[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING 1
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012
TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding
the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Libya
Available on the Internet:
www.fdsys.gov
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HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 TERRORIST
ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman
LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
PETER ROSKAM, Illinois ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas ADAM SCHIFF, California
MARTHA A. ROBY, Alabama LINDA SANCHEZ, California
SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
Professional Staff
Phil Kiko, Staff Director
Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Director
HEARING 1
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Benghazi,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room
HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Trey Gowdy (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Gowdy, Westmoreland, Jordan,
Roskam, Pompeo, Roby, Brooks, Cummings, Smith, Schiff, Sanchez,
and Duckworth.
Staff Present: Phil Kiko, Staff Director and General
Counsel; Chris Donesa, Deputy Staff Director; Dana Chipman,
Chief Counsel; Sharon Jackson, Deputy Chief Counsel; Mac Tolar,
Senior Counsel; Yael Barash, Legislative Clerk; Paige Oneto,
Executive Assistant; Luke Burke, Senior Professional Staff;
Brien Beattie, Professional Staff; Carlton Davis, Senior
Counsel; Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Director; Dave
Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; Heather Sawyer, Minority
Chief Counsel; Ronak Desai, Minority Counsel; Peter Kenny,
Minority Counsel; Laura Rauch, Minority Senior Professional
Staff; Brent Woolfork, Minority Senior Professional Staff;
Linda Cohen, Minority Senior Professional Staff; Kendal
Robinson, Minority Professional Staff; Jennifer Hoffman,
Minority Communications Director; Paul Bell, Minority Press
Secretary; Mone Ross, Minority Staff Assistant; and Daniel
Rebnord, Minority Intern.
Chairman Gowdy. The committee will come to order.
Welcome.
The chair notes a quorum for the purposes of taking
testimony pursuant to House rules.
The chair will recognize himself and the ranking member for
purposes of making an opening statement. Without objection, the
opening statement of any other member of the committee who
wishes to provide one will be included in the record.
A little over 2 years ago, four Americans serving our
country in Benghazi, Libya, were killed. Two of them were
killed when a facility emblematic of our country was set on
fire, and two of them were killed when they dared to fight back
and defend themselves and others.
Sean Smith, Chris Stevens, Ty Woods, and Glen Doherty
represented us. They represented our country and our values. We
asked them to go. We sent them. And they were killed because
some people hold a deep-seated animus toward us simply because
we are us.
So to the family and the friends and the loved ones of
those killed, we can never adequately express our condolences
and our gratitude. To the families, you have helped each of us
understand these four were not just pictures on a television
screen; they were sons and husbands and fathers and brothers
and friends and fellow Americans.
I remain hopeful that there are some things left in our
country that can rise above politics. And I remain convinced
that our fellow citizens are entitled to all of the facts about
what happened before, during, and after the attacks in
Benghazi, and they deserve an investigative process that is
worthy of the memory of the four who were killed and worthy of
the respect of our fellow Americans.
Some question the need for this committee, and I respect
their right to dissent. But the mark of a professional--indeed,
the mark of character--is to do a good job with a task even if
you don't think the task should have been assigned in the first
place. And given the gravity of the issues at hand, I would
rather run the risk of answering a question twice than run the
risk of not answering it once.
I am willing to reconsider previously held beliefs in light
of new facts and evidence, and I would encourage my colleagues
and others to do the same. Because we know that all the
documents have not yet been produced, and we know that there
are still witnesses left to be examined, and we also know that
there are witnesses who have been examined in the past but for
whom additional questions may be warranted. So I would ask each
of my colleagues, given their vast and varied and exceptional
backgrounds, to put those talents to good use on behalf of our
fellow citizens.
The House of Representatives constituted this committee,
and they did so for us to find all of the facts. And I intend
to do that, and I intend to do it in a manner worthy of the
respect of our fellow citizens.
Our fellow citizens have certain legitimate expectations.
They expect us to protect and defend those that we send to
represent us. They expect us to move heaven and earth when
those who are representing us come under attack. They expect
government to tell us the truth in the aftermath of a tragedy
always. And they expect that we will not continue to make the
same mistakes over and over and over again.
Which brings us to this hearing. Benghazi was not the first
time one of our facilities or our people have been attacked.
Beirut, Kenya, Tanzania are three that come to mind, among
others. And, after these attacks, groups come together and they
make recommendations on how to prevent future attacks. That
seems to be the process that is followed. A tragedy or an
attack comes; we commission a panel, a board, a blue-ribbon
commission to study the attack and make sure that we make
recommendations to ensure that it never happens again. But yet
it does happen again.
And so, to those who believe it is time to move on, to
those who believe that there is nothing left to discover, that
all the questions have been asked and answered and that we have
learned all the lessons that there are to be learned, we have
heard all of that before, and it was wrong then.
It is stunning to see the similarities between the
recommendations made decades ago and the recommendations made
by the Benghazi ARB. And if you doubt that, I want you to
compare the recommendations of those made a quarter of a
century ago, 25 years ago, with the recommendations made by the
Benghazi ARB. We do not suffer from a lack of recommendations.
We do suffer from a lack of implementing and enacting those
recommendations. And that has to end.
So it is appropriate to review the recommendations of the
most recent ARB, and I commend our colleague from California,
Mr. Schiff, for suggesting that we do so.
And it is also fair to ask why we have not done a better
job of implementing recommendations made, in some instances,
decades ago. In other words, why does it take an attack on our
people or our facilities for us to make a recommendation? Why
not evaluate the threat before the attack? Why not anticipate
rather than react?
In conclusion, the people that we work for yearn to see the
right thing done for the right reasons and in the right way.
And they want to know that something can rise above the din of
partisan politics. They want to trust the institutions of
government. So to fulfill the duties owed to those we serve and
in honor of those who were killed, maybe, just maybe, we can be
what those four brave men were, neither Republican nor
Democrat, just Americans in pursuit of the facts and justice,
no matter where that journey takes us.
And, with that, I would recognize the ranking member from
Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
thank you for holding this hearing today.
I know every member of this panel is dedicated to ensuring
that our work honors the memories of the four Americans who
were killed in Benghazi. Their names must be etched in our
memory banks: Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone
Woods, and Glen Doherty.
I want to thank our colleague Representative Schiff for
proposing the topic for today's hearing. And, Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for accepting that topic so that we can see
what has become of the ARB recommendations.
Too often over the past 2 years, the congressional
investigation into what happened in Benghazi has devolved into
unseemly partisanship. We are better than that. Today we have
an opportunity to focus on reform. How can we learn from the
past to make things better in the future?
And, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that, over the years,
recommendation after recommendations have been made. The
question is, as you said, what became of them.
I do believe that in life there are transformational
moments. That is, something happens, it causes you to stop and
pause and try to figure out how to remedy the situation and
make it better. And the problem is, when those moments come--
and they come to all of us--the question is whether we pause,
and make things better. Because usually, if we don't, we repeat
the errors, and usually things get worse. And this is one such
transformational moment.
This kind of oversight can be productive, it can be
critical, it can sometimes even be tedious, but it can also
save lives. That is what we are talking about. And that is why
I want to thank every member of this panel for agreeing to do
this, for we are about the business of trying to save lives.
That is a very serious mission.
I sincerely hope the select committee will stay on the
course of constructive reform and keep this goal as our North
Star. It would be a disservice to everyone involved to be lured
off this path by partisan politics.
Today we will review the recommendations of the
Accountability Review Board, which was chaired by Ambassador
Thomas Pickering and Admiral Michael Mullen, the former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
During our previous investigation, the House Oversight
Committee, Chairman Gowdy and I, heard directly from both men
about how seriously they took their roles. Ambassador Pickering
called it ``a debt of honor.'' Their report was independent. It
was adopted unanimously by all board members. And it was a
blistering examination of what went wrong at the State
Department. They made 29 recommendations, and Secretary Clinton
accepted all of them.
After they issued their report, the State Department
Inspector General issued his own report, finding that quote
``The Department wasted no time addressing the
recommendations.'' The Department has been working on
implementing those recommendations for the past year and a
half, and Congress should ensure that it finishes the job.
Today I would like our witnesses to provide an update on
the status of several of the Board's recommendations.
First, the Board found that the Department's response to
the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi was
``inadequate,'' and it was inadequate at the post in Benghazi,
at the embassy in Tripoli, and here in Washington. Ambassador
Pickering explained that the post did not take action despite
crossing several tripwires that should have caused officials to
review security more closely and develop a stronger response.
The Board recommended that the Department change its
procedures to make sure that security breaches are reviewed
immediately. Today, the Department reports that it has created
a new process that requires posts to report tripwires as soon
as they are crossed so security officials can review them
immediately and take action if necessary. I want to know if
this process is now fully operational and, if so, how it has
been working so far.
The Board also found that we should not have relied so
heavily on local militia groups, like the February 17th
militia, to protect our posts. The Board called this reliance
``misplaced,'' and it found that these security forces were
``poorly skilled.'' The Board recommended the Department
strengthen security ``beyond the traditional reliance on host-
government security, supporting high-risk, high-threat posts.''
Today the Department reports that it has 17 new Marine
Security Guard detachments and another new Marine unit to
enhance security in changing threat environments. In addition,
the State Department is now using new funding from Congress to
hire 151 new personnel in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, or
DS. I want to hear from our witnesses about whether these
actions are sufficient or whether we need to do more.
The Board also found fault with a Deputy Assistant
Secretary with DS who denied repeated requests for additional
security in Benghazi. At the time, this official oversaw the
security of all 275 diplomatic posts around the world.
To address this problem, the Department created a new
position to focus exclusively on the security needs of roughly
30 posts experiencing highest threats. The Board praised this
action, stating that it could be ``a positive first step if
integrated into a sound strategy for DS reorganization.''
Today, I want to hear from the State Department specifically
about how this new position is working and whether they believe
we should make additional changes.
Everyone understands that diplomacy, by its nature,
sometimes requires us to be in very dangerous places. Our
diplomats work in high-threat environments, and although we
cannot eliminate every risk, we must do everything that we can
to keep Americans as safe as possible when they are serving
overseas.
With that, I want to conclude by recognizing the tremendous
sacrifices that are made every single day around the world by
our diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, and our
military servicemembers on behalf of the American people.
And I remind my colleagues that this is our watch. I said
to the chairman before we started, this is bigger than us. The
things that we do today and over the next few months will have
lasting effects even when we are gone on to heaven, and that is
how we have to look at this. And so we prepare not only for the
present, but we prepare for the future and generations unborn.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, gentleman from Maryland.
The committee will now recognize and receive testimony from
today's witness panel.
The first witness will be the Honorable Greg Starr, the
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security at the Department
of State. The second witness will be Todd Keil, a member of the
Independent Panel on Best Practices. And the third witness will
be Mark Sullivan, the chair of the Independent Panel on Best
Practices.
Welcome to each of you. We will recognize each of you for
your 5-minute opening statements. There are a series of lights
which mean what they traditionally mean in life, and I am sure
that you are familiar with the lighting system.
Because this is an investigative hearing, I will need to
administer the oath to the witnesses before taking their
testimony. So if the witnesses would please rise and lift their
right hands.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
Secretary Starr, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF THE HON. GREGORY B. STARR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; TODD M.
KEIL, MEMBER, THE INDEPENDENT PANEL OF BEST PRACTICES; AND MARK
J. SULLIVAN, CHAIRMAN, THE INDEPENDENT PANEL OF BEST PRACTICES
STATEMENT OF THE HON. GREGORY B. STARR
Mr. Starr. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and
distinguished committee members, good morning. And I thank you
for your invitation to appear today to discuss the Department
of State's implementation of the 29 recommendations made by the
independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, also known as
the ARB.
Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to interrupt
you. Would you pull the mic just a little--some of us have had
a couple----
Mr. Starr. Okay.
Chairman Gowdy [continuing]. Birthdays recently, and we
are hard of hearing, so----
Mr. Starr. I too, sir.
I, along with my colleagues at the State Department, look
forward to working with you as you examine the issues relating
to the 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi.
The attacks in Benghazi were tragic. Today we honor those
we lost by internalizing the lessons from that night to protect
our people in the field as they carry out our country's foreign
policy work every single day. Over the past 2 years, with
Secretary Kerry's leadership, that commitment is being honored.
Like you, we want to keep our people safe.
The heart of the Accountability Review Board's
recommendations was to enhance the Department's approach to
risk management, ensuring that when our national interests
require us to operate in dangerous places that we identify the
risks and take the proper steps to mitigate them.
The Department has made important strides in that regard. I
would like to highlight just a few examples of how we are
implementing the ARB's recommendations, including how we are
giving high-threat posts the attention and the resources that
they need.
However, even with this progress, it is essential for us to
acknowledge that, while we can do everything we can to reduce
the risk, we can never eliminate it fully.
High-threat, high-risk posts require special attention to
confirm our national interests require us to operate there and
to provide the right resources to do that. We have instituted a
new process called the Vital Presence Validation Process--
shorthand ``VP2,'' as we call it--to do just that.
One example of it in action is our recent return to Bangui,
Central African Republic. The Department suspended operations
there in December of 2012. This year, using the VP2 process and
a support cell process that plans for how we go into these
operations, the Department engaged in an analysis that
determined that we should and could go back. We worked with our
colleagues at the Department of Defense to assess the security
situation on the ground and develop a comprehensive plan for
our return.
I'm proud to report that we deployed DOD and State
Department personnel just last week. The embassy is now open.
While we must closely monitor conditions on the ground, our
return to Bengui demonstrates that our enhanced risk management
procedures are working.
Another example of our enhanced risk management posture
since Benghazi is how we have improved at training. Chief of
Mission personnel, including both security professionals and
all Foreign Service personnel, are now better prepared for
operating in high-threat environments.
We have increased the expanded training for our DS special
agents who receive high-threat training specifically, and then
we have also expanded what we call our Foreign Affairs Counter
Threat course for Foreign Service colleagues that are going to
all of our high-threat posts. And we are working towards making
this FACT training, Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training,
universal for Foreign Service personnel and employees for all
of our posts overseas.
Further, to combat fire as a weapon, we have partnered with
the City of New York Fire Department and the Army's Asymmetric
Warfare Group to enhance our training curriculum and implement
countermeasures in response to fire and smoke as a terrorist
weapon.
Finally, with your help, we have added to our security
resources. The ARB recommended that we expand the number of
Diplomatic Security personnel, and we have done just that. We
are well on our way to just finishing that off and hitting all
of our targets. It also recommended that we augment the Marine
Security Guard program, which we have done as well.
While these are just a few examples of the Department's
efforts post-Benghazi, I believe they highlight some of the key
progress we have made. I will not outline all of this, all the
things that we have done, in the interest of time, but I'm
pleased to report that we have made what I consider to be
tremendous progress on the 29 Benghazi ARB recommendations. To
date, we've closed 22 recommendations and 7 are in progress or
nearing completion. Today we are better prepared, better
protected and informed to manage the risk.
We look forward to working with Congress and you on
ensuring that foreign affairs--our foreign affairs community
has safe platforms for carrying out our national interests. I
want to thank Congress for the additional resources that you've
provided over the past 2 years to improve and sustain this
diplomatic platform.
And I'll be glad to answer any questions that you have.
Thank you.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Starr.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Keil.
STATEMENT OF TODD M. KEIL
Mr. Keil. Thank you, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished members of the select committee for
inviting me to testify today about our independent panel report
on best practices in the aftermath of the tragic attack on the
U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, and to provide our insight
regarding the implementation of our recommendations and related
issues relevant to our report.
Our panel was committed to identifying best practices from
throughout the U.S. Government, the private sector,
nongovernmental organizations, and international partners which
can finally establish an effective risk management process in
the Department of State, improve the security of U.S.
diplomatic facilities abroad, and enhance the safety of
Department of State and foreign affairs agencies' personnel,
not only in high-risk areas but globally.
We identified 40 crucial recommendations to achieve this
goal. We continue to stand behind our report in the strongest
possible terms and believe that the 40 recommendations and the
supporting narratives, which were derived from well-known and
established best practices, provide a clear roadmap for an
absolutely necessary organizational paradigm change throughout
the Department of State to support the current direction of
expeditionary diplomacy and the application of proven
enterprise risk management enhancements.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I spent a career of
almost 23 years as a special agent with the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security in the Department of State. As a result of
my years of service, I am uniquely familiar with the history
and, most importantly, the operating culture both within the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Department of State.
As our panel interviewed hundreds of people in the U.S. and
abroad and gained valuable ground truth from our travel to 10
countries during our work, including numerous high-threat
locations, I couldn't have been more personally and
professionally proud and heartened, along with my fellow panel
members, by hearing and witnessing the dedicated and admirable
work of the men and women of the Diplomatic Security Service.
Each day around the world, the DS team faces extreme
challenges and unpredictable risks to provide a safe and secure
environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, and they do
so with distinction. The men and women of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security are truly dedicated public servants and are
owed the gratitude of the American people for their service to
this great Nation.
As we stated repeatedly throughout our report, best
practices will not save lives unless they are resourced,
implemented, and followed. Almost 14--now, actually, almost 15
years ago, as was mentioned in the chairman's opening
statement, a number of very similar recommendations were made
after the East African embassy bombings, and little has been
accomplished by the Department of State since then to improve
its approach to risk management.
While we are pleased our report has been finally officially
released by the State Department, along with the implementation
fact sheet, we are disappointed with the decision not to
implement recommendation number 1, the most important one, and
recommendation number 13.
In a meeting earlier this year with Deputy Secretary
Higginbottom and Assistant Secretary Starr, we were encouraged
by their candor and support for our report and their intent to
adhere to the recommendations in our report. In light of the
long history of such report and recommendations to the
Department of State and with a continuing sense of
responsibility, we voiced our concerns in a recent letter to
Deputy Secretary Higginbottom both for those recommendations
not implemented and those that are apparently relying on pre-
Benghazi processes and procedures to demonstrate or achieve
implementation.
Now is the time. Clear the smoke. Remove the mirrors. Now
is the time for the Department of State to finally
institutionalize some real, meaningful, and progressive change.
And as the ranking member said, this is a transformational
moment. They can't lose this moment.
Words and cursory actions by the Department of State ring
hollow absent transparency and verifiable and sustainable
actions to fully put into practice the letter and the intent of
our recommendations, which will facilitate diplomacy and
safeguard the selfless Americans who carry out our national
security priorities around the world. The Department of State
owes it to those people who have given their lives in service
to our country and to those employees who continue to serve our
country in some very dangerous locations around the world to
continue to identify and implement risk management best
practices.
Additionally, we urge the Department to institutionalize
the process of outside and independent counsel and guidance on
risk management best practices sooner than 2016. The
Accountability Review Board recommended that this be an annual
process, and we concur that this remains a critical need for
the Department and should begin as soon as possible. In our
view, this is a decisively important step the Department must
take to demonstrate transparency and ensure a continuing
dialogue on security best practices with an input from outside,
independent experts regarding operations in high-threat and
challenging international locations.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take just a quick
moment to introduce another member of our panel sitting in the
audience, Mr. Ray Mislock. Ray's multiple careers in public
service include more than 25 years as an FBI agent, 5 years as
the Director of Security at the CIA. Ray exemplifies the
definition of a great American.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Keil. And welcome, to your
guest.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Keil follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Sullivan, you're recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK J. SULLIVAN
Mr. Sullivan. Good morning, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking
Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for asking Todd Keil and I to appear before you
today.
Mr. Chairman, I consider it an honor to have served on the
Best Practice Panel with outstanding and dedicated individuals.
Our team of Todd Keil; Richard Manlove; Raymond Mislock, Jr.;
Timothy Murphy; and staff Erica Lichliter and Stephanie Murdoch
have a combined experience of 175 years of security and law
enforcement expertise.
During our careers, each panel member has gained an
appreciation and understanding of the importance of having
clear lines of leadership in an organizational structure
concerning security matters. We, as a panel, also understand
that things don't always go as planned, and when they don't, it
is vital to implement lessons learned in an effort to prevent
them from happening again.
The panel report reflects the independent views of the
panel based upon our best professional judgment, experience,
and analysis of the best practices, informed by interviews,
travel, and extensive research. It was a pleasure to serve with
this dedicated group, and I appreciate their professionalism
and hard work.
I would also like to acknowledge and thank all of those
interviewed in the course of drafting this report from the U.S.
Government, private sector, international organizations, and
foreign governments.
The Best Practice Panel was the result of the
Accountability Review Board for Benghazi, which recommended
that the Department of State establish a panel of outside,
independent experts with experience in high-risk, high-threat
areas to support the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, identify
best practices and recommendations from other agencies and
countries, and evaluate United States security platforms in
high-risk, high-threat posts.
Our report provided 40 recommendations in 12 different
areas. Those 12 areas are organization and management,
accountability, risk management, program criticality and
acceptable risk, planning and logistics, lessons learned,
training and human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and
security assessment, program resource and technology, host
nations and guard force capability enhancement, regular
evaluation and change management, leadership, and communication
and training.
It was the opinion of the panel all 40 recommendations
would further strengthen the Department's ability to protect
its personnel and work more safely on a global platform to
achieve American foreign policy goals and objectives. The
panel's view was that its recommendations were realistic,
achievable, and measurable.
On August 29th, 2013, the panel delivered its final report
to the Department of State. Of the 40 recommendations we
offered, the Department accepted 38. Of the 38 accepted
recommendations, the Department of State has reported that 30
have been implemented, and, in addition, the implementation
process for the remaining 8 is ongoing.
The two recommendations not accepted are: the Department
should, as a matter of urgency, establish an Under Secretary
for Diplomatic Security; and, number 13, waivers to establish
security standards should only be provided subsequent to the
implementation of mitigating measures as agreed by regional
bureau or other program managers, advised by Department of
State, and as informed by the Department risk management model.
The Best Practice Panel looked across a wide spectrum of
private and nongovernmental organizations to identify effective
measures to enhance the Department's ability to ensure a safe
and secure environment for employees and programs. Not
surprisingly, the panel found that many institutions, including
governments, refer to the Department of State Bureau of
Diplomatic Security as the gold standard for security and seek
to model their service after the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Nevertheless, any organization must continuously evolve and
improve to adjust with a fluid and dynamic environment. The
panel continues to advocate that the way forward should be
characterized by cooperative efforts that will provide a
framework which will enhance the Department's ability to
protect Americans. In order to be effective, we must be
innovative so that we ensure our institutions adapt and evolve
to meet the ever-changing security requirement needs.
In any environment where uncertainty permeates, one
certainty we share is the necessary collaborative effort that
is needed in our country to ensure the safety and security of
all American lives. It is also a necessary certainty that we
honor and protect the memories of those citizens who have been
lost as a result of violent attacks with dignity and respect.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the
Department of State, the overseas post that hosted our panel
visit, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for the
outstanding support they provided to our panel during our
endeavor.
I would also like to thank Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member
Cummings, and members of the Select Committee for inviting us
here today in your continued efforts to make America safe.
I look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Chairman Gowdy. The chair will now recognize the
gentlewoman from Indiana, Mrs. Brooks, for her questioning.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to start out by thanking each of the panel
members for being here. You've dedicated your careers, whether
it's protecting the President, whether it's protecting Foreign
Service Officers or those in Homeland Security, and we'd like
to thank you for that work.
In preparation for today, I looked at the Department of
State's website and learned that there are reports that show--
and I certainly am certain that you're aware--since the 1970s,
there have been over 500 attacks on our diplomatic facilities
abroad in over 92 different countries. From 1998 through
December of 2013, there were actually 336 attacks against U.S.
personnel and facilities. These include things like rocket
attacks, firebombing, attempted murder, arson, takeovers,
vandalism.
It wasn't until 1987 that the State Department started what
are called accountability review boards, and there have been 19
ARBs since that time. They've reviewed only--and, as I
understand, it's the mission of the ARBs to review only the
most significant attacks against our diplomatic personnel and
to review specifically security and intelligence and whether or
not government employees breach their duties.
As the chairman and the ranking member have brought up, in
the 1998 East African bombings, 300 lives were lost--12
Americans; the rest were Africans. And an ARB was convened
then, and, as we have already heard, they made several findings
and recommendations then. This follows what was called the
Inman panel, which was 14 years before the East African ARB.
And, again, many of those findings and recommendations were
found in East Africa in their ARB. At the time, the then-
Secretary of State accepted all of the recommendations in the
East Africa ARB. And now here we are, 14 years later, and some
of those same recommendations have been repeated by the
Benghazi ARB.
And so we seem to have a State Department that has a long
history of repeat recommendations. But I think there's a
significant difference between recommendations and
implementation. And I would like to talk about how that happens
and how that has happened.
In fact, the board in East Africa urged the Secretary of
State to, quote, ``take a personal and active role in carrying
out the responsibility of ensuring the security of the U.S.
diplomatic personnel abroad,'' and it was essential to convey
to the entire Department that security is one of its highest
priorities.
Assistant Secretary Starr, are you familiar with the East
Africa recommendations?
Mr. Starr. Not every specific recommendation, but with the
report, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. And do you agree with the report?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mrs. Brooks. Are you aware that, after the Benghazi ARB,
then-Secretary gave her personal assurance, as well, that she
put overall responsibility for implementing all of the ARB
recommendations in the hands of the Deputy Secretary? Are you
familiar with that?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am.
Mrs. Brooks. And that was, in fact, in her letter in
December of 2012 to, at the time, the Honorable John Kerry,
chairman of Foreign Relations. She indicated that the Deputy
Secretary would be overseeing the implementation of the ARB.
Are you familiar with her letter?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And, then, are you familiar with the fact
that when Secretary Kerry became the Secretary of State, he
initially kept it at the Deputy Secretary level? Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And could you please speak into the mic?
Thank you.
Mr. Starr. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. Today, however, overall responsibility for
oversight and implementation of all of the recommendations is
with an office known as Management Policy, Rightsizing, and
Innovation--is that correct?--1 of 11 separate offices that
reports to the Under Secretary of Management.
Mr. Starr. MPRI is tracking. They are not necessarily
responsible for implementing, but they are doing the job of
tracking the implementation, yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And it is their job.
And so I would like to just point out for those who might
not be familiar--and you, too, are an Assistant Secretary
reporting to the Under Secretary of Management. Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. And so, with respect--and you say that they
are tracking the implementation. However, that is the office
that is day-in and day-out going in and trying to ensure that
all of those recommendations are being followed. Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. One office, yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And so, at this point, the ARB
recommendations, it's really not at the Secretary of State
level; it's not at the Deputy Secretary of State level, the
second level; it's not with an Under Secretary; but the
tracking is happening at the fourth tier. Is that correct? The
tracking and making sure that day-in and day-out--it's at the
fourth tier.
Mr. Starr. The tracking is going on at MPRI, but I can
also give you further information about how it is, in fact,
being closely looked at by the Deputy Secretary herself.
Mrs. Brooks. And the Deputy Secretary--are you familiar
with the Inspector General's report, sir?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am.
Mrs. Brooks. And the Inspector General who issued the
report in 2014 also believed that at the highest levels in the
Department, those are the individuals that must be personally
responsible for overseeing those recommendations. Isn't that
correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it is.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in fact, indicated in the IG report that
that's how lasting change and cultural change would happen, is
if implementation were at the highest levels of the Department.
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is true.
Mrs. Brooks. I would like to ask Mr. Keil, if I might,
your Best Practices Panel indicated that where a security
function is placed in a department is a statement of how that
organization values security and its personnel.
Do you recall that finding, Mr. Keil?
Mr. Keil. Yes, ma'am, very well.
Mrs. Brooks. And can you please explain, with respect to
recommendation number 1, which has not been implemented by the
Department, can you please talk about the importance of that
recommendation of elevating the importance, actually, of Mr.
Starr's position, to a higher level? So can you please talk
about the importance of that recommendation and what you
understand as to why the Department is not elevating the
importance of security within the organization at the current
time?
Mr. Keil. As we looked at other government agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, it
became very clear that the placement of the chief security
officer with responsibility for the safety of the programs and
the people--it clearly depends on where it is placed within the
organization. And especially at the Department of State, where
visuals, because of the culture of the Department of State, are
so crucially important, the placement of that position was
crucially important.
Mr. Starr previously served up at the United Nations in
charge of their Department of Safety and Security. In that
organization, he was an Under Secretary. That position was an
Under Secretary. The United Nations recognized that important--
in that diplomatic world, where you see things really matters.
And, ma'am, if you would actually look at our
recommendation number 40, we recommended that the Secretary
should establish a comprehensive change management strategy
throughout the Department that is led by the Deputy Secretary
for Management and Resources. So those two things clearly come
together and are crucially important.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in your view, the Best Practices Panel,
when they looked at the organization of the Department, it was
clearly your view that overall responsibility for security from
a visual standpoint, which is important in large organizations,
was too low on the org chart. Is that right?
Mr. Keil. From a visual standpoint and also from an
operational standpoint. I remember, on the first day, when we
brought out the org chart as part of our panel, Mr. Sullivan
was trying to find the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and I had
to keep pointing him further and further down the org chart
until he identified it.
Mrs. Brooks. And while it might not just be where it's
placed on the org chart visually, it has to do with command and
control, does it not?
Mr. Keil. Exactly. Command and control and informed
decisionmaking.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in fact, when you are a lower level on an
organization chart, that requires you to then move up within
the organization to get approval for things that you would like
to do. Is that correct?
Mr. Keil. Yes, of course.
Mrs. Brooks. I'd like to just briefly wrap up with Mr.
Sullivan.
And with respect to--you've led a large Federal agency, the
Secret Service. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. And you understand the span of control. And
so, with respect to the need to lead lasting cultural change in
an organization, which is what I believe this panel is going to
try to lead and to do, where does that need to start?
Mr. Sullivan. I think it needs to start at the top.
Mrs. Brooks. And when you start at the top, which would be
the Secretary of State, if you want to emphasize within your
entire organization the importance--and in this place--of
security, the Deputy Secretary or the Under Secretary, which
are considered principals in a department--is that correct? And
that's the highest levels?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Brooks. And with respect--do you have any other
comments you would like to make with respect to Mr. Keil's
assessment?
Mr. Sullivan. No, I'd just--you know, when we look at, you
know, management, that is a very large and very complex
directorate. And it has some very important and critical
functions going on there, but it's personnel, it's budget
procurement. I believe there may be about 20 or 21 Assistant
Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries reporting up to
that Under Secretary.
And, for us, quite frankly, this was not about an upgrade
in title. I mean, quite frankly, from my perspective, I don't
really care what the title is. I just think there needs to be a
direct report up to the--you know, in my former position--and I
may be biased--you know, I reported directly to the Secretary.
We had the Deputy Secretary of the FBI was on our panel, and
the FBI Director reported to the Attorney General.
We just believe that that's the way that this should be
structured. We think, internally and externally, it tells
people, you know, where security is thought to be and the
importance of security. But, again, this was not about an
upgrade in title. This was just about clarity of who's in
charge of security.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. The gentlelady from Indiana yields back.
The chair will now recognize the gentleman from Washington,
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We've talked a lot about process--sort of, who's in charge,
how can we--I always think one of the first recommendations
when everything goes wrong is go back and review who was in
charge, how we can change the process, how can we sort of move
around who was and who should be responsible. But what I really
want to focus on is what should be done, regardless of who it
is, who's in charge of it.
The challenge I see--and as I've traveled around the world
to various different posts, I'm just awed and amazed at the
risks that people who serve in the State Department take every
day. I went to a consulate we have up in Peshawar in Pakistan,
and just listening to the personnel there talk about going back
and forth to work every day, all the security that's involved.
We are in a lot of dangerous places throughout the world.
And most of the people in the State Department that I talk to
take a certain amount of pride in that. That's their job; they
go into tough places to make sure that American interests are
respected and watched over.
But the question becomes how do you protect them? So we've
got the Africa recommendations and these recommendations. What
have we learned about what you can specifically do, forgetting
for the moment of who's in charge of doing it, to enhance
security at high-risk posts?
And I guess it'd be a two-piece, and I'll start with Mr.
Starr. How do you identify the high-risk posts, first of all?
And then, second of all, once you identify one, what do you do?
How do you then try to enhance security and make sure that
people are protected?
And if you could tie that back into what played out in
Benghazi. I don't think there's any question that people view
that as a high-risk post. What should have happened as a result
of that identification that didn't? And then the broader
question about high-risk posts and how you approach them, now
and before.
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
We have always rank-ordered our posts according to threat.
We look at the threat of terrorism; we look at the threat of
civil disorder. This is done in a process every single year
with a tremendous amount of input from the post itself, from
the emergency action committee on the post, which has members
from all the different agencies that are represented. We rank-
order these posts and give them ratings for terrorism, for
civil disorder, for things like crime, counterintelligence,
human intelligence, technical intelligence----
Mr. Smith. And then the question, the real key question
there is, then what? Okay, once you identify them, how do you
try to better protect them?
Mr. Starr. We look at these posts, and for years we have
worked through something called the Overseas Security Policy
Board to craft policies, security policies, and standards--
physical security standards, technical security standards,
procedural security standards--on what we can do at these posts
at these different threat levels.
Once we decide and we see that a post is in our highest
threat--let's say a critical threat category, we are going to
devote more RSOs. We are going to look at, what's the size of
the Marine detachment? Does it need to be larger?
In terms of our posts in the physical security, that plays
a huge role in when we decide which posts we want to rebuild
under the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program. And we
prioritize replacing the most vulnerable posts with newer, much
more robust, much safer facilities that we build with, you
know, funding from Congress and the Overseas Office of
Buildings.
We look at the threat, and we make determinations--now, in
the aftermath of Benghazi, we have categorized our 30 highest-
threat, highest-risk posts. We sent out teams specifically to
those posts, and in addition to just making sure that they meet
the security standards, are there things that we need to do in
addition to the security standards that make sense? These were
multi-agency teams that we sent out.
We continue to look at the threat information from every
post around the world that we get every single morning. We
start at 8 a.m. every morning looking at the threat information
that we get. But one of the critical lessons we learned from
Benghazi is that there are many times--and we know this from
times past--that we don't get specific threat information
before an attack. If we did, we would thwart the attack.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Starr. And, you know, Congresswoman Brooks talked about
how many attacks that we have suffered over the years. That's
our document that we put out to ensure that people know what
the environment is.
We look at the threats, and then we determine, what do we
have to do? We have been practicing risk management for years.
In many cases, we take our dependents out of posts, or we may
downsize the post, or in critical places we may actually close
the post for a certain amount of days or we may evacuate the
post. There are times when we go to the U.S. military and ask
Department of Defense to augment our protection on the ground.
In Sana'a and in Tripoli, we had nearly 100 Marines with us.
So, on a daily basis, we look at exactly what's happening
at our posts overseas, try to make sure that we are aware of
whatever intelligence is out there, try to make sure that we
are fully aware of the larger instability question, ``What does
that mean to us?'', and put the right resources in the right
place and take the proper steps.
Mr. Smith. So as a result of the ARB, on this specific
instance, what do you think you learned specifically about
Benghazi? What should have been done there that wasn't?
And, actually, let me ask Mr. Sullivan that question.
Mr. Sullivan. You know, sir, our focus was not to evaluate
what happened in Benghazi. Our focus was to, you know, come up
with best practices. During the course of that, we did become
aware of certain things that did happen in Benghazi. This may
be a way of answering your question.
When we met with the Assistant Secretary--and we met as a
panel--we quickly determined that we were going to take our
approach from a tactical approach to a more strategic approach.
We recognized that, you know, they didn't need us to tell them
what type of weapons to get, what type of fire equipment to
get, that they needed--we needed to approach this from a
strategic perspective.
I think one of the things you see in any type of a
situation where things go bad is communication. And I think
this comes down to communication. And, you know, we made
recommendations under planning and logistics; we made four
different recommendations there. And I believe for any type of
a trip, whether it be to Benghazi or wherever you go, there has
to be a cohesive plan, there has to be logistics, you have to
do a very good job of risk management.
Obviously, there was a communication breakdown for that
visit to Benghazi. I think it was mentioned earlier that there
were numerous tripwires there. I think in that spring, starting
maybe in March of 2012 and going up until July or August of
2012, there were numerous incidents that were occurring in
Benghazi. I think one embassy moved out; the British moved out
of Benghazi. That needed to be communicated. That needed to be
discussed. They needed to talk about, you know, what were the
mitigating measures they were going to take to protect our
people at that mission.
And, again, I think that, unfortunately, four people paid
the price because that communication didn't occur and that
planning and logistics, quite frankly, didn't happen the way we
are recommending it should occur and which I have every
confidence that Assistant Secretary Starr and his staff are
working on right now.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Keil, did you want to add something on that?
Mr. Keil. I think, Congressman, the first question is not
about how many people you send, how many walls you build, and
how high they are. The first question has to be--and that's
where we change from a tactical approach on our panel to a
strategic approach on our panel. The first question has to be,
do we need to be there? Do we need to be in Benghazi? Do we
need to be in Peshawar?
And the Department lacks a risk management process to make
those informed decisions. Do we need to be in those places? Do
the risks--are the risks less than the national security
priorities or the policy gains? The Department does not have
that process to determine do we need to be there and do we need
to stay.
And that's the center and the heart of our report. The
Department needs that process. Not just give them more people,
not just give them more guns, not just build the walls higher.
Do we need to be there? And if the national security priorities
outweigh the risks, fine, then go. There's nothing wrong with
that. We are not saying don't go. But you need that risk
management process, which the Department lacks, to make those
determinations.
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
Mr. Starr. Congressman, could I just--my good friend Todd
Keil here--could I just say perhaps it should be past tense,
``lacked'' as opposed to ``lacks''? This is one of the things
that we have concentrated on most over the past 2 years. It is
the heart of the Vital Presence Validation Process.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. And talk about that because Chairman Gowdy
talked at the outset about the necessity of this panel. There
is no question that there was a necessity to look at what
happened in Benghazi and learn from it. But we have done that
with a number of different reports, and as you point out, we
have made this change now.
So what is different about that communications level as a
result of the ARB and some of the other studies that we have
done?
Mr. Starr. Sir, the biggest single change that I would
really like to point out is the Department's acceptance--not
just acceptance but embracing this concept that, first and
foremost, as Todd just alluded to, Mr. Keil just alluded to, we
need to ask the question, why are we in the most dangerous
places?
Mr. Smith. Right.
Mr. Starr. And the 30 places that we identified as the
highest-threat, highest-risk, that's exactly what we are doing,
going through every single one of those 30 and doing this Vital
Presence Validation Process.
The first step is, what is our national interest for being
there? Why should we run these high risks that we have already
identified as a high-threat, high-risk post? And if the answer
comes out that the risks don't outweigh why, you know, we
should be there, the national interest, then we are going to
make decisions that either we have to put additional security
in or we are going to have to withdraw our presence.
Mr. Smith. And we have actually, in the last year, pulled
out of posts as a result of that process, correct?
Mr. Starr. Not as a result of that process. That's the
longer strategic process. But the risk management process and
the principles of it, yes, exactly so. We have pulled out or
closed posts because of these things.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Washington.
The chair would now recognize the gentleman from Kansas,
Mr. Pompeo.
Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Starr, you said in your just recent testimony that
there was no immediate tactical warning--that's the same thing
that the ARB found--about the incident before Benghazi. Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. That's my understanding, yes.
Mr. Pompeo. And it is also the case that, in your
experience, that's often not the case, that there's an
immediate tactical warning?
Mr. Starr. That is very true, sir.
Mr. Pompeo. And so I want to talk about that intelligence.
You, in your opening statement, didn't mention anything related
to findings 21 and 22 that had to do with intelligence. In
fact, none of these matter, VP2 is not an important fact if you
don't have the threat analysis right. Ranking them, all of the
various things you've talked about are meaningless if you don't
have the threat analysis correct--that is, if you don't have
the right intelligence and have it in the right place.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. But I would just add that it is not
just the intelligence. You also have to look at the entire
situation in the country. It's analysis and intelligence.
Mr. Pompeo. Yes, of course. I would agree with that, as
well. Indeed, there were some 20 incidents that were referred
to by Mr. Sullivan a bit ago in and around from March of 2012
up and through the death of the four Americans where there was
an incredibly deteriorating situation in and around Benghazi.
Would you agree with that, as well?
Mr. Starr. The situation was deteriorating.
Mr. Pompeo. And finding number 21 said careful attention
should be paid to that kind of thing, when the situation
deteriorates. In your July 14th fact sheet, your only response
to that particular finding was that the Department has
addressed this recommendation.
Can you tell me what that is, what it is you've done to
address this recommendation?
Mr. Starr. I can discuss part of it in open session, sir.
As I alluded to earlier, literally, we start every morning
at 8 a.m., looking at every bit of threat intelligence and
threats that come in from a wide variety of sources, not just
the intelligence community but from our posts and the
reporting.
Beyond that, we bring in personnel from the regional
bureaus, the political officers and others that are with us,
that we are not just looking at the threat intelligence.
Because, as you pointed out and as we well know, in many cases,
we don't pick up the threat before an attack.
Mr. Pompeo. I don't want to interrupt, but if you can tell
me if this is different pre-Benghazi as opposed to post-
Benghazi, this process, I'd appreciate that as you go through.
Mr. Starr. This is different, sir. We are incorporating
the regional bureaus with us. We are looking at the political
reporting in addition to the intelligence reporting.
We are looking at sources that we get from private
companies, from NGOs in the area, the entire question of
instability, what is the overall threat profile, and I would
say that a much better job of looking at the entirety of the
threat situation as opposed to just whether or not we know
whether there's a specific threat against us.
Mr. Pompeo. And after all the incidents in the previous
years that have been recounted so eloquently this morning, you
weren't doing that before the incidents of September 11, 2012,
or before the ARB's findings? Is that right? The State
Department wasn't doing that? Is that what I understand from
your testimony?
Mr. Starr. I think we're doing it better than we were
before.
Mr. Pompeo. And can you tell me if any of these changes
would have made an impact on the lives of those four Americans
in Benghazi, had we been doing those before that date?
Mr. Starr. Hard for me to say, sir. I was at the United
Nations at that time. I can tell you that, at the U.N., when I
was the Under Secretary General, we were aware of the
deteriorating security situation in Benghazi. On the date of
the attack, September 11, 2012, I still had U.N. personnel in
Benghazi as well.
Mr. Pompeo. Let me change topics just a little bit.
One of the findings of the Best Practices Panel that now
dates just a bit over a year ago was that the State Department
had not interviewed the DS agents who survived the attack at
the Benghazi Special Mission Compound as of that date.
Is that still the case?
Mr. Starr. The agents were interviewed by the FBI. The
agents were interviewed by Diplomatic Security.
Mr. Pompeo. So the State Department now--so was the panel
incorrect or did you conduct these interviews after the panel's
report--the independent panel's report?
Mr. Starr. The FBI 302s and the interviews were done prior
to the Best Practices Panel. We had discussed tactics with the
agents, but we were not--we had not fully debriefed them on the
incident because we had the FBI 302s.
Mr. Pompeo. It may have been important to know what the
folks on the ground saw that night. Right? In order to
implement the security considerations, it would be very
important to know what those people saw?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pompeo. The same for the folks who were their TDY who
weren't there that night but had been there previously.
Has the Department of State interviewed all of those
persons at this point?
Mr. Starr. Has the Department of State--all of the--I
hesitate to say ``all.'' We have interviewed a number of people
that we thought relevant to the attack.
Mr. Pompeo. When those interviews were conducted by the
Department of State, were they conducted individually or in
groups?
When the interviews were conducted by the Department of
State, were they conducted individually or were they group
interviews?
Mr. Starr. Individually.
Mr. Pompeo. All right. So I asked that question because,
you know, the ARB conducted group interviews. And I've seen
that dynamic. I was in business for 16 years before this. When
the boss is sitting around, the underling isn't often as candid
as they might be in a situation where they were there
independently.
So as we look at the ARB's findings in trying to evaluate
if they are sufficient for you to do what you need to do, that
is, to implement them, it's important to know the basis for
what the ARB did as well. And I appreciate that.
So these interviews were conducted by the Department of
State individually?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pompeo. Thank you.
Mr. Keil, Mr. Cummings referenced the State Department's
Inspector General's report. One of the things that it said is--
it indicated that at least two Secretaries of State have asked
the question about whether the ARB was a sufficient process,
that is, is it capable of handling investigations of the
complexity of the kind that we see here.
Do you think that the ARB itself is sufficient to make this
transition from facts known about an incident to conducting
good security policy moving forward?
Mr. Keil. I think there are limitations in the law that
establishes the ARB and it--especially when you're talking
about a complex catastrophic incident, they have significant
limitations in what they can and can't do. So it clearly
impacts their effectiveness.
Mr. Pompeo. And, Mr. Starr, back to you, finding 23 goes
to some of those limitations. It goes to the ARB's capacity and
its authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of
unsatisfactory leadership. It indicates that you all are
prepared to help us change the statutory authority of the ARB
so that they can do that.
Are you prepared to testify today that you'll help us
continue to make sure that the ARB does, in fact, have the
ability to make sure that the leaders of organizations are held
accountable for any errors that they may have made?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. And it's my understanding that we
have been looking at this and working with the Congress since
December of--sorry--January of 2013 on this.
May I also just say that one of the points that I think is
important to make is that, while the ARB in several cases may
not have the expertise to look at everything, the fact that the
ARB recommended that we consider putting together a Best
Practices Panel that could then delve further into the
specifics I think proves that the ARB can make recommendations
that can go beyond what they can do and look even further.
I think that's a very good example of the fact that, while
the ARB may not have the exact expertise that you're talking
about, recommendations can be made that bring in other experts
to do these things.
Mr. Pompeo. I appreciate that.
And so you think it's important that the ARB have the
capacity to at least recommend some type of disciplinary action
against senior leaders in various agencies that they're
reviewing?
Mr. Starr. The ARB already has the ability to recommend
disciplinary action if they find a breach of duty. I think what
we're looking at now is whether or not--if they find a lack of
leadership. I would support that as well.
Mr. Pompeo. Right. Right. Thank you. That's exactly what I
was asking.
I have a handful of questions that go to the scope of the
ARB. Mr. Starr, I know you weren't on that--none of you were--
but I want to make sure we understand precisely what's there.
Do you know if the ARB had the opportunity to interview the
CIA employees and contractors who were on the ground that night
who might know something about the security at the SMC as well
as the other facilities in Benghazi that evening?
Mr. Starr. I do not know the answer to that, sir.
Mr. Pompeo. Do you know if they have had the opportunity
to interview the DIA people who might have known something
about the intelligence and the security situation on the ground
that night?
Mr. Starr. I'm sorry, sir. I do not know the answer to
that.
Mr. Pompeo. Great.
I won't go through the rest. There's a handful more
questions about what I think the scope of the ARB has in its
information. I think they're important.
I also wondered if you had all had a chance to review any
of the intelligence that had been gathered as a result of the
capture of Abu Khattala, who would know a fair thing about what
was going on that night on the ground as well.
And so I'm interested in whether you all have had the
chance to incorporate that into your ideas about implementing
the ARB.
Mr. Starr. We are aware of the debriefings. We're looking
at some of the debriefing material that is relevant to us, and
we are taking the proper steps based on what we find.
Mr. Pompeo. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. Chair would now recognize the gentleman
from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I thank you very much.
Mr. Starr, I want to pick up where Mrs. Brooks left off.
How is the Department tracking its compliance with the
Benghazi ARB recommendations? Can you tell me briefly.
Mr. Starr. Mrs. Brooks is correct that the MPRI office is
the one that is actually doing the tracking as we go through
these.
But I can tell you that I have had many meetings with the
Deputy Secretary, myself, anyone that has anything to do with
the response of a particular ARB answer or Best Practices Panel
answer or the management panel answer where we have sat with
the Deputy Secretary and literally gone through every single
one of the recommendations: Where are we? How have we answered
it? What is the response? How far along in implementation are
we?
We have these meetings about every other month. She's out
at the moment. But, literally, she has been on top of this and
tracking it since the beginning.
Mr. Cummings. And so you said that there were seven ARB
recommendations that have not been completed. Is that right? Is
that what you said?
Mr. Starr. We are still in progress or nearing completion
on seven of them, but they're not totally fulfilled.
Mr. Cummings. And do you have a timeline on those?
Mr. Starr. Some of those, sir, are what I would refer to
as evergreen recommendations. And I'll give you an example. One
of the recommendations was for better language training for the
Diplomatic Security agents.
Since that time, we worked with FSI and specifically put
together some courses in Arabic, Urdu and French. We call them
Arabic, Urdu or French alert courses. They're much shorter.
They're specific to training DS agents in the types of language
capabilities that they need in a short period of time.
We have the courses in place, but the reality is it's going
to take me a long time, you know, as I--as agents get ready to
rotate overseas, then put them into the training and then get
them trained. So that's the type of recommendation that's going
to actually be open for a long time.
Mr. Cummings. So--but all of them aren't like that, are
they, of the seven?
Mr. Starr. Many of them are evergreen recommendations.
Mr. Cummings. Well, what I'm trying to get to----
Mr. Starr. Some of them will be closed in 2015.
Mr. Cummings. Yeah. Let me tell you where I'm going with
this.
I've seen over and over again in my 17 years in Congress
that departments will come in, say they're going to do things,
and then they wait. There's no checking up on them. A new
Congress comes in and the next thing you know, it hasn't been
done. We want to be effective and efficient. This is a moment
that we've got to take advantage of.
So can you--of those seven, the things that you know can be
done in a definite amount of time, can you give us a timetable
on those so that we can, at least while we are a committee--can
hold the Department accountable? Is that a reasonable request?
Mr. Starr. I think that's a reasonable request, sir. I'd
rather not do it orally right at this moment, but we can supply
you with the information on where we are on those
recommendations, implementation panel.
I would say, sir, that there is no doubt in my mind that we
are going to implement every one of these recommendations. I
think one of your questions is whether or not we have been
implementing ARB recommendations. One of the exercises we went
through last year was to review every single ARB recommendation
that has been made since 1988.
The office of MPRI, that office that is tracking these--we
sat down with them and went through every recommendation in the
past to make sure that we were doing our best to fulfill those,
and that office is going to track these in the future as well.
I think I--I can understand some hesitancy about whether,
you know, this--if we drag these out, they're not going to get
done. I can assure you, sir, that, while I am there, while
Secretary Kerry is there, we are going to make sure that every
single one of these recommendations is fulfilled.
Mr. Cummings. As I get older, I realize that we're not
going to be here but so long. We are in the places that we're
in for a season, and it may come to an end in any--in all kinds
of ways.
That's why I want you, as I said in my opening, under our
watch. I want some definite timetables so that we can hold
somebody accountable. Other than that, we're going to be going
through--Mr. Keil said it best--we'll be going through this
over and over and over again.
Can you understand what I'm saying?
And so--but you just gave me some more information that I'd
like to add on to your list. If there are crucial things that
we've been looking at, recommendations from 1988 that you are
working on, would you add those, the significant ones--going
back to Mrs. Brooks now--that you haven't been able to complete
that you're working on so that we can have a timetable on that?
I think that the most important thing that we can do coming
out of this--and I promised the father of Tyrone Woods. I
looked him in the eye. And he asked us one question--and, by
the way, every family that we talked to said the same thing:
Make it safer for somebody in the future.
So, Mr. Starr, are you with me? I just want to make sure
you're with me.
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. I am.
Mr. Cummings. All right. So will you come back to us--how
much time do you need to give us what I just asked for?
Mr. Starr. Let me take this back to the Department and let
me work through this. I will try to get you these answers as
fast as possible.
Mr. Cummings. 45 days?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. Very well.
Mr. Chairman, we can talk about this. But, Mr. Chairman, it
may be appropriate later on for us to have a hearing just on
the progress that has been made. And I know that's the
chairman's decision, but I don't--I think we need to make sure
that we stay on top of this.
Mr. Starr, the independent ARB found that the tripwires,
which are security incidents, that are supposed to trigger
reviews and responses were ``too often treated as indicators of
threat rather than essential trigger mechanisms for serious
risk management decisions and actions.''
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence came to a
similar conclusion in its bipartisan report. It said ``There
were tripwires designed to prompt a reduction in personnel or
the suspension of operations at the mission facility in
Benghazi. And although there is evidence that some of them had
been crossed, operations continue with minimal change.''
As a result, the ARB recommended that the State Department
``revise its guidance to post and require key offices to
perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires.'' Is that
right?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And in response to this recommendation, the
State Department set up a ``tripwires committee'' in
Washington.
As I understand it, the purpose of this entity is to review
tripwires when they are triggered to help ensure that post and
the relevant regional bureaus respond quickly to deteriorating
security environments.
Mr. Starr, who is on that committee?
Mr. Starr. Regional bureaus--representatives from regional
bureaus. It's chaired out of the crisis management group out of
the State Department operation center.
I think the biggest single change, sir, is that, in past
years, the tripwires were usually something that the post
itself would look at as part of their emergency action plan and
then, if they'd crossed a tripwire, they would determine what
action needed to be made and then report to us what decisions
they were going to have.
At this point, the major change is that anytime a post
crosses a tripwire, it has to be reported to Washington. At
that point, CMS gathers a group of people that review what
tripwire was crossed. They look at the implications on it, and
we make decisions on what should happen.
Now, in many cases, the post may have already made the
decision, but this is a new review that goes on back on the
Washington level as well and with a much greater degree of
oversight and a much greater degree on emphasis on action if a
tripwire is crossed.
Mr. Cummings. Can you give me an example that's actually
happened with regard to that, what you just said.
Mr. Starr. Sir, I would say that tripwires are not just
security concerns, but I'll try to concentrate on a security
concern.
The activities in Kiev and Ukraine recently, at the
beginning of those activities, when it was clearly unsure what
was happening and we had civil disorder in the city, the post
reported that quite a few tripwires had been crossed for
instability and for insecurity.
Decisions were made at that point, and we made a decision
that we were moving our dependents and nonessential personnel
out of Kiev. We moved them out until the situation had ceased,
had rectified itself.
We looked at what we call reverse tripwires. Was the
situation really changed and what had changed? And then we made
the decision--we ultimately made the decision to return the
families in about 2 weeks after the situation in the middle of
town that could have affected our personnel was resolved.
Mr. Cummings. I look forward to receiving the information
that we requested.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from Maryland.
The chair will now recognize the gentleman from Georgia,
Mr. Westmoreland.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.
Mr. Starr, the ARB found that--systematic failure in the
security posture in Benghazi and it was inadequate for the
special mission compound.
And just a little side note here. 3 days after the attack,
we had been calling at the Embassy. We were told that it was a
temporary mission facility. And now it's being called the
special mission compound.
Was there any reason for the terminology continuing to
evolve into something?
Mr. Starr. I think, sir, as it was neither an embassy nor
a consulate nor a consular agency, there was just some----
Mr. Westmoreland. Do you call it a temporary mission
facility or do you call----
Mr. Starr. I think the term of "temporary mission
facility" is probably the right definition.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. So--all right.
Anyway, they had hired the Blue Mountain, I believe, is
that correct, to do the screening of any visitors and the
perimeter protection?
Mr. Starr. My understanding from the ARB and other reports
was that it was a contract with the Blue Mountain security
company for Libyan individuals and agreements with--I think it
was the 17th militia as well.
Mr. Westmoreland. That was the host country security, was
the 17th Brigade?
Mr. Starr. Well, in the absence of a practical and real
host country security, I think that was the best that they
could do.
Mr. Westmoreland. But the Blue Mountain was unarmed. Is
that correct?
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Mr. Westmoreland. Who's responsible for vetting these
contractors like Blue Mountain that's going to be used at some
of these facilities?
Mr. Starr. In terms of--vetting in terms of a contract and
performance and those types of things?
Mr. Westmoreland. Yeah. Uh-huh.
Mr. Starr. Normally, sir, it's--we have an open competition
process. How we contract for guard services is a function that
has been given to us with very specific requirements from
Congress.
It's open competition, and the--you know, whoever can bid
on it and meet the requirements does it. I think, in
contingency-like situations like we were finding in Benghazi,
there was probably, probably, very little competition, very
little----
Mr. Westmoreland. So was this the lowest priced bidder?
Mr. Starr. That, sir--I'm not there at the time. I can't
really tell you. I don't----
Mr. Westmoreland. Are you aware that two contracts that
these people had in Tripoli were canceled and that the RSO at
the temporary mission facility had recommended that they not be
used?
Mr. Starr. I have read reports of that, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. You were once an RSO. Correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. In your distinguished career, do you
ever remember recommending that a service not be used that you
were familiar with anywhere and then them being hired over your
protest or your recommendation?
Mr. Starr. Not in my experience, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. But you would have at some point
recommended somebody or maybe not recommended anybody? I mean,
was it your job to look at the performance of these people that
you were aware of and report it?
Mr. Starr. As an RSO, when we have guard contracts, if we
find that our contractor is not performing, we have a variety
of ways. We can deduct money or we can ultimately find that
they are not performing.
And if they're found to be lacking and can't perform the
contract, they can be terminated, they can be barred. They can
actually be barred if that, you know, goes that far.
Mr. Westmoreland. All right. You had mentioned the 17th--
February 17th, the Martyrs' Brigade, I believe is what it was
called, and we have been told that that was basically the host
company security. Is that true or not?
Mr. Starr. I would hesitate to call that host country
security, sir. I think, at best, it probably had some control
in that area of the city, but this is based on what I've read
from the reports.
Mr. Westmoreland. Is there an individual that would be at
the post that would be responsible for ensuring that the 17th
Brigade was responsible and dependable?
Mr. Starr. Sir, I wasn't there at the time. As a former
RSO, I can probably tell you that there were likely limited
choices.
And one of the things that an RSO would do at that point,
if he was faced with limited choices, was try to train them as
best he could to try to make the best of whatever situation he
was handed.
Mr. Westmoreland. He would have to train the February
brigade or----
Mr. Starr. If he found that they were not up to the levels
that he wanted, he would engage and assist in the training and
making sure that they understood the guard orders and making
sure that they had the capabilities that were necessary.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Now, let's say that--and they were
hired to--in case there was an attack inside the compound to
respond.
Who would have the contact information? And who would've
been responsible on the post for contacting this protective
brigade of martyrs?
Mr. Starr. There were--as I read the reports, sir--again,
I was not here at the time--there were personnel on the
compound. They had telephone communication with their own
groups. The agent that was in the----
Mr. Westmoreland. With their own groups?
Mr. Starr. With other personnel in the group. With other
personnel.
And there was communication on the part of the ARSO, who
was in the operations center, who was making phone calls, and
there were phone calls that were being made from the annex.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Let's go to the tripwires that Mr.
Cummings was talking about.
The Foreign Affairs handbook defines tripwires as events
that activate, initiate or set in motion post plans to prevent
harm to the post, its personnel, the U.S. citizen community or
other U.S. national interests. The handbook also notes that,
when a tripwire then occurs, it requires that an action be
taken.
Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. It's my understanding that the tripwires
are preplanned, preapproved measures that should be taken in
light of a security-related incident or threat. Is that true?
Mr. Starr. That is true, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Has the State Department emphasized to
the post the purpose of having tripwires?
Mr. Starr. Has the State Department?
Mr. Westmoreland. Having tripwires.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Westmoreland. When a tripwire is breached, meaning
something bad has happened, that breach is the trigger to take
specific action; is it not?
Mr. Starr. At a minimum, it is a--it is a warning that the
post must review what has occurred and then determine whether
action needs to be taken, at a minimum.
Mr. Westmoreland. Take action rather than just requiring
that they sit around and reevaluate the situation?
Mr. Starr. Well, sir, tripwires are written in advance of
activities. We try to cover a wide variety of situations that
could occur. Predicting the future and exactly what your
actions are going to be is very difficult.
I think the purpose of tripwires really is to indicate
that, ``Wait. Something has just happened. This could be
significant. We need to consider whether or not we need to take
action in this case.''
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.
Mr. Starr. As I said previously, it was normally a post
activity. Now, once a tripped wire is tripped, it is looked at
both by the post and by the various sections in Washington.
Mr. Westmoreland. Would you consider a hole being blown in
the perimeter wall of the temporary mission facility--would you
consider that a tripwire?
Mr. Starr. I'd certainly say that's a good indicator, sir.
Probably crossed the tripwire, at that.
Mr. Westmoreland. And that event would have probably--
should have caused some action or discussion. Correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Would an attack on another diplomat's
coming into Benghazi that caused that country to pull out--
would that have been a tripwire?
Mr. Starr. I assume you're referring to the attack on the
British Ambassador, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. I am.
Mr. Starr. That's another tripwire, sir. Yes.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.
Mr. Starr. I certainly think that's an indication of
security problems and instability.
Mr. Westmoreland. And so those were two tripwires that you
would consider significant; would you not?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. And what was done with the security
after those two tripwires were tripped?
Mr. Starr. Sir, as I said, I was not here at that time. I
was not in Diplomatic Security.
Mr. Westmoreland. Well, you've read reports.
Mr. Starr. I've read the reports----
Mr. Westmoreland. Yes.
Mr. Starr [continued]. And I'm aware that the RSOs were
increasing physical security. They were engaged in building
safe havens inside the facility. They had engaged in training
with the guards, training routines. They had run drills with
the annex.
I think they were--from what I've read, they were doing the
types of things that an RSO would do when he sees the situation
beginning to deteriorate.
Mr. Westmoreland. Well, thank you for your testimony.
Thank all of you for being here.
And let's hope we can get some results out of this tragic
event.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Georgia.
The chair will now recognize the gentleman from California,
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you.
At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
conducting the hearing today and for the way that you have
worked with us to bring together witnesses and follow up on ARB
recommendations. I greatly appreciate it.
I want to ask you gentlemen something that cuts in a bit of
a different direction than the questions you've had thus far,
and that is--I serve also on the Appropriations Subcommittee on
State and Foreign Operations, and I have an opportunity to meet
with a lot of Foreign Service officers both here in Washington
and around the world.
Many of them have described to me what they consider the
``Benghazi effect'' on their jobs. And, by that, they refer to
such a heightened concern about security that many of them feel
they cannot fulfill their mission anymore, that they are
confined to a bunker, that they're not allowed to undertake
things they think are necessary to their job responsibilities.
And I think this sentiment was best expressed in June by
Vice President of the American Foreign Service Association,
Matthew Asada, who wrote, ``Does our collective response to
Benghazi threaten to make the Foreign Service less
knowledgeable about the world, less effective on the ground
and, ultimately, less influential with the host country and the
U.S. government itself? ''
That's a question that Ambassador Stevens might have asked.
And I wonder if you could share your thoughts on it. As we
implement the recommendations of the ARB and of your panel, how
do we make sure that we're not preventing our people from doing
their job?
We all acknowledge this is a dangerous thing. And, as my
colleague pointed out, our facilities have been attacked
literally hundreds of times over the last couple decades. It's
happened in the past. It's going to happen again. We want to
protect our people as best we can, but we want them to be
effective. That's why they're there.
So if you each could share briefly your thoughts on: Are we
striking the right balance or has the ``Benghazi effect'' meant
that we are undermining the ability of our people to do their
work?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, you are going to the heart of the
question of risk management and how do we implement risk
management.
I will tell you that, over many years, with the support of
Congress, we've made great strides in building safer and
securer facilities so that an attack on a facility that could
hurt everybody in one attack--we've done great things in terms
of protecting that.
And I think, if you look at the number of attacks against
our facilities and how few have actually been successful--most
have been driven off with casualties by our security personnel
or others only--we've made great strides in that.
But we can't lock people inside embassies. The whole point
of diplomacy is to get out. And I think we need to understand--
and a lot of the processes that we've been talking about are at
our highest-threat, highest-risk posts. We've got the most
security and, in many cases, it will be the most restrictive
for our Foreign Service personnel.
But we've got to have the security programs in place to get
them outside of the wall as well, and that means protective
security details and it means armored vehicles and it means
working with the host country security services.
Every single day that we run motorcades outside of our
embassy in Kabul or in Iraq or in Sana'a or the ones that we
ran in Tripoli, we were taking risks.
But every single day we were judging what that risk was
versus the need to get out and making sure that we could
balance those risks and that we were not running those
motorcades or getting our people out for not very good reasons.
They had to be very important reasons.
In lower-threat-level posts, we're operating almost
normally around the world. We have physical security at our
post, but our people get out every single day.
That's the work of diplomacy: Talking with people,
understanding the country, representing the United States, and
bringing information back. And you don't do that without
talking to people.
So I think all the efforts that we've made in terms of
recognizing what are our highest-threat, highest-risk posts,
doing risk management and making sure that we're getting the
people out when we can, but understanding that, if too many
people get injured or it's too dangerous we can't operate or,
if we're negligent or we're not taking the threat seriously
enough, we won't be there either.
We'll close that post if we get too many people killed or
too many people injured or the threat is too high. Those are
the types of things that we need to weigh every single day, and
we do.
I can understand the frustration of Foreign Service
officers at our highest-threat-level posts. No, sir. They
cannot live on the open economy. They cannot just go to a
coffee shop. But we are still, even in the highest-threat
locations, getting them to the meetings that they need to get
to.
Mr. Schiff. But I don't think that's the issue for them,
as much as they would like to be accompanied by spouses and go
to a local coffee shop.
What they've expressed to me is not that, which they
understand, but that they can't undertake the meetings they
want in the places they need to go to have those meetings and
have the contacts they need to be able to gather the
information for our government, to be able to convey the U.S.
position to people. They can't do their job because they're
confined by a hyperconservative point-of-view perspective back
in Washington.
And do you get that feedback? And are there any situations
where you feel the pressure has been such--to be so risk-
avoidant--that we're not allowing our people to do their job?
Mr. Starr. I think, in the immediate aftermath after
Benghazi, there is a deep appreciation of that attack and we
may have--the pendulum may have swung the other way for a
while.
I think today, with the systems that we have put in place,
with the risk management that we are doing every day, with
things like VPVP, the additional resources that you're giving
us, I would not agree with that statement, sir.
I think we need to take certain precautions, and we do. But
I talked with Ambassador Deb Jones when we were still in
Tripoli. I talked with the Ambassador in Sana'a about whether
we're getting out enough and doing the things that we're doing.
And they're saying, yes, we are, and it's the right balance.
Mr. Schiff. Gentlemen, let me ask a different question
because I have very limited time.
One of the problems we had in Benghazi was an overreliance
on the willingness, ability, or loyalty of the local militias
to provide security.
Are there any places around the world today where you feel
we're continuing to place an overreliance on local militias for
security of our facilities?
Mr. Sullivan. You know, that was something that, you know,
we talked an awful lot about, Congressman. The fact that--you
know, when you go into a situation like that, you have to be
able to evaluate the will and the capability of a particular
guard force.
And I think, no matter where you go in the world, you're
going to always have to come up with that evaluation. And if
you don't have that will and you don't have that capability, no
amount of money you're going to pay in that contract is going
to resolve that.
And that's why, again, it goes back to risk management. If
you don't have those capabilities locally, you know, you have
to go and bring them in yourself. And I can't speak to where
they aren't--you know, who has them and who doesn't have them
where--in the world.
But I really do think, when you look at the reaction of
that guard force, you know, leading up to that, those tripwires
that were spotted there, I mean, that was a real concern. And,
again, I just go back to there wasn't the will--there might
have been the will, but there just was not the capability.
Mr. Schiff. Mr. Keil, on either question.
Mr. Keil. Well, I think, first of all, sir, one of our
recommendations--well, to start with, as Mr. Sullivan pointed
out in his opening statement, when we first started with our
panel, we thought we were going to look at these tactical
issues of building bunkers and building higher walls.
We quickly realized that wasn't the answer because that
doesn't facilitate diplomacy, and we moved to the strategic and
looked at the Department in overseas posts and risk management.
We asked Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of mission and Foreign
Service officers as we traveled overseas, ``Tell us about the
State Department's risk management process.'' Without
exception, each one said there is none and they make it up.
And, sadly, I think, to this day, while they may be making
progress, that's still a significant concern.
Risk management process--as you indicated, sir, the Foreign
Service is a dangerous business. We have to be out there. We
have to do these things that are national security priorities,
but we have to do it under a risk management process that's
effective and sustainable and transparent.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from California.
The chair will now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Keil, how many years of experience do you
have in the security field?
Mr. Keil. Approximately 30, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And how many years did you serve in the State
Department at that same area?
Mr. Keil. Almost 23.
Mr. Jordan. Did you get good evaluations? High reviews?
Strong reviews?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. So good, in fact--I looked at your resume--
that you actually were put on the security detail to protect
the Secretary of State. Is that accurate?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir. Secretary Warren Christopher and
Madeleine Albright.
Mr. Jordan. Protecting two Secretaries of State.
And then your most recent service in the public sector was
as Assistant Secretary at Homeland Security. Is that right?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And that's an appointment from the Obama
Administration?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. Do you trust the agents in the field, Mr.
Keil?
Mr. Keil. I trust them implicitly. They have the best
perspective. They know the ground truth. They know what's going
on.
Mr. Jordan. Under their assessment, their instincts,
they're the guys on the ground putting their lives on the line
just like you did.
So when they make a recommendation to the State Department,
you take that seriously?
Mr. Keil. Yes. I would.
Mr. Jordan. And are you familiar with the fact that the
guys on the ground in Benghazi repeatedly asked for additional
security and were repeatedly denied?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir. From what we saw.
Mr. Jordan. Routinely denied. They said, ``We need''--
``Look, this thing is out of control. We need some more good
guys here'' and repeatedly asked for that and repeatedly
denied.
And it was worse than that, wasn't it, Mr. Keil?
Mr. Keil. Possibly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. Yeah.
Because what they asked for, they not only--they said, ``We
need more,'' but what they had was actually reduced. Is that
accurate?
Mr. Keil. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. We heard about a year and a half ago testimony
from Colonel Wood, who was on the ground in Benghazi, and he
said this: ``We were fighting a losing battle. We couldn't even
keep what we had.''
Now, Mr. Keil, my guess is--you know, we've heard--we're
the United States of America. We've got facilities all over the
globe. And my guess is, at every facility, the security people
would say, ``We could use a few more folks here. We'd like a
few more.'' My guess is that that happens.
But wasn't the situation in Libya and Benghazi somewhat
unique?
Mr. Keil. Sir, when you look at the intelligence, the
threat reporting, the deteriorating security environment, and
the numerous incidents, yeah. I would prioritize Benghazi.
Mr. Jordan. Some have talked about, ``We had IED attacks,
RPG attacks, assassination attempt on the British Ambassador.
This is as bad as it gets.'' And they said, ``We need more good
guys here.'' And the State Department says, ``No. You're not
going to get that. In fact, we're going to reduce what you
had.''
If you were an agent on the ground in Benghazi at the time,
Mr. Keil, would you have been lobbying for more help to come to
Benghazi?
Mr. Keil. I'd probably be doing more than lobbying. I'd be
extremely frustrated and try to push every button I could
possibly push.
Mr. Jordan. Flip it around. You're the guy at the desk in
Washington. You get the request from these guys on the ground
for more help.
Would you have fought to make that request happen?
Mr. Keil. As a matter of fact, sir, my last position with
DS, I was the regional director for DS Regional Bureau, vetting
those requests from the field. I would have put a significant
amount of priority on Benghazi requests.
Mr. Jordan. Oh. So you had that job?
Mr. Keil. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. Before Benghazi, you had that job?
Mr. Keil. Correct.
Mr. Jordan. And you would have went to bat for these
folks?
Mr. Keil. Yes. I would have.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Keil, what's the Overseas Security Policy
Board?
Mr. Keil. Overseas Security Policy Board is an interagency
board that is the genesis from the Beirut Embassy bombings; the
Inman Commission, which created the Diplomatic Security
Service; the Inman standards. It's an interagency board that
creates physical security, technical security, procedural
security requirements----
Mr. Jordan. So these were standards developed interagency.
So they're the State Department standards. Is that correct?
Mr. Keil. State Department leads OSPB.
Mr. Jordan. And this resulted from the Embassy bombing in
Beirut where 63 people were killed, 17 Americans?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And were the standards followed at the
Benghazi facility?
Mr. Keil. Sir, we saw a memo which authorized the
continued opening of the Benghazi mission, which referred to it
as the special mission compound. In talking with people, and
based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the
standards.
Mr. Jordan. So the standards weren't followed?
Mr. Keil. No.
Mr. Jordan. Now, my understand is there's a waiver process
that you have to follow if, in fact, you're going to deviate
from the standards.
Was the waiver process followed?
Mr. Keil. That was one of our recommendations, sir. And
when you're not following the standards, you don't have to
follow the waiver process either.
Mr. Jordan. So they didn't follow standards or the waiver?
Mr. Keil. Correct.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Keil, what's your overall impression of
the ARB report?
Mr. Keil. Mr. Sullivan and I testified before the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee. Ambassador Pickering
referred to the ARB as being fiercely independent.
In that same hearing, Admiral Mullen admitted to Oversight
and Government Reform that he was reporting on ARB proceedings
to the senior staff of the State Department outside of the
precepts and the requirements of being a member of the ARB. I
don't think that fits anyone's definition of being fiercely
independent.
Mr. Jordan. You don't think it was independent at all?
Mr. Keil. Not based on what was----
Mr. Jordan. Frankly, I share your belief. I mean, when
Secretary Clinton gets to appoint the co-chairs of the board,
when Cheryl Mills calls him up and asks him to serve, when
neither Secretary Clinton or Cheryl Mills are interviewed, when
they get a draft report before it goes public, in essence, they
get to edit the report before the rest of the world gets to see
it.
And as you point out, when Admiral Mullen told the
committee--told the committee he--now, think about this. He's
been on the job a few days. As the cochair of the supposedly
independent ARB, been on the job a few days, he interviewed
Charlene Lamb and he discovers that Charlene Lamb is going to 2
days later come in front of the Oversight Committee and he
realizes she's not going to be a good witness.
What does he do? Just what you referenced, Mr. Keil. He
gets on the phone and calls the Chief of Staff to the Secretary
of State and says, ``Hey, Charlene Lamb is not going to be a
good witness. She's not going to reflect well on the State
Department.'' He gives a heads-up to the very person he's
supposed to be investigating. So of course this thing wasn't
independent.
I mean, think about--we asked Mr. Mullen, ``Why do you care
whether she's a good witness or a bad witness? It's your job to
get to the truth for the American people and for the families
of those four individuals who lost their lives, not to give a
heads-up to the higher-ups in the State Department.'' So it was
anything but independent.
But here is--there was one good thing that came out of the
ARB, in my judgment, at least one good thing. They created the
Best Practices Panel that you and Mr. Sullivan sat on. Right?
Mr. Keil. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. And you guys made a whole bunch of
recommendations?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. How many recommendations, again?
Mr. Keil. 40 recommendations.
Mr. Jordan. 40 recommendations.
And some of them are more important than others. Is that
right?
Mr. Keil. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. And the most important one is which one?
Mr. Keil. The creation of an under secretary for
Diplomatic Security. In fact, sir, in our executive summary, we
said one clear and overarching recommendation that's crucial to
the successful and sustainable implementation of all of the
recommendations in this report is the creation of an under
secretary.
Mr. Jordan. And is that the first recommendation you
listed in your report?
Mr. Keil. It's recommendation number 1.
Mr. Jordan. So it's recommendation number 1.
Most of the others hinge on the implementation of that
recommendation?
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. It's designed to give accountability and
responsibility to one particular person at the State
Department. Is that correct?
Mr. Keil. To identify those who are----
Mr. Jordan. Yeah. Something Mrs. Brooks talked about in
her opening questions.
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. Designed to give accountability and
responsibility to someone at the State Department.
And is this the first time that this recommendation has
been put forward, Mr. Keil?
Mr. Keil. No, sir. Our Board--or our panel--excuse me--was
a bit surprised to actually uncover a memo from now 15 years
ago that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had signed after
the East African Embassy bombings, ordering the creation of an
under secretary for Diplomatic Security.
Mr. Jordan. So we have the Overseas Security Policy Board
created after Americans were killed in Beirut. That wasn't
followed. We have a recommendation from Madeleine Albright, the
lady you protected, that says we need to create an under
secretary after Americans were killed in the East African
Embassy bombings.
Mr. Keil. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And that wasn't followed.
I mean, has the State Department said they're going to
implement this at all?
Mr. Keil. They said it's one of the recommendations they
are not going to implement.
Mr. Jordan. They're not going to implement it. They're not
going to implement it.
My question is real simple, Mr. Chairman: What's it going
to take? What's it going to take for the State Department to
put in place the practices that are going to save American
lives?
They didn't listen to the guys on the ground, the pros who
know what they're doing in a situation that anyone looks at and
says, ``Wow, we need more Americans there to help.''
They didn't listen to the guys on the ground who put their
lives on the line. They didn't follow their own standards that
were developed in 1983 after the Beirut Embassy bombing. They
didn't follow the waiver process to deviate from those
standards. And now they're not following the Best Practices
Panel's number one recommendation.
What's it going to take? The ranking member in his opening
remarks said this is a transformational moment. Well, somebody
better tell the State Department that because--I mean, think of
this track record. I hope the member is right. I hope they get
it.
But if they're not going to listen to two guys with the
experience that Mr. Keil and Mr. Sullivan have and say the one
thing we need--the one main thing we need is this person of
accountability, the one main thing, how--that everything else
hinges on, I mean, talk about the arrogance of the State
Department.
So, hopefully, one of the things this committee can do is
at least convince them to follow these guys, what they said. At
least convince them of that.
Mr. Keil, thank you for your service. It's an amazing
record what you have done for our country.
Mr. Sullivan, yours as well. We appreciate the work on the
Best Practices Panel.
Mr. Cummings. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Jordan. 42 seconds, I would yield.
Mr. Cummings. Why don't you ask the question of the State
Department?
Mr. Jordan. You can ask him that question. The way this
works----
Mr. Cummings. What's your----
Mr. Jordan. Reclaiming my time, you're welcome to do it,
Mr. Chairman. I think you spent a lot of time on Mr. Starr. I
chose to focus on Mr. Keil, who's got 30 years of experience,
appointed by the Obama Administration, 23 years in the State
Department, viewed so highly that he was actually on the
protective detail for Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
I chose to use my 10 minutes on Mr. Keil. Minority can use
their 10 minutes on whatever witness they want. In fact, this
is a hearing they called. You can handle it however you want
to.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.
I now recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for joining us for what
I hope will be a productive and a forward-looking hearing on
what can be done and what is being currently done and what we
have yet to do in terms of trying to prevent a tragedy from
Benghazi from happening again or, at the very least, minimizing
the potential for something like that to happen again.
I am going to begin my questions sort of in the same realm
of where the questioning left off, talking about the security
accountability framework within the Department of State.
The Best Practices Panel, which was led by Mr. Sullivan,
determined, ``Clearly defined accountability and responsibility
for security at every level is fundamental for effective
security management within an organization.'' And the panel
recommended the development of an accountability framework.
Is that correct, Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. In response to that recommendation, the
Department created a security accountability framework that the
Department explained clearly defines key actors, their roles
and responsibilities, and governance mechanisms.
Mr. Starr, I'd like to begin with you. Can you please
describe the responsibilities at each of the various leadership
levels.
Mr. Starr. I think the first leadership level starts with
the Secretary of State. The Secretary acknowledges that he is
ultimately responsible for the security of our personnel
overseas.
Beneath that in the accountability framework, the next
person that has the direct responsibility for security is me,
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.
And I would have to say that we looked long and hard at the
recommendation of whether it needed to be an under secretary
position or an assistant secretary position. It was a
recommendation by the panel.
The Department looked at this very seriously, ultimately
weighed all of the points behind it, and made a decision that
what was probably more important is whether or not I, in my
position, had the direct access to the Secretary that was
necessary.
And under both the accountability framework and then the
FAM, we have modified it so that I am directly reportable to
the Secretary for security threat information and security
threats against our people. I do still report to the Under
Secretary for Management.
Now, we think that that's key because, isolated and alone,
Diplomatic Security would not have some of the capabilities
that we have when we work closely with the management bureau,
with Overseas Building Operations, with IRM and others. But I
just wanted to put that back in the record.
One of the things that the accountability framework does is
talks about the fact that all of us in the Department of State
are responsible for security, but it specifically designs the
roles of the deputy secretaries and what they do. It defines
roles that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the
Under Secretary for Management has.
The most important thing that it does is define roles for
the other assistant secretaries, the people that I work side by
side with every single day, who run the regional bureaus, the
NEA Bureau, the WHA Bureau, the EUR Bureau, and it assigns
security responsibility to them. And, in fact, their job
descriptions have been changed to reflect the security
responsibilities.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me----
Mr. Starr. All of this is contained in the accountability
framework.
And then one final thing, which I think is critical, we
can't do the security that we need to do unless every
individual Foreign Service officer understands that they have a
role in their own security as well, and it goes to defining
that.
Ms. Sanchez. So those expectations have been communicated,
then, on down the security framework. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. And State Department employees have a clear
understanding of what the chain of command, so to speak, is for
security decisions and security decision-making?
Mr. Starr. Overseas it was always clear. It ran from the
RSO and the Deputy Chief of Mission to the Chief of Mission and
that letter of responsibilities that the Chief of Mission has.
So it was always clear overseas.
It was a little less clear within the Department who had
the responsibilities, and this document goes a long way taking
information that was already in the FAM and putting it together
into a clearer framework. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. If I can go back for just a second to the
number one recommendation about creating a different position
that would be in charge of security, explain some of the
thought-making process that went into the ultimate decisions
not to accept that recommendation and to essentially make you
responsible for security.
Mr. Starr. Well, first and foremost, I think it has to be
acknowledged that I am responsible, whether I am the Assistant
Secretary or whether it will be changed to an under secretary
position. The Department looked at this and had to weigh
different things. An under secretary typically has additional
responsibilities than one focus on something.
If you look at other under secretaries and the range of
things that they do, one of the things the Department made sure
of was that this position, my position, A, had the access that
we need to the Secretary and to the other leadership and,
second, that I wasn't being diverted from the just pure
security role by other duties. Under secretary positions in
many cases would carry other duties.
My predecessor was the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security and the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions,
the Office of Foreign Missions. One of the things that we did
in the aftermath of Benghazi was to separate those two
functions, and now there's an ambassador in charge of overseas
foreign missions. I am not distracted by that role.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Mr. Starr. I can focus exclusively on security.
Ms. Sanchez. I appreciate the answer. I have two other
questions I'd like to ask, and I'd like to get to them.
Mr. Sullivan, do you think that the new framework that the
Department of State has adopted clearly defines accountability
and responsibility for security?
Mr. Sullivan. Congresswoman, we haven't been fully briefed
on that. From what I heard just now, I mean, I think that's a
great start. But, clearly, there does have to be
accountability. People do have to know, you know, who's in
charge of security.
And, also, to the point that was made earlier, how all the
employees feel around the world, I mean, I think that that
leadership is important to let them know that they're valued,
that they're supported, and that those people that are making
decisions are going to be made accountable for those--every
employee is going to be made accountable for those decisions
that they're making.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
I want to hit on the issue very quickly--I have very
limited time--about temporary staffing.
Several investigations into the attacks in Benghazi found
that the temporary staffing of security officers was what
contributed to poor security at the Benghazi facility. The
bipartisan Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Reform
Committee found--I'm going to quote from that report--``For
example, DS agents stationed in Benghazi were always on
temporary duty assignments, remaining there for relatively
short periods, often no longer than a month.''
The Independent Accountability Review Board concluded that
the utilization of temporarily assigned agents in Benghazi was
problematic--and I'm quoting from their findings--``the short-
term transitory nature of Benghazi staffing to be another
primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in
Benghazi. Staffing was, at times, woefully insufficient,
considering the post security posture and high-risk, high-
threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional
knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by
talent and hard work alone, although the Board found ample
evidence of both in those who served there.''
So based on one of the ARB's recommendation, the Department
has set a policy for one-year minimum tours at high-threat
posts and a minimum of 120 days for temporary duty assignments.
Now, Mr. Starr, you've held a number of positions during
your tenure at the Department, including that as a regional
security officer.
Why is it valuable for security officers to spend longer
durations at posts? And what's the benefit to developing an
understanding of the local environment?
Mr. Starr. It is critical. In your first 30 days on the
ground in a place, you are just trying to figure out where you
are, how things are operating, where the threats are.
We absolutely concur with that recommendation of taking
steps to ensure that the personnel that we put on the ground
are there for longer periods of time.
Ms. Sanchez. And has the Department been able to achieve
those requirements in its actual practice?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it has. The fact is that we don't actually
have any temporary facilities at the moment. I can give you an
example, though, that--you know, we just reentered Bangui. We
have mobile security teams of agents on the ground with U.S.
Marines that are there.
Those agents are going to stay for a much longer period of
time, probably up to 90 days, until we're sure that we have the
proper security that we can then start replacing them with the
permanent personnel that we're going to have on the ground. The
30-day rotations, as the ARB pointed out, were not conducive to
the security operation.
Ms. Sanchez. And are there any other incentives that the
Department can provide or can think to provide for personnel to
undertake those longer assignments?
Mr. Starr. I don't think it's a question of necessary or
additional incentives. I think it's a question that we needed
to understand that constantly rotating like that was not in our
best interest.
I think my agents clearly understand that, and I think it
really isn't about additional incentives. It's about just
knowing that that's not the proper procedure and we needed to
change it.
Ms. Sanchez. Not a great practice.
Thank you for your forthright answers.
And I yield back to the chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from California.
The chair would now recognize the gentlelady from the state
of Alabama, Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Returning to the questioning of Mr. Jordan about the waiver
process briefly, Mr. Starr, the Overseas Security Policy Board
sets the physical security standards that must be met, and it's
also my understanding that they're either temporary, interim,
or permanent. Correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mrs. Roby. And overseas diplomatic facilities can be
further classified as residential, office, or other categories
as well?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. And how was Benghazi classified in 2012?
Mr. Starr. My understanding from the reports is that it was
the temporary mission facility.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. And was that classification found in the
OSPB standards?
Mr. Starr. No.
Mrs. Roby. Are there any OSPB standards for a temporary
office facility? There's not. Right?
Mr. Starr. Our outlook on that is that, whether it's
temporary or interim or permanent, that we should be applying
the same security standards that the OSPB has put in place and
that, if we can't, then we need to look closely at what risks
we run----
Mrs. Roby. So the--sorry to interrupt you.
But the office and the residential do not require a higher
level of security if they're in that category?
Mr. Starr. Office--there are higher levels. When we build
offices, when we build facilities, those have a higher level of
security than residences do.
Mrs. Roby. The Benghazi facility was being used as both.
Correct?
Mr. Starr. Yeah. I'd say that's an accurate portrayal, from
what I understand.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. And so, in a dual case where it's being
used as a residential and an office, what standards apply? The
higher standards. Correct?
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. And so those OSPB standards should have
applied to the Benghazi facility?
Mr. Starr. That is the way that I would apply them now. As
I say, I wasn't here. But if we had a similar situation, we
would be applying the higher standards.
Mrs. Roby. I just want to make sure this is very clear.
Your policy is that anytime a facility is being used for
more than one purpose, whatever type of facility has the
higher--or the highest level of physical security standards,
those standards should be applied?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. But that didn't happen in Benghazi?
Mr. Starr. Not--I would have to say I can't answer that
question.
Mrs. Roby. Looking ahead, when you talk about in this era
of expeditionary diplomacy, is it possible for the State
Department to open a temporary residential facility?
Mr. Starr. We don't have any at the moment. I can't
imagine that we would or that I would approve it.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
Let's turn to the Marine Security Guard detachments. Were
Marine Security Guard detachments ever deployed to the Benghazi
compound?
Mr. Starr. No.
Mrs. Roby. The Benghazi compound, we've already
established by multiple questions here, it was a temporary
facility. And Marine Security Guard detachments are never
deployed to temporary facilities, correct?
Mr. Starr. Not in my experience.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. So the increase in Marine Security Guard
detachments as a result of the ARB recommendation 11,
therefore, would not have actually helped in Benghazi, correct?
I mean, if it's a temporary facility and they can't be
deployed, then it won't help.
Mr. Starr. Oh. I just want to make the point, I'm not
saying that additional personnel on the ground would not have
helped. But, yes, you are correct that we would not--in my
experience, we would not have put a Marine Security Guard
detachment into a temporary facility.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
So we've also already established here today that there's
currently 30 posts that are considered high-risk, high-threat.
How many have benefited, of those 30, from the Marine Security
Guard personnel?
Mr. Starr. I would have to get back to you with the exact
number. I think--I think about 20. We have opened four Marine
detachments since Benghazi at our high-threat, high-risk posts.
There are still some that do not have Marine Security Guard
detachments. There's a variety of reasons why they do not.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. Is it your intent to get to a place where
you have these Marine Security detachments at all of the high-
risk, high-threat locations, posts?
Mr. Starr. I would like to have Marine Security Guard
detachments at every one of our high-threat, high-risk posts.
There are impediments that in some cases cannot be overcome.
Mrs. Roby. At the ones that currently do not have the
Marine Security detachment, how exactly does the Department
plan to augment security at these high-risk, high-threat
without highly trained Marine Security Guards?
Mr. Starr. In some cases, we have made up by using
Diplomatic Security agents. In some cases, it's a mixture of
Diplomatic Security agents and other security elements that we
have within Diplomatic Security. In some cases, we have made
risk-managed decisions where we have taken personnel out and
lowered our presence--in some cases, our families are not
there--or we lowered the number of employees to minimum
numbers.
In many cases, we make representations with the host
governments, and now we analyze whether or not the host
government has both the capability and the will to provide the
necessary level of protections. And if we find that we don't
have those types of protections or we think that the risks are
too high, then we won't be there.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
If an ambassador at a high-risk, high-threat post picks up
the phone and calls the seventh floor of the State Department
today asking for additional security, physical or personnel,
who ultimately makes the decision to grant or deny that
request?
Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. The last person in the chain would be me. The
request would probably not go to the seventh floor; it would
probably go to me on the sixth floor, or it would go through
the RSO to our personnel.
But I can tell you that, today, I have available mobile
security teams to deploy. We work very closely with----
Mrs. Roby. But, ultimately, I'm just--I'm asking who makes
that decision.
Mr. Starr. It can be approved at lower levels----
Mrs. Roby. What's the lowest level it can be approved?
Mr. Starr. Oh, I think the lowest level would be the
regional director of the--of Diplomatic Security.
Mrs. Roby. And if an ambassador sends a cable, would it be
the same--rather than picking up the phone, it would be the
exact same?
Mr. Starr. Exactly the same.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
And would the decisionmaking process change if it was not a
high-risk, high-threat post?
Mr. Starr. No, it would not.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. And was Benghazi considered high-risk,
high-threat or a critical threat?
Mr. Starr. Pardon me. I actually don't know what the
rating was of Benghazi. We did not have the 30 identified high-
threat, high-risk----
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
Mr. Starr [continuing]. Posts listed at that point.
Mrs. Roby. Well, who denied the additional Diplomatic
Security personnel requested in Benghazi by those who were
working and living there and in Tripoli? Who was the person
that denied that?
Mr. Starr. I'm going to have to refer you back to the
results of the ARB. I came back 5 months after the attack. I
wasn't----
Mrs. Roby. What I'm trying to get at, is that same person
who was also responsible for ensuring the physical security of
Benghazi, is that the same person that is vested with that
responsibility today?
Mr. Starr. I think the Board pointed out that there were
lapses in judgment on the part of the Director and several
others, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Programs.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
If a DS agent at the post writes back to headquarters
requesting additional physical security upgrades or increased
personnel performing security duties, who is responsible for
making the decision to deny or grant that request from a DS
agent?
Mr. Starr. I think the first thing that would happen is
that the discussion would go on, is this an individual request
from DS? Has it been vetted through the emergency action
committee at the post? Is this a post request?
Mrs. Roby. Okay. And is it affected by whether you've
categorized this as a high-risk, high-threat?
Mr. Starr. We pay more attention to our high-threat, high-
risk posts on a daily basis, but I would tell you that any
request for additional security resources for any of our posts
overseas is going to be met with immediate action. We would
make decisions on how we can best fulfill those requirements.
Mrs. Roby. So, to get to the point, even if a post is not
high-risk, high-threat, we know in certain parts of the world
things are very volatile and can unravel in a moment's time,
despite threat assessment or not. And what I'm getting at is,
is the Department, now, today, in light of what happened in
Benghazi, prepared to pay better attention when the folks on
the ground are saying, ``We need help,'' and--which was not
what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the attack in
Benghazi.
Mr. Starr. My answer to you is unequivocably ``yes.'' That
is what I have been spending my time since February 1st in 2013
on, making sure that we have the resources, the programs, the
knowledge, the capabilities to respond quickly and effectively
to any cry for help. Moreover, not just respond to the cries
for help, but to try to better place ourselves before those
come in and make sure that we're ready for these things.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentlewoman from Alabama.
The chair will now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois,
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As a member of the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee and also the Armed Services Committee, I've spent a
great deal of time working on all of the--working my way
through all of the reports on the attacks in Benghazi. And as
the committee begins our work here today, I think the most
appropriate way that we can honor the brave Americans who lost
their lives in Benghazi is to make sure that we learn from
those past mistakes and never, ever make them again. And I
heard that from the family members, as well. Let's never let
their buddies down the way we let their family members down.
And so I want to go back to the discussion on the security
and interagency cooperation. But, first Mr. Keil, I was there
the day that Admiral Mullen testified, and I have to disagree
with you. You may question his professional integrity, but when
Admiral Mullen, a man who served in Vietnam, 43 years of
military service defending this great Nation, comes before our
committee and swears an oath of office and says--and then
testifies that he was fiercely independent in the ARB, I would
tend to believe him. And, in fact, the ARB was incredibly
scathing of the State Department in its report. And I want to
go to that report.
Mr. Starr, I just want to follow up a little bit on what my
colleague, the gentlelady from Alabama, her line of questioning
about the Marine Security Guard details. So if you don't have
a--if you have a post that does not have a detail because
they're not at a temporary facility, for example, can you talk
about other details that can be there? Are there other military
options that can be assigned to those temporary details? You
talk about the mobile security teams, Marine augmentation
units. Are there other options if the Marines can't actually be
assigned there full-time?
Mr. Starr. Yes, there are other options. We currently are
trying to expand 35 more detachments, but it should be noted
that, at the moment, we have more than 275 diplomatic
facilities, counting the embassies, consulates, and consulate
generals. We have only 173 Marine Security Guard detachments.
We have never had enough Marines, nor will we ever, to cover
every single post. And in many of our posts around the world,
if we put a Marine Security Guard detachment in, we would
probably have more Marines than we had Foreign Service Officers
at some of these places. So we carefully look at where we need
to use this scarce resource.
We have had excellent cooperation from the Marine Corps in
terms of augmenting the different units and getting more
detachments. As I say, we have opened 17 more detachments since
Benghazi, on our way to opening 35 totally. And we should be
done by the end of next year.
Additionally, the Marines have created something called
Marine Security Augmentation Units, where we can send
additional Marines in under the rubric of the Marine Security
Guard program that helps us where we have different situations.
But the thrust of your question was, what do we do in
places where we don't have Marines or we don't have permission
to send Marines? We have different capabilities.
We have Diplomatic Security agents that are high-threat,
high-risk-trained, our highest-level operators, mobile security
operators. We have the ability to request from the Department
of Defense--and they have never let us down--for things like
FAST teams to come in and protect our embassies and consulates
when we need that.
We have a robust program where we have security
contractors. In many cases they're Americans, but sometimes
they're third-country national contractors. But we have used
contractors for many years. Now, there are some downsides to
that, and there are some countries that won't allow them. And
we've learned some very painful lessons over the years about
contractors, that we have to have incredible amounts of
oversight and make sure that we're using them properly. But it
is still a tool.
We have local guard forces and local protective elements
that we hire directly from the country that we're in. And I
would tell you that some of these units in places around the
world, even unarmed, have done amazing acts of heroism
protecting our people.
And then, ultimately, we have the host-country services,
which we now evaluate for both whether they have the
capabilities to protect us or the will to protect us. And in
those cases where they may not have the best capabilities or we
may think that we're challenged, one of the things that the
additional funding that Congress has given us is the ability to
start a program where we can train those host-country forces,
whether it be police or national guard, directly around the
embassies and increase their capabilities.
So we have a number of different possibilities.
Ms. Duckworth. You had said, Mr. Starr, that the State
Department has always engaged in the process of risk management
and is well-experienced at it. I have to say I was disappointed
with the risk management process that was undertaken leading up
to the Benghazi attacks, and I would hope that that risk
assessment and mitigation process has become more robust.
I want to speak specifically to interagency cooperation
between DOD and the Department of State. You said that DOD has
never let you down. On that night, the ARB and various reports,
including Armed Services Committee, has stated that there was
no way that those F-16s, that those military--U.S. military
forces could have made it there in time to save our Americans'
lives.
What have we done since to make sure that in the future
they can be present in time to save American lives? As these
special dates come up, September 11th, these anniversaries, or
as you hear more chatter that is going on and you think there
might be the potential for greater risk, what tripwires are in
place, what processes are in place for you to call the DOD and
say, hey, maybe you need to help us and reposition some forces
so that if we do have another Benghazi we can call and that
those F-16s can be there in time in the future so that we don't
lose American lives? What process is happening between DOD and
Department of State at this point?
Mr. Starr. The Department of Defense has put together a
program that they essentially refer to as the new normal.
We have looked closely at what capabilities DOD can bring
for defensive use at the American embassies and consulates
overseas. There has to be a realization that we don't have
bases everywhere in the world. In many cases, while we would
like to be able to say that the Department of Defense could
respond to any one of our embassies within 4 hours, physical
distances, just the amount of distance between where our
military is stationed and where our diplomatic facilities are
make it impossible.
And then, even if they could respond in a certain amount of
time, this idea that, you know, we're magically going to get
paratroopers coming out of the back of planes and they're going
to land on the American embassy isn't realistic. We still have
to go through airports, we have to get permission from host
countries to get personnel in, we have to transport them from
the airport to the embassy somehow. And in the midst of a
crisis, this isn't really realistic about what's going to
happen.
What we've worked with DOD on is making sure that we're
better prepared to predict what is going to happen, looking at
instability. And as DOD has often said, we'd rather be on the
ground in advance of something happening than trying to react
after something happens.
Now, it doesn't mean in certain cases that they haven't
been on a very close leash with us. I can give you the example
of Tripoli recently, where we had in many cases Special Forces
and helicopters and Marines on less than 1-hour notice to
respond to the embassy. And in high-high-threat, critical-
threat situations, those are the types of things that we're
working with DOD on, to make sure that they have very close-at-
hand response capabilities.
But I can tell you that, with 275 locations around the
world, we can't do that often. We can't do that everyplace. DOD
is seeking increased basing options. And I would highly
recommend a discussion with DOD on this about where they are
going in terms of basing closer and more closely to U.S.
embassies and facilities. They have excellent plans. They are
working closely with the State Department on this.
But, ultimately, we've got to do a better job of making
sure that we have the right preparations on the ground in
advance. In those situations that are absolutely critical,
we'll have DOD very close to us. And they've worked
tremendously with us in places like Tripoli and Sana'a and
other places.
So I just have to tell you I have the utmost respect for
the way that the Department of Defense, U.S. Marine Corps, and
Army and Air Force have responded--and the Navy--have responded
to our needs.
Ms. Duckworth. In the last minute that I have left, can
you talk about, at what level at the State Department does that
request to DOD have to take place?
For example, in the case of Tripoli recently, where you
said that they had them on a 1-hour leash to respond, does that
come from you, or can it come from lower? If an ambassador
determines that, through his risk analysis assessment with his
Diplomatic Security team that's there, that he needs this, how
far does he have to go before you can have something like a
FAST team that's ready to come in or something along those
lines? How high up through the State Department bureaucracy
does he have to go?
Mr. Starr. In an emergency, the Ambassador is going to
call the commander of the nearest combatant command. And they
meet all the time; they talk with each other. And in an
emergency situation, he can pull the string immediately.
In a less-than-emergency situation, in a way that we're
looking at it to try to preposition ourself, he would state
something or make a request, or we may make the request and
say, we think you need this. We would work through the Office
of the Executive Secretaries, who send an exec-sec back and
forth. I can instigate it. The Ambassador can instigate it. The
Assistant Secretary of the regional bureau can instigate it.
In most cases, it's a collaborative effort, and we're
talking with each other. We're either having a SVTS or we're
having phone conversations. But in the most extreme cases, the
Ambassador can go directly to the combatant commander that is
closest to him and request support and then, even, notify us
afterwards.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from Illinois.
The chair would now recognize the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Roskam.
Mr. Roskam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the three panelists for your testimony today.
Mr. Keil, what's a special mission compound?
Mr. Keil. Sir, if I could just take 2 seconds, I'd like to
clarify one point that Ms. Duckworth made.
Mr. Roskam. Feel free.
Mr. Keil. I wasn't making any subjective judgment on
Admiral Mullen. I was simply stating the facts. The precepts
and regulations of the ARB say you cannot discuss the
proceedings outside of the ARB. Admiral Mullen, he admitted he
did that. It's a statement of fact. It's not a subjective
judgment.
Mr. Roskam. In legal terms, that's called ex parte
communication.
But go ahead and answer.
Mr. Keil. Thank you. I didn't go to law school.
Sorry, sir, could you give me the----
Mr. Roskam. Yeah. What's a special mission compound?
Mr. Keil. I don't know. To be honest, in our review, Under
Secretary Kennedy, in authorizing that, made up that term in
order to avoid the OSPB security standards.
Mr. Roskam. It's an interesting thing; yesterday, in our
office, we did a LexisNexis search of ``special mission
compound, not Benghazi.'' Now, there may be other ways to
search, there may be other ways to look out over the landscape.
The result of looking for that term yielded nothing. Throughout
all those data files, all across the fruited plain, absolutely
nothing.
So what does it mean if something is simply, then,
redefined? What does it mean if something is said, ``Well,
we're just going to declare this as something other than that
which is to be regulated'' ? That means you have no
regulations. Isn't that right?
Mr. Keil. Correct, sir.
Mr. Roskam. Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned in your opening
statement one of the regrets that you have as a member of the
panel is that the Department of State didn't adopt your
recommendations as it relates to waivers. What is your
recommendation as it relates to waivers?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, we think--we believe waivers are--
waivers are needed, and we want to see those waivers. Because
when you have a waiver, what that will do is set in motion
standards. And people all recognize that, once you have those
standards, you have to meet those standards.
What we saw in this particular instance was, since there
were no standards, there was no waiver, there really were no
standards set. And I think somebody brought up the fact before
that there were a lot of people coming in that were TDY and
some very dedicated people, some very hardworking people, and
some extremely well-intentioned people and dedicated people.
However, these were people that were extremely inexperienced,
and they were coming in for 30-day periods. And they would come
in for 30 days, they would identify vulnerabilities, they would
take care of that vulnerability, and then the next person would
come in, and that process would continue. And----
Mr. Roskam. So you're saying you need an orderly process
by which things are waived, not declarations on the part of the
Department of State that it's all waived. Is that right?
Mr. Sullivan. Right. It goes back to what we talked about
before: risk management. And, you know, in its simplest terms,
risk management is all about identifying the threat,
identifying the vulnerability, and then coming up with the
mitigation for that threat. And we just did not see that
formalized process ongoing.
Mr. Roskam. Secretary Starr, question: You said earlier,
in an answer to Congressman Smith, that on Benghazi they didn't
get the threat information.
Now, I understand that ``threat information'' may be a term
of art, but to Mr. Westmoreland's point earlier, certainly a
bomb blowing up on the side of a wall, the whole litany of
events that took place beginning March 18th, 2012, until the
first time there was a communication from Ambassador Stevens,
isn't that enough information?
So you're not saying nobody was aware of the nature of the
threat. Is the threat a term of art?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, thank you for the question.
I think the distinction that I was trying to make was that
there was no specific threat information that had been
developed by the intelligence community----
Mr. Roskam. In other words----
Mr. Starr [continuing]. To say that we were under attack.
Mr. Roskam [continuing]. These people are coming over the
hilltop at this moment in time.
Mr. Starr. Right.
Mr. Roskam. Okay. Let me ask you this------
Mr. Starr. And, as I said, we don't normally get that. I
think your point that there were a number of different things
going on--I think people were aware of the overall level of
instability.
Mr. Roskam. Okay. Well, here's my point. In the Senate
Intelligence Committee report, they reported, on June 6th of
2012, Ambassador Stevens recommended the creation of teams and
so forth. The team was never created in Benghazi despite the
Ambassador's recommendation.
There were other events subsequent to that. Then Ambassador
Stevens reaches out again, sends a cable to the State
Department headquarters, requesting a minimum of 13 temporary
duty personnel. And the State Department never fulfilled his
request, and headquarters never responded to the request with a
cable.
And then they follow up on August 16th of 2012, a month
before these events. Again, a cable to the State headquarters,
Stevens raised additional concerns, et cetera, et cetera, et
cetera.
Now, go to the ARB. The ARB says one thing two times about
Ambassador Stevens, and it's worth noting. They said this about
him: ``His status as the leading U.S. Government advocate on
Libya policy and his expertise on Benghazi in particular caused
Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.'' They
said that on page 6 of the report. They cut and pasted--they
liked it so much, they put it on page 34 of the report.
And yet, ignoring the Ambassador, who, by their own
admission, is the expert in the area, and ignoring his requests
for support, that's not giving unusual deference to his
judgments, is it, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Starr. Difficult question, Congressman.
Mr. Roskam. No, it's very straightforward.
Mr. Starr. No, I don't think it is. I think it's a
difficult question. I think that Chris Stevens was a tremendous
ambassador with a tremendous amount of----
Mr. Roskam. Look, there's no question that he was
tremendous. There's no question that he was a hero. He made----
Mr. Starr. From what I------
Mr. Roskam [continuing]. Specific requests of the
Department. The Department in the ARB said this person is
uniquely qualified, Secretary, and he was ignored.
Mr. Starr. And I think this is why the ARB recommendations
are what they are.
Mr. Roskam. Well, this is why the ARB recommendations and
the panel say you can't have this kind of waiver authority.
When Ms. Roby asked you the question, are there any plans
for temporary facilities in the future, you were pretty clever
in how you responded. You said, we don't have any plans for it,
and I'm not likely--and I'm paraphrasing now--I'm not likely to
approve it. And you know what that tells me? That tells me you
can do it all again. That tells me that you can take the
special mission compound, you can call it something else, you
can call it a temporary consular facility, you can take two
adjectives and put it in front of a noun and call it some other
thing, and do it all again.
So here's the question: If Madeleine Albright signed off on
certain recommendations, if the Best Practices Panel makes
certain recommendations, why is it that the State Department is
clinging to this legacy of power that has failed? Why are you
grasping on it so much? Why not walk away from it?
And nobody here is criticizing a very tough job, but the
nature of the job, Mr. Secretary, means that this, to Mr.
Cummings' point, needs to be the transformational moment. And
why not be the transformational moment to say, we're not just
going to choose to redefine things, and we're going to revisit
how we do these waivers, and we're going to do everything we
can, in cooperation with Congress, to honor Chris Stevens'
legacy, to honor the legacy of those who suffered, who you
served with and you know.
But why cling to this old thing that just isn't working?
Are you the only one that doesn't see it?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, I think I have a distinct view,
having served 29 years for the State Department, 4 years for
the United Nations, and I'm back again.
I think that in accepting all of the recommendations of the
Accountability Review Board, I think in accepting 38 out of 40
recommendations made by the Best Practices Panel, I think the
Department has made tremendous progress and efforts in the time
that I have been back and Secretary Kerry----
Mr. Roskam. But the opportunity----
Mr. Starr. Not every----
Mr. Roskam. You want to knock it out of the park right
now, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Starr. Not every recommendation is gold. Every
recommendation needs to be looked at from the recommendation's
standpoint but then from the organization as well.
Mr. Roskam. Okay. So take your argument. A couple of
minutes ago, you made this point as it relates to the
responsibility of a Foreign Service Officer, that they have a
responsibility to be mindful of their own security. That was in
response to Ms. Sanchez. Every Foreign Service Officer must
understand that they have a role in their own security. I agree
with that wholeheartedly.
And yet, when Ambassador Stevens played a role in his own
security on cable number one, cable number two, and cable
number three, that responsibility was not absorbed or reflected
in the State Department.
And you're not offering anything as it relates to
fundamental change. Because based on what the rules are right
now, Mr. Secretary, you have the authority, you have the
capacity, and you've got the flexibility to do the Benghazi
structure again. Am I wrong?
Mr. Starr. The rules have been changed. Who is responsible
is clearly defined.
Mr. Roskam. Who is responsible is fourth down on the food
chain. And by your own recommendations----
Mr. Starr. Well, sir, I would disagree with that. I am
responsible.
Mr. Roskam. Yeah, but I'm telling you----
Mr. Starr. I can give you the latest example, when we're
trying to open a facility in southern Turkey. We had a request
to put personnel in on the ground for start operations, for
humanitarian operations. They're in there TDY. We need a
facility.
We are in the process of leasing a facility. We know where
it's going to be. A request came to me from the people on the
ground saying, can we use it in advance of the security
upgrades being done, being accomplished? My answer: No.
Mr. Roskam. Okay. That's beautiful. And in light of Mr.
Cummings' response and his admonition to us that we're here for
a season, you're going to be there for a season, and in another
season someone is going to succeed you. And in that new season,
when someone with your judgment and your deference doesn't have
that level of capacity and they don't have your kind of stick
and your background, they're going to be under tremendous
pressure, and they're going to say, ``Yes.''
I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. The chair thanks the gentleman from
Illinois and recognizes himself.
It strikes me that there are at least two issues at play,
two major issues. Number one is the efficacy of the ARB process
itself, whether or not it is in our best interest to allow any
entity to essentially grade its own papers. We don't do that in
any other category of life. We don't get to sentence ourselves
when we're in court. We don't get to grade our own papers in
the classroom.
The other aspect of the efficacy of the ARB is who they
interviewed and who they didn't interview, whether or not they
have to accept recommendations or don't have to accept
recommendations. That's a separate issue to me, is whether or
not the ARB process works, whether or not it has shortcomings.
The second issue is, let's assume, arguendo, that the ARB
process works. Let's just make that assumption for the sake of
argument. Is anyone following the recommendations of the ARB?
So, Mr. Secretary, I want to read something to you. ``We
are disturbed at the inadequacy of resources to provide
security against terrorist attacks. We are disturbed at the
relative low priority accorded security concerns. And we praise
the Ambassador for seeking security enhancements long before
the attack.''
Do you know what that comes from, Mr. Secretary, what I
just read?
Mr. Starr. I believe it's part of the Accountability
Review Board report.
Chairman Gowdy. From 1999. That was the----
Mr. Starr. Dar as Salaam and Nairobi, correct?
Chairman Gowdy. That was the ARB from 1999. And you can
lay it almost perfectly over what happened in Benghazi.
And one other point. The 1999 ARB made it really clear,
they went out of their way to make it clear, they were
disappointed that the recommendations that came after the
bombings in Beirut were not being implemented, something called
the Inman Commission. So the '99 ARB criticizes existing State
Department employees for not following the Inman Commission
from 14 years prior. That is a quarter-century's worth of
recommendations, and yet here we sit.
So what I want to do--because, honestly, I commend Mr.
Schiff. His was a wonderful idea, and I thank each of you for
coming. But given the inescapable interconnectivity between
recommendations made after Beirut and after eastern Africa and
now after Benghazi, we're going to look at some of those past
ARB recommendations.
And I'll give you one, Mr. Secretary. ``For diplomatic
buildings abroad not meeting Inman''--of course, Inman being,
again, Beirut bombing--``not meeting Inman standards, essential
physical security upgrades should be made immediately.'' That
was the recommendation of the 1999 ARB.
Mr. Secretary, I'm going to read you another one. This goes
to Mr. Cummings' point, which I thought was a wonderful point.
``Diplomatic petitions should be made to all governments with
whom we have relations to remind them of their obligation to
provide security for our embassy.''
Who in Libya were we to call? Who? Mr. Cummings' point is a
wonderful point. It was so good, the 1999 ARB made the
recommendation: Make sure the host country is aware of its
obligations. Who did we call in Libya?
Mr. Starr. Is that a question, sir?
Chairman Gowdy. Yeah, when I pause, that's generally an
indication I'm waiting on you to answer, but I'll make it more
clear in the future.
Mr. Starr. I think this is the heart of the question.
There are times when, for the national interests of the United
States, we are going to have to have diplomats, humanitarian
programs, rule-of-law programs, and other things in places
where the host country----
Chairman Gowdy. Mr.----
Mr. Starr [continuing]. Does not have a government.
Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Secretary----
Mr. Starr. And in those cases we must take the lessons
from this ARB and previous----
Chairman Gowdy [continuing]. Was there a government in
Libya for us to contact?
Mr. Starr. No, not at that time.
Chairman Gowdy. All right. So that recommendation of the
1999 ARB we were not able to do.
Let's move to one that perhaps we were able to do. This was
also a recommendation from the 1999 ARB. And, again, the ARB is
presented to us as a panacea. I mean, that's the evolution of
what happens, is there's an attack, there's a blue ribbon
panel, we're going to study, we're going to make
recommendations, and this is never going to happen again.
So back to the 1999. `` The Secretary of State should
personally review the security situation of diplomatic
facilities, closing those which are highly vulnerable and
threatened.'' Why do you think the 1999 ARB went out of its way
to use the word ``personally''?
Mr. Starr. No comment, sir.
Chairman Gowdy. What--is the answer privileged? I mean,
that's a recommendation from the 1999 ARB, the Secretary of
State should personally review. And I'm asking you, with all
due respect--we're not going to get to the word ``review.''
We've got to get past the word that modifies ``review,''
``personally.''
Why did they think it was important that the Secretary of
State, himself or herself, personally review?
Mr. Starr. I think, ultimately, the Secretary, who bears
the responsibility for the security, has to be brought the
information that is necessary for him to make decisions.
Chairman Gowdy. All right.
Mr. Starr. That is my job.
Chairman Gowdy. Okay.
Mr. Starr. I have gone to the Secretary of State on
different occasions, and we have talked specifically about the
security of different places. Tripoli was one of them in
particular since I have been back, but we have also looked at
Sana'a. We've talked about Kabul. We've talked about the other
locations, as well.
Where I have concerns about the safety and security of our
personnel and if I believe that we are not doing the things
that we need to do, then it is my responsibility to bring it to
the Secretary.
Chairman Gowdy. And I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. Was
it done on September the 10th of 2012? Was it done prior to
Benghazi? Because this recommendation has existed for more than
10 years.
Mr. Starr. I was not here at that time. I'm sorry, I
cannot tell you.
Chairman Gowdy. Well, your answer mirrors what the 1999
ARB further said, which is, first and foremost, the Secretary
of State should take a personal and active role in carrying out
the responsibility of ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic
personnel.
Is that being done now, and was it being done prior to your
tenure?
Mr. Starr. In the time that I was here previously--and I
have served under multiple Secretaries of State--I have heard
every Secretary talk about the importance of security. I have
heard every Secretary state to the personnel, the Department,
that security is their function, their personal security has to
be their function. And that goes for Madeleine Albright, that
goes through Secretary Clinton, Secretary Rice, and with
Secretary Kerry, who has also made those statements and has
made statements that the safety and security of our personnel
is absolutely one of our highest priorities.
Chairman Gowdy. And I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. But,
again, I think words have consequences, and they have meaning,
and most people use words intentionally. And the 1999 ARB
intentionally used the words ``personally'' and ``active.''
That, to me, does not mean talking about something. A personal
review is not simply talking about it.
Is the personal review ongoing? Is that ARB recommendation
still accepted, I guess, is my question. Does the State
Department still accept these recommendations from the 1999
ARB, and is it being done?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I think the best and clearest example that
I can give you today is a new process that we put into place,
the VPVP process, the Vital Presence Validation Process, where
we, again, look at what are our vital national interests and
why should we be in these high-threat, high-risk locations. We
put this process up, and it goes all the way to the Secretary.
Chairman Gowdy. All right. And that is a great point which
leads very nicely into the next point I was going to make or
ask you about. What is it about that recommendation that is so
talismanic that it couldn't have been made prior to the attack
in Benghazi?
Mr. Starr. I think the Department of State has practiced
risk management from the day that I----
Chairman Gowdy. With ``risk management'' being: We're
going to weigh the risk of being somewhere with the benefits of
being somewhere.
We know the risk of being in Benghazi. Can you tell us what
our policy was in Libya that overcame those risks? In other
words, why were we there?
Mr. Starr. These questions, I think, have been fundamental
to the Department for over 30 years. It is the reason why in
many places we have evacuated or we have shut down operations
or we've taken our families out or we've gone down to essential
personnel only or we've asked for Marines to come in and
support us while we're there. I don't think----
Chairman Gowdy. Right. And my point being, Mr. Secretary,
none of that was done in Benghazi.
So what--we know the risk in Benghazi. My colleagues and
you and others have done a wonderful job of highlighting some
of the tripwires, I think is the diplomatic term. What policy
were we pursuing in Libya that was so great that it overcame
all of the tripwires and all of the risk?
Mr. Starr. Not being here at the time, sir, I cannot
answer that question for you.
I do believe, personally, from my time at the United
Nations, that many of us understood that if we lost the eastern
half of Libya, that if we lost the confidence of the people
after the revolution in Libya, that we were going to pay a
terrible price.
And I don't want to put words into Chris Stevens' mouth. I
think he was an immensely talented diplomat. And I was not here
at that time. But I think it was clear in Chris' mind why he
needed to go to Benghazi and what he was trying to accomplish.
I think today we have more formalized processes to make
sure that those decisions are documented. The VPVP process
makes us go through a process that I don't think was there
prior to Benghazi. I think the results of the Accountability
Review Board and the Best Practices Panel and the
recommendations that we've accepted ensure that, as we go
forward, we've got a clearer, more precise, more mandated
process for risk management.
But I would tell you, sir, that every single day for the
years that I was with the Department of State, we were weighing
the safety and security of our personnel versus what our
national security priorities were. And I think that's a
fundamental tenet that you will find that everybody in the
Department agrees with.
Chairman Gowdy. Well, I appreciate you bringing the
hearing, towards its conclusion, back to Chris Stevens and back
to the other four who lost their lives. But Mr. Stevens was
equally clear that he needed help. He was equally clear that
the situation was getting worse in Benghazi. He was equally
clear in asking the people who sent him there to represent us
to provide adequate security. And none was forthcoming.
With that, I would recognize the ranking member for his
closing remarks.
Mr. Cummings. First of all, I want to thank you all for
being here today. I thank all of you.
One thing I want to remind all of us is that we are
Americans, everybody trying to do the best they can to protect
our people.
When we look at what happened in Benghazi, there are a lot
of lessons to be learned. The question is not only have we
learned them, but then how do we address them.
And, you know, quarterbacking--what do they call it,
Monday-morning quarterback?--I think when you look back on
things, a lot of times, you realize the things you could have
done differently that probably would have made things better.
But, you know, we cannot bring back the past, but I think we
can make a difference right now.
It's clear that our diplomats are in some very dangerous
situations. I think we all agree on that. And so now we've got
to figure out how we go about protecting them even better than
we have in the past.
And so that's why, Secretary Starr, I asked you about
coming back to us and letting us know exactly what you're
working on, those things that you still have to do, and
reporting back. It is so important because, when all the dust
settles, the question is, what did we accomplish?
I've been here 17 years, and I've seen a lot of arguments
back and forth, but I think we must concentrate on being
effective and efficient and getting something done. The
arguments that have been made and the frustration that you hear
from both sides, trying to figure out what happened--and I
believe that everybody is acting in an honorable way with great
intentions--but I want you all to understand we're just trying
to figure out what happened so that we make sure, if there were
things that went wrong or could have been better, that it does
not happen again. That's what it's all about.
So, Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for this
hearing, and I want to ask you to do something for me. I want
to bring Mr. Starr back in either December or January. He's
already told us that in 45 days or less he can tell us about
what he's working on and give us some kind of timetable. But I
want him to come back and tell us what has been achieved. And
that's very, very important for me and, I feel, for the whole
committee.
And, Mr. Chairman, if you will, I mean, that's your call,
but I think it would be unfortunate if, when this committee
ends, that we have not addressed these recommendations and
addressed them in a way that would please the families of the
deceased.
And that brings me back to them--four great Americans who
lost their lives. And I think we all made a commitment in one
way or another to them that we would do everything in our power
to find out what happened and at the same time to make sure we
did the best we could to protect our folks overseas, to tighten
up security if that's appropriate. And it is, and we've got to
do that.
And so, with that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you.
Chairman Gowdy. I want to thank the gentleman from
Maryland for all of his help in, frankly, getting ready for
this hearing and the cooperative nature with which he has
always worked with me.
And I think it's an excellent idea. We will work with the
Secretary. I don't want to pick a date that is inconvenient
with his schedule. December suits me better than January. Just,
I'd rather do it sooner rather than later. But we will work
with the Secretary, and I will work with you on the nature of
whether or not that would be a hearing with all of our
colleagues, whether or not that would be with just you and me.
We'll work all that out, but I will pledge to you it will be
done. And it will be done in December if it suits his schedule.
And I also want to just say this. I mean, we were given two
different tasks--and I say ``we''; the House voted for us to be
in existence--find out everything that happened before, during,
and after the attack in Benghazi; and then do everything--and
the Speaker has been very clear in my conversations with him
about this--do everything you can to make sure that it never
happens again.
And part of that is taking recommendations that have been
made in the past and asking whether or not they've been
implemented. The other part of that, frankly, frankly, is
anticipating things that might possibly happen. We do not have
to wait on a tragedy to make recommendations.
And I noted, Mr. Cummings, during the Secretary's opening
statement--I'm not minimizing this at all. If it comes across
as me minimizing it, I am not. But he mentioned that they were
partnering with the New York Fire Department. That's a great
idea, but it does necessarily lead some of us to conclude, why
could that not have been done previously? I mean, fire has been
around a long time. It's been a weapon for a long time. Why
now? And that's not fair for me to ask him, which is why I
didn't ask him. But the notion that we have to wait on
something bad to happen before we can act to do something that
all 12 of us agree ought to be done.
So, again, I thank all of my colleagues. I want to thank
Mr. Schiff again for giving me this idea. I hope he will share
some others with me.
And, again, as we adjourn, I want to adjourn in memory of
Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Ty Woods, and Glen Doherty and
pledge a process that is worthy of their memory and one that
our fellow citizens can respect regardless of their political
ideations.
And, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]