[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 19, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-118
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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
Wisconsin JERROLD NADLER, New York
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT,
LAMAR SMITH, Texas Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ZOE LOFGREN, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
DARRELL E. ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
STEVE KING, Iowa Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JUDY CHU, California
JIM JORDAN, Ohio TED DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina SUZAN DelBENE, Washington
RAUUL LABRADOR, Idaho JOE GARCIA, Florida
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
JASON T. SMITH, Missouri
[Vacant]
Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel
Perry Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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NOVEMBER 19, 2014
Page
OPENING STATEMENT
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 1
WITNESS
The Honorable Joseph P. Clancy, Acting Director, United States
Secret Service
Oral Testimony................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 32
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2014
House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room
2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob
Goodlatte (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Coble, Chabot, Issa,
Gohmert, Jordan, Poe, Chaffetz, Marino, Gowdy, Labrador,
Farenthold, Holding, DeSantis, Conyers, Scott, Jackson Lee,
Cohen, DelBene, Garcia, Jeffries and Cicilline.
Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff &
General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief
Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel;
Sarah Allen, Counsel; Brian Northcutt, Secret Service Detailee;
Kelsey Deterding, Clerk; (Minority) Perry Apelbaum, Minority
Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle Brown,
Parliamentarian; Joe Graupensperger, Counsel; and Veronica
Eligan, Professional Staff Member.
Mr. Goodlatte. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will
come to order. And without objection, the Chair is authorized
to declare recesses of the Committee at any time.
We welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on oversight
of the United States Secret Service. Before we begin, I want to
make Members aware that the first portion of our hearing is
open to the public. There may be items which we cannot discuss
in an open setting, because they fall into the category of
being law enforcement sensitive information; therefore, after
the Director has testified and we have concluded one round of
questions, we will recess briefly to clear the hearing room.
After that, Members and staff will be permitted to re-enter the
room and we will convene the law enforcement sensitive portion
of the hearing.
Today we welcome Acting Director Clancy to a hearing to
conduct oversight of the United States Secret Service. We very
much appreciate you being here today, particularly given that
you have only been on the job for a little over a month. You
had an exemplary record of service as the head of the
Presidential Protective Division, and we're grateful that you
agreed to take the reigns of the Secret Service at this
critical juncture.
The Secret Service, created by President Lincoln in 1865,
has a long and distinguished history. The agency has two
primary missions: criminal investigations and protection of the
President, Vice-President and other dignitaries. While
protection is clearly the most visible of its two missions, I
would be remiss not to mention that the Secret Service has
recently had a number of significant investigative
accomplishments, including approximately 6,700 arrests for
financial and cyber crimes in fiscal year 2014 alone, which
prevented more than $3 billion in losses.
It is important to note that the Service has also had many
successes implementing its protective mission. In fiscal year
2014, the Service provided protection for 6,000 travel stops,
including more than 2,500 visits by foreign dignitaries, and
two national special security events.
Secret Service is entrusted with protecting some of our
most valuable assets, including the President, the First
Family, and the White House. This is an extremely difficult,
high-profile mission, for which there is no margin for error.
Recent incidents give me great concern that the policies,
procedures and training at the Secret Service are not entirely
up to the task.
Just after 7:15 p.m. on September 19, 2014, Omar Gonzalez
was able to scale the White House fence, evade numerous Secret
Service officers outside the White House and force his way
through the unlocked front door, armed with a knife. Although
it was initially reported to the public and Congress that
Gonzalez was apprehended just inside the north portico doors,
we have since learned that he actually made it all the way to
the East Room of the White House before being tackled by Secret
Service officers.
The Department of Homeland Security's review of this event
uncovered a laundry list of errors that evening, including
communication systems that didn't work and that officers were
not trained to use properly, a construction project along the
White House fence that obscured officers' sight lines, unlocked
front doors to the White House late on a Friday evening, and a
canine officer who was on a personal cell call without his
radio ear piece in his ear or his tactical radio at the time
Gonzalez scaled the fence. This delayed the officer's response,
meaning that the canine was not able to identify Gonzalez as
the target.
The report also discusses a number of training and staff
issues as well as potential missed opportunities to stop
Gonzalez in the months leading up to September 19.
Today's hearing will take place in two parts: A public
portion and a closed portion, in which we will drill further
down into the deficiencies that have been revealed in the
Secret Service's policies and procedures as well as any
deficiencies with the physical security at the White House. In
particular, I am interested in discussing how the Service
intends to improve security at the White House when, as was
true on September 19, the President or other protectees are not
present.
A month after Omar Gonzalez was able to enter the White
House, another fence jumper was quickly apprehended by Secret
Service officers, including the canine unit. It is my hope that
this incident shows that the service has already implemented
important reforms; however, the Gonzalez fence jumper is just
one of many events in the past few years that call into
question whether the U.S. Secret Service is doing all it can to
fulfill its mission and prevent mistakes. Others include the
Columbian prostitution scandal, the recent ability of a
security guard with a criminal history to take a service weapon
into an elevator with the President, and the incident in the
Netherlands dealing with intoxicated Secret Service agents.
Given the vital role the Secret Service plays in the
security of the President and the White House, it is critical
that Congress investigate the Service's response to recent
incidents and work with the Service to make sure it fulfills
its critical mission. This hearing is intended to do just that.
And since the Ranking Member has not yet arrived, we will
go ahead and swear in our only witness, and, again, welcome
him.
So, Acting Director Clancy, if you would raise your right
hand and repeat after me.
Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Thank you very much.
Let the record reflect that the Acting Director responded
in the affirmative, and we welcome him.
Joseph P. Clancy was designated as the Acting Director of
the United States Secret Service on October 1, 2014, by
Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson. Prior to accepting
the position of Acting Director, Mr. Clancy served as the
executive director of cable security at Comcast Corporation. A
27-year veteran of the Secret Service, Mr. Clancy's career
there began in 1984 in the Philadelphia field office. Mr.
Clancy was appointed special agent in charge of the
Presidential Protective Division on February 1, 2009. Mr.
Clancy held this position until his retirement from the Secret
Service on June 30, 2011.
Mr. Clancy attended the United States Military Academy at
West Point and is a graduate of Villanova University with a
Bachelor of Arts in political science and criminal justice.
Prior to joining the Secret Service, Mr. Clancy worked as a
high school teacher and football and baseball coach for the
Philadelphia Archdiocese.
Mr. Clancy, we appreciate your presence here today and we
look forward to your testimony. Your written statement will be
entered into the record in its entirety, and we ask that you
summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay
within that, there's a timing light on your table. So welcome,
Mr. Clancy.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH P. CLANCY,
ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman
Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and distinguished Members of
the Committee. Let me begin by recognizing the tremendous
support this Committee has given the Secret Service over many
years, and acknowledge your staff, both past and present, who
worked with us on issues as varied as protection of former
Presidents, to cyber crime targeting our Nation's banks and
financial institutions.
Forty-four days ago, I embarked on the greatest endeavor of
my professional life: the privilege of leading the dedicated
and self-sacrificing employees of the Secret Service through a
challenging time in the agency's storied history. While
returning to public service after beginning a second career in
the private sector was not an easy decision, the call to
restore operational excellence to the Secret Service was too
urgent to ignore.
I did not come here today expecting this hearing to be
easy, but it is my hope that the next several hours will yield
productive discussions about the state of the Secret Service.
Without question, the agency has been severely damaged in
recent years by failures ranging from disgraceful misconduct on
the part of some employees to operational breakdowns that
undermine the trust and confidence that previous generations
worked so hard to establish.
One of those operational breakdowns was the White House
incursion on September 19 of this year. I understand the
Committee was briefed last week on the Department's review of
the incident. I read the report. I found the findings
devastating. What hits the hardest is the range of shortcomings
that ultimately allowed Omar Gonzalez to enter the White House
practically unencumbered.
Although I firmly believe the Secret Service is better than
this incident, I openly acknowledge that a failure of this
magnitude, especially in light of other recent incidents,
requires immediate action and longer term reform.
The Department found that the level of training for
Uniformed Division officers likely contributed to Gonzalez's
ability to breach the White House interior, and documented
there was confusion regarding the various roles and
responsibilities during a fence jumping incident.
To address this issue, I will continue to oversee the
integrated training for White House uniformed division officers
and tactical teams that was initiated after the September 19
incident. This training involves dynamic scenario-based
exercises simulating breaches of the White House grounds. My
goal is to ensure that 100 percent of all White House branch
officers receive this training by the end of the calendar year.
If someone does attempt to scale the White House fence, I
want to ensure they are met with immediate and forceful
resistance, but I also view the fence itself as a needed
deterrent for would-be jumpers. The Secret Service has long
held that prevention is the linchpin of effective security
plans, which is why we are currently working with our partners
in the National Park Service to look at potential changes that
would assist in the detection and delay of any person
attempting to scale the White House fence.
Special agent and Uniformed Division staffing levels have
direct impact on the Secret Service's ability to conduct
regular in-service training. Thanks to additional funding
provided by Congress, in fiscal year 2014, the Secret Service
was able to hire a total of 238 new law enforcement positions,
more than tripling the number of hired over the previous 2
years combined. This fiscal year, we hope to surpass that
number and continue our work to achieve staffing levels that
are commensurate with mission requirements.
However, I recognize that staffing challenges are not
remedied overnight. As it stands now, the recruiting and
onboard process takes approximately 12 months, with an
additional 7 months of training for new agents and officers.
While staffing concerns within the agency will take some
time to resolve, I have taken immediate steps to improve the
flow and quality of communication at all levels within the
agency. An integral part of why I agreed to serve as Acting
Director were troubling reports that some employees saw no
option but to take their concerns to people outside the Secret
Service rather than trusting their supervisors and the agency's
leadership to confront difficult issues head on. That is
unsustainable in any organization.
While I have the utmost respect for the employee's right to
report incidence of waste, fraud and abuse in a confidential
manner without fear of reprisal, I also see an urgent need to
reestablish what I view as one of the most basic tenets of a
well-functioning workplace: trust your boss that he will stand
up and do the right thing.
One of the first actions I took since assuming this
position was to foster better communication between the rank
and file, their supervisors, and the agency's executive
leadership. I conducted town hall style meetings with the
Secret Service field offices around the country by video
conference. I personally joined officers and agents at the
White House complex during their daily roll call.
In the event that employees are apprehensive about
discussing their concerns with their supervisors, I instructed
the Secret Service ombudsman to establish a mechanism of
elevating employee concerns directly to the executive review
board for resolution. I made clear the importance of full
accountability and directed that I be present when actions are
taken.
The core values of the Secret Service, justice, duty,
courage, honesty and loyalty, have guided the agency through
many challenges over the course of its history. Now more than
ever, it is critically important for us to recognize that in
the midst of all the turmoil, there is exceptional work being
carried out by thousands of Secret Service employees around the
country and around the world who embody these core values.
In my view, failure can be an integral part of success,
whether that refers to an agency or to an individual. And we
are confident we can fulfill our mission with honor and restore
the Secret Service's rightful place as the most respected
protection service in the world.
Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, this
concludes my opening remarks. I look forward to a good
discussion, and will be happy to answer your questions during
both the open and closed portions of today's hearing as
appropriate. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clancy follows:]
__________
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Clancy. The Ranking Member
has not yet arrived. I will begin the questioning, and when he
does arrive, we will recognize him for both his opening
statement and questions.
As you know, the officers who were present when Omar
Gonzalez jumped the fence on September 19 believed that he was
not armed and did not present a threat that would warrant the
use of lethal force. It was ultimately discovered that he was,
however, carrying a knife when he entered the White House.
Can you explain the Service's policy for the use of lethal
force? And given that Mr. Gonzalez did actually have a knife
when he entered the White House, do you agree with the decision
to withhold lethal force?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. DHS, Department of Homeland Security,
and the Secret Service have a very clear policy on the use of
deadly force. Basically what it states is that an officer, when
it's necessary, is authorized to use deadly force if the
individual poses an immediate danger of death or serious bodily
injury to the officer, the agent or to someone else.
Mr. Goodlatte. And what non-lethal options does an officer
have to subdue or stop a fence jumper?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, officers, in addition to their weapon,
they have batons, they have CS spray, more or less the pepper
spray, and obviously they're trained to use their hands as well
to transition to that mode.
Mr. Goodlatte. Now, are you looking into other options?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, we're always looking at other options that
are available. We have close consultation with other agencies
and we share information. So we're always evaluating the
equipment that we have for our officers and agents.
Mr. Goodlatte. Concern has been raised that there's an
overreliance on the dogs, on the canines that may have impeded
the Service's ability to stop Gonzalez on September 19. Could
you comment on that?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, the canine are obviously a very important
asset that we have on the north and south grounds of the White
House complex. It is one option of several that officers can
use in the event of a fence jumper. It's a decision that the
officers have to make depending on circumstances whether to use
the canine, but previous jumpers have been confronted with--our
officers have used their hands, have used their baton, they've
used other equipment to stop these fence jumpers.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. I want to give you an opportunity
to discuss an incident that occurred back in 2011. It's been
reported that there was a period of initial confusion about
whether gunshots had been fired toward the White House on
November 11, 2011, and that officers were told to stand down.
Can you comment on what the Service did that evening and the
days following to investigate that shooting, and did the
Service realize or did it not realize that anything was wrong
until the bullets were found on the side of the White House
several days later?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Thank you. As I've been briefed, when
we were aware of shots being fired, initially there was a
report over the radio that there was a stand-down order, but
that was quickly overridden. Our officers responded
appropriately. They went to their defensive positions at the
White House complex, because they did hear some noise that
sounded similar to gunshots. We continued to try to identify
where those noises came from, we knew there was construction
down on Constitution Avenue, but we immediately, within 2
minutes, notified the Park Police of the sounds down by
Constitution Avenue.
Within 5 minutes, we located the vehicle that Ortega was
driving. Within 30 minutes, I believe, we built an incident
command center on Constitution Avenue. And then we continued to
stay with the course of the investigation for the next several
days.
Mr. Goodlatte. And how quickly was there a warrant for the
arrest of the suspect in that case?
Mr. Clancy. How many days, sir? As I've been briefed, we
identified Mr. Ortega that day as the owner of the vehicle. And
then through the process of an investigation through our
Pittsburgh field office, we were able to identify where he was
located, and I believe November 15th, a warrant was served on
him in the state of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Goodlatte. So within a few days?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. Not one day of the event?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. With regard to the elevator incident in
Atlanta on September 16th of this year, what steps has the
Service taken to review and revise its policies and procedures
for handling third-party security contractors?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Needless to say, sir, that was a
break in our procedures. We did not follow procedures in our
advance of that visit at the CDC. We have done an investigation
on that, and in general, only sworn law enforcement officials
should be in close proximity to the President, who are armed.
In this case, we did not follow the proper procedures.
It's not a matter of necessarily changing policies, but
more of an indication that we need to do better training and
reshape some of the training that we're doing with our folks on
the protection details.
Mr. Goodlatte. And on that, what is your policy for
determining when third parties may be armed while in the
proximity of the President or another protected individual? How
do you go about determining that?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, the advance agenct will ask first if
there's local security at the site, is anyone armed? And then
needless to say, we also do records checks on anyone who's
going to be in close proximity of the President.
In this case, again, we failed our procedures in allowing
this gentleman to operate the elevator armed.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you very much. My time's expired, and
I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the Crime
Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for his
questions.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Director Clancy, thank you for being
here.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. One of the problems we have around here
frequently is that when we do budgets, we don't think tax cuts
affect the budget and that budget cuts don't affect your
ability to provide services. Can you describe a little bit
about the budget ups and downs over the last 3 or 4 years?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. When I came back to the Secret
Service and accepted this position, I identified three main
areas of concern: one was staffing, one was training, and
obviously the morale as well.
Staffing is a complicated issue. Back in 2011, we were at a
high point with our staffing. We had appropriately 7,024
security personnel back in 2011. In 2012 and 2013, we had a
severe drop-off and there were some uncertain times from a
budget standpoint, and also we realized, from what I
understand, is that that 7,024 number was unsustainable. We
were not able to year after year, continue meet our pay of
those employees, so our numbers dropped down.
Now, in 2014, the year 2014----
Mr. Scott. Excuse me, Director. Did you need 7,024 people?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Keep going.
Mr. Clancy. So in 2014, with the help of Congress, we were
able to hire 238 new security professionals, which was a good
help to us, but we were starting from scratch after not hiring
very few people in 2012 and 2013. So we're starting to work our
way back up, and needless to say, in 2015, that's a priority.
Right now we've got scheduled six classes of uniformed officers
and six classes of special agents prepared to go through
training this year.
Mr. Scott. Now, you are understaffed. What does that do to
people's vacation time and overtime?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. It affects their vacation time, it
affects overtime drastically. Our Uniformed Division works
extremely hard, but very often they get their days cancelled or
they have to extend their workday, and that has a severe effect
on their morale and obviously has an effect on training, which
is something we're going to correct moving forward.
Mr. Scott. When you're understaffed, can you explain what
happens to training?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. When we are understaffed, it's
difficult to get people out to their training assignments,
because of the operational needs of the Service. So one of the
things we've done to alleviate that in the short term is we've
brought agents in from the field, to take some of these
positions that Uniformed Division has at the White House
complex so that we can get people out to training.
Mr. Scott. What happens when people are not properly
trained?
Mr. Clancy. When we're not properly trained, sir, we fail.
Mr. Scott. Now, we have coming up next year another round
of sequester, a 10 percent across-the-board cut. What will that
do to your staffing, morale and training?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, that would have an effect on our staff and
on our training and on our morale. We will continue to do our
very best to fulfill the needs, and we will meet the needs of
the protection of the White House, the first family, we'll do
whatever we need to do to make sure we meet those requirements.
Mr. Scott. Well, if you meet those requirements, then
something's got to give. What priorities will not be met if you
need to transfer people onto the White House security?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, sometimes we do have to reach out to our
field offices, who are doing a tremendous job, as the Chairman
had mentioned in his opening remarks. We take some of those
agents to support us in the protective mode.
Mr. Scott. Do you know if the transfer from Treasury to
Homeland Security had any effect on your ability to perform
your mission?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I don't think I'm one to evaluate. I was a
young manager when we were in the Treasury Department.
Certainly I've had good exposure and experience with the
Department of Homeland Security, and we've used them. As I've
been briefed, for the most recent United Nations, we used our
other components within the Department of Homeland Security to
assist us in that United Nations security plan. We used their
HSI investigators to help us with post standing, we used their
TSA agents to assist us with magnetometers, we used the Coast
Guard to assist us with our water, sea support and air support.
So we were able to use the components of the Department of
Homeland Security to assist us in a very critical mission.
Mr. Scott. Just for the record, when the fence jumper
incident occurred, where was the President and the First
Family?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, when the fence jumper on September 19
occurred, the President had just left for Camp David and the
First Lady was out of the residence as well.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Clancy, good to have you with us this morning.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Clancy, if I were going to pursue an
activity to direct attention to me, I believe I would find some
exercise other than volunteering as a fence jumper at the White
House, but that's me, but maybe I'm in the minority on that
roll.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coble. But it's been reported that the Service had
multiple contacts with Gonzalez prior to the September 19
incident. Will any review of that event include a review of how
information regarding the suspect prior to that date was
handled, including information gathered by the Secret Service
investigators following Gonzalez's arrest on July 19, 2014?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. That's correct, sir. And do you want
me to explain a little bit what happened during that?
Mr. Coble. If you would do that.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. During that time, sir, when Mr.
Gonzalez was arrested down in Virginia, our Roanoke office was
advised of the arrest. There was consultation between the local
authorities and our agents, and at that time, our agents did
not interview Mr. Gonzalez. Subsequent to that, when Mr.
Gonzalez posted bond, our agents did interview Mr. Gonzalez.
And we were aware of the weapons that he had in his vehicle, we
were also aware of the map that he had in his possession.
This is one of the most difficult decisions an agent has to
make, make an assessment of someone that they're interviewing
with whether or not that individual has the potential or the
motive to do harm to any of our protectees. And during that
interview, Mr. Gonzalez did not exhibit any of those
characteristics. He did not indicate in any way that he wanted
to harm any of our protectees, or indicate in any way that he
wanted to harm any of our protectees or the President.
Subsequent to that, he did come to the White House, outside
the White House perimeter. And as he was walking around the
perimeter, one of our uniformed officers noticed he was a
little suspicious the way he was walking and there was a bulge
in the back of his jacket, as I've been briefed here. And the
officer approached him and noticed that he had a hatchet in the
back of his pants, as I was briefed.
The hatchet, my understanding is, in D.C. is not in
violation of the law if it's considered to be used for camping-
type activities, and that's what this individual indicated he
had the hatchet for. The individual also gave a consent search
of his vehicle. So he was very cooperative during the
interview. When they searched his vehicle, there were no
weapons found in the vehicle. There were other hatchets, there
was other camping equipment again, to his story that he was
involved in camping activities. So again, he was released from
the interview.
Then subsequently on September 19, he did return to the
White House. And, again, three of the officers who were
familiar with the hatchet interview recognized him.
And to be candid, one of the things we've addressed since
that incident is that we've got to do a better job of
communicating. Those officers who saw Mr. Gonzalez walking on
the perimeter of the White House did not do a good enough job
of communicating to everyone, including our joint operations
center, that he was in the vicinity again.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Clancy. Let me put another
question to you before that red light illuminates.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Coble. Do you intend to review the White House's
physical infrastructure for security risks? Is it solely within
the discretion of the Service to update the physical security
systems in place within the White House and surrounding
grounds, and which other agencies or offices, if any, must
approve any recommended improvements?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. That's a good question. Thank you,
sir. And we are constantly evaluating all of the security
measures at the White House complex. In fact, the very first
week, I walked the perimeter of the White House as well as the
interior of the White House and looked at the security measures
we had in place.
Now, any adjustments we want to make, just as an example,
the fence, we have to work with our partners, and we're happy
to do that, and we've gotten very good cooperation with our
partners, to include the National Capital Planning Commission,
the Fine Arts Commission, the National Park Service, and we
work with those agencies on the perimeter of the White House
for any adjustments we want to make.
Mr. Coble. I thank you for that, sir.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, for his
questions.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it's a great honor
to follow the gentleman from North Carolina, who has served
this Committee so ably for so many years and been a friend to
me, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
The White House protection, does the Secret Service
protection begin on the inside of the fence or does the Secret
Service have personnel on the outside of the fence on 16th?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, we have a presence on the outside
perimeter as well, yes, sir.
Mr. Cohen. Do the D.C. Police normally also provide some
type of perimeter screening?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, D.C. Police is also on the outside, but
the actual perimeter of the protection of the White House
complex would be the responsibility of the Secret Service, and
we do have people with several different job descriptions on
the perimeter of the White House.
Mr. Cohen. On the day in question of September 19, 2014,
how many agents were on the 16th Street side, that's opposite
Andy Jackson, Lafayette Square, how many folks were on the
street beyond the White House perimeter?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Sir, typically we would have on the
street two Uniformed Division officers, but we also have some
countersurveillance units that could be in that area by
Lafayette Park. We also have posts that are right inside the
gate.
Mr. Cohen. But on the outside----
Mr. Clancy. On the outside, yes.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. You have just a couple.
Mr. Clancy. Yes.
Mr. Cohen. None of them saw this man jump the fence?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, they saw him prepping to jump the fence.
And by that, they can usually see the body language of
individuals who--as you know, so many pedestrians come up to
the fence, but our officers and other security folks, they
recognize when someone is starting to maybe prep to climb the
fence. And they started to move in that direction, and as he
started to make a move for the fence, they shouted verbal
commands, sprinted to Mr. Gonzalez, and they were about an
arm's length or two arm's lengths short of reaching him.
Mr. Cohen. And then what did they do then? Did they jump
over the fence too, or were they incapable of doing that?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. Protocol there, sir, is first to get
on the radio. And one of the officers did get on the radio to
announce a fence jumper. Then their next role is to clear the
fence line of all the guests and all the tourists that are on
Pennsylvania Avenue. And once that individual, in this case,
Gonzalez, had climbed over the fence, now it's the
responsibility primarily of our emergency response team and our
other officers that are inside the fence.
Mr. Cohen. And it's easy to second-guess. I mean, you know,
I do it every Saturday in watching football, but nevertheless,
doesn't it seem like that they should have tried and been able
to leap the fence and chased him from behind, and not just done
what you said, to become a radio communication and clear other
folks? They didn't try to apprehend the person other than yell?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. Everyone has a specific position to
hold when an event like that happens, and one of the reasons is
because of the canine. One of the tools that we have, it can
affect how the canine react to that individual.
But I will say that as a result of September 19, if you go
by the White House, you'll see that we have a bike rack there
now, which we know is not going prevent someone from jumping
the fence, but it's going to allow us to have a little more
time to react to someone who may have designs on climbing the
fence, so that's been helpful.
Mr. Cohen. Is that the only area we've had any history of
people trying to enter the White House from the outside?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. We've had people jump the fence on
other parts of our perimeter. I will say that the north grounds
is more prominent in our people jumping, yes.
Mr. Cohen. Would a moat----
Mr. Clancy. Moat?
Mr. Cohen. Water----
Mr. Clancy. Yeah.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. Six feet----
Mr. Clancy. Yeah.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. Around be kind of attractive and
effective?
Mr. Clancy. Yeah. Sir, it may be. One of the things we
balance is obviously the accessibility of the White House. We
recognize the historic nature of the White House and how the
American people should have access to the White House. So we
are now in the process of working with our partners at the
National Park Services to see if we can do something with the
fence. That's our first step, see if we can do something that
would still be appeasing to the eye and keep the historical
nature of the White House.
Mr. Cohen. Like a higher fence.
Mr. Clancy. Maybe a higher fence, sir, or maybe some other
design.
Mr. Cohen. Because this guy got further in the White House
than some of my Republican colleagues have ever gotten.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. But you're right, sir. A
higher fence would certainly help us, and we're looking for
ways and options. In fact, we hope within the next few months
to have some renderings, some drawings of some options for
people to look at.
Mr. Cohen. And the incident of November 11, there's hardly
anything we can do about somebody from a great distance with a
rifle, is there?
Mr. Clancy. Well, it's very challenging. Yes, sir, you're
right. But what we have done as a result of that is we've
pushed out our perimeter a little bit further out to
Constitution Avenue to monitor that area as well.
Mr. Cohen. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. The Chair thanks the gentleman,
and recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Poe. Thank the Chairman.
Thank you for being here. I have a great admiration for the
Secret Service. Back in the days when I was a judge in Texas, I
had agents bring cases. They were well-prepared and they did
very well, and well received by juries, and I think that's
still the case today.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Poe. The Secret Service does a lot of things.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. Is your number one priority protecting the
President and the President's family?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Poe. So that's number one?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. And everything else is below there and you're in
charge of all that?
Mr. Clancy. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. All right. I believe that the United States,
because of who we are, it's really neat that the people can go
to the White House where the President lives.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. You can't do that in any other countries----
Mr. Clancy. No, sir.
Mr. Poe [continuing]. Whether it's western countries or
third world countries, you can't go see who's in charge, you
can't go to their house.
Mr. Clancy. No, sir.
Mr. Poe. And we get to do that, American citizens get to do
that.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. I think that's a good thing.
Let's go back to the fence jumpers.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. There have been 16 fence jumpers of recent years.
Is that correct?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. And in October 22nd, I think add one
to that. I believe it's----
Mr. Poe. 17.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. All right. Jumping the fence, going onto the White
House grounds without permission, and I guess that would
include Republicans as well going out permission, is a Federal
offense, correct?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. Of those 16, leave out Gonzalez, what happened to
those 16 other fence jumpers?
Mr. Clancy. Sir----
Mr. Poe. Were they prosecuted? Were they told not to do it
again? Were they released at the time? What happened to those
16 fence jumpers who presumably violated Federal law by jumping
the White House fence?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I know charges were filed. I'll have to
get back to you with how that played out in court, sir. I don't
have those figures in front of me.
Mr. Poe. I would appreciate it if you would take each one
of those cases, date and whether they were prosecuted and then
the results of the prosecutions.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. And send that to the Chairman of the Committee,
who will share it with the rest of us.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. We'll do, sir.
Mr. Poe. But that is the priority of the Secret Service, is
protecting the President?
Mr. Clancy. It is, sir.
Mr. Poe. It seems to me that the Secret Service cannot make
a mistake. This is one area where you're protecting the
President, the President's family, there can't be mistakes; and
if there are mistakes, but for some other intervening reason,
bad things are going to happen. I believe that that makes your
job, I mean, as you know and the Secret Service knows, very
serious and very important. There could be no mistakes ever.
You cannot do a redo if there is a mistake of security of the
President and the President's family.
At the White House, it's not just the Secret Service that
is there. There's also the White House police. Is that correct?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, there's a Uniformed Division branch of the
Secret Service that protects the White House facility.
Mr. Poe. So they're still Secret Service?
Mr. Clancy. They're Secret Service, yes.
Mr. Poe. They're not White House police?
Mr. Clancy. Years ago they were called White House Police,
many years ago, yes, sir, but now it's Uniformed Division----
Mr. Poe. Okay.
Mr. Clancy [continuing]. Of the Secret Service.
Mr. Poe. So it's all Secret Service?
Mr. Clancy. It is, yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. Are there protocols when people jump the fence, 16
people jump the fence, to make sure that the President and the
President's family, if that's the ultimate goal of fence jumper
to get to them----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe [continuing]. That will not happen?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. And obviously on September 19, we
failed in the execution of that security plan, but we do have
very specific assignments, responsibilities of all of our
tactical units as well as our officers at the White House
complex.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Mr. Clancy. And they've been successful in all cases other
than----
Mr. Poe. Okay. I've got a couple more questions, because I
have a minute left.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. You're not trying to say, though, this event
occurred because of so-called budget problems, are you?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. This is no excuse. It's solely----
Mr. Poe. It has nothing to do with the budget, because
that's your number one priority, is protecting the President.
All the other things the Secret Service do and do well is
secondary?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Poe. Colombia. How many agents were involved in the
scandal in Colombia?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, as you know, I was not assigned at that
time----
Mr. Poe. I know you weren't.
Mr. Clancy [continuing]. But my understanding is----
Mr. Poe. I know you weren't in charge. Do you know how many
agents were involved?
Mr. Clancy. There were 13, is my understanding, sir, and I
believe 10 are no longer with us.
Mr. Poe. Y'all fired 10 of them or let them retire or----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. There----
Mr. Poe [continuing]. Some----
Mr. Clancy. A mix. Yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. Something like that. All right. I thank you for
your help today, and good luck to you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington, Ms. DelBene.
Ms. DelBene. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, Director
Clancy, for being with us today.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you.
Ms. DelBene. I wanted to ask you regarding the September 19
incident in particular, can you explain further the radio
communications challenges that were experienced? There were
several officers who were unable to hear ``any comprehensible
radio communications'' to notify them of the fence jumper
leading to, for example, a delay in deploying the canine unit.
So is it concerning to learn that some officers experienced
unclear and muffled radio communications about the alarm break,
and can you talk about what might have caused these
communications challenges, whether it was people didn't know
how to operate the equipment properly or whether there was
actually problems with the communications infrastructure, the
underlying infrastructure?
Mr. Clancy. Yes. Thank you. We are very concerned with the
radio communication. For us to execute our security plan, we've
got to have good communication, and that night we did not have
the communication we should have had. I did read the report by
the deputy security of homeland, Deputy Mayorkas, and he
highlighted that as one of our failings, the communication on
that evening.
We immediately went out and checked all the radios at the
White House complex as well as our Joint Operations Center, and
we did discover some areas at the Joint Operations Center
that--the commander at the Joint Operations Center, when he put
out word that there was a fence jumper, he was under the
impression that his communication would override all the
handheld radios, and it did not, but we have now since gone
back and we've corrected that, so when the Joint Operations
Center has to get a message out, that will override any
handheld radio communication.
There was also some reports of the muffling of radio
communication. Sometimes that's in the heat of battle. People
have to slow down, use radio discipline and explain exactly
what happened. But subsequent to that event, we also did a
review of any dead spots, were there any dead spots for radio
communication at the complex, and we found that there are no
dead spots, but the command post was one area that we had to
correct, and that has been corrected.
Ms. DelBene. And given communication is obviously critical
to deploying resources around in a situation like this, the
report recently issued by DHS suggests that aging
infrastructure may have contributed as well. So are there
specific resources that might be preventing you from doing the
best job you can? Is there modernization to the infrastructure
that's going to be important? And can you give me any feedback
on what you think would be more helpful in terms of the tools
that are available to your officers?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry. As I've been briefed,
that is a main concern. Some of our equipment is aging, and
that's one of the areas that we are looking at to try to
enhance our radio communications. It's outdated, some of it.
It's still operational, we can certainly fulfill our mission,
but we are always looking to improve the assets that we have.
Ms. DelBene. And do you know specifically what it is that
you would prefer to have or what would be helpful?
Mr. Clancy. I don't have specifically--I think it's a
little more technical than I have facts today, but we'll
provide a report for you.
Ms. DelBene. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I think I'll yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. DelBene. Thank you.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman, and is
pleased to recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, and
also to congratulate him on his new assignment in the new
Congress as Chairman of the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the Chairman.
And, Director, I thank you for being here. The President
made an exceptional choice by putting you in this position in a
difficult situation, and I appreciate your service to this
country and your taking on this role.
You have an internal code of conduct. My understanding is
that Offense Code 2.4 deals with false and misleading
information. Do you expect every person in the Secret Service
to live under this code?
Mr. Clancy. We do, yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. There's no exceptions as to who should or
should not live under this code about providing false
information and the penalties therein?
Mr. Clancy. That's correct, sir, no exceptions.
Mr. Chaffetz. And my understanding is that if it is found
that you're providing misinformation, that would lead anywhere
between a range of 5-day suspension to removal. Correct?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. Secret Service put out a statement on
September 20th, 2014, after the fence jumping incident where
they said, ``physically apprehended after entering the White
House north portico doors.''
Is that true or not true?
Mr. Clancy. That is not true, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. It was further said that, according to Mr.
Donovan in an Associated Press article that was posted on
September 20, 2014, at 1:24 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Donovan
said the--Ed Donovan, what's his role for the Secret Service?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, he's our public affairs office.
Mr. Chaffetz. Donovan said the man appeared unarmed to
officers, who spotted him climbing a fence, and a search of the
suspect turned up no weapons.
Is that true or not true?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, it's not true. Can I elaborate on that,
sir, or--I'm sorry.
Mr. Chaffetz. Let me keep going.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. How quickly after he was apprehended did you
find the weapon on the suspect that had entered the White
House?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, within minutes, I would have to assume,
sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. And somehow Mr. Donovan evidently claimed
that the suspect turned up no weapon. This is then posted on
the Associated Press. Was there ever a correction given to
the--posted on the Secret Service Web site or given to the
media that this was inaccurate?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I don't know the answer.
Mr. Chaffetz. So they just let that linger out there in
perpetuity. Let me go on.
Operation Moonlight, Mr. Donovan is quoted as saying,
``because there were no protective assets used during these
checks, there was no impact on protective operations.''
Do you believe that to be true or not true?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, from the inspector general's report,
everyone interviewed indicated it did not affect the protection
of the President.
Mr. Chaffetz. So you have a prowler unit that's outside the
White House, you have the President of the United States in the
White House----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz [continuing]. And you don't believe that
there's trouble by taking those protective assets and moving
them close to an hour away from the President himself?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I've read the inspector general's report,
and we respect his report, and we agree with the report that
there was poor judgment in sending the prowler unit that
distance in this case.
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, the inspector general came to the
conclusion that the prowler unit would have been unable to
respond if there was an incident at the White House.
Mr. Clancy. That particular prowler unit, yes, that's
correct, sir. Any agent that is----
Mr. Chaffetz. So did the President have more or less assets
around him from the Secret Service by moving the prowler unit
away? He had less, right?
Mr. Clancy. He did not have that unit, yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. So there was less protection for the
President as opposed to more protection for the President,
correct?
Mr. Clancy. Well, the prowler unit is a reactive unit. It's
not a protective unit.
Mr. Chaffetz. We don't know if there's going to be an
incident on the President. And when you take a prowler unit,
how do you come to the conclusion that the prowler unit had no
effect on the President's security? You were lucky there was no
incident, but what if there was a an incident?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I'd have to define what the prowler unit
does here. We have agents who are assigned to our Washington
field office, and when they are called to the White House to do
an interview----
Mr. Chaffetz. But--sorry.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. I have the yellow light on. I need to ask the
core question here. We've cited at least two, I believe three
incidents, where the public was misled, there was false
information given, it was not correct.
Was there any disciplinary action, and who's involved in
that chain of command to review what the Secret Services say?
Because as a Member of Congress, as a United States citizen,
the Secret Service misled us on purpose. Was there any
consequence to any personnel? Did you follow the code and did
you actually suspend or remove people from their service? Was
there any penalty or consequence for providing false
information?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I agree with you that you, and I have the
same outrage that you have regarding the communication----
Mr. Chaffetz. But I want to know what you did about it.
Mr. Clancy. Sir, we've got to do a much better job of
communicating within the internal----
Mr. Chaffetz. No. I want to know if there's any
consequence. Did anybody face disciplinary action? You have a
major morale problem, and this is why. There doesn't seem to be
a consequence to doing something that's in obvious violation of
your own internal codes.
Mr. Clancy. Sir, this was not an intentional violation of
the code. We just haven't communicated as well as we should
Mr. Chaffetz. They just made a mistake, an innocent
mistake? Was there any consequence?
Mr. Clancy. No. There was no discipline administered in
those examples that you gave, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. With all due respect, and my----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz [continuing]. Time has expired----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz [continuing]. Until you actually live by your
own codes and you hold people responsible and accountable,
you're going to continue to have this problem. That's just my
own personal view of it from afar, but there have be
consequences when people purposely and knowingly mislead the
public, the press and consequently the Congress.
Mr. Clancy. With respect, sir, again, from what I've heard,
been briefed, and what I've seen, I would not say it was
intentional. There is a difference between misconduct, sir, I
think, and operational errors, and I think there is a very
clear distinction.
Mr. Chaffetz. Did you not know immediately that he was
apprehended at the doors or was he apprehended deep in the
White House?
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Clancy will be permitted to answer the
question. You can answer that question.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Again, how that information was
relayed, again, not being there, I don't know how that
information was relayed to our public affairs office, but
needless to say, it wasn't relayed in the proper manner and we
gave bad information, and it's something that we cannot do.
We've got to slow down a little bit with our communication,
because we know it's critical to give accurate information, and
that's what our goal is, but we failed on that day. I agree
with you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Jeffries,
is recognized for 5 minutes for his questions.
Mr. Jeffries. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Clancy, for your service to this
country, to the Secret Service and for your presence here
today. It's my understanding that the number of threats to this
particular President, Barack Obama, and the White House has
increased significantly since the President first took office
in January of 2009. Is that correct?
Mr. Clancy. No, sir. I'd say there are spikes, sir,
depending on world events. We've noticed over time that threats
rise and they lower depending on the world events.
Mr. Jeffries. And so how would you characterize, from a
comparative standpoint, the number of threats that this White
House or this President has faced as compared to modern
Presidents over the last 20 or so years?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Our protective intelligence
department does metrics regarding just what you're referring to
here and we do compare it to previous Administrations, previous
Presidents. And the last one I looked at, it does look as if
the President's threat level has gone up slightly, but that's
not unnatural, but it has gone up slightly.
Mr. Jeffries. So the President's threat level has gone up
to some degree, and at the same time over the last 6 years,
we've seen security breach after security breach after security
breach. I think that is a reason for us to be concerned, if not
outraged, as it relates to the state of the Secret Service
right now.
Now, as it relates to the concerns that you've established
upon your arrival, I think you mentioned three: staffing,
training and morale. Is that correct?
Mr. Clancy. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Jeffries. And is it fair to say that the staffing
issues that you confront relate to the fact that you don't have
the budgetary resources necessary to operate at an optimal
level?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I think our staffing levels from a budget
perspective are appropriate at this time. One of the things we
need to do to build our staffing is to better our hiring
process. Right now, as I mentioned in an opening statement
here, that it takes about 12 months for us to get people hired
on, and we've got to do a better job of identifying good,
quality people early on in the process so that we can
streamline that process, maybe move that from 12 months to 7
months, possibly shorter.
First of all, there's still an incredible interest in the
Secret Service. The last job announcement, I'm told, we had
45,000 applicants, but only 72 of those applicants made it
through the process and were hired.
Mr. Jeffries. Now, if I can hone in on that point----
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jeffries [continuing]. In terms of the interest in the
Secret Service, connecting it to the morale problem that you've
identified and that Members of this panel and other Members of
the Congress have identified, you've got the Elite Presidential
Protection Unit, correct?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jeffries. And that is generally viewed as sort of an
optimal assignment within the Secret Service. Is that fair to
say?
Mr. Clancy. In my view, it is, yes, sir.
Mr. Jeffries. And you demonstrated yourself to be an
excellent leader of that unit during your time there, we're
thankful for that.
As it relates to the uniformed service division, there's a
general perception amongst many observers of the Secret Service
that that is viewed as a less than desirable assignment or on a
cast system, perhaps some may say, as it relates to Secret
Service hierarchy. Is that fair to say?
Mr. Clancy. For the Uniformed Division?
Mr. Jeffries. Yes.
Mr. Clancy. That's a very challenging position, yes, sir.
Those officers at the White House and the Vice-President's
residence and our foreign missions, they have a very
challenging position. I have great admiration for what they do,
when you consider, as was mentioned here earlier, the number of
people that come into the White House. We have over 300,000
people that are screened coming through that White House every
year, and these officers are confronted with a variety of
issues, and I have great admiration for the work that they do
there.
Mr. Jeffries. Now, what can you do to sort of improve both
the morale and the operational capacity, the ability, the
competence of the Members of the uniformed Secret Service
division, who play a very important role, and, of course, with
the most recent incident that we saw in terms of the fence
jumping episode, clearly did not perform at a level
commensurate to what the American people, what the President,
what the First Family deserve?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Our people desire more training and
they have a passion to get out to our Beltsville facility in
Maryland for more training, and we've got to get them out there
for that additional training. That's one thing that may help
their morale.
I think, additionally, we've got to do a better job of
communicating and hearing their issues, and that's why we
instituted the ombudsman and put more focus on the ombudsman
and the anonymity of the concerns that could be sent to the
ombudsman, because these officers want to be heard. And the
ombudsman sits on my director's staff, so twice a week when I
meet with the director's staff, the ombudsman will bring those
issues to the table where I'm sitting. And, as much as we want
to allow people to communicate up, we've got to communicate
down as well, responses to these concerns, and I think that
will help the morale of the uniformed officers, too.
So training, better communication, I think will be a good
start for helping the uniformed officers.
Mr. Jeffries. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, for his
questions.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. Director, it's a pleasure
to be talking with you today. It's nice to have a fellow
Pennsylvanian in the position as Director of the Secret
Service. I've worked with the Secret Service for 18 years as a
prosecutor, as a State and Federal prosecutor, and I have
nothing but praise for the Secret Service. You have the best of
the best, and I have personal experience there, so I thank the
agents for their service. The President made the right choice
putting you in this position. I can tell instantly from the way
you answered several of these questions, the right choice of
assigning you as a director. You have your hands full.
There are some changes that have to be made, but I have
complete confidence in you that you will square these issues
away, improve security, improve morale, et cetera. I do believe
that. I'm kind of old-fashioned. I think Secret Service should
be with Treasury, not Homeland Security. I think there was a
finer system of operation there, no disrespect to Homeland
Security. They have their hands full in many other areas. And
with that, I'm going to I yield back because many of my
questions pertain to the second round, so thank you for being
here.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Thank you sir.
Mr. Gowdy [presiding]. Thank the gentleman. If you will
bear with me, I'll recognize the next person, Mr. Cicilline
from Rhode Island. I apologize. Forgive me. Would the gentleman
yield to the Ranking Member from Michigan?
Mr. Cicilline. Of course.
Mr. Gowdy. I would recognize the Ranking Member, Mr.
Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you both, and I apologize for my
tardiness, and I, too, welcome Mr. Clancy.
I wanted to raise a little discussion about the 10 people
that have successfully climbed over the White House fence. Is
there any thought yet about how we're going to repair this
problem that keeps happening, replacement or a different
design, or what are your thoughts as you sit here before the
Judiciary Committee, sir?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. There's several levels to this, sir.
The first is from our own operational standpoint to address
what happened on September 19. We immediately instituted
additional training and integrated training between the
tactical units and our Uniformed Division officers, first with
a 4-hour block of classroom work and then additionally a 6-hour
block out at our Beltsville training facility where we would do
a much better job and not allow what happened on September 19
to occur again.
But additionally there are some other things that we are
looking at to include adjusting either the height of the fence
or some modification to that fence. And again, we've worked
very well with our partners at National Park Services. We've
met with them already regarding this concern, and we're meeting
in the very near future with the National Capitol Planning
Commission and the Fine Arts Commission. And with those
meetings, we think we're going to find some solutions to make
it more difficult for people to get over that fence.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you. Now, the Secret Service performs
two huge missions: One, protecting the President, Vice
President, their family and other dignitaries, but also
investigating crimes against our financial system. Some have
raised a question of whether Secret Service should maintain
both missions and question whether the investigative mission
reduces the effectiveness of the protective mission. Have you
examined these issues yet?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. Let me just break it
up. Uniformed division, the officers at the White House
complex, are strictly there for protection. But on the agent
side of the house, we do have very robust investigative field
offices throughout the country. We think that is critical to
our mission, our protective mission and our overall mission.
But the work that our agents do in the field allows them to
build skills from working the streets, doing interviews,
situational awareness, those skills carry over into the
protective mode so that you're much more attentive; you pay
attention to your details, helps you with your advance work.
There's a direct correlation between the investigative side of
the house and the protection side.
To include now with these cyber investigations where we've
had great success investigatively, we use a lot of those people
in our critical protection systems division which we use on
protective movements. We've used them significantly with our
national special security events. So that we see the
correlation between the physical security of our sites as well
as the cybersecurity.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you. Let me ask you about the September
19 incident. It revealed numerous problems with radio systems,
alarm systems, officer training, physical attributes of the
White House grounds, and officer performance. Do you have any
way of determining, in your capacity as Acting Director,
whether we have facilities and training to host full-scale
drills to test the equipment so that we can be confident that
it will not fail us in the future?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, just as an example, with the Beltsville
training that we've instituted just recently again for
retraining, we sent our officers out there, and we've built a
mockup of the White House grounds, so we have the proper
distance from the north fence line to the north portico, but
it's a mockup out at our Beltsville facility. Ideally in the
future, we'd love to have a true replica of the White House so
that our dogs can feel comfortable working in the true
environment of what the north grounds are like. So that would
be a long-term goal to get a mockup of the White House at our
training facility.
Mr. Conyers. Glad to hear you say that. I ask unanimous
consent that my opening statement be included in the record,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gowdy. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative
in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee
on the Judiciary
Today, the Committee will examine the operation of an agency that
performs two vital missions for our country: the protection of the
President and Vice President and other dignitaries, and the protection
of our payment and financial systems.
The Secret Service has done an outstanding job in many instances,
with respect to both missions. The Secret Service helped protect the
integrity of the nation's economy by closing over 7,000 criminal cases
in Fiscal Year 2014, leading to approximately 6,700 arrests.
This year alone, the agency's efforts in investigating financial
crimes have saved us $3 billion. Cybercrime investigations prevented
another $383 million in losses.
With respect to the protection it provides the President, Vice
President, and their families, there is no doubt that the determined
and dedicated agents of the Secret Service have provided--and continue
to provide--a tremendous service to the nation.
However, in recent years, a number of incidents have shaken our
trust in the agency, including lapses in protecting the President and
the White House, and too many instances in which agents have engaged in
misconduct while on presidential trips.
Most notable is the failure, in September of this year, to prevent
a man from climbing over the fence and running across the White House
lawn into the White House, making it all the way to the East Room
before he was apprehended.
This incident demands that we change our approach to White House
security, with lessons that should be applied to other aspects of
presidential security as well.
First, we must replace the current White House fence with one
designed to make it far less likely that anyone may successfully climb
over it. The current fence is not adequate.
It is too low and of a design that allows for handholds that are
used to propel climbers over the fence.
While I understand that there may be historical considerations and
concerns about how a more secure fence might look, I believe a new,
more secure fence can be developed to afford greater protection while
maintaining the dignity of the building and office it protects.
Next, we must improve the plan and systems for securing the White
House from attack from anyone who is able to successfully climb over
the fence.
When former Director Julia Pierson testified before the Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform on September 30th, she indicated
that the breakdown in protection in the September 19 fence jumper
incident was a problem of implementation and not a problem of the
adequacy of the protective plan. I disagree.
Yes, the evidence shows specific lapses in performance and the use
of various alarm systems on September 19--but it also points to a
broader set of problems. I am concerned that the Secret Service has
taken its protective plans and preparations for granted. It is clear
that the equipment, planning, and training that are supposed to protect
the White House are inadequate. All of these areas must be improved.
Unfortunately, we only know that because their deficiencies were
exposed by a man who eluded all the Uniform Division officers on post,
the Emergency Response Team, and the canine unit on September 19th to
make it all the way to the East Room.
Finally, I believe it will be necessary for experts outside of the
Secret Service to contribute to regular reviews of the security plans
and operations that protect the White House.
Secretary Johnson has appointed a panel of experts to make
recommendations concerning the Secret Service and White House security
on a one-time basis.
However, I believe a similar group of experts should, perhaps on an
annual basis, review the plans and operations related to the security
of the White House complex.
Two decades ago, the Delta Force of the U.S. Army evaluated White
House security and made a number of recommendations. While I do not
know whether these recommendations were good ones, I support the
concept of experts from inside and perhaps outside the federal
government providing security recommendations to the Secret Service.
I have no doubt that the agency takes its critical, protective
mission very seriously.
However, the agency should not be alone in assessing the array of
threats and types of attacks that could be attempted against the White
House complex. We cannot expect that future threats will be as simple
as one individual jumping over the fence.
Our planning must involve thinking outside of the box. I fear that
current planning and review has been too insular, even if undertaken by
a dedicated agency with the best of intentions.
I make these recommendations because we must improve the manner in
which we protect our President, Vice President, and their families.
This Committee has always afforded the Secret Service a high degree
of respect and gratitude on a bipartisan basis. I trust that this will
continue today and that this hearing will identify additional ways that
a good agency may be strengthened so that it will do a better job at
accomplishing its various missions.
__________
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Michigan. The Chair
would now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, the
former United States Attorney, Mr. Holding.
Mr. Holding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Clancy,
thank you for being here. I think it's very good that someone
with a long history in the Secret Service is there to address
these problems. Like my friend, Mr. Marino, I spent a long time
working with the Secret Service and have nothing but the
highest respect for all the Secret Service agents that I had
the privilege of working with.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Holding. The Secret Service was always willing to jump
into a task force and bring whatever resources that they have
to the table. And how to multi task, it's always good when
you've got a Secret Service agent working the case. They bring
a lot to the table and pride themselves on always having the
best prepared cases when they bring them to the U.S. Attorney's
office and so forth.
Picking up where Mr. Marino left off, it saddens me to hear
the Secret Service is having such morale problems considering
just the elevated reputation and stature of the Secret Service.
And in talking to agents over the years, some think that the
problems with morale started when the Secret Service was taken
out of the Treasury and lumped together with a lot of other law
enforcement agencies, all great agencies. I'm not deriding
them, but, you have a breadth of experience. You were in the
Secret Service when the Secret Service was in the Treasury
Department. Take a moment and just reflect on that. Do you
think that some of these problems started then, and if so, what
have you thought about ways to address morale problems that may
have started when the Secret Service left Treasury?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. When I was a younger agent and a
younger manager in the Secret Service, we were under Treasury,
but I didn't have a lot of exposure to those decisions at that
time. So my true management experience has been with the
Department of Homeland Security. To be candid, sir, the issues
that we've had of late are really a reflection on some of the
things we've done. We've got to fix our operational procedures,
our conduct, and our morale. Obviously a concern, when I came
back from the private sector and saw the reports on the morale
issues, that was very concerning.
So that's one of the top three areas I think we need to
fix, and I'm committed to working on ways to fix that morale.
And as I said earlier, I think training is one thing. We're
going to have to build up the training. If we can get our folks
trained, they're going to feel more confident in their actions
every day; so that's one priority. The other is the
communication. Our folks just want to be heard. They see
things. They can see how we can be better. They've got good
ideas out there. We want to hear their good ideas. If it's an
idea that we cannot implement, we need to get word back to them
and explain to them why we can't implement that idea that they
had.
The key here is communication. People want to be heard. My
first day on the job here, I met with our senior staff and said
that is one of the priorities we've got to have. We've got to
communicate with all of our people, all of our agents, our
officers, and our protective staff, and make sure that they're
being heard and respected.
Mr. Holding. Good. One other follow-up question. Then I'll
I yield back. Regarding the security guard who was armed and
hadn't been cleared. Were there any other security guards armed
but not pinned at the event in Atlanta?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, as I've been briefed, there were other
security at the CDC, but they were not on the inner perimeter.
They were on the outside of our inner perimeter which is not
uncommon on the outside perimeter to have armed----
Mr. Holding. So there were armed security who had not been
cleared on the outside of the perimeter. Were there any on the
inside of the perimeter like the individual that we've noted?
Mr. Clancy. As I've been briefed, sir, not on the inside of
the perimeter, other than the elevator operator was armed.
Mr. Holding. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. The
Chair will now recognize Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Mr.
Clancy for being with us today.
As you well understand, the protection of the President is
a critical national responsibility, and I know that we all
recognize that in many ways the work of the Secret Service,
really our ability to defend our democracy, is directly tied to
our ability to protect the occupant of the White House, whoever
he or she is at any given time. These issues are serious, and I
think we all appreciate the seriousness with which you are
approaching these new responsibilities, and I thank you for
being here to provide some testimony today.
I just want to first focus on, you've made some reference
to staffing levels have declined over the last several years
while the workload of the agency has not. I'd like to hear from
you whether or not, recognizing there are training and
personnel and scheduling and communications issues that relate
to each of the incidents we're reviewing in particular, are
there more generally concerns you have about resources both at
the staffing level and in terms of infrastructure, equipment,
and the capacity you have to integrate new equipment as it
becomes available?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. First with the staffing levels, we
think we are appropriately funded for the staffing levels at
this point. Our concern is getting people into our pipeline and
getting them hired quicker so that we can build up our staffs.
From an infrastructure standpoint, there are some things that
we will be looking for additional funding. We've talked about
the fence here today. Once we get good renderings, and once we
get the approval, if we get the approval, from our partners in
the National Capital region, that will be required, some
additional funding for that.
But also our communications, we'd like to update our
communication systems. We saw that we had some failures on
September 19, so our communications need to be upgraded. And
then the Vice President's residence, we've got a lot of
facilities that we protect. All of those are under constant
review, and we always want to update our alarms and cameras,
and that's the main focus.
Mr. Cicilline. I was pleased to hear you say that with
respect to additional training to be sure that agents are
familiar with the grounds at the White House, that you have
some expectations to make some requests for additional
facilities at your training facility. But in addition to that,
it seems as if staffing policies also played a role in the
incident, particularly in the incident on September 19, and
that agents being required to work overtime and many shifts in
a row and that that obviously contributes to a general
weariness and the way seniority plays a role in assignments. So
can you speak to kind of what you will be doing or have already
done to address the staffing issues to the extent that they are
contributing to the kind of experiences?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. You bring up an excellent point, sir,
regarding the staffing, particularly at the White House. We are
making a review of our staffing in terms of experience at the
White House. We want to make sure we have a good mix of
experience as well as newer agents at the White House complex,
and that review is ongoing now. We've already completed that
review at our other branches of the Uniformed Division.
Mr. Cicilline. Because it appears that sometimes the least
experienced officers are being assigned the most important
responsibilities. Isn't that what happens?
Mr. Clancy. We may have an overabundance of junior officers
on some shifts, and that's where we want to find that balance,
to make sure that we've got good experienced, good mentors for
those junior agents who may be on duty at the same time.
Mr. Cicilline. And that's an issue you're examining
currently?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cicilline. I should have started with this, and I'll
end with this to say that I have enormous respect for the men
and women of the Secret Service. I think they have always
really represented the gold standard in many ways, and I'm very
pleased that you have undertaken the responsibilities to
address these deficiencies and to help raise the morale of this
agency. It's essential because of the important work that they
do, and obviously I think this Committee and this Congress will
look to be a partner and support you in any way that you think
is necessary to achieve that mission successfully. And with
that I yield back.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. Director, I want to start by also thanking you for your
service. I hold law enforcement in very high esteem. In fact, I
would be biased toward law enforcement. I think they have been
given unique powers in our culture, and with those unique
powers come correspondingly unique responsibilities. It's a
difficult job, and it takes a different kind of person to be
able to do that job. When I hear reports about alcohol abuse
while you're either on the job or about to go on the job, and
when I hear reports of sexual harassment of female agents or
solicitation of prostitution, with all due respect, that just
doesn't strike me as a training issue. That's a moral issue.
That's a character issue. That's a recruitment issue. If you
need to go to a seminar to learn at that stage of your career
not to send sexually explicit texts to female agents, you have
no business being in the Secret Service. There's a quote from
the spokesperson: ``Periodically we have isolated incidents of
misconduct, just like every organization does.'' But the Secret
Service is not like every organization. That is not a defense
to me. You guys are different.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So from a recruitment standpoint, and we're
going to get into jurisdiction in a second. But from a
recruitment standpoint, are you getting the recruits you want?
Are State and local law enforcement folks, men and women,
applying? Are you getting folks with no experience? Talk to me
about your recruitment.
Mr. Clancy. Sir, we're getting a wide range of candidates
in our recruitment, but one of the things that we feel, and in
my short time here, is that through the USAJOBS we're getting a
lot of applicants who may get moved on because they use the
right words in that computer system. What we need to do is if
any of our people know good quality people, people that have
served in the military, people that have law enforcement
experience, good quality people, get them to our field offices,
get them an interview right away, and then get them into the
hiring process. That's the way we used to do it, years ago. And
we've got to get back to that where we can bring in good
quality people up front.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, I'm going to defer to your expertise. I'll
probably have a different perspective on whether or not your
jurisdiction should be as expansive as it is. Way back when the
earth cooled, when I used to work with Secret Service, I never
got the connection between investigating counterfeit $100 bills
that were created on an ink printer, and protecting the life of
the President or the Vice President or a judge. I would rather
have a State or local law enforcement officer who used to do
homicide cases or child sex assault cases.
I watched ATF in the early 1990's kind of delve more toward
Title 21 drug cases. Even though there was no D in ATF, they
just found themselves matriculating toward drug cases. I just
wonder if it wouldn't be in the Service's best interest to let
the Marshals or the Bureau or somebody else handle some of
these books of business and just focus on what really is
incredibly important, which is protecting the life of our
Commander in Chief and our judges and other important people.
Why is that the not enough?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I appreciate your view. I would say
additionally from my earlier statement that our field offices,
in addition to the investigations they do regarding counterfeit
and cyber crime and whatnot, they also do protective
intelligence investigations, so if you're sitting in Kansas
City or Texas and there's a threat made to the President, those
same field office agents go out and do the investigation. So
they've got those skills, and they've got to make judgements on
is this someone who could potentially threaten or harm any of
our protectees, so they learn those skills as well.
Additionally, when our protectees travel, for example, the
President travels to any city within the country, those same
field offices, those agents who have already built up rapport
with the locals and the county officers, that rapport has
already been built through their investigations, and now we're
going to rely on them to support us in a protective mission, in
a perimeter that we set up, the middle perimeter, the outer
perimeter; so those relationships are very strong, and we use
that from a protective standpoint. They actually start the
advance work. When the President goes to Kansas City, the
beginning of that advance work is done by the field agent.
Mr. Gowdy. You're the expert, and clearly I'm not. But I
would, it's really tough for me to draw a connection between
the investigation of financial crime and the investigation of
counterfeiting and protecting the life of X. There may be
categories of crime where that is a more natural, seamless
transition. I just don't know. You're the boss and I'm not and
never will be. There may be books of business that do prepare
your agents. I just, I don't see that one. But I will say this,
and I'll share with a colleague outside, for whatever reason we
tend to have the person who's not responsible before us. The
person who you could argue was responsible is no longer in that
position, so I'm not going to expend my energy beating up on
you. I do not understand not searching the White House when
there is any evidence, even a scintilla of evidence of a
shooting. I cannot understand not doing that. But it's not fair
to you for me to ask you about that. It's not yours. So let the
record reflect that I was fair at least on one occasion. And
with that, I would recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Mr. Clancy. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
yielding the time.
This is a very serious hearing, and I'm grateful to the
Judiciary Committee for its concern. I particularly want to
thank Mr. Gowdy for his words as I associate myself, as I
imagine every single Member of Congress does, and that is to
recognize, first of all, the storied history of the Secret
Service. Mr. Clancy, your name has certainly traveled through
many Presidents' careers, and we thank you so very much for
your sacrifice. As well, I associate myself with the concept
that the most important responsibility, I believe, is the
securing of the Commander in Chief, although you, by statute
and otherwise, have added additional duties, and I think over
the years you certainly have been engaged as a part of the
Treasury before your coming into Homeland Security, and our
Founding Fathers or fathers and later than that mothers,
thought that was an appropriate role for you to be engaged. So
obviously changes would require assessment and overhaul from
many parties, including Members of the United States Congress.
But I did want to put on the record that I thought that no one
doubted the respect that we have for the Secret Service, and
particularly for the important and crucial role that you have.
As I recall, former Director Pierson was brought on to
address the scandals and problems reported about the culture of
the Service, and an independent review panel will issue a
report in the near future. Just for the record, is that report
coming soon?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, ma'am. That report has been completed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I'm not talking about the one that we
received on Homeland Security. Is there another report coming?
Mr. Clancy. The investigation of September 19 that was
conducted by the Deputy of Homeland Security, that's completed.
Now there's a Blue Ribbon panel by the Secretary that was set
up, and my understanding is by December 15, it will be
completed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. That's the one I'm asking for.
I'm familiar with the Homeland Security. So December 15 we can
expect that?
Mr. Clancy. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Because that ties in to the reason why
Director Pierson was appointed, or at least, besides her
competency; but the idea was that there were issues that needed
to be addressed before. Is that correct?
Mr. Clancy. That's correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We also know that every Director has to
address emerging threats and resolve staffing, morale problems,
et cetera, and so I'm hoping this report will address that
question.
Just as an aside, and I'm going into some of the aspects of
September 19, but just as an aside, we know that there are
issues dealing with morale. I think you acknowledged that?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you focusing on trying to address
those questions?
Mr. Clancy. Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I note that a recent order or notice
came out for female agents to wear their hair in a bun as
opposed to any other kind of hairstyle. Can you tell me how
that helps morale, and how is that relevant to caring for the
principles that they have concern for?
Mr. Clancy. I'm not familiar with that directive, but I
will certainly go back after this hearing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you please check that, and I would
appreciate a response back. And I would argue vigorously that
that is inappropriate and certainly a contributor to low
morale.
Let me continue on. Who is responsible for overseeing the
agency's disciplinary processes, ensuring employees are held
accountable? Is the discipline consistent and appropriate
across the workforce for similar violations? So the base of my
question is, who is responsible, and is there an attempt to
make sure that there's even-handed assessment of the
discipline?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, ma'am. As a result of the events of
Cartagena and some of the other events, the Office of Integrity
was set up by Director Pierson, so the purpose of the Office of
Integrity is to have one central location where all discipline
will be filtered into, and there a decision is made whether or
not it's a criminal violation or whether it's a misconduct
violation, et cetera. But what we wanted to make sure is that
there is a consistency and a discipline that is effective. We
have a table of penalties now that will ensure that there is
consistency as we are confronted with these either operational
errors or misconduct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me go to two incidences, and let me
say that I have the greatest respect for the First Amendment
and the greatest respect for the media that has every right to
interpret and write articles, please to our broad third estate,
know that I do that. But I do know that sometimes we have to
get to the facts, so if the Chairman would indulge me, let me
just get two facts on the table without any personal
acknowledgement as to what is going to happen to the gentleman.
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, the gentlewoman is
recognized for one additional minute.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm going to quickly say in one instance
on the breach, a gentleman was on the phone, on a personal
phone; earplug was not in their ear, and their walkie talkie
was locked in their locker. One instance. Second instance is
the gentleman on the elevator at the CDC who, as the story is
told, was certified and authorized to be there with a gun, had
secret clearance from the CDC, and was doing his job.
The facts have come that the time that he took pictures was
as he was waving good-bye to the Commander in Chief after he
got in the car. Can you tell me how does that trickle up to, if
you were at the time the Director, how does that trickle up?
Those are incidences that I believe if it was you, I'd want to
give you an opportunity to correct it, because those are
incidences that with the best mind you couldn't imagine that
happening. And the gentleman at the CDC was actually
legitimately doing his job, certified, and just got a little
star happy and took pictures. Why don't I yield to you and find
out because I want to get to the point that we're not knocking
off directors every 5 minutes because incidences happen that
should have been taken care of by the immediate manager. Mr.
Clancy?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, ma'am. As far as the officer at the White
House complex on the cell phone that's been reported by the
investigation by the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. We
waited for that report to be concluded, and we've forwarded the
facts of that report on to our Office of Integrity, so that's
under review now for any discipline that may be affected.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That would be the responsibility of the
special agent that was over that area, the White House.
Mr. Clancy. It's actually the responsibility of this
specific central Office of Integrity so that it's removed from
his direct supervisor. The Office of Integrity will look at the
facts, and they'll make a decision.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But his actions were under his direct
supervisor?
Mr. Clancy. That's correct. Yes. In regards to the CDC
events, that was fully investigated. It was actually self-
reported. The agent who saw that the individual in the elevator
was armed, he self-reported that. Immediately we had an after
action, we had a full inquiry, and those details are also sent
to that Office of Integrity to determine what discipline, if
any, should be administered.
Mr. Goodlatte. Time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Issa, for his questions.
Mr. Issa. Thank you. Director, I know we are going to go
into a classified section, so I'm going to be brief. Two
predecessors ago, we had a scandal. It turned out that this
Committee, two other Committees, were never given the full
facts. We then had subsequent revelations time and time again.
During each of these, Committees of jurisdiction, including my
other Committee, Oversight, endeavored to work with your people
and Homeland Security to get the full facts. In each case, we
did not get the full truth.
Will you pledge today in all cases during your tenure to
give us more, not less, and if there's something that may be
relevant in even the most spurious way, at least make the
staffs of the Committees of jurisdiction aware that there is
something else that we may or may not want to pursue, at least
in an in-camera format. Because without that, we're playing a
game that I don't want to play, ever, and certainly not
publicly, which is I ask; you answer. I ask another one to try
to see if there's anything else. I don't want to ask publicly,
and I don't think the Chairman wants to ask publicly or any of
the rest of us, what it is you're not telling us.
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. You have that commitment.
Mr. Issa. Thank you. Secondly, and I'll end with this as
quickly as I can. The term law enforcement sensitive is one
that was recently used in, if you will, the two versions of
this report. Now, our Committee, our other Committee, and I
believe this Committee, got to look in-camera at the sensitive
material. Do you know how Fox got what we were only allowed to
look at in-camera to get it on the air? In other words, it was
on camera while were still looking at it in-camera.
Mr. Clancy. No, sir, I'm not aware.
Mr. Issa. Will you pledge to see if you can find out, and
if it came from the offices of the President or anyone else in
the Administration, would you at least report back to us so
that we know that there's two standards, the standards for the
press when convenient, and the standards for Congress. Because
I just have to share one thing with you. I have always felt
that an in-camera review followed up with a discussion about
what should be made available fully to the Committee and under
what conditions is a reasonable middle ground. But if anything
is withheld from Congress and asked to look at in-camera, by
definition, I think it is fair to say you have, in fact,
asserted a form of privilege, or at least the potential for a
privilege or sensitivity or near classification, and that bars
the Administration from willy-nilly releasing it to the press
in order to get, if you will, either a positive spin or get
ahead of a story. I hope you'll appreciate the sensitivity?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Issa. So will you come back with any findings about how
that got to Fox before it got to Chairman?
Mr. Clancy. I will, sir. This is the first I'm hearing
about that, yes, sir.
Mr. Issa. Our staff over at oversight will be glad to share
the detailed timeline with your people.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, and I do yield back the balance of my
time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for his
questions.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Director.
Mr. Clancy. Good morning, sir.
Mr. DeSantis. You've been frank about some of the
incidences in response to the organization of Secret Service
within DHS. You said, look, these are just mistakes that we
made. You didn't necessarily attribute to that, and I
appreciate it. But I do look, and I think it's important that
we in Congress will conduct oversight of how agencies operate.
We also have to conduct oversight over legislative products
that we've done because you look at the history, Congress has
created a lot of problems as well in various different areas.
And I think moving the Secret Service to DHS is something that
I've been thinking a lot about since these incidents have
become more public, and I think we need to do further inquiry.
You did mention that when the United Nations operation,
protective operation, was undertaken that there was there was
utilization of TSA and Coast Guard at the U.N., and I
appreciate that, but if the Secret Service was in Treasury, you
still would be able to liaison with other agencies. Correct?
Mr. Clancy. That's correct, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeSantis. And being part of a bigger bureaucracy, does
that make the Secret Service mission, is it conducted more
efficiently as a result of that, or are there bureaucratic
hurdles that the Secret Service has to deal with that they did
not have to when they were part of Treasury?
Mr. Clancy. Again, sir, it's difficult for me to compare
the two because I wasn't in a management role under Treasury. I
will say that the Department of Homeland Security is very
inclusive. The Secretary had me up there several times to work
with the other components and meet with the other components,
so there's a good sharing of information.
Mr. DeSantis. What about, you mentioned you wanted to hire
and you're not doing that on the scale you want. Are you
competing for more resources because you're within DHS? I would
imagine there are all these different agencies that are being
funded and that, and it seems like you would probably have less
competition in that regard if you were still in Treasury. Is
that accurate?
Mr. Clancy. Again, it would be hard for me to evaluate and
compare to Treasury. I know all the agencies and components in
the Department of Homeland Security have very important
missions, so we are all vying for those dollars, yes.
Mr. DeSantis. I know you said you weren't in a management
position, but I have retired Secret Service agents in my
district. They've served in both capacities, pre-2003, and then
after, and I think by and large I get negative feedback about
the change. So just when you're talking with people, other
agents who have kind of lived through this, is it something
that you would say a substantial number of them have misgivings
about?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I think when we have failures, and what
we've had the last several years are really our failures.
Mr. DeSantis. I understand and you've been frank about
that. But I think we always have to look at how are we--we're
legislating this stuff. We're funding these different agencies,
and if we haven't done that in a way that best meets the needs
of the American people, we always have to go back and evaluate.
So I'm just curious, because I know there's some morale issues
with the Secret Service. If you're just over the water cooler
with people who have been in the Secret Service, is it going to
be something that people look back and say, man, that was a
great thing that Congress did by putting us in with DHS, or are
you likely to hear people say, man, I liked it better when we
were in Treasury?
Mr. Clancy. Certainly some people have said that they liked
our time in Treasury and had good memories of that time frame.
But, again, I have to be focused on our agency and where our
failures are and working with our people, and that's really my
focus; and others can determine whether or not we're situated
properly in the Department of Homeland Security, but I'm really
focused on our operational needs.
Mr. DeSantis. I understand. And as you should be, but we
need to always look at this stuff. And it just seemed to me,
and again, I'd like to do some more investigation in this. But
with Treasury, obviously there's less bureaucracy, but actually
for Congress it's good because I think we actually conduct
better oversight that way. I think it would be easier. DHS has
been problematic for us in terms of oversight of other
functions other than the Secret Service. But anyways, I
appreciate you stepping up to take this position. I know it's a
tough job, and we wish you all the best, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Issa. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman for yielding
back the remainder of his time. We now go to the gentleman from
Texas, from east Texas, Mr. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Director, for being here. We've had different hearings.
Secretary of Homeland Security has been here a number of times.
There seemed to be in the past a feeling of invulnerability of
the White House, the fences, that somehow there was bound to be
more security there than you see. So it rattles folks when
somebody can jump over the fence and get there. Somebody else
was saying, oh, I think there's two rows of fences. Isn't there
just one row of fence around the White House?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, as a result of September 19, on
Pennsylvania Avenue on the sidewalk there, we've now put bike
rack in addition to the permanent fence, realizing that people
can still get over the bike rack, but what it does is it gives
us a little more time to react, so there is bike rack in front
of the original fence.
Mr. Gohmert. How tall is the fence there? I'm not asking
anything classified. You can go out there and measure it.
Mr. Clancy. 7 feet 6 inches, I believe, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. 7 feet 6 inches. Is there any thought about
making it higher. Is it being discussed?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. It's being discussed, and we have
been working very closely with the partners in the region. We
have to work with the National Park Service, National Capital
Region Planning Commission and the Fine Arts Commission. And we
have already started those discussions to work together to see
if there is something that is amenable to all the groups so
that we keep the historic nature of the White House, but also
increase the security measures at the House.
Mr. Gohmert. I know this was before your time as Acting
Director, but do you remember late 2009, there were the
Christmas party crashers, the Salahis, that got in there, that
were not on the list, and there was a hearing up here on the
Hill about it. And it turned out that actually it wasn't so
much the Secret Service's fault, that there was a social
secretary of the White House who was always supposed to be
there and if somebody's not on the list gives the ultimate yes
or no and that she had told someone she didn't care about
having to be the one to say no, and it left the Secret Service
in a terrible bind. But what was obvious to those of us who
would go over to the White House regularly was that it was all
about appearances after the Christmas party crashers, that even
though it really wasn't so much the Secret Service's fault as a
breakdown in White House leadership, the Secret Service, who
wore plain clothes, suits, were made to start wearing uniforms
so that it looked like there was a lot more security there.
And, in fact, we went from just having the one check point,
you had to go through there at the southeast corner, to adding
another there near the monument and then adding another down on
15th Street.
So pretty clearly it was all about appearance to make it
look like, gee, it was the Secret Service's fault, and we've
tripled those up, added a bunch of people there when really it
wasn't necessary that any more need to be done other than just
make sure White House gave proper direction. So my concern has
been that there's been too much about appearances and not as
much about actual protection. Has there been any thought to
just eliminating the fence around the White House? Did
Secretary Napolitano ever talk about that, maybe having a
virtual fence or electronic fence? Has that been discussed at
all?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, I'm not aware of any discussions in that
regard.
Mr. Gohmert. Would you be in favor of removing the fence
around the White House and having a virtual or electronic fence
around it?
Mr. Clancy. Sir, my knee jerk reaction to that would be no,
sir, partly because of the number of tourists that come on
Pennsylvania Avenue and come right up to that area and take
pictures and whatnot.
Mr. Gohmert. You know, the Secretary has said a number of
times, Secretary Napolitano, the fence is worthless. You put a
10-fence up, somebody is going to build a 12-foot ladder, so I
would think that if the Administration is going to be
consistent, it's now time to remove the fence from around the
White House, because if it isn't good enough for our border, it
shouldn't be good enough for the White House.
So I would ask you to consider that consistency and also
consider the fact that maybe there really is some real virtue
in having a fence that slows people down, and with that I yield
back.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman. And Director, as
originally scheduled, we're going to take a short recess and
give you a chance to maybe have just a short bite of lunch. Is
12:30 okay to reconvene?
Mr. Clancy. Yes, sir. That's perfect.
Mr. Issa. Okay. We'll have the room made right, and we'll
be back in at 12:30. We stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the Committee was recessed, to
be reconvened in executive session.]