[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-126]
THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY
FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ
AND THE LEVANT
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 18, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
______________________
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91-811 WASHINGTON : 2015
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, September 18, 2014, The Administration's Strategy for
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant....................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, September 18, 2014..................................... 49
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2014
THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE
LEVANT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
WITNESSES
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense, accompanied by LTG William Mayville, USA, Director for
Operations, J-3, Joint Staff................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hagel, Hon. Chuck............................................ 53
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Carson................................................... 66
Dr. Fleming.................................................. 64
Mr. Kline.................................................... 63
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 63
THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE
LEVANT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 18, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:19 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before we begin, I will state up
front that we intend to conduct this hearing in an orderly and
efficient manner to ensure all members have an opportunity to
ask questions and our witnesses have an opportunity to be
heard. To that end, please be advised I will not tolerate
disturbances of these proceedings, including verbal
disruptions, photography, standing or holding signs. Thank you
all for your cooperation. If there are disturbances, we will
stop and have those who are disturbing leave the room.
The committee meets to receive testimony on the
administration's strategy for the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant or ISIL. I would like to welcome Secretary Hagel,
Lieutenant General Mayville, Director of Operations at the
Joint Staff. General Dempsey is on a long-planned trip, meeting
with his defense counterparts in Europe. Given the many crises
in the world right now and the immense demands that they are
placing on our military, General Dempsey is exactly where he
should be.
I received a call from Secretary Hagel I think it was about
a week ago. He said I am in, I think Tbilisi or whatever,
Georgia, and I said, is that near Atlanta? He said, No, a
different Georgia. And he was there, and then he was going to
Turkey, and then he was coming back here, and then he just--it
is really great to have you here today, Mr. Secretary, and I
understand how busy you are and how much you are traveling.
Really appreciate your time, what you, General Dempsey, what
all of the men and women in uniform are doing to keep us safe
and from harm.
Just yesterday the House, on a bipartisan basis and in
large numbers, passed my amendment to the continuing resolution
at the President's request which authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to train and equip appropriately vetted elements of the
Syrian opposition. We strengthened the proposal through
congressional oversight, including detailed reporting and
reprogramming requirements.
Although not everyone supported the authority, there was
widespread agreement that ISIL is a threat to our allies and to
the United States, apparently that ISIL--agreement that ISIL
must be defeated, agreement that the landscape is incredibly
complex and that any option will carry risk and agreement that
the Syria train-and-equip authority is but one part of what
should be a broader regional strategy to defeat ISIL.
I listened to the President's speech last week, and I
talked with military experts, including those who know Iraq
best. I traveled to the region earlier this month and got blunt
answers from our allies and partners on what needs to be done.
I do not believe the minimalist counterinsurgency strategy that
the President has proposed is sufficient to achieve his
objective to degrade and destroy ISIL.
I gave a speech at the American Enterprise Institute last
week. I called for swift action, not the current ``go slow''
approach. For every week we wait, ISIL grows. We need to
conduct military operations in both Iraq and Syria to deny ISIL
any safe haven.
While the Kurds and Iraqi security forces are willing to
fight and have some capability, they still need our trainers,
our advisors, our command and control, our intelligence, our
close air support, our special forces, the capabilities that
only the United States can provide. None of us should minimize
the risks. We cannot succeed from the safety of some
headquarters building. Engaging those divergent groups and
advising indigenous forces will put our military in harm's way.
This is a dangerous business. The most irresponsible thing
that the President can do is give the military a mission but
not give it the tools it needs to do the job. By taking options
off the table, I fear the President is setting the mission and
our military up for failure rather than success. I know when
Eisenhower was planning the invasion of Normandy, one of his
subordinates questioned some of the planning, and he said, ``We
are planning for success; failure is not an option.'' We are in
that same situation today.
Today's hearing is important for us to understand the
administration's strategy for ISIL. The President has
identified his objective to degrade and ultimately destroy. We
need to hear from our defense and uniformed leaders on what you
believe will be required of the military to achieve that
objective. We need to understand the campaign, the role our
partners will play, the risks, the capabilities our military
will need, and the consequences of inaction.
Mr. Secretary, General Mayville, again, thank you for being
here during this consequential moment for our country. I look
forward to your question and gaining answers to our questions.
I would like to point out that we have a staff member who
is leaving us, Debra Wada. Is Debra in here?
Mr. Smith. We can thank her anyway.
The Chairman. She already left? You already got her, huh?
She is a professional staff member for the Subcommittee on
Military Personnel for the House Armed Services Committee, a
position that she has held since 1999. Ms. Wada served as the
lead staff member for the subcommittee from 2007 to 2010 and
briefly served as deputy staff director for the committee in
2011. In 1999, Ms. Wada served as legislative affairs
specialist for the National Parks Service. She served as
legislative assistant for U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka, acting
as the Senator's principal aide on national defense, veterans
affairs, maritime issues, educational, social security, and
welfare from 1987 to 1999. She received a B.A. [Bachelor of
Arts] from Drake University.
This sounds like an obituary. It is not. She is leaving to
become the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, Department of Defense, so we just got her
ready to move down there for another very important job. She is
still in the fight. So we want to point that out and thank her
for what she is doing and wish her well down there for you, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess it is not so
much an obituary as we can just say she has been sentenced to a
stint over at the Pentagon. So we wish her well and we will
visit her from time to time.
Well, I thank you very much for being here, Mr. Secretary,
General Mayville, and this is a very difficult moment for our
country, because I think the best way to sum it up is our
country simply wants this problem gone. You know, ever since 9/
11 [September, 11, 2001], ever since we learned about this
terrorist threat that is out there, the two wars that we
fought, all the decisions that have been made, and believe me
it wouldn't be hard for anyone to go back over those decisions
and criticize them step by step from just about any point on
the political spectrum and say, Why did we do this? Why did we
do this? If only we hadn't done that, everything would be fine.
But the bottom line is, this problem is not going away. I
cannot personally imagine any set of decisions that we could
have made in the last 13 years that would have made it just go
away now.
I can certainly, you know, imagine ones that would have
been better, and we can look back and learn about what was
perhaps not a good decision, but the threat that we face, and
ISIL is but one piece of it, is the ideological threat that we
first came to understand with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. It
is an incredibly violent extremist ideology, attempting to
hijack one of the world's great religions, and their ideology
is very straightforward. They want to destroy us. The only
thing that, you know, stops them from doing it is our efforts,
the efforts of men like you and others and just the lack of
capability. This threat exists, and we have to confront it, and
every time a decision comes up, I really think a lot of the
opposition is we just don't want to have to deal with it. But
it is there, and we have to deal with it. The threat is real.
It is not being made up, and ISIL is the latest manifestation
of that threat. We have seen how just absolutely brutal and
vulgar they are.
They have committed, you know, small-scale genocides every
place they have gone. Anyone who doesn't believe what they
believe they kill and usually in the most brutal fashion
imaginable. And they threaten us. Certainly they threaten the
region first. There has been considerable debate about whether
or not ISIL is a direct threat to us right now, and in a truly
technical sense, they aren't, in the sense that they haven't
been able to yet set up a system for plotting and planning
attacks overseas, but I vividly remember, and this was a
mistake I made along the way, when we were focused on Al Qaeda
and we were focused in Pakistan, and for the longest time I
said, Look, you know, Pakistan, Afghanistan, that is where it
is at because any attack against western targets has always
been plotted and planned out of that region.
And that was true until Abdul Mutallab showed up on that
airplane in Detroit, and that one was plotted and planned out
of Yemen, which showed that the threat can spread, and we have
responded to that. We were responding to it at the time by
working with the Yemeni Government and trying to confront the
threat there. And make no mistake about it, if ISIL were to
settle down and get secure territory in Syria or Iraq, I have
no doubt that they would try to train fighters and send them
back to attack targets in the West. Now anyone who wants to,
you know, say that that wouldn't happen, I wish you were right,
but you are not. Their ideology is clearly a threat.
So the question comes, how do we confront that threat? The
one thing we can do even if we can't wish the problem away is
we can learn from our past mistakes, and I think one of those
mistakes and one of the areas that we need to change and move
forward is the assumption that U.S. military might will fix
this problem, and I understand that trap as well. You see a
problem, you say by gum, we are not going to go at this at a
halfway fashion, we are going to go get them because it is the
American way; you win. You got a problem? You know what? We are
going to go fix it. As the cliche goes, to a hammer every
problem is a nail.
But the problem here is this ideology gains strength from
over-Western aggression, militarization in the region. The
strongest argument that Al Qaeda and ISIL have to present to
the people they want to join them is that they are protecting
Islam against Western aggression. That is how they present
themselves.
Now, we understand that that is a--sorry, I was going to
say something that isn't appropriate in a public hearing. That
is not true, let's just put it that way, but that is their
message. So when we show up with 150,000 troops in Iraq or
100,000 troops in Afghanistan, it is effective up to a point,
but it also reinforces that message. And that is why I think
the vote we took in the House [of Representatives] yesterday
and the train-and-equip mission is so critical.
To win this fight, we have got to find partners, Muslim
partners--in the case of ISIL, preferably Sunni partners--to
work with to fight them. We have got to convince the people of
the region that they need to fight this evil for their own
sake. We were incredibly successful in the Anbar Awakening
precisely because that is what we did. Yes, we had troops
there, but we went in and we worked with the Sunni tribes in
the Anbar region to convince them that Al Qaeda was evil, and
then they took the fight.
That made a huge difference, and that is what we have to do
here. That is why I think the train-and-equip mission makes so
much sense, and it was a bit frustrating yesterday to listen to
people who are concerned about it, didn't want to do the train-
and-equip because they were concerned about, you know, U.S.
military getting too engaged. They were in favor of the
bombing, but they didn't want to do the train-and-equip, and I
understand how those issues can become conflated, but train-
and-equip is how we get us out of the fight. It is how we
develop a capable force, and we have seen this succeed against
ISIL in Iraq. We have seen the Kurds, who were a broken force
until we showed up, provided some arms and trained them, and
they have now turned the tide and are actually starting to take
back territory from ISIL because we helped them.
Similarly, the Iraqi Government, a totally, totally broken
force. Now, I have an argument, people say, well, gosh, here we
go again with train-and-equip. We trained and equipped the
Iraqi military, and how did that work out? The primary reason
that didn't work out is because the Sunnis in the Iraqi
military chose not to fight for [Iraqi Prime Minister] Maliki.
I don't know whether they were a capable force or not, because
they didn't even fight because the Maliki government became
sectarian and corrupt and didn't support the Sunnis, so we
insisted on a change in that government. Now we have a new
Iraqi Government that is at least trying, initially, a power-
sharing arrangement that can bring some of the Sunnis in.
So we have Sunni partners now who are going to lead that
fight. So when we go after ISIL, the one big point, it has got
to be locally driven, we have got to find local Sunnis who are
willing to do that. So we could go rushing in and bombing and
dropping a whole bunch of U.S. troops in there, and we would
simply exacerbate the problem. We have got to be smart about
how we build local support to confront ISIL, but make no
mistake about it, they are a threat. One of those I wish we
didn't have to think about it, I truly do. It involves money,
it involves putting lives at risk, it involves difficult
military decisions. I wish that there wasn't a threat from ISIL
and this ideology, but we have learned in the last 20 years
that there clearly is. We have to come up with a plan for
confronting it, and I look forward to hearing from the
Secretary and the General today about how we are going to keep
working on that plan, implement it, and move forward. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY LTG WILLIAM MAYVILLE,
USA, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J-3, JOINT STAFF
Secretary Hagel. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
members of the committee, I very much appreciate the
opportunity this morning to discuss the President's strategy to
degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.
Mr. Chairman, on a personal note, I want to thank you for
your leadership on yesterday's vote. I believe, the President
believes, that that vote was a very important and defining
vote, and we are not unmindful of the work that you and others
on this committee invested in that vote and getting the turnout
that you did. So thank you.
Yesterday I joined President Obama at MacDill Air Force
Base in Tampa where he received a briefing from the commander
of U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], General Austin, on
operational plans to implement our ISIL strategy and met with
representatives while I was there, as did the President, from
more than 40 partner nations.
I am joined here today, as you have noted, Mr. Chairman, by
the Joint Staff's Director for Operations, Lieutenant General
Bill Mayville. He is our J-3 [Joint Staff, Operations], and
General Mayville helps oversee, among many of his
responsibilities, our military operations in Iraq, the Middle
East, and in CENTCOM, and works closely with General Austin and
CENTCOM to develop all of our military plans. So I appreciate
very much General Mayville being here.
And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Dempsey is with
our partners internationally over the next few days, and as you
noted, he should be. Much of that discussion will be about the
Middle East, specifically Iraq and Syria. He consults with our
allies in this fight against ISIL and tomorrow will attend a
special NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Chiefs of
Defense conference in Lithuania where they will be focused on
the ISIL challenge.
The Defense Department civilian and military leaders, Mr.
Chairman, are in complete agreement with every component of the
President's strategy, and we strongly believe it offers the
best opportunity to degrade and destroy ISIL. The President,
Chairman Dempsey, General Austin, and I are in full alignment
on all of our objectives and our tactics and our strategy, that
military strategy necessary to achieve the President's
objective. However, as President Obama has repeatedly made
clear, American military power alone cannot eradicate the
threats posed by ISIL to the United States, our allies, and our
friends and partners in the region. Iraq's continued political
progress toward a more inclusive and representative government
will be critical to achieving our objective.
We believe that Iraq's new Prime Minister is committed to
bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL. To support him and
the Iraqi people in their fight against ISIL, against
terrorists, the special coalition that we are assembling will
need to use all of its instruments of power--military, law
enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and intelligence--in
coordination with the countries in the region.
To succeed, this strategy will also require a strong
partnership between the executive branch and Congress. The
President has made it a priority to consult with congressional
leadership on the ISIL challenge, as have Vice President Biden,
Secretary Kerry, and many senior members of the administration.
I appreciate the opportunities I have had to discuss our
strategy with members of this committee, including you, Mr.
Chairman, and other members of the Senate and the House over
the last couple of weeks, and we will continue with these
consultations.
ISIL poses a real threat to all countries in the Middle
East, our European allies, and to America, as you have noted,
Mr. Chairman, as has Congressman Smith.
In the last few months the world has seen ISIL's barbarity
up close as its fighters advanced across western and northern
Iraq and slaughtered thousands of innocent civilians including
Sunni and Shi'a Muslims and Kurdish Iraqis and all religious
minorities who stood in their way. ISIL's murder of two U.S.
journalists outraged the American people and exposed the
depravity of ISIL's ideology and tactics, exposed those tactics
and that brutal ideology to the world.
Over the weekend we saw ISIL's murder of a British citizen.
ISIL now controls a vast swath of eastern Syria and western and
northern Iraq, including towns and cities in these areas. ISIL
has gained strength by exploiting the civil war in Syria and
sectarian strife in Iraq. As it has seized territory across
both countries and acquired significant resources and advanced
weapons, ISIL has employed a violent combination of terrorist,
insurgent, and conventional military tactics.
ISIL has also been very adept at deploying technology and
social media, employing this to increase its global profile and
attract tens of thousands of fighters. Its goal is to become
the new vanguard of the global extremist movement and establish
an extremist Islamic caliphate across the Middle East. It
considers itself the rightful inheritor of Osama bin Laden's
legacy.
While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American
citizens in Iraq and our interests in the Middle East, we also
know that thousands of foreign fighters, including Europeans
and more than 100 Americans, have traveled to Syria with
passports that give them relative freedom of movement. These
fighters can exploit ISIL's safe haven to plan, coordinate, and
carry out attacks in United States and Europe. Although the
Intelligence Community has not yet detected specific plotting
against the U.S. homeland, ISIL has global aspirations, clearly
has global aspirations, and they have so stated.
And as President Obama has made clear, ISIL's leaders have
threatened America and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL will
directly threaten our homeland and our allies. In his address
to the Nation last week, President Obama announced that the
United States will lead a broad multinational coalition to roll
back ISIL's threat and defeat ISIL. More than 40 nations have
already expressed their willingness to participate in this
effort and more than 30 nations have indicated their readiness
to offer military support. President Obama and Vice President
Biden, Secretary Kerry, and I and others are working to unite
and expand this coalition.
At the NATO summit in Wales, Secretary Kerry and I convened
a meeting of key partners in this coalition. I then went to
Georgia and Turkey, as you noted, Mr. Chairman. The Georgians
made clear they will help. Turkey, by virtue of its geography
and its common interest in destroying ISIL, and I might note an
indispensable member of NATO from the beginning of NATO. We
know that Turkey is now in the grips of ISIL holding nearly 50
of its diplomats.
[Disruption in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The chair notes that there is a disturbance
of the committee's proceedings. The committee will be in order.
The committee will stand in recess until the Capitol Police can
restore order.
The gentleman will proceed.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you. As I was noting, ISIL is
currently holding nearly 50 Turkish diplomats hostage, and this
obviously is a high and first priority of the Turkish
Government to get those hostages back, and in my conversations
with President Erdogan and other leaders in Turkey, we talked
specifically about that, but also the important role Turkey
will play in our overall efforts in this coalition.
Secretary Kerry convened a meeting in Jeddah [Saudi Arabia]
last week with foreign ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation
Council states, also Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, and all
22 nations of the Arab League adopted a resolution at their
summit in Cairo calling for comprehensive measures to combat
ISIL.
Earlier this week in Paris, President Hollande of France,
who traveled to Iraq last weekend, hosted a conference attended
by the U.N. [United Nations] Security Council permanent
members, European and Arab leaders, and representatives of the
EU [European Union], Arab League, and United Nations. They all
pledged--they all pledged to help Iraq in the fight against
ISIL, including through military assistance. Other key allies
such as Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom are
already contributing military support, and other partners have
begun to make specific offers.
At next week's U.N. General Assembly, we expect that
additional nations will be making commitments across the
spectrum of capabilities, building on the strong Chapter 7 U.N.
Security Council Resolution adopted last month calling on all
member states to take measures to counter ISIL and to suppress
the flow of foreign fighters to ISIL. Also next week, President
Obama will chair a meeting with the U.N. Security Council to
further mobilize the international community.
As you all know, former International Security Assistance
Force [ISAF] commander and acting CENTCOM commander, General
John Allen, has been designated to serve as special
Presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL.
General Allen will work in a civilian diplomatic capacity to
coordinate, build, and sustain the coalition, drawing on his
extensive experience in the Middle East. He will work closely
with General Austin of CENTCOM to ensure that coalition efforts
are aligned across all elements of our strategy.
In his address to the Nation, the President outlined the
four elements of this strategy to degrade and ultimately
destroy ISIL. Let me now describe how we are implementing this
whole-of-government approach. First, in close coordination with
the new Iraqi Government, we are broadening our air campaign
against ISIL targets to protect Americans threatened by ISIL
and advances that ISIL is making and also to prevent
humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. military has already
conducted more than 170 successful air strikes. These strikes
have disrupted ISIL tactically and helped buy time for the
Iraqi Government to form an inclusive and broad-based governing
coalition led by the new prime minister. That was one of
President Obama's essential preconditions for taking further
action against ISIL because the Iraqi people, the Iraqi people
must be united in their opposition to ISIL in order to defeat
them. This is ultimately their fight.
The new broader air campaign against ISIL targets will
enable Iraqi security forces, including Kurdish forces, to
continue to stay on the offensive and recapture territory from
ISIL and hold it. The President of the United States has the
constitutional and the statutory authority to use military
force against ISIL in Syria as well as Iraq. Because ISIL
operates freely across the Iraqi-Syrian border and maintains a
safe haven in Syria, our actions will not be restrained by a
border that exists in name only.
CENTCOM's plan includes targeted actions against ISIL safe
havens in Syria, including its command and control, logistics
capabilities, and infrastructure. General Dempsey and I have
both approved and spent considerable time reviewing and
adapting the CENTCOM plan which General Austin, as I noted,
briefed to the President in Tampa yesterday.
The second element of the strategy is to increase our
support for forces fighting ISIL on the ground, not American
forces, but forces, Iraqi forces fighting on the ground. To
support Iraqi and Kurdish forces, the President announced last
week that we would deploy an additional 475 American troops to
Iraq. Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors
and support personnel to supplement forces already in Iraq
conducting assessments to the Iraqi security forces. This
assessment mission is now transitioning to an advise-and-assist
mission with more than 15 teams embedding with Iraqi security
forces at the headquarters level to provide strategic and
operational advice and assistance.
By the time all these forces arrive, there will be
approximately 1,600 U.S. personnel in Iraq responding to the
ISIL threat. But as the President reaffirmed yesterday in
Tampa, American forces will not have a combat mission on the
ground. Instead, these advisors will continue to support Iraqi
and Kurdish forces, including the government's plans to stand
up Iraqi National Guard units. These units are to help Sunni
communities defeat ISIL in their area. The best counterweights
to ISIL are local forces and local citizens, the people.
As you know, in June, the President asked Congress for the
necessary authority for DOD [Department of Defense] to train
and equip moderate Syrian opposition forces and $500 million to
fund this program. And again, we appreciate yesterday's House
vote to amend the continuing resolution with language
authorizing this train-and-equip program. Saudi Arabia will
host the training program for this mission, and the Saudis have
offered funding and additional assistance with recruiting and
vetting. The $500 million request the President made in June
for this train-and-equip program reflects CENTCOM's estimate of
the cost to train, equip, and resupply more than 5,000
opposition forces over one year.
This is the beginning of a multiyear, scalable effort
designed to eventually produce an even larger opposition force.
The package of assistance that we initially provide would
consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like
communications, as well as tactical and more advanced training.
As these forces prove their effectiveness on the battlefield,
we would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated
types of assistance to the most trusted commanders and capable
forces.
The goal is not to achieve numerical parity with ISIL, but
to ensure that moderate Syrian forces are superior fighters
trained by units. Our goal is to undercut ISIL's recruitment
and to enable the Syrian opposition to add to the pressure ISIL
is already facing from the Iraqi security forces and the
security forces of Kurdistan.
We want to force ISIL into a three-front battle against
more capable local forces. A rigorous vetting process will be
critical to the success of this program. DOD will work closely
with the State Department, the Intelligence Community, and all
of our international partners and in the region to screen and
vet the forces we train and equip. We will monitor them closely
to ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of radical
elements of the opposition, ISIL, the Syrian regime, or other
extremist groups.
There will always be risks, Mr. Chairman. There are risks
in everything. There are risks in action and there are risks in
inaction, but we believe the risk is justified, given the real
threat ISIL poses to this country and to the region and to our
allies and the necessity of having capable partners on the
ground in Syria.
As we pursue this program, the United States will continue
to press for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict.
Assad has lost all legitimacy to govern. He has created the
conditions that allowed ISIL and other terrorist groups to gain
ground and terrorize and slaughter the Syrian population. The
United States will not coordinate or cooperate with the Assad
regime.
The third element of the President's strategy is an all-
inclusive approach to preventing attacks from ISIL against the
homeland of the United States and our allies. In concert with
our international partners, the United States will draw on
intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic tools
to cut off ISIL's funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen
homeland defense, and stem the flow of foreign fighters.
The United States and our allies have been stepping up
efforts to identify and counter threats emanating from Syria
against our homelands. This includes increased intelligence
sharing, working with DOD's partners at the National
Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security,
the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and across the
Intelligence Community.
Our terrorist screening and analytical databases now have
special threat cases linking together known actors and
potential foreign fighters, making it easier and faster to
update them regularly with new information. Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has directed enhanced
screening at 25 overseas airports with direct flights to the
United States, a step that the United Kingdom and other
countries have already taken.
The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have
launched an initiative to partner with local communities to
counter extremist recruiting, and the Department of Treasury's
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is working
closely with coalition partners to disrupt ISIL's financing and
expose their financing activities.
The final element of the President's strategy is to
continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent
civilians displaced or threatened by ISIL. Alongside the
Government of Iraq, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
France, U.S. troops have already delivered life-saving [aid to]
thousands of threatened Iraqi civilians on Mount Sinjar and the
Iraqi town of Amerli.
Our total humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis is
now more than $186 million for fiscal year 2014. The United
States is also the single largest donor of humanitarian
assistance for the millions of Syrians affected by the civil
war. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, the United States
has committed almost $3 billion in humanitarian assistance to
those affected by this war.
All four elements of this strategy require a significant
commitment of resources on the part of the United States and
our coalition partners. This effort will not be easy. This
effort will not be brief. This effort will not be simple. We
are at war with ISIL, just as we are at war with Al Qaeda, but
destroying ISIL will require more than military efforts alone.
It will require political progress in the region and effective
partners on the ground in Iraq and in Syria, and as President
Obama said yesterday in Tampa, we cannot do for the Iraqis what
they must do for themselves. We can't do for them, but this is
an effort that calls on America's unique, our unique
capabilities and abilities and responsibilities to lead. As the
Congress and the administration work together, we know this
effort will take time. The President has outlined a clear, a
comprehensive, and a workable strategy to achieve our goals and
protect our interests.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you. Thank
you for your continued support, your partnership, and what you
do for our men and women in uniform who protect this country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Will the General have an opening
statement?
General Mayville. No, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You outlined a lot of things. I
think the President's stated objective to degrade and
ultimately destroy ISIL is a very worthy goal, and I think you
have outlined a lot of things that he plans to do in that area,
yet the only thing he has asked Congress for--I presume he will
be coming for other things, but so far all he has asked is for
the train-and-equip. We acted on that yesterday. The Senate, I
understand, will act on that today. So I think that is a good
message that we are trying to work together. We are all
Americans and we have one common enemy, and that should unite
us and unite us strongly.
I was glad to hear you say that you are all united, your
team, all the military leaders. It was reported that General
Austin's military advice was to send a modest contingent of
American troops to advise and assist in Iraq, more than the
President I think has decided to do. Is that an accurate
report?
Secretary Hagel. What I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, is,
as you know, and I think the President has been very clear, and
certainly General Dempsey made this clear 2 days ago in our
hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. First, the
President expects from his military leaders an honest, direct
evaluation of what they think and what is required to implement
strategies that will protect this country. There were a number
of recommendations on a number of things based on the questions
the President asked of our military leaders. I will tell you
this: General Austin, as I have said, is in full agreement with
the President's decisions on the resources the President has
decided to use to implement that strategy, and General Austin
made that very clear again yesterday with the President when
the President was in Tampa to get--spent the day there with
General Austin and his commanders to get a thorough briefing of
the plan. Thank you.
The Chairman. There is one thing that I am going to give
you, give the President some advice through you. I think it is
very important that he does follow the advice and counsel that
he receives, the professional advice of the military. They are
the ones best suited to do that. I realize he is Commander in
Chief, he has the final say and the final obligation and
responsibility. I would also request that he not take options
off the table. It seems to me every speech he gives, the first
thing he says is no boots on the ground, and then makes an
announcement of sending more boots.
I think that that is confusing to the American people, and
I think it builds distrust rather than understanding of what he
is really saying. I think no boots on the ground, I think
people are thinking divisions and full-bore thing that we
originally did in Iraq, shock and awe. I understand that is not
the strategy, but I think the American people get confused, and
if we explain to them, look, boots on the ground means no
combat forces, or boots on the ground means we are not going to
do shock and awe or whatever, but we are going to have our
people there, and there are certain things that they have to
do, and without them, we can't be successful in this battle,
and I think they can accept that, and they can--they are smart
enough to figure it out, and if they think they are not hearing
the truth, the whole truth, then I think they get, they kind of
get their backs up.
I think it is also very important that the President give
lots of updates. I think, you know, over the last several years
the war in Afghanistan, there have been a lot of
accomplishments that we have achieved over there, and I don't
think the American people know, and I think only the President
can tell them that, and I think they would like to know, as we
move forward, how we are doing in Iraq, how we are doing in
Syria, and I would strongly suggest that he go before the
people--he is the only one that can do it--and keep them
informed as to what is going on, because I think they are going
to have to be in this, and this is not going to be--this is
going to be for the entire duration of his Presidency and
probably the next President's. So if we don't let people know
what is going on and make them a part of it, we are not going
to have the political support we need to go forward.
I am concerned about the strategy of counterterrorism. I
don't think it has been overly effective in Yemen or other
places that he pointed out that had actually been successful. I
think we are going to have to be more aggressive than that.
I see what we are doing in Iraq is building up, pushing
ISIL, I think the plan is to push them out of all their
occupied territory, regain that, take it back, and free up
Iraq, and then as you are pointing out, we don't want to have a
safe haven where they can just slip over into Syria. So my
understanding of what the President is saying, he is not going
to give them any safe haven. So while we don't know yet what
more he will do, he has said he will make--take air strikes
there if possible.
So I just, more than questions, I think I just want to
relay a few of those things, my thoughts and feelings. I am not
going to be in a position to do that much longer, so I want to
take advantage of it while I have the opportunity. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to a couple of
the points you made because each is particularly important, and
not only are your points right, I think, and I think the
President agrees with what you have said, but most of the
points are centerpieces and pillars of his strategy.
On the particular question on boots on the ground, what he
has said is that there is no ground combat role for Americans.
Yes, a combat role on the ground is going to be required.
Obviously, it is going on in Iraq today. It will be required in
Syria. And what he has said is the Iraqi security forces, the
Peshmerga, the Kurdish forces that are the ground forces in
Iraq, and we will continue to support them through air strikes
and other capabilities we have.
Syria, as you know, the whole point of train and equip is
to help develop that ground force, a capable unit-by-unit
ground force in Syria, but he is fully aware of and agrees that
this isn't going to be done without ground forces, but what he
has made clear to the American people, and I know there are
differences of opinion, as he does, that he is not going to
order American combat ground forces into those areas, but I
thought that was a point that you made that you gave me an
opportunity of maybe hopefully clear that up.
Your point about informing and updating the American
people, you are right. I think any of us in this business
understand how critical that is the American people understand
what is going on. They are represented obviously in this body
and the body across the way, as it should be, but to have the
American people understand it and be part of it, and especially
the Congress, as I have noted in my testimony, the President
thinks it is a critical component of going forward. So thank
you for allowing me to maybe clear that up.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Yeah, on the boots on the ground point, I think
the problem is that the President and many people have the
instinct that the country, as we witness from the protesters,
you know, we just don't want to go back into another war, and
everyone is very concerned about that, and the President is
seeking to reassure those folks, but I agree with the Chairman,
I think it would be better to sort of explain, you know, what,
it is not a boots-on-the-ground issue, and also it is not even
a matter of, you know, we are war weary, so we are not going to
send in troops just because we know it will upset people.
It is because we don't think it will work, and I think that
is the thing to make clear is that there is too much of an
excessive reliance on U.S. military force, then oddly, we push
more people into the arms of ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria], and I think, you know, too often the President does
sound more like he is in the former camp of we don't want to do
this because we know it is hard and we know you don't like it.
It would be better if he would make it clear that we are not
going to do this because it is not going to work, it is not the
most effective way to confront those forces.
So both Buck and I will task you with going to the
President and working on his messaging, but it is important and
it is important how it is presented to the American people and
how we build support for this program.
On the issue of finding, you know, Sunni partners because I
still contend that is the key, if we find enough Sunnis in Iraq
and Syria who are willing to fight against ISIS, that is when
we will start to be successful. What are our efforts in terms
of outreach to some of those tribes, focusing on Iraq for the
moment, from the Anbar Awakening? They are still there. I
suspect many of them are fighting with ISIS. How are we doing
working with the Iraqi Government and the locals there to try
to turn some of those tribesmen the same way we did during the
Awakening?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, as you have just pointed out,
and as I noted in my testimony, the reaching out to the Sunni
tribes through an inclusive representative functioning
government in Iraq is a start. General Allen's relationships
will help, General Austin's relationships, relationships of
other coalition partners in the area, especially Arab Sunni
countries that are part of the coalition will be critically
important to this. This cannot be seen as a U.S.-Western effort
against any component of the Muslim world or Islam, Sunni
versus Shi'a.
So it is all of those working together as we go forward in
this coalition to get once again the Sunni tribe leadership and
buy-in, and as I noted in my testimony that what we are doing,
one of the most fundamental parts of that is the evolution and
development of government in Iraq that the Sunnis trust and
have some confidence in that begins to unite that country, and
as you defined it in your opening statements, much of the
Maliki government did everything but that the last 5 years and
brought a lot of this on. So that can be done. It is a critical
component of this. We know that, and we are working hard to do
it.
Mr. Smith. And just a little pie in the sky for the moment.
The whole area there would benefit from the Sunnis and the
Shi'a finding some way to coexist. Massive understatement, I
understand. But our partners Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab
Emirates], Qatar, is there any way to have conversations with
them and say, look, we know you guys hate Iran and understand
that. A big part about what motivated Saudi Arabians and these
other countries in the early stages of Syria's civil war to
just say, hey, if you are against Assad, we are going to throw
money at you, we are going to throw guns at you, which is what
really empowered some of these violent extremists was the
Saudis, they didn't care, they were like, we--we hate Iran,
Assad is a partner, so whatever, whatever we have to do to get
Assad is in our interests.
Do you think it is sort of dawning on them at this point
that they are caught between two things here and if they don't
find some way to peacefully--I mean, Iran's not going anywhere,
okay? Now, we do wish that they would stop messing in external
affairs as well as they do, but has there been any effort at
saying how do we sort of take the edge off that because that is
what, you know, groups like ISIS feed on.
Secretary Hagel. You have just identified a big part of the
complications. Yes, we are much aware of that. We are working
with that. As I noted, Secretary Kerry was in Jeddah last week
and convened a meeting of the foreign ministers from the six
GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries as well as four other
Middle Eastern countries.
As I noted in my testimony and my comments, this is a
complicated dynamic on a good day, and there are many factions
and factors that are flowing through this, and we have to be
mindful of that as we proceed and try to calibrate achieving an
objective here that the President has laid out that is clearly
in our interests, and clearly in the interests of those Sunni
countries, Arab countries, all the countries of the Middle
East, and to find that common ground and common interest and
seize upon that where we can find that cooperation, and we are
doing that, and that is coming together, as these countries are
stepping forward on committing to what they are going to be
doing, and they are going to be doing more of it as we
coordinate that. So what you have identified, Congressman, is a
core piece of this effort.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield my time
to the gentlelady from Indiana, Ms. Walorski.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
gentleman for yielding his time. Thank you, Secretary Hagel and
General for being here, for your service, we appreciate it. And
I am thinking that I remember on September 11th, a reporter was
asking a question to White House press secretary and said how
are you defining victory, and the White House press secretary
said, I don't have my Webster's dictionary with me up here. And
what is on the minds of the American people, I know, it is on
my mind as well, that we have talked about degrading and
destroying, and now those seem to be the two coins that we are
understanding, we are degrading, which my understanding is we
are slowing down this process, we are disrupting ISIL's
maneuvers and operations, and then we are ultimately
destroying, and I think it is a fair question to ask on behalf
of all Americans that if this plan is successful, and there is
so many doubts about this plan being successful, the big
``if.'' What is the end game? What does it look like with a
destroyed ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. First, destroying ISIL, which is clearly,
as you have noted and we have said clearly, is not an easy or
simple or quick task, and we have been very honest about that.
We will continue to be honest about it. But your question, what
is the end state, it is a region and it is a reality and a
threat that is eliminated from threats against the United
States and against our allies.
Mrs. Walorski. So----
Secretary Hagel. That threat of beheadings, of terrorist,
sophisticated terrorist attacks of slaughtering people, of a
barbaric approach to everything they do, an ideology that has
nothing to do with religion, any religion. The capacity that
ISIL now possesses through their funding mechanisms, through
their sophistication, through their organization, through their
strategy is a threat to everybody, so what does an end game
look like is a world without that threat. Now, is the world
always going to be dangerous? I suspect in our lifetimes it
will be, but that is something that we are aware of, but we are
dealing with the threat right now.
Mrs. Walorski. Right, I understand that, and I understand
the enormity of it and the complexity of it, and I think the
American people do as well, but I think it is a fair question
to say, is, you know, is success that we stop seeing
beheadings? You mentioned that. Of course that would be a
measure of success. Is success that Iraq gets its territory
back? That would be successful; I would imagine you would
agree. That Syria----
Secretary Hagel. Stability in the Middle East.
Mrs. Walorski. Stability in the Middle East.
Secretary Hagel. Partners.
Mrs. Walorski. What about the caliphate in general, is
success also going to be measured in the fact that we no longer
have a group of people that literally are going to insist on
world dominance in a caliphate or are we ever going to be able
to deal with that, because it seems to me that if we don't
continue to have some kind of a bold and aggressive approach,
that there is some kind of democracy and freedom in that region
with the very limited partners that we have that there will
never be an end game, and my fear, and I think the fear of the
American people is we have all heard this before. We have all
lived through this already.
Secretary Hagel. So what's the alternative, do nothing?
Mrs. Walorski. What does it look like? If this plan doesn't
work, what is the alternative? What does it look like in the
Middle East then?
Secretary Hagel. Well, we always have Plan Bs and Cs, that
is what the military does as well as anybody in the world, but
we believe this plan will work, and we believe the way it is
laid out with our partners, the structuring of it, the reality
of it, the timeframes of it, the partnerships, commitments to
this will work. But back to your more fundamental question, and
I understand your question. As I said, I don't know if we will
ever see a world without threats, particularly your question
about won't there always be threats out there with some
extremist group wanting to build an extremist caliphate in the
Middle East? I suppose. But I have got to worry about what I
have right in front of me right now, and this is an immediate
threat. Yes, we have to think long term, we do. We are trying
to think through that as to what will work, what will be
effective, how do we bring the civilized world together to stop
this----
Mrs. Walorski. Right.
Secretary Hagel [continuing]. Because the other way to ask
that question, Congresswoman, is what if we don't.
Mrs. Walorski. Correct. And just quickly, what else can we
do as a Congress to make sure we get those passports away from
the foreign fighters that are coming from America?
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, and I am glad you mentioned
that because it is something I noted in my testimony. It is a
critical piece to this. It is a dangerous and real threat with
those kind of individuals floating around out there, possessing
those passports with easy access, as I said, we are
coordinating with using every interagency force we have,
coordinating with our partners all over the world and
databases, everything that we can do right now to address this,
to identify those threats out there, to stop those threats.
Some countries are further ahead, like the U.K. [United
Kingdom], probably further ahead than almost anyone, but I just
was in a National Security Council meeting late yesterday
afternoon when we came back from Tampa, the President chaired,
and the Attorney General was there, the Secretary of Homeland
Security there. We were all there. This was a big part of the
topic. In fact, it was the central part of the topic, foreign
fighters, and the President wanted updates, and he gets them
every week on what are we doing, how much are we doing, how
much can we still do and what do we have to do, so it is a big
part of what we are doing here.
Mrs. Walorski. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
So yesterday we took a vote. The vote was on whether to arm the
Syrian rebels. We, I think, all acknowledge that ISIS is a
problem and something that we need to take care of. I find it
pretty disturbing that we are having this hearing after we have
taken a vote because I don't think that the plan that I have
seen was detailed enough to make me believe that your plan will
work.
I am going to ask you some questions, most of which will
probably have to go on the record or you will have to come in
and brief me, and I hope the other members of this committee
believe that it is important enough for us to understand
exactly what this plan is because I am not so sure of it and I
haven't heard the details as I would like to hear them.
I want to begin by saying that I have a Syrian-American
community, and they are all over the place on this. I go and I
talk to them, et cetera. Syrian moderates, most of my people
say that those Syrian moderates have gone over to ISIS. And
most of them have told me that they don't think that the Syrian
moderates we arm, whoever those may be, are actually going to
fight against the ISIS moderates who used to hang out with the
Syrian moderates.
Equip and train, because we did such a great job in Iraq,
$35 billion later--and Mr. Chairman, I was the one every single
time Rumsfeld and others were in front of us asking about equip
and train. But some have said, as my good friend and colleague
here, that it wasn't a problem of equip and train; it was a
lack of leadership; it was bad people commanding; it was the
commander in chief Maliki who was wrong and didn't help us on
this or didn't make this thing work.
Can you tell me who the commander in chief of the Syrian
moderates, who are all over the place--don't even talk to each
other sometimes--how we are going to see that leadership go
through? These are just for the record, okay. What type of
arms? Exactly what type of arms are we going to hand over to
these people? Because the last time I checked, we handed over
arms to Maliki and they ended up in ISIS and the very same arms
are going after us.
Coalition. Coalition of 40, the President says. Who? What
will they really do? How many troops? I have been through this,
you guys. I saw the coalition in Iraq, and we used to sort of
like chuckle at each other in seeing some of these countries
with one person. I don't know, training dogs, maybe a bomb
expert, but coalition of 40? Who? What? How much? Which are the
combat troops? How are they going to get there? I would like to
know those things.
And I have a problem, when you go out in front of the
American people and start talking about why certain countries
might not want to suggest that they are with us--this is why I
want all this information somehow. I don't need to put it out
in the public. But you know what I am told by my Turkish
Americans? That Turkish Army arms are in ISIS hands, and the
Government of Turkey has winked to let those go into those
hands. I have a problem. It is a very complicated issue you are
getting America into and an even more complicated situation.
More importantly--and, Secretary, this isn't and shouldn't
be under your sort of purview, but it is under the
administration's--so let's say--and I hope your plan works,
because, you know, ISIS, ISIL, they are not good. I hope I am
wrong. I hoped the same thing when I voted against the Iraq
war, that I was wrong, but I don't believe that I was wrong on
that. So I want to see the plan; in particular, I want to ask
the administration for this, the neighborhood players, let's
say we eliminate ISIS and ISIL, what fills that gap? What has
to fill that gap for this to work are people putting up homes,
people putting up schools, people putting up jobs, people
getting these people the type of lives that they see on
television and all these TV shows we export but aren't living.
And that is one of the reasons this has been created.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlelady yields back.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, in November 2005, as a Senator,
you penned an article in Foreign Affairs magazine asserting
that Vietnam was a national tragedy, partly because Members of
Congress failed their country, remained silent, and lacked the
courage to challenge the administration in power until it was
too late. You wrote, and I quote, ``To question your government
is not unpatriotic; to not question your government is
unpatriotic. America owes its men and women in uniform a policy
worthy to their sacrifice.'' These are your words, Mr.
Secretary.
In the past, you informed America that many in the Middle
East see us as an obstacle of peace and an aggressor, an
occupier. You wrote that our policies are a source of
significant friction in the region, and that we are, at the
same time, both a stabilizing and destabilizing force in the
Middle East. Also, you described a fear of the uncontrollable,
the unpredictable consequences of military action. You stated,
``How many of us really know and understand Iraq, the country,
the history, the people and the role of the Arab world?'' You
asserted that the American people must be told of that long-
term commitment, risk, and cost of the undertaking.
Mr. Secretary, you and I have a friendship that was based
on my coming out against the Iraq war. I did not know you prior
to that, and I was very grateful that you extended a hand to me
because I was getting beat up pretty bad down in my district
and by some of my Republican colleagues. In fact, the chairman
at the time told me that he would not appoint me to be a
subcommittee chairman because I would vote with the Democrats
to pull our troops out of Iraq, which he was right in that
assessment--not necessarily not naming me as a subcommittee
chairman but my position.
The reason I bring this up in when you said back in 2005 is
that in the year 2000, when Bill Clinton left the Presidency,
President Clinton left this country as President, we were $5.6
trillion in debt. Today, Mr. Secretary, the debt of this Nation
is over $17.6 trillion. I have heard you testify--and you will
in 2015--that cuts are coming to the military. You are
concerned about it, and we are concerned about it. You also
have said that sequestration, if it is not repealed, is going
to complicate the cuts that are coming without--normally.
I want to ask you today, do you think that Congress should
pay for whatever we decide to do and the administration decides
to do as it relates to Syria and to Iraq? Do you think we need
to pay for it today or put it on the back of our grandchildren?
Because we will not be able to continue to police the world,
and by using what we have is known as borrowing money from the
Chinese, the Japanese, and all these other countries, because
we cannot pay our bills today, would you agree that we need to
pay for whatever we do in Syria and in Iraq, we need to pay for
it today and not tomorrow?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you. And I recognize
any time any of us ever write anything or say anything, it is
always at some peril. But let me address my own words for a
moment and say that I, obviously, agreed with what I wrote then
and I still agree with it.
Now, there is a big difference between what we are talking
about today versus where we were in 2005. The President's
strategy in where and how and why it was to go forward----
Mr. Jones. Mr. Secretary, one moment. I apologize to you
for that. But please answer my question about do we pay for it
today or do we pay for it tomorrow, because my time is going to
expire.
Secretary Hagel. The responsibility of elected officials is
always to be honest about anything they get this country into,
any action they take, including paying for it. And I can assure
you, this Secretary of Defense will be very clear in this
administration on what we believe it is going to cost, how we
are going to pay for it. And there will not be any ambiguity
about that. But, yes, every Congress, every elected official
has that responsibility, that financial responsibility and
fiduciary responsibility.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I think, generally, history would show that
the West won the Cold War. It would also show winning the Cold
War didn't either end communism or get rid of communists. So
the point I want to make is, is it fair to say that we might be
able to beat ISIL as a group, but that is not going to end
extreme Islamic militants or going to end the desire for those
folks to try to create a caliphate sometime in the future?
Secretary Hagel. I can't, nor would I, and I don't believe
the President would, ever say that what we are doing now and
attempting to do with our strategy and our focus on ISIL will
end forever any terrorist group or any group of people who want
to do harm to our country or establish Islamic caliphate. Of
course, not. I can't guarantee that.
Mr. Larsen. That is great. That is what I want to hear,
because I think we need to have the right expectation here.
When people ask you what the definition of winning is, it is a
great question. We just need to have the right expectation
about what that is.
Secretary Hagel. But I think also, Congressman, the reality
of the threat, as it is today, is very real and----
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
Secretary Hagel [continuing]. I will never come before this
committee overstate a threat or understate a threat. And we
have a threat.
Mr. Larsen. Second, in your testimony on page 3, you say,
``CENTCOM's plan includes targeted actions against ISIL's safe
havens in Syria. General Dempsey and I''--meaning you--``have
both approved the CENTCOM plan.''
So you have approved a CENTCOM plan already that includes
air strikes inside Syria?
Secretary Hagel. That plan was provided to the President in
full explanation yesterday with all the options, all the plans.
And I laid it out, generally, in my testimony, and the
President asked that, as to what our options are.
Mr. Larsen. In your testimony, you say you have approved
that plan. It was briefed to the President. Has the President
approved that plan or taken any action to operationalize that
plan?
Secretary Hagel. The President has not yet approved its
finality, but he will do that when he feels that he is----
Mr. Larsen. I am sure he is putting a lot of thought into
it. I am not saying he is not. I just want to be sure at what
step the White House is with that.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks.
The third question, mainly for the general--I don't want
you to feel left out--on the train-and-equip mission, I think
Mr. Smith made a good point, it is how we get out of the fight.
We want to train and equip moderate Syrian opposition.
Obviously, after 13 years in Afghanistan and Iran, we should
have learned some lessons about the vetting. And I think a big
concern is how do we know people are moderate; people are
Syrian, that is, are committed to a free Syria; and third, that
they are in the opposition, they are not going to turn on us?
General Mayville. Yes, Congressman. You raise a good point.
I think we have got to be very upfront that the vetting process
is absolutely essential if we want to get this right. We have a
tremendous amount of experience over the last decade in vetting
and standing up these types of forces. We have an eye on the
pool right now of folks that we can draw from, but we need to
be very deliberate. Despite our best efforts, this will not be
perfect, but we are looking for individuals that can come
together that want to defend their community, can work as a
team.
They have to be able and willing. They have to be
appropriate for the task. Many of them will be former military.
Some will come from the large Syrian diaspora that's already
been displaced, but many of them are fighting right now against
the Assad government. We will have to put in place mechanisms
to assure ourselves of their reliability and make sure that we
have a system of accountability, and then we will build from
there. We will build a chain of command. We will take small
groups and create clusters and build formations. It will be
something that is a multiyear requirement that we will have to
look at.
Mr. Larsen. I think that we will, as it was laid out in the
amendment we had yesterday, we will have plenty of time to talk
to you all later on how that is going and what you are running
into.
Finally, I don't have a lot of time so I will just make a
note on this, I was surprised to hear the President use the
2001 AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] as a
justification for this, because the last time Pentagon, as I
recall, was in front of us to discuss this issue at all, there
was at that time I wouldn't say 100 percent opposition but a
lot of reluctance in using the 2001 AUMF because there was no
connection. So, at some point in the future, I would like to
find out what changed. But time is up, and I do want to have
that explored at some point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing.
Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for giving us your time
today to help walk through this strategy. I would like to get
your thoughts on two areas. You know, strategy has a lot of
components, as you mentioned. When you look at a lot of these
terrorist groups, the oxygen that tends to feed them is
twofold: One is hatred, which we can't always do a lot about,
but the second one is their financing and their money.
When I look at ISIL, at least the figures that I have, that
we expect them to get about $1 billion this year through
kidnapping for ransom, selling oil in the black market,
stealing money from banks and funding from state sympathizers
from the Gulf. Could you give us your thoughts on the strategy
we are going to use to cut that off, one? And secondly, could
you give me your thoughts--you know, General Dempsey about a
year ago told us that Syria had five times more air defenses,
some of which are high-end systems that is to say higher
altitude, longer range--could you give us your concerns, if
any, about the impact those air defense systems could have on
some of our air strikes and our capability of that?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you. On the ISIL
financing, and you stated it correctly, we must cut off that
funding and those sources, and it is as high a priority in this
effort as any one priority.
As I mentioned in my testimony just generally, the Treasury
Department, through a couple of their offices set up to deal
with foreign financing and these general kinds of threats, have
set up a special office on this particular issue working with
our international partners. You hit some of the main ones, the
black market avenue that they use to sell oil. They have, as
you I know are aware, ISIL has taken control of certain small
oil fields in Syria, and we have some estimates of 100,000
barrels of oil that those fields are producing, and they get
them out in different ways, so to cut off that main source.
You mentioned other sources. They, obviously, have taken
over cities and towns and resources and banks. But there are
day-to-day illegal activities that they are involved in,
businesses that we are trying to find, will find, but that has
to be working with our partners on it. So there is no higher
priority than getting that-- to cut that off.
On your question on Syrian air defenses, I would feel a lot
more comfortable, Congressman, and we can do this in a
private--in a closed setting, and we would be very happy to
come in and give you a thorough briefing on this.
Mr. Forbes. And Mr. Secretary, thank you. And the other
thing I would just ask, at some point in time if you could do
for us, I know we have a priority of cutting off that funding,
but I think, on the committee, we would love to just hear what
our strategy is for actually doing, you know, doing that.
Because----
Secretary Hagel. Okay.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. We would like to know, if they are
getting $1 billion a year, do we want to get them down to $200
million? I mean, what have we laid out as our strategy, and
what exactly is our plan to get our hands around that and do
that? So if at some point in time you could maybe share that
with us in whatever venue or setting you think is appropriate,
we would appreciate that.
Secretary Hagel. We can do that whenever you want to do
that, and we could do that--I think it'd be more effective in a
closed briefing on exactly how we are doing it and take you
down into some depth on this. And we can coordinate with your
staff on this.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I am glad you brought that up. I think that
is one thing that really separates ISIL from all the other
terrorist groups is they are so well funded and they have good
leadership and know how to use that money. So it would be very
good to attack that.
Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, we can do it through your
committee however way you want to do it.
The Chairman. Well, we just found out there is no votes
tomorrow, so probably people will be heading to the airport
pretty quick, so we will get back to you. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hagel, your predecessor one-time removed,
Secretary Gates, as he was leaving, gave a speech at West Point
where he said, ``In my opinion, any future defense secretary
who advises the President to again send a big American land
Army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have
his head examined, as General McArthur so delicately put it.''
Yesterday, during the debate on the chairman's amendment, I
mean, obviously, there was, you know, high anxiety that, you
know, this amendment was really sort of a prelude to the
scenario that Secretary Gates warned against. One of the
reasons why I voted for the amendment was that I think a close
examination of the text showed that, in fact, we were talking
about using a program, title 10, which is not about sending in
large ground forces from the U.S. but, in fact, almost doing
the opposite, which is to sort of stand up indigenous forces to
take the fight, you know, to our enemy.
And I guess I just want to ask you, as long as I've got you
here, is just, you know, if you could just sort of reiterate
whether or not that is the correct interpretation of the McKeon
Amendment, or do you need to have your head examined?
Secretary Hagel. Well, having my head examined, that
question is open for many reasons, not just this issue, I
suspect.
But I completely agree with Secretary Gates. And I would
not make that recommendation unless it would be such a
catastrophic situation that--but I don't think that is the case
today. I know it is not the case today.
Now, that said, I think the issue overall, though, is
always one of, first, identifying the threat, is it real? And
then, what do you do about it? And your question about the
interpretation of the amendment is, for example, I mention in
my testimony, when we put all of the additional soldiers in
place that the President has ordered, that will be
approximately around 1,600 Americans in Iraq. The
interpretation, as I have read the amendment in the CR
[continuing resolution], is--I think your interpretation is
correct.
I said this has to be a partnership--the President has said
that--between the Congress and the administration. I was once
on your side of the dais. I understand Article I pretty well,
the responsibilities of Congress, starting with the fact you
have the money and the authorities and all that goes with your
side of the equation. So there are specific issues that we will
work through on how we implement that amendment and those
authorities.
There is always a question of, I think, if we could rewrite
it, we would probably rewrite it in certain areas. But,
overall, I think what you have laid out your understanding of
what you voted for is pretty clear, in my understanding.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And in fact, I think one of the benefits of the amendment
is that it really does engage the Congress with the
administration as opposed to just kind of abdicating our role,
which, you know, some of the comments on the floor were just,
well, let the AUMF from 2001 and 2002 kind of control or
authorize whatever actions the administration needs to take,
which, again, I really think is not the way that our checks and
balances should operate.
Secretary Hagel. No. Well, I agree. But the difference,
AUMF, 2001 or 2002, on this particular issue, the train and
equip moderate opposition for Syria is, this is equipping and
training a nongovernmental group that we have--I am not sure
recently or when historically we have done that--I suppose we
have, but legally, I mean, above board.
Mr. Courtney. Right.
Secretary Hagel. And that was different in Iraq. That was
different in some of these other situations. So--but the
authority the President has statutorily--and I know there are
differences of opinion on this, using that AUMF from 2001,
2002--really it comes down to the connection ISIL has had with
Al Qaeda and still has in terrorist groups. But the training
and equipping mission with nongovernmental groups is a little
different.
Mr. Courtney. Right. And, again, I think that is our role
now. I mean, it is by statute that we will get those reports
from your Department and we are going to have a timeline where
we are going to be reengaged almost immediately after the
election.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being here today.
Over the weekend, the President promised that, as we defeat
ISIL, there will be no more mistakes. I look forward to working
with you to avoid his mistakes.
The Obama mistake of underestimating ISIL as junior
varsity, JV. We know that 16 months ago, as the President was
underestimating the terrorist threat and saying it was
diminished, that that was not true. Dr. Fred Kagan of the
American Enterprise Institute released a map showing in warning
of the growing terrorist threat across North Africa, Middle
East, and Central Asia, and this was ignored by this
administration.
The Obama mistake of failing to secure a basic security
agreement with Iraq, undermining the achievements of the
American and allied service members who promoted freedom in
Iraq--and I particularly appreciate that I had two sons serve
in Iraq and working with the people of Iraq to preserve their
freedom.
The Obama mistake of defense sequestration, downsizing our
military as jihadists expand their safe havens across the world
to attack the American families.
The Obama mistake of failing to support the students of
Iran's Green Revolution. We should remember the Iranian
revolution supporters in Tehran carried signs in English
declaring clearly their goals: Death to Israel; death to
America.
The Obama mistake of declaring a red line in Syria on
chemical weapons and then blaming others. Clearly, the red line
was stated by him in a speech on August 20, 2012, and a year
later he denied it, which is not correct.
The Obama mistake of releasing five murderous Taliban while
negotiating with the terrorists. One of the terrorists was
praised by the Taliban murderers as the equivalent of 10,000
warriors to destroy America. It is more important than ever
that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay be retained to
protect American families.
The Obama mistake of announcing an Afghan withdrawal date,
disregarding conditions, putting Afghanistan and Pakistan at
risk.
The Obama mistake of equating Hamas rocket attacks with
Israel's self-defense. We should recognize the Hamas creed,
quote, ``We value death more than you value life,'' end of
quote.
The Obama mistake of the Benghazi assassinations cover-up.
The Obama mistake of the Fort Hood massacre dismissed as
workplace violence and the Little Rock murder as drive-by
shooting.
The President obviously needs to change course and adopt
peace through strength. We know weakness endangers American
families worldwide. I believe the President should take action
remembering September 11 and the global war on terrorism. And a
way to change course is backing up the Kurdish regional
government, our courageous allies.
And I would like to know, what are the plans for weaponry
for Erbil? I understand there is a problem in delivering the
weapons. We need to be there to back up people who have been so
bravely associated with United States.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, on your question regarding
backing up Erbil, the Peshmerga, there is no country that we
have accelerated our deliveries to quicker than Iraq,
specifically the Peshmerga. We have had allied countries flying
missions in there directly to Erbil to reinforce them with
ammunition, with equipment coming from many nations. It has
been as high a priority over many months as we have had. So it
has been ongoing, and it is as high priority as we have with
our partners.
Mr. Wilson. And as the co-chairman of the Kurdish Regional
Caucus, I appreciate that. And I have been to the Kurdish
region. For decades, they have resisted oppression and
identified with freedom of the United States.
A final question from me, Mr. Secretary, is just yes or no,
is America at war?
Secretary Hagel. I said America was at war against ISIL,
just like we are Al Qaeda. I said it in my testimony.
Mr. Wilson. And we are at war on a global war on terrorism?
Secretary Hagel. Yes. Terrorists who try to kill us. The
President is taking action and has laid that action out very
clearly and has asked for the Congress' partnership.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And actions are so important. Thank
you very much.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Secretary Hagel and General Mayville.
Like all Americans, and I think, as you have heard in our
discussion today, obviously everyone on this committee and if
you could have been on the floor throughout the past several
days, I am greatly concerned with the recent events in Iraq and
Syria. We know that ISIL is a lethal terrorist organization,
and we must confront the difficult questions that our President
has raised about the serious threat that it poses.
But this is a complex and long-term challenge, and as such,
I am wary of commitments that the President has admitted will
spill into future administrations, creating enduring costs
while raising substantial and unpredictable risks without a
more robust, clear-headed debate. And I, like Congresswoman
Sanchez, would have appreciated the opportunity to have this
hearing with you before we took the vote.
And I appreciate the President's continued commitment not
to send U.S. ground forces into combat, but his experience has
shown any expansion of U.S. involvement in this region raises
serious concerns over this slippery slope we may find ourselves
on. Chairman Dempsey's recent testimony that he could foresee a
scenario in which he could recommend U.S. ground troops in the
future crystalizes the alarming uncertainties around this
effort.
Many questions remain. You have heard some of them
addressed today, including the cost, the timetable, the nature
of the participation from the region's Arab states, to name
just a few. Yesterday's train-and-equip vote, endorsing just
one piece of the strategy, focused on expanding our effort in
Syria, masked the multifaceted challenges ahead, and I could
not endorse it.
But I appreciate the opportunity today to begin to ask some
of these questions. In his September 16 testimony before the
Senate, Chairman Dempsey noted that the United States and its
allies would work to develop a military chain of command in
Syria that is linked to a political structure. I would like to
know more about the political structure that Chairman Dempsey
is envisioning.
Secretary Hagel, do you think that the Syrian opposition
has a solid and widely supported political structure on which
to base a military command? And, if not, who do you think it
will be linked to?
Secretary Hagel. First, on the issue of a political
agreement and a political resolution, I mentioned that in my
testimony, the President has been very clear on that point when
he has said, on many occasions, and I have just noted, that
there is not a military solution to this in Syria or in Iraq or
the Middle East. So a political resolution must be achieved.
Now----
Ms. Tsongas. Reclaiming my time. But that is not the
question. We are now embarking upon an effort to train and
equip the Syrian forces--the moderate Syrian forces that we
think we can work with. And for it to be effective--and I
believe he is correct--that it has to be tied to a political
structure. So to start down this path in which we are focusing
on training, equipping a force that is not aligned with any
Syrian-oriented political structure, really in some ways puts
the cart before the horse.
Secretary Hagel. Well, not exactly. If, in fact, there is
no alternative that is allowed to develop in Syria because of
the brutality of ISIL and other terrorist groups that are
slaughtering the people in Syria, and you have a regime that
has no legitimacy to govern, which started all this, you have
got to start somewhere. And we recognize this is difficult. We
recognize there is no good option here.
But if we don't help where we can help develop some
infrastructure--and this is why we would train in units, not
individuals--to allow a political opposition to come together
based on security--because security is required in this, as
well. It isn't either-or. That is how we envision and that is
how we would want to go forward. That is partly why this is a
long-term effort. This is why we have been very clear it is
complicated. It is serious.
But if there is no opening, no opportunity for a political
opposition group to develop because they are all out of the
country----
Ms. Tsongas. But you would agree it, obviously, doesn't
exist today.
Secretary Hagel. There is very little organizational
opposition in Syria today, that is right.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
Secretary Hagel. And that is part of the problem.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. My time is up.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
This morning I saw a brief news story that said that
decisions for approving targets for air strikes in Syria would
be made by the President and only by the President. Is that
true?
Secretary Hagel. No, it is not true. That story in the Wall
Street Journal was not true.
Mr. Kline. I can't tell you how relieved I am to hear that.
That is a terrible mistake if we are going to start making
daily tactical decisions in the White House. So I am very
relieved to hear that. But that leaves----
Secretary Hagel. I might just say, I was sitting next to
the President yesterday when this entire issue was being
discussed, and he was very clear with General Austin, once he
makes decisions, he gives General Austin and our military
leaders the authority to carry out those policies.
Mr. Kline. Outstanding. As I said, I am very, very relieved
to hear that.
That does lead me to the larger question, though. You know,
I have got 3 or 4 minutes here, but could one of you sort of
outline what the command structure, what the command and
control structure is going to be? What is the role of General
Austin and CENTCOM? What is the role of Iraqi commanders, of
Peshmerga? Who is going to make the decisions?
Secretary Hagel. Well, because the general is just a pretty
face here and hasn't had to answer a question, really, except
one.
Mr. Kline. Actually, I was so hoping he would answer.
Secretary Hagel. Well, you have never been indirect before,
Congressman.
So, with your permission, I will ask General Mayville.
Mr. Kline. Very good.
General Mayville. The command-and-control structure begins
with the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces. Our
role there is to supplement that with what they need so that
they can make informed decisions. We are doing that right now.
Now we are going to switch out some of the initial assessment
teams and replace them with more--with Army advisers that can
better help at the general officer level, as well as reach into
the ministries and assist, as well. But the chain of command is
an Iraqi chain of command, enabled by partners in the region.
Mr. Kline. Okay. Pretty face or not, let me try it this
way: I started my questioning by asking about targets for air
strikes in Syria. So if it is not the President of the United
States, who is it?
General Mayville. Now, for targeting, targeting will be
planned jointly and enabled by U.S. Central Command through its
CAOC [Combined Air Operations Center], which is in the region.
The mechanisms to command and control those, they are already
in place. We did that, you saw that unfurl when we retook Mosul
Dam. You saw that when we assisted in the operations around
Haditha and Amerli. So we are not going to change that. The
CAOC, which is an Air Force command and control structure
component underneath Central Command, will orchestrate all of
this. The coordination and the planning, it will be done
forward in concert with Iraqi forces and Iraqi leaders.
Mr. Kline. Air strikes in Syria, I am talking about.
General Mayville. We haven't received authorization. That
is part of what the Secretary was talking about. We have yet to
receive authorization for those missions. But----
Mr. Kline. So it is not the President of the United States,
but we are not really quite sure who it is to make those
decisions?
General Mayville. If I could, sir, whether we strike in--
where we strike ISIL, regardless of its geography, the command-
and-control structure that I just laid out is the command-and-
control structure that we will use wherever the President
allows us to strike.
Mr. Kline. All right.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and General, for being here. I
think part of the problem, and you heard it with the
questionings that we are having today, is that because the
amendment that we voted on involved Syria and the potential to
train and to arm the Syrian, quote, whatever that moderate
force will be that is going to be vetted 15 days from now or
when the Senate passes it, and the fact that the 170 air
strikes are really in Iraq, and we are talking about our 1,600,
as far as I know, are in Iraq, that the public, I think, are
getting confused, as we probably are, as to what exactly is
being done in Iraq versus what we are authorizing.
You also know that part of the continuing resolution was to
fund OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] at the 2014 level,
which technically is about $30-some-odd billion dollars more
than what was requested in 2015. And whether or how you
determine what that money is and how it plays out for the
remainder of the continuing resolution is something else, but
we also know that it was the request early on that the OCO
funding include the $500 million, which is to arm and train
5,000 Syrians.
So having said that--whoever can answer this question, take
it--my question is really, when we divide the two, not Syria
part but the Iraq part, which we are clearly engaged in, one,
where is the funding coming from? Is it OCO funding? Two, how
much is that costing us per day? And, though we feel that we
don't have the same kind of legislation as we have in the
amendment, which clearly defined who would be appropriate
vetted people in Syria, now who are the people that we are
vetting, if we are vetting them at all, in Iraq?
Because right now, air strikes are in Iraq, and we need the
ground forces, as I understand the philosophy, to be in Iraq.
So who are we vetting? Because General Dempsey, I think, made a
statement yesterday that there are 50 brigades or so in Iraq of
which 26 or 24, 1 of those 2 numbers, are not appropriate
because it is not of the right composition.
So who is making these vetting decisions, and what are we
in for in the Iraq portion of this? Though we have sort of been
kind of thrown off the path, because we are talking about
Syria. But our people, 1,600 of them are in Iraq. I think my
constituents want to know, what does this mean for Iraq? Iraq
is the concern right now because that is where we are.
So whoever wants to take it.
Secretary Hagel. I will give you an answer, and then the
general may want to go deeper on this. But your question about
who are we vetting, we would be vetting the Syrian opposition
forces that we would begin to train and assist.
Ms. Hanabusa. But I am talking about Iraq.
Secretary Hagel. But you asked the question about who are
vetting? That is who we are vetting. It is not Iraq.
Ms. Hanabusa. So we are not vetting anyone in Iraq? Is
that----
Secretary Hagel. The Iraqi security forces under the
government, the sovereign Government of Iraq and the Peshmerga,
who, as you know, are part of the overall structure, are in
place. They are institutionalized. They are functioning armies.
Now, that is different from what we are doing.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Secretary, not to interrupt you, but
General Dempsey said, of the 50 brigades, only 24----
Secretary Hagel. Those are in Iraq.
Ms. Hanabusa. No, that is what I am talking about. I am
talking about Iraq. I said, we have sort of meshed this whole
thing together, but I am looking at Iraq. So are we vetting the
Iraqi forces that are supposed to be the ground troops----
Secretary Hagel. No.
Ms. Hanabusa [continuing]. Or is it only Iraq that is going
to provide--the general is nodding and you are saying no. So I
would like----
General Mayville. I am nodding because I understand the
question. I can understand the confusion.
Secretary Hagel. We are not vetting Iraqi forces and
troops. What General Dempsey was talking about is the most
capable Iraqi security forces, Iraqi security forces. Vetting
in that part of it is part of the Syrian--train and equip
moderate Syrian opposition.
General, do you want to add anything to that?
General Mayville. Yes, Congresswoman, I understand the
question. I can see how it can be confusing.
What we are doing today in Iraq is we are, first and
foremost, securing U.S. Government facilities and U.S.
Government personnel, American citizens in Iraq. We have two
operating centers, one in Erbil and one in Baghdad, designed to
facilitate the Iraqi security forces operations. We advise
them. We make them aware of what they need to do next, and we
help them track issues. And, as was mentioned earlier, when
they go on an operation and it needs to be enabled by air
support, these operation centers do that as well.
Most recently, the assessment team that went into the
Baghdad area, the area that General Dempsey spoke to and
identified 50 brigades and gave an assessment, that assessment
is over. And we are changing those forces out, and they will be
advise-and-assist forces to work with selected brigades and
divisions in Iraq. I hope that helps.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers [presiding]. Gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for
questions.
And, Secretary Hagel, I first want to thank you for
yesterday's Medal of Honor ceremony for Bennie Adkins. That was
very special. I appreciate you doing that for a great American.
I understand that the administration was prepared to
acknowledge publicly that the Russians were in violation of the
INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty over a year ago
but didn't for policy reasons. Do you know what thought went
into why we didn't publicly acknowledge INF violations earlier?
Secretary Hagel. I know that we were carefully examining
the evidence that we had and that we were looking at to see if,
in fact, they were in violation. But, as to your specific
question, no, I don't know.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Yesterday--or recently, Russia's
President announced at Yalta in mid-August that he had
authorized the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons
into Ukrainian territory. Do you know how the U.S. would
respond and what the implications are for us if he, in fact,
does move those weapons into Ukrainian territory?
Secretary Hagel. Well, again, I think, rather than talking
about this in an open hearing, we probably ought to do this in
a closed hearing to take you through a number of steps there on
this. And I think I would feel more comfortable to talk about
it that way.
Mr. Rogers. I understand.
And do you know why the United States is considering
continuing to approve Russia's proposals to fly under the Open
Skies Treaty enhanced sensors and aircraft over the United
States while it is in material breach of the INF? I am really
concerned about us going forward with that Open Skies access
when we know that they are cheating on chemical weapons
conventions, biological weapons conventions, and now we know
they are cheating on the INF.
What are your thoughts on whether we should go forward with
the Open Skies practice?
Secretary Hagel. We, as you know, just had a team in Moscow
last week on this specific issue. We were represented by a
senior member, Defense Department, State Department led it, and
others, and these were all issues that were discussed. We, the
Russians and us, have many mutual interests on different
things, and what they have done in Ukraine and their actions
the last 6 months have not only complicated but put in jeopardy
all of those interests that we have. So we are working our way
through the very set of questions that you have just asked
right now.
Mr. Rogers. So, in fact, this may be one of the
consequences they may suffer or experience as a result of the
INF violations----
Secretary Hagel. Well----
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Denied access under the Open Skies
program?
Secretary Hagel. No decision has been made on this, but we
are looking at a lot of different options, and we are talking
to the Russians.
Mr. Rogers. Good.
My last question is, recently or yesterday, the committee
received the second of two reprogramming requests to the total
of $1 billion out of the Army O&M [operations and maintenance]
to pay for the military's efforts to respond to the Ebola
outbreak. We already have a serious readiness problem. What are
your thoughts about what this $1 billion would do to that? I
ask this to either one of you. Doesn't matter.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you. Two pieces to that. One is the
money. And second is probably the bigger implication of your
question, how does that affect, as you say, our readiness and
our capability to respond to other challenges. And we have got
a lot of them, as you know.
On the money, that can be done, okay, by using OCO that
would not affect our readiness in any other area. But the other
question that you ask is a legitimate question. Right now,
General Dempsey and our commanders have agreed that what we
will be providing the military in assisting in Africa with the
specific areas that the President announced on using our unique
capabilities would not affect our readiness anywhere in the
world, because these are capabilities that we have that we
wouldn't take away from any of the other areas that we are now
dealing with that are significant threats.
Mr. Rogers. So am I hearing that you said that OCO is
really the proper source for the money? Would it be accurate to
say that we can expect you to come to the conferees and ask us
to adjust the OCO levels to reflect this added amount of money
before we can finish up the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I have to talk to the comptroller
about this and OMB [Office of Management and Budget] on the
bookkeeping on how that works. But, as you know, Congressman,
and there are a lot of different opinions on whether there
should be an overseas account or not and whether it is a slush
fund or not, but in this case, I think--and it is an imperfect
process--probably OCO is an appropriate account for this kind
of thing, these things that develop, these contingencies,
overseas contingencies situations. I don't think anybody would
have forecast this, we didn't a year ago, the seriousness of
this. So we are working it right now with comptrollers and the
appropriations people here on the Hill.
Mr. Rogers. Based on the way the world is looking, OCO may
have to get a lot bigger to accommodate all of the
contingencies that are popping up around the globe.
Secretary Hagel. Well, it may. I hope not. But, as you
know, we have been bringing that OCO account down every year,
so that is the good news.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
service.
Who is next?
Mr. Barber from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Mayville, for your
service, both in uniform, Mr. Secretary, and in public life as
Senator and now as our Secretary of Defense.
You know, I was--took the vote yesterday after a lot of
consideration about what we were doing when we were giving
authorization to a limited authority to train and equip the
vetted and moderate forces in Syria. I was proud to stand with
my colleagues to give that to you and the President, because
absolutely, we must stop the savagery that we know has been
already committed at the hands of ISIL and, also, because I
want to make sure that we do everything we can to prevent them
from having a safe haven to send harm our way in the homeland.
We must do everything we can to prevent another situation in
which terrorists can attack this country from safe havens
overseas.
So I have two questions, Mr. Secretary, one related to that
and the other to the larger issue of how we really contain and
hopefully eliminate and destroy ISIL. First, could you speak to
the question about how you see ISIL's current capabilities for
carrying out transnational terrorism? And, secondly, could you
speak to how arming the Syrian opposition will roll back ISIL's
territory and their ability to launch an attack? And how long
would you estimate it will take for the opposition to really
engage ISIL in order to degrade its capabilities?
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Congressman. The first question
on transnational criminal activities as a source of ISIL
funding, it is part of--and a significant part of--that
funding, and I think in a couple of the questions that were
asked here earlier, specifically the black marketing of oil----
Mr. Barber. Secretary, I was really addressing what is your
view about how we can prevent their capabilities for exporting
terrorism into our country and to other countries.
Secretary Hagel. Well, you have to cut off the capability
and cut off the funding. And that is what I was talking about
earlier in answers to some other questions, as well. And that
is a huge priority of what we are overall in our overall
strategy how you defeat ISIL, how you degrade them, you
disconnect them and you defeat them. Taking that funding away
is a big part of that, and we are operationally doing that
right now with our partners through the Treasury Department,
our law enforcement all over the world. And it is a key part of
degrading any capacity they have in the future.
As to your longer-term question, how long, I think the
President has been pretty clear on this. When General Dempsey
and I were before the Senate committee 2 days ago, we talked
about this. I can't give you an exact number of years how long,
but we know it is going to take some time. We know it is going
to take some years. Maybe we can do it sooner.
But this is, as you know so well and has been reflected
this morning in many of the comments, this is a group that has
capacity that we have never seen before outside of a nation
state. And you mix in with that the religious dynamic, ethnic
dynamic, all the other factors that complicate this situation.
It is going to take some time, and we know that.
Mr. Barber. In your view, is ISIL capable today of sending
radicalized Americans back to this country to do harm to the
United States?
Secretary Hagel. Oh, I think they are capable of doing that
today.
Mr. Barber. Given that, I want to expand the question of
their threat in the Middle East to Israel, to Jordan, to
Lebanon. Can you speak to us about what you see is already
happening and further threats that might exist for those
countries?
Secretary Hagel. It is very clear to me, and I think most
people who have looked at this, and certainly it is to the
President and his administration, that with the instability
that currently resides all across the Middle East, that you go
right through each of the countries, starting on the west with
Lebanon and you move east, every one of those countries is in
some form of instability and under threat from ISIL, from other
terrorists organizations.
If we see further destabilization of these countries, that
will create a global problem that will ripple out everywhere.
Oil, if you would destabilize the major oil-producing countries
in the Middle East, that in itself would affect world economy.
It would affect everything. Israel, I mean, you look at where
we are today in that part of the world; it is probably as
unstable as it has been in our lifetime.
Mr. Barber. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup [presiding]. Gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
Secretary Hagel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. I did support the amendment yesterday of the
chairman. However, that is only good through December 11 at the
latest, so we will be revisiting this issue again soon. So,
because we know ISIL is so dangerous, look what the news is out
of Australia just today, going against the public, against
Australians. So this is a bloodthirsty group, and the beheading
of two Americans is a horrible situation and was one of the
real reasons why I supported the President's plan.
However, I would like to have you elaborate on some of the
details of the President's plan. Other questions have done this
previously, but particularly, are we contemplating--will we be
using UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] and drones, armed
Predators and Reapers to take out ISIL leadership like we have
done in Iraq and Afghanistan, like we are doing now currently
in Somalia and Yemen?
Secretary Hagel. Well, the way I would answer your question
is, and I think the President noted this in his statement to
the American people a week ago, that we are looking at every
option, every target using our capabilities and our partners to
degrade and destroy ISIL.
Mr. Lamborn. So that is something that is on the table?
Secretary Hagel. Everything is being closely examined.
Everything.
Mr. Lamborn. Because I would certainly hope the President
would not take that off the table.
Secretary Hagel. Everything is on the table.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Good. And regardless of whether it is
Syria, Iraq or any other neighboring country, this leadership
needs to be--and the American people would support eliminating
the leadership.
Secretary Hagel. Well, as you also recall from the
President's speech, he said wherever they are.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Second issue is the use of our Tier One
special forces, our elite special forces to mount assaults on
the ground to capture and apprehend ISIL leadership wherever
they are found. This is what I meant when I said we were doing
this in Somalia and Yemen. Is that something that will be
contemplated and is on the table?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I think to really get into any of
the specific tactics, Congressman, we want to probably have a
closed briefing on that. We can do that.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Certainly, then, let's follow up on that
at the appropriate time.
Secretary Hagel. We can do that.
Mr. Lamborn. And, also, along the same lines, using boots
on the ground, for lack of a better word, to guide and direct
close air support, that is something that I think is critical
also. And, once again, is that something that we can talk about
in this forum? I want to see as many tools in the tool box as
necessary so that this plan can be successful, and I think
taking things off the table militates against that.
Secretary Hagel. Well, again, within the confines of an
open hearing, I would again say that we are looking at
everything, nothing off the table, but I would also point to
the success here recently regarding the Haditha Dam, Mosul Dam,
and some of these strikes, where it has been Iraqi security
forces on the ground with their special forces and our air
strikes and we didn't have our people embedded with them and
they were very successful. So the Iraqi security forces have
capability.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear your answers,
Mr. Secretary. My concern is, I am just going to echo what the
chairman said earlier, sometimes the President takes things off
the table right off the bat, and that that is troubling to me.
I want to see as many options on the table as possible.
Secretary Hagel. Well, if I might, and I think you have got
a little time, so I won't indulge anyone else here, I know how
that works. I don't think it was a matter, and I know it is not
a matter of the President taking options off the table of the
American public. I think what he wants to always make sure that
the American public is certain and clear of what his intent is
and what he as the President of this country is willing to do,
but he wants the American people to understand what is it that
he is getting them into, what is he asking the American people
for, and I think that is the clarity you see. Tactically in
these issues, no, he won't take things off the table.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you for that reassurance, and I will
continue to be supportive.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. At this time we are going to go to 4 minutes
so that we can try to get everybody's questions in before we
have to go to votes. Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Had to start with me, didn't you, Mr.
Chairman? Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being patient and staying here
until we freshmen get to ask questions. I very much appreciate
that.
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, I was a freshman once, I
understand. You ask the best questions.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. Well, thank you very much. So,
you know, I voted no yesterday, and it was a tough no vote for
me because I simply have a lot of questions. If--the vote
yesterday was on this reauthorization for the $500 million that
expires in just 7--I am sorry, 12 weeks. Why would we not start
by asking for that amount of money to arm the Peshmerga and
putting more forces and more resources behind the troops in
Iraq first before we go to what is a short-term funding for
arming these rebel groups in Syria?
Secretary Hagel. Two answers, Congresswoman. One is we have
got to do both, and we are presently supporting the Peshmerga
as well as the Iraqi security forces with literally expanded
accelerated help, equipment, armaments, and we are doing that
and have been doing that, and I noted that in an earlier
answer. So it is not an either-or. We believe we need to do
both, and we need to get the training and equip part of the
moderate Syrian opposition piece started as quickly as
possible, because they both fit into the overall strategy as
how you defeat ISIL, and you help stabilize those countries,
particularly Iraq, and so it is not a matter of not doing one
versus the other.
Ms. Duckworth. I am concerned that we are starting with the
rebels.
General, I had a couple questions for you. If we turn, if
we actually train and equip these moderate rebel groups and we
send them back in, my understanding is that they don't have
much of a command-and-control structure, they are fairly self-
identifying, there are a whole bunch of groups, there is no
military-like structure like the ISIS and ISIL has, and their
first mission is to basically defend and deny territory to
ISIS. How are they able to logistically support themselves once
we train them and give them this weaponry? How are they going
to be able to conduct these operations? Who is going to provide
them with the 556 [5.56 millimeter rifle ammunition], the 40
mike-mike [40 millimeter grenade launcher ammunition], the 7.62
[7.62 millimeter machine gun ammunition]? Where is that coming
from and are we looking now at relying on contractors or secret
ops or covert ops to do that?
General Mayville. Congresswoman, we are looking at all
options of how you sustain this effort once we begin, but you
do raise an important issue in developing the leadership and
finding those within these initial formations that have the
aptitude for additional skills. So we are going to have to find
who has the aptitude to be a logistician, who has the aptitude
to be a communications expert, and we will build that
capability as we build this basic force. The first phase is
identify and vet them, create a relationship, give them the
basic training, and let them go back and protect their
communities. The next thing we will do is we will build off of
that with skills, and we will stay connected to them. There
will have to be an oversight, there will have to be
accountability, and we will have to create a method for doing
that with the leadership that we identified within the
training.
Ms. Duckworth. Just in the last 20 seconds I have, so you
are not ruling out the fact that we may be actually turning to
a Blackwater or whatever their subsidiary is, Xe International
Development Solutions, Academy, whatever they are calling
themselves to provide the logistical support in the initial
stages? Is that what we are opening ourselves up to?
General Mayville. There has been--we are still in the very
early planning of this, but to date, there has been no
discussions of anything other than how would we as a military
would do this.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. The gentlelady's time has expired. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and Mr. Secretary, I
think I heard you clearly and concisely say, we are at war and
everything is on the table. Is that accurate?
Secretary Hagel. Yes.
Mr. Scott. I think one of the things that is confusing to
me and I think confusing the majority of Americans is that that
is not consistent with what the President says when he, as one
of my colleagues pointed out, takes other actions or potential
operations off the table, and my granddad is no longer here,
but he was a World War II POW [prisoner of war] and a B-17
pilot, and he would tell you that the first, the first decision
is the decision to win and make sure that we are willing to do
whatever it takes to win.
Desert Storm was in 1990. We have been in that country, in
those countries on and off for 24 years, over half of my life.
We have spent trillions of dollars, we have had hundreds of
thousands of Americans in there, hundreds of thousands of other
people that we have trained, and, General, these 5,000 moderate
Syrians ought to be pretty easy to find. I assume they are 10
foot tall and bulletproof. My question is, how can 5,000
moderate Syrians do what the United States and all of our
coalitions could not do in 24 years?
General Mayville. Well, 5,000 moderate opposition groups
with basic training to secure their villages will have some
effect, but it won't have the decisive effect that you speak
to, but it is only one part of a larger effort. That larger
effort includes training, continuing to assist in the Iraqi
security forces counter ISIL. We will have the use of our
airpower to assist where it is necessary, and we are also
looking to employ the support, the direct support of partners
in the region. So we are going to squeeze on this through
multiple venues.
Mr. Scott. Then, with due respect, the President should
outline that. There should be a separate vote, not a vote on a
continuing resolution. I blame this on my leadership as much as
I do the President. This is much more serious than an amendment
to a continuing resolution. I would also suggest, you know, the
Sunnis and Shi'as have been fighting since the 7th century. We
don't understand that war, certainly not all of them
participate in it, but when we talk about beheadings, you know,
Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that the Saudis beheaded
eight people in the month of August, and they practice one of
the strictest forms of Sharia law and do some things over there
that by any stretch of the imagination I think any American
would consider barbaric. And so how do we pick our friends?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I think the first way I would answer
your question is America, I think any country, always responds
in its own self-interest. What is our interest here? I think
you asked the question when American citizens are publicly
killed, murdered, is that in the interest of this country?
Well, I think it is. Is it a threat to who we are? I think it
is. So you can take that out as far as you want. So that is
partly, I think, the answer.
But your bigger question, which is exactly the right
question, the history of that area, we can't interject
ourselves or impose ourselves on any country or traditions or
history, and what we are doing differently is bringing in
partners from the region. This, as the President has said, what
I said, has to be settled by the countries themselves, and that
means the Arab countries, the Muslim countries. We can help,
but we can't alone dictate or determine the outcome of that.
But it is in our interests.
Dr. Wenstrup. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Maffei.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Lieutenant General Mayville, thank you for
your service to our country. Can you describe to us what--there
is talk about coalition. What are the members of the coalition
that actually are going to have people on the ground either as
military advisors or troops along with us?
Secretary Hagel. As I said in my opening testimony, we are
close to 50 coalition nations who are----
Mr. Maffei. Mr. Secretary, I don't mean to interrupt you,
but specifically have committed to having people there arm in
arm with us, not just supplies, not just--but actual human
beings on the ground helping us with that mission.
Secretary Hagel. Each country will provide assistance based
on their capacities too. Some will be airpower, some will be
people. We have had a number of military offers. We are
coordinating that now I noted in my testimony. General Allen
has the essential responsibility of bringing that together,
coordinating each of these pieces. So we are in the process of
doing that.
Mr. Maffei. Okay, thank you. I am a little bit still
confused about the nature of this. The President promises no
combat mission, and I know you have been questioned by other
folks about sort of what that means, but I am concerned that
whether our people are over there on a combat mission, a
training mission, advisory mission, they will become targets.
Can you just clarify, if we have people that are shot at, they
will have, the rules of engagement will say they should defend
themselves, correct, sir?
Secretary Hagel. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Maffei. I appreciate that and I am glad. But won't that
then lead to combat missions, maybe not offensive combat
missions, but if our people are in harm's way, won't they be in
combat?
Secretary Hagel. Well, anybody in a war zone who has ever
been in a war zone, and some of you have, know that if you are
in a war zone, you are in combat. What the President has said
that there would be no specific American ground combat role. I
think that is pretty clear. Yes, if you have advisors in a war,
they are in a combat zone, yes. But the role of Americans in
that war, as the President has laid out, I think is pretty
clear, what he said we will do and what we won't do.
Mr. Maffei. Can you or Lieutenant General give us any sense
of how many Americans will be put in harm's--how many Americans
additionally will be put in harm's way either in the theater or
near the theater?
Secretary Hagel. Well, what I said in regard to the
President's announcement last week on what he has ordered now
additional American forces into Iraq, by the time they all get
there, there will be around 1,600 American forces in Iraq.
Mr. Maffei. And they would be in Iraq?
Secretary Hagel. In Iraq.
Mr. Maffei. Not Syria?
Secretary Hagel. Not Syria. In Iraq.
Mr. Maffei. Okay. Just finally, I guess trying to figure
out again who exactly we are helping. You speak of sort of the
``we'' in this, and I know you have been asked similar
questions, but I am still fuzzy on how exactly you are going to
identify the forces that we can train, we can enhance, and I
guess it goes back to my allies question, and are they going to
be alone, is this just going to be a few Syrian fighters, 5,000
each? Because it seems to me that if we are training them, yes,
we will eventually build up a force there, but in the meantime,
won't our enemy build up their force far more than we can catch
up?
Secretary Hagel. Well, a couple answers to your question.
It is a beginning. We might be able to do more than 5,000 a
year. As I said in my statement, it depends on more training
sites, more vetting, more people. We are going to train them in
units, equip them in units, not just rebels here and there, so
that they are prepared to take on more and more responsibility.
With our partners. That is another piece of this. This is an
undertaking that is pretty dramatic and sophisticated. It is a
beginning, but at the same time, all of the other dynamics of
this strategy, what is going on, as General Mayville just noted
here a minute ago, are in play at the same time. We are not
just relying on that train and equip moderate Syrians.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Wenstrup. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Hagel and General Mayville, I really want to thank
you for your service across the board, and it has been varied
for Secretary Hagel in a number of ways, going back to Vietnam.
We really do appreciate that.
You made a comment about combat, so I want to make sure
that our troops, the 1,600 that are in Iraq, are going to be
compensated as they should be reference to combat pay, because
they are going to be exposed to that at some point in time or
could be. Are they going to be?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, they are now, but let me have General
Mayville explain how that is----
Mr. Nugent. Okay, so those currently in country are
receiving combat pay?
General Mayville. Let me not get in front of that important
decision that will come to the Secretary, but typically you are
talking about hostile duty pay?
Mr. Nugent. Yes.
General Mayville. And there are a set of procedures clearly
outlined and under what conditions one is entitled to that.
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
General Mayville. And we will apply that standard here, and
it will go to the Secretary.
Mr. Nugent. So the answer is the Secretary will make that
decision whether or not?
Secretary Hagel. Yes, and they will be compensated.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. You
know, I voted no. I will tell you it was difficult, but at the
same time, because of all of the briefings I have heard, and
you have touched on it, you know, the Syrian force that we are
talking about training and equipping, and the reason I voted no
was, you know, they have very little organization, there is
no--and you mentioned this, there is no political structure in
place to support them. I would support an Iraqi issue because
there is a political force to at least start talking about how
to fix things. Command and control.
We know that at this point in time there is no command and
control for the Syrian free forces or whatever you want to call
them, and there is for the Iraqis because we helped build that.
And training or retraining the Iraqi force is a whole lot
easier than trying to train up, by the President's own, you
know, description of, you know, guys that are, you know, the
regular folks. They may have some combat experience now because
they had to fight for their lives, but they are certainly not a
trained combat, just as Iraq is because we trained them, even
though they have had some issues, but we still have at least a
base to start from, and I guess that is why I disagreed with us
getting involved in the train-and-equip portion in Syria when
we have the ability to do that I think and win in Iraq. I think
we have, and I think we have shown that we can work with them.
So it gets a lot, it is a whole lot of hoping and wishing
in the fact that--and I know it depends upon the training
facilities that we have available, but the testimony has been,
you know, 3 training facilities, 5,000 troops. I don't know
how--how do we overcome those other things, the command and
control, political system, and the actual trained forces,
because the fact remains static, obviously, in Syria as we move
forward, if you could.
Secretary Hagel. Well, here, the way I would explain it,
and it is my opinion and the opinion of the President that if
you are going to defeat ISIL, and that is the objective, as the
President has laid out, you are not going to defeat ISIL just
in Iraq. Matter of fact, most of the ISIL threat is in Syria,
safe havens, training camps, resources.
Mr. Nugent. I get that.
Secretary Hagel. So you are going to have to deal with them
in Syria.
Mr. Nugent. But I would think a step by step, at least an
approach where you can drive them out of Iraq while we have the
opportunity to, and as we are doing it, focus then back on
Syria. I yield back, I apologize.
Secretary Hagel. We have to do both at the same time.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate that.
Dr. Wenstrup. Mr. Kilmer.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for joining us. I am of the opinion that the 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force needs to be
rescinded and that a more specific authorization needs to be
drafted to combat the ISIL threat.
What cautions, what advice and requests would you have for
us if we were to consider that effort of drafting a new
Authorization for the Use of Military Force?
Secretary Hagel. Well, as you know, we believe the
President has the authority under the AUMF of 2001 to do what
he believes that is important to do for the security of this
country. He also has said he welcomes the Congress'
involvement, support. If the Congress believes that they want
to get involved in writing a new authorization of force, that
is the prerogative of the Congress. But to go beyond that as to
advise you, I am not a lawyer, so I would leave that up to the
lawyers and specifically what the White House thinks they would
need if that is something that they think they should want to
do or need to do.
Mr. Kilmer. Is there anything specific that you would want
or not want in such an authorization? I understand that you
believe you currently have that authorization. I guess the
question I have, in one of the briefings we had, it was said we
would welcome if Congress wanted to provide a more specific
authorization. Any constraints or things that you would want to
see in that regard?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I think anytime--and I am going to
be general in this because that is not my area. That is really
the President have to make those kinds of decisions. But for
us, Department of Defense, who we are always the ones required
to implement, we would want to have the Commander in Chief have
as much flexibility within the bounds of accountability, which
in a coequal branch of government we have to have, we recognize
that, but for us, we have to have that flexibility and I think
the Commander in Chief does as well in order to carry out his
duties.
Mr. Kilmer. The other question I had for you was has the
Department begun to consider the second- and third-order
effects of providing air support and training and supplies as
prescribed by this mission? I am particularly concerned with
the wear and tear on our military airplanes and seagoing
vessels that may have a higher utilization rate, and as a
consequence, require more maintenance than was originally
presumed in the President's fiscal year 2015 budget submission.
As the presumed $500 million OCO dollars to train and equip our
allies won't cover that initial maintenance, where will the
additional money come from, OCO or O&M accounts or through a
supplemental request?
Secretary Hagel. We are looking at all that right now, and
you are right, as we pick up the pace on this mission and do
the things that we need to do, we are going to most likely have
to change some of those numbers, but that is not new. I mean,
the world is dangerous and it is fluid and it is dynamic.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Chairman, I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. At this time I will take my 4
minutes here, and I appreciate you both being here. You know,
as we look back on things, I remember Vice President Biden
saying the victory in Iraq will be one of the greatest
successes of the Obama administration, and as I look out and I
see those of you with your combat patches, I would say the
success goes to those that were in the field. But that being
said, we did succeed and we succeeded with combat troops and
using all of our assets, and it was a gift to Iraq that
unfortunately has fallen apart.
My concern is when we start talking about counterterrorism
operations as opposed to full combat, I have some concerns
there. ISIL, to me, is somewhat of a state, not a recognized
state, but they actually have territory, they have wealth, and
they have an army, and they are different than the typical
terrorist effort, and I understand our desire to want to use
the Kurds and the Iraqi Army and the Syrian forces that we are
talking about.
My concerns stem from the questions you got earlier about
who has got the central command here, I mean, who is really
calling the shots when you are putting these pieces together,
and I have the concern with that, but also in another hearing I
had asked is the Iraqi army or the Peshmerga willing and
authorized to move into Syria if that is what it takes to
destroy this enemy ultimately, especially if our effort with
the Syrians is not successful? And the answer I got was no. And
to me that is like saying in World War II, well, we will go to
Germany, but we won't go in and defeat them. And so what is our
contingency here? What are we going to do if this effort in
Syria is not successful, knowing that our strongest assets on
the ground are not willing to go into Syria where they have
safe haven at this point?
Secretary Hagel. First, I think we recognize that Iraq is a
sovereign country, so we don't order Iraq to do anything. We
can't.
Dr. Wenstrup. Understood.
Secretary Hagel. So if Iraq makes a decision for whatever
reason, that is their decision.
Dr. Wenstrup. But see that to me is their objective is to
liberate Iraq from this enemy, from ISIL, but our objective is
to destroy ISIL. So I am concerned about the strength of what
we have in Syria. We may run them into Syria, and then what if
we are not succeeding there?
Secretary Hagel. Well, that is exactly right, that we are
looking at this from a borderless dynamic, that ISIL is a
threat to all the nations of the Middle East. Right now they
are principally focused in--their safe haven is in Syria, which
is ungovernable, as you know, in the eastern part of Syria, so
with the strategy that we have laid out and we are implementing
with partners, partners again essential, strong, united,
inclusive Iraqi government essential, we have got the--must-
have Muslim Arab partners essential as well as other partners
in order to destroy ISIL, and you are exactly right, it isn't
by borders. We are not dealing with that. Each will play roles
where they can.
Dr. Wenstrup. My time is running out, but I would hope
maybe in another setting, a classified setting, perhaps, we can
find out what some of those contingencies might be because I
know the good general has already anticipated some of these
things as a strategist, and it is not necessarily something we
want to expose to everyone. So.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. I appreciate that, and I yield back my time.
At this time they have called votes, and so we are going to
break and I have been told we are going to return after the
votes. And I, again, appreciate both of you for your time
today. And I do encourage members to come back, even some of
those that have left and get them back. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Byrne [presiding]. The committee will come back to
order and the chair recognizes Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding this meeting.
Secretary Hagel and Lieutenant General Mayville, thank you
for appearing this morning and this afternoon before this
committee, and I thank you for your steadfast leadership and
dedication to service, and I applaud, I want to go on record as
saying that I applaud the President for his four-point strategy
to defeat ISIL.
Now, the first question I have is, as you can imagine, talk
of these actions against ISIL have stoked some concern in the
Asia-Pacific region that the rebalance strategy will be
abandoned or not fulfilled. I don't necessarily share these
concerns, but I was hoping that you might be able to touch on
how we balance our efforts to degrade and destroy ISIL and
meanwhile keep to our commitments in the rebalance strategy in
the Asia-Pacific area. Secretary Hagel.
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, thank you, and I think your
question is an important one because, as we all know, the world
is faced with many threats, America is faced with many threats,
and we always have to keep in mind all of our interests around
the world, and certainly the rebalance to Asia-Pacific is one
very clear commitment and interest we have.
Our efforts against ISIL will not affect our commitment to
Asia-Pacific, as the President has made very clear. That
commitment, that rebalancing will continue, and I think we
have, over the last couple of years in particular, have made
great progress as we have enhanced our relationships and
partnerships in your part of the world, and very much
appreciate Guam's role in all of this because you are a key,
key area, and the people that you represent I want to also
thank for their hospitality to all of our men and women who
serve there.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and I
thank you for your very direct answer to my question.
The other one is I noted on Tuesday that Chairman Dempsey
talked about how this is a generation problem, and this battle
against ISIL will be protracted, a protracted war, and with
that in mind, what is the exit strategy for U.S. service
members? If we are doing our job right over there, at some
point our training teams should work themselves out of a job as
the countries in the Middle East take on these roles. So what
is the plan for the exit?
Secretary Hagel. You are correct that our role and our work
with our partners is with an exit in mind, but let's start with
what we are doing and how we are doing it. First, the
responsibility for bringing Iraq back into a strong position to
defend itself is a responsibility of the Iraqis, the Iraqi
security forces, Peshmerga, the government, the new government
of Prime Minister Abadi, and bringing all the various segments
of that country together.
So it is not our responsibility. We are going to help them
do that, we are going to support them in their efforts to do
that. We will keep, obviously, some contingency of force there,
but this is a different situation than we have had before. It
is their responsibility and their fight, but we will help them.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I really
appreciate your answers to my questions, and Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
Mr. Byrne. The gentlelady yields back. The chair recognizes
himself for 4 minutes.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being patient with us. We had
a series of votes, and there were some of us that didn't have a
chance to ask you some questions. We appreciate your sticking
around for this. I voted for the McKeon Amendment yesterday,
but I recognized in doing so that it was one element, and it
has a limited duration, and we will be back, at the very least,
to consider what we are going to do about that one element, but
obviously it is one element of what is going to be a much
bigger strategy, and the President has some key decisions to
make there, and we heard you talk about some of those today.
My first question is, is it the President's intent, your
intent to come back to us with a bigger strategy, the full
strategy so we can understand how that element and other
elements fit together and operate together? And, if so, will
you bring that back with a new AUMF because there are a lot of
us that believe there needs to be a new AUMF, and we can get
into the legal arguments about it, but as a matter of good
policy, would you think that in addition to just giving us a
strategy, there should be an AUMF that accompanies it?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you. On the AUMF, as
you heard me say this morning and what the President has said,
we believe, he believes he has the authority to do what he
needs to do to keep this country safe and to degrade and defeat
ISIL within the statutory authority that now exists. He has
also said, as I have said, that he would welcome the
President--or the Congress' involvement, would welcome a
rewrite of any of those authorizations. That is up to the
Congress. But in the meantime, he feels strongly that he needs
to take action on these threats now.
As to strategy, the strategy that the President generally
laid out to the American people last week as I am up here
testifying on today--Secretary Kerry is as well, has been--I
was in the Senate a couple of days ago as you know. Other
cabinet members have been up, we have been up briefing over the
last 2 weeks, as you know, in closed-door sessions, and I am
sure you have been part of those briefings, all in an effort to
further define and bring some clarity to the strategy, how are
we implementing it, what resources we are going to continue to
need, what are the dynamics to each of these.
So I don't think the strategy changes. Obviously as we
comply with the continuing resolution limits, having to come
back in December with more information, and I suspect in the
next 3 months we will have more fidelity and clarity on a
number of things. As you know, these are fluid and dynamic
challenges. We have to be prepared for that, be ready for that.
So the basic strategy I don't think is going to change or
shift, but as we evolve in our requirements and how we are
implementing that strategy, will, I suspect by necessity, be
redefined and changed and shifted just the tactics of how we
are implementing it.
Mr. Byrne. Well, let me offer this observation; not advice,
just an observation. In listening to my colleagues in the House
as we were debating the amendment, as we were talking among
ourselves, I think it would be very helpful to you in getting
successful votes in the future if there was a clearly
articulated strategy, complete, comprehensive strategy. And I
think it would equally help if it was accompanied with a new
AUMF. There are some of us that took the vote yesterday knowing
that it was of a limited time duration, that we were only
talking about one element, and I think it would strengthen our
ability to support you and support the President, and perhaps
gain some more votes if we had it all laid out for us, it was
all put together in a package.
I am not trying to get into a legal argument with you or
the President about legal authority. I am talking about good
policy. So I just offer that observation to you and hope that
you will take that back to the President.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you, I will. I
understand what you are saying.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you very much, sir. The chair recognizes
Mr. Gallego for 4 minutes.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Secretary,
thank you for hanging out and staying. I know that, you know,
many times when this row gets to ask questions, the witness has
to leave, so I appreciate the courtesy.
Very quickly, when we are talking about strategy, I mean,
one of the things that I hear is that, you know, we are very
capable of winning battles, but in the long run, we lose the
war. That is certainly the impression that so many of the Iraq
war, the second Iraq war veterans have in the district that I
represent. And, as you know, it is a district that, it is
bigger than 29 states, I mean, it is about 24 percent or so of
the land area of Texas, it is a huge swath, disparate opinions,
but there seems to be a good consensus that, you know, the
strategy that we had outlined is a strategy for a specific
purpose, a limited purpose as opposed to a more big picture
long term, you know. And the perception is we have seen this
movie before. What makes us think that the ending on this
particular case is going to be any different than the endings
that we have seen before? What makes this different from other
times?
Secretary Hagel. Well, first, I think that the strategy
that the President laid out corresponds very directly and
clearly with the threat, and that threat has been identified
and defined, I think, pretty clearly by the President and a
number of us. This threat that ISIL presents to the United
States, to our interests, to our allies, certainly to the
region, we believe is very clear.
Now, that said, the strategy that the President has
announced that we are in the process of finalizing and in the
process of implementing is different in many ways. Number one,
it includes the, not just the strategic but the tactical buy-in
of many partners, including partners in that region, including
Muslim Arab countries.
Second, it defines our role in a very clear way. As the
President said, there will not be American combat
responsibilities on the ground. We will have support missions
where we can help, where we have unique capabilities, along
with our partners. Another essential part of this is a new
Iraqi government that must bring an inclusiveness and a
representation to not just the government but the governing,
where the new Prime Minister brings all the people in.
I think the clear threat that ISIL presents to all of those
countries is so clear now and the common interests are so clear
that that is different from anything I can recall in how we
have, certainly in the recent, in our recent history how we
have gone about anything.
Mr. Gallego. One of the important things that I would ask
you to keep in mind as you move forward is, as you talk about
getting investments from others, is that we need to make sure
that the American people are invested in this as well. I mean,
you know more than most even in this room about what happens
when an American public is not supportive of U.S. military
action, and it is very important that the public be kept
engaged and that they be supportive of the President's action
and, frankly, America's actions overseas.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you, I get that and I
think, again--in fact, I know one of the reasons the President
wanted to make that address to the American public last week
was for that very reason, and we will continue to make that
point. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne. The chair recognizes Mrs. Davis for 4 minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for staying. I appreciate it.
You know, we know that this is just fraught with
complications, but my belief is that the consequences of doing
nothing is also fraught with great risks, and I appreciate the
fact of moving forward when we don't have all the answers
clearly. You can tell from the questions here and the questions
throughout the last few weeks and the way, frankly, that the
vote came up, good bipartisan yes and no, and so that means
that we all have a lot of work to do, I think, and I know you
appreciate that.
The President requested that authority in order to provide
direct military training for our moderate Syrian rebels so that
they have an alternative to ISIS, but the concern is partly the
lack of unity among the disparate parts of those who have not
chosen to join and are engaged in other areas. But I wonder if
you could talk about that difficulty that we are going to face
with whether it is dual alliances, the desire to defeat or to
certainly weaken the Assad regime versus pushing back against
ISIL.
Have we ever trained and worked with a new group of troops
who have that kind of dual goal, and perhaps it is not even
dual? How do you see that coming together? I think the other
concern is we obviously are looking for intel on the ground,
and yet when it comes to air support and the intel on the
ground, which is why we are training the Syrian forces first in
local communities and then hopefully to be more helpful in the
broader goals, we are going to need to have more, whether it is
partner support on the ground or U.S. support on the ground as
well. And, again, in terms of how we describe that strategy, I
think that is very important to people, and that is another
area that we really haven't heard much about.
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, thank you. You ask a very
important question, and you led with that, with the reality
that it is complicated. I suspect Members of Congress hear that
maybe all too often on all issues, but this one is complicated,
and your question does reflect that complication.
Let me answer it this way: The moderate opposition forces
that we will be vetting, and that process I think we talked at
some length about this morning, how we would do that and so on,
are people in Syria, people who have lived in Syria, who are
citizens of Syria, whose families have lived there for a long
time, they are being and have been squeezed right now--are
being squeezed--by both the Assad regime and by ISIL and other
terrorist groups.
Right now there is nothing that they have in any
coordinated organized way to give anyone in Syria who wants
their country back and some kind of a future of peace and
stability for their families and themselves any hope or any
possibilities to build on. So the moderate opposition
understands it is not a choice between necessarily ISIL and
Assad. Yes, ISIL is who we are focused on, and that is our
primary mission and objective here is to destroy ISIL, but the
reality is that people that we will train have to deal with
that, both of those realities, and they need a new political
base that will, we believe, will come from this possibility of
organization and hope that we can help with a new moderate
opposition.
Mr. Byrne. The gentlelady's time has expired. The chair
recognizes Mr. Langevin for 4 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today.
Is this on? Okay, there we are. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, I was one of those individuals who voted in
favor of the resolution supporting the President's plan last
night. I did it with mixed emotions, and I know it is not a
perfect plan, but I think we need to start somewhere, and I
believe ISIL does pose a threat to the homeland and to our
allies around the world based on the knowledgeable testimony I
have heard from this committee and my work on the Intelligence
Committee.
My concern is, though, that there are going to be boots on
the ground that are going to be required, but we don't want
them to be U.S. boots, and I support the President's position
there, and I know you probably have talked about this already,
but for my knowledge, I need to know the commitment that we
have from our neighbors in the region in terms of what they are
going to be able to do to put boots on the ground, because my
constituents are really adamant that they don't want a big U.S.
footprint involved in this with forces on the ground, but, you
know, and I know, I am concerned, we hear that it is going to
take up to a year potentially to train the forces that we are
training in Syria, and that is obviously too long a timeframe.
If we had nations in the region who were willing to put
boots on the ground now, at least to start with, it would be
something to hold us over until those forces are trained and
are going to go in and actually battle ISIL on the ground. So
would you comment on that?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you, I will comment on
it. First on your question on coalition partners and what are
they committed to do and when will they start doing it, and all
of the follow-up questions that go with it, just as an example.
I understand this morning, I have not seen the report, but I
knew it was forthcoming that President Hollande announced that
France would be involved in military operations with us to
destroy ISIL over Iraq, the next piece of this, Syria, and so
on, as far as I know they have not made a decision, but that is
just but one, since it just happened this morning, an example
of how we are having more and more of these coalition partners
come forward.
But the bigger question that you asked specifically about
partners in the region, coalition partners in the region, how
are they going to play a role as we take time to build these
moderate Syrian forces in our train-and-equip program.
Again, I would emphasize the importance of the entire
dimension of the strategy. The train-and-equip portion of the
moderate Syrian opposition is part of that, but so is a new
Iraqi inclusive government to bring in the Sunnis and Shi'as so
we can start to get the Sunni tribes in western Iraq back off
of that support of ISIL and back with the government. Coalition
partners, their involvement through military action, our air
strikes will continue to help Iraqi security forces continue to
work the offensive, take back territory, hold territory that
they had lost to ISIL, stabilize Iraq.
All these different dimensions are in play at the same
time. Yes, it is going to take some time to start training
these people, the right people, the vetted people in groups
where we are not just training one or two terrorists, or
antiterrorists, or fighters, but groups have discipline,
strategy, tactics, weapons, that they can offer then a base of
a beginning in Syria, not just a military option, but also
political opposition to build around that. So it is going to
take some time, but it is all these other elements of the
strategy working at the same time toward the same end.
Mr. Byrne. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne. Mr. Secretary, thank you for coming today, thank
you for your patience and your candor. This is a great threat
facing the people of our country. You are very concerned about
it, and we share your concern. We know that this needs to be a
partnership between you and the President and the Congress, and
we want to continue to work with you, and we appreciate the
further communications we know we are going to be receiving
from you.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you very much, and I
very much appreciate the questions, the attention, and the
support.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, sir, and this committee is adjourned.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 18, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 18, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 18, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE
Mr. Kline. Secretary Hagel, you testified that reports of President
Obama personally selecting each target in Syria or President Obama
individually authorizing each target nominated for strike in Syria were
erroneous. If the reports are wrong and the President is not personally
selecting targets, please answer the following: To whom has the
President delegated this selection authority and who will be nominating
and giving final approval for prosecution of targets in Syria?
Secretary Hagel. General Austin, the Commander, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) has been delegated the authority to select and engage
targets in Syria. General Austin has further delegated the authority to
engage targets in Syria to the Combined Forces Air Component Commander
(CFACC) and the Commander, Task Force 94-7 (TF 94-7). Targets for
deliberate engagement are vetted through the Intelligence Community at
the request of CENTCOM's Intelligence Directorate. This vetting ensures
the accuracy of the supporting intelligence. Once vetted, each target
is validated at CENTCOM to ensure it falls within the Law of War and
supports the CENTCOM Commander's intent and objectives. These vetted
and validated targets are then approved for strike by General Austin
upon nomination by the CFACC, TF 94-7, or the CENTCOM Intelligence
Directorate. Dynamic targets, also known as targets of opportunity, are
approved for engagement through the appropriate target engagement
authority.
Mr. Kline. Please provide the committee a ``wire diagram'' of the
command relationships and responsibilities that have been created for
the ongoing operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), include all partner (coalition) nations and their
responsibilities and authorities and annotate any national caveats
coalition partners have placed on their use in the on-going campaign
against ISIL.
Secretary Hagel and General Mayville. [No answer was available at
the time of printing.]
Mr. Kline. Under what rules of engagement (ROE) will our forces be
operating? Please provide legal and layman definitions and examples of
the ROE that we are currently operating under and plan to utilize in
future operations.
Secretary Hagel and General Mayville. U.S. forces will be operating
under the Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) that apply to operations
conducted overseas. In addition, the Executive Orders for operations in
Iraq and Syria have provided mission specific ROE. All the ROE are
classified.
The mission specific ROE authorize the use of force against two
specifically designated groups, which means that these declared hostile
forces may be targeted based on status. Forces that have been declared
hostile for operations in Iraq and Syria include both the Islamic State
of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Khorasan Group. U.S. forces use multiple
forms of intelligence to determine whether or not the individual or
equipment being targeted is a member of the declared hostile forces.
U.S. forces always retain the inherent right of self-defense.
Additionally, I authorized the use of force to defend other military
and civilian personnel as well as critical infrastructure. In addition
to the individuals designated by me, the Commander, U.S. Central
Command has authority to designate additional military forces, civilian
personnel, and critical infrastructure for protection under collective
self-defense. General Austin has designated all partner nation
coalition forces as eligible for protection under collective self-
defense. U.S. forces have used this collective self-defense in
operations that defend American citizens, internally displace people in
vicinity of Sinjar and Kobani, and Iraqi Security Forces.
The ROE also authorize entry in the land, internal waters,
territorial seas, and air space of specifically designated nations. The
entry authorization supports operations in Iraq and Syria and also
allows for entry for the specific purpose of personnel recovery
operations in surrounding nations, if necessary.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. Forbes magazine recently wrote an article on DOD's
decision to reduce our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities by 50% given the proposed retirement of the U-2
aircraft. The committee understands the U-2 currently provides 75
percent of our actionable intelligence. Several combatant commanders
are on record supporting the capabilities of the U-2 over the Global
Hawk. Public law in the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) and again in the FY2012 NDAA preclude the retirement of the U-2
until ISR gaps caused by the retirement of the U-2 are mitigated. The
law further stipulates that ``until the capability to be fielded at the
same time or before the U-2 aircraft retirement would result in equal
or greater capability available to the commanders of the combatant
commands.'' Can you provide details on the transition plan that allows
a thoughtful transition strategy from the U-2 to the Global Hawk
without creating an ISR gaps?
Secretary Hagel. The plan to upgrade the capabilities of the Global
Hawk sensor and transition ISR missions from the U-2 to the Global Hawk
is detailed in the office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's
(CAPE) classified report to Congress. This report was prepared in
response to section 143(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 and was briefed to members of the House
Armed Services Committee on September 5, 2014. The Department of
Defense Special Access Program Central Office (SAPCO) is coordinating
with your office to arrange a discussion in which CAPE can review with
you the classified details of the plan.
Ms. Tsongas. Several combatant commanders have expressed their
concerns about our ISR capabilities and capacity? What investments are
being made to maintain the necessary multispectral capabilities in
order to preclude a gap in ISR capacity and capability as the U-2 is
retired?
General Mayville. The retirement of the U-2 will create a multi-
spectral gap until the required equipment for the RQ-4 is developed.
The Air Force is assessing options for the transition of U-2 like
capabilities to the RQ-4. In accordance with a $10M FY14 NDAA
Congressional Mark, the Air Force is conducting a study to assess the
cost and feasibility to transition U-2 sensor capabilities to the RQ-4.
The results of this study are pending and distribution to the
Congressional committees will occur by the spring of 2015.
The FY15 PB provides investments to transition unique U-2 sensors
to the RQ-4, mitigating some gaps in collection capabilities with the
U-2 retirement. USAF estimates U-2 sensor transition costs at less than
$500M over the next 10 years. The sensor transition will be deferred if
BCA funding levels are realized.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING
Dr. Fleming. President Obama has stated: ``Our objective is clear
and that is to degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) so it is no longer a threat.'' While the President has
repeatedly promised no combat boots on the ground, earlier this week
General Dempsey testified in a Senate hearing that: ``To be clear, if
we reach the point where I believe our advisers should accompany Iraqi
troops on attacks against specific ISIL targets, I will recommend that
to the President.''
Could you please clarify: Will the President accept the
recommendations of his top military leaders in order to destroy ISIL so
that it is no longer a threat as the President has stated is his goal,
or will this administration allow ISIS to continue its operations and
conduct terrorist attacks in Iraq should the planned air campaign fail
to destroy ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. The President has been clear: he is in regular
discussions with his national security team on countering ISIL. The
Chairman is a member of that team and his role is to provide military
advice to the President. As events on the ground evolve, the President
will continue to consider advice from his entire team.
Dr. Fleming. I am concerned about the safety of our airmen as they
conduct the campaign this administration is proposing. The President
has stated that there will be no combat troops on the ground, and yet
as we know from the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, and as has been
explained by senior Air Force leaders, special operations forces are
needed on the ground in Syria in order for air strikes to be
successful. General Dempsey testified in a Senate hearing earlier this
week that U.S. forces will be prepared to provide search and rescue
missions if pilots are shot down and to make the mission successful.
Could you please clarify as to how this administration plans to
ensure the protection of U.S. airmen and the success of the airstrike
mission that he is proposing without special operations forces serving
in some kind of combat role?
Secretary Hagel and General Mayville. All airstrikes are
coordinated through the Combined Air Operations Center. Through various
intelligence collection assets, a threat overlay is developed
displaying the threats from surface to air missiles. These threats are
incorporated in mission planning to mitigate to the greatest extent
possible risks to the force; mitigations are attained primarily through
avoidance of these areas and the use of standoff munitions to limit
exposure to these anti-air threats. The tactics used by pilots are also
designed to minimize their vulnerability to surface to air missiles and
anti-air threats. For targets that are inside the threat rings of
surface to air missiles or located in other high threat areas, detailed
weaponeering is conducted to minimize the threat to aircraft. The use
of standoff weapons systems such as Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-Off
Missiles, Joint Stand-Off Weapons, sea-launched Tomahawk Cruise
Missiles, and employment of stealth aircraft minimize the threat to
personnel.
Dr. Fleming. Since President Obama has taken office, our military
has been cut by over $1 trillion and is set be cut by billions more
before his term is complete. How does this administration intend to
ensure that our soldiers have the training, resources, and equipment
they need to be successful in meeting the President's stated objective
of destroying ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. The Military Services will always ensure the
forces that are deploying to engage in combat operations or train and
assist operations are trained and equipped to meet the mission tasking.
Specifically for the current operations to defeat the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Military Services, for the most part,
have relied on forces already assigned to the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM). The Department is relying on Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding that is available under the Continuing
Resolution to cover the costs of current operations. The Department, in
coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, will evaluate
the need to request additional OCO funding in fiscal year 2015 as
requirements are better defined.
Dr. Fleming. As part of his plan to destroy ISIL, the President has
requested that Congress authorize the training and equipping of what
this administration has called the ``vetted, moderate Syrian
opposition.'' Yet recent media reports have indicated that the founder
of the Free Syrian Army has stated that it will not join the U.S.-led
coalition to defeat ISIL because overthrowing Assad is its top
priority.
What evidence can the administration provide that the opposition
forces that the President intends to equip and train will focus its
efforts on ISIL, rather than on Assad's forces? How does the
possibility of the rebel opposition focusing on Assad square with this
administration's stated goal of destroying ISIL? What is this
administration's plan for eliminating ISIL if rebel forces focus on
Assad rather than ISIL and other radical jihadist groups?
Secretary Hagel. The program to train and equip Syrian moderate
opposition forces is a multi-purpose effort designed to build a force
capable of defending the Syrian population against extremist groups
such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as well as regime
attacks; to stabilize areas under opposition control; and prepare
trained forces to go on the offensive against ISIS. The initial
priority is to fight ISIS, to the extent possible we will recruit from
communities that are directly threated by ISIS, or where forces will
have the capacity and will to fight ISIS. More broadly, our goal is to
ensure that the moderate opposition is in a positon to hold territory
from which ISIS is removed and, by strengthening opposition forces, to
advance the conditions that will lead to a negotiated end to the Syrian
conflict.
Dr. Fleming. A major concern Congress and the American people have
with arming and training this ``vetted, moderate, Syrian opposition''
is its relationship to other groups on the ground. Could you please
describe the nature and level of political, diplomatic, economic, and
military cooperation, integration or affiliation between the identified
rebel forces and the following groups: ISIL, Al-Nusra, the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Khorasan Group, and other Al Qaeda affiliates and
radical jihadist groups.
Secretary Hagel. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Dr. Fleming. The constitutions and politicians we supported in Iraq
and Afghanistan were not supportive of religious freedom. Are we going
to change course on this matter? For example, are we going to include
Christian militia groups and leaders, and perhaps other groups, or only
Islamic militias? For example, one of the most prominent Christian
militia groups is the Syriac Military Council. They control an area of
free Syria. Will they be included in any approved weapons support and
training support from us?
Secretary Hagel. We have not yet identified the specific armed
groups we will work with for the train-and-equip program. However,
should Christian groups demonstrate interest in working with us, and be
deemed appropriate recipients of U.S. support after being properly
vetted, we could consider including them in the program.
Dr. Fleming. Please give a detailed account of the coalition
against ISIL that the administration has formed thus far, including the
type and level of support from each country part of the coalition.
Secretary Hagel. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON
Mr. Carson. We know that major terrorist groups like ISIL and Al
Qaeda actively pursue an international profile--both to boost
recruiting and to spread their extremist ideology. But I'm interested
in understanding whether the split between ISIL and Al Qaeda has driven
them into direct competition. Do you believe that the level of
attention given to ISIL is encouraging Al Qaeda and others to branch
out, as Al Qaeda recently did on the Indian subcontinent, or to act
more violently to keep up? Are there any notable changes in Al Qaeda
and other terrorist group activities that correspond with the rise of
ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Carson. President Obama made clear that ISIL is not a state.
But are they taking any steps in pursuit of their statehood
aspirations, like attempting to set up a government structure or
provide public services? And if so, are we taking any steps to
distinguish between ISIL fighters and those conscripted into these
types of service positions in cities taken over by ISIL?
Secretary Hagel. ISIL aspires to establish local governments and
provide basic services to the populace in each city or district of Iraq
and Syria it controls. ISIL seeks to form its governance based on
strict Sharia law. ISIL's leadership structure in areas they control
remains in-line with the group's overall structure; however, the group
has given some responsibility to local citizens loyal to ISIL and
empowered supportive tribal leaders to address grievances. Local
government offices and medical services are operated and managed ISIL
members and loyalists.
At this time we are unable to accurately distinguish between ISIL
cadre and local citizens working under ISIL control. This is largely
due to the lack of detailed information on the people in ISIL
controlled cities.
Mr. Carson. What is the status of foreign military sales to Iraq?
Are they on hold, proceeding normally, or being expedited to shore up
the ISF? And after watching some of our equipment fall into ISIL's
hands, what steps can be taken to ensure that any future equipment
provided is not lost in the same way?
Secretary Hagel. Since January, Iraq has requested additional
equipment and services to aid in its campaign against ISIL. The USG has
expedited delivery of more than 1,100 Hellfire missiles, 20,000 2.75-
inch rockets, thousands of rounds of tank ammunition, thousands of
machine guns, grenades, flares, small arms, and other equipment.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases are currently in development to
provide additional Hellfire missiles, rockets, and other munitions as
an immediate and effective tool against the threat. The formation of
the new Iraq government, the strengthening and regeneration/
reorganization of the ISF, and the increased U.S. advisory role will
help ensure better security and employment of these critical
capabilities.
Mr. Carson. I would like some clarity on the role of special
operations forces in this conflict with ISIL. Obviously, special
operations encompasses a wide array of missions. But does the ``no
boots on the ground'' assertion apply to short-term special operations
missions, like the pursuit of a high value target? If so, what types of
special operations may occur while still sticking to the ``no boots on
the ground'' pledge?
Secretary Hagel and General Mayville. Special Operations play a
central role in the conflict against ISIL. Counterterrorism, foreign
internal defense, security forces assistance, counterinsurgency, and
hostage rescue remain core activities for our Special Operations
Forces. Nonetheless, the ``no boots on the ground'' policy applies to
all operations, including Special Operations in Syria. However, our
forces are capable of creating effects in Syria while not physically
located there. U.S. Special Operations Forces conduct the core
activities using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and
in unique conditions and to different standards, but in a manner that
complements conventional capabilities. Special Operations Forces can
tailor their capabilities in combinations with foreign forces that
provide options for creating effects to achieve a broad range of
strategic objectives. If the situation necessitates, the President and
Secretary of Defense retain the authority to make an exception to this
policy.