- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2015

[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2015

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey, Chairman
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
KEN CALVERT, California TIM RYAN, Ohio
TOM COLE, Oklahoma WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mrs. Lowey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Tom McLemore, Jennifer Miller, Paul Terry, Walter Hearne,
Maureen Holohan, Tim Prince, Brooke Boyer, B G Wright,
Adrienne Ramsay, and Megan Milam Rosenbusch,
Staff Assistants

Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________

PART 1
Page
FY 2015 Department of Defense Budget Overview.................... 1
FY 2015 Navy / Marine Corps Budget Overview...................... 87
FY 2015 Air Force Budget Overview................................ 197
FY 2015 Army Budget Overview..................................... 277
________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2015

_______________________________________________________________________

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey, Chairman
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
KEN CALVERT, California TIM RYAN, Ohio
TOM COLE, Oklahoma WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

Sherry L. Young, Administrative Aide
________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

90-985 WASHINGTON : 2015

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia NITA M. LOWEY, New York
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
TOM LATHAM, Iowa JOSEE E. SERRANO, New York
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho ED PASTOR, Arizona
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas SAM FARR, California
KEN CALVERT, California CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
TOM COLE, Oklahoma SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida BARBARA LEE, California
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
TOM GRAVES, Georgia MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
KEVIN YODER, Kansas BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas TIM RYAN, Ohio
ALAN NUNNELEE, Mississippi DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
CHARLES J. FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio
DAVID G. VALADAO, California
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
CHRIS STEWART, Utah

William E. Smith, Clerk and Staff Director

(ii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2015

Thursday, March 13, 2014.

FISCAL YEAR 2015 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET OVERVIEW

WITNESSES

HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY, UNITED STATES ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
HON. ROBERT HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER

Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good morning. The committee will come to
order. As we begin this hearing, I want to take a moment to pay
tribute to the service of our late chairman, Congressman Bill
Young. America's men and women in uniform had no more effective
advocate. We will miss his leadership and friendship. For my
part, my working relationship and friendship with Mr.
Visclosky, our committee's ranking member, will help fill that
loss. Our recent trip to the Middle East strengthens the ties
that bind us in our work together.
We meet today to begin a series of hearings to examine the
fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Department of Defense.
We are pleased to welcome the Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel;
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey; and the Department of Defense Comptroller, the
Honorable Robert Hale.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service in Vietnam,
distinguished service. General Dempsey, thank you for your
decades of service to our country since your graduation from
West Point. And to Bob Hale, thank you for being the longest
continuous-serving Comptroller for the Department of Defense.
And we hear of your retirement, but on behalf of the committee,
both sides, and we are unified on this committee, we thank you
for your remarkable service and dedication. We are honored to
have each of you here today, and we look forward to your
testimony.
For the first time in years, the committee is operating
under regular order. The budget agreement reached in December
between Congress and the President means that we can proceed in
an orderly, deliberate, transparent fashion to meet our
responsibilities to the full committee, the full House and to
the American people.
Over the past several years, the practice of funding the
Federal Government through continuing resolutions has seriously
affected the ability of both the Department of Defense and
Congress to do long-range planning that is crucial to our
defense and intelligence responsibilities. Furthermore, the
sequester, which the President proposed and the Congress agreed
to, has compounded the problem. We must all work together to
avoid its return.
The committee has, as it always had, two principal
responsibilities. First is to provide the Department of Defense
and the intelligence agencies with the resources they need to
carry out their missions in the most effective and efficient
manner. The second and equally important responsibility is to
ensure that our men and women in uniform, every one of whom
volunteers, have the resources they need to defend our Nation
and support their families.
As a committee, I want to be certain that everyone knows
that these hearings will provide all of our Members with the
opportunity to ask questions they have and get the answers they
require to make fully informed judgments about the budget
before us.
Ladies and gentlemen, we begin these hearings today at a
critical juncture for America. The decisions this committee
makes will help set the course for America's defense
capabilities not just for the coming year, but for many years
to come. And as we consider this budget, we must recognize we
still live in a dangerous and unstable world, in the Middle
East and throughout Africa, in Ukraine and Asia, and in
countless hidden places where nonstate actors are planning and
plotting to do harm to our country and our interests both at
home and abroad.
So among the challenges this committee faces are these:
First, how do we use limited resources in the most efficient
and effective way? That includes making certain our acquisition
process works.
Second, what are the risks associated with the decisions we
make on the size of our military; the size of our Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marines? And what capabilities, such as the
increased use of drones or cyber warfare, do we want our
military to emphasize?
Third, are those risks tolerable given the threats and
conflicts we can responsibly be expected to face as a Nation
and as a world leader?
And fourth, with so many demands and such limited
resources, what specifically do we hope to achieve through the
2015 budget?
People around the world, our allies and adversaries, are
watching to see how we answer these questions, and we want to
be certain that our response reassures our allies and deters
our enemies. The budget is, after all, not just about numbers;
the budget is, in essence, a policy document. Where we decide
to spend our money reflects, or should reflect, our strategies
for defending our Nation. Those choices also reflect our best
evaluation of where the most likely threats to our national
security are likely to originate and how we can best overcome
them when they materialize.
We have heard talk from the administration it is time for
the United States to get off a war footing. Frankly, that
troubles me, coming as I do from a State that suffered so much
loss on September 11th, 2001. Nations around the world saw the
manner in which we withdrew from Iraq and the way we are
addressing Iran and Syria. They will be watching now how we
exit Afghanistan, and they want to know whether America is
still willing, ready, and able to lead.
When we talk about getting off war footing, it suggests to
both our adversaries and our allies alike that the United
States has lost its will and its ability to lead. If that is
the message we send, we will be promoting greater instability
in the world and not less. History is replete with examples of
what happens to a great nation when it tires of the
responsibilities that accompany greatness. If we withdraw from
the world's stage, we would leave a vacuum that others, others
whose interests do not necessarily align with ours, are all too
eager to fill.
But even at a more basic level, history also shows the
wisdom of what George Washington said more than two centuries
ago: To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means
of preserving the peace. We must make certain that in meeting
the demands of fiscal austerity we do not leave any question,
any question, about our will and our ability to defend
ourselves and our interests around the world.
It is not enough to say that the President's proposed
budget does not support the military any of us wants. We must
do everything to ensure that it supports the military we need.
We must be creative and innovative in finding ways to rein in
spending and make every dollar count, while also meeting our
national security responsibilities and providing our military
with what it needs to meet its various missions.
And we must hear directly from you, Mr. Secretary, where
this budget is taking us and exactly what our defense posture
will look like in 1, 2, or 5 years from now as a result of it.
We must also be realistic, realistic not just about our
resources, but also about the world in which we live, realistic
about the threats we face today and are likely to face in the
years ahead, and realistic about maintaining our ability to
deter and then, if necessary, meet those threats effectively
and decisively.
Now I would like to recognize my ranking member Mr.
Visclosky for any comments or statements that he would like to
make. Thank you.

Remarks of Mr. Visclosky

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would
associate myself with your opening remarks and ask my entire
statement be entered into the record.
And, gentlemen, I would certainly thank you for your
attendance today and your service. I would especially want to
recognize Mr. Hale, our Under Secretary of Defense, the
Comptroller. As the chairman indicated, this may very well be
your last official appearance before the Defense Subcommittee.
Mr. Hale, you have helped the Pentagon navigate what I
think is probably the most difficult fiscal and financial
terrain that they have had to deal with since I showed up in
Washington on a congressional staff in 1977. And in all
sincerity, I thank you for your service to our country. You
have always performed your responsibilities with wisdom,
whether I have always agreed with that wisdom or not,
discretion, and as a gentleman. And again, the people of this
Nation have been served well by you. I appreciate it.
On the surface, the fiscal year 2015 budget request
suggests stability; however, there is much uncertainty and
change within an apparently stable top line. The fiscal year
2015 budget clearly expresses a desire to break out of the
constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act. This is best
evidenced by the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative,
which recommends $56 billion in spending above the bipartisan
budget agreement, paid for with tax reform and mandatory
spending cuts; 26.4 billion of this is proposed for the
Department of Defense and would suggest, speaking only for
myself, that those are very questionable assumptions.
The request leaves the overseas contingency operations
funding unresolved, and I think this is a very serious problem
that we face in the Congress with this subcommittee. On these,
the budget annex contains plenty of struck language from the
prior fiscal year but provides no new language for fiscal year
2015.
The Department of Defense budget does include a placeholder
for $79 billion but also fails to provide justification for
this amount. We certainly recognize this stems from the
uncertainty in Afghanistan, specifically whether or when the
Afghans approve the bilateral security agreement. However,
under any scenario being discussed, there will be a requirement
for OCO funding in fiscal year 2015, if nothing else, for the
first quarter. Some path forward must be chosen to provide the
support required for our deployed forces.
I am very optimistic and happy that potentially we will
have this bill on the House floor in June, and if there is not
a sentence of justification for $79 billion, you provide us
with a very difficult task as we proceed.
Finally, the request also embarks on initiatives to control
the growth of personnel and healthcare costs that consume an
increasing share of the Defense budget. I congratulate you for
addressing a very important and difficult issue. In light of
failed attempts in the past, I would remark that Congress must
be very responsible and not simply react in a politically
convenient fashion, and be as deliberate in our consideration
of your proposals as you have been in putting them together.
Again, with the chairman and the other members of the
subcommittee, I look forward to your testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.

Summary Statement of Secretary Hagel

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Secretary, good morning again. Thank
you for being here. Your entire statement will be put in the
record, and if you would be good enough to proceed.
Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member
Visclosky, thank you, and to the members of this committee, we
very much appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning.
And I want to particularly note General Dempsey's presence, who
I have come to have the highest regard for and rely on his
partnership and wise counsel during the time that I have had
the privilege to serve as Secretary of Defense, and I always
appreciate him for what he is and what he does and what he
represents to this country.
Mr. Hale has been appropriately noted, beatified, sainted,
glorified, and I don't think it is an overstatement at all to
note what you have each said about his service and the
sacrifice he has made to this country. And as Congressman
Visclosky noted, it has probably been as difficult a 5-year run
as Comptroller as maybe any Comptroller at the Pentagon has
ever had.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. He is a Navy veteran, too, so we didn't
mention that.
Secretary Hagel. Well, let the record show, of course, that
he is a Navy veteran.
But thank you, Bob, and I will miss you. We will all miss
you.
While our focus, Mr. Chairman, I know, today, as you have
noted, is on the Defense Department's fiscal year 2015 budget,
let me first address, if I might briefly, the situation in
Ukraine. As you know, the administration's efforts have been
focused on deescalating the crisis, supporting the new
Ukrainian Government with economic assistance, and reaffirming
our commitments to our allies, NATO partners in Europe.
Yesterday, as you all know, the President met with
Ukraine's interim Prime Minister here in Washington and
reconfirmed America's strong commitment to the people of
Ukraine. Secretary Kerry will meet again tomorrow in London
with his counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, and I
know Secretary Kerry is here on the Hill today to address some
of the more specific issues on this issue.
Chairman Dempsey and I have spoken with our Ukrainian
counterparts, our NATO counterparts, as well as our Russian
counterparts, and Chairman Dempsey and I will meet with NATO
Secretary General Rasmussen here in Washington next week.
Last week we put a hold on all military-to-military
engagements and exercises with Russia and directed actions to
reenforce NATO allies during this crisis. These include
augmenting joint training efforts at our aviation detachment in
Poland with 12 F-16s and 300 additional personnel, and
increasing our participation in NATO's Baltic air policing
mission by deploying 6 F-15s and one refueling tanker to
Lithuania.
I know that many members of this committee, particularly
Congresswoman Kaptur, have been instrumental in helping the
United States stand with the Ukrainian people, and I also know
that you all, in the House last week, took important action by
passing a $1 billion package of loan guarantees for Ukraine. In
addition, the President has called on Congress to increase the
International Monetary Fund's capacity to lend resources to
Ukraine. I strongly support this effort because the IMF is best
positioned to provide the Ukrainian Government and people with
the technical expertise and the financial resources it needs.
Mr. Chairman, the events of the past week once again
underscore the need for America's continued global engagement
in leadership. The President's Defense budget reflects that
reality, and it helps sustain our commitments and our
leadership in a very defining time. I believe this budget, as
you have noted in your opening comments, is far more, has to be
far more, than a set of numbers or just a list of decisions. It
is a statement of values. It is a statement of priorities. It
is a statement of our needs. It is a statement of our
responsibilities. It is a realistic budget. It prepares the
United States military to defend our national security in a
world that is becoming less predictable, more volatile, and in
some ways more threatening to our country and our interests.
It is a plan that allows our military to meet America's
future challenges and threats. It matches our resources to our
strategy, and it is a product of collaboration. All of DoD's
military and civilian leaders were included in this effort, the
Chairman, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the service
secretary, the service Chiefs, the senior enlisted and others.
As we all know, America has been at war for the last 13
years. As we end our second war of the last decade, our longest
war ever, this budget adapts and adjusts to new strategic
realities and fiscal restraints, while also, something you
noted in your opening comments, is focused on preparing for the
future. As we all recognize, this is an extraordinary time. I
don't believe any of us have ever quite lived through this kind
of time.
You opened your remarks this morning, Mr. Chairman, saying
this is the first time the regular order has been dealt with
for some time in dealing with budgets. Rarely have we had so
much budget uncertainty, living with continuing resolutions as
we adjust to a very large and abrupt set of budget cuts. As a
result, this budget is not business as usual. It begins to make
the hard choices that we are all going to have to make. All of
us are going to have to make some hard choices. The longer we
defer these difficult decisions, the more risk we will have
down the road, forcing our successors to face far more
complicated and difficult choices into the future.
Last year DoD's budget cut was $37 billion because of
sequestration. Now, that is on top of the $487 billion 10-year
reductions under the Budget Control Act that DoD was already
implementing. December's Bipartisan Budget Act gave DoD some
temporary relief from sequestration, but it still imposes more
than $75 billion in cuts over the next 2 years. And unless
Congress changes the law, sequestration will cut another $50
billion each year starting in fiscal year 2016. The President's
5-year plan provides a realistic alternative to sequestration-
level cuts, projecting $115 billion more than current law
allows from 2016 to 2019.
DoD requires that additional funding to implement our
updated defense strategy as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, and to responsibly meet the national security missions
of the Department of Defense. The strategic priorities
articulated in the QDR represent America's highest security
interests: defending the homeland, building security globally,
deterring aggression, and being ready and capable to win
decisively against any adversary.
The funding levels in the President's budget let us execute
this strategy with some increased risks in certain areas, and
we point those risks out. These risks would be reduced if
Congress approves the President's Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative, a proposal that would provide DoD with an
additional $26 billion in fiscal year 2015 to improve readiness
and modernization. We have been in a deep hole in readiness the
last 2 years. We have deferred many of our most important
future programs to keep this country technologically superior
and our forces modern.
My submitted statement contains details of this initiative,
Mr. Chairman, which I strongly support. Since my submitted
statement provides a detailed explanation of our budget request
and the rationale behind all of our key decisions, I would like
to briefly focus on just a couple of critical issues.
First, the relationship between our fiscal year 2015 budget
request and our Future Years Defense Program, which we shared
with Congress last week. As we all know, Congress appropriates
1 year at a time, and this committee is focused on drafting and
passing a defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2015. The
President's fiscal year 2015 budget request fully funds our
preferred long-term force levels, 440- to 450,000 Active Army,
182,000 Marines, and 11 aircraft carriers. We can do this
because the Bipartisan Budget Act gave us some certainty in
fiscal year 2015.
In fiscal year 2016 and beyond, sequestration returns and
remains the law of the land. In developing our Future Years
Defense Program, we chose to plan for two scenarios for fiscal
year 2016 through 2019, one where Congress provides DoD the
resources needed to support our defense strategy, and one where
sequestration-level cuts are reimposed. We had to do this
because future funding levels are uncertain. We just don't know
how much funding Congress will provide for decades--or for
defense in our fiscal year 2016 budget and beyond. And it would
have been irresponsible for our planning to completely ignore
the law of the land.
Our detailed planning for sequestration-level cuts showed
that sequestration would impose some force structure reductions
that simply can't be implemented with the push of a button.
They require precise plans, longer time horizons in planning;
therefore, our Future Years Defense Program hedges. It projects
$115 billion above sequestration-level spending on fiscal year
2016--in fiscal year 2016 through 2019, because those are the
resources that will be required to execute the President's
defense strategy, although at a higher risk for certain
missions.
But even though the Future Years Defense Program projects
this additional spending, in its later years, the plan includes
the sequestration-level force structure reductions that take
the longest to plan and implement. By the end of 2019, it shows
the Active Army being reduced to 420,000 soldiers and Marine
Corps reductions to 175,000. It also reflects decommissioning
of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, even though we
are committed to paying its overhaul, and if we receive funding
at the levels requested by the President's budget, we can
accomplish that. But we had to plan for sequestration-level
budgets.
We are not recommending the sequestration-level reductions;
just the opposite. In fact, we are urging Congress to provide
the additional resources requested by the President, but we
cannot ignore the reality that sequestration remains the law
for fiscal 2016 and beyond. So we start planning for some of
the most challenging decisions required under sequestration. It
would be irresponsible not to do so.
DoD leaders all agree that our preferred force structure
levels can be sustained if DoD receives appropriations at the
President's budget level over the next 5 years, and I have
codified this in written guidance to the service secretaries
and the service Chiefs. But Congress, Mr. Chairman, must
reverse sequestration in order for DoD not to plan for these
large force structure reductions.
Next, let me address the balance between readiness,
capability, and capacity in this budget request. After more
than a decade of long, large stability operations, we traded
some capacity to protect readiness and modernize capabilities
as we shift to focus on future requirements shaped by enduring
and emerging threats. We have to be able to defeat terrorist
threats and deter adversaries with increasingly modern weapons
and technological capabilities.
We must also assure that America's economic interests, our
economic interests are protected, they are protected through
open sea lanes, freedom of the skies and space, and deal with
one of the most urgent and real threats facing our Nation today
and well into the future, cyber attacks. That is why we
protected funding for cyber and Special Operations Forces.
For the Active Duty Army, we propose over the next 5 years
drawing down, as I have noted, to about 440- to 450,000
soldiers. Mr. Chairman, that is less than 10 percent below its
size pre-9/11. We believe this is adequate for future demand
and future threats. We will continue investing in high-end
ground capabilities to keep our soldiers the most advanced,
ready, and capable in the world.
Army National Guard and Reserve units will remain a vibrant
part of our national defense and will draw down by about 5
percent. We will also streamline Army helicopter force
structures by reducing the Guard's fleet by 8 percent. The
Active Duty's fleet will be cut by around 25 percent. But we
will still be able to maintain and keep these helicopters
modernized as we move from a fleet of seven models to four.
The Navy, for its part, will take 11 ships out of its
operational inventory, but they will be modernized and returned
to service with greater capability and longer life spans. This
will also support a strong defense industrial base. That
industrial base, as this committee knows, itself is a national
strategic asset that we must not allow to let down.
The Marine Corps will continue its planned drawdown to
182,000 but will devote 900 more marines to increased embassy
security. And the Air Force will retire the aging A-10,
replacing it with more advanced multimission aircraft like the
Joint Strike Fighter.
Now, Mr. Chairman, regarding compensation reform, taking
care of our people, as we all know you are committed to, we are
committed to, means providing them with both fair compensation
as well as the training and the tools and the edge they will
always need to succeed in battle and return home safely. To
meet those obligations under constrained budgets, we need some
modest adjustments to the growth in pay and benefits. All these
savings will be reinvested in training and equipping our
troops, and there are no proposals to change retirement in this
budget.
Let me clarify what these compensation adjustments are and
what they are not. First, we will continue to recommend pay
increases. They won't be as substantial as in past years, but
they will continue.
Second, we will continue subsidizing off-base housing
costs. The 100 percent benefit of today will be reduced, but
only to about 95 percent, and it will be phased in over the
next several years.
Third, we are not shutting down commissaries. We recommend
gradually phasing out some subsidiaries--or subsidies, but only
for domestic commissaries that are not in remote areas.
Fourth, we recommend simplifying and modernizing our three
TRICARE systems by merging them into one TRICARE system, with
modest increases in copays and deductibles for retirees and
family members, and encourage them more fully to use the most
affordable means of care. Active Duty personnel will still
receive care that is entirely free.
The President's Defense budget supports our defense
strategy. It defends this country, and it keeps our commitments
to our people. However, these commitments will be seriously
jeopardized if we don't have the funds and the resources to be
able to implement them. My submitted testimony details how
sequestration would compromise that security, and the result
would be a military that could not fulfill its defense
strategy, putting at further risk America's traditional role as
a guarantor of global security and ultimately our own security.
It is not the military the President, General Dempsey, our
leaders and I want. It is not the military you want. It is
certainly not what we want for our future. But it is the path
we are on unless Congress does change the law.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, DoD leaders and I
look forward to working with you, all of you, as we make the
difficult choices that are going to be required, difficult
choices to continue to assure America's security and protect
our national interests. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The written statement of Secretary Hagel follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of General Dempsey

Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Dempsey, good morning.
General Dempsey. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you for being with us on behalf of
the entire committee.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member
Visclosky, other distinguished members of this committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to be back here this year to discuss
the Defense budget for 2015.
Before I do, let me comment that I do remain deeply engaged
in our efforts to support the diplomatic approach to the
resolution of the crisis in Ukraine. I have engaged with our
NATO allies, and, as the Secretary mentioned, I have spoken
several times with my Russian counterpart, and I have urged
continued restraints in the days ahead in order to preserve
room for that diplomatic solution. We will continue to maintain
that line of communication.
I have also recently returned from Afghanistan where I went
to gain firsthand appraisals from our leaders and commanders on
the ground. As always, I left there inspired. They remain fully
engaged on the missions that we have set before them. We will
be prepared to support a variety of options over the next
several months as our relationship with Afghanistan moves
forward. This includes, of course, the option to draw down our
forces there by the end of the year if that is the decision
made by our elected leaders.
While 2015 remains uncertain in Afghanistan, our joint and
NATO team has much work to do this year, and they are ready for
it. Russia's recent actions remind us that the world today
remains unpredictable, complex, and quite dangerous. We can't
think too narrowly about future security challenges, nor can we
be too certain that we will get it right. At the same time, the
balance between our security demands and our available
resources has rarely been more delicate, and that brings me to
the budget.
I want to add my appreciation to Under Secretary Hale for
his many years of service to the Department and to our Nation
and for getting us to this budget.
Secretary Hagel has walked you through the major components
of the budget. In my view, this budget is a pragmatic way
forward that balances, as best it can, our national security
and our fiscal responsibilities. It provides the tools for
today's force to accomplish the missions we have been assigned,
rebuilding readiness, by the way, in areas that were by
necessity deemphasized over the last decade. It modernizes the
force for tomorrow, ensuring that we are globally networked and
that we can continue to provide options for the Nation, and it
reflects in real terms how we are reducing our cost of doing
business and working to ensure that the force is in the right
balance.
As a whole, this budget helps us to remain the world's
finest military, modern, capable, and ready, even while
transitioning to a smaller and more affordable force. But as I
said last year, we need time, we need certainty, and we need
flexibility to balance the institution to allow us to meet the
Nation's needs for the future.
The funds passed by this Congress in the bipartisan budget
agreement allow us to buy back some of our lost readiness and
continue to make responsible investments in the Nation's
defense. It doesn't solve every readiness shortfall, it is not
a long-term solution to sequestration, but it does give us a
measure of near-term relief and stability.
The Joint Chiefs and I will never end our campaign to find
every possible way to become more effective. We will do things
smarter and more efficiently, more in line with the sorts of
security challenges that we face today and in line with fiscal
reality. We will seek innovative approaches as an imperative
not just in technology, but also in how we develop leaders,
aggregate and disaggregate our formations, and work with our
partners. And we will improve, we will have to, how we buy
weapons and goods and services. And we will invest deeper in
developing leaders of consequence at every level, men and women
that are both competent in character, who are good stewards of
the special trust and confidence given to us by the American
people, our fellow citizens.
But we have infrastructure that we don't need, and, with
your support, we ought to be able to divest. We have legacy
weapons systems that we can't afford and, with your support,
that we ought to be able to retire. We have personnel costs
that have grown at a disproportionate rate, and which we ought
to be able to slow the rate in the way that makes the All-
Volunteer Force more sustainable over time. If we don't move
toward a sounder way to steward our Nation's defense, we face
unbalanced cuts to readiness and modernization, and these
imbalances ultimately make our force less effective than the
Nation needs it to be.
We really can't ignore this. Kicking the can will set up
our successors for an almost impossible problem. We have to
take the long view here. I know these issues weigh heavily on
the minds of our men and women in uniform, on their families,
and on you. Our force is extraordinarily accepting, by the way,
of change. They are less understanding of uncertainty in
piecemeal solutions. They want and they deserve predictability.
I support the Quadrennial Defense Review in this budget. To
be clear, we do assume higher risks in some areas, risks that I
have conveyed in my assessment of the QDR. Under certain
circumstances we could be limited by capability, capacity or
readiness in the conduct of an assigned mission. I expect that
we will have more difficult conventional fights, we will rely
increasingly on allies and partners, and our global
responsibilities will have to be placed in balance with our
available resources.
If sequestration-level cuts return in 2016, or if we can't
make good on the promises embodied in the QDR, then the risks
will grow, and the options we can provide the Nation will
shrink. That is a gamble none of us should be willing to take,
because it is our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coastguardsmen, America's sons and daughters who will face
tomorrow's challenges with whatever strategy, whatever
structure, and whatever resources we provide today.
Our most sacred obligation is to make sure that we never
send them into a fair fight, which is to say they must continue
to be the best led, the best trained, and the best equipped
force on the planet. That objective has been a fundamental
guiding principle as this budget was prepared, and is one to
which the Joint Chiefs and I remain absolutely committed.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you for your
support and commitment to our men and women in uniform, and on
their behalf, I stand ready to answer your questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Dempsey.
[The written summary of General Dempsey follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Frelinghuysen. And let me say that you are a wonderful
representative of our sons and daughters.
General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me say, too, on a personal note, you
may both be aware that your good Air Force escorted a number of
members of this committee, Mr. Visclosky, yours truly, as well
as Mr. Moran and Mr. Calvert, over to the Middle East recently.
We visited Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Jordan, and may I
say that our time in Afghanistan, of course, it is truly
inspiring to see what those young men and some not so young are
doing serving after multiple deployments.
I must say, coming away, this is sort of a personal note
from that trip, I am somewhat discouraged by some of what we
heard from talking with leaders in that region about our long-
range commitment to the Middle East. Of course, the soldiers
have a desire to get out of Afghanistan and back home, but they
look around to see and recognize the sacrifices that they have
made, their predecessors have made, their predecessors made in
Iraq, and they look to Fallujah, the loss of Fallujah, and they
have serious questions about where we are going. So, one of the
things we focused on was the overseas contingency operation,
and this is a serious hole in your budget here. I know that you
want us to put in a marker in there, but ingrained in that sum
of money, which some would estimate perhaps would be $80
billion, is some open questions.
So, can you tell us how we are going to fill that hole and
when we are going to fill that hole? I think it is difficult
for us to put a bill together with that issue open.
Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, we recognize that question,
that concern. As you have noted, and I didn't note except in my
written testimony, and I am going to ask the Comptroller to
take us down a little deeper into your question, but the
obvious reason is that we held back was the uncertainty of what
decision is going to be made about our future presence in
Afghanistan post-2014.
I think you know, the President has said, it is certainly
the advice that we have gotten from General Dunford and from
our military leaders, and I support them on this, that we
believe we have a role, want to have a role, continued role in
Afghanistan, train, assist, advise, counterterrorism, but that
has to be done in coordination first with the people of
Afghanistan inviting us and agreeing, and that is embodied in a
bilateral security agreement, that arrangement. Without that,
without knowing what our future is, it was our feeling that we
would hold off and not further complicate an already
complicated budget process, because of the reasons we have
already talked about, and then come back with you or to you
once we hopefully have better certainty. When we may do that,
let me ask Bob Hale to----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have to be able to go to the floor at
some point in time. We have to defend----
Secretary Hagel. We have anticipated it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have to defend--you know, when you
visit Pakistan, and you see the relationship we have had with
Pakistan since 1947--and the OCO funds are more than just
Afghanistan. They provide resources for the region, and the
general statement is that OCO funds will be needed for some
time to come not only in Afghanistan, but in that region. So, I
would be happy to have Mr. Hale address that. This sort of gets
to my critical question is where are we going?
Mr. Hale. Well, Mr. Chairman, when we get an enduring
presence decision, as soon as we can after that, we will get a
formal budget amendment to you for OCO. If that doesn't work
with the timing issue, then we are going to have to look at
other options, and we are thinking of them now as to how we
proceed if we don't get an enduring presence decision. I know
that is vague, but at the moment, I think that is about the
best I can do.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me recognize the ranking member Nita
Lowey from New York for any comments she may have.

Remarks of Mrs. Lowey

Mrs. Lowey. Well, first of all, I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Unfortunately, there are several hearings going on at
the same time, and I want to join my colleagues, Chairman
Frelinghuysen, Mr. Rogers is probably on another one of those,
Ranking Member Visclosky, Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey,
Under Secretary Hale, and the rest of our distinguished guests.
Thank you for appearing before us today, and, again, I
apologize.
As we know, the global environment is growing increasingly
volatile with new threats emerging every day, exemplified by
the current events in Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela. In the
fiscal year 2015 bill, we need to work together to help the
Department of Defense address very serious challenges, from
ending major combat operations in Afghanistan to addressing
enduring threats from North Korea and Iran; flash points in the
Middle East, Africa, and Asia. And, of course, there are also
pressing issues at home such as the epidemic of sexual
assaults, suicides among military members.
We need to ensure that the quality of life for those
service members staying in the military remains high, while
those transitioning out of the services are cared for properly.
And I applaud the Department for submitting a 2015 request that
stays within the caps permitted in existing law, which already
directs more than 50 percent of all discretionary spending to
Defense.
Barring an agreement to increase investments in both
categories, the Department must live within its cap, as you
well know. Tough choices must be made, but as the 2014 omnibus
showed, our committee is up to the task. In times of fiscal
constraint and uncertainty, it is hard to juggle all
requirements, but we owe it to our service members and the
Nation to get it right, and I would like to just ask a
question. I thank the chairman for your indulgence.

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

As we well know, sexual assault and harassment in the
military was front and center during last year's budget cycle.
Due to the ongoing investigations and revelations on this
heinous crime, the issue still occupies this spot,
unbelievably. The President, our Commander in Chief, gave the
Department a deadline of December 1st, 2014, to evaluate
whether changes implemented over the past 12 to 18 months are
making a difference. The Pentagon reported about 5,400
instances, 5,400 instances, of sexual assault or unwanted
sexual contact in the military in fiscal year 2013, a 60
percent rise from 2012. Just last week the top Army prosecutor
for sexual assault was suspended after allegations that he
sexually harassed a subordinate.
Do you believe the military services will be able to stem
the rise of incidents of sexual assaults or unwanted contact?
Is it a cultural problem? Is it a leadership problem? Will
opening more military positions to women at all ranks help the
problem?
So, if you could please describe the requirements of the
military criminal investigative organizations to investigate
100 percent of sexual assault cases, what impact will this have
on the MCIOs, and are the MCIOs equipped in both funding and
manning to meet this requirement? I would appreciate your
response, Secretary Hagel.
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, thank you, and I appreciate
very much your leadership on this.
I can provide as much background for the record as you want
but in the interest of time, let's go back to May of last year.
At that time, I directed all the services to do a number of
things, and in the course of that directive and over the next
few months, that resulted in 21 directives that I gave our
services. Victims rights counsel, which victims had never, ever
had; not only a process, a mechanism, a highway to deal with
them and their concerns in every facet of a victim's rights,
but that was just but 1 of the 21 directives.
I actually took the initiative, along with our chairman and
our Chiefs, to suggest to the Congress that we needed to amend
the UCMJ. Obviously, fast forward, and what the Senate did here
a few days ago, what the House has been working on is a
culmination--not the end, but a culmination at least of that
phase of a lot of the requests that DoD has made of Congress to
help us.
I also instituted new offices. I have asked for, directed a
complete review of all the different offices, not just sexual
response offices and those who have responsibility for carrying
out the rights of our victims, but military police, trainers,
basic training instructors, everyone who has any responsibility
for education of our troops. And it is partly that, it is
partly culture, it is partly some areas where we haven't paid
as much attention. Accountability of leadership is always
essential to any of these issues, whether it is sexual assault
or any ethical issue. So, it has been a wide scope of
activities that we have undertaken to get at this.
We are going to fix it. It needs to be fixed in the
institution. We have asked for help from the outside, from the
Congress. The President is taking this up, as you have just
noted one example. I meet once a week around the table with the
Chiefs, Vice Chiefs, all our senior components of our
enterprise, and it is to give me an update for 1 hour what has
been implemented, what are the problems, what are we not doing
right, what do we need to do more. I have been doing this for
months. Each week I meet for 1 hour. Either the Chief of the
service is there or the Vice Chief is there. Their attorney is
there. Their sexual prevention assault people are there.
So, we are coming at this, Congresswoman, on many fronts.
We have to.
One quick point, and then if the chairman may want to
respond to this as well. Your note of 5,000 sexual assaults and
more people coming forward, it is too early yet to make an
assessment is that encouraging news, or is it not encouraging
news? We think there may be some encouraging news in this in
that victims are feeling more confident that they can come
forward without harassment, without all of the things that have
happened to many victims in the past, no one paying any
attention or people covering it up, whatever the issue is; that
they will be protected, that there will be justice done, their
rights will be acknowledged, and they will be respected as
victims.
So, I think there may be some good news in this that we are
developing confidence in the systems that they have enough
confidence to come forward. We will see. Too early to tell. We
haven't fixed all the problem yet, but we will fix it.
Mrs. Lowey. General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. Thank you.
I just want to reenforce what the Secretary said. The
answer to your question, the simple answer is yes, we can--we
have to fix this. It is a stain on our profession, we just met
with the Chiefs. We have got 12 metrics, if you will, or
measures that we are monitoring to determine whether we have
got the trend lines moving in the right direction or not.
But we have to fix this because it erodes the foundation of
our profession. You know, our profession is built on trust. You
don't walk out the gate of a forward operating base in
Afghanistan unless you trust the man or woman to your left or
right, and this crime and this kind of conduct erodes that
trust. So, it is not just because it is such a horrible thing
to happen to a man or woman in any case; it is that it actually
erodes the very foundation of the profession, and we are taking
that very seriously.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
And, Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to make one other point
in closing, because one of the greatest honors we have as
Members of Congress is to appoint beautiful, young, smart,
intelligent women to our Nation's service academies, and it has
been shocking to me that these young men and women also have
this issue that is out of control. So I would just suggest to
you that you look at that very carefully, because I know that
this is high on the agenda of almost all of us who appoint
people to our academies, and I thank you very much. Thank you
so much for your indulgence.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey. We should have
zero tolerance for this type of behavior.
Pleased to yield to the vice chair Ms. Granger.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have two questions. I am sorry. Two
questions. Should I wait for another round for the second or--
--
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Go right ahead.

STEALTH AIRCRAFT OF ADVERSARIES

Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, as you and I have both discussed before, the
Joint Strike Fighter is critical to the U.S. and our allies'
ability to maintain air superiority, but both China and Russia
continue to dramatically increase their defense spending in an
effort to increase their influence throughout the world. With
both countries developing Stealth fighters, it is likely they
will export these planes to other countries. So what countries
concern you the most as potential buyers of their aircraft, and
how would those potential purchases impact the ability of the
U.S. and our allies to establish and maintain air superiority
in those regions?
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, one of the points I made in
my opening statement, and much of the strategy of the QDR, and
essentially what was behind the President's defense strategy
guidance that he issued in January 2012 was not to allow our
superiority, our technological edge to erode or to forfeit that
to any nation. And as I have noted, we put a premium focus on
that on our prioritization, on the modernization of our
capabilities. The Joint Strike Fighter is a good example of
that, and that is what we are committed to do. Our budget
reflects that, our strategy reflects that, everything we are
doing reflects that.
We have had good partnership on the F-35, as you know, with
a number of other countries, and those allies are continuing to
hang in there with us. Everyone has budget issues, as you know,
and so some of the orders have slowed down, but none, as far as
I know, have been canceled.
Ms. Granger. Right.
Secretary Hagel. So, we are always in a competitive race
with adversaries who are upgrading and financing that
upgrading, but we have to play our game. We have to recognize
that that threat is going to be out there, and we have to be
wise in the decisions we have made, and I think that we are
doing exactly that.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESTRUCTURE

Ms. Granger. Thank you.
I have one other question for the Secretary. In 2011, the
Air Force proposed a plan that restructured the Air National
Guard, and the Guard opposed this plan, but their attempts to
work with the Air Force on an alternative solution were
dismissed. Congress didn't appreciate that, nor did they
respond very well to that approach. Unfortunately, it appears
that the Army is attempting a very similar tactic.
So, Mr. Secretary, given the Guard's critical role both
domestically and internationally, what are you doing to ensure
the Army takes the concern to the National Guard Bureau and our
Governor seriously? I can't see Congress supporting a plan that
they so vehemently oppose.
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, first, I put a high
priority on the Guard and the National Guard and the Reserves;
the President does. I know all of our Chiefs do, and General
Dempsey may want to address this. That is where I start. As I
noted in my opening statement, the Guard and Reserves are going
to continue to be, must be, a vibrant part of our larger
national security enterprise, and they will. That is where I
start.
Second, as you know, the Guard has a seat at the table with
the Joint Chiefs; General Frank Grass, who is a very, very
articulate, capable spokesman for the interest of the Guard. I
just met 2 days ago with Governor O'Malley of Maryland. We
interface with Governors on trying to connect with them. That
is part of the reason for setting up the Governors Council a
few years ago, which the Secretary of Department of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of Defense cochair, to get that
input from them directly, from their adjutant generals.
Now, to the more specific points of your question. We have
in every way tried to protect as much as possible the Guard and
Reserve, and I gave you some numbers which I think reflect
pretty well how we have come up with decisions to protect them
in every way. In fact, the Active Duty Army proportionately
have taken far bigger cuts in every way than what we are
talking about for the Guard here.
So, their voice is important, it is heard, we need it to be
heard, but the bottom line is when we are talking about the
cuts that we have already taken, and what is ahead, and then,
on top of that, the uncertainty yet that we have to deal with,
we have to examine everything, and we have to come at this from
what Chairman Dempsey said, and this is exactly the way we
looked at the budget, of the balance of what is going to be
required for the national security interests of this country. I
don't see anybody exempt from that, because everybody plays an
important role, but it has to fit into the overall framework of
the balance of what I said: Readiness, capability, capacity,
and the modernization.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
General Dempsey. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I don't agree actually that the Active Army has been
unwilling or unable to hear the concerns of the Guard, because
I have been watching this debate over the past year, and it may
just be that they have come to a position where they can't
agree with each other, and we have got to work through that.
But they have been engaged.
Secondly, it is about balance for me. I mean, my
responsibility is the Joint Force, and that is all the services
and all the components who together have to be greater than the
sum of their parts. And so as we go forward, what I have
suggested to Active Guard and Reserve is the thing we ought to
be most concerned about is not whether we can agree or not on
an end state number or a number of bases or a number of
weapons; we have got to link arms on the message that if we go
to sequestration levels of cuts, if we go back to that in 2016
and beyond, we won't be able to maintain a balanced force, and
in which case we won't have the military that the Nation needs.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky.

READINESS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, just a couple of things. First, I do want to
thank you, because last year when I asked questions about
auditable financial statements you indicated that they would be
completed, if you would, by the end of September 30th, 2017.
Note that in the statements prepared for the budget, that
deadline continues to be the same and has not slid to the
right.
I do think it is an important principle. I think it is
important as far as underlying financing of the Department, and
I appreciate that that has not slid to the right and would
encourage you to continue to hold fast to that September 30th,
2017, date.
I would want to add my voice again to the chairman as well
to reiterate my opening remarks concerns, and that is on OCO. I
am certain as we meet here today that it is not the decision of
anyone on the panel not to provide details for $79 billion.
Understand there are very delicate negotiations going on, we
are anticipating the outcomes of elections, and we need a
statement signed. Also realize it is probably very difficult
for the administration to come up with one set of numbers,
assuming an agreement is signed; a second, if no agreement is
signed; and then a third as to what the next 6 months look if
there is a complete pullout.
But there is a fundamental problem we face when we go to
the floor, hopefully earlier rather than later. And I speak
only for myself, but I think it is impossible for us to go to
the floor with a placeholder for $79 billion. The Comptroller
has mentioned other alternatives in the past supplemental
requests have been used. I am not going to ask for a response,
except as discussions take place with the President and other
officials in the administration, they have got to understand
there is some urgency here as far as the appropriations
process.
The question I do want to ask is on readiness. In the
budget submittal, the Department stated that with the enactment
of fiscal year 2014 appropriations, the readiness levels are
trending positive, but the fiscal year began with relatively
low readiness levels. I did mention the Opportunity, Growth,
and Security Initiative that is very dependent upon entitlement
changes and tax changes.
Mr. Secretary, I absolutely agree with you on
sequestration. I voted against the agreement last December
because it was only for 2 years. You have a government to run
and a Department to plan for, and I am concerned that those who
want to, if you would, act irresponsibly are simply lying low
until November, and they will continue to have the leverage.
And on readiness, the Opportunity, Growth, and Security
Initiative that has been put forth, that I do not think is
going to happen, includes additional monies for readiness
enhancements for training for the Army, spares and logistic
support for the Navy, unit training for the Marines, and
increased flight training for the Air Force.
The question I have is relative to the 2015 requests and
looking at the issue of readiness to make sure nobody is ever
in a fair fight. I agree with that.
Are some of those items things we should have in mind as we
mark our bill up that are still necessary in 2015, assuming
that this initiative is not adopted? Are there still readiness
holes that we should be concerned about if this initiative is
not adopted?
Secretary Hagel. Well, I think, first let me begin the
answer this way, and then I am sure the Comptroller would want
to respond to this, and the chairman may also.
Chairman Dempsey and I have made it clear in our opening
statements, and all of the Chiefs and the combatant commanders
who have been on the Hill this week and will be next week, and
some before Appropriations Committee already this week, have
made it very clear that readiness is a concern, will continue
to be a concern.
Let's take the 26 billion additional piece for fiscal year
2015 that the President has asked for, and Hale can go deep
into this, but about 40 percent of that, I think, is for
readiness, is to just try to get us back out of this hole to
some extent that we have sunk into the last 2 years. And so
readiness is something that is up front all the time for all of
us in all of our planning.
If we don't get that additional money, then we have already
talked a little bit about the future years, 2016 through 2019,
but I think your questions is, should you be looking at
something for 2015 if you don't get the money.
Well, I am going to ask Hale how he handled that in the
budget specifically. But, yes, it is always a concern for us,
and it is going to continue to be a concern.
General Dempsey. ``Readiness'' is a very difficult thing to
define, to be honest with you. We struggle with it, we keep
working at it. So let my give you a little historical
perspective.
This is my third appearance before this committee, and 3
years ago----
Mr. Visclosky. Doesn't get better than that.
General Dempsey. I know. I look forward to it every year, I
promise you. It gets easier every year. Not really. Not because
of you, by the way. Just the issues seem to become more and
more complex.
But some of you will remember that 3 years ago, we
highlighted the fact that coming out of 12 years of--or that at
that time it was 9 or 10 years--of fighting a particular kind
of conflict, that even if we didn't have this challenge called
the Budget Control Act, that it would take us a few years to
restore our readiness in terms of resetting the force after
having, you know, worked it for so hard for so long; and,
secondly, that there were forms of warfare, kinds of fights,
for which we hadn't prepared.
So, for example, we have become extraordinarily capable at
counterinsurgency, counterterror. Less so some of our skills
have eroded in things like maneuver warfare, and that is true
of every service. So is you are the Army, it is the movement of
larger formations over distance, integrating fires, joint fires
and Army fires. For the Air Force, it is suppression of enemy
air defenses. We haven't had to do that for a long time. It is
forced entry for the naval forces in concert with Army and Air.
There are things we just haven't practiced.
And 3 years ago I said, we have got to practice those. And
then along came the Budget Control Act and took $52 billion a
year--well, first of all, came the $487 billion, followed by
the Budget Control Act. We have not yet been able to restore
our credentials, if you will, to rekindle some of those lost
skills. And that problem persists. And it is taking us longer
to restore our full readiness than it should.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Hale, you are going to have to hold
for a while because I want to make sure Members have a chance.
Mr. Visclosky, thank you very much.
Mr. Crenshaw.

SIZE OF THE NAVY'S FLEET

Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you all for being back. A special word
of thanks to Under Secretary Hale for his service, and just
would note that he was a great traveling companion to the North
Pole not too long ago. So if you ever go back to the North
Pole, please call me. Love to make a return trip.
I want to ask a question or two about ships. You know, I
have been in Congress for about a decade, but I have been
around the Navy all my life because I am from a community where
the Navy has a big presence. And I have seen times when the
Navy was modernizing and transforming and changing. I have seen
leaner times when the Navy was--had ships that couldn't deploy
because maintenance had been neglected. But I never have seen a
time when we didn't need the Navy, its flexibility, its
firepower, its presence. There has never been a time we didn't
have that need.
And I guess when I look at the number of ships, it makes me
think about how important the ships are. And then for the last
year, we have had briefings about how we need to pivot to the
Pacific, that that is the geographic area that we have got to
be concerned about in terms of our national security, and I
guess to be successful there, we would need a strong maritime
presence. And so that seems to indicate probably more ships as
well.
And I know that there was a time when Ronald Reagan said we
ought to have 600 ships and 15 aircraft carriers. And times
have changed. The ships today are a lot more capable, a lot
more technologically advanced. But I don't think we ought to
kid ourselves, I think numbers still matter. And we still
haven't figured out the age-old problem of how you have one
ship in two different places at the same time. And the world
hasn't gotten any safer; I know the world hasn't gotten any
smaller.
And so when I look at the budget, Mr. Secretary, in my
opinion, the numbers just don't add up. On one hand you have
the Secretary of the Navy saying that we are going to grow our
fleet size from about 285 to a little over 300, and that makes
sense. But that is contradicted by the fact that the Navy is
going to require 20 less littoral combat ships than they
planned. You mentioned 11 cruisers are going to be laid up. I
don't know exactly what that means. There is talk that maybe a
carrier that still has 25 years of useful life might be
decommissioned.
So it seems to me that you have got to figure out how we
are doing all this counting, because if you are taking 11
cruisers that don't have weapons systems, that don't have
crews, I don't know if they are counted in part of our fleet. I
don't know if you count an aircraft carrier that might or might
not be decommissioned.
So ordinarily I would ask the Secretary of the Navy this
question, but, Mr. Secretary, my understanding is a lot of the
decisions that are being made are coming from your office,
which is appropriate; in other words, which ships we are going
to keep, which ships we are not going to keep, how much money
we are going to spend to develop the Navy that we need today.
And so I do think it is appropriate to ask you if you could
tell this subcommittee how you plan to meet those requirements.
And I would like to ask General Dempsey if he has looked at
those plans and if he has kind of validated the size and the
makeup of this planned fleet, because, as I understand it, the
combatant commanders, when they request assistance from the
Navy, they are accommodated about less than half the time. I
have seen the number 43 percent of the requests that are made
by the combatant commanders actually have requirements met.
So it seems to me if you face greater risks, and you have
less ships, then there will be even less a percentage of those
requirements being met.
So if you all could comment on those two, I would very much
appreciate it.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, first, yes, we are gong to
need a Navy. I don't think there is any question about that.
The Navy is a critically important component for forward
presence, and power projections, and all the things that you
know. So make no mistake, no one is suggesting otherwise. That
is first.
Second, of the specific examples you used, all of those
examples you used except one, the LCS, and I am going to come
back to that, those were recommendations made to me by the
Navy. So those were not initiated out of my office; those came
from the Navy, and I accepted them. And I am going to address
LCS.
But I think the bigger point here is if you have only got
so much money to go around, you have only got so much money to
go around. And I can't invent more money. I have got to balance
a budget, I have got to balance our force structure, because I
don't think there is any question that we are still going to
need an Army and an Air Force and modernization. Half of our
money goes to compensation, retirement benefits. I don't think
there is any question there, we want to make sure our people
are taken are of. I have only got so much.
I would like to have more ships, I would like to have more
planes. Everybody would like to have more revenue.
On the LCS, you made the comment that we are taking 20 of
the LCSs out. That is not exactly right. The program of record
for the LCS was 52. A decision I made was play it out to 32,
there is a specific mission for the LCS, but what I asked the
Secretary of the Navy to do, is to come back to me by the end
of the year and give me some options for a more capable LCS,
one that is far more survivable than this one. Up gun.
This panel has already talked about, and we will hear more
about, as this focus should be, the technological capabilities
of our adversaries. You can have a lot of ships, Congressman,
but if they don't have the capability to survive, and the power
that they need, and the projection of that power is out there,
but if they can't survive these new technologies, then I am not
sure we have made the right decision.
It isn't a matter of we are going to lose 20 ships. What I
said to the Navy is, come back to me, see if there is a better
way to do this. All that money that was budgeted for the LCS is
not taken out of their program. So if that helps clear that up,
that was the reasoning behind this.
So in the interest of time, I will be glad to go further on
any of this.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The time is of the essence. I know you
want to weigh in, General, but I do want to get to other
Members.
Thank you, Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Moran, thank you for your patience.

MILITARY COMPENSATION REFORM

Mr. Moran. Sure.
Let me start with the positive. This is a good and
responsible budget, particularly under the circumstances. And,
General Dempsey, you are proving yourself to be an excellent
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and thank you for your service.
And, Mr. Hale, you are a true professional, a real
gentleman, and extraordinarily good guy. You have been a
delight to work with.
And, Mr. Secretary, I mean it when I say that you are a man
of exceptional character and courage and ability, and really
the finest person we could find at this time in the history of
the Defense Department. So I want to thank you as well.
The three of you are the best bet, then, for tackling what
I think may be our most serious threat to a robust defense
budget, and that may not be any military threat outside our
borders. Just as entitlement programs are squeezing our ability
to invest in the kinds of programs that would ensure a stronger
economic and social future for our country, the cost of
military pay and health care is now a third of the Department's
budget, and it is the fastest-growing element, and unless we
get some handle on it, it really is going to foreclose many of
the discretionary options that are necessary within our Defense
budget.
And to a greater extent, it really isn't an investment in
the future of our security. I was very disappointed in what has
happened to the effort to trim by 1 percent military retirement
pay. Eighty-seven percent of our military veterans don't get
retirement. They don't stay for 20 years. A lot of them are the
kids who get the most serious combat wounds. But there are many
who will stay for 20 years, and then more often than not,
because they are particularly healthy, they will sign up for a
second career with a defense contractor. Of course, the
contractor doesn't have to pay for their health insurance. It
is a good deal all around. In fact, we find now that by the
time they are in their sixties, those who do benefit from
retirement pay and another salary are in the top 5 percent of
compensation throughout the country.
You know, that doesn't bother me. In fact, I think it is a
good thing. You know, living the good life, voting Republican,
it is fine. But I am not sure we can continue to afford it. And
I was particularly disappointed that those organizations who
represent military retirees were so adamant. I think they knew
they were going to ultimately be successful. One of the most, I
think, comical arguments was that it is going to affect
adversely recruitment.
I am not sure how many 18-year-olds, when told that 20
years later their retirement COLA is going to be cut by 1
percent, really change their mind about signing up, you know?
And you picture an, Oh, no. A 1 percent cut in my COLA when I
am 38? Oh, no. Let me change my mind on that. They don't. The
fact that we froze civilian pay, many of these civilians work
alongside those in uniform, for 3 years. It just shows you that
it is an area that we are going to have to overcome
politically, but somehow you are going to have to get a handle
on the budget. And what you have suggested is kind of trimming
around the edges.
Now, this is not supposed to be a speech, it is supposed to
be a question, so I am going to ask you if you think there is
any chance that the Commission on Military Compensation can
give us an opportunity to get a handle on the fastest-rising
portion of the Defense budget, because it really seems
unsustainable.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Hagel. Well, that is the charge of the Commission
that the Congress set up, and we have just sent a number of
options to them, as you probably know, on retirement. And for
all the reasons you mentioned, I think it has been pretty clear
across our leadership spectrum that we can't continue to
sustain the kind of commitments that we are now obligated to
sustain.
And just one point on the COLA-minus-1 issue, as you know,
that would be for--I think you referenced people coming in
after January 1st of this year.
Mr. Moran. Yes, yes.
Secretary Hagel. No, this is a serious issue. It has to be
dealt with. I am hopeful that the Commission will come forward
with some very smart recommendations.
The Congress is going to have to work with all of us on
this. We can't move without the Congress on this, as you know.
And I would tell you that I am committed. Our enterprise is
committed to work with you on what those recommendations will
be. But it is a key part of our future enterprise in order to
deal with this, and it is the most difficult part, as you have
mentioned.
Mr. Moran. I know we are the problem more than you, but----
General Dempsey. I will be very brief, Chairman. What we
are trying to do here is slow the growth, we are trying to slow
growth. We want the money to go back to the services so they
can do things like plow it back into readiness and maintenance
and equipment. And we want to do it once.
By the way, that is important. I know that you pass annual
budgets, but we want to have pay compensation, healthcare
reform once so that the force can settle and stabilize against
a new set of compensation standards.
And on retirement, Congressman, the one place I probably
part company with you a bit is I have said and will continue to
advise or recommend that any changes to retirement should be
grandfathered for the force currently serving.
Mr. Moran. Sure.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Moran, for raising an
important issue.
Mr. Calvert.

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for coming to speak to us today.
I would like to talk a little bit about the civilian
workforce. It was mentioned briefly, Mr. Secretary, in your
statement. The committee has heard official and unofficial
testimony in the past that the Department could use some
assistance from Congress in better managing its workforce,
giving you some legal authorities. According to the American
Enterprise Institute, over the last 10 years, the Active Duty
military grew by 3.4 percent, while the number of civilian
defense employees grew by 17.4 percent. Despite this disparity,
in light of our fiscal challenges, I am concerned that your
testimony does not address any real detailed effort to
rebalance the Defense Department's workforce; rather your
proposed defense cut would obviously shrink the Army and
obviously would add to risk in certain areas.
I am introducing some legislation tomorrow, which I have
worked with some former Comptrollers--we discussed this in Los
Angeles at the Defense Forum--which would require DoD to make
necessary reductions to its civilian workforce in a systematic
manner without compromising our ability to maintain a strong
national defense over the long term. I think it is time that
we, obviously, keep the best and brightest of our civilian
workforce and bring the workers into balance with the Active
Duty Force.
So my question, Secretary, in your testimony you mention a
5-year defense plan, which includes savings from reducing
civilian personnel and contractor costs, but I didn't see any
real details on how you would do that.
Just one last comment. Last year former Secretary Lehman
wrote in a Wall Street Journal article that each 7,000 civilian
employee reduction saves at least $5 billion over 5 years.
Can you explain in more detail how your proposal to reduce
civilian personnel and contractors will be implemented and
savings that will result?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, first, and I will ask the
Comptroller to give you some numbers on this, we did focus--and
those numbers and how we would intend to do it are in the
budget and the specifics of that. We did focus exactly on what
you just talked about. We have been focusing on the civilian
workforce, trying to judiciously explore what their role is.
Twenty percent of the headquarters staff over the next 5 years,
all headquarters staffs, will be cut. Chairman Dempsey and I
did this together. The Joint Chiefs, all headquarters across
the globe.
Now, when you look at just plain numbers, that doesn't
represent a great number, but it is not insignificant. But it
is bigger than that. And the percentages here are pretty
impressive, what we are looking at.
And if I can ask the Comptroller to explain what is in that
budget, the specifics of how we intend to do it and the focus
that we put on it. But we did focus on it.
Mr. Hale. I will keep it short, and we can give you more
detail. It was about a 5 percent cut in civilian full-time
equivalents between fiscal 2014 and fiscal 2019 in this budget,
similar to the reduction in the Active strength.
It comes from reorganizations. It comes from recognizing
that workload is going down, as, for example, the war ends. And
it comes--and here we could use your help--from BRAC. And when
you get rid of a brigade combat team, you don't get rid of many
civilians. If you close the base that that team was, then you
save all the infrastructure, and that is a lot of civilians.
So, if you give us BRAC authority, we will be much better able
to----
Mr. Calvert. Let me follow up on that. As you know, we have
been through several BRACs, and we have been through several
previous secretaries, and they have all tried to reform and
reduce the civilian workforce, most notably Secretary Rumsfeld.
But they failed to do so.
And I have been told by some of your predecessors and some
of your former Comptrollers that you are unable to do so
because of laws that are on the books, the number--and so forth
that--especially on issues regarding performance, to make
significant reductions in the civilian workforce.
You mentioned 5 percent. The Defense Business Board said
that it is necessary, to bring them back into a ratio relative
to civilian-to-military employees, should be a reduction of 15
percent over 5 years. Do you agree with that number?
Mr. Hale. We set our civilian numbers to match workload. So
these are service recommendations that seemed right to us. So,
I wouldn't be willing to sign up to a 15 percent cut,
especially if we are going to have to keep civilians at bases
we don't need.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Calvert, thank you for your
questions.
Ms. McCollum, thank you for your patience.

BASE RE-ALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good morning. I guess I could almost say good afternoon,
gentlemen.
Mr. Secretary, this defense budget makes tough choices that
are responsible and necessary, and it has my support. Yet this
year's tough choices are modest when you compare them to the
dangerous budget choices that we will face next year if
sequestration remains in place, as you gentlemen have pointed
out. So I believe it is high time that some of my conservative
colleagues in Congress stop criticizing this budget. Instead,
find the political courage to put new revenue on the table to
fund our national security priorities.
But absent such political courage or new revenue, we are
not going to make America stronger and more secure by cutting
domestic priorities like education, infrastructure investments,
health research, or Social Security to fund the Pentagon's
budget.
So to follow up on what you started talking about, BRAC,
you know, one of the tough choices in this budget is a new
round of closings. In 2004, the Department estimated that it
had about 25 percent excess infrastructure. So, Mr. Hale, you
started to kind of allude to this. Could you give us the
estimate of excess Defense Department infrastructure today?
Mr. Hale. Well, I have to give you the same number. We have
not been allowed to plan, and so we haven't. But we know that
it was about 25 percent at the end of the BRAC 2005 round, and
it is almost certainly higher now because we have reduced
forces. So there is a good deal of unneeded infrastructure out
there.
Ms. McCollum. Okay. Secretary Hagel, is it fair to say that
as Congress continues to spend billions of dollars every year
for military facilities and infrastructure that the Department
of Defense does not need or no longer wants, that it impacts
projected savings in future year defense programs from
implementing the--you know, when we don't close BRACs, that
means there is less money for readiness, there is less money
for modernization, other priorities.
Could you maybe explain how if we don't do that, you can't
do some of the things that General Dempsey and you were talking
about for preparing our force to be well rounded?
Secretary Hagel. Congresswoman, it is really pretty simple.
If you are paying for overhead you don't need, whether it is
people that Congressman Calvert talked about, or all the
expense that goes with overhead you don't need, then you are
absorbing resources from the more viable parts of your
enterprise, and that is just less money you have.
And so I don't think it is anything more complicated than
that. It is complicated to get there. It is imperfect, I know
that. But the longer we defer this, and the longer we continue
to keep that excess capacity that we are paying for, taking
money away from the real important aspects of our mission and
our national security, the higher price we are going to pay for
that.
And at some point then, at some future Congress, or whoever
is running the Pentagon at the time and the next chairman, they
are going to have to make some tough choices. And that is what
I said in my opening statement. The chairman has noted it. You
all know it. That is life. So we are far wiser to get at this
now to try to sort this out. But make no mistake, it is costing
us now.

CAPABILITY OF AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
As the White House and the Pentagon has to consider a
withdrawal of U.S. troop, zero option, and it was alluded to
with the dollar figure that the ranking member brought up on
the floor, there is also something else I would like you to
briefly touch on.
What is your assessment of Afghan security forces' capacity
to sustain the gains our troops have made and ensure that
progress made by civil society and women in Afghanistan allow
to be continued to develop?
Secretary Hagel. I don't think there would be anybody here
certainly today that would argue that things are not better in
Afghanistan for women, for the people of Afghanistan than they
were 10 years ago. That has come at a cost, yes. And the real
question, I think General Dunford addressed this yesterday, and
General Dunford will continue to address it; Chairman Dempsey
noted it in his opening statement--that how do we protect that
as much as we can, as best we can, the tremendous gains that
have been made, the sacrifices that we have made, our people,
to help the Afghan people get there.
Obviously, they are a sovereign nation. They have the
responsibility to defend themselves, just as Iraq does. We have
tried to help build those capacities as we have dealt with the
terrorism issue, which led us there in the first place.
But the open question is, if in fact there is no role for
the United States, and if there is no role for our allies--and
let's not forget we have 50 International Security Force allies
with us in Afghanistan and NATO--then there is an open question
on the vulnerabilities that they are going to be dealing with.
I have confidence in the tremendous progress the Afghan
army has made, their institutions. It is imperfect, I know. Our
inspector generals remind us of that every day. But they have
made great progress.
And General Dempsey was just there, as he noted. He made
some evaluations, and he stays very close to this every day. I
talk to Dunford on a regular weekly SVTS and touch base with
him, our commanders as well, a number of times each week. But
there is risk, and there is unpredictability.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Mr. Cole.

AWACS/DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Mr. Cole. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, first, thank all of you for your service. And I
appreciate it more than I can say. We may occasionally have
some disagreements, but nobody on this panel doubts anybody's
commitment to the defense of the country or absolute personal
integrity and appreciates all the service.
I am going to focus on two or three things quickly. But I
first want to make a quick remark. This is a budget full of
really tough choices. I don't think there is any doubt about
you made some choices you didn't want to have to make. And I
want to associate myself, Mr. Secretary, with a couple of your
remarks, because I think you made those tough choices because
we in Congress and the administration have not made the tough
choices that we ought to make. Frankly, we all know we are
under a cloud here of fiscal restraint that is beyond what
anybody on this panel wants to see happen where the military is
concerned.
So, again, your job would get a lot easier if we did our
job as well as you do your job. And, hopefully, in the next
couple years we will be able to find some way to get there.
Most of the members on this panel have voted for every deal
that has been out there, whether it was the fiscal cliff or
whether it was, you know, reopen the government or the Ryan-
Murray deal, and they did that in large measure because they
are very concerned about the men and women in uniform and about
the challenges that we have dealt you as leaders.
So, again, I think the real message here at a deeper level,
beyond the budget, is the political class of the country needs
to start doing its job so that you guys are free to do yours.
Now, the two areas of concern that I had quickly to focus
on, one, you made some tough choices in this budget concerning
our AWACS fleet. And that is a pretty low-density but high-use
asset that we are using right now, as you mentioned. And in
full disclosure, this is a parochial concern, most of those are
stationed in my district at Tinker Air Force Base. So obviously
I have got a concern there.
But I think the fact that you could immediately deploy six
of them, and you have got missions in the books for homeland
security, to deny and to defeat, I mean, it is an asset we use
an awful lot. So I would like to get your thinking on why we
can lose that percentage. I recognize there have to be cuts not
just in one place. This is a very high percentage of this
asset. Essentially 25 percent that we are going to be losing.
Second question, and somewhat related, I just would like,
if we have enough time, to expound a little bit, this sort of
picks up on Mr. Calvert's question about are you comfortable
with where you are at in terms of the depot system that we
have. I mean, do you have what you need for modernization? Do
you have what you need in terms of personnel? When you look at
civilian reductions, where do you see those coming across the
civilian workforce?
I think we get high value out of our depots. And I just
want to kind of probe your thinking a little bit on where these
civilian personnel cuts could come from, what areas of
economizing there are out there.
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Congressman. And thank you for
your comments.
Starting with your last question, using depots as an
example, but it is a broader question, picking up on
Congressman Calvert's question, picking up on Congressman
Calvert's question, which is a very important one. I think I
would refer back to what the comptroller noted. Any business
person, many of you are business people, or any responsible
person who has responsibilities for an institution and people,
so on, knows that you have to match your resources up with your
mission. You match your people with the mission.
And what the comptroller was noting in a general answer, I
think, to Congressman Calvert was we have tried to focus on
what the civilian component responsibilities are for this
institution. Everyone knows they support the military. And so
what is their exact role? How many do we need? How many do we
not need? As the world changes, everything shifts. So we have
tried to do that. No, we are not perfect at it. But we
prioritize that. So that would be the first general answer I
would make to your point.
Depots and the civilian workforce there are really
critically important for all the reasons, starting with the
mission of the depot and how do they support the military. And
so we focus on, again, those missions, and those missions that
are most critical in support of our military and national
security interests. That is always the starting point.
On AWACS and some of the touch choices we made. I followed
most all of the recommendations that our chiefs and our
secretaries made. General Dempsey deserves tremendous credit in
working through this. This was not an easy process internally,
as you all can imagine.
Each Service Chief, of course, has the responsibility for
his or her service. And we have to rely, the President has to
rely, I have to rely on the fact that they will be an adequate,
an efficient, effective spokesman for their service, they will
protect their service. That is their job.
But in the end, they also have a bigger responsibility, and
that is the entire enterprise. And the chiefs had to make some
very tough recommendations based on these fiscal restraints.
And so I think I did a very effective job, much because General
Dempsey helped them work through all this. It wasn't easy for
anybody.
And so, therefore, your direct question to me, those were
recommendations in almost every case that came from the Service
Chiefs, the secretaries, on what they thought they were going
to need with the restraints, fiscal restraints to protect the
country, do the job that they are asked to do.
Mr. Cole. I am sure this was taken into consideration, this
is last point, and I don't need a follow-up answer. But this is
an asset that does enhance the capability of our allies. It is
not just an asset for us. And so in that sense, it is a force
multiplier. I think one of these things can enormously useful.
That is really how we are using it now, as I understand it, in
Romania and Poland. And it is something, it is a capability
that not very many other people have that we do, obviously.
Secretary Hagel. No, there are strong arguments,
Congressman, on both sides of that. Those are close calls. I
mean, I get it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. I am sorry we put you in that position. I am
sorry, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Cole, point is well taken. Mr. Ryan.

DOMESTIC NATURAL GAS

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. I am going to cover a little bit of
territory.
First, Mr. Secretary, I would like to thank you. Last time
you were here, I talked with you about an airman, Karl Hoerig,
who was murdered in my district, and his wife fled back to
Brazil. And I want to thank you for your help. And I may have a
question or two for the record on that issue.
With the issue of Ukraine, one of the issues, if you look
at the map of Ukraine, you obviously see a lot of gas pipelines
coming in and out of Russia. One of the things we are trying to
do here is export more of this newly accessed natural gas that
we have in the United States, in eastern Ohio and western
Pennsylvania.
Can you just talk for a minute or two, General and Mr.
Secretary, about what you think the Pentagon, Department of
Defense position is on using our bounty that we have here as an
opportunity to wean a lot of the European countries off of
Russian natural gas?
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, thank you for your comments
regarding your former constituent, too.
Well, first, that is not our area of responsibility,
specifically, as you know, as you implied. Not that we are
unmindful, and cannot be, of all the different tools that the
President has to conduct foreign policy to assure our national
security and our national interests around the world. And
certainly your question brings into focus one of those areas.
I know that the interagency is looking at all these
different options. I am no expert on any of this, but I do know
that one of the issues that we are dealing with--we, not DoD,
but just our economy domestically as far as exports and
liquefied natural gas--is our terminals. We don't really have
the facilities, that I know some are being built and plan to be
built.
But your bigger question, though, is one that we really
don't get involved in. I don't know, the Chairman may have a
response to it.
General Dempsey. Just to align myself with your thinking
that an energy independent and net exporter of energy as a
nation has the potential to change the security environment
around the world, notably in Europe and in the Middle East. And
so as we look at our strategies for the future, I think we have
got to pay more and particular attention to energy as an
instrument of national power, because it will very soon, in the
next few years, potentially become one of our more prominent
tools.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. Ryan. I appreciate that. We had a meeting with Ms.
Merkel, a year ago today, the German Study Group was in
Germany. And the first question she asked us was about how do
we get some natural gas. And now the world is seeing how they
are in the middle of this whole play that is happening.
The other issue and final question is regarding the defense
industrial base. And I know you said earlier that the defense
industrial base is an important national asset, which those of
us in the industrial Midwest certainly know.
One of the issues is, as we move to cut some of these
programs and weapon systems, I think it is important for us to
understand how that is going to affect the industrial base, how
that is going to affect the supply chains, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier
3, all the way down, subcontractors, all the way through the
supply chain. And I don't think that DoD has yet a full, deep
understanding of the supply chain.
And I want to know and ask, is there any move afoot or
initiative within the Department of Defense to really map and
figure out what this supply chain looks like? And it would
certainly have benefits into other manufacturing sectors as
well.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, your point here is very, very
important, and I alluded to it, as you noted, in my statement.
But to your question, yes, we do, matter of fact, pay a lot of
attention to this.
I don't know if our under secretary for acquisitions has
been up here, Frank Kendall, to talk with any of you. I suspect
most of you know who he is. He comes from the business world.
In fact, he is a West Point graduate. But he has spent a lot of
time on this, as all of our chiefs have, our services have,
because everyone recognizes that industrial base is where that
strength, where that comes from.
Every decision we make, recommendation we make, factors
that in, Congressman. Now, you may disagree with some of the
decisions, but it goes back to what we have been talking about
all morning. I mean, when we are limited with resources, we
have got make some hard choices. I would like to keep all the
airplanes flying and all the ships steaming, and more ships,
more airplanes. But I don't have that opportunity to do that.
So we have to make tough choices.
But I want to assure you--and we will be glad to come over
and give you a complete briefing on this, too, as to how we do
this--that your point is a very important part of all our
decision making.
General Dempsey. Mr. Chairman, could I just add.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes. Very briefly.
General Dempsey. To your point, I am sure there are things
happening out there that we haven't yet been able to fully
understand. So, for example, the big providers are able to
absorb the uncertainty that we are all confronted with. The
smaller ones, subcontractors, are not. And so I am sure that in
terms of the big providers, the effect is probably pretty
minimal. But I think among the small providers it is probably
pretty significant, and it argues for the kind of certainty we
have been asking. Long-term certainly will mitigate the risk
that we lose some of these really important and smaller
providers.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Womack. Thank you for your patience.

ARMY AVIATION RESTRUCTURE

Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, I would like to add my thanks to the panel here
today for their great service to our country. And I can't
imagine the difficulty you are having in making these tough
choices.
At the risk of getting down in the weeds, maybe more
appropriately at the hover level, I want to ask you for your
explanation on the decision to take attack aviation out of the
Guard and put it into the Active component in totality. And
then there is a second piece to this question that is more
strategic thinking in nature. Does it signal that there is a
new construct to how we look at our Guard and Reserve, who for
many, many years, since the war on terror began, has become
more of an operational force? And now we are making a proposal
or making a decision to take strategic depth away from attack
aviation and put it in the Active component.
Does that signal a change in the construct of how we look
at our Guard and Reserve?
Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Congressman. That is a
critically important question, and I am going to ask the
General to address it. Because he has probably--not probably. I
can't speak for the all-knowing comptroller here, who is expert
on everything, at least we go to him for everything. But there
is certainly nobody at this table, nobody in this room I am
aware of who knows more about this question than the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I am going to defer. I have
got an answer, but his will be better. So let me defer my
answer and let General Dempsey address this.
Mr. Womack. Please, General. Thank you.
General Dempsey. I can't promise you better, but I will
promise you as much information as I can possibly provide. And
I would be happy to also take a further follow-on for the
record.
[The information follows:]

We are continually assessing our force structure, to include the
balance of forces in the Active and Reserve Components. Moreover, we
constantly look for more efficient ways to manage the force while
meeting combatant commander requirements. Transferring attack aviation,
the low-density/high-demand AH-64 Apache helicopters, from the Guard
into the Active Component is an example of the normal rebalancing of
capabilities between components to better enable the Joint Force to
meet the needs of the combatant commands. This decision better enables
Apaches to be teamed with unmanned systems for the armed reconnaissance
role as well as their traditional attack role. Further, it provides the
National Guard a more robust capacity of the more versatile UH-60
Blackhawk. These aircraft not only improve the National Guard's
capabilities to support combat missions, they increase their ability to
support civil authorities, such as disaster response, while sustaining
security and support capabilities to civil authorities in our states
and territories.

General Dempsey. The Army is essentially trying to reduce
the number of platforms from seven to four, to replace some
aging platforms that, frankly, are just cost inefficient, and
in so doing turn the Apache helicopter both from an attack
platform into a scout helicopter, link it with some unmanned
aerial systems in order to form a scout weapons team.
To do that, their intent, as currently briefed, is to move
the attack helicopter fleet, as you know, into the Active
component, but replace the loss of aircraft in the Guard with
lift helicopters, which have both utility in a combat
environment, but also in homeland defense, humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief.
I can assure you it is not a move toward pushing the Guard
back into a strategic reserve. That is actually a separate
issue. I can understand the question, and I can understand the
concern on the part of the Guard. But the Guard will always
remain part of our operational capability. Albeit the attack
helicopter capability, the rotary wing attack helicopter
capability would be removed.
We are now in negotiation, frankly, and in discussion with
the Guard about how much of it can be operational at any given
time in balance with the Active component and how much of it
then would be in a more strategic role. And that is a
discussion that will persist for the foreseeable future as we
determine what our needs will be. But we are not trying to push
the Guard onto the shelf, I assure you.
Mr. Womack. My last comment would be this, and if you want
to respond to it, fine. You have already touched on this notion
that we are pretty good right now at counterinsurgency. We have
been doing that for a long time, we are really good at it.
Some of the more recent activities going on in Eastern
Europe concern me that we could be thrust back into some kind
of full spectrum operational environment. And we are not very
good at that now. We are not certified, as you called it,
credentialed to do that. We have to know up here, as we pivot
to new threats, emerging threats, we have to know up here where
we are weak in our ability to respond, to project power into
these trouble spots. And the sooner the better.
So I got it. I agree with you. I am concerned about it. And
I hope that our Nation can become as concerned about it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Womack, for some
excellent, on-point questions.
Mr. Owens.

BASE RE-ALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Mr. Owens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
I want to go to an issue that has been raised several
times. But you have clearly, I think, laid out an argument that
we have excess weapon systems or at least aging weapon systems.
We have facilities that are, in your minds at least, not
necessary. And, obviously, that brings people along in the
process as well. You have also told us that we have not allowed
you to plan to deal with that issue.
If you had the capacity to plan, how long would it take you
to construct something that would tell us where you anticipated
being after you made cuts, and then how would that lay over to
what you see as the mission and/or threats that you are trying
to address? Because it is clear to me that we have had a change
in what we see as our threat assessments over the last 10 or 15
years.
Secretary Hagel. Congressman, were you speaking about--you
started in your comments about excess capacity. I am not sure--
--
Mr. Owens. You mean I wasn't clear?
Secretary Hagel. No, I wouldn't put you in my category. Let
me take a run at what I think I can provide you here.
Mr. Owens. Maybe I can clarify this. There has been a lot
of talk about BRACs. You said you can't plan for a BRAC because
you don't have authority to plan. What I am trying to
understand is, if we gave you authority to plan, how quickly
could you develop a plan, present it to us, and how does that
match up with our threat assessments?
Secretary Hagel. On BRAC, you mean?
Mr. Owens. Right.
Secretary Hagel. Well, we have done a lot of planning on
that. We know based on, to your point, corresonding threats,
where those threats are. For example, I laid out in my opening
statement just a brief four specific priorities on our defense
strategy guidance, QDR, what was the focus, homeland security,
went right down through that. Let's just take those four
priorities that the President laid out 2 years ago, QDR. How do
you implement the plans the programs, the missions in order to
develop, sustain, and then implement those strategies to deal
with the threats?
And so, yes, we have got a pretty good sense of overhead
and structures and so on that we could do without, that don't,
in fact, factor into the strategic threats that you noted have
changed significantly in the last 10, 15 years.
Mr. Owens. It doesn't appear to me that the public
understands that you have had this change in threat assessment
and what those threats are and how you would meet those
threats. I don't think that is well understoood by the public.
Secretary Hagel. Well, maybe not. I mean, if you start with
the President's Defense Strategic Guidance and then QDRs, I
suspect most in the public don't spend that much time going
that deep down into it, and maybe we haven't articulated
clearly enough what we see as threats. But I think, you know,
in speeches I give, the Chairman gives, our chiefs give, we
talk about those all the time, cyber terrorism, so on. And so
maybe we could crisp that up better.
When I go out and speak or when I take questions and when I
am on different forums, different settings, not just up here,
as the Chairman does often, we are often asked that, I mean, by
the media, by others in various ways. But I don't think it has
been any particular secret as to where we thought we needed to
go and what the threats were.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Dempsey.
General Dempsey. Let me take a really brief swing. This is
the elevator speech of national security strategy.
Our threats can be described as two, two, two, and one. Two
heavyweights: Russia and China. Two middleweights: Korea and
Iran. Two networks: Al Qaeda and the transnational criminal
network that runds from south to north in this hemisphere. And
one domain: cyber.
And in response to that we have distributed the force, we
have a very good idea of how much of it should be foreard
deployed, how much should be rotational, and how much should be
in we call it surge capability and the homeland. We have got
that. We can certainly provide that.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

Our global posture analysis, which includes forces, footprints, and
agreements with Partner Nations, is an on-going and dynamic process
that involves multiple coordinated efforts. We carefully balance the
need to provide forces to the geographic combatant commands to assure
our allies and deter our adversaries with the need to preserve ready
units for homeland defense and surge events. This delicate balance is
measured against our strategic pillars, National Security Initiatives,
and mission prioritizations. This review yields a set of forces that
are forward-based (stationed), forward-deployed (rotational) from the
U.S., and forces that can be deployed in response to crisis or war
(surge). The combatant commands have forces with which to plan and
conduct current operations, and the Services manage forces for steady-
state missions while providing a hedge for unforeseen contingencies.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me just comment before I go to Mr.
Aderholt. A lot of emphasis is placed on all these assessments
and QDR. And, of course, it didn't escape you that in the most
recent one, of 64 pages, Russia was only mentioned once. I
think you perhaps saw that. I mean, that is pretty alarming.
Mr. Aderholt.

SPACE LAUNCH ROCKET ENGINES

Mr. Aderholt. Thank you. I join my colleagues in welcoming
you to our subcommittee. And it is great to have you here this
morning.
Concerning the Ukrainian situation, touch base about it
just a minute. My question would be, do you feel like--and I
will address this first to the Secretary and then to the
Chairman, or whoever would like to respond to it--but does it
demonstrate it is time for us to move ahead promptly more with
a joint Air Force-NASA funding to develop additional
capabilities for making powerful rocket engines here in the
U.S.? Just your thoughts on that.
Secretary Hagel. You are obviously referring to the
relationship we have with the Russians on----
Mr. Aderholt. Yes.
Secretary Hagel [continuing]. On their rocket motors.
Well, I think this is going to engage us in a review of
that issue, I don't think there is any question about that.
Mr. Aderholt. But do you feel that this is something that
is rising to the forefront now with this Ukrainian situation?
Secretary Hagel. Yes. As I just said, I think there is no
question it is----
Mr. Aderholt. Yeah.
Secretary Hagel. Sure.
General Dempsey. Well, as you know, we have got
relationships not only in the issue of commerce and trade with
Russia, but the northern distribution network coming out of
Afghanistan, cooperation on counterterror and counterpiracy;
many, many different areas where we have a relationship with
them, and I think they will all be under some scrutiny,
depending on how the issue in the Ukraine evolves.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Mr. Aderholt. Let me move over quickly to the LCS. I know
it has already been mentioned here this morning, but you know,
of course, some concerns about I think about every ship in the
fleet will be equally armored, but be that as it may, I believe
that the threats which the current LCS are designed to address
need to be defended against probably as we go for the budget
process. But in the fiscal year 2015 budget report, the Navy, I
understand, acquires three LCS ships instead of four as
originally planned. Given the situation, how do you decide
which of the two versions of the LCS to put on hold for a year?
Secretary Hagel. Well, first of all, we are not putting
anything on hold with the production line that is in place.
What I have said is that of 32 LCSs, 24 have already been
contracted for, and another 8 will need to be contracted for.
Those go forward. Those are ongoing now. We budget for them, so
there is no change. Those will go right into fiscal year--in
the current production line, 2020, so that doesn't change.
What I have asked the Navy to do is to come back to me, as
you may know or you may have seen the memo, and address the
issue of if we are projecting out a 300-ship Navy, is it the
smartest place we can have a sixth of our ships, LCSs? That is
what we are projecting. In the light of some of the points that
have been made here today, the new emerging technologies and
threats that our adversaries have, is this really what we need
and what we want, we should be spending our money on?
You are correct, the LCS was designed for specific
missions, and that isn't changing. We are going ahead with
those, for those missions, but then we are talking about, well,
is that where we need another 20, which then that would
represent a sixth of our Navy. So that is the question.
Your point about the two holds, one, as you know, being
produced in Alabama and the other in Wisconsin, what I have
asked the Navy to go do is look at those two holds; is there
any variations that can come with already what is in the
production line, research, technology, everything we know
about, so you don't start over. How do you come back to me,
will you come back to me with some thoughts about a more
survivable ship, a more up-gunned ship, a more capable ship
than what the LCS is presently? So that is the decision. Then
we will make a decision in the next budget on that.
Mr. Aderholt. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. And the cost.
Secretary Hagel. I am sorry?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The cost of that.
Secretary Hagel. The cost.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The cost. That is one of our primary
focuses.
Secretary Hagel. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Of what might succeed----
Secretary Hagel. That is right.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Represent and upgrade.
Secretary Hagel. That is right.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes, Ms. Kaptur.

FORCE INTEGRATION/ALCOHOL ABUSE

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank this
panel. We really appreciate your service to our country and
your being here today. You are under a lot of pressure on many
levels, and we thank you for your great intelligence and your
composure.
I am going to ask for three items for the record, so I will
just tick these off very quickly and then ask my question. For
the record, I would appreciate any information the Department
has on Ukraine's military losses, including wounded and their
engagements in support of our efforts on the global war on
terrorism.
[The information follows:]

Industrial base impact (at all levels of the supply chain) is an
important consideration factored into the Department's investment
planning and budget preparation. In 2013, the Department implemented
its first widespread application of Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier
(S2T2) Fragility and Criticality (FaC) assessments with the Services
and Defense Agencies. These assessments systematically evaluate the
need for program adjustments or investments to sustain specific niches
in the defense industrial base. The framework allows DoD leadership to
better consider industrial capabilities spanning multiple sectors,
tiers, Services, and programs as part of DoD's normal budget process.
FaC assessments measure the criticality of a capability; the impact of
losing the capability, including the difficulty of restoring it; the
fragility of a capability; and the difficulty of obtaining a capability
when needed. A summary of S2T2 FaC assessments will be included in the
2014 Annual Industrial Base Capabilities Report to Congress.
Results of the S2T2 fragility and criticality assessment are
reflected in the FY15 President's Budget Request including investments
for Air Force and Navy high-performance jet engine technology
development, Army next generation ground combat vehicle design teams,
and missile industrial base for production process improvements/
automation and material/technology upgrades for enhanced performance.
In addition, the Department initiated a new program in FY14,
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Support, which will fund
projects that preserve critical defense industrial base capabilities
through a break in production that would otherwise have to be recreated
later at a higher cost to the taxpayer. These projects are rated by the
S2T2 FaC criteria. FY14 will fund focused projects for Butanetriol, a
solid rocket fuel precursor chemical; Infrared Focal Plane Arrays;
Advanced Thrusters for Solid Rocket Propulsion; and Test Facilities for
Radiation Hardened Electronics.
While the Department is committed to achieving the best possible
balance between affordability and capability, budget cuts are and will
continue decreasing production and R&D for all defense systems and we
cannot afford to ``fix'' all of our industrial base vulnerabilities. In
general, we are concerned about maintaining engineering design
capabilities in several sectors, most notably for tactical aircraft and
rotary wing.
To address tactical aircraft concerns, the Department has
initiated an Air Dominance Initiative (ADI) led by DARPA with extensive
participation from both the Navy and the Air Force partnered with major
tactical aviation industry suppliers. This ADI team is exploring
concepts for the next generation of air dominance and undertaking
prototyping efforts based on the results of concept exploration. The
Department continues to promote competition and innovation in
aeronautics with its investments in enabling technologies and programs,
including the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and
Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRSB).
With regard to rotary wing concerns, DARPA has launched
the vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) X-Plane program to challenge
industry and innovative engineers to concurrently push the envelope in
four areas: speed, hover efficiency, cruise efficiency, and useful load
capacity. They are looking for true cross-pollinations of designs and
technologies from the fixed-wing and rotary-wing worlds. Additionally,
the Future Vertical Lift Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR-
TD) program will also encourage innovation and enhance competition for
rotary wing platforms.
The Department has also worked with other government rocket
propulsion stakeholders (Services, NASA, & OSTP) to establish a
collaborative body within the Joint Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force
(JANNAF) construct to address rocket propulsion industrial base issues.
We are leading activities associated with implementing the Government's
Course of Action for sustaining the solid and liquid propulsion
industrial base.
The Department is working through the Defense Ordnance Technology
Council to address industrial base concerns associated with developing
and executing missile fuze and thermal battery risk mitigation
activities. We are also developing a strategy to address ammonium
perchlorate industrial base issues.
As the Department continues to refine and implement S2T2 FaC
assessments, we will increase our knowledge of those capabilities that
truly need to be preserved as well as help inoculate the Department
against concerns not related to industrial base risk.

Number two, in terms of a defense industrial base, a
summary of vulnerabilities, componentry, processes, and trained
employees in the sectors you deem most critical.
[The information follows:]

Industrial base impact (at all levels of the supply chain) is an
important consideration factored into the Department's investment
planning and budget preparation. The Department conducted its first
widespread application of Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2)
Fragility and Criticality (FaC) industrial base assessments with the
Military Services and Defense Agencies in 2013. These assessments
systematically evaluated the need for program adjustments or
investments to sustain specific niches in the defense industrial base.
The framework allows DoD leadership to better consider industrial
capabilities spanning multiple sectors, tiers, Services, and programs
as part of DoD's normal budget process. FaC assessments measure the
criticality of a capability; the impact of losing the capability,
including the difficulty of restoring it; the fragility of a
capability; and the difficulty of obtaining a capability when needed.
The S2T2 fragility and criticality assessment results were used to
balance short and long-term risks, and balance cuts to capabilities, in
moderation. These decisions are reflected in the FY 2015 President's
Budget Request, which include investments for Air Force and Navy high-
performance jet engine technology development, Army next generation
ground combat vehicle design teams, and missile industrial base for
production process improvements/automation and material/technology
upgrades for enhanced performance.
In addition, the Department initiated a new program in FY 2014,
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Support, which will fund
projects that preserve critical defense industrial base capabilities
through a break in production that would otherwise have to be recreated
later at a higher cost to the taxpayer. These projects are rated by the
S2T2 FaC criteria. FY 2014 will fund focused projects for Butanetriol,
a solid rocket fuel precursor chemical; Infrared Focal Plane Arrays;
Advanced Thrusters for Solid Rocket Propulsion; and Test Facilities for
Radiation Hardened Electronics.
While the Department is committed to achieving the best possible
balance between affordability and capability, budget cuts are and will
continue decreasing production and research and development for all
defense systems, and we cannot afford to ``fix'' all of our industrial
base vulnerabilities. In general, we are concerned about maintaining
engineering design capabilities in several sectors, perhaps most
notably for rotary wing. For instance, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency has launched the vertical take-off and landing X-Plane
program to challenge industry and innovative engineers to concurrently
push the envelope in four areas: speed, hover efficiency, cruise
efficiency, and useful load capacity. They are looking for true cross-
pollinations of designs and technologies from the fixed-wing and
rotary-wing worlds. Additionally, the Future Vertical Lift Joint Multi-
Role Technology Demonstrator program will also encourage innovation and
enhance competition for rotary wing platforms.
The Department has also worked with other government rocket
propulsion stakeholders (Services, NSA, and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy) to establish a collaborative body within the Joint
Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force to address rocket propulsion industrial
base issues. We are leading activities associated with implementing the
Government's Course of Action for sustaining the solid and liquid
propulsion industrial.
Through the Space Industrial Base Council and the Critical
Technologies Working Group, the Department is assessing and identifying
actions to preserve and sustain essential capabilities and critical
sub-tier vendors within the broader space industrial base. Risks are
identified through annual S2T2 analysis efforts and then coordinated
and ranked with interagency space partners for resourcing and action.
The Department is working through the Defense Ordnance Technology
Council to address industrial base concerns associated with developing
and executing missile fuze and thermal battery risk mitigation
activities. We are also developing a strategy to address ammonium
perchlorate industrial base issues.
As the Department continues to refine and implement S2T2 FaC
assessments, we will increase our knowledge of those capabilities that
truly need to be preserved as well as help inoculate the Department
against concerns not related to industrial base risk.

Number three, there was nothing really in the testimony
today dealing with energy security. There was some reference in
the question, but in the quadrennial Defense Review, there was
a little bit in there, but I am very interested in how you,
across departments, deal with the management structure to lead
the Department towards energy security and independence, and in
so doing lead our country in that direction.
[The information follows:]

The Department incorporates the geostrategic implications of global
energy supply and demand into our strategic planning. More directly,
for the Department, energy security means having assured access to the
reliable supplies of energy for military forces and operations and the
ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission
essential requirements. Building on the strategic direction in the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department issued a policy directive
(DoD Directive 4180.01) on April 16, 2014 that will enhance military
capability, improve energy security, and mitigate costs in its use and
management of energy. The Directive institutionalizes the imperative to
improve our use of energy and assigns responsibilities for implementing
these actions across the Department. Regarding collaboration with other
agencies, our Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Energy
is a good example. It provides a framework for steadily strengthening
the collaboration and information sharing between both departments
regarding energy technology in such areas as permanent and contingency
bases and ground vehicles.

In terms of questions, in following Mr. Womack's question,
he has left the room at this point, but in evaluating your
spending reductions, across various categories and cost savings
associated with these hard choices, I was surprised that the
Guard and Reserve was also reduced. And in the region that I
represent, I will give you a real specific example of what
appears to have happened.
I support the Guard and Reserve very heavily. They have
just performed superbly, and they cost less, but yet at our F-
16 unit in northern Ohio, for the first time someone from
Active Duty has come to command the base. This may be something
strategically important that is beyond my ability to
comprehend, but never before have we had someone come from
Active Duty into a Guard situation at a base that is so highly
ranked. And I thought, hmm, does that cost more than someone
residing within the Guard? Maybe it is an anomaly, maybe it is
something that is unusual with the blending of force, but if
that is happening across the country, it is going to cost us
more money, I think.
So I just point that out. With all these changes happening
at the Department of Defense, I just think, following with what
Mr. Womack said, we need to really look at that and make sure
that Guard and Reserve are properly respected on many levels,
because you are really dealing with tough budget choices.
Finally, I wanted to reference the area of human
effectiveness, brain research that DARPA is doing, so
important. We didn't talk much about DARPA today, but I want to
pinpoint mental health of our troops, and particularly alcohol
abuse. The most current report suggests alcohol use disorders,
such as alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence, to be three times
more prevalent in the military than PTSD. How is the military
managing what appears to be an epidemic of alcohol misuse,
abuse, and dependence, and the co-occurrence of alcohol misuse
in a soldier who is either depression or PTSD, is recognized as
being a common route by which impaired soldiers downwardly
drift, leading to attempted suicide. Essentially alcohol abuse
converts a soldier who is depressed and thinking suicide to one
who plans and attempts suicide.
So this issue of alcohol abuse across the force, including
in our veteran population once they are discharged, is very
serious. I would just like a comment on that today, and then if
you want to provide additional for the record, terrific.
[The information follows:]

In 2012, DoD released a review of policies and programs for the
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of Substance Use Disorders (SUDs)
in members of the Armed Forces. Concurrently, the Institute of Medicine
conducted an external review of DoD SUD policy and programs. A recently
submitted Report to Congress, dated October 10, 2013, focused on
outlining DoD activities that ensure a comprehensive approach and plan
for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of SUDs. The Department has
published two new instructions related to substance use: DoD
Instruction (DoDI) 1010.01, ``Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing
Program,'' was published on September 13, 2012, to establish standards
for specimen and data collection on drug use and misuse and to direct
the Services to issue guidance regarding participation in national
anti-drug awareness, community outreach, and education campaigns. DoDI,
1010.04, entitled ``Problematic Substance Use by Department of Defense
Personnel,'' was published on February 20, 2014, establishing
requirements for prevention, screening, and intervention for SUDs. New
initiatives include the use of the Screening, Brief Intervention, and
Referral to Treatment (SBIRT) model across the continuum of care. SBIRT
is a comprehensive, integrated, public health approach to the delivery
of early intervention and treatment services for persons with SUDs, as
well as those who are at risk of developing these disorders. SBIRT
includes the routine screening of patients for unhealthy alcohol use by
using an empirically validated measure and prescribes interventions
consistent with an identified risk.
The Department also continues to improve the flexibility of
information technology platforms that track prescription medications in
an effort to inhibit the diversion and misuse of prescribed
medications. The Department is monitoring the implementation of the
U.S. Army's Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot, which
has expanded confidential substance use treatment services for Active
Duty personnel. Lessons learned from this pilot may provide new
insights and strategies for broadening the implementation of SUD
treatment without impacting force health and readiness. In addition,
there are several proposed changes to the TRICARE SUD benefit which are
ongoing or under review. DoD has published a proposed rule lifting the
ban on opioid replacement therapies, thus increasing the pharmacologic
options for those suffering with an opiate addiction. Also, the
Department is reviewing recommendations to lift current lifetime and
annual benefit limits on SUD care and is exploring alternatives that
would permit the delivery of SUD care in settings outside of a TRICARE
certified Substance Use Disorder Rehabilitation Facility. These
combined efforts will help to ensure a standardized, integrated
approach to the screening, education, early intervention and recovery
for unhealthy alcohol use among our military members.

General Dempsey. Sir, if you want to take the alcohol abuse
one, and, I mean, clearly we are focused on all manner of
social challenges we have with the force, but let me just
really briefly on the Guard.
The Air Force has actually been the most innovative force
of all in integrating their Active component and Guard. I went
and visited a B-2 squadron, and when they lined up the crew of
the B-2 in front of it and introduced me, about every third
member was a member of the Guard.
So they are looking at ways to integrate the force, and I
would like to believe, but will check, that what you see
manifest in the question you have asked is part of that
integration, and that somewhere else there is a national
guardsman taking command of an organization that heretofore has
always been Active. But I will check with the Air Force.
The only thing other thing I would say, and I will take it
for the record to give you analytics, that cost issue is really
a challenging one. The fact is, if you want a guardsman to be
as ready tonight as an Active component soldier, sailor,
airman, or marine, it is going to cost you the same thing. You
buy readiness, how quickly can you have that man or woman
deploy, and that costs exactly the same. So, we will give you
the data to document that.
[The information follows:]

The cost to deploy a unit of active or reserve forces is roughly
equivalent; however, there are cost differences in preparing active and
reserve units prior to deployment. These differences occur primarily
due to the number of training days for reserve forces--generally 39
days a year, increasing as a reserve unit approaches a deployment date.
In peacetime, active units are funded to maintain a higher level of
readiness relative to reserve component units and, therefore, cost more
per unit. If you want a Guardsman to be as ready and capable as someone
who is active, then you must pay for them to achieve that level of
readiness, and the costs become equal.
Reserve component units are generally resourced at a lower level of
readiness in peacetime and require additional time and resources to be
ready for deployment, although there are some exceptions, particularly
in the Air Force. These training times range from days to months,
depending on the unit type, and will affect the time for each unit to
be ready to deploy.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Kaptur.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you. And I wanted again to acknowledge
Mr. Hale's exemplary service to our country. We wish you
Godspeed in the months and years ahead, and thank you so very
much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
Anchoring our questioning is Judge Carter from Texas, who,
I believe, has some of the strongest military presence of any
Member of Congress in his congressional district. Judge Carter.

PURPLE HEART ELIGIBILITY REVIEWS

Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We like to hope so
anyway, and welcome and thank you for being here. I apologize
for being bouncing in and out, but I am chairing a hearing
across the hall, and I have to get over there once in a while
to make sure it is moving along.
To start off with a more provincial question, fiscal year
2014 defense authorization required two reviews and reports
regarding the issuance of the Purple Heart. The reports are due
not later than 180 days from passage, which means this May. One
review is of the attacks at Fort Hood, Texas, and Little Rock,
Arkansas, of what requires anyone determined to be eligible for
that review to receive the Purple Heart.
The second review is a broader look at whether the criteria
for awarding the Purple Heart is still relevant in today's
battlefield and requests your recommendations for any changes
in that criteria.
Mr. Secretary, I hate to get local, but this issue is very
important to me. I represent Fort Hood, and the community that
I represent has a keen interest in this issue. It also has
significant impacts on the Department. Can you provide the
current status of that, the report preparation, any updates you
can give and about these reports that are due in May?
Secretary Hagel. The reports are ongoing. The
recommendations have not been presented to me yet. It is
something that I watch very carefully. You might be aware that
I have asked for a complete review of all our military
decorations in light of I think it is just important to do that
every now and then as we have come out now, coming out our
military combat action portion of the longest war we have been
in in Afghanistan. I think it is a smart thing, appropriate
thing to do, so there is an ongoing review of all our military
decorations. And this specific area that you have mentioned,
because it is specifically noted in the 2014 budget, I will get
the recommendations, I will make a decision, we will be--
obviously, we are working with the Congress on this, and we
will be in touch with you on it.

FORCE REDUCTIONS

Mr. Carter. Well, we look forward to that report in May. It
is important to our community.
If I may, another line of questioning here. Mr. Secretary,
this budget proposes significant force reductions, particularly
in the Army. Our men and women join the service with the
understanding that they would be performing duties associated
with their military occupational specialty, or MOS. Recently I
have heard concerns about the effect of morale of service
members who are being tasked to perform duties that have
nothing to do with military skills.
The morale of our service members severely impacts
efficiency and performance of our military and must be taken
into consideration in seeking these efficiencies. Has this
issue been brought to your attention? How do you plan to
address this issue to ensure that our men and women are
performing tasks they signed up for? As DoD reduces its
civilian and military workforce, as this budget proposes, can
we anticipate service members will have to perform more of the
support roles that were once conducted by civilian workforce?
And finally, what consideration, if any, does DoD give to the
effects these civilian workforce reductions have on the
surrounding communities around our military installations?
Secretary Hagel. Judge, I am going to respond briefly, and
then I am going ask General Dempsey to respond to this
question, because I think it is important you hear from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this.
First, the morale of an institution, our military, nothing
more important. I am committed to assure that.
Second, we have a professional military. They don't peel
potatoes anymore, like I did once, and maybe you did, when I
was in the military. This is a professional group of men and
women. We treat them as professionals. We ask them to undertake
professional assignments that they were trained for. If there
are specific examples or areas where that is not happening, I
want to know about it, and I know Chairman Dempsey wants to
know about it, our Chiefs would want to know about it. I will
do everything I can while I am Secretary of Defense to assure
that.
So that would be my general commitment to you and to the
people of this country and to our military, and this just won't
happen as long as I am here, but let me ask the chairman.
General Dempsey. Yeah, and I will answer this briefly, and
we will follow up with you, Congressman.
In adjusting to our new budget reality, we, of course, have
had to issue guidance to the force on displacing, in some
cases, contract workers. Over the last 10 years when we had a
budget where we were able to do so, for example, you might have
noticed most of our installations were guarded by civilian
contractors.
So, as we have adjusted to the new fiscal reality, the
guidance has been, put soldiers back into those functions, but
only if they can relate to their responsibilities as--I am
using soldiers, but it is true of all the services. So one of
the responsibilities of a soldier is inherently guard things.
That is what we do. And so putting soldiers back on the front
gate at Fort Hood makes perfect sense and is consistent with
what you would expect of a soldier.
Where there may be other things happening, and we learn
about them, we adjust it. But we are doing more than we did
before at garrisons because we have got less money to spend to
have others do it for us.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Carter. And I am not saying this is happening at Fort
Hood, but the question comes up, do you want an MOS that is an
artillery man pushing a lawnmower?
Secretary Hagel. No.
Mr. Carter. And that is why I ask the question.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge Carter.
Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A-10 AIRCRAFT

To our distinguished panel, I am sorry. I am chairing
another committee right across the hall with another Secretary,
so I apologize for going back and forth. I will submit my
questions for the record.
I would be remiss in my duty representing actually every
branch of the military in my district, but also particularly
the Air Force and the Army, A-10s, Air Force loves them, Army
lives and breathes by them, and so I wanted just to make sure
you knew how the Georgia delegation feels about A-10s.
And then also the proposal of the Commission for
restructuring the Air Force in regards to the Air Force Reserve
Command, I will have a question submitted to you on that. And
then also potentially transitioning JSTARS to a bizjet of some
sort in terms of a platform that gets them up faster. And so,
aside from that, I will submit the questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Visclosky.

SPECIAL FORCES

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, I just want to note that the budget proposes
reductions in services end strength, but notice that there is a
request for a Special Operations Command to receive a 10
percent increase over fiscal year 2014 in Active levels.
Last October, the Joint Staff authorized the Special
Operations Command to develop a detailed campaign plan to
establish a global Special Operations Forces. It also directed
that it must maximize the use of existing infrastructure and,
at a minimum, be cost neutral and offer scalable options under
reduced cost and force structures. The fiscal year 2015 budget
requests funding to begin new activities associated with the
global SOF network vision, and also there is budgetary document
language talking about obtaining the necessary authorities.
The Special Forces are special, but from this Member's
perspective, anybody who puts on that uniform is special, and I
do have a very serious concern about the accretion within
Special Forces, and also that everyone understands that there
is a Title 10 authority for Special Forces.
So I want to make it very clear, and I am, again, speaking
for myself. I have a deep concern. I understand that Admiral
McRaven is coming in. We are going to have a full hearing on
this issue. But I just wanted you to understand my concerns.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
On behalf of the committee, let me thank all of you for
your testimony this morning and this afternoon. We focused a
number of questions, and you have provided answers. We have a
bucketful of other questions that we would like answered on a
timely basis which go to your important work representing the
world's best military. And as someone who once performed KP, I
am aware that even the man or woman on the lowest rung of the
ladder is part of a remarkable team of heroes.
So, with that, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Clerk's note--Questions submitted by Mr. Rogers and the
answers thereto follow.]

Need

Question. Does TriCare provision of pediatric/adolescent
psychological services meet present and anticipated demand?
Answer. Yes, TRICARE has implemented many initiatives to ensure
pediatric/adolescent psychological services meet current and
anticipated demand. TRICARE plays a significant role in caring for our
Active Duty Service members, retirees and their families and is
continually evaluating and adjusting its programs and policies to
ensure that eligible beneficiaries are receiving the mental health care
services required. TRICARE, through the Managed Care Support
Contractors (MCSCs), has established networks of civilian providers
world-wide. The MCSCs primarily establish networks as a means of
augmenting Military Treatment Facilities' (MTFs) capability and
capacity; however, the MCSCs have added networks in some additional
areas distant from MTFs.
TRICARE beneficiaries usually constitute only a small portion of
any particular civilian provider's practice, and TRICARE has a good
deal of flexibility in expanding or contracting the size, composition,
and use of the network in response to changes in MTF capability and
capacity. For example, since October 2004, network outpatient
behavioral health care visits for Active Duty family members 17 and
under increased. This increased need for services was met by drawing on
the nationwide unused network capacity and by adding thousands of
additional providers to the network.
Question. What is the number of TriCare eligible children who are
presented for the treatment of psychological illness each year? Within
this population, what percentage are related to child psychological
health consequences of military personnel traumatic brain injury (TBI),
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other military-related
chronic stress?
Answer. The association between children with mental health
conditions and parental PTSD, TBI, and other military-related chronic
stress cannot be quantified; however, the table below represents the
number of beneficiaries from birth to age seventeen with primary mental
health, PTSD, and/or acute stress diagnoses across fiscal years 2005 to
2014.

Number of Beneficiaries Aged 0-17 Who Were Seen for Any Mental Health, PTSD, and/or Acute Stress Diagnoses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Mid-Year Population Mental Health
PTSD
Acute Stress
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005................................ 2,053,847 187,019 9.1% 2,721 0.13% 1,013 0.05%
2006................................ 2,020,144 187,653 9.3% 2,735 0.14% 952 0.05%
2007................................ 1,980,003 191,300 9.7% 2,740 0.14% 968 0.05%
2008................................ 1,995,552 200,350 10.0% 2,926 0.15% 1,138 0.06%
2009................................ 2,033,837 213,216 10.5% 3,117 0.15% 1,190 0.06%
2010................................ 2,092,201 230,234 11.0% 3,360 0.16% 1,086 0.05%
2011................................ 2,086,571 245,050 11.7% 3,474 0.17% 1,075 0.05%
2012................................ 2,068,359 256,951 12.4% 3,667 0.18% 1,146 0.06%
2013................................ 2,031,581 260,803 12.8% 3,632 0.18% 1,118 0.06%
2014*............................... 1,987,267 172,116 8.7% 1,869 0.09% 481 0.02%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: 2014 data is incomplete; Mental health defined as ICD-9 code 290 to 319; PTSD defined as ICD-9 Code 309.81; Acute Stress defined as 308.xx; Data
extracted from the Military Health System Data Repository on April 1, 2014.

Question. Has there beeen an increase in the need for pediatric/
adolescent pychological treatment in the military health care system
during the last ten years? Is a future increase in demand anticipated?
Answer. Yes, there has been an increase in mental health diagnoses
among beneficiaries age 17 and under and this increase is consistent
with the trend also seen in the general population. Based on these
trends, it is reasonable to assume that the demand will continue to
increase. The number of pediatric and adolescent beneficiaries who had
a primary mental health diagnosis increased from 187,019 in Fiscal Year
2005 to 260,803 in Fiscal Year 2013. The beneficiary population
actually decreased from 2,053,847 in 2005 to 2,031,581 in 2013, meaning
that the percent of the beneficiary population who had at least one
mental health encounter increased from 9.1% in 2005 to 12.8% in 2013.
The Services have robust staffing models, including the
Psychological Health Risk-Adjusted Model for Staffing (PHRAMS). PHRAMS
was developed to provide the Services with a tool using a consistent
methodology to define the appropriate number of mental health personnel
to meet the mental health care needs of Service members, retired
members, and their families. PHRAMS and other mental health staffing
models permit the Services to make adjustments in planning assumptions
to meet the needs of individual communities to determine the
appropriate number and mix of mental health personnel required in
Miliary Treatment Facilities (MTF).
Additionally, TRICARE has a good deal of flexibility in expanding
or contracting the size, composition, and use of the network in
response to changes in MTF capability and capacity. For example, the
increase need for services from October 2004 to 2013 was met by drawing
on the nationwide unused network capacity and by adding thousands of
additional providers to the network. Finally, the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2014 (Title V, Subtitle C, ``Mental health
counselors for service members, veterans, and their families'')
directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs
to provide a joint report that describes a coordinated, unified plan to
ensure adequate mental health counseling resources to address the long-
term needs of all members of the armed forces, veterans, and their
families. As part of this request, the Department is conducting a
formal review of current mental health staffing, resources, and future
demand.
Question. Compared to the general population, is the pediatric/
adolescent military dependent population at increased risk of PTSD,
PTSD-like symptoms, and other psychological disorders?
Answer. According to a large study of 307,520 children conducted by
the U.S. Army (Mansfield, et al, Deployment and Mental Health Diagnoses
Among Children of US Army Personnel, Archives of Pediatric/Adolescent
Medicine. 2011;165(11):999-1005), 16.7% had a least one mental health
diagnosis. This is consistent with the overall prevalence of a mental
disorder in a given year reported in the general population, which
according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) (estimate is between
13-20%. The study also reported that children of deployed Service
members have higher rates of specific mental health disorders than the
general population, particularly for depression (5.6% prevalence
compared to CDC's 2.1%) and pediatric behavioral issues (4.8%
prevalence compared to CDC's 3.5%). Disorders of stress (a category
that combines the diagnoses of acute stress reaction/adjustment
disorder, neurotic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD] and
other stress disorders) were assessed at a prevalence of 5.9% among
children of deployed Service members, which was only slightly higher
than the CDC prevalence rate of 5.0% for PTSD alone is 5.0%. This
suggests that children of deployed Service members may be at higher
risk for depression, pediatric behavioral issues, and, to a lesser
extent, PTSD or PTSD-like symptoms, compared to the general population.
Question. How do the psychological/psychiatric health issues seen
in military children differ from the psychiatric issues seen in the
general population?
Answer. At least three studies suggest that children of deployed
Service members have higher rates of depression than the general
population. A 2005 United States (U.S.) Army survey found that
approximately one in four children experienced depressive symptoms when
a parent(s) was deployed (Orthner, D. et al, 2005). Another study,
Children in the Homefront: the Experience of Children from Military
Families (Chandra A. et al, 2010), found that school aged children
scored 2.5 times higher risk for emotional problems than the national
norms. According to a large study of 307,520 children conducted by the
U.S. Army (Mansfield, et al, Deployment and Mental Health Diagnoses
Among Children of US Army Personnel, Archives of Pediatric/Adolescent
Medicine. 2011;165(11):999-1005), 16.7% had at least one mental health
diagnosis. This is consistent with the overall prevalence of a mental
disorder in a given year reported in the general population, which
according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimate is between
13-20%. The study also reported that children of deployed Service
members have higher rates of specific mental health disorders than the
general population, particularly for depression (5.6% prevalence
compared to CDC's 2.1%) and pediatric behavioral issues (4.8%
prevalence compared to CDC's 3.5%). Disorders of stress (a category
that combines the diagnoses of acute stress reaction/adjustment
disorder, neurotic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD] and
other stress disorders) were assessed at a prevalence of 5.9% among
children of deployed Service members, which was only slightly higher
than the CDC prevalence rate. This suggests that children of deployed
service members may be at higher risk for depression, pediatric
behavioral issues, and, to a lesser extent, PTSD or PTSD-like symptoms,
compared to the general population.

Research

Question. Has pediatric/adolescent psychological health been
recognized as a research priority within the DoD? What is the research
priority of child psychological health consequences of military
personnel traumatic brain injury (TBI), posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and other military-related chronic stress?
Answer. Yes, family research is an important aspect of
understanding the well-being of the military family. The military
family research portfolio is focused on improving military family
psychological health outcomes and mitigating potential negative
trajectories. Some research specifically targets child psychological
health consequences of military member traumatic brain injury,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and military-related chronic stress. In
addition, research within the broader psychological health portfolio
indirectly affects pediatric and adolescent health by identifying ways
to improve the health of Service members, thereby improving the well-
being of the family and the children in the process.
Question. What is the current funding commitment specifically for
research into diagnosis and treatment of psychological health in
military families? Is this adequate? What would be the optimal level of
such research funding?
Answer. Funding priorities are based on requirements-driven
research to project, sustain, and heal our Service members. All
programs are subject to the availability of funds and are prioritized
based on the greatest health threats facing the force. Family research
is an important aspect of the overall well-being of the force.
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, $8.72 million was committed to research
focused on the diagnosis and treatment of psychological health in
military families. Approximately $11 million is projected for FY 2014-
2015.
While greater investment will always enhance the quantity of
research, current and planned investments in this area support the
needs of the Department.
Question. Is further research in treating military dependent
pediatric/adolescent psychological health issues required? [Effect on
the Military]
Answer. Military families and children face unique challenges
compared to their civilian counterparts. Further research in treating
military dependent pediatric/adolescent psychological health issues is
needed to continue the adaptation and development of appropriate
evidence-based interventions and targeted therapies to address the
specific mental health needs of military children.

Effect on the Military

Question. This question concerns future military recruitment. The
active duty military population is a small demographic group within the
American population, but the children of active duty personnel and
veterans are a very large component of the recruit population. Could
the incidence of psychological illness among military children have a
significant effect on future military recruitment? Simply put, are we
in danger of losing the next generation of military recruits?
Answer. The Department of Defense recruits personnel across the
full strata of the age-eligible U.S. population. The Department of
Defense Instruction 6130.03, ``Medical Standards for Appointment,
Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services,'' April 28, 2010,
provides accession standards for mental health and substance use
conditions by using the International Classification of Diseases. A
definitive response to the questions above may not be possible even if
a comprehensive study were to be conducted, but the available data
indicate that any observed higher incidence of mental health issues
among military children is not so significant as to affect the next
generation of military recruits. Also, during Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Department instituted a waiver
process to allow the accession of personnel into Military service who
were experiencing less severe mental health conditions and possessed
mitigating factors that would justify a waiver. This waiver process
generally worked well and helped ensure the military was able to meet
its recruitment goals.
Question. This question concerns retention. Are data available
indicating that the incidence of psychological problems in military
dependent children is having a negative impact on the retention of
senior NCOs?
Answer. While the specific retention of Senior Noncommissioned
Officers with children with psychological health concerns has not been
directly studied in Health Affairs, the Military Health System (MHS),
which includes TRICARE, provides a robust mental health benefit that
covers military dependent children until age 26 (when including the
TRICARE For Young Adults program). TIRCARE provides MHS beneficiaries
both outpatient and inpatient mental health services. In addition to
the TRICARE Basic Program, the development of the Extended Care Health
Option (ECHO) for Active Duty beneficiaries has made available
additional supplemental services to eligible Active Duty family members
with a qualifying special needs condition. These programs have
addressed significant needs for military families as evidenced by
parental feedback and the rapidly increase in beneficiary utilization.
Under the ECHO Autism Demonstration Program, for example, TRICARE
continues to increase access to Applied Behavioral Analysis services,
and positive feedback from parental surveys indicate this and similar
programs may improve retention.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Rogers.
Questions submitted by Mr. Kingston and the answers thereto
follow.]

Air Force Reserve

Question. The Commission on the Restructuring of the Air Force made
recommendations that Air Force Command be eliminated and absorbed by
the Active duty component. The report proposes these responsibilities
could be subsumed within Headquarters Air Force and within the existing
active duty major commands. While there appears to be no plan for this
to occur in the budget, does future planning past FY15 have this move
taking place? Has consideration been given to how its implementation
would directly affect the effectiveness of the Air Force Reserve and
the considerable costs associated with a move such as this?
Answer. I rely on the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
to organize, train and equip our great Air Force to meet the needs of
our national military strategy. I recognize that this Commission was
very thorough in its approach to this issue; however, the assessment of
restructuring the Air Force by eliminating the Air Force Reserve
Command does not indicate substantial savings, and could lead to
decreased efficiencies and effectiveness in both organizational
structure and command relationships.

J-STARS

Question. The J-STARS recapitalization plan in this budget has a
divestiture of six E-8 aircraft in FY15-16 at Robbins AFB. While there
is an add for two of the new next generation J-STARS replacement
aircraft, this does not occur until FY19. What plans are in place to
meet this capability gap from the time that the existing J-STARS
aircraft come out of service and the next generation J-STARS
replacement comes online?
Answer. The Air Force did not want to reduce the J-STARS fleet, but
the Budget Control Act forced the Air Force to make difficult strategic
choices and to accept a temporary, near term, capability gap. However,
the divestiture enables the Air Force to recapitalize the critical J-
STARS mission area with the least amount of risk. The E-8C's increasing
sustainability costs on top of tight budgetary constraints led the Air
Force to make a decision to pursue the J-STARS Recap aircraft with its
on-board Battle Management/Command and Control (BMC2), improved radar,
and affordable operations and sustainment costs. While this divestiture
will result in capacity shortfall and additional risk in the near-term,
the payoff will ensure combatant commanders' success in contested
environments during future joint operations. We will continue to
prioritize CCDR requirements to ensure the most pressing needs are met
while maintaining historical deployment and usage ratios. Operations
tempo and aircraft utilization rates for J-STARS will remain high.

A-10 Aircraft

Question. The Department's FY15 budget request proposes to
eliminate the entire fleet of A-10 ground attack aircraft (the
Department already has authorization to retire 61 aircraft out of a
fleet of 346). However, we do not have enough F-35s right now to
deliver to the squadrons that will lose their A-10s. Does the
Department have a plan for backfilling those A-10 squadrons until the
F-35 is available? Why is there no plan to assign aircraft and follow
on missions to active duty units currently flying the A-10?
Answer. The following timeline illustrates the Air Force's A-10
retirement plan along with planned backfills:

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Starting in fiscal year 2015, the Air Force will begin retiring
overseas-based active duty A-10s as well as aircraft based at Moody
AFB, GA, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ, Nellis AFB, NV, and Eglin AFB, FL. The
Air National Guard squadron at Boise, ID will form a Classic
Association with the F-15E squadron at Mountain Home AFB, ID. The
remaining active duty A-10s at Moody and Davis-Monthan will be retired
in fiscal year 2016. As part of the Air Force plan to retire Air
Reserve Component (ARC) A-10s in the latter half of the Future Years
Defense Program, the aircraft at Selfridge, MI Air National Guard Base
(ANGB), will be replaced by eight KC-135 aircraft in fiscal year 2017.
Whiteman AFB, MO Air Reserve Base and Martin State, MD ANGB A-10s will
be replaced by 18 F-16 Block 40s and eight C-130Js, respectively, in
fiscal year 2018. The reserve unit at Davis-Monthan AFB and Ft Wayne,
IN ANGB will gain 18 F-16 Block 40s each, once their A-10s are retired
in fiscal year 2019.
The Air Force is simply unable to backfill any of the Active Duty
A-10 units as a result of the $54 billion in funding cuts directed by
the Budget Control Act of 2013, coupled with our effort to move
targeted force structure to the Air Reserve Component.

Equipment Providers

Question. The Department of Defense has purchased hand and power
tools and other types of related equipment in high volume through the
General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Strategic Sourcing
Initiative Multiple Award Schedule contract holders. It has come to my
attention that GSA has recently undertaken an effort to dramatically
scale back the number of participants in this schedule--especially
impacting small businesses. You are probably also aware that the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued a report to
Congress about the effects of this sourcing initiative on small
businesses which found that DoD among other agencies was not adequately
tracking performance measures on the inclusion of small businesses and
monitoring progress (or regression). In fact, I have been informed that
a most recent contract solicitation for a Blanket Purchase Agreement
would cut participants through the GSA schedule from over 380 equipment
providers (over 300 which are small businesses) to a total of just six.
This seems like a very drastic and sudden change. Has the Department of
Defense, as one of the largest participants in this GSA effort,
provided input to GSA on this matter? Does the Department support this
approach? Why? Will a sudden reduction of over 98 percent of its
equipment providers in this category impact DoD supply chains?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to removing
any barriers that impede the maximum utilization of small businesses in
fulfilling our requirements. DoD, through the Strategic Sourcing
Leadership Council (SSLC) chaired by the Office of Management and
Budget, had subject matter experts work with the General Services
Administration (GSA) in analyzing requirements for the proposed
Maintenance, Repair and Operations (MRO) Blanket Purchase Agreements
(BPAs). Although the analysis, conducted by GSA and the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), determined the contracts that support DLA would
not be included in the MRO acquisition, DoD advocated for maximum use
of small business vendors on these BPAs.
DoD, GSA, and other SSLC members reviewed the previous requirements
across this category of spend, and GSA determined an acceptable number
of BPAs to be issued in order to maximize savings and efficiencies.
DoD will continue to utilize those contract vehicles that provide
the maximum savings and efficiencies in order to meet the mission. DoD
continues to assess capabilities of small businesses in all of its
acquisitions. Small businesses have provided support in this area in
the past, and we expect they will continue to help DoD meet its mission
in the future.
Question. Is DoD taking steps to improve its monitoring and
performance measures of the impacts of strategic sourcing decisions on
small businesses? Is the Department confident that such a drawback is
warranted and that its implementation timeline is manageable? Is there
evidence to suggest limiting the supply pool will save money?
Answer. Strategic sourcing is the collaborative and structured
process of analyzing an organization's spending and using this
information to make business decisions about acquiring commodities and
services more effectively and efficiently. This process helps the
Department of Defense (DoD) optimize performance, minimize price,
increase achievement of socio-economic acquisition goals, evaluate
total life-cycle management costs, improve vendor access to business
opportunities, and otherwise increase the value of each dollar spent.
Strategically sourced contracts are utilized across the Department and
the Federal government (i.e., Office Supplies, Fuel, IT, Small Package
delivery).
DoD acquisition teams conduct market research for all requirements
to determine the capability of small businesses in supporting the
mission. Strategic Sourcing teams strive to maximize small business
utilization and to scope their requirements in order to support small
businesses.
In response to the Government Accountability Office Report
``Strategic Sourcing: Selected Agencies Should Develop Performance
Measures on Inclusion of Small Businesses and OMB Should Improve
Monitoring,'' the Department has begun to collect baseline data on the
inclusion of small businesses on current and future strategically
sourced contracts. Small business utilization rates are being tracked
and monitored in order to provide senior leadership with visibility of
markets where small business can achieve success, or areas where future
small business opportunities may exist. The Department believes that
maximizing competition and small business utilization is critical to
achieving mission success.

TRICARE

Question. The FY 15 budget request creates a consolidated TRICARE
plan with higher co-pays and deductibles along with increases in co-
pays for pharmaceuticals and implements an enrollment fee for new
TRICARE-for-life beneficiaries. In reviewing these options has the
department considered implementing a means tested scale for fees and
co-pays? How do these cost increases compare to similar civilian
healthcare plans?
Answer. The department has considered means testing for premiums.
The President's Budget 2014 proposal for TRICARE Prime enrollment fees
was means tested for retirees and the PB 2015 proposal is still means
tested for TRICARE For Life beneficiaries. Even the PB 2015
consolidated TRICARE plan has some aspect of means testing for fees and
co-pays with the lowest copays for Active Duty families of El-E4s and
lower copays for Active Duty families than for retirees. It also
proposes that the medically retired and the families of those who died
on active duty have the lower co-pays associated with active duty
family members.
The fees and co-pays are for the most part significantly less than
most civilian plans. Attached is a comparison with the 2014 Blue Cross/
Blue Shield plans offered under the Federal Employees Health Benefit
(FEHB) Program. (Note that the comparison is with the 2014 BC/BS cost
shares which may rise by 2016 when the Consolidated TRICARE Plan would
begin.)

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Kingston.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the answers thereto
follow.]

Depot Workload

Question. Secretary Hagel: Core requirements in Section 2464 of
Title 10 establish the link between the organic depot workload that
must be performed by depot personnel and our warfighting systems. DoD
generally has interpreted this section to mean the minimum capability;
however, Section 2464 also requires that the organic facilities are
given sufficient workload to operate efficiently. What is DoD doing to
meet that part of the statutory requirement?
Answer. Department of Defense (DoD) core capability requirements
and sustaining workloads are calculated in accordance with DoD
Instruction 4151.20, ``Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities
Determination Process.'' Workloads necessary for efficiency are
imbedded in the core sustaining workload requirement. Those
requirements are then compared to anticipated workloads and any
shortfalls identified. Core capability requirements and sustaining
workloads are determined by the Military Services on a biennial basis,
to ensure currency. They are also reported to the Congress in
accordance with the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2464.
The Department's last report, August 2012, reflected a total core
requirement of 69.5 million direct labor hours (DLHs). In that report,
the Army and Air Force reported anticipated core sustaining workload
shortfalls of 982,000 and 404,000 DLHs, respectively. Army shortfalls
were related to ground vehicles and ground support equipment. The
ground vehicle shortfall (869,547 DLHs) occurred as operational tempo
declined and because overseas contingency operations funding reduced
the average age of the fleet to 3-4 years, so the Army assessed this
shortfall as minimal risk. The shortfall is in ground support equipment
related to Rhino Passive Infrared Defeat System, Floating Bridges, Tank
and Pump Units, Biological Integrated Detection System, and Forward
Repair Shelter System. The Army planned to mitigate these specific
shortfalls by performing workloads on systems with similar attributes.
Air Force shortfalls were in Communications and Electronics (C&E)
(260,698 DLHs) and Ordnance, Weapons and Missiles (143,280 DLHs). The
C&E shortfall was in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), whose organic
capabilities had not yet been established. UAS organic capability will
stand up incrementally through FY 2016. Ordnance, Weapons and Missile
shortfall was in missile components, which will be mitigated through
existing and new weapons systems, such as missile launchers and
defensive missile systems for the KC-46, F-35, MQ-1, and MQ-9.

DoD Workforce Plan

Question. Secretary Hagel: I am concerned about the ongoing
utilization of civilian personnel caps and the perverse incentives that
are created. As I read the transcript from last year, you and the
Comptroller testified to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
on this topic that contractor personnel often cost at least two times
more than civilian personnel, particularly for long term employment.
How do you plan to allow your managers to hire personnel based on law,
need, requirements and cost? How do you avoid a de facto freezes on
personnel that cause problems with ensuring DoD has the appropriate mix
of personnel, such as in depots, where skills and positions are not
necessarily fungible?
Answer. The Department's total workforce plan is based on sourcing
of functions and work among military, civilian, and contracted services
based on workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and
management needs, as well as applicable laws and guidance. The
Department does not utilize civilian personnel caps and has not imposed
a Department-wide hiring freeze in FY 2014. The Department continues to
be committed to defining the right mix of military, civilians, and
contracted services workforce needed to reflect new strategic
priorities and evolving operational challenges within available
resources.
Ensuring DoD has the right mix of personnel and protecting certain
critical skill areas, such as depots, from civilian personnel
reductions reflect not only DoD priorities but also congressional
intent. For example, section 955 of the FY 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act directs the Department to exclude civilians
performing core or critical functions in complying with the statutorily
required civilian personnel reductions over the FY 2012 to FY 2017
period. The core or critical functions that are protected include
depots, acquisition workforce, cyber, and Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole.
Questions submitted by Mr. Womack and the answers thereto
follow.]

Third Party Payment System

Question. Secretary Hagel, despite a series of acquisition program
reviews and enhancements, recent studies have shown that the cost of
doing business with the Department of Defense continues to grow.
Current estimates identify 38% of every dollar spent by the DoD goes
towards administrative and other bureaucratic requirements. The
overhead costs greatly reduce the overall purchasing power of the DoD
and the ability to equip our armed services personnel. In fact, a
recent article by the Lexington Institute referenced the DoD's Third
Party Payment System program as an example of where significant savings
could be realized by the DoD. Since 1998 the DoD has employed a third
party payment provider to perform transportation invoicing and payment
processing for the Department much like successful private sector
companies. This program has virtually eliminated paper invoicing,
provided ``commercial best practice'' financial controls, and has saved
the Department millions of dollars in reduced fees and personnel costs.
The program also provides the Department a rebate for ensuring prompt
and accurate payments.
I understand that only half of the DoD's annual $10B freight spend
is processed through this program In light of the aforementioned cost
savings of this program, can you tell me if and when the DoD plans to
expand this program across the Department?
Answer. While DoD has gained efficiencies with the automated
transportation process, it is not a fully automated solution. Since the
beginning of fiscal year 2014 approximately 50% percent of the payments
transacted through the Third Party Pay Service--Transportation (TPPS-T)
service provider are processed as fully automated. Until the current
volume of DoD transportation business is successfully processing
through the TPPS-T automated process, additional savings cannot be
realized and expansion to other DoD transportation business cannot
occur. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is working
aggressively with the other DoD Components and the financial
institution providing Third Party Payment System services to improve
the volume of transactions that can be processed in an automated
fashion.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Womack.
Questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto
follow.]

Hypersonic Weapons

Question. Given the recent work by China on hypersonic weapons, and
also the threats from other nations: Is a US hypersonic weapon
considered critical to our strategic posture? What type of hypersonic
system, including AHW, could we field the fastest as a forward-deployed
capability? What would the cost of that be, versus the cost of having
to develop an alternate launch platform such as a submarine? Is this
program supported by EUCOM, CENTCOM and STRATCOM, given the threats
from Syria, Iran and now Russia?
Answer. In part to respond to the FY 2014 NDAA, a cost comparison
study of various hypersonic strike concepts is underway.
The U.S. hypersonic boost-glide strike capability was recently
addressed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in
November 2012. It was determined that the existing portfolio of fielded
strike systems or modifications to current systems can meet the interim
long-range-strike requirements identified in the prompt strike Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD) with acceptable risk. The JROC did
recognize that potential future circumstances may require a capability
to address high value, time sensitive, and defended targets from ranges
outside the current conventional technology.
The hypersonic strike capability is supported by EUCOM, CENTCOM,
and STRATCOM; however, the Department is not confident that a
realistic, affordable hypersonic strike concept capability can be
fielded in the near future. Technology risk must be reduced, projected
costs driven down, and operational considerations addressed before the
Department commits to funding and fielding this kind of capability. In
the mid-term, a forward-based ground or air-launched hypersonic strike
concept could be fielded, but both present capability that would need a
new basing plan and defenses. A submarine-launched hypersonic-strike
concept could be fielded within 10 years utilizing existing platforms
currently under development, and this concept does not require new
basing or defenses. I fully support the Army and Navy's collaboration
on hypersonic boost-glide concepts that are applicable to both land-
and sea-basing as part of the Defense-Wide Conventional Prompt Global
Strike program.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)

Question. Regarding the possibility of high-cost, national security
satellites being launched by new companies, General Shelton was quoted
March 11, as saying: ``National security payloads have to get there,
and we have to make sure we've done due diligence on the part of the
government to make sure that that rocket is going to deliver that
safely and reliably to orbit.'' In order for competition to be accurate
and fair, will each launch company be open to the same level of
financial accounting-scrutiny by the government, and held to the same
high level of mission assurance activities? My understanding is that
one new entrant was given a special arrangement by the Air Force, which
is less transparent than the requirement for the current launch
provider. When will commercial capabilities be certified to launch
high-value security payloads? Will the certification requirements
include the same level of tasks and reporting for mission assurance as
is required of the current launch provider?
Answer. All potential satellite launch competitors will be expected
to comply with the applicable auditing, oversight, and accounting
standards related to and required under the specific acquisition
strategy the Department ultimately pursues in the competitive phases of
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) acquisition strategy.
Similarly, once certification is complete, all potential EELV
competitors will be expected to comply with the applicable mission
assurance standards and reporting measures. New entrant certification
to launch high-value security payloads is an ongoing process which the
Department is closely monitoring.

Condition-Based Maintenance Plus

Question. Most Army aircraft are now equipped with sensors which
allow for condition-based maintenance and have been conducting
condition-based maintenance on a pilot program basis for several years,
which created a lot of data. (1) When can we expect the Army to analyze
the data? (2) When will a decision be made on whether the savings merit
making condition-based maintenance even more widespread? (3) Will the
other services adopt the program?
Answer. (1) Condition-Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) is maintenance
performed based on the evidence of need and is enabled by data
collection and analysis. Engineering and logistics data analysis from
sensors and related data systems is an ongoing Army aviation life-cycle
process that has been actively expanding for nearly a decade. The Army
Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) has moved well beyond piloting
CBM+, by equipping 86 percent of their helicopters with sensors and
establishing a Common CBM+ Data Warehouse to centralize all the
collected data for easy analysis and retrieval. The data generated by
on-board aircraft sensors is foundational to Army Regulation 750-1,
``Army Materiel Maintenance Policy,'' and Army Regulation 700-127,
``Integrated Logistics Support,'' which aim to improve flight safety,
reduce operations and support costs, decrease maintenance labor, and
increase aircraft availability.
(2) In December 2012, Army Headquarters approved AMCOM's cost
benefit analysis (CBA), which resulted in continuing planned CBM+
activity. The analysis identified over $51 million in cost avoidance to
date, showed a projected return on investment of nearly $2 billion in
life-cycle cost avoidance, and highlighted avoidance of 4 Class A
mishaps. Additionally, Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command has
installed sensors on 1,740 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles resulting in an
approved CBA that projected net savings of $45 million over 20 years,
just for those 1,740 vehicles. The Army will monitor the actual results
of the pilot and build their plan for further expansion.
(3) The other Services are also actively implementing CBM+. Navy
guidance is in OPNAV Instruction 4790.16. Their Integrated Condition
Assessment System program has installed sensors on hull, mechanical,
and electrical equipment on 96 surface fleet vessels with funded plans
to expand to 164 ships by 2020. The Marine Corps incorporated CBM+ in
MCO 4790.25, ``Ground Equipment Maintenance Program,'' and is currently
conducting a capabilities based assessment and business case analysis
to define and document current gaps and vulnerabilities, assess
alternatives, and validate requirements for enterprise-wide CBM+
implementation. Air Force Instruction 63-101, ``Acquisition and
Sustainment Life Cycle Management,'' defines the Service's overall CBM+
policy. Aircraft engines have a long history of sensors and data
analysis capability. Air Force Instruction 20-115, ``Propulsion
Management for Aerial Vehicles,'' directs engine health management
processes on propulsion assets to enable a predictive maintenance
capability.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen and the answers
thereto follow.]

Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute

Question. I want to follow up on my earlier discussion on the free
exercise of religion--a right guaranteed in our constitution--and the
Equal Opportunity Briefings conducted by the Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute (DEOMI) that have labeled Christian churches and
Christian non-profits as hate groups.
Has a review of DEOMI training materials been conducted? What
material is considered non-federal reference material and could you
provide me with a list of such sources that are used in the equal
opportunity briefings? Is there DoD policy requiring what materials
should be made available for training purposes? Who is responsible for
approving the material's content?
Answer. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)
has never conducted any equal opportunity briefing that labeled
Christian churches and Christian non-profit groups as hate groups. The
incidents you mentioned were the result of service members at the unit
level, who had never been trained by DEOMI, developing their own
training slides that contained the erroneous information. The Office of
Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity conducted a comprehensive
review of DEOMI curriculum. During the review, curriculum content items
were identified and updated.
As DoD's premier entity to promote human dignity through education
in equity and diversity, DEOMI evaluates the relevance and
applicability of training content based upon the equal opportunity
occupational training need. Instructional designers, curriculum
developers, and subject matter experts review information and data to
ensure its significance to each Service's training requirement. DEOMI
course designers consider all sources of information to provide the
academic scope needed to prepare instructors to meet the human
relations needs of their students, and the students' customers and
clients. DEOMI faculty and staff use sources external to DoD to inform
instructor guides/lesson plans that generate discussion on sensitive
human relations issues in an instructor-led classroom environment. The
classroom experience prepares DEOMI graduates to perform their duties
as Equal Opportunity Advisors to commanding officers or officers in
charge. Information from non-DoD sources is used in instructor guides/
lesson plans only when necessary to ensure an approved training
objective is met.
This academic freedom allows instructors to best prepare students
to perform their duties and responsibilities as equal opportunity
advisors.
Further DEOMI training material is evaluated annually as directed
by local operating instructions and required by the Council on
Occupational Education (COE), DEOMI's accrediting agency.
DEOMI faculty and staff conduct course evaluations frequently to
ensure the Service training requirements are met. DEOMI uses several
instruments to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the training,
to include DoD Instructional Systems Design guidance, evaluation
surveys, condition checklists, and research. Curriculum approval is
completed and documented annually during DEOMI Curriculum Review
Committee meetings. This documentation is available to the Office of
Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity and demonstrates that DEOMI
consistently produces high quality training and properly trained equal
opportunity trainers.

Military Healthcare

Question. As your Services look to control the rising costs of
military healthcare and benefits, what steps are you taking to ensure
that our warriors and their families have ready access to the care they
need--both upon return from deployment and during their transition from
the Department of Defense to the Department of Veterans Affairs
healthcare system?
Answer. The Military Health System offers a very comprehensive and
low cost benefit that is far better than virtually every comparable
employer in the US today. The TRICARE Prime access standards coupled
with the robust TRICARE Network around MTFs help ensure ready access to
the care they need.
Most Service members being involuntarily separated from the
military including those who are being medically separated (not
medically retired) qualify for premium-free TRICARE coverage under the
Transitional Assistance Management Program (TAMP) for themselves and
their families. Established more than two decades ago, the purpose of
TAMP has always been to provide coverage to certain sponsors and their
families for a brief period of time while they are making arrangements
for their ongoing health care coverage. DoD's in-Transition program
helps Service members undergoing behavioral health treatment with at
least weekly contact with a telephonic coach until they find an
appropriate follow-on mental health provider.
In addition to getting TAMP coverage; deactivating reservists are
highly encouraged to enroll in the Veteran Health Administration at
demobilization stations with VA staff often on-hand to assist. DoD and
the VA have been working closely together on care coordination for a
number of years.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014.

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY/MARINE CORPS BUDGET OVERVIEW

WITNESSES

HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMIRAL JONATHAN W. GREENERT, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. The committee will come to order. If our
guests will take their seats, we will get this show on the
road. I want to thank everybody for being here so promptly.
This morning the committee conducts an open hearing on the
posture and budget request from the Department of the Navy. I
would like to welcome the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus; the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert; and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos. Welcome to
you all and thank you for being here this morning.
I am sure I can speak for every member of the committee in
thanking you for your valuable service to our Nation and to the
men and women you represent that are serving around the world
as we gather here.
Gentlemen, this committee has constantly heard about all
the difficult choices that had to be made to prepare the fiscal
year 2015 defense budget. Your choices set the stage for the
difficult decisions that lie ahead for this committee in coming
weeks.
The committee is anxious to hear from you this morning on
how your budget request will deter future conflicts with fewer
marines, fewer ships, and a smaller naval presence in parts of
the world where our adversaries and potential adversaries are
expanding their military capabilities every day.
We are aware that China plans a 12 percent increase in
military spending in 2014 and has already delineated areas
where they challenge our naval power and that of our allies
every day.
As my predecessor, Congressman Bill Young, would constantly
remind us, it is all about risk and how much more we are all
creating as a result of continuing resolutions and
sequestration.
So let's take advantage of the regular order we have in the
time we have it and make sure we can do what we can to make
sure we have regular order into the future.
Gentlemen, this committee realizes that all the rebalancing
and repivoting to the Pacific and the size and capability of
the fleet are dependent on an industrial base that needs to be
as robust as we can make it, and we can talk about that later.
I think that is important to all of us.
I am also somewhat alarmed about the frequency of reported
misconduct by some members of the Navy leadership team. Just
since the beginning of this year we have been notified of nine
separate commanding officers, executive officers or command
master chiefs being removed from their leadership position for
some type of misconduct. That is a disturbing frequency of
nearly one incident per week.
And then there is the suspension of the 30 nuclear reactor
instructors and the shutdown of the Navy's training reactors in
Charleston in connection with an exam cheating scandal. I think
you know that both Mr. Visclosky and I were very much involved
in the Energy and Water Committee and committed to naval
reactors. So I think it is important at some point in time we
explore what is going on there. There really have not been any
reports since that situation was uncovered.
I would also like to add, as somebody who served on the
Naval Academy Board of Visitors, I still have the sense that
the institution needs to do more to address the whole issue of
sexual assault and sexual harassment. I was very unhappy
serving on that board, from time to time when we addressed the
issue, we do it briefly in public and then we went into
executive session.
And I think I can say on behalf of all of us here that the
men and women that we nominate we are enormously proud of. They
represent the best of America. And I am not sure that
everything is in place to eliminate that type of behavior, and
I hope we have some level of reassurance here this morning.
Despite these challenges, as we have always done in the
past, this committee will work hard to assure the Navy and
Marine Corps are ready and able to conduct their very important
missions. This year, more than ever, we will have to work
together to assure the best possible budget outcome.
I would like to yield the floor to Ms. McCollum, if she has
any comments she might wish to make on behalf of Mr. Visclosky
or herself.

Opening Remarks of Ms. McCollum

Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
And on behalf of those of us on the other side of the aisle
who serve on this committee, we thank you for your openness, we
thank you for your leadership, and your statement reflects many
of the shared common interests and goals that we want out of
this hearing.
Especially appreciate your comments on sexual abuse and the
scandals involving cheating and other things throughout the
military that have been in the Navy as well. So thank you very
much, Mr. Chair.
Gentleman, thank you for being here, Admiral, Mr. Secretary
and General Amos. We work alongside of you in our role to
protect and defend our country. I look forward to hearing the Q
and A that will result after your testimony.
Thank you for submitting your testimony earlier so that my
colleagues who are in other committees right now will be fully
prepared when they attend the hearing to ask their questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. Your comments will be,
of course, a matter of public record. So the floor is yours.

Summary Statement of Secretary Mabus

Mr. Mabus. Thank you.
Before I begin my opening statement, I just want to say
that our thoughts and prayers and that of the whole Navy family
are with the sailor who was killed in Naval Station Norfolk
last night.
They go out to his family, friends, and shipmates. It is
very early in the investigative process and, of course, we will
keep this committee apprised of any information that we learn
about this sad case.
Chairman Frelinghuysen, Congresswoman McCollum, members of
the committee, I want to first thank you for your support of
the Department of the Navy, our sailors, our marines and our
civilians and their families.
General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and
Admiral Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, and I couldn't
be prouder to represent those courageous and faithful sailors,
marines and civilians.
These men and women serve their Nation around the world
with skill and dedication no matter what hardships they face,
no matter how far they are from home and from their families.
And I want to take just a personal moment here--this will
be Commandant Amos's last posture hearing before this
committee--just to say what a high privilege it has been to
serve with Jim Amos as the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The architects of our Constitution recognized the inherent
value of the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Article I,
Section 8, gave Congress the responsibility to provide and
maintain a Navy because our Founding Fathers knew that the
Nation needed a naval force to operate continuously in war and
in peace.
Over 2 centuries ago the United States had a crucial role
in the world, and today that role is exponentially larger.
Whether facing high-end combat, asymmetrical threats or
humanitarian needs, America's maritime forces are ready and
present on day one of any crisis for any eventuality.
In today's dynamic security environment, naval assets are
more critical than ever. In military terms, they provide
presence, presence worldwide.
They reassure our partners that we are there and remind
potential adversaries that we are never far away. This presence
provides immediate and capable options for the Commander in
Chief when a crisis develops anywhere in the world.
In the past year, our naval forces have operated globally
from across the Pacific to the continuing combat in Afghanistan
and from the Gulf of Guinea to the Arctic Circle.
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the recently
released QDR are both maritime in focus and require presence of
naval forces around the world. Four key factors make that
global presence and global action possible.
These four factors--people, platforms, power and
partnerships--have been my priorities during my tenure as
Secretary and they have to continue to receive our focus
looking ahead.
In our fiscally constrained times, we have used these
priorities to help balance between the readiness of the force,
our capabilities and our capacity. Our people are our biggest
advantage, and we have to ensure that they continue to get the
tools they need to do their jobs.
In compensation, we have increased sea pay to make sure
those sailors and marines deployed aboard ship are
appropriately recognized.
However, this budget also seeks to control the growth of
compensation and benefits which threaten to impact all areas of
our budget.
If this is not addressed, as Admiral Greenert puts it, the
quality of work for our sailors and marines will almost
certainly decline.
Shipbuilding and our platforms remain key elements of our
maritime power and a focus of this committee. The number of
ships, submarines and aircraft in our fleet is what gives us
the capacity to provide that global presence. While we have the
most advanced platforms in the world, quantity has a quality
all its own.
I think it is important to understand how we got to our
current fleet size. On September 11, 2001, the fleet stood at
316 ships.
By 2008, after one of the great military buildups in
American history, that number had dropped to 278 ships. In the
4 years before I took office as Secretary, the Navy put 19
ships under contract.
Since I took office in May of 2009, we have put 60 ships
under contract. And by the end of this decade, our plan will
return the fleet to 300 ships.
We are continuing our initiative to spend smarter and more
efficiently, which is driving down costs through things like
competition, multi-year buys and just driving harder bargains
for taxpayer dollars.
Power, our energy, is a national security issue and is
central to our naval forces and our ability to provide
presence. Dramatic price increases for fuel threaten to degrade
our operations and training and could impact how many platforms
we can acquire.
Having more varied, stably priced, American-produced
sources of energy makes us better warfighters. From sail to
coal, to oil, to nuclear, and now to alternative fuels, the
Navy has led in energy innovation.
Since the end of World War II, U.S. naval forces have
protected the global commons to maintain the foundation of the
world economy.
In today's complex environments, partnerships with other
nations, evidenced by things like interoperability, by
exercises and by operations, continue to increase in
importance.
The Navy and Marine Corps, by nature of their forward
presence, are naturally suited to develop these relationships,
particularly in the innovative, small footprint ways that are
required.
With the fiscal year 2015 budget submission, we are seeking
within the fiscal restraints imposed to provide our Navy and
Marine Corps with the equipment, the training, and the other
tools needed to carry out our missions that the Nation needs
and expects from them.
There are never any permanent homecomings for sailors and
marines. In peacetime, wartime, and all the time they remain
forward deployed, providing presence and providing whatever is
needed for our country. This has been true for 238 years, and
it is our task to make sure it remains true now and in the
future.
Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The written statement of Secretary Mabus follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of Admiral Greenert

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Admiral Greenert, good morning and
thank you for being with us.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Chairman Frelinghuysen, and
Ranking Member Visclosky, distinguished members of the
committee.
I am proud to represent 633,000 sailors, Navy civilians and
their families, especially the 50,000 sailors deployed and
operating forward around the globe today.
The dedication and resilience of our people continue to
amaze me, Mr. Chairman, and the citizens of this Nation can
take great pride in the daily contributions of their sons and
daughters in places that count.
I, too, like Secretary Mabus just past, would like to offer
my condolences to the family and the friends and the shipmates
of the sailor killed in last night's shooting.
The sailors, particularly those of the USS MAHAN, are in
our thoughts and prayers today, as well as the entire Norfolk
Naval Station family.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify today for the first
time under your leadership of the committee. And I am also, as
Secretary Mabus said, proud to appear this morning beside him
and General Amos.
Your Navy and Marine Corps team is united in fulfilling our
longstanding mandate to be where it matters when it matters and
to be ready to respond to crises to assure that the stability
that underpins the global economy is in place.
General Amos has been a great shipmate. Our services'
synergy of effort has never been better, and I am committed to
continuing that momentum.
Secretary Mabus has provided us the vision, the guidance,
and the judiciousness to build the finest Navy and Marine Corps
that this Nation is willing to afford.
Mr. Chairman, forward presence is our mandate. We operate
forward to give the President options to deal promptly with
contingencies.
As we conclude over a decade of wars and bring our ground
forces home from extended stability operations, your naval
forces will remain on watch.
The chartlet that I provided in front of you which has the
Navy today shows the global distribution of the deployed forces
as well as our bases and our places that support them.
Our efforts are focused in the Asia-Pacific and the Arabian
Gulf, but we provide presence and respond as needed in other
theaters as well.
Now, with this forward presence, over the last year we were
able to influence and shape decisions of leaders in the Arabian
Gulf and in Northeast Asia.
We patrolled off the shores of Libya, Egypt and Sudan to
protect American interests and to induce regional leaders to
make the right choices.
We relieved suffering and provided assistance and recovery
in the Philippines in the wake of a devastating typhoon. Our
presence dissuades aggression and coercion against our allies
and friends in the East and the South China Seas.
We kept piracy at bay in the Horn of Africa, and we
continued to support operations in Afghanistan while taking the
fight to insurgents, terrorists and their supporting networks
across the Middle East and Africa with our expeditionary and
Special Operations forces.
The 2014 budget will enable us an acceptable forward
presence. Through the remainder of fiscal year 2014, we will be
able to restore fleet training, maintenance and operations and
recover a substantial part of the 2013 backlog caused by that
tough year, and I thank this committee for its support.
The President's 2015 budget submission enables us to
continue to execute these missions, but we will face high risk
in specific missions, those that are articulated in the defense
strategic guidance. And I have laid that out in my written
statement to you.
Our fiscal guidance for the FYDP--that is the future year
defense plan--for the President's budget 2015 is about halfway
between the Budget Control Act caps and our PRESBUD 2014 plan.
That represents a net decrease of $31 billion versus PRESBUD
2014.
So to prepare our program within these constraints, I set
the following six priorities: Number one, a sea-based strategic
deterrence; number two, forward presence; number three, the
capability and capacity to win decisively; four is readiness;
five, asymmetric capabilities and maintaining technological
edge; and, six, as you articulated, sustaining the relevant
industrial base.
Using these priorities, we build a balanced portfolio of
capabilities within the fiscal guidance provided. We continue
to maximize our presence in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle
East using innovative combinations of rotational, forward
basing and forward stationing forces.
We still face shortfalls in support ashore and a backlog in
facilities maintenance that will erode the ability of our bases
to support the fleet.
We have slowed modernization in areas that are central to
remain ahead of or keep pace with technologically advanced
adversaries.
Consequently, we face higher risks if confronted with a
high-tech adversary or if we attempt to conduct more than one
multi-phased major contingency simultaneously.
I am troubled by the prospects of reverting to Budget
Control Act revised caps in 2016. That would lead to a Navy
that is just too small and lacking the advanced capabilities
needed to execute the missions that the Nation faces and that
it expects of its Navy.
We would be unable to execute at least 4 of the 10 primary
missions articulated in the defense strategic guidance in the
Quadrennial Defense Review if we reverted to those caps.
Looking at the back of the chartlet that I provided you,
you can see our ability to respond to contingencies and that
they would be dramatically reduced, limiting our options and
our decision space, and we would be compelled to inactivate an
aircraft carrier and an air wing.
Further, as you can see there, our modernization and our
recapitalization would be dramatically reduced, threatening the
readiness and threatening our industrial base.
Reverting to the BCA caps year by year will leave our
country less prepared to deal with crises, our allies' trust
will wane, and our enemies will be less inclined to be
dissuaded or to be deterred.
Mr. Chairman, I remain on board with the efforts to get the
fiscal house in order. I look forward to working with this
committee to find solutions that enable us to sustain readiness
while building an affordable, but a relevant, future force.
This force has to be able to address a range of threats,
contingencies and high-consequence events that could impact our
core interests.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. Thank you
for your continued support and this committee's continued
support. I look forward to the questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Admiral Greenert.
[The written statement of Admiral Greenert follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of General Amos

Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Amos, thank you for your
decades of service.
Of course, you as well, Admiral Greenert.
But this is your last hearing. But thank you for standing
strong, representing the Marines. And the floor is yours. Thank
you so much.
General Amos. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I am not sure it is my last hearing all
total, but----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Maybe before this committee.
General Amos. So if you could give me a waiver, I would be
happy to----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We would be happy to give you a waiver.
General Amos. Sign a chit for me or something like that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Be happy to.
General Amos. Anyway, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Visclosky, members of the committee, it is good to be here
today, and thanks for the opportunity to tell you a little bit
about your Marine Corps as we move into the next year.
Since our founding in 1775, marines have answered the
Nation's call, faithfully protecting the American people and
maintaining a world-class standard of military excellence.
Nothing has changed. We will continue to do the same in the
future.
And, yet, we find ourselves at a strategic inflection
point. After 12 years of war, we are drawing down our forces in
Afghanistan, resetting our institution, and reawakening the
soul of our Corps.
Today we are challenged by fiscal uncertainty that
threatens both our capacity and capabilities, forcing us to
sacrifice our long-term health for near-term readiness.
As I have testified before many times, despite these
challenges, I remain committed to fielding the most capable and
ready Marine Corps that the Nation is willing to pay for.
Our greatest asset is the individual marine, the young man
or woman who wears my cloth. Our unique role as America's
signature crisis response force is grounded in the legendary
character and warfighting ethos of our people.
As we reset and prepare for future battles, all marines are
rededicating themselves to those attributes that carried
marines across the wheat fields and into the German machine
guns at Belleau Wood in March of 1918, those attributes that
enabled raw and combat-inexperienced young Marines to
courageously succeed against a determined enemy at America's
first offensive operation in the Pacific, the attack at
Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, and, lastly, those timeless
strengths of character and gut courage that enabled marines to
carry the day in an Iraqi town named Fallujah and against a
determined enemy in the Taliban strongholds of Marja and
Sangan.
Your Corps is rededicating itself to those timeless
attributes. There are simply just four of them: Persistent
discipline; faithful obedience to orders and instructions;
concerned and engaged leadership 24 hours a day, 7 days a week;
and strict adherence to established standards. These ironclad
imperatives have defined our Corps for 238 years. They will
serve us well in the decades to come.
As we gather here today, some 30,000 Marines are forward
deployed around the world, promoting peace, protecting our
Nation's interests and securing our defense. But we don't do
this alone.
Our partnership with the Navy provides America an unmatched
naval expeditionary capability that is forward deployed. Our
relationship with the Navy is a symbiotic one. My relationship
with Admiral John Greenert is, quite frankly, unprecedented.
This is why I share the CNO's concerns about the impacts
associated with our marked paucity of capital ships,
shipbuilding funds. America's engagement throughout the future
security environment of the next 2 decades will be naval in
character, make no mistake.
To be forward engaged and to be present when it matters
most, we need capital ships and those ships need to be loaded
with United States marines. Expeditionary naval forces are our
Nation's insurance policy. We are a hedge against uncertainty
in an unpredictable world.
The Navy and Marine Corps team provides power projection
from the sea, responding immediately to a crisis when success
is measured in hours, not in days.
From the typhoon that tragically struck the Philippines
last fall to the rescue of the American citizens in South Sudan
over Christmas, forward deployed naval forces were there. We
carried the day for America.
As the joint force draws down and we conclude combat
operations in Afghanistan, some argue that, ``Well, we are done
with conflict.'' My view is different.
As evidenced in the events currently unfolding in Central
Europe today, the world will remain a dangerous and
unpredictable place. There will be no peace dividend for
America, nor will there be a shortage of work for its United
States marines. Ladies and gentlemen, we will not do less with
less. We will do the same with less.
In closing, you have my promise that we will only ask for
what we need. We will continue to prioritize and make those
hard decisions before ever coming to you and this committee.
Once again, I thank the committee for your continued
support for its marines, and I am prepared to answer your
questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, General Amos.
[The written statement of General Amos:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

SHIP COUNTING RULES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. And I was remiss for not extending
condolences of our entire committee for the loss of that sailor
in Norfolk, to his family and, obviously, to the Navy family.
I would like to yield the floor to Mr. Crenshaw for the
first question.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me add my words of welcome to three true friends of
the subcommittee. I know I have worked with each of you all and
developed what I would describe as a trusted working
relationship and, indeed, a friendship.
And I am grateful for that, and I know the subcommittee is
grateful for the work that you do, the dedication for the
future of our Navy.
I want to say just a personal word of thanks for visiting
Northeast Florida, both of you, Admiral Greenert and Secretary
Mabus.
I know you were in Northeast Florida/Southeast Georgia over
the last couple of weeks, and you know how Navy friendly those
communities are.
And I want you to know it is a big deal when you all take
the time to not only visit the men and women in uniform, but
the communities that support them. That gives them a sense of
where your commitment is to the future of the Navy.
One of the things I wanted to kind of talk a little bit
about, we have worked on aircraft. We have worked on ships. We
have worked on submarines.
But I must say, when I saw the proposed budget, it raised
some questions about some of the programs that we worked on,
like the P-8 Poseidon program where eight aircraft are being
dropped; the E2-D Hawkeye, Advanced Hawkeye, one of those is
being dropped; when you look at how are we going to replace the
Ohio-class submarines; what are we going to do about
prepositioning ships that the Marines have; what about the
amphibs; questions about that.
But the Chairman runs a pretty tight ship; so, we don't
have time to talk about all of that. But I would like to
continue that conversation as we develop the subcommittee's
final work.
But I would like to talk about just the heart and soul of
the Navy, and that is ships.
The first question comes, Secretary Mabus, when you sent up
the budget, you also sent up a new way to count ships, and for
the first time that I know of you are going to count ships that
haven't been counted as part of the count.
And I know the Navy always has a problem making sure that
we keep our ship count up because numbers matter. We talk about
that. And so, when you count ships you haven't counted before,
then you get to increase the size of the fleet without going
out and buying a new ship.
I guess at a time when there is talk about decommissioning
an aircraft carrier, there is talk about laying up cruisers,
skeptical people might say, ``Is this just a coincidence that
you decided you are going to count ships that you didn't count
before?'' while maybe that takes some of the attention way from
some of the other things that are going on.
So I guess my first question is just common sense. What
drove you? What goes behind that decision to decide to count
ships, like, I guess, a hospital ship that hadn't been counted
as part of that battle group--or battle force? What went into
that thinking?
Mr. Mabus. Well, first, Congressman Crenshaw, we talked
about this last year. And the Navy always takes a look at how
we do our ship counts and we have changed it several times over
the past decade or so.
The short answer to why we made this change was it was the
ships that were requested by combat commanders, so ships that
were requested to be forward deployed. And we have also taken
some ships out in this count.
And two examples are we have taken mine countermeasures
ships that are not forward deployed out of the count. We put
patrol craft that are forward deployed that have been up-
armored and up-gunned and are now on patrol in particularly in
the Arabian Gulf onto this because this is requested by the
combat commander.
One of the things I told this committee last year was that,
if we did this, we were going to be completely transparent. So
when you get the 30-year shipbuilding plan, you are going to
get the old counting rules and the new counting rules. And when
I say we are going to get the fleet to 300 ships, I am using
the old counting rules.

CRUISER MODERNIZATION/RETIREMENT

Mr. Crenshaw. I get it.
For instance, I want to ask you about the cruisers because
there is also in the budget a proposal to, I guess, lay up--I
don't know exactly what that means--lay up 11 cruisers, and I
guess they will still be counted.
But here is the question. The last two years the Navy said,
``We are going to decommission 7 cruisers,'' and this
subcommittee, trying to be cost-efficient, has said, ``Common
sense will tell you, if you have got some ships that have
useful life remaining, then maybe, rather than decommission
them, it might be wise to modernize them and upgrade them and
then they would stay in the fleet.'' And, as you know, we put
that in our appropriations bill and said do that.
And this year it was kind of a surprise when we say you
should modernize them, then we--I guess this year at least you
didn't say, ``We are going to decommission them,'' but you did
say, ``We are going to take 11 cruisers and put them in what is
called, I guess, a lay-up and kind of a phased modernization.''
As I understand it, the average time would be 9 years. Some
would be modernized in 5 years. Some would be modernized in 12
years.
But if you are going to phase in this modernization, it
seems like that is a long time to have these cruisers out of
service. I assume they are tied up somewhere with no crew and
the weapons systems, et cetera.
So I guess my question is: Is that, you think, the best use
of the money that we appropriated? And, I guess, what assurance
does this subcommittee have that--it is almost like one foot in
the grave.
You say, ``We are not''--at least we didn't say we are
going to decommission them, but you did say, ``We are going to
phase in the modernization that might take, on average, 9
years.''
So my concern and, I think, the concern of the subcommittee
might be that--is this kind of a way to phase in the
decommissioning as opposed to actually modernizing them and
upgrading them?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We need some answers here. This is a
focal point. And maybe Mr. Crenshaw might not have any more
time.
But before we leave here, we need to know how we are going
to have this forward presence with a lot of ghost ships that
are part of that count.
Mr. Mabus. Well, first, the short answer to your last
question is no. It is not a way to try to decommission them.
Second, we are profoundly grateful to this committee and to
Congress for giving us the funds to modernize these cruisers.
When we looked at the cruisers that we needed, we need 11
operational at any one time. The most effective way to keep 11
in the fleet--because, if we simply modernized all the ships
today, all those cruisers would leave the fleet.
All 22 of them would leave the fleet in the late 2020s. By
doing this phased modernization, we will keep those cruisers in
the fleet into the 2040s. And we are not laying them up. We are
modernizing them.
I know that the concern is that this is just a way for us
to decommission them. This is the first step down that road. We
will work with this committee in any way you want us to to
reassure you that that is not the case.
In fact, our plan is to buy all the materials to do the
hull, mechanical and electrical modernization, for these
cruisers up front so that the ships begin to be modernized.
Second, we are not taking them out from under the control
of the Chief of Naval Operations. Unlike a ship which is laid
up which goes under the control of the shipyard, the CNO has
command of these ships and can bring them back in if there is a
national emergency that requires that.
Third, the reason that we are phasing it the way we are
doing it is, as the cruisers that remain forward deployed,
operational, retire, as they reach the end of their lives--the
ones we are modernizing have the most life left in them.
As the ones that reach the end of their lives, we are doing
a one-for-one. As one retires, one comes out of modernization
so that we keep the same number--we can keep the same number
deployed.

AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. This is--no pun intended--a pivotal
question, and I suspect others may follow up on Mr. Crenshaw.
But I would like at this time to yield to Mr. Moran for some
questions.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I first want to thank General Amos for the tremendous
Marine Corps fellows, Dax and now Catherine, that have put
together our questions. So it is really their fault if you
don't like these questions.
I also have to say once that, since this is the last time
before the committee, Mr. Chairman, I had the great honor of
holding the banner with General Amos for the end of the Marine
Corps marathon one year. We haven't----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Have you ever run it?
Mr. Moran. I did, but not recently. Thanks for asking. I
wish you hadn't. I finished in 3:56, but that was in another
life. I then threw up in the Pentagon parking lot afterwards.
But this was a true highlight because we had this great
pleasure because--I haven't been asked again. I am not sure if
you have, General--because we got to talking among ourselves as
the female lead runner passed the finish line.
So we wound up in the awkward position of having to run
after the lead runner, trying to get in front of her so we
could put the banner in front of her so she could run through
the finishing banner.
So it was not one of our most glorious achievements.
Anyway, I will get back to--that is a true story, isn't it,
General?
Let me ask you about the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. The
budget has $106 million in it. We canceled the Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle in 2011 after a $3 billion investment. So that
one hurt.
And we are still trying to replace the Amphibious Assault
Vehicle. But after the budget was drafted, you announced,
General, that you were going to review the program.
So the question is--we provided $123 million last year. I
am not sure whether that is being used for the Amphibious
Combat Vehicle. And we really have to ask, if we are reducing
end strength and force structure, do we still need the 573
vehicles?
General Amos. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity to
talk about that.
There was no sleight of hand on that. And you were very
generous with your historical memory of the $3 billion, because
my memory of the EFV vehicle was actually more expensive than
that when we canceled it. But I will take your number.
Mr. Moran. The $3 billion hurts enough.
General Amos. Yeah.
But that was 15-plus years of effort to produce a vehicle
that, in the fall of 2010, the Secretary and I sat down with
then-Secretary Gates and said this is unaffordable for a host
of reasons.
So we stopped, as you recall, and we said we are going to
spend--we are going to put a lot of effort and try to determine
the way ahead.
We need a vehicle that swims out the bowels of the ship.
You come off the ship one of two ways. You either fly off or
you come off in some type of surface craft.
We spent two years in detailed effort on that and we have
labeled that program the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. We have put
money in the budget for R&D.
A year ago I was getting close to being prepared to make
the decision on that, come to Congress, ask you for help. I
wasn't satisfied that the absolute final degree of effort had
been done.
I knew I was only going to get one more bite at this apple,
and I was not about to come to this committee and say, ``Let me
proffer up something that looks a lot like the one I just
canceled.''
So we put it back in the sausage factory again,
Congressman, I mean, detailed efforts, and it reported out in
January. And I sat and fussed with that for about 45 days,
wanting to make the right decision.
The money right now that you see in this year and over the
FYDP is sufficient to do what I am about to describe. It is
just in the wrong cubbyholes. And my folks are going to work
with this committee to try to rearrange that. We are not going
to ask for any more money.
But, in a nutshell, what we have elected to do is we can
build a high water speed vehicle, and we know now that we can
do it. The cost of that vehicle is going to be somewhere along
the lines of the vehicle that we canceled; so, that is not
good.
And, second of all, the compromise on what that vehicle
will be able to do ashore with its 13, 17 marines in it,
however many marines it is going to carry, was too great. The
compromise ashore where the vehicle is going to live 99 percent
of its time was too great.
So we elected to switch and go to a wheeled vehicle. And
these are commercial, off the shelf, Congressman. They are
already being made by several different manufacturers.
So we have put a program in place for what we call an
increment one, which will be somewhere probably around 300
vehicles. We are in the process of doing the acquisition work
on that right now.
And, sir, these vehicles will be somewhere between $3
million to $4.5 million apiece viz 12 to 14. It is the way to
go. And they are highly mobile. And that is the direction we
are going.
I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Moran. It does. It did take up all the time,
unfortunately, but I am glad you gave us a complete answer. I
want to talk about the George Washington, too.
Do you think we need to move on, though?

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING EXERCISES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I want to give Mr. Kingston a chance to
put his oar in the water here. But we are going to hear plenty
about the George Washington, I can assure you.
Mr. Moran. Okay. And we will get another round. So I'll
move on.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Kingston.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to clarify for the record to my
friend, Mr. Crenshaw, that Kings Bay is, in fact, in Georgia
and not part of north Florida, although we will be happy to
annex Jacksonville, if necessary. But----
Mr. Visclosky. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Kingston. Absolutely.
Mr. Visclosky. My wife was born and raised in
Jacksonville.
Mr. Kingston. We are good with her, particularly if she
votes the right way.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Your time is evaporating here.

OHIO-CLASS REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Mr. Kingston. First of all, General Amos, I want to say
thank you for all the service that you have given our country
and the great leadership that you have shown the men and women
of the Marines.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Greenert, we appreciate your
visits to Kings Bay and your support of the nuclear deterrent
program and the Ohio-class submarine replacement.
Mr. Secretary, I think foremost my question number one
would be: Can you assure us that the Ohio replacement program,
the Ohio class, is going to stay on target?
As you know and I say many times in my speeches, that--they
are going to be decommissioned in 2028 and the time to build
them is not 2027.

F-35C PROGRAM

And then, secondly, I would like you to comment on the F-
35C program and the Navy's commitment to it.
And then, thirdly, depending on time, about a year ago a
number of us and some members of the authorizing committee went
to Operation Bold Alligator, the training exercise, and I think
the price tag on that was maybe $15 million of the exercise.
And it really worries me that the Navy doesn't have the
money for large-scale training operations like that, and maybe,
if only for the record, if you could say how important those
large training operations are, because, as you know, that was
all over the eastern part of the country.
Mr. Mabus. If I could take that in reverse order, I will
be happy to say for the record how important those large
particularly amphibious training exercises are, like Bold
Alligator, to, number one, completely mesh the Navy and Marine
Corps team, but, number two, to practice the opposed amphibious
assaults that our marines are unparalleled and unrivaled in the
world in doing.
On the Ohio-class replacement program, Congressman, I can
say, yes, we are absolutely on track on that both--in this FYDP
in terms of the engineering money and the R&D money.
We have to start building that first replacement in 2021 to
be ready to go to sea at the end of that decade. We have to
have the common missile compartment ready earlier because the
British, who are also buying that compartment, will field their
replacement submarines first and will test that common missile
compartment.
We are driving costs out of the program as aggressively as
possible, making sure that we don't compromise any mission
areas.
I do think that there needs to be discussion, conversation,
in Congress and in the country as to how we pay for the Ohio-
class replacement program because this is a national program
and, if Navy bears it all out of our shipbuilding budget, it
will absolutely devastate the rest of the fleet, including the
other submarines, including the attack submarines in the fleet,
which I don't think is a result that any of us want.
We are committed to the F-35C program and the carrier
program. The Marines are first with the B version and we in
this FYDP--or in this budget are buying two C's and six B's,
two for the Navy, six for the Marine Corps.
We pushed some tails off purely as a financial measure. It
will not affect IOC--initial operating capability--for the
first naval squadron. And we feel confident in our ability to
bring F-35C's into the fleet while maintaining our current
TacAir capability.
Mr. Kingston. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Ms. McCollum.

MILITARY MISCONDUCT

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Amos, thank you for your service. And I am going to
talk about military misconduct. My comments are going to be
more directed to the Admiral, but I just want you to know that
we will continue to watch the Marine Corps handle its progress
towards military misconduct and the way the discipline is met
out.
But to Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, I do want to
thank you for your leadership. I know this is something that
you have been focused on and that an overwhelming majority of
our seamen and -women serve honorably and with great
distinction. And today we have a heavy heart because of the
loss of the sailor that we just heard about this morning.
However, the recent state of high-profile cases of military
misconduct within the Navy, we have to confront it. We have to
address it.
Widely reported bribery scandals involving two Navy
commanders, the cheating incidents in the Navy nuclear power--
--
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. McCollum, could you just pull your
microphone up a little bit?

BRAC

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. [continuing]. And the
sexual assault allegations are deeply concerning to me as well
as my colleagues on the committee, and we will continue to
follow this. But because we are preparing our budget, I wanted
to discuss and get some feedback on BRAC.
Secretary Mabus, as you know, the Under Secretary of
Defense, Robert Hale, said--and I quote--``We have got at least
25 percent of unneeded infrastructure in the Department of
Defense. If we can't get Congress to allow us to close it, we
are simply going to waste taxpayers' dollars,'' the end of his
quote.
He goes on to say that not allowing the closure of this
excess infrastructure means the Pentagon--and I quote again--
``won't have the money to invest in things like readiness and
reducing the numbers of force cuts that are required.'' And
that is the end of his quote.
So, Secretary Mabus, I would like you to tell me explicitly
how much excess infrastructure that you have in the Navy.
And then here is where there is a bit of a contradiction,
gentleman, because Admiral Greenert on March 24th in an AP
press was quoted as saying that the Navy is not pushing for
BRAC.
So, gentleman, can you explain to me what--the Navy's
position on getting rid of excess capacity in order to free up
funds for other things like readiness and maintenance and
operations as has been discussed by my colleagues earlier?
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Comptroller Hale was obviously speaking for the entire
Defense Department when he made that statement.
And while we think that everything ought to be on the table
in these fiscally constrained times and that BRAC is a useful
tool to take a look at what we have, one of the things that the
Navy and Marine Corps has done is, in previous BRAC rounds, we
have taken those very seriously and we have ridded ourselves of
a good bit of excess capacity that we have.
We will certainly take a very hard look at all our
capacities, at all the bases that we have, should Congress
authorize a new BRAC round, and we do support the use of that
tool. But we think that, in the past, because of past BRAC
rounds, we have gotten rid of most of our excess capacity.
Admiral Greenert. And, ma'am, the context of my comment
was speaking at a base about a base, in this case, Mayport.
As you know and as Congressman Crenshaw mentioned earlier,
strategic dispersal is important to us. And as Secretary Mabus
said, BRAC is a process. It is frequently used as a verb--``You
are BRACed''--as a derogatory thing.
The Department of Defense is asking for a BRAC. I support
that. It is not a bad process. It is kind of cleansing to look
at what you need strategically and in the business case
analysis of it.
With regard to our laydown, our strategic dispersal, which
I was addressing at the time, I am satisfied with it.
Ms. McCollum. So, gentlemen, in your opinion, unless
ordered to by Congress--because I am confused--Mr. Hale
identified 25 percent--could you perhaps talk to Mr. Hale and
get us back to what share of the Navy's 25 percent that is?
Because, from what I am hearing today, you say that there's--
possibly none of the 25 percent is in the Navy.
Mr. Mabus. I would be happy to talk to Bob Hale.
And, Congresswoman, I was Governor on the other side of a
BRAC process; so, I understand how BRAC processes work.
And to the CNO's point, they do bring some needed rigor to
looking at what bases that we do need.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Ms. Granger.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, all three of you, for your service
and your leadership and for being here to answer our questions
this morning.
General Amos, you and I have discussed the Joint Strike
Fighter many times, and I certainly appreciate your leadership
in keeping the Marine variate on track.
Could you give us an update on how the program is going
from your point of view and, also, confirm the Marine Corps'
plan to replace six Harrier losses in Afghanistan with
additional Joint Strike Fighters.
General Amos. Congresswoman, thank you.
To your last point, when we lost the six airplanes in the
attack at Bastion airfield about a year and a half ago, there
were six Harriers completely destroyed on the line.
Since then, we have brought two of the other Harriers back,
and it is my understanding that those two airplanes have not
survived what we call the planning and estimating, trying to
determine how much damage. So the total is really eight
airplanes at this point.
We have put in an OCO request--a request through OCO,
through OSD and through OMB to replace those airplanes. We
can't buy Harriers anymore. They don't manufacture them. So to
buy JSF's with those.
We have certainly--OCO in the past has replaced damaged and
lost equipment, whether it be vehicles, whether it be attack
helicopters and that. So that is what that is about.
And I don't think a final determination has been made on
that. We have included it in our unfunded priority list up to
the House. Chairman McKeon asked for that. So you have that.
And that is really for just six airplanes, and it is six JSF's.
The program itself is doing well. The GAO, as you are
aware, released a report yesterday critical of several things.
And they are doing their job. They are doing what they are
required to do.
But the airplane for us--we have one squadron completely
stood up with 16 airplanes down at Yuma, Arizona. It is our
first fleet operational squadron. And we have a training
squadron set up in Eglin Air Force Base along with the Navy and
the Air Force.
The airplane itself now has over 5,000 flight hours on it,
both in developmental testing and the flying that is being done
out at Yuma, Arizona. It is still in developmental testing. I
mean, we are going to find issues with it.
I talk to the JPO, the Joint Program Officer, all the time,
who manages this. We understand where he is with relationship
to software, with relationship to the structural integrity of
the airplane. We have got a good plan--he does--to continue to
fix those things.
It is pressurized. There is no question about it. Just to
give you an order of magnitude on software, the F-22 has 2
million lines of software code in it. The JSF has 6 million
lines of software code. So it is an order of magnitude greater
in complexity.
But it is a tremendous weapons system. It is flying well.
And we are still on track at this point to what we do, initial
operational capability for our squadron out in Yuma, Arizona,
in late summer of 2015.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.

AIRCRAFT TIRES

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Granger.
Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Amos, it is sad to see you depart, but I have a
feeling that you will still be around. And I want to thank you
for your leadership, especially your leadership in the field of
resiliency. I know we have talked and met about that a good
many times, and I want to just thank you for your leadership on
that score as well.
I have a question, Secretary Mabus, on an issue that I have
been working on since I got in the Congress a while back, not
as far back as when Mr. Moran was running marathons.
But it was----
Mr. Moran. Before you were born.
Mr. Ryan [continuing]. It is regarding Navy aviation
tires.
And the Defense Department tire procurement reform was
taken up in 2005 during the BRAC process and, subsequently, the
House and Senate Armed Services Committee and this subcommittee
and our Senate counterparts.
Those reforms have almost completely eliminated the unfair,
uncompetitive and uneven process that used to allow a tire
manufacturer to directly contract and manage DOD's tire
procurement.
The result, which--means that the company--for example
Michelin--has the contract that sells DOD almost exclusively
their own tires in this instance.
In the fiscal year 2010 defense appropriations report, we
said, ``Having a tire manufacturer as the manager as well as
the vendor creates a perception of a lack of competition.''
And then we went on to say that the Secretary of Defense
will award a new contract and ``the new contract should
prohibit any tire manufacturer from acting as a prime
contractor for the management of the contract.''
The existing Navy aircraft tire contracts are exempted.
That existing contract continues and, as this committee said, a
perception of the lack of competition continues as well.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to show the Secretary and the
committee a chart that puts into stark terms the actions of the
existing contractor's actions. The contractor selects their
tires 98 percent of the time.
The Navy, for reasons that are not clear to anyone given
the language and direction provided by this committee, is at
this very moment proceeding with a new tire contract RFP with a
tire manufacturer acting as a prime contractor for the
management of the contract. It seems as though the Navy
believes it received a never-ending exemption.
Mr. Secretary, this budget environment is extremely tight.
Let us save the taxpayers some money, conduct business in a
uniform way across DOD, provide competitive pricing for your
aviation tires, inject fairness, and allow for investment into
American manufacturing, one of which has aviation tires all
made here in the United States, in Virginia.
You received a letter--and I have it in my hand--signed by
19 members of the House, including 5 members of this
subcommittee, asking you to have the Navy employ the process
for tire procurement used by the rest of the Defense
Department. A letter is also forthcoming from the United States
Senate.
Mr. Secretary, the Congress and this subcommittee have been
on record on this subject for quite some time. You have this
letter from members of the House Armed Services Committee and
the Appropriations Committee asking you to act as Congress has
previously directed the Navy.
Now, we can do this the easiest way, I think, possible or a
harder way, where we end up having to act on this committee and
writing it into law.
But can you commit to me and my fellow members concerned in
writing you and the membership of this committee that the Navy
will abandon its duplicative contracting members and use TSI?
Mr. Mabus. Congressman, what I can commit to you doing is
getting you an answer not only to your letter, but, also, to
this question in the detail that we should get you the answer
and as quickly as is possible. I will do that, and I will make
sure personally that is done.
Mr. Ryan. I would appreciate this.
I think this just feeds into--I mean, there is always a
level of cynicism on how the government is doing business, and
I think this just feeds into that level of cynicism to say, you
know, you are going to be in charge of picking and you pick
yourself.
I mean, people in Youngstown, Ohio, and Akron, Ohio, they
get that. You know? That sounds like a scam to them. And so I
would appreciate your response.
And I appreciate the other members of this committee who
have signed on to that letter.
And I appreciate the time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Calvert.

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also, General Amos, want to thank you for your service
and look forward to your next career, whatever it may be.
This budget proposes significant reductions in the size of
our military, particularly the Army and the Corps. While the
U.S. military is now 30 percent smaller than at the end of the
Cold War and forecast to shrink even further, it has 20 percent
more three- and four-star generals.
The fiscal year 2014 Appropriations Act directed the
department to provide a report on all direct and support costs
associated with general and flag officers.
While reducing the size of the force will save money, it is
important that we retain a force that is rightsized with the
right mix of personnel, both military and civilian, to
accomplish that mission.
Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert and General Amos, as you
may know, just two weeks ago I introduced an act, the REDUCE
Act, which will require DOD to make necessary reductions to its
civilian workforce in a systematic manner without compromising
our ability to maintain a strong national defense over the long
term.
It would provide DOD with the authority to reduce the most
nonessential positions and an opportunity to determine which
tasks no longer need to be done through a reduction in force.
Currently the United States has 1.3 million active duty
military personnel versus 770,000 civilian personnel. I believe
that ratio is out of balance.
I would like to ask each one of you: What do you believe is
the right mix of civilian and military personnel across your
services?
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Mabus. Congressman, we have been taking a very hard
look at this for several years now, and, in fact, we have had
our hiring freeze in place last year for civilians, and Marines
have had a hiring freeze in place for 2 years for civilians,
and we have cut pretty substantially the number of civilians
working.
However, having said that, we literally can't put our fleet
to sea without the civilian workforce. The 12 people that we
lost at the Washington Navy Yard were working as civilians
building our fleet. The people that worked with them, 2 days
later, were back at work to make sure that we did that.
So I think we have to continue to take a look at both, at
the uniformed and at the civilians. But also, one of the things
that we are finding, we spend an enormous amount on contracts,
on contract services that are not government employees. We
spend $40 billion a year on that, more than all our
acquisitions combined. We are absolutely convinced that we can
save at least 10 percent a year on that over the FYDP without
harming in any way any of our activities.
Mr. Calvert. General.
General Amos. Congressman, as my Secretary said, in 2012 we
put a hiring freeze on the Marine Corps, on the civilian side
of the Marine Corps. In fact, we set thousands of numbers below
what we would call the targeted, the right balance. So you ask
what is the right balance between Active Duty and civilian
Marines. We said several thousand below that number that we
have adjusted almost annually to make sure that we have got the
right balance. We are the leanest of all the services. We have
got the fewest civilians per--and I was just looking through my
notes here to get you the exact figure, and I will find it here
in a minute--of all the services.
Now, I don't want to be misleading. We use the services of
my brother in the Navy with his depots and with his systems
commands. So we don't have quite the overhead in civilians, but
we look at this twice a year, Congressman, to maintain that
right balance.
I will tell you, we are short right now. I don't think it
is going to get any better for us. So I guess if you are
looking for a force that is already lean, we are there, and I
think we are probably going to get leaner over the future.
Mr. Calvert. Admiral.
Admiral Greenert. What is a little unique about the Navy,
Congressman, is we buy equipment, and we man it as opposed to--
and I am talking about military--as opposed to determining the
size of the Navy on numbers of people. That is just not what we
are about. And it is similar to the Air Force as opposed to the
ground forces, and they get people, and then they equip it.
With regard to civilian personnel, as Secretary Mabus said,
there are folks there, they are wrench turners, welders, pipe
fitters, electricians. If we were to reduce them, well, we just
have to bring in military, because that has to get done for the
fleet to sail and for aircraft to fly, and, as General Amos
said, same with Aircraft Depot.
But to look at this in a broad, more strategic approach, I
think that would be great. But we would need some regulatory
relief, because we have to manage higher, if you will, and
reduce in force locally, which is different from our military,
which we can do. We can put a master plan and look at----
Mr. Calvert. I worked with former comptrollers--it was
their suggestion, by the way--and former Under Secretary of the
Department of Defense and former Secretaries of Defense who
believe that the ratios are out of balance, and that the
Secretary does not have the authority under existing law to
make those types of reductions.
And we are not talking about the wrench turners or the
folks that are manually working every day; we are talking about
a look at the Department, especially in management and the
management of middle management and the rest, like civilian
workforces have done in private sector over the years to
reevaluate the growth in the civilian workforce.
As you know, it has grown by 17 percent in the last 10
years versus the military at approximately 3 percent. And I
think, from a business perspective, you need to take a serious
look at that and have the tools to make those reductions. And
we are talking about 3 percent per year over 5 years in a
770,000 workforce, it would seem to me a reasonable thing that
could be accomplished, and it could save over 10 years
approximately $170 billion and keep that in the Department, I
think would help sustain the readiness, procurement and troop
levels.
Admiral Greenert. Armed with that sort of authority, if you
will, and guidance, we could do that. But heretofore things
have been done so homogeneous that we would go to these
shipyards and say, you are frozen, I can't hire a wrench
turner, when the target may be support. And so until we can
change that, the baby goes out with the bathwater.
Mr. Calvert. And that is the intent of this legislation.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is worth a look. Please take a look
at Mr. Calvert's proposal.
Mr. Cole.

E-6 AIRCRAFT

Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, all three of you, for your terrific
service to our country in so many different capacities.
Two quick points to make and then a bigger, unrelated
question. To my friend Mr. Ryan, not as a corrective and not to
undermine your point at all, but I do want to just point out
Michelin has a lot of factories in America. One of them is in
my district; it is actually the largest single site in
Oklahoma. Now, we don't make aviation tires there, but it is
over 2,200 jobs. So they are a good company with a great
presence in the United States.
I would like to know, and we have been trying to go through
the budget to determine, do you have any plans in terms of
downsizing or changing the E-6 Communications Wing that you
have at Tinker Air Force Base now?
Admiral Greenert. No, sir, we don't. To my knowledge, we
don't. We sized that base. It is all part of the--as you know,
the sea-based strategic deterrent; and the support, that is the
command-and-control feature.
Mr. Cole. Right.
Admiral Greenert. So we are required to have a number of
airborne--you can call it an orbit, however you want, and
everything fits around that just like SSBNs at sea.

CAPABILITIES OF CHINA

Mr. Cole. Thank you very much.
Let me switch it pretty dramatically now. Again, you have
had to deal with some really pretty tough budget decisions. I
appreciate the fact that both the service chiefs in particular
used the phrase, I think, you know, the best force that America
is willing to pay for, or something like that. I think that is
a really important point to be made, and ringing the alarm bell
about 2016 can't start too early. Everybody on this committee
knows what we are going to be facing if sequester actually does
kick back in and what that will mean for your jobs. So thank
you for making that point.
I would like you to look outside. While we are going
through a pretty difficult downsizing process with our
military, that is certainly not true of some of our assets--or
potential adversaries that you deal with, particularly in the
Western Pacific. So I would like you to give us a quick
overview of what you think the Chinese in particular are doing,
and whether or not you have what you need to make sure that
that remains a stable and hopefully peaceful place, even given
all the tension there is in the South China Sea right now.
Admiral Greenert. Well, the Chinese Navy, as they are very
upfront, they intend to build and replace. They are modernizing
their fleet. Folks think they are building a larger fleet.
Frankly, the size itself is not so much the change; the
modernity of the vessels that they have and aircraft and
submarines is changing.
I view it with vigilance right now. You can buy all kinds
of new stuff. We have done it. Can you operate it? Can you
network it? Do you have the people to support it? Can you man,
train and equip it? And I watch that closely as I do that.
Secondarily, so what is the strategy here? And that is a
frequent topic of us in military talks. I had my Chinese
counterpart here in September for a week in the United States,
spent the entire week with him, and it was clear to me they
want to become what they call, if you will, a world-class navy,
therefore the carrier program and others. So they were quite
inquisitive. How do you guys do this? How do you build the
force to do that? So our asymmetric advantages are people. As
we have talked about, the right industrial base you can, you
know, build or not. So that is the core of what we are.
Do I have what I need to do what I need to get done,
presencewide? Yes. And I provide this little chartlet. With
what we have, we can be where we need to be when it matters. Do
we meet the COCOM requests--there are several questions here--
no. The COCOM in the Pacific is very clear. He needs greater
than two carrier strike groups. With the ships and aircraft
that we have, we can provide one, and that is reconciled, if
you will, we call it the Adjudicated Global Force Management
Plan.
My concern is if we go to Budget Control Act caps, we will
have difficulty just keeping one in the Pacific and one in the
Arabian Gulf, and we will at times go below that. We won't be
able to build with the industrial base that we need. And
perhaps more importantly, when contingencies occur, the ability
to respond with the right capacity, with the right capability,
on time, all of those three are very important, won't be there
like the combatant commanders say it needs to be at a Budget
Control Act level, if you will, at sequestration.
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ACCEPTABLE RISK LEVELS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Womack.
Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My thanks to the gentlemen. I will start with a thank you.
And I want to thank General Amos. In late January, you
visited my district. It was part of one of your initiatives
that brought you there, but I have got to tell you, the
luncheon that you spoke at that normally seats about 350 people
had over 900 that day, and a number of marines were there, old
and young alike, that made a lot of difference in their lives,
and I just want to thank you publicly for taking the time to do
that.
My question is for the panel, starting with the Secretary,
and it is kind of a follow-up to what Mr. Cole has just
broached. What we are doing today is we are trying to address
real or perceived or emerging threats based on budget
constraints, and that is just a business that we always have to
do.
So my question is really simple: When you speak to us, you
are speaking to the American people. What is an acceptable
level of risk that we can take, given the spectrum of things
that you have to have the capacity to respond to, sometimes
surprisingly? What is that acceptable level of risk, and are we
getting to an unacceptable level of risk particularly when we
see just around the corner the potential for the resumption of
sequestration in fiscal year 2016?
Mr. Secretary, I would offer the floor to you first and
then as the two gentlemen to your left and right might be
willing to respond.
Mr. Mabus. Thank you, Congressman.
The budget that we put forward, I think the short answer is
we have an acceptable level of risk. There is a level of risk,
and we have tried to articulate that level, and it goes to
several factors. The concern that we have, which the CNO has
talked about earlier today, is if in fiscal year 2016 we go
back to sequester levels, that level of risk goes up, and it
goes up pretty dramatically in terms of numbers of ships that
we have, in terms of the assets that we can put forward, in
terms of the stress that it puts on, in terms of our
modernization programs, in terms of our weapons programs, in
terms of so many programs that we have that we simply couldn't
get the things that we need when we need them.
So our concern is not so much for 2015, the budget that we
are talking about right now, because we do think we can manage
that risk, because it has been. Thanks to this committee and
thanks to Congress, we have these 2 years, 2014 and 2015, to do
some planning and to set some priorities. It is from 2016 out
and, if it does return to those sequester levels, the problems
that that will cause.
General Amos. Congressman, I think knowing that risk and
readiness would probably be a key part of today's discussion, I
spent a bit of time last night thinking about how I could
describe that so it would make sense. If you would allow me,
please, to talk just as a service chief how I look at readiness
to begin with, and then I will transition to risk, because I
think they are absolutely related, because one will drive the
other.
The matter of readiness for my service, the Marine Corps,
is measured in people, people readiness; in other words,
everything from their preparedness to deploy, everything from
as simple as dental readiness and medical readiness to their
family readiness. Are they set and ready to go? Are the right
people, the right ranks, the right experience levels? Do they
have the right noncommissioned officers in charge of young
marines, what I call baby marines, the ones that have just
joined? Do I have the right staff NCOs? So it is people
readiness, and it is equipment readiness.
And the equipment readiness is mechanical. It is I have a
piece of gear; I have got a Humvee; I have got an MRAP. Is it
up? Is it operating? And if it is not, is it partially mission
capable? We do that in airplanes. Can we fly the airplane on
some missions, or is it completely grounded, is it down?
So it is people, it is equipment readiness, and both of
those, in particular the second one, require a lot of
operations of maintenance money. It is parts. It is support. It
is that kind of thing.
The next one is training readiness, and that is taking
those marines and being able to put them through the training
syllabus and ensure that they are at a--what we would call at
the highest state of readiness before they go to deploy, if
they are going to deploy in combat. I have told this
subcommittee many, many times, those marines that are forward
deployed in Afghanistan and those that have gone before in Iraq
are my highest priority, so they will always go ready. So it is
training readiness is the next piece.
Then there is what we call bases and stations, which is
often overlooked, because that is where our training ranges
are; that is where our facilities are; that is where all that
home station support is that takes those squadrons and
battalions and sets the conditions so that they can train, they
can deploy, they can deploy and know that their families are
going to be cared for back in the rear.
And the last part is tied to what I just talked about, and
that is family readiness. Are the programs set so that when
that unit deploys on a moment's notice, that the family is
plugged into a network, and they are going to be cared for, and
information is going to flow.
So that is the readiness kind of Rubik's Cube that we work
in as commanders, and I certainly do within my force.
You transition to risk now. First of all, risk is a
judgment call by the individual. I try to pass this to
somebody, but it is. The other thing I would say is that risk
is not necessarily a point on a continuum; it is a space on a
continuum between high risk and probably low risk. Somewhere in
there is moderate risk in there we would probably describe as
acceptable risk, and it would be, in my case, you know, a
certain size force, and I can talk about that in a minute.
But risk is a function of the total capacity of the force;
in other words, it is numbers of units, the capacity, the
numbers of ships, the numbers of marines, battalions, squadrons
to be able to do something that the Nation wants it to do. So
that is the first part in the calculus of risk.
The second part of it is the levels of readiness, which I
just got done talking about. That fits in the risk equation.
And those levels of readiness are readiness for forward-
deployed units, readiness for those next-to-deploy units, and
those readiness of those units that are, frankly, maybe a year
from now. And this is where we are beginning to feel the pinch
is those units that are at home station that are not in the
queue that start deploying because they are in a low state of
readiness right now.
So the next piece of risk is the ability to build combat
power over time; in other words, how quickly can I move forces?
We have always got forward forces deployed, you know that.
Thirty thousand marines. John Greenert has got his ships
forward deployed, and we are out there. But how quickly, in
case we need something for a large-scale operation, can I build
that combat power up? How do I get it there? Do I sail it? Do I
put it on airplanes? Where does the equipment come from? How
quickly can I build that? So that is an element of risk.
And then the next thing, quite honestly, is the sustainment
ability both in people, combat replacements, and the ability to
get parts; the ability to get stuff forward to fix things; the
ability to provide meals ready to eat, water, batteries, fuel,
ammunition; and then how quickly can I get those combat
replacements to people that are wounded or we have lost in
action, and we have got to replace them in a unit. So those are
all parts of the things that count that fit in the calculus of
risk.
In my service we sit at about 193,000 marines today. We are
on our way down to 175,000. That 175,000k force was built and
designed around full sequestration. That is a force that is
highly ready. I have gone into bases and stations, pulled money
out of maintenance and facilities, and put them into these
deploying units, so they are ready. But the ones that aren't
deploying, I have taken money away from them; I have taken
money away from the bases and stations. There is risk there,
but there is not risk for those that are forward deployed and
ready to go. They are at a high state of readiness.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General, I need to make sure I recognize
Mr. Visclosky at some point. I want to get to this issue
through my own questions, too. But this is a critical issue
here, whether this is budget driven or military requirements
driven, but I think we are getting some of the answers we need.
Mr. Womack. And I appreciate the gentleman for his remarks.
Just a quick point I think we all need to remember: Risk
can go on or off pretty quickly, but capacity to address the
risk is not an on/off switch, and that is where I base most of
my concerns.
And I yield the floor.

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. We share your concerns, and I don't mean
to cut anyone short, but I want to make sure we all get some
questions here.
Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. Chairman, thank you very much.
General Amos, I want to join the chairman and my colleagues
in thanking you for your service to this country as well as
your colleagues on the panel, and also join the chair and my
colleagues in extending my personal and all of our sympathy on
the death of the sailor yesterday.
General Amos, you mentioned in response to Ms. Granger's
question a number of aircraft and suggested that a request was
submitted for the overseas contingencies operation. We face a
very difficult task because there is a placeholder for $79
billion for next fiscal year. And our bill hopefully will be on
the House floor, and there will be a placeholder for $79
billion that is as of this moment undefined. That is going to
be a very difficult problem to address.
There is a theory that there is a bridge that the
administration is considering for the last 3 months of this
calendar year as well as a supplemental. But the question I
would ask today is, Secretary and Officers, has the Navy/Marine
Corps contributed assumptions or analyses that are contained in
that placeholder? There was a specific mention of a request for
aircraft in OCO. What is in OCO for the Navy and Marine Corps
for fiscal year 2015?
Mr. Mabus. I will give you a very specific answer to your
very specific question. Yes, we have contributed information
into the OCO request. As you know, it is not final yet, and we
put the things in that we thought were appropriate to be put in
to an overseas contingency operation request, things that were
related to our combat operations, particularly in Afghanistan.
Mr. Visclosky. I appreciate you answering my question. That
is why you are Secretary of the Navy.
Could I ask, have you submitted options? Because there
appears to be an operative theory that at some point after an
election and/or runoff, an agreement will be signed, but that
if an agreement is not signed, there is a so-called zero option
that the President of the United States has talked about. Would
your request in that instance be different than the ones that
you have submitted to date?
General Amos. Sir, there is no question about it, and that
is a little bit of the unknown right now, is this going to be a
zero option, or will there be enduring force presence? If there
is enduring force presence, it is going to require OCO; if it
doesn't, then the actual OCO to deploy and train those forces
in Afghanistan or sustain them there will go away.
But the requirement to reset the Marine Corps will not go
away; that will be 2 to 3 years. And I have sat before this
committee many, many times and talked about that, and we are
now down to about $1.3 billion worth of requirements to reset
the Marine Corps. That is from about 15.5 billion years ago
when Chairman Murtha sat here. So we have come a long ways to
reset, but there are--there will be some OCO requirements, sir,
as a result of once we even come out of Afghanistan.
Mr. Visclosky. And on the reset, because the roles are
changing place, and we obviously face some very difficult
circumstances with Russia and the impact that has as far as
their influence on some of the former republics that are
contiguous to Afghanistan, is that factored in as to any
possible fluctuation in your cost on reset if that becomes more
difficult as far as transit of equipment north?
General Amos. Congressman, we have got forward deployed
forces in that--in the Persian Gulf area, and we are looking at
putting a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force on the
ground somewhere there for the combatant commander. Those will
be covered in our----
Mr. Visclosky. I am talking about transit out of
Afghanistan as far as the reset----
General Amos. Pardon?
Mr. Visclosky [continuing]. And the lack of options
potentially based on Russians' activity with some of the
nations that border Afghanistan.
General Amos. Sir, we have not put any money in there for
options.
Mr. Mabus. Congressman, the Marines have more than 75
percent--in fact, it is getting close to 80 percent of their
equipment has already gotten out of Afghanistan. They took
their weapons out of Iraq, and they have had a detailed plan
now for some time, and they have moved equipment out. So the
risk to them in terms of the way you take it out is--it is not
completely gone, but because of what they have done, it is much
smaller.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SIZE OF THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Following up on Mr. Visclosky's
question, and this may be a focus on the Marines. And let me
thank you for reminding us of the Marine Corps' ethos and
invoking Belleau Wood, and mentioning, obviously, Fallujah,
which was one of the most remarkable battles and successful
battles that the Marines were ever involved in. I don't think
we will ever forget the level of sacrifice that was identified
in Iraq.
I would like to ask, relative to the size of the Marine
force going forward, to some extent the forces of all of our
military are directly related to our withdrawal of U.S. Forces
in Iraq. What do you see, General Amos, as the laydown--maybe
that is not the proper term--but the blueprint of where the
Marines are going to be over the next couple of years?
And I am not talking about as a result of the, you know,
potential of continuing resolutions and sequesters, but
relative to military, you know, the military obligation, what
you see out there. I know sometimes we are taking a look at
what the Russians are doing. That was unanticipated to some
extent, it appears. The Chinese, with all due respect, are
still on the high seas doing things to deny us access in areas,
and our allies. Give us a blueprint as to where you think the
Marines are over the next couple of years.
General Amos. Thank you, Chairman.
I think we will always have somewhere between 30- to 40,000
Marines forward deployed at all times. We will continue in this
budget, even the fully sequestered budget, we will have seven
Marine expeditionary units, the same number we have today,
which are those ships and marines that are forward deployed on
a rotation basis. We have three MUEs out right now; Admiral
Greenert has his ships out, one in the Pacific, one in the
Persian Gulf area, and one on its way home, coming up through
the Mediterranean. So they will always be there. So that hasn't
changed.
And we will have 22,500 marines west of the International
Date Line. That doesn't include Hawaii. That is starting up
north in Iwakuni, Okinawa, Guam and down in Australia. And we
are realigning that, as you are aware right now. Today we have
pretty close to about 20,000 marines west of the International
Date Line. So they will be there. They will be forward
deployed, and they will be ready.
What we have built, and we have one already in existence,
it is called a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Crisis Response, and it sits in the European theater right now
by the graciousness of the country of Spain. They have been
very good to our country, allow us to position our forces there
and to operate into the African Continent.
And General Rodriguez uses them. They were down in the
South Sudan, they rescued the Americans out of there, and they
are his crisis response force. We have money, and they will be
positioned available there. We are going to build one of those
for General Lloyd Austin. It has to be approved by the
Secretary of Defense, and so we are offering that up. And we
are looking at building one of those down in South America for
General Kelly. So the marines will be positioned all around,
Chairman, and that is our----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So what the Secretary talked earlier in
the morning about, you will be an essential part of what he
described as the innovative combinations that are being used
now and will be structured in the future to meet a potential
aggression and crises. So you are essentially part of that,
which sort of begs the question here, and I say this
respectfully, we know that the Marines will do anything at any
time for our country and have done it time and time again. You
have always been the point of the spear. You are remarkable.
What is your relationship with--and I know you are part of that
relationship--with our special operators, who also do
remarkable work, and who now have a greater role in this budget
scenario? In other words, you are being reduced, and we are
making substantial investments in cyber warfare, we are making
investments, and no one is against them in the role of our
special operators. Where are you in that mix?
General Amos. Chairman, we have 25-, almost 2,600 marines
that are part of Marine Special Operations Command. They are
under the command and control of Admiral Bill McRaven, the
Commander of Special Operations Command down in Tampa. They are
just like SEALs, they are just like the Rangers, the other
forces that he owns. They are highly trained, and they are our
contribution.
And they have a general role as Special Operations Forces,
but the synergy here is they have unique tentacles back to us.
And so we have just agreed, Admiral McRaven and Admiral
Greenert and I, that we will put some of those on Navy ships,
on Marine expeditionary units, on amphibious ready groups, and
they will be in concert working with these special operators as
they travel around.
So it is a symbiotic relationship, and, sir, we are all in
on it. I think we have got the right amount. I get asked that
question all the time, do you have too many, do you have not
enough? Right now for the budget that we have and the roles and
missions, I think we have got the right amount.

SPECIAL PURPOSE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Granger, any further questions?
Ms. Granger. Yes.
General Amos, we have seen and heard from the Navy on the
need for more amphibious ships; however, as I understand it,
you began filling this critical amphibious gap with land-based
crisis response forces, particularly in Africa. And my question
is will the Marine Corps continue to develop these Special
Purpose Air-Ground Task Forces throughout the world, and do you
feel the air support at your disposal is adequate to continue
those missions?
General Amos. Congresswoman, I think we will. I think it
is a sign of the future. It is the sign of kind of this what
people are calling the new norm. We want to be relevant based
on what the needs are for the combatant commanders, what the
real world has unveiled. After the Libyan tragedy with
Ambassador Stevens, we sat back and within my service said, is
there anything that we can do in the future?
And two things came to mind. One was, with the help of
Congress, was to authorize another 1,000 Marines in the Marine
Security Guard detachment, which we have done and we are in the
process of. It is turning out to be very successful so far. The
second was what if they had a force that was on the ground
somewhere or at sea, ideally it would be at sea, that could
react in the event the combatant commander has a need?
And that is what this is all about. And so this is in
anticipation of can we provide something for future
requirements. So I think we are going to continue to do that. I
know that Admiral Greenert and the Secretary are working very
hard on the ships. We will probably talk some more about that
here. We would like to be on ships. It is just they cost a lot
of money, and it is just a function of trying to balance the
budget.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I mentioned that I wanted to ask some questions about the
George Washington, and we haven't gotten into that, and I know,
Admiral and Secretary, that you really do want to get into that
subject, so I will give you the opportunity.
We invested $3 billion into the George Washington aircraft
carrier back in 1983. The price of a new carrier is now $10
billion. In this budget you have put 46 million for defueling
the ship, but it is going to be $1 billion if we actually
decommission it.
Now, in prior years this subcommittee has provided over
half a billion for the planning and advance procurement of
these kinds of--you know, for the lead items like the reactor
core and for refueling. So we have got an issue here. I know
you do, as well, but we need to be able to plan, what are you
going to do? It is an enormous cost if we change our mind, as
you know.
We don't know whether this ship is going to be inactivated
for $1 billion. We know that this small amount of money is not
even a placeholder. Are you going to ask for the additional 800
million to deactivate it, or is it just a situation where we
haven't made a decision as yet?
I guess I should ask you, Mr. Secretary. That is why you
get paid the big bucks to answer those kinds of questions.
Mr. Mabus. Congressman, to start with, I just don't think
it is true that either one of us was at the first marathon.
Mr. Moran. What?
Mr. Mabus. I don't think either one of us was at the first
marathon even though there are rumors that we were there in
Greece a couple of thousand years ago.
Mr. Moran. Oh.
Mr. Mabus. The only thing we have done with the GW is moved
the decision 1 year, whether to move----
Mr. Moran. Move the decision for 1 year, you are saying?
Mr. Mabus. Yes, to move the decision for 1 year. Nothing is
going to take place in 2015 that will head in one direction or
the other.
Having said that, we very much want to keep the GW, as you
pointed out. She was built 25 years ago. She is halfway through
her expected life span. Admiral Locklear, the Pacific Command
Commander, testified in Congress about the need for us to keep
11 aircraft carriers. We are very aware that there is a law
that says we will have 11 aircraft carriers. So it is like
gravity: It is not just a good idea; it is a law.
And so we are very aware of all that, and we want to keep
that carrier and her associated air wing. To lose that carrier
would have implications in terms of our presence, in terms of
our surge capacity, in terms of the stress that we put on the
remaining carriers, and also on the industrial base in terms of
building carriers.
So by moving the decision, completely moving it, we had a
year to work with, we will not have an impact on the cost of
refueling or defueling, and we will not have an impact on the
next carrier coming in to be refueled. And that is why we did
it, to give us a little more decision space, to give Congress a
little more decision space, because, as you point out, the bill
for keeping GW and her air wing and operating her is about $7
billion over that 5 years beginning in 2016.
Mr. Moran. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just quickly finish the conversation about cruisers
and ask a question. You know, last year we had to find $25
billion to take out of our bill to meet all the requirements,
and in spite of that, there was money left to modernize those
seven cruisers. So you can see from our standpoint, we thought
that was pretty important, because it is common sense; if you
are going to maintain your fleet without spending a lot of
money to buy new ships, you simply maintain, modernize the
ships you have.
And so I just want to kind of make that clear that we were
pretty clear in our intention. And I think that your proposal
probably is within the letter of the law, but I am not sure it
follows the spirit of our clear intention to say here is seven
cruisers, and here is the money to modernize them and proceed.
So I am hoping that we can work together, because you won't
always be--all you three gentlemen, always be sitting there,
and you say, okay, we are not really putting one foot in the
grave; 9 years, everything is going to be fine. But I have seen
times when the Navy said, well, here is an aircraft carrier,
and we are going to spend $350 million to do an availability,
and which was done; and then they said, here is 400 million to
finish the availability, and then all of a sudden somebody
said, well, we need the 400 million somewhere else, we are
going to decommission the aircraft carrier and $350 million
down the drain.
So I just want to leave you with that thought, that we
would be happy to work with you to kind of understand what our
clear intention was. That is just a comment. Doesn't require a
response.
Here is my question: I want to talk about the littoral
combat ships. You know, that was going to be the ship of the
future. And we spent a lot of time and energy developing that
ship, and then we decided it is the ship of the future, and we
are going to build 52 of these.
And when Secretary Hagel was before the subcommittee a week
ago or 2 weeks ago, I said, I see where you have decided to cut
back the number of littoral combat ships from 52 to 32. And he
said, well, no, we are not really not going to build the last
20 littoral combat ships, we just are only going to contract
for the first 32, and then we are going to take another look at
the littoral combat ship; maybe we can upgrade it, maybe we can
replace it, whatever.
But I always thought that what we do is we try to figure
out what we are going to need, and then, to be cost efficient,
we buy as many of those as we think we need. So I guess my
question is if you decide that maybe it is not exactly what we
wanted, and somehow you are going to take a second look, I
mean, how did you figure out we will do the first 32, we are
tight on money, and somehow in the meantime we are going to
decide that there is a better way to do the littoral combat
ship or maybe even replace it? It seems to me it is either the
ship of the future or it is not. So how did you decide to say
we will just do 32 of those, and then we will decide what to do
with the next 20?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We need some answers on that. I mean,
respectfully, in our first hearing we didn't get a lot of
answers to these questions. So----
Mr. Mabus. Well, I think it is important to----
Mr. Visclosky. If the gentleman would yield, I would
associate myself with the question just raised by the chair and
the gentleman from Florida. And I guess I would just add, why
buy any more?
Mr. Mabus. Well, I think it is important to look at exactly
what the Secretary of Defense said, which is don't engage in
contract negotiations past 32. That will take us almost all the
way through this FYDP on the littoral combat ship as they are
being built today. And it is not unusual at all, in fact, we
have done it on virtually every ship, to take a look at are we
getting the requirements that we need; are we getting the
lethality that we need; are we getting the survivability that
we need?
And we have done it, the DGG-51s, where we are about to
start building the fourth consecutive flight of those, and the
ones we are building now are very different from the first ones
we have built. Same thing with the Virginia class submarines;
we are about to begin to build flight 4 of those. So we are
taking a look now, and we will have this answer, you will have
this answer in order to inform the 2016 budget.
And the options that he directed me was keep building the
LCS, build a modified LCS, or complete the new design. But he
also said, take into account cost and take into account
delivery time to the fleet, because he said in his statement
that we needed to get to this number of small service
combatants to meet our war plans, to meet our presence
requirements.
So that is the look that we are engaged in now. We will be
finished in time to put whatever we find into that. But this is
not an unusual thing to do for a class, particularly a new
class, of Navy ships. We have just deployed the first one to
Singapore, 10-month deployment, came back, had an excellent
deployment. We have block buys for 20.
And the last thing I would like to say is one of the things
that I am very proud of about the littoral combat ship is that
the first of these ships cost north of $750 million. We have
now driven that cost down so that the ships that are coming
that we are contracting for now will cost about $350 million.
And when you add the weapons systems and its cost to the
cost of the haul, and the fact that you can switch out these
weapon systems, the fact that you don't have to build a new
ship as technology changes, they are bringing these ships in at
pretty close to what Congress was told they were going to cost
in 2002 in 2002 dollars, which I think is a pretty remarkable
accomplishment.
Mr. Crenshaw. And I appreciate that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You are suggesting that the deployment
to Singapore was an enormous success? I thought it was replete
with all sorts of issues.
Mr. Mabus. Any time you have a first ship of a class, we
deployed this one early to learn some lessons, but it was
available for service at the same rate the rest of the Pacific
fleet was available. It performed all the missions that we sent
her out there to do----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. If everything is working well--I have
endorsed both models--why are we working on version 3 here? The
issue is survivability, isn't it?
Mr. Mabus. Again, it is not unusual to do this for Navy
ships----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I know that this is sort of what makes
the committee very exasperated and frustrated. I mean, we look
at the Army with a ground combat vehicle and messed around with
that. With all due respect to the, you know, expeditionary
vehicle, we spent a huge investment. I mean, these are sort of
what we want to try to eliminate, this type of situation here.
I don't mean to jump on your time here, but this is sort of the
crux of what we do here. People are looking over our shoulder
wondering what is going on here.
Mr. Mabus. Well, as I said, we are driving the cost down
on this ship, and we have gotten it down and through
competition and through block buys to do that. We are where we
need to be in terms of the weapons systems, in their stage of
development. But if you look back----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, whatever you put on the ships
were for it, but they could be put on the new model as well.
Mr. Mabus. Well, anything that you build, you would have
to be modular going forward, because to build these systems in
and not be able to change them as technology changes, no matter
what kind of ship we build, we can't afford to do that anymore.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Visclosky. And I don't want to impose on the
gentleman's time, but as long as we are on, I appreciate the
gentleman raising it. You used an analogy about we have
improved the Virginia class, no question about it, carrier, no
doubt about it. But in this case, the Secretary talked about
the literal survivability of the ship, talked about the
lethality of the ship, talked about the concept of operations.
This isn't just this is a good ship, we can make it better.
And you mentioned that we are hitting a cost target; I am
delighted. But if the ship is not survivable, I don't care if I
meet my cost target if it is in the bottom of the ocean. Maybe
we should be looking at that next small surface combatant.
And you mentioned earlier in your answer, we need to get to
a number which raises the earlier question the gentleman also
raised. I am an accountant, but I don't just get to a number; I
want to have a survivable ship for the purpose intended as
opposed to one that meets costs, that is not survivable, not
lethal, and it is subject to the concept of operations.
Mr. Mabus. Let me give you two chunks of an answer here.
One is I have looked back at reports from GAO and other sources
on things like the DDG-51, things like the frigates that we
have today. In nearly every case where we have a new class of
Navy ship, there have been questions, serious questions, about
survivability, about lethality, and about concepts of
operation. And those ships have obviously met all those
requirements.
Secondly, in terms of the concept of operations, that is
being developed today. That is what the CNO set up the Littoral
Combat Ship Council for, exactly how we use these ships. You
know, before a conflict starts, we might have one of these out
by itself, clear mines or something like that. Once a conflict
starts, it is going to be part of a battle group.
We have to protect lots of Navy ships including----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Respectfully, it is about a group which
is shrinking, and we are not quite sure how many ships we have.
We want to make sure the ones we do have are survivable.
I want to yield to Ms. McCollum so we can keep the
questions going here.

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend all of you for your commitment to energy,
security and your support of alternative energy investment. I
had the opportunity to see some of that that work firsthand at
Camp Pendleton with the solar panels and the real thoughtful
process that was put into the building the new barracks and any
rehab that you are doing on base.
But, Secretary Mabus, you have been really focused on
reducing operational energy costs by shifting the Navy's
reliance from fossil fuels to alternative energy. You have had
a stated goal of 50 percent of the Navy's total energy coming
from alternative sources by 2020. So I am hoping that you could
further discuss the energy programs that you have in place that
will help the Navy achieve this goal, and is the goal still
attainable within the top line defined by the Control Budget
Act?
So, in other words, how much of the fiscal year 2015 budget
request is devoted to securing these alternative energy
resources as well as energy conservation through smart
investments when you are purchasing equipment and rehabbing
buildings and ships as well?
Mr. Mabus. It is more important in constrained budget
times to do this than it is in unconstrained budget times. One
of the reasons that we are doing it is that in fiscal year 2011
and fiscal year 2012, Navy got a bill for unbudgeted fuel
increases of $2 billion because of the price spikes and the
cost of oil, because oil is a globally traded commodity, and
any time something happens somewhere in the world, there is a
security premium that oil traders put on the price of oil.
So it is important that we move to these alternative
sources, particularly in these budget-constrained times, to
flatten out those spikes, to keep those spikes from harming the
rest of the budget. We are well on our way to meeting those
goals using the Defense Production Act. We have four biofuel
companies now that are obligated, as they are moving through
the process, to provide 163 million gallons of biofuel starting
in fiscal year 2016 at an average cost of a good bit less than
$4 a gallon. So in direct answer to your question, we are not
going to spend any more money on these energy-saving things
than we would on other things.
In terms of efficiencies, we are moving at sea, hull
coatings, voyage planning, stern flaps, replacing lights with
LED lighting onboard ship, simple things like that to bring
down the operational costs. We built our first hybrid ship, the
Makin Island, which came back with almost half its fuel budget
from its last deployment. We have also on bases done many of
the same things.
The final thing is the culture has almost completely
changed, and one of the ways that we are meeting these goals is
just because sailors and marines have come forward with, this
is a way we can save, this is something we can do. And the
Marines, I want to say, have embraced this more
enthusiastically than anybody, because they know that if we
make energy where we use it, we save marine lives.
Ms. McCollum. And General Halter did a fabulous job of
explaining all the smart investments.
So my point is when we look as a committee at cutting these
line items, we are actually having the potential of increasing
your future operational costs; are we not, gentlemen?
Mr. Mabus. Yes.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you.

NAVY WORKFORCE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to get
into the George Washington littoral combat ships, but I was
beat----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You still can. I think there are more
questions to be----
Mr. Calvert. We may come back to that.
It was brought up that we need contract reform, and I
absolutely agree with that, and I think Mac Thornberry is
working on that, and also procurement reform. I think he is
working on that, also. But the issue regarding the civilian
workforce, as I understand it, the Marines are almost--based
upon the numbers that you gave us, General Amos, you are
talking about almost a 10 percent reduction in the core force
from 193,000 to 175,000. The Army is talking about reductions
of exceeding 15 percent. I am not quite sure where the Navy is
going. Admiral, what is the reduction you are looking at?
Admiral Greenert. I will have to give you the specific
numbers of civilian personnel, but we are reducing our
headquarters, a lot of them, 23 percent.
Mr. Calvert. How much of that on military uniform?
Admiral Greenert. Pardon me?
Mr. Calvert. On uniform personnel, what percentage?
Admiral Greenert. A vast majority are civilian and
contract. I will give you the numbers and breakdown, but I can
tell you right now, a very small number of military
comparative.
Mr. Calvert. Well, I want to make sure that everyone
understands that we are not targeting depots or people who are
performing tasks that are necessary to the United States
Government. What we are looking at is giving managers the
ability to evaluate performance and make sure that we keep the
best and the brightest people in the civilian workforce.
And this isn't something that came out of whole cloth; this
is people that you know and I know you have talked to that
believe that the civilian workforce ratio is out of whack, and
it needs to be taken a serious look at. And you need to have
the tools, because, like Marley's ghost, you have been hauling
around chains from previous administrations, both Republican
and Democratic, task force commissions that have never
dissolved, employees that are around that have not been able to
be changed, and that is not acceptable, especially when many of
these employees are up for retirement.
As I understand, there is a significant number of employees
at the Department that are up for retirement at this point, and
so that kind of what I would call as an employer some of the
low-hanging fruit out there, but you don't--and I understand
you don't have the tools, but that is what we are trying to do
is provide the tools for managers to make decisions that have
to be made; rather than cutting Marines and Army and Navy
personnel, uniform personnel, that you can also look at the
civilian personnel the same way you are looking at uniform
personnel, because it is easier to cut military personnel than
it is civilian personnel.
Or it is easier, and the problems that was also discussed
on procurement. I mean, it is, as the chairman pointed out,
embarrassing, the billions of dollars that we have spent in
Army programs, Navy programs, Marine programs, and that is gone
money that you really wish you had right now.
So all of these things have to be done in order for us to
make sure we maintain our readiness, to make sure we maintain
the personnel that you want to maintain the platforms, the
economies in fuel and so forth that you want to do. If anyone
wants to make a comment on that, Secretary, go ahead.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. A brief comment, and then we are going
to go to Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Mabus. The only comment I want to make is you are
absolutely right about the procurement reforms, and I think we
have done a lot. And in terms of some of these programs, we
killed them. If it was not giving us what we needed, or if it
was too expensive, or if it wasn't going to perform in the way
that it should, we killed them.
And we have, I think, and I am very proud of the fact, we
have driven down costs all across every one of our procurement
programs, and we have done it by pretty simple business things:
putting competition back in, using firm fixed-price contracts,
just driving harder bargains, and keeping a closer eye on tax
money. And thanks to this committee and thanks to Congress for
giving us some of those tools to be able to do that, and I do
appreciate the tools, whether in the military, in the civilian
workforce or in procurement.
And in answer to the number of Navy people, our numbers
will stay essentially the same over the FYDP.

SUICIDE

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Flatlined pretty much, the numbers.
Thank you, Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Ryan and then Mr. Cole.

METAL HEALTH PROGRAMS

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for each of you on the issue of suicide
in the force, and this is an issue that the committee continues
to deal with and we know that you continue to deal with as
well.
Mr. Ryan. It is too high, too many, still happening. And
lots of programs; 123 programs in the Navy alone designed to
improve resiliency or prevent suicide, but it is really unclear
how many of them are actually effective.
So what kind of metrics are you using and are being used to
measure the effectiveness of these programs, given that we
don't seem to be making much progress in tackling the issue?
That is for the Secretary.
And then to the Admiral and General Amos, if you could talk
about what mental health services are available to your sailors
and marines prior to deployment, while in theater, and then
upon returning; and which programs--which of those programs do
you see as really having merit and ones we can move forward on?
Mr. Mabus. The way we are measuring it, Congressman, and
we saw the same thing you did, that we had 123 of these, I set
up something called 21st Century Sailor and Marine to tackle
all the issues of resiliency that the force faces, and as part
of that there is a task force looking specifically at suicide.
We don't need 123 programs; we just need some effective
programs.
And one is too many, but in fiscal year 2013, for both the
Navy and the Marines, suicide numbers came down, I believe, in
each single month and I know over the course of the year.
We think we are beginning to get traction on things like
educating sailors and marines on warning signs of their
shipmates. We have travel teams now that go out to do this sort
of training, bystander intervention, making sure that, as the
Commandant and the CNO will talk about, that people are willing
to reach out and seek help, that there is no stigma to
receiving that help, and that we watch very closely whether the
stress on the force has anything to do with it.
The last thing I will say is that there seem to be three
common denominators in most suicides, one of these factors or
more: relationships, finances and alcohol, and/or alcohol. So
we are trying to move on the alcohol part, but also on the
other two in terms of warning signs and when a shipmate needs
to intervene.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Admiral Greenert, very briefly, because
we want to sort of have some sort of exit time in the near
future.
Admiral Greenert. Regarding mental health, we have a
predeployment survey. Everybody takes it before they deploy. It
is done, if you will, quietly, if you will. You fill out the
form and say what you want.
The point is here are your options. You can go to a
nonclinical counselor, and they are on all our bases. I have
seen these. This is not at a Fleet Family Service Center even.
It is not in the hospital. You can go down and talk about it to
somebody, a chaplain or whomever. You could go to the Fleet
Family Service Center where you have a counselor, again
nonclinical or clinical. Or you can go to the medical treatment
facility.
When one returns from deployment, you fill out a
postdeployment health survey, how do you feel. It is anonymous,
like predeployment. You do it again in about 30 days, and you
do it--90 days, excuse me, and then at about 6 months because,
as you know, these things sometimes take time to manifest
themselves. Those are all available, again, nonclinical or
clinical.
Now, if you fill out the form, and it is obvious, each of
those postdeployment and predeployment, they are screened by a
medical officer to see if there is something consistent here or
alarming, and then you say, well, we need a clinical consult at
least in this case.
So there is a pre and a post. And we are getting good use
out of these nonclinical. Our sailors, I saw a few of them.
Kids come in, they are very comfortable, you don't have to get
an appointment. And the whole idea is the stigma. Get over the
stigma. Go in and see someone. It is okay to not feel okay.
Congressman, that is what we have got to continue to drive
home. The nonclinical aspect is reaching some pretty good
results.
The 123 programs, I agree with you, that is where we were.
We have, to the Secretary's point, the 21st Century Sailor Task
Force called Resiliency. How do you make the sailor more
resilient? Get these programs focused onto the ones that get to
the point, you know, how do you get a job, how do you deal with
debt, deal with marital problems that we all have, substance
abuse, whatever it may be, and bring them into something more
coherent.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Amos, I am going to turn to Mr.
Cole, but I assume the ranks are in lockstep with the Navy
brothers and sisters on this issue.
General Amos. We are, sir. The thing we have, we have got
embedded mental health providers in our forward-deployed combat
units and special training for a whole host of folks, and I
would be happy to talk to you about it offline, sir, if we are
out of time.

PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good question, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I yield
to my friend Mr. Womack.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Womack, almost batting cleanup. Go
right ahead.
Mr. Womack. Thank you.
I want to address these questions to the Chief of Naval
Operations and more concerning the pivot to the Pacific. You
know, we have been tied up in a decade-plus long war in
landlocked nations, and now we are pivoting to an area that is
extremely vast in terms of water.
What kind of technologies--and specific maybe to the MQ-4
and the UCLASS programs--what kind of technologies is the Navy
investing in? And if I might just kind of add to the question,
to lengthen the question a little bit more about back to what
we were saying earlier about LCS, the ``measure twice, cut
once'' kind of thinking, are we doing the right thing? Are we
on the right track? It seems like particularly in the UCLASS
program it is extended a little bit. The timelines have moved.
Help me understand this pivot to the Pacific and what we
are trying to do to extend our capability in that region.
Admiral Greenert. I happen to have a little chartlet here
for you, and it is all about the Asia-Pacific rebalance, right
in front of you underneath your iPhone there. It is about
forces and capabilities and what I call understanding. So I
will focus on your question, which I think is forces and
capabilities.
So we have talked about, I think, in this committee before
home porting ships 60 percent to the west, 40 percent east and
moving that. We are growing our forward presence no matter what
the budget. I mean, whether we go to the Budget Control Act or
not, we must grow as we do this rebalance. But we have to have
our most modern forces out there. So that gets to the force
structure, which brings you the capability.
To the UCLASS, unmanned carrier--carrier landing, excuse
me, surveillance and strike. And the point here is we want to
make sure that what we bring into the fleet has the means to
grow; has appropriate observability, read stealth; can carry a
proper payload to deliver, in effect read weapon; that has the
right kind of sensors; has enough fuel so it has persistence.
Balancing all of those, and I underline the ability to grow
in each of those key performance parameters, that is what we
are having this lengthy discussion, which, as you said, we are
measuring again twice before we build so that we get what we
need. And again, it can grow out there.
So what we want, we need this by the end of the century
and--decade, excuse me. And what we want to do is bring this to
the Western Pacific. We talked about the Joint Strike Fighter,
the C version. That will deploy to the Western Pacific first
for us. 2019-2020 is our goal there.
Other capabilities, Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, we have a
host of them out there today that industry and our Office of
Naval Research has brought. We need to neck those down and
bring Autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, large diameter,
about three times the size of this open area here you see in
front of you, so that we can then put them on patrol. Again, I
want to do this. We have got to do this by about the end of
this decade, because we have to own the undersea domain like we
do today. We have superiority in it, and we need to bring that.
Other issues become electronic attack, the electromagnetic
spectrum. Our potential adversaries are going to higher
frequencies that are outside where our sensors detect. They are
changing their sensors on their weapons. We need to be able to
detect them so that we can spoof them, jam them, or shoot them
down. They are lower power, so we need to have more sensitive
sensors.
These are the electronic warfare, the electromagnetic
spectrum work. We need to be able to jam not just radars, but
series of radars so that we get where we need to get. That is
access. Some call it antiaccess area denial. To me it is joint
assured access in the amount of time we need and for as long as
we need.
So these are the sorts of technologies. And, of course,
cyber. We need to be able to get in to protect our networks,
know if anybody is in our networks, and then get in other
networks to the degree we need to and do what the combatant
commander and what the Nation wants us to do in there.

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Mr. Womack. Quickly on the Growler, you had an unfunded
priority for an additional nearly two dozen. Speak to me about
the EA-18.
Admiral Greenert. Well, the EA-18, if you look at the air
wing of the future, we spoke earlier about the E2-D, that is
the Hawkeye, that is the big radar, that is the manager of the
air wing. And the E2-D is awesome. It has an extended range; it
has the ability to find very, very small objects and, most
importantly, network to bring that together. So that is your
manager, but you got to get in. And a lot of what we are about
in the future, as I mentioned, is electromagnetic spectrum, and
we have got to jam, spoof and depress as necessary. So the
Growler has got to get us in there.
Our adversaries and potential adversaries in technology,
advanced radars, I kind of mentioned it. Many bands. X-band is
your lower frequency, and that is your original detection. But
then you have got S-band and others bands to target. We have
got to understand all of that, and we have got to operate in it
and jam it.
So the Growler of today, what we have in the air wing today
on the program of record is the minimum requirement. That is
fine for the missions that we have today. But as we look out,
and as we have done studies and look into the future, and we
are the DOD electronic attack source, I view it as increased
risk and a hedge as we look at the Growler line potentially
closing.
So, for me, I discussed with Secretary Mabus and put it on
the unfunded requirement list as a risk reducer and as a hedge,
which is what the request to us was: Show me what you need for
programmatic and operational risk reduction.
Mr. Crenshaw. I think one of the E2-D Hawkeyes is being
cut. If it is important, it might be something to think about.
Admiral Greenert. Absolutely. I mean, I don't like that
anymore. As Secretary Mabus spoke earlier of other programs, we
will protect the IOC, the initial operability capability, but
we need to--I mean, more capacity is definitely there. It is
totally about money, Congressman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Womack.
And, gentlemen, don't underestimate the committee's
interest in the issue I raised in my opening statement:
misconduct. It is way beyond what is unbecoming to an officer.
But, you know, sometimes the public's perception of our
remarkable people who serve us, sometimes it is framed by the
bad acts of a few that we condemn. And I understand the issue
of command influence, but it is time we get--there are some
consequences.
I think I am especially appalled, since I know, Admiral,
you are a submariner, Admiral Rickover would be turning over in
his grave if he knew that we had that recent incident in
Charleston, I think. We need some level of assurance, and I am
sure we are getting it from you, just looking at you, that this
is an area that will be addressed.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. The investigation regarding
that is almost complete. Admiral Richardson is spearheading
that. He is our Director for Navy Nuclear Propulsion. He will
be ready to brief you in a matter of a week or two. As I said,
the investigation is complete.
More importantly, where do we go from here? What is inside
the heads of these kids? These were not poor performers, these
were people making choices.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. They are kids, but these kids have
leadership above them. And we work with Admiral Donald, we are
working with Admiral Richardson, and sometimes, you know, the
people who are in charge of the program do bear some
responsibility. It is not just the kids at the lower rung of
the ladder. And since the safety of those subs depends on every
submariner, it is important that we get this situation
corrected.
Admiral Greenert. Sorry, Chairman, everybody is a kid to
me when you are at this point in my career. But I know what you
mean, and I completely agree. All levels of leadership.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. On behalf of the committee, we thank
you gentlemen for your service and those that you represent. We
stand adjourned.
[Clerk's note--Questions submitted by Mr. Crenshaw and the
answers thereto follow.]

Sunken Military Craft Act (SMCA)

Questions. Recently the Department of the Navy issued proposed
regulations concerning the Sunken Military Craft Act. My office has
been contacted by several Florida based companies involved in the
underwater treasure salvage industry and dive industry concerning these
proposed regulations.
As you may know, these industries are significant contributors to
Florida's overall economy--employing thousands of employees directly
and indirectly. These proposed regulations might contradict efforts
undertaken by the Department of Transportation's Office of Ship
Disposal to salvage valuable cargos on ships that sunk while on
missions for the US Government--World War II Liberty Ship, SS Barry
(RFI issued by Office of Ship Disposal in Oct, 2013).
I'm concerned these proposed regulations might restrict the Office
of Ship Disposal's ability to conduct future salvage efforts which
might return significant revenues back to the US Treasury.
Were these changes to the SMCA developed without an impact study,
or consultation with stakeholders; if so, why? How has the department
worked with stakeholders regarding proposed changes to SMCA?
Answer. The Department of the Navy's (DON) proposed regulations do
not amend or change the SMCA. The prohibitions and restrictions that
may be of concern to the treasure salvage and dive communities have
been in place since enactment of the SMCA in 2004. The proposed
regulations do not expand these prohibitions or restrictions. Per the
SMCA, the regulations do create a permitting regime that will allow
persons to engage in otherwise prohibited activities for
archaeological, historical, or educational purposes. In January, the
DON published the proposed regulations in the Federal Register for a
60-day public comment period and received many comments from
stakeholders, including the salvage and dive communities.
Question. The proposed changes will directly conflict with
Department of Transportation's jurisdiction over billions of dollars in
commodities aboard wrecked vessels from WWI and WWII. Was this
considered or intended as a reason for the regulatory changes?
Answer. The proposed regulations do not impact the Department of
Transportation (DOT) or resources under its jurisdiction in any manner.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the SMCA contains specific language
excluding the actions of Federal agencies, including DOT, from the
prohibitions in the law. The DON's proposed regulations do not change
this or any other provision of the SMCA.
While the DON's proposed regulations establish a permitting program
that only applies to sunken military craft under the jurisdiction of
the DON, upon the request of the Secretary of a military department,
the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
or a foreign sovereign, the DON may consider incorporating sunken
military craft under the jurisdiction of those entities within the DON
permitting program.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Crenshaw.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the answers thereto
follow.]

Shipbuilding

Question. What is the Navy's current capacity with respect to the
shipbuilding industrial base? How does this compare, for example, with
the Chinese shipbuilding industrial base?
Answer. The Chinese and United States (U.S.) shipbuilding
industrial bases differ in terms of mission, which leads to differences
in capacity, supplier infrastructure, ship types built, and technical
capability.
1. Mission. The Chinese and U.S. shipbuilding industries serve two
national missions, sea power and economic growth, but the priorities
are not the same. China, as a newly-industrializing society, places a
high priority on the shipbuilding industry's role in fostering export-
led Gross Domestic Product growth. This has led to the government-
supported creation of a large-scale, export-oriented commercial
shipbuilding industry in China. Chinese government support mechanisms
for the shipbuilding industry have included export credits, loan
guarantees, R&D funding, and encouragement of foreign investment. In
addition, many major Chinese shipyards are state-owned enterprises. The
U.S. shipbuilding industry is focused on naval construction and
fulfilling Jones Act commercial shipbuilding needs.
2. Capacity and supplier infrastructure. One of the most notable
features of Chinese shipyards involved in naval production is that
most, if not all, are also actively involved in commercial
shipbuilding. The Chinese shipbuilding industrial base accounted for
approximately 35 percent of commercial vessel tonnage delivered in 2013
as measured by compensated gross tons--roughly tied with the South
Korean industry for 1st place in global market share (the U.S. industry
accounted for about 0.2 percent). Large-scale shipbuilding strengthens
the business case for investment in modem production infrastructure and
technologies in the shipyards, and provides the volume to support
capital-intensive supplier industries that are not viable in the U.S.
(for example, low speed diesel engine manufacturing).
3. Ship types built. Many Chinese shipbuilders concentrate on
lower-complexity products such as bulk carriers; however, some are
moving up-market. One example is Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding (Group)
Co., Ltd., which builds both commercial and naval vessels; it is
currently under contract to build a series of large Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) carriers, some for a Japanese owner. LNG carriers are at the
upper end of the commercial complexity scale. NASSCO is currently
building LNG powered Container Ships for the Jones Act trade.
4. Technical capability U.S. shipbuilders are the global leaders
in naval shipbuilding and their technological capabilities in that area
are unmatched. The technical capabilities of the leading, well-
capitalized Chinese shipyards tend to focus on enabling high-volume
steel fabrication and assembly, and commercial ship design. Operations
management and production planning remain a challenge in the Chinese
industry, as reflected in reports of late deliveries on commercial
contracts.
Question. Does the Navy consider the shipbuilding industrial base
critical to its future warfighting requirements? If so, does the Navy
have a strategy to maintain its shipbuilding capacity?
Answer. A healthy design and production industrial base is critical
to achieving the Department of the Navy's priorities and fulfilling the
Navy's needs going forward. We are very mindful that our decisions
impact the industrial base and we take those impacts into consideration
along with the near-term and long-term effect such decisions have on
future readiness.
Since I took over the Department, we have focused on revamping
internal management and oversight practices, and have reached out to
our industry partners to foster communication and establish clear
expectations. Two key facets of our plan to sustain our shipbuilding
industrial base are stability and affordability. Stability is required
in naval ship design and construction because of the long-lead time,
specialized skills, extent of integration needed, and complex nature of
military ships. Recognizing that schedule and quantity perturbations
have a cascading and often expensive impact on programs, the Navy and
Congress have worked together to provide industry greater stability by
offering a realistic shipbuilding plan so that the number, type, and
timing of building will be transparent; awarding multi-year and block
buy procurements on mature programs; stabilizing designs and
requirements; and to the extent possible, avoiding the introduction of
changes or new technologies until the next block upgrade.
Affordability is another facet of our plan to sustain the
industrial base. We have introduced initiatives to acquire our ships
and equipment smarter and more efficiently, through competition, multi-
year buys, and better buying practices. In exchange, we have asked our
industry partners to do their part in driving down costs, and
delivering a more affordable, high quality product. We have made it
clear that in doing our part to stabilize requirements, design, and
acquisition profile perturbations, we expect them to do their part,
namely: demonstrate consistent learning from ship-to-ship so each ship
of the same type, whose design had not dramatically changed, would take
fewer man-hours to build and cost less than previous ships; revisit
their cost drivers and practices and drive costs out and quality and
visibility in; and make appropriate investments in infrastructure and
workforce training. All of these efforts are focused on making our
programs more affordable. Given a constrained budget, improving
efficiency and driving out costs from our programs enables the
Department to deliver the ships our Sailors and Marines deserve.
Question. Do you consider this strategy to be optimal to ensure a
robust industrial base or does it reflect a budget-driven strategy?
Answer. The Navy's strategy to sustain the industrial base provides
a sound approach toward achieving Navy goals regardless of the fiscal
constraints. In the past five years, we have turned shipbuilding around
putting 70 ships under contract. This is a significant increase
compared to the 27 ships put under contract in the prior five year
window We have promoted acquisition excellence and integrity as well as
aggressive oversight. We have focused on everything from requirements,
to design, to construction efficiency, continuing to introduce
stability and affordability into our shipbuilding programs.
In today's fiscal environment maintaining and increasing the fleet
size will require us to continue applying sound management, innovative
solutions, and a comprehensive approach toward ensuring that our
design, construction and vendor base is sufficient to meet our naval
shipbuilding requirements. That said, today, even with the Navy's
priority on shipbuilding acquisition, there are not enough ships being
built to sustain the industrial base at an optimal level, nor at a
level which satisfies the Fleet and Combatant Commander operational
requirements. Sequestration in FY 2016-2019 will further exacerbate
shipbuilding industrial base issues and may result in significant lay-
offs and/or closures in those areas most affected.
Question. Are you concerned about a future date when the U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base may not be sufficient to meet mission
requirements? If so, what is your strategy to mitigate this potential
shortfall so that we do not end up in the same situation as some of our
allies have experienced?
Answer. As numerous Navy witnesses have stated, we are concerned
that the Navy's fiscal topline at the FY2011 Budget Control Act levels,
commonly referred to as sequestration levels, in FY 2016-2019, is
insufficient to meet the ship force requirements called for in the
Defense Strategic Guidance. Recapitalization of the Ohio Replacement
program further compounds an already challenging situation. Over the
next two decades, the Navy's number one priority will be recapitalizing
the Ohio Replacement SSBN. At constrained fiscal levels, every other
shipbuilding program will suffer.
Our ability to mitigate the adverse impacts on the shipbuilding
industrial base from constrained resources has its limits. At some
point, we reach the point of diminishing returns from our efficiency,
stability, and shaping efforts. The Navy will need to work with the
Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and industry to ensure that we
do not allow our design, engineering, and production skills and
capabilities to deteriorate to such a level that we are not able to
reconstitute them. Some legislative relief may provide the means to
delay making drastic reductions which could permanently harm our
ability to reconstitute, but these too have their limits. Ultimately,
some difficult discussions and decisions will be required which look
beyond our development and procurement accounts and fundamentally
address the way and lime in which we respond to crises, our desire for
forward presence, and how we meet those demands.

Operations--Cruiser Modernization Plan

Question. Please describe your plan to lay up the eleven cruisers:
For how long? At what cost? What are the anticipated savings? How can
you ensure they will be returned to active service in future years in
light of the persisting budget fiscal challenges? What is the
alternative if Congress does not approve the layup plan?
Answer. Beginning in FY15, the Navy plans to induct CGs 63-73 into
a phased modernization period. The Navy will begin phased modernization
on the 11 cruisers with material assessments, detailed availability
planning, and material procurements. Subsequently, the Navy will
perform hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) upgrades, critical
structural repairs, and extensive corrective and condition-based
maintenance. The final phase is combat system installation,
integration, and testing. This will occur concurrently with re-manning
the ship, preceding restoration to the Fleet.
The Navy will commence the cruiser phased modernization plan with
the HM&E modernization of USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64) in FY14. The first
combat system modernization will notionally begin in FY17, followed by
another in FY18 and continuing armually through FY23, with two
executing annually in FY24 through FY26. The ships undergoing phased
modernization will replace, on a hull-for-hull basis, the retiring CGs
52-62 as those ships reach the end of their service life in the 2020s.
The cost per ship will vary based on individual hull material
condition of the ship and previously completed modernization. The range
is estimated to be approximately $350-$600M per ship which includes
induction, sustainment, modernization, and maintenance costs.
Initially, Navy will leverage the Ship's Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund (SMOSF) for those ships specifically named in the FY14
National Defense Authorization Act (CGs 63-66, 68-69, 73.)
Navy estimates cost avoidance of $2.2 B in Operations and
Maintenance (OMN) and $1.6 B in Manpower, Navy (MPN) which will provide
additional resources to partially offset the cost of phased
modernization.
In order to ensure the CGs will retum to active service in future
years in light of the persisting budget fiscal challenges, Navy has
built a transparent plan which includes direct Congressional monitoring
of funding and work accomplishment.
If Congress does not approve the phased modernization plan or
provide the funding to retain the force structure, the Navy's only
remaining alternative is to decommission the ships.
Question. If the cruisers are laid up, how will the Navy meet the
COCOM force presence requirements?
Answer. The Navy will maintain 11 of its most capable Air Defense
Commander CGs in service to meet COCOM requirements. To date, the Navy
has modernized CGs 52-58 with the Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 08
Combat System as well as substantial Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical
(HM&E) upgrades, and has nearly completed modernization on CGs 59-62
with the improved ACB 12. These investments to date have allowed the
first 11 ships of the Ticonderoga class to remain the world's premier
Air Defense Commander platform, fully capable of integrating into the
Carrier Strike Group construct or operating independently in support of
COCOM demands.

Depot Maintenance

Question. Naval aircraft depot maintenance (to include Marine
Corps) is funded at $815 million in the fiscal year 2015 base budget
request, up from $795 million in fiscal year 2014 enacted base budget.
According to DOD, ``this program funds repairs, overhauls and
inspections of aircraft and aircraft components to ensure sufficient
quantities are available to meet fleet requirements to decisively win
combat operations.''
In fiscal year 2014 it appears that even with OCO funding, the Navy
can meet only 89 percent of its total requirement. Therefore, the Navy
expects an increase from the FY14 backlog of 33 airframes and 319
engines to 66 airframes and 612 engines in FY15. The FY15 budget
request for aircraft depot maintenance is $14 million less this year
for a total request of $83 million.
How will the current backlog be managed and what carryovers do you
expect for FY16?
Answer. Naval Aircraft Depot Maintenance (ADM) (to include Marine
Corps and Naval Reserve Forces) is funded at $898 million ($815M OMN
and $83M OMNR) in the fiscal year 2015 base budget request, up from
$892 million ($795M OMN and $97M OMNR) in the fiscal year 2014 enacted
base budget.
In reference to the current backlog to be managed and what
carryover we expect for FY16, we have been successful in minimizing the
current backlog in FY14 though deferred maintenance due to operational
commitments, better than planned reliability for engines and some
targeted retirements of aircraft that were coming due for maintenance.
We will continue to make these types of decisions throughout FY14 and
FY15 to minimize the impacts.
There is no data on projected FY16 depot carryover because the
Fiscal Year 2016 budget has not been finalized and published.
Question. How would a 15% mandatory decrease in number of civilian
personnel, starting in FY2015 through FY2025 impact workloads at Navy
Depots and how would the necessary workload be managed? In order to
meet the required workload, would the Navy need relief or seek a change
to 10 U.S.C. 2466 that mandates a 50% ceiling, measured in dollars, on
the amount of depot maintenance workload that may be performed by
contract for a military Department or defense agency during a fiscal
year?
Answer. A 15% CIVPERS reduction would reduce public depot capacity
by at least 15%, but would not reduce the workload requirement,
creating a mismatch between public depot capacity and workload that
would reduce operational availability and the ready force structure.
For example, in naval shipyards the workload requirement is
dependent on ships' schedules, class maintenance plans, and required
emergent repairs/maintenance and unaffected by cuts to naval shipyard
capacity. A 15% reduction to CIVPERS would cut naval shipyard capacity
by approximately 750,000 man-days per year. Because most of the work in
naval shipyards is required maintenance on nuclear powered submarines
and aircraft carriers that cannot be deferred, the result of this lost
capacity would result in the loss of submarine/aircraft carrier
operational availability as ships are not able to be returned to the
Fleet on schedule. Attempting to move this workload to the private
sector would be more expensive and less effective than simply
maintaining the current CIVPERS levels in the naval shipyards.
Similarly, naval aviation does not have sufficient commercial contracts
(type and scope) to move that much workload.
A public sector workload reduction of this magnitude would likely
result in a breach of the 50% ceiling of 10 USC Sec. 2466.

[Clerk's note-- End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole.
Questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto
follow.]

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Question. The Navy seems to have a sudden shift in its position on
acquiring the LCS ship. The Navy selected the LCS program as the most
cost-effective program for filling the fleet's requirement for
additional capability for countering mines, small boats, and diesel
submarines in littoral waters. I am not aware of a drop in these types
of threats.
Has DoD conducted a formal analysis that demonstrates that there is
a more cost-effective way to address these capability gaps?
Answer. Navy has not changed the requirements for LCS. Rather, as
directed by the Secretary of Defense, ships beyond LCS 32 are not yet
being placed on contract. The Navy has been directed to complete a
study to support the future procurement of ``a capable and lethal small
surface combatant''. The Navy has also been directed to submit
``alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface
combatant'' and the study should consider options of ``a completely new
design, existing ship designs (including LCS), and a modified LCS.'' A
Small Surface Combatant Task Force has been established to conduct the
analysis and will complete by July 31, 2014.
The threats that LCS was designed to counter still exist, and LCS
(as currently designed and under contract) will defeat those threats.
The approved 2008 LCS Capabilities Development Document, which
establishes the requirements for the LCS Program, was revalidated by a
Joint Capabilities Board in 2013.
Question. Are you concerned with the lost investment in LCS by
changing to a new ship?
Answer. No. As designed, LCS is a capable and affordable ship that
meets requirements and is a sound investment. The requirement is for 52
small surface combatants. The first 32 LCS have been designed for
countering mines, small boats, and diesel submarines in littoral
waters. Going forward, it is fiscally and strategically prudent to
review the capabilities and requirements, to ensure Navy continues to
deliver a ship that meets anticipated future requirements. It is
premature at this time to say Navy is changing to a new ship. The Small
Surface Combatant Task Force was established to evaluate requirements
and design options for the ships beyond LCS 32.
Question. Are you concerned that ``starting over'' with a new ship
design will set us back by 10 years in addressing the threat that the
LCS is charged to counter?
Answer. It is premature at this time to say Navy is changing to a
new ship. The Small Surface Combatant Task Force was established to
evaluate requirements and design options for the ships beyond LCS 32.
Question. Does the LCS meet the CENTCOM requirement to counter
Iranian ``A2/AD'' threat?
Answer. LCS meets the CENTCOM requirements for Anti-Access Area
Denial (A2/AD) threats. LCS with a SUW Mission Package is lethal
against FAC/FIAC threats using its speed, aircraft, and onboard weapon
systems. LCS with its shallow draft can operate in areas inaccessible
to FFG/DDG/CG. Also, with the addition of Longbow missile to the SUW
Mission Package, LCS will provide more firepower capacity to defeat the
small boat threat than FFG or PC. Additionally, LCS with an MCM Mission
Package is able to clear mines faster and safer than legacy MCM-1 class
due to its unique systems which allow it to operate outside the mine
danger area. LCS MCM Mission Package also provides vital support to
amphibious operations in theater.
Question. Has a new threat developed since the days of the original
contracts? Or is all this the result of the fact that there is a shift
to build up our forces in the Pacific and the way to pay for that is to
cancel LCS ships and to linlc it to the overall number of ships.
Answer. Navy and Department of Defense examine emerging threats in
all theaters, to include the Pacific, and apply resources as required
to best counter current and future threats. With the shift in strategic
guidance to rebalance to the Pacific, LCS will be a major contributor
against existing and emerging threats with all three focused mission
packages.
LCS has not been cancelled. Rather, as directed by the Secretary of
Defense, ships beyond LCS 32 are not yet being placed on contract while
the Small Surface Combatant Task Force continues to conduct their
analysis and report their findings.

LCS Procurement Plan

Question. There seems to be some conflicting information about the
LCS procurement plan between 3 or 4 ships in FY15.
To clear the record, how many ships does the Navy intend to buy in
FY15?
Answer. The PB15 submission provides funding for 3 LCS in FY15.
Question. Will either company be directed to deliver one less ship?
(per this change in the FY15 budget request)
Answer. No, Navy will not direct the industry teams to deliver one
less ship. Navy plans to procure the single LCS shifted to FY16 under
the current block buy contract(s) by making an adjustment to one of the
two contracts. The decision of which shipbuilder will have one ship
shift to FY16 will be determined in consultation with industry, with
consideration of cost, production schedule performance, shipyard
resource loading, and vendor base considerations.

Shipboard Weapons

Question. In terms of a having a fleet that is smaller than in past
decades, are there particular budget challenges or technical challenges
you are concerned about in terms of being asked to put new weapons
systems, or other systems, on your ships and submarines?
Answer. The total number of ships available for the requirements of
the global combatant commanders continues to be a challenge. As the
Navy has drawn down in the total number of ships over the years, our
forward presence has remained relatively constant, adding increased
pressure on the ships, their crews, and their families. Because we have
fewer total ships, periodic modernization and scheduled improvements of
the weapons systems on those ships is essential to ensure that the
ships we do have are as lethal as they can be. Balancing the capability
and capacity to win decisively is a key Navy priority.
While the size of the fleet has become smaller than in past
decades, the technical challenges associated with delivering and
sustaining these advanced systems have grown. The Navy consistently
strives to get the most out of each acquisition dollar to ensure our
Sailors are equipped with sensors, systems, and weapons to accomplish
the mission. Cost reduction efforts the Navy has implemented include
increased commonality in weapons systems so they can be used across
multiple classes of ships, scalable equipment designed to fit different
types of ships and situations, and modular systems that can be easily
swapped with newer, more modern systems at the end of their service
lives. Additionally, the Navy is leveraging the work done by the
commercial sector to deliver systems whose processing capabilities
improve with advances made by the pace of industry and not by the sole
needs of the military.
We have prioritized investments to close gaps in critical kill
chains, and have accepted risk in capacity or in the rate at which some
capabilities are integrated into the Fleet. We have also terminated
certain capability programs that do not provide high-leverage
advantage, and slowed funding for those that assume too much technical
risk or could be developed and ``put on the shelf'' until needed in the
future.

Hypersonic Weapons

Question. How much funding and what length of time would be
required to field a sea-launched hypersonic weapon of the same reach
and destructive power anticipated by the HTV-2 program?
Answer: The Navy does not have, at this time, a requirement or a
program of record to develop a sea-based Conventional Prompt Global
Strike (CPGS) capability. At the request of OSD (AT&L), Navy Strategic
Systems Programs is participating in the advancement of hypersonic
delivery technologies and providing subject matter expertise. If the
Department of Defense validates a requirement for a sea-launched
hypersonic weapon, system requirements such as payload, range, accuracy
and reliability would need to be defined in order to scope a program
and estimate cost and schedule. Certain attributes such as range and
payload would likely differ from the HTV-2 program due to technical
considerations. For example, range requirements would likely be less,
as a sea-based concept would be forward-deployed requiring less flight
time to reach target sets.

Training Programs

Question. Why doesn't the surface Navy have a comprehensive
training program like every other officer community in the military,
and how may that be affecting the morale of junior officers?
Answer. The Surface Navy has a comprehensive junior officer
training program that begins with an eight week Basic Division Officer
Course followed by a series of Personal Qualifications Standards (PQS)
and on the job training on their assigned ship. The first tour afloat
is comparable to an afloat training schoolhouse and emphasizes
development of surface warfare and leadership slcills as a Division
Officer and Officer of the Deck. Training and PQS focus on watch
standing competency, seamanship, ship handling, navigation and
administrative tasks that are fundamental to the community and
necessary for professional development. The recently established
Advanced Division Officer Course, which occurs between first and second
afloat tours, standardizes baseline Icnowledge and reinforces
competencies previously developed. The second afloat tour, in a more
complex Division Officer billet, further develops and refines the core
competencies of the community and enables the junior officer to gain
additional operational experience and qualifications as Engineer
Officer of the Watch or Tactical Action Officer, which are
prerequisites for command afloat. Additional comprehensive leadership,
billet specific, tactical and operational pipeline training is
conducted prior to Department Head, Executive Officer and Commanding
Officer assignments.
This longstanding model for training junior officers has been
effective in producing confident and capable officers to support
Surface Navy operational milestones at every pay grade. Periodic
surveys of Surface Navy junior officers are developed to assess
satisfiers and dissatisfiers in the community. The most recent survey
from 2013 does not indicate an adverse effect on morale, but rather an
increase in satisfaction with the junior officer training program since
the 2008 survey.

Mission Qualification Programs

Question. Are there objective and universal standards and tests to
become a qualified surface warfare officer? How does surface warfare
compare to aviation and to submarine warfare on this point?
Answer. Until FY15 there were three paths for junior officers to
qualify Surface Warfare Officer. All paths for qualification for
Surface Warfare Officer include objective and universal standards and
tests directed under Surface Force Type Commanders instruction and
administered by the afloat Commanding Officers. The three paths for
qualification are the Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC) path, the
Surface Warfare Officer Introduction/Advanced Ship handling and Tactics
(SWO Intro/ASAT) path, and the Direct Path. Officers on the BDOC path
attend the BDOC course and then report to their ship to complete the
rest of the qualification process. The BDOC course requires a 90% on
the Rules of the Road examination and a minimum acceptable score of 75%
for all other examinations. Officers on the SWO Intro/ASAT path attend
a short introductory course on Surface Warfare, report to their ship,
and attend the ASAT course prior to final qualification as a Surface
Warfare Officer. As with BDOC, ASAT requires a 90% on the Rules of the
Road examination and a minimum acceptable score of 75% for all other
examinations. The Direct Path is for officers not from a traditional
Surface Warfare Officer source designator, such as Limited Duty
Officers and Chief Warrant Officers. Direct Path officers do not attend
BDOC or SWO Intro/ASAT, but must meet all other qualifications. All
junior officers are required to satisfactorily complete Personnel
Qualification Standards (PQS) qualification in Basic Damage Control,
Maintenance and Material Management System, Division Officer Afloat,
Import Officer of the Deck, Small Boat Officer, Engineering, Combat
Information Center Watch Officer, Anti-Terrorism Watch Officer, and
Officer of the Deck Underway. Junior officers must demonstrate
effective leadership skills and proficiency in performing Division
Officer duties, to include management of personnel, spaces, and
equipment as well as significant experience as a watch stander. On
completion of the required PQS, the junior officer must pass a multi-
member Surface Warfare qualification oral board, chaired by the
Commanding Officer to validate the officer's general professional
knowledge of all aspects of Surface Warfare.
In FY15 the process will be further standardized by consolidating
the BDOC and SWO Intro/ASAT paths into the BDOC path.
This qualification process is similar to warfare qualification as a
Submarine Officer with the exception of nuclear power training.
The qualification process for Aviation Officers is different than
that of Surface Warfare Officers, due to the differences in employment
of ships and aircraft. Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers receive
their warfare qualification upon successful completion of initial
flight training in the Naval Air Training Command. All Naval Aviators
and Naval Flight Officers then receive tactical employment training in
their Fleet type/model/series aircraft at the Fleet Replacement
Squadron (FRS). Officers retuming to the fleet from non-flying
assignments receive refresher training at the FRS before returning to
an operating squadron. Advanced tactical training for aviation officers
is guided by a formal air combat training continuum administered by the
Commander, Naval Air Forces, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center,
and aviation community weapons schools.
Question. How many junior surface warfare officers are recommended
for non-attainment by their commanding officers, and what percentage of
those are subsequently approved by Commander, Surface Forces?
Answer. From March 2012 through March 2014 there have been 69 non-
attainments representing a four percent non-attainment rate from 1753
junior officers in year groups 2010 and 2011. Recommendations for non-
attainment are forwarded by the afloat Commanding Officer to Commander,
Naval Surface Forces (Pacific or Atlantic) following review and
endorsement by the Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) (an O-6 or
Flag-level review). Statistics on those recommended by the Commanding
Officer for non-attainment that were disapproved by the ISIC are not
kept as to not disadvantage officers who are afforded another
opportunity to qualify.

Inspector General

Question: What is the funding level for the Inspector General's
office for each year from Fiscal Year 2011 to Fiscal Year 2015? Are
changes in funding impacting the IG office's ability to process cases?
Answer: The funding levels for the Office of the Naval Inspector
General (NAVINSGEN) are:

FY2011-FY2015 Budget Levels Amount in Thousands
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY Pay % Support % Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011..................................... $5,553 75.28% 1,823 24.72% $7,376
2012..................................... 6,020 83.15 1,220 16.85 7,240
2013..................................... 6,326 80.56 1,527 19.44 7,853
2014..................................... 7,268 87.85 1,005 12.15 8,273
2015..................................... 7,961 88.61 1,023 11.39 58,984
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although it appears that the funding has increased, NAVINSGEN grew
by 23 investigators in FY13, which, increased staff salaries,
accounting for the growth. In contrast, funding for support functions
including transcript services, travel, and information technology
requirements (hardware/software) declined since FY13 (see chart above
showing percentage decline in support dollars.)
The NAVINSGEN HQ is comprised of 92 people: 20 inspectors, 36
investigators, and 36 audit liaison and support personnel. The small
number of staff in the Naval IG community presents a challenge in
processing cases, especially given the general increased trend of
NAVINSGEN Hotline contacts, Hotline investigations, and Military
Whistleblower Reprisal investigations since 2008. In particular,
NAVINSGEN has been unable to complete Military Whistleblower Reprisal
investigations within the statutorily required 180-day timeframe, but
importantly, has taken actions to add billets over the last 2 years, as
well as review processes, policies, procedures, and training in an
effort to improve through put.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Ms. McCollum and the answers thereto
follow.]

Airborne Electronic Warfare Capability

Question. I understand the Navy is reviewing an emerging need for
additional
E/A-18G Growlers and Next Generation Jammer equipment to provide needed
electronic warfare capacity. The Navy submitted a recent ``unfunded
priority'' for 22 additional Growlers following the release of the
Fiscal Year 2015 budget.
Can you please comment on the ``unfunded priority'' for additional
Growlers and the need for electronic attack.
Answer. Electromagnetic Warfare is a core competency and primary
mission area of the Joint Force. Operating in Anti-access/Area Denial
(A2AD) contested environments requires precise control of the Electro
Magnetic Spectrum (EMS). EA-18Gs bring the fundamental attributes of
range, speed, persistence, and flexibility to regions of the globe
where Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) capability is required to
support the Joint Force whether with sea-based or land-based aircraft.
The Growler will soon be the only DoD tactical AEA aircraft in the
joint force inventory and is required to support both 4th and 5th
generation strike fighter aircraft. With legacy jamming pods or Next
Generation Jammers the EA-18G provides precise control of a broad range
of the EMS to create sanctuaries for the Joint force, denying enemy
access to portions of the EMS.
The current total procurement of 138 aircraft can source the Navy
mission. Recent analysis conducted for the Navy's Air Warfare Division
pointed to the need for additional Growlers. The addition of 22 EA-18Gs
will be used to augment existing Navy squadrons in the execution of the
joint AEA missions allowing carrier squadrons to deploy with seven
aircraft vice their current complement of five aircraft per squadron.
The additional aircraft will reduce risk in meeting operational demand
for multi-ship tactics and the potential increased need for joint AEA.
The Navy's Assessments Division is completing an AEA mission
requirements study to determine the number of Navy Growlers needed for
the Carrier Strike Group in support of joint MCO requirements. Results
are expected to be available in June, 2014. As nations expand their use
of the EMS, the ability to perform the AEA mission will become more
critical and buying additional EA-18Gs in FY15 reduces risk in our
ability to meet future AEA demand.

[Clerk's note--End of questions submitted by Ms. McCollum.]
Wednesday, March 26, 2014.

FISCAL YEAR 2015 AIR FORCE BUDGET OVERVIEW

WITNESSES

HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
GENERAL MARK A. WELSH III, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good morning. We gather in public
session this morning to take testimony on the Air Force budget
request for fiscal year 2015. I would like to welcome, on
behalf of the committee, Secretary Deborah Lee James in her
first appearance before our subcommittee, and may I commend
President Obama on making an excellent choice. You have had a
lot of experience on the Hill and a lot of experience off the
Hill, and we are highly appreciative of your role and new
responsibilities.
Ms. James. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Welsh is making a second
appearance before the committee. General, welcome back, and may
I say thank you for representing the best of America, the men
and women of the United States Air Force, and a special thumbs
up to the remarkable men and women who at Bagram Airbase do
that air transport, the land stool, any of us that have been
over that part of the world, and I know we are winding down
there. But the transport of those individuals with serious
injuries and the way and manner and the professional way it is
done is truly remarkable. So I salute you.
Air power is vital to the Department's ability to project
power globally and to rapidly respond to contingencies. The Air
Force brings capabilities critical to national security in the
air and the space, in cyberspace and will continue to improve
performance in each. We will incorporate Next Generation
Equipment and concepts into the force to address sophisticated
threats, key priorities include continuing plans to field the
new generation of combat aircraft and making advancements in
cyber capabilities, avionics, weapons, tactics and training.
These are not my words; they come directly from the Quadrennial
Defense Review, and they illustrate the tough decisions the Air
Force will have to make balancing current readiness with future
modernization.
This committee also has some tough decisions to make in
coming weeks, and this morning we are anxious to know from our
witnesses where our Air Force is going with its nuclear
mission; with the F-35 procurement; with the KC tanker program;
with the combat rescue helicopter; the Next Generation JSTARS
platform; the proposed long-range strike bomber; the role of
UAVs; the competition between U-2 and Global Hawk; the high-
altitude ISR and other military satellites and the role and
size of our Air Guard and Reserves.
We must also seek your views on military modernization in
China and the threats posed by the Russian Federation in what
we call transnational terrorists. As the QDR said, and I quote,
``Air power is vital'' in defending America and America's
interest. And we need to know how the Air Force is preparing
itself to meet current and future threats in an increasingly
dangerous world.
I would now like to recognize my Ranking Member, Mr.
Visclosky, for any comments that he may make, but, again, Madam
Secretary, General Welsh, thank you for being with us.
Mr. Visclosky.

Opening Comments of Mr. Visclosky

Mr. Visclosky. Chairman, thank you very much for having the
hearing today, and I want to thank the Secretary as well as
General for your appearance and your service and look forward
to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
Madam Secretary, good morning.
Ms. James. Good morning, and thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, Mr. Visclosky and Members of the Committee. General
Welsh and I really appreciate the opportunity to come before
you today and we do have written testimony, which is combined
between the two of us, and we would ask that it be included in
the record.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It will be put in the record. Thank you.

Summary Statement of Secretary James

Ms. James. It certainly is a huge honor and a privilege for
me to serve as the 23rd Secretary of the Air Force alongside
our nearly 690,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian Airmen
and their families. I have now been on the job for all of 3
months, and I want you to know that I have visited 18 bases in
13 States. In addition, I have just returned from a trip to the
Area of Responsibility (AOR), including stops at Kabul and
Bagram, Kandahar and Shindand, so I had those stops in
Afghanistan; and I saw terrific Airmen delivering crucial air
space and cyberspace capabilities across the U.S. Central
Command.
It was truly a phenomenal trip, and I was so proud to be
among them, and I know many of you have visited with them, as
well, overseas. And by the way, whenever I have visited a
location, I have basically seen three things: I have seen
leaders who are tackling tough issues at every level; I have
seen every step of the way superb, total-force teamwork, but
particularly Active, Guard, Reserve and civilians working
together seamlessly. And once again, it all comes down to those
amazing and innovative and enthusiastic Airmen who are so
dedicated that their mission and to our Nation.
Now, Mr. Chairman, it is no secret to this committee that
we are in challenging times, both in terms of our changing
security environment as well as having a period of declining
budgets. And so in this submission that we bring before you
today, we have attempted to tackle these challenges head on,
and we have tried to do it in a thoughtful and deliberate and
inclusive way.
So to make these tough choices, of course, we started with
our strategy. It is a strategy for today: Defending the
homeland against all strategic threats, building security
globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression,
and remaining ready to win decisively against any adversary
should deterrence fail. So that is the mission of today.
But we also have a mission for tomorrow: We need to invest
in new technologies and platforms, to take on new centers of
power as well as those old centers of power that sometimes are
troublesome, as well, and be prepared to operate in a much more
volatile and unpredictable world, a world in which the American
dominance of the skies and space can no longer be taken for
granted.
Now, your Air Force is crucial in all of these areas, but
the trouble is, the likely budget scenarios we face will leave
us with gaps in this strategy that I have laid out. Now, I have
been in the defense business for upwards of 30 years, and of
course, I know as you know that strategy and budgets never
match exactly; there are always some mismatches, and those
mismatches force us to make budget decisions, judgment calls,
you might say, about where we want to assume the most prudent
risks.
I will grant you, I think this year is probably more
difficult than most that I have seen. And by the way, we are
very grateful for the stability that we have and the additional
bump up in resources that we received in fiscal year 2014 and
2015 and under the Bipartisan Budget Act and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 2014. These laws didn't solve
all of our ails. We are still faced with these difficult
scenarios, but they were a great help and we want to thank you
for that.
Our 2015 budget request does hit the budget targets, the
dollar targets of the BBA, but it also contains something
called the Opportunity Growth and Security Initiative. This is
a $26 billion initiative across DOD, 7 billion of which is
targeted for the Air Force; and if we are to receive it, it
would go toward readiness and investment priorities that will
help us close those gaps I told you about.
So the bottom line is, the budget in a 5-year plan is all
about rebalancing. We are all about rebalancing, readiness and
future capability. It is not an either/or; we really need both.
It is essential for our future.
Now, I would like to give you a quick overview of some of
the major decisions, but put them in the framework of the three
priorities that I have laid out for our Air Force. And those
three priorities are: Taking care of people, balancing today's
readiness with tomorrow's readiness, and ensuring that our Air
Force is the most capable at the least cost to the taxpayer.
So beginning with taking care of people, as far as I am
concerned, every job I have ever had I have learned, it always
comes down to people, 100 percent of the time. So taking care
of people to me means we need to recruit the right people,
retain the right people, we need to develop them once we have
them in the force. We need diversity of thought at the
leadership table, diversity of background so that we make
innovative decisions and solutions going forward.
We need to protect the most important family programs. We
need dignity and respect for all, and that includes combating
sexual harassment and assault and making sure that everybody in
our Air Force is living the legacy and living our core values
of integrity, service and excellence all the time. It means
fair compensation going forward for our Air Force. So all of
this is taking care of people.
Now, let me zero in on two areas where we have had some
controversy lately. First is force reductions. We are coming
down in all of our components, Active, Guard, Reserve and
civilians, and we will rely more, not less, in the future on
our Guard and Reserve. We think that makes good sense both from
the mission standpoint as well as from the budgetary
standpoint.
But as we draw down, it is not good enough just to get
lower numbers; we have to reshape the force. At the moment on
the Active Duty side, we have too many of certain types of
career fields and too few of others. So we need to get in
balance and we are doing that through both voluntary and
involuntary initiatives.
The second controversy has to do with compensation, where
we are proposing to slow the growth in military compensation.
We think there are reasonable ways to do this and these are
contained in our budget proposal and it is across DOD, but this
was one of those hard decisions that nobody is really happy
with, but it is necessary to ensure that we free up some money
to put back into both the readiness of today as well as the
modernization of tomorrow.
That leads me to priority two, which is balancing today's
readiness and tomorrow's readiness. You are well aware that our
readiness has suffered over the years and particularly last
year during the period of sequestration where we had to ground
flying squadrons and furlough civilians and delay maintenance
and a whole host of other approaches.
In fiscal year 2015 we have fully funded our flying hours
and other high-priority readiness issues; and if approved, we
will see gradual improvements of readiness over time. It won't
be overnight; it won't be in 1 year, but we will be on a good
path toward getting to where we need to be.
At the same time, we are looking to tomorrow. So we do
remain committed to those programs you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
the F-35, the KC-46 tanker, the long-range strike bomber, and
our triad, two-thirds of which the bombers and the ICBMs reside
in our Air Force. So we are committed to all of this, and we
are funding these going forward.
We are also beginning to replace other aging platforms. As
you mentioned, the combat rescue helicopter, we have laid the
groundwork for the Next Generation of JSTARS, we have laid the
groundwork for the replacement of our trainer aircraft, called
the T-38. We want to invest in a new jet engine technology that
promises reduced fuel consumption, lower maintenance, and will
help the industrial base.
Now, to pay for all of these investments, given the
budgetary realities, we had to make some hard choices, and we
have to accept some risk. So here we go. It is not popular, but
here are some of the tradeoffs that we chose to make:
Retirement of the A-10 fleet and the U-2 fleet; limiting the
growth of combat air patrols to 55 instead of 65, and by the
way, today we are at 64, so we would still be going up, we are
not just not going up as much.
We would retire the MQ-1 Predator fleet over time in favor
of an entire MQ-9 Reaper fleet, that, of course, is the
Predator. These are just a few examples of the tradeoffs, but
by making these choices today, we will make sure that we don't
end up getting bested in a contested environment in the future,
and that is the kind of future that we are looking toward.
And that leads me to my last priority, making every dollar
count for the taxpayer. To me, this means keeping acquisition
programs on budget, on schedule; it means auditability as a
fundamental principle of our good stewardship; it means
trimming our overhead in the Air Force, including that 20-
percent headquarter reduction that the Secretary of Defense
asked us to do, and we think we are going to do better than
that. And by the way, I do want to join with our Secretary of
Defense and ask you to approve another round of BRAC in 2017.
I want to begin to wrap up by telling you the very serious
impacts we feel we would face if we have to revert to the
sequestration level budgets in fiscal year 2016 and beyond. We
do not recommend this. We feel that it would compromise our
national security too much.
So if we return to sequestration level budgets, this would
mean retiring up to 80 more aircraft, including the entire KC-
10 tanker fleet; deferring sensor upgrades for Global Hawk,
which would bring it up to parity with the U-2; retiring Global
Hawk Block 40 fleet; slowing the purchases of the F-35;
reducing our CAPS further of Predators and Reapers; we wouldn't
be able to do that Next Generation engine technology I told you
about; and we might have to relook at the combat rescue
helicopter and a whole series of other things.
So the bottom line is, it is a bad deal for the Air Force,
for the DOD and the country, and we ask you to please support
the higher levels of defense under the President's Budget
request.
I will conclude, Mr. Chairman, by just offering you up my
vision of the Air Force 10 years from now. It will be an Air
Force which is smaller, but it will be an Air Force which is
highly capable, innovative and ready. We will be a good value
in everything that we do for our taxpayers. We will be able to
respond overseas decisively through unparalleled air power, and
we will also stand ready to defend here at home when disaster
strikes.
We will be more reliant, not less on our Guard and Reserve,
again it makes good sense to do so from a mission standpoint
and from our taxpayer standpoint; and we will be powered by the
very best Airmen on this planet who live the culture of dignity
and respect for all, integrity, service and excellence.
I want to thank all of you for what you do for our Nation,
and I will yield to General Welsh.
[The joint statement of Secretary James and General Welsh
follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Summary Statement of General Welsh

Mr. Frelinghuysen. General Welsh, the floor is yours and
your entire statement will be put in the record, so if you
could summarize it for us, that would be great.
General Welsh. Thank you, Chairman, I will do so. Thank
you, Ranking Member Visclosky and members of the Committee for
allowing us to be here. It is always a privilege to be up here
before you.
Ladies and gentlemen, your Air Force is the finest in the
world and we need to keep it that way. We built this budget to
ensure that Air Force combat power remains unequal, but that
does not mean that it will remain unaffected. Every major
decision reflected in this budget proposal hurts. Each of them
reduce the capability that our combatant commanders would love
to have and believe they need and there are no more easy cuts.
That is just where we are today.
We simply can't ignore the fact that the law is currently
written and returns us to sequestered funding levels in fiscal
year 2016, so that is also considered as part of our plan. And
to prepare for that, we must cut people and force structure now
to create a balanced Air Force that we can afford to train and
operate in fiscal year 2016 and beyond.
I will submit the rest of this oral statement for the
record, sir. There is one thing I would like to walk through,
though, because it highlights the very tough decisions that are
having to be made. And let me say that because we needed to cut
billions of dollars, not millions of dollars out of our budget,
the normal trimming around the edges just wasn't going to get
it done, and so we looked at cutting fleets of aircraft as a
way to get to the significant savings that are required.
And let me walk you briefly through that logic. In our air
superiority mission area, we already have reductions in our
proposal, but eliminating an entire fleet would leave us unable
to provide air superiority for an entire theater of operations,
and we are the only service that can do so. Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is the number one
shortfall of our combatant commanders year after year. They
would never support even more cuts than we already have in our
budget proposal.
We have several fleets of aircraft in the global mobility
mission area. I actually spoke with Chief of Staff of the Army,
Ray Odierno, to ask what he thought about reductions in our
airlift fleet as we were going through this planning, his view
was that a smaller Army would need to be more responsive and
able to move quicker. He did not think that reducing airlift
assets further was a good idea, and the Secretary and I agree.
We looked at our air refueling fleets and considered
divesting the KC-10 as an option, just one example, but
analysis showed us that the mission impact was too significant.
But as the Secretary said, if we do return to sequestered
funding levels in 2016, that option will have to be back on the
table.
We looked at the KC-135 fleet, but we would have to cut
many more KC-135s than KC-10s to achieve the same savings, and
with that many KC-135s out of the fleet, we simply can't meet
our worldwide mission requirement. In the strike mission area,
cutting the A-10 fleet would save us $3.7 billion across the
FYDP, and another $500 million in cost avoidance for upgrades
that we wouldn't have to achieve.
To get that same savings would require a much higher number
of either F-15s, or F-16s, but we also looked at those options.
We ran a detailed operational analysis comparing the
divestiture of the A-10 fleet to the divestiture of the B-1
fleet, to reducing the F-16 fleet, to reducing the F-15E fleet,
to deferring procurement of a large number of F-35s outside the
FYDP, and to decreasing readiness by standing down a number of
fighter squadrons and just parking them on the ramp.
We use the standard DOD planning scenarios and the results
very clearly showed that cutting the A-10 fleet was the lowest
risk option from an operational perspective out of a bunch of
bad options. And while no one is happy, especially me, about
recommending the divestiture of this great old friend, from a
military perspective, it is the right decision. And it is
representative of the extremely difficult choices that we are
facing in the budget today.
The funding levels we can reasonably expect over the next
10 years dictate that for America to have a capable, credible
and viable Air Force in the mid-2020s, we must get smaller now.
We must modernize our force, but we can't modernize as much as
we would like to, and we must maintain the proper balance
across all of our mission areas because that is what the
combatant commanders expect from us.
Thank you for your continued support of our Air Force and
my personal thanks for your unending support of our Airmen and
their families. The Secretary and I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Great. Thank you, General Welsh. Thank
you both for your testimony.
Before recognizing Vice Chairman Granger for the first line
of questioning, four of us on this panel were in the Air
Force's capable hands as we travel to Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Qatar and Jordan, and hats off to Colonel Sam Grable and Major
George Nichols who were with you or stand behind you today for
their assistance. It was wings up all the way. No problems. So
we are highly appreciative.
Mr. Moran. Here, here.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I had to wait until Mr. Moran showed up
before I gave those kudos, but he is loyal and true and did
show up so I could do it in a show of unity.
Ms. Granger.

SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE

Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Secretary James and General Welsh, thank you for what you
are doing, and we really are anxious to hear more details about
the enormous demands that you have before us and decisions.
But before we do that, I would like you to spend a few
minutes. A year ago with the fiscal year 2014 Air Force budget
hearing, it was really turned into a hearing on the Air Force
sexual assault because of the terrible acts of one officer here
in Washington. And at that time, a lot was said about zero-
tolerance policies within the Air Force and heightened
screening for new recruits.
I would like you to take just a few minutes to talk about
the success of your Special Victims Counseling Program, but
also tell us what steps have been taken to help weed out
perpetrators before they enter your service, and what is
happening at the academies and how you address Secretary
Hagel's directive requiring additional screening of sexual
assault coordinators and recruiters and military training
instructors and bring us up to speed on that.
Ms. James. Okay, thank you, Ms. Granger. First of all, I
want you to know, I am fully committed to this as is the Chief,
and we are both working this hard. So for example, I told you
all this travel I have been doing, everywhere I go, I meet
privately with the Sexual Assault Response Coordinators
(SARCs), I meet with the Special Victims' Counsels, I meet with
victims' advocates, sort of one-on-one to get their point of
view about how things are going in the location where they are
serving.
And my overall feeling is that we are making progress. We
are making progress in getting the force more comfortable
believing that reporting is a good thing, and indeed, our
reports are up over the last year on the order of about 33
percent. We don't yet know about the incidents. We will know
that at the end of December 2014, so the end of this year we
will have more data on the incidents. Of course, what we want
are reports up and incidents down, ultimately.
Now, as to the Special Victims' Counsel Program, I think it
has been a tremendous success. We are ramping it up a little
bit as we go forward, and as you know, they are spreading it
now across the Department of Defense because it has been so
successful. It has given victims more confidence.
Additionally, it has helped to turn some restricted reports
into unrestricted reports. And as everybody knows, the key
difference there is when a victim makes a restricted report,
they can get care and counseling and help, but we don't get
told anything, and therefore, it can't be investigated. So to
turn these types of reports into unrestricted where they can be
investigated and something can be done about it, of course, is
a tremendous help. And the Special Victims' Counsel has done
that, as well.
As far as trying to root out predators from our system, we
are looking at a number of ideas. We are trying to learn as
much as we can from the civilian sector and from civilian
research to see if we can come up with a better knowledge about
profiles of people, to recognize people in advance; that is one
idea that we are working on.
Another idea is to look at the questions that we ask new
entrants into the Air Force. We ask many questions about
conduct and health and all sorts of questions. We are wondering
if there might not be additional questions that depending on
the answers could root out predators. So these are just some
ideas we are working on. Don't have anything solid to recommend
at this point.
General Welsh. Only one or two things to add, ma'am. First
of all, the Secretary mentioned this idea of Special Victims'
Counsels helping people transition from restricted to
unrestricted reports. This is really a big deal. It has allowed
us to move forward with prosecutions that we could not have in
the past by getting victim's report for an investigation,
which, as you well know, is a difficult thing for a lot of
reasons.
The victims used to transition at about a 13-percent rate
in the past from unrestricted to restricted. Those who have
Special Victims' Counsels now over the past year have
transitioned at almost a 50-percent rate, which allows us to
move forward in many more cases and get to whatever the right
outcome is.
The second thing I would mention is that there are lots of
things that go into this increased confidence, we believe we
are seeing it, in willingness to report. We put new
investigation training programs into place for all of our
Office of Special Investigations (OSI) investigators. We have
new special prosecutors who have been trained in a different
way now. All the services are pursuing this same approach.
Our prosecution rates have doubled in the last 2 years.
Now, prosecution isn't the goal; the right outcome is the goal,
but if we investigate better we should prosecute more. All that
will contribute to increased confidence. Our conviction rates
are up. There have been lots of positive trends. None of that
is good enough. We have to continue the trends, accelerate the
trends, figure out where the other game-changing approaches are
and keep charging toward the only acceptable number, which is
zero.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Granger.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
recognizing these two-star Air Force personnel. They are
terrific, as I am sure all of their colleagues are.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

General and Secretary, this subcommittee has, relatively
speaking, been pretty supportive of the F-35. And it is a great
plane. But I think we would be remiss if we did not raise
questions over a fleet that the most at recent cost estimate is
going to cost us $1 trillion. It is a lot of money. And so the
underlying question is, how can we afford it?
But let me ask some specific questions that we need to get
on the record. Because the decision, Secretary, is to
concurrently test and produce the F-35 has led to a number of
problems that are kind of unprecedented in terms of the
procurement process.
For example, we have issues with regard to on-board safety.
I am going to mention a number of these, and you can pick and
choose which ones you want to address. But we have a system
that is supposed to prevent explosions after fuel tanker is hit
by a bullet, and that is defective. We can't seem to be able to
stop fires if they are caused by lightning strikes. So we
wonder, is this going to cause a roadblock to production?
Then we have the helmet mounted display that has not done
well in testing, and the pilots are saying that it causes
spatial disorientation resulting from the jitter and the
latency issues of the display. Again, is that a fatal flaw?
And then we are told that the distributed aperture system,
you know, you have these six infrared cameras that track the
incoming missiles, it has failed in its most basic function as
a missile warning and defense system, and now can't tell the
difference between incoming missiles and the system's own decoy
flares. Again, we are concerned about this.
And then, most recently, we were told that performance
concerns have led to the imposition of severe training
restrictions on the F-35. Training squadrons are prohibited
from night flights, supersonic flights and flights in bad
weather, particularly when there is any possibility of
lightning. They are prohibited from dropping live ordnance or
firing the aircraft's guns while training. So again, those
kinds of restrictions cause some real concerns about achieving
our training objectives.
So you may want to defer on some of this to General Welsh,
but these are the concerns about a program that is going to
cost the taxpayers $1 trillion when all is said and done. Can
you address at least some of them, Madam Secretary and General
Welsh.
Ms. James. Yes, I will. I will start, Congressman Moran,
and then, as you say, General Welsh can also chime in.
So number one, I totally agree with you about the money,
and it is an enormous amount of money. And there are a variety
of pieces to this, of course, and I think that $1-trillion
figure, which is just so enormous, also goes to the 50 years of
operations and sustainability and what not.
So in terms of trying to be on top, we are where we are, so
the overruns have occurred, and there is nothing that I or
General Welsh can do about that past history but the future is
ours.
So, as you heard me say, I want to be on top of this as
best as I can, so I have already met probably four times with
the program manager on this, General Bogdan; I have been out to
Edwards Air Force Base, California; I have been to Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida; I have talked to the pilots; I have looked
at the helmet; I have been exposed to many of these things that
you mention; I have sat down with the head of Lockheed Martin,
and I have specifically talked to her about some of these key
concerns.
So we are on it. And particularly with respect to
sustainability, we recognize that bending that cost curve,
breaking that cost curb is going to be so crucial as we go
forward. This issue of concurrence, you just put your finger on
it, it is a devilishly difficult thing to be doing all of this
at once. Again, that decision was made years ago and we are
where we are.
The other person I am sticking close to is Dr. Gilmore, the
Head of Independent Operational Tests and Evaluation, because
he frequently has a slightly different point of view than the
program office. I think it is very important to hear both of
those points of view.
So I will just tell you that we are on all of these things.
The program office feels like given where we are in the program
that we are still going to meet the Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) dates within reason. There is some slippages
up to 6 months on one of the software development areas that
the program office is predicting, but within reason, for
something this complex, they feel like we are going to be
reasonably on time for that IOC.

INDEPENDENT OPERATIONAL TESTS (IOC)

Mr. Moran. Are you still talking about the IOC of 2016?
Ms. James. That is right.
General Welsh. Congressman, let me start by saying that I
am confident that we are going to be at IOC in 2016, as is
Lieutenant General Bogdan, as, I think, is the contractor
leadership team for the program.
A couple of quick things, the fuel tanks, the lightning
strike concerns, those aren't new concerns, as you know, sir.
Those have been a problem for awhile. Those fixes are actually
coming into place now. The airplane is starting to fly more, in
fact, you mentioned the helmet, the AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture
System (DAS) system.
The airplane flew at night for the first time down at Eglin
Air Force Base on Monday night. The flight went fantastic. I am
trying to remember the exact quote but this is very close, from
a note from the squadron commander who flew the sortie, his
note to his boss said, well, my big takeaway is that we are not
going to have big issues flying at night. The DAS system worked
phenomenally well; the helmet worked great. The only issue he
had is when he turned the DAS system off that there was a
little bit of a green glow in the mass. It was a little bit
distracting to him, he said. But this is just not an issue. And
the DAS system operated superbly for him at night.
So the software issues that will allow us to not get the
DAS confused by different inputs, whether they are airplane
flares or a ground launch, it will allow them to utilize their
full suite of weapons, have not been completed yet. Those are
part of the development process.
The airplane's performance has been on track since 2011. We
follow it very closely. I am in touch with Lockheed Martin
leadership team, with the Program Executive Office (PEO) team,
with the folks in the field. The Secretary and I have both
visited both Eglin Air Force Base where our training program
is, and Edwards Air Force Base where our test program is within
the last month. We are paying an awful lot of attention to
this, sir, and I am actually more confident than I have ever
been that we will reach IOC. There will be software issues.
Beyond that is where those software issues start to be a
problem in getting the full operational capability of airplane
finalized before FOC.
Mr. Moran. Well, that is new and encouraging information
that your first night flight was this Monday. Thank you. I
didn't know that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. We had a keen interest,
obviously, in this project.
Mr. Crenshaw.

LIGHT AIR SUPPORT

Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got just
three quick questions, two about light air support and one
about our space launch program. I think as you all know, we
have got a lot of our international partners that can't buy,
maintain big jet aircraft, so we have these light air support
that we help them particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
Philippines.
Sir, can you just give us an update, are we doing any
foreign military sales other than those three countries on
these light air support? I want just kind of an update on that
program. And two, how does it work when somebody requests those
kind of aircraft? Do we open up competition in our country to
provide those? Give us a little overview of that.
Ms. James. So, sir, the light air support, the A-29 issue
that I am most familiar with, again, I was just over in
Afghanistan, does pertain to the training of the Afghan Air
Force. And so I think we are quite close to sort of finalizing
a proposed way forward, and we are really waiting on General
Dunford and his negotiations with the Afghan government on
that.
There has been competition in that program, of course. And
other countries do currently use the A-29, but I believe it is
not in our inventory. So to the extent, it depends on where we
are going to do this training of the Afghan pilots and Afghan
maintainers, but of course, we have a process in the Air Force.
Once we get the go ahead, we would launch our normal process to
try to figure out where that training would occur.
Mr. Crenshaw. You know, there is some talk that maybe, I
mean, we spend a lot of money in Afghanistan training the
pilots and the folks that are involved in those aircraft, and
since nobody knows exactly what is going to happen politically,
whether we are going to have any troops there or not, is there
talk about training those Afghan pilots, bringing them to the
United States and doing training; and if so, is that any
concern to you in terms of security? Do you have an update on
that?
Ms. James. So there is discussion about this, and this is
what we are sort of awaiting, the final discussions that
General Dunford is having. But that is a possibility, and of
course, the Air Force has a process, if you will, to try to
decide when a new mission like that comes along where to put
it, and that is what we are working through. And as I
mentioned, I think we are getting close.

SPACE LAUNCH

Mr. Crenshaw. And the last quick question is, the military
space launch, the EELV program, and as I understand it, the
United Launch Alliance, they provided all the launch services,
and you are going to open up that to competition to other
companies. And are you going to make sure that, I mean, since
you have had one group doing everything, when you open up the
competition, the question becomes making sure it is a level
playing field. How are you going to ensure the new entrants
have the kind of background expertise that all things are going
to be considered?
Ms. James. Right. So on the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program, the way I will describe it, and this is
making it very simple but it is the way I can sort of remember
it and talk it, you have different types of launches of
different payloads. So I will say there are heavier launches
and then there are lighter launches in terms of the weight. So
right now, we are interested and we are trying to aggressively
get more competition. We think that will be good for all of us.
It will bring our costs down.
But the key thing is to make sure that the people are
qualified, as you said, as you bring new entrants in. So there
is this qualification process where new entrants have to
demonstrate that they can actually do a certain number of
launches. They have to share their engineering data with the
Air Force just to make sure that they are qualified.
We think, if all goes well, we will have new entrants
qualified for those lighter launches, maybe as early as the end
of the year. And eventually, some years from now, I think the
target is 2017, if all goes well, we would have new entrants
qualified to do the heaviers, as well. So the point is, we are
on a glide path to get more entrants qualified so that we can
have competition. So that is kind of the road we are on. At the
moment, United Launch Alliance (ULA) is the only one that is
qualified to do any of these launches.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Crenshaw.
Ms. McCollum.

ENGINEER SHORTAGE

Ms. McCollum. Thank you. I appreciated in your testimony,
you talked about 100 percent is personnel because you can have
all the equipment in the world, but if you don't have good
personnel to use it, you don't have much of anything, and
balance. So I want to talk about something that really caught
our eye in the office. It is from Defense News, March 24, and
it is Air Force engineer shortage.
The Air Force Chief Scientist Endsley recently commented
that the U.S. Air Force is facing a perfect storm of personnel
issues that is endangering retention and recruitment of
engineers. And we know how important it is to have good, you
know, science in driving innovation, technology breakthroughs;
so a shortage is very concerning.
And the shortage is both in Active Duty and civilian,
according to this article. The article goes on to say that the
main shortage isn't a lack of science and technology funding in
the budget, but it is uncertainty. With sequestration still
looming and 2016 government shutdowns, civilian pay freezes,
there seems to be a lot disincentive for young engineers to
choose the Air Force over a job in the private industry.
It goes on to point out, you know, that we don't have the
enhanced graduate tuition that many of the private sector
industries that were competing for these young men and women
in, let alone the inability to attend scientific conferences
where you can interact with people and move towards to have
your work published in the future if you are a scientist.
So I want to know what kind of steps are being taken to
prevent further erosion, and how, as we, as members of this
committee, help with the recruitment and retain top scientists?
And what do we need to do to be crystal clear that travel
abuses will not be tolerated, but at the same time, expedite a
way in which you can get people to attend top conferences so
that we can retain?
And I do have another question, so if you could just kind
of briefly answer that.
Ms. James. So I think you are dead right. I think science,
technology, engineering and math in general is very difficult
to recruit and retain because they can, you know, those folks
can write their own ticket. I will go you one better, they are
hard for the defense industry. I come out of the defense
industry, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
was my company, and we had a tough time recruiting and getting
such people into our workforce. They wanted to go into other
forms of high-tech. Defense was not seen nearly as cool as it
once was.
So it is a hard problem and you add cyber on top of that
and it is very difficult. I don't have any specific solutions
to suggest at this point. We do have a series of bonuses and
things of this nature that we utilize throughout the course of
recruiting and retaining to make sure that we try to balance
the force.
I would also say that when it comes to the temporary duties
(TDYs) and so forth, we took a very hard line during the year
of sequestration on that. I think you are going to see
hopefully some easing of that. So that will naturally get a
little bit more eased, I believe.

SPACE LAUNCH

Ms. McCollum. If you have some ideas and if you could get
back to us.
I would like to go to my second question, but first, I
would like to comment, Ms. Granger is right on. In our
committee is lockstep wanting to do whatever we can do to work
on the issue of sexual assault and have it down, as you said,
to zero.
But Mr. Crenshaw, I want to expand on what he was talking
about, of the launch program. Another issue that has arisen in
recent weeks is the use of Russian-made RD-180 engines in the
Atlas V rockets that launch our military satellites. It is my
understanding that ULA has exclusive agreement with the Russian
company that manufactures this particular engine.
I believe, you know, that we should be concerned that a
heavily-reliance on these engines at a time when our country is
imposing sanctions against Russia for its actions in the former
area of Ukraine, the Crimea. So how well do the RD-180 engines
perform? And I know Secretary Hagel is asking the Air Force to
review this matter. Could you please comment what your
assessment is on this and when it will be complete for this
committee?
Ms. James. So I share the worry, and as you mentioned, we
have launched a review. By the end of May or so, we expect to
have the results of that review which we will be looking at
risk, cost, and how might we do it in the United States, things
of this nature.
I will say this: This partnership, if you will, has been in
existence for years. It has weathered various storms that we
have had in the U.S./Russian relationships. That doesn't mean I
am not worried about it; I am, but I am just trying to say we
have seen ups and downs before.
I also want to tell you that ULA does have, I am told, a 2-
year supply of these engines already on hand. I have learned a
lot from my trip to the AOR: Having the equipment is one thing,
but do you also have the spare parts? So we are looking into
that just in case there are any other hitches out there.
But what I am hearing right now is at least for the next 2
years, no matter what, we are in okay shape. But it is
worrying, and by the end of May, we should have our review
done.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Mr. Calvert.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL LEVELS

Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of quick
questions. One, obviously, Madam Secretary, you and the General
spent some time going over what capabilities must be cut in
order to meet the future budget obligations and those are
difficult decisions to make. But right now, the United States
has 1.3 million Active Duty military personnel versus 770,000
civilian personnel. The Defense Business Board recommended the
defense civilian reductions go back to the 2003 levels, or 15
percent, whichever is greater. If we go back in history, in
2003, we had 1.4 million Active Duty personnel versus 636
civilian personnel.
So we have had a significant increase in civilian personnel
relative to the military personnel. That is actually a
reduction in the military personnel and a substantial increase
in civilian military personnel. What do you think is a
reasonable ratio?
We are talking about a big number here. To bring that
number back into the conformance ratio that it has been
previously would save $165 billion over 10 years, and we are
talking about significant capability cuts both to in-strength
especially in the Army, Marine Corps, obviously platforms and
we have, I believe, a civilian workforce that is out of whack.
What do you believe is a reasonable ratio here, and what are
you prepared to do about it?
Ms. James. So, Mr. Calvert, I don't have a particular ratio
to offer up, but I will just make a couple points, if I may. We
are coming down in our civilian personnel. The numbers that we
put forth were very sort of judiciously figured out in terms
of, you know, according to certain missions and reorganizations
and 20-percent headquarter reductions and things like that. So
our numbers add up to a total that was specifically developed
rather than across the board.
Mr. Calvert. According to your comptroller, it is going to
be less than 5 percent. Less than 5 percent of civilian
personnel will be touched through this process, and yet we are
going to be cutting the in-strength of the United States Army
by 15 percent, and the United States Marine Corps by more than
10 percent. And just through your own testimony, we are
removing several weapons platforms and talking about parking
air wings on the ramp.
Ms. James. Right.
Mr. Calvert. What do you think is more appropriate, the
reducing civilian employees to a more proportionate level or
ending, you know, troops strength and aircraft and the rest?
Ms. James. So we want to scrub it as much as possible. But
most of our civilians are involved with our depots, supporting
our Guard and----
Mr. Calvert. I am not talking about depots or wrench
turners or that. The biggest growth in the civilian workforce
has not been that, it has been in--folks in middle management
and various occupations.
We have support from former comptrollers, former senior
defense managers, many others who believe that the growth
within the civilian workforce has gone out of bounds. And there
is not anything you can do about it, because under the work
rules you are not able to do reduction-in-force performance
reviews and the rest. And we have a number of people that are
up for retirement. So I hope you take a good look at this,
because it seems to me that we ought to be looking at that
versus removing necessary capability from the United States Air
Force.
One other quick question. It was brought up, these EELVs,
and I understand this, we all love Lockheed and Boeing and ULA,
but they guard their contracts very judiciously, I understand
that. But competition is important. And we need to take a close
look at that because we need to allow these new interests to
compete.
And, you know, let's face it, the military has been, over
the history of the United States Military, I will just mention
the Air Force, slow, for instance, to accept UAVs as a capable
alternative to what was traditional aircraft. And I know you
have changed that point of view, but there was a slow
acceptance of new technology. And so we need to have an open
mind and look at those technologies, and if they are capable,
then accept it and save the taxpayer some money.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think I will have to take that as a
statement firmly held by Mr. Calvert, perhaps by others. Thank
you, Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESERVE COMPONENT C-130 AIRCRAFT

Secretary James, you mentioned that we need to rely more on
our Air Guard and Reserve, and I appreciate that comment. We
have a local Air Reserve Base in Youngstown that has C-130s
there. As you know, it is the workhorse of the Air Force, and
several of those were taken away. This budget divests in
another C-130 from the Youngstown Air Reserve Station, losing
one backup C-130 which takes us down to just eight C-130s.
My concern is that we are hurting the mission at reserve
bases like Youngstown by subjecting them to a death by a
thousand cuts. We are the only fixed-wing aerial spray unit, as
well in the DOD, but Youngstown isn't the only base losing
backup aircraft, C-130Hs. From looking at a copy of the Air
Force summary of PB-15 adjustments, I see many bases are losing
and being divested of their backup aircraft, C-130Hs.
Can you tell me where those planes are going, and General,
as well, what the rationale behind those moves are and what the
long-range plan for the Air Force's fleet of C-130s is.
Ms. James. I will begin, sir, by telling you that the
military has validated requirements and we budget against
those, for tactical airlift, we currently have too much in the
way of C-130s. So overall, the decision in this tough budget
environment was to bring that down so that it is closer to the
validated requirement.
As to what planes went where and so forth, I would yield to
the Chief to elaborate.
General Welsh. Sir, the overall plan for the balance
between the Active and Reserve components has been developed
over the last year. We are about halfway through the proposals
that we are going to put in place. We have done some detailed
analysis, we would love to share it with you, by weapons
system, on ratios between Active and Reserve components, and
then within the Reserve components, the Air Guard and the Air
Force Reserve working with the National Guard Bureau have
worked with the Adjutant Generals to figure out what is the
best way to balance those things.
When you talk about one or two C-130s coming out of the
unit, it is so they can make units across the Guard and Reserve
the same size. They want to provide a consistent template for
support equipment, for everything they do to support the fleet.
They thought that was the best way to balance those aircraft.
And so we can come give you the details on all those moves if
you would like.

The information follows:
The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request reduces excess C-
130 capacity by divesting 27 backup aircraft inventory C-130H aircraft.
These aircraft will likely be retired to the 309th Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Group at Davis Monthan Air Force Base--
known as the ``bone yard.'' As part of the normal fleet management
process, the Air Force will analyze the C-130H fleet to ensure the best
aircraft are kept in the inventory while those with the highest
maintenance and modernization costs are retired.
The aircraft are being divested to reduce excess C-130 capacity. To
this end, we will normalize Reserve Component C-130H squadrons to a
standard size of 8 primary aircraft. The Mobility Capabilities
Assessment-18 determined ``there is no surge scenario associated with
the current defense strategy--even one in which a significant homeland
defense event occurs concurrently with two warfights--that requires a
fleet of 358 C-130s.'' In fact, the report finds that the Air Force
requires no more than 320 C-130s, and potentially as few as 248.
The Air Force's long-range plan for its C-130 fleet is to right-
size it in accordance with current analysis, modernizing where
necessary and recapitalizing where feasible. Each C-130H recapitalized
with a C-130J avoids the costs of expensive avionics modernization and
center wingbox replacement. The current C-130J procurement effort is
funded to 134 aircraft by fiscal year 2017. We will continue to examine
when and how to recapitalize as part of future budget proposals;
however, identifying funding to do so in the current fiscal environment
remains a challenge.

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS

I will tell you what our 2015 budget also shows if you look
carefully. Because we are only halfway through this, we haven't
balanced all the force structure across the Active and Reserve
components. The guidance from the beginning has been put as
much as we can into the Reserve components. If we can become
more efficient and remain operationally capable, why would we
not do that?
So we are pushing everything we can by aircraft type
because that is the way you have to do the analysis into the
Reserve component. We are about 60 percent through that
analysis. We will finish the rest this year. We have done it
with the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Active
Duty sitting side by side, using the same cost models, the same
decision support tools, and we have had the Adjutant Generals
in the decision making process with us. And when we have a
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) brief to the Secretary to
make these decisions, those representative Adjutant Generals
are sitting in the room and have a voice at the table.
We are trying hard to get this right. The cut in the Air
National Guard manpower for this next year, 400 people versus
17,000 in the active component.
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield
for a second.
Mr. Ryan. I would be happy to yield.
Ms. McCollum. I heard what you said about you wanted every
Air Reserve to look balanced. We have one in Minnesota that
draws a lot from pilots that fly out of the Humphrey Airport
and the International Airport. What I have heard from those
pilots for retaining them in the Reserve is how much that they
are going to have to drive and how much time that they are
going to have to take off to go to other places if it closes.
So I hope you are surveying where your pilots are and you
are talking to the pilots to make sure that while you are just
looking at this someone here on paper that we aren't, you know,
shortchanging ourselves for pilot retention in the Reserve in
the long run because those folks have a choice whether or not
they stay in or go out, and they are flying full-time and they
are doing this on off hours. And if we start adding more time
into them going and getting the training, they are telling me
they are considering leaving.
General Welsh. Ma'am, the Reserve and Guard are bringing
all those discussions to the table. I hope they are talking to
the pilots in Minneapolis. I will make sure they are. But the
bottom line for all this in the budget is, we are getting
smaller.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Ryan, I know your time is about up,
since some of it was claimed by our colleague, but there is a
keen interest in this issue here.
Mr. Ryan. Just real quick.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Go ahead. Fire away.
Mr. Ryan. So you are saying there is a more detailed
account than the PB aircraft changes that we have here?
General Welsh. What I am saying is there is a reason all
those changes are being made. We will be happy to come and talk
to you. We will bring the Guard and the Reserve and sit down
and tell you the story.
Mr. Ryan. And you think eight is about the number you want
to have at each of the different bases?
General Welsh. That is the footprint they were looking at
is eight, and as they balance the fleet that is what they did.
Some of these airplanes are older, take more to maintain, so
they are trying to centralize to places where they can be most
efficient and maintain the fleet over time.
Mr. Ryan. Okay. Love to have you all come in.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole.

FISCAL ISSUES

Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for being here, and thank both of you
honestly for, I think, very politely but making the appropriate
point that you are making a lot of tough decisions because the
Congress hasn't really made very tough decisions in terms of
what we are going to do fiscally, and we are forcing a lot of
that down on you. And that is something I have said repeatedly
just to keep reminding ourselves.
And I know this committee feels very strongly about this.
We don't deal with our entitlement crisis; we don't deal with
the bigger fiscal issues in front of us. We are going to keep
taking it out of the height of the American military, and that
has got a lot of costs and risks associated with it. And I know
you are both making decisions you don't like to make and that
you probably wouldn't make, quite frankly, in different
circumstances.
I do want to pick up on a point that Mr. Ryan made and
asked about a specific concern, and I will admit right up
front, it is shamelessly parochial. I will be like Ryan,
shamelessly parochial, but I think appropriately so. Because he
did make the point and you did make the point, General Welsh,
that we are going to rely more on Reserve capability than we
have in the past, and we are fortunate to have those folks.

AWACS

But, you know, we are also going to eliminate seven AWACS,
and they are the entire Reserve capability that we have in that
area. I mean, they are just going to be gone. And that is a,
you know, low-density, high-use asset. We are using them right
now, as you know, you know, in Europe to try and send a message
to the Russians.
So I worry about the loss of that capability, particularly
any in the Reserve component of it. So could you walk us
through, insofar as you can, the decision to do that and
explain to me why it might be wiser to actually put more of the
Active fleet in Reserve and lower the cost that way as opposed
to actually lose the capability.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. The decision and the
recommendation that we have on the E-3 Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) is actually not based on that. It is
based on this balancing of capability today versus
modernization and capability 10 years from now. As a platform
base force, you understand, we have to invest now to have the
capability in the mid-2020s that is viable against the threat
we expect then.
The AWACS is getting old. We have got to recapitalize it
somehow. Within the Air Force budget, the only option we could
come up with to modernize that fleet was to eat some of the
aircraft to pay for the modernization of the command and
control mission area. We completely understand, it means
accepting more risk over the near term. And our combatant
commanders aren't going to like that either, but if they want a
capability in 2023 and beyond, we have to do something now.
If they are willing to not have a capability and just let
the AWACS fleet time out or limp along in the mid-2020s, which
I don't think anybody is interested in, then we do nothing. So
this is about creating investment money to recapitalize the
command and control system.
Mr. Cole. I understand the rationale perfectly well, and I
think you are very wise not to count on us to do the right
thing. But I also think and, you know, this is just a
theoretical discussion here, that probably with sequestration
looming, there is going to have to be some sort of big-time
deal in this place between the administration and the Congress,
probably sometime early next year in the first quarter of the
year.
Because we are not going to go through cuts of that
magnitude, in my view, I just don't think they are sustainable.
And again, I appreciate you, Madam Secretary, bringing that up
and pointing that out, how critical that will be if we get past
that point, because I think we are a lot further down this road
than anybody a year or two ago thought we were going to be. I
know certainly Congress never thought we were going to get to
sequestration and we did. And I know that for a long time, the
administration didn't. So we now know we are playing with live
bullets that have real consequences for our military.
But I do think we can avoid that, and I am going to be
looking for ways, if there are ways, because I think keeping
that capability is really a force multiplier for us and for our
allies. A lot of them simply don't have that capability and
actually rely on us to provide it at a critical time.
I have got other questions, but I will reserve for another
round, and again, thank both of you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Cole.
Mr. Womack, thanks for your patience.

A-10

Mr. Womack. Thank you.
My compliments to the Secretary and to the Chief for their
great work. I have a, and I will admit, I was hopelessly,
shamelessly, however you referred to it, parochial about A-10s,
once upon a time, and I have got an A-10 question that only
demands just a brief answer. We are going to retire the fleet,
but are we not investing more money in these A-10s wing
replacement, I assume, the A-10C variant, that is complete. I
don't know for sure, but do we continue to invest in platforms
like the A-10 that we are targeting for elimination and why?
General Welsh. Congressman, the ones we would continue to
invest in, even if it was approved to divest the fleet, would
only be to keep the airplane viable through the end of its
service life. We don't completely divest a fleet until 2019
under our plan. So if there is anything required to keep the
fleet viable until then, we would have continued to invest in
that. We would not invest in buying additional kits for
upgrades that would happen beyond that point or to upgrade
airplanes that we plan to divest over the next couple years.

MQ-9 REAPER

Mr. Womack. Now, I will be shamelessly parochial about the
Reaper mission. Can you kind of walk me through the Air Force's
plans long-term on Reaper? I know there have been some targeted
numbers of procurement that have been reduced, but where are we
in this process?
General Welsh. Yes, sir, right now, we have 64 orbits of
Predators plus Reapers. Our game plan is to migrate all of the
Predators, which are an older system, essentially the Wright
Flyer of a remotely piloted aircraft. That airplane has been
fantastically good for us, but it doesn't have the capability
of the MQ-9 Reaper. And so we will transition our entire
Predator fleet to Reapers. As we do that, the Predator fleet
will go away. Our intent was to grow originally to the
Department-established requirement of 65 combat air patrols.
That has been modified down to 55, which will allow us to use
some of that money we save in that regard to start
recapitalizing the rest of the ISR enterprise.
What the rest of the combatant commanders need and want is
not 55 orbits of Reapers. But the plan right now is to continue
with the Reaper plan that we currently have on track to include
down at Fort Smith, Arkansas.
Mr. Womack. Yeah. In the Fort Smith area they are having,
in this transition period, they are engaging the FAA on air
space-related information. Is the Air Force having any problem
at all with the FAA on air space issues related to, say,
unmanned aerial aircraft?
General Welsh. I wouldn't call it a problem. I think this
is something the FAA is doing their due diligence on for very
good reasons. We are working closely with the FAA in places
like Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota to figure out how
do you manage multiple types of remotely piloted aircraft in
the same air space, something we need to do before the FAA will
feel comfortable mixing unmanned aircraft with commercially
piloted aircraft. So I think that is the push for the future,
and the effort is ongoing and we need to continue it.

MILITARY COMPENSATION

Mr. Womack. My last question is directed to the Secretary,
and it is just a general question. You know, my friend, Mr.
Cole, talked about how the Congress is having a hard time
recognizing and wrapping its arms around the real problem
driving the deficits and the debt that affect our country
today, and that is basically pensions and health care. And at a
smaller level, not an insignificant level, but at a smaller
level, it is affecting the five-sided building, too, pensions
and health care.
Madam Secretary, what is your recommendation to the
Secretary, to the President, on how we harness this growing
problem where so much of our money that would be available for
the platforms that we are talking about cutting and the end
strength and the force structure are now going towards the
mandatory side of the Pentagon spending as it is in our
country?
Ms. James. So Congressman Womack, I do think the proposals
in our budget with respect to compensation are reasonable.
Again, it is slowing the growth. We have had substantial growth
in the last 12 or 13 years, and thank you to all of you who
supported it, by the way, because we were able to, over that
time, catch up military personnel to the equivalents in the
private sector, and indeed, I think in some cases, we have
exceeded those comparability statistics. So thank you for that.
But I think we are now at a point, given that our
recruiting is strong, our retention is strong, as you heard me
say, we are offering incentives for people in some cases to
leave the service. Given that environment, we can afford to
take a little bit of a risk, and slow that growth and
compensation. So that is point one.
As far as the retirement is concerned, you know, there is,
of course, the commission. They are due to report in something
like 9 or 10 months. DOD has submitted some ideas but has not
recommended one idea over the other. But everybody that I am
aware of, certainly in DOD and the Administration, has put
forth the important principle that when it comes to any
retirement reforms, that people currently in the force, and
people currently retired should be grandfathered, and that any
sort of reforms should apply to new young people who have not
yet entered the force.
So that is sort of the principle that we are all behind.
But totality, I think we do need to get control of some of
these costs, and to do it judiciously is the way to go.
Mr. Womack. Thank you.
Mr. Cole. Mr. Chairman, if I could just----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Womack.
Mr. Cole. Just to make a quick point.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Go right ahead.
Mr. Cole. On a hopeful note, that is exactly what Congress
did actually in the Ryan-Murray deal. That initial proposal,
the reaction was negative, but we retained, you know, for new
people, that would be the standard, but we would not,
obviously, hurt those currently serving. So I agree with you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. Mr. Visclosky.

BUDGET PROJECTIONS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of
questions about what is not contained in the 2015 budget. In
the administration's budget, the 2015 request is within, if you
would, the agreed cap, for lack of a better term. But the
proposed 5-year period thereafter, does not accept
sequestration, and adds an additional $116 billion above
sequestration levels.
Are there items that are not contained in the 2015 budget
that are contained in that $116 billion that I consider a very
speculative figure? It should be in 2015 on the theory, the
$116 billion you are never going to see it?
Ms. James. So with respect to the fiscal year 2015 budget--
--
Mr. Visclosky. I don't want to be a downer. I am just
trying to be realistic here.
Ms. James. Right. So with respect to the fiscal year 2015
budget, the way I would describe it is with the exception of
that $7 billion I told you which was in that opportunity
security piece, you know, part of the $26 billion, that is kind
of, I will say, over and above the targets laid out in the BBA,
but other than that, everything we testified to is in the
fiscal year 2015 budget.
Mr. Visclosky. Right.
Ms. James. Fiscal year 2016 and beyond, that list that I
gave you, we retire the KC-10, and the Global Hawk Block 40 and
so forth, these are all things that if we don't get that
President's budget level, we would have to strip out.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The issue here is, we are pushing a lot
of things to the right here, you know, and I went through the
shopping list. Some of that may be on whatever this list is
that has been put out by the Defense Department, but there are
a lot of things we are sort of putting off here, you know,
combat rescue, JSTARS platform, and you know, there is some
question as to, in the final analysis, whether we are going to
ever, you know, whether these programs are ever going to see
the light of the day. I would sort of like to sort of know
where you are on that. But we are pushing a lot of things
deliberately to the right here, which----
Ms. James. That is true.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Removes, perhaps, the
possibility since this is all about, you know, this is a
Defense posture hearing that we might not have something which
is actually essential to us.
General Welsh. Mr. Chairman, I think that is kind of the
point of our budget submission. Everything does hurt. Now,
everything has a major impact on us. Divesting the A-10 fleet
has a major impact. Divesting U-2s has a major impact. Trying
to figure out how to recapitalize AWACS and JSTARS by even----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And to look ahead towards the long range
bomber, I mean.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. But all of those things are
included. Even if we stay at sequestered levels through the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the things I just
mentioned stay in there. There are some other things, the
Secretary mentioned that would have to come out because we just
won't be able to afford them.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thanks for yielding.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the
chairman probably asked my question a lot better than I did,
and Madam Secretary, really, I don't think I am asking the
question properly, because I didn't understand your answer. And
I am not blaming you. I am blaming me. I guess my question, and
it gets back to the chairman talking about things going to the
right, is you mentioned the $7 billion for the Opportunity,
Growth, and Security Initiative. The idea that this Congress is
going to do entitlement reform and tax change, I think is very
speculative. So you have got a $7 billion request there. And
there is $116 billion department-wide for the next 5 years on
the theory that sequestration is not going to happen.
I guess my question is, within those requests because of
the speculative nature of them, should some of those be shifted
to the left for 2015, and have gone on requested in the 2015
budget?
Ms. James. So the fiscal year 2015 budget that we have
placed before you is our best judgment. So I would say we made
our judgment calls and we would stand by what is in that fiscal
year 2015 budget.
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
Ms. James. Now, of course, Congress, I believe, did invite
us to submit and we are putting together an unfunded priority
list, but as you said, these things are--would be over and
above the dollar figures which are likely. But if I could maybe
say as one summary point, we recognize that sequestration is
the law of the land, and so we have given over-budget judgments
that reflect those dollar figures. But at the same time, we are
using our bully pulpit to tell all of you as much as we can,
that we believe we need more. And that is why we are urging the
approval of these higher levels, and we are trying to, in
effect, tell you the judgments at the low level how we would do
it. And we are telling you what we really need to be at that
higher level. So we have sort of given it to you two ways with
the urgent requests that we have that higher level.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. So if the gentleman will yield, so the
long-range bomber is something which has been, you know,
pointed to as something we need. We know what we have. Some of
it is pretty ancient. Is that a top priority for you?
Ms. James. Yes, it is.
General Welsh. And it is funded through the FYDP, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. I am done, Mr. Chair.

MCGUIRE AIR FORCE IN NEW JERSEY

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Reclaiming a little time, be a little
bit parochial. I follow, obviously, the good work of McGuire
Air Force in New Jersey, the work they did, they do and have
done, obviously, with other Air Force bases to allow us to have
the degree of success we had in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What happens with those tankers, you know, just incredible
things that they do that often people don't recognize, those
crews and the ability to sustain the effort over there is I
think, at times, miraculous. I give them and others in that
part of your Air Force special credit. We talked before the
hearing a little bit, so this isn't coming out of left field.
This is a Defense posture hearing.

CHINA AND RUSSIA

Where do you see our, I don't like to use the term
``adversaries.'' At times around here, we are careful about the
words we choose, but where do you see China going in terms of
its modernization and its readiness? Where do you see the
Russians going? I mean, it didn't surprise--it did surprise
some of us that in the Quadrennial Defense Review only one
mention of Russia, but now we are spending an inordinate amount
of money trying to sort of catch up with what they are up to in
Crimea, perhaps elsewhere, in terms of causing some inherent
hostilities in their region.
Where do we stand relative to China, and matching their
capabilities? They are doing things with their own aircraft
that to some extent from what I understand mirror--I won't say
our capabilities, but they have their own--they have their own
fleet, and they are doing some things relative to space
architecture which appear to be fairly modern and innovative.
Would you react to that to what the Chinese are doing
specifically?
General Welsh. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and let me kind of
reference all three domains that the Air Force operates in,
air, space, and cyber, very briefly. I will start with cyber. I
think everyone is familiar with the activity in the cyber
domain over the last number of years. It is getting more
significant, not less. We have got to stay abreast or ahead of
that activity, technologically, and capability-wise in the
services. We are investing in this budget to try and do that as
is the Department. Clearly, that is a driving factor for what
we are planning.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are putting more money in--the
President has recommended more money both for cyber----
General Welsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. And special operators.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. On the space side, you mentioned
the kind of the increased threat to our capability to operate
freely in the space domain. We think that will continue to be a
problem, and we think it now expands beyond just the low-Earth
orbit, and so we have got to be worried about how do we
maintain situation awareness in space? How do we track objects
in space? How do we maneuver, evade, in space, things that our
Air Force Space Command has built into our plan here over the
next 5 years because we cannot stop investing in that area.
And on the air domain, air forces are successful over time
because they stay on the front end of technology. There is some
great literature out there about why air forces fail. In fact,
that is the title of one book. And typically they fail because
they fall behind the technological curve.
The Chinese and the Russians are creating capability in the
air domain, aircraft that will be competitive or more capable
than our legacy fleets. They just will be. Now, whether we
worry about direct confrontation with China or Russia isn't the
point. Today 53 countries around the world fly either Chinese
or Russian front-end fighters. And if they follow their typical
model and they export these things within 3 to 5 years, we will
be facing their equipment within the next 10 years. That is
what is driving our insistence on the F-35 as a priority
program for the United States Air Force. We need the technical
capability it will bring in contested environments and full
spectrum fights. It is not about a counterinsurgency battle.
That is not what that airplane is for.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. They, too, are working on a degree of
stealth that is--we need to be able to contend with.
General Welsh. Yes, sir, we think the Chinese will field it
in 2017 or early 2018, and the Russians in 2019 and they will
export it 3 to 5 years after that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Granger.

FISCAL RESTRAINTS

Ms. Granger. Thank you. And thank you both for being so
straightforward and talking about what the losses are if we do
the lower amount. You know, when sequestration was first talked
about, we kept saying, tell us what this means. We couldn't get
that answer, and there are Members of Congress who really think
it is really not going to hurt that much. It is really going to
hurt and you have said that and I appreciate that.

CV-22

Now, continuing the tradition of asking parochial
questions, and I am also shameless about this, but it is
important, and General Welsh, we talked about the CV-22 fleet,
and the requirement of 50 aircraft. I have one real simple
question. Are you going to replace the three that were
essentially lost by combat, and then the other thing is the
future of the CV-22. And as they pick up more search and rescue
missions, and Medevac missions, it seemed like it would make
sense to use the CV-22s, as part of the combat rescue
helicopter needs. Are you considering that?
General Welsh. Yes, ma'am. To both questions, yes. Congress
has already, I believe, appropriated the funding in support of
that funding to replace the one training and one combat loss of
the CV-22. And so the intent is to get back to the 50 aircraft
that we originally had programmed in the budget and thank you
for your support for that.
On the combat search and rescue side, even though we are
trying very hard to push forward with the combat rescue
helicopter program, which we think is part of the fabric of our
Air Force, if we are going to send people out the door, to go
engage in aerial combat, I want to be able to look them in the
eye and tell them we are going to come get them if something
goes wrong. And the Secretary has stood very firmly behind her
decision to push forward with that. And I think that has been
wonderful for us.
The issue over time is, does the concept of operations
change to include CV-22s and the new combat rescue helicopter?
We haven't made that decision yet. We will look at it over time
because there are some environments the CV-22 lends itself to,
longer distances, longer legs for rescue operations, et cetera,
as we saw in the Libya operation, when a great Marine Corps MV-
22 crew went and picked up an Air Force F-15E pilot. And so I
think we have to continue to evolve the concept of operations.
Ms. Granger. Good, thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Ryan.

AIRLIFT CAPACITY

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on my
last question, so we talked about the backup aircraft, and you
were pretty clear you want to get it down to about eight for
each of these bases. So the extra aircraft that aren't going to
fit in, we have surplus capacity. Where do those go?
General Welsh. Some of them are not surplus capacity,
surplus capacity overall. We have more airlift aircraft right
now than we believe we need. You will recall, sir, that in 2012
and 2013, some force structure actions that we were trying to
take were held up because we hadn't done a good job of telling
the story to the Congress and making it clear why we were doing
this. We believe we have too many C-130s, and----
Mr. Ryan. You just retire them?
General Welsh. We have to retire some.
Mr. Ryan. So how many do you think?
General Welsh. The number is rough. I can give you exact
numbers, but we have 358 or so now. We think we can go down to
nearly 320, 318 or so, in the C-130 fleet. But I will give you
the exact numbers. I have got these buried here somewhere.

The information follows:
The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request sheds excess C-130
capacity by reducing the fleet from 358 to 328 by fiscal year 2019
based on the findings of the Mobility Capability Assessment 2018 (MCA-
18), signed in May 2013. The MCA-18 report determined that ``. . .
there is no surge scenario associated with the current defense
strategy, even one in which a significant homeland defense event occurs
concurrently with two warfights, that requires a fleet of 358 C-130s.''
The report finds that the Air Force requires no more than 320 C-130s.

Mr. Ryan. And we would still be able to meet our needs with
that number?
General Welsh. Yes, sir, that is what the latest mobility
and capability assessment told us. So that has been the goal we
have been targeting for the last couple of years.
Mr. Ryan. Okay. Well, I would love to sit and dig into this
a little further.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. We would love to have that chance.

ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING

Mr. Ryan. Madam Secretary, continuing the parochialism of
the committee today, which is very unusual, I must say. We have
been blessed with President Obama's first additive
manufacturing institute of these 15 institutes he wants to
stand up in the field of manufacturing. The top funder for this
is the Department of Defense, and they are pursuing research,
development, and eventually commercialization in additive
manufacturing; phenomenally, transformational technology as I
know that you know.
One of the collaborations that is now called America Makes,
one of the collaborations that we are proposing and we are
having conversation, is between America Makes and the
Youngstown Reserve Station, but also the Air Force Research Lab
in Dayton. And there is an opportunity there, I think, for a
real partnership to figure out, as you know, they can print
parts for aircraft, and to work, to develop in Ohio with
Dayton, Youngstown, and the America Makes facility, to really
figure out how we can drive down the cost in the Air Force and
other places in the military, but particularly in the Air
Force, to drive down the cost of component parts manufacturing.
So I would just like to bring that to your attention, and
have you comment on it if you would like. General, you can
comment on it as well, to just look at the possibilities we
have. I mean, this is the idea of the institute.
Mr. Chairman, I think this can be huge all across the
military. We look at the amount of money we spend on
replacement parts and whatnot. If we can start printing these
parts ourselves in-house without transportation costs or any of
the other necessary things that we need to do, I think it could
be huge. So if you could just comment on that, and at least
consider what we are proposing with the relationship between
Dayton and Youngstown State, and the other relationships that
we would like to put together.
Ms. James. So Congressman, I am not familiar with this
program, but I would like to learn more about it. As you said,
it sounds very exciting and it is certainly, you know, my three
priorities. And number three, I said, is make every dollar
count and look for ways to do things smarter and better and
save money. So I would love to learn more about it.
Mr. Ryan. And maybe you can come out and see it.
Ms. James. I would love to.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. That is a good invitation.
General Welsh. I have been looking at this a little bit.
Air Mobility Command, for example, is a big fan of the idea,
because if you can laser print parts in the back of a C-17, by
carrying a portable laser with you when you deploy somewhere,
you might not have to have as many problems of picking up parts
along the route in the system.
For those who are deployed to remote locations, it is even
more important. Air Force Special Operations Command and others
who operate the C-130s and other aircraft in other places where
there is no rapid FedEx access. And so we have been looking at
this Air Force Materiel Command, and actually Air Force
Research Labs have been looking hard at this with your teams at
Dayton, Ohio as you mentioned. This is a real ripe area for
further research.
Mr. Ryan. Yeah, well, great. We would love your support on
this. I think it would be huge and I think it, as I said, drive
down the costs and increase convenience a great deal. So we
would appreciate your support on that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. Judge Carter,
welcome. I know you have been chairing a committee--the other
committee on which I serve, and I apologize for my absence.

COAST GUARD C-130 TRANSFER

Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being
late, and I have been chairing Homeland, and it is still
ongoing, which--one quick question. How are we working out on
our joint contract with getting our C-130s for the Coast Guard?
They are working with the Air Force on a project. When can we
anticipate--you know, one C-130 means a whole lot more to us
than it does to the Air Force. Do you have any idea what the
time frame is?
General Welsh. I should, because I was just told this about
3 weeks ago. The program is on schedule. It is on track. Bob
Papp and I talked about this not long ago. It is exactly where
we want it to be. I don't remember the dates. That is my fault.
Let me get it for you.

C-130 TRANSFERS TO THE U.S. COAST GUARD

Mr. Carter. Well, let me know, because as I walked out the
door they said, ask about our C-130s.

The information follows:
Contract award for the HC-130J for the United States Coast Guard is
projected for December 2014, with aircraft delivery expected by
November 2016.

F-16 COMBAT AVIONICS PROGRAMMED EXTENSION SUITE

Okay, Secretary James, according to the Defense news
article, the cancellation of the F-16 combat avionics program
extension system, CAPES, is one of the largest cost-cutting
measures the Air Force is requesting. This program would
upgrade 300 U.S. Air Force F-16s. Part of the CAPES program
also included upgrades to 146 F-16s in Taiwan. Taiwan claims
that the U.S. is not being up front on the cost that they would
be burdened with to upgrade their F-16 fleet if the CAPES
program is zeroed out.
As the co-chair of the Taiwan caucus, I take great interest
in this particular matter. Has the Air Force found a way to
fund CAPES upgrades for F-16s in Taiwan? What liabilities will
Taiwan face if Congress approves to eliminate the CAPES upgrade
for the F-16? Taiwan's Minister of National Defense claims the
U.S. Air Force officials are not providing them with
information they need to take the appropriate action. Can you
please elaborate on this, and explain the actions your service
has to alleviate the issue?
Ms. James. So Congressman Carter, you are right, Capability
Evaluation System (CAPES) was one of the decisions that the Air
Force made to try to meet the affordability targets. It saves
us about $2 billion over the rest of the program (FY15-24) just
to give you an order of magnitude there. My information, so I
am going to have to now go back and look into your information
there, but my information was, of course, we did inform Taiwan
and we don't believe that it will be significant additional
dollars for them as a result of this.
But I heard what you just said, and I am going to have to
take that back, unless the Chief has anything to add at this
point, but that is a little different from the information I
had.
General Welsh. Same thing, ma'am. We don't think there is
an increase to their top line costs at all, and we do believe
they have been notified, so we need to go check this.
Mr. Carter. Well, I want it clarified. When I was in Taiwan
in October, everybody, including the cab drivers, were telling
me that they needed their F-16s. They worry, and they are
worrying even more now that there seems to be a trend of the
big boys pushing the little boys around, coming our way, and
they are worried about it. So do I have time for another
question?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Absolutely.

A-10

Mr. Carter. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going
to go--I know you all have had a little discussion about the A-
10, but I want to ask you some more things about the A-10.
First off, I have--my office manager in my office is a former
Army Command Sergeant Major, and he and many, many, many other
Army people tell me that nothing makes a soldier smile brighter
than a Warthog coming over the horizon, because they do a
fantastic job in the, up close and personal where the Army
needs it. And so from the standpoint of the ordinary soldier,
the loss of that A-10 is a big deal because they really see
that as a--they just smile at me and say, when they fire that
cannon all the way, they almost stop dead still in the air, it
has got so much force. We love that thing.
General Welsh. Might not be a strength of the airplane.
Mr. Carter. He says they are tough enough. You can't shoot
them down. That is what he said. These Army guys, they love the
A-10. But back to the more important thing. It was designed
primarily as a tank killer, and a very effective tank killer,
and we are looking at using it on the battlefields in Central
Europe. Well, as we sit here today, 20,000 Russian troops are
sitting on the border of Ukraine, and it is not beyond our
imagination that we are going to be needing to kill tanks
sometime in the future.
So as we eliminate this effective tank killing airplane,
how--what are we doing to cover these main risks that are
associated with retiring the A-10s? Was the plan to retire the
A-10s coordinated with the Army? What is the plan for the A-10
divestment? Will these aircrafts be put in storage? What is the
prospect of our allies taking the A-10s? What would the Air
Force do if Congress mandated retention of the A-10 fleet? What
will be used to fill the close air support CAS missions
currently filled by A-10s. Are you confident these platforms
will be able to fill the other roles? And finally, you have
stated the A-10 only provides around 20 percent of the CAS
missions. How is that number calculated?
Ms. James. I was going to start, and Congressman, I just
returned from Afghanistan, so I, too, was trying to get every
ground commander that I could ask this very question about the
A-10s. And as you point out, it is a very beloved aircraft, and
nobody likes the idea of retiring it. But you also just
mentioned this 80 percent/20 percent split, so and the chief
will tell you how it is calculated, but this is an important
point; that there are other aircraft--well, let me back up.
A-10, or close air support is a mission. It is not a
platform. So there are F-16s, and F-15Es and some of our
unmanned vehicles and bombers, others do the close air support
mission as well. In fact, 80 percent of the mission in
Afghanistan was done by aircraft other than the A-10, and 20
percent was done by the A-10.
So to answer a couple of your questions, the plan is to
divest it over 5 years, so it is not overnight. It is gradual,
over 5 years. The plan, at the moment, is to fully retire them,
so not to transfer them to other countries. If there would be
other countries interested, I suppose that would be an idea. It
was coordinated with the Army, and as you say, the Army loves
the A-10, but what the Army really needs from us is the
commitment for close air support, and they have that
commitment, absolutely. It is a sacred mission. So those are a
couple of points I wanted to add in.
General Welsh. Sir, I have a son who is a Marine Corps
infantry officer. He tells me the same things about the A-10s.
The CAS is not an afterthought for the United States Air Force;
certainly isn't one for me, and it will not be in the future.
We have been doing close air support for a long time in the
United States Air Force, in a major way since World War II. It
is not going to slow down. We are not going to change, but we
are going to do less of it, just like we are going to do less
interdiction, less air superiority, less ISR, less everything
with these funding levels. And so we had to look at how do you
save big chunks of money. And that is where this came from. It
is not really about the A-10. It is about balance and what an
air commander provides a ground commander. The A-10 does close
air support. The other airplanes we are talking about, F-16s,
F-15Es, the B-1, they do other things besides close air support
in an uncontested environment as we have had in Afghanistan.
For the last 14 years, all we have done that got anybody's
attention is close air support, so people don't understand the
value of the rest of it in a large fight. But where you save
the most lives for a ground commander, if you are an air
commander, is by providing air superiority so they have freedom
to maneuver and freedom to attack; by interdicting the enemy's
will to continue the fight; by destroying leadership command
and control; logistics infrastructure; reenforcement ability
from the rear areas; by eliminating the enemy's second echelon
forces, particularly their operational reserve, which is the
Army commander's biggest concern. Do not let them commit their
reserve at a time and place of their choosing. They don't do
that against us because we erase their operational reserve.
That is where the Air Force has saved big lives on the
battlefield. And then we have to do close air support well. We
do it well with lots of airplanes. The A-10 was designed,
optimized with great help from Congress over the last 20, 25
years, to be superb at this mission. But we are very good at it
with other platforms. I don't want to give up the A-10, but if
you look at what the trades are, you mentioned the backup plan,
it is giving up the capability to do those other things. That
is not acceptable.
Mr. Carter. And I understand the big picture of what the
Air Force provides, the real key to the world is control the
air, especially in a tight battle, if you don't control the air
you are dead. But then in turn, this was designed specifically,
and I am no military expert. Believe me. I just read a lot of
books. But in Korea, for instance, the F-86, they just, the
ground forces discovered that the F-86 went too fast to be
effectively low end protecting them, so they brought in P-51s.
General Welsh. And----
Mr. Carter. Yes, and they used them very effectively
because they said they come by too fast. They are not as good
as--it is not getting in close and personal like they had
experience in the war 8 years ago.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The judge is well read, General.
Mr. Carter. And I just want to make sure that because the
old warthog is a slow lumbering big fortress that comes in and
wreaks havoc and it gets big holes shot in it, I am aware of
that, but it also certainly is--it makes individual soldiers
light up with a smile when it comes in.
General Welsh. Sir, I had a lot of time flying the A-10.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think the General is well aware of our
keen interest in it. Thank you, Judge.
Mr. Carter. All right, thank you very much.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge. Mr. Crenshaw, and Mr.
Cole.

NUCLEAR MISSION

Mr. Crenshaw. I am going to ask a question about the
nuclear missile officer scandal, and I want to point out that
is not a parochial issue. It happened a long way from Florida,
but it raised some serious questions about quality of life,
pointed out the fact that a lot of people are in places where
they don't necessarily want to be. And so I am wondering what
your plans are to make sure you have your personnel where they
want to be, and in a program like this, how you plan on
maintaining that as a career field?
Ms. James. So, in the wake of this incident, which I have
been on the job for 3 months. I think this happened when I had
been on the job for either 2 or 3 weeks, both the Chief and I
went out to the missile bases to sort of directly try to get to
the bottom of what was going on there, and we both came back
with impressions. There were seven impressions. I won't run
through all of them with you, but I will just give you a few;
that there is something systemic going on, you know, that the
cheating was only in this one base, but there were systemic
morale issues, there were systemic cultural issues, I will say,
at all of the locations. And that part of the solution, or I
should say the solution needs to be holistic, not just talking
about cheating. If all you care about is the cheating, you can
proctor the tests differently, and just take care of that and
be done.
But really it is more of a holistic approach. So we have
had these two quick studies going on, one called the Commander
Directed Investigation, and one is called the Force Improvement
Plan. These are coming together and among other things, these
are going to talk about people issues, and what do we need to
do for morale, and professional development, and the
consideration of accolades, and awards, and incentives, and so
forth.
So I think we are very close. By the way, we owe the
Secretary of Defense a report within 60 days as does the Navy.
He got together all of us in the Department of Defense to focus
on the nuclear mission generally. And so our reports are almost
coming due, and so we will have more to share on all of this,
but the main point is, it will be holistic. It will be very
people-focused, and I think we are also going to address this
testing and training environment which at least struck me as
being unhealthy when I saw it.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
Ms. James. The nuclear mission is safe and secure. I want
to say that. There is a lot of checks and balances.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Right, I think that is important. I
think you have done that publicly, reassured us, and actually,
you and I first became acquainted soon after your appointment
and I had two calls from you, and certainly the committee has a
keen interest. I think the public, as we discussed sort of
before the meeting, is unaware of your historic
responsibilities in this regard. I think they need to have a
better awareness. But if you continue to have those
responsibilities, we need to have that assurance which you have
given us.
Ms. James. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But we are--that safety is first here.
Mr. Cole.

SEQUESTRATION IMPACT

Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Having drug us down into
shamelessly parochial issues--that seems to be the phrase of
the day--I am going to avoid that. I am going to ask you a
question for the record, so I just wanted to alert you on C-130
avionics modernization program, which I think the Air Force is
sort of--well, not sort of. I think it has pretty much ignored
congressional intent for 2 or 3 years so I am going to ask a
pretty pointed question about why. But, I want to actually go
back to much, much bigger issues, and you both touched on them
in your testimony. A few years ago, when General Schwartz and
General Luff was sitting in your chair and was briefing this
committee, very justifiable pride about what his airmen had
done the year before, and he ticked off he said, you know, we
have been in combat operations in Iraq. We have done a
wonderful job; been in combat operations in Afghanistan, done
one terrific job. You know, unexpectedly were called upon to
provide support to an important friend and ally in Japan during
a national disaster that they had, and then with 6 days
warning, conducted an air war over Libya that, you know, we can
debate the wisdom of the war, but I don't think you can debate
the success of the effort which was pretty magnificent.
So, and I asked him, and he was warning about sequester
then. I said--well, this was even pre-sequester. I said, given
where we are going on our budget, tell me if you can do that
for another President 2 or 3 years down the road. And he said
no, we will not have the capability. We can probably do two of
these things, maybe on a stretch, three, but we certainly
couldn't do all of them again with the kind of force reductions
that we are looking at. And this is pre-sequester. These were,
you know, first round of cuts.
So I am going to pose the same question looking forward to
you. We have made you both make a lot of very tough decisions I
know you didn't want to make, but I do think we are in danger
of leaving the next Commander-in-Chief, whoever that happens to
be, with a lot fewer options and capabilities than our
Commanders-in-Chief have traditionally enjoyed in the last
couple of decades, or really longer.
So what, if you are looking ahead, you know, and you have
told us you are going to do the best with what you have and I
have no doubt that you will, tell us a little bit, in 2 or 3
years, if we--you can do it either--well, both would be better.
In a sequester scenario, or a non-sequester scenario, but just
sort of steady State funding, what kind of capabilities will
the President have in a crisis situation? What are the things
he can do? What are the number of different contingencies if he
had to face multiple contingencies, and they all do at some
point, you know, what is he going to have to say, no, we can't
do that anymore? Or that is one where, you know, we are just
out of here?
Ms. James. Why don't you go ahead.
General Welsh. Congressman, it is kind of the key question
for service chiefs and for the combatant commanders as they are
trying to advise the chairman and the Secretary of Defense and
the President. We are going to be able to do less, clearly,
which means that we have to look at it in terms of the defense
strategy we have today. If we return to sequestered funding
levels and maintain that through the rest of this 5-year
defense plan and beyond, we will not be able to execute the
defense strategy the way it is written. All the service chiefs,
I believe, are in full agreement on that.
Even short of that, however, if there are adjustments made
as you have done in the balanced budget agreement for the first
couple of years here, if more adjustments are made along those
lines, we still will have to be doing less because we are still
putting a lot more, a lot less on our top line than we had
planned to have on our top line, even 2 or 3 years ago.
And so the ability of the Nation to present options to the
President on how to be using the military sort of National
power, are going to be more limited. You can't continue to stay
involved everywhere we are involved and add new contingencies.
You won't have the capacity.
And in this business, quantity does have a quality all its
own. You can have the best tanker in the world, but if you have
only got one of them, you are not refueling in two oceans. And
so some of this you have just got to have in the back of your
mind as you look at options for the Nation to get engaged.
Mr. Cole. Madam Secretary----
Ms. James. I would just reiterate the point that that
higher level over the 5 years will put us in a much better
position than that sequestration level. We do feel bottom line
that that sequestration level will compromise our security too
much.
Mr. Cole. Well, I just want to thank you both for making
the point, because I think it is, as my colleague, Ms. Granger
mentioned, it is a point we need to make over and over for the
American people, and frankly, for the Congress much more
specifically that these things do have real life consequences,
and we really are going to have Commanders-in-Chief that are
not going to be able to do what we have traditionally thought
American Presidents could do, and should be able to do not only
for this country, but for other countries around the world in
terms of our total security.
So I mean, so it is real stuff we are playing with. It is
not just, you know, my AWACS versus his tankers, versus you
know, an A-10. It really is less capability for the country and
for the President in a time of crisis.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Cole. Points well taken.
Mr. Visclosky.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, do you
have any thoughts on how to formalize a process in conjunction
with the Nuclear Weapons Council, Department of Defense, and
NNSA?
General Welsh. Beyond the current process, I am assuming
you mean?
Mr. Visclosky. Right.
General Welsh. Sir, I think this is one that we actually
worked pretty hard. There are different factors driving
everybody's decisions, obviously, as you move across government
agencies. And the biggest problem we have within National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and ``problem'' is
probably the wrong word, the biggest tension we have trying to
balance our modernization plans with things like the B-61, for
example, with their modernization plans for things like the B-
61, and when we are working on common programs, we have to make
sure that our plans are closely aligned because if one side or
the other deviates from the plan, the funding becomes
inefficient, the program is put at risk, and certainly falls
behind timelines. So we are trying to do that at every level
from the program office up to the Commander of the Air Force
Global Strike Command. It is one of the reasons that our
predecessors put in place a directorate on the air staff
responsible for only nuclear matters to help us in that debate
within the Department and across departmental lines every
single day.
Mr. Visclosky. And I know what the answer should be, and I
am not asking it to put you on the spot or be trite, but both
the chairman and I have chaired the Energy and Water
Subcommittee. I have been ranking on the committee. Mr. Calvert
serves on it today. Ms. Kaptur does, which I think is very,
very healthy because of the coordination of the two
subcommittees and their jurisdiction.
I was always under the impression that DOD may not give as
much thought as possible to all of the cost implications to the
NNSA and the Department of Energy as to what their needs are.
But we need it. But it is in NNSA's budget. It is not on my
line. I need it. Would you just address that if you could? This
is a care or lack thereof.
General Welsh. Yes, I would say you are a smart guy and we
probably ought to go look at this concern. I don't know if--how
I would stand on that. I don't know the history behind this. I
would have to go take a look at this and advise the boss on
where we think this stands. But I can certainly understand what
you are saying the problem could be. I don't know if it is a
problem today or not. I would be making up an answer, sir.

DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

Mr. Visclosky. And you mentioned the B-61, and I do have a
question on that. In earlier testimony, on the 2015 budget, you
reaffirmed the Air Force's commitment to making the F-35 a dual
capable aircraft; that is non-conventional weapons, and there
is a request for $15.6 million in the budget to study and
analyze the fielding of the B-61 on the F-35. There is also a
quarter of the request for $198.4 million for the life
extension program for the B-61 for the integration and
modernization of these gravity bombs for a variant to be placed
on the F-15 and the F-16.
If the F-35 is going to represent a sizeable portion of the
Air Force, and we are going to spend money as far as if you
would be matching up the gravity bomb and the F-35, it is a lot
of money for another variant of a nuclear weapon on a plane
that is going to see less and less use. Andbe I am wondering
from a cost-effective standpoint, is that a wise decision to
spend all of that money on a variant for an aircraft that has
seen better days?
General Welsh. That is a great question, sir. The F-35 is
not yet nuclear capable.
Mr. Visclosky. Right.
General Welsh. The F-16 and 15E are. As we do the
transition between the platforms, I don't know what is going to
happen to funding for the Defensive Counter-Air (DCA)
capability on the F-35 over time. I just don't know. The hedge
is the F-15E. So the F-16 is more of a near-term problem. When
the B-61 first releases, will we still have some F-16s doing
the DCA mission? We think that is possible. Therefore, we plan
to make sure that they are capable of doing the mission. The
policy decision is that we will support the mission. Now, we
don't make that decision.
The F-15E will be capable through the early 2030s, to
support the mission and that is kind of our hedge for the
transition into the F-35. So as the F-35 comes on board, gets
to full operational capability, and we start to actually do the
transition to the F-35 being a DCA platform, if that remains
the policy decision of the Nation, then during that time
period, the F-15E will be here to ensure we can continue the
DCA mission until we can make the transition. That is all this
is intended to be.
Mr. Visclosky. Well, I do have concerns, simply because if
we are talking about a life extension program, it is not
something that is done tomorrow. You know, since, there is some
concurrency as far as the two tracks of the F-35, downward
slope, and I am spending--the taxpayers are spending a lot of
money on doing two life extension programs for a gravity bomb
that probably as we proceed with the arsenal is going to also
see from a numerical standpoint a smaller portion. It is a lot
of money.
General Welsh. Yes, sir. With the timeline for right now,
we still believe the first production unit of the B-61, of the
bomb assembly being developed by DOE will come out in about
2020 or so, late 2019, early 2020. And if that is the case, we
do not believe that F-35 will be involved in the DCA mission
yet at that point.
Mr. Visclosky. Do you think that is necessary?
General Welsh. Is what necessary, sir?
Mr. Visclosky. That if you have a gap, if you would, do you
think that is a critical gap?
General Welsh. Not if the airplane that we have that is
available today to fly the mission in support of NATO, for
example, can carry the weapon. That is the integration with the
F-15E and the F-16. They are the airplanes doing it today.
Mr. Visclosky. Okay, if I could, the Air Force apparently
has been very successful, has an efficient space deterrent
program. Apparently, those processes are going to be applied to
a space modernization initiative, and I guess the question I
have, has the efficient space procurement program gone away,
and are we taking the lessons learned to a new initiative, or
are we going to now have two different initiatives?
General Welsh. No, sir, I don't think so. I think----
Mr. Visclosky. That wasn't confidence building.
General Welsh. She is remarkably able to send thoughts my
way.
Ms. James. Yes.
General Welsh. I will just make a side comment here. I have
never worked with somebody who picks things up as fast as my
new boss does, which is going to be remarkably good for this
committee, I believe, and for the Air Force.
Ms. James. I will give your money later, General Welsh.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You make a pretty good team, but we were
watching your body language very carefully.
General Welsh. She is making me study. The efficient space
procurement strategy really is formed on four principal points,
I will make sure I say them right: Stable R&D funding, block
buys, fiscal authorities that allow you to maintain a smooth
spending profile, fixed-price contracts, and then should cost
reviews throughout the life of a program. And I think we are
talking about the same thing, sir. I don't think that is any
different than the focus areas you are talking about now.
Mr. Visclosky. Do you know if there is a chart or any type
of a document that the committee could have for the record
relative to the initiation of the space modernization
initiative? And if not, if you could for the record answer
that, that would be great.
General Welsh. Yes, thank you very much.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KC-10

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you. Let me associate, as we say,
myself with the ranking, of our interest in getting more
information on both of those questions and points he has
raised.
Getting back to the tankers again, General, I just want to
somewhat put a question into the record. As you know, General
Welsh, the Air Force operates five dozen KC tankers out of
Travis Air Force Base on the West Coast, and Joint Base McGuire
on the East Coast. The Air Force has suggested if the
sequestration returns in fiscal year 2015, it will retire the
entire fleet of KC-10 extenders. I am aware of the Air Force's
argument that it saves more money to retire the entire airframe
because you do not have to maintain the school house, and
maintenance systems, the logistics detail. But how much service
life is left on these KC-10s?
General Welsh. Sir, this wouldn't be a retirement because
we can extend it longer. It can extend longer. The question is,
just where do you take the cuts from? It is back to the balance
discussion. And when we did our operational analysis, we
determined that the KC-10 would be the next fleet that would
make the most operational sense to retire if you had to retire
something. There are no good answers.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. But tell me if I am wrong, the KC-10 is
the only aircraft that has both the boom and the basket to
refuel.
General Welsh. Until the KC-46 starts fielding in 2016----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is still going to be the aircraft of
choice?
General Welsh. Yes, sir. The KC-46 will provide that
capability, but the issue for us is number of booms, not just
how good each boom is. And so if we take the number of KC-135s
away that can pay the same bill, we cannot support the global
mission. If we take the KC-10 fleet away, even though we don't
want to, you can do the mission. It will just put more strain
on it.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Any other questions?
Ms. James. Mr. Chairman, could I also say that is a fiscal
year 2016 issue. So under no circumstances would we do this in
fiscal year 2015. But if sequestration returned, those levels,
if we have to live with those levels, then----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We are going to do our level best to
make sure that sequestration does not return. I think on behalf
of all of our members, I want to thank you for your testimony.
Madam Secretary, General Welsh, appreciate your being here. We
do have a number of questions for the record and if you could
expedite responses, we would appreciate it. The meeting stands
adjourned. Thank you.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Crenshaw and the
answers thereto follow.]

Afghan Pilot Training

Question. The American people have spent billions of dollars
training and equipping Afghan pilots and aircrew so they can be
responsible for their own operations once the U.S. has ended its combat
mission in theater. I am concerned that the political uncertainty
surrounding how many, if any, U.S. forces will be left in Afghanistan
at the end of 2014 will destroy all the work that the United States has
done to build the Afghan's aviation capacity and capability.
Madame Secretary, please provide this committee with an update on
the plan to base Afghan pilots on American soil to continue their
flight training. What are some of your concerns with the proposed plan?
Answer. A temporary stateside training option is being considered
to ensure the Afghan Air Force (AAF) receives the support and training
it needs to safely and effectively employ a platform for conducting air
interdiction and close air support operations within their home
country.
The U.S. Air Force is following its formal strategic basing process
to determine the most suitable location for a contingent of 20 A-29
aircraft for use in Afghan pilot and maintenance training. In its
assessment of possible locations, the U.S. Air Force has identified
Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South
Carolina, as the three candidate bases for a possible Afghan A-29 Light
Air Support training mission. The U.S. Air Force is now accomplishing
site surveys to begin evaluating a range of operational and
infrastructure requirements. If training in the U.S. is to occur,
aircraft may arrive at the host base as early as September 2014, but
the first Afghan trainees would not arrive until February 2015.
We acknowledge that the basing timeline is aggressive and much work
remains. For example, we will need to ensure that appropriate National
Environmental Policy Act requirements are met within this timeframe.
Additionally, it is important that we accept student candidates who are
properly identified and prepared to meet the challenges of operating
and maintaining this aircraft.
Question. Additionally, even though reports of ``green on blue''
attacks has decreased, can you please discuss the security requirements
and procedures that need to be in place to ensure that we are not only
protecting our service members who will be training these aviators, but
also ensure the safety of those who reside on and near these
facilities?
Answer. The United States provides training for thousands of
international students each year in the U.S.--not only with the U.S.
Air Force, but with all branches of the Armed Forces. We are proud to
encourage and enable international partners to work with the United
States to achieve strategic objectives. We have already trained several
Afghan fixed wing pilots in the U.S., and the Army has trained Afghan
helicopter pilots in the U.S.
Vetting requirements are more stringent for training conducted
outside of Afghanistan than for programs conducted in-country. As such,
all potential Afghan Air Force (AAF) trainees are nominated by AAF
leadership for training outside Afghanistan. In-country U.S. and
coalition organizations, in coordination with the U.S. Department of
State, then ensure the trainees undergo proper vetting and meet visa
requirements prior to their departure for the United States.
The proposed Afghan A-29 training squadron would be commanded by a
U.S. Air Force officer in order to facilitate safe and effective
training within U.S. Air Force regulations. Afghan pilots are subject
to the same flying rules and restrictions as U.S. Air Force pilots;
additionally, the training squadron would embed U.S. advisors to
specifically ensure safety in flight operations. The A-29 is a tandem
two-seat aircraft and a U.S. instructor pilot will occupy a seat that
has its own set of flight controls; this allows the instructor to take
control at any time. The U.S. instructor pilot can inhibit any weapons
dropped from the aircraft through a ``consent switch,'' which can
prevent drop commands from the front seat. The training program is
designed to have U.S. presence at the flight controls on all Afghan
training sorties.
The U.S. Air Force plans to hire dedicated personnel stationed at
the location where training will take place. These personnel take
measures to discourage possible absences and will maintain contact with
the students on a daily basis to include weekends.

B-2 Defensive Management System

Question. The Air Force indicated in the fiscal year 2014 budget
justification materials that modernization of the B-2's Defensive
Management Systems (DMS) was the number one priority modification
program for the B-2 and critical to ensuring that this platform will
remain survivable against the world's most advanced adversary
technologies. However, the fiscal year 2015 request for the B-2 DMS
program is $160.6 million below what the request was when the fiscal
year 2014 budget was submitted last year.
What are the impacts to the scheduled fielding of the upgraded B-2
DMS capability should the committee approve the Air Force's fiscal year
2015 budget request for this program?
Answer. The Air Force's fiscal year 2015 budget request will delay
fielding of the B-2 Defensive Management System modernization by two
years. Initial operational capability will be 2021 instead of 2019, and
full operational capability will be in 2022 instead of 2020.
Question. Does the new schedule for fielding this capability
adequately address emerging threats to the B-2?
Answer. The new fielding schedule adequately addresses emerging
threats to the B-2. The new schedule will not impact the enhancement of
the B-2 direct attack capability by addressing emerging and future
threats and robust modern Integrated Air Defense Systems. The delayed
fielding does delay the reduction of the risk to the aircraft and
aircrew, but the risk is acceptable.
Question. Could additional funding for this program accelerate the
schedule for deploying the new capabilities?
Answer. No. Additional funding for the B-2 Defensive Management
System would have negligible impact to the schedule for deploying the
new capabilities.

Light Air Support Foreign Military Sales

Question. This committee has been committed to ensuring that the
United States is able to provide our international partners with the
ability to provide light air support for their ground forces. This is
especially important for nations like Afghanistan who have limited
infrastructure and capabilities. While many nations cannot afford to
buy and maintain large jet fighters, it is still essential that they
have sufficient air power to counter threats to security and stability.
Secretary James, in the fiscal year 2014 Omnibus Appropriations
bill, Congress instructed the Air Force to provide notice prior to
entering into any contract for LAS aircraft. How is the Air Force
handling requests for light support aircraft? Also, please describe the
status of the LAS foreign military sales program and discuss any
potential buyers.
Answer. All requests for light support aircraft (LAS) are processed
by the Air Force in accordance with established policies and
procedures. We acknowledge the provision in the fiscal year 2014
Consolidated Appropriations Act to provide notice prior to entering
into any contract for future LAS aircraft. If a security cooperation
partner nation requires LAS capability, the acquisition strategy would
depend on the funding source. If the new country uses its own national
funds, it could specify that the purchase be made from a specific
contractor (sole source) for its LAS-like aircraft, like Iraq did with
the AT-6. If a partner nation is relying on Department of Defense (DoD)
funding, such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund appropriation, as
in the case for the LAS for Afghanistan, the Air Force would compete
the effort in accordance with U.S. acquisition statutes and
regulations, to include the Competition In Contracting Act.
Currently, the Air Force is executing a Letter of Offer and
Acceptance (LOA) for 20 A-29 aircraft for Afghanistan and has received
a Letter of Request (LOR) from Iraq for 24 AT-6C aircraft. A fiscal
year 2014 Global Train and Equip (Section 1206) case for an
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)-only LAS platform
has been approved for the country of Yemen. Additionally, the Republic
of the Philippines has submitted an LOR for price and availability for
LAS aircraft, to which the Air Force has responded. However, the
Philippines has not pursued this aircraft acquisition any further, at
this time.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Crenshaw.
Questions submitted by Mr. Calvert and the answers thereto follow.]

Evolved Expendable Launch Program (EELV)

Question. Is it your intent to sole source launches for which a New
Entrant could compete?
Answer. The Air Force intends to compete portions of the launch
manifest each year in 2015, 2016, and 2017 if there is even one new
entrant is ready to compete (i.e., they have successful launches and
have completed the required certification steps as documented in their
certification plan). Currently, the Air Force plans to compete 7 of the
8 missions in fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2017 that we assess new
entrants as being able to lift: NROL-79, AFSPC-9, GPS III-4, 5, & 6,
SBIRS-5, NROL-47. The 8th, SBIRS-4, is planned for the 36-core buy to
maintain requirements contract terms and preserve $4.4 billion in
savings gained. The Air Force is committed to competition as soon as a
certified New Entrant exists and is examining options to compete 8
instead of 7 missions in the fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2017
timeframe.
Question. It is our understanding that there are actually five
missions that New Entrants have the capability to compete for in 2015
alone: GPS III-3, NROL-61, NROL-42, NROL-79, SBIRS-4. Were you aware of
this and if so will you open these missions to competition, as was
clearly the letter and spirit of the Kendall Acquisition Directive?
Answer. There are updates to your information. First, GPS III-3 is
currently planned to be awarded in fiscal year 2014. Second, our
current assessment indicates that the Falcon 9 v1.1 cannot launch NROL-
61 or NROL-42 payloads. Additionally, the satellite designated for
NROL-61 is a fixed-price contract, which includes the launch service as
government furnished equipment. We will not open up a previously
awarded fixed price contract. NROL-79 is planned for competition. SBIRS
GE0-4 was moved into the 36 core buy to preserve requirements contract
terms and the $4.4 billion in savings achieved with the block buy. The
Air Force is committed to competition as soon as a certified new
entrant exists and is investigating options to compete 8 instead of 7
missions in the fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2017 timeframe.

U-2, Global Hawk, and High Altitude ISR

Question. Two years ago the Department of Defense wanted to cancel
the Global Hawk Block 30. At the time, the Department stated that while
the two systems had roughly equal operating costs, the U-2 collected
far better imagery. What has changed in the last two years that led to
this about-face?
Answer. The Department of Defense determined the RQ-4 Block 30 will
be sufficient over the long-term to meet intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements when considered within the total
portfolio of ISR capabilities. The lower operating cost of the RQ-4, as
seen in the reduction of the system's cost per flying hour and enabled
by its greater endurance, became the primary driver for retaining the
RQ-4. Although upgrades to the Block 30 will cost more in the near-term
versus keeping the U-2, the potential long-term savings provided the
rational basis to retain the RQ-4 Block 30.
Question. These two platforms, the Global Hawk and the U-2, have
some overlap, but they each bring unique capabilities to the high
altitude ISR mission. Furthermore, both systems are being heavily
employed overseas. Should we be reviewing these as rival, rather than
complimentary systems?
Answer. The Air Force has long viewed the RQ-4 and U-2 as
complementary systems, but cannot afford to maintain both in the
current fiscal environment. Both systems provide unique capabilities to
the warfighter, and if the Air Force could maintain both fleets, it
would.
Question. If the U-2 retires, will there be a gap in our capability
to collect intelligence?
Answer. With a force structure reduction, there will be less
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity to meet
conventional peacetime and wartime requirements; however, the
Department of Defense has determined that the RQ-4 Block 30 force
structure is sufficient when considered within the total portfolio of
ISR capabilities. Some losses in ISR capability can be mitigated with
planned upgrades to the RQ-4 and the Air Force is accepting some
increased risk to combat and peacetime ISR collection capabilities. Any
specific mission, capability, or capacity gaps must be discussed at a
classified level.
Question. When the Department of Defense wanted to cancel the
Global Hawk Block 30 two years ago, the Air Force had 18 aircraft
delivered or on contract. Congress mandated that the Air Force purchase
three more that had already been appropriated, bring the total fleet to
21. The program of record was for 31 aircraft. If the U-2 is retired,
will there be a need to procure more Global Hawks?
Answer. Based on Joint Requirement Oversight Council requirements,
the current programmed fleet of 21 Block 30 will be sufficient. There
will be no need to procure any RQ-4 aircraft beyond the pith-filed 21
aircraft.
Question. What are the plans to increase the Global Hawk's
capabilities in the Pacific theatre?
Answer. The RQ-4 Block 30 is already operating in the Pacific. The
fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request funds Block 30 improvements
to increase operational reliability, including improved performance in
inclement weather and avoiding conditions previously resulting in early
recovery or flight cancellations. In addition, the budget request
provides funding to transition unique U-2 sensor capabilities to the
Block 30 in the future years defense program at fiscal year 2015
funding levels. Starting in the third quarter of fiscal year 2014, the
RQ-4 will open up a temporary forward operating location in Japan to
improve mission reliability during the Pacific typhoon season. In
addition, the first deployment of Block 40 early operational capability
(pre-initial operational capability) is scheduled to deploy to Guam in
mid-2014.
Question. Do you plan to adapt the U-2's sensors for the Global
Hawk?
Answer. The Air Force plans to capitalize on our long experience
with the U-2 as we transition the conventional high altitude
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) responsibilities
solely to the RQ-4. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request
provides investments to transition unique U-2 sensors to the RQ-4 Block
30. An engineering feasibility study is ongoing with a report due to
the Congress this summer. Pending the outcome of this study, the Air
Force will develop plans to integrate the Senior Year Electro-Optical
Reconnaissance System (SYERS) and the Optical Bar Camera (OBC) on the
RQ-4 Block 30. However, the sensor transition to Block 30 will be
deferred if the budget is reduced to the Budget Control Act levels.
Question. One of the Global Hawk's perceived shortcomings is its
difficulty in avoiding bad weather, which is a particular problem for
the Pacific theater, and its lack of an anti-icing system. What are the
plans to address these concerns?
Answer. The Air Force's fiscal year 2015 budget request includes
funding for three distinct efforts related to these concerns:
1. A weather radar system that will enable operators to avoid
thunderstorms;
2. Ice shape testing to better understand how icing conditions
affect the airflow over the Global Hawk's wing; and
3. A heated cowling on the Global Hawk's engine inlet which will
prevent ice buildup.
All three efforts are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2015.
Question. The U-2 carries the wet-film Optical Bar Camera (OBC),
which produces high-resolution digital imagery; it is highly trusted,
making it critical to certain situations--such as the U.S. mission to
monitor the Middle East peace treaty. If the U-2 retires, how will you
address this capability gap?
Answer. The Department of Defense does not intend to gap Middle
East peace treaty support and is pursuing options to fulfill this
requirement based upon the fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request.
The Optical Bar Camera (OBC) capability is not available from any other
Department of Defense platform. OBC is a ``wet film'' sensor, providing
broad area synoptic coverage. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget
request provides funds to transition the U-2 OBC and the Senior Year
Electro-Optical Reconnaissance System sensor to the RQ-4 Block 30 by
fiscal year 2019. In the interim, the Air Force and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are assessing OBC capability
options from the time of U-2 shutdown until RQ-4 is capable and
approved for the mission. Those plans will be developed by the Air
Force and coordinated with the rest of the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and the National Security Council, as required.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Calvert.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the answers thereto follow.]

E-3

Question. General Welsh, we still have Homeland Security
responsibilities and the strategy calls for U.S. forces to ``defeat'' a
regional adversary in a large-scale, multi-phased campaign, and
``deny'' the objectives of, or impose unacceptable costs on, an
opportunistic aggressor in another region. Does it make sense to lose
the most effective, efficient, and qualified crew members ever
assembled on the E-3? How do you capture the experience of service
members who have developed special E-3 skills and experience when you
do away with the one and only E-3 Reserve squadron?
Answer. In order to retain maximum flexibility to fulfill combatant
commanders' requirements, execute the strategy as described above, and
endure a high operations tempo, the best way forward is to transition
to an all-active duty E-3 AWACS force structure and to divest the
reserve squadron. The ultimate decision to divest this squadron was a
result of Budget Control Act-mandated reductions. Being responsive to
homeland security requirements and global ``defeat'' and ``deny''
operations requires a force that can be deployed at a moment's notice.
Because we do not want to lose these highly qualified E-3 Reserve
aircrew members, we intend to retain their operational knowledge and
Airmanship expertise within the Reserve force. In fiscal year 2016, the
Air Force plans to incorporate the Reserve AWACS 513th Air Control
Group into the Reserve KC-135 Wing currently at Tinker Air Force Base,
Oklahoma. Four KC-135s and E-3 Reserve personnel will be added to the
KC-135 Wing.
Please note that the fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request
decisions were a Total Force effort and each component--Active,
Reserve, and Guard--recommended these tough choices in light of fiscal
constraints.
Question. General Welsh wouldn't it make more sense to augment the
Reserve squadron and reduce the number of active duty E-3s if you
wanted to save money and preserve a mission? How did you arrive at this
recommendation and did you consider alternatives?
Answer. In light of the Budget Control Act (BCA)-directed
reductions, the Air Force concluded it is most prudent to trade
capacity in order to retain capability. Based on Title 32 limitations
for utilizing the Reserve force, the best course of action for meeting
both BCA-directed reductions and maintaining the maximum ability to
fulfill combatant commanders' requirements was to divest 7 E-3 aircraft
and both associated active duty and Reserve personnel. Augmenting the
Reserve force would not increase flexibility to meet prioritized
combatant commanders' requirements and fund modernization of the aging
command and control (C2) enterprise. Modernization of the C2
enterprise--AWACS 40/45, JSTARS recapitalization, 3-Dimensional
Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR) acquisition, Air Operations
Center (AOC) 10.2 upgrade, and Deployable-Radar Approach Control (D-
RAPCON) acquisition--is critical to the Air Force being ready to meet
the operational demands of the future fight in 2023 and beyond.
Please note that the fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request
decisions were a Total Force effort and each component--Active,
Reserve, and Guard--recommended these tough choices in light of fiscal
constraints.
Question. General Welsh, most recently, the 513th ACG activated yet
again for 180 days May-Nov 2012 to deploy and completely take over the
OEF Mission in Afghanistan, as the Active Component could not maintain
their mission without the 513th Air Control Group. Without their
support, there wouldn't have been enough AWACS crews able to deploy in
theater. How will the Air Force adjust to meet the demand for this
asset?
Answer. The Budget Control Act and the resulting sequestration-
level funding constraints compelled the Air Force to make changes and
cuts that will impose higher near-, mid-, and far-term operational risk
across a broad range of mission areas and platforms. These constraints
drove the Air Force to assume additional risk with the E-3 AWACS in
order to fund critical modernization of the aging command and control
enterprise. The E-3 AWACS inventory reduction will exacerbate
operational shortfalls. As with other high demand/low density
platforms, the Air Force will provide assets to meet the critical
priorities of combatant commanders through the global force management
process.
Question. Cutting platforms and programs such as JSTARS, Compass
Call, and AWACS, removes high demand, low density assets that support
the combatant commanders. I'd like to understand the rationale behind
the decision to cut high demand, low density assets and how that
comports with the priorities that were laid out in the QDR and the
Defense Planning Guidance.
Answer. The fiscal environment required tough choices, and the
fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request cuts capacity across all
Air Force missions. Due to these constraints, the Air Force chose to
trade capacity in order to sustain critical modernization for airborne
and ground command and control (C2) systems to remain operationally
viable for contested/highly contested environments. The capacity
reduction permits completion and fielding of E-3 AWACS Block 40/45 by
2020, continuing modernization of legacy E-3 AWACS avionics systems,
and other needed C2 modernization, including: Deployed Radar Approach
Control; Air Operations Center 10.2; and Three Dimensional
Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR). In order to improve E-3 AWACS
capacity, we are funding an analysis of alternatives to evolve the E-3
AWACS mission into a more efficient and effective platform, similar to
the E-8 JSTARS recapitalization effort. The EC-130H Compass Call fleet
reduction was another tough decision given the unique and critical
capability it brings to combatant commanders. Over the next five years,
even with the reduction of half the fleet, there will be capacity to
support most combatant commander airborne electronic attack
requirements. It also allows time for analysis to replace the
capability in a manner that will allow operation in the range of non-
permissive combat environments outlined by the Quadrennial Defense
Review and Defense Planning Guidance.

C-130 AMP

Question. The fiscal year 2014 President's Budget stated, ``with
termination of C-130 Avionics Modernization program (AMP), the Minimize
C-130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management
(CNS/ATM) option provides minimal airspace compliance focused program
to modify 184 C-130H aircraft.'' It is alarming that the Air Force has
identified the C-130 AMP for termination after investing over $2
billion in the program.
Even more alarming is the fact that even despite funds being
appropriated in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 for the program of
record, those funds have remained unobligated and it appears no effort
has been made to move the program forward. To date, C-130 AMP has been
on cost and schedule since 2007, and resulted in the delivery of five
modified aircraft and four additional kits. Moreover, a robust training
program is in place with full motion simulators and multiple aircrews
and maintenance personnel have been trained.
Secretary James, the Air Force has ignored congressional intent for
the past three budget cycles and does not plan to obligate funding
authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2014 for the C-130 AMP. The
Air Force has sunk $1.5 billion in developing and testing this
successful program and now plans to shelve the taxpayers' investment.
Why has the Air Force not continued the C-130 AMP program?
Answer. In today's fiscally constrained environment, C-130 AMP is
too expensive ($3.15 billion for 187 aircraft) and not all upgrades are
essential. A reduced scope C-130 CNS/ATM program meets Federal Aviation
Administration and international airspace requirements at a
significantly lower cost--$0.62 billion. Due to fiscal year 2013 budget
constraints, the Air Force attempted to cancel the C-130 AMP and
replace it with the reduced scope ``Optimize Legacy C-130 CNS/ATM''
program. Section 143 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 prohibited the Secretary of the Air Force from taking
any action to cancel or modify C-130 AMP until a period of 90 days
after the Secretary submitted to the congressional defense committees a
cost-benefit analysis. This congressionally mandated analysis was to
compare the C-130 AMP to a reduced scope CNS/ATM program and be
completed by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The Institute
for Defense Analysis (IDA) study, delivered to Congress on November 15,
2013, recommended that the Air Force not continue the AMP program.
Accordingly, the fiscal year 2014 President's Budget request funded a
reduced-scope ``Minimize C-130 CNS/ATM'' program to meet minimum CNS/
ATM requirements and ensure global access. However, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 again prohibited C-130
AMP cancellation pending a Comptroller General sufficiency review of
the IDA study. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request funds
the reduced scope C-130 CNS/ATM solution; however, the Air Force is
unable to proceed until Congress removes the restrictive legislative
language.
Question. Secretary James, in lieu of C-130 AMP, the Air Force
plans to develop a lesser avionics modernization capability that will
not provide the required capability throughout the service-life of the
C-130 aircraft to meet FAA and international airspace flight
restrictions. What is the cost to develop a lesser avionics
modernization program that will satisfy airspace flight restrictions to
keep C-130 aircraft relevant and capable through year 2040, its
projected service-life?
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request includes
funding for the C-130 CNS/ATM program. This program will allow the C-
130H aircraft to meet the January 2020 Federal Aviation
Administration's airspace mandates. The total fiscal year 2015 Future
Years Defense Program funding for the C-130 CNS/ATM program is $177.8
million and is planned to be complete in fiscal year 2023.

Readiness of Combat and Mobility Services

Question. General Welsh, in what year will you achieve sufficient
readiness in your combat and mobility air forces to fully support the
requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance? How would you
characterize the operational risk incurred in executing the 2012 DSG
and supporting combatant commanders' steady-state rotational and
warfighting requirements between now and that date?
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request allows the
Air Force to begin recovering readiness, but recognizes it will likely
not fully recover until sometime around 2023. The current strategy
requires the vast majority of Air Force units to be ready now. The
proportion of Air Force units required to be ready to meet this
strategy will actually have to increase as the Air Force continues to
shrink.
Air Force readiness recovery is heavily influenced by ongoing
operations, as time and resources consumed in supporting current
operations limits opportunities for units to train for the full
spectrum of potential operations. Operational demands over the last
twelve years have eroded the Air Force's ability to conduct the full
range of Air Force missions, especially complex missions conducted in
contested and highly contested environments.
Regarding operational risk, rotational mission readiness currently
meets combatant commander rotational demand, but leaves few, if any,
other forces available for surge or emerging requirements. Return to
Budget Control Act funding levels in fiscal year 2016 or roll-back of
the force structure divestitures in the fiscal year 2015 President's
Budget would substantially increase risk in Air Force readiness.

KC-10

Question. General Welsh, if the Air Force is required to execute
fiscal resources at Budget Control Act levels, what operational risk do
you incur by having to divest the entire KC-10 tanker aircraft fleet?
What other programmatic options would you have to execute if Congress
prohibited the retirement of the KC-10 aircraft?
Answer. If Budget Control Act level caps are maintained into fiscal
year 2016 and the Air Force is forced to divest the KC-10 before
sufficient numbers of KC-46s are fielded, we would have less
flexibility in meeting air refueling demands across a broad spectrum of
operations, resulting in fewer ready forces to support current
strategic guidance. The resulting tanker force will be smaller, but
still required to meet pre-divestiture air refueling demand levels.
Higher tanker readiness and availability levels are required to meet
the strategy.
If the Congress prohibits the Air Force from retiring the KC-10
fleet, the Air Force's ability to meet the strategy will be at greater
risk and we would be forced to shift critical funds from our readiness
and recapitalization/modernization accounts, as well as consider
reductions in other parts of our force. These may include deferring KC-
46A procurement and reducing the KC-135 and the C-5 fleets. Budget
Control Act-imposed cuts to our readiness and recapitalization/
modernization accounts would mean a less capable, smaller force that is
even less ready for tomorrow's fight.

F100-229 Engines

Question. General Welsh, its my understanding that the production
line for F100-229 engine, which powers F-15s and F-16s, will shut down
by the end of calendar year 2016. I am also aware that the Air Force
has a validated shortfall in spare 229 engines to meet wartime
requirements. Can you confirm this for me and please tell us what the
Air Force plans to do about procuring the required spares before the
production ends?
Answer. While the Air Force currently has an adequate level of
serviceable F100-229 engines available for mission needs, there is an
overall shortfall of spare engines in the logistics pipeline. Based on
the latest Propulsion Requirements System (PRS) engine acquisition
computation, there remains a requirement for 25 additional F100-229
spare engines which we hope to fund if resources allow. Absent these
additional engines, the Air Force has and will continue to intensively
manage the F100-229 logistics pipeline, particularly during peak engine
overhaul periods. As of April 4, 2014, the Air Force has 52 serviceable
spares available.

Civilian Workforce and Depots

Question. What is the rationale for funding depot maintenance at
only 70 percent of the requirement and do we anticipate that the
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request will increase the
percentage to at least 80 percent as some have speculated? I have heard
it said that 80 percent, that is about as much as the organic depots
can handle; however, I am aware of some civilian personnel cuts in the
Air Logistics Centers (ALCs). If we are funding Air Force depot
maintenance at the highest level the depots can handle at their current
capacity levels, why would we need to cut civilian employee levels?
Answer. All of weapon system sustainment (WSS) is funded to
approximately 70 percent without Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding in fiscal year 2015 and the Air Force expects an OCO submission
that will bring the portfolio to approximately 80 percent. This funding
level balances capability and capacity with readiness, as our limited
resources require strategic choices. Our organic depots are not
operating at capacity, but organic depot workload is planned more than
a year in advance of any given fiscal year. This planning timeline is
required to balance workforce with workload and makes it difficult to
adjust industrial and contract planning to accommodate near term
funding changes.
Overall depot manning is based on the workload and funding received
as intended under Title 10 United States Code Section 2472, which
prohibits the management of the depot workforce ``on the basis of any
constraint or limitation in terms of man years, end strength, full-time
equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees.'' The Air Force
has used targeted Voluntary Early Retirement Authority or Voluntary
Separation Incentive Program (VERA/VSIP) for skills leveling at the
depots to shape the workforce so that the right skill and capability is
available as workload generates. The depots primarily use normal
attrition to accommodate these changes; however, based on the
demographics of the workforce and changes in workload requirements, a
VERA/VSIP is required when normal attrition will not achieve
requirements.
Question. As you know, Congress has not been too keen on BRAC, yet
the Department has continually requested a BRAC. Deputy Secretary Fox
has said that we need a BRAC to cut civilian personnel especially at
depots. If granted BRAC authority, would you expect to look at depot
capabilities within the Air Force? Also, if not granted a BRAC, should
we expect to see your current authority to try and close or realign
depots or other organic industrial facilities?
Answer. The Air Force considers the retention of a strong and
viable industrial base as critical to our ability to successfully
complete the Air Force mission. The Air Force continually reviews
requirements to ensure that a ready and controlled source of repair is
maintained within the organic depots. The capabilities that exist and
that are planned are sized to ensure the Air Force has the capability
to support the warfighter. Capabilities within the organic depots are
sized and structured to enable the Department of Defense to satisfy 10
USC 2464. Any final analysis of capabilities or consideration of
realignment under BRAC would be conducted at the Department of Defense-
level, not by the Air Force. At this time, the Air Force does not
anticipate using any of its current authority to try and close or
realign depots or other organic industrial facilities.

Weather Data

Questions. As you may know, the National Weather Center located in
Norman, Oklahoma is in the OK-04. Delays and significant cost growth to
development of joint NOAA-Air Force weather satellites have caused both
agencies to embark on different paths to get weather information once
previous satellite development programs were cancelled. The nation
faces a ``weather data gap'' during the next few years as a result.
Secretary James, what is the Air Force strategy for development of
the next generation of Air Force Weather satellites, to replace the
venerable Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) that provides
crucial weather data to support DoD combat operations?
Answer. The Air Force's Weather System Follow-on, introduced in the
fiscal year 2015 President's Budget request, will provide a foundation
to transition from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program to
future capability to satisfy Department of Defense overhead weather
requirements. In fiscal year 2015, we will begin acquisition planning
and strategy development to include sensor interface design and
development, and ground processing system upgrades to process civil and
international partner system data.
Question. Secretary James, please summarize the key features of the
recent ``analysis of alternatives'' conducted by the Air Force, and
highlight in particular the recent thinking that DoD will rely on other
sources of weather data beyond those developed with the DoD or U.S.
government.
Answer. The Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) began by assessing the military utility of 12
capability gaps identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), which formed the requirements basis for the AoA. The AoA
validated the military utility of 11 of the 12 capability gaps and
analyzed these gaps to determine if a Department of Defense (DoD)
materiel solution was warranted to address each gap. In determining
possible materiel solutions, two factors were considered: 1) The
likelihood that currently programmed civil and international SBEM
systems will be available to, and usable by, the DoD; and 2) the
operational risk tolerance for noticeably increased dependence on non-
DoD assets. Within these parameters, a diverse set of alternatives was
developed that ranged from no materiel solution through a materiel
solution that addressed the entire set of capability gaps identified by
the JROC.
The SBEM AoA ultimately determined that the nearest term
operational risks were associated with the following capability gaps:
Ocean Surface Vector Winds, Tropical Cyclone Intensity and Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) Energetic Charged Particle Characterization. The fewest
mitigation options exist for these gaps, which prompted the Air Force
to pursue a potential materiel solution that addresses these specific
capability gaps. This is a pre-decisional approach, pending formal
review and approval with the JROC and Milestone Decision Authority.
In addition, the DoD currently accesses international SBEM data
through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to
support military operations. The DoD's agreement with NOAA allows it to
not only share its SBEM data, but also access international partner
data from a variety of partner environmental monitoring satellite
systems. This relationship highlights the DoD's current reliance on
international data, which is expected to continue and increase in the
future.
Question. Secretary James, a number of companies are willing to
finance, build, and launch their own weather satellites that can
perform some of the missions that the Air Force seeks in its analysis
of alternatives. This approach can be attractive since no government
procurement or research & development funds would be necessary during
the next few years, and later the Air Force could simply purchase
weather data as needed, using operations & maintenance funds. What role
does the Air Force envision for commercial sources of weather data from
U.S. companies in its analysis of alternatives?
Answer. The Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) documented that the nearest term operational risks
were associated with the following capability gaps: Ocean Surface
Vector Winds, Tropical Cyclone Intensity and Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
Energetic Charged Particle Characterization. It was determined that
these specific capability gaps warranted a Department of Defense (DoD)-
specific materiel solution due to the unacceptable level of risk of
reliance on civil and international SBEM systems to fulfill these
capability gaps. However, the purchase of weather data will be
considered as part of the materiel solution trade space, pending Joint
Requirements Oversight Council endorsement of the SBEM AoA results in
the third quarter of fiscal year 2014 and review of the acquisition
approach with the Milestone Decision Authority in the fourth quarter
fiscal year 2014. For the remaining capability gaps assessed within the
SBEM AoA, it was determined that DoD can rely on its civil and
international SBEM partner systems to provide the data that meets these
capability gaps.
The Air Force is not pursuing commercial sources of weather data at
this time. The Air Force is focusing its limited resources on
addressing specific gaps through a DoD materiel solution. The SBEM AoA
did not identify any existing or potentially viable commercially
available systems that can fill these gaps.
Question. Secretary James, what specifically has the Air Force done
to encourage development of commercial sources of weather data in the
United States, similar to what our nation did a decade ago to develop
commercial sources of imagery and mapping data for the intelligence
community?
Answer. The Air Force has considered the use of commercial sources
of weather data as part of the Weather System Follow-on risk reduction
activities and the recent Space Based Environmental Monitoring Analysis
of Alternatives (SBEM AoA). Specifically, Air Force Space Command's
Space and Missile Systems Center awarded a contract to a commercial
company to study the benefits and possible drawbacks of utilizing a
commercial approach to obtaining weather data. A key objective of the
study was to demonstrate weather system architecture trades in the
context of annual fee-for-service arrangements.
The purchase of commercially available weather data is dependent
upon several factors including the endorsement of the SBEM AoA results
in the third quarter of fiscal year 2014 and review of the acquisition
approach with the milestone decision authority in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2014. The Air Force has not taken any action to preclude
the purchase of cost effective and operationally assured commercial
weather data in the future.
Question. Secretary James, When does the Air Force plan to hold an
industry day for possible U.S. commercial sources of weather data?
Answer. The Defense Weather Systems Directorate (DWSD) at the Space
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is planning a Weather Partnership
Council meeting for the third quarter of fiscal year 2014, once the
Weather System Follow-on (WSF) materiel solution strategy is approved
by the Milestone Decision Authority. This meeting will provide the
opportunity for the DWSD to meet with government and industry
environmental monitoring stakeholders to discuss the current status and
the path forward for the weather system follow-on activities.
The Air Force and NOAA participated in an experiment called COSMIC
(Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere, and
Climate) with the Government of Taiwan to test the concept of ``GPS
radio occultation'' which is a highly accurate technique to derive
measurements of temperature, pressure, and water vapor at all altitudes
by observing the ``bending'' of radio signals from Global Positioning
System satellites. This technique also enables prediction of solar
activity that is potentially damaging to satellites, power grids, and
military and civil communications.
Question. 1) What is the Air Force plan to contribute funds or in-
kind assets to a COSMIC-2 follow on program? 2) How many COSMIC-2
satellites are in the Air Force plan and budgets? 3) Provide all Air
Force and other DoD funding for COSMIC-2 by appropriation, fiscal year,
and line item. 4) How do COSMIC-2 sensors compare to those to be flown
by U.S. commercial weather satellite industry? 5) Compare data latency
in the COSMIC-2 approach with that of the commercial approach, and the
need for a dedicated U.S. funded ground stations.
Answer.
1) At this time, there is no planned COSMIC-2 follow-on program.
The equatorial plane of COSMIC-2 is currently in production, while the
polar plane is being contemplated. Following COSMIC-2, the Department
of Defense will likely benefit from the type of data COSMIC-2 provides,
regardless of source.
2) The Air Force is not purchasing any COSMIC-2 satellites. The Air
Force is purchasing the primary and secondary payloads to be flown on
spacecraft procured and operated by Taiwan. The payload suite includes
the Tri-Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Radio-Occultation
System (TGRS), the Radio Frequency (RF) Beacon, and the Ion Velocity
Meter (IVM).
3) Air Force funding procured primary and secondary payloads for
the COSMIC-2 satellites through the Space Situational Awareness
Environmental Monitoring (SSAEM) program. The following amounts were
appropriated under the SSAEM Budget Program Activity Code (BPAC):
Air Force, RDT&E-FY10, $15.501 million, PE
0604425F, Line Item 73--$2.5 million of that fimded COSMIC-2
activities
Air Force, RDT&E-FY11, $55.548 million, PE
0604425F, Line Item 70--$40 million of that funded COSMIC-2
activities
Air Force, RDT&E-FY12, $38.1 million, PE 0604425F,
Line Item 65--$30 million of that funded COSMIC-2 activities
4) At least two companies propose operating a weather satellite
constellation using the same radio frequency occultation technology as
COSMIC-2. One company plans to use the same receiver the Air Force
developed for COSMIC-2 via the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Another
company plans to use a previous version of the receiver which operates
today on COSMIC-1.
5) COSMIC-2 data latency is expected to be about 30 minutes, but
will depend in part on the ground system that the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration is developing. The expected data latency is
sufficient to meet the Department of Defense's requirements for this
type of data, particularly over the Pacific Ocean. Commercial proposals
cannot meet this requirement at this time. The Department of Defense
will meet this latency requirement by using existing weather satellite
ground equipment located around the world.
Question. Secretary James, why is the Air Force using its funds,
at the time it is making drastic cutbacks to U.S. military programs, to
support the government of Taiwan?
Answer. No U.S. funds are provided directly to Taiwan under this
joint program. In fact, the United States is leveraging $241 million
provided by the Taiwan government to procure the COSMIC-2 spacecraft
and integrate U.S. provided payloads. The Air Force has developed the
primary and secondary payloads to fly on each of the COSMIC-2
equatorial spacecraft. This partnership is a highly leveraged and cost
effective means of providing the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) with
the high quality data upon which the Air Force Weather Agency and the
National Weather Service relies. In addition to DoD and NOAA, COSMIC-2
data will be shared with the international weather community, including
several countries which are providing ground receive sites and
services.
Question. Secretary James, why is it acceptable to have weather
data for U.S. military operations being under the control of a foreign
nation?
Answer. Historically, the legacy Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program has fulfilled the United States military's most essential and
critical space based environmental monitoring operational needs.
Nevertheless, the United States military has long benefited from the
civil collection capabilities of National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and from the international sharing of weather data
facilitated by the World Meteorological Organization. For over 25
years, the United States, including the Department of Defense, has
utilized environmental imagery and data from satellites operated by our
European and Japanese allies to support resource protection and safety
of maneuver. We have also demonstrated assured access to weather data
by partnering with Taiwan in the Constellation Observing System for
Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate (COSMIC-1) program. In the future,
the Department of the Air Force's Weather System Follow-on, combined
with continued access to our civil and international partner
capabilities, will continue to fulfill the Department of the Air
Force's minimal essential environmental sensing requirements.
Consistent with the National Space Policy, the Department of
Defense will continue to expand international cooperation in space and
leverage our international partners' capabilities, as well as existing
commercial capabilities, to augment dedicated United States
capabilities.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole. Questions
submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto follow.]

Air University

Question. Knowing the value you place on Air University and
recognizing the fiscal environment we are facing, coupled with the
President's Budget request to conduct a BRAC in 2017, would you please
address:
a) The importance of Air University as it relates to other
priorities
b) The importance of future investment in Air University
c) Any opportunities to consolidate other forms of education
at Air University
Answers. The importance of Air University as it relates to other
priorities. As the education center of the Air Force, Air University
produces the future. Education is a force multiplier that increases the
ability of Airmen to accomplish the mission and defend the nation. Air
University centrally manages citizenship and accessions, professional
military education, professional continuing education, and graduate
technical education programs for the Air Force, making it unique among
the four uniformed services. Under one organization, an enormous range
of educational programs are developed and extended to hundreds of
thousands of active duty, Guard and Reserve, and civilian Airmen, joint
service members, and international coalition partners every year. While
training imparts specific skills for a defined current need, education
develops critical thinking and leadership skills for the future. Both
are necessary to produce a force that can secure the Nation's interests
today and for the future. The airpower dominance that the United States
has come to expect derives in part from Airmen who are equipped with
the knowledge, competencies, and thinking skills to confront unexpected
strategic and operational challenges. As the force shrinks, the
importance of consistently improving the ability of all Airmen grows. A
flexible, educated force is essential to secure the Nation's future
security needs.
The importance of future investment in Air University. Air
University operates at a nominal cost to educate the force compared to
rising costs for technology and equipment. Air University programs
reach high school students (Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps),
college students, and virtually every enlisted, officer, and civilian
Airman, expanding their knowledge and their capacity to think logically
and critically as they confront an increasingly complex world,
unpredictable adversaries, and an uncertain future. Resources spent to
educate Airmen pay dividends in improved performance over a career and
a lifetime. Through career-long learning, Airmen become better prepared
to serve in more advanced leadership roles; Airmen who leave the
service are better assets for their communities and for the country.
Any opportunities to consolidate other forms of education at Air
University. The Air Force consolidated nearly all education mission
elements at Air University. The efficiently-sized headquarters staff,
compared to the number of programs and students, supports and manages
accredited programs in five academic centers and one advanced studies
program at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and at the Air Force
Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Air University
fields accredited programs and awards associate through doctorate
degrees that meet established Air Force requirements with an annual
enrollment of more than 170,000 Airmen. Past efforts to identify
further opportunities to consolidate Air Force education missions
focused on merging Air University with the United States Air Force
Academy. To date, the Academy's unique mission has precluded further
consolidation for commissioning education. Additionally, legal
constraints prohibit expanding Air University programs to overlap or
encroach on civilian academic programs. Nevertheless, Air University
continues to transform educational programs to take advantage of the
most current educational techniques and technologies. Delivering the
right education at the right time and place in an Airman's career is
one of the key priorities for the university.

Associate Units

Question. Does the Department see a further integration of the Air
Guard and Air Force Reserve units with the Active forces? More
specifically, are you pursuing an expansion of Guard/Active associate
units and Reserve/Active associate units as a mission effective and
cost effective solution for both fighters and airlift?
Answer. Yes. Over the last three years, the Air Force has increased
our associations from 102 to 124--a 22 percent increase. The Air Force
is also committed to associate every new F-35A and KC-46A unit based in
the continental United States.
We are constantly performing analysis to arrive at the appropriate
force size and force mix to further integrate the active component with
the reserve component, which can be traced back to the National
Military Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance. Cost is only one
factor in the decision. All options are checked against the analysis
for operational viability, efficiency, effectiveness, benefits, and
risks. Final programmatic decisions are negotiated with inputs from a
variety of stakeholders across all three components. Programmatic
changes to size and mix are made each cycle in order to continue to
meet demands and strategic goals within current fiscal constraints.

F-35

Question. Does the department plan to equip the Guard and Reserve
forces with newer aircraft such as the F-35, at the same time as the
Active forces?
Answer. The continental United States basing plan for the F-35
includes Hill Air Force Base, Utah (active duty), followed by
Burlington Air National Guard Base, Vermont (Air National Guard). No
other basing decisions have been made beyond these two locations at
this time. The Total Force-Continuum (TF-C) has an on-going analytical
effort underway that will produce detailed options for approximately 80
percent of the Air Force by the end of calendar year 2014 and that
analysis will inform future active/reserve component mix decisions.

Application Assurance Center of Excellence

Question. The Consolidated Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2014,
consistent with the $10 million authorization provided by the fiscal
year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, contained a $10 million
appropriation for the Application Assurance Center of Excellence at
Maxwell AFB-Gunter Annex in Montgomery. What is your timeline for
acting on this?
Answer. The Air Force intends to begin obligating funds by the end
of May 2014. The Air Force Chief Information Officer is maturing the
Air Force's strategy to organize a comprehensive software assurance
plan which will utilize the capabilities of the Application Software
Assurance Center of Excellence.

Aircraft Engines

Question. During Secretary Hagel's remarks before the announcement
of the President's Budget, he alluded to a $1 billion investment in
aircraft engines. Can you clarify or expand on what this initiative
entails? Is there an expected RFI or RFP announcement this year that
addresses this initiative?
Answer. The Air Force has invested in adaptive engine technologies
through the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) effort (FY07
to FY13) and the Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) effort
(FY12 to FY16). The acquisition strategy for the $1 billion investment
Secretary Hagel announced is still in development, but the Air Force is
working to maintain competition as long as possible in this follow-on
effort. If the Department of Defense is held to sequestration levels
for fiscal years 2016-2019, we expect no funds will be available for
the next generation engine technology program.
All future aircraft engines are likely to benefit from
technologies proven through this program. In addition, the anticipated
fuel savings could free-up funds for the Air Force to invest in the
modernization of other Air Force warfighter capabilities. The next
generation engine program, a follow-on to AETD, will further mature
adaptive engine technologies through extensive ground testing to
facilitate integration and flight testing. The emphasis is on proving
advanced component and subsystem maturity prior to incorporation into
major systems.
The Air Force is in the process of developing the acquisition
approach, so specific program titles (``Adaptive Engine Transition
Program'' is only a notional program name at this point), goals, and
milestones are yet to be defined. However, the next generation engine
program has an objective of reducing specific fuel consumption by 25
percent, yielding a 30 percent increase in range, which will be game-
changing for the Department of the Air Force's capability to operate in
highly contested environments. The program will increase performance,
durability, and efficiency in jet engines and bolster the nation's
engine industrial base for the future.

Dual Launch

Question. Please provide an answer, including dollar amounts, on
what savings could be achieved by launching two satellites on one
flight, occasionally known as ``dual launch.'' a) Please provide a
constellation of satellites the Air Force would consider a prime
candidate for dual launch? My understanding is that adaptation costs to
the launch vehicles and satellites is approximately one tenth or less
compared to the savings achieved by essentially launch two launches at
once. b) Do other launch providers (domestic or international) take
advantage of dual launching satellites as a way to achieve launch cost
savings?
Answer. Dual launch is one possible approach to lowering launch
costs, assuming the two satellites are going to the same orbit or
orbital plane. The Air Force considers the GPS constellation as the
primary candidate for dual launch due to the large constellation size
and required replenishment rate. It is correct that adaptation cost to
the launch vehicle and satellites is approximately one tenth or less
compared to the savings achieved by launching two satellites on one
launch vehicle. Air Force analysis has shown that dual launching GPS
III satellites can save the Air Force up to $80 million per dual
launch. Currently, other Global Navigation Satellite Services such as
Galileo (European Union) and Glonass (Russia) perform dual and triple
launch of satellites as a way to rapidly populate the constellation and
reduce cost.

Launch Competition

Question. Is the Air Force providing competitive launches solely
for new entrants to prove themselves capable irrespective of any
additional cost imposed onto the taxpayer?
Answer. No, a new entrant must ``prove themselves capable''
through the certification process before they can be awarded a contract
to launch national security space missions. We believe that competition
and the existence of a competitive environment are essential to locking
in savings for the future.
The Air Force did compete the DSCOVR and STP-2 launches among
prospective commercial new entrants via the Orbital-Suborbital Program-
3 contract. They were ideal risk-tolerant missions for potential new
entrants to demonstrate system capabilities on missions requiring EELV-
class performance.
Question. For any competition to be real, and of benefit to the
taxpayer, the launch services provider must launch on schedule. Is the
Air Force willing to impose financial penalties for failing to do so?
Answer. The terms and conditions to be included in the request for
proposals are still in the review and approval process. The Air Force
was directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 to brief the appropriate congressional committees on the plan to
implement the new acquisition strategy at the same time the Air Force
releases the draft request for proposals.
Question. What evidence has the Air Force been provided that
indicates new entrants will be able to meet their launch schedule?
Answer. The Air Force monitors the launch schedule of all domestic
launch providers for national security space, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, and commercial payloads. The Air Force has not
yet finalized the acquisition strategy for Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) competition; however, the Air Force will assess the
cost, schedule, performance, and risk of all competitive bids.
Question. Will the added costs of adding a duplicative launch
provider to the EELV market offset any cost savings of competition?
Answer. The Air Force intends to compete launch services, not
launch capability. Any cost incurred by a competitor will need to be
reflected in their offered pricing of the service. We do not anticipate
needing to pay more for a competed launch service than we would in a
sole source environment. Our experience has shown that competition
drives down cost for services.
Question. How is the Air Force accounting for the added costs of
the additional launch vehicles and additional infrastructure it must
carry with a second provider, for a total of 3-4 launch vehicles
(Atlas, Delta, Falcon)? As I understood there are currently 4 EELV ULA
Pads (2 Atlas and 2 Delta from both the East and West Coast and there
are 3 new entrant pads (1 pad on each coast and the newly acquired pad
39A).
Answer. We do not anticipate needing to pay more for a competed
launch service than we would in a sole source environment. The Air
Force intends to compete launch services, not launch capability. Any
costs incurred by a competitor will need to be reflected in their
offered pricing of the service. Our experience has shown that
competition drives down the cost of services.
Question. Do any new entrants currently possess the necessary
processing facilities required to launch all the nation's Air Force and
NRO payloads?
Answer. At the current time, none of the new entrants involved in
any portion of the certification process with the Air Force possess
either the lift capability or the appropriate processing facilities
required to lift the entire National Security Space manifest.

Auditing, Oversight, and Accounting Rules

Question. Should new entrants be required to comply with the same
auditing, oversight, and accounting rules that are cuffently applied to
United Launch Alliance? If not, why do you think different rules should
apply to new entrants?
Answer. All potential EELV competitors will be expected to comply
with the applicable auditing, oversight, and accounting standards
established in the acquisition strategy the Department of Defense
ultimately pursues. Specific requirements will be contained in the
requests for proposal.
Question. Should government auditors be able to verify that funding
disbursed prior to a launch was used to pay for materials, salaries,
and expenses pertinent to that launch vehicle and its specific mission?
Answer. Yes, for non-commercial contracts the contractor is
required to account for costs in accordance with its disclosure
statement and Federal Acquisition Regulations. For all government
contracts, the contractor is required to submit proper invoices and/or
vouchers for payment in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Launch Competition

Question. To what degree should the government rely on this
commercial backlog in assessing the viability of a supplier?
Answer. The Air Force is not relying on the commercial backlog to
assess the viability of a launch supplier. The Air Force's decision to
award a launch services contract requires the determination that the
system vvill meet technical requirements and the contractor is deemed
responsible in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Question. What insight is typically required to determine whether a
contractor has sufficient capacity and financial stability to meet its
contractual commitments?
Answer. In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.104-1,
to be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must:
(a) Have adequate financial resources to perform the
contract, or the ability to obtain them;
(b) Be able to comply with the required or proposed delivery
or performance schedule, taking into consideration all existing
commercial and governmental business commitments;
(c) Have a satisfactory performance record;
(d) Have a satisfactory record of integrity and business
ethics;
(e) Have the necessary organization, experience, accounting
and operational controls, and technical skills, or the ability
to obtain them;
(f) Have the necessary production, construction, and
technical equipment and facilities, or the ability to obtain
them; and
(g) Be otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award
under applicable laws and regulations.
For (a), (e), and (f) above, the contracting officer shall require
acceptable evidence of the prospective contractor's ability to obtain
required resources. Acceptable evidence normally consists of a
commitment or explicit arrangement that will be in existence at the
time of contract award, to rent, purchase, or otherwise acquire the
needed facilities, equipment, other resources, or personnel.
For (b) above, the contracting officer typically relies on an
evaluation of the technical proposal by subject matter experts.
For (c) above, the contracting officer typically relies on recent
and relevant reports obtained from past performance tracking systems,
such as the Past Performance Information Retrieval System.
For competitive source selections where past performance is an
evaluation factor, the assessment of performance record also typically
uses past performance questionnaires.
For (d) above, a review of the System for Award Management,
Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System, and
Excluded Parties List System is performed.
For (g) above, the contracting offer typically reviews the
representations and certifications included in the prospective
contractor's proposal.
Question. Do you know if such an analysis has been performed of the
new entrant space launch companies and if so, do you believe there are
any risks for the financial stability and viability of new entrants? If
so, what areas would you look at most closely?
Answer. The Orbital/Suborbital Program (OSP)-3 contract was awarded
to be compliant with Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.104-I(a). Under
this requirement, a Contractor Responsibility Determination was
executed for each of the three companies who were awarded OSP-3
contracts (Orbital Sciences Corporation, Lockheed Martin Corporation
and Space Exploration Technologies). Each of those determinations
concluded that that the awardees had adequate financial resources to
perform the contract, or the ability to obtain them.

STP-2 Mission C

Question. Please provide an update on the STP-2 mission?
a. It was to be launched on a Space X Falcon Heavy rocket with the
latest launch date in mid-2015. Is this still the expectation? If so,
please provide a list of milestones.
b. If not, please explain the new plan and what tasks the $60
million, already disbursed, was used for.
c. If there is a change to the mission, please explain the reason
for the change in plans.
Answer.
a. The current date for Initial Launch Capability of the STP-2
mission is August 2015. The mission milestones are:
Service Requirements Review; complete: The
contractor presented a review of their requirements analysis
for the STP-2 mission which included mission requirements
decomposition, allocation, and validation. This is how the
contractor demonstrated understanding of their performance
obligations to the government in meeting terms of the contract.
Mission Design Review-1; complete: The contractor
presented a mission design concept to meet the mission
requirements. The contractor also presented a review of their
preliminary design for new items, new interfaces, or design
modifications that must be implemented to meet STP-2 mission
requirements.
Mission Unique Review; complete: The contractor
presented their preliminary design for the payload satellite
dispenser to include the separation system, dispenser design,
analysis, and test/verification plans. This review also
included delivery of a computer aided design model, an
integrated test plan, and a Finite Element Model of the
dispenser.
Mission Design Review-2: The contractor will present
a mission critical design concept to meet the mission
requirements. They also will present a review of their critical
design (90 percent) for new items, new interfaces, or design
modifications that must be implemented to meet STP-2 mission
requirements.
Pre-ship Review: The contractor will present the
pedigree of their hardware, status of factory testing of flight
hardware, status of preparations to ship hardware to the launch
site, status of the launch to receive flight hardware, and the
status of launch documentation and readiness to start the
launch campaign.
Launch Readiness Review: The contractor will present
the status of the final launch vehicle preparation, testing,
and readiness to conduct final launch countdown procedures.
b. The mission plan remains unchanged. The $63.9 million already
dispersed was for the work completed against the first three milestones
above, which are annotated as ``complete.''
c. The Air Force is processing a no-cost change to the initial
launch capability date of the STP-2 mission to accommodate space
vehicle driven delays. The details of this contract change are not yet
finalized.

Re-Competition for Cores

Question. Some have asked for a re-compete of part of the most
recent block buy of cores. What costs would that incur, directly and
indirectly (including lost savings) and how would other programs or
tasks paid for by those anticipated savings be impacted?
Answer. If the Phase 1 contract with United Launch Alliance (ULA)
is re-competed, the government walks away from the most cost and
operationally effective acquisition strategy and its 36-core commitment
to ULA, thereby breaching the contract. The government can expect ULA
to re-price the 36 cores on the contract, thereby eliminating the some
portion of the $4.4 billion in savings resulting from this strategy,
and exposing the Department of the Air Force to potential litigation as
ULA's prices with its subcontractors and suppliers will likely
increase.
Assuming the Phase 1 contract with ULA is terminated for
convenience in its entirety on October 1, 2014, ULA would not be able
to complete its launch services for National Security Space (NSS)
missions (at least 15) procured under previously awarded contracts.
This is due to an Interdependency clause associated with Launch
Services procured through ULA. On the date of termination, ULA would
stop production and the launch of rockets in support of NSS
requirements. This would significantly delay launches for those 15
missions already on other contracts, potentially adding substantial
costs (currently not available) to the satellite programs and delaying
critical national space capability to the warfighter, putting our space
constellations at risk. If a termination occurs, the contractor would
provide a termination proposal which would then identify the costs
related to the termination. Termination costs will not be known until
the termination proposal is received. Re-procurement costs are also
unknown.
In addition to the costs above, ULA would seek payment for
termination liability of $371 million as reported by ULA in their March
2014 Contract Funds Status Report for Launch Capability. Launch
Capability is needed to support launch vehicle production, satellite to
launch vehicle integration, launch site activities and launch for the
Phase 1 contract and for the other existing EELV active contracts. As a
result there would be financial consequences on the current contract as
well as on the other EELV active contracts. The total magnitude of
these costs is currently unknown. Due to interdependencies, NASA
contracts may be impacted as well.
It is not possible to estimate competition driven savings until
proposals are received.

Launch Services

Question. Please specify the typical percentage amount of payment a
launch services provider received prior to the actual launch. For
example, it is 40 percent to allow ordering of long-lead items?
Answer. Typically, launch services are paid in accordance with the
Progress Payment clause--Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.232-16
as follows:
``(1) Unless the Contractor requests a smaller amount, the
Government will compute each progress payment as 80 percent of the
Contractor's total costs incurred under this contract whether or not
actually paid, plus financing payments to subcontractors (see paragraph
(j) of this clause), less the sum of all previous progress payments
made by the Government under this contract. The Contracting Officer
will consider cost of money that would be allowable under FAR 31.205-10
as an incurred cost for progress payment purposes.''
Question. Is it typical for a launch provider to be paid an amount
equal to 100 percent of three or more launches (prior to launch)?
Answer. The contractor is paid for work performed in accordance
with the payment terms in the contract. In the Air Force's Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) launch program, the contractor is
normally paid using progress payments in accordance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. In our experience, it is not typical to pay 100
percent of three or more launches prior to launch.
Question. If a provider claims that the early funding is required
for additional launches later, is there an accounting of what materials
require more than a 36-month lead-time?
Answer. Funding is obligated to the contract at the time of
contract award. Contractors are paid via the payment terms in the
contract after costs are incurred. The most typical payment terms are
52.232-16 Progress Payments for fixed priced contracts and 52.216-7
Allowable Cost and Payment for cost reimbursement contracts.
Yes, there is an accounting of materials. Both payment clauses
require the submission of proper invoices or vouchers which include a
description of supplies or services.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen and the answers thereto
follow.]

A-10

Question. Of all the ANG A-10 squadrons being divested nation-wide,
Idaho was the only one not to receive a stand-alone replacement flying
mission (at Gowen Field) like the other A-10 units. How was that
decided?
Answer. Once the decision to divest A-10s was made, the Air Force
worked across the total force to mitigate impacts, leveraging the
unique characteristics and capabilities offered at each A-10 location.
We considered numerous options for replacement missions, determining a
classic association at Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB) maximized
value to the Air Force. This determination was supported by the
following:
Gowen Field is a relatively short commute to Mountain Home
AFB (51 miles gate to gate)
This option provides an opportunity for Air National Guard
(ANG) entry into the F-15E community; F-15Es are currently undergoing
critical radar and electronic warfare modifications, so we expect the
fleet to be a critical global precision attack asset well into the
2030s
This option provides the active duty F-15E community a
path to the ANG; and provides the opportunity for additional personnel
if some Idaho ANG A-10 pilots do not want to transition to become
weapon system officers (F-15E back-seaters)
Question. Was a business case analysis used to determine the most
cost efficient course of action in this divestiture and re-missioning?
If so, please provide the details.
Answer. No, a full business case analysis was not performed. In
reviewing an array of divestiture and re-missioning options for the
Idaho Air National Guard, the Air Force viewed consolidating two flying
units at a single location (Mountain Home AFB) where the necessary
infrastructure already exists as the inherently more efficient and
fiscally responsible option. The alternative of doubling the
requirement for facilities to support two units flying the same number
of aircraft was considered untenable, given current budget constraints.
Question. This proposal seems counter to the recommendation
recently published by the National Commission on the Structure of the
Air Force. In light of that report, would the Air Force/National Guard
Bureau consider making the 124th Fighter Wing a pilot unit for the
iWing concept described within the report?
Answer. The Total Force--Continuum (TF-C) is currently evaluating
the recommendations outlined in the National Commission on the
Structure of the Air Force report. This includes recommendations on the
iWing concept. Through this evaluation, TF-C will explore the proper
force mix per mission area, along with valid options associated with
potential pilot programs outlined in the National Commission on the
Structure of the Air Force report.

F-15E Aircraft at Gowen Field

Question. Are there sufficient F-15E (Combat Coded, Backup Aircraft
Inventory and Attrition Reserve) available worldwide to stand up a 7th
F-15E (Active Associate) at Gowen Field while maintaining both current
active duty F-15E squadrons at Mountain Home? Did the Air Force
consider leveling all F-15E squadrons at 18 Primary Aircraft
Authorizations to establish a 7th F-15E squadron?
Answer. There are 138 combat-coded F-15E aircraft in 6 F-15E
squadrons; 5 with 24 primary aircraft assigned (PAA) (2 each at RAF
Lakenheath in the United Kingdom and Seymour Johnson AFB in North
Carolina, and 1 at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho) and 1 with 18 PAA at
Mountain Home AFB. Each squadron also has 2 to 3 backup aircraft, which
are required to maintain enough aircraft available while aircraft
rotate for depot or are down for maintenance. In addition, there are 2
attrition reserve aircraft (needed in case of mishap or combat loss) in
the entire combat-coded fleet.
Further, there are two different engines (-220 and -229) used in
the fleet, and we keep each squadron ``pure'' for logistics cost/
efficiency reasons. This is important because the only aircraft that
can be considered for carving out a 7th squadron would come from the 24
PAA units using the -229 version of the engine, meaning the two RAF
Lakenheath squadrons and the one Mountthn Home AFB squadron. The Air
Force considered the option of adding a 7th squadron, but it was not
selected due to the following operational issues.
The F-15E community has a 1:3 deploy-to-dwell rate, meaning on
average a unit is deployed 6 months out of every 2 years; we do not
expect this deployment rate to change in a post-Operation Enduring
Freedom environment. For deployments, combatant commanders require 24
PAA units. If we create an 18 PAA unit at Gowen Field, we would have to
take 6 each aircraft from the two 24 PAA RAF Lakenheath squadrons and
the 24 PAA Mountain Home AFB squadron, meaning only the two North
Carolina units would still have the required 24 PAA. This would create
an unsustainably high operational tempo and burden on these units and
the community.
When a 24 PAA unit deploys, there is some residual capability at
home station permitting the unit to continue with valuable upgrade and
continuation training; this capability is not available to 18 PAA
units. Squadrons have fixed overhead costs and requirements, so smaller
units are less efficient.
In addition, the extra pilots at the squadron, group, and wing all
have to be trained in the F-15E, which places increased burden on our
formal training unit (FTU). The F-15E FTU is already over-stressed and
unable to produce sufficient numbers of pilots. For safety reasons
based on net explosive weights, Gowen Field cannot handle some of the
munitions used by the F-15E. Gowen Field would likely require some
operation and maintenance funding to accommodate the F-15Es requiring a
site survey for precise costs.

Movement of Personnel from Boise to Mountain Home

Question. What criteria were used in the proposal to move the 550
Guardsman from Boise to Mountain Home for a Classic Association? Is
there a set of basing criteria considered to move this significant
number of personnel? If so, please provide those details.
Answer. The Air Force and Air National Guard ultimately agreed that
a 545-personnel classic association at Mountain Home AFB was the best
balance for maximizing efficiencies while continuing to meet F-15E
rotational demand during the A-10 divestment and 124th Fighter Wing
conversion to the F-15E. This was an operational decision and did not
qualify for the strict basing criteria the Air Force reserves for
movement of platforms between bases.
There will be zero Air National Guard billets/jobs lost in the
transition. The 545 personnel are both full-time and part-time
personnel from the operations and maintenance groups (74 and 471,
respectively) needed to fill a 6-ship deployable package in each of the
two active duty F-15E squadrons at Mountain Home AFB, as well as
associated personnel at the wing, group, and operations support
squadron. It is best for unit integrity and the mission to move the
operations and maintenance personnel together.
Question. With the significantly longer commuting distance from
Boise to Mountain Home, were the time constraints, safety, recruiting
and retention of Traditional (part-time) Guardsman considered?
Answer. We recognize there may be some inconvenience in the commute
and that some Guard members may choose to separate or retire as a
result of the move. However, early indications are that this will not
be a significant problem, and we also expect some active duty Airmen
from Mountain Home AFB and other F-15E units will transition to the Air
National Guard to fill any open billets.
Experience from St. Louis/Whiteman AFB, and other classic
associations, suggests there will be minimal impact on recruiting and
retention. For example, in Virginia the Air National Guard unit at
Richmond was closed and re-located to Joint Base Langley-Eustis with
minimal effects on recruiting and retention.

124th Wing

Question. The 124th Wing, like all Air Force wings, is comprised of
4 Groups: Operations, Maintenance, Support, and Medical. The Air Force
proposal would relocate two of those groups, Operations and
Maintenance, to Mountain Home AFB. Under this proposal where the 124th
Wing is geographically split (two groups at Gowen Field in Boise, and
two at Mountain Home AFB) was the long term viability of the entire
IDANG as a military unit into consideration?
Answer. For the integrity of the training and operational mission,
it is vitally important for the operations and maintenance groups to
move to Mountain Home AFB. The mission support and medical groups were
considered for movement, but ultimately it was decided to leave them in
place at Gowen Field where they retain their facilities and remain
viable supporting the base and providing medical services. It is also
likely better for the Guard members within those groups who will not
have to commute.
In terms of viability, the range control squadron which is part of
the 124th Fighter Wing is already operating out of Mountain Home AFB.
There is no indication that this is degrading the viability of the
unit. Further, there is precedent in other states. For example, there
are split operations for the B-2 between St. Louis and Whiteman AFB in
Missouri (an approximately 3-hour commute). A few Guard members left
the unit, but most made the transition and recruiting was not an issue.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Frelinghuysen.]
Thursday, March 27, 2014.

FISCAL YEAR 2015 ARMY BUDGET OVERVIEW

WITNESSES

HON. JOHN M. McHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

Opening Statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Good morning. The Committee will come to
order.
This morning, the Committee holds a public hearing on the
posture of the United States Army and the budget request for
the Army for fiscal year 2015. We welcome back to the Capitol
our friend and former colleague, the Honorable John McHugh,
Secretary of the Army, and General Ray Odierno, Chief of Staff
of the Army.
I speak for everybody in this room when I thank both of you
for your long and valuable service and to the men and women you
represent, who have had repeated deployments overseas and make
up the force that continues to serve in Afghanistan as we speak
here this morning. We honor all of those. And we particularly
honor those who have paid the supreme sacrifice as well as
those who have physical and mental wounds who live with the war
each and every day. We honor all of them.
There are many challenges facing our great Army, and this
morning we will discuss personnel issues, readiness, equipment
modernization and reset, current operations in Afghanistan,
obligations to the Pacific region, research and development,
and the lack of an overseas contingency operations budget,
among other important topics.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING

The Army budget proposal is $116 billion. In addition, the
Department of Defense has forwarded an $80 billion placeholder
in lieu of a formal request for funding of overseas contingency
operations. These operations, war operations, are still
essential to the safety of our troops and to our national
security and to security in that part of the world--a very
dangerous and unpredictable place.
We have discussed this in private, but I will say it again
publicly: This Committee, in the strongest possible terms,
urges the Department of Defense and all of our services to work
together to provide us with verifiable and defensible line-item
data on projected costs of our overseas operations as quickly
as possible. We have a bill to write.
Of course, the Committee is very concerned about the
challenges facing the Army for current operations and
readiness. We understand the difficulty in reducing spending in
operations, personnel, and modernization accounts in order to
satisfy budget control requirements. But we have made the
decision to leave--we have left Iraq, and we are exiting
Afghanistan, and, of course, one might anticipate that we would
have reductions in a variety of accounts, including end
strength.
Innovative thinking is required, and the road to a lower
top line is never smooth. We expect to have a thoughtful
discussion on force structure and personnel and also on several
major programs:

KEY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

A new infantry fighting vehicle remains a major goal for
the Army, as does the continuation of fielding components of
the information network of sensors, software, and radios that
the Army has been assembling since 2011.

AVIATION RESTRUCTURE

Your proposed aviation restructure is designed to retire
all OH-58-series helicopters, the Army's only remaining single-
engine helicopter. The Active Component will downsize by 887
helicopters, and the Army National Guard will cut 111
helicopters. However, the plan moves all the Apaches from the
Army Guard to serve as a reconnaissance helicopter for the
Active Component. Whether or not to keep Apaches in the Army
Guard remains a contentious issue.
Last point: The Army is people. There is no room for sexual
assault in its ranks. Good soldiers do not abuse one another,
and this committee nor Congress will tolerate it.
We will ask our witnesses for their summarized statements
in a moment, but I do want to recognize the distinguished
ranking member, Mr. Visclosky, for any comments he may wish to
make.
[The opening statement of Chairman Frelinghuysen follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Remarks of Mr. Visclosky

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding the hearing; gentlemen, for your service and your
attendance today.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING

And I do want to associate myself with the chairman's
remarks in their entirety, but particularly his comments about
the overseas contingency operation fund. And, again, we have
had the discussions, but, as the chairman pointed out, we do
have legislation that will be on the floor shortly, so I
appreciate your comments.
And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
Secretary McHugh, thank you for being with us this morning.

Summary Statement of Secretary McHugh

Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Distinguished Ranking Member Visclosky, fellow former
colleagues, members of the subcommittee, I deeply appreciate
the opportunity.
This is my fifth chance to appear before you to talk about
the work of our soldiers, our civilians, and our leaders over
this past year and to, as you said, Mr. Chairman, discuss very
important matters of the current state of America's Army in
what I think we can all agree are very uncertain and perilous
times that lie ahead, particularly if the requirements in this,
our budget proposal, should not be approved.
I think it is important that I be clear up front: The time
for action is now. And perhaps more than any other time
certainly in recent years, we need your leadership, we need
your help and your support. We must have this budget to
properly restructure, reduce, and to revamp our force, and,
quite frankly, we need it to protect your Army as we march into
a dangerous and unpredictable future.
As members of this subcommittee, you know full well that
the cuts that we have already endured from the Budget Control
Act and sequestration have significantly damaged our readiness,
drastically reduced our modernization programs, and demanded,
as the chairman noted, sharp cuts to our end strength.

SHORTFALL IN READINESS FUNDING

These, coupled with a significant shortfall for the Army in
2013 in OCO funding, caused us to enter this year with a $3.2
billion hole in readiness alone. The bipartisan budget
agreement does, happily, provide some temporary relief, but we
still are implementing a $7.7 billion cut to our fiscal year
2014 budget request, and to meet our top-line requirements, we
have had to cut another $12.7 billion from our 2015 submission.
In order to protect current operations, our combat power,
as well as our soldiers and their families, we have been forced
to make extremely hard choices in this budget that impact
virtually every component, every post, camp, and station, and
limit nearly every modernization and investment program. Trust
me, this is not what we wanted. It is not what I think your
Army deserves. But it is what we have had to do to preserve
America's land power in such an austere fiscal environment as
constructed by the dictates approved in law.

COMBAT, RETROGRADE, TRANSFORMATION

Now, in spite of turbulent funding and tremendous change, I
think it is fair to say this past year has been one of great
transition, transformation, and, yes, triumph for America's
Army, not just here at home but across the globe as well. From
intense combat to counterterrorism and retrograde, to
humanitarian relief, disaster assistance, and regional
engagement, your soldiers and civilians from every component--
Active, National Guard, and Reserve--have seen unprecedented
success, saved countless lives, and promoted freedom and
democracy in some 150 nations around the world.
In Afghanistan, as your Army continued to fight insurgents
and terrorists, we further transitioned into a training and
support role, helping to set conditions for elections in April
and appropriate withdrawal in December.
Simultaneously, we are conducting one of the largest
retrograde operations in history, returning, removing, or
demilitarizing some 580,000 pieces of equipment in the past 12
months alone. We plan to retrograde $10.2 billion of the Army's
$15.5 billion in equipment that currently remains there.
From Europe to the rebalance to the Pacific to South
America and beyond, as our forces perform vital missions around
the world, we began a major transformation to reorganize our
brigade combat teams. We have also accelerated end strength and
cut our headquarters staff, all of these things designed to
protect critical readiness and seek more balance under these
budgetary constraints.
As we continue to retrograde, restructure, and reduce, we
also continued our transition to decisive action training,
replacing our recent focus on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately,
due to severe cuts in fiscal year 2013, we were forced to
cancel seven combat training rotations and significantly reduce
home station training.
Although we ensured deploying units were fully trained,
sequestration cuts directly impacted the training, readiness,
and leader development of more than two divisions' worth of
soldiers. Although our readiness levels will increase through
this year and into 2015, the looming return of sequestration in
2016 will quickly erode these gains.
I would be very remiss if I did not mention the
extraordinary burden our civilian employees have faced over the
past year through pay freezes and furloughs. Although our
fiscal year 2014 appropriation brought some relief, I truly
fear that we have yet to see the true impacts of these cuts on
their morale and their retention.
Our fiscal year budget reflects the challenging fiscal
times in which we live by making the hard strategic choices
now. It contains a number of very difficult decisions to
further reduce end strength, realign our aviation assets,
prioritize near-term readiness, and protect our soldier and
family programs. We do much of this by taking calculated risk
in modernization and facility initiatives. This budget, as
such, is lean, it is stark, but it is critical to meeting the
needs of our Nation and our soldiers.

END STRENGTH

In this request, we will begin further reduction to our end
strength, reaching 450,000 Active, 335,000 Guard, and 195,000
Reserve soldiers by the end of fiscal year 2013. It is
important to note that we are also adjusting our force mix in
favor of the Reserve Component. This is the maximum end
strength we believe we can afford to protect readiness and the
minimum we need to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.
Nevertheless, this clearly is not without risk.

AVIATION RESTRUCTURE

As the chairman mentioned, we must restructure our aviation
portfolio. We know this is controversial, but we believe we
have no choice. The money is gone, and we must rebalance these
vital assets in a way that maximizes our readiness and
minimizes costs across all components.
This initiative will generate significant savings by
reducing our total number of platforms from seven to four. We
will divest the older, less capable Kiowa and TH-67 trainers in
favor of Apaches and Lakotas. In support, the Guard will
transfer their low-density high-demand Apache attack
helicopters to the Active Army and receive over 100 of our most
modern Blackhawks, a platform which is far more ideal for their
dual combat and state support role.
This is the right thing to do. It allows us to better
sustain a modernized, more capable fleet across all components
and significantly reduce sustainment cost. Once again, the vast
majority of these cuts, a total of 86 percent, come from the
Active Army. Overall, the Guard's fleet will decline by just 8
percent, while the Active force declines by some 23 percent.

CARING FOR PEOPLE

As you said, Mr. Chairman, at its core, our Army is people.
Accordingly, we are committed to protecting effective soldier,
civilian, and family programs and, where appropriate, adding
resources. In fact, we increased funding by nearly 46 percent
across a myriad of programs associated with a ready and
resilient campaign.
From the prevention of sexual harassment, assault, and
suicide to transition assistance and comprehensive soldier and
family fitness, we are determined to meet the needs of our
warriors, employees, and families. We have a sacred covenant
with all those who serve and with all who support them, and we
will do everything within our power not to break it.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

On a final note, let me take a moment to mention BRAC. I
know that is not popular. As a Member, I went through three
rounds. I had a base close in my district. And I recognize that
authorizing another BRAC is a difficult step to take. But it
was necessary during the last round, in 2005, and I would argue
it is even more necessary now. We cannot afford to pay for the
maintenance and upkeep of unused or unnecessary facilities. It
wastes money we just don't have.
As I noted, we didn't want to make a number of these hard
decisions, we didn't want to limit our programs or further cut
our end strength, but we had no choice. Nevertheless, we
believe we have developed a plan that balances the needs of our
Nation, our soldiers, and family members against severe budget
constraints and calculated risk.
This is where we need your leadership, your support, your
help. If our planned reductions and realignments are derailed
or delayed, we do not have the funding, we don't have the time
to adjust. Simply put, we need protection and we need
predictability, not politics.
In conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of your Army,
let me thank you for your continued and thoughtful oversight,
your steadfast support, and proud partnership. Let's go forth
together to help safeguard the most capable land force the
world has ever known as we prepare to meet the unforeseen
challenges that lie ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for an
excellent statement.
General Odierno, good morning, and thank you for being with
us again.

Summary Statement of General Odierno

General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman Frelinghuysen and
Ranking Member Visclosky, other distinguished members of the
committee.

DEPLOYED FORCES

Despite declining resources, the demand for Army forces
continues to increase. More than 70,000 soldiers are deployed
today on contingency operations, and about 85,000 soldiers are
forward-stationed in nearly 150 countries, including nearly
20,000 on the Korean Peninsula. Our soldiers, civilians, and
family members continue to serve with the competence,
commitment, and character that our great Nation deserves.
As we consider the future roles and missions of our Army,
it is imperative we consider the world as it exists, not as one
we wish it to be. The recent headlines alone--Russia's
annexation of the Crimea, the intractable Syrian civil war,
missile launches by North Korea, just to name a few--remind us
of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the international
security environment. It demands that we make prudent decisions
about the future capability and capacity that we need within
our Army.
Therefore, we must ensure our Army has the ability to
rapidly respond to conduct the entire range of military
operations, from humanitarian assistance and stability
operations to general war.
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review builds on the defense
priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.
Last year, I testified that we can implement the defense
guidance at moderate risk with an end strength of 490,000 in
the Active Army, 350,000 in the National Guard, and 202,000 in
the U.S. Army Reserve. I stand by that assessment. However,
given that sequestration cuts are the law of the land and
remain in fiscal year 2016, we must take deliberate action now
to prepare.

REDUCTION IN END-STRENGTH

Therefore, in order to attain the proper balance between
end strength, readiness, and modernization by the end of
sequestration, we will have no choice but to slash end-strength
again beginning in fiscal year 2016. We will be required to
further reduce the Active Army to 420,000, the National Guard
to 315,000, and the U.S. Army Reserve to 185,000.
At these end-strength funding levels, we will not be able
to execute the defense strategy, and, in my opinion, this will
call into question our ability to execute even one prolonged,
multiphase major contingency operation. I also have deep
concerns that our Army at these end-strength levels will not
have sufficient capacity to meet ongoing operational
commitments and simultaneously train to sustained appropriate
readiness levels.
The President's budget submission supports end-strength
levels at 440,000 to 450,000 in the Active Army, 335,000 in the
Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. I
believe this should be the absolute floor for end-strength
reductions.
In order to execute the defense strategy, it is important
to note that, as we continue to lose end strength, our
flexibility deteriorates, as does our ability to react to
strategic surprise. My experience tells me that our assumptions
about the duration and size of future conflicts, ally
contributions, and the need to conduct post-conflict stability
operations are overly optimistic. And if these assumptions are
wrong, our risk grows significantly, even at the 440,000 to
450,000 levels.
For the next 3 to 4 years, we are reducing end-strength as
quickly as possible while still meeting our operational
commitments. As we continue to draw down and restructure into a
smaller force, the Army will continue to have degraded
readiness and extensive modernization shortfalls.
This has required us to implement tiered readiness as a
bridging strategy in the near term. Our acquisition funding,
which has declined 39 percent since the fiscal year 2012 budget
planning cycle, will continue to suffer.
At the end of fiscal year 2019, under sequestration, we
will begin to establish the appropriate balance between end-
strength, readiness, and modernization, but for an Army that is
much smaller. From fiscal year 2020 to 2023, we begin to
achieve our readiness goals and reinvest in our modernization
programs. Under the President's budget, we achieve balance
between end-strength, readiness, and modernization 3 to 5 years
earlier, around fiscal year 2018, and at greater total force
levels.
In order to meet the reduction imposed by sequestration, we
have worked with the leadership across all our components on a
total force policy that ensures the proper balance for all
components. In developing our plan, we took the Secretary of
Defense guidance to not retain structure at the expense of
readiness. Additionally, the Secretary of the Army and I
directed that cuts should come disproportionately from the
Active Force before reducing the National Guard and U.S. Army
Reserve.
Our total force policy was informed by the lessons learned
during the last 13 years of war. We considered operational
commitments, readiness levels, future requirements, and costs.
The result is a plan that recognizes unique attributes,
responsibilities, and the complementary nature of each
component while ensuring our Guard and Reserves are maintained
as an operational, and not strategic, reserve.
Ongoing reductions, coupled with sequestration-level cuts
over the next 7 years, will result in a reduction of 150,000
soldiers and 687 aircraft and up to 46 percent of the brigade
combat teams from the Active Army. The National Guard will
reduce by 43,000 soldiers, 111 aircraft, and up to 22 percent
of the brigade combat teams. And the U.S. Army Reserve will
reduce by 20,000 soldiers.
These end-strength cuts to the Active Army will represent
70 percent of the total end-strength reductions, compared with
20 percent from the National Guard and 10 percent from the U.S.
Army Reserve. This will result in the Guard and Reserves
comprising 54 percent of the total Army end strength, while the
Active Component will comprise 46 percent. The Army will be the
only service in which the Reserve outnumbers the Active
Component.

ARMY AVIATION RESTRUCTURE

Under sequestration, we cannot afford to maintain our
current aviation structure and still sustain modernization
while providing trained and ready aviation units across all
three components. Therefore, we have developed an innovative
concept to restructure our aviation fleet to address these
issues. Overall, we believe this plan will generate a total
savings of $12.7 billion over the POM.
Of the 798 total aircraft reduced under this plan, 687
aircraft, or 86 percent, will come out of the Active Component,
and 111 aircraft, or 14 percent, will come from the National
Guard. This will also include the transfer of over 100
modernized UH-60s to the Guard.
As with end-strength, we have disproportionately taken cuts
from the Active Component aviation. And, in fact, we will
eliminate three full combat aviation brigades out of the Active
Component, while the National Guard sustains all of its brigade
structure.
This plan allows the Army to eliminate obsolete airframes,
modernize the fleet, and sustain pilot proficiency across the
total force. The result is an Active and Reserve aviation force
mix with more capable and prepared formations that are able to
respond to contingencies at home and abroad.
Let me be very clear: These are not cuts we want to take
but we must take based upon sequestration. I believe our
recommendation delivers the best total Army for the budget that
we have been allocated.
The Secretary and I understand that the American people
hold us to a higher standard of character and behavior.
Combating sexual assault and harassment remains our top
priority.
Over the past year, the Army has established more stringent
screening criteria and background checks for those serving in
positions of trust. Army commanders continue to prosecute the
most serious sexual assault offenses at a rate more than double
that of our civilian jurisdictions, including many cases that
civilian authorities refuse to pursue.

ETHICAL LEADERS

We appreciate the continued focus of Congress as we
implement legislative reforms to enhance the rights of
survivors and improve our military justice system. We continue
to take this issue very seriously, and I also know much work
remains to be done in this area.
We are also aggressively and comprehensively attacking the
issue of ethical leadership, both individually,
organizationally, and through systematic reviews. We have
initiated 360-degree assessments on all officers, especially
commanders. We have implemented a new officer evaluation report
to strengthen accountability. For our general officers, we
conduct peer surveys and developed a specific ethics focus as
part of our Senior Leader Education Program, and we have also
implemented 360-degree evaluations.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

We also appreciate help with two issues impacting our
ability to maintain the right balance for our Army.
First, the base realignment and closure process is a
proven, fair, and cost-effective means to address excess
installation capacity. With the reduction of over 200,000
soldiers from our Army and lower budgets, we need a BRAC to
reduce unsustainable infrastructure.

PAY AND BENEFITS

Second, we are extremely grateful for the high-quality care
and compensation provided to our soldiers. We have endorsed
proposals that recognize their incredible service while
allowing us to better balance future investments in readiness,
modernization, and compensation.
We must keep in mind that it is not a matter of if but when
we will deploy our Army to defend this great Nation. We have
done it in every decade since World War II. It is incumbent on
all of us to ensure our soldiers are highly trained, equipped,
and organized. If we do not, they will bear the heavy burden of
our miscalculations.
I am proud to wear this uniform and represent the soldiers
of the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army
Reserve. Their sacrifices have been unprecedented over the last
13 years. We must provide them with the necessary resources for
success in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the entire
committee for allowing me to testify here today. And I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I thank you, General Odierno.
[The statements of Secretary McHugh and General Odierno
follows.]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am pleased to yield my time for the
first line of questioning to Mr. Womack, who, as you are aware,
has had a distinguished career as a member of the--I think a
30-year career as a member of the Arkansas National Guard.
Mr. Womack, the time is yours.

Remarks of Mr. Womack

Mr. Womack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me just say at the outset how much I admire the
work of the Secretary and the Chief here for the terrific job
that they have ahead of them, the challenges they face, and the
tremendous demands that we are putting on these gentlemen and
the men and women that they represent.
And I will just say this at the outset, that we owe you
certainty. We owe the country certainty. And we have fallen
short in that area, and I am hopeful that we can give you the
certainty that you need.
Mr. Chairman, I am a product of a tremendous, what I call,
AC/RC relationship down through the years. I have been a
participant in and the beneficiary of that AC/RC relationship,
and it is something that I take a great deal of pride in. And I
know I speak a lot on behalf of Guard issues, because that is a
lot of my background.

AVIATION RESTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

And, General Odierno, you know that I have some deep
concerns in the area of attack aviation and the proposed
exchange, if you will, in the Blackhawk and Apache arena.
I cannot argue a lot of the logic about the utility of the
Blackhawk and its ability to better serve Governors and
adjutants general for some of their statewide missions. And so
I applaud you for giving consideration to those missions.
My concern, however, is taking the attack aviation piece
completely out of the National Guard. And it creates a bit of a
contentious debate between the AC and the RC components, but I
just think it is flawed from a sense that we have taken some of
our strategic depth out of the Reserve Component that we
believe is a very important component of our ability to
prosecute missions around the world.
And so I need you to help me understand why we would make
such a drastic exchange of that type.
General Odierno. Thank you, Congressman.
First off, it is about the budget. The issue is we can no
longer afford to sustain the amount of aircraft we have, so we
have to eliminate obsolete aircraft. And that is centered
around the OH-58.
This proposal is cost-avoidance of almost $12 billion
because it would cost us about $10 billion to modernize the OH-
58 for it to perform the mission. So what we have to do is we
have to take existing Apaches and replace them to do the scout
mission. We can't buy enough Apaches to have them do the
mission both in the Active and the Guard.
And so we have had to make some difficult choices. So what
we have tried to do is come up with an organization that allows
us to respond to future threats with the Active Component while
still keeping structure in the Reserve Component.
As I mention in my comments, we are eliminating three
complete aviation brigades out of the Active Component because
we can't afford to keep them. We are not eliminating aviation
brigades in the Guard. What we are doing is transferring the
attack capability out of the Guard. We can't afford to keep it.
If we kept the attack capability in the Guard, we would have to
eliminate three to four brigades out of the Guard in order to
do that. I don't want to do that because I need the lift.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, the combat aircraft that flew the
most hours is the UH-60, by far. It is the centerpiece of
everything we do, and I need that capability in the Guard. I
need that to be capable of coming forward.
The other piece with the Apache is it is not about
individual pilot proficiency. We can sustain that in the Guard.
It is about the complexity of the air-ground integration that
has to occur that just frankly takes a long time to do. We
don't have the training time--we will not in the future have
the training time to sustain the right level of this
integration that is necessary in the Guard. We do have the time
to do it in the Active Component, and that is why we felt it
would be better to move it to the Active Component.
Again, if I had my choice and I had the dollars, I
certainly would have kept it in the Guard, but we simply don't
have that choice.

APACHE SCOUT HELICOPTER

Mr. Womack. Well, so let me ask as just a follow-up--and I
know I am going to run out of time. The wisdom of using the
Apache helicopter, an attack helicopter, for a scout mission
and the wisdom of taking 100 percent of your capability out of
the National Guard--I am just simply suggesting that there is a
better rebalance than the one that is proposed.
General Odierno. Again, I would say the rebalance would be
eliminating more aviation brigades in the Guard. And I don't
think--that would also eliminate lift in CH-47s, and I don't
think we can afford to do that as I look at our total mission
set as we move forward.
Mr. McHugh. Mr. Chairman, may I add one brief point?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Secretary, it is my time, so go
right ahead. And----
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. I am going to go to Mr.
Owens after Mr. Womack.
Mr. McHugh. Okay.
The gentleman from Arkansas is more than capable of making
up his own mind, but the only thing I would say, as I mentioned
in my opening comments, as not just Mr. Womack but all of you
consider this proposal, the money is gone.
So if we are not allowed to do this, if that is the
judgment of Congress, obviously, we will follow that, but we
have to find that $12 billion somewhere else out of hide. That
is a lot of money, that is a lot of end strength, that is a lot
of readiness. So that is just part of the equation.
Mr. Womack. I appreciate the responses and the hard work of
these gentlemen.
And, Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate you yielding me the
time.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Womack.
Mr. Owens.

REMARKS OF MR. OWENS

Mr. Owens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
You mentioned in your opening comments about the National
Defense Strategy and how you are, in effect, trying to match
the resources that you have against that strategy. That makes,
ultimately, good sense.
What do you see as the threats that we are going to face
over the next 3 to 5 years, and how would you prioritize those
threats?

THREATS

General Odierno. So what I would say is, as I look at the
world today, we have the breaking-down and unrest in the Middle
East, we have Sunni and Shia conflict going on throughout the
Middle East, we have governments, ungoverned territories in the
Middle East, as well as North Africa and Central Africa, that
have great concerns, where terrorism can use in order to--
terrorist organizations can use in order to attack the United
States. Those are grave concerns.
I have grave concerns over the Korean Peninsula. The acts
of the new leader of North Korea, some of the things he has
done, such as he has done in the last week or so--launching
missiles, provocatively launching missiles. So those are
concerns.
We obviously were somewhat concerned, because of the
economic necessity of Asia-Pacific to the United States, by
some of the competition over the islands with some of our close
allies, the Japanese, and issues with China.
And there are others, but those are the main ones that I am
concerned about.
And the bottom line is--and then we have things that pop
up, such as what has happened over in Ukraine and the Crimea,
where 90 days ago nobody would have been talking about that.
And so it is these unknown issues that come up that also
concern me that we have to be prepared to do.
In my opinion, as we move forward, one of the most
important things our military does is deter, and that we have
to deter miscalculation and actions that others might do. And I
think that is what we have to be concerned about. And
deterrence is a combination of capability and capacity, and I
think, for us, it is important that we understand that as you
move forward.

SEQUESTRATION IMPACT

Mr. Owens. And if I am interpreting your testimony
correctly, you feel that at this point you do not have the
maximum deterrent capacity that you need.
General Odierno. I think that, if we have to go down to
full sequestration, I believe it will be difficult, it will
become into question.
Mr. Owens. So, absent the impact of sequestration in 2016,
you think you would be at your maximum deterrent capacity.
General Odierno. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Owens. Do I have a little more time?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. A little more time, yes.
Mr. Owens. A little more time. I have a question----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. And then Mr. Kingston.

BRAC

Mr. Owens [continuing]. On BRAC. I have a question on BRAC.
One of the things that we have seen the Army doing is some
realignment without a BRAC. You have, in fact, moved some
troops around. You obviously can't close a facility in the
absence of a BRAC, but you can, in fact, move troops around.
Is the plan to continue that process, and the ultimate
outcome being, if you will, the creation of a scenario in which
it is now obvious which facilities you want to have closed?
Mr. McHugh. Well, having gone through a BRAC that hit close
to your hometown, Plattsburgh----
Mr. Owens. It did.
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. You can never tell, because
Plattsburgh Air Force Base was closed in spite of the fact that
the Air Force very much wanted to keep it. So it is not our
intent to create a foregone conclusion.
As you noted, we have made significant restructuring
decisions largely because we had to draw down in end-strength
pursuant to budgets. Absent some further relief, that will
continue. Although I will tell you, we are already scheduled to
come down to 490,000 by the end of 2015 and then from 490,000
to 440,000 to 450,000. So, just by definition, as your troops
are in those buildings, more and more space will become excess.
We want to minimize that.

COST OF MAINTAINING EMPTY FACILITIES

Right now, we calculate we are paying about a half a
billion dollars a year in what we call the ``empty facilities
tax.'' You have to maintain buildings to a certain level even
though you are not using them.
But we will always stay within the law. We have
prerogatives of certain things we can do with respect to
structure that the Congress has provided us. And as we go
forward, we will try to use those. But an ultimate BRAC, which
is the most efficient way, the most way in which we wisely
spend taxpayers' dollars and which we receive the most savings,
is, in our judgment, the most sensible path to take. But we
need your authorization to do that.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Owens.
Mr. Kingston.

REMARKS OF MR. KINGSTON

Mr. Kingston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Odierno, it is great to see both of
you. We certainly appreciate everything that you do and your
friendships that you have developed here on the Hill.
I wanted to follow up with Mr. Owens on that. Mr.
Secretary, I think that is an important point. You are paying,
you say, a half a billion dollars a year, $500 million a year,
to maintain buildings which you no longer need?
Mr. McHugh. Correct.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Mr. Kingston. And, therefore, would it be more orderly to
have a BRAC than to not have a BRAC? Because it seems like
right now we are having a BRAC, it is just that it is a
backdoor BRAC.
Mr. McHugh. Well, without a BRAC, what we do is create more
excess rather than fewer. We keep facilities, but there are no
people in them. There is no use for those facilities, and yet
we still have to maintain them. So it actually adds--the
process that we are going through right now of drawing down
forces, our end strength, of creating more vacancies in our
facilities, actually will drive that $500 million up.
A BRAC would allow us to go about it in a far more sensible
way, would allow us to make rational decisions so that we can
concentrate our facility excess and, to as great an extent as
possible, get it off the books, saving us rather than costing
us money.

COSTS OF DOWNSIZING

Mr. Kingston. Would it be possible to put a dollar amount
on that?
Mr. McHugh. Well, if you look at 2005, the Department spent
$6 billion as investment going in to execute the BRAC and are
realizing $3 billion savings per year.
Right now, we would estimate a BRAC would probably produce
us about a billion dollars in savings after a 7-year
implementation period.
That is a hand-grenade estimate, obviously. We were
precluded under the NDAA from even considering or planning for
a BRAC, so we don't have the fidelity on our estimates that we
would like, but we think that is a reasonable estimate. And as
we go forward, we will certainly refine those estimates.
Mr. Kingston. General Odierno, Mr. Owens had asked about
troop strength, and we have the numbers in terms of not just
the Guard but the Reserve and the Active Duty. Do you think
that puts us at peril, going down to the troop levels that are
proposed?
General Odierno. So at 440,000 to 450,000, 335,000,
195,000, I believe that is the floor that we can go to and meet
the Defense Strategic Guidance. And as I view the national
security environment, I believe that is the lowest we should go
to.
Sequestration takes us to a much lower level--420,000,
315,000, 185,000. And I believe we will not be able to meet our
mission, and I believe it puts in question our ability to
properly deter and to properly even conduct one long,
prolonged, multiphase campaign if necessary. And that is my
concern.
Mr. Kingston. Okay. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Kingston.
Ms. Kaptur.

REMARKS OF MS. KAPTUR

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Odierno, welcome.
General Odierno, I first met you in Iraq, and I want to
thank you for your service to our country in a most difficult
assignment. And we are very honored with your presence today.

RUSSIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS

I almost don't know where to start because I really want to
ask you about your perspective on Iraq and the prospects for
stability going forward, but I simply must ask this because of
what has happened in Central Europe with the staging of Russian
troops at both the Ukrainian and very proximate to the Moldovan
border and now, we heard on the news this morning, Estonia, at
the Estonian border. It appears largely army troops.
I am wondering if you have had a chance, with your staff,
to observe what is going on and could put what is happening
there in perspective for us. How significant is that staging by
Russia?
General Odierno. Well, I would just say, first, we do watch
it very carefully. I think, for us, it is something that we
have to be very cognizant of, and ``us'' within the NATO
context. I think NATO and the United States has to be very
cognizant of what is going on and watch very carefully the
troop deployments and the exercises that they are doing in
Russia.
So we have to watch it. We have to understand that some of
these countries who we have begun to work with are concerned
about this. We have some of our other NATO allies that are
concerned about what they are seeing here, especially those in
Eastern Europe.
And I think it is important for us that we operate within
the NATO framework to address these issues. And we are doing
that. We are obviously reaching out to our counterparts.
Obviously, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe is working this
very hard. But it is something that I think we all have to
watch very carefully and that we are all concerned with.

TRAINING AND SUPPLYING RUSSIAN BORDER NATIONS

Ms. Kaptur. I want to just make an observation, that it
appears to me Ukraine was left defenseless over the last 2
decades. There have been some exercises that have occurred
within her territory, there has been some engagement, but the
last 2 decades appear to have allowed this moment to happen.
And so I just wanted to state that for the record.
I hope that whatever occurs in the future, that the border
nations--Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, even
Turkey, Moldova, Romania--that a new architecture for
participation in some manner to maintain an edge. There has to
be some structure that holds the line. And I am sure that is
being discussed, and I hope it continues.
I would just ask you to consider--it is my understanding
there are some training exercises that were to occur in the
western portion of Ukraine in June with several allies of the
United States. I don't know--and not all of them, I believe,
are members of NATO. However, I am wondering if those training
exercises might be moved up, or some aspect of them.
I am not aware of all training exercises, but it just seems
to me to leave any country that wants to accede to Europe
defenseless at this moment is not a good strategy. And I am
just wondering about the flexibility of exercises.
And then I would like to ask about supplies. If Ukraine
were to request supplies, would that be formally done through
NATO? Where would supplies come from to Ukraine if she faced
the worst?

COMBINED TRAINING EVENTS

General Odierno. So, a couple things.
I think we have a robust exercise program that goes on
throughout Europe that could be used, utilized, to do many
things, to include what you suggest. And I think we are taking
a very hard look at that, as we look at the exercises that we
have planned.
You know, last year, we went through this for the first
time. The United States has a brigade that is part of a NATO
response force, and it is actually First Brigade or First
Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood. And they have been training,
and, in fact, they are supposed to conduct training exercises
in Europe with NATO over the next several months. And so there
are things that can be done.
In terms of supplies, we are working several different
courses of action, from nonlethal to lethal supplies that we
could provide. It could be done through NATO, it could be done
in a bilateral nature, depending on the decisions that are
made. We are conducting assessments of types of things we could
do, and we are providing those to the Joint Staff for analysis.

MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one additional question?
I just wanted to place on the record, if I could, that it
has come to my attention--and I may have incorrect
information--that within your budget, in the area of the
marksmanship and training of our personnel, both Active and
Guard and Reserve, that the funding for marksmanship has been
reduced by about 60 percent. I don't know if that is a correct
number.
I represent Camp Perry, with the best shooting range in the
country. And I would hope that if, in fact, there has been that
type of serious cutback, you might take a look at the ability
of our forces to train properly and to do what is necessary to
provide them with those skills.
General Odierno. If I can just give a quick answer. There
has been no reduction in individual and squad-level training
and marksmanship. That is funded. Where we have problems is
when we get above that level. The collective training that
happens at platoon, company, battalion, that is where we have
had to reduce funding.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
And I think the record should also show, and I think it is
true, General Odierno, that Ukraine has stood with us both in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and we are highly appreciative and
recognize their sacrifice.
Mr. Cole.

BUDGET CONTROL ACT

Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank both of you gentlemen for your terrific service
to our country in a variety of capacities.
And thank you, in particular, in both your testimony for
being direct and blunt about the consequences of another
sequester. You know, I think your--and I have said this on
multiple occasions, but I am going to keep saying it for the
record. I think you and your counterparts in the other services
are making tough decisions because we haven't, as a Congress
and an administration, made our tough decisions.
And I don't think anybody, when we first voted for the
Budget Control Act, ever thought sequester would become a
reality. Nobody did politically on either side. I don't think
the services did. And we stumbled into a really bad situation
that you are having to deal with.
And while I am very proud that we found 2 years of relative
budget certainty, you know, all we did was buy a little time.
We are going to have exactly the same problem here.
And I would suggest, I don't think anything is going to
happen between now and November, but we need to make the tough
decisions as soon after that as we possibly can so you have the
certainty that Mr. Womack appropriately said that we owe you. I
have always been willing to vote for any deal that we could
find that would do that. I would to do that again.
But I do think some of our leadership on both sides of the
aisle and, sort of, up the chain need to sit around the table
and come to a deal. Otherwise, we are going to keep living this
scenario, and it is just not fair to the men and women that you
both lead.

PALADIN-PIM

Let me ask a couple of quick questions, if I may. One, you
know, if you represent Fort Sill, you are always interested in
artillery. So I am very interested in your assessment of where
we are in the PIM modernization program and how you see that
unrolling.
Mr. McHugh. Well, thank you for your comments, Mr. Cole.
And, obviously, it is not important, I suppose, but we fully
agree.
As I know you and I have talked in the past, the Army is
fully committed to PIM. And we recognize the impact to the
great State of Oklahoma, but it is critically important to the
Army. We need a new self-propelled artillery howitzer to keep
up with our formations, and so we are going forward.
We really have no particular challenges at this point. We
are coming up to our first delivery of LRIPs. We expect 66.5
vehicle sets sometime in mid-2015. And, thereafter, we will go
to the first unit equipped and a full-rate production decision
plan for the second quarter of 2017.
You know, these are long timelines, they are frustrating.
But when you are developing something as important as this and
really is a generational change, time is kind of an unavoidable
factor.
Mr. Cole. Second, just a quick follow-up. And I know this
causes everybody a great deal--we have spent an awful lot of
money in the pursuit of new cannons, whether it was the
Crusader or the NLOS-C, part of the Future Combat System. We
spent billions of dollars, never got a deployable system out of
it.

TECHNOLOGY HARVESTED FROM TERMINATED PROGRAMS

Number one, is there anything that was gained in the course
of that work that can be salvaged technologically? And, number
two, what are we doing to make sure we don't walk down this
road again? Because we certainly can't afford to do it.
Mr. McHugh. Yeah. Thank you for bringing--I think there
was----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Let me associate myself with----
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. Bringing up our painful past.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Mr. Cole, having defended a
lot of those programs.
Mr. McHugh. At least he didn't throw in Future Combat
Systems and some of the----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I think he did, actually.
Mr. McHugh. Oh, he did? I missed that. I had grown numb by
the time he had gotten to that.
Mr. Cole. I can repeat the question.
Mr. McHugh. No, no, that is okay. Thank you.
If you take, as we have, all of these nondeliverable
developmental programs, we can learn a great deal, and we do
think we have. And we have tried to employ those lessons
learned of reaching too far for immature technologies, of
writing requirements that are really more a pipe dream than a
realistic path forward to acquisition. I do believe we have
shown great improvement.
The fact that the PIM at this point of maturity and in the
low-rate initial production is still on time and still on
schedule I think reflects, indeed, the fact of those lessons
learned. And I think we can show it in other developmental
programs, as well.
We spent a lot of time after the cancel of the NLOS-C and
Crusader and those other things you mentioned trying to better
understand where it was we seemed to repeatedly come up short.
We had the Decker-Wagner report that I ordered to be held; it
came back with 56 great recommendations. We have implemented
the vast majority of those, and they are making a difference.
And we watch these very, very closely. And every program
manager knows that he or she is going to be judged by their
staying in budget, on schedule, and is going to be judged by
their ability to bring in that program to production.
Mr. Cole. Just one quick request, really. If it is
possible, could I get a copy of that report?
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely.
Mr. Cole. Frankly, it could be helpful for us to learn the
same lessons.
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno. If I could just quickly comment, and I am
just going to reenforce what the Secretary said. But we have
moved some of the technologies into the PIM program. Now,
probably not worth the investment that we made, but we have
taken some of those technologies and integrated it.
Now, I would say one thing----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Used to be called ``spiralling up.''
General Odierno. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I don't know what they call it now.
General Odierno. Spiralling out.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. All right.
General Odierno. Spiralling out technologies.
But the other thing I would say is, and the Secretary
mentioned it, it is about requirements and it is about our
requirements process.
We have put in a lot of work on ensuring we have adjusted
our requirements process in the Army, and we are constantly--
because what happens is you have--we built requirements on
hoping for technology instead of building requirements on
technology that was achievable. And that is what we are
changing.
And you have to build requirements that are achievable. And
if we build them that are unachievable, it leads us down this
road. And you have to constantly assess it, adjust it, take a
look at it. And we now, I believe, have processes in place that
allow us to do that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan.

REMARKS OF MR. RYAN

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first just, as I look at the numbers here, I know we
have had a couple questions already on the end strength. And
you look at the sequester numbers, what the potential
possibilities could be. I just want to encourage you, as
publicly and as loudly as you can, to continue to get this
message out and amplify it.
I think this is a situation that would be completely
unacceptable from the committee's perspective, and I know it is
from yours, as well. My fear is that this hasn't really
penetrated the thoughts of average Americans as to what this
would mean for us.
And you have mentioned, General, that this is mostly about
deterrence, to Mr. Owens' question, this is mostly about
deterrence. And so, to look at these numbers and to imagine a
world in 2018, 2019 is unacceptable, I think, to most of us
here. So if you can continue to help us out in the public to
drive that message, I think it would be critically important.
You mentioned BRAC. And the Navy was here yesterday, and
they mentioned BRAC, as well. As you know, Mr. Secretary, it is
not the favorite phrase to hear as a Member of Congress.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

And so just a question. I know we had some discussions from
previous BRACs at how much it cost to actually implement the
BRAC process. And there were a lot of complaints of how
expensive it was to implement BRAC. I think it was $35 billion
in some of the estimates that I looked at.
Can you talk a little bit about how a new BRAC would be
different? Or is that standard?
Because the assumption was it was going to cost, like, $21
billion to implement, and it ended up being $35 billion. And in
these tough times, I think this is a fair question, for us to
ask how much money would we be asked to put up front and what
would the estimated savings be on the back end.
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely an important and appropriate
question.
The $35 billion was a department-wide, as you noted,
department-wide investment for the 2005 round.
If you look at from the Army's side of it, the 2005 round
was really two BRACs in one. We had really what we call an
efficiency BRAC to the extent that it largely entailed moving
troops around, relocating headquarters, trying to place
programs and processes in one location to gain efficiencies.
That takes a lot longer to pay back. And because the MILCON
costs are so high because we are creating new structure, that
would be considered an unusually expensive BRAC for the Army.
The second piece was the more traditional closure--save
money, fewer facilities. And we are saving right now from the
2005, as an Army, about a billion dollars a year, each and
every year, even at that high price tag, unusually so in 2005.
For the Army, again, we don't expect our costs going in
would be anywhere near the 2005, although, as I commented
earlier, because of previous prohibitions on our ability to
actually do analysis related to BRAC--that has now been
lifted--we don't have the kind of clarity, the kind of numbers
I think that you would want. And we understand that. We are
going to try to work to get those to you.
Our rule of thumb, about a 7.7 percent rate of return on
investment for the Army, that that would be our goal after 7
years. We have made that, to my understanding, virtually every
previous BRAC, and we think that would be a more than
reasonable expected rate of return, which would----
Mr. Ryan. You said you have met that over previous BRACs?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ryan. You have hit that number?
Mr. McHugh. Right.

ARMY BASE CONSULTATION

General Odierno. If I could, I would just add that, the
last BRAC, there was really some significant reorganization
that went on in the Army. For example, we consolidated the
Maneuver Center of Excellence. Fort Benning and Fort Knox
consolidated. We consolidated all our combat service support at
Fort Lee. We consolidated maneuver support at Fort Leonard
Wood. Those were major changes.
That is not what this BRAC would be about. We have done
that, and that has been very successful. This one is more about
excess infrastructure. In other words, it is just that we have
to get rid of some of the excess infrastructure, and we can't
afford to pay it.
So I think, based on that, the expense would not be as
great, because we had to build new facilities as we combined
facilities at Fort Benning and at Fort Lee and at Fort Leonard
Wood in Missouri. So it was probably a bit higher. I think this
one would be quite a bit different, because it is really about
eliminating infrastructure we just can't afford to have because
of the reduction in the size of the Army.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You will get another bite at the apple--
--
Mr. Ryan. All right.
Mr. Frelinghuysen [continuing]. Depending on time here.
Judge Carter, thank you.

OCO FUNDING

Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And good to see both of you.
Mr. Secretary, I believe we met first and got to know each
other on a trip to Iraq. And, General Odierno, we met you in
Iraq. So there is some relationship there. I don't know what it
is. I have since gotten to know you at Fort Hood.
I want to ask a question that still is relevant to what we
are talking about. As I understand it, we will not receive the
fiscal year 2015 overseas contingency operations, OCO, budget
until after the Afghanistan--President's decision has been
made.
The Army has said it will need OCO dollars for years after
operations in Afghanistan draw down, both to get our equipment
out of the theater and into depots so that the equipment may be
retrograded and reset. The Army has $9.9 billion of reset
requirements alone that are directly attributable to this war
effort. In addition, OCO provides funding for global-war-on-
terror operations happening in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility but not necessarily Afghanistan.

LONG-TERM RESET

Secretary McHugh, what is the Army's long-term plan to fund
equipment resets and retrograde? Will you request funding for
the Army in OCO in fiscal year 2015 and in the out-years? What
impact would the loss of OCO funding have on the Army's
retrograde and reset, and what impact would it have on the Army
readiness?
And, General Odierno, with the problems in--I understand
that when we are moving things out of Afghanistan, a great deal
of that is to go the northern route because of issues we have
had with Pakistan. And, therefore, I assume that would involve
Russia in some form or fashion. And with what is going on with
the unrest in Russia, do you see that, the northern route out,
being an issue as we take our equipment out?
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Congressman.
Our intent has always been and our need has been and
remains that OCO funding continue for 3 years after cessation
of hostilities, after withdrawal out of Afghanistan. And the
vast, vast majority of those funds are intended to do the reset
that you mention.
As we sit here this morning, we have probably about $10
billion worth of equipment in Afghanistan that we intend to
retrograde back to the United States to reset and to return to
our troops. And if we lose that money, we will have junk piles
next to our arsenals, next to our depots particularly, because
we won't have the funds to process those.
That has multiple effects, none of them good. First of all,
the workload, the people need at those depots will go down.
That is a real impact on the economy. It is an added concern
for us as we struggle to find ways, already, to sustain our
organic industrial base. It also means that those pieces of
equipment, vital to our formations, vital to keeping our
equipment on hand and our modernization ratings up and
sufficiently high, would not get back to those troops; it would
just be unavailable. That means readiness declines even
further.
So, regardless of what perspective you take on this issue,
if we fail to get that funding, we have an enormous problem
that I just don't see us fixing in any less than a decade, if
then.
We do intend to ask for funds in 2015. The problem that I
recognize that is challenging for this committee, particularly
this subcommittee, is that without hard numbers it is hard to
write a bill. The administration has asked for a placemarker.
We obviously will look to you to----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Not only--if the gentleman will yield--
not only to write a bill, defend a bill. We need to----
Mr. McHugh. No argument. I have been there, seen it. I
never served on this great committee, but I begged you for
things over many years.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. You worked very closely with our former
Chairman.
Mr. McHugh. So, yeah, if you look at last year, the Army's
portion of the OCO bill is about $46 billion. We are coming
out, we expect it would be something less than that. But we owe
you the numbers as quickly as we can get them.
But, as you noted, Judge, we have the issue of the Afghan
elections and the Afghan SOFA.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Judge Carter.
Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Carter. Could I get the answer to the northern route?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Very briefly.
Northern route I know we are not using as much as we
originally intended; is that correct?
General Odierno. That is correct. It has not been affected.
We are using it, but we have a course of action in case we
don't have to use it.
I know you are----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Expensive, too.
General Odierno. Yeah, it is expensive.
Could I just make a short comment on OCO?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Go right ahead.
General Odierno. On the OCO, we understand the Army has a
really specific problem even for 2015, because October,
November, December, we know for sure we are still in
Afghanistan. We have to pay for October, November, December. In
addition to that, all of our end-strength over 490,000 is in
OCO, and we don't get to 490,000 till the end of 2015. So we
already have a bill that we know, regardless of what the
outcome is in Afghanistan. So we have to work this very
carefully, because it would have significant impact on our
budget.
The other piece of this is we also have about $5 billion,
we estimate, that has to go from OCO to base if we continue to
do some of our contingency operations that are being paid by
OCO.
And so there are a lot of issues involved with this that we
are going to have to deal with in 2015 and the out-years with
OCO. And that could have a significant impact on our base
budget.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Excellent point and important to have in
the record. Thank you.
Mr. McHugh. If we have to fly everything out, which if the
GWACs go down we would, that is a $3 billion estimate. The
least expensive using GWACs is a billion. So it is big money.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yeah.
Mr. Visclosky.

Remarks of Mr. Visclosky

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, just following up on your remarks, and we have had
some extended conversation on OCO, you hit a point. And that
is, no matter what happens, we are there for 3 more months.
And, again, the chairman's opening remarks and mine, should we
expect from the administration shortly some details for at
least those 3 months for our anticipated bill?
General Odierno. We are having discussions right now
internally on this. We understand the importance of it, and we
are having discussions on this now.
Mr. Visclosky. I would like to follow up--as always, Mr.
Cole is ahead of me. I have a terrific question that he has
already asked, thanks to our wonderful staff. But I would
follow up on that, and in all seriousness, about the issue of
acquisition in programs.
Relative to some of these large programs--Ground Combat
Vehicle, the Future Combat Systems, just to name a couple--as
we proceed, two questions on my mind. One is, what are our
risks of obsolescence?
And understanding that the Army is always trying to upgrade
what we do have and circumstances change, what is the
difficulty we are seeing here in the industrial base? Because
you still keep that base alive as you upgrade, but at some
point if you don't have some significant production, I am very
concerned about that.
Mr. McHugh. Well, it is very important. And although we
focus a lot of time on our external industrial base, as we
should, it is not often that people think about what we do in
our modernization programs in terms of supporting the general
economy.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE (GCV)

And when we have to, as we already have, take significant
cuts out of our modernization programs, out of our
developmental programs--and GCV is a perfect example. GCV was
performing. The program was on schedule, it was on budget for
the internals of the initiative, but we simply couldn't afford
it in light of other realities. So that results in potential
loss of jobs. Those are programs that go away.
And so, as we look across our portfolio, we try to do the
best we can in identifying particular points of failure--in
other words, where we have suppliers or we have high-skilled
manufacturing personnel--and try to make adjustments, where
possible, so that we continue to support them at least at a
minimum sustainment rate so that when, you know, larger
programs come about and we are in full-rate production of
something else that they can build, you know, they can return
to full health.
But it is a challenge. We don't have enough money to do the
things we need to do to begin with.

INDUSTRIAL BASE CONCERNS

Mr. Visclosky. Any particular discrete areas of the
industrial base, if you would, that you are most concerned
about? And, again, the issue of obsolescence that you----
Mr. McHugh. Well, we have a number of studies and analyses
ongoing. One, the S2T2, sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis
conducted by the Department of Defense, and as well as,
internally to the Army, we are setting our organic industrial
base at particular points of vulnerability. And we have an
ongoing A.T. Kearney study that will finish its first phase and
the report will be ready probably by the end of next month and
then enters a second phase.
And most of those are trying to identify two particular
areas. First, where are those truly high-skilled, close-to-
irreplaceable workers? You know, we are not talking about folks
who, you know, come and go and folks we are able to hire off
the economy pretty readily, but those folks that have
particular skills.
And, second of all, where are those--and they are usually
lower down on the chain of acquisition--single points of
failure? And they generally lie in pretty specialized
manufacturers. And we have made some adjustments in our FLIR,
our forward-looking infrared radars, and in some transmission
components for our combat fleet to try to protect those kinds
of things.
But, again, it comes back to you can only protect as many
as you have money to spend.
Mr. Visclosky. All right.
General Odierno. I mean, we are working very hard. Let me
use the Ground Combat Vehicle as an example. How do we sustain
the intellectual base of our combat development programs in
industry? And so we are working to make sure that we have the
dollars to do that. Because if we lose that, then as we move
down the road, we really have problems in developing these
programs.
So we are looking to put some moneys in this process so
they can sustain a level of intellectual capacity to move
forward as we look down the road to develop a future, for
example, infantry fighting vehicle. And we have to do that in
several areas. And we are trying to balance that so that we can
sustain that. Because if we don't, we have real problems.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chair, if I could ask one more question,
please?
On women in combat, Secretary Panetta had a memorandum in
January of last year. And would note that in 2012 the Army has
already opened up 14,000 positions that had previously been
closed to women.
One of the issues, obviously, is the issue of physical
standards. And, as I understand it--and had a very good
conversation with a number of people yesterday--it is not
necessarily having the same standards but making sure that the
outcome you need for that particular skill set is met. And
there might be different techniques to get to that outcome.
I guess the question I would have is: Has DOD, in this case
the Department of the Army, taken steps to more clearly define
what those physical standards might be? And, secondly, how are
we proceeding? And, again, recognizing that the Army is making
significant progress here.

PHYSICAL DEMAND STUDY

General Odierno. So there are two things.
So the Training and Doctrine Command has undertaken a
physical demand study, and that is in coordination with the
U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine and
other outside organizations. And they are conducting valid,
safe, legally defensible physical performance tests.
We are out doing it now. We just finished one at Fort
Stewart, Georgia, where we are doing these tests in order to
define what are the capabilities, physical capabilities, that
are necessary to accomplish specific MOSes. And it is
regardless of----
Mr. Visclosky. Sex.
General Odierno [continuing]. Gender.
Mr. Visclosky. Yeah.

GENDER INTEGRATION

General Odierno. So it is really important that we do this.
The other thing we are doing is a gender integration study.
And what we are doing is, you know, they are conducting the
cultural and institutional factors that would ensure that we
set the environment for successful gender integration in the
MOSes that previously women have not been serving.
And so, with those two efforts, we believe we are really
making a lot of progress. And we are very confident in how we
are moving forward right now.
Mr. McHugh. May I make a comment, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Yes.
Mr. McHugh. I think it is important that everybody
recognize that the discussion that somehow we are lowering
standards to allow women to enter is simply untrue.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Right.
Mr. McHugh. We have been told by the folks who are in a
position to know that when we get through this exercise that
the Chief laid out and match the physical requirements to
skills required, there are going to be some men who probably
for some time have been in those MOSes who are not going to be
able to qualify anymore.
This is about making sure we are maximizing every soldier
to have a job that he or she is most likely to succeed in and
ensuring that we have soldiers who are less likely to get
injured, who can perform at higher standards. And we are going
about this in a very, very deliberate way.
So while we are working very hard to open up positions for
women--right now we have a notice from DOD to the Congress that
for the Army will open 32,000 additional positions--this is
much wider than just women in the Army. This is about giving
every soldier a better opportunity for success.
Mr. Visclosky. Well, I appreciate your seriousness about
this issue and all of the good work and progress you have made
to date very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
The chair would like to claim some time before I recognize
Ms. Lowey.

WAR FOOTING

When I was in the coffee line this morning, somebody said,
are you going to mix it up with the Secretary and the Army
Chief, and I said, well, first of all, they are good friends
and they do a remarkable job, they provide a lot of leadership.
And you have been given some pats on the back and accolades for
being blunt about the sequester. But the other part of that
equation is that--and I suppose I would direct this to you, as
a civilian leader. There has been a decision to get off what we
call permanent war footing.
In other words, to me, as someone on this committee who has
been here for a while, we sort of started the process being
able to be involved in two wars at the same time, and General
Odierno suggested that we could perhaps address one for a
limited period of time.
So we have good reason, in some ways, to continue to be on
a war footing. I mean, there was a time a couple of months ago
when the House was challenged that we were going to, sort of,
take some military action in Korea. And there was sort of a
back-off from that, which I think surprised a lot of people,
disappointed some of our allies. The Koreans aren't slowing
down, you know, their hostility. The Chinese are setting up
sort of an exclusion zone. We talked about this in another
setting over the last 24 hours. And they are being
confrontational. And there is the issue that our adversaries
are watching, our allies are watching what our response is.
After all, this is a defense posture hearing here. We can
wring our hands about the state of what is going on here, in
terms of the sequester and continuing resolution, but you still
have a job to do here. And I don't know whether, you know, this
is the forum, but this is the committee that is going to come
up with whatever it takes you to get across the finish line.
I think we continue to live in a very dangerous world here.
Who would have thought that the Russians would have annexed
Crimea? We can go back into the history. We can talk about
gulags and things that, you know, all these people have
suffered, their indignities and the horrors. But we need to be
prepared for every eventuality.
And I know this is sort of sequester-centric here, but, in
reality, we now have a--we are taking ourselves off a permanent
war footing. I think we live in a more dangerous world, and we
need to be prepared for that.
So the bottom line here: Are we prepared? Are we prepared?
It is an issue of readiness here. Whatever the number is, are
we ready to meet whatever those challenges are, some of which I
have outlined?

BI-PARTISAN BUDGET AGREEMENT

General Odierno. Well--and a really important subject. And
what keeps me up at night is our readiness today. That is what
keeps me up at night.
I mentioned earlier we have 70,000 soldiers currently that
are on operational commitments around the world. That is a
significant number. And what has happened is, in 2013, we had a
really significant downgrade in our readiness because of the
hammer of sequestration.
The bipartisan budget agreement helped us significantly in
2014. It helps a little bit in 2015. So we are starting to
rebuild this readiness. The problem is, if you go back to
sequestration in 2016, you fall off the cliff, readiness cliff.
So, once again, we are going to have readiness issues because
of the nature of sequestration.
So, in order to sustain appropriate readiness, it has to be
consistent funding over consistent periods of time. Because
readiness is something that comes and goes. If you are not
constantly preparing yourself, you lose readiness. And I worry
we are having too many fits and starts with readiness.
We are taking advantage of the money that you have given us
on the bipartisan budget agreement, and we are now building
readiness. But that ends, you know, in 2015, and so we have
this problem.
The only other thing I would say that is counterintuitive,
what people don't realize, as you get smaller, readiness is
more important. Because----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Exactly my question.
General Odierno. Yeah.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Whatever your size is, you better be
capable of moving it quickly.
It is a subject which is key to our--and this is a group
that all endorses, you know, regular order. We have the ranking
member here, Mrs. Lowey. I mean, it has been a working
relationship with Chairman Rogers. I am not sure everybody
outside our committee gets it, but we are still working on it.
Leader Lowey.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure for me to join you in welcoming the Secretary.
Nice to see you in this position.
And, General Odierno, I know that I have been involved, I
know you are, in the Wounded Warrior Project. And I know how
much you care and you are working to address that very, very
serious issue when these young men and women come home.
I want to thank you and all the Army soldiers and civilians
for your sacrifices and dedication to keeping our Nation safe.
The Army faces great funding shortfalls due to
sequestration, and while a partial restoration of funds in the
fiscal year 2014 budget will help recoup some of the lost
readiness, tough choices remain in the Army's budget proposal
for fiscal year 2015 and beyond.
With today's volatile environment, it is increasingly
difficult to most effectively shape the Army for the future.
And we need to work together to ensure this budget allows the
Army to meet our national security goals despite uncertainty
and fiscal constraint.
And I look forward to doing just that, Mr. Chairman.
Sexual assault and harassment continues to plague the
military. The President gave the Department of Defense a
deadline of December 1st, 2014, to evaluate whether changes
implemented over the past 12 to 18 months are making a
difference.
The Pentagon reported that about 5,400 instances of sexual
assault or unwanted sexual contact were reported in the
military in fiscal year 2013, a 60 percent rise from 2012. Last
month, a top Army prosecutor for sexual assault was suspended
after allegations that he sexually harassed a subordinate. Just
this week, an Army general officer got off with merely a hand
slap after being charged with similarly egregious offenses.
General Odierno, do you believe the Army will be able to
stem the rising incidence of sexual assaults or unwanted
contact? Is it a cultural problem? Is it a leadership problem?
Will opening more military positions to women at all ranks help
the problem?

ARMY STRATEGY TO COUNTER SEXUAL ASSAULT

General Odierno. First off, I think there are several
things we have to do. One is we have to constantly work on our
culture. And we are working that from the bottom up and the top
down, and it is absolutely critical.
It is also, anything that goes on in the Army is a leader
issue. And this is about leaders being involved at every level
to solve this problem. We have made it our number-one priority.
I hold regular meetings with our leaders. I talk to every
brigade or battalion commander, I am talking to every one of
our generals about their responsibilities--our sergeant majors.
And that is, in our institutions, we are changing how we train.
So all of this is absolutely critical to us as we go
forward. Yes, we can solve this problem, but we have a lot of
work to do yet.
We are seeing some things that I think--you know, our
prosecution rates are up. Number of people going to trial is
up. So there are some positive signs.
I also believe that the reason the rates have gone up in
terms of the number of incidents is because they feel much more
comfortable coming forward because of the new renewed
involvement in the chain of command and that they are gaining
some confidence.
But we still have much work to do. We are nowhere near
where we need to be yet. But we are absolutely focused on this.
Mrs. Lowey. If you could describe for us, the DOD Military
Criminal Investigative Organization, the MCIO, to investigate
100 percent of sexual assault cases, what impact will this have
on the Army? And how has the criminal investigation division
been resourced, both funding and manning, to meet this growing
requirement?

SEXUAL ASSAULT COUNTERMEASURES

General Odierno. There are two things that we have done.
First of all, I think we are recognized as having the best
forensics capability of any of the services in terms of sexual
assault within the criminal investigation division of the U.S.
Army because we have invested a lot of dollars in that.
We continue to increase the number of special prosecutors
that we are training with experience in this area. We are also
increasing the number of investigators and giving them very
specific training to ensure they understand how to investigate
these crimes. And we are continuing to increase this.
We also have an awareness campaign that commanders
understand the capabilities of the criminal investigation
division, both the special prosecutors as well as the
investigators.
We continue to increase in all of these areas, and we are
continuing to invest.
I just went down to Fort Leonard Wood, where we have our
school, and I spent time there. We have also implemented new
courses in the school. We have also established a new Army-
level school for SARCs.
And so we are investing a lot of money in this, and we will
continue to do so.
Mrs. Lowey. And one other question, if I may. The issue of
suicide prevention remains a high priority, I know, within the
Department of Defense. While Army suicides in all 3 components
have declined in recent years from 325 in 2012, 305 in 2013, 53
reported thus far in 2014, it remains a problem, and it really
pains all of us to look at those numbers.
General Odierno, do you believe the Army is doing a better
job of addressing this issue with soldiers? And what has made
the difference? What still needs to be done?
It is so painful for us to think this exists after our
young men and women serve with such distinction. If you could
address that.
General Odierno. Yes, thank you, ma'am. Two areas I will
highlight quickly.
One is we have expanded behavioral health significantly in
the Army. We have increased behavioral health staff by 150
percent since 2013. And we are now in the units; we now have
behavioral health specialists down to brigade level. This is
having a significant impact, so they have people they can get
to and more access to the care that they need.
The other thing I would say is that it is about us, also,
our ready/resilient campaign, where we are focusing on ready/
resilient soldiers and families and the education of them in
terms of modification of their behavior, better physical,
better mental toughness and strength, the ability to cope with
very difficult situations. And we are getting great feedback
from our soldiers and families that this is starting to make a
difference.
Again, this is one that requires leadership attention. This
is one that we will not stop. No matter however we lose a
soldier, it is very difficult for us. And we continue to work
this very carefully.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
And let me just correct the record. I was referring early
to Syria, the potential military action there. We obviously
hope never to see such a thing happen on the Korean Peninsula.
Mr. Crenshaw.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pick up a little bit on what the chairman just
talked about in terms of readiness. When I walked in, Mr.
Visclosky was talking about the industrial base. And I want to
ask a couple--we have had this ongoing conversation about
tanks.
And I actually just came from a meeting with Condoleezza
Rice, and we were talking about Ukraine, talking about Russia,
talking about Georgia, talking about NATO. And one of the
things that she commented on, you know, maybe we were a little
premature in thinking everything is going in the right
direction.

M1A2 ABRAMS TANK PRODUCTION

And when you talk about tanks, I know there was a time 3, 5
years ago, said, we don't need any more tanks for now, but we
might need them 5 years later. And so we had a discussion about
what happened if you shut down a production facility and then
had to start it back up. And there was a back-and-forth about
how much that might cost, somewhere, $500 million to a billion
dollars.
And the last several years, this subcommittee--and we have
to take, like, a long view of the world. I know sometimes your
decisions can be driven on a short-term basis. But we provided
somewhat of a safety net to make sure that the only tank
production and modernization facility we have stayed open,
along with some foreign military sales. And, each year, you
have chosen not to put any money in your request to--but we
kind of provided that safety net.
And so, once again, here we are; we look at the request.
And I think your view is that hopefully foreign military sales
will keep the line sustainable. And as the world seems to get a
little more dangerous, tanks probably become more important
than they might have been 5 years ago in terms of
modernization.
And I guess the question is, if we didn't provide a safety
net and the foreign military sales weren't what we all hoped
they would be, what would happen to that only tank production
facility we have in the country? And if it were to shut down,
how much would it cost the Army, the military, to start it back
up, either next year or the year after that? And that is not in
the budget.
So talk about that and how you view the whole readiness
issue, the industrial base issue. Because I think we all agree
how important it is, but it seems like that is an overall cost
of doing business.

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. McHugh. If I could, Mr. Crenshaw, I will start and then
let the Chief take over.
As I mentioned earlier, we have spent a whole lot of time
trying to analyze what we are able to do to sustain both the
organic as well as the external industrial base.
In the case of our combat fleet, we have, in fact, done
some things to try to stretch out procurement times to sustain
a minimum amount of work necessary to retain the skilled
workers, which is our focus. We can't possibly maintain an
entire workload as it was at the height of production, but we
want to keep those skilled workers.

KEEP SOME M1A2 WORKERS ON THE PROGRAM

We have made some accelerated acquisition, I mentioned
earlier, in FLIR, our forward-looking infrared radars, some
engine transmissions for Bradley and other units to try to
ensure that those skilled workforces stay available. And we
have accelerated, with respect to the Abrams, we have
accelerated our plan for the engineering upgrades. Originally
planned in 2019, we have accelerated that to 2017.
We had, and you mentioned, shut down to warm status,
analysis that showed us that doing that kind of action and then
a restart was far more cost-efficient than sustaining and
buying product that we don't need. We will have met the full
Army acquisition requirement for Abrams tanks by next year,
2015. It will be what it already is, one of the most modern
articles in the United States Army's inventory. The average
Abrams tank is 4 to 5 years old right now.
So do we wish we had money to continue to buy and build up
a reserve? I suppose that would be nice. But in the current
budget realities, we just don't have that capacity.
General Odierno. If I could just add, we have the most
modernized and new tank fleet that we have ever had since I
have been in the Army today. And that is because of the
investments that you have allowed us to make. And so I feel
comfortable with where we are with our tank fleet. We have not
ignored it. We have capacity, we have capability. So we have
that capability.
The issue is, as the Secretary said, how do we sustain an
industrial base for the long term. And I think we have tried to
come up with the best strategy possible to do that.
And so I feel comfortable with where we are with that. I
feel comfortable with where we are with our tank fleet. Again,
I believe we have the best tank in the world, and I believe we
have the most--and it has been modernized to the extent that
the fleet age of our tanks are the lowest they have ever been.
And so I feel comfortable with where we are with that.
We certainly are concerned with sustaining an industrial
base that can continue to support us in the long term.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Crenshaw.
Ms. McCollum and then Ms. Granger.

REMARKS OF MS. MCCOLLUM

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
I have two questions, and I really would like to get to
them both. One builds off of what Mr. Crenshaw was talking
about. There has been a lot of discussion about weapons systems
and protecting those and making sure that we have what the Navy
needs in order to carry out its mission--the Air Force, the
Army, the Marine Corps. And a lot of it is heavy equipment.
But one thing I see when I am out in the field and one
thing that is issued to just about everybody in the military is
body armor. And so I am concerned from conversations that I
have had from our soldiers as well as with some of the medical
personnel that I have spoken with that some of the body armor
was so heavy and what we were asking our soldiers and Marines
and others, you know, to carry around with them was really
causing a lot of stress on their body.
So I understand that the Army was really pursuing to work
towards better body armor. I am also aware that there is a
shelf life with a lot of the body armor and there is a report
coming out shortly.

BODY ARMOR

So here is my question: What are you doing, because of what
is in the budget for body armor, one, to make sure we have
don't lose the ability to continue the R&D on it, that we don't
find ourselves in a position where we have outlived shelf life
and all of a sudden we are scrambling for body armor?
I mean, I think it is important that--you know, the
industrial base, we think of the big-ticket items, but the
industrial base also includes R&D for the smaller-ticket items,
the items that are, you know, intimately responsible for
protecting that soldier or Marine.
Mr. McHugh. If I could start, Ms. McCollum.
Body armor, in terms of weight, is a very significant
aspect, but it is only one aspect. We are working across all
the personal protection and personal equipment arenas to try to
lighten the load, everything from batteries for a 3-day patrol,
we have lightened the battery weight by 30 percent, and on and
on and on. So body----
Ms. McCollum. Mr. Secretary----
Mr. McHugh. Sure.
Ms. McCollum [continuing]. I really want to be respectful,
but I have another question that is very----
Mr. McHugh. Sure.
Ms. McCollum [continuing]. Very important to me. If you
could just address body armor for me, please.
Mr. McHugh. We have an acquisition objective to reduce
further procurements of body armor weight by up to 20 percent.
We have already reduced body armor through carrier plates and
other systems by some 10 percent. But every day we are trying
to do what we can to squeeze out weight.
Ms. McCollum. And what is the shelf life on the body armor?
Is there a report coming out?
Mr. McHugh. I do believe there is an analysis. I haven't
seen it, so I can't tell you what it says.
Ms. McCollum. And do you know what happens to the R&D and
some of things that are going into the, I am going to call it
the industrial base for body armor, when the requisitions go
down so low, especially when we don't know what the shelf-life
report is going to say?
General Odierno. Yeah, if I could, we do have the Soldier
Protective System, which is the body armor system for the
future. And that is our line to get the R&D and continue to
move forward with new developments in our body armor program.
And that is ongoing, and it looks at all aspects of the body
armor--eye, torso, et cetera.
And we are also looking at different types of body armor
for different missions, because that also reduces the weight.
And so that is all part of this future program that is being
worked. Again, I am not--I have to look at the report, as well,
to----

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Ms. McCollum. Okay. Well, we will get back to you.
I want to go back to the issue of sexual assault. Army
General Sinclair just recently received a fine and no time.
When he was first charged, it could have meant life in prison.
My understanding and I could read from a report in the
Washington Post here that, you know, after 2 years, all of a
sudden all the charges were dropped.
What I had been led to believe is that General Sinclair had
originally been willing to--and admitting to charges which
would have had consequences of jail time and consequences of
losing rank and possibly losing pension. When that was
discussed higher up the chain, it was told, no, we are not
going to do that, we are going to go to trial, even though--and
I have it on fairly good authority--that this was an agreement
that the General had agreed to.
We have been asked to trust the chain of command. I watched
very carefully what was going on in the Senate. Can you tell me
whether or not Admiral Sinclair had agreed to do jail time and
had agreed to accept charges and then the chain of command
said, we don't want to do that?
Mr. McHugh. I am the civilian authority that has to make
final determination on this and all similar disciplinary cases.
Given that this is and remains an open case, unlike in the
civilian sector when a jury renders its verdict and the judge
issues sentencing, there still are several significant steps in
the military process that have to occur. So we are greatly
constrained, at this point, as to what we can say.
I can say this. I am not sure where you got your
information that charges were dropped, but obviously they
weren't dropped. The decision to prosecute--in fact, he was
convicted.
The issue, as I understand it, that arises was the judge's
decision for sentencing. As in the civilian sector, the Army
has no control over what an independent judiciary does or
doesn't do----
Ms. McCollum. So, Mr. Secretary, to your knowledge----
Mr. McHugh [continuing]. With respect to sentencing.
Ms. McCollum [continuing]. To your knowledge, General
Sinclair was never willing to plead guilty to any of the
charges earlier and was directed or told that he should not
accept that and that it should go to court?
Mr. McHugh. To my knowledge, I am not in a position to
speak as to the procedure of the trial. The trial record is
still open----
Ms. McCollum. I am not talking about a trial, sir. I am
talking about----
Mr. McHugh. That is all part of the record, Congresswoman.
And I am sorry, I wish I could, but I am not in a position to
comment on that.
I can tell you that this officer, when he was accused, the
investigation was properly begun. There was a decision to
charge him. He was charged, he was prosecuted, and he was
convicted. That is what I am at liberty to say.
I have the final determination authority as to his
conditions of retirement, meaning his grade at retirement. And
that matter has not yet reached my desk.
Ms. McCollum. And I can understand you can't talk about
that any further. Thank you very much. And I think I made my
point to my committee members.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Ms. McCollum.
Ms. Granger.

REMARKS OF MS. GRANGER

Ms. Granger. Secretary McHugh, less than a year ago, May of
2013, the Army opposed purchasing additional Lakota
helicopters, stating that there was no emergency requirement
that existed and that the Lakota was not designed for combat. I
have been advised that you are planning to now purchase 100 new
Lakotas and moving 100 existing Lakotas into the Training
Command.

LAKOTA HELICOPTERS IN FLIGHT SCHOOL

The requirements generation process that led you to replace
the existing TH-67 Creek trainers with Lakotas is unclear to
me. Was there a study done? And if there was, what did the
study say?
Mr. McHugh. There was an analysis done that resulted in a
report that we call ARI, the Army Reconfiguration Initiative,
that seeks to realign and make new decisions on the entire Army
portfolio.
As we discussed earlier, one of the keystones of that is
having the Army totally divest itself of Kiowa Warriors. That
has been an integral part of our attack platforms for many,
many years, but it is no longer affordable. And, instead, to
use Apache platforms, particularly in the Active Component, as
a measure, frankly, to save money, some $12 billion.
The decision on the training base was an underpinning of
those other decisions and was led, in part, to the decision
that you mentioned on the acquisition of 100 additional Lakotas
for training purposes.
Ms. Granger. Can we get a copy of that, of the ARI? Or do
we have a copy of the ARI?
Mr. McHugh. It is really a proposal. Do we have a full
analysis, maybe the Chief can----
General Odierno. We have a proposal. We can provide you
some backup data on why we made some of these decisions, and we
will do that, ma'am.
Ms. Granger. Okay. Thank you.
[The information follows:]

As requested, a copy of the Army Restructure Initiative plan and
related supporting analysis has been provided to Representative Granger
under separate cover.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Granger, I know we have a second
round here. I am trying to make sure it is even-steven here. Is
there any indication on my left, if there is someone who would
like to pose a question?
Ms. Kaptur, and then we will go to Mr. Cole or Mr. Crenshaw
or Judge Carter.
Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to associate my statement today with
Congressman Crenshaw of Florida on the importance of a very
robust force and overground capacity, particularly in tanks,
and not knowing what the future will bring.

EQUIPMENT RETROGRADE FROM AFGHANISTAN

I wanted to also ask Secretary McHugh, as you consider
shipment back to the United States of equipment, used equipment
from theater, I would hope that you would look at all four
coasts equally. And if you need additional authority to use the
Great Lakes, I would hope that you let me know that. Because,
in the past, a lot has not come back through the Lakes, even
though we have a very high enlistment rate. And if there is not
sufficient authority to use all four coasts, I hope that you
will let me know that. I will try to fix it if you don't have
the authority.

HELPING THE NEEDY

And that also there be an aggressive effort made by the
Department of Defense to look at organizations stateside that
need help. Our State veterans homes, for one--everything from
beds to kitchen equipment, et cetera. Our homeless veterans
shelters, not-for-profits in some of the lowest-income
communities in our country that need kitchen equipment, et
cetera.
So I just wanted to sensitize you to four coasts and
allowing people who need equipment to be aware that it is being
offered.
Mr. McHugh. I saw your neighbor on your right-hand side,
also your neighbor on the Great Lakes, perk up at that. Having
represented a Great Lakes district and a Saint Lawrence River/
Seaway district for 17 years, I understand your concern and
interest.
I will advise TRANSCOM, Transportation Command, of your
very gracious offer. They are interested in doing it in the
most cost-effective way possible, obviously.
As to the equipment disposal, there is a Federal process
whereby we are required to offer excess articles to certain
nongovernmental and governmental agencies. A lot of the kinds
of things that you mentioned are, frankly, far too expensive to
bring back; they cost more to bring back than they cost to buy
new.
So I am not sure how many of those articles would be
available, but if they are brought back as excess, we do have a
way by which we make those available.
Ms. Kaptur. All right. Very good. Well, I think we have
some interest. So thank you very much.

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

I wanted to also just state for the record--and this
relates to defense medicine and the condition of our soldiers
in terms of suicide, alcohol, and PTSD. Through work that the
Department has done with Case Western Reserve and our Army
Guard in Ohio, we have learned some very important things. One
of the most important is in terms of suicide, that the
correlation between alcohol abuse descending into suicide is
direct and significant.
And I don't want to spend my time today talking about
alcohol abuse, but I would--I am sure you know this, but I just
wanted to place it on the table and hope that the Department
would do everything possible to identify alcohol abuse and to
intervene at that level initially in order to make a difference
on the suicide numbers. And I know you have already done--yes,
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. McHugh. Very quickly.
Absolutely true. And we have seen that in our analysis, as
well. And I think the other services would agree.
We would love to have the opportunity to have some folks
come over and talk to you about, I think, one of the
revolutionary programs the Army has initiated and I have
authorized to go Army-wide called CONTREAT, where we encourage
soldiers with those kinds of problems to self-report before
they get into trouble, to go through treatment, and to have
absolutely no negative effect to their record.
Ms. Kaptur. And their buddies can help a lot, too.
Mr. McHugh. Absolutely.
Ms. Kaptur. The second point----
Mr. Crenshaw. If the gentlewoman would--would you yield----
Ms. Kaptur. I would be happy to yield.

TANK MODERNIZATION

Mr. Crenshaw. She mentioned she would like to associate
herself with the remarks. And with all due respect, the
question I asked didn't really get answered. I know the
chairman wanted to move on, but this whole question of are you
going to build more modernized tanks in 2016.
And if they are not enough military sales this year and
there is no safety net that we provide as Congress, how much is
that going to cost when you decide you are going to start
building tanks again? And do you build that in?
And that is the question.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Well, that will be a rhetorical
question, but we would like to have a response.
Mr. McHugh. We can provide--we have the analysis, as I
think, Mr. Crenshaw----
Mr. Crenshaw. The initial analysis, you said it would be
better go ahead and shut down the line for 5 years. And we
argued about whether that cost a billion or not, but you had an
analysis that said that is a good way to do it. We thought it
would be better to get something for our money, and that is
what we have been doing.
Now, if you are telling me now you have a report that says
shut down the line for a year and that is still----
Mr. McHugh. Well----
Mr. Crenshaw [continuing]. A better way to do the business
than actually have some money in the budget this year to kind
of make sure it stays open----
Mr. McHugh. Yeah.
Mr. Crenshaw [continuing]. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. McHugh. The analysis I mentioned didn't really deal in
5 versus 3. It dealt with, what does it cost to shut a line
down and then reopen it, whether it is 1, 2, or----
Mr. Crenshaw. One year or 5 years?
Mr. McHugh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crenshaw. So if it cost a billion dollars per year,
that is still a better use of the taxpayers' dollars?
Mr. McHugh. That has been our analysis when we meet our
acquisition objective. And the minimum sustainment rate for the
manufactured tanks is 12 tank equivalents per month. We are
talking billions of dollars that we simply don't have to spend
on something we don't need, is our point.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Kaptur reclaims her time for 15
seconds. Then we go to Mr. Cole.

PTSD

Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to place important information on the record
relating to PTSD. And we in Ohio have been very involved with
the Department in doing a longitudinal study of over 3,000 Ohio
Guard members upon return, especially from Iraq and
Afghanistan, and here is what we found. Fifty percent of
soldiers were entirely resistant. The other half had various
levels of symptoms: 36 percent had mild symptoms; 11 percent,
chronic, mild, and persistent; and 3 percent, very
debilitating.
But what we learned was that if more attention was paid at
the enlistment level to the following factors, we could
identify the most susceptible. And these are the categories:
those enlistees who come from families with less than $40,000
in income; who have an education of high school, GED, or less;
who have had more than 10 traumatic experiences prior to
enlistment in the military; they have spent most of their time
in Iraq and Afghanistan; and they had no insurance at the
baseline.
So I just think that the work that Case Western has done
with the Ohio Guard is extraordinarily important in identifying
subgroups that we should focus on within the military.
Ms. Kaptur. And I thank the chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Ms. Kaptur is requesting you take a
close look at that report, and I am sure you will do it as a
result of the discussion.
The gentleman from Oklahoma.

IRON DOME

Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Recently, with the chairman of our whole committee, I had
the opportunity to go to Israel and see--we not only sustain
our industrial base, we help some of our friends sustain their
industrial base and get something back in return. And I think
one of the better investments, it appeared to me, that we have
made was in Iron Dome. And we went to the company that
manufactures it, also went and saw it deployed in the field.
And I was just curious, you know, are the technology
benefits coming back to us? And what are the things we are
doing to harvest that and make sure that, you know, if our
friends have developed something that is capable and robust and
that we have helped finance and deploy--and let me tell you,
the gratitude was tremendous about what the United States had
done in this case.
I just am curious what we are doing to make sure that we
get whatever benefit out of the investment that is appropriate
for us, as well.
Mr. McHugh. Well, we try to do just that, not just with the
Israelis but all of our Tier 1 partners. And I think there is a
sense of shared best practice. There does at times get into the
consideration of industrial jealousies, et cetera, that we try
to work through.
As to Iron Dome, we have had pretty robust opportunity to
analyze it. It certainly seems to meet the Israelis' needs
very, very well. We didn't, the last I checked, find a lot that
we could harvest out of it.
But having said that, the fact that we had the chance to
sit down and work with our Israeli partners was very, very
important and appreciative. And, as you said, Mr. Cole, they
have been enormously grateful for the support that they have
received from us, and I don't think we could ask for better
cooperation.
Mr. Cole. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Cole.
Yes, Mr. Visclosky.

REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES

Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Secretary and General, I would very sincerely
and seriously associate myself with the observations that Ms.
Kaptur made relative to transport in the Great Lakes. Too
often, people forget States like New York or Minnesota or
Indiana or Ohio or places are actually a fourth seacoast, and
would hope that people do note that fact.
I would, just in the time I have, want to say that I
support your efforts as far as your regionally aligned forces.
Since our standing military is going to be smaller, I do
appreciate that you are looking for innovative, low-cost,
small-footprint initiatives to work with others relative to
counterinsurgency.
I particularly am pleased with the Department's decision on
increasing assistance relative to going after the Lord's
Resistance Army. I understand that you have, if you would, for
these partnerships, protected that program in the 2015 budget.
Might you just briefly for us explain where in that budget
request those types of items would appear and we could look for
them?
General Odierno. Oh, the State Partnership Program, is
that----
Mr. Visclosky. Yes.
General Odierno. Yeah. So we have increased 27 percent.
Mr. Visclosky. Well, not just that, but for all of--in
general, the partnership capabilities that you have.
General Odierno. Okay.
So, first off, what we have done under regional line forces
is--there are several things. First, we have some baseline
activity in our budget, our O&M budget, that allows us to
conduct regionally aligned force activities, whether it be in
support of NATO, whether it be in Africa, et cetera.
But the other thing we have found when we ran the pilot in
Africa, that out of the $98 million that were spent last year,
only $4 million came out of the Army budget. We found $94
million in other pots of money within DOD and the State
Department that we were able to leverage in order for us to
support efforts in building partner capacity as well as other
activities that we have conducted.
And so what we are doing is we are leveraging the moneys
that have been allocated across the Department of Defense as
well as the Department of State to execute this. And we believe
we can continue to do this. There are funds set up specifically
to go after these kind of missions.
And so we will fund some minor portions of it out of the
Army O&M, but we will try to utilize these other budget
capabilities that are specifically targeted towards building
partner capacity and developing other countries' militaries.
And we are using that as our funding to do this, and we have
been very successful so far in doing it.
Mr. Visclosky. Army's resources, is that a line item, or is
that dispersed throughout your----
General Odierno. I would have to get back to you
specifically what it is.
Mr. Visclosky. That would be fine. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. It is substantial, though.
Judge Carter.

ASIA PACIFIC REBALANCE

Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Recently, in fact yesterday evening, we had a discussion
about PACOM. And looking at that map, it sure as heck looked
like the Pacific theater in World War II, as far as the area we
are talking about. And the President and the administration
have announced a shift to that area.
So, General Odierno, I am well aware of what we have in
Korea and what we are doing in Korea, but as you look at PACOM
and the possible needs and involvement of the Army, I would
like your opinion as to what you think--and the Secretary's
opinion--about what you think our Army involvement potentially
could be in PACOM.
General Odierno. Yeah. So we have 80,000 soldiers--Guard,
Reserve, Active Component--assigned to Pacific Command. And so,
as I said, 20,000 of those--and we have 60,000 that are
conducting missions throughout many different areas in the
Asia-Pacific region.
You know, we have five treaty allies--South Korea, Japan,
Thailand, Philippines, Australia--that we are working very much
with.
On this issue of partnership activities to facilitate U.S.
relationships, gain access, provide security for global
commons, and support some of our contingency planning, we are
looking at where we put prepositioned stocks, not only to meet
a range of activities, from humanitarian assistance support all
the way up to supporting potential deployments of forces in the
Asia-Pacific region--so it is a wide variety of engagements
that we are conducting.
And just to give you an example, we just did a joint
airborne operation with the Thai Army, for example. We just did
a humanitarian assistance exercise with the Chinese in Hawaii.
So there are activities such as this that we are doing to
build confidence, to build our relationships, to build
familiarity, which helps us in developing our security
activities throughout the Asia-Pacific region. And that is what
we are going to continue to do. It is a significant commitment
that the Army is making in this area.
Mr. McHugh. Could I just add, you know--and I think it is
understandable. People talk about the Pacific, and you
immediately think of a lot of ocean and a lot of sky. But the
reason people are interested in those oceans and sky is because
there are a lot of people who live around them.
There are 36 nations in the Pacific region. Of those, 27
have military. And of those 27, 26 of them, the army is the
largest of their militaries. And of those 27, 20 of the defense
chiefs are army officers. So, however we view it, the Asian
nations of that region view their army as their principal actor
in military matters.
And while we always have to think about conflict and going
to war, our main purpose, particularly in that theater, is to
prevent and shape, to work with partners and build partnership
capacity. And there, I would argue, the Army is better postured
in terms of ability to work with other nations than perhaps any
of the other services.
So we think we have a very important part. And the PACOM
commanders--Admiral Sam Locklear, who I understand was with you
yesterday, was with the SASC a day or 2 earlier, I think would
be one of the first to validate that.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. I think he did validate that.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Owens?
Thank you, Judge.

ASIA PACIFIC REBALANCE

Mr. Owens. Thank you.
First of all, certainly, we would like to see Saint
Lawrence Seaway used for the repatriation of those items.
I want to go back to this whole PACOM area. I am assuming
that the analysis that you have applied has led you to the
conclusion that China is the next emerging, if not emerged,
superpower, and that in order to have that deterrent effect,
therefore we have shifted our position toward Southeast Asia.
Is that a fair analysis?
Mr. McHugh. Well, certainly, China is an emerging military
and economic power. And I don't know that one needs to do a lot
of analysis on that.
But the pivot to the Pacific is really based on a broader
range of considerations. I mean, if you look at India, another
very major emerging power. And if you look at where the great
economic interests of this Nation lie and where we want to do
everything we can to promote peace and security, the Pacific
would seem to be a good place to start.
Clearly, there are security challenges there. We have
already talked about Korea, and I know the Chief has spent some
recent time in China trying to build relationships with their
military and their army, and we want to continue to do that.
But it does posture us to better, we hope, productively and
cooperatively engage with China.
Mr. Owens. It would also be logistically somewhat difficult
to move large numbers of troops in and around that region, I
would think.
General Odierno. Yeah, I think, again, I think, obviously,
the distances involved make it very difficult. So that is why
it is important for us to posture certain capabilities there
that allow us to do that.
Again, I would focus on, I think in the Asia-Pacific region
it really is about protecting our economic interests. And what
we want to do is have a balanced approach to the Asia-Pacific
region that allows us to continue to move forward economically,
that helps to keep us as a strong Nation. And so what we are
trying to do is develop strong relationships, to build
partnerships that allow us to sustain and would make everyone
realize that we are a Pacific power.
The Asia-Pacific region is very important to the United
States. It is important to us, as the Secretary said,
economically, and it important to us to sustain stability.
So this is not about having another cold war; this is about
sustaining a level of stability that allows to continue to
develop economically as we continue to increase significantly
our trade in the Pacific region. And I think it is about that:
preventing conflict and shaping the environment for us to
continue to grow in strength as a Nation economically.
And that is the strategy we are putting forward by building
partnerships, by having access, in order to prevent conflict in
the future. And I think that is what we are trying to do.

PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Mr. Frelinghuysen. And may we add also, if the gentleman
would yield, the prepositioning of assets which are highly
important and do represent a substantial contribution to
stability and are recognizing our continued interest in the
area.
Mr. Owens. Thank you.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Owens.
Ms. Granger.

ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENT MIX

Ms. Granger. In 2011, the Air Force proposed a plan that
was opposed by the National Guard and also the Governors. And
the Congress really didn't appreciate or respond very well to
that plan.
It now appears that the Army is attempting a very similar
tactic. So, given the Guard's critical role, both domestically
and internationally, I am concerned that the Army's proposal
ignores not only the concerns of the Governors but also the
concerns of a seated member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
So I would like to know what you are doing to work with the
Guard and our Governors to incorporate changes that will enable
them to support your plan. And have you incorporated any of the
Guard's suggestions or alternatives?
Mr. McHugh. If I may just open with a few comments.
I think there are enormous differences between the path the
Air Force took and the path we took. First of all, the Air
Force began with cuts against the Guard. The Army has, for the
last 2 years, totally immunized the Guard from cuts while we
have taken substantial reductions across the board. And that
was to protect the operationalized aspects of that Guard that
we have built. I mean, this wasn't forced upon us. We have
built over the last 13 years, and we want to continue to
sustain.
The other is, unlike the Air Force, we engaged the
professional staff members here on the Hill, kept them fully
informed. I am not suggesting that means everybody buys into
it. But I think when the Air Force hit the street with their
proposal, it was a surprise to a lot of people. Again, we
didn't do that, and we did involve the Guard in the discussions
from day one.
So I will let the Chief--again, not that they agree with
it, necessarily, but they were involved.
Chief.
General Odierno. As we looked at this proposal, this is
about what is best for the Army. And we are very cognizant of
the role the Guard and Reserve plays, and that was taken into
consideration as we made these recommendations.
I would also say that, again, comparing it to the Air
Force, the Air Force has 70 percent of their structure in the
Active Component and only 30 percent in the Guard. The Army in
2012 was about 51 percent to 49 percent, Active to Reserve.
When we finish this, we are going to be 54 percent Reserve and
46 percent Active, so we have taken the majority of the cuts
out of the Active. So it is a very different situation.
We recognize the importance of the Guard and Reserve. This
is not about the Guard versus the Reserve--I mean, the Active
versus the Guard. This is about coming up with the right
balance.
And we recognize the fact that the Active Component is more
expensive, so we have taken a significantly more--majority of
the cuts out of the Active Component. We have done that. But it
comes to a time where, based on what we believe we need to
execute our defense strategy, we can't go any lower in the
Active Component, so we have had to take some out of the Guard.
And the budget is driving us to those decisions.
We understand that we have to have the right integration
and the right capabilities and depth that the Guard provides
us, that the U.S. Army Reserve provides us. It is critical to
what we are doing. And I think the Secretary and I have
recognized that in the budget submission. We recognize the
importance.
What we can't do is maintain structure that we can't
sustain at the right readiness levels. So we have gone to the
lowest level we can in the Active. We want to take a little bit
out of the Guard, because we want them to stay in operational
reserve. We do not want them to go back to a strategic reserve.
And I worry, if we keep too much structure in the Guard, they
will end up being a strategic reserve because we can't fund the
training that is necessary.
Ms. Granger. Did the Guard--I understand they presented
several alternatives. Did you consider the alternatives?
General Odierno. We absolutely did. I don't want to debate
that here, but in their alternatives, in some cases, it
actually increased the size of the Guard. And so it was
difficult, but----
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Okay. Maybe we will leave that
discussion for a future date, but, certainly, the Members have
a keen interest.
Moving towards the finish line, Mr. Ryan and then Ms.
McCollum, and then we may be towards an adjournment.
Thank you.

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a brief question, as we are all concerned with what is
happening in the Ukraine and Russia. Should the Russians
continue to move aggressively in that region and in the Ukraine
and NATO would have to respond, for example, what would that
mean for the United States Army?
General Odierno. Well, I can't comment on the decisions
that--what I have to make sure is we are prepared. So my
responsibility is to make sure that the U.S. Army is prepared
to respond as part of a joint force as part of NATO. So I have
to make sure that we ensure that we are ready if asked. The
decision for us will be external to that.
So what I am focused on is improving our readiness in
combat, combat service support and combat aviation
capabilities, to make sure we are ready to respond, whether it
is from a humanitarian assistance aspect or any other aspect.
And that is what I am focused on now.
Mr. Ryan. What would the number be? I see we have 28,000
soldiers in Europe, 940 in the Balkans. What would our
commitment level be, do you think?
General Odierno. Well, I simply don't know.
And I would just remind people that, actually, some of the
soldiers that are assigned to Europe right now are in
Afghanistan.
So it just depends on what they would ask us to do. But we
would take the whole CONUS Army and whatever else, depending on
what we are asked to do, we will take capabilities from across
the Army to go after the problem.
Mr. Ryan. Okay.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
Ms. McCollum.

READINESS

Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
And to go to the issue of readiness, the President had
proposed $56 billion in additional spending above the Murray-
Ryan budget for 2015, and that was paid for with tax reforms
and mandatory spending cuts. So about half of the $56 billion
would have gone to nondefense spending, and that would have
about $28 billion for defense spending broadly across, you
know, several bills.
So it was envisioned that part of the Army's piece of this
account would have been about $7.5 billion, and $4.2 billion
was for operation and maintenance accounts. And some of the
proposals were to go towards readiness enhancements of all
services, including $600 million in training and other
readiness-related increases for the Army.
So could you describe a little more about some of the
projects and activities that you would have been able to
include in the Army's portion of this?
And given the fact that readiness is one of your highest
priorities, can you also say maybe why some of these activities
were left in this proposal? Or are they just really, you know,
the extra deluxe that you would like to see our Army have for
readiness?
Mr. McHugh. If I may start, Ms. McCollum.
This Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative is the
President's I think laudable attempt to try to work with
Congress to increase, of course, in DOD's case, the top line
by, as you correctly noted, over $26 billion.
For the Army, I wouldn't say it was a luxurious thing, but
it would allow us to recover our readiness and to do some--to
restore what is called our ISM, our investment and sustainment
moneys, for our facilities to a more historic target of about
90 percent.
So, while we think it is very, very important money, it
allows us, most importantly, to regain readiness more quickly
than we can under the 2015 plan that was adopted under the
bipartisan budget agreement. It would be very, very positive
news for this Army.

TRAINING AND INSTALLATION READINESS

General Odierno. Yeah, I would just--this is essential
readiness funding. We do not have the funding to sustain the
level of readiness we think is appropriate for the Army under
the current budget, but this would improve our readiness more.
It would give us more readiness number to ensure our aviation
is more ready, our combat brigades are more ready, our combat
service support.
But, also, it has to do with our installations. We are only
funding about 50 percent of our installation needs now in
readiness. And that gets to family program--we are fully
funding family programs, but it gets to ranges which we are not
able to sustain or upkeep. It gets to some of our equipment
that we are not able to sustain or upkeep.
So this additional money allows to us to fund that which we
think is the appropriate level of readiness necessary to
sustain the readiness over the long term in the Army.
Ms. McCollum. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you very much, Ms. McCollum.
Gentlemen, Mr. Secretary, General Odierno, thank you for
your testimony this morning and--I should say, this afternoon.
And we look forward to getting the OCO portion to us sooner
rather than later.
And on behalf of the entire Committee, we thank you for
your leadership and the men and women you represent who honor
us by their service every day.
We stand adjourned.
General Odierno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Rogers and the
answers thereto follow.]

AISR Assets

Question. What are the Army's plans for manned, fixed wing AISR
assets in Afghanistan?
Answer. Our commitment to the Soldiers deployed to Afghanistan
remains paramount. We continue to provide our Soldiers and Commanders
the tools they need to accomplish their mission. The Army currently
provides a fleet of 34 fixed-wing and 14 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
platforms to Afghanistan. Down from a peak of 110 manned OEF/OIF
platforms in 2008, the current Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (AISR) Fleet includes the platforms and sensors
necessary to support the force in this critical year of transition.
Should U.S. Forces be sustained at any level past 2015, the Army
has been tasked to be prepared to sustain the following platforms and
associated sensors, while the rest will be withdrawn:
2 x Highlighter (B200 with Airborne Change Detection)
2 x Night Eagle (B200 with FMV Change Detection)
8 x Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System
(MARSS) (B300 with SIGINT and FMV)
4 x Saturn Arch (DHC-8 200 with Hyper Spectral Imagery)
As the bulk of the AISR assets are withdrawn, those designated as
enduring will remain in Army's AISR Fleet. Those assets not designated
as enduring in program of record will be divested from the Army's AISR
Fleet in accordance with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) G-
3 directives.
In accordance with the Army's AISR 2020 and Beyond Strategy, which
was approved by the Army Requirements Oversight Council for Non-
Standard Equipment ISR, the Army will:
Enhance 14 x RC-12 Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) X
Models with full motion video and eliminate 28 x legacy GRCS
Systems
Modernize the 9 x existing EO-5C Airborne
Reconnaissance Low (ARL) with improved sensors and a
sustainable platform
Modernize the Enhanced Medium Altitude
Reconnaissance and Surveillance System (EMARSS) by leveraging
and combining 12 OCO-procured quick reaction capability (QRC)
aircraft and 8 Liberty Project Aircraft with 4 base-procured
EMARSS platforms to meet the program requirement of 24 total
systems
Integrate the best of the proven QRC sensors to
provide high-demand capabilities to satisfy unique Department
of Defense (DOD) directed requirements
This fleet of 52 aircraft (accounting for 5 training aircraft) will
provide the Army and DoD with a standardized mix of platforms and a
diverse set of sensor technologies by capitalizing on OCO investments
and migrating best-of-breed sensors and QRC aircraft into programs of
record.
The Army recognizes the committee's concern regarding the Army's
plans for manned, fixed wing AISR assets in Afghanistan. We are
confident in our strategy and look forward to continuing our work with
Congress to sustain the best AISR platforms and sensors for our Army. A
more detailed explanation of our strategy accompanied the plan
submitted to the congressional defense and intelligence committees as
directed by Senate Report 112-173, dated June 4, 2012. While minor
changes have occurred since submission (e.g., the Army's intention to
accept Liberty Project Aircraft into the Army's AISR fleet), we remain
on plan and prepared to provide a detailed update to Members of
Congress and/or their staffs at any time.
Question. Is the Army concerned about a potential capability gap
that may emerge during the shift to government-owned platforms?
Answer. No, the Army is not concerned with any potential capability
gaps that may emerge during the shift to government-owned platforms.
The Army's Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR)
2020 strategy will allow the Army to maintain the most capable and
relevant platforms and sensors as we migrate the best-of-breed from
quick reaction capabilities (QRC) into programs of record (POR) without
compromising capabilities in the current fight.
The Army's AISR 2020 strategy meets the directives received from
the Secretary of Defense Planning Guidance, the Department of Defense
Consolidated Intelligence Guidance, and the Army Requirements Oversight
Council for Non Standard Equipment--Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (AROC for NSE-ISR). Based upon those directives, the
following sensor capabilities will be retained by the Army and
transition to a POR. We will experience no capability gaps during the
transition.
Wide Area Motion Imagery (Constant Hawk)
SIGINT (Med Altitude Recon. and Surveillance System
(MARSS))
Light Detection Ranging / Foliage Penetration
(LIDAR/FOPEN)
Ground/Dismount Moving Target Indicator (GMTI/DMTI
(VaDER))
Hyper-spectral Imagery (HSI (Saturn Arch))
UHF Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) (Desert Owl)
High Definition EO/IR FMV (multiple platforms)
The Army Aerial ISR 2020 Strategy will move the Army toward the
following objectives:
Enhance 14 x RC-12 Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) X
Models with full motion video and eliminate 28 x legacy GRCS
Systems
Modernize the 9 x existing EO-5C Airborne
Reconnaissance Low (ARL) with improved sensors and a
sustainable platform
Modernize the Enhanced Medium Altitude
Reconnaissance and Surveillance System (EMARSS) by leveraging
and combining 12 OCO-procured QRC aircraft and 8 Liberty
Project Aircraft with 4 base-procured EMARSS platforms to meet
program requirement of 24 total systems
Integrate the best of the proven QRC sensors to
provide high-demand capabilities to satisfy unique DOD directed
requirements
We will migrate the best-of-breed sensors to POR and apply them to
the AISR fleet above to provide the Army the best possible AISR Fleet.
The Army recognizes the committee's concern for potential
capability gaps, but we are confident in our strategy and look forward
to continuing our work with Congress to sustain the best AISR platforms
and sensors for our Army. A more detailed explanation of our strategy
accompanied the plan submitted to the congressional defense and
intelligence committees as directed by Senate Report 112-173, dated
June 4, 2012. While minor changes have occurred since submission (e.g.,
the Army's intention to accept Liberty Project Aircraft into the Army's
AISR fleet), we remain on plan and prepared to provide a detailed
update to Members of Congress and/or their staffs at any time.
Question. Given this significant rebalancing of the AISR fleet and
the need for a mix of assets with a range of capabilities, on what
assets will the Army rely for tactical Brigade-level AISR?
Answer. The Army's tactical Brigade-level Aerial Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) is primarily satisfied through
the organic Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), which are part of a larger
strategy to provide assured, organic UAS support from Platoon to
Division. UAS at each echelon enables improved situational awareness
and decision-making for our ground commanders.
The RQ-7B Shadow UAS supports our Brigade Combat Teams and Special
Forces Groups. At Battalion level and below, the Army relies upon the
hand-launched RQ-11B Raven and the RQ-20A Puma systems.
At the levels of Brigade and below, the emphasis is upon
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition. The organic UAS
systems enable tipping and queuing between full-motion video and
signals intelligence collectors. The result is improved shared
situational awareness from limited post-mission exploitation.
Platforms and sensors at the levels of Division and above provide
additional and advanced sensors, fusion, and detailed exploitation that
builds on and expands the shared situational and target awareness.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Rogers. Questions
submitted by Mr. Kingston and the answers thereto follow.]

HMEE

Question. Since it was first fielded in 2007, the HMEE has expanded
beyond traditional Engineer missions of Survivability, Counter-mobility
and Mobility-into Route Clearance and the machine has become the
engineering jack of all trades. The Army is confronted with the
requirement to replace the M9 Armored Combat Earthmover-which may is
cost prohibitive in this environment. There are many advantages to
considering HMEE since the M9 ACE is not critical dual use for the
National Guard, whereas HMEE is And, HMEE is more deployable (air
droppable from C-17) and it is self-deployable and can travel in excess
of 60 mph even with armor protection. Should the US Army use High
Mobility Engineering Excavator as a next replacement for the M9 ACE?
Since the system is a Critical Dual Use (CDU) platform employed the
Army National Guard to provide Defense Support to Civilian Authority
(DSCA) as part of its Homeland Defense missions, wouldn't this
capability make the HMEE the most cost effective and logical choice for
both the Active and reserve component?
Answer. There is currently no requirement to replace the M9 Armored
Combat Earthmover (ACE). However, the Army acknowledges significant
sustainment costs for the ACE and is in the very early stages of
exploring potential alternatives. The Office of the Chief of Engineers
conducted a preliminary analysis of courses of action to upgrade the
ACE for the Commandant, United States Army Engineer School (USAES).
Since then, the USAES Commandant has asked the Maneuver Support Center
of Excellence to prepare a requirements document for the future ACE
replacement. A robust and formal Analysis of Alternatives that
considers costs and operational requirements will be conducted in
conjunction with the development of a requirement for a replacement
system. At this early juncture, it would be premature to determine
whether the High Mobility Engineering Excavator, or other existing or
developmental system, would best meet these emerging requirements.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Kingston.
Questions submitted by Mr. Calvert and the answers thereto follow.]

Shape of the Force

Question. Currently the U.S. has 770,000 Defense civilian personnel
vs. 1.3 million Active Duty Military personnel--that is 1 civilian for
every 1. 79 Active Duty Military personnel. It is the most
disproportionate ratio between Defense civilians and Active Duty dating
back as far as 1949. In 2010, the Defense Business Board recommended to
direct Defense civilian reductions back to FY 2003 levels or 15%
whichever is greater. In 2003, we had 636,000 Defense civilian
personnel vs. 1.4 million Active Duty Military personnel--that is 1
civilian for every 2.25 Active Duty Military personnel. According to
the testimony, Army Civilians will reduce from 285,000 to 263,000 by
the end of FY15, just under 8%. Do you believe these reductions will
result in the right mix of civilian and Active Duty personnel across
the Army? Please provide a detailed explanation to your response.
Answer. The Army is resetting the entire force from that needed to
fight two foreign wars, amid massive fiscal reductions. This requires a
broader strategy that links functions, funding, priority and manpower
to produce the workforce of the future--one that fully supports and
focuses on a generation of trained and ready combat units, rather than
a strategy of fair-share percentage reductions. Every single function
and classification of personnel (civilian, contractor, military) is
going to be affected in some way as we obtain balance of capabilities
within resources.
We are in the process of drawing down our Civilian Workforce from a
wartime high of 285,000 in FY10 to 263,000 by the end of FY15, and if
necessary we will make additional cuts commensurate with military
reductions projected through FY19.
This civilian reduction takes into account not only the fiscal
realities in which we now find ourselves, but also the reintegration of
Soldiers from the Operational Army back into the Institutional Army,
while reducing military end strength.
The Institutional Army must reabsorb Soldier authorizations;
analyzing every function to determine which positions can or should be
performed by military and which should be civilian. And, all of this
must be done not only from a cost perspective, but with readiness as
the primary concern.
Any reductions or conversions that are made--civilian, contract or
military--will be consistent with applicable laws and policies.
The Army is also addressing investments made in key areas such as
cyber, intelligence, and health of the force.
This rebalancing effort will require multiple changes as strategic
decisions are made. Force structure changes, unit basing and
operational activity will be key to informing future needs (as will
funding levels).

AH-64 Apache

Question. General Odierno, the National Guard Association has
voiced several of their concerns over this latest proposal of taking
the AH-64 Apaches from the National Guard's fleet, including the
following: (1) the National Guard will lose attack and aerial
reconnaissance capabilities, (2) the Total Army will lose some of their
most experience Apache pilots and maintainers, and (3) this proposal
would eliminate a place for Active Component pilots and maintainers to
serve should they leave active service. How would you respond to each
of these concerns?
Answer. First, the transfer of AH-64s from the National Guard to
the Active Armed cannot be viewed in isolation, and, instead, must be
seen as a part of a larger effort to simultaneously reduce structure
and increase the warfighting capabilities of the Army. The Aviation
Restructure Initiative (ARI) enables the Army to retain critical
structure, maintain modernization programs, and sustain the force in
the current fiscal environment. In the absence of the Army's ability to
procure a new Armed Aerial Scout helicopter, the way ahead under ARI
was chosen because it optimized combat power at the lowest risk given
the budget available and requirements of combatant commanders.
Under the ARI, the Army will eliminate three complete Aviation
Brigades from the Active Component (AC), divest all remaining OH-58Ds
from the fleet and transfer all AH-64Ds from the Army National Guard
(ARNG) to the AC. Currently, an ARNG Aviation battalion is funded to
maintain platoon proficiency and requires one to two years notice and
approximately 70 training days at the mobilization station prior to
being ready to deploy. An ARNG AH-64 battalion simply does not have
enough collective training days to operate and satisfy mission
requirements to support an AC multi-component brigade. In most cases,
they are geographically located too far away from AC bases and their
training schedules do not match in order to conduct critical joint
training. Additionally, the ARNG currently does not have Shadow
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) platoons organic to their AH-64
battalions to conduct Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) collective
training in order to be proficient enough to rapidly deploy for short-
notice, world-wide contingency operations. ARNG AH-64 battalions would
be required to take additional training days to conduct MUM-T training
with Shadow platoons at the mobilization station. These Shadow platoons
are in short supply in the AC and may not be available to participate
in 90-120 day mobilization training along-side ARNG AH-64 battalions.
The ARNG counter proposal to keep six AH-64 battalions would cost
the Army an additional $4.425 billion in one-time equipping costs.
Furthermore, the ARNG AH-64 battalions will have only 18 out of 24 AH-
64s assigned which would require them to pull aircraft from other units
possibly rendering their Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate too low to
deploy. Transferring the AH-64s to active duty would avoid this
situation and mitigate the risk of not being able to provide the
commander on the ground essential attack/reconnaissance capabilities in
a rapid manner. Active Component units are funded at battalion/brigade
level proficiency and have more resources and collective training days
to keep their Attack/Reconnaissance pilots fully trained and ready for
deployment on short notice to meet world-wide critical mission
requirements.
It should be noted that UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft are essential for
Air Assault, Air Movement, and Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) combat operations. In Afghanistan, UH-60 medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC) aircraft and crews are carrying out heroic rescues
on the front lines of combat. The Army strategy will provide AC AH-64
battalions to be available to deploy with RC Aviation Brigades when
required. Army National Guard Aviation is, and will remain the most
capable and experienced in disaster relief and should be the force of
choice for disaster relief and humanitarian aid (Haiti, Pakistan,
Philippines, Colorado, East Coast, Gulf Coast, Tornado Alley). Army
National Guard Aviation Brigades will have an AC AH-64 battalion
aligned (Multi-compo solution) for non-permissive or hostile
environments. Active Component AH-64 Battalions will be aligned to RC
Aviation Brigades for training (Multi-compo solution).
The ARNG will provide their AH-64 pilots and maintainers every
opportunity to transition to a new aircraft as a result of a unit
conversion or transfer to another existing unit. In some cases, there
may be opportunities for highly skilled ARNG AH-64 Instructor Pilots
and Maintenance Test Pilots to apply for a position in the Active
Component under a limited call to active duty program. The ARNG is
planning to ensure 100 percent of their personnel impacted by ARI are
accounted for through aircraft transitions, unit conversions, transfers
to other units, and a small percentage through retirements and ordinary
attrition. The skill sets and experience achieved by ARNG personnel in
the Attack/Reconnaissance units, or AC personnel transitioning to the
ARNG, will easily transfer and be very beneficial to CH-47, UH-60, UH-
72, and Fixed Wing units. It is not unusual for ARNG pilots to be
qualified in multiple airframes due to turbulence within their civilian
careers and a state need to fill unit vacancies.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Calvert.
Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the answer thereto follow.]

PATRIOT

Question. The Patriot system appears to be in high demand around
the world. Please tell us a little about the threat and demand, as well
as the requirements to modify and modernize the Patriot system and the
timeline for that. Why are those modifications important?
Answer. Patriot is in high demand from our combatant commanders and
from our Allies, not only to support their warplans, but also as a
flexible deterrent and strategic message to our common adversaries.
These demands currently stress the Patriot force and if not managed
carefully, may over exceed the ability of the US Army to generate
forces to continuously meet all commitments. While the Patriot system
remains proven and capable, modernization is necessary to counter
modern threat technology and techniques, and to achieve maximum
effectiveness and efficiency.
The threat is increasing in capability, complexity, and quantity.
To counter the evolving threat, the Patriot system must be upgraded and
sustained. The FY14 President's Budget contained finding for
modifications and modernization efforts necessary to increase Patriot's
capability against threats now and in the future. Planned Patriot
upgrades include software upgrades and a more powerful Radar Digital
Processor (RDP). The RDP provides the increased memory and
computational capacity needed to provide capability against current and
emerging threats. RDP additionally pairs with the latest software
build, Post-Deployment Build 8 and with the newest Patriot Missile,
Missile Segment Enhancement, to synergistically improve Patriot's
overall capability.
The Patriot Modernization Acquisition Strategy addresses
modification and modernization program efforts implemented for
incremental improvements of the Patriot Weapon System. Modification is
defined as near and mid-term (FY14-FY19) updates to existing hardware
and software. Modernization is defined as long-term (FY20-FY27) lower
tier, air and missile defense, protection requirements and development
of the next generation lower tier air and missile defense capability.
Modification and modernization improvements are necessary to meet
performance requirements against evolving threats based on the
requirement to remain viable for the US Army and Coalition Forces
through 2048.
To fully leverage Patriot capabilities and defeat the full range of
threats, the Army's plan is to integrate our Air and Missile Defense
(AMD) portfolio of systems as nodes within a larger Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) network. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Battle Command System (IBCS) is scheduled to begin fielding in FY18.
Networked IAMD mission command provided by IBCS will enable more
efficient and effective use of Patriot sensors and interceptors in
future engagements.
Question. Do you have enough PAC-3 and Missile Segment Enhancement
(MSE) missiles or are more required for the various threats we face?
Answer. Patriot PAC-3 is the Army's primary missile defense system
to protect U.S. forces, allied forces and key assets from Tactical
Ballistic Missiles, as well as Air and Cruise Missile threats. When the
Army incorporates Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), beginning in FY15,
Patriot will be able to engage at greater altitudes and ranges. MSE
production will ultimately replace PAC-3 and older legacy missiles and
only recently commenced at its initial low rate of production (limited
deliveries in FY15). An increase over the currently planned production
is most likely needed to backfill the natural obsolescence of the PAC-2
Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) family and to counter the increasing
threat. However, the Army must balance modernization, readiness and
acquisition requirements within the current budget. Given these
constraints, we believe we have the right balance for air missile
defense. Calculating an estimate of our missile needs is a continuous
process, supported by modeling and simulation. Army PAC-3/MSE needs are
defined by an Army Acquisition Objective which the Army continues to
purchase toward. This estimate considers threat analysis from the
intelligence community, along with combatant command warplans.

AMPV

Question. This replacement is the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle
(AMPV) correct? I am informed that Under Secretary Kendall has twice
reviewed the AMPV acquisition program and solicitation, and has deemed
this program ``Full and open Competition.'' What is the current AMPV
acquisition timeline? Is it in competitive sourcing right now? How
important is the AMPV program to the Department of Defense?
Answer. AMPV is the Armored Multi Purpose Vehicle. Undersecretary
of Defense Frank Kendall has reviewed the AMPV program and solicitation
in detail, as the program is under direct OSD oversight.
The Army released the AMPV Request for Proposals (RFP) on 26
November 2013 and is currently in competitive sourcing. The AMPV RFP
closing date is scheduled for 28 May 2014, following a 90-day extension
granted in January 2014 in response to industry request. The Army plans
to award an Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) contract
in second quarter Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15) with Low-Rate Initial
Production (LRIP) projected in FY19. The Army will open negotiations to
accelerate the LRIP to FY18 once the Army selects a vendor and we have
evaluated the technical risks of doing so.
The AMPV RFP provides for full and open competition to find the
best value solution for the Army's needs. The analysis of alternatives
examined 115 candidate vehicles, both tracked and wheeled.
Additionally, the 656 requirements in the AMPV solicitation are tiered
to allow industry to make more flexible design trades on any potential
vehicle proposed. The Army has continuously engaged with industry, to
include holding two industry days in which a total of 112 companies
participated. The Army also released all Government owned technical
data required to use the Optional Exchange Vehicle in some manner and
released two draft RFPs to understand and incorporate vendor feedback
on the AMPV requirements to ensure a robust competition. Additionally,
Government extended the solicitation due date by an additional 90 days
to allow for proposal refinement.
The AMPV program remains the highest priority developmental effort
in the Army combat vehicle portfolio. The current fleet of M113
vehicles has become operationally irrelevant due to the lack of
protection, mobility, and survivability necessary to fight within the
Armored Brigade Combat Team. The Army must balance the need to
expeditiously replace its aging fleet of M113s against overall
portfolio affordability constraints.
Question. What is the current AMPV acquisition timeline? Is it in
competitive sourcing right now?
Answer. The Army released the Armored Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
Request for Proposals (RFP) on 26 November 2013 and is currently in
competitive sourcing. The AMPV RFP closing date is scheduled for 28 May
2014, following a 90-day extension granted in January 2014 in response
to industry request. The Army plans to award an Engineering and
Manufacturing Development contract in second quarter Fiscal Year 2015
(FY15) with Low-Rate Initial Production projected for FY19.
Question. Now that GCV is terminated, what is the Army's plan for
accelerating the AMPV program IAW Congressional directive in the last 2
National Defense Authorization Acts (FY13, FY14)
Answer. Although the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program was
executing on planned cost, schedule, and performance, the Department
determined that it is no longer affordable to transition the GCV
program to the next phase of development due to significant fiscal
constraints under sequestration. The program will conclude upon
completion of the Technology Development phase in June 2014. This
decision will enable the Army to maintain investment in Armored Multi
Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) development and modernization of existing combat
vehicle platforms, including Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and Paladin;
thereby ensuring that our currently-fielded combat vehicles are as
capable as possible for contingencies that may arise. However, it will
not allow us to accelerate the program.
Once an AMPV vendor is selected, the Army will open up discussions
for possible acceleration of the schedule depending on the solution
proposed and the assessed technical risks.
Question. The CSA recently briefed that AMPV will become the Army's
highest combat vehicle priority after GCV termination. What is the
capability gap that drives this decision? (e.g. M113s can't drive off
the FOBs).
Answer. The current fleet of M113 vehicles lacks the protection,
mobility and survivability necessary to fight within the Armored
Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The current M113 Family of Vehicles lacks
the required under-belly protection, 360 degree ballistic protection
and overhead artillery protection needed to accomplish its mission
within the ABCT as well as adequate Space, Weight, Power, and Cooling
(SWaP-C) capabilities necessary to accept the Army's inbound network.
The Armored Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) addresses these shortfalls and
provides mobility commensurate with the combat vehicles it supports
within the ABCT. The AMPV will maneuver to support the unit's tank and
infantry fighting vehicles and maintain its doctrinal positioning
within the ABCT formation throughout the battlefield.
Question. How has the Army maintained competition in the AMPV
procurement Request for Proposal?
Answer. Since the earliest stages of the program, the Army has
taken deliberate steps to develop and implement a competitive
acquisition strategy for Armored Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). The
AMPV's Acquisition Strategy is competitive and platform-agnostic,
providing for full and open competition to find the best value solution
for the Army's needs. An analysis of alternatives examined 115
candidate vehicles, both tracked and wheeled, and the mobility
requirement does not specify a wheeled or tracked solution.
The Army has continuously engaged with industry to understand and
incorporate vendor feedback on the AMPV requirements to ensure a robust
competition. This engagement included holding two industry days with
112 companies participating, and releasing two draft Request for
Proposals (RFPs). As a result, the 656 requirements in the AMPV
solicitation are tiered to allow industry to make more flexible trade
designs on any potential vehicle proposed. The final RFP is open to any
vendor proposing a range of vehicle solutions that meet the
requirements, including either wheeled or tracked vehicles. This
deliberate strategy allows for robust competition among multiple
platforms to find the best value solution.
Question. What would a 1-3 year delay in the current Armored Multi-
Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (AMPV) Request for Proposal do to the program
as structured? How will this jeopardize Soldiers who could potentially
deploy in M113s for the next fight?
Answer. A 1-3 year delay in the Armored Multi Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) Request for Proposal (RFP) would delay initial fielding of the
AMPV until at least Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 to FY 2024 and could put
program funding at risk. The program is currently fully funded and
supported within the combat vehicle portfolio across the Future Years
Defense Program years. Further delay could jeopardize funding and delay
or reduce the availability of funding for future combat vehicle
programs.
Additionally, a delay would require Soldiers to continue using the
operationally irrelevant and unsustainable M113 platform, which
provides lower levels of survivability, mobility, force protection, and
networking capability than the AMPV will provide. The M113 platform
lacks adequate Space, Weight, Power, and Cooling capabilities necessary
to accept the Army's inbound network. Without the inbound network, the
Commander's ability to maneuver and communicate across the full width
and depth of the battlefield will be reduced.

End Strength

Question. Secretary McHugh, What are the estimates of the number of
active, National Guard and reserve personnel that will have to be
reduced in the FY14-18 time frame, and if sequestration continues
beyond FY18?
Answer. The Active Component will reduce its personnel inventory by
approximately 80,000 during FY14-17 to achieve an end strength of
450,000. Over the same time period, the Army National Guard will reduce
its personnel inventory by 23,000 to achieve 335,000 and the U.S. Army
Reserve will reduce 10,000 to achieve a 195,000 end strength. If
sequestration continues beyond FY18 and the Army is required to
continue its drawdown, the Active Component would further reduce its
inventory by 30,000 personnel across FY18-19 to achieve a 420,000 end
strength. The Army National Guard would lose an additional 20,000
personnel to reach a reduced end strength of 315,000 and the U.S. Army
Reserve would lose an additional 10,000 for a reduced end strength of
185,000.
Question. Secretary McHugh, How has the Bipartisan Budget Agreement
(BBA) spending limits impacted Army major defense acquisition programs,
and in your opinion, how will these impacts require a change in defense
strategy and/or loss in operational capability for the Army? Please
explain.
Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2013 provides the Army
modest, temporary relief from Budget Control Act (BCA) defense spending
caps in 2014. However, the Army still faces budget shortfalls of $7.7
billion in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14), and an additional $12.7 billion in
FY15, when compared to the President's FY14 Budget request. While we
welcome the relief and predictability that the BBA provides, the Army
will be forced to cut $20.4 billion in planned finding, an abrupt
reduction over a short two-year period of time.
The BBA allows the Army to remedy only a fraction of lost
capability. The Army remains committed to a balanced modernization
strategy by executing incremental modernization with selective
investment in new capabilities to support force protection, lethality,
and networked mission command; investment in enabling technologies;
incremental upgrades to existing capabilities; divesture of selected
legacy systems, to include efforts through the Aviation Restructure
Initiative; and delaying some new capabilities due to fiscal realities,
such as the next generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Armed Aerial
Scout, and Warfighter Information Network--Tactical Increment 3. The
collective impact of the BBA is that Army units will continue to rely
on current solutions while threat tactics and capabilities continue to
adapt and evolve. This means the Army will employ current or slightly
modified systems against an enemy with increased lethality and armed
with lessons from on-going operations.
Question. Secretary McHugh, from a Department of Army perspective,
what do you consider to be the greatest threats to the defense
industrial base, and what can we do to address them?
Answer. The greatest threats to the Defense Industrial Base are the
loss of critical commercial suppliers at the lower tiers of the supply
chain and the related loss of critical skill sets.
As the Army draws down from contingency operations, some additional
issues being addressed include excess capacity, limited incentives for
private investment, commercial sources exiting the Defense business, a
potential growing dependence on foreign suppliers, shrinking, and aging
stockpiles and declining commercial research and development
capabilities.
In addition to the significant reduction on the demand for supplies
and equipment, the financial uncertainty of sequestration will affect
the future demand for new systems. These factors create a high-risk
environment for manufacturers and suppliers, especially, for small-to-
medium-sized companies, due to their inability to reconstitute or
rapidly move to other business portfolios. As these lower-tier
companies downsize, exit the defense sector, or go out of business, the
critical skill sets they possess, such as those in engineering and
advanced manufacturing, become less available.
The Army is taking a proactive approach to identify those critical
and essential capabilities needed for future short and long term
operations.

Arsenals

Question. Secretary McHugh, How would a 15% mandatory decrease in
number of civilian personnel, starting in FY2015 through FY2025 impact
workloads at Army Arsenals and how would the necessary workload be
managed? In order to meet the required workload, would the Army need
relief or a change to 10 U.S.C. 2466 that mandates a 50% ceiling,
measured in dollars, on the amount of depot maintenance workload that
may be performed by contract for a military Department or defense
agency during a fiscal year.
Answer. The Army manages its civilian personnel at arsenals based
on workload and available funding. A mandatory 15% reduction starting
in FY2015 through FY2025 will result in the loss of critical workforce
skill sets that will take many years to rebuild, sub-optimize existing
Army Working Capital Fund business processes, and render the arsenals
as an uneconomical option for manufacture support that is required to
effectively and efficiently meet future Army contingency requirements.
The Army does not require relief or a change to Title 10 U.S.C.
Section 2466, which mandates a 50% ceiling on contractor funded depot
maintenance. The Arsenals' manufacturing workloads are not considered
depot-level maintenance and repair workload for purposes of Title 10
U.S.C. Section 2466.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole. Questions
submitted by Mr. Aderholt and the answers thereto follow.]

UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopters

Question. General Odierno, can you describe the model or type of
UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters that will transfer to the National Guard
and the plan to modernize the National Guard UH-60 fleet under the Army
proposed plan?
Answer. Under the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), 111 UH-60L
Blackhawk helicopters will transfer to the Army National Guard. The
Army's H-60 Blackhawk modernization strategy remains the procurement of
1,375 UH/HH-60M new build aircraft and digitization/recapitalization of
760 H-60L aircraft. The ARI will allow this modernization plan to
continue at an affordable rate to ensure that the Total Army can meet
its operational commitments. Almost 600 of the planned procurement of
1,375 UH-60M helicopters have been fielded to all three components;
procurement will continue through the mid 2020s. In the near term, the
Army will continue recapitalizing and modernizing a select number of
UH-60As to UH-60Ls at a rate of approximately 36 aircraft a year. This
effort is primarily focused on the Army National Guard and will
continue through FY18. At that time, the Army will transition the
recapitalization/modernization effort to UH-60L helicopters. These
aircraft will be recapitalized and modernized with a digital cockpit at
a rate of approximately 48 aircraft per year. This effort will
modernize 760 UH-60Ls in all three components (Active, Guard, and
Reserves), and continue until completion in FY34.

Armored BCTs

Question. What is the final projection for the number of
``armored'' BCTs?
a. Is this enough to deter a traditional mechanized army,
such as Russia or China?
b. Are we at risk of ``fighting our last war''--one focused
on counterinsurgency and not on the most serious threat of a
force-on-force engagement?
Answer. By FY 15 there will be 9 Armored BCTs in the Active Army
and 7 in the Army National Guard. The Army is actively working through
the Total Army Analysis 17-21 process to determine the optimal number
of Armored Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as the Army further reduces end
strength to the levels directed in the Quadrennial Defense Review. As
we move forward, the rapidly evolving operational environment will be
taken into account.
Effective implementation of the National Defense Strategy is
dependent on the total capability and capacity of our Army, not just
the number of Armored BCTs. Resource reductions under the Budget
Control Act will severely jeopardize our readiness and modernization,
limiting our ability to effectively deter our adversaries. The Army
recognizes that tomorrow's threats may be different from today. When
properly resourced, the Army remains ready to protect our Nation and
defend our interests across the full range of military operations.

Prompt Global Strike (PGS) Program

Question. Initial testing of the department's Prompt Global Strike
(PGS) program by the Army Space and Missile Command/Army Forces
Strategic command was successful and demonstrates the progress made in
developing technologies that would allow us to quickly engage ``high-
value targets'' or ``fleeting targets'' with a global-reach
conventional weapon strike capability. A second longer-range test of
AHW is planned for August of this year.
a. How soon could this technology be deployed if needed?
b. Is there a plan for a Flight 3 test?
c. Are we at risk of losing critical developments and slowing
the program if Flight 3 is not conducted?
d. What impact does a Navy focused program have on achieving
a near-term capability?
e. Does the current plan, which involves the pursuit of a
possible sea-launched option also recognize the short-term
threats and preserve critical technology development made by
the Army and provide a near-term deployment option?
Answer.
a. The Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) Program is a technology
development effort which focuses on maturing technologies in pursuit of
a proof of concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
capability. The AHW technology development is one of several potential
initiatives intended to lead to a CPGS capability. The maturity of the
technology and the reliability of the concept are still to be fully
assessed; and, therefore, an estimate of an operational capability is
presently not available.
b. No. Per current Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
direction, there is not a third AHW flight test planned.
c. No. The intent of OSD's CPGS Office is to leverage demonstrated
technology as well as lessons from the first and second AHW flight
test, and apply them to the overall national CPGS effort. Desired AHW
Flight Test 2 advancements in technology, such as navigation and
guidance control, thermal protection, aerodynamic characterization and
test range capabilities will be applicable to the next OSD planned CPGS
test--the Navy's Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS)
Flight Experiment 1 (FE-1) as well as the overall CPGS program.
d. The stated focus of the U.S. Navy led IRCPS program is a CPGS
capability designed and optimized for utilization in the upgraded
Virginia class submarine. This will require the development of both a
smaller scale variant of the AHW glide body and a new booster stack
designed for use on this platform. Questions concerning the Navy
program capability of supporting a near term limited operational
capability should be addressed to either the OSD's CPGS Office or the
U.S. Navy's Strategic Systems Program Project Office.
e. The requirement for a CPGS capability has been established by
the Department of Defense (DoD). The intent of the OSD CPGS office is
to leverage the technology advancements and lessons from both the
initial and upcoming AHW flight tests and upcoming Navy test and apply
them to future operationally deployed DoD developed systems. At this
time, the Army has no plans for a near-term CPGS capability.

Cyber Vulnerabilities

Question. The 2013 Defense Science Board report concluded that
cyber vulnerabilities in weapon systems as well as DOD system
architecture exists and places our nation at risk. How does the Army
plan to counter these vulnerabilities and provide resiliency in areas
such as the missiles and space portfolio and UAS operations?
Answer. Cyber threats to Army systems and networks are becoming
increasingly sophisticated. We know the adversary incessantly probes
our networks and attempts to access and exploit our military systems.
Therefore, the Army must ensure our systems and networks are cyber
resilient by designing them with the capability to operate through a
cyber attack. Such preparedness is achieved through coordinated and
focused efforts involving policy, resource investment, systems
architecture and design, acquisition of cyber defense capabilities, and
dynamic cyber defense operations. Leaders and users must work to
eliminate common, cybersecurity weaknesses from Army systems and
networks such as poor password hygiene, failure to patch or update
software, poor physical and information security, and unprotected
servers/vulnerable web applications.
Army Missile and Space Systems and Unmanned Aerial Systems have
implemented additional mitigation steps to harden and protect systems
and ensure their cyber resiliency. Examples include: implementation of
protected communications, limiting access to critical hardware from
physical access panels, increasing training and awareness to protect
passwords, enforcing cyber security policy compliance and penetration
testing in advance of operational tests.

Improved Turbine Engine Program

Question. The Improved Turbine Engine Program was significantly
highlighted in the Army's budget presentation.
a. Please explain to the importance of this program to Army
Aviation and the benefits this engine will bring to the fleet?
b. Is this program fully funded in the out-years and if not,
what does this mean for the program?
Answer.
a. The Improved Turbine Engine will provide critically needed
improvements to support operations in hot weather conditions (95
degrees) and at higher altitudes (6,000 feet) as recently experienced
in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Also, the engine is intended to
achieve a 25 percent fuel consumption reduction and a 35 percent
reduction in maintenance costs. The engine will replace the T700 family
of engines for the UH-60 Black Hawk and AH-64 Apache fleets, bringing
an urgent capability needed by the Warfighter to operate in a worldwide
environment.
b. No. Based on the initial cost estimate, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics has assessed the program
as not fully funded in the out-years. Given that the program is Pre-
Milestone A, it is too early in the process to have appropriate data to
yield a reliable cost estimate. A planned future independent cost
estimate will provide additional clarity.

Combat Vehicle Manufacturers

Question. The last time the Army was down to a single major ground
vehicle modernization program was during the days of Future Combat
System. At that time, the Army felt very strongly that it was important
to have two healthy, viable combat vehicle manufacturers and directed
that the Manned Ground Vehicle part of FCS be split between BAE and
General Dynamics. Today with the cancellation of the Ground Combat
Vehicle (GCV), the Army is once again down to a single major program to
build new combat vehicles, the AMPV program. Since that is the case,
would it make sense to have a split buy of Bradley and Strykers to
sustain both vehicle companies at time of very lean budgets?
Answer. The Army supports a healthy combat vehicle industrial base
and continues to assess impacts as budgetary resources decline.
AMPV development is under a competitive solicitation open to any
vendor proposing vehicle replacements for the existing M113s. There is
potential for an overall mixed Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
fleet in the future, as the current solicitation is only for vehicles
at echelons below brigade. The current AMPV program will only replace
M113s at the brigade and below level--within Armored Brigade Combat
Teams--which consists of 2,897 vehicles. There are an additional 1,922
M113s supporting Echelons Above Brigade, and the Army is currently
assessing these emerging vehicle requirements against potential
solutions for a future competition that may involve a diverse range of
platforms.
The Army continues to assess the Combat Vehicle industrial base,
and seeks to keep this diverse portfolio of platforms modernized within
the current fiscal constraints. Such modernization efforts support the
industrial base while maintaining critical capabilities. Currently, the
Army has plans to modernize the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker platforms
via Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs). These ECPs include two major
upgrades to the Bradley, enhancing track and suspension as well as
upgrading transmission and networking power capability. We are also
continuing production of the Abrams tank and procurement of a third
brigade of Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) vehicles. The Army is further
assessing requirements and resources for a potential fourth brigade of
Stryker DVH vehicles.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Aderholt.
Questions submitted by Ms. McCollum and the answers thereto follow.]

BRAC

Question. Secretary McHugh, earlier this week you testified that
the Army would be able to save up to $5 billion dollars from a new
round of base closures. Why is a BRAC critical to mission readiness?
What percentage of Army facilities are in excess?
Answer. BRAC is critical to mission readiness because Army force
structure and end-strength are declining alongside our available
finding. We must carefully balance end-strength, modernization, and
readiness. In particular, the Army cannot afford to retain a hollow
force structure and excess infrastructure at the expense of readiness.
Therefore, the time to authorize BRAC is now. The money is gone. If we
do not shed excess overhead, hundreds of millions of dollars will be
wasted each year in maintaining underutilized buildings and
infrastructure.
The Army has conducted facility capacity analyses to support an
end-strength of 490,000 Active Component (AC) Soldiers. Preliminary
results indicate the Army will have about 15-20% excess capacity at its
installations (over 160 million square feet) by 2019. The average
excess capacity is about 18 percent. At roughly $3 per square foot for
sustainment, the ``empty space'' or under-utilization tax on our budget
rapidly adds up. Further, Army end strength and force structure cuts
will only increase the amount of excess capacity.
The Army is saving $1 billion a year in annual recurring savings
from the BRAC 2005 process, and we began realizing those savings as
soon as the BRAC process concluded in September 2011. The BRAC 2005
process produced two types of recommendations--efficiency and
transformation. Efficiency recommendations across all of the Department
of Defense (DoD) in BRAC 2005 cost about $6 billion to implement, and
produced recurring savings of $3 billion per year.
For the Army, our BRAC 2005 ``efficiency'' recommendations cost
about $2 billion to implement and are saving over $500 million each
year. Those are the kinds of returns on investment we are looking to
achieve in a future round of BRAC.
The Department of Defense has calculated that a future efficiency
BRAC round that eliminated about 5 percent of our plant replacement
value would involve a rough magnitude $6 billion to implement and save
about $2 billion a year. The Army would represent a portion of that,
depending upon the objective processes of developing recommendations.
An independent Commission would review the BRAC recommendations and
receive community input. If the President approved the package of
recommendations on an ``all or none'' basis, Congress would then have
an opportunity to review the recommendations.
Question. If Congress fails to approve a new BRAC round, what are
the consequences for the Army?
Answer. If Congress fails to authorize another round of BRAC, the
defense drawdown is likely to repeat a very unfortunate historical
pattern of hollowed-out forces dispersed across hollowed-out
installations. If we cannot reduce excess infrastructure, we will need
to reduce funds elsewhere to meet the budget caps.
The Army has conducted facility capacity analyses. Preliminary
results indicate the Army will have about 15-20% excess capacity at its
installations by 2019 at the 490,000 active component end-strength. The
average excess capacity is about 18 percent. Further, Army end strength
and force structure cuts will only increase the amount of excess
capacity.
At roughly $3 per square foot for sustainment, the ``empty space''
tax on our budget rapidly adds up. Paying nearly $500M a year to carry
over 160 million square feet of excess or under-utilized facilities on
our books, will simply result in cuts to capabilities elsewhere in the
budget.
In considering the Army's BRAC request, the following points are
critical:
First, the money is gone.
Second, failure to authorize a new round of BRAC in 2017 does not
prevent defense communities from experiencing the consequences of
smaller forces and lower off-post economic activity. The Soldiers and
Families at the installations will be gone, and their spending power
and requirements will go with them.
Last, without the BRAC process, it is much more difficult to back-
fill those vacant or underutilized facilities with other missions.
[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Ms. McCollum.
Questions submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen and the answers thereto
follow.]

Hollow Force

Question. General Odierno, you have repeatedly expressed concern
that retaining too much Army force structure would result in a hollow
force. Could you explain what is meant by a hollow force?
Answer. The Army's definition of Service hollowness is a military
force that appears mission-ready, but in fact does not have the
capacity to generate the necessary capability to conduct its mission
and responsibilities as prescribed in strategic guidance. The gap in
capacity and capability is attributed to prolonged and disproportionate
investments across manpower, operations, maintenance, modernization,
sustainment, and procurement without a corresponding adjustment to
strategy. While aggregate amounts of units with low readiness may be a
by-product, unit readiness is not a standalone indicator of hollowness.
Question. Do you believe that sequestration and reduced defense
budgets are leading to a hollowing out of the force?
Answer. The cumulative effects of sequestration and reduced defense
budgets could create a Hollow Force if prolonged and disproportionate
investments across manpower, operations and maintenance, modernization,
sustainment, and procurement are made without a corresponding
adjustment to strategy. While reductions in the short term will not
immediately trigger a Hollow Force, they will have impacts that, when
accumulated over time, will contribute to a Hollow Force. For example,
a single year reduction to operations and maintenance doesn't indicate
a hollow force. However, that single reduction combined with a seven
year decisive action training deficiency, poorly maintained
installation facilities, and slowed modernization can contribute to a
hollow force.
Question. Some will argue that hollow units may be the best of an
array of poor alternatives in an era of tight budgets. The services
seek to retain experienced and well trained officers and NCOs. They are
battle tested veterans. Structure can be maintained to support the
continued readiness training for mid grade leaders. While junior
enlisted soldiers can be recruited and trained relatively quickly, it
takes many years to develop a platoon sergeant or first sergeant.
Should the Army retain structure in order to have the number of
experienced mid grade officers and NCOs we will need if we are forced
to respond to another large scale contingency operation?
Answer. At the stated end strengths mandated by the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), the Army can maintain the readiness and
modernization needed to prevent a hollow force within resource
constraints. Hollow units are not a viable solution because they
jeopardize the lives of our Soldiers and limit our ability to rapidly
respond to crises. Further, hollow units are not sustainable since they
do not provide the requisite experience for junior leaders due to
shortages of personnel and resources.
However, in order to mitigate risk, the Army is exploring the
possibility of retaining select numbers of experienced and well-trained
senior officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NC0s) in the generating
force. If the Army is required to expand for a contingency, these
personnel can form the nucleus for new units.

Manned Ground Vehicle/Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Question. General Odierno, the Bradley began service in the U.S.
Army in 1981. Automotive technology, sensor technology, and weapons
technology have advanced greatly in the decades that the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle has been in service. Might our mechanized units be
better off by having an Infantry Fighting Vehicle that is built to
today's state-of-the-Art, which would benefit from over 30 years
advancement in technology, rather than terminating and restarting the
program again and again and always falling short of the impossible?
Answer. A new state-of-the-art Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
remains a key requirement for the Army. However, due to significant
fiscal constraints, the Department has determined that it is no longer
affordable to transition the Ground Combat Vehicle program to the next
phase of development, and the program will conclude upon completion of
the Technology Development phase in June 2014. This decision will
enable the Army to maintain investment in Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) development and modernization of existing combat vehicle
platforms, including Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and Paladin; thereby,
ensuring that our currently-fielded combat vehicles are as capable as
possible for contingencies that may arise.
The Army will continue to manage Infantry Fighting Vehicle
technology maturity activities in support of a future modernization
program once anticipated resources become available in Fiscal Year
2019.
Question. The Army sponsored a voluntary demonstration where
developers could bring their Ground Combat Vehicles to be compared
side-by-side. However, none of the vehicles offered by industry was
considered adequate by Army. General Odierno, what were the main
improvements over the Bradley that you were seeking in a new vehicle,
and which none of the demonstrators provided?
Answer. The Army completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for
the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, including an assessment of
non-developmental vehicles (NDV) to determine if they could meet the
key requirements for the GCV. The analysis found that while many of the
vehicles could meet one or more aspects of mobility, lethality, force
protection, survivability, capacity, or network hosting power, none
could meet the required key Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
capabilities in combination. The AoA concluded that a new start combat
vehicle program was required to meet the requirements.
Question. Did any of the vehicles achieve an 80 percent solution?
Answer. No. None of the non-developmental vehicles tested presented
an acceptable 80 percent solution. For example, one system met the
force protection and nine-man squad carrying requirements, but failed
to meet the tactical mobility requirement to keep pace with the Abrams
tank and had limited lethality. Two other systems provided increased
underbody protection, the capacity to host our network, increased
lethality, and the mobility to keep pace with the Abrams tank, but did
not meet required direct fire protection or passenger carrying
capacity.
Question. Mr. Secretary, are the armed services adopting an
``MRAP'' military acquisition strategy, that is, to train on existing
equipment, and depend on industry to rapidly produce materiel solutions
once the fight begins?
Answer. The Department's procurement of the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicle does not represent the Army's intended
strategy for developing and fielding future capabilities. In the case
of MRAPs, as cited in the GAO Report (GAO-10-155T--Rapid Acquisition of
MRAP Vehicles), ``The program relied only on proven technologies and
commercially available products; established minimal operational
requirements; and undertook a concurrent approach to producing,
testing, and fielding vehicles.'' This approach, driven by the
exigencies of large-scale urgent operational requirements, is the
exception, not the norm.
Given the Army's budget pressures, our modernization strategy
incorporates a diverse investment strategy that includes procurement of
available commercial technologies in suitable areas, incremental
upgrades on existing systems, and targeted investment in development of
new capabilities. Examples include procurement of the Handheld, Manpack
& Small Form Fit (HMS) radio which is based on mature commercial
technology; increasing space, weight, and power margins for the Abrams
tank; and targeted investments in the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (MTV) to address critical
capability gaps in the current ground combat vehicle fleet.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

Question. General Odierno, please describe the progress of the JLTV
program.
Answer. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program is
progressing on schedule, due to stable requirements focused on mature
technologies. It remains on track to close a critical capability gap
for Soldiers and Marines. The initial production phase contract is
planned for solicitation and award in fiscal year 2015 in conjunction
with an anticipated Milestone C, low-rate initial production decision.
Question. What are the planned advances over the up-armored HMMWVs
and MRAPs?
Answer. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is not a
replacement for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, but is
designed to fill critical capability gaps related to protected
mobility. At maximum protection levels, the legacy High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle fleet loses substantial payload and
performance capabilities that inhibit mission accomplishment. At the
same time, MRAP vehicles are not easily transportable and do not
perform well in a wide range of operating environments. JLTV
intentionally balances payload, performance, and protection to restore
protected mobility across a range of operating environments, and is the
first vehicle purposefully designed for networked mission command
operations. It provides major operational improvements in protected
mobility, fuel efficiency, and reliability, operation and sustainment
costs, and network connectivity in order to meet future mission
requirements.
Question. The Committee understands that three companies are
competing in the engineering and manufacturing development phase and
the program will select one of the companies for production and
deployment. General Odierno, what problems do you see in this program
at this time?
Answer. I see no problems in the program at this time. The initial
production phase contract is still planned for solicitation and award
in Fiscal Year 2015, in connection with a planned Milestone C low-rate
initial production decision. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
program is executing on schedule, due to stable requirements focused on
mature technologies. It remains on track to close a critical capability
gap for Soldiers and Marines.
Question. The strategy for the light tactical vehicle fleet calls
for 49,099 JLTVs for the Army, or about one third of the fleet? What
type vehicles will make up the other two thirds?
Answer. The Army's Acquisition Objective, determined through
mission requirements analysis, is 49,099. The existing High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet will continue to make up the
remaining complement of light tactical vehicles. The Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs) will be fielded on a priority basis, and the
Army will cascade the most modernized HMMWVs to lower priority units,
with plans to divest the oldest and least modernized HMMWVs.
Question. When will production be complete?
Answer. The Marine Corps 5,500 vehicle procurement will be complete
in 2022. The Army's 49,099 vehicle procurement will complete production
in the year 2040.

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter

Question. General Odierno, what are the comparative costs of
performing the manned aerial reconnaissance mission with an OH-58 Kiowa
Warrior versus performing that mission with an Apache?
Answer. A simple comparison of flight hour costs (2014 Department
of Defense Flight Hour Rates) does show the AH-64 is more expensive to
fly than the OH-58D: OH-58D--$2,373 per Hour vs. AH-64D--$6,034 per
Hour.
However, the transfer of AH-64 Apaches to the Active component (AC)
is one aspect of the Secretary of Defense-approved comprehensive
Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), which is designed to achieve a
leaner, more efficient and capable force that balances operational
capability and capacity across the Total Army. Under ARI, the Army will
eliminate three entire Combat Aviation Brigades from the AC, ultimately
avoiding approximately $1.1 billion in annual costs. It is important to
understand that the total Army funds and flies all of the AH-64s and
OH-58s in the current force structure, meaning no additional costs
associated with flying those aircraft and, ultimately, avoiding $496
million in annual costs as a result. ARI removes nine Active Component
OH-58D Squadrons at a cost avoidance of $479.7 million annually (*Does
not account for Institutional/Sustainment Cost Savings due to
Termination of the OH-58D Program). It removes one Reserve Component
OH-58D Squadron at a cost avoidance of $19 million annually. It removes
six Reserve Component AH-64 Battalions at a cost avoidance of $195.8
million annually. And it adds three manned Active Component AH-64
Squadrons at a cost of $198.6 million annually.
Question. General Odierno, will Apache crews that are performing
the armed reconnaissance mission aircraft be able to maintain the same
operational readiness rate as the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter?
Answer. Yes. The pilots that transition from the OH-58D to the AH-
64 will be able to achieve the same pilot proficiency readiness level.
The maintainers will be able to achieve an Operational Readiness (OR)
maintenance rate on the AH-64 comparable to the OH-58D.
Question. The Committee understands that the requirement for a new
armed aerial scout helicopter remains valid. When will the Army resume
its search for a new armed aerial scout?
Answer. The Army maintains a valid requirement for the Armed Aerial
Scout and would like to develop an aircraft to meet the manned aerial
reconnaissance mission. However, we currently do not have the funding
to pursue that path.
The analysis of alternatives conducted for the Armed Aerial Scout
(AAS) determined that absent a new materiel solution, the best solution
for the armed reconnaissance capability was a team of AH-64E with
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). The AH-64 and UAS manned-unmanned-
teaming solution was not chosen at the time because it was unaffordable
to buy and sustain additional AH-64s. The reduction in aviation force
structure, mainly in the Active Component, allows the Army to employ
AH-64s and Shadow UASs that the Army already owns and sustains to meet
the Armed Aerial Scout requirement. The AH-64 with its Modernized
Target Acquisition Designation Sight, and teamed with unmanned systems,
is already being employed with tremendous success across Afghanistan--
this is a proven success story. The best sensors in Army Aviation are
on the AH-64E.
Question. General Odierno, the Army recently conducted a voluntary
flight demonstration. However none of the aircraft brought forward by
industry were considered to be adequate as the basis for a new armed
aerial scout. Please comment on the key shortcomings that made the
demonstration aircraft unacceptable. Were there capabilities among the
demonstration aircraft that are desirable going forward?
Answer. The voluntary flight demonstrations in 2012 did not reveal
any aircraft that was rapidly available while providing a substantial
increase in capability over the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. All aircraft were
assessed for performance, military airworthiness, safety,
survivability, and mission equipment. None of the aircraft mitigated
the current capability gaps without a development and integration
effort and investment associated with a full acquisition program. Some
common areas that indicated the need for additional development
included high pilot workload, high control forces, growth potential
(maximum gross weight at takeoff), survivability (integration of
aircraft survivability equipment), and safety (closed circuit refuel
capability). A common desirable capability was field of view.
Performance (speed, range, and endurance), maneuverability, and mission
equipment were capabilities that varied among the demonstration
aircraft.
Question. General Odierno, will high enroute speed, be a key factor
in the selection of the next armed reconnaissance helicopter? In future
conflicts, the Army must have an aircraft that is capable of flying
230+ knots to and from the battlefield. This is why the Army is looking
into Future Vertical Lift (FVL) aircraft as a viable solution for the
Scout/Reconnaissance mission.
Answer. Yes. Enroute speed is an important performance
characteristic for the next armed reconnaissance helicopter. Range,
power (hover capability at 6,000 feet pressure altitude and 95 degrees
temperature), and operational radius (range to an operational area with
one hour of station time and return) are the other key performance
factors. Speed is important for crossing the battle space quickly and
for conducting escort missions with other Army helicopters.

Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)

Question. General Odierno, during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
our Army added armor kits to many vehicles, including Bradleys, trucks
of all sizes, Strykers and even MRAPS. However we did not develop a
solution to up-armor or replace the M113s. Instead the M113s were
restricted to the forwarding base. The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle or
AMPV [Amp Vee] program is intended to replace the M113 family of
vehicles. This is a big program, the Army has about 3,000 M113 series
vehicles. Could you provide the Committee a progress report on the AMPV
program?
Answer. The Army released the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
Request for Proposals (RFP) on 26 November 2013. This solicitation is
designed to fill requirements for 2,897 AMPV vehicles at echelons
within the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The Army is still
assessing requirements for vehicles at echelons above brigade, which we
anticipate to consist of 1,922 vehicles. The AMPV RFP closing date is
scheduled for 28 May 2014, following a 90-day extension granted in
January 2014 in response to industry request. On February 14, 2014, a
prospective bidder filed an agency protest with Army Material Command
which was decided on April 4, 2014. The protest was decided in the
Army's favor, and found that the solicitation provided adequate
information and time for contractors to develop proposals, and that the
solicitation requirements did not unfairly favor any competitor or
materiel solution. The current solicitation reflects a competitive
acquisition strategy in which vendors can propose any vehicle that
meets stated AMPV requirements. The Army plans to award an Engineering,
Manufacturing, and Development contract in second quarter Fiscal Year
2015. The AMPV program is focused on meeting a requirement that the
Army and Joint Staff has deemed operationally relevant and necessary.
Question. The low rate production decision is planned for Fiscal
Year 2018. At this point is that schedule doable?
Answer. Yes, the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program
schedule is achievable at this time. Moreover, once a vendor is
selected, the Army will open up discussions for potential acceleration
of the schedule depending on the solution proposed and capabilities the
vendor offerors.
Question. Will the Army continue to require protection against IEDs
in vehicle design? Some argue that the best solution to defeat IEDs is
to avoid lengthy stabilization and security assistance operations in
which our forces become sitting ducks. What is your comment on that?
Answer. The requirement to engage in stabilization and security
assistance operations remains a political decision. However, the use of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) can occur across the range of
military operations. Recent experiences have exposed gaps in the
survivability of the Army's current wheeled vehicle fleet which must be
addressed, regardless of future employment.
Land forces will continue to face threats from explosive devices;
the design and function of most IEDs incorporate effects also produced
by conventional ordnance items such as blast and fragmentation, or
explosively formed penetrators. These effects can be produced by the
conventional weapons inventories of many potential adversaries. As an
Army, we must develop vehicles that protect our Soldiers from both
conventional and improvised explosive threats. This requires the Army,
our Joint and Coalition partners, along with our industrial partners to
continue developing the best vehicle protection possible while
maintaining mobility for our forces.

Air and Missile Defense

Question. General Odierno, please provide the Committee your
assessment of the aircraft and missile threat to our deployed forces.
Answer. North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that
retains the capability to inflict serious damage on the Republic of
Korea (ROK) despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware.
North Korea continues to be deterred from conducting large-scale
attacks on the ROK primarily due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK
Alliance. However, North Korea has demonstrated its willingness to use
military provocation to achieve national goals. North Korea's special
operations forces (SOF), artillery, and growing missile force provide
significant capabilities for small-scale attacks that could rapidly
spiral into a larger conflict. A classified response containing more
details on the air and missile components of North Korea's military
capabilities has been provided in a separate document.
Question. General Odierno, you recently stated that due to budget
limitations, prompt improvements to out dated air and missile defenses
would not be forthcoming. Rather, the Army can provide increased air
and missile defenses to U.S. Forces in distant locations by means of
air lift. Could you discuss your air and missile defense concept?
Answer. Generals' Sharp and Thurman recent National Defense
Industrial Association article on Air and Missile Defense (AMD),
specifically in Korea, highlights the high demand for AMD assets in the
Pacific and worldwide. The Army is challenged but able to meet current
Combatant Command requirements with a mix of forward deployed and
forward stationed AMD capability. Forward stationed AMD assets (such as
the Army's 35th Air Defense Artillery BDE with its two Patriot
Battalions in South Korea) would be augmented with additional assets
and capabilities as needed if a conflict arises. Expeditionary airlift
would be used to bring these capabilities forward, further, supporting
the Army's move towards a more expeditionary force. We are reviewing
the global posture of our newest AMD Capability, the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), to include possible worldwide
stationing. Already deployed to Guam, the planned global posture for
future THAAD batteries is being incorporated into the Army Campaign
Plan's Strategic Effort #4 (THAAD Posture). Additionally, the Secretary
of the Army and I signed the AMD Strategy in September 2012 to
articulate an overarching AMD framework that synchronizes Service
functions in support of Army and Joint missions over the next 25 years.
Central to that strategy are ``game changing'' new systems such as
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System and Indirect
Fire Protection Capability Multi-Mission Launcher. These key additions
to the AMD Portfolio will allow the Army to capitalize on all available
sensors and shooters and be less constrained by command and control
limitations, better enabling us to organize forces at the component
level and increasing our global responsiveness.
Question. Are there air defense assets that have been tested, and
proved, but not fielded which could be adopted for use and quickly
brought into service?
Answer. There are no available air defense assets that have
completed a full test and evaluation program and are proven, but not
fielded. There were three Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems in the
development process that were not approved for fielding. Those systems
are Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS), Surface Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
Missile (SLAMRAAM), and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).
None of these assets were fully tested or proved, though JLENS testing
continues in a 3-year exercise in the National Capital Region.
The Army has developed two JLENS orbits; all further development
and procurement is canceled. One orbit is committed to a Secretary of
Defense directed three year operational exercise at Aberdeen Proving
Ground in support of the Commander, NORAD/NORTHCOM in the National
Capital Region. The second orbit is incomplete and is in long-term
storage. There is no force structure or manning allocated for the
second orbit, and it would require additional common equipment for
employment. Beyond providing one orbit in support of the operational
exercise, any additional employments of this capability will require
extensive planning, coordination, force structure and time to execute.
The other two AMD systems formerly in the development process were
canceled. The first, SLAMRAAM, had operational prototype equipment
delivered, which went into storage after procurement was canceled.
There is no force structure, no common equipment, no trained Soldiers,
and no plans to address obsolescence issues for this system.
Finally, the U.S. Government was developing the MEADS system in
coordination with Germany and Italy. The system is not beyond the
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development phase, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense agreed that MEADS doesn't meet the Army's open
architecture, non-proprietary requirements to interoperate with other
US AMD systems/command and control. The limited components that could
be made available will not meet operational requirements or our
modernization path forward, and would require resources, time, and
hardware and software improvements to become operational. Also, there
are no trained MEADS Soldiers who could man the system.

Army Aviation Restructure

Question. Given the high demand for Combat Aviation Brigades does
it not make sense to have some Army Guard brigades, complete with
Apache attack helicopters? Commanders are taught to always have a
reserve. But the aviation restructure plan would have no ``Apache
reserve'' in the reserve components. Would it make more sense to retain
some number of attack helicopter units in the Army Guard?
Answer. The Army's Attack/Reconnaissance battalions are considered
low density and high demand assets that must be fully trained and ready
on short notice to deploy for world-wide contingencies and crisis
response in the wake of major reductions to the Total Army end-strength
and force structure. The divestment of OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and the
elimination of three entire Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) from the
Active Component (AC) will take Army Aviation down from 37 to 20
shooting battalions. This necessitates transferring all Apache
helicopters to the AC in order to meet the demands of our Combatant
Commanders. The Army simply does not have the luxury of retaining
Apache helicopters in the Reserve Component (RC) as it is considerably
more expensive to maintain a sufficient, available inventory of Apaches
in the RC than it is to do so in the AC.
When considering the most effective use of limited resources,
National Guard Formations should be optimized with ``dual use''
equipment and formations that are capable of supporting States and
Governors as well as Combatant Commanders when mobilized. We must
develop complimentary and mutually supporting capabilities. The Army
supports a multi-component solution for operationalizing Army National
Guard (ARNG) Aviation Brigades in non-permissive environments. Under
the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), each ARNG Aviation Brigade
will have an AC AH-64 battalion aligned with them for training and
deployment. These AH-64 battalions will deploy with an intermediate
maintenance slice to support AH-64 maintenance and armament. This model
has proven effective in the past, and in fact, we have a National Guard
aviation brigade deployed to Kuwait today with an active duty attack
battalion attached.
Question. Has consideration been given to buying additional Apaches
to outfit both active and reserve component units? Would it be feasible
to partially equip some units, to support proficiency flying, and when
the unit is called up, provide additional aircraft from units returning
from theater?
Answer. Yes. Prior to selecting the current Aviation Restructure
Initiative (ART) plan, the Army considered two other options in which
the Army National Guard (ARNG) keeps 6 AU-64 battalions and the Active
Component operates with 18 AH-64 battalions plus 2 AH-64 Korea rotation
equipment sets. Under the selected ART plan, the Army will require 690
AH-64s out of the 730 currently on hand. The analysis conducted on the
alternative plans required 765 AH-64s for the first option and 805 for
the second option. However, this analysis concluded that it would
require a budget increase between $2.5 billion and $4.4 billion for
both options in unprogrammed one-time equipping costs added to the
Total Army budget which is not supported by the Budget Control Act
(BCA). This added cost comes from the requirement to either
remanufacture old aircraft or build new ones.
It would not be feasible to partially equip some ARNG units in
order to maintain proficiency until additional aircraft are assigned
from units returning from theater. An ARNG unit that is partially
equipped would only be able to maintain the minimum flying requirements
making it extremely challenging to achieve platoon or company level
proficiency prior to mobilization. This would require a longer post-
mobilization training period to bring an ARNG AH-64 unit up to a level
in which they were ready to deploy. Additionally, most aircraft
returning from major combat operations are required to be RESET for
major maintenance repairs and upgrades which can take several months.
This situation could place some units at high risk of not receiving
their aircraft prior to mobilization. Since the AC has a faster Army
Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle (1:2) as compared to the ARNG (1:5),
this could place AC AH-64 units at risk of not getting their aircraft
back in time to redeploy. For example, if ARNG AH-64 battalions were
given only 18 out of 24 AH-64s assigned, this would require them to
transfer aircraft from sister units (AC and RC) rendering the donor
units' Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate too low to deploy. Keeping all
AH-64s in the Active Component would avoid this situation and mitigate
the risk of not being able to provide the commander on the ground
essential attack/reconnaissance capabilities in a rapid manner to meet
operational demand requirements. Active Component AH-64 units train to
the battalion/brigade level of proficiency and have access to more
resources and available collective training days to keep their Attack/
Reconnaissance pilots fully trained and ready for deployment on short
notice to meet world-wide critical mission requirements.
Question. General Odierno, how long will it take to retrain the
pilots and ground crews that will be shifted to a different aircraft
under the restructure?
Answer. The institutional training curriculum to transition to a
new airframe takes between 8 to 14 weeks on active duty for training
either at Fort Rucker, Fort Eustis, or one of the Army National Guard
(ARNG) Training Sites. Once a pilot returns from an aircraft
qualification course it can take between 3 to 6 months to complete
progression training to be fully mission qualified depending on the
skill level of the individual. It will take ground maintenance
personnel about 6 to 9 months upon graduating from an Army helicopter
maintenance course to be fully trained and ready at their home unit.

Rotational Presence

Question. Please discuss what you see as the benefits to Army units
of actually living and training at forward locations in their wartime
area of responsibility.
Answer. Access and influence are important to achieving U.S.
strategic ends. Forward presence also increases the response time
afforded to Combatant Commands by ensuring military capability is
postured closer to a theater of operations. Army forces living and
training forward will enable U.S. global engagement while benefiting
from enhanced readiness and providing combatant commanders a persistent
presence to prevent, shape, and if required, win.
The benefits to these units begin with the enhanced readiness they
develop through the experiences gained in the geographic locations
where they may be deployed for operations. The additional terrain,
regional, cultural, socio-political, and language familiarization these
personnel and units will develop while living and training at forward
locations significantly improves their ability should they become
engaged in combat operations in these locations. Moreover, the
interpersonal relationships they develop with Allies and partners at
all levels and over time is a critical enabler to support inter-
operability, assured access, and to shape U.S. strategic objectives.
While Forward Stationing units ensures deep contextual
understanding for our soldiers and families, establishing a Rotational
Forward Presence by unit and/or individual replacement can provide
similar benefits with reduced infrastructure. The Army must balance
forward presence and rotational force posture to ensure we meet
Combatant Command requirements for responsiveness and readiness while
operating in a fiscally constrained environment and meeting the
targeted reductions in the Total Army force.
Question. Will National Guard units take part in this program?
Answer. As we begin rotating a complete brigade to Korea, we will
exclusively use Active Component (AC) forces. Over time, we could
consider Reserve Component (RC), but this would incur an additional
requirement in our base budget of approximately $344 million per 9-
month brigade combat team (BCT) rotation in addition to any training,
mobilization and demobilization costs required to bring the BCT to the
required readiness level.
Question. What size units make these rotational presence visits?
Answer. During our pilot, one Combined Arms Battalion of
approximately 800 personnel and one Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron of
approximately 400 personnel will initially conduct the Korea rotational
presence mission. Beginning in FY15, we will rotate the entire Brigade
Combat Team and continue to rotate an Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron.
Question. What is the required readiness training status of the
rotational units before they deploy?
Answer. The Army tailors readiness of rotational forces to meet the
specific operational requirements established by the Combatant
Commanders to assure mission success. In some instances, this process
will build unit readiness that is identical to the core functions and
capabilities of the unit--for example an armor brigade conducting
offensive decisive action operations. In other instances, the process
will generate unit readiness that is focused on either a subset of a
unit's design (deployment of a truck platoon instead of the entire
truck company) or on an assigned mission that differs greatly from the
unit's core functions, such as a Security Force Assistance Brigade. In
either case, the Army ensures that deploying units are trained and
ready to perform those missions designated by the combatant commander.
Question. ``Why not bring home all of the units that the U.S. has
forward stationed, in Europe and Asia?''
Answer. For nearly 70 years, our overseas military bases have been
a centerpiece of American security. U.S. boots on the ground remain the
most visible and potent symbol of enduring American support for
partners and allies. They are both a fundamental aspect of our national
defense policy and a means to safeguard ourselves and our interests
from shocks to the international system. Faced with increasingly
sophisticated anti-access and area denial abilities of potential
adversaries, maintaining forward presence, especially in the Asia-
Pacific and Europe, ensures interoperability and timely and decisive
response to Combatant Commander requirements.
The cumulative effects of sequestration and reduced defense
budgets, however, could create a Hollow Force if prolonged and
disproportionate investments across manpower, operations and
maintenance, modernization, sustainment, and procurement are made
without a corresponding adjustment to strategy. While reductions in the
short term will not immediately trigger a Hollow Force, they will have
impacts that, when accumulated over time, will contribute to a Hollow
Force. For example, a single year reduction to operations and
maintenance doesn't indicate a hollow force. However, that single
reduction combined with a seven year decisive action training
deficiency, poorly maintained installation facilities, and slowed
modernization can contribute to a hollow force.

Body Armor

Question. General Odierno, what advances in technology is the Army
pursuing that may result in better body armor?
Answer. The Army is focusing on long-term revolutionary solutions
in biotechnology, nanotechnology, and materials science to provide the
next generation of body armor capability. Examples include investments
in manufacturing processes, improved ceramics, biomimetic materials
such as spider silk, aramid copolymers, and textile composite armor
that provide a framework for successful design of lightweight textile
armor of the future. The Army is also investing in light weight
protection material systems that exhibit revolutionary performance by
manipulating matter at the atomic scale, pushing the high-performance
material envelope. Payoffs from this research include protection
materials with 33 percent savings in weight over current systems. While
we believe that significant breakthroughs in ballistic material
performance and system weight reduction are possible, revolutionary new
material technologies typically require 10-20 years of development.
Meanwhile, we are also focused on near-term solutions through the
Soldier Protection System (SPS), which is the Army's next generation
body armor system. The SPS program is a clear step forward, which
focuses on reducing weight while integrating the systems worn by our
Soldiers and balancing capabilities in protection and mobility. This
program integrates the Integrated Head Protection System, Transition
Combat Eye Protection, Torso and Extremity Protection, Vital Torso
Protection, and an Integrated Soldier Sensor System. SPS provides a
modular, scalable integrated system of mission tailorable ballistic/
blast protective equipment that will improve the level of mobility,
form, fit, and function for both male and female Soldiers. The
threshold weight reduction of ten percent for both hard and soft body
armor and five percent reduction in head protection are realistic and
achievable at this time. This program entered into Engineering and
Manufacturing Development in third quarter fiscal year 2013 (3QFY13)
and is currently scheduled to enter into Milestone C and Low Rate
Initial Production in 3QFY15.
Question. Is there an established shelf life for body armor?
Answer. The Army has not established a shelf or service life for
body armor. The Army replaces body armor (both hard and soft) and
helmets when it has determined that a particular component is no longer
serviceable and safe for its intended use. Such determinations are made
through routine and frequent Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
(PMCS) by Soldiers or periodic scanning by the Army's hard body armor
non-destructive test equipment. During combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, body armor improvements evolved quickly, leading to the
replacement of Small Arms Protective Inserts with Enhanced Small Arms
Protective Inserts (ESAPI), the current standard plates used in body
armor. ESAPI plates are up-to-date and have been in continuous
production to meet requirements for deploying soldiers. The Anny
continues to use surveillance as the principal means to establish
accurate shelf and service life for body armor components.
Question. Is there a maintenance program for body armor that
requires periodic inspection and testing?
Answer. The Army maintenance program for Armor Ballistic Plates
consists of Soldier level pre-combat checks and additional
serviceability inspection conducted via the Hard Body Armor
NonDestructive Testing Equipment (NOTE) system. The NOTE is an
automated digital X-Ray inspection system that evaluates the internal
ballistic integrity and serviceability of the plates. All Soldiers
deploying to theater must have plates that have been scanned and
determined to be serviceable. Body armor with external material defects
are sent to the appropriate Regional Logistics Supply Center (RLSC) for
repairs. External material defects consist of, but not limited to;
tears in material, frayed or damaged cables, bunching of soft
ballistics, hook/loop failure, punctures, and petroleum based stains or
discoloration. The RLSC repair activities consist of patching torn
covers of ballistic plates, sewing outer material tears of vests,
replacing unserviceable components, and industrial cleaning of body
armor.
Question. The Committee understands that PEO Soldier has been
conducting a study of body armor. When will the results of the study be
available?
Answer. The Army is supporting an Office of the Secretary of
Defense study in accordance with Section 146 of the Fiscal Year 2014
National Defense Authorization Act, directing the identification and
assessment of cost-effective and efficient means of procuring personal
protective equipment, anticipated to be complete by RAND in 4QFY14.
This study is also examining how to promote competition and innovation
in the personal protection equipment industrial base.
Question. At this time is some of the U.S. Army body armor over
age?
Answer. No, current body armor (soft and hard ballistic components)
does not have an expiration date. Body armor for deployment is
continuously evaluated for serviceability through prescribed Soldier
Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) and regularly
through the Hard Body Armor Non-Destructive Testing Equipment (NOTE)
system pre-deployment screening program.
Question. Is there a plan to recertify or replace over age body
armor?
Answer. At this time the Army has no plans to replace body armor
based solely on age. We replace body armor when faults are noted during
Soldier Preventative Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) inspections
or the Hard Body Armor Non-Destructive Testing Equipment (NOTE) system
scanning. Currently the Army has sufficient stocks on-hand to support
anticipated requirements for contingency operations until 2020. Once
current Operation Enduring Freedom deployment requirements end,
ballistic plates held in contingency stocks will be recertified through
NOTE testing every four years.

Sexual Assault in the Force

Question. Please describe the policies and programs in place to
combat sexual assault and provide immediate care and assistance to
victims of sexual assault. What new programs are being implemented to
combat this issue?
Answer. In the past year, the Army has devoted extraordinary
resources to addressing the issue of sexual assault, and those efforts
have begun to gain traction. Through the combined efforts of our
military and civilian leaders at all echelons, we've implemented an
unprecedented number of initiatives--more than 30 in the past year--to
address this insider threat. These initiatives are enhancing the
reporting, investigation and prosecution of sexual assault offenses,
increasing the accountability of leaders and fostering a cultural
change that will lead to a positive command climate.
Key among the initiatives implemented during the past year are:
A Special Victims Counsel Program available to all
service members and their dependents who are victims of sexual
assault;
Added sexual assault prevention and response as a
category for all officer and noncommissioned officer
evaluations;
Expanded to all command levels the requirement to
conduct Command Climate Surveys, with results reviewed by
supervisors;
Raised the level of leadership of the Army's Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) office to
the SES level;
Expanded the implementation of our Special Victims
Capability for the investigation and prosecution of offenses by
instituting trauma-informed investigation training and
increasing the number of Special Victims Prosecutors;
Credentialed thousands of Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs) and Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and
Prevention Victim Advocates (SHARP VAs);
Enhanced background screening requirements before a
Soldier is qualified to serve as a SARC or SHARP VA;
Required Judge Advocates to serve as investigating
officers in Article 32 proceedings;
Enhanced victim participation in the post-trial
process of military courts-martial;
Required administrative separation of Soldiers
convicted of sexual assault offenses;
Implemented a pilot SHARP 8-week course for SHARP
Program Managers and Trainers, Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs), and Victim Advocates (VAs). This course
is an initial action in the Army's efforts to establish a SHARP
Schoolhouse, which will incorporate doctrine, SHARP Life-Cycle
Training (Professional Military Education, Civilian Education
System, Unit Training and Self-study training), and quality
assurance measures for all SHARP training. This first-of-its-
kind schoolhouse will ensure our full-time program personnel at
brigade and higher are thoroughly trained and prepared to
assist commanders in preventing and responding to sexual
offenses. Once the pilot, which began in late January,
concludes in October, we'll assess the effectiveness of the
initiative, as well as what needs to be refined prior to
instituting a permanent schoolhouse in the FY15/16 time frame.
The Chief of Staff of the Army conducted two forums
with Survivors, SARCs and VAs. The SHARP School efforts are a
direct result of this forum. The last forum was held 18 March
2014, and the next one is scheduled to occur no later than
November 2014.
Question. What measures is the Army taking to encourage victims to
report sexual assaults and to cooperate with investigators so they are
able to prosecute these cases.
Answer. Sexual assault is one of the most underreported crimes in
society at large, and this is no less the case in the Army and other
Military Services. The Army is working hard to foster a climate in
which victims: trust their chains of command to support them if and
when sexual offenses occur; know they will receive all necessary
services and support from the Army, are confident their allegations
will be taken seriously; and know that all incidents of sexual assault
and harassment will be thoroughly investigated. The 51 percent increase
in reporting during this past fiscal year is possibly reflective of
victim's growing confidence in our system. Although the apparent
increase in victim confidence in the chain of command and response
system is an encouraging sign, some barriers still exist that
discourage reporting--feelings of shame or embarrassment as well as
fear of retaliation or ostracism by peers. That's why this is an issue
whose remedy lies in the hands of the leadership and command authority.
Commander-driven change in unit culture and compassionate,
comprehensive support of victims are critical to address these concerns
and assuage victims' fears.
Some of the initiatives in place to provide commanders with the
tools they need to facilitate cultural change include:
Enhanced medical, psychological and legal
assistance. The Army is dedicated to providing sexual assault
victims with extensive medical, psychological, and legal
support services. The Army is learning from the increasing body
of peer-reviewed research about the neurobiology of trauma and
how it affects the needs, behavior, and treatment of victims of
sexual assault and other traumatic experiences. The Army is
committed to both understanding this research and in
implementing innovative and successful strategies to combat the
effects of Military Sexual Trauma (MST). All sexual assault
victims are assigned a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator
(SARC) and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim
Advocate (SAPR VA). When a victim of sexual assault presents to
any Military Treatment Facility (MTF) in the Army, his or her
care is managed by a Sexual Assault Clinical Provider (SACP)
and Sexual Assault Care Coordinator (SACC) from initial
presentation to completion of all follow-up visits related to
the sexual assault. The victim will be offered a Sexual Assault
Forensic Exam (SAFE), and if not already accompanied by a SARC
or SAPR VA, the SACP or SACC will coordinate the process and
explain reporting options. The SARC or SAPR VA will also
provide a referral to appropriate services. With the
implementation of the Special Victim Counsel Program, the
victim will also be notified of the availability of a Special
Victim Counsel by the SARC.
Enhanced investigatory and prosecutory resources.
The Army has invested a substantial amount of resources and
training toward the investigation and response to sexual
assault allegations. The U.S. Army Military Police School
provides Special Victim Unit Investigative Training that
focuses on memory and trauma, common victim behaviors, alcohol-
facilitated sexual assaults, sex offender behaviors, male
victimization, and the innovative victim interviewing technique
that has resulted in a more in-depth and complete recollection
of events than traditional methods of questioning.
Investigators and attorneys from all three Services, as well as
the Coast Guard and National Guard Bureau, attend this
training, and it is regarded as the best education available to
investigators and attorneys anywhere in Federal government. The
Army also has a dedicated group of nearly 22 Sexual Assault
Investigators (SAI) in the Criminal Investigation Command
(CID), each of whom is specially trained to ensure allegations
of sexual assault are fully and appropriately investigated. An
additional 8 authorizations were added in FY14. The Judge
Advocate General also manages 23 specially-trained Special
Victims Prosecutor (SVP) Teams comprised of SVPs, paralegals,
and SAPR VAs. Special Victim Investigators collaborate closely
with SVPs, who are hand-selected at the Department of the Army
level for their expertise in the courtroom and their ability to
work with victims.
Developing a properly trained cadre of investigators is
extraordinarily important in the Army's efforts to increase reporting
because victims' willingness to initiate and follow through with
investigations is directly related to whether they feel supported and
believed. If their initial contact with law enforcement is a positive
experience, victims' likelihood of pursuing cases increases.
Question: New evidence shows the bulk of sexual assaults may
actually be committed by serial offenders, or predators, who have
dozens, sometimes hundreds, of victims in a lifetime rather than a case
of ``mixed signals''. Please explain what the new emphasis means and
what kind of changes you're implementing based on this new evidence.
Answer: The Army is also aware of this line of research, much of it
informed by the work of Dr. David Lisak, PhD, recently of the
University of Massachusetts-Boston, which indicates that although
incarcerated sex offenders may have been prosecuted on a single count
of rape, in actuality those individuals went undetected in committing
multiple incidents of rape throughout their lifetime, prior to
apprehension. However, the Army currently does not have data to
validate these findings within a military setting. We further agree
with Dr. Lisak's research in that many offenders leverage their
personal relationships with victims in order to affect a sexual
assault. In fact, over 80 percent of military victims of sexual assault
knew their attacker for at least a little while prior to the sexual
assault. In addition, the sexual assault case synopses submitted to
Congress each year since 2007 show another common pattern to sex
offender behavior, that is a considerable portion of sexual assaults
are perpetrated opportunistically by individuals known to the victim.
These cases show signs of manipulative behavior on behalf of the
alleged offender, but would not necessarily align with what most would
consider predatory behavior.
As a result, the Army feels very strongly that its prevention and
response work must address a wide variety of criminal and suspect
behavior. In its prevention programs, the Army Sexual Harassment and
Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program focuses on the benefits
that an active and empowered bystander can achieve when they recognize
situations at risk for sexual assault. The Army made a conscious
decision to move to a bystander approach after a great deal of research
and consultation with experts in the field of sex offender behaviors,
such as Dr. Lisak. Given that 80 percent of military victims knew their
offender, sexual assault is viewed as an ``insider threat''--something
that is most likely to be perpetrated by a friend or co-worker they see
daily. The lessons learned from research on all sexual offenders, not
just those with a particular pattern of behavior, is that prevention
efforts should be geared mostly toward the bystander--male and female--
who can be trained to identify predators and safely intervene in
situations that have the potential to lead to sexual assault. Since
2006, the Army has incorporated bystander Intervention into its
prevention and training curriculum at all levels of military
operational and institutional training.
Research on the wide variety of offender behaviors also emphasized
the need for highly-trained, highly-skilled Sexual Assault
Investigators (SAI) who are skilled in identifying sexual predation.
Early on, the Army invested in sexual assault investigators by adding
22 positions to the Criminal Investigation Command. An additional 8 SAI
authorizations were added in FY14.
Question. Incidents of assault remain high among the 18-24-year-old
junior enlisted population as well as a continued problem at the
Service Academies. What are we doing to teach our newest
servicemembers, who will someday become our nation's military leaders,
about the military's no tolerance policy for sexual assault and the
programs in place for both our recruits and at our service academies to
raise awareness of this issue?
Answer. SHARP training is a key element in our multi-faceted
prevention approach. SHARP training is integrated throughout the life-
cycle of a Soldiers' career, including ``Future Soldier'' training in
which we engage Army recruits with SHARP and values training in the
recruiting environment. Since 2011, SHARP training has been integrated
into Army Initial Military Training (IMT). This training includes signs
of abuse of power, sexual harassment/assault, and unprofessional
relationships. The Army requires all trainees receive SHARP training
within 14 days of reporting to IMT. This policy has been in place since
2012, making the Army a leader among the Services in that respect. The
Army also requires SHARP Unit Refresher Training for all personnel and
has expanded SHARP training throughout all levels of Operational and
Institutional Training. Additionally, the Army provides SHARP training
during pre-command courses, such as the Commander/First Sergeant
Course, to provide commanders and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers
(NC0s) with the skill sets required for them to lead from the front on
the issue of sexual assault. Our Training and Doctrine Command has
added sequentially progressive SHARP training at the Army's
Professional Military Education schools for Soldiers, NCOs and
Officers.
The Army has recognized the importance of fostering an environment
free of sexual assault and harassment at the United States Military
Academy (USMA). The West Point leadership has made this a top priority
at the academy. The USMA Superintendent chairs a monthly Sexual Assault
Review Board to ensure there is unity in effort throughout the military
academy in combating sexual assault and harassment. Sexual assault
prevention and response education is incorporated at every level of
cadet progression. The Corps of Cadets have dedicated Sexual Assault
Response Coordinators (SARC) and Victim Advocates (VA) to educate
cadets and cadre and care for victims of these offenses. USMA also
offers Special Victims Counsel and has a trained Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner to provide specialized legal and medical care to victims.
Furthermore, the Corps of Cadets are taking a proactive role in
changing the culture and eliminating sexual assault and harassment.
They have established the Cadets Against Sexual Harassment and Assault
(CASH/A). This organization consists of trained facilitators who have
become the subject matter experts in the Army's Sexual Harassment and
Assault Response and Prevention Program. The program has grown to
include a CASH/A representative within every company. USMA will
continue to combat sexual assault and harassment by attacking the
problem from every level.
Question. What programs are in place to train our commanders and
senior commissioned officers how to handle such cases?
Answer. The Army has sustained and expanded legal education for
commanders, and added education for their senior enlisted advisors.
Commanders who serve as courts-martial convening authorities attend
mandatory legal education at the Senior Office Legal Orientation (SOLO)
(for Special Courts-Martial Convening Authorities--SPCMCA) and the
General Officer Legal Orientation (GOLO) (for General Courts-Martial
Convening Authorities--GCMCA). Additionally, The Judge Advocate
General's Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS) recently published the 2013
version of the Commander's Legal Handbook, which serves as a valuable
resource for commanders.
The SOLO is a 4.5-day course that covers the MI breadth of a
commander's legal responsibilities. Classes are generally 60-70
students with seminars and electives built into the curriculum. A
significant portion of the course focuses on command responsibilities
related to sexual assault. While most commanders who attend are brigade
level commanders, a significant number of battalion commanders attend
on a space-available basis. There are efforts to expand legal education
for all battalion commanders and to enhance commander education at the
company command level through standardized training support packages
implemented at the local level.
The GOLO is a 1-day course that is required for all general
officers who will serve as a GCMCA, but is also mandated by the Chief
of Staff for all General Officers who are deploying. This course is
conducted in a ``one-on-one'' setting and consists of mandatory topics
including Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response,
as well as elective topics that help focus the commander and specific
topics relevant to their command.
The Command Sergeant Major Legal Orientation is a new 3.5-day
course that covers legal topics relevant to the duties of the senior
enlisted advisors to general officers and SES civilians. Attendees are
nominative CSMs whose attendance is approved by the Sergeant Major of
the Army. SHARP topics are emphasized in this course.
Training at the Company Commander and First Sergeant Course and the
Battalion and Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC) is specifically focused
on preparing leaders for the unique SHARP responsibilities inherent in
their respective levels of command. The instruction at the Battalion
and Brigade PCC is provided by General Officers from the Office of the
Judge Advocate General (OTJAG) and the Office of the Provost Marshal
General. Each year, the Army also conducts a Sexual Harassment/ Assault
Prevention Summit that commanders attend. During the Summit, attendee
hear from national leaders, Department of Defense (DoD) and Army
leadership, and subject matter experts, as well as exchange ideas with
each other and provide feedback to Army leadership on challenges they
face in executing the SHARP Program and ideas they have for improving
it.
Question. This Committee provided an additional $25 million to
expand the Special Victims Counsel (SVC) program to all of the
Services, to give victims their own lawyer to represent them through
the process. Could you give us an update regarding timing for the
implementation of the program in the Army?
Answer. Since January 1, 2014, the Special Victims Counsel (SVC)
program for the Army's active component has been at full operating
capability. The Army has received largely positive feedback, from both
the program's clients and SVCs themselves, on the program.
The SVC program has a pool of judge advocates who are trained and
certified to perform SVC functions--these attorneys are well supported
and functioning under Legal Assistance Divisions across the Army. Since
the SVC program's inception in August 2013, the Army has conducted four
instructional courses--three face-to-face courses and one on-line
course--training a total of 91 Active Army and 110 Reserve Component
SVCs. The Reserve Component SVC Programs are ready to be at full
operating capability no later than May 1, 2014. The active component
Army SVCs are located world-wide, to include the Central Command Area
of Responsibility. There are a limited number of small installations
without a resident SVC but SVCs at identified larger installations will
be directly responsible to support those few smaller installations. In
addition, the SVC Program Manager(PM) has the ability to allocate
assets as needed to ensure each and every Special Victim in the Army
has the opportunity to have an SVC, regardless of location.
The Army SVC program presently represents over 700 clients, has
conducted over 2,400 consultations, accompanied 556 clients to
interviews with Trial Defense, Trial Counsel, and Criminal
Investigation Division and appeared either by brief or in person on
behalf of clients in over 125 court-martials. The program is fully
funded by Congress and has the assets needed to carry out Congress's
intent. The Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps has
enthusiastically embraced the SVC program and the Corps' leadership has
made it one of its highest priorities.
Question. Does this year's budget request include sufficient
funding for the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs?
Answer. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response is an Army top
priority. As such, the Army is committed to applying all resources
necessary to effectively address this issue. As a reflection of the
Army's commitment, the Army SHARP Program's budget is projected to grow
by approximately $44M from FY14 ($86.70M) to FY15 ($130.40M). We are
doing everything in our power to maximize our SHARP funding line by
continually assessing the efficacy of our program and by looking for
ways to leverage best practices, eliminate redundant and inefficient
procedures and by ensuring the full utilization of our resources. We
are working diligently to meet our SHARP funding requirements and
responsibilities.

Women in Combat

Question. Servicemembers often talk about `Band of Brothers culture
and the importance of unit cohesion and morale, particularly in certain
specialties currently closed to women. How will opening these units to
women impact unit cohesion? What kinds of challenges do you expect in
integrating these kinds of units? What has been the reaction of
currently serving (male) servicemembers to opening positions to women?
Do you expect them to be largely supportive or do you expect
significant opposition to the integration?
Answer. The evidence to date does not indicate that integrating
women into previously closed positions will have any negative impact on
unit cohesion. The Army conducted interviews, focus groups and surveys
of soldiers when women in open occupations were initially assigned to
positions in headquarters and headquarters companies of maneuver
battalions in select units. The results of those assessments indicated
that women were successfully integrated into the units, and there were
no negative impacts on unit cohesion or effectiveness.
Question. A recent Army survey showed that only 7.5% of the female
Soldiers who responded said they were interested in combat positions,
and younger Soldiers were more interested than mid-level Soldiers in
those positions. Given that the Services have said they would like
integration to begin at the more senior levels, will this hesitation
present a roadblock to integration?
Answer. Preliminary results of the surveys conducted to date
indicate that approximately twenty-two percent of women polled are
``moderately interested'' or ``very interested'' in serving in closed
occupations. This survey represents a much larger polling population
than other surveys because it included women of all ranks. The survey
cited with only 7.5% interest only included junior Soldiers (O1-O3, E1-
E6) who indicated they were ``very interested.'' Although results from
the propensity survey are still being evaluated, data from recent
assessments indicate a very encouraging trend regarding the level of
interest of women to serve in closed occupations. While statistics
serve as useful indicators of trends as part of the analytic process,
Soldier feedback is equally, if not more, important. The Gender
Integration Study will help us determine what is important to Soldiers,
what they see as keys to success, and where they have concerns. Gender
Integration Study data has been and will continue to be compiled and
analyzed to inform Army leadership and develop strategies for future
gender integration. The focus is on, and will continue to be on,
expanding opportunities to women, rather than equating success to
numbers.
Question. Do you expect to see women being integrated into all
specialties, such as special forces units or infantry, for example? Are
there any specialties that you are expecting the Services to recommend
remain closed to women? Are there any specialties that you expect to
approve requests to remain closed to women?
Answer. In accordance with the Army Implementation Plan, no later
than 1 January 2016, the Secretary of the Army will either notify the
Secretary of Defense to open positions and occupations, or request an
exception to policy to keep the positions and occupations closed.

[Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr.
Frelinghuysen.]

W I T N E S S E S

----------
Page
Amos, General J. F............................................... 87
Dempsey, General Martin.......................................... 1
Greenert, Admiral J. W........................................... 87
Hagel, Hon. Chuck................................................ 1
Hale, Robert..................................................... 1
James, D. L...................................................... 197
Mabus, Ray....................................................... 87
McHugh, J. M..................................................... 277
Odierno, General R. T............................................ 277
Welsh, General M. A., III........................................ 197

[all]