[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-127]
THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY AND
MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC
STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 13, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, November 13, 2014, The Administration's Strategy and
Military Campaign Against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, November 13, 2014...................................... 47
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2014
THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC
STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 2
WITNESSES
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 9
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hagel, Hon. Chuck............................................ 53
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Jones.................................................... 61
Ms. Speier................................................... 61
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 68
Ms. Duckworth................................................ 69
Mr. Langevin................................................. 65
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 67
THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND
THE LEVANT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 13, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before we begin, I
would like to state up front that I will not tolerate
disturbances of these proceedings, including verbal
disruptions, photography, standing, or holding signs. I want to
thank you at the outset for your cooperation.
We have a hard stop at 1 p.m. today because of a House
organizational meeting. Therefore, after consultation with Mr.
Smith, I ask unanimous consent that each member shall not have
more than 4 minutes, rather than the usual 5, to question the
panel of witnesses so that we can get to as many members as
possible. Thank you.
The committee meets to receive testimony on the
administration's military campaign and strategy for Syria and
Iraq. I would like to welcome Secretary Hagel and General
Dempsey. We appreciate you being here to address these very
consequential issues.
When we last saw you in September, the Congress had just
passed an authority to train and equip [moderate] Syrian rebels
after a lengthy debate. The air campaign in Iraq had been
underway for a few weeks and strikes in Syria had not yet
begun. I stated then that I did not believe the President's
minimalist strategy was sufficient to achieve his objectives of
degrading and destroying ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant]. This hearing is critical to our understanding of the
progress made by the President's strategy and to hear from our
military leaders on what else may be needed.
The OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget amendment
that we received Monday afternoon pays for the air campaign and
adds more advisors, but it does not appear to reflect any
changes in strategy. However, we know that targeting and air
strikes are getting harder as ISIL changes tactics, and
limiting our advisors to headquarters buildings will not help
newly trained Iraqi and Syrian opposition, their forces, to
hold terrain, much less defeat ISIL in the field. Yet the
President has doubled down on his policy of no boots on the
ground despite any advice you have given him.
So my fundamental question is, how can you successfully
execute the mission you have been given to degrade and
ultimately destroy ISIL when some of your best options are
taken off the table? Mr. Secretary, both of your predecessors,
Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, have stated that we need boots on
the ground if there is to be any hope of success in the
strategy. Even Coach K, a West Point graduate and very
successful basketball coach at Duke, told an Army conference
last month that declaring we won't use ground forces is like
telling your opponent you are not going to play your best
players.
We may very well be considering a new AUMF [Authorization
for Use of Military Force] in the future, but I would offer a
warning that should the AUMF proposed by the President contain
such limitations, it will be DOA [dead on arrival] in Congress.
I will not support sending our military into harm's way with
their arms tied behind their backs.
Lastly, the risk to our forces increases even more with
terrorist detainees returning to the battlefield. ISIL's
leader, al-Baghdadi, is chief among them. There are reports of
former GTMO [Guantanamo Bay Naval Base] detainees returning to
the fight and recruiting militants for ISIL. Despite these
disturbing trends, we have seen an increase in notifications
regarding detainee transfers from GTMO.
Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, you shoulder an immense
responsibility each time you sign off on or concur on these
releases. I understand you are under pressure to release even
more. But the roughly 150 detainees that are left are the worst
of the worst. To continue these releases just as we have had to
open a new front in the war on terror is unwise.
Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey, again, thank you for
being here today. This is likely the last hearing that we will
have together, and all of the issues that bring us together are
never easy. I have always appreciated your friendship and
candid conversations, and your service, and your dedication to
this Nation. And for those of us who will not be here in the
114th Congress, let me express our gratitude to you for your
leadership, your service, and above all your devotion to our
troops.
Ms. Sanchez.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you again for being before us.
Mr. Smith could not be here this morning, and so I will be
reading his statement if it so pleases, and I hope the
chairman. So, again, these are not my words, because, as you
know, Mr. Chairman, I am probably very different than a lot of
the thought that is going on in this committee in many ways.
But these will be Mr. Smith's words.
He would like to thank the witnesses for appearing here
today. Just 3 months ago, the President notified Congress that
he had authorized the commander of Central Command to undertake
air strikes in Iraq against ISIL.
Just 2 short months ago, on September 23, the
administration provided a War Powers notification of strikes in
Syria against ISIL. And since that time, the U.S. has taken
hundreds of strikes in Iraq and Syria, killing hundreds of ISIL
fighters, eliminating their freedom to move in convoys,
substantially impacting their ability to sell oil to fund their
operations, and driving their leadership underground, which
complicated their ability to command and control their forces.
The DOD [Department of Defense] has deployed about 1,400
troops to Iraq to protect the embassy and to advise and assist
Iraqi security forces [ISF], including the Iraqi Army,
counterterrorism services, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the
President has announced that another 1,500 would go. We have
also airlifted substantial stocks of weapons and ammunition to
ISF and to the Syrian Kurds fighting ISIL, and the
administration has enlisted somewhere around 60 countries to
fight against ISIL. And a number of them have undertaken
strikes in either Iraq or Syria, and some have volunteered to
send special forces to Iraq to help. And of course Congress
approved a temporary authority for the DOD to begin training
and equipping elements of the Syrian opposition to fight ISIL.
In other words, Mr. Smith says, we have come a long way in
a fairly short amount of time. And thank you to the two of you
for leadership in arriving at most of what I just mentioned.
And even though we have made substantial progress, more remains
to be done to combat the threat of ISIL. An ISIL able to
control territory in Iraq and Syria will, without question,
plot and plan attacks about the West. I think we all agree, as
we have seen what they have been doing to the people that they
have taken, the beheadings, the executions, et cetera. I am
paraphrasing here in order to make this short, Mr. Chairman.
But going forward, we have many decisions to make about
combating the threat of ISIL. The President, for example, has
requested that Congress authorize the use of military force
against the group rather than relying on the 2001 AUMF to
combat Al Qaeda. I agree that Congress should debate and pass
an AUMF, but I am skeptical that we can assemble a majority to
do so. The President has also requested $1.6 billion to train
the Iraqi security forces, and we in Congress need to
reauthorize the Syrian train-and-equip authority. And, again,
these are the words of Mr. Smith.
I will end, and I would like unanimous consent to put the
entire statement into, let me end with just this last
paragraph, Mr. Chairman, to make it much shorter.
Going forward, prosecuting the campaign against ISIL in
either Iraq or Syria will be extremely complex and challenging.
We must not delude ourselves about this. Both Iraq and Syria
are complex, messy situations where perfect outcomes are
extremely unlikely. Whatever course of action we undertake will
take years and dedicated effort. We will have major
disagreements with our allies and partners about desired
outcomes.
Russia's role in Syria will be challenging. And while we
seem to have overlapping interests with Iran and Iraq, our
desired outcomes do not clearly align, and we certainly do not
have the same overlapping interest in Syria. All of which is to
say that these situations are going to be messy and require
constant attention and management.
Fortunately, managed correctly, we have a real path towards
the goal of degrading ISIL, denying them safe haven,
eliminating their leadership, and curtailing their ability to
strike at our allies and at us. And I hope our panelists here
will help to explain to us and the American people the
strategy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask unanimous consent to put
it forward into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Mr. Smith 10 days ago had surgery on his hip,
and he is recovering. I want to let you know he is fully
engaged. Yesterday we had our Big Four meeting working on the
bill, and he was telecommuting it. Technology made it possible
that he was in the room with us and fully, totally engaged.
One other thing I would like to mention at the outset.
Several of our members will not be with us next year, some
retired, some lost their election. Let me thank each of you for
your service to this Nation, to your service on this committee.
It is much appreciated. This committee has always tried to work
in a bipartisan manner. Anyway, I think enough said. Thank you.
Thank you for your service.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Hagel. Chairman McKeon, Congresswoman Sanchez,
members of the committee, thank you.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The Chair notes that there is a disturbance
in the committee's proceedings. The committee will be in order.
I would like to formally request that those in the audience
causing this disruption cease their actions immediately.
Thank you very much. Thank you to the Capitol Police for
restoring order.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Hagel. Chairman, obviously your last hearing is
not going unnoticed and unrecognized. So we shall proceed.
As I was saying, I very much appreciate, and I know General
Dempsey does, an opportunity to come back after a couple of
months and update this committee on what we are doing and how
we are doing it, why we are doing it. I know that this has not
been, as you all know, the only communication we have had with
this committee. We have had many, many briefings with your
staff. Many of you I have spoken to directly, as well as
General Dempsey and many of our military leaders. So to have
this opportunity to bring together in some convergence of
explanation of what we are doing and why and how, I very much
appreciate.
Mr. Chairman, your leadership and your service to this
committee, to this Congress, to this country over many years
has been recognized many times, appropriately, over the last
few months. It will continue to be recognized. It should be
recognized. I want to thank you personally for your support,
your friendship. I have valued that over the last 2 years I
have had the privilege of holding this job. I will miss you
personally, and I know this committee will, but there are so
many very able and capable and dedicated people that are right
next to you that will carry on.
So I didn't want this opportunity to go without me
expressing my thanks and best wishes to you and to your family
and to the next chapter in your life and your many new
adventures that lie ahead.
As I noted, I am joined this morning by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who I too have,
like you, have appreciated his wise counsel and his partnership
as we have dealt with some of the most complex and difficult
issues that I think this country has faced in a long time, and
I know General Dempsey appreciates all of your service as well.
General Dempsey has played a critical role over the last 6
months especially in shaping and developing our strategy, along
with our CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] commander, who you all
know, General Lloyd Austin. To General Austin and his
commanders and to our men and women, I want to thank them.
Mr. Chairman, President Obama, Chairman Dempsey, General
Austin, all of our leaders and I have been very clear that our
campaign against ISIL will be long and will be difficult. We
are 3 months into a multiyear effort. As we enter a new phase
of this effort working to train and equip more counter-ISIL
forces in both Iraq and Syria, we will succeed only with the
strong support of Congress and the strong support of this
committee.
Since I testified before this committee 2 months ago our
campaign against ISIL has made progress. ISIL's advance in
parts of Iraq has stalled, and in some cases been reversed, by
Iraqi, Kurdish, and tribal forces supported by U.S. and
coalition air strikes. But ISIL continues to represent a
serious threat to American interests, our allies in the Middle
East, and wields still influence over a broad swath of
territory in western and northern Iraq and eastern Syria.
But as President Obama has said, ISIL will not be defeated
through military force alone. Our comprehensive strategy is
focused on supporting inclusive governance, sustaining a broad-
based regional and global coalition, and strengthening local
forces on the ground. It also includes undercutting ISIL's flow
of resources, countering ISIL's messaging, constricting the
flow of foreign fighters, providing humanitarian assistance,
and our intensive regional and global diplomatic effort.
In Iraq, much more needs to be done to achieve political
reform, but we are seeing steps in the right direction. In the
wake of years of polarizing leadership, Iraqi Prime Minister
Abadi is leaning forward by engaging all of Iraqis' diverse
communities. He has appointed a Sunni defense minister after
that post was left vacant for more than 4 years, and he is
moving to create an Iraqi national guard which would empower
local forces, especially in Sunni tribal areas of Anbar
Province, while aligning them with the central government.
And you may have noticed that yesterday it was announced
that he replaced 36 of his most senior commanders, integrating
the Iraqi security forces with more senior Sunni leaders. This
is essential to strengthening not only the Iraqi security
forces, but strengthening a central government, a government in
Iraq that in fact can build trust and confidence of the Iraqi
people.
Thanks to intensive diplomacy, America is not supporting
this effort alone. We have built a global coalition to support
local forces in both Iraq and Syria, a coalition of over 60
nations that are contributing assistance ranging from air
support to training to humanitarian assistance. Since I
testified here, 16 nations have joined the military campaign
against ISIL.
The first coalition air strikes in Syria involved Bahrain,
Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, a
tremendous demonstration of unity among our Middle East Arab
partners. Coalition partners have carried out 130 air strikes
against ISIL in both Iraq and Syria. Last week, Canada launched
its first air strikes in Iraq, bringing the total to 12 nations
participating in strike operations in Iraq and Syria, as
additional partners provide tanker, command and control, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft.
Coalition nations have also pledged hundreds of personnel
to support our mission to train, advise, assist, and help build
the capacity of Iraqi forces. Our global coalition is also
helping shape the burden of the campaign, with nearly all our
coalition partners funding their own contributions. With the
President's special envoy for our counter-ISIL coalition,
General John Allen, General Allen is in the lead as he
coordinates the coalition's strategy and contributions across
all our lines of effort with our coalition partners.
As a coalition and as a nation, we must prepare for a long
and difficult struggle. There will be setbacks, but we are
seeing steady and sustainable progress. And, Mr. Chairman, I
think that is an important part of answering the questions we
have, the questions we have about our own strategy that we ask
ourselves, the questions you have about our strategy. Can we
sustain it? Can it be sustained after, at some point, we leave?
That is a critical component of our strategy, asking that
question and answering that question.
We are seeing steady and sustainable progress along DOD's
two main lines of effort. First, we are seeing progress in
degrading and destroying ISIL's warfighting capacity and in
denying safe haven to its fighters. Directly and through
support of Iraqi forces, coalition air strikes have hit ISIL's
command and control, its leadership, its revenue sources, its
supply lines and logistics, and impaired its ability to mass
forces.
In recent weeks, these strikes helped Peshmerga forces
press ISIL out of Zumar in northern Iraq and helped Iraqi
security forces begin retaking areas around the major oil
refinery at Baiji. Last weekend, air strikes hit a gathering of
ISIL battlefield commanders near Mosul. ISIL fighters have been
forced to alter their tactics. We knew they would. They will
adapt, they will adjust, maneuvering in smaller groups,
sometimes making it more difficult to identify targets, hiding
large equipment, and changing their communications methods.
Sustaining this pressure on ISIL will help provide time and
space, time and space for Iraq to reconstitute its forces and
continue going on the offense. This pressure is having an
effect on potential ISIL recruits and collaborators, striking a
blow to morale and recruitment. We know that. Our intelligence
is very clear on that. And as Iraqi forces build strength, the
tempo and intensity of our coalition's air campaign will
accelerate in tandem.
We need to continue to help build partner capacity so that
local forces can take the fight to ISIL and ultimately defeat
it. Today, many of the approximately 1,400 U.S. troops in Iraq
are engaged in advise-and-assist programs with Iraqi and
Kurdish forces.
As you know, last week the Defense Department announced
that we will expand the support to Iraqi forces by deploying up
to 1,500 additional military personnel, including 2 new advise-
and-assist centers at locations beyond Baghdad and Erbil, as
well as 4 new training centers in northern, western, and
central Iraq.
I recommended this deployment to the President based on the
request of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Central Command's
assessment of Iraqi units, General Dempsey's recommendation,
and the strength of the Iraqi and coalition's campaign plan.
These additional troops and facilities will help strengthen and
reconstitute Iraqi forces, expanding the geography of our
mission but not the mission itself. U.S. military personnel
will not be engaged in a ground combat mission.
Our phased plan to help strengthen Iraqi security forces
has three major components.
First, our advise-and-assist mission that is partnering
coalition advisors with Iraqi forces at the headquarters level.
U.S. and coalition advisors are already helping plan current
and future operations. And, as noted, we will expand this
mission with two new advise-and-assist centers that we have
announced.
Second, we will support the regeneration of Iraqi forces so
that they are better equipped to launch offensive operations
over the coming year. CENTCOM's new training sites in northern,
western, and central Iraq will help train 12 Iraqi brigades,
and more than a dozen coalition nations have expressed their
intent to send trainers and advisors to help build the capacity
of Iraqi forces.
Third, we will concentrate on broader security sector
reform to help transform Iraqi forces into a more coherent and
capable unified force. This includes Prime Minister Abadi's
initiative to develop provincially based national guard units,
which I mentioned earlier.
Coalition partners are playing an important role in all of
these efforts by providing advisors and trainers to help
regenerate Iraqi combat brigades. Together, we are also
providing more arms and equipment to Iraqi security forces.
This year, the United States alone has shipped more than $685
million in critical equipment and supplies to Iraq, ranging
from grenades and small arms to tank ammunition, helicopter
rockets, and Hellfire missiles, hundreds of which will be
arriving this month. U.S. and coalition partners together have
delivered over 2.7 million pounds of supplies, including 33
million rounds of ammunition to Peshmerga forces alone.
Mr. Chairman, in Syria our actions against ISIL are focused
on shaping the dynamic in Iraq, which remains the priority of
our counter-ISIL strategy. But we are sober about the
challenges we face as ISIL exploits the complicated, long-
running Syrian conflict. Because we do not have a partner
government to work with in Syria or regular military partners
to work with as we do in Iraq, in the near term our military
aims in Syria are limited to isolating and destroying ISIL's
safe havens.
Coalition air strikes in Syria are accomplishing this by
containing or continuing to target significant ISIL assets,
which has impaired ISIL's ability to move fighters and
equipment into Iraq, disrupted their command and control,
damaged their training bases, and significantly limited their
financial revenue by hitting captured oil fields and disrupting
their crude oil distribution and collection sites.
The Defense Department's longer-term effort is to train and
equip credible moderate Syrian opposition forces, especially
from areas most threatened by ISIL. This will require at least
8 to 12 months to begin making a difference on the ground. We
know the opposition will continue to face intense pressure in a
multi-front battlespace, and we are considering options for how
U.S. and coalition forces can further support these forces once
they are trained and equipped.
These forces are being trained in units, not as
individuals. Our strategy in Syria will demand time, patience,
perseverance to deliver results. We cannot accomplish our
objectives in Syria all at once. The position of the United
States remains that Assad has lost the legitimacy to govern.
But there is no purely military solution to the conflict in
Syria. Alongside our efforts to isolate and sanction the Assad
regime, our strategy is to strengthen the moderate opposition
to the point where they, where they can first defend and
control their local areas. Next, go on the offense and take
back areas that have been lost to ISIL. And ultimately, as
their capability and leverage develop, to create conditions for
a political settlement in Syria.
Thanks to the broad bipartisan support in Congress, Mr.
Chairman, including majorities in both parties, preparations
for our Syria train-and-equip mission are now complete. We have
established a combined joint interagency task force to
coordinate the coalition's train-and-equip program for Syria.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other partner nations have agreed to
host training sites. Development of those sites, recruiting,
and vetting will begin once Congress has authorized the actual
funding, but we are still moving forward doing what we must do
to prepare for that vetting process and that training.
We are still at the front end of our campaign against ISIL.
As President Obama told leaders of both Houses of Congress last
week during a session which I attended with General Austin,
congressional support, your support is vital for the campaign
to succeed. As you all know, the administration is requesting
$5.6 billion in additional Overseas Contingency Operations
funding for fiscal year 2015 to help execute our comprehensive
strategy in Iraq and Syria, $5 billion of it for the Department
of Defense; $3.4 billion would support ongoing U.S. military
actions against ISIL under Operation Inherent Resolve; $1.6
billion would go toward a new Iraqi train-and-equip fund
devoted to helping reconstitute Iraq's security forces.
This fund will be critical for enabling Iraqi security
forces, including Kurdish and tribal forces, to go on the
offense in 2015, and it will require the Iraqi Government and
coalition members to make significant contributions as well.
Over 60 percent or $1 billion of the $1.6 billion fund would be
available initially. The remaining $600 million would not be
released until the Government of Iraq and coalition partners
have provided at least $600 million of their own contributions
because the Iraqi Government must invest in its own security
and its own future.
As the President said last week, the administration will be
engaging the Congress to support the effort against ISIL by
enacting a new and specific authorization for the use of
military force, one that reflects the scope and the challenges
of our campaign against ISIL. DOD will work closely with the
Congress on each component of this effort. As this mission
continues to progress, we will continue to evaluate and
reevaluate each element of our strategy.
Having just marked Veterans Day earlier this week, let me
again thank this committee for what you do every day to support
all our men and women in uniform and their families serving
this country across the world.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. General Dempsey.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman. I want to add my deep
appreciation to you on behalf of the Joint Chiefs for your
leadership and all you have done for the defense of our Nation.
Your devotion to the men and women of the joint force, and,
importantly, to their families, will continue to resonate
throughout our ranks.
I too appreciate the opportunity to appear before this
committee this morning to discuss our strategy against ISIL.
Secretary Hagel has already detailed the elements and the
progress of our comprehensive approach against ISIL. Broadly,
our strategy is to reenforce a credible partner in the Iraqi
Government and assist regional stakeholders to address the 20
million disenfranchised Sunnis who live between Damascus and
Baghdad. They have to reject the ISIL ideology from within.
We are implementing an Iraq-first strategy enabled by the
coalition, but as I have said before, it is not an Iraq-only
strategy. It will evolve through the coalition and with
multiple lines of effort and over time. We need to squeeze ISIL
from multiple directions. We need to deny them safe haven and
disrupt their activities in Syria. We need to build up a Syrian
opposition to confront them. And we need to take a long view.
Achieving the outcome we desire requires that the multiple
lines of effort all have to move apace of each other.
These lines of effort include counter-financing, counter-
foreign fighter flow, counter-messaging, humanitarian aid,
economic progress, the air campaign, restoring an offensive
capability to the Iraqi security forces, and a ground campaign
managed by the Iraqi security forces with the ISF from Baghdad
and the Peshmerga from the north, with contribution from the
tribes, and in particular, in Al Anbar Province and in Nineveh
Province.
In ongoing dialogue with my coalition counterparts there is
a consensus across the coalition about our common vision and
the objectives across those lines of effort, and there is a
strong commitment to work together closely in this complex and
long-term undertaking. Progress will be uneven at times, but
with strategic patience, the trend lines favor the coalition
over the long term.
We are alert that the assumptions that underpin our
campaign will be challenged. Most notably, we don't yet know to
what degree the new government of Iraq will be able to convince
the Kurds and the Sunnis that it intends to have a government
of national unity, one that gives the people of Iraq confidence
that they have a future other than through ISIL's radical
ideology, and we don't know how sectarianism will ultimately
affect the region and our campaign. We will continue to revisit
and review our assumptions as the campaign evolves, and we will
adapt.
Which brings me to resources. Our commitments across the
globe, as you well know, are up. Resources are down. And to add
to that, sequestration is only months away. Every day that we
don't have budget certainty, flexibility, and time means that
we will continue to erode our readiness, and over time I will
have fewer military options to offer.
The Joint Chiefs and I appreciate your support to help us
work our way through not only our national security challenges,
but also the resources and the flexibility necessary to meet
them. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Dempsey, in September you testified to our
colleagues in the Senate that, I quote, ``If we reach the point
where I believe our advisors should accompany Iraqi troops on
attacks against specific ISIL targets, I will recommend that to
the President,'' end quote.
However, during a recent interview on ``Frontline,'' Deputy
National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes stated that the President
will not reconsider his boots-on-the-ground limitation
regardless of any recommendation you might provide.
Furthermore, the President seems to equate boots on the ground
to a 150,000-person U.S. invasion force. I haven't heard anyone
talk about sending in divisions. So please help us understand
the circumstances where you would envision the need to
introduce U.S. military troops into combat situations and the
size and types of forces or capabilities that these would be.
General Dempsey. Thanks, Chairman.
First, I want to make sure that I mention, I have never
been limited in my ability to make a recommendation of any size
or sort to the President of the United States.
As we look ahead to the campaign as it evolves, there are
certain operations that could be more complex than the ones in
which the Iraqi security forces are currently involved. They
are doing a better job, and I think soon we would be able to
describe it as a good job in Al Anbar and up moving north out
of Baghdad, the Pesh[merga] moving south out of the KRG
[Kurdistan Regional Government]. But there are some places
along the path that I think will be fairly complex terrain for
them, including, for example, Mosul, and eventually as they
need to restore the border between Iraq and Syria. I am not
predicting at this point that I would recommend that those
forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be
accompanied by U.S. forces, but we are certainly considering
it.
The Chairman. The size and types?
General Dempsey. Well, back to your point, it is probably
worth mentioning, there are two ways we could go about this
strategy to defeat ISIL. We could take ownership of it entirely
and then gradually over time transition it back to Iraqi
security forces, Peshmerga, tribes, Sunni opposition; or from
the beginning we could enable them and then hold them
accountable for the outcomes, because, after all, it is their
country that is most threatened by this threat. Obviously we
have taken the latter course.
In taking that latter course, we have established a modest
footprint, one that is focused on the development of the
security forces, assisting them with planning, integration of
fires, and advising and assisting them from higher
headquarters. Any expansion of that, I think, would be equally
modest. I just don't foresee a circumstance when it would be in
our interest to take this fight on ourselves with a large
military contingent.
Could there be an exception? I mentioned assumptions in my
prepared statement. One of our assumptions is that the
Government of Iraq will be inclusive. One of the assumptions is
that the Iraqi security forces will be willing to take back Al
Anbar Province and Nineveh Province. If those assumptions are
rendered invalid, I will have to adjust my recommendations.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The U.S. and our allies are facing an increased terrorist
threat from ISIL, and former U.S. detainees, in part, make up
the leadership of ISIL and also are fighting alongside ISIL.
Secretary Hagel, how can the administration continue to
press ahead with transfers from Guantanamo at this time? Isn't
this in conflict with your policy of stemming the flow of
foreign fighters?
Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Congress
delegated the responsibility and the authority to make that
ultimate decision based on the risk, security risk to the
United States and our allies, of whether we would release any
and which detainees from Guantanamo. I have, as I have noted in
testimony before this committee, taken that responsibility very
seriously, and every time I certify and send up documentation
to this committee, I am saying to this committee, with my name
and reputation, that I believe that the assurances
substantially mitigate the risk to this country and to our
allies of certain detainee releases.
Now, in September, this committee may be aware of this
number, the Intelligence Community released a percentage, based
on their intelligence, on those who have returned to violent
extremism since their release from Guantanamo in this
administration, and I am dealing with what I have right now.
And over the course of this administration's detainee
release--I think there are over 80 total, I believe over 600
during the Bush and Obama administrations--the Intelligence
Community assessed that more than 90 percent of those detainees
had not intended to or had in fact, we had no evidence of
returning to the battlefield.
Overall, you know what the President's position and policy
is on closing Guantanamo--Department of Defense supports that,
I support that--but not at any cost, not at any cost. So every
certification that I make, bottom line, with all the other
requirements by law that I have to comply with, and I do comply
with every part of the law, in my best judgment, the best
judgment of our Intelligence Community, of our Joint Chiefs, of
the interagency, of our Secretary of State, Homeland Security,
has to be unanimous before I will seriously entertain it. I
believe then, if I can get the assurances required by the host
governments and the mechanisms, and I go into detail, that it
substantially mitigates the risk, then I will sign it, and I
have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask a little about what has changed with respect
to working and training these Iraqi troops in order to make
them effective. And I say it with all due respect because you
gentlemen weren't necessarily involved in this, but I have been
here for 18 years, so I have been clearly on this side asking
some of these questions, because in Afghan, of course, we saw
that, you know, we had ghost people in the Afghan Army meaning
they didn't really exist. We had 63-year-old men, illiterate
people, you know, and that is one of reasons why I think we
have been so ineffective with respect to the training and
bringing up of the Afghan forces.
But I am particularly very interested in the Iraq
situation. This goes all the way back to the Bush
administration where they were throwing out hundreds of
thousands of numbers of who was being trained and who wasn't,
and of course they were completely and totally off and wrong.
And so then what we saw was the Iraqi Army either run away from
the fight with respect to ISIL or fall in with respect to ISIL.
And some have said that it was the leadership, that Malaki, you
know, wasn't doing the 60/20/20 thing, et cetera, et cetera.
But my question is, what has changed or what needs to
change in order for us to continue what I see as your strategy
in part, what I call the ``Iraqification'' of that army, of
having Iraqis actually fight the battle so that our people
don't come in as boots on the ground? What is it that has
changed or what did you learn from the fact that we haven't
gotten it right in Afghanistan and we then haven't gotten it
right in Iraq? What are you doing to change that so that these
men actually do take the fight to ISIL and our men and women
don't have boots on the ground?
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, I will give you an answer,
but I am going to also ask Chairman Dempsey to answer this
because, as you all know, Chairman Dempsey spent a lot of time
in Iraq, and there are few military leaders that we have today
in this country who know as much about Iraq based on personal
experience than General Dempsey. So I will give you my brief
response, and then I think this committee will want to hear
from General Dempsey on this.
What has changed? Well, a number of things have changed.
Let's start with ISIL and the threat of ISIL and what it
represents. I have said before this committee, I have said in
other places and believe it absolutely, we have never seen a
threat like ISIL before. The comprehensive threat that ISIL
represents, the sophistication, the armaments, the strategic
knowledge, the funding, the capacity, the ideology, it is new.
The threat is significantly worse than we have seen ever
before, not just in Iraq but in the Middle East, what ISIL
represents, certainly to the future of Iraq.
Second, you have a----
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Secretary, I understand the threat of
ISIL. I am asking what is the difference in the Iraqi men that
we have in the forces there in making a difference, not running
away from the battle----
Secretary Hagel. Well, I am going to----
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. Being trained correctly, being
led correctly?
Secretary Hagel. I am going to get to that. But I think it
is important, you ask what is the difference. There are a lot
of differences, like I said, starting with ISIL.
Second, a national unity government by a new Prime
Minister, who in fact, as I said in my testimony, for the first
time has designated, picked a minister of defense. We haven't
had a minister of defense in Iraq for more than 4 years. Prime
Minister Malaki took that job unto himself, as he did the
minister of interior. This new minister of defense and this new
government are reconstituting the leadership of the Iraqi
security forces. As I have noted in my testimony, 36 new
commanders were switched, starting at the top, across the top.
Men and women will not fight if they do not have confidence
in their leaders, if they do not have confidence in their
country, in their government, if their government won't support
them. Those are fundamental changes.
Now, let me hand this off to General Dempsey, and I think
get to more of the specific points.
Ms. Sanchez. And with respect to that second point, maybe,
General Dempsey, you can clarify whether those 36 new
commanders are a 60/20/20 split or the same as before.
General Dempsey. Well, I am hoping we will find out. We
don't know yet. We have got some who have been retired, some of
who have been relieved, some of who have been moved, we are not
yet familiar with who is taking their place. And I hope it is
not actually some artificial 60/20/20 ratio because what you
really want to get into the ISF is somebody who can actually
lead and fight and inspire and be inclusive. But we will see.
We will see here very shortly actually who takes the place of
those who have been changed.
This is a very brief answer to a very complex question. We
left Iraq, and we left it with some things undone. We hadn't
fully established a logistics architecture, an intelligence
architecture. They did not have close air support and the
capability to integrate fires. And we left there with a
Ministry of Defense that was largely dysfunctional in the way
that it would assign leadership. And they knew that, they knew
we knew that. But it was not a completed work. It remained a
work in progress.
And then to couple that back to the Secretary's comments,
what creates courage on the battlefield is confidence that you
have got somebody at the central government that actually will
care for you and your family. I mean, look, you don't think we
would be out there swinging and fighting if we didn't have the
support of the Congress of the United States and the kind of
support that the American public provide to our men and women
in uniform. So we really can't hold the Iraqis to a higher
standard that just simply didn't exist.
That is why I have said that one of the important
assumptions about this campaign is that the Iraqi Government
does establish its intent to create a government of national
unity. I can predict for you right now, if that doesn't happen,
then the Iraqi security forces will not hold together.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that the President said that
he would be engaging Congress to support a new, updated,
revised authorization for the use of military force. My
understanding is in every previous instance an administration
has proposed language and sent it up to the Congress. Is this
administration going to propose language and send it up to us,
and if so, when?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, I don't know specifically
what they are going to propose. I don't know specifically if
they are going to send it up as a legislative proposal. I do
know that conversations are being held right now, have been
with various Members and their staffs about the right approach.
The President said, as you know, last week, that he intends to
engage Congress on this. I know the President has had specific
conversations with specific Members of both the House and
Senate on this.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I would just comment that having
conversations is one thing, but as we learned with the
authorization to train and equip the folks in Syria, until you
get words on paper, it is kind of hard to make progress.
Let me follow up a little bit with some of your comments
that you made to Ms. Sanchez, and I noted, never before seen a
threat like ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria], or ISIL,
worse than we have ever seen before. One of the key questions
underlying all of this is to what extent we can ultimately be
successful against ISIS without dealing with Assad. And what is
your view of that? Some people believe, some of our closest
allies involved in this effort believe that we can only be
successful against ISIS if we become involved in the effort
against Assad.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, it is a fundamental question
you ask, and I will answer it this way. First, let me just make
a brief comment about my assessment about ISIL. I make that
assessment--and by the way, it is not only mine--but when you
look at the brutality, the slaughter, the indiscriminate
brutality and slaughter of what ISIL is doing and has been
doing, killing, slaughtering, murdering women and children,
Sunni, Shi'a, Kurd, minorities of any kind, completely
indiscriminate, and the sophistication of that, and again, when
you add all that up, represents a pretty clear and different
kind of threat.
Now, how does that relate to your question about Syria? I
think it is also clear that Assad, because of how he has
governed, has brought this astounding instability on himself,
on his people, on his country, and it has allowed groups like
ISIL, Al-Nusra, Al Qaeda is still there, other terrorist
organizations, to be strengthened for obvious reasons. But just
alone dealing with Assad where we are now, maybe 2 years ago, 3
years ago, that is not going to put ISIL back in the box or
defeat, beginning with degrading or defeating ISIL.
Assad is part of the equation, of course, but when you look
at what ISIL dominates now, the swath of the control they have,
eastern Syria, much of northern and western Iraq, you could
change Assad today and that is not going to change all the
dynamics quickly, certainly in Syria. But who are you going to
replace Assad with, and what kind of an Army would take on
ISIL?
So, yes, Assad is part of it. Yes, it is the longer term
part of this. To find a stable government, leaders in Syria, to
be able to bring some stability to that country is part of it.
But ISIL is right now, and ISIL is threatening the country of
Iraq and the Government of Iraq. And so that is why we are
dealing with that component first, because we must. They are a
threat to our allies. They are a threat to us.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel, you have my first 2 minutes, and, General
Dempsey, you get the next 2.
So for Secretary Hagel, there has been no discussion yet of
the OCO request for 2015, which is $5.6 billion, and I am
wondering not what is in it. We have some information on that.
But what do you know about the current 2014 OCO request through
the end of the CR [continuing resolution], what is in that, and
why do you need an additional 5.6 in the 2015 given that there
is authority for you, at least through the CR, for out of 2014
money?
Secretary Hagel. Well, the quick answer to your question as
to why do we need additional. As I have noted in my testimony,
part of that new additional money, the $5 billion for defense,
is for a new train-and-equip program in Iraq. When we had the
budget hearings, when the original OCO submissions were made
months and months ago, that wasn't the case. So it is a new and
sustaining effort.
The other dollars are for the continuation, which we didn't
have 6 months ago either, of our efforts in Syria and Iraq, air
strikes, train and assist, train and equip, will be in the 1.6,
but the continued assistance and other assistance that we are
giving Iraq.
So it is separate, it is new, it is different, and
particularly the sustainability of us being able to do that and
carry it out. And we thought too it was the most honest way to
do it, set up a fund, let everybody know the accounting and how
we are doing it and why. So that is essentially the bottom line
of why we presented it the way we did.
Mr. Larsen. All right. Two minutes. Good job. Thanks.
General Dempsey, somewhat related. The defense has
requested a broad waiver of existing laws in this request for
the Iraq train and equip, and I understand there is a
discussion about requesting a similar waiver for the Syria
train and equip. Why does the Department need such a waiver and
what would the impacts be if you didn't get waivers and you,
for example, had to follow existing acquisition laws in order
to implement?
General Dempsey. Yeah, the issue is pace, I think, is
probably the short answer to your question, Congressman. We
think that a national security waiver in the hands of the
Secretary of Defense allows us to move with the pace we believe
we need to move in an environment that where--you know, it is
interesting, one of the realities of this campaign is kind of
the conflict between progress and patience, you know what I
mean. And so I have mentioned that strategic patience is
actually a virtue in this kind of conflict. I think progress
purchases patience, and in that context the waiver would allow
us to move at a pace that would allow us to produce that kind
of progress that would, as a result, result in patience.
Mr. Larsen. All right. That is fine. Thank you both for
giving me some food for thought. I appreciate it. I appreciate
you coming in.
Yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, it is kind of ironic, the last time that I
heard before today a Secretary of Defense talk about military
involvement in Iraq was Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that got us
into a war that was unnecessary.
I know ISIL is evil. There is no question about it. They
need to be taken out. But I looked at some of your statements
from 2002 when you were a Senator and how you felt about the
obligation of a Member of Congress to make a decision to send a
young man or woman to die. I also looked at your statements in
2007 when, like myself, you came out against the surge in Iraq.
Now we are possibly going to be asked by the President of
the United States, like we were by George Bush, to authorize an
AUMF. This is nothing but an abdication of our constitutional
responsibility to give any President an AUMF. We tried this
past year in June when we had the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] bill, Adam Schiff tried to sunset out the
AUMF that we gave to President Bush, which has been used by
President Obama, and I do not understand how we in Congress can
continue to abdicate what the Constitution says is our
responsibility.
Before I get to a brief question, James Madison once said,
``the power to declare war, including the power of judging the
causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested in the
legislature.'' And I do not believe, sincerely, because when
this happens to be President Obama, he wants to have another
AUMF or an extension of what we have, I hope that the Congress,
both parties will look seriously at what is our responsibility.
Because it is not going to be but so long. You have sent
more and more troops to Iraq to train. Many of these are former
Saddam Hussein loyalists, and now they are fighting with ISIL,
and then some are still now fighting with the other side. It is
very complex, I understand that, and I agree with that. But for
goodness sakes, why in the world should we make such a
commitment and we don't have an end point to it?
I would like for you or General Dempsey, I have great
respect for both of you, to submit for the record two things
very quickly.
Mr. Jones. How does this new war end, in your opinion?
And I realize it is just your opinion, but that is very
important because of who you are.
What is the end state of what we are trying to accomplish?
The American people--over 50 percent of the American people do
not want our personnel in Syria or in Iraq. And I will be
honest with you, I don't know how we can convince the American
people that a nation that is financially broke--you sat right
here, General Dempsey--and you are exactly right--sequestration
and all the budget problems coming your way and yet you are
asking for $5 or $6 billion to drop more armaments in Iraq and
Syria. Where is it coming from?
Please explain to the American people and to this Congress
how this war is going to end someday, whether we are advisors
or we are fighting. And I hope to God we are not fighting, and
I hope we do not give the President a new AUMF.
So if you will get those into the committee for written
form, then, you won't have to answer the questions.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Jones. But this, again, it looks like we are going down
the same road that Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told us we had to
do, we had to do, and yet we had no end point to that as well.
So thank you very much.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman Jones, if I might just respond
very briefly.
You very accurately described my position when I was in the
United States Senate. But it is basic, as you have noted, to
the responsibilities of Congress. And an AUMF comes out of
Congress. The authority of military force for a President, that
authority comes from the Congress of the United States. And I
too hope that Congress will engage in this. And I have great
confidence the Congress will. They need to. They must. It is a
responsibility of the Congress.
So I am right with you in that point, and I will give you
my best thoughts on your other question as well.
Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing. Secretary Hagel, and, General Dempsey, thank
you for your time today.
As I have stated before, I believe that ISIL could become a
direct threat to the United States or our allies in Europe, and
we must make efforts to avoid that threat. While I believe that
we must keep all our options open, it must be a joint effort
with our coalition and allies to stop ISIL.
Secretary Hagel, what additional U.S. or allied military
support do you believe it will take for the Iraqis, the Kurds,
or the Syrian rebels to hold their current position and
eventually advance to retake areas now controlled by ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, as I noted in my statement,
that is a very important part of what we are doing to assist
Iraqi security forces as they strengthen their capacity,
capabilities. That is obviously a big part of the train-and-
equip effort as our coalition partners are with us on this, as
well as a reinstitution of the Iraqi security forces at the top
with confidence, with trust of the men and women in uniform and
a unity government that they, in fact, believe is worth
fighting for, as General Dempsey said, that they have some
confidence in, not just for themselves, but their families.
And so, as I have noted, it is a comprehensive strategy. I
believe it can be done, but this is an Iraqi fight. It is their
future. And we can help. We are helping. We are doing
everything we can. And we will continue to support them as we
will with our coalition partners. But that is the way I would
just very briefly respond to the question.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General Dempsey, in testimony before the Senate back in
October, you mentioned that OCO is not the solution to funding.
And I have stated before that I agreed that the OCO credit card
is going to come to an end sometime very soon. However, as the
ranking member on Readiness, I am deeply concerned about the
impact of the loss of OCO on readiness.
When will you have a better sense of what this is going to
cost, both monetarily and in manpower to continue operations
against ISIL? What is the Department doing to plan and budget
for this and other activities into the base budget?
General Dempsey. Yeah thanks, Congresswoman. I did say
that. In fact, I think I went on to say that OCO or the
Overseas Contingency Operations fund was gas money and that the
service chiefs actually also need the base to support the
recruiting, training, organizing, and equipping of the force
over time. You can't sustain the force with OCO. You can use
it, and that is why I described it as gas money.
To your question, we actually have a pretty good idea of
what it is costing right now. And given that we think that our
level of commitment is about what it will be for the
foreseeable future, it is approximately $8 million a day. And
the funding requests that the Secretary mentioned accounts for
that.
We are well aware of the desire to rely less on OCO and
more on base. That is a debate--you know, from a military
perspective, I can just tell you what I need. And you all have
to guide how to provide what I need.
But the base budget is an important component of readiness
because it is the foundation on which we build.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlelady yields back the balance of time.
Mr. Secretary, we understand that you recently had to
postpone your trip to Vietnam and Burma to prepare for this
hearing and others on Capitol Hill. And I know our allies and
partners in the region are concerned with senior administration
officials postponing important travel to the region, and I
share their concern. But I hope they can understand that our
government has the ability to walk and chew gum at the same
time.
While we are focused in this hearing on the ISIL challenge,
we remain as committed as ever to America's enduring interests
in the Indo-Pacific area, and I appreciate your attendance here
on this important topic and the accommodations you have made to
the hearing.
But, also, I hope you will reschedule your trip and
continue your strong record of engagement in Asia. And thank
you for being here.
The last time you were here, we asked a question about a
strategy to cut off the finances for ISIL. And I think you were
kind enough to acknowledge then that we needed to develop that,
and I was just wondering if you could outline for us a little
bit about the strategy that we have now in trying to cut off
the finances of ISIL.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you for your thoughts
on the Asia-Pacific emphasis in rebalance.
As you have accurately noted, I unfortunately had to make a
decision and I didn't want to have to do that for the reasons
you mentioned. As you probably know, since I have been
Secretary of Defense, I have had six major trips to the Asia-
Pacific. This would have been my seventh. I will reschedule. We
are planning on that rescheduling. I talked to all of our Asian
partners--Pacific partners, explained to them why I was having
to reschedule. And I get the emphasis. I agree with you
completely.
But at the same time, to your point about the
administration being able to walk and chew gum at the same
time, as you know, the President is there now and will be in
that area for a few more days in different countries. We will
have other follow-up visits as well. But I am rescheduling. It
is important. There is no less emphasis on the importance of
the rebalance.
On your question about financing on ISIL, I alluded to a
couple of things in my statement. When I talked about cutting
off their more obvious oil sales as they have, as you know,
taken control of some of the oil fields in eastern Syria as--
and they did have some in western Iraq. We have been able to
take back some of that, the Iraqis have, in most all of it,
Baiji oil refinery and so on.
But that is one thing that we are doing and have been
pretty effective. Have been able to not only disrupt that, but
stop that oil flow out of there that gets into the borders. And
they were getting a few million dollars a day from that.
Now, other things, our Treasury Department is taking a lead
on this, with partners all over the world, United Nations,
European partners, Middle Eastern partners. We are trying to
shut those money markets off, any way of funding and resourcing
ISIL has, continues to have. We have made a global effort that
we lead.
As you know, they also get funds from contributions inside.
We try to stop that through our intelligence communities. So
this is as much of a focus as it was when I was here 2 months
ago. It has to be for the reasons that I mentioned. And as I
also said in our comprehensive strategy, cutting off those
funds is a very big part of what we are doing and what we are
attempting to do and will continue to do.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
My time has expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized
for 4 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Forbes.
Earlier Secretary Hagel, some of your predecessors were
cited as sort of some grounds or authority for the notion of
boots on the ground, larger presence of boots on the ground in
Iraq and, I suppose, in Syria.
I want to just, for the record, again remind people that
Secretary Gates in his farewell address to the West Point
stated, I think, correctly that any Secretary of Defense who
advises the President to engage in a ground invasion in the
Middle East ought to have their head examined. And I think the
approach that you have described here today, which is to
strengthen local forces to provide assistance as we have seen
unfold in Kobani is really the right approach to adhere to
Secretary Gates' good advice, I think, which is that, you know,
we are not going down that path again.
And as someone who voted for the title 10 authorization, I
just want to share with you: A mother from London, Connecticut,
of a Marine came up to me and said, you know, I am with you to
this you know, to this extent; but, you know, I am counting on
you not to, again, open the door to just--a redux visit of what
this country went through over the last 8 years or so. So I
just want to share that input with you.
Your request for additional resources obviously is in the
middle of a lame duck where it is not clear where we are going
yet in terms of whether it is going to be an omnibus with an
additional amount as you have requested. There has been talk
that the majority is actually, at least, discussing the notion
of a continuing resolution into the next Congress.
And I am just wondering if you could share your thoughts
about what a CR would mean in terms of being able to, again,
implement the operations that Congress authorized.
Secretary Hagel. Well, recognizing the purview of the
Congress on appropriations, I will answer your question this
way because you have asked me for my thinking on it. I will
begin with what Chairman Dempsey said. Any enterprise must have
the flexibility and essentially the authority to plan, as best
we can, every business, every nonprofit.
And to take away that critical management tool for the
Pentagon where we cannot plan, based on a continuing resolution
every few months--maybe this will happen. Maybe this will
happen, or maybe it won't happen, is really disastrous. And it
does damage to our institution. It does damage to the
confidence of our men and women that we ask to go out and
serve. It does huge damage to our future investments.
You know, people don't recognize sometimes that our defense
enterprise has to be thinking years and years down the road.
The platforms that we have today, the sophistication of our
technology and our platforms far superior to anything since
World War II or anybody else's. This just didn't happen. It
didn't happen a year ago, 2 years ago, 2 years ago.
These planning stages and investments in having some
certainty that you have got to budget and you know what you are
going to have in that budget is critical to planning. So
continuing resolutions are not good for the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Courtney. And in terms of the specific operations that
we are discussing today, I mean, again, is that just sort of,
again, make it difficult for you to figure out what, you know,
extent of operations you can conduct?
Secretary Hagel. Well, you factor that in. That is exactly
right. And when you take away--those are hugely important
management tools, but we are talking about our national
security here. We are not talking about putting out a new
product or a new colored shoe or overcoat or automobile. We are
talking about the national security of our country.
So as much ability, flexibility that we have to have some
certainty as to what is ahead, also, to retain a force that
these young men and women, smart, they have got other options.
And these young enlisted and officers think about what is
ahead. Am I financing or are we going to continue to drawdown?
What is the future? I understand it is an uncertain world,
unpredictable world, but we all do.
But you can't run institutions--especially the Department
of Defense--responsibly on continuing resolutions.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is
recognized 4 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for being
here today.
The American people are counting on you to provide
information, counsel to our President. And you have indicated,
Secretary, national defense is your priority. And I am just so
concerned that the President has an odd world view.
It is inconceivable to me the release of trained mass
murderers as detainees from Guantanamo builds goodwill
anywhere. But it does put the American people at risk. It puts
our military at risk.
And I have a personal interest. Two of my sons served in
Iraq. They developed a great appreciation of the people of Iraq
who do want to live in a democratic society, not a totalitarian
or authoritarian. Additionally, I have got four sons now
serving in the military. And I believe in peace through
strength. I am counting on you, and so are my constituents, the
American people.
In this regard, Mr. Secretary, the Islamic State, does it
still pose an imminent threat to the people of the United
States and is it an imminent threat to our allies?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I--thank you, Congressman, and thank
your sons. Again, I am well aware of their service and what
your family has done for our country, continues to do.
As I said in my statement and, I think, in some of the
comments I have made here this morning, it is a threat. It
continues to be a threat, a significant threat to the United
States, to our interests, to our allies. And we have seen every
dimension of that play out. So, yes.
Mr. Wilson. And, in such a threat, would the capabilities--
say, the seizure of an extraordinary city, Mosul, that enhances
the threat, doesn't it?
Secretary Hagel. It does. And we are very honest about
that. As I said in my statements, I think that there is good
progress being made by the Iraqi security forces, Peshmerga, as
we--just to give you one example. Over the weekend--you may be
aware of this--there was a ceremony in Anbar Province. And
about 2,000 Sunni tribesmen were there and are preparing to be
sworn in to the Iraqi security forces. This is in the province,
the general area of Mosul and the area that will have to be
taken back.
The ISIS--ISF forces have taken much of that back, not
Mosul yet. They will. But the Mosul dam, Haditha dam--I
mentioned in my comments Zumar, Baiji oil field, a lot of good
news there.
But, yes, of course, any time they hold significant,
identifiable cities or pieces of geography, it makes it more
difficult.
Mr. Wilson. And we should remember that, indeed, Osama bin
Laden operated from a cave, a safe haven in the middle of
Afghanistan and was able to conduct mass murder in this country
and around the world.
And in regard to achieving a stable, self-reliant Iraq, can
this be done with the personnel that you have sent or what do
you anticipate?
Secretary Hagel. Well, first, we, the United States, cannot
assure a stable Iraq. The Iraqi people will have to do that. As
I have said, we are supporting them. We are doing the things
that we think are most important, the things they have asked us
for, they have requested from us and that is a significant
difference from recent years. They have invited us in. They
have invited us with our coalition partners in to help them.
But I believe Prime Minister Abadi and others understand
the seriousness of this. It is imperfect, but they have to do
it. And we will help them do it, but they have to do it.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The Chair recognizes Ms. Tsongas from
Massachusetts for 4 minutes.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you--both of you for being here.
I, like my colleagues, remain greatly concerned with recent
developments in both Iraq and Syria. But given the long-term
consequences of U.S. operations in the region, I think we have
to be sure that the administration's overarching strategy and
objectives are fully discussed and robustly debated here in
Congress. This is especially important, given the lessons of
the last decade when, despite 7 years of conflict in Iraq,
4,500 American lives lost and more than $1.5 trillion spent,
our military efforts did not resolve the sectarian conflict we
are now confronted with.
Given these harsh lessons and because a full-throated
debate has not occurred, I have voted against a short-term
authorization to train and equip the moderate Syrian forces.
Before we move forward, we need to be clear on what we are
asking and will ask of our brave service men and women, what
the costs might be, how we are going to pay for any operations
against ISIL, what the exit strategy is, what we are asking of
our regional partners, their willingness and capability to
meaningfully engage in this effort, and what our ultimate goal
might be. But it seems to me the horse is ever more out of the
barn.
While I have appreciated the President's current commitment
to not send U.S. ground troops into combat, I am troubled by
the recent tasking of an additional 1,500 troops to Iraq and
President Obama's statement that he has not ruled out deploying
more troops.
General Dempsey, I appreciate your candor. I think you are
very forthcoming when you describe a complex, multifaceted,
long-term effort that requires strategic patience in a
situation that will continue to evolve. And you have said in
the past and are clear about today saying that there are
situations in which you could consider recommending ground
troops.
You also just described the very important role of the
Iraqi security forces and the deep investment that we are
making in bringing their capability back to par so that they
can take on this task.
But what if they are not up to the task? Could you talk
about some scenarios you might envision? As you said, you only
make recommendations. I would like you to talk, if you could,
about some of the recommendations you might make if it becomes
clear that the Iraqi security forces cannot take this on.
General Dempsey. Yeah. What I would like to do,
Congresswoman, is give you kind of an unclassified answer, but
promise you that, in a classified session next week, we can
talk about contingency planning.
So if--I mentioned earlier, if some of the assumptions we
have made are rendered invalid, of course, we will have to have
a branch, as we call it in military terms, to our campaign
plan.
There are other--look, we absolutely need a credible
partner to provide ground forces in that region so that we
don't have to provide the ground combat power to accomplish the
task. If the Government of Iraq fails to reach the kind of
national unity agenda that we think they need, which would
empower and encourage the Iraqi security forces, then, we will
have to look for other partners in the region to assist us or
build other partners in the region. But, again, I would defer
to a classified setting anything more than that.
I will say that since we--I think we agree that this is a
long-term commitment. You mentioned end state. It is--the end
state is defined as the--ultimately, the defeat of ISIL. I have
actually said, including in my opening statement, that will
occur when the 20 million disenfranchised Sunnis that live
between Damascus and Baghdad reject that ideology and we see
some indication, just, again, a glimmer of indication that that
is beginning.
ISIL has to continue to advance to succeed. It has to
maintain momentum. And we have begun to break that momentum.
And, then, I think we will have a clearer picture in answer to
your question.
One last point: This campaign will be marked or
characterized--I have described it this way--three steps
forward, two steps back and, at every step forward or back, we
will debate about the size of the step.
Ms. Tsongas. I look forward to your classified briefing.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the chairman of the Tactical Air and
Land Subcommittee, Mr. Turner from Ohio.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel, I want to personally thank you for your
support for a provision that is in the National Defense
Authorization Act that protects the custody rights of our
service men and women.
As you know, the House, on a bipartisan basis, has in the
past 6 years taken action to provide a national standard to
protect men and women in uniform custody rights.
I appreciate your letter of October 30th where you both
affirm the DOD support for that provision, but also go further
in to say that this legislation does not affect other State
custody laws and precludes Federal court jurisdiction.
Thank you for the time you spent with me and for your
thoughtfulness in this matter.
General Dempsey, you said that you have never been limited
in your recommendations to the President. We are also aware
that he has never been limited in his ability to reject them.
Our inquiry to you is not whether or not you have been
forthcoming in your recommendations, but in the gap that might
exist between your recommendations and the President's proposal
that is before us. We all have concerns about how effective the
air strikes have been as they have both been intermittent and
in--and dispersed.
Also, the issue, as Loretta Sanchez has raised, as to how--
having the--you know, the diversity of populations participate
in being able to take Iraq, how, the Kurdish and other forces
might be able to be armed and your assurances that that will be
able to be accomplished, working with the Iraqi regime.
So our question to you is: Is in evaluating our support for
the President's proposal, we would like to know what is missing
in your recommendations versus what we are receiving from the
President?
General Dempsey. Before I actually answer the question, you
have described the air campaign as--I think you described it as
erratic or episodic.
Mr. Turner. Intermittent.
General Dempsey. Intermittent. I knew there was a word.
Mr. Turner. I would never say ``erratic'' because I have
such regard for you.
General Dempsey. Thanks for the opportunity.
But the word I want to add is ``precise.'' And, you know,
look, the thing that will cause the Sunni population to
actually take heart and begin to reject ISIL is if we are very
careful not to create circumstances of civilian casualties or
to, in some way, impact on other groups, tribes, for example.
So we have got to be very, very deliberate and very precise
in our air campaign. And I think we are accomplishing that. In
just over 800 strikes to date, I think we have been both
successful and careful.
To your point about whether there is a gap? I can say to
you today there is no gap. Both General Austin and I have made
recommendations, and those recommendations have been accepted.
Any recommendation is made with a risk assessment. You know
there is high-risk options, moderate-risk options, and low-risk
options.
A low-risk option to the campaign would probably include
the introduction of U.S. ground forces to take control of the
fight. Neither General Austin nor I and certainly the Secretary
of Defense believe that is the right thing to do at this point.
So our--there is no gap right now.
Mr. Turner. You know that we will continue, obviously, to
provide oversight and inquiry in that. And we hope that you
will certainly share with this committee, to the extent that
that gap evolves, because we are very concerned about the
success of what the President's goal is to defeat and degrade
ISIS. And we look to your leadership for that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Loebsack, is
recognized for 4 minutes.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thanks to both of you
for being here.
I was writing down lots of questions while you were talking
because I think I probably reflect my constituents' concerns
about what we are doing there and the number of questions that
they have. This doesn't even begin to get at what I have been
hearing over the course of the past several months in my
district in Iowa, at least. And I may be repeating some things.
I had to step out for about half an hour, so I apologize if I
am.
But if you could, first, explain in, at least, some detail,
what is the ISIS threat regionally or otherwise? Can you lay
that out? What is the threat?
Secretary Hagel. Well, the threat--you started, I think,
with regionally or otherwise, is the extent of the brutality
and the inhumanity of what they have been doing, what they
continue to do as they have expanded their base up until--most
recently until we, the United States and our coalition
partners, got into this about 3 months ago. They are a threat
to the Iraqi Government. As was noted here in an earlier
question about, they still control the second largest city in
Iraq, Mosul.
As they--if they would be allowed to continue, they would
not only, as they already have, to a great extent, inflame a
sectarian war and continue to gather momentum with their
ideology, which brings in their successes and momentum foreign
fighters who hold passports from the United States, from
European nations. That starts to extend the threat to not just
the region and to Iraq and countries there, but to Europe, to
the United States. And I could continue, but I think you get
the picture.
Mr. Loesback. Yeah. Thank you.
We have not heard the word ``counterinsurgency'' in this
debate, I don't think, because that was obviously our approach
to Iraq and Afghanistan earlier on. And then, correct me if I
am wrong, but it seems, though, we kind of then transformed
whatever military operations we have been doing in this regions
to counterterrorism perhaps.
Where would this fall? What you are trying to do, where
would this fall if there was a contingency as such--maybe there
isn't. Explain to me if there isn't--but between
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency?
Because, in fact, ISIS or ISIL is creating a state if they
are actually creating governments. And if they are
consolidating their control, might counterinsurgency be really
the way to go as far as responding to them?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I think our----
Mr. Loebsack. I am not advocating that. I am just asking
from an analytical standpoint.
Secretary Hagel. No. I think our strategy--and it is a good
question--is pretty clear on this point because you have
really, I think, hit the centerpiece.
Our strategy is counter-ISIL. And if you were here for my
testimony, I walk through a number of those points. General
Dempsey has further refined those points as to how we are
countering ISIL, what are we doing about that.
And one of the points that I noted, it is a comprehensive
strategy. It has to be. Many of the questions here this morning
have gotten into that, one, being their funding, cutting off
their funding, coalition partners, all the partners of the
region involvement--involved strengthening the Iraqi security
forces, doing everything we can to support a new Iraqi unity
government that reaches out to everybody, the Sunni, the Shi'a,
the Kurds, all the minorities, giving everyone some
participatory power in their government, which elicits
confidence and trust in their government. So that is our
strategy.
Now, we can frame it up by however way you want. But it is
counter-ISIL. It is a strategy that is focused on this
particular issue, this particular threat. And the world is
dynamic and changes, and we are not going back to what worked
in--12, 10 years ago. We learn from mistakes. We learn from
things that worked. But this is a unique threat.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman----
General Dempsey. May I, Chairman? I can do this in 30
seconds.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General Dempsey. Clearly, we are alert to any threats that
could emanate from Iraq and Syria with planning and operational
activities that could threaten the homeland. And you have seen
us take some actions here of late that clearly align with a
counterterror strategy.
I would suggest to you that Iraq is actually conducting a
counterinsurgency. And we are enabling it with our air power,
our planning, and our assistance. Because they do have an
insurgency on their hands. And, actually, it allows them to
think about, not just the military component. So as they clear
an area, whether it is up to Baiji or out to al Assad, they
have got to follow it up with governance, economic development,
humanitarian assistance. Otherwise, that insurgency will
persist.
Mr. Loebsack. All right. Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline, is
recognized.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Just following up on this discussion here the last minute
or two, I think it is important for all of us in this
committee, all of us in America for that matter and certainly
you gentlemen to keep the focus on what the policy is. The
policy is to defeat ISIS, our enemy. Whatever we do with Iraq
is a tool in achieving that policy.
It is not--our ultimate goal here isn't to protect Iraq and
build a stable Iraq. We just need that tool to affect our
policy of defeating ISIS.
And sometimes I think we forget. We start talking about how
many wars we are in or what are we doing, can the Iraqis defend
their own country and so forth. All useful discussion. But the
policy is to defeat ISIS.
General Dempsey, are Americans flying helicopters now in
Iraq?
General Dempsey. Yes.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
And in a classified session, I would like to get some more
information about what that force looks like.
But it reminds me that, while we may have forces in
compounds doing various intelligence and logistics and so
forth, we actually have Americans out and about in harm's way.
And that makes me think that I hope, and, again, this is
probably a discussion for another day--that we have good
American medical support for those soon to be 3,000 or so
American forces there. We don't want Americans in harm's being
reliant on, in this case, Iraqi medical support. So, again,
probably a discussion for another day.
And then my question, General Dempsey, is: You said in an
earlier answer to a question, as you were talking about turning
over to Iraqi security forces some responsibility to do some
fighting, that, if they can't do it, we would, quote, ``hold
them accountable.'' I can't understand what that means, ``hold
them accountable.'' What would--how would we do such a thing,
hold them accountable?
General Dempsey. Yeah. I actually think, Congressman, maybe
there is two answers that have been--that have been pulled
together into one to create that confusion.
What I said was that, among the tenets of our strategy is
that, as we assist the ISF and the Peshmerga, that the
Government of Iraq has to be held accountable for progress that
matches the military progress.
Mr. Kline. But what does that mean?
General Dempsey. Well, what that means is, if they do not
form and actually manifest this national unity agenda, then,
frankly, it will be among--I will be among those that recommend
that we do not support them to the degree we are supporting
them. Because that has got to--there has to be some
conditionality to our support, it seems to me.
Mr. Kline. Well, I--clearly, I mean, I agree with you. I am
just not sure that we know yet what that ``hold accountable''
means. We don't give them any more money? What? I don't know
what that means.
But I do think that is important that we all--and certainly
the two of you--think about--and the President and so forth,
what does that mean, hold them accountable? Again, keeping in
mind what our policy is and what your job is, is to defeat
ISIS.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for 4 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, thank you very much for your service and,
Mr. Secretary, the same. We appreciate all that you are
attempting to do.
My question, General Dempsey: Are we at war in Iraq and
Syria?
General Dempsey. We are at war against ISIL, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Since that is the case, would you,
Secretary, please provide in writing the most recent legal
authority for the United States to conduct such a war. We know
that, previously, there was talk of the War Powers Act. But,
apparently, that is no longer the case since 90 days has passed
and we are still at war.
Perhaps there is the Iraq or the Afghanistan authorization
to use military force, but I would like to have the most recent
legal justification, if you would please, for the record.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. Also, we heard the chairman in his opening
remarks say that any authorization to use military force that
is not unlimited is dead on arrival. Since the chairman is not
here, perhaps his staff could tell the chairman that, at least,
this member of this committee would love to see his proposed
authorization to use military force as broad as he might like
to do. Bottom line here--this is more for us than for you two
gentlemen--is the obligation that we have under the
Constitution to declare war.
Now, there may be some legal justification in the past that
could be stretched for this war. I don't think so. So we have
an obligation here, and we should be about that. We ought not
wait until the next Congress. You have said, the President has
said, to conduct a war successfully, we all need to be
supporting it. We are not at the moment.
Now, my questions to you two gentlemen have to go with two
issues that have not yet been discussed. You have mentioned the
coalition, but you have not specifically mentioned Turkey or
Iran. Would you please do so. What are they doing? What is
their role now? And what do you see it in the future?
Secretary Hagel. Well, Iran is not a member of the
coalition. As you know, historically, Iran and Iraq have had
cultural, religious, economic ties. That doesn't stop. It
hasn't stopped. We are not coordinating with the Government of
Iran. We are not working with the Government of Iran.
Mr. Garamendi. Is the Government of Iran involved in any of
the military activities in Iraq?
Secretary Hagel. They are not involved in anything that the
United States or the coalition is involved in.
Mr. Garamendi. That is not my question. Are they involved
in any military activities in Iraq?
Secretary Hagel. As far as I know, the Iranian army is not
engaged in Iraq. There may be other components, Shi'a militia,
those kinds of groups that have been there that have--over the
years, we have dealt with over the years. But as far as an
official Iranian Government military presence in Iraq, I am not
aware of any.
Mr. Garamendi. And now Turkey.
Secretary Hagel. Turkey, as I noted in my comments, has
agreed to be one of the training sites for the train and equip
of the Syrian moderate opposition. They, as you know, worked
with us opening up the airspace to get in supplies into Kobani
for the Peshmerga to resupply their forces. They continue to
work with us on other areas of common interest that are
important to our efforts there and, of course, their own
border. They, as you know, are hosting one and a half million
refugees coming out of Syria.
So, no. They are part of the coalition, an active part. And
we continue to work with them on those areas.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Texas----
Mr. Conaway. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 4
minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield
my time to Dr. Heck, Chairman of the O&I [Oversight and
Investigations] committee--subcommittee.
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Heck is recognized, then, for 4 minutes.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Secretary, General
Dempsey, thanks for being here today.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciated your general comments
regarding GTMO detainees earlier in the hearing. As you know,
since early June, this committee has undertaken an
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the transfer
of the five Taliban detainees from GTMO to Qatar. The committee
appreciates the Department's cooperation in this very important
matter.
In addition to previous requests, the committee recently
sent two letters to you requesting additional material and
support. Just ask if the committee will continue to have your
commitment for the Department's cooperation with the items
noted in these letters and with other aspects of the
committee's ongoing work?
Secretary Hagel. Yes. Of course. And we will continue to
cooperate as we have been.
Dr. Heck. Okay. And, Secretary, I am curious as to whether
or not you are being kept up to date regarding the Qatar
Government's compliance with the terms of the memorandum of
understanding [MOU] for the prisoner exchange? And, if so, who
in the Department is specifically responsible for keeping you
updated? And are you satisfied with the terms of the MOU being
met?
Secretary Hagel. Yes. Every 2 weeks, I receive a report. We
have a special envoy in the Department that we work with, along
with the General Counsel's office. I talk with the General
Counsel every 2 weeks about this. Steve Preston.
I am continually assured that the Qatari Government is
fulfilling its commitments that it made to us in exercising the
operations that they said that they would in order to maintain
the security of these five individuals. But, yes, every 2
weeks--sometimes more often than not. But every 2 weeks, I get
a readout.
Dr. Heck. I would ask. You know, there has been some report
in open source media about some of the visitors that the
detainees have received and whether or not they are having
access to communication systems that are outside of what is
permitted through the MOU. Any concerns from us in regards to
that type of activity?
Secretary Hagel. I--within the limits of an open hearing
here, I am aware of those reports. And I--nothing that I have
seen so far concerns me more than what we are doing now, and it
is within the boundaries of the assurances that we received
and--and the agreement that we have from the Qatari Government.
Dr. Heck. Thank you. And I appreciate the Department's
continued support as the subcommittee continues its
investigation.
Secretary Hagel. And we will.
Dr. Heck. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized
for 4 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Thank you, Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, for your
leadership.
The Chair early on spoke about Guantanamo detainees joining
the fight with ISIL. He has repeated that on a number of
occasions.
Is there any evidence that detainees from Guantanamo have
joined the fight with ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. Not that I am aware of.
Ms. Speier. General Dempsey?
General Dempsey. The Secretary, in his comment, referred to
approximately--of the 89 or so released, that 90 percent of
them we have clear evidence that there has been no recidivism.
The other 10 percent are largely unaccounted for.
ISIL, of course, is a recent manifestation, within about
the last 9 months. But, if I could, we will take that one for
the record.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
You know, sometimes I feel like we are in a time warp. As
we have been sitting here talking about ISIL, CNN has been
reporting that there is a change in strategy by the
administration. And it is now going to potentially refocus its
effort on toppling Assad. So while we are focused here on ISIL,
it appears that yet another strategy is being undertaken by the
administration.
Can either of you respond to that, please?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I believe the administration has
addressed that last night and again this morning, as well as
the State Department, as well as the Defense Department.
No, there is no change in the strategy. And, again, the
National Security Council has addressed it. The State
Department has. We have. So----
Ms. Speier. Well, let me ask you----
Secretary Hagel [continuing]. That is all I can tell you.
There is--there is no change, and there is no different
direction.
Ms. Speier. Let me ask you this question, then. Our
presumption has been that we would train the Free Syrian Army
and that they would, as trainees, then fight ISIL. There have
been many reports that suggest that they are not willing to
fight ISIL. They want to first topple the Assad regime.
So what confidence do we have that, by training them, they
are going to be fighting ISIL and not Assad?
Secretary Hagel. Well, that is the essence of the training
and the purpose of the training. And this is, also, part of the
vetting process, a clear understanding of what they would be
doing.
But let me get to a more basic point. One of the points
that I made in my statement as to why moderate Syrian
opposition would be part of this training effort, and I noted
that their homes and their families are in jeopardy from ISIL,
from the brutality and the slaughter and the murder of ISIL.
That is their first issue. Yes, they want to see Assad go. Yes,
there is no question. Yes, there are other forces and
interests, yes.
But the most absolute immediate threat to most of these
people is ISIL and what ISIL is doing to their villages and to
their families and their homes. So it is clearly in their own
interest. But this is also part of the--the vetting process.
Ms. Speier. I only have 19 seconds, so maybe you can
provide this answer in writing. I continue to be concerned
about how we shut off ISIL's revenue stream, and I want to know
what we are doing to try and shut down their revenues by
closing down the oil refineries that they appear to have taken
control of.
And I yield back.
Secretary Hagel. I will do that in the interest of time.
Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the chairman of the Readiness
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 4
minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, thank you for joining
us today and thanks so much for your service.
Each of our service branches, I think, has a significant
challenge in front of them.
Today, there are haves and the have-nots, those units that
are trained, those units that are not current in training. I
think a significant challenge for them, it affects not only
today's mission, but future missions as to what our capability
might be.
Each of our service branch chiefs have talked about this
concept of tiered readiness and what that means for their
force, the risk it places upon their force, how it affects
morale and retention.
And now today, my question to you is: How do we address
that current situation? And, then, how do we integrate into
that the challenges that we are now facing in Syria, in Iraq
with ISIL in accomplishing that mission in addition to missions
around the world that we want to continue to try to be
successful at?
It seems like, to me, that we are a mile wide and an inch
deep. So I want to get your perspective on that, too. And how
do we get to a point where we are returning to full-spectrum
training and making sure that we have a continued full
complement of readiness across our force structure?
General Dempsey. Let me take a shot at this, Congressman.
It is a very, very profound question, meaning intricate.
But I will say this: You are correct that we are generally
consuming readiness as soon as it is built. You know, if we
would have had this hearing 6 months ago, we wouldn't be
talking about the necessity of reassuring our European allies,
we wouldn't be talking about ISIL, we wouldn't be talking about
Ebola, all of which have had a--have pressurized our readiness.
On the other hand, that is why we exist. I mean, you know,
to one of the earlier questions, you know, when will this all
end? You know, personally, I believe that the current state of
security affairs is about what it will be for about the next
generation.
Stated another way, peace is probably not the norm, as you
look back at history, and it is certainly not the norm today.
So the military has to respond or--to whether it is a security
threat or a threat of infectious disease.
To answer your question, it is why I mentioned in my
opening remarks that we really need budget certainty,
flexibility, and time. And I will say, to your question, I
think that we will need additional funding to account for new
requirements. I mentioned the three of them that were new just
over the last 6 months.
I also think we are going to need to gain your support for
some of the reforms we have recommended: pay compensation,
health care, weapons systems, and BRAC [Base Closure and
Realignment]. Because that will allow us to be more predictable
and sustainable over time.
And I think we have absolutely got to get rid of this--this
horrible shadow of sequestration because it places such a--both
a physical, but also a psychological shadow over the defense
budget that it has very bad, long-term effects.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, let me ask this question. Specifically, today,
as we speak, if sequester comes back in 2015 and we have the
reduction in OCO funding that is projected to go from $60
billion to $30 billion, give me a one-sentence assessment of
where you believe our military will be.
General Dempsey. We will be less ready than at any time in
my 40-year career.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Secretary Hagel.
Secretary Hagel. Well, I haven't had a 40-year career in
the military. But I would completely agree with the Chairman,
and I have been on the record on this point. It will put the
military and our national security enterprise in a very, very
deep hole.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Palazzo [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes Mrs.
Davis from California.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your leadership, Secretary Hagel,
and Chairman Dempsey.
I wanted to ask about the level of expertise that would
give us confidence in the troops that we are training right now
in order to pull out of our activity. And I know that we are
not talking about boots on the ground here, but in an advisory
capacity. Because I think Americans are well aware of the fact
that, in order for us to do our job, we need highly trained
professionals like our SEALs [Sea, Air, Land teams], like our
special operations.
And I would like to know whether we are in any position to
see that level of expertise and really hair-triggered
preparedness that is required of SEALs and of those who go into
special operations like that. I would have to believe that the
possibility of something occurring that would require that kind
of professionalism is something that we must be planning for.
And how do we respond to people that are wondering if they are
having that level of expertise.
Which wouldn't require only consulting, but clearly boots
on the ground and, again, whether or not there are those who
would be on the ground who could order air strikes effectively
in order to make that happen.
General Dempsey. Well, Congresswoman, I can absolutely
assure you I would never come to the Secretary of Defense and
suggest that he send anyone into any mission unless they are,
in our judgment, the Joint Chiefs, the best trained, best led,
best equipped force on the planet. And so we--there is no
shortage of skills and expertise whether it is in the
conventional forces or the special operation forces. And by the
way----
Mrs. Davis. I am talking about our Iraqi partners or the
Syrians as well.
General Dempsey. Well, what--of course, the--there is
always a gap between our level of expertise and theirs that we
try to close to the extent we can.
I guess maybe the only thing I am suggesting, it is
conventional. It is special operating forces. It is air, sea,
and ground. And, you know, we kind of gloss over--not you--but
we tend to focus on what are we doing on the ground. But we
have been flying, for 8 weeks now, a very--an extraordinary air
campaign. And those young men and women are executing that,
frankly, exceeding expectations in my view.
So I am not sure how to address your question about the
expertise issue. If you could elaborate a bit more, I would--I
will give it a shot.
Mrs. Davis. Yeah. Thank you.
Is there a metric? Do we need to have a certain level of
expertise and a quantity of those who were trained?
General Dempsey. On their part? On the part of the----
Mrs. Davis. On their part.
General Dempsey. Yes. Absolutely.
Mrs. Davis. Do we know that our--our team will not be
required to go in----
General Dempsey. Yes.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. That kind of an operation.
General Dempsey. Yeah, and I will give you this briefly. So
there is--the Iraqi security forces have an organization called
the CTS, Counter-Terrorism Service. They are absolutely
capable. In fact, if anything, they have been overused because
they are the best of the Iraqi security forces.
So what we are trying to do with them is reconstitute them.
They are also very well led, by the way, which means they have
both capability and leadership.
On the other side of it, we believe we need three capable
divisions. A division is roughly 9 brigades, which is to say we
are going to need about 80,000 competent Iraqi security forces
to recapture the territory lost and, eventually the city of
Mosul, to restore the border.
And we are on path to conduct that training. It is why we
are setting up these training centers in the locations the
Secretary mentioned.
Mrs. Davis. So we didn't necessarily see a lack of response
on their part in the latest--when we were looking at the Iraqi
forces and they basically----
General Dempsey. When we did our assessment?
Mrs. Davis. When we did the assessment, but just in terms
of what happened.
General Dempsey. Oh, what happened when they collapsed?
Mrs. Davis. Yeah.
General Dempsey. Two divisions and a few more brigades
collapsed in northern Iraq. They collapsed because of corrupt
leadership.
There was a period of time just a couple of years ago when
a man could purchase his command of an Iraqi division. That was
a terrible outcome, as we saw, for Iraq in general.
Anyway, they collapsed because of poor leadership, no
confidence in the central government, and a kind of mythology
that it built up around ISIL that it was unstoppable. ISIL has
now been stopped.
Some of the forces that have--that abandoned their post
have been reintegrated into the military, which is a very
positive sign, I think. And the assessment that we have been
making suggests that we can recover from the shortcomings they
exhibited. So--but that is all part of this campaign.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you, both of you.
Mr. Palazzo. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hunter from
California.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here.
I guess, the--the first question I have I am going to lead
with a quote from you, Secretary Hagel: ``I disagreed with
President Obama, his decision to surge in Afghanistan, as I did
with President Bush on the surge in Iraq. It wasn't a matter if
we could win at the moment. Of course, no force in the world
can stand with the sophisticated power of the American
military. Nobody could stay on the field with you, but that is
not the issue. That never was the question. The question is,
then, what happens next? Where is this going? What is the end
game?''
So where is this going? What is next? And what is the
endgame? The Iranians are training more Iraqis than we are.
They are getting more influence in Iraq right now. You have no
plan for Syria. You don't know what you are going to do with
Assad. You don't really want to take him out because you don't
know who is going to take his place.
And both of you right now work for an administration that
had Iraq finished, completed, and handed to it on a silver
platter. And you talk about the long view, General. The long
view would have been we wouldn't be here right now if we had
stayed in Iraq in the first place. And we are talking about
this like we weren't there for 10 years and that this
administration didn't give it up.
I don't get it. I am completely confounded and, frankly, I
guess I would question the administration's credibility on this
and their ability to even do anything, based on the fact that
you didn't see this coming, you didn't react quick enough, you
got in way late in the game, and we literally wouldn't be where
we are right now if the administration had made the right
decisions in the first place.
Do we even have a status of forces agreement now with Iraq?
Do we have a status of forces agreement now with Iraq?
Secretary Hagel. Well, we have a diplomatic note.
Mr. Hunter. So we don't even have a status of forces
agreement now, which was the reason we left in the first place,
is because we lacked that?
Secretary Hagel. We have privileges and immunities that we
believe satisfy our requirements to protect our troops.
Congressman, I will respond to some of your points.
Mr. Hunter. Secretary, let me give you one of your quotes,
if I could too: ``The plan to revive the Iraq war by sending a
surge of 30,000 troops''--obviously this was then--``is the
most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since
Vietnam. If it is carried out, I will resist it.''
You were adamantly against and consistently against the
Iraq war as a Senator, and now you are basically the second-
highest ranking military officer in a civilian capacity in the
country in charge now of leading our forces in a strategy in
Iraq again. I am really confounded on how the American people
are looking at our team right now, at your team, and saying,
how do we do this? You are now in charge of what we lost
because of decisions made outright and forthright by the
administration.
Secretary Hagel. Well, let me see if I can pull some of
this apart. My past record and statements stand, and that was a
situation that is different from today. I can't go back and
replay 2011 or 2012 or why did the United States leave or not
leave. We will let history decide that.
Mr. Hunter. But we didn't leave, because we are there now,
right?
Secretary Hagel. Well, we never left. We have the largest
diplomatic compound in the world. Our embassy there is the
largest in the world. So we have never left. But regardless, we
are where we are. My responsibility today, Congressman, is not
back in 2007 or 2002 or 2003. I have a new responsibility, new
set of threats and challenges, new dynamics. That is what I am
dealing with
Now, I said earlier this morning, sustainability. We had
150,000 troops in Iraq. Yes, we are the most powerful military
in the world, but we are trying to build and help the Iraqis
build--not us, them, it is their country, their interest--a
sustainable----
Mr. Hunter. I was there.
Secretary Hagel. I know, and we appreciate your service. A
sustainable government force where they can protect themselves,
they can support themselves, they can do all the things that
sovereign governments must do.
Mr. Hunter. Right.
I am out of time, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel. My role today is the threat that ISIL
poses against the Government of Iraq, against us, and against
our allies. That is my threat responsibility today.
Mr. Palazzo. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gabbard for 4 minutes.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
As both of you walked through your testimony, I couldn't
help but think that it does sound very familiar to other
testimonies we have heard in the past about training and arming
Iraqi security forces, of training and arming a local security
force, now called a national guard. And overall, I am wondering
how we can be walking down this same path that we have walked
down over the last decade or more and hope for a different
outcome.
You have outlined your intentions to train and arm 12 Iraqi
security forces, brigades, to include arming them with Hellfire
missiles, and I have got a few questions with regards to that.
How many Kurdish Peshmerga brigades will you be training, and
will you be arming them directly and not funneling those
weapons through the central Iraqi Government as we have seen,
very recently, has been very resistant to passing on any of
those weapons or arms, ammunition that we have provided through
that central government.
Secretary Hagel. Well, I will take a couple of the specific
questions you asked. One, I noted the 12 brigades that we will
be training. You asked how many of those are Peshmerga. Three
of those 12 brigades are Peshmerga brigades. You ask about the
request that the Peshmerga has made for armaments and for the
materiel. That is all being funneled through the Iraqi
Government.
Ms. Gabbard. How can you be assured that they are getting
any of that? Because publicly their ministers of defense and
others are saying that they are not receiving those arms.
Secretary Hagel. They are being given the armaments. All of
the requests are ongoing. So just as I said in any statement,
all of the requests from the Iraqi security forces aren't there
yet. As I said in my statement, a good deal of this is still
coming. I mean, you just don't produce large inventories of
armaments in weeks or in a month. All of that is being worked
through the Iraqi security force, through the Iraqi Government.
And I also noted, by the way, in my statement,
Congresswoman, there were very specific amounts, significant
amounts of armaments given directly to the Peshmerga from
coalition partners over the last few months.
Ms. Gabbard. So up until this date, as well as with the
funding request that you will have before Congress, none of
those arms will be provided directly to the Kurds and the
Peshmerga from the U.S. Government?
Secretary Hagel. The Kurds' request will be worked through
the Iraqi Government.
Ms. Gabbard. Has the Iraqi Government stated publicly that
they will provide those arms to the Kurds?
Secretary Hagel. Well, that is an Iraqi Government issue. I
can't sit here and----
Ms. Gabbard. But they have stated publicly that they will
not in the past.
Secretary Hagel. It is clear that the Iraqi security forces
want a strong and viable and armed and trained Peshmerga. It is
in the interest of the country of Iraq. So whether the
Peshmerga is given every item on that list--and by the way, I
have seen some of the list, their pretty spectacular list.
Ms. Gabbard. Well, understandably, but they are also the
trusted fighting force on the ground that has been most
effective against fighting ISIS----
Secretary Hagel. We appreciate that.
Ms. Gabbard [continuing]. And with very limited resources.
I guess my last question--we are running out of time here--
is how can we have the confidence that this Iraqi security
forces at this early stage of this government will not end up
with the same outcome of units deserting and leaving weapons in
the hands of ISIS?
Secretary Hagel. Well, again, I think we have covered some
of these questions before this morning, but I will say, first,
there is risk in everything, there is no guarantee of anything.
But we believe what we are doing now to help rebuild the Iraqi
security forces, as the Abadi government is changing their
leadership, so it will instill, we believe, a new level of
trust and confidence and support in Sunni forces and the Sunni
tribes. I noted an example over the weekend of 2,000 Sunni
tribesmen in a ceremony this weekend preparing to go into the
Iraqi security forces being sworn in. All those different
things we are doing now we believe can lead to the kind of
strong Iraqi security forces that will be required to take back
their country, but also that must reside within an inclusive,
unity, strong participatory government in Iraq.
Mr. Palazzo. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Franks for 4 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, let me begin by saying that I think you have
very accurately described ISIS. I think that your description
there is well considered and very accurate, and I appreciate
it. You have kind of told it like it was.
I remember that George Bush said almost verbatim: If we
leave Iraq before our commanders say that we are ready we will
be risking the future of Iraq. We will see mass killings on a
horrific scale, and we will be increasing the chances of
American troops having to return and face an even more
dangerous enemy.
And I have to say to you, Mr. Secretary, in all due respect
to you, I think that this President owes Mr. Bush, Mr. Hunter,
and thousands like him an apology for standing by as ISIS
entered Iraq and essentially made this Bush prediction come
almost precisely true. And the concern I have, of course, is
that I am afraid that it is the same ideology or the same
approach is being borne out in other fronts.
As dangerous as ISIS is, as again you have so accurately
described, the greater danger is if some of the core elements
of that insidious ideology, which is in some of the leadership
of Iran right now, gets their finger on the nuclear button. And
this President seems equally oblivious to that as he has been
to ISIS entering Iraq. And my concern is that their latest
funding request includes a significant portion that would go to
ISF that we will be fighting along beside Quds and Iranian
Shi'a militia, and that has a way of elevating Iran's
credibility or increasing their credibility to some extent, and
I think increasing the chances and hastening the day when they
will gain access to nuclear weapons, and this administration
seems oblivious to all of that.
And I know that this is a contentious issue, but do you
think that we are doing enough to prevent Iran from gaining
nuclear weapons?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, I am going to answer that,
but also let me lead into that answer by the first comments and
questions you ask about whether we are oblivious to the ISIS
threat.
Mr. Franks. Certainly the President was. We wrote.
Certainly he did nothing to stop them. A very small force could
have prevented them from coming in, very small force, and it
could have prevented them from gaining the base of operation
that they have gained. We wrote letters. They were ignored.
This is for over a period of months.
Secretary Hagel. Yeah. Let me just remind all of us that,
first of all, our Defense National Intelligence Agency earlier
this year had noted the threat of ISIS, specifically ISIL. We
were all aware of it. We were talking to the Iraqi Government
about it. This was the government of Prime Minister Malaki.
Now, let's also remember Iraq is a sovereign nation. We
have to be invited into Iraq to help. We were telling Prime
Minister Malaki he had a problem he was going to have to deal
with. We couldn't have just arbitrarily--I suppose we could
have--invaded Iraq without the sovereign country and the
elected Government of Iraq inviting us in. We were not. We were
not asked to help, even though we were talking to the Iraqi
Government. So I think it is important we just set the stage.
This also was at the time, if you recall, Congressman, Iraq
was at the front end of changing governments. And a new
government didn't take over, if you recall, until September of
this year. But even then, we were invited in, in late summer,
and we did get involved in it in late summer, but we had to be
invited in. And so that is first.
On Iran, this administration is very aware of the dangers
of Iran, and the President has said again that his policy is
the same as President Bush's policy that Iran----
Mr. Franks. It is not the same as President Bush's policy,
but continue.
Secretary Hagel. On Iran, it is, that Iran will not, cannot
have a nuclear weapon. That hasn't changed.
Mr. Franks. In all due respect, the Bush policy was in
keeping with the U.N. [United Nations] Security Council, which
was we would dismantle and make sure that they didn't have the
ability to enrich uranium or produce plutonium. And this
administration has written an agreement that allows that
protocol to be a protected policy.
Secretary Hagel. That is what this administration has been
doing, working with IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].
What the talks are about, as you know, Congressman, which we
may see something come out of it, we may not, the P5+1 [United
States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, and Germany],
through the United Nations, the five members of the Security
Council of the United Nations plus Germany in those talks is to
dismantle, is to do all the things that we want to do to move
Iran away from the capacity, capability of building a nuclear
weapon. This Department has the responsibility to continue to
provide the President with all the options on the table. We
have and we will.
Mr. Palazzo. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Palazzo. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Johnson from
Georgia for 4 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I am prompted to ask you, Secretary
Hagel, to set the record straight as to what factors led the
U.S. to withdraw all of its troops from Iraq because of the
inability to attain a status of forces agreement. Can you
remind us of what major factor precipitated our inability to
enter into an agreement with the Iraqis?
Secretary Hagel. Well, without going into the long history,
and I think everybody recalls it, I was not in this job at the
time, but the United States could not get the assurances that
it required, that it always requires when we have troops in a
country, assurances to protect our troops. That is normally
done through a status of forces agreement, but in the case of
Iraq now we have privileges and immunities. But the fact is we
were not invited to stay. Malaki had said that he couldn't get
it through the parliament.
Mr. Johnson. That is the point that I want to make. Thank
you.
I also would like for you to explain what interests the
U.S. and Iran have jointly with respect to this ISIL issue?
What are some of the things that we have joint interest about?
Secretary Hagel. ISIL, as it has demonstrated through its
indiscriminate brutality of killing all groups and sectors of
people, Sunni, Shi'a, Kurds, minorities, Christians, that ISIL
is a threat to Iran. It is a threat to the entire region. It is
a threat, as we have said all morning, a clear threat to Iraq
because it now controls large swaths of the country of Iraq.
But at the same time, we, the United States, are not
coordinating with Iran. We are not working with Iran.
Mr. Johnson. Are there any areas where the U.S. and Iran
can cooperate with respect to this ISIL threat?
Secretary Hagel. Well, each sovereign country in the Middle
East must protect its own interests, as Iran certainly is
doing, will do, as Iraq is doing, as Jordan is doing, Turkey is
doing, but that is an independent effort that the----
Mr. Johnson. Are there any areas where we can have joint
concerns?
Secretary Hagel. Well, we have joint concerns, but not
joint cooperation.
Mr. Johnson. Do you see joint cooperation being a
possibility?
Secretary Hagel. Well, that is not our policy, and it may
some day be possible.
Mr. Johnson. It wouldn't be a bad thing, would it?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I am all for cooperation and getting
along in the world in peace, but the realities of the fact that
Iran is a state sponsor of terror, they have continued on a
path of trying to nuclearize weapons and make those efforts, so
it is hard to be unmindful of that.
Mr. Johnson. It is good to be mindful that dialogue can
help to create better conditions also. But let me ask you this
about Mr. Baghdadi. Is he alive? Is he injured? Was he involved
in the situation that occurred, the air strike that occurred
last weekend?
Secretary Hagel. Well, those are areas that we probably
should get into in a classified hearing.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. We will have a classified follow-
up next week.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, what is the current strength of ISIL? We
have heard reports, 30,000. I have heard reports of 50,000. Can
you clue us in as to what that current strength is?
General Dempsey. The Intel Community does put kind of a
band around it. At one point, 21,000 to 31,000. Frankly, I
think that includes groups that they may have scooped up along
the way, former Baathists, for example. So I would suggest to
you that the core group of ideological ISIL, probably about
two-thirds of them are in Syria, about a third of them in Iraq,
and in total it is probably 15,000 to 18,000.
Dr. Fleming. 15,000 to 18,000 core, but then maybe another
20,000 or so that may be cooperative with, fight alongside is,
I think, what you are saying, 30,000 to----
General Dempsey. I think that is where the number 31,000
comes from, the affiliates, if you will.
Dr. Fleming. Now, I get your strategy in Iraq, which is to
go back and undo the things that went wrong in Iraq. We have
got better leadership. Certainly we are helping them stand up
their military so they can go on the offensive. Eventually
restoring the border. But I think we can assume that most of
those ISIL members will end up in Syria if we move them out of
Iraq.
So what about the Syrian piece, the Free Syrian Army, how
long will it take and how many strong will we be at when they
become an effective force?
General Dempsey. I think we have testified previously that
in the first year we think we can produce about 5,400, that we
think the total required in order to put enough pressure on the
ISIL forces in eastern and northern Syria would probably need
to number about 15,000.
Dr. Fleming. 15,000. So would that be an offensive force
where they could actually march into Syria and actually attack,
take out, degrade, destroy?
General Dempsey. No, let me describe it this way. It will
be a force large enough to defend initially so that it can
actually hold territory that heretofore is more fluid, and then
it should have the capability over time to become offensive.
Dr. Fleming. And at what point do we get to 15,000, at what
point, I am talking timeline here, do we get to an offensive
force?
General Dempsey. Those details are actually part of what is
happening at CENTCOM this week. There is about a 30-nation,
190-planner contingent down there that is talking about ISIL
both as it exists in Iraq and in Syria. And so the question is,
where along the way will there be enough of a critical mass to
employ it, and that is a conversation that is ongoing right
now.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Will we be able to get more details
tomorrow?
General Dempsey. Sure. I don't know about tomorrow, but you
will be able to get more details, yes, sir.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks for being here. I know you have got a lot
on your plate with budgets and other things and big decisions
on our national security, the different things that are going
on in the world, and I certainly respect you, and I will try to
be brief about this.
Secretary Kerry was before this committee. I believe the
two of you were with him a couple of months ago when he was
asking for the ability to move into Syria, and I asked
Secretary Kerry at that point what were the principles of war
under which the Obama administration operated. He could not
give them to us. He promised to get them to us within 24 hours.
He has not responded, nor has his staff responded in any way
when we have again asked for those principles.
But I quoted at that point Colin Powell's doctrine. Is
there a plausible exit strategy? Do we have a clear obtainable
objective? And then I go and I look, you know, again at where
Colin Powell has expanded on that, and when a nation is
engaging in war, every resource and tool should be used to
achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing U.S.
casualties, and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the
weaker force to capitulate.
Why should we approve an authorization that doesn't give
you, General Dempsey, and you, Secretary Hagel, the ability to
do what it takes to win the war?
General Dempsey. Congressman, that is a great question, and
you are obviously a student of warfare. Let me answer it this
way. The use of the military instrument in state-on-state
conflicts does comport better to General Powell's principles
than the use of military instrument against something like
ISIL. And so as we have looked at mass, which is one of the
principles of war, as we looked at mass, mass has a coherence
and a quality all its own when it is applied against the mass
of another force, notably a state. But when you are applying
mass against something like ISIL, you can have a particular
kinetic effect against it, but you can also generate antibodies
within the population that could actually be counterproductive
to what you are trying to achieve.
I would like to unpack this a bit in a longer conversation
with you or a paper, but I will tell you this. In terms of what
we are doing in Iraq and what we are doing in Syria, I referred
to a command sergeant major that I had as a young lieutenant
colonel, and I was trying to figure out, of these five or six
or seven things that we really had to get done, how would I
possibly prioritize them. And he said to me simply--his name
was named Don Stockton, he has passed away since--he said,
look, Colonel, just make sure that you keep the main thing the
main thing.
And so ISIL is the main thing, and our priority is in Iraq,
and then we will figure out, while disrupting it in Syria, what
to do about it in Syria.
Mr. Scott. General, I am certainly not a student of war,
but I have a tremendous amount of respect for both of you. I
guess my problem with this administration, as respectfully as I
know how to say this, I believe that the indecisiveness at the
White House has led to a lot of the problems and the challenges
that we are facing today. And when we first saw ISIL, we knew
that no good was going to come from that.
And the indecisiveness is what bothers me. I don't feel
like you have that indecisiveness. I feel like it is the
President of the United States' indecisiveness that, quite
honestly, puts our men and women in uniform and our American
citizens at risk because he is not willing to make the decision
to turn it over to somebody who will go do what it takes to
protect this country.
And so I respect you, and I would love to have one that
just gave you the authority to do what our military leaders
think it takes to protect Americans.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dempsey, Secretary, thank you all for being here.
Happy Veterans Day. Happy Veterans Day to the veterans behind
you. Happy birthday, Marine. There is cake downstairs if you
haven't had enough. Very important topic. Thank you all for
being here.
Previous hearings, we have discussed how ISIS is self-
financing and how that is kind of unique compared to some other
Islamic extremist organizations in Syria and other places. They
are self-financing through smuggling, extortion, murder, you
name it, I mean, these are bad people. I think, General
Dempsey, you mentioned some of the things that we are doing.
Have we been able to truly disrupt their financing source that
will lead us to helping, I guess, break up their logistics?
General Dempsey. We have certainly disrupted it. There are
some things that I would be more willing to share with you in a
classified setting where we have reflections of the impact of
some of the things we have done against their oil revenue, for
example. But again, some of that is probably best described in
a classified setting.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay.
General Dempsey. But I will tell you, the answer is, yes,
we have significantly disrupted their financial support.
Mr. Palazzo. Because, after all, if we can dry up the
ability to buy beans, bullets, and Band-Aids, I mean, hopefully
another way to break their will to fight.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, I would just add to that a
couple of points we made this morning on this. It is your
point, question, observation is part of the comprehensive
effort that we are using to stop them, and it isn't just force.
Yes, that is a big part of it, but all the other pieces. And
just as you said, you don't cut off that funding source, they
will keep coming. And so it is a priority piece of the overall
strategy, and we are making progress.
Mr. Palazzo. Earlier, the status of forces agreement was
brought up, and it was said that we have more of a diplomatic
note, and you all said you feel like that is enough to protect
our men and women in uniform from any form of prosecution in
Iraq, which led me to believe, usually when there is a military
force there is a civilian contractor force. Is there currently
a civilian contractor force providing LOGCAP-type [Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program] services to our men and women in
uniform, and what kind of protections do they have, and how
many do you think may be over there?
General Dempsey. We intentionally have approached this
mission in an expeditionary way, so we are not dragging in a
big LOGCAP to provide life support for our forces. We are
dealing with it as a military.
Now, that said, as you know, there is an Office of Security
Cooperation in Iraq that deals with the FMS [foreign military
sales] case. It is the part that the Secretary referred to as
the part that never left Iraq, where these 200 military men and
women who are helping procure weapon systems and then provide
them to the Iraqis over time. That is supported by a contract,
whether it is with a particular weapon system dealer or in some
cases trainers, and they have, as part of the contract, they
have protections and immunities under the contract.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay.
Secretary Hagel, I think this week you were quoted as
saying--you were actually at a Veterans Day speech at the
Vietnam War Memorial, and you publicly stated, we must openly
acknowledge past mistakes and learn from them because that is
how we avoid repeating them. I would have to agree with you. I
mean, Congress, I think, has been honest and saying that
sequestration and placing those devastating defense cuts on top
of our men and women in uniform was a mistake. There is a huge
appetite to, you know, remove those defense caps.
But also I think a lot of people look at this
administration and see that they made some mistakes in how we
have handled ISIL, how we have handled Iraq, the 2011
withdrawal. And I hope that through your comments alone, that
this administration and others will be honest and not glossing
over the past, but looking at it honestly so we can avoid
making these mistakes, because our men and women in uniform,
their lives depend on it. So thank you all.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I really want to thank both of you for your service to
the country. Belated happy Veterans Day to you. You both
deserve our congratulations and our respect.
You are responsible for the lives of our service men and
women, and I appreciate both of your positions. And Secretary
Hagel, I appreciate your past comments in regards to putting
our sons and daughters at risk. I have three sons that are
currently serving, and so that hits a point for myself and my
wife.
But as we move forward, and two of my sons were in the
drawdown in Iraq in 2011, I just wonder, and I know you weren't
responsible because you weren't in that position as it relates
to the status of forces agreement, but also an enduring
presence in Iraq, do you think, as we move forward, as this
starts to--and you mentioned it is going to take years--but
shouldn't we have a status of forces agreement? Would that be
preferable as we move forward that we have an enduring presence
in Iraq instead of walking away like we did? And then because
it is so unstable there, who knows what it looks like again
after we stabilize it, would it be a good idea that we have a
status of forces agreement that allows us to have an enduring
presence there?
Secretary Hagel. Well, Congressman, first, thank you for
your sons' contributions and service and for your family's
sacrifice and service.
As to your question, I think good question, and it is
something we are thinking through, but these are the kinds of
things you continually think through, but they evolve. What
that place looks like, what the world looks like in 6 months, I
can't predict. I can do what I can do now with knowing what I
know now, anticipating.
Mr. Nugent. I think we have talked about strategically
looking forward. I mean, that should be part of our strategic
plan.
Secretary Hagel. Well, it always is, but, again, we are not
intending to stay there in an indefinite way in the same
capacity that we are now at the invitation of the Iraqi
Government to come back in to help them, training and equipping
and so on. I mean, that is not an indefinite mission. And our
air strikes, that is not indefinite.
So we think through what we need now and what the coalition
requires, and then what we are going to need as we go along.
And we get wiser as we go, too. So you adjust. You have to
adjust.
Mr. Nugent. Okay. And I understand. You know, I am not
trying to--I guess I am trying to pin you down.
Would you recommend to the President at some point in time,
and I know things change, would it be in our best interest to
have a status of forces agreement with Iraq and have an
enduring presence of some type within Iraq?
Secretary Hagel. Well, what I have recommended to the
President, what General Dempsey has recommended and our
leaders, first, protection of our forces. That is it. Whether
you call it a status of forces agreement or whatever it is,
whatever the piece of paper or document, it has to mean
something. The privileges immunity document that we have now,
the diplomatic note, our commanders--I--feel that it is
adequate to protect our forces and what we need now.
Now, into the future, we adjust, we have to adjust, and we
may want something different. We are looking at this. We will
continue to look at it. But right now what we have now is
essential and it is adequate for what we require to protect our
troops.
Mr. Nugent. General.
General Dempsey. I was the Chief of Staff of the Army at
that time. The reason that we believed the status of forces
agreement was the right instrument to achieve, to seek to
achieve, was the scale, the size of the residual force, which
was going to be approximately 10,000.
Secondly, the nation of Iraq was a stable platform. There
was no ongoing conflict within its borders. And so we thought
that requiring a status of forces agreement from a responsible
government as an expression of a shared commitment was the
appropriate instrument. We couldn't get it.
The difference? We reentered Iraq in an extremis situation
with a brand new government that actually hadn't even named all
of its ministers, and so we accepted the diplomatic note as
adequate to the task because of the scale and also because we
don't have these men and women traveling all over Iraq. At some
point in the future, as the Secretary says, when this platform
is more stable, I think----
Mr. Nugent. I would think that because it was important to
have an enduring force back in 2011 when talks broke down, I
would think that would remain the same today and maybe even
be--the reason to have that is what we are facing today in Iraq
with ISIL, just as observation.
General Dempsey. Yeah. Maybe.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, sir, and I thank both of you.
The Chairman. That concludes our questions from the members
of the committee. I want to thank you again both for your
service for being here and--boy, oh boy. You just made it. Mr.
Bridenstine.
General Dempsey. Only if it is an easy one, Congressman.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I
am down to 4 minutes now? Okay.
Mr. Nugent. Three.
Mr. Bridenstine. Three minutes.
Well, first of all, thank you guys both for being here, Mr.
Secretary and Mr. Chairman. Our country is facing a major
challenge in the Middle East, and I am sometimes deeply
troubled by the way things are going. And today we are here to
talk about a $5.6 billion ask, and it seems as though we are in
the middle of replanning or changing our strategy, changing our
tactics. There are 30 nations that are meeting to talk about
the next steps.
It seems to me that we are actually in a position where we
are getting ready to allocate $5.6 billion and not fully
understanding ultimately what our approach is going to be.
Could you guys each take a few seconds and respond to that so
that I can go back to my constituents and say we are not just
giving $5.6 billion but we are actually taking a serious
approach at this?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you. It is a pretty
important and basic question, so I get it.
I tried to lay at least the general parameters of that out,
that question in my statement as to the general breakdown of
where would it be used, why, and why we think it is important.
Also, the dimension that you mentioned and others had this
morning, well, what are others doing, what are the other
coalition partners doing. And as you just noted, one of the
reasons that General Austin has over 30 of our coalition
partners in Florida this week is working through where their
contributions specific, money, planes, people, logistics, so
on, are going to come from. And you know we have conditioned in
our request, actually the Congress does this, that we can only
draw down so much of that train-and-equip part, the $1.6
million, until others have put their money in.
But the specifics of how all that is broken down, the
timeframe, I mean, we have all that, and we would, in briefings
that we will start, and we have generally started, we will
continue to have with staff and explaining why we have asked
for this much money, we are prepared to do that.
General Dempsey. I would like to take about 30 seconds and
swing at this myself because you asked what are we doing. Well,
we have a counter-ISIL strategy. It is not an Iraq strategy. It
is not a Syria strategy. It is a counter-ISIL strategy.
Secondly, the strategy is built around what I think is a
remarkable coalition. If you look at the countries in that
coalition, and if you had told me a year ago you could draw
these countries into that coalition, I would have said probably
not. So the coalition is on board. And the campaign is built
around the principle of by, with, and through allies, to
include the Iraqis, the Peshmerga, and eventually a moderate
Syrian opposition, so that we don't own this problem, we enable
it.
Mr. Bridenstine. One last question with my 41 seconds. I
have got a study here from the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, and they make a case that when you look
at the seriousness of the campaign regarding air strikes, they
make the case that in Kosovo we were doing 86 air strikes a
day, which was another campaign where there were no troops on
the ground, and in this campaign we are doing 7 air strikes per
day. Can you guys shed any light on what the discrepancy there
is?
General Dempsey. Sure. Very different enemy. It is not a
nation-state. It is a terrorist organization. They have adapted
their tactics to our strengths. And so they are just not
sitting around waiting to be bombed, frankly, in a way that a
traditional military might have to because you can't hide it.
These are individuals in pickup trucks that can hide in and
among the population.
Actually, we ought to be taking credit for this, not being
criticized for it, because we are being so precise and
deliberate, limiting civilian casualties in order to disrupt
but not create additional problems for the coalition.
Mr. Bridenstine. Might it be a challenge with gathering
intelligence?
General Dempsey. Well, I mean, look, any military leader
worth his salt would always say, oh, I need more intelligence.
Of course, intelligence is a challenge, but we have got our
assets focused like a laser beam on learning more about this
enemy.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Will the audience please remain seated while
the Secretary and General leave and their party? Thank you.
Thank you. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 13, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 13, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
November 13, 2014
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES
Secretary Hagel. As the President articulated on September 10,
2014, the objective of the counter-ISIL campaign is to ``degrade, and
ultimately defeat, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter
terrorism strategy so that it's no longer a threat to Iraq, the region,
the United States, and our partners.'' [See page 17.]
General Dempsey. The goal of our strategy is to defeat the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): to halt its progress, destroy it
as an organization, and help local forces liberate the territories it
now controls. Our effort seeks to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately
defeat ISIL so that it no longer threatens the region and the national
security of the U.S. and our allies. It ends when the Sunni population
rejects it. The U.S. military line of effort will enable that to occur,
but the military cannot do it alone. [See page 17.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Secretary Hagel. The U.S. Government is working to target the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) revenue across multiple
lines of interagency effort. According to the Department of the
Treasury, until recently, ISIL was earning several million dollars per
month through diverse efforts, including oil sales, ransom payments,
extortion and crime, and support from foreign donations. Coalition
airstrikes are impeding ISIL's freedom of movement and ability to pump,
refine, and sell oil, reducing its revenue stream. In addition to
physically impairing ISIL's ability to sell oil, the Treasury
Department also prioritizes disrupting the market for oil derived from
ISIL-controlled fields by targeting with financial sanctions anyone who
trades in ISIL's stolen oil or refined product, among other efforts.
[See page 31.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 13, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. The Department of Defense has requested a broad
waiver of existing laws in the request for the Iraq Train and Equip
Program (ITEP) and I understand there is discussion about requesting a
similar waiver for the Syria Train and Equip program. Why does the
Department need such a waiver? What would the impacts be if you didn't
get such waivers and you, for example, had to follow all the
acquisition laws?
Secretary Hagel. The Department requested a broad waiver authority
that could be exercised by the Secretary of Defense in the draft Iraq
Train and Equip Program (ITEP) provision for flexibility and to hedge
against unforeseen circumstances. The waiver request was not intended
to encompass the Department's responsibilities in the Leahy provision.
Leahy vetting of Iraqi security force units intended to be trained is
ongoing. The ITEP waivers that are in the recently enacted fiscal year
2015 appropriations and authorizations acts are more narrow than
requested, and authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive statutes
relating to the acquisition of items and support services if he makes
the specified determinations. This more specific waiver addresses our
core concerns regarding flexible and timely acquisition to facilitate
training and equipping the security forces of Iraq.
The Syria Train and Equip program waiver as enacted authorizes the
President to waive any provision of law if he makes the specified
determinations, but provides that such waiver will not take effect
until 30 days after congressional notification. This waiver will allow
waiver of provisions that would otherwise prohibit financial or other
assistance to the country of Syria (which would preclude assistance
even to groups within Syria that are in conflict with the Government of
Syria). In addition, provisions regarding acquisitions may be waived to
enable contracting overseas or expedited contracting in order to
facilitate the Syria train and equip effort. The possible effects of
having to follow all acquisition laws are less flexibility and longer
lead times, which could severely affect the Department's ability to
meet emergent requirements.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Secretary, after U.S. airstrikes in Syria last
week, Charles Lister, with the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, was
quoted in the Washington Post as saying ``the U.S. may now have lost
Syria.'' While I do not yet share Mr. Lister's pessimism, I am very
concerned that we may have ceded the space that really matters in this
fight--the economic, political, and cultural battles that will
ultimately be what decides this conflict. If there's one lesson that
we've learned in the last 13 years, it's that we need to be realistic
about what military force alone can and cannot do. With so many
factions engaged in Syria, who have multiple competing objectives and
who are unfriendly to U.S. interests or are terrorist organizations
outright, what is the United States' strategy to win the information
campaign, and do we have the institutional and organizational
capability to manage that campaign?
Secretary Hagel. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. Much reference has been made to the longer-term
problems of U.S. and Western persons currently fighting with ISIL
eventually returning home. These individuals may well have violent
intentions and the training and capabilities to carry them out. Keeping
tabs on these threats, in the numbers that we are talking about, is
going to, at the very least, severely tax the abilities of many of our
allies, if not overwhelm them, and pose a huge challenge here
domestically. How can we act now to ameliorate the worst of this coming
problem--for example, with intelligence or law enforcement cooperation?
Secretary Hagel. The Department of Defense remains concerned with
the threat posed by Westerners who travel to fight in Syria and Iraq
and who may return home to carry out attacks. Constricting the flow of
foreign fighters is an essential element of the U.S. Government's
comprehensive strategy to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant. The Department of Defense is acting through a
coordinated, whole-of-government effort, engaging with international
partners to highlight the threat, urging international partners to
interdict the flow of foreign fighters, and disrupting those who
facilitate the travel, related fundraising, or other support wherever
possible. This involves sharing information and intelligence with our
partners and encouraging them to collect and share information on
suspected foreign fighters and facilitators as well. Other elements of
the U.S. Government are working to build law enforcement and
counterterrorism capacities to address this threat.
The Department of Defense also recognizes certain common factors
that contribute both to the challenges posed by homegrown violent
extremists (HVEs) and to the phenomenon of westerners traveling to join
extremist organizations abroad. As we recently saw in the case of the
attack on the Canadian Parliament, an individual motivated to engage in
violence, but not able to travel abroad to fight may become a domestic
threat. Recognizing the history of HVE targeting of Department of
Defense personnel and facilities within the homeland, the Department of
Defense is working in close coordination with both the intelligence and
law enforcement communities, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to protect Department of Defense personnel and
facilities.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Secretary, in your (Senate-side) testimony in
September you said ``we believe that Iraq's new Prime Minister, Haider
al-Abadi, is committed to bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL.''
I'm confident we'd all agree that a military solution alone will not
quell the rise of radical Islamic extremism in the Middle East. Could
you expound upon why you have such confidence in Prime Minister al-
Abadi's intention and ability to be inclusive and more successful in
efforts towards a political solution, particularly after Mr. Maliki,
who once held our confidence, failed so miserably? Will the new
government prove more capable at reconciling with alienated Sunni
tribes?
Secretary Hagel. Our confidence to date in Prime Minister Abadi is
based on the early signals of his commitment to building an inclusive
government--a commitment that distinguishes him from his predecessor.
Prime Minister Abadi is facilitating cooperation among Kurds, Sunnis,
and Shia. For example, he has named a Sunni Minister of Defense and
directed outreach to Sunni tribes in an effort to incorporate tribal
fighters into Iraq's security forces. The Iraqi government is also
working on legislation to establish a National Guard that would
incorporate Sunni tribesmen, devolve local control, and help build
trust in the central government. At the same time, much work remains to
be done and Prime Minister Abadi faces many competing pressures.
Although the State Department leads on U.S. Government engagement with
the tribes, the Department of Defense will continue to work through the
Iraq government to support Sunni fighters and establishing an Iraq
National Guard.
Mr. Langevin. As you stated in your testimony, our comprehensive
strategy to combat ISIL includes undercutting their flow of resources.
Shutting down access to revenue, and closing the means by which funds
flow to and from ISIL is a critical component of that strategy. To what
extent were coordinated efforts made between the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department
of Justice, and other intelligence and national security agencies to
identify and restrict ISIL's access to revenue, restrict revenue flow,
including through Hawala networks, and restrict access to international
financial systems prior to August 7, 2014 (President's authorization of
airstrikes); prior to June 2014 (ISIL's seizure of Mosul); prior to
January 2014 (ISIL's seizure of Fallujah and Ramadi), and currently?
Secretary Hagel. The Department of Defense coordinates routinely
with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to identify and
disrupt the finances of terrorist groups. Even prior to January 2014,
the Department of Defense was reviewing threat assessments and
supporting interagency planning efforts against ISIL. Between January
and August 2014, these efforts evolved through increased interagency
collaboration to identify non-kinetic disruption priorities. In May,
U.S. Central Command issued a theater directive tasking components to
pursue counter-threat finance activities with interagency counterparts.
U.S. Special Operations Command compiled information on ISIL foreign
fighter facilitators and proposed disruption options through military,
law enforcement, and diplomatic levers of power. Defense Department
elements also participated in interagency exploitation of documents
seized from ISIL, including exploitation for financial-related
information, the results of which were included in finished
intelligence disseminated widely across the U.S. government. Currently,
the Department of Defense is coordinating with interagency partners to
degrade the financial health of ISIL, capitalizing on lessons learned
during recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Inter-agency partners
coordinate directly on the military's targeting process against
financial nodes, including pre-strike and post-strike planning and
assessments. Additionally, the Department of Defense is reviewing data
sets developed during Operation Iraqi Freedom to identify options to
disrupt ISIL's illicit networks and financial facilitators. Defense
components continue to examine ISIL financial resources and
vulnerabilities in order to contribute to the whole-of-government
campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIL.
Mr. Langevin. To the extent possible, please describe the policy
concerning when, and to what degree, actions are taken with respect to
terrorist financing, and what role the DOD plays in identifying
networks and informing those decisions. What is the threshold for an
organization to receive our attention with respect to terrorist
financing action, and given the current environment, is that strategy
and threshold being revisited? Finally, how effective have our economic
pressures been to date, and how can our military leverage past progress
in their role as advisors to ground forces?
Secretary Hagel. The Department of Defense in coordination with the
Department of State, the Department of Treasury, and other interagency
stakeholders, assists in the determination process of a foreign
terrorist organization (FTO) designation. These FTOs have engaged in
terrorist activity and retain the capability or intent to conduct
future terrorist acts, which threaten the security interests of the
United States. Once a group has been identified as an FTO, the U.S.
Government's counter-threat finance community will take action against
it. Department of Defense counter threat finance policy states DOD will
work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with
partner nations to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries'
ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to
negatively affect U.S. interests.
Internal to the Department of Defense, the counter threat finance
(CTF) mission is often driven by intelligence assessments on a
terrorist group's attack plans, Geographic Combatant Commander
priorities and resources, and also, requests for support from other
U.S. Government agencies and international partners. The Department of
Defense prioritizes its CTF efforts by those terrorist organizations
and networks that pose the most significant threat to U.S. national
security and Department of Defense personnel worldwide.
The Department of Defense continues to disseminate within the
Department of Defense and among the interagency the Department's
lessons learned from supporting the Iraq Threat Finance Cell and
Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell. Those cells yielded many successful
investigations and operations, such as the takedown of the New Ansari
Money Exchange in Afghanistan. Earlier this year, the Department of
Defense initiated a multi-year effort to improve the integration of
counter threat finance principles and programs into military doctrine,
training, and education as another key component of the U.S.
Government's counterterrorism strategy.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Given that the administration has already opened lines
of communication with Iran, an enemy that holds ``Death to America''
parades and regularly expresses its desire to destroy our ally Israel,
do you envision any scenario where you would work with Iran in the
fight against ISIL? Is the administration currently in regular
communication with the government of Iran regarding ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. No, the United States is not in regular
communication with the Government of Iran regarding the Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We do not coordinate our activities with
Iran.
Mr. Shuster. In your estimation, how effective have coalition
airstrikes been in countering ISIL on the ground? Given the nature of
the threat and the current state of ISIL forces, by what metrics would
you define ``success'' in the air campaign?
Secretary Hagel. Airstrikes have been effective by disrupting
ISIL's offensive, killing multiple senior ISIL leaders, and forcing
them to change their tactics to avoid our strikes. We have achieved a
95% accuracy rate on kinetic targeting. Success for the air campaign in
Iraq, however, is to actively enable Iraqi and Kurdish Ground forces in
making steady advances and retaking ground as recently demonstrated in
Beiji. Air power is a critical component of our overall strategy, but
it is complimentary to the main effort, Iraqis retaking, controlling,
and governing their own soil. In Syria we continue to use airstrikes to
successfully target ISIL leaders, disrupt their lines of communication,
and means of finance by targeting sources of oil revenue.
Mr. Shuster. How involved are you and the rest of DOD with the
President's strategic decisionmaking in the campaign against ISIL? Have
you been in regular consultation with the President during the
formulation of this strategy, and is the President consulting military
leaders as new developments arise on the ground? In what areas do you
feel there needs to be better communication?
Secretary Hagel. Both the civilian and military leadership of the
Department actively participate in National Security Council meetings
with the President. The Department has been represented at all
interagency meetings about the counter-ISIL strategy convened by the
National Security Council Staff.
Mr. Shuster. Given that the administration has already opened lines
of communication with Iran, an enemy that holds ``Death to America''
parades and regularly expresses its desire to destroy our ally Israel,
do you envision any scenario where you would work with Iran in the
fight against ISIL? Is the administration currently in regular
communication with the government of Iran regarding ISIL?
General Dempsey. We did not envision a scenario by which we would
collaborate with Iran in our effort to defeat ISIL. While U.S. Forces
are working with coalition partners to train, advise, and assist Iraqi
and Peshmerga forces, they are not in communication, collaboration, or
cooperation with Iranian forces which may be operating in proximate
areas.
Mr. Shuster. In your estimation, how effective have coalition
airstrikes been in countering ISIL on the ground? Given the nature of
the threat and the current state of ISIL forces, by what metrics would
you define ``success'' in the air campaign?
General Dempsey. Airstrikes have been effective by disrupting
ISIL's offensive, killing multiple senior ISIL leaders, and forcing
them to change their tactics to avoid our strikes. We have achieved a
95% accuracy rate on kinetic targeting. Success for the air campaign in
Iraq, however, is to actively enable Iraqi and Kurdish Ground forces in
making steady advances and retaking ground as recently demonstrated in
Beiji. Air power is a critical component of our overall strategy, but
it is complimentary to the main effort, Iraqis retaking, controlling,
and governing their own soil. In Syria we continue to use airstrikes to
successfully target ISIL leaders, disrupt their lines of communication,
and means of finance by targeting sources of oil revenue.
Mr. Shuster. How involved are you and the rest of DOD with the
President's strategic decisionmaking in the campaign against ISIL? Have
you been in regular consultation with the President during the
formulation of this strategy, and is the President consulting military
leaders as new developments arise on the ground? In what areas do you
feel there needs to be better communication?
General Dempsey. The Secretary of Defense and I personally consult
with the President regarding the campaign and the broader strategy. At
each of these engagements, we have in depth strategic discussions where
I offer my best military advice. From the very beginning, the
Department of Defense participated in the formulation of the counter-
ISIL strategy. Communication between the White House and the Pentagon
is open and frank, and the President remains advised of all new
developments on the related to the campaign.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
Mr. Barber. We must prevent ISIL from gaining a safe haven from
which to attack Americans, abroad or here at home. As you have said, a
critical piece of our fight is to train and equip moderate Syrian
opposition groups. However, in a recent Newsweek article, one former
CIA vetting expert declared that the U.S. and CIA was ``completely out
of its league.''
Can you give us any indication as to how the vetting process is
working? How can we make sure that we are not arming the enemy with
training, aid and weapons that may be used against us?
Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey. The Department of Defense will
follow a layer vetting approach that uses long-standing and well
developed U.S. military procedures and practices for vetting
international forces. This approach applies processes from the U.S.
Intelligence Community and interagency partners, while also soliciting
sustained assistance from regional and international partners. Further,
the Department of Defense will assess trainees and monitor recipients
of assistance and training when they return to Syria. It will be a
challenge to ensure certainty that the weapons and training will not be
misused. The Department of Defense will discontinue support to any
person, unit, or commander associated with credible evidence of end use
violations.
Mr. Barber. The Indiana Air National Guard's 122nd Fighter Wing has
been deployed to the CENTCOM area of operation with a number of A-10s.
It seems logical to me to use the A-10 in our fight against ISIL,
especially since we are operating in contested territory mostly without
the help of forward air controllers. The A-10 is one of the best
airframes at a low altitude and can see the total battlefield much
better than high-flying, high speed aircraft
You have both testified to this committee that the Pentagon is
preparing for a multi-year campaign against ISIL. Have you considered a
role for the Warthog in the fight? Is there a reason we would not use
one of our best tools, particularly one that is already deployed to the
area?
Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey. A-10s deployed to the U.S.
Central Command area of operation are supporting the counter-ISIL air
campaign.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH
Ms. Duckworth. Can you explain the current vetting process for
training and equipping opposition fighters and what mitigation measures
are in place to ensure that those we train and equip are fighting in
accordance with U.S. strategic objectives? Furthermore, who will be
doing the training and who will be providing the long-term logistical
support? For example: where and how will they get U.S. caliber
ammunition for the U.S.-made rifles and machine guns we are supplying?
Will all of these logistical requirements be the responsibility of
American forces, or of contractors, our allies, etc.?
Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey. The Department of Defense will
follow a layered vetting approach that uses long-standing and well
developed U.S. military procedures and practices for vetting
international forces. This approach applies processes from the U.S.
Intelligence Community and interagency partners. The approach also
solicits sustained assistance from regional and international partners.
Further, the Department of Defense will assess trainees and monitor
recipients of assistance and training when they return to Syria. U.S.
special operation forces and partner nation personnel will conduct the
required training. Existing U.S. and partner nations will provide
necessary supply and logistics, to include initial and periodic
resupply.
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