[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON PRIORITIES FOR THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND
SECURITY REVIEW
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 20, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-72
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Ron Barber, Arizona
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana, Vice Chair Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the
State of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency............................ 1
The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Stewart A. Baker, Former Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director,
Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Henry H. Willis, Director, Rand Homeland Security and Defense
Center, The Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Ms. Elaine C. Duke, Former Under Secretary for Management, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Stewart A. Baker......... 41
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Stewart A.
Baker.......................................................... 41
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Frank J. Cilluffo........ 42
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Frank J.
Cilluffo....................................................... 42
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Henry H. Willis.......... 43
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Henry H.
Willis......................................................... 43
Questions From Honorable Jeff Duncan for Elaine C. Duke.......... 44
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Elaine C.
Duke........................................................... 45
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON PRIORITIES FOR THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND
SECURITY REVIEW
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Friday, June 20, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management
Efficiency,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Duncan, Hudson, Barber, and Payne.
Mr. Duncan. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order. The
purpose of this hearing today is to receive testimony from
National security stakeholders on their recommendations for the
Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Our homeland security faces a significant test. From the
influx of illegal aliens, including 60,000 unaccompanied
children over the last year--and what we see going on even
today in the Southwest is alarming--to terrorist threats from
Syrian foreign fighters and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups wreaking
havoc on the Middle East, and the continued cyber attacks by
China and others, this administration has failed to provide a
comprehensive strategic vision to secure our Nation.
Mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Department
of Homeland Security, or DHS, is required to conduct a
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, every 4 years.
The purpose of the QHSR is for DHS to assess the state of
our Nation's homeland security and determine what steps, if
any, are needed to shift, or enhance, our strategic focus. The
QHSR is meant to outline DHS's mission, and the Department's
vision and strategy to effectively implement its mission. While
the report was released only hours before this hearing, it was
due no later than December 31, 2013. As a result, it is 6
months late. Although I understand part of the delay was due to
the need for Secretary Johnson to review the report, we need a
cohesive strategy to combat the threats that we face.
Until we have a focused, achievable, and affordable
strategy that addresses these threats, this administration is
failing its duty to lead. Because of the lengthy delay, this
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review was also unable to guide
the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request. With our
country over $17 trillion in debt, and almost $18 trillion
today, it is imperative that we make wise and well-informed
decisions when it comes to the budget. Unfortunately, without
the timely issuance of the QHSR, DHS lacked the strategy
necessary to help prioritize and spend taxpayer dollars wisely.
In November 2013, the committee sent a letter to Acting
Secretary Beers recommending that the QHSR focus on areas such
as border security, cybersecurity, terrorist threats,
preparedness, transportation security, and management
effectiveness. While the QHSR mentions most of these areas of
interest, it does not address these threats posed by other
nation-states such as Iran, China, and Russia. This is a major
omission for a document intended to guide how we secure the
homeland. Its failure to mention Departmental management is
also a major weakness.
Year after year, DHS is ranked at or near the bottom of
Federal agencies in many public-sector agency performance
rankings. For this Department to be efficient and effective,
proper management must be a priority. Highlighting climate
change as a homeland security issue and not nation-state
threats--as I mentioned earlier, Iran, China, Russia--or the
management of the Department makes no sense and it raises
questions about the usefulness of this strategy--climate
change. However, most concerning in reviewing the QHSR is that
there seems to be a lack of aligning resources with strategic
priorities.
In the 9/11 Commission Act, it requires DHS to identify the
budget plan required to provide sufficient resources to
successfully execute the full range of missions called for in
the National homeland security strategy. While the QHSR briefly
mentions budget drivers in general, it does not link specific
mission areas to the actual budget. The Government
Accountability Office reported, after the release of the first
QHSR, that there was a lack of input from 9 Federal
stakeholders. For this document to be truly effective there
must be interagency, State, local, and private-sector
consultation.
In viewing the list of stakeholder participation, it seems
DHS increased their stakeholder outreach. But it also notes
direct engagement with the Executive Office of the President.
DHS's strategy should be objective and fact-based, and I
sincerely hope that there was no political influence in the
development of this document. The production of this report
should not solely be a box-checking exercise for the
Department. The Nation desperately needs a strategic vision to
secure our homeland. Time will tell if this document meets that
need. I look forward to hearing the testimony from our
stakeholders and hearing their perspectives on the latest QHSR.
With that, I will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, my friend, Mr.
Barber, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the
witnesses for being with us today.
The purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or
QHSR, is to conduct a comprehensive assessment that outlines
the long-term risk, strategy, and priorities for homeland
security across our Nation.
Unfortunately, as the Chairman pointed out, the Department
did not release its report until yesterday, despite the
statutory mandate that it be delivered no later than December
31, 2013. I am very disappointed that it was released late. It
makes it hard to conduct a meaningful hearing with so short a
time to study the review. But I am pleased that the report is
finally in our hands, and that it includes specific strategic
priorities for the Department for the next 4 years.
It is now encumbent upon the Department, in coordination
with its Federal, State, and local partners and other
stakeholders, to carry out these strategies in an effort to
keep our country secure. And, I might add, to make sure that we
have a way of tracking progress, which has been sorely lacking
in the Department in so many areas.
For the QHSR to be truly effective, a truly effective
guide--one that ensures that all Department components are
working towards the same goals--it is absolutely critical that
the strategies the Department has put on paper in the QHSR
actually become programs, policies, and budget requirements.
Although the Department is required by law to be included,
missing from the QHSR is an assessment of the organizational
alignment of the Department with a National homeland security
strategy, including the Department's organizational structure,
management systems, budget and accounting systems, human
resource systems, procurement systems, and a physical and
technical infrastructure. These missing elements make it
difficult to determine whether the Department has the required
capabilities to achieve the goals established in the QHSR and
its ability to link its policies to planning, budget, and
execution.
It is also essential that the Department do more to engage
stakeholders. I represent 1 of 9 Southwest Border districts.
The people who live and work, have businesses, go to school
along that border should have a right to have a say in how the
Department develops its strategies and carries them out. I
still--I am waiting to see an active and robust effort to
engage those stakeholders. I would add, the personnel, the
boots on the ground have to have their voice to make sure that
they are helping to form strategies and priorities for the
future.
It is a sad commentary--and the Chairman also pointed this
out--that when there is a review, National review, of all
Federal agencies, DHS has consistently fallen very low. In
fact, typically 19 out of 19 agencies studied. Then when you
look inside the Department, within the Department that--looking
at morale of employees, the CBP--Customs and Border Protection
ranks lowest of all the employees of the Department. These must
be addressed, these issues must be addressed, and should become
a priority for the Department going forward. Morale is
essential to effective personnel activities.
The Chairman and I recently co-sponsored H.R. 4228, the DHS
Acquisition, Accountability, and Efficiency Act, which passed
the House earlier this morning. This bipartisan bill will, I
believe, bring transparency, accountability, and consistency to
the Department's acquisition processes, which have been sorely
lacking.
We have had some outrageous examples of how acquisitions
have gone wrong. The effective and efficient acquisition of
technology goods and services will be vital in the Department's
ability to implement the strategic approaches defined in the
QHSR.
As Ranking Member of the Oversight and Management
Efficiency Subcommittee, I will be joining with my colleagues
on both sides of the aisle in monitoring the Department's
implementation of the strategic priorities laid out in the QHSR
to ultimately determine its worth. Improving the importance of
DHS programs, activities, and initiatives is clearly a
bipartisan process, a bipartisan priority. This committee has
shown that time and time again.
But while the Department is not here today to address our
specific questions, I do appreciate the willingness of these
very important stakeholders and former Department employees to
testify today. Their insights into the QHSR and the
Department's plan forward should serve as a valuable
contribution to our oversight, and I look forward to hearing
from each of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Ron Barber
June 20, 2014
The purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR,
is to conduct a comprehensive assessment that outlines the long-term
risks, strategy, and priorities for homeland security across the
Nation.
Unfortunately, the Department did not release the QHSR until
yesterday; despite the statutory mandate that it be delivered no later
than December 31, 2013. While I am disappointed it was released late, I
am pleased to see that the report includes very specific strategic
priorities for the Department for the next 4 years.
It is now incumbent upon the Department, in coordination with its
Federal, State, and local partners and other stakeholders, to carry out
these strategies in an effort to keep our country secure. For the QHSR
to be a truly effective guide, one that ensures all Department
components are working toward the same goals, it is critical that the
strategies the Department has put on paper in the QHSR actually become
programs, policies, and budget requirements.
Although required by law to be included, missing from the QHSR is
an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with
the National homeland security strategy, including the Department's
organizational structure, management systems, budget and accounting
systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, and physical and
technical infrastructure.
These missing elements make it difficult to determine whether the
Department has the required capabilities to achieve the goals
established in the QHSR and its ability to link its policies to
planning, budget, and execution.
The Chairman and I recently co-sponsored H.R. 4228, the DHS
Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, which passed the House
earlier this month. This bipartisan bill will bring transparency,
accountability, and consistency to the Department's acquisitions
process. The effective and efficient acquisition of technology, goods,
and services will be vital in the Department's ability to implement the
strategic approaches defined in the QHSR.
As Ranking Member of the Oversight and Management Efficiency
Subcommittee, I look forward to monitoring the Department's
implementation of the strategic priorities laid out in the QHSR to
ultimately determine its worth.
While the Department is not here today to address our specific
questions, I do appreciate the willingness of these very important
stakeholders and former Department employees to testify today.
Their insight into the QHSR and the Department's plan forward
should serve as a valuable contribution to our oversight. I look
forward to hearing from each of you.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Other
Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 20, 2014
Pursuant to the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, every 4 years, the Department of Homeland
Security (Department) must outline its long-term strategy and
priorities for homeland security in the form of a Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review, or QHSR, which was to be submitted to Congress in
December 2009, and every 4 years thereafter.
This is a model that has proven to be helpful for the Department of
Defense and it was anticipated that the Department, and the Nation as a
whole, would equally benefit from the Department of Homeland Security's
effort.
The first QHSR was not timely received and did not satisfy the
requirements set forth in the statute defining what it must contain. It
did, however, serve as a framework for the second QHSR, which should
have been submitted to Congress by December 31, 2013.
Unfortunately, once again, the report was late. The first QHSR was
submitted almost 2 months past the statutory deadline; this latest
version is almost 6 months overdue.
I appreciate the need for the Department to align the QHSR with the
President's budget request, which is released in March and that the
transition in Departmental leadership also impacted the time line, but,
the Department must do better.
Moreover, one of the fundamental purposes of the QHSR is to inform
the budget and as a result the budget should align with the priorities
set forth in the document. Building on this foundation as well, are the
programs and policies that are implemented, which should also align
with the strategies laid out in the QHSR.
For example, although I appreciate the Department's emphasis on
improving our biosurveillance capabilities, it is unclear whether and
how its strategy will align with Federal efforts coordinated by the
White House.
The administration released the National Strategy for
Biosurveillance in July 2012, and an implementation plan was due 120
days later. To date, the implementation plan has not been released, and
the Department has not been able to tell the committee when the
implementation plan will be released or what its role will be.
Accordingly, I will be interested in learning more about the degree
to which portions of the QHSR related to biosurveillance were written
in coordination with the implementation plan for the National Strategy
for Biosurveillance and whether and how the Department's role will
change when that document is ultimately released.
Likewise, there is an entire section devoted to immigration. Yet,
unless and until we pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform, our system
will remain broken. I look forward to monitoring how the Department
will carry out these and other priorities set forth in the document.
Furthermore, the QHSR process does not and should exist in a
vacuum. The homeland security enterprise consists of Federal, State,
local, and Tribal partners, in addition to the private sector.
I therefore look forward to hearing from the stakeholders present
at today's hearing to ascertain how those outside of Government were
included in the process and to obtain their perspective on what the
Department has identified as our Nation's priorities over the next 4
years.
Mr. Duncan. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in
the record. I will introduce each of you first, and then
recognize you individually for your testimony.
Our first witness today it Mr. Stewart Baker. He is a
partner in the law office of Steptoe & Johnson in Washington,
DC. Mr. Baker formerly served as the first assistant secretary
for policy at the Department of Homeland Security. In this
role, Mr. Baker led a staff of 250 people and was responsible
for Department-wide policy analysis as well as the Department's
international affairs strategic planning and relationships with
law enforcement and public advisory committees.
The second witness, Mr. Frank Cilluffo is an assistant vice
president at the George Washington University, where he is the
director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute. The
institute is a non-partisan think tank that focuses on
counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts, cyber
threats and deterrence in the nexus between crime and
terrorism. He also joined the faculty at George Washington
University in 2003 from the White House, where he served as
special assistant to the President for homeland security.
Dr. Henry Willis is the director of the Rand Homeland
Security and Defense Center, and a professor at the Pardee Rand
Graduate School. Dr. Willis has applied risk analysis tools to
resource allocation and risk-management decisions in the area
of public health and emergency preparedness, homeland and
National security policy, energy and environmental policy, and
transportation planning. Dr. Willis' recent research involved
assessing the cost and benefits of terrorism security measures
like the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and evaluating
the impact of public health emergency preparedness grant
programs.
The Honorable Elaine Duke is the former under secretary for
management at the Department of Homeland Security, a position
she held from 2008 until 2010. As the under secretary, she was
responsible for the management of the Department's $47 billion
budget, acted as the Department's chief acquisition officer,
and led DHS's $17 billion acquisition program. Prior to her
appointment as under secretary, Ms. Duke served in a number of
positions at the Department, including deputy under secretary
for management, chief procurement officer, deputy assistant
administrator of acquisitions at the Transportation Security
Administration.
So I thank all of you for being here today. I look forward
to delving into this topic.
I will now recognize Mr. Baker for your testimony, 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEWART A. BAKER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member
Barber. It is really a pleasure to be here. I vividly remember
launching the first QHSR in the waning days of the Bush
administration with a meeting that included outside
stakeholders, such as Randy Beers when he was in private life.
Effective management of the Department, achieving its
goals, protecting us from terrorism and the other goals that
have been set here is not a partisan exercise. Everyone wants
the Department to be well-managed and effective in achieving
its goals.
So I am pleased to talk about the second QHSR. There are
several things that I think are praiseworthy about it. It
clearly is now an institutionalized part of the Department's
planning, and that is important. The QDR has been a valuable
planning and management tool for the Defense Department, and
the QHSR, if it continues to improve, can be the same for the
Department of Homeland Security.
It stresses, the second report, the continuity of the
objectives that the Department has. They have not significantly
changed at the top level. I do not think they would
significantly change under a different party or a different
President. These are the goals that DHS is set up to achieve.
In addition, I would say that this report is better than
the last. It is, in particular, a very thoughtful addressing of
the challenges of terrorism, particularly nuclear, biological,
and deserves to be praised for looking hard and making some
difficult choices with respect to how to carry out the
counterterrorism mission.
That said, there are certainly areas where significant
improvement is required. It is always a temptation in producing
reports, particularly reports that have been required by
Congress, to move from looking out the windshield and using
this tool to guide the Department to just looking in the review
mirror and telling us what you see behind the Department.
That is easier because it is really--it is more of a speech
than a decision-making process. There are elements of
speechifying in this QHSR. If you look at the QDR and the
Secretary's letter, the first sentence talks about the tough
choices that the QDR makes. I don't see as many tough choices
being made in this QHSR. It is a little bit more a description
of a strategy. Until that strategy actually bites and produces
tough budget decisions, it is not easy to say that it is really
a strategy. I think more needs to be done in translating the
QHSR into actual budget decisions.
There is also, frankly, a temptation on the part of other
agencies or other stakeholders to say, well, if you are writing
a speech be sure to name-check me. Or maybe I would like to
have a turf fight. Since you have to get this out, I will hold
it up until you give me some turf concessions. There is some
reason to believe that this may have happened with the
Department of Justice demanding name checks for all of its
roles in areas where its legislative or statutory authority is
a little dubious. That is unfortunate; the idea that a DHS
strategy would be held hostage by other agencies strikes me as
inappropriate.
More specifically, I would say the things that I found
disappointing about the content of the report--I thought the
cyber discussion was only adequate, not particularly strategic.
The advertisement for immigration reform, we understand that
that is a legislative proposal that the administration feels
very strongly about. But we don't know whether it will pass,
and it is hard to plan for something that has such a
questionable future on the Hill. Introducing it into the QHSR
is open to some question, particularly because I don't think
the report acknowledges just how tough a management challenge
that will be. It will be an enormous management challenge.
The Department should be planning for that challenge
because of the possibility that we will get significant
reforms. I did not see as much discussion of that challenge as
was appropriate. Finally, I could not agree more with the
remarks of both Congressmen about the deleterious effects of
delay here. That makes it hard for this to have an impact. If
it doesn't have an impact it is just a speech. It needs, the
Department needs, more centralized management for sure.
This could be an enormously valuable tool as part of a
strengthening of overall management. I would certainly support
anything that achieved that goal.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stewart A. Baker
June 20, 2014
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, Members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to testify before you today about the
Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
(QHSR). During my time as assistant secretary for policy at DHS, I was
involved in launching the QHSR, as well as what was then known as the
Office of Strategic Plans. As you can imagine I am a strong supporter
of coordinated strategic planning in general, and of the QHSR in
particular.
Our goal in starting the QHSR was to create a mechanism for the
Secretary to articulate a unified set of strategies and priorities for
protecting U.S. homeland security. We believed that by forcing
ourselves to think strategically about the range of threats to the
Nation and the tools available to the Department, we could create a
unified set of priorities that could guide the components of the
Department without the need for constant personal attention from the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary. We also hoped that doing so would make
for a better budget process, one in which some of the goals and trade-
offs had already been clarified, so that budgeting was a matter of
matching limited resources to an agreed set of priorities. We hoped, in
short, that some of the hard choices then driven by annual budget
exercises could be made with a longer perspective across all parts of
the Department.
Since its inception, DHS has suffered from a lack of unity between
its components. In many ways this is unsurprising. As you all know, the
Department was created from the combination of several different
entities, most of which brought with them a fully formed set of ideas
about how to best go about protecting the Nation. Reconciling these
diverse missions into something resembling a coherent set of policy
goals was always going to be a challenge, even under the best of
circumstances. The Department has benefited tremendously over the years
from strong leadership, and when the Secretary brought personal focus
to the task, the Department responded with unity and focus. But without
that personal involvement it has been hard to maintain mission unity
among the Department's components.
Unity has only grown more important in an era of evolving threats.
The original impetus for creating DHS was to better coordinate the
various entities responsible for protecting the Nation against
terrorism. In certain ways this reorganization has been tremendously
successful. America's enemies have been unable to replicate the
destruction of 9/11 within the United States, and DHS deserves great
credit for the role it has played in thwarting many post-9/11 plots.
But terrorism today is a more dynamic threat than it was 10 or 15 years
ago. The advances in communications technology since 2001 alone have
fundamentally altered the ability of terrorists to recruit, both inside
and outside of the United States, as well as to coordinate attacks.
This is not to mention, of course, the many other threats beyond
terrorism that the Department must guard against. Some of these threats
are new or evolving. For instance, our increasing reliance on network
technology has made us more vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hacker can
today cause a level of damage from his living room that would have been
inconceivable as recently as 10 years ago. Others are as old as the
planet, as Hurricane Katrina reminded us nearly 10 years ago.
The QHSR is thus a mechanism for DHS to think carefully about the
full range of threats it faces, and to prioritize them accordingly. In
a world of unlimited resources this would be less important. But that
is not the world we live in. We have settled into an extended period of
austerity for the Department, and cuts to its budget remain a real
possibility in the immediate future. Given that DHS cannot treat every
threat equally, it is therefore even more imperative that the Secretary
be able to prioritize threats and coordinate the Department's resources
accordingly. This is what we hoped the QHSR would facilitate.
grading the 2014 qhsr
DHS issued the first QHSR in 2010. The final product was, in my
opinion, a good first statement of the Department's priorities. Having
analyzed the range of short- and long-term threats to the United States
in light of the Department's responsibilities, it synthesized these
priorities into five core missions: Counterterrorism, border security,
immigration enforcement, cybersecurity, and resilience to natural
disasters and attacks. I imagine you are all familiar with the previous
report so I will not spend much time discussing its details, other than
to say that it was, in my mind, an effective articulation of where the
Department's overarching focus should be.
Thankfully, substantial progress has been made since the inaugural
QHSR. The second report is better, more detailed and far-reaching in
scope. It maintains the previous QHSR's five core DHS missions
essentially unchanged, but it goes significantly further in analyzing
the dynamic risks and challenges we face within these core areas. It is
a more detailed statement of the principles that should guide
individual decision making within the core framework. And it is a more
comprehensive forecast of potential future threats to our homeland.
This is not to say that the report is perfect. From my perspective,
it is not clear that areas like cybersecurity or nuclear terrorism were
approached with the same level of care as other forms of terrorism.
With respect to cybersecurity, the 2014 QHSR has little new to say
about the need to recruit and develop a skilled cybersecurity
workforce, for instance. It also does not appropriately prioritize the
importance of protecting critical U.S. infrastructure from espionage.
To be sure, there are parts of the QHSR that need work. Nonetheless, on
balance the report is an improvement over its predecessor.
These improvements are not surprising to me, since this year's
report has benefited from a consolidated Strategic Planning and Risk
Analysis department (SPAR). As I am sure you are aware, DHS combined
the Offices of Strategic Plans and Risk Management in 2012 into a
single group. This was a good idea; the combination has resulted in a
more methodical, efficient analysis of the relevant data. The 2014 QHSR
is also the result of substantially more cooperation between DHS and
stakeholders, both public and private. Accordingly, it is a more
complete description of the broad range of threats we face in the
United States, based on a wider range of perspectives.
The quality of this year's report is surely the product of the
tremendous professionals in the Department. This begins with Secretary
Jeh Johnson's stewardship. It is clear that Secretary Johnson sees the
value of strategic planning for the Department. Although still
relatively new to DHS, he wasted no time in quickly making the QHSR his
own, apparently redrafting portions of it to better bring them into
alignment with his vision. The result is a clear statement of his and
the Department's priorities.
More generally, I have been pleased to see that Secretary Johnson
is also committed to unifying the Department's components into
something, in his words, greater than the sum of its parts. The ``Unity
of Effort'' memo he sent to the Department's leadership in April of
this year is a good example of his commitment to embrace strategic
thinking beyond what is mandated by the QHSR.
I suppose it didn't hurt that Secretary Johnson was able to see how
much those of us involved in starting the QHSR cribbed from the Defense
Department's Quadrennial Defense Review (``QDR''). Like DHS, DoD is a
group of proud, independent components with often divergent traditions
and missions. Yet, DoD has often succeeded in fostering a larger sense
of unity where DHS has not. Obviously, this is due in part to DoD
simply having been around longer. DHS is, after all, barely 10 years
old. When DoD was older than that, the Secretary of Defense reportedly
asked the Navy during the missile crisis how the embargo of Cuba would
be carried out; he was reportedly told that it would be done in
accordance with Navy tradition and international law, and that he could
retire to his quarters, secure in the knowledge that the Navy would
call for his advice if and when the Navy thought that was necessary. I
am confident that DHS is past that point in its drive for unity.
And so of course is DOD. We looked to the QDR as an exemplary
strategic planning exercise that played an important part in fostering
a culture of unity within DoD--an influence Secretary Johnson has
correctly reinforced.
I would also be remiss if I did not mention Alan Cohn, assistant
secretary for strategy, planning, analysis & risk. Assistant Secretary
Cohn has led the QHSR process for both the 2010 and 2014 editions. His
hard work and ability to find consensus is one of the principal reasons
the current report is as good as it is. The only real credit I can take
for the QHSR as it stands today stems from the fact that I had the
wisdom to hire and then promote Assistant Secretary Cohn. I am happy I
did--he has made me look brilliant ever since (and he, at least, knows
how hard that is). Without question, he has turned out to be one of the
important career talents for the Department in this area.
bringing the department's budget into alignment with the qhsr's
statement of priorities
As I mentioned before, the 2010 QHSR did a fine job stating the
Department's priorities. It was less effective, however, at actually
linking the budget up with these priorities. From the perspective of
2014, we can look back and see clearly that, in practice, the
allocation of money within the Department did not end up tracking the
QHSR all that closely. We can chalk that up, perhaps, to the learning
curve, but we should expect the second QHSR to have a greater influence
on funding decisions inside the Department.
But there are more fundamental issues with the way money is
allocated within DHS that make it difficult for the Secretary to bring
DHS's budget into alignment with his priorities as they are described
in the QHSR. These issues need to be addressed if the report is to ever
approach the level of efficacy we hoped it would have. For an agency
like DHS, which is mainly in the business of execution rather than
oversight, funding is everything. Compare DHS with oversight agencies
like the Environmental Protection Agency, whose primary function is
writing rules for others to follow. While those agencies obviously need
to keep the lights on, their ability to perform their mandate is less
tied to appropriations and more to the legislative authority they
receive. DHS, in contrast, is far more often in the business of
execution rather than oversight. Most of its missions are carried out
directly. When you cross a border you are met by DHS employees. The
same is true if you are lost at sea and need rescue, are boarding an
airplane, or are caught counterfeiting funds or illegally immigrating
into the United States.
How--and how well--DHS does these jobs depends largely on how it
allocates its budget. Thus, while strategic planning exercises like the
QHSR are useful in their own right, they can easily become sterile
exercises if no one believes they will actually drive budgetary
decisions. Make no mistake about it, a statement of the Department's
priorities, no matter how lucid, will ultimately ring hollow if the
priorities are not honored when budget decisions are made.
recommendations moving forward
This is not to say that the QHSR should be a holy writ that
determines budgetary allocations for an entire 4-year period. It should
not be, and it will at times be necessary to deviate from the script in
order for the Department to be able to effectively respond to the
dynamic range of challenges it is sure to face. While long-term
strategizing is vital, so too is making sure that the Secretary and the
components within DHS can fluidly make decisions to respond to threats
as they emerge. The QHSR is not a substitute for judgment. Instead, the
report is what I would call an auto-pilot. It is a mechanism for
individuals within DHS to understand how to carry out their jobs unless
and until they know the Secretary has reconsidered. And it is a way to
make sure the Secretary can be confident that those within the
Department are following his objectives, even when he is not personally
overseeing them.
Finally, one other issue I would like to briefly address is the
degree to which the Department of Justice has been given a near veto
over the QHSR, presumably by the Office of Management and Budget. I
simply do not understand how it is that DHS's strategic plan can be
delayed by an agency that has no skin in the game. There is no reason
to allow the QHSR to be delayed for so long, particularly at the
instance of another Cabinet department.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for your testimony.
I will recognize Frank next. Pronounce your name for me.
STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cilluffo. SIH-LU-FO.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, and Ranking
Member Barber, Congressman Payne, thanks for the opportunity to
join you today. I think you guys hit it out of the park in
terms of your opening remarks. I think you captured a lot of
what a lot of us are struggling and thinking about in terms of
the QHSR in terms of its strengths and in terms of its
weaknesses. There is nothing I disagree with my good friend and
long-time co-conspirator, Stewart Baker.
But I thought I would maybe pick up on a couple of points
that haven't been raised. First, talk a little bit about the
threat, and then maybe focus on some of the recommendations.
I think it is important to recognize that the QHSR does
come at a time of incredibly significant international
instability. I think there is a feeling that we are in a safe
place. The reality is, if you were to close your eyes and point
to a place on the map, I can tell you, or we can tell you, what
some of the challenges and concerns are. They are varied and
they are many, and they come in various shapes, sizes, flavors,
and forms.
I think Mr. Duncan, you were spot-on to highlight the
growing nature of state-sponsored terrorism, which is back.
Whether it is the government of Iran in support of Hezbollah,
or some of the Shia militias, or others, others are turning to
proxies, as well. If you just look at what played out in Crimea
vis-a-vis Russia, you have a role of proxies. You see that in a
very strong form vis-a-vis cyber, where everyone is turning to
proxies to do their bidding. In terms of the non-state Islamist
threat, though, we have got problems on our hands.
At the end of the day, you have got broad swaths of
territory and ungoverned spaces that are providing and
affording our enemies the time and space to plan and execute
attacks. Obviously, when we look at Iraq in the past couple of
days, it is incredibly disconcerting that some of the hard-
earned gains both in terms of treasure but, more importantly,
in terms of lives of our men and women in uniform are being
rolled back. That is--that is unacceptable.
Why Yemen, why Iraq, why the Sahel, the Magreb, which are
broad swaths of territory--why are these concerns? They are
ungoverned spaces and they are under-governed, where the
authority--where nations have been usurped by those that have
more hostile aims.
For awhile there, we were applying enough pressure that
they were spending more time looking over their shoulder and
less time plotting and executing attacks. This is a big
concern, and it does have ramifications in terms of our next
steps in Afghanistan.
Moreover, you are seeing advances in technology that have
increased the lethality of weapons, targeting systems, and
means of communication used by terrorists. New and powerful
avenues of recruitment and radicalization have opened up,
notably through social media. I might note, even in terms of
ISIS in Iraq, they now are coming out with propaganda very
similar to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire
magazine, in English, and clearly targeting, and aimed at,
Westerners, including Americans.
And why is Syria and the foreign fighter flow you are
seeing spill into Iraq of such concern? We are talking over 70
countries--3,000 Westerners, including over 70 Americans. At
some point they return. What makes Syria unique is that unlike
the foreign fighter flows we have seen in the past--whether in
the AfPak region or in Yemen or in Somalia--they were primarily
focused on a single diaspora.
What you are seeing in Syria is flocking from all over the
world. At some point, you are gonna see new networks. You are
gonna see Yemenis who have bomb-making experience meeting up
with Brits who have social media experience. It is these new
networks that I think are going to be of significant concern.
Don't think for a minute that al-Qaeda isn't doing talent-
spotting on the battlefield and identifying individuals that
they will turn back to the West. This is a big concern. That is
why foreign fighters, I think, are especially significant.
In terms of the cyber threat, I do feel this is--when you
look at the homeland, you can attack the United States without
ever stepping foot in the country. At the high end of the
threat spectrum, we are obviously talking about nation-states:
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea. Some are engaged primarily in
espionage, others are engaged in more computer network attack,
or attacking our systems.
Again, the role that proxies play is quite significant
here. Because who is behind that clickety-clack of the
keyboard? Anonymity; attribution is very difficult to discern
in cyber space. So I think a lot more there. I think as you
start seeing the internet of things, where physical and cyber
converge, you are going to see new threat vectors. I think one
thing the Department deserves some credit on is recognizing the
convergence of physical and cyber threats in the QHSR.
Bottom line on the QHSR, as Stewart said, we don't--I think
we are all tired of speeches. At the end of the day, unless the
QHSR has bite and can be aligned to budget planning and budget
processes, which it didn't do the first go-around, it is merely
rhetoric. Policy without resources is rhetoric.
We do have to make tough decisions. In the words of
President Eisenhower, we actually need security and we need
solvency. I think that is what we are struggling with here, is
the need to be able to make some of those tough decisions, get
the greatest return on our investment, and get the most bang
for our buck. Doesn't do that thus far.
One thing I want to just highlight as I close is, I give
you props and kudos for passing the acquisition legislation. I
think there is a lot you can do using that model to keep your
oversight functions moving, as well, in terms of some of the
policy deliberations. We do need to elevate the Office of
Policy to an under secretary. That will give you more oversight
function. I think the committee itself can play a more
significant role with authorization bills that can align to
some of the budget-making.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to join
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
June 20, 2014
introduction
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today.
The Department of Homeland Security has now completed its second
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), and is expected to issue
its report to Congress on the results of this review shortly. My
testimony today will comment on key issues addressed in a draft version
of the report, beginning with general remarks and then focusing on what
I believe are the two most critical threats facing the homeland today:
Terrorism threats and cyber-related threats.
This QHSR comes at a time of significant international instability.
Although our homeland security posture has improved substantially in
the last decade-plus, the terrorist threat climate in which the United
States finds itself today is in many ways reminiscent of that prior to
9/11, sharing a number of similar attributes and characteristics. The
current climate is also one marked by budget cuts as well as the roll-
back of hard-earned gains that had been achieved through the investment
of billions of dollars and, most importantly, the lives of thousands of
our men and women in uniform.
Against this background, it is all the more disconcerting to see
that in Iraq and Syria, terrorist groups have found space and time in
which to maneuver, plot, and execute attacks; all while U.S. forces
prepare to draw down in Afghanistan. In Africa, we see a constellation
of active and skilled terrorist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel, from
Boko Haram in Nigeria, to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in
Yemen, to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, to Ansar al-Dine in Mali, to al-
Shabaab in Somalia. At the same time, advances in technology have
increased the lethality of weapons, targeting systems and means of
communications used by terrorists. New and powerful avenues of
recruitment and radicalization have opened up, notably through social
media. These tools have in effect shrunk the globe as young, tech-
savvy, and like-minded extremists are connecting in the dark corners of
the web--as evidenced by the swell of foreign fighters flocking to
Syria. As a result, what happens overseas has significant domestic
implications, including with respect to homegrown violent Islamist
extremism.
In addition to the Islamist threat posed by terrorism, the cyber
domain is a permissive environment, which is made for plausible
deniability, for a wide range of U.S. adversaries who need never set
foot in this country in order to do us harm. Our political, military,
and economic secrets including our intellectual property are being
siphoned out covertly by cyber means, specifically computer network
exploitation (CNE). From CNE--to include mapping of our critical
infrastructure systems, to computer network attack, to cyber crime
perpetrated by forces whose capabilities have grown to such an extent
that some of these criminal groups are now even on par with some
nation-states' abilities and capacities, the range of activities and
actors with hostile intent is both wide and deep. Nation-states are
investing in and building up their cyber war capabilities, as well as
integrating these capacities into their broader war-fighting doctrine
and operations. Moreover, nation-states are making use of proxies for
both physical and cyber attacks. In these regards, China, Iran, North
Korea, and Russia are of abiding concern.
The ecosystem of threats facing DHS and the homeland is thus varied
and seriously challenging. From physical threats to cyber threats, and
the nexus between the two, DHS and the Nation must stand ready and
prepared for the full gamut of these scenarios. We must position
ourselves to be as nimble in prevention and response as is required to
meet whatever variant or form in which the threat of today and tomorrow
manifests.
overview of the qhsr
Congress established the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in
law in 2007 as a mechanism to focus senior leadership attention at DHS
on long-term strategic issues, enhance the strategic planning processes
within the Department, and then ultimately to ``strengthen the linkages
between strategy and execution'',\1\ particularly with respect to the
Department's operational requirements and budget decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Quoted from page 403 of H.R. 110-259, House-Senate Conference
Report for the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007, July 25, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first QHSR report, released at the end of 2009, played a
valuable role with respect to defining the strategic priorities of the
Department, but did not have a significant impact in terms of
implementation. Very few of the initiatives outlined in the follow-on
``Bottom-Up Review'' were ultimately implemented, and the QHSR did not
appear to have a major impact on successive budget requests within DHS.
This second QHSR has built on the positive and negative lessons of
the first review, and the activities that informed the review have
matured in the past 4 years. Overall, the strategic framework defined
within the report is robust, and reflects hard choices about which
issues are of greatest priority to the Department. Notably, it calls
out biological threats as a significant homeland security priority--an
area that I believe has received insufficient attention by policy
makers in the last few years, but which is likely to represent the
greatest long-run catastrophic terrorist threat that we face.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See for example Nathan Myhrvold, Strategic Terrorism: A Call to
Action, The Lawfare Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2--2013
(July 2013 Working Draft) http://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/
2013/10/strategic-terrorism-myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the real verdict on this QHSR will come in the months and years
ahead. It is imperative that this QHSR is used to inform key strategic
decisions in the next 4 years, starting with the fiscal year 2016
budget request to Congress that will be released next February. As the
primary House authorizing committee for DHS, this committee has the
opportunity in the next 4 years to hold the Department accountable for
implementing the strategic priorities outlined in this review.
I should note here that it is refreshing that Secretary Johnson and
his leadership team are taking these strategic issues seriously,
particularly with respect to the ``Unity of Effort'' initiative that is
underway within the Department, as outlined in a memorandum by
Secretary Johnson sent to his senior leadership team in April of this
year.\3\ The issues raised by the Secretary in this memorandum are
critical, particularly with respect to the integration and
effectiveness of policy, management, and operational activities within
the Department. I would urge the committee to consider legislation that
strengthens key offices--such as the Office of Policy, which has never
been authorized in statute--and holds DHS accountable for making
progress on these ``Unity of Effort'' objectives, along the lines of
what you have already done with the recently-passed legislation on DHS
acquisition. I should also note that the Homeland Security Policy
Institute is forming a task force that will take an independent look at
these ``Unity of Effort'' issues, and we look forward to engaging
further with the committee on this in the months ahead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Memo available at: http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/04/DHSUnity- OfEffort.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the remainder of my testimony, I will focus on two of the five
top-level homeland security missions defined within the QHSR framework:
Preventing terrorism and addressing cyber threats. While my remarks
center on these two areas, I would emphasize that we must also remain
focused on other important DHS missions, to include emergency
preparedness and disaster response, and the task of securing the
Nation's borders.
preventing terrorism
The terrorist attacks and atrocities within the past week in Iraq
by ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), in Kenya by al-Shabaab,
and in Nigeria by Boko Haram are stark reminders of the persistent
Islamist terrorist threat, not only in the region, but also with
respect to the threat of attacks against the homeland. They are also an
example of the increasing fragmentation and diversification of
terrorist threats; as the introduction to the draft QHSR report notes,
``the terrorist threat is increasingly decentralized and may be harder
to detect.''
Of particular concern is the foreign fighter threat in Syria, which
is now also spilling over into Iraq; indeed, I would argue that the two
conflicts are merging into a single regional insurgency. In Syria, we
have seen the on-going civil war become a magnet for foreign fighters
from no less than 74 countries around the world.\4\ Up to 3,000
Westerners have traveled to fight in Syria since the conflict began,
including more than 70 Americans.\5\ Disturbingly, the Syrian conflict
has given rise to new networks and new connections. For example, bomb
makers are meeting up with individuals who are well-versed in media,
especially social media. Armed with Kalashnikovs, laptops, and cell
phones, foreign fighters are thus amassing and emerging with new and
blended skill-sets and expertise, including potentially expertise with
chemical weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Aaron Y. Zelin, ``Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep
rise among Western Europeans,'' The International Centre for the Study
of Radicalisation (ICSR)--Insight (Dec. 17, 2013), http://icsr.info/
2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-
western-europeans/.
\5\ Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, ``Foreign Jihadis Fighting in Syria
Pose Risk in West,'' New York Times (May 29, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/foreign-jihadis-fighting-
in-syria-pose-risk-in-west.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the past month, we have begun to see examples of the global
implications of this foreign fighter threat. In late May, a French
national and former Syrian foreign fighter committed a terrorist attack
at a Jewish museum in Brussels, Belgium, killing 4 people. The United
Kingdom and Spain both made high-profile arrests of individuals
recently who had traveled to Syria to fight or who were involved in
facilitating such travel. And an American citizen from Florida who was
fighting in Syria carried out a suicide truck bombing attack in late
May. ISIS is now issuing English-language propaganda, similar in nature
to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire magazine.\6\ These
examples are likely to be leading indicators of a direct terrorist
threat that the United States and other Western nations will face in
the months and years ahead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Rosen, Armin, ``ISIS is Bragging about its `Brazen' Attack on
Mosul in its English Language Magazine.'' Business Insider (June 10,
2014). http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-bragging-in-its-english-
language-magazine-2014-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Countering the challenge posed by foreign fighters must therefore
be a priority mission for DHS, and not just conceptually. The
Department of Homeland Security already plays an important role in one
way in mitigating potential threats to the homeland from Syrian foreign
fighters: Its activities to detect and prevent terrorist travel and
entry into the United States. It is critical that key activities
related to terrorist travel--at CBP, TSA, ICE, US-VISIT, and the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis--are maintained and strengthened even in
this difficult budget environment for the Department.
Another key responsibility for DHS (along with the FBI, National
Counterterrorism Center, the State Department and other agencies) has
been less well-developed: Countering the ideologies of violent Islamist
extremism (``CVIE'') that radicalize individuals and replenish the
ranks of our terrorist adversaries. This is the biggest missing
dimension of U.S. counterterrorism statecraft to date. The State
Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications is
doing some good work overseas in this area in foreign languages, but
very little is being done domestically. A systematic strategic
communications effort is needed, aimed at exposing the hypocrisy of our
adversaries' words versus their deeds. The goal is to knock terrorist
groups off-balance; embarrass their leadership by bringing to light
their seamy connections to criminal enterprises and drug trafficking
organizations; and broker infighting among al-Qaeda, its affiliates,
and the broader jihadi orbit in which they reside--which will damage
violent extremists' capability to propagate their message and organize
operations.\7\ Again, it is crucial to link priorities with budgets. A
former senior White House official, Quintan Wiktorowicz, recognizes as
much in recent commentary that emphasizes the need for a dedicated CVIE
budget: ``It is Time to Fund Domestic Counter-Radicalization.''\8\ The
piece makes several solid points, including the need to invoke
community engagement in this effort. While that is part of the
equation, however, CVIE also needs to support the pointier end of
operational counterterrorism efforts, Federally and at the State and
local level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ``It's the Ideology,
Stupid,'' The National Interest (June 3, 2013), http://
nationalinterest.org/commentary/it%E2%80%99s-the-ideology-stupid-8537.
\8\ http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-foreign-policy-essay-it-
is-time-to-fund-domestic-counter-radicalization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current conflict in Syria and Iraq is symptomatic of a broader
concern: The circumstance of ungoverned or under-governed spaces that
provide our adversaries with the time and space needed to recruit,
train, and plot. Instead of being back on their heels, looking over
their shoulders, our adversaries are benefiting from conditions that
provide them with a level of freedom of action that they have not
experienced in recent history. Note that ungoverned and under-governed
spaces do not need be geographically vast in order to facilitate
terrorist activity; under-governed neighborhoods in large cities in
countries such as Pakistan, Kenya, and Nigeria can also provide a form
of safe haven to terrorist groups. Urban environments also serve to
limit U.S. military options. To further cement the dilemma, these
developments are taking place when our intelligence collection
platforms are becoming fewer and perhaps less effective than in the
past, due to the draw-down of American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
and due to the damaging revelations of critical U.S. intelligence
collection activities in the past year.
For all of these reasons, the terrorist threat to the homeland is
becoming increasingly grave, and it is critical that DHS and its
Federal, State, and local partners remain focused on detecting and
countering these threats in the months and years ahead. As threats
evolve, DHS also needs to be agile and continuously evaluate the
effectiveness of its various activities in countering such threats, and
invest in new tools and capabilities to address emerging threats. This
committee can play a significant role in ensuring that the Department
does not succumb to inertia and is focused on anticipating and
addressing such emerging threats.
cybersecurity
The rapid growth in cyber-related threats in the last few years has
led some senior Government officials to assert that cyber threats have
now surpassed terrorism as the most significant National security
threat to the United States. I am not yet prepared to agree with such
an assessment, for all of the reasons discussed in the previous
section; and would argue instead that it is not an either/or
proposition--that we must be prepared to defend against both types of
threats. But it is undoubtedly true that the cyber threats to U.S.
National security and economic interests have significantly advanced in
recent years, and taken on new dimensions, particularly in the area of
cyber threats to critical infrastructure.
The cyber and physical threats to critical infrastructure have been
a key focus of Executive Branch policy making in the past 2 years,
through activities mandated by Executive Order 13636 and Presidential
Policy Directive 21. These threats are also highlighted in the draft
QHSR report, which discusses how cyber-physical convergence and
interdependence has ``changed the risks to critical infrastructure in
sectors ranging from energy and transportation to agriculture and
health care.'' Vulnerabilities in these sectors could give rise to
catastrophic outcomes, especially if cascading effects ensue as a
result of interdependencies between and among critical sectors. The
physical attack last year on the PG&E Metcalf substation is an example
of this convergence and interdependence of threats; if that attack had
been slightly more damaging, it could have had a severe impact on the
power grid in Silicon Valley.
DHS plays a critical role in addressing and mitigating these cyber
threats, working with other Federal, State, and local government
partners on threats to government networks, and of equal importance,
forming strong partnerships with the private sector. These public-
private partnerships are critical given that the predominant share of
the relevant cyber infrastructure and expertise is located within the
private sector--in Silicon Valley, and in our key economic sectors,
including defense, energy, finance, and telecommunications. DHS has
made significant progress in building its relationships with the
private sector on cybersecurity in recent years, particularly with
respect to its incident response activities at the National
Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).
But it still needs to improve, particularly with respect to its
analytic activities on cyber threats and risks. Currently
responsibility for cyber analysis is split between the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the National Protection and
Programs Directorate. These two parts of DHS need to become better
synchronized in their analytic efforts and work together to best
support critical infrastructure stakeholders in the private sector.
final thoughts and recommendations
The QHSR is an important deliberative process for the Department of
Homeland Security. Unless we define our priorities clearly and fund
them accordingly, we will not be optimizing our efforts to address
these critical threats to the homeland.
But such a review cannot simply be an exercise that takes place
every 4 years; the threats that we face are evolving too rapidly for
such widely-spaced reviews. Instead, this process of review and
assessment needs to be fully embedded into the day-to-day decision-
making processes of the Department. One proposal that would promote
this is the establishment of an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within
DHS, similar to the office of the same name at the Department of
Defense. The ONA would produce comprehensive long-term analysis of
future homeland threats and the capabilities needed to meet those
threats. I would urge this committee to consider establishing the ONA
in law, building on the existing capabilities of the Office of
Strategy, Planning, Analysis, and Risk within the DHS Office of Policy.
This is not a new idea, but rather one that Congressman Lee Hamilton
and I first put forward back in January 2007, in the Homeland Security
Advisory Council (HSAC) Report of The Future of Terrorism Task
Force.\9\
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\9\ Report available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-
future-terrorism-010107.pdf.
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In closing and as detailed above, I would recommend the following
actions for your consideration:
The ultimate value of the QHSR will be determined by the
influence that it has on budgets, plans, and operational
requirements. This committee can use its oversight function to
determine whether this is being done. Otherwise, policies such
as the QHSR are merely empty rhetoric.
Introduce and work to pass a set of DHS authorization bills.
This is a challenge given the fragmented structure of
Congressional oversight of DHS, but is worth pursuing, and can
be done in piece-meal manner to reduce the complications caused
by this jurisdictional situation. In particular, the committee
can authorize the headquarters elements of the Department and
update core DHS authorities in the Homeland Security Act.
Legislation can also be moved to authorize other components of
DHS, such as Customs and Border Protection, as Chairman McCaul
has recently proposed.
To support DHS authorization, the committee should work with
the Department to strengthen the annual Future Years Homeland
Security Program (FYHSP) reports required currently in the
Homeland Security Act, so that they can be used as a critical
source of information for authorization legislation, along the
lines of the role played by the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP) reports for annual defense authorization legislation.
As part of authorization legislation, establish the DHS
Office of Policy in law, to be led by an under secretary for
policy. This idea was originally proposed by Secretary Chertoff
nearly 9 years ago, but has stalled because of resistance by
Congressional committees that have secondary jurisdiction over
parts of DHS. It is time to elevate and strengthen the Office
of Policy by the finally establishing it in law, a step that
will also give Congress greater influence over its priorities
and functions.
Establish an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within DHS to
provide the Secretary with comprehensive analysis of future
threats and U.S. capabilities to meet those threats.
Prioritize the challenge posed by foreign fighters,
particularly those fighting in Syria and Iraq. In part this
means maintaining and strengthening key DHS activities related
to terrorist travel, even in this difficult budget environment.
It also means placing greater priority and increasing funding
for programs and activities intended to counter violent
Islamist extremism.
Better synchronize I&A and NPPD in terms of their cyber
analytic activities and private-sector stakeholder outreach.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
look forward to trying to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that. Very refreshing. I think
you are right. The acquisition bill gives us at least some
oversight and gives us some leverage. One thing I will say
about Chairman McCaul, with the authorization bill that where
we finally authorize the Department, I think is the right thing
to do, as well. So I thank you for that.
The Chairman will now recognize Dr. Willis for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HENRY H. WILLIS, DIRECTOR, RAND HOMELAND SECURITY
AND DEFENSE CENTER, THE RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Willis. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
Barber, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting
me to testify at this hearing.
Yesterday, the Department of Homeland Security released the
second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Converging trends
of the evolving threats, increasingly constrained budgets and
new leadership make now an opportune time for DHS to prioritize
the Department's goals and ensure its programs are best aligned
to meet them.
Today, I will highlight three important ways Congress and
DHS could work together to build on the results of this second
quadrennial review. First, align DHS budgets with Department
strategic guidance. Second, establish more effective oversight
of DHS programs. Third, seek ways to improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of the DHS by leveraging Department of Defense
capabilities.
Regarding my first point, aligning budgets with strategic
guidance and risk management will make the Department more
effective. The analysis behind the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review provides a basis for reasoned discussion of
risk management priorities. Secretary Johnson has proposed new
initiatives that could build on this progress.
Specifically, in a memorandum to DHS leadership, Security
Johnson proposed three initiatives: A Department leadership
forum, Departmental management processes to review and
implement joint requirements and oversight, an enhancement of
headquarters strategy for planning and analysis capabilities. I
encourage Congress to consider supporting each of these
initiatives.
Second, establishing effective oversight of programs will
make the Department more efficient. Several GAO studies point
out cases where effectiveness of DHS is either poor or
undocumented, costs are uncontrolled, or oversight is lacking.
While the Department continues to remedy these situations,
there remains plenty of room for improvement.
For example, a Rand paper published last year included a
number of recommendations that could improve acquisition at
DHS, including ensuring every major acquisition program has an
approved acquisition program baseline document; not delegating
decision-making authority for components until key planning
requirements are met; conducting careful analysis of cost or
schedule breaches to improve further acquisitions; and
establishing more professional development opportunities for
DHS acquisition officials.
Congress has already helped DHS with these types of
problems, through passing the H.R. 4228, and can continue to
help DHS improve oversight by reinforcing and funding
initiatives that allow DHS headquarters to implement
recommendations like these.
Finally, the homeland security enterprise will be stronger
if DHS seeks ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by
leveraging DOD capabilities. The department of--many of the
priorities identified in the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review require a whole-of-Government approach. Disaster
management, border security, cybersecurity are just a few
examples. The Department of Defense has also recognized the
importance of these missions and the opportunity for
collaboration.
For example, defending the homeland was identified as the
first pillar of National security in the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review. There are many ways DOD capabilities may be
used to support DHS missions. Examples include leveraging DOD
technology demonstrations, learning from DOD experiences with
cloud computing, and using DOD technologies to improve land,
air, and maritime demand awareness.
However, before implementing any of these or other
solutions, Congress, DHS, and DOD should together ensure that
the full acquisition and sustainment costs are known. That any
transfer of technology has been coordinated with existing DHS
acquisition strategies. That the use of DOD capabilities
reflects the desired use of the military and civilian missions.
That it is clear which organizations should bear the costs of
these technologies and that, then, budgets reflect that.
In closing, we all certainly want more effective protection
from terrorism, better preparedness for disasters, and more
resilient communities. The multiplicity and complexity of
current homeland security threats, uncertainty surrounding what
new threats could emerge or how known threats might evolve, and
constraints in budget make it difficult to achieve these goals.
However, if DHS is to overcome these challenges three
things are required. Strategy focus to direct resources where
they are most needed, strong oversight to assure that resources
are used effectively and, finally, cooperation across
Government to improve efficiency.
Again, Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member Barber and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify before you today on this very important opportunity for
DHS.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Willis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Henry H. Willis \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT412.html.
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June 20, 2014
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will soon release its
report on the second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The
convergence of several trends makes this an opportune moment for the
Department to step back and assess what are the most pressing current
and emerging homeland security challenges and decide how they should be
addressed. Let me briefly mention five such trends:
First, onset of terrorism fatigue--When DHS celebrated its
10-year anniversary, some questioned whether law enforcement
and domestic security operations had become too focused on
terrorism at the cost of addressing other public safety issues
such as drug violence, public health, or crime.
Second, persistence of terrorism as a real threat--The
Boston Marathon bombing reminded us that attacks can happen
anywhere, anytime. Destabilization of governments that followed
the Arab Spring raises the prospect of new safe havens for
terrorism emerging. The recent al-Qaeda summit held in April by
Nasir al-Wuhayshi in Yemen demonstrates that al-Qaeda continues
to pursue global jihad.
Third, increasing threats from natural disasters--The
effects of Super Storm Sandy emphasized the consequences for
coastal communities of the combined impacts of continued
population growth and sea-level rise, and the need for
incorporating planning for community and infrastructure
resilience into economic development.
Fourth, cyber threats outpacing cyber defense--Last month's
indictment of five officers in the Chinese People's Liberation
Army for stealing information from six U.S. firms, along with
revelations of Operation Olympic Games, reveal the scope of
cyber crime and potential for malicious cyber attacks against
critical infrastructure.
Fifth, increasingly constrained Government budgets--Federal,
State, local, and Tribal governments have fewer resources to
address this expanding list of concerns.
In short, when Secretary Johnson took the reins at DHS, he stepped
into a deeply uncertain, utterly complex, and continuously dynamic
environment with more constraints on the resources at his disposal.
These converging trends, combined with new leadership and new guidance
expected to arise from the QHSR, make now an opportune time for DHS to
prioritize the Departmen's goals and assure its programs are best
aligned to achieve them.
The first QHSR brought DHS together to develop a collective list of
all missions for components across the Department.\3\ Though
comprehensive--the list spanned issues of terrorism, border control,
immigration, cyber space, disaster management, and governance--the
first review did not set priorities.
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\3\ Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic
Framework for a Secure Homeland, Department of Homeland Security,
February 2010.
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The second QHSR will now set the stage for improving both the
effectiveness and efficiency of DHS. The review includes a strategic
assessment of the current and emerging homeland security threats,
focused analysis on selected priority topics, and guidance on
management priorities for the Department. I'd like to highlight three
important ways Congress and DHS could work together to build on the
second QHSR:
First, improve the linkages between budgets of DHS's
component agencies and strategic directions of the Department
as a whole on risk management;
Second, establish more effective oversight of programs once
initiated;
Third, seek ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by
leveraging Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities, especially
for Defense Support of Civilian Authorities.
improve linkages between budgets and strategic directions on risk
management
The Homeland Security Strategic Environment Assessment marks a
significant accomplishment for DHS and reflects well the trends that
are changing the homeland security landscape. The review covers
persistent threats to the Nation from problems such as smuggling,
illegal migration, and maritime safety. It also addresses catastrophic
events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, pandemics, and terrorism. The
strategic environment assessment describes all of these events in a
common way, allowing for the first time an informed discussion of
priorities based on risk.
Knowing the facts about homeland security risks is important
because the public's fear of terrorism and disasters can be out of
alignment with the risks the events pose. The unpredictability of
terrorism, individuals' uncertainty about how to protect themselves,
and the realization that attacks are purposeful and not random all
contribute to increased fear about terrorism.\4\ As an example of how
fear can affect behavior, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo (the
Beltway Snipers) paralyzed communities and closed schools as the public
and Government officials tried to understand what was happening and how
to protect themselves. Fear of terrorism is further magnified by
evocative images of suicide bombings that are replayed on TV and the
internet.
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\4\ Cass R. Sunstein (2003). Terrorism and Probability Neglect. The
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26:2/3 121-136.
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Fear of terrorism matters. Numerous studies--many supported by the
DHS Science and Technology Directorate--demonstrate that even if other
hazards threaten the same number of lives or economic activity, people
are more concerned about terrorism events than other events, support
spending more for terrorism security, and are willing to cede more
liberties in the name of terrorism security.\5\ However, in reality,
all terrorist events do not pose the same risks as other hazards.
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\5\ For example see, W. J. Burns (2007) Risk Perception: A Review,
CREATE Report, May 22, 2007.
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When assessed side-by-side, there are many disasters, accidents,
and crimes that have historically threatened more lives, caused more
economic damage, and led to more societal disruption than terrorism.
When presented with this evidence, people with different and competing
interests often can agree on what problems are most serious and make
judgments that are consistent with what is known about risks.\6\
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\6\ Russell Lundberg (2013) Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using
a Deliberative Risk Ranking Methodology. RGSD-319, RAND Corporation,
Santa Monica, CA.
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The analysis behind the QHSR will provide a basis for this type of
reasoned discussion of risk management priorities. Secretary Johnson
has proposed new initiatives that will build on the current progress.
Specifically, in a memorandum to DHS leadership in April, Secretary
Johnson proposed three initiatives:
First, a Departmental Leadership Forum for the ``most senior
leadership . . . to gather regularly . . . in an environment of
trust, and openly place on the table issues, arguments, and
disagreements concerning [DHS's] most challenging issues.''
This forum could provide means for coordinated implementation
of leadership guidance and management initiatives.
Second, the establishment of Departmental management
processes to review and implement processes to develop joint
requirements for programs across DHS and improve oversight of
programs once implemented.
Third, the enhancement of headquarters strategy, planning,
and analytic capability to build and maintain the organizations
required to support the leadership and management initiatives
being proposed.\7\
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\7\ Secretary Jeh Johnson (2014). Strengthening Departmental Unity.
Memorandum for DHS Leadership, April 22, 2014.
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I urge Congress to consider supporting each of these important
initiatives.
establish effective oversight of programs once initiated
DHS programs are notorious for lacking appropriate oversight.
Several Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies point out cases
where effectiveness of DHS programs is either poor or undocumented,
costs are uncontrolled, or oversight is lacking. While the Department
has made progress and continues to remedy these situations, plenty of
room for improvement remains.
A review by GAO in 2011 suggested that more than half of the 77
major acquisitions programs at DHS are over budget or behind
schedule.\8\ In July 2013, DHS reported that 63 percent of its
acquisitions programs had cost growth, and one-third of these programs
had cost growth over 10 percent.\9\
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\8\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined
Investment Management to Help Meet Mission Needs, Washington, DC, GAO-
12-833, September 18, 2012.
\9\ GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS Oversight of Major
Acquisitions and Efforts to Match Resources to Needs. GAO-13-846T,
September 10, 2013.
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A RAND paper published last year, Reducing the Cost and Risk of
Major Acquisitions at the Department of Homeland Security, included a
number of recommendations that could be expected to improve acquisition
management at DHS based on experience with acquisition management in
other contexts.\10\ For example:
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\10\ Jeffrey A. Drezner and Andrew R. Morral (2013). Reducing the
Cost and Risk of Major Acquisitions at the Department of Homeland
Security. PE-105, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
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Every major acquisition program should have an approved
acquisition program baseline document defining milestones and
requirements to which programs are held accountable for
demonstrating their readiness before progressing to new phases.
Decision-making authority, given to the DHS Office of
Management, should not be delegated to components until key
planning requirements are met.
Careful analysis of acquisition cost or schedule breaches
should be conducted to help the Department identify root causes
for these failures and incorporate lessons to improve future
acquisitions.
The Department should establish mechanisms for more
professional development opportunities for DHS acquisition
officials.
Congress can help DHS improve oversight by reinforcing and funding
initiatives that allow DHS headquarters to implement recommendations
like these. And in fact, this committee has already proposed
legislation, H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition Accountability and
Efficiency Act, to improve acquisition management. Cooperation between
Congress and DHS on improving oversight should continue.
seek ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by leveraging dod
capabilities
Many DHS priorities require a whole-of-Government approach.
Disaster management and pandemic preparedness to improve
community resilience requires cooperation among FEMA, DHHS,
DoD, HUD, local response organizations, private firms, and
NGOs.
Border security requires coordination of Federal and local
law enforcement agencies across several bureaucratic and
geographic jurisdictions to counter smuggling networks that
span several continents.
Cybersecurity must protect Government and private systems
from both State-sponsored and criminally-aligned threat
networks, potentially using capabilities that exist in several
departments, while balancing dynamic norms for privacy.
At the same time DHS is deciding how best to address these
challenges, the Department of Defense is scaling back use of its assets
in theater operations (making them potentially available for other
uses) and the Federal Government as a whole is wrestling with the
realities of reduced budgets. The confluence of these events creates
potential opportunities to identify ways to improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of homeland security, especially in the areas of
disaster management and border security.
The Department of Defense has also recognized the importance of
these missions and the opportunity for collaboration. Defending the
homeland was identified as the first pillar of National security in the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Defense Support for Civilian
Authorities remains a critical responsibility.
Motivated by this synergy, RAND studies have identified several
opportunities worth consideration:
On-going DoD technology demonstration efforts could be
leveraged to provide additional support to on-going DHS
operations.\11\
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\11\ Daniel Gonzales, Sarah Harting, Jason Mastbaum, Carolyn Wong
(2104). Improving Interagency Information Sharing Using Technology
Demonstrations: The Legal Basis for Using New Sensor Technologies for
Counterdrug Operations Along the U.S. Border. RR-551-OSD, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
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Information sharing among local law enforcement and response
agencies and Federal agencies could be improved using DoD
lessons about how to design and operate cloud networks to
improve both disaster management and border security.\12\
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\12\ Isaac R. Porche III, Bradley Wilson, Erin-Elizabeth Johnson,
Shane Tierney, Evan Saltzman (2104). Data Flood Helping the Navy
Address the Rising Tide of Sensor Information. RR-315-NAVY, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
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Advanced Navy platforms and surveillance technologies could
improve maritime domain awareness for counter-narcotic
operations.\13\
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\13\ Scott Savitz, Irv Blickstein, Peter Buryk, et al. (2014). U.S.
Navy Employment Options for Unmanned Surface Vehicles. RR-384-NAVY,
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
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These are just a few of the many ways DoD capabilities might be
used to support DHS missions. However, before implementing any of them,
Congress, DHS, and DoD should work together to:
Demonstrate how the new uses improve capability, and
estimate the associated acquisition and sustainment costs.
Coordinate transfer and use of DoD systems with existing DHS
acquisition strategies.
Ensure use of DoD capabilities for homeland security
missions is consistent with existing legal authorities and
policies and reflects the desired use of the military in
civilian operations.
Review policies associated with using DoD capabilities for
homeland security missions and address any policies that should
be streamlined or reinforced.
Clarify which organizations should bear the costs of
operating the technologies and adjust budgets accordingly.
making the nation safer and more resilient
The second QHSR should reflect continued maturation of governance
at DHS and provide a stepping-off point for further improvements. We
all certainly want more effective protection from terrorism, better
preparation for disasters, and more resilient communities. The
multiplicity and complexity of current homeland security threats,
uncertainty surrounding what new threats could emerge or how known
trends might evolve, and constraints on budgets, make achieving these
goals difficult. If DHS is to overcome all of these challenges, three
things will be required: Strategic focus to direct resources where they
are most needed, strong oversight to assure that resources are used
effectively, and finally, cooperation across Government to improve
efficiency.
Again, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on
this very important opportunity for DHS. I look forward to taking your
questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Dr. Willis.
The Chairman will now recognize Ms. Duke for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Duke. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
Barber, and Members of the committee. I appreciate being here,
and thank you for your efforts in overseeing the Department
with the goal of improving mission effectiveness. To my fellow
panel members, who have already covered most of the key points
of the hearing this morning.
I do agree with both of you in your opening statements that
the improvement of the management of DHS is key and essential
to delivering the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review mission
stats. I do support H.R. 4228 and its effects to improve
management. I would like to state that in addition to being
bipartisan, it also, in a large part, is policy-agnostic. It
will succeed despite policy changes and changes in the threat
environment. So to do this is really an investment of our
future of homeland security.
In the statements announcing this hearing, the Chairman
mentioned that DHS must prioritize and make trade-offs on how
to best keep us safe. Having a focused and affordable and
achievable strategy is critical to reining in DHS's massive
bureaucracy. I would like to focus my comments this morning on
the piece of that statement about being achievable. I do
believe that the efforts we have talked about here in terms of
building the management and the operational infrastructure is
essential to achieving this QHSR and future policy and strategy
initiatives.
In setting up the legislation to require the QHSR, the
lawmakers recognized this. They mandated that the QHSR include
an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department
with the National homeland security strategy and mission areas.
That is really where the challenge lies. The management
infrastructure, including the right people with the right
policy, processes, allocation of resources and systems under
united leadership, empowered with the data and analytics to
make sound operational decisions. One sentence, a lot of work
and a lot of effort.
This is necessary, though--however, to transform the QHSR
from a policy document into the living reality actually used to
more effectively deliver the homeland security mission to our
Nation.
In the first years of DHS, we put the building blocks of
management into place. Those building blocks included
developing a budget process, developing a program and analysis
PA&E capability, developing an acquisition system, logistics,
and human capital. The challenge to achieving the QHSR mission
objectives is to first continuing maturing those building
blocks that were initially put in place during the first years
of the Department. More importantly, integrating those building
blocks into a system.
The integrated model has to have policy- and strategy-
informing capabilities, which will be followed by requirements
driving into programming and budgeting, acquisition, and life-
cycle management of the individual programs in the entire
mission. Strategy has to be analytical, integrated, focused,
and collaborative.
I would like to point out, as Dr. Willis did, that
Secretary Johnson's strengthening Department Unity of Effort
memo dated April 22, 2014 outlines a strategy to accomplish
this. That memo is packed with processes not only for policy,
but for management, that I believe, if executed, would be key
to further maturing the Department in the areas of management
and supporting the policy of the QHSR.
Several key tenets are in that memo. One is the senior
leadership engagement, not only at the headquarters level but
with the component, on a regular both strategic and tactical
basis. That is essential to driving forward the Unity of Effort
memo and accomplishing the QHSR.
Second, the system must recognize the interfaces and
interdependencies of the individual pieces of the management
system from policy through execution and sustainment, as I said
earlier. The imperative for a sound system also includes having
the interdependencies of mission, as the QHSR shows.
Moving forward to more of a risk-based approach must ensure
that both the policy and the execution of the policies are
interrelated and show those dependencies that, as we move
towards a risk-based approach, we actually recognize the risk
appropriately. It is critical that this initiative be carried
through by the Department and sustained so that we can deliver
that mission set to our country. The framework will continue to
drive the Department towards maturity. Otherwise, the QHSR
cannot be achieved effectively and efficiently, and it does
become just another policy document on the shelf.
I thank the committee for this opportunity and look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Duke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elaine C. Duke
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. Though
I retired from Federal service, I still have a passion for the homeland
security mission, and remain committed to the success of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). I thank you for your efforts in overseeing
the Department with the goal of improving mission effectiveness.
DHS completed its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)
in 2010. Soon, it will issue the second QHSR, legislatively mandated by
Section 707 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. It is
important that the QSHR be sound in terms of strategy and missions.
Based on my experience with the first QHSR, DHS is spending
considerable planning effort on updating the strategy and missions. It
is updating the five basic homeland security missions:
Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security,
Secure and Manage Our Borders,
Enforce and Administer our Immigration Laws,
Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace,
Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience,
and ensuring the Department has the right mission set and strategy. I
am certain my colleagues on this panel will provide that policy
stakeholder perspective.
However with my background and experience, most recently as the DHS
under secretary for management, I'd like to provide the execution
perspective, on behalf of the stakeholders responsible for developing
the management infrastructure that turns the strategy and policy of the
QHSR into successful mission operations.
Therefore, I am focusing my comments today on that lesser
discussed, but in my opinion an equally or more important aspect, of
the QHSR. The Chairman, in his comments announcing this hearing stated
that ``DHS must prioritize and make tradeoffs on how best to keep us
safe. Having a focused, affordable, and achievable strategy is critical
to reining in DHS's massive bureaucracy.'' Mr. Duncan's point that the
strategy must be achievable is the critical issue, in my opinion. And
the strategy is only achievable if DHS continues to build the
management and operational infrastructure to execute it effectively and
efficiently.
Lawmakers recognized that fact when legislating that DHS must
complete a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. They mandated that the
QHSR include an assessment of the organizational alignment of the
Department with the National homeland security strategy and mission
areas.
The QHSR is to include recommendations not only regarding the long-
term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland security, but
also guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies,
and authorities of the Department. It must review and assess the
effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Department for executing the
process of turning the requirements developed in the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review into an acquisition strategy and expenditure
plan within the Department. Additionally, it is to identify the budget
plan required to provide sufficient resources to successfully execute
the full range of missions called for in the review.
This is where the challenges lie. The management infrastructure,
including the right policy, people, process, allocation of resources,
and systems; under united leadership empowered with the data and
analytics to make sound operational decisions. This is necessary to
transform the QHSR from a document to a living reality, actually used
to more effectively deliver homeland security to our Nation.
In the first 10 years of DHS, we put building blocks of the
management structure into place to enable DHS to deliver the homeland
security strategy and mission. Those building blocks included a budget
process, program analysis and evaluation, acquisition, logistics, and
human capital. The challenge to successfully achieving the QHSR is to
continue maturing those building blocks. And even more importantly,
integrating the building blocks into a system. In an integrated model,
policy and strategy inform capabilities, followed by requirements,
driving into the programming and budgeting processes, and acquisition
and life-cycle management. Strategy must be analytical and integrated,
focused, and collaborative. The strategic guidance must drive a joint
capabilities-based analysis that identifies gaps and overlaps, analyzes
alternatives to close those gaps and eliminate the overlaps, and
develops requirements to fill them. And to ensure the capabilities are
effectively delivered, there must be coordinated operational planning
with scenarios against the DHS strategy. All aspects of the system must
be driven by the most senior DHS leadership at both headquarters and
the operating components, and executed with optimum unity. And it must
be continually monitored against goals to ensure stated objectives are
met.
DHS Secretary Johnson's direction to continue maturing this system
is set for in his ``Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort'' memo
dated April 22, 3014. This memo outlines the further development of DHS
planning, management, and operations to deliver the DHS missions
enumerated in the QHSR. It describes an integrated model designed to
ensure that strategic and analytically-based decisions optimize mission
performance.
Several key tenants of the Secretary's Unity of Effort are critical
to successful implementation of the QHSR. The establishment of regular
meetings and engagement by the Secretary, deputy secretary, and
operating component head leaders is critical to the Unity initiative.
It must provide unified leadership that results in the optimum
allocation of resources, while improving the management process for
planning and investments. It must develop planning, programs, budgets,
acquisition, that are currently effective, and also sustainable
throughout the life cycle of the program and mission.
This system must recognize interfaces and interdependencies and be
based on good data and sound analytics. That will position DHS
headquarters and operating component leadership to make the right
decisions to execute the QHSR missions and strategies. DHS must have
the infrastructure in place, then it can execute the evolving homeland
security mission to be updated in the QHSR; it can achieve the
strategy.
The imperative for a unified, sound system is even stronger as DHS
moves away from a one-size-fits-all security approach to a risk-based
security model. A risk-based approach to security must be intelligence
driven with complete situational awareness from integrated data. This
requires Unity of Effort. The ability to perform effective case
management and data-driven risk analysis is essential to the risk-based
appraoch, and that data must be timely and accurate, and part of a
unified effort.
It is critical that once the QHSR is finalized, the initiative to
strengthen delivery of the mission set is continued. The framework
outlined in the memo must be brought to maturity. Otherwise, the QHSR
cannot be achieved effectively and becomes just another policy document
in the library.
Again I thank the committee for this opportunity, and look forward
to answering your questions today.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank you for that, and thank you for
all the opening statements.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
Before I get started, I just want to give sort of a shout-out
to one of my staff members who has helped this committee as a
shared employee. Rebecca Ulrich will get her master's degree
today from the Naval War College. We are proud of her and she
has helped the committee on both sides. We thank her for her
hard work and congratulate her for her master's degree.
I come from the private sector, and in business we did a 5-
year plan. I think that is important to set focus for the
company, to steer the ship in a certain direction and try to
put pieces in place to make your vision and your goals. So
whether it is sales goals or performance goals or income goals,
return on investment issues to make those happen. So I hope
this plan isn't just eyewash for America. I hope it is not done
just to meet a requirement of the United States Congress. I
hope it is actually a vision for the Department going forward.
I think that is the intent of Congress when they passed
this, is to make DHS actually stop and focus on: What are the
strategic threats to this country, where do we need to place
our resources, where do we need to spend our money, and what do
we need to do to ensure America is safe? So I hope that that is
what has taken place.
I do want to point out that in the strategic priorities for
homeland security it says this: ``Continue to evolve
immigration policies and processes in order to respond to new
trends in illegal migration and further align our enforcement
policies with our goal of sound law enforcement practice that
prioritizes public safety.''
In case you haven't noticed, we have a crisis situation on
our Southern Border today. Regardless of how you feel about
immigration reform in this country, you cannot sit idly by and
watch this blatant invasion of our Southern Border and our rule
of law by folks that are illegal crossing this country.
Chain migration is a real thing. If the children enter this
country, what happens with their families? Do they also come at
a later day? I am concerned that we have CBP officers changing
diapers and warming formula for these children. This is a
humanitarian crisis, and I am very sympathetic to the
humanitarian aspect of this.
But I am also very cognizant of the fact that OTMs--other
than Mexicans--a DHS term that says anyone other than a Mexico
or nationality person that crosses in this country is an OTM.
These are Guatemalans and El Salvadorians and Hondurans. I get
that. But I am worried about the Asian, the Middle Eastern, and
the African folks that are coming into this country and could
possibly cross our Southern Border while we have CBP officers
warming formula. What would they come here for? Would they come
here to seek a job? Possibly.
But we see what is going on in North Africa, and we talked
about the foreign fighters in Syria. I am concerned that there
are real threats that could possibly exploit this situation and
enter my country, the sovereign Nation of the United States of
America across our Southern Border because we are looking
somewhere else, and we are dealing with something else.
I am going to let my blood pressure calm down for just a
second. Think about the world that we are living in today. We
have got our border situation I just talked about. We have got
Iraq and ISIS. We have got Syria and foreign fighters. We
talked about foreign fighters a minute ago, and I appreciate
that.
We went overseas to actually look at this issue. While we
were there, a foreign fighter came from Syria, came from the
battlefield. He was European, he was battle-hardened, he was
radicalized. He came to Belgium and he shot up a Jewish museum
where four or five people were killed, while we were there. The
French got lucky and caught him at a bus stop.
He was in an open border Schengen area. With a visa waiver
program, could that European nationality have flown into the
United States? Because he didn't have to go to the consulate or
the embassy to get a visa. He could have gotten on an airplane.
If he wasn't on a terrorist watch list or a no-fly list, guess
what? He flies into the United States of America to do what?
This is a real issue with foreign fighters that are getting
battle-hardened in Syria and now Iraq.
We have got Iran continually to pursue a nuclear weapons
program, Russia, the Crimea and Ukraine, Hezbollah, Hamas, what
we see with the kidnapping of Israeli children by the
Palestinian folks.
We see Boko Haram in Libya and North Africa. What is going
on in Egypt and the Sinai. China, the South China Sea,
threatening Japan. Cybersecurity. China, Russia, North Korea. I
could go on and on and on. There are a lot of problems going on
in the world. That is why I think it is so important that DHS
has a very, very, very clear message and plan in this report.
So I will ask the witnesses a question.
Frank, the QHSR, by statute, is supposed to not only be a
comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of
the Nation. It is also supposed to include recommendations
regarding the long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation
for homeland security. Part of long-term strategic planning
requires anticipating future threats and events. So I ask you
this: Is planning for unseen changes in the Western Hemisphere,
such as in Mexico or Central America resulting in mass
migration an issue that should be addressed in a National
strategy? Was this issue adequately addressed in the newly-
released QHSR?
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, I think you do hit an important
question. At the end of the day, smuggling is smuggling is
smuggling is smuggling; whether it is drugs, whether it is
people, whether it is weapons they are gonna use the same
route. So this is a significant area for the Department. I
don't think it was addressed in as much detail as the threat
warrants. Because at the end of the day, you are looking at the
convergence of cartels meeting up with other actors. Obviously,
that is a primary concern for not only border security but, as
you mentioned, some of the P&R issues. The terror travel
issues, more strategically where CBP, ICE, VISIT, TSA, and
others play a significant role.
I do think that the Department has made yeoman's progress
in some of the terror travel-related issues. But to your point,
it doesn't have to be via air. It can come through any kind of
mode that the adversary chooses.
So bottom line, I think that clearly that is a National
security challenge. It is not just a--it does affect our
National security, and something that warrants, I think,
greater attention, going forward. Let me just underscore one
thing. We can't wait 4 years for strategies. What we need to be
able to do is identify what the goals are, what the objectives
are in a long-term planning kind of sense.
But you need a Department that is agile. I recommended an
office of net assessment, along the lines of what DOD has, to
be able to align some of these efforts. That has played a
significant role in protecting our country from a defense
perspective. I think DHS would be well-served if it had
something that was nimble, agile, and doesn't have to wait 4
years to put together a strategy, when the world changes so
dramatically overnight. So we need to get to where we have the
long-term goals, but we also need to get out tactics that are
much quicker and much more rapid.
Mr. Duncan. I agree with you. I think it should be a very
fluid process. I am concerned that--and I had this conversation
with staff this morning--that DHS was created, brought 22
different components together. Have we created such a large
agency--the third-largest in the Government--that it can't
respond in that fluid manner? Responding to crisis as they come
up, or needs, shifting assets, as needed. So I appreciate your
saying that. We are gonna have several rounds of questions, I
hope.
With this, I will yield back--I will yield over to Mr.
Barber for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a very
important discussion, especially as we are talking about the
ability of the Department to be quick in response to emerging
risks and problems. The drug cartels are very nimble. Their
strategies change by the day, by the hour, by the week
depending upon what they see us doing and where they see
weaknesses in our border security structure.
Mr. Baker, I would like to pursue this a little bit with
you if I could. As you know, one of the QHSR strategic
priorities is for the Department to adopt a risk segmentation
approach to securing and managing the flows of people and goods
into the United States. Last week, the House Committee on
Homeland Security unanimously approved an authorization bill
for CBP. In that discussion, I offered an amendment which was
adopted by the committee requiring the commissioner of CBP to,
within 6 months, develop and implement credible ways to measure
border security and its effectiveness and its use of resources
and allocations.
We have, for way too long, had a lack of credibility of the
information provided by the Department as to how it is doing.
We have actually provided billions of dollars over the life of
this Department, and we have way too little accountability.
Two years ago, the Department moved to adopt a risk-based
strategy for securing the borders. When the GAO, at the request
of the Ranking Member and myself, looked at that it found a
plan that was absent goals, absent measurements, no way to
determine progress. The people that I represent have incredible
information about the risks and the changing strategies of the
cartels. I call the cartels narcoterrorists because I think it
is a much more apt description of their goals and their
practices.
There is no doubt that we have made some improvements in
securing the border. But I can tell you this. That where I
live, the people I represent, they still are not safe in their
homes, still don't feel that the Department has been quick
enough. So how do we move in this direction?
So, Mr. Baker, I want to ask you, as someone who has worked
in the Department, what steps you believe the Department can
take not just to talk about risk assessment and moving
resources in accordance with that, but how it can actually
affect that and begin to have better credibility with the
stakeholders who live and work across the border?
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Representative Barber. I am deeply
familiar with this. Since I left the Department, I have worked
closely with ranchers in exactly that area; very remote areas,
where they are at risk every day from smugglers of drugs or
people. They genuinely feel under siege. The--coming up with a
measurement or a single measurement for success on the border
and achievement of secure borders I think is almost impossible
to do. Partly because while we can get a general sense, it is
almost impossible to turn any of those measures into something
that is the be-all and end-all.
If you ask people today how many--like if you ask Border
Patrol Agents how many people crossed the border or how many
got away, how many did you catch, they will give you a pretty
good estimate. But if you started making their bonuses depend
on achieving those numbers, you would not be able to rely on
those numbers for very long. My concern is, many of these
numbers are subject, and ought to be subject, to exercise of
judgment.
The other problem that we are seeing today is, you can have
a breakdown overnight if conditions change. I am quite struck
by the fact that the crisis that we are facing now on the
border is, in many ways, almost exactly the same crisis that I
saw when I showed up in 2005 when we had people that were
called, other than Mexicans, showing up and saying please give
me the permiso and show me the way to the bus station. Because
there was no way to return them--you couldn't return them to
Mexico because Mexico wouldn't take them--and we did not have
enough beds to put them into detention before they could be
deported, we had to release them.
Everybody was coming in greater and greater numbers when
they realized that the worst thing that would happen to them is
they would be given a date to show up, in 6 months, for a
hearing. That is happening again. I think it would be
worthwhile to look at the response that the Department took to
that problem in 2005 and 2006, when we dramatically increased
our ability to put people into detention and shrank,
dramatically, the time it took to send them back home. So that
they started to deliver the message, oh, you can take that long
trip across Mexico but you will be back here in 2 weeks once
you cross the border.
If they believe that they will be allowed to stay in the
United States indefinitely they will keep coming, and we will
spend all our time just rounding them up and giving them
permisos. Meanwhile, the drug cartels have already realized if
they can send 250 people across the border who all have to be
fingerprinted and sent to detention, as soon as the Border
Patrol is engaged in that they can begin sending their
backpackers across with the drugs.
So I think this is a genuine crisis. It is a crisis of
planning and management for the Department that needs to be
addressed quite promptly or we will have serious, serious
problems on the border.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have run
out of time. I will yield back, and hope for questions in the
second round.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Baker,
thank you for that, as well. Just a side comment. I think
Mexico needs to be appealed to by this administration. It is
their Southern Border with Guatemala that these folks are
transiting, as well. They could be stopped there. Historically,
Mexico has had a very, very strong policy of border crossings
right there. But apparently, something--somewhere along the way
something is not being done. Whether it is on the Guatemala and
Mexico border, or whether it is on our border.
So I yield to the gentleman, for 5 minutes, from North
Carolina, Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank all the witnesses
for your time here today. I thank the Chairman for having this
hearing. This is really important.
Mr. Baker, I want to start with you. In your written
testimony, you addressed the delay of the QHSR by the
Department of Justice and the near-veto power that Justice
enjoys over this Department of Homeland Security product. In
your time as assistant secretary for policy, did DOJ or any
other Federal department enjoy this type of veto power? Are
there any other departments--like Justice or Defense or State--
that have to obtain this kind of outside approval before they
present their quadrennial report?
Mr. Baker. If you let other agencies do that to you they
will do it. When I first arrived at the--and we were standing
up the Department's policy office, I handed out buttons that
had the words ``lunch money'' and a big bar through it like a
no-parking sign to say we were not gonna be giving our lunch
money to other departments anymore. Maybe we should revive
that. The Justice Department's effort to extract turf
concessions from a document that needs to be released I think
does not--what--it is not in the best traditions of the
Department. But you have to resist or other departments will do
that to you.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that. I am just very concerned
about that type of process, and I think there needs to be an
independent report. Obviously, you know, departments can work
together on issues and concern and cross-jurisdiction. But to
have a report like this delayed, and to have another Department
with near-veto power, I think that is a real mistake. So I
appreciate----
Mr. Baker. If I could tell one quick story? We had a very
similar exercise like this when we were talking about nuclear
terrorism. Where the FBI said, hey, we are in charge, we will
do everything. Shortly thereafter we actually had an incident
where a ship was coming with a cargo that had alarmed for
plutonium. It turns out that it was not plutonium, but we
thought seriously we had to send a helicopter out to
investigate. We turned to the FBI and said, well, you said you
were in charge. You got helicopters. They said, you know,
actually we don't know how to land a helicopter on a ship.
Could the Coast Guard do it for us?
That is the difference between writing the speech where you
say I am in charge, and actually carrying out the effort. Where
the people who can do it end up with the responsibility. We
need--the more we focus on what we are actually doing as
opposed to the speech parts of this, the more likely we will
have realistic assignments of responsibility.
Mr. Hudson. Well, I think that is important. Because the
American people expect us to keep them safe. If we are fighting
over turf and, you know, whose helicopter are we gonna use, you
know, that is a mistake. I think the American people have a
right to be outraged and certainly, we have concerns here in
Congress. We will continue to work on these issues. So I
appreciate you highlighting that.
Shifting gears a little bit, Mr. Cilluffo, at the time of
the last QHSR, ISIS was a weakened al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq.
It has since become a major force, first in the on-going Syrian
conflict and, more recently, in Iraq where it has taken on
several key areas and is directly fighting with the government.
Sort-of building on the theme that the Chairman raised, you
know, did the QHSR mention this type of threat? If not, is ISIS
a potential failure of the state of Iraq, and are other nation-
states a potential threat that DHS or QHSR should include in a
National homeland security strategy?
Mr. Cilluffo. That is--I think that is an excellent
question. It comes to what I think is one of these interagency
challenges and dilemmas. Because you can't look at this as a
home game or an away game alone. I would argue that we have
neglected some our away game activities in recent years. Which
has provided the time and space for our enemies to exploit. But
I would also argue that you have got to look at it as being
inextricably interwoven. Here is where I think you have some of
that breakdown.
I think the Department does deserve credit in terms of the
work it has done vis-a-vis terror travel. They have actually
made significant progress. But as the Chairman had mentioned,
you have also got foreign fighters by the thousands. In
addition to the incident in Belgium, there was a big arrest
yesterday with TATP in France where you do have a--and Syria
connection. You do have a number of foreign fighters that can
come to Europe and then go elsewhere. I mean, obviously, when
you look at the highest concern in terms of threat, it is
probably on European soil right now.
But that also does bode significantly for the United
States. The reason we did--we have done a number of studies on
foreign fighters in 2009, 2010. The reason we did that was this
particular case where the system was blinking very red in the
United States. A fellow by the name of Najibullah Zazi, he had
initially went over to Afghanistan to join up with the Taliban.
He was intercepted by al-Qaeda, said you are of much greater
value because you are familiar with the United States, you can
move in the United States. We are gonna turn you around and you
are gonna start targeting U.S. targets.
In this case, he was going after the subways in New York.
We had a couple of mix-ups in terms of being able to get there
before the balloon went up, but we did and we did it
successfully. So it is this foreign fighter. It is these
individuals that can be identified, intercepted, and turned
around. That is a big problem. When you look at ISIS today, I
think what is most unique is that you have got young folks who
are meeting who had never met before. So when we looked at AQAP
in Yemen, they are largely people who had familiarity with
Yemeni society.
When you look at Somalia, it was largely American, first-,
second-generation of Somali descent. When you looked at AfPak,
same sort of situation, southeast Asian. What makes this
different is, they are coming from everywhere. These are new
networks. So you have got very significant, concerning bomb
skills coming out of Yemen, for example, now meeting with
others who are savvy in social media or other terrorist tactics
that we need to be concerned about.
So bottom line, I don't think we will ever be able to
predict the future, since the end of the Cold War threat
forecasting has made, is some cases, astrology look
respectable.
But I would also suggest that, in the words of Mark Twain,
whereas history may not repeat itself it does tend to rhyme. I
am not sure we are learning all of our lessons that we have
learned the hard way. I think it is up to all of us to make
sure that we try to push back as much as we can.
Mr. Hudson. Very well put.
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired so I will yield back to
you.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.
Talking about some of those issues, we just saw about 20
Somalians leave Minnesota to travel. Whether they are going to
Syria or Somalia, but they are going to be jihadists. You know,
do they come back to the country? These are folks that had
legal permanent status here.
So I apologize earlier if I came across as angry, talking
about the Southern Border. But you know what? By golly, I am
angry. I am angry because I am an American and I believe in the
sovereignty of our Nation. I am very chagrined--more than
chagrined, angered--by what I see going on right now.
Ms. Duke, I want to shift gears to you. DHS is the third-
largest Federal department, and they have got a vast mission.
The Department has number of agencies, departments,
directorates, offices, and programs. There are offices involved
with the intelligence community. Others conduct research and
development within the Federal Protective Service. They serve
as uniform Federal building security. We got CBP and ICE that
strive to protect this Nation's border, among other missions.
So given the size of DHS and its broad responsibility and
it is vast and, at times, contradictory missions, is it
appropriate to expect a QHSR of approximately 100 pages to
provide an accurate, comprehensive examination of the homeland
security strategy for the Nation?
Ms. Duke. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think when you use the term
``comprehensive,'' no. I think the QHSR really is a start
document, setting forth the missions in very broad categories.
I think they are noncontroversial in large part because they
are so broad. It is a motherhood and apple pie, I think
everybody agrees. I think the key is gonna be moving that
forward.
I do think there is unity of mission. I think the mission
set of the various components of DHS does overlap more than it
is being executed today. Not completely.
I think that moving forward in joint requirements and joint
capabilities is key for two reasons. One is the efficiency, the
dollars spent. Second is the effectiveness. I believe DHS was
created to be a more effective deliverer of homeland security,
and that integration of the mission is key to moving that
forward. I think we will see a better alignment if we move
towards those joint requirements and capabilities.
Mr. Duncan. Well, speaking along that, it is sort-of silent
on management issues. So how concerned shall we be that it is
sort-of silent on those issues, and what management
infrastructure needs to be put in place to effectively
implement a DHS strategy?
Ms. Duke. It is----
Mr. Duncan. We talked about acquisition reform earlier, so
we have covered that. But any other things.
Ms. Duke. It is silent. I think No. 1 from a management is
the unity of the leadership and the regular engagement of
senior leadership, both at headquarters and the components, in
running the Department. By running the Department, it is a
250,000-person bureaucracy, and it needs to be run effectively.
I think that is key. That is a tenet through the senior
leadership council and the deputies group of the current
Secretary's initiative. I think it is gonna be difficult to
carry through on that because of schedules, but it has to
happen. That will drive down the unity at a low level.
The second is the joint requirements and capabilities, both
from a technology perspective and moving towards less
platforms, less technology. You know, how many airframes do we
need, those type of issues. Then also moving towards joint
operations. That is going to be difficult. It needs to be
tackled, but you are not gonna get that without the unity of
the leadership dedicated towards that joint-ness.
Mr. Duncan. Right. Thank you for that.
I want to ask Dr. Willis, in this current budgetary
environment that we experience, we deal with every day up here
on the Hill, what are some specific examples of how DHS could
operate more efficiently with less? For example, are there any
areas or components that could be reduced without threatening
the homeland security mission?
Mr. Willis. I think the answer to this comes back to--
picking up some of what Ms. Duke said--on joint-ness. We need
to start looking at the different mission areas that the
Department has to work on. Take them as a problem to be solved,
not a component to do work. If we start looking at it that way,
I think some of the places where there may be ways to improve,
both effectiveness or increased efficiency could emerge. I
think border security is one of those.
We already have something like that for drug control. We
have something called The Interdiction Committee, where ONDCP,
Coast Guard and all--and others come together to figure out how
are we gonna jointly use our assets together? We could use
something like that on immigration, as well.
Mr. Duncan. All right, thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo, am I off-base when I talk about my concern
over OTMs, people of Middle Eastern, Asian, African descent,
transiting somehow to South America, Western Hemisphere and
making their way across our Southern Border? I preface that by
saying we saw the Quds Force operative called on the Southern
Border, trying to come into this country using a Mexican drug
cartel operative who happened to be a DEA agent. Trying to come
across through some sort of drug nexus, cartel nexus, to come
to this city to assassinate the ambassador from Saudi Arabia.
That is a real example. But am I exacerbating that with a
concern that foreign fighters may try to come, that Hezbollah
is trying to come into the Western Hemisphere more, that Iran
is continuing to send operatives into this hemisphere? That
there is a possibility that with a porous border like with have
that they could actually transit into the United States? Is
this a concern we should have, or am I off-base?
Mr. Cilluffo. You know, I actually testified on this issue
before the subcommittee when Mr. McCaul was chairing it. I do
feel that is a legitimate concern. Obviously, when you look at
the numbers it is a small number business. But the reality is,
is terrorism is a small numbers business. Small numbers can
cause mass harm. So I do think it is a significant concern. I
do think that our authorities at CBP and elsewhere are aware of
this in DEA. But smuggling is smuggling.
I don't care what it is. If they are getting in, they are
gonna get in. I used to tell a very bad joke. If you want to
smuggle in a tactical nuclear weapon just wrap it in a bale of
marijuana. Because we are not doing all that well in terms of
some of our drug enforcement. Now I think it has improved. I
think the likelihood would be a little more significant if you
were to bring in someone that looks entirely different. I am
not meaning to be pejorative, but that is the way it would
work.
I think some of the cartels wouldn't necessarily risk
bringing in someone if they have a sense that this is a real
bad actor. But then again, you are assuming that this is a
monolithic enterprise and it is not. It is decentralized. So I
think the bottom line here is, is it is a concern. It is not a
big numbers business. But again, small numbers can cause mass
harm here, and I think that is what is important.
Mr. Duncan. Yes.
Mr. Cilluffo. If I could just underscore one thing. Because
I do think the Department, and Secretary Johnson, in particular
deserve some credit for that Unity of Effort memo. That really
was powerful. If you do get to the joint-ness, he came from the
Department of Defense, where you had joint planning, where you
have a structure between OSD and the combatant commanders
through various means. The Department, I think at Homeland
Security, you don't really have a sense of what the office of
the Secretary is.
Elevate policy to an under secretary role. Get a joint
operations planning kind of effort, a J-3 in the military
sense. Get the under secretary for intelligence and analysis to
be a true J-2 or an intelligence function more along the lines
of the way that relates to the under secretary of defense of
intelligence in DOD. I think there are some opportunities. I
think the Secretary seems to be moving in the right direction.
Is it captured in the QHSR? Not really, but I think if you
align those two entities there is some opportunity there. I
think Congress can keep their feet to the fire to make that
happen.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that. I will say that Secretary
Johnson came and met with at least Republican Members of this
committee yesterday for at least an hour. He was very engaging,
and I am impressed. I would say I am a Jeh Johnson fan, and I
think he is the right guy at the right time. We need to make
sure he has got the right tools and the ability to do his job,
given the immense challenges, all the list of things that--and
that was just a partial list that I read earlier.
The last thing I will say before I turn it over to Mr.
Barber is, I grew up in the Cold War, where we were nation-
state versus nation-state. We were tracking tank and artillery
movements and troop movements and posturing and positioning of
troops. It is a different world today, where we are tracking
individuals. If you think about that, we are trying to track
single individuals who could commit an act of terror.
Fly an airplane into a tower or commit a Boston-style
bombing that still terrorizes this country and caused
tremendous moral and morality and harm to this country. So it
is a different world and the challenges are immense. When we
talk about the foreign fighters and other things we have
mentioned today, it really raises the hair on the back of my
neck.
So with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Barber for another
line of questioning.
Mr. Barber. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Let me talk a
little bit about the morale issue. Because I think it is a
central problem that the Department is facing as it is trying
to carry out its mission. It will be, I think, a real problem
in implementing the QHSR. Secretary Johnson came to this
committee and made it real clear that this was going to be one
his priorities: To improve employee morale. It is rightly a top
priority for him. It is for us.
Because improving employee morale means improving the
effectiveness of the Department. A demoralized workforce cannot
carry out a mission effectively. Let me be very specific about
one area of concern that is very real to me and the people I
represent. That is the work that is being done by the Border
Patrol and the Customs Agents at our ports of entry.
The Border Patrol Agents, every single day, work in the
most rugged environments on the border in the Southwest that
you could imagine. Around the next bend, around the next canyon
could be armed cartel members. We have had incidents, of
course, where our agents have been harmed in those
circumstances. They are very courageous people. I think they
are really doing their best, under very difficult
circumstances, to do their job.
The Customs Agents who work at the ports of entry also face
dangers and frustration because we have tourists, we have fresh
produce trucks, we have products that are made in the United
States, shipped to Mexico for assembly, and brought back that
wait in long lines--2\1/2\ hours is not unusual--at our ports
of entry. That is also demoralizing--it has a demoralizing
impact on those employees.
So I guess my question really is, for those of you were
within the Department at one time--and, Dr. Willis, can you
describe from your experience and from your base of knowledge,
what is it the Department is going to have to do to increase
morale, particularly in the area I have talked about? Because
without improved morale, as the Secretary has made a priority,
we are simply not gonna get a better Department.
So let me start, if I could, with Dr. Willis, and then the
other panelists perhaps can make their comments, as well.
Mr. Willis. I think this is a very important problem. It is
not just the component you called out. If you look across
morale, across the Department, the numbers are not where you
would like to see them. The basic approaches to this come out
of basic management, right? We need to give people a clear
focus on what we are gonna do, and then we need to give them
the tools to do it. I saw some things in the acquisition bill
that were helping that, providing workforce training.
In the case of the Border Patrol that you were talking
about, in addition to facing hostile threats there has also
been news about concern about use of force guidance. So these
are two in tension. So we need to give them the training in
policies to help them be able to do their job effectively. So I
think those two things are key, and then I will ask my other
panelists to help. But----
Mr. Barber. Ms. Duke, could you respond?
Ms. Duke. Yes. Well, up until the very end of my career I
was a career civil servant. I will say, after spending a long
time in the Department of Homeland Security they are some of
the most passionate civil servants that I have ever encountered
in my 28-year career. I commend them. I thank you for asking
questions about them.
I think, first of all, that passion could be turned into
better morale, No. 1, by engagement. They have got to be
engaged and valued. In terms of they know what needs to be
done, and both their operations and their opinions and their
vision has to be considered as we develop strategies.
It cannot be top-down. It has to be bilateral in terms of
those boots on the ground know what needs to happen. Combine
that with the senior leadership perspective, and have an
engaged workforce.
I think second, in the Department of Homeland Security I
think that civil servants--it is one of the few, if not the
only Department where it is okay to criticize civil servants
without merit in terms of just general their mission and their
population. I think that leadership has to support their
members and speak positively of them both internally and
externally, where it is warranted.
Make sure that the politics around homeland security are
imposed on those mid- and junior-level civil servants. That the
politics is managed by the politicians and the leadership in
terms of supporting the day-to-day mission. That they are
enabled and supported and valued for accomplishing that mission
despite the swirl around the political issues.
Mr. Barber. Before we go to other witnesses, I just want to
comment on what you said, Ms. Duke. I absolutely believe that
engaging the people who are on the ground is one of the most
important things that any organization can do, not just the
Department of Homeland Security. That simply is not happening
to the degree it needs to.
I think there is a fresh wind in the Department. The
Secretary, I think, is really committed to improving morale, to
transparency and accountability. He has already taken action
that shows that he really means it.
But let me just cite an example. It has been a while since
I have talked about this, but it illustrates the point. When
the SBInet project was launched several years ago, the contract
with Boeing specifically prohibited agents on the ground from
advising or commenting on how this project would go forward. I
can't believe that that happened. It did, the project basically
failed as a result, I think, of lack of input. I would also
add, and reiterate what I said earlier, not just input from the
agents and the Customs Agents on the ground, but also the
people who live and work on the border.
I get information from the ranchers, from the
businesspeople, from the people in the cities that is, without
doubt, some of the best information you could have about what
is really going on.
So I couldn't agree with you more. Obviously, management
has to lead. But it can't lead unless it listens to the people
it is leading. So Mr. Baker, Mr. Cilluffo, could you also
comment on this issue, please?
Mr. Baker. Sure. Clarity of mission and support for the
mission is crucial. Knowing that what you are doing when you
get up every day is something that is valued by the country and
by your leadership is the critical start. Part of that is a
responsibility of Americans. You know, the most likely Federal
employee any American is going to interact with in his ordinary
life is a DHS employee. It won't surprise you that Americans
are pretty quick to criticize and make it personal.
Really, we should be a little bit better as human beings
about recognizing that the people we are dealing with are
carrying out an important mission, even if it occasionally
inconveniences us at the border, in the airport. We should all
thank them more often than we do.
Finally, and this is a little odd and I will say it because
it was my experience at DHS. Sometimes a key to improving
morale is to identify the people who are not doing the job and
get rid of them. Nothing makes the people who are doing the job
feel more valued than the recognition by management that some
people are not and actually disciplining or removing them from
the workforce. It is a real drag on morale if you believe that
you don't actually have to do the job to keep the job.
Mr. Cilluffo. Just very finally briefly, because I think it
was covered exceedingly well by my fellow witnesses. But keep
in mind, it is also part of the mission. They can never shut
down. It is exhausting. We know, when you are dealing with law
enforcement you know when you arrest someone and your prosecute
someone. When you are overseas you kind of know when you have
gained territory. Their mission is disproving double negatives.
They can never shut down.
So you have got an exhaustion factor that I think plays in
there. Because you only recognize when something goes wrong in
terms of the Department's mission. That is what we will all
focus on.
So do we need to improve our abilities to lessen the
likelihood of things going wrong? Absolutely. But we need to
also find ways to reward some of the good work that has been
done. Part of that, I would suggest, it may be psychic income,
it may be not in the same way we think, but visits. I don't
know. When I was at the White House, President Bush would sit
down and meet with my staff, who were then at the NAC--what is
now the headquarters of the Department of Homeland Security.
I could be wrong, but I am not sure how many times the
President has visited DHS. Members of Congress can do more.
Just go to the hall, start meeting with the folks. It sounds
trivial, but it actually means a lot.
Then ultimately, to your point, get to the boots on ground
because that is where the action is. I would argue State and
local. Homeland security is not a Federal issue alone, it is
really about enabling some of our partners at the State and
local level. I think there is a lot that can be done there.
So part of it is politics, and I don't mean in a Republican
or a Demo kind of sense. But there is the need to be able to
know that the work they are doing is appreciated. There is the
need to recognize that you only realize when something goes
wrong that we can maybe try to get out there when we do have
some successes along those lines. Get out there, kick the
tires.
Mr. Barber. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, let me just close with this comment. I
couldn't agree more with all of you about what you say we need
to do to improve morale. As simple as saying ``thank you.'' I
have often traveled through some of our interior checkpoints
because they are in my district. Without fail, I never identify
myself. I say to the agent, ``Thank you for your service.''
They have this shocked look on their face. It is like no one
ever says that. I mean, it is a tough job, and I think we need
to be thankful.
Also, we need to continue to reinforce what the Secretary
is doing to improve accountability and transparency. When he
came here and he said he was going to be more transparent, he
followed through by releasing, for the first time, the use of
force policy. Controversial decision, the right decision in my
mind.
He then released information about investigations involving
agents. Again, controversial, but the right decision. The
public has a right to know what is going on in this Department.
The more it knows, I believe the more balanced it will be in
praising the good things, of which there are many, and being
clear about the things that don't work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank you
panelists for reminding us that it is a 24/7/365 day job to
protect this country. It can be exhausting. I can only imagine
what our CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement and USCIS
and all the other groups that are dealing with some of the
issues that we talked about this morning are going through. So
I want to just thank them for their service, on the record,
here today. From Jeh Johnson all the way down to the guy that
is standing at the border.
And thank them. You know, Americans get frustrated when
they go through the screening at the airport. I have been
there. I will be there in a little while. I will look at the
number of TSA agents, and wonder why things can't go quicker.
Why we can't do things in a different manner.
But I have got to temper my frustration, and understand
that they are protecting this Nation, they are keeping me safe.
I agree with Mr. Barber. I try to tell them, when I go through
the airport, thank you for your service, thank you for what you
are doing to keep us safe.
I would encourage all Americans to remember that patience
is the new sign of patriotism. Because we, as a Nation, need to
be safe.
So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions today. I thought
it was very informative and insightful. The Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
panelists, and we ask that you respond to those in writing.
So without objection, the subcommittee will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Stewart A. Baker
Question 1. What are the potential resource implications for the
Department of Homeland Security from implanting priorities in the
latest Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In an era of likely flat budgets, to what extent will
the Department of Homeland Security need to reduce funding in some
mission areas to free up resources to implement priority areas such as
biological threats and cybersecurity?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Stewart A. Baker
Question 1. Mr. Baker, policy has been organizationally challenged
since the inception of DHS; in hindsight, what lessons or best
practices do you have for management of the policy process and maturing
the policy organization at the Department so that it ultimately
produces actionable reports, guidance, and policy, as opposed to
``think tank'' policies and guidance?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with
assessing its organizational structure, including its ``management
systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems,
procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.'' This was
not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the
Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public
document expose the country to risk?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the
QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During
the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously
going through the process of an administration and political party
change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the
same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a
QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome--
new administration and party and same--affect the QHSR process and
should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not
occur during the same year as the Presidential election?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How
could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some
relationship to the budget request?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. When examining the statutory requirements for what
should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the
changing homeland security environment, are these still the best
requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative
additions or deletions to the requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders
were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more
open and transparent?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. The Secretary's Unity of Effort memo, in addition to
the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR, envisions a
unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level
officials remain spread out in various offices across the National
Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of
support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would
a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its
mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical
infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Frank J. Cilluffo
Question 1. To what extent did DHS provide a clear strategy for
securing cyberspace in the QHSR? Did the QHSR provide an opportunity to
guide a coordinated cybersecurity effort across Federal departments or
did it remain a DHS-focused strategy?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Given the increasing prevalence of nation-state-
supported cyber attacks and espionage, such as the recently indicted
members of an elite Chinese military unit who targeted U.S. networks
for the Chinese government, should the Departments of State and/or
Defense have more of a role in cyber protection?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Frank J. Cilluffo
Question 1. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with
assessing its organizational structure, including its ``management
systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems,
procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.'' This was
not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the
Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public
document expose the country to risk?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the
QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During
the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously
going through the process of an administration and political party
change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the
same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a
QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome--
new administration and party and same--affect the QHSR process and
should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not
occur during the same year as the Presidential election?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How
could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some
relationship to the budget request?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. When examining the statutory requirements for what
should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the
changing homeland security environment, are these still the best
requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative
additions or deletions to the requirements?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders
were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more
open and transparent?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. The Secretary's Unity of Effort memo, in addition to
the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a
unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level
officials remain spread out in various offices across the National
Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of
support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would
a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its
mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical
infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Henry H. Willis \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
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solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT412z1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 1a. Components, such as TSA and CBP, are ultimately
responsible for implementing DHS's strategic plan. While the QHSR
developed a strategic framework, it remains unclear to what extent
these efforts are impacting specific programs and operations at the
component level.
Do you know of any component-level programs or operations that have
changed, or been cancelled or initiated as a result of the prior QHSR
or the current QHSR?
Question 1b. To what extent have/will components adjust their own
strategies to be in line with the QHSR?
Answer. One of the results of the first QHSR was the recognition of
the importance of having a valid National risk assessment. The methods
for National risk assessment developed through the first QHSR were then
applied in this second QHSR. However, as I stated in my testimony, the
next challenge for DHS is to connect the strategic planning based on
this assessment to decisions about budgets and program priorities. To
this end, it is important that the Department complete the steps
outlined in the Secretary's Unity of Effort memo that can implement
budget processes and build the analytic capability that will allow
components to adjust their own strategies and programs to be in line
with the guidance in the second QHSR.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Henry H. Willis
Question 1. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with
assessing its organizational structure, including its ``management
systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems,
procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.'' This was
not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the
Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public
document expose the country to risk?
Answer. I am not aware of the reasons why the Department decided
not to address issues related to management more explicitly or in
greater detail. I do not believe that doing so in a public document
would have exposed the country to greater risk.
Question 2. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the
QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During
the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously
going through the process of an administration and political party
change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the
same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a
QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome--
new administration and party and same--affect the QHSR process and
should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not
occur during the same year as the Presidential election?
Answer. As indicated in this question, both the first and second
QHSRs were required to be completed as new leadership stepped into DHS.
This timing led to delays in the release of the reports and limited the
utility of the reports to the Department leadership Congress as a tool
for strategic planning and budgeting. The QHSR would be better timed if
it were initiated when new leadership came aboard (rather than
completed at that time) and was developed and released in coordination
with the President's budget request, so that it could serve as
strategic guidance for that request.
Question 3. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How
could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some
relationship to the budget request?
Answer. To reiterate a few points made in my written testimony and
in the responses to questions above, there are two steps that could be
taken to mature the QHSR process so that it will bear a relationship to
the budget request. First, the Secretary's Unity of Effort memo
identifies steps to implement budget processes and build analytic
capability to connect budget decision making to the strategic guidance
in the QHSR. Second, the QHSR would be a more effective strategic
planning tool if it were scheduled to be initiated when new leadership
comes on board at the Department and it was developed and released in
coordination with the budget request.
Question 4. When examining the statutory requirements for what
should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the
changing homeland security environment, are these still the best
requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative
additions or deletions to the requirements?
Answer. The statutory requirement for a QHSR reinforces the
importance of strategic planning for DHS and the stated requirements
are appropriate for such a review and remain relevant.
Question 5. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders
were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more
open and transparent?
Answer. I am supportive of greater transparency for the analysis
and information to support strategic planning for homeland security.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of DHS at countering terrorism, managing
risks from disasters, and facilitating trade and travel depends on the
ability of State and local governments, private companies, and non-
government organizations to contribute to making the Nation safer, more
secure, and more prosperous. When these organizations have more
information, they are in a better position to offer solutions.
Question 6. The Secretary's Unity of Effort memo, in addition to
the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a
unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level
officials remain spread out in various offices across the National
Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of
support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would
a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its
mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical
infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?
Answer. As mentioned in my testimony, the Secretary's Unity of
Effort memo includes several steps that can improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of the Department. I believe that close cooperation
between the Secretary and Congress will greatly improve DHS's ability
to implement these initiatives. I have not examined how consolidation
of headquarters at St. Elizabeths would affect management of DHS.
However, to the extent a convincing case can be made that a
consolidated headquarters would improve management, it would deserve
support by Congress.
Questions From Honorable Jeff Duncan for Elaine C. Duke
Question 1a. In your written testimony, you discuss the Secretary's
``Unity of Effort'' and the necessity of meetings and engagement by the
Secretary, deputy secretary, and the component heads.
After 11 years of a Department more resembling a collection of
independent components, how critical is Unity of Effort in protecting
the Nation's homeland?
Answer. The Unity of Effort is very critical to effectively
executing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission to
protect the Nation's homeland. The Unity of Effort will improve the
effectiveness of mission operations. It will serve to close gaps in
mission scope and delivery. It will position DHS to execute the
missions of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) more
seamlessly, with better communications, and with integrated roles and
responsibilities. It will position DHS to better understand the touch
points between the components' unique missions and manage those
integration points for better mission execution.
Additionally, the Unity of Effort will improve the efficiency of
DHS. It will drive efficient allocation of resources by eliminating
redundancies in systems, services, and aligning missions. It will help
position the business functions to more cohesively support mission
execution in leadership, resource allocation, policy and governance,
and performance measurement.
Question 1b. What are the challenges to focusing the various
component efforts on a unified DHS strategy versus an individual
component approach?
Answer. The challenges to focusing the various component efforts on
a unified DSH strategy versus an individual component approach start
with trust. Each component is passionate about its mission, and fears
that joining with the other components may hinder its ability to meet
its mission. That is one reason why the leadership councils formed
under the Unity of Effort are so crucial. Trust must start with the
most senior leaders. An additional challenge to a unified strategy is
developing an optimal balance between constancy and flexibility. DHS
must develop a unified, constant infrastructure to be efficient and
consistent in delivery services and mission. Yet, it must maintain the
flexibility to adapt to an evolving threat and be nimble and addressing
the threats.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Elaine C. Duke
Question 1. Ms. Duke, a section on Maturing Management was not
included in the 2009 QHSR. To some extent; however, it was included in
the subsequent Bottom-up Review. The current QHSR likewise did not
include the requisite assessment of the Department's management
functions. As you know, many aspects of the Department management
functions remain on the Government Accountability Office High-Risk List
and continue to pose a challenge for DHS. What should we, as Congress,
look to for management issues from the QHSR since there will not be
another Bottom-up Review? Should Congress consider mandating a
``Bottom-up Review'' process that could be released on a quarterly
basis as a companion to the QHSR?
Answer. I believe continued oversight on the implementation of the
Unity of Effort would yield more positive maturation and integration of
management functions than another Bottom-Up Review. DHS has matured to
the level that it has a relatively comprehensive understanding of the
``as is'', related to its missions and how they are accomplished. The
next step to maturity is the optimal unity of both management and
mission delivery. I stress optimal because either maximizing or
minimizing unity will not serve DHS or our Nation well. Rather than
another look at the relatively consistent mission set, I recommend
concentrating continued oversight on development and implementation of
the Unity of Effort initiatives set for by Secretary Johnson, since
they will provide the sustained progress toward executing the QHSR
missions.
Question 2. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with
assessing its organizational structure, including its ``management
systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems,
procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.'' This was
not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the
Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public
document expose the country to risk?
Answer. I do not know why DHS did not include the QHSR requirement
to assess its organizational structure, including its ``management
systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems,
procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure'' in the
recent QHSR. DHS's efforts to date regarding this segment of the QHSR
requirement are discussed at least in part in part in its reports to
the General Accountability Office related to its High-Risk report on
Management Integration. The management system is further defined in
Secretary Johnson's Unity of Effort memo. The Unity of Effort, as
proposed, will align mission and management into a more cohesive,
integrated system. If executed, I believe it would improve our Nation's
homeland security.
Question 3. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the
QHSR every 4 years, consistent with the Presidential election. During
the preparation of the first QHSR, the Department was simultaneously
going through the process of an administration and political party
change. This time, the administration and political party stayed the
same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a
QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome--
new administration and party and same--affect the QHSR process and
should Congress reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not
occur during the same year as the Presidential election?
Answer. I believe that the majority of the DHS mission, at the
strategic level, is not political. If you look at the mission sets in
the recent QHSR, I think both new and old administrations and parties
would believe they are the key missions, and the core of homeland
security. There may be some political disparity when it comes to more
detailed execution of those mission sets. For example, immigration
enforcement, screening technologies and privacy implications, and
border technology all may be executed differently depending on the
administration and party in control of Congress. But I do think that
there is danger in aligning DHS's main mission set to political events.
The need to protect the homeland is a continuous, fairly constant
requirement. I suggest a potential way to move forward would be to
allow the QHSR to stay strategic and relatively politically neutral,
done every 4 years, to provide the constancy of purpose to DHS. And
then require a DHS strategic planning document, which provides more
content on how those missions will be executed, at key events such as a
new administration, or on a set periodic basis.
Question 4. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How
could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some
relationship to the budget request?
Answer. DHS could mature the QHSR so it would bear relationship to
the budget request by including a section on the management of DHS, as
currently required by the QSHR legislation. There is a danger in
managing mission and management separately. Management only exists to
enable mission, and mission can be most effectively delivered with good
management. They are two pieces of a single puzzle, and setting a
strategy for them individually sub-optimizes both. My recommendation is
that in a future QHSR or similar document, the two are addressed
simultaneously, with the mission outlining the ``what'' DHS will do,
and the management section outlining the ``how'' DHS will do it, in
terms of resource allocation (dollars and people), process, system,
jointness, metrics, etc. I do believe the Secretary's Unity of Effort
plan does address the QHSR requirement on management, and would
ultimately ensure resources are appropriately, effectively, and
efficiently aligned to mission priorities.
Question 5. When examining the statutory requirements for what
should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the
changing homeland security environment, are these still the best
requirements, in your opinion, or should there be any legislative
additions or deletions to the requirements?
Answer. I think the current QHSR language is comprehensive and
appropriately strategic. I do not think the language of the mandate
needs to be modified, only the actual report needs to be regularly
updated (as required every 4 years) to adapt to the changing homeland
security environment and threats.
Question 6. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders
were not made public. In your opinion could the process have been more
open and transparent?
Answer. I believe DHS, and any department, should have some ability
to go through some level of deliberations within itself. This is
necessary for open and honest communications in the deliberative
process. One way the process could be more transparent, if that is
necessary, is to include a summary discussion of some of the trade-offs
and alternatives, as part of the final report supporting documentation.
This provides an open and transparent look at alternatives and
decisions that had to be made, while appropriately protecting the
deliberative process.
Question 7. The Secretary's Unity of Effort memo, in addition to
the numerous cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a
unified cohesive DHS; yet, its component agencies and high-level
officials remain spread out in various offices across the National
Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a lack of
support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would
a consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its
mission? And do you believe that consolidating DHS's physical
infrastructure supports the Secretary's Unity of Effort?
Answer. The geographic dispersion of DHS's components throughout
the NCR does hinder the speed at which DHS can build its unity. The
lack of consolidated headquarters is detrimental for several reasons,
most importantly the fact that DHS does not have a joint operations
center from which the Secretary can run incident response in
conjunction with his component heads. The multiple, independent
component operations centers fuel autonomous operations and hinders
jointness. Additionally, the lack of consolidated headquarters hinders
DHS's ability to build a unified culture. Informal communications and
professional relationship-building is difficult, and without the
personal connections, trust, understanding, and cohesiveness are more
difficult to establish. I do understand the investment for St.
Elizabeths is substantial, and know that in the current budget
situation funding the headquarters is of great concern for many
parties. I think that the unity can be established with the current
environment, but do think that it will take longer and may not be as
complete of a unification as DHS would experience with a consolidated
headquarters.