaign against the U.S.
homeland and interests abroad.
Some will no doubt argue that the wisest course is to tend our own
garden and focus on our own defenses rather than trying to intervene in
an insanely complicated struggle. The trouble is that we are rushing to
dismantle our defenses and make ourselves more vulnerable to the threat
even as it grows exponentially. We are in the process of gutting our
military in the name of an austerity that has not affected the parts of
the Government that actually account for the massive increases in U.S.
spending projected over the coming years. And we are dismantling our
intelligence apparatus in the name of protecting privacy and civil
liberty.
The defense of American civil liberties, including privacy, is of
paramount importance. It can never be ignored or simply pushed aside in
the interests of expediency. It must be balanced, however, against the
need to defend American lives and homes, which is the first
responsibility of Government. We are not currently striking that
balance properly. We have allowed highly colored and selective leaks to
instill fear in our hearts about what our intelligence community is
doing, while ignoring the very real external threats that community is
actually focused on watching.
There is no easy solution to the dilemmas posed here and I will not
offer any. But the mandate of this committee requires it to evaluate
all of the threats objectively and unemotionally and come to considered
conclusions about how to strike the right balance. That evaluation must
proceed, however, from an accurate and clear-eyed assessment of the
actual threat. That threat is large and growing while our ability to
defend ourselves is shrinking. We must reverse both trends, lest we
face attacks in the future that may well change our society
fundamentally. We can start by restoring defense cuts and re-
considering the rush to outlaw specific intelligence programs whose
merits cannot be debated publicly. This committee should, in fact, take
the lead in developing and proposing expansions in U.S. intelligence
capabilities that are coherent with the protection of civil liberties
and privacy that is so vital to our democracy.
The challenges we face are great, but we must avoid taking counsel
of our fears--fears of the enemy, fears of an unchecked government,
fears of overseas involvement, or simply fears of the complexity of the
problem. There is no certainty in acting, but there is no safety in
passivity. I thank the committee for the opportunity to consider these
challenges at this important moment in history.

Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Kagan.
Robin Simcox is a research fellow at the Henry Jackson
Society in London, a bipartisan British-based think tank. His
work focuses on terrorism and national security, specifically
al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates, and terrorism trends. Prior to
joining the society, Mr. Simcox was a research fellow at the
Center for Social Cohesion, a think tank studying extremism and
terrorism in the United Kingdom. Mr. Simcox testified
previously before the subcommittee on the same issue. I guess
that was about 15 months ago.
I want to thank for returning and thank you for your
testimony. You are recognized.

STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HENRY JACKSON
SOCIETY

Mr. Simcox. Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today.
In recent years, the United States and its allies have
faced threats emanating from terrorist safe havens in countries
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. The most recent areas
of concern to have developed are in Iraq and Syria.
In the short term, the greatest danger to emerge from these
safe havens is the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, and
also Westerners returning to their homeland having fought in
Iraq and Syria.
ISIS controls a stretch of territory the size of Jordan. It
has acquired recruits, weapons, and finances to the extent
there is now more of a terrorist army than a terrorist group.
Over the last decade, ISIS and its precursor groups have
targeted not just Iraq, but Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. It has
also threatened Turkey. ISIS has succeeded in establishing a
base in the Levant from which to expand its influence
throughout the region.
Iraq fatigue in Washington and in London is significant.
There will be a temptation to dismiss this as sectarian
bloodletting or a largely irrelevant civil war. This temptation
absolutely has to be avoided.
The danger posed by ISIS is real, enduring, and not limited
to the Middle East. It has gone largely unnoticed that it has
also been connected to a series of attacks in Europe over the
last decade. This includes a June 2007 attack against targets
in the United Kingdom, a suicide bombing in Sweden in 2010, and
most recently the May 2014 shootings at the Jewish Museum in
Brussels. This is not a group obsessed with only local
sectarian concerns.
ISIS is now likely to attract fresh recruits, including
those from the West, to its safe havens in Iraq, where they can
receive training. Earlier this year, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the
supposed new caliph in ISIS, warned the United States that
``soon we will be in direct confrontation.'' I would suggest we
take him at his word.
However, the threat the West faces from terrorism today is
obviously multi-pronged. An area of great concern to
intelligence agencies is not just the dangers posed by
terrorist groups operating in Iraq and Syria, but those
returning to the West having fought there. I will focus
specifically on the British angle.
It is thought that between 400 to 500 Brits have traveled
to fight in the Syrian conflict, a higher number than in
Afghanistan or in Iraq. Those fighters who return to the United
Kingdom will likely do so battle-hardened, well-trained, and
exposed to extremist ideology.
Not every returning fighter is going to try and aspire to
carry out attacks domestically. Yet according to Henry Jackson
Society Research, almost half of those who had committed al-
Qaeda-related offenses in the United States had received
terrorist training abroad. In the United Kingdom, it was over a
quarter.
The United Kingdom has taken a tough stance on Syria-
related offenses. Already in the last 18 months, there have
been 65 Syria-related terrorism arrests. The first successful
conviction occurred in May 2014, and others have already
followed. This is a welcome change. Previously, not a single
individual who fought in any other jihadist conflict abroad had
been convicted for doing so in a British court.
The U.K. government has also stepped up stripping dual-
national fighters of their British citizenship. This power was
used 20 times last year, a significant increase on previous
years. However, the United Kingdom's approach is not only based
on tough measures against those who have already traveled.
Channel, the home office's de-radicalization program, is
one alternative. Over 500 terror suspects have already been
placed through this scheme, and this number will only grow as
the fallout from Syria and Iraq continues. The police have also
launched a national campaign of those who are concerned about
their relatives traveling abroad, encouraging them to seek help
from the authorities if so, with a particular focus being
placed on women in these families.
Another approach to consider is one that has been launched
in Belgium, where authorities discovered that some of those who
had joined the rebels in Syria were still receiving social
security benefits. It subsequently stopped these payments. This
could act as an effective deterrent. If an aspiring fighter
knows that his departure would lead to his family being
evicted, for example, that may cause him to reconsider his
options.
The United Kingdom and the United States face a differing
level of threats from returnee fighters. The United States has
yet to see the numbers travel that the United Kingdom has,
although this probably has just as much to do with geographical
proximity as it does ideological intent, yet I believe the
solutions to be broadly similar.
Prosecution of terrorism-related activity when possible,
monitoring those deemed to be most dangerous by domestic
security agencies, coordinating our de-radicalization efforts,
potentially removing citizenship and social security benefits.
Ultimately we need to show an unflinching determination to face
down the multitude of threats to the Western homeland.
Thank you for listening, and I am happy to try and answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Simcox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robin Simcox
July 24, 2014
In recent years, the United States and its allies have faced
threats emanating from terrorist safe havens in countries such as
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. The most recent areas of concern to
have developed are in Iraq and Syria. In the short term, the greatest
danger to emerge from these safe havens is the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS, and formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq, or
ISI, and al-Qaeda in Iraq) and Westerners returning to their homeland
having fought in Iraq and Syria. Formulating effective policies to
counter this threat is now a priority for the United States and its
allies.
isis
The danger ISIS poses to the West is becoming increasingly clear,
highlighted by General David Petraeus, European Union counterterrorism
coordinator Gilles de Kerchove, and British Prime Minister David
Cameron in recent weeks.\1\ These concerns are understandable. ISIS now
controls a stretch of territory the size of Jordan and has declared an
Islamic caliphate, acquiring recruits, weapons, and money to the extent
that it is now more of a terrorist army than a terrorist group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``ISIS' Western Ambitions'', Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2014,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141611/robin-
simcox/isis-western-ambitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS has succeeded in establishing a base in the Levant from which
to expand its influence throughout the region. In a recently-released
ISIS video, a British jihadist proclaimed that ISIS ``understand no
borders'' and will fight ``wherever our sheikh wants to send us.'' He
specifically cites Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as targets.\2\ All
of these countries have been targeted on multiple occasions for
terrorist attack by ISIS and its precursor organisations in the last
decade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet the danger posed by ISIS is not limited to the Middle East.
ISIS and its precursor groups have also been connected to a series of
attacks in Europe over the last decade.
The perpetrators of a June 2007 attack against targets in
London and Glasgow, Scotland--operations which consisted of a
car bombing attack on Glasgow Airport and car bombs in London's
West End--had the telephone numbers of ISI members on their
cell phones. At the time, counterterrorism officials called the
Glasgow and London attacks ``the closest collaboration''
between ISI and terrorists outside the Middle East to date.
In 2010, a captured senior ISI operative admitted to Iraqi
forces that ISI was preparing to carry out an attack in the
West at the end of the year. Later that year, Taimour
Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born militant who was thought to
have trained with ISI in Mosul, carried out a suicide attack in
Stockholm, Sweden. ISI praised this attack and in an audio
message released after his death, al-Abdaly cited the Swedish
artist Lars Vilks' insulting cartoons of Islam's Prophet
Mohammed as a motivation for his act. ISI had previously
offered $150,000 to anyone who ``slaughtered'' Vilks.
In June 2013, the Iraqi defense ministry said it had
arrested members of a cell in Baghdad that had been attempting
to manufacture chemical weapons to smuggle into Canada, the
United States, and Europe.
In May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche, a French citizen thought to
have joined ISIS in Syria, shot and killed three people at the
Jewish Museum in Brussels. His gun was wrapped in an ISIS
flag.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While it is not known whether ISIS and its precursor groups
directed or merely inspired these plots, it certainly appears connected
to them. Therefore, ISIS is not just a local threat. Over the last
decade, it has carried out attacks in four Middle Eastern countries and
been connected to three others in Europe; offered financial reward for
the assassination of Europeans; and allegedly planned to smuggle
chemical weapons into the West. This is not the behaviour of a group
obsessed with local, sectarian concerns.
``Iraq fatigue'' in Washington and London is significant. There is
a temptation towards isolationism: To dismiss this as sectarian
bloodletting or a complex civil war which has no relevance to
international security. This temptation must be avoided. Following its
recent successes, ISIS is now likely to attract fresh recruits--
including those from the West--to its safe haven in Iraq, where they
can receive training and attempt to carry out terrorist attacks against
the Western homeland.
Earlier this year, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the supposed new caliph,
warned the United States that, ``soon we'll be in direct
confrontation'' and to ``watch out for us, for we are with you,
watching''.\4\ This warning should not be dismissed lightly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
returning fighters
However, the threat the West faces from terrorism today is multi-
pronged. An area of great concern to intelligence agencies is that of
the dangers posed by those returning from fighting jihad in Syria.
The geographical proximity of Turkey to Syria has made accessing
this conflict zone from Europe easier than past jihadist fronts. One
analysis has concluded that as many as 2,000 Europeans have travelled
to fight in Syria.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among
Western Europeans'', International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation, 17 December 2013, available at http://icsr.info/2013/
12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-
europeans/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Focusing specifically on the British angle, it is thought that
between 400-500 Brits have done so.\6\ This is a higher number than
with the jihads in Afghanistan or Iraq near the beginning of the
century.\7\ Charles Farr, Britain's top counterterrorism official,
stated this year that Syria was ``different from any other counter-
terrorism challenge that [the United Kingdom] have faced since 9/11--
because of the number of terrorist groups now engaged in the fighting,
their size and scale, the number of people from this country who are
joining them, ease of travel, availability of weapons and the intensity
of the conflict''.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict'', House of
Commons, 16 June 2014, available at http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140616/debtext/
140- 6160001.htm#14061619000710; ``Counter-terror cop: 500 Brits
fighting in Syria and Iraq'', ITV, 21 June 2014, available at http://
www.itv.com/news/update/2014-06-21/counter-terror-cop-500-brits-
fighting-in-syria-and-iraq/.
\7\ ``Europeans are flocking to the war in Syria. What happens when
they come home?'', Washington Post, 29 January 2014, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europeans-are-flocking-to-
the-war-in-syria-what-happens-when-they-come-home/2014/01/29/772f56d0-
88f6-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html?hpid=z3.
\8\ ``Syria extremism is unlike any threat UK has seen since 9/11,
security chief warns'', Evening Standard, 25 February 2014, available
at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/exclusive-syria-extremism-is-
unlike-any-threat-uk-has-seen-since-911-security-chief-warns-
9151894.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those fighters who return to the United Kingdom will likely do so
battle-hardened, well-trained, and exposed to extremist ideology.
Richard Walton, speaking at the time as the head of the London
Metropolitan Police's counter-terrorism unit, has described an attack
in the United Kingdom by a fighter returning from Syria as ``almost
inevitable''.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Anti-terrorism chief warns of British girls inspired by
Jihad'', Evening Standard, 23 January 2014, available at http://
www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/exclusive-antiterrorism-chief-warns-of-
british-girls-inspired-by-jihad-9080110.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is unlikely that every returning fighter is going to be a
national security threat and aspire to carry out attacks domestically.
Yet according to Henry Jackson Society research, almost half of those
who had committed al-Qaeda-related offenses in the United States had
received terrorist training. Almost 1 in 5 had combat experience
abroad.\10\ In the United Kingdom, over a quarter of those who
committed Islamism-related offenses had received training abroad.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Robin Simcox & Emily Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United States: A
Complete Analysis of Terrorism Offenses (Henry Jackson Society,
February 2013).
\11\ Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed & Douglas Murray,
Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections (Henry Jackson Society,
July 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To add to these security concerns, there have been recent reports
that bomb-makers in Yemen are co-ordinating their efforts with
terrorists in Syria in order to construct undetectable explosives
targeting Western aviation. This led to a new round of security
measures across airports targeting cell phones and other electronic
devices. Attorney General Eric Holder recently stated these new threats
were something he found ``more frightening'' than anything else he'd
seen in his time in office yet.\12\ This is quite an admission when
considering some of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's aspirational
and actual attempts to target the United States in recent years
(including bombs concealed in operatives' underwear, in printer toner
cartridges or even surgically implanted; ricin and cyanide plots; and
poisoning Western water and food supplies).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``Latest Syria Threat `More Frightening Than Anything' Else,
Holder Says'', ABC News, 13 July 2014, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/latest-syria-threat-frightening-holder/
story?id=24538221.
\13\ ``Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet'',
New York Times, 25 December 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/12/26/us/26plane.html?_r=0; ``Cargo plane bomb plot: ink cartridge
bomb `timed to blow up over US' '', The Telegraph, 10 November 2010,
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/8124226/Cargo-plane-bomb-plot-ink-cartridge-bomb-timed-to-blow-up-
over-US.html; ``Al-Qaeda Yemen plane bomb plot foiled by `insider' '',
BBC News, 8 May 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-
canada-17994493; ``Al Qaeda's Body Bombs: Al-Asiri's Next Threat'',
Newsweek, 14 May 2012, available at http://www.newsweek.com/al-qaedas-
body-bombs-al-asiris-next-threat-65057; Daniel Klaidman, Kill or
Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (HMH),
p. 216.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
measures taken by the united kingdom
Attorney General Holder also recently spoke about the need for
European nations to take a more pre-emptive approach in preventing its
citizens travelling to Iraq or Syria in the first place, including
undercover investigations and prosecuting those for preparatory acts of
terrorism. In the United States, the material support law--which
covered almost a quarter of all charges used in al-Qaeda related
offenses in the United States\14\--is a useful piece of legislation for
this type of crime. However, similar legislation does not exist in all
countries that suffer from a severe terrorist threat. For example, it
took France until 2012 to bring in a new statute that made ``criminal
association with the intent to commit terrorist acts''
prosecutable.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Simcox & Dyer, Al-Qaeda in the United States (Henry Jackson
Society, 2013).
\15\ ``Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort to
Confront Threat of Syrian Foreign Fighters'', United States Department
of Justice, 8 July 2014, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2014/July/14-ag-704.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United Kingdom has taken a tough stance on Syria-related
offences. In the last 18 months there have been 65 Syrian-related
arrests in the United Kingdom.\16\ Some of these cases--such as that of
former Guantanamo Bay detainee Moazzam Begg, who has been charged with
providing terrorist training in Syria and raised funds to aid terrorist
causes there\17\--are now beginning to work their way through the
British court system. The first conviction of a British citizen
relating to Syria-related terrorism offences occurred in May 2014 and
others have already followed.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ``UK will feel fallout of war in Syria `for years to come',
warns top Met officer'', Guardian, 22 June 2014, available at http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-syria-islamic-extremism-isis-
muthana-cressida-dick.
\17\ ``Ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee Moazzam Begg charged with terror
offences'', The Telegraph, 1 March 2014, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10669848/Ex-
Guantanamo-Bay-detainee-Moazzam-Begg-charged-with-terror-offences.html.
\18\ ``Syria conflict: First Briton convicted of terrorist
offences'', BBC News, 20 May 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-27488006; ``Two British men admit to linking up with extremist
group in Syria'', Guardian, 8 July 2014, available at http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/08/two-british-men-admit-linking-
extremist-group-syria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is a welcome change. Beforehand, not a single individual who
fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other jihadist conflict had been
charged for doing so in a British court. This was largely a problem of
political will, as well as some shortcomings in legislation. Yet this
government has shown more determination to start prosecuting such
offenses.
The government has also stepped up stripping dual national fighters
in Syria of their British citizenship. Under the British Nationality
Act, the home secretary can deprive someone of their citizenship if it
``is conducive to the public good'' and it does not leave them
stateless. This power was used 20 times last year, which is a
significant increase on previous years. While this does not only apply
to jihadists in Syria--for example, it has also been used against those
fighting in Somalia--one former Foreign & Commonwealth official has
said that it is an ``open secret'' that it is being applied to the
conflict there.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``No way back for Britons who join the Syrian fight, says
Theresa May'', Independent, 23 December 2013, available at http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-no-way-back-for-
britons-who-join-the-syrian-fight-says-theresa-may-9021190.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another available option--although not one that has been used so
far--is the use of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
(TPIMs), which enable the government to place a series of restrictions
on the movements of terror suspects they are unable to deport or
prosecute. TPIM subjects are, for example, given a curfew, an
electronic tag, restricted from meeting certain individuals and
attending certain mosques. While these are not measures available to
the United States, the need to detain those who are deemed a national
security threat but who the state may not be able to prosecute is
certainly a dilemma that it is familiar with (those detained at
Guantanamo Bay being the perfect example).
However, the United Kingdom's approach is not only based on tough
measures against those who have already travelled. If prosecution is
not possible, then Channel--the Home Office's de-radicalisation
programme--is a viable alternative. Over 500 terror suspects have
already been placed through this scheme, and this number will only grow
as the fallout from Syria continues.\20\ The police have also launched
a national campaign aimed at supporting the families--with a focus on
women--of those who are concerned about their relatives travelling
abroad, encouraging them to seek help from authorities if so.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ ``500 terror suspects `deradicalised' by Home Office'', BBC
News, 26 March 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
21940899.
\21\ ``Police make Syria plea to UK Muslim women'', BBC News, 24
April 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27131707.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another approach to consider is one that has been launched in
Belgium and which could be considered by the West more broadly. Belgian
authorities discovered that some of those who had joined the rebels in
Syria were still receiving social security benefits and subsequently
stopped these payments.\22\ This could act as an effective deterrent.
If an aspiring fighter knows that his departure would lead to his
family being evicted, for example, that may cause him to reconsider his
options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ ``Belgian jihadists in Syria stripped of welfare benefits'',
France 24, 19 August 2013, available at http://www.france24.com/en/
20130819-belgian-jihadists-syria-stripped-welfare-payments-assad-
antwerp/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the on-going threat
The exact amount of fighters that have already returned to the
United Kingdom is unknown. One security official claimed the number
could be as high as 250.\23\ However, since there is ambiguity over the
amount who have already travelled, there will inevitably be ambiguity
over how many have returned. The former head of counterterrorism at MI-
6 has said it is ``out of the question'' to be able to monitor all
those who have returned from fighting in Syria.\24\ The United Kingdom
simply does not have the capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ ``After fighting in Syria 250 British jihadis are `back in the
UK' say intelligence officers'', Daily Mirror, 21 June 2014, available
at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/after-fighting-syria-250-
british-3739504.
\24\ `` `Not possible' to monitor all UK Syria fighters'', BBC
News, 23 June 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27968963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, in 2007, MI-5 acknowledged they were currently
tracking 2,000 terror suspects in the United Kingdom.\25\ Assuming that
the threat has remained reasonably consistent--a safe assumption,
considering that Britain has either suffered from, or managed to foil,
at least one major terrorist plot approximately every year since 9/11
\26\--and assuming that 500 Brits have travelled to Syria, that would
mean that Syrian returnees could take up a quarter of MI-5's casework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ `` `Thousands' pose UK terror threat'', BBC News, 5 November
2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7078712.stm.
\26\ Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed & Murray, Islamist Terrorism (Henry
Jackson Society, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In reality, the number will not be that high yet--some fighters
have already been killed in Syria; others have no intention of ever
returning; some will be legally barred from returning by the
government; while others may not assessed to be a threat to the United
Kingdom. Yet this gives some indication of the scale of work that
Syrian returnees could cause British security agencies.
Furthermore, by its own admission MI-5 can only ``hit the
crocodiles nearest the boat'' and has to ``prioritise ruthlessly''.\27\
This means that someone who is on the periphery of the Security
Services' radar eventually drops off. Inevitably, the wrong decisions
are occasionally made. Last year, Michael Adebolajo, an extremist of
interest to MI-5 who had previously attempted to travel to Somalia but
not regarded as posing an imminent danger, stabbed a British soldier to
death in broad daylight on the streets of London.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ``Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on
the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005'', Intelligence & Security
Committee, HM Government, May 2009, available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224542/7-
7_attacks_intelligence.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
shared challenge
The United Kingdom and the United States face a differing level of
threat from returnee fighters. The United States is yet to see the
numbers travel to Syria that the United Kingdom has, although this
probably has just as much to do with the geographical proximity as it
does ideological intent. Despite this, the solutions are broadly
similar.
Those who have attempted or successfully joined up with, fundraised
for, and/or received training from terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria
should be prosecuted. If prosecution is not possible, trained fighters
assessed to be the most dangerous should be monitored by domestic
security agencies. The United Kingdom can call upon Channel, its de-
radicalization programme; in the United States, the Countering Violent
Extremism initiative is a work in progress and our governments should
continue to co-ordinate their efforts on this work. The removal of
citizenship and social security benefits are other potentially useful
National security tools.
Ultimately, we need to show an unflinching determination to face
down the threats being posed to the West by the dangers emerging from
this region.

Mr. King. Thank you very much, Mr. Simcox.
Dr. Peter Brookes is a senior fellow at the Davis Institute
for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage
Foundation. He is serving his fourth term as a Congressionally-
appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission and previously served in the President George W.
Bush administration as deputy assistant secretary for defense
for Asian and Pacific affairs and has been commenting on these
issues as far as I can recall ever since al-Qaeda really
emerged on the world scene.
So, Dr. Brookes, it is really a privilege to have you here
today.

STATEMENT OF PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Brookes. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to share my views today. I want to commend you, the
committee and your staff, for highlighting this issue in this
public setting. It comes none too soon, in my opinion. Of
course, today the views I express today are my own.
I want to make three fundamental points. It is my view that
Islamist militancy is on the march. I believe that we are
facing increasing threats to the homeland as a result. I have
concerns about current U.S. policy for dealing with it.
I never would have thought that 13 years after the 9/11
tragedy that we would still being dealing with the threat of
Islamist terrorism, especially that associated with al-Qaeda,
at such an elevated level. The al-Qaeda threat has proliferated
significantly in recent years in my judgment.
Syria is a good example, as others have already mentioned,
and should be of significant concern, considering the estimated
number of violent jihadists that have gathered there to oppose
the Bashar Assad regime. Iraq is also deeply afflicted with
terrorism, especially the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq off-
shoots.
Of course, perhaps the most troubling development is the
rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, ISIS, which has
been capturing and perhaps holding a swath of significant
territory that spans both Iraq and Syria. Elsewhere in the
Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may be the most
dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate today. In South Asia, the Taliban
and Haqqani Network violence is up in Afghanistan as the number
of U.S. and foreign forces, the coalition forces, draws down.
In Africa, terrorists and violent extremists are thriving,
as well. In Libya, the situation remains chaotic 3 years after
the U.S.-NATO-led operation. Of course, Libya was the location
of the deadly September 11, 2012, attack on our diplomatic
facilities in Benghazi. Algeria is afflicted by al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb. AQIM is also active in nearby Mali, where
violence is on the upswing after a French intervention slowed
the terror group's advance.
Fighting with Boko Haram, Islamist militants in Nigeria,
has resulted in a reported death of some 2,000 people just this
year, the tragic kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls aside.
In Somalia and Kenya, al-Shabaab--noted for its brazen Westgate
Mall attack in 2013--is also gaining ground. In general,
lawless, ungoverned,
and/or chaotic places remain a significant counterterrorism
problem.
What does this militant Islamist movement mean? In my
opinion, it signifies that we are facing an increasing threat
not only to U.S. interests overseas, but to the homeland. While
not all of these al-Qaeda groups are directly targeting the
U.S. homeland security currently, we should not embrace the
notion that this view will not change in the future. Their
objectives will not necessarily remain local or regional.
We should not assume that any seemingly overseas al-Qaeda
threat will stay that way and will not evolve into a direct
threat to the U.S. homeland. Indeed, intent can change quickly
and may not be discovered by intelligence before it is too
late.
While each terror group is unique, hostility towards the
United States in my view is a common characteristic. While I
understand and appreciate the hard work being done by
intelligence, law enforcement, the military, and others in
battling violent extremists and protecting the American
homeland, I have concerns about current U.S. policy.
First, the rhetoric used by the Obama administration I
believe has been misleading. Over time, the White House,
including the President, has characterized al-Qaeda as on the
run, on its heels, and decimated, and so forth.
Second, I am also troubled by other National security
decisions. For instance, I believe the decision to withdraw
from Iraq without provision of follow-on forces directly
contributed to, along with other factors, the dire situation
that exists there today. I believe that the security vacuum
that will be left by the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan
in the coming years, which could result in a total withdrawal,
could be filled by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups over time as
happened in Iraq.
Third, from a practical standpoint, I believe that the
reluctance to influence or follow through on events in the
Middle East/North Africa, such as Libya and the Arab Spring,
especially the events in Syria, have not served our National
interests well. Indeed, while a direct cause and effect is
difficult to prove, I would suggest that a case could be made
which claims that the failure of U.S. policies in Iraq and
Syria had a hand in the success of ISIS today, which now stands
as a significant National security threat.
Fourth, I am concerned that much of the world sees the
United States in absolute--or at least relative--decline. I
also believe that perception of American inattention,
disinterest, or weakness in world affairs will drive policies
and actions directed towards us, including provocations from
militant Islamist extremists.
Fifth, I am also worried that U.S. counterterrorism policy
is meant more to contain than eliminate al-Qaeda threats.
Relying too heavily on the political will of foreign
governments and the capabilities of other nations'
counterterror forces or militaries to battle terror groups may
be a losing, indeed, dangerous, proposition or strategy.
In conclusion, I would assert that parts of the world are
aflame with Islamist militancy and that we are in the
crosshairs. We have already weathered some 60 terrorist plots
and/or attacks since
9/11, according to Heritage Foundation data. This is clearly no
time for contentment with the status quo.
The concern is that some believe we are in a post-Osama bin
Laden era. That is factually correct. But we are not in a post-
terrorism or post-al-Qaeda period in my judgment. Osama bin
Laden's and al-Qaeda's inspirational Islamist ideology of
political violence lives on. Letting down our guard at this
time in the face of this growing Islamist extremist reality
would be a huge mistake and a major threat to our security and
interests both at home and abroad.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Brookes
July 24, 2014
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: Thank you for this
opportunity to share my views on the subject of today's hearing. I want
to commend you, the committee, and your staff for highlighting this
issue in this public setting. In my view, it comes none too soon.
Before I begin my testimony, let me say that the views I express
today are my own and should not be construed as representing the
official position of any of the organizations with which I am
associated.
On the topic of today's hearing, I would like to make three
fundamental points.
Quite simply, it is my view that Islamist militancy is on the
march. Second, I believe we are facing increasing threats to the
homeland as a result. And third, I have concerns about current U.S.
policy for dealing with it.
Let me briefly expand on these points.
islamist militancy is on the move
I never would have thought that nearly 13 years after the 9/11
tragedy that we would still being dealing with the threat of Islamist
terrorism, especially that associated with al-Qaeda, at such an
elevated level.
The al-Qaeda threat, whether by groups that have a direct
association with al-Qaeda's core, exist as an off-shoot, or merely
embrace its ideology, has proliferated significantly in recent years in
my judgment.
The increasing diversity and the intensity of the Islamist
terrorist threat, in my mind, means we have to defend against a growing
number of different threat vectors, making it more difficult for our
intelligence, law enforcement, and military efforts to succeed, whether
at home or overseas.
We are all painfully aware of the rise of violent extremists across
the globe. Indeed, the State Department reports that terrorist attacks
were up more than 40 percent last year.
Syria is a good example, and should be of significant concern,
considering the estimated number of violent jihadists that have
gathered there to oppose the Bashar Assad regime.
As the committee knows, an estimated 7,000-12,000 foreign fighters
from some 70-80 countries have reportedly gathered in Syria, perhaps
constituting what experts believe is the largest contingent of violent
extremists in any one place at any one time, including in pre-9/11
Afghanistan.
Iraq is also deeply afflicted with terrorism, especially the
resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq off-shoots, which seemed to have been
almost extinguished by the end of the U.S. surge in Iraq. Last year,
Iraq suffered some 5,000-9,000 casualties as a result of terrorist and
sectarian violence, according to various sources.
Of course, perhaps, the most troubling development is the rise of
the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) which has set about
capturing--and perhaps holding--a swath of significant territory that
spans both Iraq and Syria.
Within this territory, ISIS has declared a caliphate, which not
only threatens the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, but which may prove
over time to be a safe haven for terrorist planning, training, and
operations beyond Iraq and Syria.
This newest caliphate is likely to resonate with Islamists on a
number of levels around the globe. The allure of a new Islamist state
may lead to more recruits, funding, and alliances. Moreover, ISIS'
early success may encourage others to undertake the same thing
elsewhere.
Indeed, even prior to the establishment of the ``Islamic State,''
there were reports of the development of camps for not only training
fighters for opposing the Syrian and Iraqi regimes, but for training
foreign fighters to return to their native lands, especially Europe and
the United States, to undertake terror attacks there.
Of course, the problem is not limited to Iraq and Syria.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), which is resident in Yemen, may be the most dangerous al-Qaeda
affiliate today. It has held territory in Southern Yemen and its bomb-
making prowess is well-known based on a number of spectacular plots by
its innovative explosives expert, Ibrahim al Asiri.
In South Asia, Taliban and Haqqani Network violence is up in
Afghanistan as the number of U.S. and foreign forces draws down,
according to news outlets. These terror groups have historically found
safe haven in neighboring Pakistan, which has severely impacted U.S.
and Coalition counterinsurgency and terror operations in Afghanistan.
In Africa, terrorists and violent extremists are thriving as well.
In Libya, the situation remains chaotic 3 years after the U.S.-NATO
operation led to the demise of Libyan strongman Moammar Qaddafi. Libyan
militias, including al-Qaeda-associated groups like Ansar al Sharia,
continue to threaten any semblance of stability.
Of course, Libya was the location of the deadly September 11, 2012
attack on our diplomatic facilities in Benghazi.
Algeria is afflicted by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); it
has been linked to recent plots in France on the Eiffel Tower, Louvre,
and a nuclear power plant, according to news accounts.
AQIM is also active in nearby Mali, where violence is on the up-
swing after a French intervention slowed the terror group's advance.
Moreover, press reports indicate that al-Qaeda-linked militants in Mali
may be working with Nigeria's Boko Haram, a terror group causing
increasing alarm.
News accounts indicate that fighting with Boko Haram Islamist
militants in Nigeria has resulted in the death of some 2,000 people
this year, the tragic kidnapping of hundreds of school girls aside. It
also reportedly operates in Cameroon and Niger.
Across the continent in Somalia and Kenya, al-Shabab--noted for its
brazen Westgate Mall attack in 2013--is gaining ground. The terror
group also seems to be a significant draw for prospective militants
from the United States, according to some research.
Indeed, some analysts believed that al-Shabab may have drawn or
recruited more Americans than any other terror group, but it has now
likely been outpaced by a surge to Syria and Iraq. Moreover, some
assert al-Shabab is cooperating and coordinating with Boko Haram,
further expanding the terror network on the continent.
In general, lawless, ungoverned, and or chaotic places remain a
significant counterterrorism problem.
increasing threats to the homeland
What does this militant Islamist movement mean? In my opinion, it
signifies that we are facing an increasing threat not only to U.S.
interests overseas, but to the homeland.
I do not have to tell the committee about the reports of nearly a
hundred Americans and as many as 3,000 Europeans that have traveled to
Syria--and perhaps now Iraq--to fight in the Syrian (and perhaps now
Iraqi) civil war(s).
We must assume that based on open-source reporting that some of
these Americans and Europeans will be recruited and trained in the
terrorist dark arts while in Iraq and Syria with the intention of
returning to their native countries to commit terror, if reports are
accurate.
Recent violence and plots in places like Britain, Belgium, and
Spain that are related to Syria means that the threat is not a
prospective one, but one that is here and now.
Specifically, the recent reports of a possible terror plot
involving explosive cell phones and or electronic devices that might be
targeting U.S.-bound airliners out of Europe is of great concern--and
may arguably represent the most imminent terror threat to the U.S.
homeland today.
Even more troubling are the reports that this plot involved a
synergistic effort between al-Qaeda operatives in Syria/Iraq and AQAP
bomb-makers. This sort of transnational terrorist teamwork is very
disconcerting.
But we should not be surprised.
Al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, has long valued zealous
religious converts, recruiting operatives in place, including via the
internet, and travelers with passports that may be in or enter a target
country with limited scrutiny to perform terrorist acts.
While not all of these al-Qaeda groups are directly targeting the
U.S. homeland currently, we should not embrace the notion that this
view will not change in the future; their objectives will not
necessarily remain local or regional.
In my view, these terror groups, whose goals may seem local or
regional at this time, may have fundamental needs that might need to be
satisfied first (e.g., holding territory for planning, training, and
operating; securing funding; and finding recruits) before looking at
expanding their operations afield such as toward the United States.
Furthermore, from a strategic perspective, these terror groups may
not want to encourage or give reason for opposition from the United
States at this time.
The point here being is that we should not assume that any
seemingly overseas al-Qaeda threat will stay that way and not evolve
into a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Indeed, intent can change
quickly and may not be discovered by intelligence before it is too
late.
While each terror group is unique, hostility toward the United
States is a common characteristic, in my opinion.
u.s. policy concerns
While I understand and appreciate the hard work being done by
intelligence, law enforcement, the military, and others in battling
violent extremists and protecting the American homeland, I have
concerns about current U.S. policy.
First, the rhetoric used by the Obama administration has been
misleading, in my view. Over time, the White House, including the
President, has characterized al-Qaeda as ``on the run,'' ``on its
heels,'' and ``decimated,'' and so forth.
Suggesting such, especially as concerns al-Qaeda writ large, is
unfortunately disingenuous. While the White House occasionally
specified that it was referring to ``al-Qaeda core'' (essentially the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan) when it
spoke of the terror group's supposedly diminished status, that was not
always the case.
Indeed, I would suggest that the White House was attempting to
create a narrative on its handling of National security, specifically
al-Qaeda, that was arguably overly optimistic. Worse, it may have given
the American public--and others--the impression that al-Qaeda was in
its last throes.
The take down of Osama bin Laden supported that narrative.
The problem is that, yes, Osama bin Laden was dead, but al-Qaeda
was still very much alive. I do not believe that this reality was
conveyed accurately or adequately to the American people by the
administration when it should have been part of our National security
dialogue and debate.
I believe that the early, public Benghazi attack assessments, such
as references to a provocative video, were also driven by the White
House's chosen, perhaps politically-driven, National security
narrative.
Second, I am also troubled by other National security decisions.
For instance, I believe the decision to withdraw from Iraq without the
provision of follow-on forces directly contributed to, along with other
factors, the dire situation that exists there today.
In addition, I believe that the security vacuum that will be left
by the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in the coming years,
which could result in a total withdrawal, could be filled by al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups over time as happened in Iraq.
Third, from a practical standpoint, I believe that a reluctance to
influence or follow through on events in the Middle East/North Africa
such as Libya and the Arab Spring, especially the events in Syria, has
not served our National interests well.
Indeed, while a direct cause and effect is difficult to prove, I
would suggest that a case could be made which claims that the failure
of U.S. policies in Iraq and Syria had a hand in the success of ISIS
today which now stands as a significant National security threat.
Fourth, I am concerned that much of the world sees the United
States in absolute--or at least relative--decline. I also believe that
perceptions of American inattention, disinterest, or weakness in world
affairs will drive policies and actions directed toward us, including
provocations from militant Islamist extremists.
Fifth, I am also worried that U.S. counterterrorism policy is meant
more to contain than eliminate al-Qaeda threats. In other words, we are
containing threats in places like Syria/Iraq or Yemen, but not acting
vigorously enough, or at all, to eliminate them.
Relying too heavily on the political will of foreign governments
and the capabilities of other nations' counterterror forces or
militaries to battle terror groups may be a losing, indeed dangerous,
strategy whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, or Yemen.
Specifically, I believe that we are facing increasing threats to
our interests overseas and to the homeland as a result of our failure
to develop effective counterterror policies, which have provided space
for terrorists to plan, train, and operate.
conclusion
I would assert that parts of the world are aflame with Islamist
militancy--and that we are in the crosshairs. Wishing away the
terrorist threat we face at home or abroad will not make it disappear.
Indeed, worse, we are at risk of creating complacency at home and
abroad about this growing threat.
Complacency about such a challenge can be a killer. We have already
weathered some 60 terrorist plots and or attacks since 9/11, according
to Heritage Foundation data. This is clearly no time for contentment
with the status quo.
The concern is that some believe we are in a post-Osama bin Laden
era. That is factually correct, but we are not in a post-terrorism or
post-al-Qaeda period in my judgment. Osama bin Laden's and al-Qaeda's
inspirational Islamist ideology of political violence lives on in
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
Letting our guard down to this growing Islamist extremist reality
would be a huge mistake--and a major threat to our security and
interests both at home and abroad.

Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Brookes.
Dr. Seth Jones, who is the director of International
Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, as
well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School
for Advanced International Studies. Previously, Dr. Jones
served as the representative for the U.S. commander, U.S.
Special Ops Command, to the assistant secretary of defense of
special operations. Prior to that position, he served as a
plans officer and adviser to the commanding general, U.S.
special operations forces in Afghanistan, and specializes in
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, including a focus on
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda.
In a time of heightened partisanship in Washington,
interesting to note that you have appeared as a Republican
witness and today as a Democratic witness before this
committee, which says a lot about you and your perspective, and
also hopefully something about this committee and the fact that
we do try to deal in a bipartisan way. I think the fact that
you have been called by both parties as ``their witness,''
says--you know, speaks volumes about your knowledge and your
ability.
So, Dr. Jones.

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, THE RAND CORPORATION

Mr. Jones. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Higgins, other Members of the subcommittee, thanks for
inviting us to testify on I think what is a very important
subject at a very important time. I have divided my comments
into four sections, as you will see build on each other.
The first is to emphasize what Chairman King and Ranking
Member Higgins noted in their opening statements, which is that
the United States does face a--what I consider a growing threat
from violent extremists traveling to and returning from Syria
and other locations. According to my own estimates, the number
of Americans is now above 100, somewhere around 125, 130
Americans that have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to
assist rebel organizations.
I do think it is important to look at the data here that
there appear to be a wide range of motivations. Some appear to
be interested in conducting violent jihad with al-Qaeda
organizations or jihadist organizations like ISIS. Some appear
to be interested in primarily fighting Shia. Some appear to be
interested in supporting Syrian--what you might call Syrian
nationalist groups against the Assad regime, others providing
humanitarian assistance. So identifying the purpose of the
individual traveling is obviously important.
The numbers in Europe, as we heard from Mr. Simcox, are
order of magnitude larger. I will come back to that issue in a
moment. But as many as 2,500 potentially Sunni extremists from
Europe have arrived in Syria between January 2012 and July
2014. I would note also that we have seen fairly large numbers,
in the hundreds, also return from Syria into Europe.
Just to put this into perspective, according to data I
have, Syria today has the largest numbers of Westerners in any
jihadist battlefield in the modern era, larger in terms of
Westerners than what we saw in Afghanistan during the 1980s
against the Soviet Union, larger after the 2001 overthrow of
the Taliban regime, larger than in Iraq, including after the
2000 U.S. invasion, Somalia, Yemen, Libya. So I think it is
important in that sense to put this into perspective and why we
should focus on the subject.
Second, the broader trends I think are important. According
to a Rand report I recently authored and was published a few
weeks ago, the trends here are a bit concerning. There has been
a--according to our estimates--55 percent increase in the
number of jihadist groups between 2010 and 2013. The largest
number of that--percentage of that increase is in North Africa
and in the Syria area.
In addition, the number of jihadists themselves, not groups
but fighters, has roughly doubled during that same time period,
with the largest numbers of fighters operating in the Syria and
broader Levant area. So this does appear to be a growing
problem, and we can talk about the reasons for that in the
discussion afterwards.
As Dr. Brookes noted earlier, not all of these groups
present a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Nusra and ISIS
and some of the groups operating in Syria and Iraq appear to be
primarily focusing on targets inside of Syria and inside of
Iraq, but I would say that the trends are concerning. The
pipeline between Iraq and Europe, as well as other places, the
United States, Australia, is growing, financing, recruitment,
and potentially operatives, and there is always this--a concern
about inspired individuals, not directly connected with these
groups, but that have trained. So this trend is concerning.
Let me conclude, then, the fourth area which is detecting
and deterring travelers. I just want to say, I appreciate the
efforts of U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, military,
diplomatic efforts to focus on this problem.
But let me highlight three issues worth considering. I have
got a much longer list, but just want to highlight three for
note here. One is--and this really is a European issue--again,
the largest numbers of extremists that we have seen where there
is a visa waiver potential are in Europe.
Criminalizing attendance, not just training, but attendance
at terrorist training camps overseas I would assess would
likely deter or could deter some terrorists from traveling. The
United Kingdom appears to be the only or one of the only
European Union countries with such a law. The United States
prohibits attendance at terrorist camps overseas and will
prosecute. I think encouraging the European countries to
criminalize attendance, not just training, would be quite
helpful.
Second issue is preemptive action. Norway, Netherlands,
France are among the few European countries of the United
Kingdom that have preemptively arrested extremists preparing to
travel to Syria. That is before they go, but many do not--do
not have laws on the books along those lines, so I think
working with our European allies on ways to prevent them from
leaving, if there is enough evidence, would be helpful. Again,
some European countries have now passed laws.
The last thing I will just mention is we have got to find
ways, I think, to fix loopholes in our system. The fact that
apparently Abu-Salah was able to travel to Syria, return to the
United States without our awareness, and then go back and blow
himself up in Syria does raise questions about whether we
missed this.
So let me conclude by saying, I think this issue is very
important. Thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward
to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Seth G. Jones \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT414.html.
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July 24, 2014
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing,
``Jihadist Safe Havens: Efforts to Detect and Deter Terrorist Travel.''
My argument today is straightforward: The United States faces a
threat from violent extremists, including Americans and other
Westerners, in safe havens in Syria and other locations. Syria today
likely has the largest number of Westerners in any jihadist battlefield
in the modern era, with greater numbers of Western participants than in
past battlefields in Afghanistan (including during the 1980s anti-
Soviet war), Pakistan, Iraq (including after the 2003 U.S. invasion),
Somalia, Yemen, and Libya.\3\ But it is important not to exaggerate the
threat. Westerners appear to be involved in a range of activities, from
providing humanitarian aid to fighting with al-Qaeda-affiliated groups
like Jabhat al-Nusrah. It is unclear how many of these individuals will
attempt to return to the United States and become involved in terrorist
activity. Some may die in Syria, some may move to other countries
(including other jihadist battlefields), some may focus on humanitarian
activity, and still others may become disillusioned with extremist
activities. In addition, other groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and core al-Qaeda, likely present a more immediate threat to
the U.S. homeland--at least today. Still, the large number of Western
violent extremists in sanctuaries like Syria makes it particularly
important to adopt policies and practices in the U.S. homeland and
overseas to ensure that violent extremists are detected if they return
to the West and, more broadly, to reduce the flow of foreign fighters
from the West.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Author estimates based on an overview of Salafi-jihadist groups
and fighters since 1988. See, for example, Seth G. Jones, A Persistent
Threat: The Evolution of al-Qaeda and Other Salafi Jihadists (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have divided my comments into four sections. The first provides
an overview of the threat from sanctuaries in Syria and potentially
Iraq. The second section provides broader context and analyzes trends
in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks. The
third examines the impact of this threat on the U.S. homeland. And the
fourth section explores measures to detect and interdict the movement
of Western violent extremists--including Americans--and prevent them
from conducting attacks in the West.
the threat from sanctuaries in syria and iraq
The United States faces a threat from violent extremists traveling
to--and returning from--Syria and other locations. Since 2011, between
100 and 200 Americans have traveled--or attempted to travel--to Syria
to assist rebel organizations. There appear to be a wide range of
motivations, such as conducting violent jihad, fighting Shi'a,
supporting Syrian nationalist groups against the Assad regime, and
providing humanitarian assistance. However, the problem is broader than
just Americans. Between 1,500 and 2,500 Sunni extremists from Europe
arrived in Syria between January 2012 and July 2014. Many have joined
jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah and the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS). In turn, between 300 and 400 extremists appear to
have left Syria for countries in Europe.\4\ There are also a growing
number of other Westerners, including Australians, participating in
such jihadist battlefields as Syria. With the increase in ISIS control
of territory in Iraq, there may be a growing number of Western violent
extremists in Iraq as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Author interviews with senior counterterrorism and diplomatic
officials from a dozen European countries, July 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These developments should cause concern in the United States.
European travelers do not need a visa to enter the United States. This
is generally not a problem for known violent extremists that make it
onto European--and then American--terrorism watch lists. But it is a
problem if terrorist fighters and supporters train in Syria without
being detected and, consequently, without making it onto any watch
list. U.S. and European intelligence collection capabilities are not as
robust in Syria today as they were in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the
number of Western violent extremists appears to be significantly
greater.
broader trends
The problem of violent extremism is broader than just Syria and
Iraq. Current trends suggest that terrorist groups are metastasizing,
particularly in North Africa and the Middle East. As noted in the next
section, however, many of these groups are not a high threat to the
United States today and are focused on local enemies.
Figure 1 shows the number of active Salafi-jihadist groups,
including al-Qaeda, by year since 1988. Salafi-jihadist groups can be
distinguished by at least two main characteristics. First, these groups
emphasize the importance of returning to a ``pure'' Islam, that of the
Salaf, the pious ancestors. Second, Salafi-jihadist groups believe that
violent jihad is fard `ayn (a personal religious duty). Al-Qaeda leader
Ayman al-Zawahiri, among others, encourages both Salafism and armed
jihad.\5\ Each data point on the y-axis in Figure 1 represents the
number of active Salafi-jihadist groups that year. As highlighted in
the figure, there was a steady increase in the number of groups during
the 1990s and 2000s, but a notable jump in the slope of the line after
2010. Most of these new groups were in North Africa and the Levant.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ On the term Salafi-jihadists see, for example, Assaf Moghadam,
``Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of
Suicide Attacks,'' International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3, Winter 2008/
09, pp. 46-78; Moghadam, ``The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,''
CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 3, February 2008, pp. 14-16.
\6\ As used here, Levant refers to the area that includes Syria,
Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and southern Turkey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
figure 1: number of salafi-jihadist groups by year, 1988-2013 \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Jones, A Persistent Threat, p. 27.

Figure 2 provides a rough estimate of the number of Salafi-jihadist
fighters between 1988 and 2013. Calculating the number of Salafi-
jihadists is difficult, in part since groups do not provide public
estimates of their numbers and they can vary considerably over the
course of a group's life. Consequently, Figure 2 includes high and low
estimates for the number of Salafi-jihadists by year. The trend is
similar to Figure 1. There was a notable increase in the number of
fighters after 2010. The biggest jump was in Syria, which witnessed a
dramatic rise in the number of fighters.
figure 2: number of salafi-jihadists by year, 1988-2013 \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Jones, A Persistent Threat, p. 27.

Figure 3 highlights the number of attacks by core al-Qaeda and
affiliates since 2009.\9\ The data indicate a substantial rise in the
number of attacks over time. Trends for casualties and fatalities were
similar. There was a 167 percent increase in attacks by al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups between 2010 and 2013, with most of the violence in
2013 perpetrated by ISIS (44 percent), Jabhat al-Nusrah (24 percent),
al-Shabaab (22 percent), and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (9
percent). This marked a change from 2012, when al-Shabaab conducted the
most attacks (46 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The data on attacks by other Salafi-jihadist groups were much
less reliable, so I have not included the number of attacks by Salafi-
jihadists outside of al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
figure 3: number of attacks by al-qaeda and affiliates, 2009-2013 \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Data are based on author estimates and the Jane's Terrorism
and Insurgency Intelligence Centre Events Database.

To summarize the data, there was a 55 percent increase in the
number of Salafi-jihadist groups from 2010 to 2013, primarily in North
Africa and the Levant. Libya represents the most active sanctuary for
Salafi-jihadist groups in North Africa, and Syria the most significant
safe haven for groups in the Levant. In addition, the number of Salafi-
jihadists roughly doubled from 2010 to 2013, according to both low and
high estimates. The war in Syria was the single most important
attraction for Salafi-jihadist fighters.
These trends suggest that the United States needs to remain focused
on countering the proliferation of violent extremist groups, including
Salafi-jihadists, despite the temptation to shift attention and
resources to other regions and to significantly decrease
counterterrorism budgets in an era of fiscal constraint.
impact on the u.s. homeland
Not all terrorist groups overseas present a direct threat to the
U.S. homeland. As Table 1 highlights, terrorist groups can be divided
into three categories: Those that pose a high threat because they are
involved in active plotting against the U.S. homeland; groups that pose
a medium threat because they are involved in plotting attacks against
U.S. structures like embassies and U.S. citizens overseas (though not
against the U.S. homeland); and those that pose a low threat because
they are focused on targeting local regimes or other countries.

TABLE 1.--EXAMPLE OF TERRORISTS THAT THREATEN THE UNITED STATES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Threat Medium Threat Low Threat
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Characteristics...................... Active plotting against Active plotting against Limited or no active
the U.S. homeland and U.S. targets overseas plotting against U.S.
U.S. targets overseas (e.g. U.S. embassies targets overseas.
(e.g. U.S. embassies and citizens).
and citizens).
Examples............................. al-Qaeda in Al Shabaab.... East Turkestan
the Arabian Peninsula. Jabhat al- Islamic Movement.
Core al-Qaeda. Nusrah. Suqor al-Sham.
Some inspired ISIS..........
individuals and Ansar al-
networks. Sharia Libya.
Hezbollah.....
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

First, some groups pose a high threat. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and possibly core al-Qaeda likely present the most immediate
threat, along with inspired networks and individuals. The growth in
social media and the terrorist use of chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and other sites has facilitated radicalization inside the
United States.
Second, there are a number of groups that pose a medium threat. Al-
Shabaab's objectives are largely parochial, and it has conducted
attacks in Somalia and the region. But al-Shabaab possesses a competent
external operations capability to strike targets outside of Somalia.
The Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya was well-planned and well-
executed, and involved sophisticated intelligence collection,
surveillance, and reconnaissance of the target.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Committee on Homeland Security, Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and
Radicalization Within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to
the Homeland, Majority Investigative Report (Washington, DC: U.S. House
of Representatives, July 27, 2011), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah are primarily interested in establishing
Islamic emirates in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region, though their
growing networks in Europe and the United States are concerning. Their
access to foreign fighters, external network in Europe, and bomb-making
expertise suggest that they may already have the capability to plan and
support attacks against the West. It is currently unclear whether most
of these individuals will remain in Syria or Iraq over the long run,
move to other war zones, or return to the West. And even if some
return, it is uncertain whether they will become involved in terrorist
plots, focus on recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned
with terrorism. Still, foreign fighters have historically been agents
of instability. They can affect the conflicts they join, as they did in
post-2003 Iraq by promoting sectarian violence and indiscriminate
tactics. Perhaps more important, foreign fighter mobilizations empower
transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, because volunteering
for war is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in
more extreme forms of militancy. When Muslims in the West radicalize,
they usually do not plot attacks in their home country right away, but
travel to a war zone first. A majority of al-Qaeda operatives began
their militant careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi
groups today are by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Thomas Hegghammer, ``The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters:
Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,'' International Security, Vol.
35, No. 3, Winter 2010/11, pp. 53-94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, some groups present a low-level threat to the United States.
They do not possess the capability or intent to target the United
States at home or overseas. They include such groups as the East
Turkestan Islamic Movement, which has a support base among China's
Uighur community and is primarily interested in Chinese targets.
Despite this categorization, there is some fluidity between levels
because the capabilities and intentions of groups--and their
leadership--evolve over time.
detecting and deterring travelers
U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic
officials have spent considerable time and resources on understanding
the threat and developing measures to counter the spread of violent
extremists from sanctuaries like Syria. But the situation is complex.
Violent extremists usually don't advertise that they plan to fight in
battlefields like Syria, and many attempt to take circuitous routes to
Syria rather flying directly from the United States to neighboring
countries like Turkey. Moving forward, the United States should
consider several additional measures to detect and deter violent
extremists from coming to--or departing from--the United States.
Working with Europe.--The first is to continue assisting European
allies, including Turkey, in efforts to identify violent extremists
traveling to--and from--jihadist battlefields like Syria. U.S. and
European intelligence collection capabilities are not as robust in
Syria today as they were in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the number of
Western violent extremists is greater.
European states have taken some steps against jihadists traveling
to--and from--Syria and Iraq. The United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium,
France, the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, and several other countries
have arrested some outgoing and returning fighters, facilitators, and
recruiters. In addition, several European countries have stripped their
welfare benefits, frozen their financial assets, and seized their
passports to prevent further travel. The United Kingdom, in particular,
has established robust measures. In June 2014, the United Kingdom
passed legislation banning ISIS and four other Syria-linked extremist
groups, giving it the ability to prosecute individuals associated with
or supporting these groups. The United Kingdom is one of only seven
European countries that can seize passports of Syria-bound travelers
not charged with a separate offense.
The United States should continue working with its allies to
improve European counterterrorism and counter-radicalization measures
in several areas:
Regional intelligence-sharing.--Increased counterterrorism
intelligence sharing across Europe would strengthen regional
awareness of returnees and Syria-based plotters. But some
European states appear to be reluctant to implement
comprehensive intelligence-sharing mechanisms across Europe
because of data privacy, data protection, and other concerns.
Improved European Union approaches to the foreign fighter
problem, including strengthening Schengen area border security
and expanding the use of the EUROPOL and INTERPOL notice
system, would enhance European states' ability to mitigate the
threat.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Schengen area includes 26 European countries that have
abolished passport and any other types of border control at their
internal borders, permitting the free movement of individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attendance at terrorist camps.--Criminalizing attendance
(not just training) at terrorist camps overseas would likely
deter some terrorists from traveling to Syria and Iraq, as well
as allow states to prosecute more returnees. It is likely an
easier charge to prove than receiving terrorist training. The
United Kingdom is the only European Union country with such a
law. The United States prohibits attendance at terrorist camps
overseas.
Pre-emptive action.--Once individuals arrive in Syria and
Iraq, it is already late in the radicalization process for
those committed to violent extremism. If there are adequate
legal grounds to arrest individuals before they travel to Syria
or Iraq, however, it would be helpful. Norway, Netherlands, and
France are among the few European countries that have
preemptively arrested extremists preparing to travel to Syria.
Counterterrorism at Home.--The FBI, Department of Homeland
Security, and State and local agencies have already increased efforts
to counter the flow of violent extremists into--and out of--the United
States. But the United States should consider a few additional
counterterrorism steps. Following are two examples.
The first is to increase intelligence collection on potential
American violent extremists traveling to--and from--Syria and to ensure
that U.S. agencies (such as CIA, NSA, FBI, and DHS) are adequately
resourced by Congress to collect, analyze, and process signals and
human intelligence on such travel. Extremists from the United States or
other countries with visa waiver access need to be placed on proper
watch lists in the United States, Europe, and other countries. It is
troubling, however, that U.S. citizen Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha traveled
to Syria to fight with al-Qaeda-affiliated rebels, returned to the
United States around May 2013 without U.S. officials realizing that he
had trained with an al-Qaeda-linked group, and traveled back to Syria
in November 2013 before blowing himself up in a suicide attack in May
2014. In short, U.S. officials apparently did not realize that a U.S.
citizen who had received terrorist training in Syria was on American
soil for approximately 6 months before returning to Syria to perpetrate
a terrorist attack overseas. Was this a problem in U.S. intelligence
collection or analysis overseas, information sharing with allies,
customs and border protection inside the United States, law enforcement
gaps inside the United States (including with violent extremists on the
internet and social media), or something else?
Second, the United States should consider adopting--and Congress
should consider studying and potentially funding--a modified version of
the United Kingdom's bottom-up law enforcement approach to
counterterrorism. In the United Kingdom, there is a counterterrorism
coordinating officer in each local police force, ranging in size from
one officer to several hundred in the Metropolitan Police Special
Branch. This is the point of contact for counterterrorism in local
communities.
The FBI and large U.S. police departments--such as Washington, New
York, and Los Angeles--are better prepared for counterterrorism than
most other departments. But terrorist plots are often hatched outside
of these urban centers, and many of the Americans traveling to
battlefields like Syria are apparently from rural or suburban areas.
Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha lived for a time with his brother in Fort
Pierce, Florida, 130 miles north of Miami. Najibullah Zazi constructed
his bombs to attack the New York City subway in Aurora, Colorado.
Faisal Shahzad rigged his dark blue Nissan Pathfinder with explosives
in Connecticut, and then drove it to Times Square in New York City.
Many smaller police forces are not involved in counterterrorism,
understandably focusing on criminal activity and other local
challenges. Their departments often aren't resourced, trained, or
prepared to deal with violent extremists in their communities. Yet
local law enforcement agencies have a permanent presence in cities and
towns, and frequently a better understanding of local communities. As
Bruce Hoffman argued in his book Inside Terrorism, a critical step in
countering terrorist groups is for law enforcement officials to
``develop strong confidence-building ties with the communities from
which terrorists are most likely to come or hide in . . . The most
effective and useful intelligence comes from places where terrorists
conceal themselves and seek to establish and hide their
infrastructure.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Second Edition (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 169.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One variant of the U.K. approach in the United States might be to
consider appointing a counterterrorism representative in most police
departments to act as the intelligence point of contact across the
department for counterterrorism. Counterterrorism would not necessarily
be the full-time responsibility of this individual or group, who might
be more focused on dealing with drugs, homicides, or other local
challenges. But this individual would be responsible for coordinating
concerns about violent extremists in their community and improving
outreach programs to businesses, ethnic communities, schools, and other
locations. In addition to serving as the subject-matter expert on
counterterrorism (including training and contingency planning), this
individual would closely cooperate with local Joint Terrorism Task
Forces and Fusion Centers. Many police agencies do not have a single
point of contact for counterterrorism.
It is important to take proactive steps now to deal with the
problem of terrorist sanctuaries. After all, the threat from violent
extremists will persist. As a poem entitled ``Mujahid's Wish'' in the
Spring 2013 issue of al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine highlighted, the
United States remains a bitter enemy:

``I wish I am in America. It seems odd, right?
Hijra is not the end of a mujahid's ambition.
Walking with an AK is not the end of the road. I used
To think the same as you, until I met brothers in the
Training camps, brothers who look into the enemies'
Barrels and see Jannah. Surprisingly, many of them
Wish to live in America. They have one gentle project
To carry out; detonating even one bomb in any crowded
area. They wish to be lone mujahideen like Tamerlan.
Many of the brothers who made Hijrah from the West
Wish they have a return ticket, returning home
Heading for mom's kitchen. Not to serve the kuffar
With delicious and exotic meals, but to terrorize the
American society until they case to fight and assault Muslims.
Brother residing in the West, grab your chance and
Walk steadfastly towards your goal.
As for me here in Yemen, whenever I move around with
Explosives around my waist, I wish I am in America.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Sheikh Ibrahim Ar-Rubaysh, ``Allah Will Restrain the Evil
Might of Those Who Disbelieve,'' Inspire, Spring 1434, 2013, No. 11,
pp. 36-37.

Mr. King. Let me thank all of the witnesses for their
testimony. I am going to have two questions. I will ask them
both and then just ask if each of the four panelists could give
their thoughts on them.
One is, we talk about ISIS and we talk about AQAP, et
cetera, the various groups. If you could give evidence or
testimony on how much cross-pollination there is, like how
strictly are these lines of demarcation enforced? Or would you
find an AQAP bomb-maker, for instance, lending his services to
ISIS? Again, since the command structure of al-Qaeda seems to
have broken down, how strictly is the demarcation enforced
among the other groups? That would be the first question.
Then, second, Dr. Jones mentioned the--how this appears to
be--not appears--it would seem to be just by number-wise much
more of a threat to Europe than it is to the United States.
Now, we are probably the ultimate target, but as far as
numbers, there are thousands and thousands of Europeans. If you
could address the question of not just what laws have been
passed, but how seriously, other than the Brits, are European
governments and nations facing this issue of the returning
foreign fighters? So we will start with Dr. Kagan and just work
our way across. Thank you.
Mr. Kagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is a tremendous amount of cross-pollination among the
groups. I am not persuaded that the command of al-Qaeda has
broken down. It depends on what you thought the command of al-
Qaeda was to begin with. It has always been a rather loosely-
affiliated organization.
What we have seen is Zawahiri actually effecting more
command and control publicly of it, especially with the
mediation between ISIS and JN, than we usually had seen. But
what is important to understand is that the leaders of these
groups represent a human network that has--that for the most
part goes back decades. A lot of these guys fought together
against the Soviets. They have been fighting together against
us for the 1990s. They know each other.
We should remember that Naser al-Wuhayshi, the head of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is also the operational
commander for Zawahiri at this point. We have seen cooperation
between Shabaab and AQAP. We have these very credible reports
of cooperation between AQAP and Jabhat Nusra. We have reports
of cooperation between AQIM and Boko Haram.
This is a movement. It is a global movement. Its
organizations are complex, but we should not imagine that these
organizations are in any way stovepiped from each other.
Mr. King [continuing]. European government concern and
action?
Mr. Kagan. It is beyond my area of expertise to talk much
about that, except to say that the European focus on privacy,
to the exclusion of all other considerations, is making Europe
a very effective cyber safe haven, among other things, for
malign actors of all varieties, and we are seeing an increase
of migration of malign cyber activity to European servers
because they cannot by law inspect any of the packets or things
that go in and out of those servers.
Mr. King. With that comment regarding Europe, we will go to
Mr. Simcox from Europe.
Mr. Simcox. I will start with Europe. I think that there is
certainly a recognition that it is a very, very dangerous
situation, and the foreign fighters returning to Europe are
going to pose a great problem. The shootings in the Jewish
Museum in Brussels, we have already displayed that that is very
clearly the case.
Where the European countries are very much lacking, I
think, is two aspects; one, the legislation. Dr. Jones referred
to this already, and it is a problem in terms of preparatory
offenses, that--it is easy to obviously take action after a
terrorist attack has taken place, but some of these preparatory
ones, European governments aren't well-fitted-out legislatively
to deal with them.
In the United Kingdom, we had to pass a lot of laws to
begin to effectively counter this. We still haven't really got
it exactly right, but we have been more serious than others on
taking very stringent actions against those who are preparing
for terrorist attacks, not just in the United Kingdom, but
increasingly abroad.
But I do think they have a problem with political will, as
well, because, look, a lot of these countries, they hear about
the problem more than they see it, in terms of it has only been
the United Kingdom and Spain that have really suffered
extremely badly in terms of loss of life in Europe from
terrorist groups.
There have been other small incidents in France and
Belgium, but in terms of mass casualties, it is only the United
Kingdom and Spain that have really suffered. I think that part
of it is the very nature of the fact that there hasn't been the
huge loss of life as there has in the United States and the
United Kingdom to this kind of terrorism.
In terms of the cross-pollination, it certainly--it
certainly happens, I would back up all Dr. Kagan said. The one
thing maybe I would add to that is that one of the good things
about the intensity of the U.S. drone campaign has been that
perhaps some of these--let's say somebody like Ibrahim al-
Asiri, the AQAP bomb-maker, it is very hazardous for him to try
and put his head above the parapet and work too closely with
groups outside of Yemen and those he trusts very closely in
Yemen, because the huge amounts of attention that are based on
people like that, because of U.S. drones and military
operations is very high, which is why I think we need to keep
the pressure on in situations like that so that even greater
interaction between the groups doesn't take place.
Mr. King. Dr. Brookes.
Mr. Brookes. Yes, I think that Dr. Kagan has covered it
quite well. I mean, we should be definitely concerned, this
most recent plot regarding cell phones and electronic devices
shows you the force multiplier effect that can take place. If
you have a very skilled, innovative bomb-maker who might be
working with willing travelers or willing terrorist operatives
in al-Qaeda or Syria, I mean, this is very problematic to me.
We have seen the cross-pollination between AQIM and Boko
Haram and al-Shabaab and AQAP, and now we are seeing it between
AQAP and the Syria-Iraq theater of operation. I think this was
a real wake-up call to us, and I think it may be the most
imminent threat that we face today. It is going to be a very
difficult summer.
My concern about Europe is that--and I mentioned a little
bit in my testimony is that publicly, are we taking this threat
seriously? Some of the rhetoric that has come out of the
administration to me has been troubling and may be breeding a
sense of complacency.
I think we are in a very much in a very difficult and dire
situation here regarding this threat. I think that Europe and
other parts or places around the world are watching the United
States and looking for leadership on this issue. I think it is
critically important that we have some sort of harmonization.
International cooperation is critically important to fighting
terrorism, whether you are talking about intelligence, legal,
funding. I mean, terrorists still need funding to undertake
operations and travel, so it is critically important.
I think despite the challenges we are facing with Europe
right now with Russia, the Ukraine, and things along that line,
that terrorism has to be a top priority for senior leadership
in the United States to make the--to increase our security here
and to our interests overseas.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Brookes.
Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Sure, I will be brief. I realize I am in the red
now.
First, on the cross-pollination----
Mr. King. Don't worry about that. Just go ahead.
Mr. Jones. Okay. In terms of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and its role in the Syria-Iraq context, my own view
is that its relationship is closest with Nusra, because Nusra
is an al-Qaeda affiliate, along with AQAP, and the relationship
between Naser al-Wuhayshi, the emir in Yemen, and the Jalani in
Syria is the closest.
But I think what everybody said is right. The challenge
here is that when you have so many foreign fighters coming from
Europe, some in the United States, North Africa, Australia,
they move between groups. So there are formal group members,
but there is a lot of movement of individuals who aren't
formally affiliated. So in that sense, this makes this more
challenging than I think we have seen in some other
battlefields.
On the European issue, I would just point to one challenge
on the European context is that the Schengen agreement allows
for the free movement of people within European Schengen
countries. The fact that we have different laws, then, among
these countries means that we have free movement, but we have
different laws when people return or before they leave, so the
challenge for us then is we don't have agreement across
European countries, but we do have the free movement of people.
So I would say the United Kingdom has been and continues to
be very concerned and has taken action and considers the threat
seriously. The French and Spanish, in my view, have been very
concerned, have conducted operations against Syrians and
Spanish citizens in North Africa and Syria that they consider a
threat, and there are several other countries, including the
Norwegians now, have put laws in place that make it more
difficult for people to travel to or to rest once they come
back.
But I think outside of that, what we are seeing is huge
variations. With visa waiver access into the United States,
that should cause some concern here.
Mr. King. Thank you. Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brookes, I just wanted to pick up on something that you
had said relative to statements coming out of the White House
and American policy in that part of the world. You know, the
more you learn about that part of the world, the more you
conclude that it is an absolute mess and that there are no good
options for the United States.
I take you back to September, when the administration was
looking for Congress to authorize some kind of unspecified
military action in Syria, which I opposed, primarily because at
that point it seemed as though, you know, the administration
was using the justification that 100,000 people had been killed
because of the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
Well, the most effective fighters on the other side were
al-Qaeda affiliates and Islamic extremists who were beheading
people that were supporting the government. When we looked to
the rest of the world for support, including the 22-nation Arab
League, they basically said, yeah, we will support the United
States as long as we don't have to do anything. Out of 194
countries, we had explicit support from Turkey and France. That
was basically it.
So my concern was--and I am very respectful of your
position--I don't mean this to be antagonistic at all, I just--
I want to probe it, to be truthful. You know, the United States
would have essentially went in to litigate a civil war in that
part of the world for the third time, essentially alone again.
That to me is very troubling.
The United States gets played in that part of the world,
whether it is the corrupt government in Afghanistan and its
successor corrupt governments or whether it is the situation in
Iraq. You know, someone had mentioned Qasem Soleimani, who is
head of the Quds Forces, which as I understand it is
essentially a cross between special forces and the CIA. You
know, he cut the deal in Iran to give Nouri al-Maliki another
term in office. So where do his loyalties lie?
You know, at some point, at some point, these countries
have to take responsibility for their own future. The United
States has a limited role here. You know, General Jack Keane
and Dr. Kagan and so many others, you know, the surge in Iraq
was intended to do one thing, really--tamp down violence to
allow a breathing space within which the warring factions could
reach political reconciliation, including the sharing of oil
revenues, to peacefully coexist in that country toward the goal
of forging some kind of semblance of democracy.
That has been an abject failure. Nouri al-Maliki was told
at that time that unless and until he could reach into the
Sunni community, the Kurd community, and instill a sense of
confidence that he had the leadership ability to forge
something better, we would end up with what we have. What we
have is not our fault. The American military did everything
possible and continues to in an advisory role to give them the
opportunity to forge a better future.
But unless and until these two warring factions realize
that, you know, the future is more important than these past
grievances. So I went on a little bit, but, Dr. Brookes, go
ahead.
Mr. Brookes. I am not sure where to start with that, but
thank you very much for sharing your thoughts. I mean, there
are a lot of opportunities to go back and talk about
hypothetical counterfactuals, if we had done something
different, but we are where we are today. I think that is the
critical point here, is that I assume that the panelists would
agree with me--and I will let them speak for themselves--is
that we are facing a dire threat in that part of the world that
not only is a threat to U.S. interests--in a difficult part of
the world--to U.S. interests, but also, I think, increasingly
to the homeland and what do we do about that? I mean, I did
talk about some things. Like I said, I wish we had done some
things differently, but we can't go back and change that.
So we are really saying, how do we go forward here? I think
that is the purpose of the panel here, and I think there have
been some good ideas put out by my colleagues here about what
we need to do, working with international partners to try to
deal with us. I hope we can all agree that we have a
significant problem and that it needs to be publicized. I think
it needs to be--we need to look at international cooperation
for help with it. Like I said, going back now, I am not saying
it is not important, but it is--I think we have to see where we
go forward now at this point to deal with the challenges that
we are facing.
Mr. Higgins. Yield back.
Mr. King. Gentleman yields back.
Dr. Broun, from Georgia.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When I was in the United States Marine Corps, I was taught
to know your enemy. The President, as you know, of the United
States has made statements that Dr. Brookes referred to. Osama
is dead. Al-Qaeda is on the run. Just yesterday, the full
committee had a follow up on the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations. Some statements were made by my Democrat
colleagues that basically supported this type of philosophy.
Dr. Brookes was talking during his testimony that referred
to this poor concept, in my opinion, by this administration of
what we are facing, and I think there are Members of Congress
that also have this poor concept of what we need to be doing to
deal with this asymmetrical threat.
Dr. Kagan in his testimony talked about that our intel
community, as well as our military, is being decimated.
Frankly, Dr. Kagan, I think we have had four administrations--
two Republican and two Democrats--that have steadily degraded
our defense capability. I find that reprehensible. I think all
four have just steadily degraded our intel communities, as
well.
It is boots on the ground that is going to be absolutely
critical, particularly in these safe havens, for us to know
what kind of threats that we are actually facing. So I applaud
your testimony, Dr. Kagan, about that, and I hope the
administration is listening to you guys, all four of you,
because I think it is absolutely critical, because we are not
facing as a Nation the threat that we face, this asymmetric
threat.
Now, as a person who believes in the Constitution that our
founding fathers meant for it to be, the major function of the
Federal Government should be National defense and National
security. We don't have enough ships in the Navy, we don't have
enough wings in the Air Force, we don't have enough brigades in
the Army, and I can tell you, as a U.S. Marine, God knows we
don't have enough Marines.
We are paring the defense capability down, but beyond that,
we have got a lot of state threats around the world, and we
have all these asymmetric threats with these safe havens. What
I would like for you all to do--and my question to you is, what
would you tell the administration, what can we do?
The other follow-up question for all four of you is this.
When you have a snake, the way to kill the snake is cut off his
head. The greatest amount of financing--I believe is coming
from Iran. What would you do to help--each one of you--to help
cut off the head of the supply chain, not only from Iran, but I
know that from our committee work here that there is financing
coming from the United States actually to help all these al-
Qaeda-like organizations around the world.
We have got a tremendous problem. We have got to stop
worrying about containment, in my opinion, and start cutting
off the head of the snake and end this once and for all,
because we are going to be here spending trillions of dollars
over the next decades, maybe century, if we don't do something
about it.
So what is your solution? We will start with Dr. Kagan.
Mr. Kagan. I can't give you a solution in a minute-and-a-
half or even in quite a few minutes.
Mr. Broun. Well, you can answer about----
Mr. Kagan. I will answer your question.
Mr. Broun. No, I am talking about written answers. I would
appreciate all of you all----
Mr. Kagan. I am going to have to ask for quite a bit of
time on that.
Mr. Broun. Okay, please do.
Mr. Kagan. This is a very complicated problem, and there
are no easy solutions. I think that the Ranking Member very
articulately put the problem, but I think--and it is something
that is paralyzing to a lot of people as they think about it.
This is an insanely complicated problem; it really is. We don't
have good options. Almost all of the options that we are
looking at are various degrees of bad or worse.
But if it were the case that these problems were confined
to the region, we might be able to say that, you know, this is
too hard, this is too complicated, we don't have support, they
need to stand up. The problem is that the threats are to us. We
must act against them, lest they act against us.
So we have to address the complexity of this. It is out of
respect for that complexity that I am not going to answer
directly what a strategy would be--we are working on this.
Everyone here at the table is working on it. We are working on
it at AEI. We are trying to come up with something.
But, frankly, there is not a lot of appetite in this
administration for strategy, because we are still having
arguments about whether or not there is a problem. So the first
thing that we need to do is what this committee is already
doing, which is to recognize and publicize the extent of the
threat and the extent of the problem and say we need to deal
with it.
What I will tell you is, we should immediately reverse the
defense cuts. I agree with you that this has been a bipartisan
attack on defense going back to the first Bush administration.
We need to stop the runaway train toward curtailing our
intelligence activities and impose appropriate oversight and
appropriate controls to prevent abuses, while simultaneously
enhancing our intelligence capabilities to understand this
threat and help us develop strategies for it.
These are two things that I think Congress can really take
the lead on that would be extremely important and that will set
the stage and create conditions that will make it possible to
execute a coherent strategy as we can try to develop one and
hopefully ultimately get an administration that would be
willing to do so.
Mr. Brookes. Could I add to that? I mean, I agree with
that. The other thing I would say is--and this may not surprise
anybody based on my pedigree, but I am continually or
increasingly concerned that we are unwilling to use military
direct action in support of U.S. National interests.
I am not saying there is a military solution to this. I
believe in using all of the instruments of National policy to
solve problems, but I sense that there is--everybody doesn't
really want to say that we shouldn't--you know, the talk about
using airpower in Iraq, for instance, for dealing with--as one
of the ways or tools we can deal with this issue. I am
concerned that people are becoming increasingly worried or
unlikely to support the idea that we may need to use military
operations to support our National security. I think that is
something we have to throw back on the table, along with the
other instruments of National policy, as an option when we feel
we are facing an increasing threat.
Mr. Broun. Dr. Brookes, could I follow up real quickly, if
I may, Mr. Chairman? I believe very firmly that SF, special
forces and special ops, are probably the best option to
utilize, as well as civilian intelligence community--I see Dr.
Jones shaking his head agreeing with me--and I believe very
firmly that we need to be expanding, not only our total defense
capabilities, but I think we need to be expanding our special
operations community.
Pushing it down even further out of active forces down into
the Reserves and even into the Guard units, because I believe
that is going to be the ultimate solution for military action
in these kind of things.
I believe very firmly, we should never go to war unless
Congress declares war. Congress has not done its duty in--
through the Authorization for Use of Military Force and the War
Powers Act of controlling Presidents of either party.
But, Dr. Jones, you shook your head. Agree?
Mr. Jones. Yes, two follow-on points. No. 1 is, I think we
have got to be very careful when we talk about this threat that
we then don't take actions that undermine our seriousness. If
we talk about this threat, if we talk--if our policymakers talk
about the importance of counterterrorism missions, but then at
the same time we are leaving Afghanistan and, by part of that,
Pakistan, where we have core al-Qaeda that continues to
operate, we have got a milieu of militant groups, I would just
ask, how serious are we, then, if we are leaving one of the
areas where we see the sort-of headquarters and--I don't want
to overstate this--of the core, Ayman al-Zawahiri. So one thing
I would say is, we cannot leave after 2016 unless these kinds
of groups have been defeated or severely weakened.
The second issue that I would like to see more of, and I
don't see it much right now, is a specific strategy to deal
with the kinds of issues we are talking about today. What are
the areas of the world that we see the most significant threats
from, including this one we are talking about here today in the
Syria-Iraq, and what resources are we going to put there?
Are we going to put in those areas then our sufficient
signals intelligence collection capabilities, HUMINT, special
operations forces, efforts to counter the ideology? What I
don't--what I see missing right now--and I would say this with
the last administration to some degree, as well--is a specific
strategy with resources attached to it to deal with it.
I think until we see that, something we saw Reagan do
effectively in 1981 and 1982 to deal with the Soviets, I don't
think--I think we are going to continue to find problems as
these jihadists groups pop up in a range of different places.
So I would like to see a strategy, resources put against it,
and see that communicated to the American public.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back. Now the newest Member
of the committee and the newest Member of Congress, the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Clawson, is recognized.
Mr. Clawson. Everybody is going to be able to say that
until November. Then I am going to have a little leg up.
I apologize for being late. I have found in this job that
you become totally over-scheduled from your first day. So I
am--in my world previous--was not accustomed to showing up late
when people are going to speak. I hope you all don't take it
the wrong way and just really appreciate you all being here. I
have learned a lot. You know a lot. So I appreciate your
service to the country.
I don't come at this in a partisan way. I will say that I
believe that the Middle East is out of control. Whatever
president or whatever is accosted, is of no service to me right
now, because I think one of you said the cliche, ``We are where
we are.'' Correct, gentlemen?
I come at a little bit different. I believe that in this
case, the supply chain is more important than the manufacturing
site. The manufacturing site may well be Syria, Iraq, or Iran.
But the supply chain for the next bomb into our country, I
believe, runs through the heart of Europe, as you have spoken
to.
I have lived in Spain and I have seen the immigrant
population explode from northern Africa. I have seen the sealed
garbage cans in the subways of Paris when I lived there. I have
managed plants as far east as Turkey in the Islamic world.
These are troubled places. I also understand the point that
you made earlier that these--although the European community is
one entity in terms of borders, in terms of security, every
country is so different from the other one. So I don't know how
we manage that from afar, because it feels like if the wrong
person gets on a plane to Barcelona, he can get to New York. He
can get to New York.
So, therefore, my concern drilling down is: What do we do
as a country? These are proud countries in Europe, and they are
our partners. But what can we do to influence that situation so
that they are more effective? Second, as a Member of this
committee and a Member of the Foreign Relations Committee, what
can Congress do and what can we do to help you so that we are
more safe, relative to what goes on in Europe? Because I think
another event could be just around the corner.
Gentlemen.
Mr. Simcox. Yes, if I could begin, and also I would just
like to quickly comment on Congressman Broun's question, as
well, if possible. I think the key thing--the United States has
to take the lead in this. It really has to take the lead, and
we--and a lot of Europe will take its direction from the United
States.
On something like--Attorney General Holder talked about
the--was in Norway recently talking about the need for European
nations to toughen up certain parts of their legislation, which
they currently aren't doing. The United States, you have this
material support law which enables you to cover a huge variety
of terrorism offenses that in Europe just doesn't exist.
So I think that there has to be a level of grave
seriousness from the administration in terms of the way it
talks about this threat. I think at the moment, still, the
penny hasn't really dropped with the threat that Syria poses to
the United States and Europe. There was a very unhelpful
contribution from the former head of MI6 recently where he
talked about how this could potentially be overblown. I think
there is a danger we get complacent about the threat to the
homeland, because there has not been a 9/11-style attack,
obviously, on that scale since then.
Just to quickly go back to the defense question, I think
this is another area where the United States has to take the
lead, because other NATO countries are cutting defense spending
even quicker than you are. There is this--this terrible notion
of smart power that is upheld if everybody cut in different
ways that we could somehow--the end result of that that we
would all be safer is one that has taken root in Europe.
The United Kingdom does all it can. We have been of limited
help in Iraq and Libya and Afghanistan, but where is the help
from the rest of Europe in these kind of military
interventions? It is few and far between, really.
So, again, I think if America starts cutting its military,
that is a signal to Europe that it looks for excuses to do so,
as well. So I really think strong American leadership is
needed----
Mr. Clawson. Do we have unified conversations with European
countries about the security risks so that there is a unified
effort?
Mr. Simcox. Do those conversations take place? I believe
they do from government to government, but I have not seen
any--I would prefer to see some kind of collective
announcement. It all seems very piecemeal at the moment,
because European countries take the level of threat from the
returnees from Syria very differently.
So at the moment, I don't think there is anything beyond
just the cooperation that took place on counterterrorism
efforts anyway, and Syria is a whole new load of casework.
Mr. Clawson. But then you would agree that the European
security and, therefore, our security is dependent on the
weakest link in the chain in the European community?
Mr. Simcox. Absolutely.
Mr. Clawson. If that doesn't create the biggest problem
here that we have, I don't know what does.
Mr. Simcox. Certainly.
Mr. Clawson. Because we are not going to shut it down in
Syria or Iran all of a sudden. So the pipeline to us is through
the weakest link in Europe. To your words, there are some
countries that are not taking it as seriously.
Mr. Simcox. I believe so.
Mr. Clawson. Well, anything we can do? If you would like to
communicate with me privately, I am very interested in this. I
am not interested in partisanship. I am interested in
preventing this problem or anything I can do as a Member of
Congress in preventing this problem. Hope you all don't----
Mr. Jones. Yes, I just wanted to add, just to make sure
when we talk about Europe, that we are also adding probably the
most vulnerable and potentially the weakest link, which is not
an E.U. country, but is a NATO country, and that is Turkey. The
concern I have with Turkey is the vast majority of foreign
fighters that are going into and coming out of Syria, as well
as Iraq, are coming through Turkey. They are getting there by
land, by air, and by sea.
So what I would like to see a little bit more fidelity on
is, how much information is being passed by the Turks to the
Europeans and to us about names of individuals with American
passports and European passports going into and out of Turkey
for--or into Syria in particular? So I would just--this is--in
my view, this is not just a Europe or at least an E.U. issue.
Turkey remains a very--because of its location next to Syria, a
very, very important and potentially weak link.
Mr. Clawson. Turkey's economic future depends on
manufacturing exports to Europe and tourism in the GNC. We
have--the Europeans have leverage on the Turks. In spite of the
administration that is in Turkey right now, the country is cut
in half, that leverage exists back to the point if there is a
European unified effort to lock down the pipeline, I believe
Turkey would come along. Their future depends on it. Would you
agree with that?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Clawson. So anything you all can pass on to me about
how we can improve the effort among the European community to
make the entrance of terrorists safer, I would appreciate it. I
am sorry if I have taken so much time here.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
In view of what we have heard as far as the foreign
fighters to Europe and, you know, the weak links, do any of you
have any thoughts about rethinking visa waiver, modifying it,
adjusting it to the current situation?
Mr. Simcox. I mean, I couldn't speak to it with any great
level of gravitas. I think there is, obviously, a great concern
about the amount of traffic that goes between the United States
and Europe, and we are right to be concerned about the
potential threat. I suppose that the one thing I would caution
against is going over the top on it. In terms of the actual
numbers, I mean, 2,000 is--which is a potential amount that
have gone from Europe--is an awful lot, and it is a potential
threat.
But in terms of the overall picture of the amount of travel
between Europe and the United States that does take place, I
wouldn't want to see a significant strain on relations because
of an issue like that.
Mr. Brookes. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add, I
would suggest you may want to talk to some of the people at
Heritage who deal with visa waiver issues more deeply than I
do, have a great level of expertise, but my concern is, is that
we should extend our defense perimeter as far away from the
United States as possible and beyond Europe.
I think we--I am not convinced--and unfortunately, I didn't
have an opportunity to see the House Foreign Affairs Committee
yesterday hearing on Iraq, but I would want to know as a
committee Member what the strategy is for dealing with, you
know, the inside strategy, the Classified strategy for dealing
with what is going on in Syria and Iraq and the rise of ISIS
and other al-Qaeda-related groups.
I mean, I think we need--we would want to be dealing with
it at that distance, not thinking about it at our shoreline or
in Europe, as a portal. So--and I am--it is not clear to me--
and, of course, I am outside the Government--that we have a
comprehensive strategy for dealing with the rising threat that
arises from groups like ISIS and al-Nusra and other militants
in that part of that world. So I hope that the administration
is speaking with you about those issues, but that is where I
would want my first line of defense would be in theater, and I
think that is where it needs to be, as opposed to in Europe, or
at our shoreline.
Mr. King. I guess the concern I would have is, how certain
are we as to how certain the European nations are about who the
Syrian foreign fighters are and to what level are they
recording that and making that known to us and making it
available to airline security?
Mr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, I think these are very good
questions. I think I would go back to the issue of
intelligence, because you are asking an intelligence question.
The issue with visa is a visa--requiring someone to get a visa
is only relevant if we have enough information to be able to
say that we should or should not bring that person in. The more
that we curtail our intelligence capabilities, the more it
doesn't matter whether we have a Visa Waiver Program or not,
because we won't have the intelligence that we need to put the
pieces together to stop terrorists from getting our own visas.
This is a problem that we are having in Europe. I think one
of the other problems that we are having is that the enormous
damage that the traitor Snowden did to our National security
includes driving a very powerful wedge between us and our
European partners on the subject of intelligence sharing,
working together, and that is something that needs to be taken
on very directly and very energetically. It is not going to be
taken on by apologizing to Angela Merkel about listening to her
cell phone, which is not anyone's issue and also not a surprise
to Angela Merkel, I suspect.
It is something that we need to take head-on. Again, it is
why I say the specifics of what is being done to our
intelligence capabilities are very important, but the overall
messaging that is coming out of this country right now is that
we are more interested in chasing after the possibility that a
small number of people in the intelligence community might be
doing things that they shouldn't be doing that are already
illegal than we are about building up and supporting our
capabilities to identify exactly the people that you worried
about.
If that is our tone, we are going to have a very hard time
getting the Europeans to take this intelligence problem very
seriously. So my concern is less will they tell us, and more
will they know? I think that is something that we really need
to focus on.
Mr. Simcox. I would just add to that. We absolutely do not
know. We don't know who all these--we don't know--I mean, the
fact that we are estimating in the United Kingdom about the
amount of people who have gone means we almost certainly don't
know the amount of people who have come back. To give you an
idea of the scale of this, I mean, in the United Kingdom, we
have a relatively large intelligence budget, but nothing
compared to the United States. There was a speech given a few
years ago by the director general of MI5 who said that the
United Kingdom monitors around 2,000 terrorist suspects. The
threat has remained reasonably constant since then.
If you are talking about potentially 500 returnees from
Syria--now, I know there won't be 500. Some will have died over
there. Some may not come back. Some may not pose an absolute
direct threat. But that is potentially about a quarter of MI5's
case work just being added on in one conflict. There isn't the
capacity in any way, shape, or form to begin to deal with that,
even if we knew who all the people were, and we don't, which is
why it is such a great problem for us.
Mr. King. Okay. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I think the political and economic
relationship--and even the military one with the Europeans is
important and will continue to be important. I think rethinking
visa waiver in general probably would not be helpful over the
long run. I mean, there may be ways to work on trying to close
gaps in laws that allow individuals from moving to or coming
back from Syria, but I agree with what a number of people here
have said. The issue is getting names on watch lists.
Look, our presence in Syria--even the U.S. presence is not
like what it was in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the
Taliban regime. It is not like what it was in Iraq. The
jihadist problem is worse. We have much worse collection
capabilities in these countries.
The issue I would also point out is, we have gotten it
wrong, too. This is not just about the Europeans. We didn't get
it right with the Tsarnaevs, the Boston bombers, who had
traveled. We didn't get it right with Abu-Salah, who had gone
to fight, come back, and then returned to blow himself up. We
didn't catch Zazi going back and forth. We didn't catch Shizad
going back and forth. So we continue to have similar issues
with Americans going over and returning, as well.
So, you know, I think we also cannot forget that we have
got issues with putting the right people on our watch lists, as
well as pointing fingers at the Europeans.
Mr. Brookes. I think, Mr. Chairman, we also--and I am sure
this committee is obviously concerned about this and looking at
it--is the lone wolf that is already here that may be inspired
by what is going on there and never travels abroad. Obviously,
that is always a concern to us, but this--what is going on, as
I mentioned in my testimony, I think the establishment of this
caliphate is going to be inspirational to many Islamists around
the world on a number of different levels. I don't know what
effect it will have, whether it brings in more foot soldiers or
brings in more funding, brings in alliances. Of course, there
probably will be some that will oppose it, as well, but that is
another thing we have to worry about is the inspiration of
Osama bin Laden's ideology and al-Qaeda's ideology for people
wherever they are.
Mr. King. All right, thank you.
The Ranking Member.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, just--you know, to what extent does the
panel--I say this generally--believe that this is really a
battle for control of that part of the world between Shia and
Sunni that goes back to the 7th Century? Now, I was kind of
intrigued, you know, the quick emergence of this Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, you know, where would this guy come from? Why is he
so extreme to even be essentially shunned in some reports by
al-Qaeda, that--I don't think anybody accepts that that is a
benign organization.
If you look at the origins, Abu Bakr was, you know, head of
the first caliphate. He was the rightful successor as Sunnis
believe to the Prophet Muhammad. His daughter was married to
the Prophet Muhammad. He was a companion of him.
You know, you see how--what he says about Shias, that they
are apostates, that they are not true Muslims. Vali Nasr, in
his book ``The Shia Revival,'' said that Sunnis in Lebanon
believe that Shias have tails. I just think what you have got
going on here is a battle for control of the 1.6 million Muslim
world, the vast majority of whom are Sunni, but Shia obviously
control, you know, Iran and now Iraq.
So, you know, what I am trying to figure out my own view of
things is, can you allow that battle between these two groups
to proceed and, at the same time, concurrently protect the
homeland by use of military and intelligence? But I will leave
it to the panel.
Mr. Kagan. It is a great question, and it goes obviously to
the heart of the complexity of the problem. There is now a
sectarian war between Sunni and Shia that runs from the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean and is expanding. I do not believe
that that is a spontaneous development, and nor that it is a
continuation of what--of--because, in fact, this is a worse and
more widespread sectarian war than the Muslim world has seen
for many, many centuries. This is an extreme aberration in that
world. There have always been sectarian tensions, but organized
sectarian warfare of this variety is extraordinarily rare in
the Muslim community.
It is not accidental. It was caused in large part by the
deliberate policies of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's predecessor, Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, who believed--apparently rightly--that it
served his interests to stoke sectarian war in Iraq to try to
get the Shia majority in Iraq to attack the Sunni minority in
Iraq in order to drive recruitment for his cause, and that has
been successful and it has spread and sectarian groups on both
sides are leaning into this.
But the battle for the Muslim world that I am most
concerned about is not the sectarian fight. It is the battle by
al-Qaeda, which is an insurgent group fundamentally that does
desire to gain control over the entire 1.6 million--or billion
ummah to do so. I believe that its attempt will ultimately
fail, because--and I am happy to have this conversation with
you at greater length--this is part of the heresy that--what
they espouse, in my view, part of a heresy that goes back to
the very, very first days of Islam. It has emerged
periodically. It is always rejected in the end by the Muslim
community, and I believe that it will be rejected again here.
The question is: How long will it take? How much damage
will be done in the mean time to the Muslims themselves and to
us? But that is why I think that you can't separate the fight
against al-Qaeda from the sectarian fight. We have to address
both of those problems, and it is why we have to be careful--as
one of my panelists said--not to look at short-sighted
solutions to the problem.
I was the one who mentioned Qassem Soleimani. I follow Haji
Qassem very closely. If the more we support the Iranians, the
more we fuel the sectarian war, the more we provide a
recruiting basis for al-Qaeda. So we must not look at short-
term solutions that say let's back Assad because he might be
fighting Sunni extremists, let's back Maliki--and I agree with
every word you said about Maliki and would add a lot more and
not fit for printing--let's just back this guy because he is
fighting al-Qaeda. No. That is why we do have to engage in the
complexity, painful as it is.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Higgins, Ranking Member Higgins, I just
wanted to add two comments to what Dr. Kagan said. No. 1 is: I
do think you are right. There is an important Shia-Sunni
sectarian component of this. The group we see in Iraq and also
in Syria, ISIS, since its origins under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
western Afghanistan, has been among the most anti-Shia of any
of these jihadist organizations. That translated when he went
into Iraq before the U.S. invasion and then when he associated
himself with al-Qaeda.
He has--this group has been--has committed the most
atrocities against Shia. But I would say, more broadly, the
largest amounts of violence we have seen in jihadist
battlefields has been intra-Sunni. There is intense fighting
among Sunni organizations, and this gets me to my second point
briefly, which is I think Fred is right, that there is--this is
about extremism versus non-extremists. As we have seen these--
where these groups have been beaten back in Mali, with French
and U.S. participation, in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and other
locations, during the Awakening, it has been Sunnis that have
pushed them back in areas because their views are too extreme.
I think they will go down and they will go down in part
because Sunnis will not accept these extremists, because they
do not espouse the views of most Muslims in these areas. Thank
you.
Mr. Simcox. I think there certainly is battle of sectarian
warfare going on and battle for control, but what we have to
avoid is the temptation to then just take a step back and say,
well, everyone is as bad as each other, we can't do anything
about this, and retreat towards isolationism. We have a role to
play, and we have a great stake in the outcome. We have a great
stake in as best as we can trying to foster democratic
movements in that part of the world, because some of these
groups that we are worried about and that we are talking about
today, their ideology and their ambitions don't stay at their
own borders. They ultimately come to affect us in the homeland,
so we have to be very active in our engagement in that area.
Mr. Higgins. Just a final thought. There is a relatively
recent book by Marwan Muasher called ``The Second Arab
Awakening.'' In it, you know, he argues that that part of the
world is very pluralistic. Unless and until there are, minority
rights, these battles will always continue.
So if there is--you know, it is a zero-sum game. So long as
there is a zero-sum game, in order for somebody to win,
somebody has to lose. Unfortunately, it is not ideal, but it is
the reality that civil wars in world history are a part of
nation-building. You know, we in our own country had a civil
war. About 625,000 people died in the American civil war. At
that time, our Nation's population was probably about 38
million people. That is pretty significant.
It just seems that I understand the importance of this. I
understand the importance of protecting the homeland. I really
do, and I would do anything in my power to support policies to
achieve that objective. But the fact of the matter is,
everybody has been wrong, Democrats and Republicans, Democratic
administration, Republican administrations, because of the
complexity of these kinds of issues.
It just seems to me that more military intervention, if it
is viewed as supporting the Maliki government in Iraq, despite
the fact that he doesn't deserve American support, because he
only came to us when he was threatened. He cut a deal with the
Iranians to keep him in power. This is just a vicious cycle
that will continue, and there is really no game-changing moment
unless and until the warring factions make a decision that in
order to progress, they have to coexist peacefully.
You know, a lot of people say that, you know, that is
impossible, particularly in that part of the world, but, you
know, when you look at the situation in Northern Ireland, the
Protestants and the Catholics, they had to do one thing before
they were accepted to the negotiating table. They had to
renounce violence. They had to renounce violence and then they
had to participate in an international process to destroy their
arms, to confirm that they were disavowing the tradition, both
traditions, both sides of violence, then and only then--and it
wasn't unilateralism, it was mutuality--they progressed.
The United States and Great Britain played an extraordinary
role in that great achievement, albeit still with problems, but
that was a major, major achievement. The United States didn't
deploy any military troops. We had great leverage.
So I just think that, you know, we are going to be here 5
years from now, because talking about the same things, because
this will require at least another generation. Any involvement,
for every action, there is a reaction. It seems as though, when
there is a reaction, typically it doesn't accrue to the benefit
of the United States.
So I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. King. Gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Broun. I will just add a little more and just associate
myself with what my friend from New York, Mr. Higgins, just
said. I think very long-term the basic solution is going to be
the non-extremist Muslim saying, ``We are not going to put up
with this anymore world-wide.'' Somehow we as a Nation need to
foster that type of philosophy within the Muslim community.
Part of our heritage, part of our Constitution, part of
what we are all about is accepting people of different
religious beliefs. I don't think as a Nation we have really
understood how important it is to work with the non-extremist
Muslim community world-wide to try to help stop this. Again, I
think it is intelligence as well as our special ops people who
can help foster this.
Can you all expound upon that philosophy that I have that
it is going to be the Muslim community itself that just rejects
extremism and stops it world-wide, as opposed to us doing what
we have been doing, again, has been all about containment?
Mr. Kagan. I do agree with you that this ends when--or ends
for now when the Muslim community does reject this. But this is
not a theoretical political ideological discussion that is
being had in the Muslim right now. It is a war. This is
something that we really can't lose sight of, because you can
be an Iraqi and most Iraqis reject the Islamic State ideology.
But that doesn't do you any good if the Islamic State are the
guys who have got the guns and the gun trucks sitting on every
corner going around, rounding up everybody who speaks against
them, killing them.
If you don't have an ability to defend yourself against
those people, then disagreeing with their ideology is just an
extravagant way of committing suicide. We have done this
before. With respect to the Ranking Member, not everything we
have done has failed and not everything that we have tried has
been a mistake.
We did enable the Iraqi Sunni community to turn against al-
Qaeda in Iraq in 2007. We did support them, and they did reject
them, and they put 100,000 of their own sons into the front
line against this organization. Now, Maliki screwed that up,
absolutely, right with you on that, sir. But they did turn.
What made them turn? One of the things that made them turn was
the belief that they would win, that they would fight, they
would bleed, they knew that, but when they came to believe that
they could win, they were willing to do that. We had to help
them believe that they could win.
So what I would say is, no one is advocating a blanket,
large-scale military intervention around the world. That is not
what we are talking about. Although this committee is not
engaged in this, there is a lot of straw man discussion that is
going on in town where people are saying, oh, you just want to
send hundreds of thousands of troops. I don't know anybody who
is advocating doing that.
What I am going to say is that from the standpoint of
answering the question: Who is capable of helping moderate
Muslims defeat militarily the people who are attempting to
impose this ideology upon them by force? That capability does
not exist within the Muslim community right now.
Our alternative is going to be, we are either going to help
provide that capability to defeat this organization so that
what you are describing can occur, which I believe it will, or
we can have this protract for a much longer period of time,
have many, many, many more people die, including our own, and
have this movement spread.
I believe we can affect this. Although I absolutely do
understand that every action we take has a consequence and
there are going to be unforeseen consequences, we also need to
recognize that inaction has consequences and very frequently
unforeseen, but in this case very foreseeable consequences.
One of those is, is that if no one takes action to help
moderate Muslims defeat the armies of extremists they are now
facing, those armies will triumph for quite some time and the
situation will get a lot worse.
Mr. Broun. I agree with you. Again, I think it is our intel
community and our SF and special ops military forces that are
going to pay a key role in doing just that.
Mr. Chairman, if you will give me one more question, I
would appreciate it, because I believe the policies of four
administrations--two Republicans and two Democrats now of open
borders--and they have--both Bush administrations, the Clinton
administration, as well as now the Obama administration--have
absolutely refused to secure our borders. To me, that is a
National security issue. I think the United States is becoming
a safe haven, also, because of administrations.
Again, I think it is going to take intel, boots on the
ground, not monitoring every American's emails and phone calls,
but having the intelligence community in this country, as well
as worldwide, to have that human intelligence is absolutely
critical for us to make sure that America is as safe as
possible.
So I assume all of you all would agree that we need to
secure the borders and we need to do it as quickly as possible.
Is my assumption correct? Yes, no, all four of you?
Mr. Kagan. Yes, I would agree with you. But I think the
larger point you are making is also very important, that----
Mr. Broun. Well, absolutely.
Mr. Kagan [continuing]. The defense of the borders does not
start at the border.
Mr. Broun. No, in fact, a lot--40 percent of the people
here in this country illegally--in fact, all of the ones that
perpetrated the 9/11 attack came here legally. They just
overstayed their visa. That is also a part of the problem that
we have as a Nation. We don't know when people come and go, and
we are not following them.
Again, four administrations have been guilty of just
saying, come if you want to, and we know--people coming across
our Southern Border, I am sure across our Northern Border, as
well, that are--the Department of Homeland Security and CBP
calls them OTMs, other than Mexicans. We are capturing folks
from the Middle East, from Asia, that are coming across our
borders.
But who are we not capturing? With this flood of
unaccompanied minors that are coming into this country, it is--
that our administration has encouraged is exacerbating the
problem that we have from entities coming into this country
with other than generous reasons towards helping the United
States or for economic reasons. I think they are coming here.
So I would appreciate just a written idea from all of you
all, too, about--and I am going to ask a question for you to
answer about the funding, if you would, please answer that in
writing about--again, we see Iran funding Hezbollah, as well as
Hamas, both sides, from Sunni, as well as Shia. Iran is a huge
part of this issue, and I don't see this administration or the
previous administration really dealing with Iran to the
strength that we need to.
If you all have any suggestions about doing so, Mr.
Chairman, my time is up, unless they want to have a comment.
Mr. King. Actually, if you could do it in writing, I would
appreciate it, because we are running short on time.
So--the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Clawson. A little economic practicality here might be
in order. I think that the idea that we are the only arbiter in
the Arab world as this religious political civil war plays out
bothers me a little bit. Our trade deficit with Arab nations
and with oil-exporting nations, it is hundreds of billions of
dollars. They should be part of this solution. It is their
neighborhood, and it is our money that goes from our consumer
to their pocketbooks. Where are the gulf nations?
We have had this conversation today, where that hasn't even
come up. We should not be funding this. We are paying them. We
are paying for our oil, first of all. I think I am in agreement
with the Ranking Member that this is going to be such a
complicated thing. It is so difficult, because it is the
intersection of Government and religion which makes it a lot
different than a lot of civil wars that we have seen. It has
been going on for centuries.
I think in the Muslim world, now means 100 years time
frame, and America now means a week. Their now is a very long
now, isn't it not, gentlemen? So, therefore, I revert back to
what I am worried about for us, our allies, and especially
Israel, what--assuming we can't solve this program anytime
soon, I am worried about the supply chain, coming through
Europe or, to your point, Mr. Jones, straight to the United
States. It matters not to me all of our intelligence and all of
our resources to cut off people that are going to do us and our
enemies harm.
I am not saying, Mr. Congressman Broun or Mr. Brookes, that
we shouldn't be engaged there--you know, with special forces or
anybody else. I am saying I think that is a very difficult
situation that won't be solved anytime soon, even if we do pull
the right knobs, and in the mean time, let's cut off the supply
chain. Any communication to me that we can do to help or that I
can do to help, I am all ears.
I yield back.
Mr. King. I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony. I would just say, in conclusion for myself, this
could be a battle and struggle that goes on for decades,
centuries, whatever. My concern is the innocent Westerners that
are killed in the mean time. As far as whether or not we have
had success, the fact is, there has not been a major attack on
our mainland since September 11, 2001. To me, that is a
success.
It didn't happen just because you waited for it to resolve
itself. It is because we did take aggressive action, not always
done perfectly, but the fact is, we took action, and I think it
is because of that that we are a safer Nation today or at least
we have been protected more--since 9/11 than we have before. I
think emerging threats could make it more dangerous, but that
would even exacerbate itself if we lowered our defenses.
As far as the question of intelligence, I think it is
absolutely essential. The gentleman from Georgia and I can have
a debate, because I don't believe the NSA is listening to
anyone's phone calls or reading anyone's emails, but that is
another story for another hearing.
But if we don't fully use our intelligence capabilities and
don't maximize our potential, I believe that--while the Sunnis
and the Shias and the fragmentation within the Sunnis is being
resolved, I don't want Americans killed in the mean time. Mr.
Simcox doesn't want Europeans killed, nor do I, and I think
that is really what this is about, how we keep enough pressure
on to protect us and protect the homeland. I don't think any of
us ever wants to go through another 9/11.
So with that, the hearing stands adjourned. I thank the
witnesses for their testimony. As the gentleman from Georgia
said, any questions that you want to respond to in writing, he
is more than willing to take them. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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