[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UTILIZING CANINE TEAMS TO DETECT EXPLOSIVES AND MITIGATE THREATS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan O'Hara, Acting Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Richard Hudson, North Carolina, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana Eric Swalwell, California
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Amanda Parikh, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Brian Turbyfill, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 1
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Ms. Melanie Harvey, Director, Threat Assessment Division,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Ms. Annmarie Lontz, Division Director, Office of Security
Services And Assessments, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Ms. Jennifer A. Grover, Acting Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Chris Connell, President, Commodity Forwarders, Inc.,
Testifying on Behalf of The Airforwarders Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
For the Record
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Statement of K2 Solutions, Inc............................... 27
Appendix
Questions Submitted By Chairman Richard Hudson for Melanie Harvey 41
Questions Submitted By Vice Chairman Michael D. Rogers for
Melanie Harvey and Annmarie Lontz.............................. 41
UTILIZING CANINE TEAMS TO DETECT EXPLOSIVES AND MITIGATE THREATS
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Tuesday, June 24, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:52 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, Rogers, Brooks, and
Richmond.
Mr. Hudson. The Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order.
Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the use of
canine teams to detect explosives and mitigate threats. I now
recognize myself for an opening statement.
First, I would like to thank all of our witnesses for their
participation. We know your time is valuable and we appreciate
you being here today to discuss this important issue.
Most of us who have dogs know how incredibly intelligent
and capable they are at detecting the slightest changes in
their environments. When that intelligence is coupled with the
highly selective breeding, months of intensive training, and
breakthrough developments in science and technology, canines
become one of the most trusted assets for law enforcement and
military operations in critical environments. They serve as one
of the most reliable security tools that exist today.
TSA has the second-largest number of explosive detection
canine teams in the Federal Government, after the Department of
Defense. TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team
Program has a critical mission to deter and to detect the
introduction of explosives into all the Nation's transportation
systems.
With 985 teams today, including 675 teams handled by local
law enforcement, and 310 teams handled by TSA inspectors, that
is twice the number of teams that existed just 8 years ago.
While we have come a long way in recent years, I believe TSA
can and should continue to increase its use of canines in all
aspects of its mission from passenger and baggage screening to
air cargo screening.
One way TSA has diversified its canine program is by
incorporating passenger screening canine teams into its risk-
based security initiative known as Managed Inclusion. This
initiative uses a combination of behavioral detection officers
and passenger screening canine teams to conduct a real-time
threat assessment of passengers at certain airports, to give
them access to free check benefits on a flight-by-flight basis.
The canines used by TSA to conduct passenger screening
represents a less invasive, highly effective approach. I would
like to examine how canines can become a primary layer of
security at airports, and not just used through Managed
Inclusion, but as an every-day central layer of passenger
screening operations.
In addition, TSA is working with other Federal entities to
establish common guidelines and a baseline standard for
Federal, State, local, and private-sector explosive detection
canine assets. This committee and many stakeholders have long
advocated for establishing common standards. I am hopeful that
TSA will continue to make progress in this area.
I look forward to hearing from our TSA witnesses on whether
common standards will help us move forward in providing the air
cargo industry with the ability to utilize third-party canine
teams to screen cargo. I believe we will hear from at least one
of our witnesses today that this initiative is long overdue.
In January 2013 GAO released a report on TSA's canine
program that offered three recommendations to TSA, including
analyzing available areas that are working well and those that
need corrective action, assessing overall effectiveness of
passenger screening canines as compared to traditional canine
teams, and coordinating with airport operators to deploy teams
to the highest-risk airports.
GAO has informed the committee that it is prepared to close
its first recommendation, and that TSA has made progress on
addressing the other two recommendations. I look forward to
receiving a status update from our GAO witness here today on
this.
Finally, it is important to note that the fiscal year 2015
DHS appropriations bill that passed the House Appropriations
Committee 2 weeks ago includes an additional $5 million for TSA
canine teams, which will allow TSA to accelerate deployment and
training of new teams. I am pleased to see this increase is
included in the bill, and will continue to work with Chairman
Carter and the rest of my colleagues to ensure full funding for
this critical layer of security.
Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here
today. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee,
the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
convening this hearing.
I would also like to thank our panel of witnesses for being
here today to give us valuable insight into TSA's use of
canines and the role they play in aviation security for both
passenger and cargo screening, as well as how they can be used
more effectively in both domains.
The Transportation Security Administration ensures the
security of the traveling public using a multi-layered
approach. Highly-trained canine teams comprise a small part of
this approach. But when used in an efficient and smart manner,
they are an extremely effective tool within a larger toolbox
that can thwart nefarious actors.
However, in January 2013 GAO released a report that was
critical of TSA's handling of the roll-out of its passenger
screening canines. Specifically the report stated that there
was concern with the methodology that TSA implemented when
deploying and testing the canine teams.
In their prepared testimony for the hearing today GAO noted
that TSA is taking steps to analyze canine team data, and to
identify program trends. I am eager to hear about the progress
TSA has made in this regard, and also whether there is more
that can be done by the agency to ensure that canine teams are
being used in a thoughtful and efficient manner.
Ms. Harvey and Ms. Lontz, thank you for being here. Thank
you for the role that you play in helping keep the traveling
public secure.
I read your prepared testimony and was particularly
interested in the section about the use of passenger screening
canines in the Managed Inclusion process. You noted that these
canine teams operate at more than 25 airports during peak
travel times to help reduce waiting times. I know that these
airports also have explosive trace detection equipment in place
to perform the same function.
I look forward to learning if there are efficiencies that
can be achieved by using one method over another or some
combination of the two, as the cost for the technology as well
as the passenger screening canines is great.
I am also interested in the role that explosive detection
canine teams play in the maritime environment. As you know, New
Orleans has a great deal of passengers who travel to and from
the city to other destinations aboard cruise ships. I
understand that most of the work performed in the maritime
environment by canines is primarily in reference to ferries,
but would be interested to know that the role that canines play
in the screening of passengers and cargo aboard cruise ships
such as during the VIPR operations.
Mr. Connell, thank you for appearing before the
subcommittee today. I know that there is significant interest
from the cargo screening industry in having privatized canines
screen cargo as a means of having another platform available to
detect threats.
I look forward to hearing about the screening methods that
are already in place, as well as how the use of privatized
canines would affect your operations, and what savings might
stem from their use. I am also interested in the respondents to
the survey you reference in your prepared testimony who
indicated that they would not consider using dogs provided by
private companies and why they would not use them.
Once again, thank you all for being here today. I look
forward to a healthy dialogue on this topic.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Cedric L. Richmond
June 24, 2014
I would like to thank our panel of witnesses for being here today
to give us valuable insight into TSA's use of canines and the role they
play in aviation security for both passenger and cargo screening, as
well as how they can be used more effectively in both domains.
The Transportation Security Administration ensures the security of
the traveling public using a multi-layered approach. Highly-trained
canine teams comprise a small part of this approach, but when used in
an efficient and smart manner, they are an extremely effective tool
within a larger toolbox that can thwart nefarious actors.
However, in January 2013, GAO released a report that was critical
of TSA's handling of the roll-out of its passenger screening canines.
Specifically, the report stated that there was concern with the
methodology that TSA implemented when deploying and testing the canine
teams. In their prepared testimony for the hearing today, GAO noted
that TSA is taking steps to analyze canine team data and to identify
program trends. I am eager to hear about the progress TSA has made in
this regard and also whether there is more that can be done by the
agency to ensure that canine teams are being used in a thoughtful and
efficient manner.
Ms. Harvey and Ms. Lontz, thank you for being here, and thank you
for the role that you play in helping keep the traveling public secure.
I read your prepared testimony and was particularly interested in the
section about the use of Passenger Screening Canines in the Managed
Inclusion process. You noted that these canine teams operate at more
than 25 airports during peak travel times to help reduce waiting times.
I know that these airports also have explosive trace detection
equipment in place to perform the same function.
I look forward to learning if there are efficiencies that can be
achieved by using one method over another, or some combination of the
two, as the cost for the technology, as well as the passenger screening
canines, is great. I am also interested in the role that explosive
detection canine teams play in the maritime environment. As you know,
New Orleans has a great deal of passengers who travel to and from the
city to other destinations aboard cruise ships.
I understand that most of the work performed in the maritime
environment by canines is primarily in reference to ferries, but would
be interested to know the role that canines play in the screening of
passengers and cargo aboard cruise ships, such as during VIPR
operations.
Mr. Connell, thank you for appearing before the subcommittee today.
I know that there is significant interest from the cargo screening
industry in having privatized canines screen cargo as a means of having
another platform available to detect threats. I look forward to hearing
about the screening methods that are already in place, as well as how
the use of privatized canines would effect your operations and what
savings might stem from their use.
I am also interested in the respondents to the survey you
referenced in your prepared testimony who indicated that they would not
consider using dogs provided by private companies, and why they would
not use them. Once again, thank you all for being here today, and I
look forward to a healthy dialogue on this topic.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 24, 2013
In a time of shrinking budgets, TSA's canine program has the
unusual distinction of having received increases in funding since
fiscal year 2010. This year, TSA will spend $126 million to deploy
canines to airports and mass transit hubs across the country. Increases
in funding for TSA's canine program can be directly attributed to TSA's
decision in 2011 to begin using canines to screen passengers and their
property at airports.
Unfortunately, as the Government Accountability Office detailed in
its report last year, TSA faced several challenges in its initial
deployment of passenger screening canines. According to GAO, TSA failed
to deploy passenger screening canine teams in a risk-based fashion and
did not fully assess their effectiveness prior to placing them into the
field.
While TSA has passenger screening canine teams placed at the most
high-risk airports across the country today, a comprehensive assessment
of their effectiveness has still not been conducted. Specifically, TSA
has resisted GAO's recommendation that the agency conduct tests to
determine whether passenger screening canines are more effective at
identifying explosives on passengers than traditional, less costly,
explosive detection canines.
Without conducting the assessment recommended by GAO, we can have
no way of knowing whether the additional $18,000 per-team TSA is paying
for passenger screening canines is money well-spent. With 144 passenger
screening canine teams currently deployed, that extra $18,000 in start-
up costs for each passenger screening canine team has already cost
taxpayers more than $2.5 million. That is $2.5 million that TSA has no
way of assuring us has been spent on a superior product.
I look forward to hearing from TSA today regarding their plans to
address all of GAO's recommendations regarding passenger screening
canines. I am also eager to hear from TSA about how canines serve as a
better tool for reducing risk in the passenger screening environment
than less-costly alternatives, such as explosive trace detection
technology.
At some airports, TSA uses canines as part of its Managed Inclusion
program. At others, it uses explosive trace detection technology for
the same program and purpose. It must be asked, if the explosive trace
detection technology is as effective at screening passengers for
explosives as canines, why is the less-costly alternative not being
used exclusively?
Before yielding back, I would like to acknowledge Mr. Connell's
suggestion in his prepared testimony that TSA allow third-party canine
teams to screen cargo carried on passenger aircraft. The 9/11 Act
authorized TSA to approve the use of canines for screening cargo
carried on passenger aircraft. It is my understanding that TSA is not
opposed to allowing third-party canine teams to screen cargo on policy
grounds but has concerns about the costs associated with performing
oversight of such a regime.
I look forward to hearing from TSA regarding the anticipated cost
associated with overseeing third-party canine screening. I am also
eager to hear from Mr. Connell regarding how industry may be willing to
offset the cost to taxpayers associated with the necessary Federal
oversight of third-party private-sector canine screening of cargo.
Mr. Hudson. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today.
Ms. Melanie Harvey is the division director of the Threat
Assessment Division within the Office of Security Operations at
TSA. As division director Ms. Harvey leads agency-wide efforts
to plan, deploy, implement, and analyze real-time threat
detection programs. Ms. Harvey manages policy, risk-based
allocation, training, and quality assurance for TSA's
explosives operations, behavior detection, and canine programs.
Ms. Annmarie Lontz is the division director for the Office
of Law Enforcement's Office of Security Services and
Assessments at TSA. Ms. Lontz joined the Federal Air Marshal
Service in 1993, and has held her current position since July
2013, where she manages nine diverse sections within her
office. Ms. Lontz was a special agent with the Federal Aviation
Administration for 10 years and conducted investigations and
security assessments domestically and internationally into
airport and air carrier security.
Ms. Jennifer Grover is an acting director within GAO's
Homeland Security and Justice team, leading a portfolio of work
on transportation security issues. Prior to her work in
Homeland Security and Justice, Ms. Grover was an assistant
director in GAO's Health Care team, where she led her views on
a diverse range of health-care related issues. Ms. Grover
joined GAO in 1991.
Mr. Chris Connell is the president of Commodity Forwarders,
Inc., and testifying on behalf of the Airforwarders
Association. The Airforwarders Association is an alliance of
nearly 400 indirect air carriers, cargo airlines, and
affiliated businesses that serve as the voice of the
airforwarding industry. Mr. Connell has been with Commodity
Forwarders for 24 years, working in various positions in
warehouses, customer service, and sales positions, culminating
with him being named president in 2006.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Harvey to testify.
STATEMENT OF MELANIE HARVEY, DIRECTOR, THREAT ASSESSMENT
DIVISION, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Harvey. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today regarding TSA's Explosive
Detection Canine Teams and transportation security.
TSA's National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program
trains and deploys both TSA-led and State and local-led canine
teams in support of day-to-day activities that protect people
and transportation. These highly-trained teams are an effective
resource for detecting explosives and providing a visible
deterrent to terrorism.
TSA canine teams are also a timely and noble response for
rail stations, airports, passenger terminals, and surface
carriers. They are a key component of TSA's multi-layered risk-
based security model. The success of the canine program is a
prime example of Federal, State, and local governmental
entities working together to provide the most effective
security in the most efficient way.
TSA's canine program has a storied history, beginning in
1972 with the creation of a unique program under the Federal
Aviation Administration. The FAA canine program was transferred
to TSA in 2003, shortly after its formation. Congress has
recognized the value of TSA's program through continuous
funding which has resulted in the largest explosive detection
canine program in the Department of Homeland Security, and the
second-largest in the Federal Government behind the Department
of Defense.
Today, 985 funded canine teams are allocated to 171
locations in 114 cities across the country. TSA allocates these
teams to specific cities and airports using risk-based criteria
that take into account multiple factors including passenger
throughput and threats to transportation security in the
immediate geographical area.
The majority of our teams are comprised of a canine and a
State or local canine handler. For these teams TSA provides and
trains the dogs, trains the handler, provides training aides
and explosive storage magazines, and conduct annual on-site
canine team recertifications.
TSA partially reimburses each participating agency for
operational costs associated with maintaining the teams. In
return the State and local agencies agree to deploy the teams
in their assigned transportation environment at least 80
percent of the handler's duty time. State and local
participation in the program is voluntary and TSA appreciates
the critical role that they play in securing transportation.
Some of TSA's own Transportation Security Inspectors, or
TSIs, also handle canines. Approximately one-third of current
canine teams are led by TSIs, including every one of the
passenger screening canine teams, which are specifically
trained to search people for explosives odor.
The passenger screening canine, or PSC, methodology is both
complex and operationally demanding when compared to
traditional explosive detection canine work. PSC handlers must
have the ability to observe the canine and passengers while
noticing the potential subtle changes in behavior of their
canine while working in confined spaces.
As a result of their specialized training and capability,
PSC teams play a unique role in risk-based security at TSA. In
2012 TSA expanded the PreCheck population through an initiative
known as Managed Inclusion. By combining existing layers of
security in the passenger queue, including PSC teams, TSA is
making real-time threat assessments of the passenger base as
they present for screening.
Currently TSA's PSC teams operate at 27 airports during
peak travel times where they increase security and reduce wait
times. Canine teams complement other checkpoint technologies
that offer different capabilities, such as detection of other
prohibited items and advanced alarm resolution.
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act included a
requirement for DHS to examine the use of third-party explosive
detection canine teams for air cargo screening, and set
performance standards. In 2011, in partnership with the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate, TSA conducted a third-party
pilot assessment to examine the use of these teams in the cargo
environment.
TSA and DHS S&T analyzed current industry detection canine
capabilities to determine the degree of modification needed to
adopt and implement TSA standards. While there is little
question that canine teams can effectively buy down risk when
used to screen cargo, the pilot identified numerous
requirements and challenges for program implementation.
Some of these challenges include industry's need for access
to explosives, TSA oversight required for explosives handling,
and the operational mechanics and resource requirements for
certification evaluation of these teams on a Nation-wide scale.
In conclusion, TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine
team is instrumental to risk-based security, and offers a
unique capability to deter and detect explosives throughout
transportation venues.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss TSA's program with
you today. I am pleased to answer your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Harvey and Ms. Lontz
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Melanie Harvey and Annmarie Lontz
June 24, 2014
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding
explosives detection canine teams and transportation security. The
mission of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is to
protect the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of
movement for people and commerce. TSA's National Explosives Detection
Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) trains and deploys both TSA-led and State
and local law enforcement-led canine teams in support of day-to-day
activities that protect the transportation domain. These highly-trained
explosive detection canine teams have proven to be a reliable resource
at detecting explosives and provide a visible deterrent to terrorism
directed towards transportation systems. TSA canine teams are also
considered a timely and mobile response for support facilities, rail
stations, airports, passenger terminals, seaports, and surface
carriers. They are a key component of TSA's risk-based security model
and an important layer of TSA's multi-layered security program. The
success of the NEDCTP is a prime example of Federal, State, and local
governmental entities working together with a common goal--to help
secure our Nation's transportation system.
TSA's NEDCTP has a storied history, beginning in 1972 with the
creation of a unique Federal program, which established the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) Explosives Detection Canine Team
Program. The FAA program was designed to place certified teams at
strategic locations throughout the Nation, so any aircraft receiving a
bomb threat could quickly divert to an airport with a canine team. The
FAA program was transferred to TSA in 2002, shortly after its
formation, and has continued to expand. Congress has recognized the
value of TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
through continuous funding which has resulted in the largest explosives
detection canine program in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the second-largest in the Federal Government behind the Department
of Defense (DoD).
Today, 985 funded National Explosives Detection Canine teams are
stationed at more than 100 of the Nation's airports, mass transit, and
maritime systems. TSA trains canine teams to operate in the aviation,
multimodal, maritime, mass transit, and cargo environments. The
majority of canine teams working in the aviation environment are
comprised of a dog and a local or State law enforcement officer. For
these teams, TSA provides and trains the dog, trains the handler,
provides training aides and explosive storage magazines, and conducts
annual on-site canine team re-certifications. TSA partially reimburses
each participating agency for operational costs associated with
maintaining the teams, including veterinarians' fees, handlers'
salaries, dog food, and equipment. In return, the law enforcement
agencies agree to use the canines in their assigned transportation
environment at least 80 percent of the handler's duty time. State and
local law enforcement participation in the program is voluntary, and
they play a critical role in TSA's mission to ensure the safe movement
of commerce and people throughout the Nation's transportation security
environment.
passenger screening canines (pscs) and managed inclusion (mi)
TSA's Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) also lead canine
teams. Approximately one-third of current canine teams are led by TSIs,
including every one of the 144 funded Passenger Screening Canine teams,
which are specifically trained to detect explosives' odor on passengers
in the checkpoint environment in addition to their conventional role.
As a result of their proven effectiveness, Passenger Screening
Canine teams play a unique role in Risk-Based Security at TSA. In 2013,
TSA expanded the TSA PreCheckTM population through the use
of real-time threat assessments in an initiative known as Managed
Inclusion. By combining existing layers of security in the passenger
queue, including Passenger Screening Canines, TSA is making real-time
threat assessments of the passenger base as they present for screening.
This enables TSA to more fully utilize TSA PreCheckTM
screening lanes in airports where they are not able to operate at their
full TSA PreCheckTM capacity. Currently, TSA Passenger
Screening Canine teams operate at more than 25 airports as part of
Managed Inclusion and are deployed to operate during peak travel times,
where they will have the opportunity to screen as many passengers as
possible, helping to reduce wait times.
In addition to deployments at the checkpoints supporting the
Managed Inclusion process, all TSA and law enforcement-led teams
conduct a variety of search and high-visibility activities that address
potential threats in the transportation domain. For example, canine
teams play a role during Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) operations. VIPR teams can include a variety of Federal, State,
and local law enforcement and security assets as well as TSA personnel
including Federal Air Marshals, Transportation Security Specialists--
Explosives, Transportation Security Inspectors, and TSA-certified
explosives detection canine teams.
At airports, TSA-led canine teams conduct risk-driven operations to
address potential vulnerabilities in aviation security that are
airport-specific, including no-notice plane-side screening of cargo,
gate screening, and employee screening at high-volume secured area
access points. These vulnerabilities are often identified through
coordination with local or National security partners, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, local law enforcement, and the
National Targeting Center for Cargo.
Canine teams have been proven to be one of the most effective means
of detecting explosive substances. Canine teams complement other
technologies that offer expanded capabilities in terms of detecting
other prohibited items, including firearms.
deployment, acquisition, and training
TSA allocates canine teams to specific cities and airports
utilizing risk-based criteria that take into account multiple factors,
including passenger throughput and threats to transportation security
in the immediate geographical area of a transportation domain.
With increasing demand for high-quality explosive detection dogs,
particularly those best-suited for passenger screening, TSA must ensure
a reliable and adequate supply of canines. The primary source for TSA
canines is through an Interagency Service Support Agreement (ISSA) with
the DoD. Pursuant to the terms of the ISSA and as a result of our
strong relationship with DoD's ``Working Dog Program,'' approximately
230 canines are supplied to TSA each year. TSA's Canine Training and
Evaluation Section (CTES) partners with DoD during the canine selection
and evaluation process with both State-side vendors and overseas buy
trips, ensuring TSA's needs are met. TSA is well-positioned to procure,
train, and continue to deploy highly-effective canine resources.
NEDCTP deploys single-purpose explosive detection canines that are
trained on a variety of explosives. The types of explosives are based
on intelligence data and emerging threats. Conventional explosives
detection canine handlers undergo an intensive 10-week training course,
and passenger screening canine handlers undergo a 12-week training
course, all held at the TSA Canine Training Center at Lackland Air
Force Base in San Antonio, TX. This course of instruction is a ``co-
located course,'' managed by TSA's CTES, whereby TSA shares the use of
the U.S. Air Force training facilities on base. However, TSA controls
the course curriculum and the certification of the teams to TSA-
certification standards. The training course and facilities in San
Antonio, Texas, are considered to be the ``Center of Excellence'' for
explosives detection canine training in the United States.
Canine teams graduate from the TSA canine course after
demonstrating proficiency in various venues inclusive of all
transportation environments including airport, terminal, freight,
cargo, baggage, vehicle, bus, ferry, and rail. Once a team graduates
from the training program, they return to their duty station to
acclimate and familiarize the canine to their assigned operational
environment. Approximately 30 days after graduation, an Operational
Transition Assessment (OTA) is conducted to ensure each team
demonstrates operational proficiency in their environment. OTA
assessments include four key elements: The canine's ability to
recognize explosives odors, the handler's ability to interpret the
canine's change of behavior, the handler's ability to conduct logical
and systematic searches, and the team's ability to locate the
explosives odor source. Upon successful completion of the OTA, NEDCTP
canine teams are then evaluated on an annual basis under some of the
most stringent certification standards.
international security programs
In 2013, TSA established and implemented a formal process for
evaluating and recognizing National Explosives Detection Canine
Security Programs (K9 SPs) in foreign countries for use in aviation
security, checked baggage, and accessible property. Recognition of K9
SPs has several benefits; it allows for greater facilitation of goods,
commerce, and people between countries and eases the burden on industry
by lifting, where appropriate, duplicative or redundant measures while
still ensuring the highest levels of security. TSA has conducted formal
document reviews of several international partners to include New
Zealand, the European Union, and South Africa. In order to recognize
National canine security programs as commensurate with the components
of the TSA canine program, TSA employs a system-to-system approach when
reviewing a canine security program. This system-to-system approach
involves analysis of a host country's security program using a
framework of five fundamental security criteria: Explosive detection
certifications, training, utilization, explosives training aids, and
oversight and compliance. The approach ensures that the combination of
the components that make up a host country's security program provide a
level of security that is commensurate with the components of the TSA
Canine Program's own security system. To date, TSA continues to receive
requests for recognition from international canine programs.
third-party canine
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 directed DHS to
examine the use of third-party explosive detection canine teams for air
cargo screening. In 2011, TSA, in coordination with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T), conducted a Third-Party Pilot Assessment
to examine the use of these teams in the cargo environment. TSA and DHS
S&T analyzed current industry detection canine capabilities through a
pilot to determine the degree of modification to industry programs
needed to adopt and implement TSA screening standards. The assessment
revealed inconsistent results of industry programs due to
unsatisfactory odor recognition and performance. However, TSA remains
open to future proposals on third-party canine use.
industry collaboration
TSA has partnered with the National Security Staff Transborder
Security Sub-Interagency Policy Committee on Working Dogs to establish
a baseline standard for Federal, State, local, and private-sector
explosives detection canine assets to enhance interoperability of
standards for explosives detection canine team programs. Currently, the
committee is working towards a final time line for final coordination,
clearance, and limited publication of the draft guidelines in the
Federal Register.
conclusion
In conclusion, the National Explosives Detection Canine Program
provides highly-trained canine teams focused on furthering TSA's
mission to secure the Nation's transportation systems. They are
instrumental in risk-based security and offer a unique capability to
deter and detect explosives throughout transportation venues. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss this important issue with you today.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Ms. Harvey.
The Chairman recognizes Ms. Lontz to testify.
STATEMENT OF ANNMARIE LONTZ, DIVISION DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
SECURITY SERVICES AND ASSESSMENTS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Lontz. Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and
Members of the subcommittee, I too would like to thank you for
the opportunity to testify today regarding TSA's Explosives
Detection Canine Teams and transportation security.
As the division director for the TSA Office of Law
Enforcement Federal Air Marshal Service, Security Services and
Assessments Division, I am charged with the oversight of the
Canine Training and Evaluation Section, located primarily at
Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas.
The Canine Training and Evaluation Section, or CTES,
supports Division Director Harvey's National Explosives
Detection Canine Team Program through the procurement of
canines, initial training and certification of canine teams,
and recertification of deployed canine teams.
With increasing demand for a high-quality explosive
detection dogs, particularly those best-suited for passenger
screening, TSA must ensure a reliable and adequate supply of
canines. The primary source for TSA canines is through an
interagency service support agreement with the Department of
Defense. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, and as a
result of our strong relationship with DOD's working dog
program, approximately 230 canines are supplied to TSA each
year.
TSA's Canine Training and Evaluation Section partners with
DOD during the canine selection and evaluation process, both
with State-side and international vendors, ensuring that TSA's
needs are met. As a result, TSA is well-positioned to procure,
train, and continue to deploy highly-effective canine
resources.
TSA deploys explosive detection canines that are trained on
a variety of explosives, primarily based on intelligence data
and emerging threats. Conventional explosives detection canine
handlers undergo an intensive 10-week training course, and
passenger screening canine handlers undergo an additional 2
weeks for a total of 12 weeks of training. All is held at the
TSA Canine Training Center at Lackland Air Force Base.
This course of instruction is a co-located course managed
by TSA's CTES, whereby TSA shares the use of the U.S. Air Force
training facilities on base. However, TSA controls the course
curriculum and the certification of the teams to TSA's
certification standards. The training course and facilities in
San Antonio, Texas are considered to be the Center of
Excellence for explosive detection canine training in the
United States.
Canine teams graduate from the TSA canine course after
demonstrating proficiency in various venues inclusive of all
transportation environments including airport, terminal,
freight, cargo, baggage, vehicle, bus, ferry, and rail. Once a
team graduates from the training program they return to their
duty station to acclimate and familiarize the canine to their
assigned operational environment.
Approximately 30 days after graduation an Operational
Transition Assessment is conducted to ensure that each team
demonstrates operational proficiency in their environment.
Operational Transition Assessments include four key elements:
The canine's ability to recognize explosive odors; the
handler's ability to interpret the canine's change of behavior;
the handler's ability to conduct logical and systematic
searches; and the team's ability to locate the explosive odor
source.
Upon successful completion of the OTA, the National
Explosive Detection Canine Program teams are then evaluated on
an annual basis under some of the most comprehensive
certification standards requiring that they demonstrate their
ability to detect all the explosives to which they may
potentially be exposed.
TSA's highly-trained Explosive Detection Canine Teams have
proven to be a reliable resource at detecting explosives and
providing a visible deterrent to terrorism. The Canine Training
and Evaluation Section plays an important role in the
deployment of these canine teams, focused on furthering TSA's
mission to secure the Nation's transportation systems.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important
issue with you today.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Ms. Lontz.
The Chairman recognizes Ms. Grover to testify.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER A. GROVER, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Grover. Good afternoon, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Richmond, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss TSA's implementation and oversight of the
National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.
TSA has deployed over 800 canine teams, including
conventional canines, which detect explosives in stationary
objects, and passenger screening canines, known as PSCs, which
receive additional training to detect and track explosives
being carried on a person.
As you noted earlier, in January 2013 GAO reported on
concerns in three areas. First, TSA's insufficient oversight of
the canine program overall. Second, lack of evidence on the
effectiveness of PSCs in the airport environment, and third the
inconsistent implementation of TSA's policy for risk-based
deployment of PSCs.
Since then TSA has taken steps in all three areas. But TSA
has yet to determine if conventional canines can perform the
same function as PSCs with the same results and at lower cost.
Regarding our first finding about weakness in program
oversight, in 2013 we reported that TSA was collecting data,
but not analyzing it over time to identify areas working well
or in need of correction. For example, when we analyzed the TSA
data we found that some canine teams repeatedly did not meet
training requirements.
Also, TSA was not analyzing their covert test results
beyond a simple pass-and-fail rate. As a result, TSA was
missing the chance to identify specific search areas or types
of explosives where the canine teams were more or less
effective. We recommended that TSA regularly analyze their data
to better understand canine proficiency and ensure effective
program operations.
Now since then TSA has started analyzing canine program
data in all the areas highlighted in our review. In fact, 3
months ago they staffed a new office within TSA called the
Performance Measurements Section, which is focused specifically
on improving the management and oversight of the canine program
by analyzing the canine team data.
Regarding our second finding on effectiveness, in 2013 we
reported that TSA had started using the PSCs in the sterile
areas of the airports, before determining their effectiveness
and before determining where in the airport they would be most
effectively used.
We also noted that TSA's testing had raised questions about
whether conventional canines might outperform the PSCs under
certain airport testing scenarios, and thus recommended that
TSA comprehensively assess the effectiveness of the PSC and the
conventional canine teams.
In response, TSA took action to assess the effectiveness of
PSC teams, and they determined that the PSCs are effective when
working at the airport checkpoints. However, TSA has not
compared the relative effectiveness of the PSC and the
conventional canines at the airport checkpoint, which is
important to ensure that the additional resources that are
required for the PSC teams are warranted.
Finally regarding deployment, in 2013 we found that TSA was
not consistently deploying PSC teams to the highest-risk
airports. At the time TSA officials told us that they generally
defer to airport officials regarding PSC deployment, and that
some airports had concerns about the use of the PSC teams,
specifically related to the composition of the teams and
implication should a PSC team detect explosives on a person.
We recommended that TSA coordinate with airport
stakeholders to deploy PSC teams to the highest-risk airports.
TSA agreed, and they have since deployed or committed to deploy
additional PSC teams to the highest-risk airports.
As we heard today, TSA has also reported that some airports
previously opposed to the use of PSCs have accepted them as
part of the Managed Inclusion program, which allows passengers
not enrolled in TSA PreCheck to access the PreCheck's screening
lanes in certain circumstances.
In conclusion, TSA's new emphasis on data analysis will
better position the agency to understand how well the program
is working, and to target program resources accordingly.
Importantly, a comprehensive assessment of the relative
effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines is still
necessary to provide assurances that the PSC canines are a
cost-effective screening tool.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, this concludes my
statement. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Grover
June 24, 2014
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-14-695T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
TSA has implemented a multi-layered system composed of people,
processes, and technology to protect the Nation's transportation
system. One of TSA's security layers is NEDCTP, composed of over 800
deployed explosives detection canine teams, including PSC teams trained
to detect explosives on passengers.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA has: (1) Regularly
analyzed data to identify program trends and areas working well or in
need of corrective action, and (2) comprehensively assessed the
effectiveness of PSCs, and coordinated with stakeholders to deploy PSC
teams to the highest-risk airports and utilize them as intended. This
statement is based on a report GAO issued in January 2013 and selected
updates obtained from October 2013 through June 2014. For the selected
updates, GAO reviewed TSA documentation, including the results of PSC
effectiveness assessments, and interviewed agency officials on the
status of implementing GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement.
explosives detection canines.--tsa has taken steps to analyze canine
team data and assess the effectiveness of passenger screening canines
What GAO Found
In January 2013, GAO reported that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) collected and used key canine program data in
support of its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
(NEDCTP), but could better analyze these data to identify program
trends. For example, GAO found that in reviewing short notice
assessments (covert tests), TSA did not analyze the results beyond the
pass and fail rates. Therefore, TSA was missing an opportunity to
determine if there were any search areas or types of explosives in
which canine teams were more effective compared with others, and what,
if any, training may be needed to mitigate deficiencies. GAO
recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify
program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of
corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA
concurred and has taken actions that address the intent of our
recommendation. For example, in the event a team fails a short-notice
assessment, TSA now requires that canine team supervisors complete an
analysis of the team's training records to identify an explanation for
the failure.
In January 2013, GAO found that TSA began deploying passenger
screening canine (PSC) teams--teams of canines trained to detect
explosives being carried or worn on a person--in April 2011 prior to
determining the teams' operational effectiveness and where within an
airport PSC teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended
that TSA expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of
PSCs and conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in
stationary objects) in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to
making additional PSC deployments. This would help: (1) Determine
whether PSCs are effective at screening passengers, and resource
expenditures for PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions
regarding the type of canine team to deploy and where to optimally
deploy such teams. TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the
recommendation, but additional action is needed. Specifically, TSA
launched a PSC training and assessment initiative and determined PSCs
to be most effective when working at the airport checkpoint, but TSA
does not plan to conduct a comparison of PSC teams with conventional
canine teams as GAO recommended. In January 2013, GAO also found that
TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams
based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns related to the
composition and capabilities of PSC teams resulted in the teams not
being deployed to the highest-risk airports. GAO recommended that if
PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced security benefit compared
with conventional canine teams, TSA should coordinate with airport
stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports.
TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the recommendation.
Specifically, the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not already
deployed to a specific airport at the time GAO's report was issued have
been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk airports.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work on the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) National Explosives
Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP). Within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), TSA is the primary Federal agency responsible
for security of the Nation's transportation system. Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has implemented a multi-layered
system of security composed of people, processes, and technology to
protect the transportation system. One of TSA's security layers is
NEDCTP, composed of over 800 explosives detection canine teams--a
canine paired with a handler--aimed at deterring and detecting the use
of explosive devices in the U.S. transportation system.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NEDCTP is located within TSA's Office of Security Operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through NEDCTP, TSA trains, deploys, and certifies explosives
detection canine teams. The program began under the Federal Aviation
Administration in 1972 as a partnership with State and local law
enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over airports by pairing law
enforcement officer (LEO) handlers with conventional canines trained to
detect explosives in objects (e.g., baggage and vehicles). In
accordance with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which
established TSA, the transfer of the canine program from the Federal
Aviation Administration to TSA was accomplished in March 2003.\2\ TSA
subsequently expanded the program beyond airports to other
transportation modes, including mass transit, and in January 2008,
further expanded the program to include civilian transportation
security inspector (TSI) canine teams responsible for screening air
cargo. In 2011, TSA again expanded the program by deploying TSI
handlers to airports with passenger screening canines (PSC)--
conventional canines also trained to detect explosives being carried by
or worn on a person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Enacted in November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act established, within the Department of Transportation, TSA
as the agency responsible for securing the Nation's transportation
systems. See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 101(a), 115 Stat. 597 (2001). The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 subsequently transferred TSA to the
newly-established Department of Homeland Security. See Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 403, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My testimony today addresses the extent to which TSA has: (1)
Regularly analyzed data to identify program trends and areas working
well or in need of corrective action; and (2) comprehensively assessed
the effectiveness of PSCs, and coordinated with stakeholders to deploy
PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and utilize them as intended.
This statement is based on our January 2013 report and includes
selected updates on the status of TSA's efforts to implement the
recommendations in that report.\3\ The report cited in this statement
provides detailed information on our scope and methodology. To update
our work, we obtained related documentation from TSA from October 2013
through June 2014, including reports used by NEDCTP to monitor canine
team training minute requirements, results of PSC effectiveness
assessments, and PSC deployment schedules. We also interviewed agency
officials in June 2014 on the progress made by TSA to implement the
recommendations in our January 2013 report. The work upon which this
statement is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to
Analyze Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized, GAO-13-
239 (Washington, DC: Jan. 31, 2013). This is a public version of a
sensitive report that we issued in December 2012. Information TSA
deemed Sensitive Security Information was redacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
NEDCTP's mission is to deter and detect the introduction of
explosive devices into the transportation system. As of June 2014,
NEDCTP has deployed 802 of 985 canine teams for which it is able to
fund across the transportation system.\4\ Table 1 shows the number of
canine teams by type for which funding is available, as well as
describes their roles, responsibilities, and costs to TSA. There are
four types of LEO teams: Aviation, mass transit, maritime, and
multimodal, and three types of TSI teams: Air cargo, multimodal, and
PSC.
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\4\ NEDCTP has not deployed the remaining 183 canine teams.
TABLE 1.--TOTAL NUMBER AND FEDERAL COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) CANINE TEAMS BY TYPE OF
TEAM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Teams For
Type of Canine Team Which Funding Description of Roles and TSA Start-up TSA Annual
Is Available Responsibilities Costs \2\ Costs \2\
\1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Law enforcement officer (LEO): 511 Patrol airport terminals, $94,000 $63,000
aviation. including ticket counters,
curbside areas, and
secured areas; respond to
calls to search unattended
items, such as vehicles
and baggage; screen air
cargo; and serve as
general deterrents to
would-be terrorists or
criminals.
LEO: mass transit................... 131 Patrol mass transit $84,000 $53,000
terminals; search
platforms, rail cars, and
buses; respond to calls to
search unattended items,
such as baggage; and serve
as general deterrents to
would-be terrorists or
criminals.
LEO: maritime....................... 6 Conduct similar activities $84,000 $53,000
as LEO mass transit teams
at ferry terminals.
LEO: multimodal..................... 27 Patrol and search $94,000 $53,000
transportation modes in
their geographic area
(e.g., aviation, mass
transit, and maritime),
and screen air cargo.
Transportation security inspector 120 Primarily screen air cargo. $218,000 $159,000
(TSI): air cargo.
TSI: multimodal..................... 46 Patrol and search $218,000 $159,000
transportation modes in
their geographic area
(e.g., aviation, mass
transit, or maritime), and
screen air cargo.
TSI: Passenger Screening Canines.... 144 Search for explosives odor $237,000 $164,000
on passengers in airport
terminals.
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Total......................... 985
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. GAO-14-695T
\1\ The number of teams for which funding is available is for fiscal year 2014.
\2\ The cost data are as of June 2014, and have been rounded to the nearest thousand. Start-up costs reflect the
costs incurred by TSA during the first year the canine team is deployed. Annual costs include the operations
and maintenance costs incurred by TSA to keep canine teams deployed after their first year in the program.
TSA's start-up costs for LEO teams include the costs of training
the canine and handler, and providing the handler's agency a
stipend.\5\ The annual costs to TSA for LEO teams reflect the amount of
the stipend.\6\ TSA's start-up and annual costs for TSI canine teams
are greater than those for LEO teams, because TSI handlers are TSA
employees, so the costs include the handlers' pay and benefits, service
vehicles, and cell phones, among other things. PSC teams come at an
increased cost to TSA compared with other TSI teams because of the
additional 2 weeks of training and costs associated with providing
decoys (i.e., persons pretending to be passengers who walk around the
airport with explosive training aids). Of amounts appropriated in
fiscal year 2014, TSA received a total of approximately $126.3 million
for its canine program.\7\ This amount includes an additional $1.25
million above TSA's fiscal year 2014 budget request to support not
fewer than 10 more canine teams for the air cargo and aviation
regulation environments.\8\ In its fiscal year 2015 budget request, TSA
is requesting approximately $127.4 million, a $1 million increase.\9\
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\5\ The annual stipend is the Federal cost share TSA provides per
LEO team pursuant to a cooperative agreement between TSA and the LEO
team's agency (State or local). Certain items and services are
reimbursable by TSA through the stipend, including canine food and
veterinary care. The LEO team's agency is responsible for any costs
incurred greater than the amount covered by the stipend.
\6\ The LEO aviation teams' stipends are $10,000 more than those
for other LEO teams because the teams are required to spend 25 percent
of their time screening air cargo, per the cooperative agreement with
TSA.
\7\ For fiscal year 2014, TSA funds NEDCTP through three TSA
activities: Aviation regulation and other enforcement (aviation),
surface transportation security inspectors and canines (surface), and
air cargo.
\8\ See, e.g., Explanatory Statement accompanying Pub. L. No. 113-
76, Div. F, 128 Stat. 5, 247 (2014), at 32.
\9\ In its fiscal year 2015 budget request, TSA proposes to
consolidate all canine assets, including PSC teams and mass transit
teams, within its Aviation Regulation and Other Enforcement account to
allow TSA maximum flexibility to utilize the teams in any
transportation environment as needed in response to changes in
intelligence or capability requirements.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Canines undergo 10 weeks of explosives detection training before
being paired with a handler at TSA's Canine Training and Evaluation
Section (CTES), located at Lackland Air Force Base. Conventional canine
handlers attend a 10-week training course, and PSC handlers attend a
12-week training course.\10\ Canines are paired with a LEO or TSI
handler during their training course. After canine teams complete this
training, and obtain initial certification, they acclimate to their
home operating environment for a 30-day period. Upon completion of the
acclimation period, CTES conducts a 3-day operational transitional
assessment to ensure canine teams are not experiencing any performance
challenges in their home operating environment. After initial
certification, canine teams are evaluated on an annual basis to
maintain certification. During the conventional explosives detection
evaluation, canine teams must demonstrate their ability to detect all
the explosive training aids the canines were trained to detect in five
search areas.\11\ The five search areas are randomly selected among all
the possible areas, but according to CTES, include the area that is
most relevant to the type of canine team (e.g., teams assigned to
airports will be evaluated in areas such as aircraft and cargo). Canine
teams must find a certain percentage of the explosive training aids to
pass their annual evaluation. In addition, a specified number of
nonproductive responses (NPR)--when a canine responds to a location
where no explosives odor is present--are allowed to pass an evaluation
and maintain certification. After passing the conventional evaluation,
PSC teams are required to undergo an additional annual evaluation that
includes detecting explosives on a person, or being carried by a
person. PSC teams are tested in different locations within the sterile
areas and checkpoints of an airport.\12\ A certain number of persons
must be detected, and a specified number of NPRs are allowed for PSC
certification.
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\10\ The majority of canine teams are trained by TSA's CTES.
However, according to TSA officials, because of resource constraints,
TSA contracted with Strijder Group K9, which subcontracted to Auburn
University's Canine Detection Training Center to train some of the PSC
teams.
\11\ An explosive training aid is any explosive used to test and
train a canine in explosives detection.
\12\ The sterile area of an airport is the portion in an airport,
defined in the airport's security program, that provides passengers
access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is
controlled by TSA through the screening of persons and property. See 49
C.F.R. 1540.5.
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tsa has taken steps to analyze canine team data to identify program
trends
Since our January 2013 report, TSA has taken steps to analyze key
data on the performance of its canine teams to better identify program
trends, as we recommended. In January 2013, we reported that TSA
collected and used key canine program data in its Canine Website System
(CWS), a central management database, but it could better analyze these
data to identify program trends. Table 2 highlights some of the key
data elements included in the CWS.
TABLE 2.--EXAMPLES OF DATA ELEMENTS RECORDED IN THE CANINE WEBSITE
SYSTEM (CWS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data Element Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training minutes..................... Canine handlers record time spent
conducting training to ensure
canine teams maintain
proficiency in detecting
explosives odor.
The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) requires
canine teams to conduct a
minimum of 240 proficiency
training minutes every 4 weeks
(month) and for handlers to
record training minutes in the
CWS within 48 hours.
Utilization minutes.................. Law enforcement officer teams
record time spent patrolling
transportation terminals,
searching for explosives odor in
rail cars and buses, for
example, and screening air
cargo.
Transportation security inspector
teams record time spent
screening cargo, which is their
primary responsibility.
TSA requires canine handlers to
record utilization minutes in
CWS within 48 hours.
Certification rates.................. Canine Training and Evaluation
Section evaluators record the
results (certified \1\ or
decertified \2\) of annual
canine team evaluations.
Short-notice assessments............. Field canine coordinators (FCC)
administer short-notice
assessments--covert tests to
assess canine teams' level of
operational effectiveness--on
two canine teams within each
participating agency they
oversee each year.
FCCs are required to document
results of short-notice
assessments, and handlers are
required to record results, in
CWS.
Final canine responses............... Canine handlers record final
canine responses--instances when
a canine sits, indicating to its
handler that it detects
explosives odor.
Canine handlers are instructed to
document final canine responses
in CWS and submit swab samples
to TSA's Canine Explosives Unit
to be analyzed for explosives
odor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of TSA documentation. GAO-14-695T
\1\ Certified teams are canine teams that passed their annual evaluation
and are certified to search for explosives.
\2\ Decertified teams are canine teams that failed their annual
evaluation and are limited to training and providing mobile
deterrence.
In January 2013, we found that NEDCTP was using CWS data to track
and monitor canine teams' performance. Specifically, field canine
coordinators (FCC) reviewed CWS data to determine how many training and
utilization minutes canine teams conducted on a monthly basis. NEDCTP
management used CWS data to determine, for example, how many canine
teams were certified in detecting explosive odors, as well as the
number of teams that passed short-notice assessments. However, in our
January 2013 report, we also found that TSA had not fully analyzed the
performance data it collected in CWS to identify program trends and
areas that were working well or in need of corrective action. For
example:
Training minutes.--TSA tracked the number of training
minutes canine teams conducted on a monthly basis, as well as
the types of explosives and search areas used when training, to
ensure teams maintained their proficiency in detecting
explosive training aids. However, we found that TSA did not
analyze training minute data over time (from month to month)
and therefore was unable to determine trends related to canine
teams' compliance with the requirement. On the basis of our
analysis of TSA's data, we determined that some canine teams
were repeatedly not in compliance with TSA's 240-minute
training requirement, in some cases for 6 months or more in a
1-year time period.
Utilization minutes.--We found that TSA collected and
analyzed data monthly on the amount of cargo TSI air cargo
canine teams screened in accordance with the agency's
requirement. However, it was unclear how the agency used this
information to identify trends to guide longer-term future
program efforts and activities, since our analysis of TSA's
cargo screening data from September 2011 through July 2012
showed that TSI air cargo teams Nation-wide generally exceeded
their monthly requirement. We concluded that TSA could increase
the percentage of cargo it required TSI canine teams to screen.
Certification rates.--We found that TSA tracked the number
of certified and decertified canine teams, but was unable to
analyze these data to identify trends in certification rates
because these data were not consistently tracked and recorded
prior to 2011. Specifically, we could not determine what, if
any, variances existed in the certification rates among LEO and
TSI teams over time because CTES reported it was unable to
provide certification rates by type of canine team for calendar
years 2008 through 2010. According to CTES, the agency
recognized the deficiency and was in the process of
implementing procedures to address data collection, tracking,
and record-keeping issues.
Short-notice assessments (covert tests).--We found that when
TSA was performing short-notice assessments (prior to their
suspension in May 2012), it was not analyzing the results
beyond the pass and fail rates.\13\ We concluded that without
conducting the assessments and analyzing the results of these
tests to determine if there were any search areas or type of
explosives in which canine teams were more effective compared
with others, and what, if any, training may have been needed to
mitigate deficiencies, TSA was missing an opportunity to fully
utilize the results.
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\13\ TSA suspended the short-notice assessments because of FCC
staffing shortages.
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Final canine responses.--Our analysis of final canine
responses and data on corresponding swab samples used to verify
the presence of explosives odor revealed that canine teams were
not submitting swab samples to NEDCTP's Canine Explosives Unit
(CEU). Specifically, we determined that the number of swab
samples sent by canine handlers to CEU for scientific review
was far lower than the number of final canine responses
recorded in CWS. We concluded that without the swab samples,
TSA was not able to more accurately determine the extent to
which canine teams were effectively detecting explosive
materials in real-world scenarios.
In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze
available data to identify program trends and areas that are working
well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources
and activities. These analyses could include, but not be limited to,
analyzing and documenting trends in proficiency training minutes,
canine utilization, results of short-notice assessments and final
canine responses, performance differences between LEO and TSI canine
teams, as well as an assessment of the optimum location and number of
canine teams that should be deployed to secure the U.S. transportation
system. TSA concurred with our recommendation and has taken actions to
address it. Specifically, TSA is monitoring canine teams' training
minutes over time by producing annual reports. TSA also reinstated
short notice assessments in July 2013, and in the event a team fails,
the FCC completes a report that includes an analysis of the team's
training records to identify an explanation for the failure. In April
2013, TSA reminded canine handlers of the requirement to submit swab
samples of their canines' final responses, and reported that the number
of samples submitted that same month, increased by 450 percent, when
compared with sample submissions in April 2012. CEU is producing
reports on the results of its analysis of the swab samples for the
presence of explosives odor. In June 2014, TSA officials told us that
in March 2014, NEDCTP stood up a new office, known as the Performance
Measurement Section, to perform analyses of canine team data. We
believe that these actions address the intent of our recommendation and
could better position TSA to identify program trends to better target
resources and activities based on what is working well and what may be
in need of corrective action.
tsa has conducted additional psc team effectiveness assessments and
deployed some teams to highest-risk airports, but additional actions
are needed
TSA Has Conducted Additional PSC Team Effectiveness Assessments, but
Has Not Compared PSC Teams With Conventional Canine Teams
In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC
teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams' operational
effectiveness. However, in June 2012, the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) and TSA began conducting effectiveness assessments to
help demonstrate the effectiveness of PSC teams.\14\ On the basis of
these assessments, DHS S&T and TSA's NEDCTP recommended that the
assessment team conduct additional testing and that additional training
and guidance be provided to canine teams. See the hyperlink in the note
for figure 2 for videos of training exercises at one airport showing
instances when PSC teams detected, and failed to detect, explosives
odor. In January 2013, we concluded that TSA could have benefited from
completing effectiveness assessments of PSCs before deploying them on a
Nation-wide basis to determine whether they are an effective method of
screening passengers in the U.S. airport environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ S&T is the primary research and development arm of DHS and
manages science and technology research for the Department's
components, such as TSA.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We also reported in January 2013 that TSA had not completed an
assessment to determine where within the airport PSC teams would be
most effectively utilized, but rather TSA leadership focused on
initially deploying PSC teams to a single location within the airport--
the sterile area--because it thought it would be the best way to foster
stakeholders', specifically airport operators' and law enforcement
agencies', acceptance of the teams. Stakeholders were resistant to the
deployment of PSC teams because they have civilian handlers, and TSA's
response resolution protocols do not require the teams to be
accompanied by a law enforcement officer.\15\ According to TSA's
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Security Operations, to
alleviate airport stakeholders' concerns regarding TSA's response
resolution protocols, the agency initially deployed PSC teams to the
sterile areas, thereby enabling TSA to gather data on the value of PSC
teams in the airport environment while reducing the likelihood of a
final response from a PSC, since an individual has already passed
through several layers of screening when entering the sterile area.
However, aviation stakeholders we interviewed raised concerns about
this deployment strategy, stating that PSC teams would be more
effectively utilized in non-sterile areas of the airport, such as
curbside or in the lobby areas. TSA subsequently deployed PSC teams to
the passenger screening checkpoints. However, DHS S&T did not plan to
assess the effectiveness of PSCs on the public side, beyond the
checkpoint, since TSA was not planning to deploy PSCs to the public
side of the airport when DHS S&T designed its test plan. In January
2013, we concluded that comprehensive effectiveness assessments that
include a comparison of PSC teams in both the sterile and public areas
of the airport could help TSA determine if it is beneficial to deploy
PSCs to the public side of airports, in addition to or in lieu of the
sterile area and checkpoint.
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\15\ Unlike LEOs, TSIs (PSC handlers) are unarmed civilians with no
authority to take law enforcement action (e.g., arrest or detain). The
response resolution protocols require the handler to be accompanied by
two additional personnel that may, but not always, include a law
enforcement officer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the June 2012 assessment of PSC teams' effectiveness, TSA
conducted one of the search exercises with three conventional canine
teams. Although this assessment was not intended to be included as part
of DHS S&T's and TSA's formal assessment of PSC effectiveness, the
results of the assessment suggested, and TSA officials and DHS S&T's
Canine Explosives Detection Project Manager agreed, that a systematic
assessment of PSCs with conventional canines could provide TSA with
information to determine whether PSCs provide an enhanced security
benefit compared with conventional LEO aviation canine teams that have
already been deployed to airport terminals. In January 2013, we
concluded that an assessment would help clarify whether additional
investments for PSC training are warranted. We also concluded that
since PSC teams are trained in both conventional and passenger
screening methods, TSA could decide to convert existing PSC teams to
conventional canine teams, thereby limiting the additional resource
investments associated with training and maintaining the new PSC teams.
We recommended that TSA expand and complete testing, in conjunction
with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional
canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making
additional PSC deployments to help: (1) Determine whether PSCs are
effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC
training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of
canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within
airports. TSA concurred and has taken some actions to address our
recommendation, but further action is needed to fully address it.
Specifically, in June 2014, TSA reported that through its PSC Focused
Training and Assessment Initiative, a two-cycle assessment to establish
airport-specific optimal working areas, assess team performance, and
train teams on best practices, it had assessed PSC teams deployed to 27
airports cumulating in a total of 1,048 tests. On the basis of these
tests, TSA determined that PSC teams are effective and should be
deployed at the checkpoint queue. In February 2014, TSA launched a
third PSC assessment cycle to determine how PSCs' effectiveness changes
over time in order to determine their optimal duration time when
working the checkpoint queue (i.e., how many minutes they can work and
continue to be effective).
Although TSA has taken steps to determine whether PSC teams are
effective and where in the airport environment to optimally deploy such
teams, as of June 2014, TSA has not compared the effectiveness of PSCs
and conventional canines in order to determine if the greater cost of
training canines in the passenger screening method is warranted.
According to TSA, the agency does not plan to include conventional
canine teams in PSC assessments because conventional canines have not
been through the process used with PSC canines to assess their
temperament and behavior when working in proximity to people. While we
recognize TSA's position that half of deployed conventional canines are
of a breed not accepted for use in the PSC program, other conventional
canines are suitable breeds, and have been paired with LEO aviation
handlers working in proximity with people since they patrol airport
terminals, including ticket counters and curbside areas. We continue to
believe that TSA should conduct an assessment to determine whether
conventional canines are as effective detecting explosives odor on
passengers when compared with PSC teams working in the checkpoint
queue. As we reported, since PSC teams are trained in both conventional
and passenger screening methods, TSA could decide to convert existing
PSC teams to conventional canine teams, thereby limiting the additional
resource investments associated with training and maintaining PSC
teams.
TSA Deployed Some PSC Teams to Highest-Risk Airports
In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA's 2012 Strategic
Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however,
airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of TSA's
response resolution protocols for these teams resulted in PSC teams not
being deployed to the highest-risk airports. TSA officials stated that
PSC teams were not deployed to the highest-risk airports for various
reasons, including concerns from an airport law enforcement association
about TSA's decision to deploy PSC teams with civilian TSI handlers and
the appropriateness of TSA's response resolution protocols. These
protocols require the canine handler to be accompanied by two
additional personnel that may, but not always, include a law
enforcement officer. According to representatives from an airport law
enforcement association, these protocols are not appropriate for a
suicide bombing attempt requiring an immediate law enforcement
response. TSA's decision to deploy PSC teams only to airports where
they would be willingly accepted by stakeholders resulted in PSC teams
not being deployed to the highest-risk airports on its high-risk list.
Moreover, PSC teams that were deployed to high-risk airports,
specifically two airports we visited, were not being used for passenger
screening because TSA and the local law enforcement agencies had not
reached agreement on the PSC response resolution protocols.
We recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced
security benefit, TSA should coordinate with airport stakeholders to
deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that
deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with its
statutory authority to provide for the screening of passengers and
their property. TSA concurred with our recommendation, and has taken
action to address it. Specifically, as of June 2014, the PSC teams for
which TSA had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at
the time our report was issued have been deployed to, or allocated to,
the highest-risk airports. According to TSA, it was successful in
deploying PSC teams to airports where they were previously declined by
aviation stakeholders for various reasons. For example, TSA officials
explained that stakeholders have realized that PSCs are an effective
means for detecting explosives odor, and no checkpoints have closed
because of a nonproductive response. PSCs also help reduce wait times
at airport checkpoints because PSC teams are one method by which TSA
can operate Managed Inclusion--a tool that allows passengers who have
not, for example, enrolled in TSA PreCheckTM to access to
PreCheckTM screening lanes.\16\ According to TSA, PSC teams
provide an added layer of security, making it possible for TSA to
provide expedited screening to passengers who have not enrolled in TSA
PreCheckTM and therefore have not had a background
check.\17\ In November 2013, TSA also reported it was making progress
in working with stakeholders to allow PSC teams to work at checkpoints
at airports where PSC teams were not previously performing passenger
screening, but rather were training and screening air cargo. In June
2014, TSA officials reported that of all the airports where PSC teams
had been deployed, all but one airport agreed to allow TSA to conduct
screening of individuals at passenger screening checkpoint queues. We
believe that these actions address the intent of our recommendation,
contingent upon TSA comparing PSC teams with conventional canine teams.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Through the TSA PreCheckTM program, passengers who
experience expedited screening may not have to remove their shoes; may
leave their liquids and gels and laptops in carry-on baggage, and are
not required to divest light outerwear, jackets, or belts when passing
through screening checkpoints. We have an on-going review of the TSA
PreCheckTM program, including Managed Inclusion, and
anticipate issuing a report in September 2014.
\17\ For PreCheckTM applicants, TSA conducts a
background check that includes checks against law enforcement,
immigration, and intelligence databases, including a fingerprint-based
criminal history records check conducted through the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The results are used by TSA to decide if an individual
poses a sufficiently low-risk to transportation or National security to
participate in PreCheckTM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Ms. Grover.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Connell to testify.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS CONNELL, PRESIDENT, COMMODITY FORWARDERS,
INC., TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE AIRFORWARDERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Connell. Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond,
Members of the committee, thank you for hearing us on this
important hearing.
My name is Chris Connell, president of Commodity
Forwarders. We are a perishable specialist in the freight
forwarding industry. I also serve as an elected board member
for the AFA, the Airforwarders Association.
As you have heard, the AFA represents over 360 members
ranging from small to large businesses, employing upwards of
about 10,000 employees and subcontractors. The business models
vary from domestic to world-wide operations, from air to ocean
and from truck to rail.
I am helping facilitate exports, imports, and domestic
moves of many products. Our members own aircraft. They work
with scheduled airlines. They run aircraft cargo airplanes. Our
members are key to global trade.
Safety and security is the core to our members'
livelihoods. Air forwarders have worked tirelessly with
Government, customers, partners to better source the global
supply chain. We work due diligently on to comply with the 100
percent screening mandate from the September 11 findings.
We currently are also working with U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol, TSA, and on the Air Cargo Advance Screening Pilots to
move forward. We are highly aware that the threat to the
aviation industry remains high, and we are determined to do our
part to ensure safety.
Canines have long proven to be an effective security tool
for TSA and many of the agencies. In the wake of the 9/11
Commission recommendations that was passed in 2007, TSA created
the Certified Cargo Screening Program, CCSP, which permitted
certified freight companies to screen cargo away from the
airport.
This legislation allowed screening to be performed through
a variety of methods, physical inspection, X-ray, explosive
trace detection technology. Using specifically-trained dogs was
deemed to be an acceptable way to screen cargo, but was
restricted for the CCSP program.
AFP believes that privatized canines can be a potentially
valuable part to a multiple layered approach, another tool in
the toolbox, if you will, for CCSFs to perform their process.
Privatized canines are not the magic bullet when it comes to
screening. There is really no magic bullet at this point.
Our belief is that the industry--our belief as an industry
association is that the best route to the highest level of
safety and security is through the multi-layered risk-based
approach that uses the best possible tools available. Only the
sums of those parts equal a more secure supply chain.
The TSA has approved the use of dogs, and only on airports.
TSA-owned canines are limited in number busier airport
passenger terminals, and shared with airline cargo facilities
with tarmac access. For hundreds of forwarders and shippers who
operate off-airport CCSFs, there really is no option to use
canines at their premises.
The issue as we see it is whether authorizing private
companies to provide dogs to conduct security screening at
Government-certified freight forwarding facilities, assuming
those dogs are trained and certified to Government standards,
is a good thing to do moving forward. We believe that is
something the TSA should move forward with hand-in-hand with
industry.
Just this month the AFA surveyed our members and found that
three-quarters of our respondents, half of them which are
CCSFs, say that it would strongly consider using dogs provided
by private companies if they were given the option. Companies
such as Atlas, DHS, FedEx, UPS, TNT are highly supportive of
having the option to use privatized canines to screen cargo.
In 2013 my Los Angeles facility screened over 6.7 million
packages through a combination of ETD, X-ray, and metal
detection. Due to the density of produce, seafood, and
proteins, the majority of the screening, if not all, was done
by at the box level.
We have not seen an economically feasible technology to
date to screen high-density cargo by the skid. It seems to be
nothing in the pipeline. That is why we would like TSA to
consider using dogs for the cargo CCSF program.
The products my customers ship are items that families eat
every day and need cool chain. Food safety and other areas for
efficient transportation methods are key to not just food
safety, but also the security and the efficiencies of the
businesses we run.
CFI spent $1.6 million on screeners, loaders, and forklift
drivers to screen those 6.7 million cases. Now keep in mind,
that is just in our Los Angeles facility alone, for a small to
medium-sized forwarder.
Our customers range from Costco, Wal-Mart, Tyson, Cisco,
and many other small to medium-sized businesses. They are
looking for the least traumatic screening method as possible,
not just to control costs, but also to maintain the best
quality of food we ship and people eat.
Time is money in our business. Accordingly, we are highly
interested in any solution that can help us expedite the
screening process, move our perishables more quickly through
the supply chain and still provide the utmost in food safety
and security. We think dogs can really help us do that, again,
not as a magic bullet, but as an important option to give us
more tools in the toolbox, so to speak.
We believe that companies like a CFI have saved--can save
over a $1 million a year at a single facility if we access to
third-party solution deploying canines. Of course our customers
would highly appreciate the time, savings, and the solutions to
help achieve this.
It is my understanding that in 2011 the TSA ran a pilot
program to test the feasibility of implementing a third-party
explosive detection canine program that would make explosive
detection dogs available to screen all cargo before it goes to
a passenger or a cargo aircraft. We also understand that while
those results were mixed, but offered encouragement that
private-sector canines could meet TSA standards.
I would hope that the lessons learned by the TSA and the
private canine companies to jointly build testing criteria for
testing not just the private but also the Government dogs as a
benchmark would be useful in the next phase.
Given the track record of canines in cargo screening,
proceeding with the private-sector option with solutions fully
regulated, certified, and monitored by TSA would square with
the screening approaches under CCSF, such as in-house X-ray,
ETD where the Government does not develop the technology and
solutions in-house, rather relies on private sector to do the
work and puts it through a rigid testing before authorizing it
for use.
We think this approach would work well for using dogs just
as it did for X-ray and other technologies in the pipeline.
In conclusion, we urge that the TSA gets funding to help
finalize its efforts to develop a certification program for
private companies to enable them to use their own canines,
certified to TSA standards, to meet Federal air cargo screening
mandates through the CCSF program. Leveraging private-sector
resources will introduce much-needed additional canines to the
cargo screening system.
The Aviation Security Advisory Committee, ASAC, comprised
of stakeholders, including the Airforwarders Association, as
diverse as the Association of Flight Attendants to the Pan Am
103 survivors, have endorsed the concept of private screening
through canines. It is our hope that this hearing will spur
what appears to be a near-universal support for private
canines.
Thank you for your opportunity. I will be happy to answer
questions as you deem fit.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Connell
June 24, 2014
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
committee, thank you for holding this important hearing and for
inviting me to testify.
My name is Chris Connell and I am the president of Commodity
Forwarders, a freight forwarding company specializing in perishable
products. We are headquartered in Los Angeles and we operate both
domestically and internationally. Today I am testifying on behalf of
the Airforwarders Association (AfA), on whose board I sit.
The Airforwarders Association represents 360 member companies that
together employ tens of thousands of employees and contractors. AfA
members range from small businesses to large companies with thousands
of employees, and with business models varying from domestic to world-
wide operations. Some of our members operate their own aircraft, but
most use scheduled airlines and operators of cargo planes to move the
freight they are handling.
Accordingly, we move our clients' cargo throughout the supply chain
in the most timely and cost-efficient manner, whether it is carried on
aircraft, truck, rail, or ship. As many of our members operate
internationally, we are a key cog in global trade and logistics.
cargo screening
Safety and security are at the core of our members' livelihoods.
Since our Nation and our aviation industry came under attack on
September 11, 2001, air freight forwarders have worked tirelessly with
our Government, our customers, and our airline partners to better
secure the global supply chain. AfA members have worked diligently to
comply with the 100% cargo screening mandate and we are currently
working with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on the Air Cargo Advanced
Screening (ACAS) pilots. We are highly aware that the threat to the
aviation industry remains high, and we are determined to do our part to
ensure safety.
Given the topic for today's hearing, I will say, in the spirit of
full disclosure, that in addition to freight forwarders, the
Airforwarders Association also consists of air cargo screening
technology companies and canine screening companies. But I am not going
to tell you that privatized canines are a magic bullet when it comes to
screening, because that would not square with our belief as an industry
association that the best route to the highest level of safety and
security is through a multi-layer, risk-based approach.
Accordingly, what I am here to state is our belief that privatized
canines can be a potentially valuable part of this multi-layer
approach--another important tool in the toolbox, if you will--that also
includes a range of other technology solutions and Government-trained
canines for our members to utilize to meet screening requirements.
The issue here, as we see it, is whether authorizing private
companies to provide dogs to conduct security screening at Government-
certified freight forwarding facilities--assuming those dogs are
trained and certified to Government standards--is a good thing to do.
We believe that it is something that TSA should move forward with.
As you are aware, canines have long proven to be an effective
security tool. In the wake of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act
that was passed by Congress in 2007, TSA created the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP), which permitted certified freight companies
to screen cargo away from the airport. The legislation also allowed
screening to be performed through a variety of methods including
physical inspection, X-ray, and explosive trace detection technology.
Use of specially trained dogs was deemed as an acceptable way to screen
air cargo.
Unfortunately, TSA has permitted only the use of its own dogs, and
only at the airport. TSA-owned canines are limited in number, busy at
airport passenger terminals and are shared with airline freight
facilities only as time and availability permit. So, for the hundreds
of forwarders who operate off-airport Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities (CCSF), there really is no option to use dogs on their
premises.
Just this month we surveyed our members and found that fully three-
quarters of the respondents--about half of whom operate CCSFs--say they
would strongly consider using dogs provided by private companies if
they were given the option to do that. Additionally, I know that Atlas,
DHL, Fedex, UPS, and TNT are highly supportive of having the option to
use privatized canines to screen cargo.
Let me tell you about my own company's experience in operating a
CCSF.
In 2013, CFI's Los Angeles facility screened just over 6.7 million
packages through a combination of ETD, X-ray, and metal detection. Due
to the density of the produce, seafood, and proteins we move, most of
the screening is done at the box level. Cold chain is another area that
requires a more efficient method of screening. CFI spent about $1.6
million on screeners, loaders, and fork-lift drivers to screen most of
those 6.7 million cases. Companies such as Costco, Walmart, Tyson,
Kuehne and Nagel and Sysco, are asking CFI for the least adverse
screening method as possible, not just to control cost but to best
maintain the quality of the food we ship and people eat.
Accordingly, we are highly interested in any solution that can help
us expedite the screening process, move our perishables more quickly
through the supply chain, and still provide the utmost in safety and
security of what we ship. We think dogs can really help us do that--
again, not as a magic bullet, but as an important option to help get
the most out of the other solutions we are already using.
Time is money in our business. And right now we believe that we
could save over a million dollars a year at our LAX facility if we had
access to a third-party solution deploying canines. Of course our
customers would highly appreciate the time savings that this solution
would help us achieve.
past testing of privatized dogs
I understand that in 2011, TSA ran a pilot program to test the
feasibility of implementing a third-party private explosive detection
canine program that would make explosive detection dogs available to
screen all cargo before it goes on passenger and all-cargo aircraft. I
also understand that while the results were mixed, they offered
encouragement that private-sector canines could meet TSA standards. I
would hope that the lessons learned by the canine companies will be
useful should you conduct further testing.
I would add that, given the track record of canines in cargo
screening, proceeding with a private-sector option--with solutions
fully regulated, certified, and monitored by Government agencies--would
square with other screening approaches such as in-house X-ray and ETD,
where the Government does not develop the technologies and solutions
in-house. Rather, it relies on the private sector to do this work and
then puts it through rigid testing before authorizing it for use. We
think this approach would work well for using dogs.
conclusion
In conclusion, we urge TSA to finalize its efforts to develop a
certification program for private companies to enable them to use their
own canines, certified to TSA standards, to meet Federal air cargo
screening mandates. Leveraging private-sector resources will introduce
much-needed additional canines into the cargo screening system. The
Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) comprised of stakeholders,
including the Airforwarders Association and as diverse as the
Association of Flight Attendants to the Pan Am 103 survivors have
endorsed the concept of privatized screening. It is our hope that this
hearing will spur what appears to be near-universal support for
privatized canines.
Thank you for this opportunity and I will be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Connell. I apologize for
mispronouncing your name. One of my favorite bands in high
school was the Connells from Raleigh, NC and I can't help it.
Mr. Connell. It happens all the time.
Mr. Hudson. So sorry about that. But thank you to all the
witnesses.
Before I begin my question I ask unanimous consent to
insert a statement by K2 Solutions into the record, supporting
the use of canine teams in explosive detection.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of K2 Solutions, Inc.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to present written
testimony advocating for the effective utilization of canine teams in
support of the United States' on-going efforts to improve and advance
security measures. As president and chief operations officer of K2
Solutions, Inc., it is my distinct honor and privilege to present a
corporate perspective, derived from extensive experience in the canine
industry, in an effort to aid Nation-wide efforts geared toward
effective and efficient explosives detection and mitigation of related
threats.
The unparalleled efficacy of explosives detection canines has been
supported and acknowledged by research scientists, Government
officials, and politicians alike; by military advisors holding some of
the highest-ranking positions within the Department of Defense; as well
as soldiers in the ground forces who lived to tell stories of the dogs
that saved their lives. It takes little effort to find quotes from
high-ranking military officials touting canines as invaluable assets
aiding in securing the protection of our troops in combat and the
safety of our citizens at home. In his Memoirs, Robert M. Gates
remarked, ``for all the technology, there was common agreement that one
sensor worked better at detecting IEDs than anything else: a dog's
nose.'' General Colin Powell has stated, ``war dogs have, indeed,
served the nation well and saved many lives. Dogs continue to serve to
protect Americans both in combat zones and in homeland security
roles.'' General David Petraeus remarked, ``the capability they
(Military Working Dogs) bring to the fight cannot be replicated by man
or machine. By all measures of performance their yield outperforms any
asset we have in our inventory. Our Army (and military) would be remiss
if we failed to invest more in this incredibly valuable resource.''
Even more prevalent are the stories of marines and soldiers who
were supported by explosives detection canines in war zones and on the
battlefield. These testimonials have a distinctly different tone than
other canine-related accolades; the technical proficiency of the canine
is embodied in the personal accounts as told by the men and women to
whom these dogs were true partners. The following is a mere glimpse of
the value of canine detection from the perspective of those standing on
the front lines.
Lance Cpl. Jarrett Hatley: ``My dog Blue is pretty much like another
Marine, I guess. He doesn't know he's doing it, but he's protecting all
of us. If I have him on a patrol and there's an IED that could hurt us,
I know he'll find it.''
Sgt. 1st Class Regina Johnson: ``There's no doubt about my dog: Number
one, he will protect me. Number two, he will find a bomb.''
Staff Sgt. Robert Calhoun (following the unexpected death of his MWD,
Rony): ``All I ever wanted was to save lives and contribute to the
mission success. Rony saved lives. Rony saved my life when we went into
an abandoned compound, and he found a 155-pound before I stepped on the
pressure plate. Before we left, we were awarded the Bronze Star. He's
the reason--he brought us home.''
While the nature of the commendation may vary depending on the source,
there is unwavering support for the the utilization of canines in
explosives detection and threat mitigation, which steadfastly remains
one of the most valuable capabilities in our arsenal.
Between 2004 and 2010, HEDDO spent approximately $19 billion
researching and developing advanced technologies in an effort to
produce equipment that could match the detection capabilities of a dog
while being maintained at a lower cost. On June 20, 2010, Lieutenant
General Michael Oates, then commander of the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization, told a conference, quite simply, that
``dogs are the best detectors.'' Since that time, there have been no
marked changes or advancements in detection technology; and to date,
there exists no technology that can remotely rival the accuracy and
efficiency of canines in the field of explosives detection.
The time and money that has been spent by the U.S. Government in an
attempt to solve a problem for which an obvious, efficient, and cost-
effective solution already exists has not gone unnoticed by the media
nor by the taxpayers at large. While there is no question that
technology plays an integral role in our Nation's overall advancement
and is the driving force behind much of our success in developing and
instituting state-of-the-art security measures both overseas and at
home, it is imperative that the Congress recognize the value of
utilizing canines for explosives detection--a technology that despite
years of research and billions of dollars in investments remains
unsurpassed.
The utility of deploying canines as a security measure for the
purpose of detecting explosives and mitigating related threats is
incontrovertible. However, the degree of accuracy and consistency with
which canines detect explosives and other hazardous materials is
largely dependent upon the methodologies employed during training. As a
result, substantial consideration should be given when determining
whether Government and non-Government security agencies are adequately
equipped to facilitate and maintain every aspect of a canine program
internally--from initial training, to certification, to on-going
sustainment training required for long-term effectiveness. While
agencies such as the TSA have seen some success as a result of internal
canine programs established to bolster transportation security, the GAO
has pointed out that reports compiled on such internal-agency canine
programs indicate areas of weakness such as inaccurate or inconsistent
detection rates, insufficiencies in the training of both the canine and
handler, and the credibility of internal evaluations and certifications
of canine teams.
By partnering with third-party providers such as K2, the TSA and
Government security agencies will be positioned to take advantage of
methodologies and training tactics that have proven successful in
establishing effective canine detection programs for the Military, DoD,
and local and Federal law enforcement agencies alike. Much of K2's
success is a result of the company's focus on three essential areas of
practice: Comprehensive analyses of programs and training initiatives,
including follow-on training; continuous support and facilitation of
research and development; and formulation and use of innovative
technologies and services, such as explosive detection solutions that
provide safe stand-off distance to personnel using the technology.
Through the utilization of third-party vendors, the Government
realizes the benefits of established techniques and procedures; this
starts with the assessment and selection of quality canines. To date,
K2 has successfully procured, trained, and assessed over 1,570 canines,
and provided certifications and re-certifications for more than 800
explosive-odor and narcotic-detection canines to military, law
enforcement, and civilian clients around the world. This includes six
major contract awards in support of the Marine Corps' Improvised
Explosive Device Detector Dog (IDD) Program, U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), and the British Military Working Dog Program.
Explosive detection teams can provide invaluable security support
to transportation and security agencies when equipped with the proper
initial training and requisite follow-on training. Advanced canine
explosives detection teams are among the most effective in countering
threats posed by IEDs and require more specialized training than the
traditional detection canine, and such training is every bit as
essential for the handler as it is for the canine. For instance, K2's
Person-Borne Explosives Detection Dog (PBEDD) Teams have not only the
ability to consistently detect person-borne explosives present in
average amounts, but also to alert with remarkable accuracy on even
trace amounts of odors. That said, even a canine team trained to the
highest degree of excellence cannot be expected to maintain such rates
of success in the absence of follow-on training. Because K2 views the
canine team as a partnership, training is a team requirement; thus,
training is always provided to the canine and the handler concurrently.
By electing to out-source all or portions of the initial training,
follow-on training, and/or advanced training to third-party experts,
agencies will see marked increases in the consistency and overall
success of explosive detection canine programs.
An additional point worthy of note is the fact that agencies such
as the TSA currently conduct evaluations and certifications in-house.
While internal evaluations can be constructive if carried out regularly
and uniformly, agencies would realize a greater benefit by engaging
external sources to administer at least some percentage of the
evaluations. The use of external evaluation teams has proven highly
effective in providing consistent and objective results. Under a
contract with Johns Hopkins University, K2 executed initial training
using in-house resources available at the K2 K9 training facility,
followed by intensive on-site training, to provide the University of
Maryland with canines capable of detecting person-borne explosives in a
matter of 14 weeks. This type of detection capability is very similar
to the type of detection for which the TSA Passenger Screening Canines
(PSCs) are intended. Because canine detection of person-borne
explosives is a relatively new technology, it was imperative to seek
external certifications to ensure objectivity and credibility. One of
the main reasons this program has been so effective is that the
International Police Work Dog Association (IPWDA) was engaged to
objectively provide the certifications for the University of Maryland
Program. It is worthy to note that the outcome of the certification was
a 100 percent rate of passage, and the canines in the program have
continued to exceed expectations. Regular testing and evaluation by an
accredited objective entity such as the IPWDA is a critical component
of any successful canine program.
In the last 2 years, K2 has successfully supplied third-party
certified handler teams to perform detection searches at a multitude of
different sporting and recreational venues for security enhancement and
has received positive feedback from clients across the board.
Commercial vendors have found this type of relationship to be
advantageous in that the client's objectives are satisfied without
having to support canine kenneling, sustainment, and training exercises
in-house. K2 ensures that its canines are constantly trained to detect
newly developed threat odors and requires all in-house trained canine
teams to be certified externally to ensure the canine teams' capability
is evaluated in an objective manner. While outsourcing can be
extraordinarily beneficial, the advantages are recognized fully only
through the use of qualified third-party vendors.
Over the past decade, the United States has spent significant
resources, and born considerable sacrifice in developing battle-proven,
highly-effective canine detection capabilities. One of the great
benefits resulting from this effort is a clear template showing what
works and what does not when it comes to optimizing canine detection
programs. As our Nation shifts focus from theatres of operation to
greater protection of the homeland against a wide array of threats, it
is imperative that we recognize the necessity of using capabilities and
methodologies that have seen consistent success in IED detection and
related threat mitigation. In order to achieve optimum results, greater
emphasis must be placed on the importance of Governmental and non-
Governmental agencies establishing partnerships and alliances with
third-party providers that have a proven track record of success in the
field of advanced canine explosive training and detection.
Mr. Hudson. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes to
ask questions.
I will start off just sort-of with a general question for
everybody. I am obviously a strong proponent of a risk-based
multi-layered approach to security. Having said that, I believe
that canines are a highly effective, efficient, less-invasive
tool than most of the technologies designed to detect
explosives.
I would like to hear from each of you. What qualities or
capabilities, from your perspective, set canines apart from
other explosive detection technologies that we can deploy at
airports with passengers?
So maybe we just go in the order of testimony.
Ms. Harvey. Yes, sir. There are several qualities that
separate canines from other explosive detection capabilities.
At the airports the other primary technology that we use is
explosive trace detection or ETDS. Canines are distinct from
them in that they--the team provides a very visible deterrent.
An officer or a TSI with a canine, there is no question that
that is a deterrent to our adversaries.
The second thing is it is very portable. So while an ETD or
other equipment needs to be plugged in. It is very difficult to
move from place to place. The team can go wherever the mission
needs.
The third thing is it is very highly effective detection
capability. Along with that comes care and feeding of the team.
So while an ETD has to be plugged in and isn't as portable, it
is available
24/7.
So they are all important parts of TSA's multi-layered
system. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
Ms. Lontz. Just to add onto what Ms. Harvey just said, I
think it is reflective of how the canines can adapt so quickly
as a threat evolves. Our philosophy for training our canines is
for them to train in the environment in which they work.
So our focus really is to ensure that they are the most
capable asset that our canines are able to work in the multi-
modal transportation venues. So we are convinced that our
training process does just that, and allows us to have a very
adaptable canine program that can be utilized wherever
necessary.
Ms. Grover. My comment echoes much of what you have heard
before, that what we have heard from TSA is that they value the
canines as a very mobile screening tool that allows the agency
greater flexibility to meet their needs. And that they also
value them as one of the multiple layers of security.
Mr. Connell. I guess, why canines? I would probably, you
know, want to answer that question from another side.
The issues we see with ETD, X-ray, and metal detection is
the labor intensity that needs to go into to handle skids of
product at the same level, be it not just produce, seafood
needs, but also hard cargo, metal, things from Caterpillar, for
example, or other items of such.
We are finding that the high labor that needs to go into
segregating these products to get them through at the piece
level handles--creates overhead costs of not just manpower,
inefficiencies of facility flow, you know log jams and getting
cargo through to the airport. But the industry has managed to
make due, if you will, to achieve cargo security through the
layered approach.
We feel dogs bring the ability to create more of an economy
of scale through a set facility, allow us to kind of deploy
manpower resources better through the supply chain, and at that
point do it just better, you know where it is a better result
versus a human interaction saying yes or no. I hope that
answers your questions.
Mr. Hudson. That is good. To build on that, you mentioned
in your testimony that your company could save over a million
dollars every year if it was able to use third-party canines to
conduct primary screening. I guess some of these things you
mentioned are ways you would do that, some of the efficiencies
you could find not having to unpack everything and run it
through.
But what sort of challenges, though, on the other hand, do
you currently encounter by using existing screening
technologies other than--maybe you could expound on what you
were saying that you--and how would that work with canines
versus how it works now? Maybe you could get us a little deeper
into your experience there.
Mr. Connell. Yes. I would say our experience, as example
you bring in a skid of cherries. We owe 80 cases. Well, every
one of those 80 cases have to be run separately through a
machine similar to bags. There is obviously the manpower to do
that, the timing, keeping it within the cool chain for better
quality arrival.
Mr. Hudson. If I can interrupt, what size machine are you
running them through?
Mr. Connell. We are running them through--we actually had a
skidded X-ray--or a skidded metal detector at one point, but
the technology was not good enough to see the middle of the
skid. So we deemed that technology--it is available for other
cargos, not available to many different types of cargo
including produce. There is too much water and too much density
through the product.
So then we had to break that down and put it through really
almost a machine that is similar to the bags where it is a
small machine, we are putting it right through and we are
putting 80 single cases through that facility through that one
machine.
We found out things of such where there was not just the
issue of timing and manpower and having to do this in a
refrigerated environment or breaking the refrigerated
environment that hurts the value of this produce, for example.
We also found out that the actual physical of moving cases
and lumping them from place to place to place, skid, to
machine, back onto a skid, for example, created you know a
fracturing of the product and actually created product quality
issues for many of our growers.
So that is just one example. There is an unforeseen quality
hit that would occur when screening it this way. Compared to
you know other countries who screen--because we compete in the
global environment. Canada has picked cherries, things of that
nature.
I would say that is probably the No. 1 issue we saw through
that throughput, also the ability to handle spikes in volume.
It is an agricultural product. So we have to go in and ensure
and on where we can triple our volume in a single day, stacking
for that, making sure you can manage that, preventing backlogs,
making airplanes. Just being efficient.
We are not talking about efficiency, just purely to put in
our pockets. It is also efficiency that allows us to move more
cargo, gives us an economy of scale, helps our airline vendors
and also allows the customers to have a better consumer price
at the end either coming into or out of the United States.
Mr. Hudson. Great. Thank you. My time is expired. So I will
now recognize the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee,
the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will start with you, Ms. Grover. In your written--in your
prepared remarks you mentioned that TSA has improved its
analysis of canine program data relative to what you all found
in 2013. Is TSA doing enough data analysis to keep track of how
well the program is working?
Ms. Grover. Yes, sir. They have made significant
improvements during this past year. Perhaps most importantly is
the staffing of their new Performance Measurements Office that
is designed specifically to review the canine team program
data.
In addition, they have taken several steps to address
specific issues that we raised in our report such as they are
now tracking compliance with the training minute requirement
over time rather than just month-to-month. They are also doing
much more detailed analysis of the reasons for the teams that
fail the short notice assessments, you know the covert testing.
So as long as they continue to maintain the level of
analysis that is currently in place and currently planned, and
then take steps as required to address the findings, then they
should be in good shape for robust oversight of the program.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Ms. Lontz and Ms. Harvey, the 2013 report highlighted the
concerns of various aviation industry stakeholders regarding
the deployment of PSC teams, specifically those representing
the law enforcement community. Three questions from that.
How does TSA work to mitigate stakeholders' concerns
regarding the deployment of PSC teams? Are they supportive of
TSA's efforts to deploy the teams as part of Managed Inclusion?
Has the law enforcement community expressed concerns regarding
the further expansion of the use of PSC teams in the airport?
Ms. Harvey. Thank you, sir. TSA has taken several steps to
address stakeholder concerns.
When we originally rolled out the PSC teams the concerns
from our stakeholders were that there were going to be
excessive hits, for lack of a better word, of the teams, and
they would close down checkpoints or parts of the airport and
you know cause excessive wait times for passengers.
As they have rolled out that has turned out not to be the
case. We have an average of 6 to 8 responses across the country
every week. I think there has only been one shut-down since the
start of the program, and that was over 2 years ago.
So our approach to rolling out the teams has been to work
very closely with the airports, with the airport operators, as
well as the law enforcement at those airports to ensure they
understand our CONOPS and what resolution procedures are going
to be available and if in fact there is a hit.
You asked specifically about their use in Managed Inclusion
and any law enforcement concerns. Again when we rolled out the
program there were some concerns from the law enforcement
community about the resolution procedures. The way that we use
the teams at the checkpoint there are all of the technologies
at the checkpoint to resolve any alarms that the PSCs have in
the queue, and so most of those concerns have been alleviated.
Your final question is whether concerns remain with law
enforcement over expansion of the program. Again, there are
still, I am sure, some concerns, not so much about expansion,
but again in understanding the resolution procedures that are
used when there is a response of the canine team.
Thank you.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Connell, in your prepared testimony you
cite the expense associated with screening cargo at the box
level. Is--a million dollars is what you think you all would
save using a third-party canine team?
Mr. Connell. Canine teams have not established there is
that pricing yet because they don't--they cannot tell us what
their whole processes will be from the TSA. But our estimate is
assuming there will be some cost coming in that about a million
could be saved, you know $800,000 to $1 million could be saved
just in that facility alone.
Not just to mention the through-put that comes out on
quality of product and other you know unattainable--
unachievable items that are hard to really describe.
Mr. Richmond. Have you had a chance to talk about your
industry and your view with--concerning third-party canine
screening with TSA? If so, has TSA been receptive?
Mr. Connell. We have not had--originally when CCSF came up
we had light discussions about the idea of canines. But--and
basically there was a huge mountain of stuff to get through, so
to speak, so that probably fell to the bottom.
Since then the general questions we have had multiple years
ago have been that it was just not going to happen. So we
basically focused on other things that were more achievable.
I have talked to some of my competitors and some of the
industry people who have said they really had the same thing,
they just gave up on having the conversation because the few
times it came up it never really got anywhere, for all the
wrong or right reasons, budgetary, et cetera, had to go through
protocols.
So we were in a way basically discouraged from having more
discussions because why waste our time?
Mr. Richmond. I see my time is expired, but just one last
quick question. We have heard all the good stuff and everybody
supports it. Anyone in your industry opposed to it? If so, who?
Mr. Connell. You know I would say everyone is encouraged by
the idea of it. We obviously have to get through a cost
analysis, a detailed drill-down of what is required and things
of that nature.
I would say you know maybe an average Joe, people, you know
the technology companies who do X-rays and metal detection
might not be the most positive on this. But again, it is a
layered approach. We have to have all those tools in the bucket
per se.
But from talking to the AFA respondents, talking to people,
competitors, people in the industry, I have not seen any
negative pushback from people who actually physically handle
the cargo.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Richmond.
Chairman will now recognize other Members of the committee
for questions they wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance
with our committee rules and practice I plan to recognize
Members who were present at the start of the hearing by
seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
recognized in the order of arrival.
Next I will recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Rogers, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been very
encouraging. As you all know I have been working on this for
many, many years and can talk about this subject until you get
glass-eyed.
So I am thrilled to hear you all are embracing the efficacy
of these explosive detection canines. I think you would agree
with me that they are the most effective tool that we have.
There is nothing that compares to the efficacy of these
canines, particularly the explosive--the vapor wake canines in
detecting explosives.
But the purpose of this hearing is to try to figure out why
we haven't gotten more private third-party providers because
obviously TSA can only grow so far with their canine breeding
and training programs can only grow so far so fast.
So let me ask, and this would be for Ms. Harvey or Ms.
Lontz, how many of the Category X airports now have explosive
detection canines deployed?
Ms. Harvey. Sir, every CAT X airport and all CAT 1 airports
with the exception of four have some sort of explosive
detection canine capability, whether it is led by the State and
local law enforcement or TSA.
Mr. Rogers. Do you know of those how many are vapor wake
canines?
Ms. Harvey. So we are authorized for 144 passenger
screening canine, which is a little bit distinct from the vapor
wake, but the same concept. Those are currently allocated to 36
airports.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Do you know if most of the passengers are
screened by those canines as they go through the security
systems?
Ms. Harvey. So that is something that distinguishes a PSC
from the technology, to the question that was asked earlier. If
the passenger screening team is there and depending on the
configuration of the queue, the PSC team can screen every
passenger that goes through the checkpoint when they are
present.
Mr. Rogers. What about if somebody leaves a bag in the
airport? Let's just say it is an absent-minded traveler who
left their bag outside the restroom, goes to the terminal, 20
minutes later realizes it is missing and goes back. But in the
mean time it has been reported.
When the security personnel are deployed to that bag, what
is--is a canine part of that deployment to determine whether or
not there are explosives in it? Or how do they approach that
bag?
Ms. Harvey. So in general the airport law enforcement are
the officials who respond to those. If there are canine
available, yes, many times they ask for that support.
Mr. Rogers. Absent a canine what happens?
Ms. Harvey. They follow their agency's protocols.
Mr. Rogers. Which would be?
Ms. Harvey. I am not familiar with every--with the law
enforcement protocols.
Mr. Rogers. Well let me ask, clearly you all have embraced
this. What is impeding you putting more of these canines into
more of the airports beyond the Category X? I would imagine in
the Category X airports you don't have 24-hour or multi-shift
coverage.
Ms. Harvey. Yes. So it depends on the airport the number of
teams that we have. There are some airports that have a large
number, again adding up the TSA-led teams with the law
enforcement teams.
We have allocated the teams that we have. Our numbers have
grown significantly over the past few years, as somebody
mentioned has doubled since the early 2000s. The only--right
now the only hold-up on deploying more teams would be our
capacity to train the teams and get them certified.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I agree. Trust me, I know why it took so
long. I have been pushing it for the last 10 years.
But my question is--I fully appreciate the limit on the
capacity of what you can do in training and your own. But there
are third parties out there who can do the same training that
meets your standards. Why aren't we seeing those private
providers utilized more? Because the Defense Department has
been doing this for years. Why aren't you all using the private
folks more?
This may be for Ms. Lontz. I don't--it doesn't----
Ms. Harvey. Are you asking why we aren't using those to
train the teams, the private providers?
Mr. Rogers. To get them in airports. There are private
folks that do exactly what you are doing inside your own
program to breed appropriate bloodlines, train them up, to
certify them, and then deploy them, just like you do. Why
aren't we seeing those people used to supplement what you are
doing to cover additional airports, bus stations, train
stations, and whatever?
Ms. Lontz. Certainly. So this is one of those outstanding
questions that in addition to our resource concerns that the
exact nature of TSA's role in the training, and in certifying
and maintaining the oversight and the proficiency that would
need to be worked out.
Mr. Rogers. What kind of time line do you think that is
going to work out?
Ms. Harvey. So, we have--to summarize, in 2011 we did the
pilot. While the results were somewhat promising, there were
two providers. One of them provided teams that could, we
believe, meet TSA standards. The other provider did not. It
went through I think two canine providers and couldn't pass the
basic code of recognition test.
After that to test the interest from industry sort-of fell
away while they were focused on what technology they could use
to meet the 100 percent mandate. Since that time we have been
busy rolling out the passenger screening canine teams.
Given that there is renewed interest from industry, we are
going to take a look at those concepts, at the third-party
canine concept.
Mr. Rogers. Unfortunately my time is expired. I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
I recognize the gentlelady from Indiana, Mrs. Brooks, for
any questions she may have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to just
continue that line of questioning that my colleague just had
because that is actually the area that I was really quite
interested in because we certainly know that whenever we as--
now as a new Member of Congress, we are traveling through more
airports and more train stations than ever before, and bus
stations.
There is a level of great comfort actually when you see a
canine team there. But yet I am very familiar, having worked in
law enforcement, that they only have a period of time that they
can work every day because then they fatigue and they are not
as effective.
So going to what gentleman from Alabama's point is, is
certainly there must be a number of canine providers in the
industry that are interested. If the pilot only involved two
different providers, how many providers are there? I would ask
you know the whole panel, that are interested in participating
and then you know increasing this public-private partnership?
That is essentially what it would be, would be a public-private
partnership.
I appreciate that you would need to you know make sure that
they meet your level of training. But how many different groups
are out there that would be interested, if you know, or that
you are working with? Two seems just unbelievable to me.
Ms. Harvey. So the two that were--the two that participated
in the pilot were carriers. They contracted out with canine
providers. I don't know how many canine providers there are in
the industry.
Mrs. Brooks. Does anyone have any idea how many canine
providers there might be who might be willing to supplement
TSA's efforts?
Ms. Grover. No, I don't. GAO hasn't looked at that specific
issue.
Mr. Connell. I am not familiar with the exact count. I know
in our research we definitely saw three that in particular were
interested. I know there is a whole host of others that have
been discouraged through what they feel a lackadaisical
approach of testing standards, the ability to benchmark against
current TSA dogs and how that translates to test criteria. But
we can continue to vet them.
But I know there were some questions on, you know, is it
worth their while type of thing. I think that is what is
important to kind-of get established, you know the testing
criteria, before you can bring more member canine units in.
Mrs. Brooks. Would you agree, however, Mr. Connell, that
there could be, as you have said, significant savings if we
could supplement the number of canine teams that we had, and we
ought to be encouraging the industry, those that are, you know,
training the canines, that we really ought to have a huge push
on this because of the savings that could really benefit your
industry?
Mr. Connell. Yes, I would totally agree. Time is money. But
also is a point where you know companies want--they were
willing to fill a gap if the business model is there. I think
the ability to know that is an achievable business model will
definitely generate interest among many dog providers to
provide so, if not necessarily from public or from private
funds.
Mrs. Brooks. Ms. Lontz, the other Federal agencies use
canine teams, whether it is nuclear power plants, United
States, our military personnel. Are you familiar, are they
using third-party canine providers? What have any of the
lessons been from other agencies that TSA maybe has explored?
Ms. Lontz. I am sorry. I am not familiar with what the
other agencies are utilizing and if they are using a third-
party canine. We could certainly explore that though.
Mrs. Brooks. Is anyone else aware whether or not other
Federal agencies are using any third-party providers? Okay.
I certainly hope that we do explore that because I think
that it is an incredible tool that we need to add and expand
on. I have got to believe that those in the canine industry and
who raise these types of incredible dogs would be very willing
and would love to probably get involved in this type of work.
So I just want to thank you for your work on behalf of keeping
us all safe. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. Well, thank you. I think there is enough
interest if the witnesses are willing to stick around a little
bit longer, maybe we will get through another round. If that
is--I don't see any no--we will try to keep it fairly brief.
But this is a great discussion. I appreciate the witnesses'
indulgence.
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes, but I won't take all
that time. But one of the issues I was really surprised to
learn is that there are four separate offices within TSA that
handle canines.
Ms. Harvey and Ms. Lontz, maybe you could help me
understand why. What are the different responsibilities? Why do
we have four different offices that sort of all deal with one--
with the canine issue?
Ms. Harvey. Sir, a few years ago actually TSA combined the
entire canine program into the Office of Security Operations,
which is the organization that I work for. Ms. Lontz's
organization provides the--they procure the canine, train the
canines, and then provide certification of the program. But
there are only two offices in TSA that lead the program.
Mr. Hudson. Good. Well, that is--that was my question. So I
will go ahead and yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Richmond,
for the question he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have one, and
it is for you, Ms. Grover.
Last year GAO recommended that TSA conduct comparison tests
to determine whether passenger screening canines perform better
in the passenger screening environment than traditional
explosive detection canine teams. Have you all conducted that
test? If so, what is the result? If not, when will you conduct
it?
Ms. Grover. Thank you, sir. We did recommend that TSA
compare the effectiveness of the PSC canines to the
conventional canines. They have not done so yet.
It is our hope that they will do so as soon as is
reasonably possible because the PSC canines do cost more to
deploy. They cost more to start up and then they cost more to
maintain on an annual basis. So it is important to determine
that they offer an enhanced benefit relative to the
conventional canines, which are less expensive.
Mr. Richmond. Would anyone like to say if and when we are
going to do that?
Ms. Harvey. Yes, sir. So we have received--we always
appreciate GAO's advice on this. We--from a training philosophy
standpoint we believe that we should train our resources to
operate in the environment where we are going to deploy them.
For passenger screening canine they get an extra 2 weeks of
training. They cost about $18,000 more than traditional canine
in the initial year and then $4,000 more in the out-years based
on its additional certification. They receive specific training
in terms of how to operate in and around passengers. Again, it
is a training philosophy problem that we have with GAO's
recommendation.
That said, I have asked DHS S&T to give us an analysis of
the feasibility of conducting such a study with two concerns.
One, the traditional canine aren't--we don't necessarily look
at the breed or suitability of that canine for working in and
around people. So I have concerns about bites.
So we need to be very careful about the teams that we pick
as well as the protocols that we choose. We--S&T is going to
give us a feasibility study on that sometime in the next 30
days.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman. I will recognize Mr.
Rogers for any additional questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Harvey, what do you mean by traditional canine? I have
heard you use the word conventional also.
Ms. Harvey. Sir, the traditional or conventional. I mean
the traditional explosive detection canine that are trained to
screen inanimate objects and are not specifically trained to
screen people.
Mr. Rogers. Not the vapor wake?
Ms. Harvey. Correct.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
How many--you know you talked about you finished your pilot
study and now you are looking toward rolling out this on a
broader scale. Do you have a time line now that you think you
will be able to grow this program substantially?
Ms. Harvey. Sir, are you referring to passenger screening
canine?
Mr. Rogers. Passenger screening canines who probably will
have to be mostly private, given the capacity of limitations
you are going to have inside TSA.
Ms. Harvey. So we have allocated all of the teams that we
currently have funding for. That is 144 passenger screening
canine team. We have the in-house capability to provide the
canines and the training for that amount.
Mr. Rogers. If money were not your concern, and it is not,
it is our concern, how many do you need?
Ms. Harvey. That is a good question, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Airports. Let's don't even talk about trains
and bus stations and----
Ms. Harvey. Sure.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Freight. Just for airplanes.
Ms. Harvey. So currently we are at 19 out of 28 CAT X
airports. So if we wanted to deploy these teams to all the CAT
X airports we would need whatever that number is, 32 additional
teams.
Mr. Rogers. Then to go beyond Category X airports, I guess
you would like to go there, too, wouldn't you? As the next
natural progression in this process.
Ms. Harvey. We will--our approach is we will--every
additional team that we get, we will apply it to the highest-
risk airport that is left that doesn't have that capability. So
we will just march down that list as we receive additional
teams.
Mr. Rogers. I would ask, for the record, if you will go
back and look and see how much more money you think you would
need to cover the balance of the Category X airports. Give me
an idea about--for the committee, the idea how much it would
cost and how many teams. Or just how many teams----
Ms. Harvey. Okay.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Not just about the cost.
Ms. Harvey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Connell, you talked about wanting to use it
for freight. I think that they are a great way for us to
achieve a higher degree of scrutiny for freight. Have you had
much interaction with TSA about this--these standards? You
mentioned a little while ago that some of the private
contractors were frustrated by the varying degrees of
certification or criteria for certification. Is that accurate?
Mr. Connell. Correct. I mean I am not an expert on dogs,
per se. But in surveying multiple vendors on kind of how the
tests were run in 2011--and again not being an expert, there
was just a common-sense approach of you know if you are going
to run the test have a TSA dog go through it first to benchmark
it that it works. Then have the private dog go after.
Mr. Rogers. But now, Ms. Lontz, didn't you say----
Mr. Connell. That is my impression that did not happen.
Mr. Rogers [coninuing]. Didn't you say a little while ago
you now have an office of certification that you--maybe it
wasn't Ms. Lontz. Maybe it was you, Ms. Harvey.
Ms. Harvey. Yes. TSA certifies each of its teams that we
deploy, whether it is led by a TSA handler or a law enforcement
handler, and conducts an annual recertification as well.
Mr. Rogers. So the concerns that Mr. Connell was expressing
about providers getting frustrated that they were moving
targets as far as criteria, that is no longer an issue?
Ms. Harvey. I am unaware of that being an issue.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Connell, do you think that using canines would help you
fulfill 100 percent screening mandate that is always being
asked for in your industry?
Mr. Connell. Correct. I think we are currently doing the
100 percent. But I think it will allow us to No. 1, do it
better; to do it more efficiently; and No. 3, do it where it
can control costs in such a way that it can only help the
consumer pricing to be better controlled.
Mr. Rogers. So as far as your industry being able to reach
out to third-party providers, the only thing--and I could be
misinterpreting what you were saying. The only thing standing
in the way is the certification process by TSA. Is that
correct?
Mr. Connell. Agreed. I would phrase it slightly different
than that in that it allows us to go and find out what the true
costs are to each facility. Forwarders teaming up together to
you know chip in on the service, so to speak. But I would say
you know having that ability to do so would allow us to take
that next very large step forward and checking the economics of
it.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I just know that I have had, you know,
FedEx, UPS, DHL all have expressed interest in being able to
use this technology to meet their 100 percent screening, along
with other things--other information and things that they use.
So I guess my question then to Ms. Harvey would be: Do you
think that we are very close to the point that these third-
party providers could in a pretty easy way access that
certification process through your office so that they could
provide this screening for these private freight providers?
Ms. Harvey. Sir, I wouldn't say that we are exceptionally
close to that decision. There are a lot of things that would
need to be worked out in terms of roles and responsibilities.
Who provides the explosives?
If TSA provides the explosives, we also need to provide
oversight of how those explosives are handled. We need to work
out rules and responsibilities in terms of certification and
recertification every year, as well as training expectations,
who is doing the training. No funding has been identified for
this effort.
Mr. Rogers. Well, let me close by saying anything I can do
to help you, you let me know. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses for
indulging us. I am sorry the vote schedule kept you here a lot
longer than you intended. I appreciate you hanging with us, and
thank you for your testimony today.
Thank the Members for the good questions. Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses, and I would ask that you respond to these in
writing.
Without objection, subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions Submitted By Chairman Richard Hudson for Melanie Harvey
Question 1a. At the hearing, you stated that there were only 2
offices in TSA that lead the National Explosives Detection Canine Team
Program (NEDCTP)--the Office of Security Operations and the Office of
Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service. However, according to
information provided by TSA, there are two additional offices within
TSA that are responsible for some aspect of the canine program,
specifically, the Office of Security Capabilities and the Office of
Security Policy and Industry Engagement.
Can you identify the responsibilities each of these four offices
has related to the NEDCTP?
Question 1b. While I understand each office may have a unique role
to play, it would seem that in order to ensure efficiency and
consistency across the spectrum of canine deployments, the
responsibilities for the NEDCTP could be consolidated further.
Question 1c. Has TSA done an analysis to determine whether there
are any roles and responsibilities that could be consolidated further
for the NEDCTP?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Security Operations (OSO) has overall responsibility for leadership
of the National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP). OSO
manages the full range of the program including developing
requirements, acquisition, program and financial management, allocation
and deployment, canine operations, policy, performance measures, and
field assessments.
The Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, Canine
Training and Evaluation Section (CTES) supports NEDCTP's mission by
providing training and certification for all canine teams. This
includes selecting and training canines, training handlers, and
conducting initial and recurrent certification of teams by field
training visits and assessments. CTES ensures highly trained and
capable handlers and canines, both Federal (TSA-lead teams) and non-
Federal law enforcement, are deployed to detect and deter the
introduction of explosives into our Nation's transportation system.
Many offices within TSA support NEDCTP in their respective areas of
expertise. For example, TSA's Office of Security Capabilities Test and
Evaluation group is a Department of Homeland Security-designated
Operational Test Agent that provides independent expertise and
resources using program-neutral policies to test and evaluate
technologies, processes, and procedures. OSC provides this support
across TSA for security technologies and capabilities, including to OSO
for NEDCTP. The Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement leads
TSA's policy development and industry engagement and in 2011 played a
major role in the Third-Party Canine pilot, which assessed industry's
capability to use canine teams to screen air cargo. However, NEDCTP
provided the canine subject-matter expertise for the initiative and is
TSA's lead organization for all canine matters.
Question 1d. I understand the Office of Security Policy and
Industry Engagement is responsible for discussing the issue of third-
party certification with the air cargo industry; would this office also
be responsible for implementing any such certification process, or
would it be implemented by another office within TSA?
Answer. All canine certification activities are conducted by TSA's
Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service.
Questions Submitted By Vice Chairman Michael D. Rogers for Melanie
Harvey and Annmarie Lontz
Question 1. Is TSA aware that the following Federal agencies have
been using Third-Party Canine assets to protect critical
infrastructure, Federal employees, and military personnel?
Department of Defense
Federal Protective Service
Department of State
Department of Homeland Security
United States Marshalls
Department of Energy
Department of Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
National Park Service
Multiple Federal Intelligence Agencies
Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
aware of other Federal agencies' use of Third-Party Canine assets in
support of their unique missions. Canine units vary in mission and
operational environment. TSA is an active participant on the National
Security Council--Transborder Security Sub-Interagency Policy Committee
(Sub-IPC) on Working Dogs. This Sub-IPC is one forum at which Federal
agencies with canine programs share information on their unique
programs and missions, as well as best practices.
Question 2a. Is TSA aware these same agencies have testing and
certification standards for use of Third-Party Cannes?
Has TSA spoken to these other agencies regarding their use of
Third-Party Canines?
Question 2b. Why does TSA need to implement their own testing
standards for Third-Party Canine operators? Are no other Federal
standards sufficient to protect critical infrastructure or personnel?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is aware
that some of the Federal agencies rely on external resources for
testing and certification of some of their canine teams. The North
American Police Work Dog Association, United States Police Canine
Association, International Police Work Association, and Auburn
University are a few which offer various services in support of canine
testing and certification.
TSA has spoken with many of these agencies on various aspects of
their programs, including the environments in which they are deployed
and how they are tested, certified, and regulated in support of their
unique missions. Additionally, TSA is an active participant on the
National Security Council (NSC)--Transborder Security Sub-Interagency
Policy Committee (Sub-IPC) on Working Dogs. This Sub-IPC is one forum
at which Federal agencies with canine programs share information and
best practices.
The mission of the National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program
(NEDCTP) is to deter and prevent explosives from entering the
transportation system, including mitigating the threat to aviation. The
margin of error for detection of a threat that can bring down an
aircraft is much smaller than other agencies' threats. TSA's standards
for training, testing, and certification of canine teams ensure that
TSA is making the most efficient use of resources to mitigate that
threat.
There are no Federal standards, and the standards used by the
agencies listed above vary significantly from one organization to
another in support of their unique missions. TSA continues to work as
part of the Sub-IPC on Working Dogs which seeks to establish guidelines
for Federal, State, local, and private-sector explosives detection
canine assets. The guidelines were promulgated by the Sub-IPC to all
Federal stakeholders for comment in July, and it is our understanding
that they will be published in draft form for comment to stakeholders
once Federal comments are adjudicated. When implemented, they could be
used as a baseline standard to enhance interoperability and
capabilities among the varying agencies.
Question 3. What are TSA's testing and certification standards for
Third-Party Canines?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
set standards for the testing and certification of Third-Party Canines.
In the event that the pilot is successful and results in a viable
program, TSA will need to determine resource requirements and
methodology, establish TSA and stakeholder roles and responsibilities,
and implement any variation from TSA's current test and evaluation
standards for Third-Party Canines.
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