[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FIRST RESPONDERS: SHARING LESSONS LEARNED FROM
PAST ATTACKS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-71
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
Witnesses
Mr. John Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence and
Counterterrorism, New York City Police Department, New York,
New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. James H. Schwartz, Chief, Arlington County Fire Department,
Arlington, Virginia:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. James Hooley, Chief, Boston Emergency Medical Services:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Dr. Brian A. Jackson, Director, Rand Safety and Justice Program,
The Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John Miller........ 55
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for James H. Schwartz.. 55
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for James Hooley....... 56
Questions From Honorable Susan W. Brooks for James Hooley........ 57
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Brian A. Jackson... 58
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FIRST RESPONDERS: SHARING LESSONS LEARNED FROM
PAST ATTACKS
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Wednesday, June 18, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, King, Broun, Barletta,
Hudson, Brooks, Sanford, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Clarke,
Keating, Payne, and Vela.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to examine
testimony regarding the critical role first responders play in
the protection of the homeland.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The United States continues to face an ever-evolving
terrorist threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and others. We
are seeing the rise of radical Islam in Africa, attacks by the
Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the civil war in Syria
has provided a safe haven for terrorists to train, which is now
flowing deep into Iraq. As I speak, a terrorist organization
too extreme for al-Qaeda continues to march towards Baghdad
leaving a trail of death, looting, and prison breaks.
These terrorists, and others around the world like AQAP,
are intent on attacking the homeland. Just as we must continue
to combat those threats overseas, we must also remain vigilant
at home and be prepared to respond to attacks that reach our
shores.
Today's hearing examines these terrorist events; first
responder efforts before, during, and after these attacks; and
the lessons learned.
Each day, first responders save lives and enhance the
overall resiliency of our Nation. However, the 9/11 terrorist
attacks forever changed the role of our emergency response
providers. Since that day, these brave men and women have been
the first on the scene during the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood
and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, among others.
These tragic events remind us of the critical role first
responders play in the Nation's ability to react quickly,
whether it be to a terrorist attack or natural disaster.
Lessons learned from previous efforts are vital to increasing
our ability to prepare for and respond to future incidents.
We owe it to these heroes and the American people to focus
our efforts on doing all we can to ensure first responders are
properly prepared for whatever catastrophe they encounter. From
every incident, there are aspects of the response that went
well and things that can be improved. We can and must learn
from both.
This committee was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to
better protect the American people against a terrorist attack
and fulfill its mission by ensuring that first responders, law
enforcement personnel, and the Department of Homeland Security
have the capabilities, training, and tools needed to prepare
for, to prevent, and respond to future attacks.
In addition to the vital response and recovery mission,
first responders are critical partners in preventing attacks.
State and local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical
responders know their communities and will be the first to
identify suspicious behavior and other potential security
threats. First responders should have access to real-time
threat and suspicious behavior reports, which are key to
directing and detecting and stopping terrorism.
In turn, first responders must have access to all
applicable Federal information so that they can do their job to
the best of their ability. This was clear in the tragic Boston
bombing last year.
Members of this committee are committed to seeing that the
recommendations in the Boston Marathon bombing report are
implemented, and most importantly, that information sharing
between Federal, State, and local partners is improved.
I would like to recognize the first responders testifying
here before us today, as well as those in the audience and
across the country, for always answering the call. A simple
``thank you'' is not enough to express our gratitude for your
efforts to protect the American people.
Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
I want to thank the Chairman for holding today's hearing.
I also want to recognize the volunteers, first responders,
and the citizens affected by the powerful tornadoes that ripped
through the small town of Pilger, Nebraska. In a time of
catastrophe, such as this, the first responder community runs
to unsettled and unknown territory while others flee to safety.
I also thank the witnesses for their service and their
dedication. Chief Schwartz, Deputy Commissioner Miller, and
Chief Hooley are gentlemen who deserve commendation for their
efforts.
I also thank Dr. Jackson for recognizing their efforts in
his research.
Resilience and response are two of the reasons why almost a
decade after September 11 New York City remains a global
powerhouse. Resilience and response are two of the reasons why
over 30,000 military and civilian personnel continue to serve
at our Nation's defense headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.
Resilience and response are two of the reasons why a year after
the Boston Marathon bombing, Boston remains strong.
Mr. Chairman, as we rightfully commend today's panel, it
would be a disservice to them not to address one of their main
needs, which is funding.
In April this committee held a hearing on the Boston
Marathon bombing. At that hearing Sergeant Pugliese, of the
Watertown Police Department, testified that local municipal
governments are not financially equipped to take on the
increasing burden of catastrophic attacks, like Boston.
Last year at the Committee on Homeland Security's first
hearing on the Boston Marathon bombing former Commissioner
Davis stated that without grant funding the response would have
been much less comprehensive than it was, and without the
exercises supported through the Urban Area Security Initiative
funding there would be more people who died in those attacks.
Even today, Chief Schwartz is testifying that Federal grants
serve as an incentive for bringing all agencies together before
a terrorist event happens.
Throughout several Congresses, Members have heard about the
importance of these grant programs and success stories
involving them. Accordingly, I urge Members to oppose the
administration's proposal to morph the Homeland Security Grant
Program into an all-hazards grant. That proposal would shift
focus away from supporting State and local efforts to develop
terrorism-related prevention and preparedness capabilities.
I am not convinced that the administration's underfunded
grant consolidation proposal would provide sufficient support
for first responders across America to build and maintain the
capabilities necessary to respond effectively. I cannot support
any grant reform proposal until I am convinced that it would
provide the support necessary to maintain terrorism
preparedness capabilities we have spent over a decade building.
Also I agree with the Chairman that we cannot ignore the
information sharing between Federal, State, and local
authorities needs strengthening. Since September 11,
information-sharing silos that the 9/11 commissioners
recommended be addressed continue to be exposed after tragic
events. We need to work together to develop ways to fix this
problem post-haste.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we continue this
conversation with the Department of Homeland Security. We will
hear about the challenges first responders have with working
with both FEMA and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, but
we need to open hearings on what the Department is doing to
address these matters. In that forum we may find ways that we
can use our legislative platform to assist both DHS and the
first-responder community.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 18, 2014
I want to recognize the volunteers, first responders, and the
citizens affected by the powerful tornadoes that ripped through the
small town of Pliger, Nebraska. In a time of catastrophe such as this,
the first responder community runs to unsettled and unknown territory
while others flee to safety.
I also thank the witnesses for their service and dedication. Chief
Schwartz, Deputy Commissioner Miller, and Chief Hooley are gentlemen
who deserve commendation for their efforts. I also thank Dr. Jackson
for recognizing their efforts in his research. Resilience and response
are two of the reasons why almost a decade after September 11, New York
City remains a global powerhouse. Resilience and response are two of
the reasons why over 30,000 military and civilian personnel continue to
serve at our Nation's defense headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.
Resilience and response are two of the reasons why a year after the
Boston Marathon bombings, Boston remains strong.
Mr. Chairman, as we rightfully commend today's panel, it would be a
disservice to them not to address one of their main needs which is
funding. In April, this committee held a hearing on the Boston Marathon
bombing. At that hearing, Sergeant Pugliese of the Watertown Police
testified that local municipal governments are not financially equipped
to take on the increasing burden of catastrophic attacks like Boston.
Last year, at the Committee on Homeland Security's first hearing on
the Boston Marathon bombings, former Commissioner Davis stated that
without grant funding, the ``response would have been much less
comprehensive than it was'' and without the exercises supported through
Urban Area Security Initiative funding, ``there would be more people
who died in those attacks.'' And even today, Chief Schwartz is
testifying that Federal grants serve as an incentive for bringing all
agencies together before a terrorist event happens.
Throughout several Congresses, Members have heard about the
importance of these grant programs and success stories involving them.
Accordingly, I urge Members to oppose the administration's proposal to
morph the Homeland Security Grant Program into an all-hazards grant.
That proposal would shift focus away from supporting State and local
efforts to develop terrorism-related prevention and preparedness
capabilities. I am not convinced that the administration's underfunded
grant consolidation proposal would provide sufficient support for first
responders across America to build and maintain the capabilities
necessary to respond effectively. I cannot support any grant reform
proposal until I am convinced that it would provide the support
necessary to maintain terrorism-preparedness capabilities we have spent
over a decade building.
Also, I agree with the Chairman that we cannot ignore that
information sharing between Federal, State, and local authorities needs
strengthening. Since September 11, information-sharing silos that the
9/11 Commissioners recommended be addressed continue to be exposed
after tragic events. We need to work together to develop ways to fix
this problem post haste.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we continue this conversation
with the Department of Homeland Security. We will hear about the
challenges first responders have with working with both FEMA and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis. But we need open hearings on what
the Department is doing to address these matters. In that forum, we may
find ways that we can use our legislative platform to assist both DHS
and the first-responder community.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members are reminded they may submit opening
statements for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel here before us
today.
First, Deputy Commissioner John Miller. He is the deputy
commissioner of intelligence for the New York City Police
Department. Prior to this position, he was the senior
correspondent for CBS News.
Commissioner Miller is also a former ABC News reporter,
perhaps best known for conducting a May 1998 interview with
Osama bin Laden. He is a former associate deputy director of
national intelligence for analytical transformation and
technology; and he was an assistant director of public affairs
for the FBI, serving as the bureau's National spokesman.
Thank you, sir, for being here today.
Next we have Chief James Schwartz--if we could have some
water? Chief James Schwartz is the chief of Arlington County
Fire Department, a position he has held since 2004. The
Arlington County Fire Department consists of 320 personnel and
serves a community of 26 square miles and 210,000 residents.
The department was the lead agency for the response to the
September 11 attack at the Pentagon.
Additionally, Chief Schwartz chairs the International
Association of Fire Chiefs' Committee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security and served on the advisory council for the Interagency
Threat Assessment Coordinating Group at the National
Counterterrorism Center.
Thank you, sir, for being here today, as well.
Next we have Chief James Hooley, is the chief of the Boston
Emergency Medical Services, a public safety agency that
provides basic life support and advanced life support
throughout the city of Boston. Boston EMS employs over 350 EMTs
and paramedics who responded to an average of 300 emergencies
per day.
A 32-year veteran of Boston EMS, he was appointed to the
position in 2010. Prior to that he served as superintendent and
chief.
What was left out of here I want to mention is the heroic
efforts you and your force performed after the tragic events in
Boston to save so many lives. With 260 maimed and injured, it
is nothing short of a miracle that none of those maimed and
injured actually died, and I want to thank you for those heroic
efforts.
Finally, Dr. Brian Jackson is senior physical scientist at
the RAND Corporation, director of RAND's safety and justice
program, and a professor at Pardee RAND Graduate School. He
focuses on homeland security, terrorism preparedness, safety
management, and large-scale emergency response situations.
The full written statements of the witnesses will appear in
the record.
Chairman now recognizes Commissioner Miller for 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, INTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEW
YORK, NEW YORK
Commissioner Miller. Congressman McCaul, Congresswoman
Clarke, Congressman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members
of the committee, in the last 12\1/2\ years since September 11
the fight against al-Qaeda and its network has uncovered a very
adaptable enemy that has continued to mature in its ability to
spread its message as well as shift in its shape and its
tactics. In response, the law enforcement community across the
country has had to undergo fundamental changes.
In New York City, like every city and town, we have had to
reevaluate everything, from how we gather and analyze
intelligence to how we plan to police major events. After 9/11
the New York City Police Department, under the leadership of
Police Commissioner Ray Kelly, formed two new bureaus--the
Intelligence Bureau and the Counterterrorism Bureau--to
spearhead our efforts and Commissioner Bratton as well as Mayor
de Blasio have made it clear that they would like to continue
to build on, modernize, and sustain those efforts to protect
the largest city in America from terrorist activity.
Today I want to spend a little time discussing lessons
learned not just from 9/11 but also from other terrorist plots
since then. Looking at some of the most recent and most
significant, we take these lessons: We have learned that if al-
Qaeda can find sympathizing people on U.S. soil that they will
turn them into terrorists, willing and able to attack the very
country they call home.
The cases of Najibullah Zazi, in the New York City subways
plot in 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square truck bomb
plot in 2010, are just two examples of Americans, both
recruited by al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, who attempted
bombing of New York City. Law enforcement and intelligence was
critical in thwarting those attacks.
We have also come to learn the power of al-Qaeda's use of
social media and on-line messaging for operations and
recruiting and communications. The Boston Marathon bombings, if
anything, confirmed what we already always suspected, which is
that major public events with large crowds are going to
continue to be a terrorist target.
The instructions likely used by the Boston Marathon bombers
to make pressure cooker bombs came from the now infamous
article in al-Qaeda's on-line publication, Inspire magazine,
``How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.'' Those same
instructions were used by Jose Pimentel in New York City, who
built bombs intending to blow up military and recruiting
stations as well as other targets.
Recent issues of Inspire magazine call for al-Qaeda's
followers to attack New York City as well as Washington, DC;
Los Angeles; and Chicago. It is specific as to targets and
timing.
The fact that we have seen people accept this call to arms
reminds us that these threats can emanate from a camp hidden in
the tribal areas of Pakistan or from an apartment in the
Washington Heights section of Manhattan.
Counterterrorism is a major component of city planning and
requires significant financial investments. Whether it is the
Israeli Day Parade, which we had just a couple of weeks ago on
5th Avenue, or the New York City Marathon, each plan comes with
a complex what we call ``counterterrorism overlay.''
Some of it you see, some of it is invisible, but all of it
requires additional equipment, additional officers,
intelligence analysts, detectives, and investigators. We deploy
specialized equipment, from radiation detection pagers worn on
people's belts to detect a dirty bomb or dispersal device
attack, to a portable network of cameras to scan crowds.
To that end, I would like to thank this committee, the
Congress, the President, the Department of Homeland Security
for the continued critical support to New York City's
Counterterrorism Grant funding. This funding has played a
crucial role in helping the NYPD carry out its mission of
keeping the city and its citizens safe.
The work and the equipment that goes with it, along with
the personnel, is very expensive. The Counterterrorism Bureau
receives money from eight funding streams, including UASI, for
a total of $169.8 million. We have utilized these funds to
deploy and develop adaptive approaches to countering threats,
be they foreign or domestic.
Two major Federally-supported counterterrorism programs
that I am talking about refer to:
The Domain Awareness System: It is an innovative law
enforcement application that aggregates real-time data from
counterterrorism sensors and law enforcement databases,
providing members of the NYPD with a comprehensive view of
potential threats as well as criminal activities.
The Securing the Cities Program: This is a program through
which the NYPD purchases but also distributes radiation
detection equipment to over 150 law enforcement and public
safety agencies across the region, providing training,
conducting exercises, and this develops a region-wide concept
of operations for radiation detection.
These programs are critical to protecting New Yorkers, the
region, and the Nation, and funding them remains an urgent
priority.
Information sharing is also crucial to our efforts.
Regional efforts in training and information sharing among law
enforcement and first responders provide us with the necessary
comprehensive response.
The NYPD is the lead agency for Securing the Cities
Initiative, that interagency collaboration and capacity-
building effort to protect the metropolitan region from nuclear
or radiological attack. Examples of information sharing include
interagency conference calls before major events; interagency
meetings and tabletops with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies to discuss potential threats.
Public-private partnerships are also critical for first
responders. The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, or LMSI,
is a public-private partnership that creates an information-
sharing environment with the private sector, the NYPD, and
other first responder agencies. This partnership leverages the
security resources in place at some of the city's most high-
profile target buildings and institutions, but it also forges
partnerships that will facilitate an integrated response to
incidents if there is an incident at any of these facilities or
in that area.
The NYPD SHIELD program is a partnership with private-
sector security managers with the goal of protecting the city
from a terrorist attack. SHIELD includes members who work in a
wide range of critical sectors, including the energy sector,
and exchange information of concern as regards to terrorism and
security.
On the Federal level, our Federal partners at DHS provide
access to the Homeland Security Data Network, or HSDN, that
enables information exchanges of both tactical and strategic
intelligence and other homeland security information. The
NYPD's partnership with the FBI also provides the NYPD with
access to National Classified intelligence, but it is also a
means by which the NYPD can disseminate its own intelligence
and analysis at the Federal level to other Federal law
enforcement agencies.
We continue to train in table-tops, live field exercises
with multiple agencies to hone our response to the potential of
another terrorist attack or active-shooter situation, or even
natural disaster. With every drill, with every exercise, we
glean lessons to better respond to real-world security threats.
The lessons learned post-9/11 focus on two key elements I
have highlighted today. Resources: It takes additional
resources--specialized equipment, training, and more money--to
ensure police and first responders can effectively respond to
events.
And coordination: We have learned again and again about the
importance of sharing information and coordinating efforts.
This is true on the Federal, State, and local level. We are
safer and stronger when we work together as regions and
coordinate across a range of first-responder entities.
The NYPD is a proud partner with the Federal Government in
combating the threats to our National security. I thank you
again, and especially this committee, for all your help to
ensure the safety of the city of New York from these threats,
and I pass along the thanks of our police commissioner, Bill
Bratton, and Mayor de Blasio, in your support for those
efforts.
[The prepared statement of Commissioner Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Miller
June 18, 2014
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee.
In the 12\1/2\ years since the horrific events of September 11,
2001, the fight against al-Qaeda and its network has uncovered an
adaptable enemy that has continued to mature in its ability to spread
its message as well as shift in shape and tactics. In response, the law
enforcement community has undergone fundamental changes. In New York
City, like every city and town, we have had to re-evaluate everything
from how we gather and analyze intelligence, to how we plan for and
police major public events. After 9/11, the New York City Police
Department formed two new Bureaus, the Intelligence Bureau and the
Counterterrorism Bureau, to spear-head our efforts to protect the
Nation's largest city from terrorist activity.
Today, we examine the lessons learned not just from the 9/11
attacks, but also from the 16 other plots devised by al-Qaeda, or from
those taking its cues, which have targeted New York City. Looking at
some of the most recent and most significant, we take these lessons.
In 2009, Najibullah Zazi and three other men plotted to place more
than a dozen backpacks filled with explosives on the New York subways.
This plot was intended to kill scores of people and injure many more.
Zazi traveled with his friends from Queens to Afghanistan in order to
fight U.S. Forces, however, al-Qaeda recruited them to return to New
York to launch these attacks once it was discovered that they were
Americans, flying under the radar, with U.S. Passports that would
easily allow them to return to the United States. Zazi was trained in
explosives by none other than Rashid Rauch, who was al-Qaeda's top
explosives expert at the time. Zazi also met with Saleh al-Somali, al-
Qaeda's chief of external operations. From this case, we have learned
that if al-Qaeda can find U.S. persons who are willing to fight and die
in the fields of Afghanistan, they have a greater advantage in turning
them back to launch attacks on the country they once called home.
This lesson was reinforced by the case of Faisal Shahzad. He
traveled to Pakistan in an attempt to join fighters attacking U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, but the Pakistani Taliban quickly identified him
as an individual who could return to the United States and fight the
war in our streets. Shahzad placed a large amount of explosives in an
SUV in Times Square on May 1, 2010. However, a small technical error in
his bomb-making saved our crowded Theater District in the streets off
Times Square from destruction. We also learned from Shahzad that his
pre-operational surveillance was conducted in a way that was unlikely
to attract the attention of law enforcement. He chose his target by
watching crowded conditions on different streets through streaming
video over the internet from cameras in and around Times Square.
We have also come to learn the power of al-Qaeda's use of social
media and on-line messaging to operatives that the terrorist leaders
will never meet, or in some cases, may never even know are followers.
Jose Pimentel was a 27-year-old New Yorker who followed al-Qaeda's
message through its on-line publication, Inspire magazine as well as
the videos extolling violence by the charismatic al-Qaeda commander
Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki, born in New Mexico, spoke in perfect,
unaccented English and his call to violence has resonated with a dozen
plotters in the United States who have sought to kill their fellow
Americans. Pimentel was arrested by NYPD Emergency Service Unit and
Intelligence Bureau detectives while putting the final touches on a
bomb he hoped to use to attack military recruiting stations.
Mohammed Quazi Nafis came to New York from Bangladesh and, inspired
by al-Qaeda's magazine and al-Awlaki's videos, he set out to find
partners to attack New York City's financial hub near Wall Street. He
parked what he believed to be a thousand-pound bomb, hidden in the back
of a white van, in front of the U.S. Federal Reserve and placed six
calls from his cell phone to the number he thought was connected to the
bomb's detonator. However, he had no idea that the bomb was designed by
the FBI's New York Joint Terrorist Task Force not to function.
We learned from the Boston Marathon bombing what we already
suspected; major public events, which attract large crowds, continue to
be a terrorist target. The instructions likely used by the Boston
bombers to make the pressure-cooker bomb came from the now infamous
article, ``How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,'' in Inspire
magazine. Those same instructions were used by Jose Pimentel in New
York City.
Recent issues of Inspire magazine feature stories idolizing the
Marathon bombers as well as Jose Pimentel. The latest issue contains a
set of instructions for a car bomb against a backdrop of pictures of
Times Square. The article calls for those who believe in al-Qaeda's
message to attack New York as well as Washington DC, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and other major cities. The fact that we have seen people
accept this call to arms, and to use the instructions that appear in
Inspire magazine and similar publications, reminds us that the threat
from al-Qaeda, whether through its central command, or its prolific
propaganda machine, is still real. It can emanate from a camp hidden in
the tribal areas of Pakistan or from an apartment in the Washington
Heights section of Manhattan.
This is why it takes additional resources, specialized equipment,
and more money to police events that used to simply require police
personnel for crowd and traffic control. Whether it is the Israeli Day
Parade, the Super Bowl Boulevard events in Times Square this past
February, or the New York City Marathon, each plan comes with a complex
counterterrorism overlay that requires additional equipment, officers,
and investigators. We deploy specialized equipment from radiation
detection pagers to detect a dispersal device attack to a portable
network of cameras to scan the crowds. To that end, I would like to
thank the committee, the Congress, and the Department of Homeland
Security for the continued support to New York City's counterterrorism
grant funding. This funding has played a crucial role in helping the
NYPD carry out its mission of keeping the city and its citizens safe.
It might be helpful to break that down:
The Counterterrorism Bureau receives money from 8 funding streams
and 22 active grants, for a total of $169.8 million. These sources are:
Urban Areas Security Initiative
State Homeland Security Grant
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
State Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
Securing the Cities
Transit Security Grant Program
Port Security Grant Program
National Nuclear Security Administration
Major Counterterrorism Bureau grant-funded projects include:
Domain Awareness System.--An innovative law enforcement
application that aggregates real-time data from
counterterrorism sensors and law enforcement databases,
providing members of the service with a comprehensive view of
potential threats and criminal activity.
Securing the Cities Program.--The NYPD purchases and
distributes radiation detection equipment to over 150 law
enforcement and public safety agencies across the region,
provides training, conducts exercises, and develops a region-
wide Concept of Operations for radiation detection.
Regional Counterterrorism Training
World Trade Center Campus Security Plan and Environmental
Impact Statement.--A comprehensive vehicle security perimeter
around the World Trade Center Campus, increasing stand-off
distances from the buildings to reduce the risk of catastrophic
damage from a vehicle-borne explosive device.
Explosive Detection Equipment Program
Transit Security-Related Programs and Purchases
Port Security-Related Programs and Purchases
In addition to the grant funding, which is critical to our
counterterrorism mission, information sharing is also crucial to our
efforts. Examples of our information-sharing initiatives include:
The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative is a public-private
partnership that creates an information-sharing environment to
leverage the security resources in place at some of the city's
most targeted buildings and institutions and to forge
partnerships that will facilitate an integrated response to
incidents at these facilities.
The Joint Terrorism Task Force is a natural information-
sharing environment between stakeholders including
investigators, analysts, linguists, and other specialists from
dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The NYPD's partnership with the FBI provides the NYPD with
access to National Classified intelligence and is also a means
by which the NYPD can disseminate its own intelligence and
analysis at the Federal level and to other law enforcement
agencies.
A representative from the Metropolitan Transit Authority
(``MTA''), New York State Courts, Federal Air Marshal Service,
U.S. Marshal Service, and the Department of Homeland Security
(``DHS'') Federal Protective Services are detailed to the
Counterterrorism Division and share information from their
respective agencies.
A Senior Intelligence Officer from the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis disseminates DHS-generated reporting,
information from DHS Fusion Centers, and joint seal products
like Joint Intelligence Bulletins.
The NYPD is the lead agency for the Securing the Cities
Initiative, an inter-agency collaboration and capacity-building
effort to protect the metropolitan region from a nuclear or
radiological attack. Examples of information sharing include
inter-agency conference calls before major events like the
Fourth of July and New Years Eve where Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies discuss potential threats.
NYPD SHIELD is a partnership with private-sector security
managers with the goal of protecting NYC from terrorist attack.
SHIELD includes members who work in a wide range of critical
sectors, including the energy sector, and exchange information
on issues of concern.
DHS provides access to the Homeland Secure Data Network
(``HSDN''). HSDN enables information exchange of both tactical
and strategic intelligence and other homeland security
information up to the SECRET level.
Access to Suspicious Activity Reports.
Using Homeland Security funding and working with DHS partners in
research and development, we have expanded our use of ``Vapor Wake
Dogs'', the bomb detection K-9s that can identify if a suspicious
package left unattended contains explosives, but can also detect the
invisible vapor trail that indicates an explosive in a bag or a
backpack is moving through a crowd on a busy street or public event. We
have helped in the testing and development of virtual simulators that
can put officers in ``active-shooter'' situations where they move down
hallways and face the challenges of identifying shooters, rescuing
hostages, or dealing with the wounded, while making critical tactical
decisions. Controllers at the big screen see the same images being
flashed through the officer's goggles to gauge and critique their
tactical proficiency. We have applied Federal funding to the
acquisition of highly-sensitive radiological detection equipment on-
board our helicopters and harbor units that could detect a nuclear
device aboard a cargo ship miles before it entered New York harbor. We
continue to train, in table-tops and live field exercises with multiple
agencies to hone our response to another terrorist attack, active-
shooter situation, or natural disaster. With every drill, with every
exercise, we glean lessons that will be invaluable if, or more likely
when, we are faced with one of these real-world challenges in our
streets.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
Chairman McCaul. Please give him our thanks, as well.
Just for the record, the first city I visited was New York,
recognizing it is still the biggest target, unfortunately.
Chairman now recognizes Chief Schwartz for--I am sorry,
Chief--yes, Schwartz, for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JAMES H. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY FIRE
DEPARTMENT, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
Chief Schwartz. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee. I want to
thank you all for holding this hearing this morning as we look
at lessons learned from past incidents of terrorism and devise
strategies to better prepare our Nation for future events.
At 9:37 a.m. on September 11, 2001 American Airlines flight
77 crashed into the Pentagon as part of a large-scale attack
upon the United States. I arrived on the incident scene at 9:48
and assumed incident command for the response.
There was an overwhelming response to the incident that
included localities from the National Capital Region, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, and multiple Federal agencies. This
attack resulted in the deaths of 184 people.
Additionally, 106 patients received medical care by EMS and
were transported to local hospitals, care centers, and clinics.
Of those 106, only one person perished during treatment from
her injuries received during the attack.
In the aftermath of that report the county undertook an
after-action report that was eventually funded by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office for Domestic Preparedness. That
report identified 235 recommendations and lessons learned that,
along with other after-action reports in the last 13 years,
have guided decisions that both the Arlington County public
safety agencies and the National Capital Region have made to
improve our preparedness levels.
On 9/11 it was extremely helpful that our fire department
had a good working relationship--an amazing working
relationship, I would say--with the FBI's Washington Field
Office, the Military District of Washington, and other fire and
rescue departments in the National Capital Region. These pre-
existing working relationships at the incident command level
and the existing automatic and mutual aid agreements throughout
the region provided an experienced leadership team and
necessary resources during the opening minutes of the response.
In addition, we were able to use the incident command system to
establish a unified command framework in which other resources
and agencies could operate.
The after-action report also identified a number of
challenges at the incident scene. Despite the coordination at
the command level, we still had to contend with the challenges
of self-dispatching and a lack of proper credentialing that--as
we deployed our resources and strived to establish scene
security.
One of our greatest challenges was in effectively triaging,
treating, and tracking patients during this mass-casualty
event. As has been well-documented, we had problems with
operability and interoperability of our public safety
communication systems, and logistics and resources for a long-
term, large-scale incident proved at that time to be a
challenge.
The Nation since then has transformed its emergency
response system. The Federal Government has now established a
National Preparedness Goal and 31 core capabilities to prevent,
protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from a future incident.
It also sponsored training exercises to improve preparedness
and coordination at all levels of government. The Federal
Government has also spent approximately $37 billion since 2002
on grant programs to support us at the State and local level in
our preparedness efforts.
We have made important achievements to improve the
coordination of response to future acts of terror. The adoption
of the National Incident Management System allows jurisdictions
across the Nation to work together during a response. That
approach and a doctrinaire of using the same incident
management system has assisted greatly in incidents since 9/11.
Multidisciplinary exercises bring together Federal, State,
Tribal, territorial, and local agencies to plan and prepare for
future events. The grants, such as those that we have already
heard about from UASI and those from a previous program known
as MMRS, have long served as incentives to bring stakeholders
to the table to work on the common goals of preparing our
communities.
Since 9/11, one major focus has been the improvement of
public safety communications. This committee has taken a
leading role in addressing this issue.
DHS and its Office of Emergency Communications, and Office
of Interoperability Compatibility, and SAFECOM program are
facilitating improved public safety communications
interoperability. The President and Congress have played a
major role in improving future public safety communications by
establishing the First Responder Network Authority and giving
it the adequate spectrum and funding to establish a Nation-wide
public safety broadband network.
Even though there have been many accomplishments since 9/
11, we are still learning to respond to the threat of
terrorism. For example, there have been many initiatives to
improve information-sharing between Federal, State, Tribal, and
local partners.
However, there are still many barriers. The need for
security clearances is still a barrier for many fire
departments to obtain information about threats in their
communities. In other cases, information may be over-Classified
or not presented properly for practically-minded first-
responder audience trying to develop capabilities necessary for
response.
I want to commend the NCTC's approach to bringing first
responders into the intelligence community to both share
information from our perspective at the local level in the wake
of the sunsetting of the ITACG, the Interagency Threat
Assessment and Coordinating Group, the National
Counterterrorism Center established the JCAT, the Joint
Counterterrorism Assessment Team, that develops intelligence
products with practical information for first responders and
their communities.
We also must continue to focus on reducing barriers to
collaboration. The NIMS adoption requires a change in culture
for many organizations and we need to still bridge both the
organizational and professional biases that are inherent in our
organizations on a daily basis.
We should review NIMS training to ensure that all the
participants in response to an incident are adopting NIMS and
operating within it. Also, we have to support the current
efforts to develop effective, Nation-wide credentialing system.
We also need to make sure that the lessons learned are
being shared across the homeland security enterprise. The
Pentagon response demonstrated that important and diligent
planning and training at a regional-level paid dividends.
So that all stakeholders can learn from each other, we need
to develop a clearinghouse for successful uses of grant
programs and effective policies for countering threats to
terrorism. In other words, when we have a success somewhere in
the country, especially when it is a success realized through
the grant programs, replicating that elsewhere is in everyone's
best interest.
We also need to make sure that local first-responder
agencies are being reimbursed for their mutual aid activities.
In some cases it has taken years for local agencies to be
reimbursed for their participation to responses like Hurricane
Katrina and the October 2007 California wildfires.
In many jurisdictions budgets remain tight, and a local
fire and EMS department cannot wait long to be reimbursed. The
IAFC is concerned that local fire and EMS departments will not
be as responsive in the future to requests for assistance if
challenges to reimbursement remain a problem.
On behalf of the leadership of the Nation's fire and EMS
service, I again want to thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. Using the lessons of 9/11 and the
accomplishments to date from those lessons learned has made the
Nation, I think, stronger and has improved our overall
preparedness.
However, the terrorist threat remains a continuing concern
of all of ours and we must adapt to those concerns. I look
forward to answering your questions as the committee hearing
goes on.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Schwartz follows:]
Prepared Statement of James H. Schwartz
June 18, 2014
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
distinguished Members of the committee. I am James Schwartz, chief of
the Arlington County (Virginia) Fire Department (ACFD) and chairman of
the Terrorism and Homeland Security Committee of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). The IAFC represents the leadership
of the Nation's fire, rescue, and emergency medical services (EMS),
including rural volunteer fire departments, metropolitan career
departments, and suburban combination departments. I thank the
committee for this opportunity to discuss lessons learned from past
incidents of terrorism.
the response to the incident at the pentagon on september 11, 2001
At 9:38 a.m. on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight No. 77
crashed into the Pentagon as part of a large-scale terrorist attack
upon the United States. I arrived on scene at 9:48 a.m. and assumed
incident command of the response. The main focus in the early hours of
the response was to control the fires resulting from the crash and
provide emergency medical care for the victims at the Pentagon. Sadly,
the attack on the Pentagon claimed the lives of 184 people. Overall,
the response to the Pentagon incident involved resources from across
the National Capital Region (NCR), the commonwealth of Virginia, and
multiple Federal agencies. The Arlington County Fire Department was the
lead agency for unified command for 10 days and turned over primacy of
command to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on September 21.
In the early days of the response, Chief Ed Plaugher, my
predecessor, instituted a process for collecting details of the
response, so that they could be analyzed to create lessons learned.
This analysis was produced as an after-action report by the Titan
Systems Corporation that was funded with the support of the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office for Domestic Preparedness. The report
included 235 recommendations and lessons learned. In addition, the 9/11
Commission also reviewed the response to the attack on the Pentagon and
made recommendations based on the analysis. The findings of these
reports have been discussed in articles, conferences, and Congressional
hearings over the past 13 years.
Despite the unfortunate loss of life, analysts have described the
response to the Pentagon attack as being a successful one. During the
response, 106 patients received medical treatment by area hospitals,
care centers, and clinics. Of these 106 patients, only one person
perished during treatment from her injuries.
During the Pentagon response, there were a number of factors that
led to a successful response, mitigation, and recovery effort, and a
number of challenges that the ACFD and other responding agencies faced.
Among the factors that helped us were four major points:
(1) The ACFD had strong pre-existing relationships with surrounding
jurisdictions and the affected Federal agencies.--Due to years
of working together, the ACFD had strong support from the city
of Alexandria; Fairfax, Prince William, and Loudoun county fire
departments; the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority;
and other departments within the NCR. The FBI Washington Field
Office established a fire liaison position in 1998 to work with
local fire departments. The close working relationship between
FBI Special Agent Chris Combs, a former New York firefighter,
and the ACFD incident command staff played an especially
beneficial role in ensuring a coordinated response.
Many of these relationships were developed through planning
exercises. For example, the Military District of Washington
hosts a major table-top exercise each year, which allows the
leaders of Federal and local government organizations to learn
to work together. In addition, Arlington County had conducted a
May 2001 table-top exercise with military authorities about a
scenario which featured a commuter airplane crashing into the
Pentagon. This exercise helped the agencies to become familiar
both with their own disaster plans and the plans of their
military and civilian counterparts.
(2) Unified command through the Incident Command System ensured an
effective response.--Within 3 minutes of the crash, then-
Battalion Chief Bob Cornwell arrived on scene and established
incident command. I arrived within 10 minutes of the crash and
assumed incident command. Because the primary agencies
responding to the incident all understood the Incident Command
System (ICS), we were able to establish incident command within
minutes and most of the other supporting agencies were able to
operate within the framework. The fire departments in Northern
Virginia began using ICS in the late 1980s and the Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments (COG) adopted the National
Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) in March 2001,
so that there already was a common command system in place.
While the Military District of Washington has its own command
structure, it cooperated with the ACFD as a member of unified
command and provided necessary resources.
(3) A well-designed and exercised mutual aid system provided
timely resources.--At the time of the incident, and continuing
today, Arlington County was a partner in the Northern Virginia
Response Agreement wherein the jurisdictions provide automatic
aid based on the closest fire and EMS unit, not jurisdictional
boundaries. The departments operate under the same standard
operating procedures and dispatch protocols. Also, there was a
mutual aid agreement between the member governments of COG
which was developed following the Air Florida crash in 1982.
Finally, there was a State-wide mutual-aid agreement which
enabled outlying jurisdictions to respond or to backfill for
Alexandria and Fairfax County stations, while their units
provided assistance to the ACFD.
(4) The Metropolitan Medical Response System laid the
groundwork for successful coordination between emergency
response and public health officials.--After the 1995 sarin
nerve agent incident in Tokyo, the ACFD realized that American
first response agencies did not have the capability to respond
to such an attack. At the request of Chief Plaugher and the
ACFD leadership, the COG requested Federal assistance in
building this capability. By working with the U.S. Public
Health Service, the ACFD was able to develop the Nation's first
locally-based terrorism response team with a hazardous
materials, medical management, and mass-casualty
decontamination capability, the Metropolitan Medical Strike
Team (MMST). This capability became the Metropolitan Medical
Response System (MMRS) and National Medical Response Team. The
frequent use of exercises by the MMST and technical rescue
teams provided for a coordinated response by the ACFD and
surrounding jurisdictions. For example, the Arlington technical
rescue team was able to integrate its personnel with the
Alexandria team to form three teams of 19 persons each.
Despite the number of factors that led to a successful response,
the ACFD also faced a number of challenges. The seven main challenges
were:
(1) Self-dispatch created problems with the response.--As
news of the attack spread throughout the city, first responders
from around the NCR arrived on scene to help with the response.
These responders began aiding with the response without the
request of the incident commander or knowledge of the host
organization. In every major incident, self-dispatch is a
problem. Unrequested volunteers are well-meaning, but they can
complicate response operations by creating confusion at the
incident scene. Also, if the incident commander is unaware of
their actions, the self-dispatchers can put themselves at risk
if they become injured or trapped. For long-term response and
recovery operations, self-dispatched volunteers frequently do
not come with the necessary food and shelter that they require,
which creates an additional burden on the community trying to
deal with the existing incident.
(2) Public safety communications were problematic during the
Pentagon response.--During the first hours of the response,
cell phone networks were jammed, and cellular priority access
service was not provided to emergency responders. Radio
channels and phone lines to the emergency communications center
also were jammed. In addition, there were problems with
interoperability between jurisdictions. Pagers and runners
proved to be the most effective form of communication. On
September 12, the Incident Command Operations Section re-
organized the fire suppression units into four divisions. This
improved communications during the second day of operations.
(3) The Pentagon response identified room for improvement in
the emergency medical response.--During the response, triage
tags were not used to document the care of victims. In
addition, there was no system to document where patients were
sent for treatment. The after-action report also identified the
need for a clearinghouse hospital to coordinate communications
on behalf of the medical community and disseminate patient
disposition and treatment information.
(4) Logistics proved to be a challenge during the long-term
incident response.--Like many jurisdictions, the ACFD did not
have the logistical infrastructure for dealing with an incident
of the magnitude or duration of the Pentagon response. The
stock of personal protective equipment (PPE), self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA), batteries, medical supplies, and
equipment for reserve vehicles were not sufficient for
sustained operations. Fuel was a major requirement: In the
first 24 hours, 600 gallons of diesel fuel were consumed. The
resupply effort required 12 tractor-trailer loads for shoring
operations, more than 5,000 pairs of gloves, thousands of Tyvek
hazmat protection suits, and hundreds of respirators, SCBA, and
air bottles. The Arlington County government, surrounding
jurisdictions, like Fairfax County, and local business and
relief organizations provided vital assistance in meeting this
challenge.
(5) The need for credible situational information was a
challenge during the incident.--During the first 2 days of the
response, it was important to get accurate situational
information. The Pentagon incident scene had to be evacuated
three times in the first 25 hours due to reports of incoming
aircraft. These evacuations delayed some of the response
operations and caused confusion at the incident scene.
(6) Resources also proved to be a challenge during the
response.--The after-action report identified the need for
Arlington County to have a facility designed and equipped as an
emergency operations center. It also recommended that the
Arlington County Police Department upgrade its mobile command
unit and that the fire department obtain a mobile command
vehicle for on-scene incident management. The report identified
improvements that needed to be completed in the emergency
communications center to enhance communications and operations
during another major incident. In addition, ACFD and other
departments did not have access to a deployable supply of mass
casualty supplies, which meant that medical supplies had to be
taken from EMS units.
(7) The Pentagon response demonstrated the need for a
credentialing system for first responders.--During the response
and recovery effort, it was important to make sure that
authorized first responders had access to the incident scene.
Unfortunately, there was no credentialing system to identify
personnel and their skills. The DHS has worked on a number of
reports and pilot projects over the years to address this
system, but it currently remains unresolved. A First Responder
Access Card was pilot-tested, but it proved to be too expensive
and too hard for jurisdictions to maintain the database. The
DHS' Office of Infrastructure Protection has developed a new
system with State and local first responders, which has been
adopted by four States. Another six States are in the process
of adopting it.
application of lessons learned
The Nation has transformed its emergency response system since the
attack on the Pentagon. The Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11
Commission Report) described the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks,
the attacks themselves, and the response. In addition, it made a number
of recommendations, many of which Congress has implemented through
legislation. Overall, Federal, State, and local agencies; the private
sector; and members of the American public have made many changes over
the years based on the responses to 9/11 to better prepare the Nation
for future terrorist threats.
The Federal Government has become an important partner in the
effort to prepare for the next terrorist attack. It has established a
National Preparedness Goal and 31 core capabilities to help the Nation
to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from an
incident, whether from natural or human cause. In addition, the Federal
Government has sponsored training to respond to terrorist attacks, and
exercises at the Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local level.
The Federal Government also has spent approximately $37 billion since
2002 on grant programs to help State and local agencies develop the
training, equipment, and staffing resources required to meet the
terrorist threat.
One important development is the adoption of the National Incident
Management System (NIMS). The NIMS is the comprehensive, Nation-wide
approach to incident management. Based on the ICS that the fire and
emergency service uses, it allows jurisdictions around the country to
work together in response to an emergency. Much as fire departments
were able to coordinate and respond together during the 9/11 response
to the Pentagon, response agencies from around the Nation will be able
to work together to respond to future all-hazards events using NIMS.
NIMS is scalable and can be used for any National incident, no matter
the size or duration. The NIMS system is focused on defining core
terminology and defining resources, so that a fire chief can request an
asset from anywhere in the United States and have a reasonable
expectation of what is being received. Federal grant programs provide
assistance in NIMS adoption, because a grantee must comply with NIMS in
order to receive grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).
In addition, there is an improved focus on mutual aid and
collaboration. Mutual aid from surrounding departments played a major
role in the response to the Pentagon attack. There is a greater
emphasis now on multidisciplinary exercises that bring Federal, State,
Tribal, territorial, and local agencies together to build partnerships
and prepare for future threats. One of the most important lessons from
the Pentagon response is that it is important for the leaders and staff
of Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local agencies to work and
plan before any incident occurs. These existing relationships will
create an effective response when it is needed. It is important to
highlight the role that Federal grant programs, such as the Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI) and MMRS, serve as incentives for bringing
all of the agencies together before a terrorist attack happens.
One primary focus since the Pentagon incident is the need to
improve communications interoperability. DHS offices, including the
Office of Emergency Communications and the Office for Interoperability
and Compatibility, have played an important role in facilitating
improved communications between State and local public safety agencies.
SAFECOM is a Federal effort, led by local first responders, to improve
multi-jurisdictional and intergovernmental communications
interoperability. It trains emergency responders to be communications
unit leaders during all-hazards emergency operations, and coordinates
grant guidance to use Federal funding to encourage interoperability.
SAFECOM focuses both on technology and the need for jurisdictions to
develop an effective command interoperability plan. President Obama and
Congress also made an important decision to improve future public
safety communications by setting aside 20 MHz for a dedicated Nation-
wide public safety broadband network and establishing the First
Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) to govern it as part of the
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-
96).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ It is important to note that FirstNet will originally cover
only broadband data communications, such as streaming video. Local
first responders will need to continue to rely upon land-mobile radio
for mission-critical voice communications for at least the next 10
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There also is an increased focus on improving information sharing
between Federal, State, and local response agencies. The Federal
Government has helped to fund 78 fusion centers around the Nation that
serve as focal points for receiving, analyzing, and sharing threat-
related information between Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners. In addition, programs like the Nation-wide
Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and ``See Something, Say
Something'' campaign allow first responders to report possible threats
in their jurisdictions.
At the local level, jurisdictions around the NCR implemented
changes to improve their response to future terrorist attacks. Funding
by the UASI program allowed the NCR agencies to develop standardized
regional capabilities, including mass casualty units and ambulance
buses; bomb teams; and air units to refill firefighters' SCBAs during
an incident. The NCR jurisdictions also used UASI funds to interconnect
the local fiber optic networks into one ``NCR Net.'' This system uses
the seamless transition of critical data, including computer-aided
dispatch systems, throughout the region to improve situational
awareness and reduce emergency call processing time.
challenges for the future
It is important to recognize that, even though the attack on the
Pentagon took place 13 years ago, we are still learning to respond to
the threat of terrorism. New threats continuously appear and we must
adapt to them. For example, while we still must prepare for an
explosive attack on a major transportation hub or an act of
bioterrorism, we also have to prepare for the use of fire as a weapon
in a terrorist attack or an active-shooter assault by a small team as
happened in Mumbai in 2008 and Nairobi in 2013.
In recognition of this fact, I would like to raise the following
issues for the committee's jurisdiction:
(1) We need to continue to focus on NIMS adoption.--One of
the keys to any successful response is the ability for various
units to communicate and operate together. The adoption of NIMS
requires a culture change, and we still need to bridge
organizational and professional biases. We need to review NIMS
training and ensure that Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners are all adopting NIMS and operating with
it.
(2) We need to make sure that lessons learned are being
shared to improve the homeland security enterprise.--We need to
better broadcast successful uses of grant programs and
encourage the adoption of successful policies. For example, the
NCR developed a patient tracking system to track victims' basic
information and conditions, which allows them to be distributed
to hospitals and tracked throughout their time in the system.
If another jurisdiction is interested in developing a similar
system, it should be able to find out about it at a
clearinghouse instead of having to re-invent the wheel.
In addition, we should support the development of regional response
systems. The Pentagon response relied upon resources throughout
the Washington and Northern Virginia areas. This coordination
was established years before through the activities of the COG.
One of the IAFC's concerns with the National Preparedness Grant
Program proposal is its State-centric focus, which we think
might break down the sort of regional coordination required to
effectively respond to cross-border incidents.
(3) We need to improve information sharing both about the
potential for terrorist activity and during an incident.--The
attacks on 9/11 exposed a host of information-sharing problems
at the Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local level,
both before and during the incident. During the Pentagon
response, the incident scene had to be evacuated three times,
due to the perceived threat of another incoming airplane. At
least two of these incidents were caused by Federal officials
arriving in Washington to help with the Federal response to
these attacks. The Federal Government needs to make sure that
accurate information is being relayed to the first responders
on scene so that they can make the appropriate decisions.
In addition, problems still remain with the information-sharing
enterprise. The need for a security clearance remains a barrier
for some fire chiefs to access information. However, once a
chief receives information, he or she is limited with what can
be done with it, because command staff may not have clearances.
In other cases, information may be over-Classified or not
written with a practical purpose. The National Counterterrorism
Center's (NCTC) Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team helps to
solve this problem by bringing local first responders to the
NCTC to work with intelligence analysts to develop intelligence
products with practical information that first responders can
use to protect their communities. To help fire chiefs better
understand how to access threat information for their
communities, the IAFC developed the Homeland Security
Intelligence Guide for Fire Chiefs.
(4) We need to ensure that local first-response agencies are
being reimbursed for their mutual aid activities.--The National
Preparedness Goal aims to create a National network of
resources and capabilities. However, it is important to
recognize that State and local governments spend approximately
$218 billion annually for public safety. When a resource is
dispatched from a locality across local or State lines to help
with a mutual aid response, the local first response agency
potentially can lose those resources for weeks and will have to
backfill to protect its community. For major emergencies, such
as Hurricane Katrina and the October 2007 California wildland
fires, a local fire department can be left waiting for months
or even years to get reimbursed. In many jurisdictions, budgets
remain tight and a local fire and EMS department cannot wait
that long to be reimbursed. The IAFC is concerned that fire and
emergency departments will not be as responsive to future
requests for assistance during major National emergencies if
the reimbursement system is not reformed and improved.
conclusion
I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss
the response to the Pentagon attack on 9/11 and the lessons learned
from it. The events of
9/11 were a terrible tragedy. The Nation has made many improvements to
its National preparedness system to prevent such a tragedy from
happening again. However, the terrorist threat continues to adapt, and
we must adapt to meet it. Both the IAFC and I look forward to working
with the committee to face these new challenges and protect our
communities.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Chief Schwartz.
Chairman recognizes Chief Hooley.
STATEMENT OF JAMES HOOLEY, CHIEF, BOSTON EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES
Chief Hooley. Morning. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Members of the committee and staff, I want to
thank you for your invitation to testify today on the critical
role of first responders and sharing lessons learned from past
attacks.
My name is James Hooley. I serve as the chief of department
at Boston EMS.
Boston EMS is responsible for the provision of emergency
medical services for the city of Boston. We are best described
as a municipal third service EMS system, in that we are part of
the city's health department and are separate from fire or
police, who we do work closely with.
I wish to thank the mayor of Boston, Martin J. Walsh, and
the executive director of the Boston Public Health Commission,
Dr. Barbara Ferrer, for their support of my participation here
today.
I also want to acknowledge the dedicated EMTs and
paramedics from across our country, and in particular, the men
and women of Boston EMS who distinguished themselves on April
15, 2013 and play a critical role in ensuring the safety and
health of Boston every day.
On Patriots' Day--Monday, April 15, 2013--two IEDs were
detonated 10 seconds apart on the sidewalk of Boylston Street
in Boston. The sites were crowded with spectators watching the
Boston Marathon.
In an instant a large sporting event and day of civic pride
was transformed into a mass casualty incident. Three persons
were killed immediately while 118 survivors would require
transport by ambulance due to the nature of their injuries.
Within minutes, 30 patients were categorized as critical,
25 as serious, and the remainder with non-life-threatening
injuries. Those critical and serious patients were rapidly
identified, given life-saving treatment, quickly transported to
hospitals. The patients with lower-acuity injuries were
transported next. The scene was cleared within 22 minutes and
the last of the non-acute patients was transported within the
hour.
Boston's hospitals enacted their mass casualty operations
plans to effectively care for this surge of patients. In the
hours that followed, approximately 260 patients would seek
medical treatment.
We acknowledge the loss--excuse me--while acknowledging the
loss, the pain, and the suffering still felt today by survivors
and their loved ones, I can say that the medical response to
this attack was a success. It was successful because of a
system that was built in Boston which put us in the best
posture to succeed.
A lot of things went right. There was extensive pre-event
planning by public safety, hospital, and public health
agencies. Those plans were tested in drills and table-top
exercises. Staging and loading areas had been pre-determined.
A large contingent of EMS and other first responders--
medical volunteers--were prepositioned for the response, and
they did not hesitate to render aid and assist with the
extrication of patients despite the risk of other bombs.
Interoperability worked. We were able to immediately
communicate with all the emergency rooms in the city at once.
We could immediately communicate with several ambulance
services simultaneously.
Boston EMS coordinated the triage care and rapid transport
of 118 individual patients and we distributed them across 9
area hospitals. Patients were triaged, provided essential life-
saving treatment such as tourniquets, and transport was
expedited.
Boston CMED assigned ambulances to hospitals based on their
capacity and capability. Boston has five Level-1 adult trauma
centers as well as a Level-1 trauma center that is specific for
pediatrics.
Private citizens stepped up and became first responders
that day. Information sharing was supported by us having a
medical intelligence center, which was activated.
There were some issues that did not go as well. In the
immediate aftermath there was some apprehension and confusion
as reports of possible other attacks in the city had to be
investigated. In transporting that many acute patients so
quickly, many of whom--who had altered mental status or missing
personal effects, that delayed patient identification.
In some cases, the rules of privacy and restrictions on
sharing patient information resulted in delays in reuniting
patients with their loved ones. This did not impact the
survivors' care, but the frustration felt by their families
added to their stress.
Fortunately, most things did go right that day, but we were
left to wonder the ``what-ifs.'' What if the attack had
occurred somewhere else, at a different time of day, or if
other complicating factors had been present?
There are valuable lessons learned that I can share.
Ambulance surge capacity is vital. As I pointed out, half
the patients required immediate transport. Having sufficient
ambulances available was life-saving.
Planning works. The Boston Regional Mass Casualty Plan
ensures that assisting agencies will have the same language,
procedures, and equipment. Having sound operational plans with
realistic assumptions makes those plans adaptable.
Be prepared. Never assume that an attack, accident, or
natural disaster won't happen in your city. In fact, assume
that it will.
Training works. Over the years we took part in many WMD
trainings and drills, mass-casualty drills, including training
with the Boston Police Department to provide EMS in high-turn
environments, such as bombings or in mass shootings. So when
the real event did occur, our personnel were rehearsed.
EMS can operate in unsecured scenes. As in our case, EMTs
with PPE and trained to understand the risks and taking
precaution can quickly operate and maximize patient survival
while under the protection of law enforcement.
Plan for bystanders to respond. Dozens of bystanders
stepped in to help that day. Many of them had medical training
or prior military experience and they were invaluable. We need
to be able to quickly identify those force multipliers at
future events.
In the days and weeks that followed, we worked hard to
capture the lessons learned. Boston EMS solicited input from
our members, including a series of after-action meetings that
we held, and also we had one-on-one interviews.
We also hosted sessions with our private ambulance partners
who assisted us. We attended the after-action reviews at Boston
hospitals to share best practices and what will improve future
events.
We are incorporating these lessons learned into planning
for future events, and many have already been put into
operation.
I believe that the Federal Government was very helpful in
preparing us for the series of events that occurred that week
in Boston. In the past, Boston has benefitted from State
Homeland Security grant and MMRS programs.
In recent years the UASI program has proven to be very
beneficial at providing training, exercises, PPE, and
equipment. In Boston the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management
effectively administers this grant. Investment areas that
support multiple jurisdictions and disciplines in all hazards
are the ones more likely to be approved.
EMS, hospitals, and public health have had significant
input in the Boston UASI program, and as a result we were all
better prepared.
I would ask Congress to continue their support to the UASI
program, as it has proven value. I would also recommend that
communities across the country that receive Homeland Security
grants include EMS, hospitals, and public health, as their
roles and needs must be represented.
EMS and health care should also have inclusion within
fusion centers. Boston EMS has been fortunate to assign one of
our members to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center since
2007, and that has served us well.
Thank you all for the opportunity to address you today, and
thank you for your on-going efforts in protecting our homeland.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooley follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Hooley
June 18, 2014
boston emergency medical services
Boston EMS is the lead agency for the provision of emergency
medical services within the city of Boston, Massachusetts and a bureau
of the Boston Public Health Commission. As a municipal public safety
department, Boston EMS is separate from both the Police and Fire
Departments, but an active partner in the provision of
9-1-1 emergency services. In 2013, Boston EMS processed 116,637 9-1-1
emergency medical incidents, resulting in 142,341 ambulance responses
and 83,144 patient transports to hospital emergency departments. The
service is comprised of 375 full-time positions, including EMTs and
paramedics, as well as uniformed supervisors and command staff,
certified mechanics, support and administrative personnel. In addition
to the 24 front-line ambulances staffed during peak day and evening
shifts, Boston EMS is responsible for the city's medical 9-1-1 dispatch
center, which supports call-taking, dispatching, and managing the
region's Central Medical Emergency Dispatch (CMED) communication
between EMS personnel and receiving hospitals.
boston marathon and the bombings
The marathon is one of Boston's largest annual special events,
although less than 3 miles of the actual course are within the city
itself. In 2013, there were approximately 27,000 registered runners,
8,000 volunteers, and hundreds of thousands of observers lining the
streets along the route. With the finish line in the heart of Boston,
most medical assets, including both Boston EMS personnel and Boston
Athletic Association volunteers, were concentrated in this area.
At 2:49 p.m. the first explosion occurred by the finish line, at
Copley Square. Ten seconds later the second bomb was detonated. Boston
EMS personnel assigned to the zone by the finish area were able to
immediately confirm there had been explosions. This was followed by a
notification over the radio that ``two devices went off''. All units
were notified to take extreme caution. Personnel at Alpha Medical Tent
were told to prepare to receive patients and hospitals were notified
via a disaster radio that there had been a mass casualty event. Private
ambulance mutual aid was requested at 2:55 p.m. via the Boston Area
Mutual Aid network (BAMA) and the first patient was transported at 2:58
p.m. A total of 118 individuals were transported by ambulance in the
aftermath of the bombings. Within minutes, 30 patients were categorized
as critical, 25 as serious and the remainder with non-life threating
injuries. Those critical and serious patients were rapidly identified,
given life-saving treatment and quickly transported to hospitals. The
patients with lower acuity injures were transported next. The scenes
were cleared in 22 minutes and the last of the non-acute patients was
transported within the hour. Boston's hospitals enacted their mass
casualty operations plans to effectively care for this surge of
patients. In the hours and days that followed, approximately 260
patients would seek medical treatment.
what went right
While acknowledging the loss, pain, and suffering still felt today
by survivors and their loved ones, the medical response to the attack
was a success, serving as a testament to the level of preparedness,
planning, and training our city and State have achieved. Everyone who
left the scene alive is still alive today, a remarkable outcome given
the severity and number injured.
In exploring what went right, it is imperative to first address the
circumstantial elements that worked in our favor, such as: (1) The
proximity of the bombs to ready medical assets, (2) the availability of
qualified personnel to commence rapid and appropriate triage,
treatment, and transport, (3) the optimal running conditions, resulting
in reduced marathon-related illnesses and injuries, allowing resources
to be appropriately redirected to those injured by the two bombs, (4)
the incidents occurred immediately before hospital shift change,
resulting in added staffing in the midst of the patient surge. It is
also important to note that Boston has 6 level-1 trauma centers, one of
which exclusively serves pediatric patients (Boston Children's
Hospital), allowing the most critical patients to promptly receive the
care they needed. By acknowledging the elements that worked in our
favor, we recognize the possibility that maybe next time they won't
(for us or another city), and we plan for it.
Focusing on the elements of the response where we did have
influence, it is important to highlight the years of behind the scenes
planning, coordinating, drilling, exercising and training that allowed
us to have the best possible outcome, given the circumstance.
Homeland Security Grants
From the time Homeland Security grants first became available to
us, both the State and city have worked actively to make the most of
the opportunities they have afforded. We are grateful for the years of
State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative
funding. Many of the investments we have made with these dollars served
a direct benefit in response to the bombings, including trainings,
exercises, equipment, and PPE.
Emergency management and homeland security grant investments in the
region have a long-standing history of being inclusive of not only EMS,
but also non-public safety partners, such as hospitals, health centers,
long-term care centers, and businesses. With most training, drills and
exercises being both inter-jurisdictional and inter-disciplinary, the
response to the bombings was inevitably inclusive and coordinated.
Personnel utilized shared protocols, shared ICS language, and
understood what and how they needed to communicate to others and what
they could depend on them for.
Joint Training and Exercises
The joint trainings and exercises have been invaluable, not just
for the experience of the participants, but also the many months of
planning that bring agencies across disciplines together. Even
departments that respond jointly on a routine basis, benefit from
shared trainings and exercises to prepare for the less routine. As an
example, Boston EMS trains extensively with the Boston Police
Department SWAT and Bomb Squad units, so that our EMTs and Paramedics
are appropriately integrated into their responses.
Learning From Others
Just as others listen and learn from our experiences, we have spent
the last 2 decades, doing the same with other communities across the
country and the world. Whether it was the terrorist attacks in London,
Oklahoma, Madrid, New York, Mumbai, or Columbine; or the natural
disasters that swept through New Orleans, the Texas coast, and New
Jersey, we critically examined what we would have done if the same were
to happen in Boston. We tried to incorporate the successes we saw the
other first responders implement and did our best to apply their
lessons learned.
Extensive Inter-Agency Pre-Event Planning
Meetings to prepare for the race commence a year prior, with an
extensive array of stakeholders, including emergency management, public
health, EMS, hospitals, police, and the American Red Cross. Prior to
the race, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency hosts a table-
top exercise focused on a particular disaster scenario/race disruption.
Through years of exploring what could go wrong, much was done to
prepare, including pre-identified shelters, staging locations and
loading areas, in addition to pre-positioned mass casualty supplies.
Many of the existing plans for the marathon, such as taking all
critical patients to the back of Alpha Medical Tent, where Boston EMS
had a designated treatment and ambulance loading area, worked well in
response to the bombings.
Special Events As Planned Disasters
Over the years, Boston saw the potential for large-scale special
events, such as the Boston Marathon, to not only be locations of
heightened risk for attacks, due to their high-profile nature and large
crowds, but also serve as opportunities to implement, test, and gain
familiarity with NIMS and ICS practices. In fact, we began referring to
special events as ``planned disasters'', given that they inherently
share many of the same characteristics. Between 1- and 2,000 runners
seek medical care at a course medical station and/or hospital during
the Boston Marathon, many partner agencies are involved, streets are
congested, and access can be compromised. Incorporation of the National
Incident Management System and the Incident Command System, as well as
utilizing equipment, resources, and systems designed for large-scale
emergencies helps with the overall medical consequences of the event.
And, the experience provides personnel an opportunity to gain
familiarity with disaster response protocols, a practice that also
allows for a seamless transition if/when a real emergency arises,
whether it is an evacuation at the Boston Pops Fourth of July
celebration, due to a thunderstorm, or terrorist attacks at the Boston
Marathon.
There Were Ready Medical Assets That Did Not Hesitate to Render Aid
Understanding both the potential for a significant volume of
marathon-related illnesses and injuries, as well as the risk for
something worse, Boston EMS personnel, other first responders and
medical volunteers were heavily concentrated near the finish area. We
had nearly a third of our workforce, a total of 116 EMTs and
paramedics, assigned to Zone 1, the finish area. An additional 13
ambulances, and associated personnel, were staged at the event and 26
were working city-side, two above the normal day-shift complement. When
the bombs exploded there was an immediate shift to mass casualty mode.
A second device had already detonated and there was a possibility of
more, yet, there was no hesitation in going directly to the blast sites
and expediting extraction, care, and transport.
Boston EMS coordinated the care and rapid transport of 118
individual patients, distributing them across 9 area hospitals.
Patients were triaged, provided essential life-saving treatment, such
as tourniquets, and transport was expedited. Boston CMED then assigned
ambulances to hospitals based on their capacity and capability.
Interoperability Worked
When the request was sent for ambulance mutual aid support, the
response was immediate. With years of coordination and shared training,
they reported directly to the designated staging area, allowing for
fluid loading and transport, with the most critical being transported
first. Similarly, Boston EMS was able to communicated via disaster
radios to all emergency departments in the city at once, as planned.
When they received the notification they understood the implications
and took necessary actions to prepare.
Patient Distribution
The survival of a patient in critical condition is dependent upon
receiving appropriate care, making not just rapid transport, but also
the availability and capability of the hospital, essential. Many post-
disaster best practices have emerged over the years, cautioning the
tendency to transport to the closest hospital. Taking note, we have
spent years coordinating with our EMS and hospital partners to plan for
patient distribution during a multi-casualty incident. At the end of
the day, no one hospital was overwhelmed by the volume of patients they
received, in response to the bombs; we consider this to be the best
measure of successful patient distribution.
what went wrong
Aside from the most egregious wrong, the fact that Boston
experienced a terrorist attack, three lost their lives, 16 suffered
amputations and many more were injured; Boston has spent many months
evaluating how we could have done a better job.
In the immediate aftermath, there was some apprehension, confusion,
and reports of other possible attacks. Transporting such a high volume
of acute patients so quickly, with many unresponsive or missing
identification, coupled with privacy rule restrictions on sharing
information, resulted in delays for identifying some patients and
reuniting them with loved ones. It did not affect the survivors' care,
but the frustration experienced by their families was real.
Fortunately, most went right and we were left to wonder the ``what
ifs'': Had the attacks occurred elsewhere, at a different time of day
or if other complicating factors had been present. People speak of the
Boston Standard, but ultimately, the challenge is on us to ensure we
can meet that standard in other scenarios.
lessons learned
EMS Surge Capacity is Vital to Patient Survival During an MCI
The experiences of April 15, 2013 and the week that followed
highlighted both strengths and areas for improvement in our public
safety response capabilities. Speaking from the emergency medical
services perspective, our greatest success also points to one of our
most significant challenges. Having experienced and trained
professionals on scene, able to provide immediate treatment and
transport saved lives, but this EMS surge capacity was in many respects
artificial; it is not part of daily operations.
EMS has a public safety role that complements the Fire and Police
functions. Regardless whether EMS is embedded within another
organization, a private agency or a municipal third service, we as a
country must critically examine its ability surge. As we push health-
care functions to become less costly and more efficient, reducing
periods of ambulances not being assigned to calls to as close to zero
as possible, we expose ourselves to a point of self-organized
criticality, where we can't respond to the ``what-if'' scenarios. We
are grateful to our private ambulance mutual aid partners, who answered
the call when we requested their assistance on April 15, but it is
uncertain where ambulances would come from should an incident happen on
a different day of the year. Fiscal realities affect municipal as well
as private ambulance capacity and staffing.
Chance Favors the Prepared
Louis Pasteur once said, ``chance favors the prepared mind,'' a
phrase that is well-suited for the field of homeland security. Having
frequently employed NIMS and ICS protocols in real incident and special
event response efforts, their use was natural and automatic after the
explosions. For years, we would imagine the unimaginable and then take
action to expand our knowledge and capabilities in that area. We have
hosted conferences on various potential threats, including improvised
explosive devices, invested in medical supplies for trauma care, spent
years training and drilling our personnel on triage and mass casualty
incident response, and participated in multiple full-scale exercises, a
number of which included blast incident scenarios and lent experience
to skills in interagency coordination and patient distribution.
Initially focused on supporting the added logistical challenges
associated with the central artery tunnel project, known as the Big
Dig, the Boston EMS Special Operations Division, has evolved into an
essential element of preparedness within the Department and the city.
The division coordinates medical consequence resources for over 500
special events each year, as well as providing logistical support for
unplanned emergencies. Having such an integral component of the
Department dedicated to planning for the expected and unexpected,
fosters a Department-wide culture of preparedness.
Training and Exercises Work
Department of Homeland Security grant funding has been invaluable
in supporting inter-disciplinary inter-jurisdictional training and
exercises. The integration of public safety agencies from multiple
cities and towns, as well as non-public safety partners, including
hospitals and public health, has not just increased individual staff
knowledge, but has also helped agencies understand how to respond
together in a collaborative manner, respecting each other's roles and
strengths. The more we are able to provide opportunities for personnel
to train and exercise together, the more it becomes second nature. We
are appreciative of a supportive Office of Emergency management, which
has prioritized such opportunities, and for FEMA for approving them.
The more responders understand the protocols and priorities of
other disciplines, the more they are able to work collaboratively, in
support of a shared success. International Trauma Life Support
standards promote principals in trauma care for EMS that mirror combat
care in the military, focusing on rapid assessment, treatment, and
transport; if public safety partner agencies understand this, they may
better recognize how they can support this function, such as securing
routes for ambulance ingress and egress from an incident to maximize
patient survival.
In addition to local trainings, I can personally attest to the
benefit of programs focused on strategic leadership, such as the Naval
Post Graduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, where I
joined a cohort of local, State, and Federal representatives, from both
public and private sectors. This executive-level program provided an
invaluable opportunity to more critically examine issues in homeland
security and share lessons learned with other public safety and
emergency management leaders. This program serves as a reminder of how
important it is to be continually learning, particularly when we work
in a field where we are expected to protect the public from ever-
evolving threats.
Planning Works
In Boston, EMS, hospitals, and public health are well integrated
into planning teams. Having diverse representation for this component
helps mitigate false assumptions about a discipline's capabilities and
serves as an opportunity to communicate priorities that may not be
readily apparent to others. By seeking value in such partners,
emergency management has benefited from a broader platform of subject-
matter experts and built a more cohesive and prepared community.
As a coordinated effort with our private EMS partners, Boston has a
regional MCI plan. And, all large-scale special events, such as the
Boston Marathon have a medical consequence plan that is updated and
reviewed each year. Such plans are successful because they are well-
practiced and adaptable. We can write planning documents, train,
exercise, and invest in equipment, but ultimately, we have to trust in
our personnel to improvise, adapt, and overcome. If they can understand
the end-goal of what they are being asked to do, they won't need a
scripted step-by-step guide, nor will they be daunted when a component
of the plan is curtailed. In the case of the response to the bombings,
we had spent much time establishing a process and protocol for
designating which hospital each patient would go to; it would be done
by a loading officer, who would be able to assign patients across the
hospitals allowing for even distribution. With the two blast sites, the
rapid load and go of patients and more than one transport location, the
mechanism by which patients were assigned hospitals immediately changed
to a role managed by CMED at the dispatch center, where additional
personnel could support hospital assignments and even distribution
across the facilities. This was not a senior command-level decision,
this was everyone understanding the essential nature of successful
patient distribution and taking necessary action. We have since revised
our plans for complex incidents to this format.
Intelligence and Information Sharing
Much has been documented and discussed about the importance of
strengthening intelligence and information sharing across Federal,
State, and local partners, as a consequence of the bombings. In
focusing on this priority, it is important to take a broader look at
what constitutes the local-level intelligence community. Since 2007,
Boston EMS has assigned a seasoned paramedic to the Boston Regional
Intelligence Center (BRIC), the city's fusion center. He has benefited
from analyst training, offered through Homeland Security investments,
although the position itself has always been paid for by Boston EMS.
Having a paramedic assigned to the BRIC helps foster routine
information sharing, on matters such as narcotic and violence-related
incidents, and establishes a trusted partnership for sharing threat
intelligence (as permitted). In addition to better connecting our two
departments, our paramedic is able to serve as a broader health and
medical subject matter expert, allowing for a unique perspective and
contribution. There are public health emergencies that police benefit
being informed of, public safety matters that may have health and
medical consequences, and, given the broad scope of patients seen by
medical providers, there is the potential for EMTs, paramedics,
doctors, or nurses to identify a potential criminal threat (either
within the home of a patient or in their symptoms). Having an
established avenue by which information can be shared across the law
enforcement and health care community has been proven to have extensive
benefit. EMS is uniquely qualified to serve as a bridge between the
public safety and health care communities, as it encompasses both.
Looking more specifically within the health care community, we
recognized the need for modeling some of the strengths and benefits of
an EOC, but with a health and medical focus, allowing the 60-plus
health and medical departments in Boston, including hospitals, health
centers, EMS' and public health to better coordinate with each other
and share information during emergencies. This idea came to fruition
when we secured Federal grant funding in 2008 to convert a conference
room into a regional Medical Intelligence Center (MIC). Named after a
former Boston EMS deputy superintendent, Stephen M. Lawlor, who
promoted interagency collaboration, the MIC has shown much value over
the years. During the marathon and the week that followed the bombings,
health and medical information sharing was supported by public health,
hospital, and EMS personnel assigned to the MIC.
Responding to an Unsecure Scene
Every day, EMTs and paramedics risk their lives to save the lives
of others, whether it is stepping onto an unprotected ledge, being hit,
bit, spit on, or even shot at. We do what we can to protect our
personnel, they are trained in self-defense, they are assigned personal
protective equipment, including ballistic vests, but ultimately, when
they sign up for the job they understand there is a certain amount of
risk. When a representative from Israel, who came to speak at a
conference we hosted, was asked how they sent their personnel into
unsecure scenes, knowing the risk of secondary devices, he explained
that ``you do everything you can to prepare them, you try to get them
in and out as quickly as possible, but ultimately, this is the job they
signed up for.'' The safety of our personnel will always be paramount,
but when everything they are taught focuses on caring for the injured,
we can expect that they will respond. This is what happened on April
15, everyone knew the risk and they responded. Ensuring EMS personnel
across the country receive necessary training and personal protective
equipment is now being recognized more broadly as a priority.
Planning for Others to Respond
Just as we can expect first responders to enter unsecure scenes
when there are people in need of medical care and transport, we should
also plan for members of the public to respond, as we saw on April 15.
The skills of those who assisted varied, although not having a public
safety or medical background was not necessarily a limitation, many
asked what they could do; some were instructed on the application of
tourniquets and others served vital roles in supporting patient
movement. During an incident as we experienced in Boston, the initial
priorities were quite simple: (1) Immediate trauma care, such as the
application of a tourniquet, if necessary, (2) extraction to a point
where they can be loaded into an ambulance, and (3) transport to a
hospital. While assistance can be helpful in the first two steps, it is
important to ensure others understand that if their presence hinders
any of these elements, it is best if they stay back. Congestion,
particularly if it inhibits ingress or egress of ambulances, can have a
negative consequence for patient survival. Ultimately, the onus is on
us, members of public safety and homeland security, to ensure it is
broadly understood that a disaster is defined by the impact to human
life and that for those suffering traumatic injuries, rapid ambulance
transport is essential. Plans, trainings, protocols, and guidance
should focus on supporting these priorities, within the first response
and emergency management community, as well as with the public at
large.
The Role of EMS Extends Beyond the Immediate Response to Injuries
Boston EMS has been asked to speak of the immediate triage,
transport, and distribution of patients in the aftermath of the bombs,
but what is less recognized is the role our personnel played in the
events that continued throughout the week. Department personnel were
assigned to the blast site for the duration of the road closure and
every public event that occurred to honor those who were injured; we
worked in partnership with the Boston Police Department, were on scene
during each of the captures, and transported both suspects.
The Value of Experienced Personnel
At Boston EMS, our EMTs have an average of 10 years of experience
on the job and our paramedics have 25 years. When we invest in
training, equipment, and exercises, the experience is applied to an
individual member of the department. Over time, this investment,
coupled with the skills they garner from years on the job, becomes a
tremendous asset to the department and the city they serve. By focusing
on EMS as a career, by fully recognizing EMTs and paramedics as public
safety officers, we make our communities better prepared for potential
emergencies of any scale. Boston EMS had over 140 department members
provide direct care to those injured by one or both of the blasts,
either directly on scene or while in transport. Even more were involved
with events that transpired over the following week. Just the one day,
April 15, represented more traumatic injuries than people with more
than 30 years on the job have ever seen. In the aftermath of the
experience, Boston EMS' sick time went down and the injury rate went
down, people worked harder and worked through what might otherwise have
kept them out, because they knew they were needed. Having dedicated and
highly-qualified EMS personnel is something we hope our experience will
lend broader recognition and appreciation for Nationally. Just as we
need career police officers and fire fighters, we need career emergency
medical technicians and paramedics.
capturing lessons learned
Boston EMS hosted two compensated internal 4-hour after-action
meetings open to all personnel on May 2, 2013, during the day and
evening shift. A paramedic was assigned to perform more in-depth one-
on-one interviews to capture additional feedback. Personnel were asked
to submit any additional comments verbally or in writing, if desired.
An interagency meeting with our private EMS partners, as well as
attending hospital after-actions, helped us draw from and better
understand their experiences. A number of other after-action meetings
took place within the city and State.
incorporating lessons learned to improve preparation and response to
future (or potential future) events
When we read about and spoke to the first responders from other
communities who had just experienced a natural disaster or terrorist
attack, we thought through what we would have done in a similar
situation, but also understood that we should add any new best
practices to our overall all-hazards approach. There were no planes
that attacked us, no floods, no chemical agents or structural collapse,
but there were many lessons learned we applied from 9/11, Hurricane
Katrina and Sandy, the Tokyo Sarin attacks, earthquakes, and tornadoes.
It is our hope that others hearing about our story, look beyond the
possibility of a bombing and draw from the many other practices that
will save lives regardless the nature of the disaster.
More than anything, the experience validated much of what we were
already doing. Certain measures wound up working well in response to
the bombs; if they were not already built into plans, they now are. In
talking to others, we also learned how their plans were influenced by
expectations we had established. For example, we spent many years
coordinating and exercising with hospital partners; this experience
reinforced the fact that during mass casualty incidents, EMS would use
triage tags. They grew to expect this and made the determination that
triage classifications assigned by EMS would be an initial guide for
prioritizing patients upon receipt. When the first patients did not
have triage tags, this had a direct impact on the hospitals that we had
never expected. While the most critical patients were transported
first, this was an important lesson learned, reinforcing the fact that
we are integrally connected in the continuum of patient care. Steps
have now been taken to forward-deploy triage tags during special
events, to increase the likelihood that tags will be applied to
patients from the onset, should it become necessary.
sharing lessons learned
To date, presentations and speaking panels have been the principal
means for communicating our experience, although we hope to complete an
official after-action report. Homeland Security funding was utilized to
fund a Massachusetts After-Action and Improvement Plan.
the role of the federal government
Boston EMS has long benefited from Department of Homeland Security
funding, particularly Urban Areas Security Initiative grants, which
have paid for training, exercises, and equipment. As a regional grant,
it has helped foster regional and interdisciplinary coordination and
standardization. That said, there is currently no requirement to use
any homeland security grant funding to support EMS. While we have been
fortunate to have a supportive emergency management office that
includes EMS, we have not seen that to be consistent when we speak to
our partners in other parts of the country. We commend FEMA for making
emergency victim care a priority, but ultimately, without directly
tying priorities to funding and required outcomes, it is at the
discretion of the local and State recipients whether or not sufficient
investment is made to strengthen such capabilities. The funding has
been invaluable, but the more it can focus on promoting inter-
disciplinary and inter-jurisdictional coordination, the better a
community will be prepared to handle disasters of all scale and scope.
recommendations to congress
I would also ask Congress to continue support to the UASI program
as it has proven value. Recognizing that disasters do happen, as much
as we try to protect against them, it is imperative that homeland
security be inclusive of EMS and the broader health care community. EMS
as a discipline and as a critical function needs to be viewed within
the lens of public safety for the purpose of homeland security. In
doing so, there will be life-saving benefits on a daily basis, as well
as during disasters. The fact that emergency medical services may be
different in each city or town, should not diminish the importance of
the function and discipline; emergency victim care is vital in any
disaster; EMTs and paramedics who operate ambulances are the first
responders.
I wish to thank Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Ranking Member Bennie
G. Thompson, the Members of the committee, Boston Mayor Martin J.
Walsh, and the executive director of the Boston Public Health
Commission, Dr. Barbara Ferrer for allowing me to submit this written
testimony.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Chief Hooley. Let me again
commend you for your life-saving, heroic measures that day in
Boston.
Chairman now recognizes Dr. Jackson.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN A. JACKSON, DIRECTOR, RAND SAFETY AND
JUSTICE PROGRAM, THE RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jackson. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of
the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify this
morning and to be part of such a distinguished panel.
In my written testimony I address three areas where
Congress can play a significant role in maintaining the
National preparedness and response system that supports first
responders to future incidents, and which lessons from past
response operations indicate should still be important
priorities: The need for better ways to assess and measure
preparedness, continuing to support and improve upon programs
that protect emergency responders' health and safety at large-
scale incidents, and improving the adaptability and agility of
the National response system by more effectively learning
lessons from the preparedness exercises that we have heard
about held at the local level to tell us about the National
response system.
Action in these areas via Congressional support and
oversight could contribute to better preparing the country to
contain the human and financial costs of future attacks,
incidents, and natural disasters. In my oral remarks I will
focus on the first two of these.
The men and women of the fire service, law enforcement,
emergency medical services, and the wide range of other
Government and non-Government organizations that are called on
for often large and very complex response operations are
absolutely central to the Nation's ability to deal with a
future that will always be uncertain and will always hold the
risk of terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other damaging
incidents.
These organizations play that role while also responding to
the much smaller-scale everyday emergencies that affect their
jurisdictions and populations, the demands of which already
stretch some of these organizations' resources.
To enable responders to do their jobs during large-scale
incidents and attacks it is critical that the National
Preparedness System, from the Federal to the local level, work
together and support them effectively. Concerns regarding the
performance of that system led to substantial legislative and
executive actions in the wake of both September 11 and the
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Performance at subsequent response operations has
demonstrated that these actions have produced significant
improvements in National preparedness, and the contrast between
well-executed recent responses like Boston or to Hurricane
Sandy and to Hurricane Katrina is striking.
However, trends in both the future risk environment--
particularly increasing numbers of large-scale, response-
intensive natural disasters--and a challenging fiscal
environment, that we have heard about, is putting pressure on
response organizations, emphasize the importance of continued
focus on the health and functioning of the National response
system. Given such challenges, there are areas where
Congressional focus would be valuable, and I will discuss two
of these that have been the subject of significant RAND
research.
First, the issue of improved evaluation and preparedness
assessment. To support first responders at large incidents
there needs to be a clear picture of the capabilities of the
National Preparedness System. Significant strides in
preparedness measurement have been made since 2001 by both the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health
and Human Services, but this is not yet a solved problem, as
recent GAO reports have highlighted.
Effective measures are necessary to have confidence that
the National Preparedness System will be able to support first
responders and also to educate the public about what they
should and should not expect when disaster strikes. Measurement
becomes even more critical under fiscal austerity, since
without good measures it is difficult to have an educated
public debate about preparedness and make trade-offs with a
clear understanding of the implications of funding allocation
choices.
Second, protecting the safety of emergency responders.
Responders clearly take risks as the assist others, and the
Nation relies on them to do so. Providing both the necessary
equipment and safety management structures to minimize risk to
them is not just the right thing to do, it is in the Nation's
interest as well.
The experience of 9/11 and the extensive health impacts on
many responders to those attacks have demonstrated the
significant personal, organizational, and financial costs that
can result. Since 2001 there has also been major progress on
improving safety management for response operations, coming out
of focused efforts to learn from those responses and others.
There have been broad efforts involving a wide range of
organizations to improve both the doctrine and practice of
safety management, including processes for monitoring health
and safety of responders before, during, and after deployment
at large-scale response operations. However, the experience at
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response and cleanup has shown
that challenges remain.
In conclusion, the Nation obviously relies on first
responders to act and act effectively when major incidents and
terrorist attacks occur while simultaneously responding to all
of the emergencies that occur on a daily basis. For the Nation
to be prepared for large-scale events, the National
Preparedness System needs to effectively support those
initially local responders who will always be the first ones on
the scene.
Again, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to submit
testimony on this important issue.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jackson follows:]
Statement of Brian A. Jackson \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT211.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 18, 2014
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning and to be
a part of such a distinguished panel.
Today I am going to talk to you about three areas where Congress
has a significant role in maintaining the National preparedness and
response system that supports first responders to future incidents--and
where lessons from past response operations indicate a continuing need
for focused attention:
Developing better ways to assess and measure preparedness to
maintain both responders' and public confidence that the
National preparedness system will be there when they need it;
Improving the adaptability and agility of the National
response system by more effectively learning lessons from
preparedness exercises;
Continuing to support and improve upon capabilities and
programs that protect emergency responders' health and safety
at large-scale incidents and disaster responses.
Action in each of these areas--via Congressional support and
oversight--can contribute to both better supporting responders to
future incidents and to better preparing the country to reduce the
human and financial costs of future attacks, incidents, and natural
disasters.
The major incidents the country has faced in recent years--
including both terrorist attacks and others--clearly demonstrate the
critical role played by first responders in containing such events and
addressing their consequences. The men and women of the fire service,
law enforcement, emergency medical services, and the wide range of
other Government and non-Government organizations that are called on
for often large and very complex response operations are absolutely
central to the Nation's ability to deal with a future that will always
be uncertain and always hold the risk of terrorist attack, natural
disaster, and other damaging incidents. And the responder community
plays that role while responding on a daily basis to the much smaller
scale, every day emergencies that affect their jurisdictions and the
populations they protect, the demands of which already stretch some of
these organizations' available resources.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For example, Kellerman, A.L., What Should We Learn from Boston?
CT-395, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To enable responders to do their jobs during future large-scale
incidents and attacks, it is critical that the National preparedness
system--from the Federal to the local level--work together and support
them effectively. Concerns regarding the performance of that system led
to substantial legislative and executive actions in the wake of both
the September 11, 2001 attacks and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Performance at subsequent response operations has demonstrated that
those actions have produced significant improvements in National
preparedness.\4\ The contrast between well-executed recent responses
like those in Boston or to Hurricane Sandy and the response to
Hurricane Katrina is striking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector
General, ``FEMA's Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster--An
Update,'' OIG-10-123, September 2010; Dodaro, G.L., ``Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing
Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,'' GAO-11-940T,
September 8, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, two trends emphasize the importance of continued focus on
the health and functioning of the National response system:
The first is that responders' tasks and missions are not
getting any easier over time. Statistics on large-scale natural
disasters requiring substantial response efforts show an
increasing trend, requiring more extensive--and more
expensive--response operations.\5\ Concern about terrorist
attacks has also remained prominent in the years since 2001,
with cases like the attacks in Boston demonstrating the unique
response challenges of such incidents. First-responder
organizations have also been challenged by other incidents of
mass violence, with their own distinct response demands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Smith, A.B. and R.W. Katz, ``US billion-dollar weather and
climate disasters: data sources, trends, accuracy and biases,'' Natural
Hazards, Volume 67, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 387-410; Department of Homeland
Security, Office of the Inspector General, ``FEMA's Preparedness for
the Next Catastrophic Disaster--An Update,'' OIG-10-123, September
2010; Kostro, S.S., A. Nichols, A. Temoshchuk, ``White Paper on U.S.
Disaster Preparedness and Resilience: Recommendations for Reform,''
Washington, DC: CSIS, August 27, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Nation has also just gone through the most
serious financial and economic crisis in recent history. During
and after the crisis, fiscal austerity at the State and local
level drove reductions in budgets of responder organizations--
with predictable effects.\6\ In recent years Federal spending
in this area has also declined,\7\ and there is significant
concern about controlling Federal expenditures going forward.
Though a robust debate about the right amount to spend on
preparedness efforts is worthwhile and appropriate, resource
constraints nonetheless do represent a challenge to maintaining
and further strengthening National preparedness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, ``The Impact of the Economic Downturn on American Police
Agencies,'' October 2011; Police Executive Research Forum, ``Policing
and the Economic Downturn: Striving for Efficiency Is the New Normal,''
February 2013; Cooper, M., ``Struggling Cities Shut Firehouses in
Budget Crisis,'' New York Times, August 26, 2010.
\7\ Pines, J.M. et al., ``Value-Based Models for Sustaining
Emergency Preparedness Capacity and Capability in the United States,''
The Institute of Medicine Forum on Medical and Public Health
Preparedness for Catastrophic Events, January 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given such concerns about both the future risk and fiscal
environment, there are areas where Congressional focus on the National
preparedness system would be valuable. I will highlight three that have
been the subject of significant RAND research:
Improved evaluation and preparedness assessment.--To support
first responders to major incidents, there needs to be a clear
picture of the capabilities of the National preparedness
system. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) have made significant strides
in preparedness measurement since 2001, including the
development of the National Preparedness Report and the
National Health Security Preparedness Index.\8\ Efforts by
nongovernmental organizations and analysts have also
contributed.\9\ Nonetheless, recent reviews by the Government
Accountability Office have identified areas where improvement
is needed.\10\ That this is not yet a fully-solved problem
should not be a surprise, given the complexity of evaluating
the ability of diverse sets of response organizations across
the country to come together and effectively respond to
incidents as varied as floods, active-shooter incidents, and
bioterrorist attacks. Work at RAND on these challenges has
argued that evaluations must distinguish between response
systems' theoretical capacity to respond (based on the
resources that have been put in place) and whether they will be
able to reliably deliver capabilities in the uncertain post-
disaster environment.\11\ Though much more difficult to
measure, it is the ability to reliably deliver capability that
is the true measure of preparedness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Maurer, D.C., ``National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress,
But Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess
Capabilities,'' GAO-13-637T, June 25, 2013; Department of Homeland
Security, ``National Preparedness Report,'' March 30, 2013; Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, ``Public Health Preparedness:
Mobilizing State by State,'' February 2008; ``National Health Security
Preparedness Index,'' on-line at http://www.nhspi.org/.
\9\ For example, National Association of County and City Health
Officials, ``Indicators of Progress in Local Public Health
Preparedness,'' May 2008.
\10\ Jenkins, Jr., W.O., ``Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA
Has Made Limited Progress in Assessing National Capabilities,'' GAO-11-
260T, March 17, 2011; Caldwell, S., ``Homeland Security: Performance
Measures and Comprehensive Funding Data Could Enhance Management of
National Capital Region Preparedness Resources,'' GAO-13-116R, January
25, 2013; Maurer, D.C., ``National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made
Progress, But Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management
and Assess Capabilities,'' GAO-13-637T, June 25, 2013.
\11\ Jackson, B.A., The Problem of Measuring Emergency
Preparedness: The Need for Assessing ``Response Reliability'' as Part
of Homeland Security Planning, OP-234-RC, Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2008; Nelson, C. et al., ``Conceptualizing and Defining
Public Health Emergency Preparedness,'' Am J Public Health, Volume 97
(Suppl 1), 2007, pp. S9-S11; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, H.H. Willis,
``Are We Prepared? Using Reliability Analysis to Evaluate Emergency
Response Systems,'' Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
Volume 19, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 147-157; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, H.H.
Willis, Evaluating the Reliability of Emergency Response Systems for
Large-Scale Incident Operations, MG-994-FEMA, Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2010; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, ``The Challenge of
Measuring Emergency Preparedness: Integrating Component Metrics to
Build System-Level Measures for Strategic National Stockpile
Operations,'' Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Volume
7, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 96-104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The need for measurement is tied to good Government goals,
including the effective management of Federal investments in
preparedness.\12\ But the need for preparedness measurement
goes beyond questions of management and accountability.
Measures are necessary to have confidence that the National
preparedness system will be able to support first responders in
the future, and to educate the public about what it should--and
should not--reasonably expect when disaster strikes.
Measurement becomes even more critical under fiscal austerity,
since without good measures it is difficult to have an educated
public debate about preparedness and make trade-offs with a
clear understanding of the implications of funding allocation
choices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``Are We Prepared? Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants
Since 9/11,'' Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency Management,
Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia, June 25,
2013, on-line at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/emdc/
hearings/are-we-prepared-measuring-the-impact-of-preparedness-grants-
since-9/11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supporting agility and continuous improvement in the
preparedness system.--Maintaining preparedness in the face of
evolving risks requires mechanisms for identifying lessons from
past response operations and applying them to improve
preparedness Nation-wide. However, just relying on what we can
learn from actual response operations is not enough to
adequately prepare for uncertain future threats.
Exercises and drills--for example, those carried out under the DHS'
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program \13\ or DHHS'
public health preparedness cooperative agreements \14\--are
held as part of individual jurisdictions' preparedness
programs.\15\ Beyond just contributing to bolstering
preparedness where they are held, such exercises can be a
source of insight into preparedness more broadly to guide
National improvement efforts. In past RAND work examining
exercise design, we have developed and recommended approaches
to make it possible for exercises to produce more useful
information to inform assessment and improvement efforts.\16\
Similarly, our research analyzing the after-action reports from
both exercises and incident response operations has
demonstrated they too can be a source of insights--a source
which to date has not been fully utilized--on the health of the
National preparedness system.\17\ Measuring the effectiveness
of efforts to disseminate lessons learned to the many
organizations within the National response system (e.g., DHS's
Lessons Learned Information Sharing System \18\) also merits
attention--since lessons not effectively disseminated and
applied are not actually lessons learned from a system
perspective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program,'' https:/
/www.llis.dhs.gov/hseep.
\14\ ``Funding and Guidance for State and Local Public Health
Departments,'' http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/coopagreement.htm.
\15\ For example, Dausey, D.J., J.W. Buehler, N. Lurie, ``Designing
and conducting tabletop exercises to assess public health preparedness
for manmade and naturally occurring biological threats,'' BMC Public
Health, Volume 7, 2007, pp. 92-101; Biddinger, P.D. et al., ``Public
Health Emergency Preparedness Exercises: Lessons Learned,'' Public
Health Reports, Volume 125 (Suppl 5), 2010, pp. 100-106.
\16\ Jackson, B.A., and S. McKay, ``Preparedness Exercises 2.0:
Alternative Approaches to Exercise Design That Could Make Them More
Useful for Evaluating--and Strengthening--Preparedness,'' Homeland
Security Affairs, Volume VII, 2011; Nelson, C. et al., New Tools for
Assessing State and Local Capabilities for Countermeasure Delivery, TR-
665-DHHS, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009; Jones, J.R., et
al., ``Results of Medical Countermeasure Drills Among 72 Cities
Readiness Initiative Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2008-2009,''
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Volume 6, Issue 4,
2012, pp. 357-362; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, ``The Challenge of
Measuring Emergency Preparedness: Integrating Component Metrics to
Build System-Level Measures for Strategic National Stockpile
Operations,'' Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Volume
7, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 96-104 (and references therein).
\17\ Faith, K.S., B.A. Jackson, and H. Willis, ``Text Analysis of
After Action Reports to Support Improved Emergency Response Planning,''
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Volume 8, Issue
1, December 2011 (see also more recent similar work by others in
Savoia, E., F. Agboola, P.D. Biddinger, ``Use of After Action Reports
(AARs) to Promote Organizational and Systems Learning in Emergency
Preparedness,'' Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health, Volume 9, 2012,
pp. 2949-2963.)
\18\ ``Lessons Learned Information Sharing,'' https://
www.llis.dhs.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protecting the safety of emergency responders.--Lessons
learned from past response operations have also demonstrated
the importance of providing first responders at major incidents
the protection they need to fulfill their critical roles.
Responders clearly take risks as they assist others, and the
Nation relies on them to do so. Providing the necessary
equipment and safety management structure to minimize risks to
them is not just the right thing to do, it is in the Nation's
interest as well. The experience of September 11, 2001 and the
extensive health impacts on many responders to those attacks
have demonstrated the significant personal, organizational, and
financial costs that can result from the risks involved in some
response operations.
Since 2001, there has been significant progress on improving safety
management for response operations, coming out of focused
effort to learn from past responses. RAND, in collaboration and
with the support of the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, facilitated a set of research projects to
gather responder safety lessons from those and previous
response operations.\19\ The resulting products have
contributed to broader efforts involving many organizations and
agencies to significantly improve responder safety management
doctrine and practice,\20\ including processes for monitoring
the health and safety of responders before, during, and after
deployment at large-scale response operations.\21\ However, the
experience at incidents such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
response and clean-up \22\ has shown that challenges remain in
effectively protecting responders at large-scale incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Jackson, B.A., et al., Protecting Emergency Responders:
Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks, CF-176-OSTP/NIOSH, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002; Jackson, B.A., et al., Protecting
Emergency Responders, Volume 3: Safety Management in Disaster and
Terrorism Response, MG-170-NIOSH, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2004.
\20\ For example, ``National Response Framework,'' http://
www.fema.gov/national-response-framework; ``Emergency Response
Resources,'' http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres/responders.html;
``Emergency Preparedness and Response,'' https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/
emergencypreparedness/; National Response Team, ``Health and Safety,''
http://www.nrt.org/.
\21\ ``Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance,''
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/erhms/.
\22\ Kitt, M.M. et al., ``Protecting Workers in Large-Scale
Emergency Responses: NIOSH Experience in the Deepwater Horizon
Response,'' Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Volume
53, Number 7, July 2011, pp. 711-715; Michaels, D. and J. Howard,
``Review of the OSHA-NIOSH Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:
Protecting the Health and Safety of Clean-up Workers,'' PLoS Currents,
July 18, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nation relies on first responders to act, and act effectively,
when major incidents and terrorist attacks occur--and to do so while
simultaneously responding to the much smaller-scale emergencies and
crises that occur on a daily basis. For the Nation to be prepared for
large-scale events, the National preparedness system--made up of
agencies and individuals from the Federal to the local level, inside
and outside Government--needs to effectively support the initially
local responders who will always be the first on the scene.
Congress, through its oversight role, can contribute to
strengthening both the efficiency and effectiveness of the National
preparedness system by continuing to support and to encourage agency
programs focused on improved preparedness measurement and evaluation,
increasing focus on improving the value and effectiveness of
preparedness exercises, and supporting on-going efforts to improve
protection of responders at large-scale response operations.
Again, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to submit testimony on this very
important National issue.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Jackson.
Chairman recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions.
Commissioner Miller, you and I discussed in the back room
about the rising threat that we see. It seems like with every
briefing I get the threat seems to be getting worse overseas,
and I believe that with that, too, comes a greater threat to
the homeland.
One only need turn on the television today to realize what
we have realized for the past year, and that is there is a
growing al-Qaeda presence and training ground in Syria and Iraq
that I believe is rivaling if not surpassing what we saw in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. ISIS--and it very much concerns me.
We are very privileged to have someone from New York;
Arlington, where the Pentagon was struck; and of course,
Boston--the three biggest targets that we have seen on 9/11 and
since then. So we have your expertise, I think, to draw on.
The biggest complaint after 9/11 was we were not connecting
the dots, we were not sharing information. Then a decade later
we had Boston, and I was disappointed to see that we are still
not getting it right.
I had Ed, Ed Davis, the police commissioner, testify that
even though he had four members of his police department on the
JTTF, that they knew nothing about the Russian warning; they
knew nothing about the FBI opening an investigation into
Tamerlan; they knew nothing about his travel--foreign travel
overseas even though he was on four watch lists. Even though
CBP knew about that, we don't know if that was even shared with
the entire JTTF or the FBI.
We know in this business we get it right most of the time,
but if we don't get it right the consequences can be very, very
severe and very damaging, as we saw on 9/11 and in Boston.
So my question to the three of you is: Where are we since
9/11 in terms of this information-sharing process, not only
with FBI and DHS but the JTTFs and the fusion centers? Are we
where we need to be or can we--do we need to do a better job?
I will start with you, Commissioner.
Commissioner Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say
from New York City's perspective we are in as good a shape as
we could be.
To take your question in the arc it was delivered, we have
a high degree of concern in that there are more foreign
fighters in Syria right now in a 3-year war than during the
entire pendency of the war with the Russians in Afghanistan the
last time, and that is largely owed to the marketing piece of
social media that sends out a global message that will bring
them there. Twelve thousand of them are--12,000 to 15,000 are
estimated to be Westerners from United States, Canada, Europe--
visa-waiver countries where they are a plane ticket away from
the United States, and that is of great concern.
So within the framing of your question, in that kind of
threat environment, when you have to ask yourself, ``Will they
be hardened, radicalized, trained in weapons and explosives,
and who and where will they be when they come back?'' Within
the structure of the New York City Counterterrorism Program we
have the Intelligence Bureau, we have the Counterterrorism
Bureau. We have over 100 detectives assigned to the JTTF.
Addressing the issues of my good, close, personal friend,
Commissioner--former Commissioner Ed Davis, from Boston, part
of the difficulty they had to deal with was that they only had
four detectives on the JTTF and that they lived within the
threat squad that ran leads. Our investigators are spread out
across every single squad in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, so
that delivers us a 360-degree view of the activities of that
task force across all programs.
Behind that we have a briefer that comes up from the
National Counterterrorism Center every week and, within our
secured compartment and information facility, conducts
Classified briefings for the command staff of intelligence and
counterterrorism on the current threat pictures as it is
amalgamated in NCTC from overseas, as well as regular briefings
that we have between our analysts and the analysts at the FBI.
If anything, Mr. Chairman, the challenge we face is
drowning in intelligence, information, and leads in the busy
threat stream across a number of platforms. But a lack of
connectivity or information sharing is not a New York City
problem.
Chairman McCaul. That is very encouraging. I do think--I
have always said--that the local police and first responders
know the streets better than anybody. They are the eyes and
ears. I think the FBI can leverage that to their benefit if the
information is properly shared.
I do think New York has stood up, and I commend you for
your efforts.
Chief Schwartz and Chief Hooley, you are in a little
different position. It is more fire fighting, EMS, but I do
think there is a benefit to the sharing of information in terms
of being prepared.
Like, sir, in Boston I think there was a threat prior to
that, not related to Tamerlan, so the--Boston did stand up its
EMS operation. I think in Arlington, being so close to the
Nation's capital, it would be of benefit, I think for the two
of you, can you sort of--can you tell us where you are with
information sharing?
Chief Hooley. Yes, sir. I definitely think that we are in a
better place than we were right after 2001.
You know, Boston started its local regional intelligence
center--its fusion center several years ago. In 2007 we did
place a full-time paramedic--a veteran person from our
department--over there, and that is his primary assignment.
Over the years he has been offered a lot of training that
came through DHS for analysis training, has access to the GIS
and to other analysts that are in there, is able to sit in on
daily briefings, has received a lot of training about, you
know, how to handle material and how to pass it on.
Now how--what can be passed on? What comes through is
another thing and I can't always speak to that.
But having somebody in there as a trusted partner is a good
first step, because sometimes you only need a little bit of
lead time to start to put yourself in a position to prepare for
something. There was an incident several years ago where I
mentioned to one of the staff--you know, I don't think it was
anything sensitive; I think it was Law Enforcement-Sensitive--
about a truck that was missing, stolen, whatever, up in eastern
Canada somewhere that had a large amount of cyanide with it.
Again, no threat with it or anything, but just that little bit
of information that did come down to us, you know, reviewed our
treatment, signs, and symptomology for that, our stores of the
antidote that we had, what P.V. do we need to effectively care
for people. So it gave us the ability quietly, behind the
scene, for the managers and the medical directors to be ready
for that.
So again, nothing happened. It didn't evolve. But having
that--having people in places like that does give us that early
head start.
Chairman McCaul. Chief Schwartz, my time is expiring, but
if I could touch on interoperability, you mentioned that in
your opening statement, that 9/11 Commission recommended
greater interoperability. We are still not there. Congress has
acted, as well, and there is a $7 billion initiative called
FirstNet to develop that interoperability.
Do you feel that the first responders have been adequately
consulted with regarding the development of FirstNet?
Chief Schwartz. Congressman, I would say that, you know, so
far the efforts at FirstNet are still maturing. We are not too
far down the road yet, you know, in terms of results.
But I think that we are confident, you know, to date that
we are being consulted. Chief Jeff Johnson, former president of
the International Association of Fire Chiefs, is on the board.
He is doing a great job, along with some of his colleagues, to
do a lot of outreach and inform local communities, local
leaders about what this is going to mean.
So I don't think we are too far along yet, but I think we
are pleased with where we are to date. We are watching it very
closely.
Chairman McCaul. That is certainly good to hear.
Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I really appreciate the expertise that our witnesses bring
to this hearing.
Chief Schwartz and Chief Hooley, the Metropolitan Medical
Response System has been credited with building local and
regional capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks involving
hazardous material and other mass casualty events. However, we
have not provided funds for that program since 2011.
Has the lack of this funding, in your professional opinion,
affected capabilities for your departments to respond to mass
casualty events, and how has your region maintained that
capability with the lack of these funds?
Chief Schwartz. Congressman, we have been very fortunate in
both Arlington and the NCR to be in an area that receives UASI
funding, so it is hard for me to tell you that the amount of
money that we were getting with MMRS has been a tremendous loss
because we still have other funds coming through the UASI
program that enables us to do, you know, some of the same
things that we were doing through MMRS.
What I would say is that MMRS, in my estimation, was less
about the amount of money that we received; it was more about
how it sort-of catalyzed a systems approach to preparedness. It
got the right stakeholders to the table to interact around the
various threats that a particular community might face and
caused them to do planning and the development of capabilities
in a way that recognized that everybody has to work together,
that there isn't any one profession--or in the case of regional
applications, any one jurisdiction--that has, you know, the
full solution or a full set of capabilities.
So I would say that in those jurisdictions that, you know,
are not the beneficiaries of UASI money, MMRS played a far
greater role in getting people to the table even though it
didn't provide a lot of money. If I am not mistaken, I think
the entire program never exceeded $70 million.
On a local level we were receiving little more than, you
know, $150,000 or $200,000 a year. That wasn't buying an awful
lot, but it did certainly facilitate getting stakeholders to
the table to figure out how to do things together, and that
resulted in better performance in the operating environment, in
my view.
Mr. Thompson. Chief Hooley.
Chief Hooley. Congressman Thompson, yes, I really have to
echo what I just heard from my new friend here from Arlington.
The MMRS program in a lot of ways was the little engine that
could.
I think the largest amount of funding we maybe saw in 1
year for that might have been around $300,000. But it did pull
together a lot of stakeholders because it was specific to
hospitals and to pre-hospital.
Just to give you a couple of examples from when we did a
lot of work with that group to build our staff-sharing
agreements between hospitals. We built a lot of our capability
to respond to a nerve agent, a chemical attack, and to buy
antidote, stockpile that, do the training for that.
We were able to keep that in place, but sustaining that now
does mean that we have to draw our other dollars. You either
take it from operational money, you take it from UASI, or you
don't do it. So that is one of the--our legacies from that.
The other one was we were able to build up a pretty good
capability around the medical management of patients if there
was a dirty bomb by involving the radiation safety offices from
all the hospitals in Boston, who just--the hospitals donate
their time to us so we could work on building portals, building
other things. They maintain--they keep them available for us to
use if there is a mass care event.
So with a small--relatively small investment from MMRS we
were able to build some pretty good systems that we are still
benefitting from today.
Mr. Thompson. My point is sometimes we can provide the seed
monies to get people to the table to do something big, and that
was kind-of the reason we kind-of pushed those funds.
Dr. Jackson, do you think the Federal Government is doing
everything it can to ensure first responders have equipment and
technology they need to protect themselves during disaster
responses, based on your research?
Mr. Jackson. Setting the bar at ``everything that can be
done'' is a very high one. I mean, certainly the investments
that have been made in the grant programs have built capability
over time, sort-of as I cited in my testimony, the change that
we have seen since 9/11 and since Katrina really is impressive.
One of the challenges that has come up in our research
sort-of trying to understand this from an outside really is the
problem of measurement. I mean, some of the things that we have
heard about here are the relationships, you know, building the
relationship between agencies so they can work together
effectively. Figuring out how to measure that to determine, you
know, whether the capability that was built between agencies,
you know, 5 years ago before staffs change will still be
available 5 years from now, you know, when people have retired,
when people have been promoted gets to the question about, you
know, sort-of how do we ensure that we maintain the
preparedness that we have built over time?
So the--sort-of continuing those investments, but also
continuing the investments in understanding how to measure it
so we know how much confidence we should have in this system is
still something that I--that there is a need to focus on at the
Federal level.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank all the witnesses, and especially thank Chief
Schwartz for what your department did at the Pentagon attacks
of 9/11, Chief Hooley for the outstanding work that the EMS did
after the marathon bombings last year. As the Chairman said, it
is really amazing that 263 people had severe injuries and no
one died. It is really a testament to the outstanding job that
you did.
Commissioner Miller, it is good to see you here today. You
have a long record in law enforcement--NYPD, FBI, director of
National Intelligence Office, and now back with the NYPD.
You know, there is a lot of talk about--excuse me--Federal
funding that goes to different police departments around the
country, including the NYPD. There are also a lot of
unreimbursable expenditures. Can you just give some example--
for instance, how many NYPD police officers and civilians are
focused on counterterrorism and intelligence?
Commissioner Miller. As you know, Congressman, one of the
things that those funds rarely if ever apply to is personnel
costs. The NYPD's commitment to the counterterrorism mission is
second to none in that between those two bureaus we have
devoted over 1,000 people to this on a full-time basis, and
then pull in additional officers from around the city on ad hoc
missions to support the counterterrorism effort every day.
Mr. King. As you said, that is largely unreimbursable as
far as the personnel cost attached to that.
Commissioner Miller. Yes.
Mr. King. Right. There are also many threats that are not
reported where you have to send detectives out there or
officers out there to monitor a situation, which goes
unreported but does obviously run up the expenses.
Commissioner Miller. Yes. That is correct.
Mr. King. Also, you mentioned about New York being a
target. Could you give some examples--for instance, from
Inspire magazine; rather than just a generic attack on New
York, they actually give specific examples?
Commissioner Miller. New York as a primary target for
terrorism is based first on empirical data. When you tick
through the 16 plots targeting New York City before and after
9/11, starting with the bombing of the World Trade Center in
1993 and moving forward, but I think when you look at some of
the more recent plots, whether it was Najibullah Zazi's plot to
put 16 backpacks on the New York City subway system to cause
mass casualties or the plot that followed that involving Faisal
Shahzad's delivery of a truck bomb to Times Square, both of
them would say that they were inspired in large part by the
videos and messages of Anwar al-Awlaki.
As you know from your briefings on this committee, Anwar
al-Awlaki then aligned himself with a young American from North
Carolina via Queens named Samir Khan, who started Inspire
magazine. From its first issue, Inspire magazine has always
focused on driving forward--this is an on-line publication of
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, carrying al-Qaeda's
narrative--driving forward the idea of the homegrown terrorist
acting out within the capacity of what they could do without
the actual support of the headquarters component of al-Qaeda.
We have seen that in a number cases, including Mohammad
Quazi Nafis, who drove what he believed to be, as part of an
FBI undercover sting operation in concert with the NYPD, a
1,000-pound truck bomb to the front of the Federal Reserve in
the middle of a crowded Wall Street lunch hour, and dialed the
phone to set that bomb off while watching from a hotel window
above six times. When we looked at that device you saw the
detonator hooked up to the cell phone with the six missed
calls.
In addition, the most recent issue of Inspire magazine
takes the mistakes that they claim caused Faisal Shahzad's
Times Square truck bomb not to function and says that they have
remedied those technical errors with a new recipe and
instruction manual for a car bomb. The magazine is quite clear
in its copy to say that the purpose of this bomb is not to blow
up the Federal building, or recreate Oklahoma City, or destroy
structures; its specific purpose and design is to kill people
in crowded areas. The picture that comes with that accompanying
article shows a Ford van coming down Broadway in Times Square
with a red circle on it at the corner of 47th Street and
Broadway, which was the same place Faisal Shahzad planted his
device.
They suggest actual attacks against New York City right
down to citing specific events and crowd conditions that would
be optimal. So this is a theme and drum beat that we continue
to see.
The Pakistani Taliban has now launched its own magazine
called Azan, along the Inspire model, and it also focuses on
attacking within the United States, attacking large cities,
specific references to New York City, and urges its readers not
to reinvent the wheel. If you can't get a gun, get some other
kind of weapon and do what you can.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner.
Mr. Chairman, if we have a second round I would like to
discuss Secure the Cities with Commissioner Miller.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman now recognizes in the order of
appearance, Mr. Keating, from Boston.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is great to see you here, Chief Hooley, in particular.
I have a couple questions. One is, quickly, I think one of
the most important parts of training is to develop the chain of
command so that is there. Could you comment on that? Because in
my own experience, when there are emergencies of lesser scale,
and you had fire personnel, emergency personnel, police
personnel even within the same areas of government, that was a
problem.
But how important is that, so that that is established
ahead of time?
Chief Hooley. Having a chain of command established and
having people routinely employ ICS or NIMS is of great
importance. When events happen, such as we experienced that day
in Boston, people knew--the people I know in my department, and
suspect also in police and fire, everyone knew what their
positions, duties, and zones of responsibility were that day.
They knew who the supervisors were above them.
But they also--the supervisors above them, more
importantly, knew how much that they could delegate and let
people improvise on the plan to accomplish the mission.
Mr. Keating. Great. You just segued to one of my other
questions from the EMS side.
In the Boston Marathon bombing there was so much that was
accomplished through just the good common-sense people
exercised. They put people in--not in medical vehicles, many
times, but just in cars that weren't equipped, just to get them
to the hospital in time.
What lessons were learned from doing that? What resources
are necessary in the future? One of the things--things like
QuikClot and other things that are there, more accessible to
first responders that are important?
Could you comment on what you learned through some of the
improvising that occurred and what you saw in terms of the need
for additional resources?
Chief Hooley. One of the biggest things we saw was, you
know, the willingness of the public to step up and become first
responders, as well. You know, in a city like Boston, and I am
sure in New York and the Capital Region here, there are a lot
of folks who either have medical training, or they have worked
in medical settings, they have prior military experience, and
they are all willing to step up when they see, you know, fellow
citizens injured.
Being able to supply them with quick material--for example,
when you mentioned tourniquets, well we have always carried
them, we have always deployed them going back many years. You
know, now we have since more than doubled that.
All the first responders in Boston now have been equipped
with that because we saw just how quick, simple, mechanical
tool it is. You know, it requires a minimal amount of training.
Mr. Keating. So, if I--just jump, because my time is
limited, to the panelists as a whole: 9/11 identified one of
the most serious needs to be increased communication. In 2012
we have appropriated $13 billion to help that. We have the
FirstNet going on; we have--which would be years away.
Where are we now, from your perspective, in terms of
increased communication? Because that will save lives. It was
identified in the 9/11 Commission report as something that if
it had been at a better level would have saved lives.
Where are we now with that communication on the ground?
Chief Hooley. Well, for the base interoperability--and I
will go real quick--we have made a lot of advances, really
thanks to the Federal Government. Our EMTs and paramedics on--
just on the radios they carry have hundreds of channels where
they can immediately talk to other agencies if they need to,
and even the surrounding cities and towns around Boston, all by
agreement. There have been a lot of advances there.
The Federal Government also sponsored us being able to
build a Boston Area mutual aid network, where we are able to
put consoles in the private ambulance companies, because we
really depend on the privates to help in a mass care event. If
this had been 5 years prior, we would have been forced to go
through our rolodex of phone numbers and call companies
individually. This way, we hit a button, like on this, we are
able to talk to them all.
Mr. Keating. Great.
Chief Schwartz.
Chief Schwartz. Congressman, I was just going to say, using
Virginia as an example, one of the things that we have done is
divided--or using the regions that were already established in
the Commonwealth of Virginia, and within each of those regions,
developed regional interoperability committees that join
together both jurisdictions and professions--the different
disciplines--to work on the problems, you know, regionally of
interoperability. Then the State-wide interoperability
coordinator has the role of sort of knitting together what each
of those regions is doing.
I think we have made vast improvements in the last almost
13 years now, but, as you say, there is--you know, there is
still some work to do. You know, one of the things that I think
we need to focus on is that there are an awful lot of
jurisdictions out there that simply do not have the resources
of a New York of the National Capital Region, and that is where
I think we can take greater advantage of sharing
infrastructure, you know, that each jurisdiction doesn't
necessarily need to build its own capability; it can share
infrastructure with other jurisdictions, thereby reducing cost
and facilitating interoperability.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
My time is up. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman now recognizes the chair of the
Emergency Response and Preparedness Subcommittee, Mrs. Brooks.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
hosting this hearing.
Thank you all so very much for what you do.
Good to see you again, Chief Schwartz. You have appeared
before our subcommittee and really appreciate you returning.
You have listed, actually, a number of things that you
brought up, as well, before the subcommittee. I am curious from
your colleagues that are here with you today what are the top
priorities that you would like to see fixed. Because you listed
a number of things, which I think are very important--security
clearances for, whether it is EMS or fire, to sit on JTTFs;
over-Classification of Classified information, possibly that
issue of over-Classifying information which first responders
might very much need to have.
Chief Hooley, you mentioned that you need that information
so you can be prepared with respect to antidotes and how to
take care of patients, and so forth.
So I am very curious from each of you, what is it that you
need? We certainly know that the funding is critically
important, but what are the top concerns that you actually have
for first responders, particularly with respect to terrorism,
which--and as we have heard from the deputy commissioner, with
the thousands of people that we are concerned might be
returning--thousands of Westerners returning to this country,
what are your top priorities?
Deputy Commissioner, just out of curiosity?
Commissioner Miller. I think you have actually framed it
very well. From the New York City standpoint, with the
bandwidth we have, though, as has been a bit of a theme behind
the questioning here and our testimony submitted for the
record, funding is still the top priority in that the
counterterrorism overlay, the training that comes with it, the
equipment that comes with it, even, as Congressman King pointed
out, while we absorb a lot of that cost in the personnel area,
the idea of networking the region together, having a common
operational picture, getting common operational equipment so we
are operating on a common standard--all of this is dependent on
the support of the DHS funding, the UASI program, and so on.
The FirstNet issue is critical in that that real estate in
the communications world needs to be mapped out, needs to be
well-thought-out. Of course, the training, which relates back
to the funding.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Chief Schwartz, of all the things that you listed, what
would be your top priority?
Chief Schwartz. So I am not going to repeat the--you know,
what we have all talked about in terms of the funding, but I
think, you know beyond the funding there is, you know, dare I
call it a behavioral aspect to some of this, you know, what
people in positions of leadership are held accountable for.
So as an example, we have talked a little bit about
information sharing and, you know, how we at the local level
get our information. One of the things that we have discovered
is that the people who are amassing that information--the
analysts--don't often understand what we do or why we need that
information or why it needs to be characterized in a way that
would lead us to develop capabilities in response to these
threats.
That is why I cite, you know, the Joint Counterterrorism
Assessment Team at the NCTC. We have undertaken in the National
Capital Region an effort to--something we call Take Your
Analyst to Work Day. We actually have the analysts from the
intelligence community come out and ride fire trucks, ride
ambulances, ride in cop cars so they can see our job, how we do
it. It actually makes it clear to them why the information that
typically and traditionally they are producing for high-level
Federal decision-makers has, in some cases, applicability to
us.
Mrs. Brooks. While that is an incredible example of a best
practice, you have also mentioned that we as a country aren't
doing a very good job sharing the best practices.
Chief Schwartz. Correct. Correct. We are spending a lot of
money on some very good things in our jurisdictional or
regional areas, but for all of the money that we are spending,
we are not leveraging the best practices.
It seems to me that it would be easy enough in the grant
programs to look at some of the success and promote those,
incentivize those in subsequent years--adapted for local
conditions, obviously, or regional conditions, because not
everything is a one-to-one fit. But I think there is not enough
out there--not enough awareness of what has worked in other
areas.
Patient tracking, as an example. We have heard a couple of
times about the Boston experience and other experiences.
In the NCR we have created what we believe is a very robust
patient tracking system that overcomes the difficulties of, you
know, where patients are during a crisis. How do we promote
that beyond our own, you know, marketing of that? How do we get
FEMA to say, ``This is important and we are going to put money
into this so that everybody can enjoy the successes that the
National Capital Region has''?
Mrs. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, because I know that Chief Hooley
and Boston have been outstanding in looking at best practices,
I could just ask Chief Hooley to respond what--how you have
studied best practices, if I am not mistaken, from around the
country. Can you share a bit with the committee about that?
With that, I will yield back after his answer.
Chief Hooley. Thank you.
You know, we take advantage of every event to try to learn
from not only formal after-actions reports that come out later,
but whenever we have an opportunity, you know we have expended
dollars--sometimes operational dollars or even some grant
dollars--to bring some of the folks who dealt with the
situations on the ground there in to talk with us.
One example, after Katrina we brought up some folks from
the local hospitals and EMS, as well as law enforcement and
fire down there, to really give us an idea of what would work,
what wouldn't work here to test us. We did that with the Gulf
Region for some hospital evacuations.
As it relates to terrorism, we brought over folks from
Northern Ambulance Service after their attacks on their subways
to find out what worked in the mass care setting, what worked
as far as setting up either a field hospital versus getting
people out of there. We have talked to people from the Israeli
Defense Forces about how to deal with secondary devices,
suicide bombers, so that we could maximize our effectiveness
if--when our day came.
Mrs. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, there are so many incredible
things that these departments are doing, it just seems that
with modern-day technology we as a country ought to be able to
figure out how to share these incredible best practices, which
I don't think we are doing right now as a country.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I completely agree with the gentlelady.
Chairman recognizes now the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman and I thank the
Ranking Member for this important hearing.
To all of the witnesses, each of you have had first-hand
experience or you have had involvement in the research of this
very important component to our National security. Every time I
address this question in homeland security I like to use the
terminology ``National security,'' because each of you are
really on the international front lines, only because many of
what you have had to encounter has generated from entities
beyond these shores. So I thank you very much for your first-
hand knowledge and involvement.
Let me mention the obvious that both the Chairman and the
Ranking Member have already made mention of. First of all, I
believe the Chairman made mention of ISIS, which is now, in
essence, having a large part of Iraq under siege, and as we
speak, are moving toward any number of cities and confronting
the Iraqi National Security Forces, which are finding it very
challenging to deal with these both heinous and violent,
horrific, and moral-less terrorists. They represent a threat to
Iraq, but the represent the existence of entities that are
hungry for publicity and the ability to show their prowess.
We just returned from Nigeria less than 24 hours ago, and
you may have heard of something called Boko Haram. Today some
would say that that is a small entity in an isolated northeast
part of Nigeria, but the delegation that went saw them as vile,
moral-less thugs and terrorists that are decapitating police
officers, and slitting the throats of women, and kidnapping
children. They are connected to the terrorists that are in the
Sahel and they are worth taking note of.
I say this because it is well that America has first
responders and a new view of intelligence sharing that gives us
some comfort since 9/11. But it is always important to be
vigilant.
So one of the things that we established--two points--and
to my Ranking Member, I support wholeheartedly his analysis
regarding using something called all-hazards grants as opposed
to the grant process that we had before that would allow the
various first responders to seek particular resources and they
would be focused on National security and homeland security. I
hope that we can continue to work with the administration to
see that importance.
I want to read a sentence from Deputy Commissioner Miller,
from your statement that said, ``That is why it takes
additional resources, specialized equipment, and more money to
police events that used to simply require police personnel for
crowd and traffic control.'' It is a new day, is it not?
Would you speak to the importance of dollars that impact
intelligence sharing and interoperability? I say that because
none of you are from the fourth-largest city in the Nation,
which is Houston, but we also face our challenges and need to
have those resources. But would you speak to that, please?
Commissioner Miller. I would be pleased to, Congressman
Jackson Lee.
The counterterrorism overlay that we referred to, if you
look at an event like the Boston Marathon and then you have a
major public event, whether it is another race or a major
parade, deploying the people who are going to be conducting the
countersurveillance in the crowd, looking for operators who
might be planning something in the crowd, looking for those
Tsarnaev brothers; the deploying of not just a bomb detection
canine that is going to look at a package and say ``does it
contain explosive or not'' if it is sitting there, but the more
highly-trained and more costly vapor-wake dogs that are going
to be able to move through a trail and actually pick up the
vapor wake, the unseen odor that only one of those dogs can
detect of somebody wearing a backpack or carrying a bag that
contains a device moving through a crowd.
When you look in the incredibly scalable world of port
security and you want to push that threat outward from a city,
the idea of having the sophisticated radiation detective----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is very important.
Commissioner Miller [continuing]. Equipment on your
aircraft or on your boats to detect that threat before it
enters your port, all of this is enormously costly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chief, may I just thank you.
Chief, may I just ask you the question of interoperability
and the importance of having grant dollars to improve
interoperability--both the chiefs that are there, between your
services and other services?
Chief Hooley. Well, it is important--it is important, you
know, to maintain it, because as we make advances in
communication equipment and we keep expanding our abilities to
talk to each other we want to be able to stay current with
technologies.
Again, the interoperability then extends beyond us and
shared by the public safety agencies. You know, we have built
up interoperability now with Mass Highway, so we can talk
when--you know, they can direct us from their control centers
when there is traffic things with Mass Port for incidents over
at the airport. The potential to just keep expanding it, you
know, now that you have a base and--is very good.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Chief Schwartz. I would just add that, you know, this
entire effort in the wake of 9/11, it seems to me, has been to
develop really a National capacity to respond to a crisis,
whether it be, you know, terrorism or something more naturally
occurring. Every after-action report that has been written has
pointed to the issue of communications, the lack of
interoperability.
You know, I think the grant money as a way to facilitate
people coming together and working on what really are not
technological problems, you know, but are problems governance,
they are problems of, you know, people sitting down and
figuring out what it is they need to get out of the situation,
I think is certainly assisted by the grant money to facilitate
those relationships.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman for his extra time.
I thank the witnesses for that special insight on
protecting our National security.
I thank you. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the hard work of our witnesses and the men and
women that they represent, who are key members of our
communities.
We must train for disasters, and I fully support efforts to
train our first responders. As a former mayor for 11 years I
know how important this is. I have supported firefighters
grants, cops grants, regional information-sharing system. So I
certainly understand that.
But we must also prevent--work to prevent a terrorist
attack. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and my
good friend, Michael Cutler, who was an ICE agent, would tell
me, ``When it comes to terrorism, an ounce of prevention is
worth a ton of cure.''
Now the best thing that we can do to help our first
responders is to prevent a terrorist attack in the first place.
Now the 9/11 Commission report was given to Congress to do just
that--to make recommendations of what we can do to prevent
another attack. It was passed by Congress and signed by the
President.
The first paragraph of the preface of the 9/11 Commission
staff report on terrorist travel begins with the following
paragraph: ``It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists
cannot plan and carry out attacks in the United States if they
are unable to enter the country. Yet prior to September 11th,
while there were efforts to enhance border security, no agency
of the United States government thought of border security as a
tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, even after 19
hijackers demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S.
visa and gaining admission into the United States, border
security is still not considered a cornerstone of national
security policy.''
Now, the 9/11 Commission study on terrorist travel went on
to detail numerous examples of instances where terrorists not
only made use of visa and immigration fraud to enter the United
States, but to also embed themselves in the United States. Page
47 of this report notes, ``Once terrorists have entered the
United States their next challenge was to find a way to remain
here. Their primary method was immigration fraud.''
Another paragraph--and this is found on page 98--it said
that ``terrorists in the 1990s as well as the September 11th
hijackers needed to find a way to stay in or embed themselves
in the United States if their operational plans were to come to
fruition.''
Our borders are not secure. We do not have a biometric exit
system to identify when someone overstays their visas. We are
not enforcing our immigration laws to prevent immigration
fraud.
So we have not taken the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission report.
My question is, to each of you: Doesn't this make you
nervous?
Commissioner Miller. From the standpoint of New York City,
given all the context we have discussed at this hearing, we go
to bed nervous every night, and we wake up nervous every day.
It is a state of being in the post-9/11 world.
But to address those concerns, intelligence is, at its
simplest, understanding a problem. Good intelligence analysis
is understanding it well enough to do something about it. Part
of that has to be about being well-placed to collect and
analyze----
Mr. Barletta. But if I could just--if intelligence tells us
that the best way to prevent a terrorist attack is to stop it
in the first place, and we know that terrorists use visas as a
method of entry into the United States, and we know that they
use immigration fraud as a method to embed themselves, wouldn't
intelligence then tell us that we should enforce our
immigration laws and secure our borders?
Commissioner Miller. It would be within the Government's
capacity to do it. You are asking a local official about a
Federal problem, but I think where I was going with that is we
have, as well as people in London, Tel Aviv, Oman, Abu Dhabi,
Singapore, NYPD people embedded within those services to watch.
We also--and I will be meeting with this person after this
hearing--have people here at Interpol, but also at Customs and
Border Protection.
One of the great relationships we have between the NYPD and
the Federal agency, aside from the FBI, is with CBP, in terms
of keeping track of who is coming in, making sure that suspects
we are investigating aren't getting out, and an alert system
that goes both ways on that. I think that between our agencies
that works very well.
The larger problem that you frame is beyond the scope of
the NYPD to address.
Mr. Barletta. Chief Schwartz, does it make you nervous that
we are not following this report?
Chief Schwartz. Well, Congressman, I would, you know, echo
the commissioner's observations. There is a lot about
international travel that, you know, that has me concerned, and
that is one element that--you know, the one you are describing
is unfortunately one that I have little influence or control
over.
As concerning to me is the people, you know, the legitimate
people in this country who are, you know, potentially traveling
to areas of conflict right now, picking up, you know tactics,
techniques, and procedures that they might bring back here and
use. As the commissioner indicates, our ability to get the
intelligence on those folks and properly prepare----
Mr. Barletta. I understand that. I appreciate that. You
know, it is remarkable--the intelligence of what we are able to
do, but aren't we missing step No. 1 is to prevent it in the
first place? If we can stop an attack from someone even coming
here and embedding themselves here, shouldn't that be a
priority?
Chief Schwartz. Congressman, I wouldn't argue your point.
Absolutely. It is just that from where I sit I have little
influence on that.
Mr. Barletta. Chief Hooley.
Chief Hooley. Well, as you said in the beginning, an ounce
of prevention is worth a ton of cure. Can't disagree with that.
I guess, you know, as far as, you know, my influence as a
local EMS provider is a little bit--not much when it comes to
international travel or those type of matters.
Mr. Barletta. But isn't the best thing we could do for the
EMS is to not put them in harm's way in the first place?
Chief Hooley. Oh, sure. Because our response is based on
having to respond to something and consequence management----
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Dr. Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. Certainly the challenge here is understanding
the right approach to get the most benefit towards this
problem. Immigration and border control is one part of that,
but as we have heard about, you know, interagency
relationships, really this is a systems problem. We have heard
discussions about----
Mr. Barletta. If you think of enforcing--but again, we are
glazing over, because there is a political aspect to this, but
there is a National security aspect to this. I get it. I
understand the political aspects of it, but I am worried about
our National security. We should not be playing politics with
the security of the American people.
If we know that terrorists embed themselves in the United
States and use immigration fraud as a way to do it, should we
be doing that?
Mr. Jackson. Well, certainly immigration and border
protection is one part of this overall system. But there is a
resource question here, and it is a question of where in that
system an investment in the resources will get the most safety.
Mr. Barletta. Isn't the way to get the most safety is to
not allow them into the United States in the first place? Seems
pretty obvious to----
Mr. Jackson. In the ideal, depending on what the relative
price of getting better there versus getting better----
Mr. Barletta. What was the price of 9/11?
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Time is expired.
The Chairman now recognizes the ever-patient Ms. Clarke,
from New York.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is so good that you
should mention that. I just want to put on the record, I got
one--you owe me one. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the Ranking Member, as well, thank you.
To our panelists, thank you for sharing your expertise this
morning. It has been quite edifying. I think that there are
some recurrent themes that, you know, remain a challenge for
us.
Let me welcome back the NYPD and welcome back to Capitol
Hill Deputy Commissioner John Miller. I wanted to ask--I will
start with a question to you, sir--unfortunately, due to the
experience of 9/11 and not--and out of the necessity of having
thwarted several terrorist attempts since, New York City has
developed expertise that serves as a model for counterterrorism
planning and programs.
Since you have been in your current position, what
counterterrorism programs have you changed, and what programs
have you found most effective or ineffective? For example, many
Americans in and outside of New York--the New York-New Jersey
area--were a bit troubled by a few years back when we learned
that NYPD officers were dispatched to New Jersey to conduct
surveillance activities at mosques and other social gathering
places of Muslim Americans.
In the wake of 9/11 we understand that singling out and
targeting individuals based on religion is not the way to go.
Violent extremism transcends religion. Can you comment on that?
Then, please share any concerns that your agencies have
regarding consolidation of grant programs, maintenance of
effort, and its impact on remaining vigilant, stood-up, and
forward-leaning in the face of ever-evolving and multi-faceted
terrorist threats.
Commissioner Miller. Let me try and go in order, and if I
miss something just bring me back.
As far as concerns about NYPD and the so-called Muslim
Surveillance Program, there is nothing called the Muslim
Surveillance Program; that is a term kind-of coined by the
newspapers so that has become a bit of a bumper sticker. On the
other hand, there were concerns about the scope and breadth of
NYPD's efforts to gain information at the onset of its
intelligence program and its coordination with other
jurisdictions.
In the time that I have been back at the NYPD, which is a
mere 6 months at this point, what we have done is increase our
coordination, I would say in the extreme with the FBI, not just
in New York but also in the Newark field division in New
Jersey. We have increased an already fairly good coordination
with the counterterrorism entity in the attorney general's
office in the State of New Jersey.
In terms of the optics issue about, well where were they
looking and what were they looking for, part of that is to
understand that while jurisdictional borders between law
enforcement agencies are critical to be mindful of, both in
procedure and in some cases in law, terrorist plotters don't
actually honor those borders. The people who built the World
Trade Center bomb in 1993 built it in New Jersey. Most of the
plot against the Federal Reserve was--the bomb was constructed
in Long Island.
So it is incumbent upon the NYPD to have a richer picture
in terms of understanding not just New York City but the
surrounding areas. Part of the issue there is the community
outreach and community relations issues, which is how were
those efforts framed? Were the earliest efforts reflective of
what we are doing today--and the answer there would be no. I
think there was also a bit of a learning curve over those
years.
So to get a better understanding and get clearer optics,
one of the things that we have done in the past 6 months is to
increase our outreach to those communities within the greater
metropolitan area. We have had three major meetings with
stakeholders in the Muslim community, as well as some of the
very groups that are engaged in litigation against us, to bring
them to the table, to take their questions, to try and give
some answers, to address their concerns.
Today, as we sit here in this room, the New York City
Police Department is doing its pre-Ramadan briefing, where they
bring in a large number of people from the Muslim community and
religious leaders to talk about, before the holiday season,
their concerns, from issues as simple as parking during prayer
time at mosques to as complex as radicalization--whatever they
want to discuss. The police commissioner has met with them
personally; I have addressed those concerns, and that is a
dialogue we intend to continue.
I just want to close on that issue by saying: Very much in
the universe that we lived in in Los Angeles, where we competed
with the message of gangs in the streets for the attention of
children and teenagers and young people, we are competing with
an equally powerful message coming through social media and the
publications that go by the narrative of al-Qaeda that is
urging young men to travel overseas to fight, to die, to martyr
themselves or be maimed or killed, or to come back and bring
that narrative back home to the United States.
My message to those stakeholders in the community has been
more, ``I need a partner here in a counter-narrative to that
message that I cannot be the deliverer of the government, the
police department, an intelligence entity can't be the one to
deliver that message. I need your voices because there is a
powerful message coming from the other side and we need to
engage in this effort together.''
That may mean a little more transparency on my part. I get
that, and that is what they are seeking. But I need more help
from the community as well.
Ms. Clarke. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you. Gentlelady's time has expired.
Chairman recognizes Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking
Member.
To the panel, thank you for your testimony today.
Deputy Commissioner Miller, I know your work with the NYPD.
I grew up across the river in Newark, New Jersey, but as a
youngster I remember you more on NBC channel four,
disseminating information to the community.
Chief Schwartz, I was fortunate enough to have TEEX
training in Texas, and they used your experience on 9/11 as the
scene, and what you were able to do that day in the
circumstances that you found yourself is commendable.
Chief Hooley, to know that you were able to get those
people to the hospital within 22 minutes of that function is
incredible.
You know, Chief Schwartz, in your testimony, you know that
communications problems posed challenges during, you know, the
response activities at the Pentagon on 9/11. Can you talk about
how States, regions have improved interoperable communication
capabilities since 9/11? Can you also talk about the important
role of State-wide interoperability coordinators and the
regional interoperability working groups?
Chief Schwartz. Thank you, Congressman. I mentioned in a
previous question just a little bit about some of the things
that we are doing in Virginia with regard to regional groups
that are working on the interoperability problem, and that has
been facilitated by the State-wide interoperability
coordinator, through what, you know, again, as we have talked
about in a number of different dimension here, you know, by
using some of the grant money as sort-of the hook to get people
to the table and get them to cooperate with each other, and it
is our hope that, you know, some of the things that we have
accomplished there will be continued.
Two other things that we have done in Virginia under the
auspices of the interoperability coordinator is to create a
linkage between the State's radio system and that of all the
local radio systems. The State had a previous architecture that
they had invested in, and it was important that, as an example,
the State police be able to communicate with local law
enforcement, fire, rescue, and so they were able to create a
linkage between those two disparate systems.
Then last, and it, you know, it is a relatively, you know,
minor issue in the overall scheme of things, but it is not
unimportant in the operating environment, and that is the State
interoperability coordinator moved everybody towards a common
language, which, as you may remember during 9/11, you know, was
especially problematic with the use of 10 codes and different
terminology that really complicates communication.
So I would just add to this discussion about
interoperability that the interoperability can't be seen as,
you know, sort-of the Holy Grail. It has to be part of an
operating system that includes an effective incident command
system, incident management system. In my view, I have seen too
many times where interoperability is used as a kind-of a reason
not to co-locate and actually make joint decisions.
So I think interoperability needs to be looked at through
the lens of operability--you know, the total system of incident
management, of which our ability to talk to each other
mechanically is but one part.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you.
You know, during the discussion, you know, the grants that
have been very useful to your different agencies have come up,
and, you know, there is a proposal--the NPGP, or the National
Preparedness Grant Program--to consolidate UASI and all the
grants into one sum of money and have everyone compete. There
are many Members in Congress that don't think that is very
wise.
I know what UASI has meant to Newark, New Jersey, and to
have those dollars all come together and then disseminated to
the State and then, you know, in Newark, cross our fingers and
hope that we still continue to get the funding that has been so
vital to the success of, you know, our homeland work in Newark
that we hope that the State decides, ``Well maybe, Newark, you
don't need as much.'' The direct funding to the entities, you
know, on the ground is important.
What is your feeling about--of that?
Chief Schwartz. Well, Congressman, we have--you know, both
the International Association of Fire Chiefs and and our
partner organizations, the professional organizations, I think
have been on record. I think this proposal has come forward now
three times, and each time we have been of the view that, you
know, we don't understand enough about what is trying to be
achieved here.
We are concerned about the transparency; we are concerned
about--I would say we are concerned about even the competitive
nature--the proposal that includes competitiveness, because
what we are really trying to do is create a collaborative
spirit here, right? How do we build systems in which people can
work across the traditional boundaries?
So, you know, I think our position has been not to dismiss
it out-of-hand, but not enough information has come forward
that gives us the confidence that we can achieve some of the
same successes that we have had to date under the proposal that
has come forward now a few times.
Mr. Payne. Commissioner Miller.
Commissioner Miller. From the simplest perspective, I have
always believed, as the former head of counterterrorism and
intelligence for the city of Los Angeles Police Department and
now New York City, that the money should go where the threats
are and where the targets are. That is a basic principle.
I would also say that one of--reflecting on the chief's
comments, one of the great successes of the UASI program in its
current form is that it has pushed the money where the threats
are, despite the expansion of UASI regions. But it has also at
the same time, to Chief Schwartz's point, developed regional
partnerships and strategies in how to exploit that money best
within the regions where the threats and targets are.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. I wasn't planning on opening up to a
second round of questions.
Mr. King does have a question, and I would like to
recognize him.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Of course, if the other Members would like
to, that is fine as well.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I regret that I had to leave for another meeting,
but I just want to follow up on something.
First of all, let me just say, Commissioner Miller, besides
being on this committee I am also on the Intelligence
Committee. I do get Sensor briefings. When I see the threats
and potential threats and possible threats against the city of
New York and the outstanding work that you do and the NYPD
does, and knowing that people in the community could
participate in those threats and how important this is to
prevent them and to monitor what is happening, I want to
commend the NYPD for respecting Constitutional rights and
protecting the safety and liberty of the people of the city of
New York.
In that regard, the Secure the Cities program has been
funded now for a number of years, and there are questions as to
how far into the future that funding should go. I believe it
should be extended. I think it is vitally important. But if you
could explain the significance of the program and also how that
technology is transferable throughout the country?
Commissioner Miller. The Securing the City program has been
vital to the New York City Region, and I say ``region'' with an
underline on the region part. This was a program that started
with base funding of $18 million to develop this program where
we would have radiation detection across the region. The
regional piece is critical because, as the President of the
United States said when he was asked an international affairs
question recently, he said, ``What keeps me up at night is the
thought of a nuclear device in New York City. Regional
conflicts will come and go.''
We have seen that go from $18 million to $16 million to
$11.5 million, and then plans to take it down to the $4
million-plus area. Building this out in New York City and then
getting the common operational picture through the region, the
common operating equipment, the same standards, the same
vendors has given us the ability--again, back to the World
Trade Center example--you know, they are not going to construct
a nuclear device in New York City. It is going to come in
through a port; it is going to be built on an off-site--in an
area outside New York City, which means that detection
equipment radiating out from the urban center that could be a
target is critical, and we have built that incrementally over
time.
I would like to thank you for your efforts personally for
helping us with the Department of Homeland Security and our
efforts to maintain that funding as we complete that building
process.
To the back end of your question, is how could that help
other regions, we were the first to do this regional Securing
the Cities thing, with New York City serving as, for lack of a
better term, the executive agent and helping the smaller
agencies as they radiated out--150 of them within that region.
I think what we have learned over time and what we have
developed in terms of a program is transferrable.
It is the conversations we have been having with my former
colleague in LAPD, Mike Downing, about how to apply those
lessons, and form, and format to their efforts, as well as
Superintendent Gary McCarthy, in Chicago.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the extra time.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
I want to thank the witnesses.
I would be remiss, Commissioner, if I didn't allow you a
few minutes to share with this committee your interview with
Osama bin Laden.
Commissioner Miller. It was something that happened in the
last days of May 1998, a few years before September 11, back, I
think, before that was within our concept. But I would like to
say this: In sum and substance, what Osama bin Laden said to me
over the course of an hour sitting face to face in that tent on
a mountaintop in Afghanistan was this, that the system is more
important than the organization.
When I asked him if he was concerned about being captured
or killed by the United States, his answer was, ``I am building
an organization that is going to outlive me and whoever comes
behind me by networking the message and the groups together.''
But he also said on May 28, 1998, ``I predict a black day
for America, after which nothing will be the same, that this
war with the United States will be greater than our battle with
the Russians, and that you will only come to understand this
when you leave our lands dragging your bodies in shameful
defeat and the coffins and the boxes.''
I think at the time he said those words to me in 1998 it
sounded a tad, Mr. Chairman, hyperbolic. Who was this
individual who was not the leader of a state nor the general of
an army, who had access to funds but not National treasure, to
declare war on the United States and to predict that kind of
outcome?
I think Chief Schwartz and Chief Hooley and Dr. Jackson
would agree that had that interview been done on September 10,
2001 and reviewed later in that week, it would have sent--it
would have sounded a lot less hyperbolic.
So from that I take a lesson in context, which is, right
now, through the very Classified briefings that you and
Congressman King and the other Members of the Homeland Security
Committee sit in, we are seeing an unraveling of a security
picture that seems very far away in places like Iraq and Libya
and Syria, and we are seeing the emergence of a group of new
potential Osama bin Ladens who are claiming leadership and
ability to extend their reach and power in terms of threat and
action.
So I would like to commend my fellow first responders at
the table for their continued attention, heroism, and
commitment for what they do, because more than a decade after
9/11 the threat stream is not an awful lot brighter and the
picture is changing minute-to-minute.
I commend the committee and thank you all, individually and
as a group, for the support, perspective, and wisdom you bring
to this fight.
Chairman McCaul. Well let me just say, sir, thank you for
sharing that very powerful story and reminder that the threat
is still, unfortunately, very much alive and well.
I see we had one Member show up at the last minute.
Mr. Vela, would you like to be recognized for questions?
Okay.
Did the Ranking Member have any additional questions?
With that, I want to thank the distinguished witnesses for
your compelling testimony. It is very helpful to this
committee.
Without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John Miller
Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information
developed in a JTTF to outside organizations, such as State and local
law enforcement, and fusion centers?
Answer. This would have to be done very carefully. JTTFs are both
collectors and consumers of intelligence, but the primary role of the
JTTF is to run investigations. The primary role of fusion centers is
not to do investigations (this is always a temptation, because
everybody wants to be in the game) but to do analysis and share that.
Once a fusion center becomes a detective squad doing investigations, it
loses its focus on the analysis role. In the same vein, a JTTF should
not become the font of intel to the State and local police units.
Question 1b. Perhaps some sort of integration between JTTFs and
fusion centers?
Answer. The best model I have seen is in Los Angeles. The LA
Regional Intelligence Center (J-RIC). At the JRIC, they have an ``all
crimes, all hazards'' approach. They deal with crime and CT. This is
reinforced by the theory that many terrorist plots had their roots in
other crimes. The FBI has embedded the ``Threat Squad'' there. By doing
this, the FBI Threat Squad takes all the incoming threat info and teams
up with local officers who run the leads on the ground. This keeps the
fusion center in the loop. At the same time FBI analysts are embedded
on the Classified side of the fusion center. This way, the JTTF does
its job on the main cases. The Threat Squad runs out all the leads
keeping the fusion center involved. The fusion center does its job by
providing threat info and analysis tailored to the community it serves.
Question 1c. Do you have any other suggestions as to how we can
make the best use of the resources in the fusion centers.
Answer. All fusion centers should be ``All Threats,'' meaning they
should study, collect, and analyze intel on all crimes.
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for James H. Schwartz
Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information
developed in a JTTF to outside organizations, such as State and local
law enforcement, and fusion centers?
Question 1b. Perhaps some sort of integration between JTTFs and
fusion centers?
Question 1c. Do you have any suggestions as to how we can make the
best use of the resources in the fusion centers?
Answer. This question concerns the relationship between the JTTFs
and fusion centers. As the Nation has invested in the development of
fusion centers, it is fair to say that a division of labor or
relationship needs to be better defined between the JTTFs and fusion
centers. While a few like the Los Angeles JRIC are very good at
integrating the fusion center and JTTF missions, my experience is that
that is not the case in many fusion centers.
In the National Capital Region (NCR), there are examples of good
coordination between the FBI Washington, DC field office and the
Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (NVRIC). However, as I
testified, there is a long-standing history of the field office working
with local fire and EMS departments that could be replicated in all
field offices. This relationship was a key component during the
response to the 9/11 incident at the Pentagon where critical
intelligence was shared in the command post and influenced numerous
decisions. Even now, the field office hosts twice-monthly conference
calls in which they include the fire chiefs of the NCR to update them
on threats and operations. Over the last 13 years every piece of
significant information that I have received as a local official,
information that caused me to rethink my preparedness efforts, has come
from the FBI. Information that which has been provided by the fusion
center has in every instance been that already provided by the Bureau
or was available in open sources, normally the news media.
It is worth assessing whether the return on investment from fusion
centers is worth the cost. More than a decade after their formation
across the Nation many fusion centers have shifted the majority of
their focus to ``all crimes'' which may be appropriate given the real
but relatively small threat from terrorism when compared to daily crime
in many communities. In these centers there is often a close link with
the investigation functions separate from the JTTF. Consideration
should be given to letting fusion centers focus on local and regional
crime, which was the role of criminal intelligence before 9/11, and
requiring that when there is a terrorism nexus, the issue be turfed to
the JTTF who would then be responsible for coordinating with locals.
Additionally the practice of adding fire/EMS representatives to the
JTTF as is done in New York and Los Angeles, should become standard
practice. Redirecting some of the resources now dedicated to a murky
mission in the fusion center to a JTTF would not only facilitate
greater information sharing with locals but would provide the Bureau
with an operational perspective many do not currently have.
Question 2a. Many fusion centers have developed Terrorism Liaison
Officer (TLO) programs, which are one way ``non-traditional partners,''
including the fire service and EMS, can gain situational awareness on
current terrorist tactics, techniques, and practices.
Question 2b. Do your departments have dedicated Terrorism Liaison
Officers?
Answer. In general, there are a number of good TLO programs across
the Nation. The cities of Phoenix, Arizona and Los Angeles, California
probably have the best example of a TLO program.
In NCR, we do not have a TLO program. The Northern Virginia region
has placed a fire/EMS representative at the NVRIC and developed a fire
chief's intelligence committee that works closely with the fusion
center representative. However, fire and EMS participation at the NVRIC
is limited to that person. We are not allowed to provide substitutes
when the representative takes leave, or add extra staffing (even though
the jurisdictions have offered to cover the cost of additional fire and
EMS representatives) and there is no executive representation from the
fire and EMS community on the NVRIC governing board. This issue can
present problems in developing a strong relationship between the fusion
center and fire departments that it serves.
Question 2c. Do your local fusion centers provide training to the
TLOs on how to properly report suspicious activities that may be
observed on call?
Answer. The Arlington County Fire Department developed a suspicious
activity reporting (SAR) policy many years ago, and it was adopted by
other agencies in the Northern Virginia region. Training has been
provided to all personnel in the region. Any suspicious activity is
reported to both the Fire/EMS representative at the NVRIC and local law
enforcement agencies, which have representatives at the JTTF.
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for James Hooley
Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information
developed in a JTTF to outside organizations, such as State and local
law enforcement, and fusion centers?
Perhaps some sort of integration between the JTTFs and fusion
centers?
Question 1b. Do you have any other suggestions as to how we can
make the best use of the resources in the fusions centers?
Answer. Let me begin by describing the relationship of my
department, Boston Emergency Medical Services (Boston EMS), with the
local fusion center and the JTTF. Boston EMS is what has been described
as a ``non-traditional partner'' within the Boston Regional
Intelligence Center (BRIC), the city's fusion center, located at the
Boston Police Department (BPD). Boston EMS has had a paramedic assigned
to the BRIC full-time, 5 days a week, since 2007.
Boston EMS is a member of the Massachusetts Anti-Terrorism Advisory
Committee, which is co-chaired by the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts
and the SAC of FBI Boston. Although we are not a member of the JTTF,
several BPD members from the BRIC, with whom we work with regularly,
are assigned to the JTTF. From my perspective, our law enforcement
partners at the BRIC are integrated at the JTTF and EMS depends on
those officers to represent us at the JTTF, much like other non-
traditional partners, such as public health and fire services. I do
think that the BRIC representatives to the JTTF would be comfortable
sharing information they receive from the JTTF with EMS, as security
levels permit. Having said this, I believe the JTTF would be more
likely to share information once they determine it necessary. It is my
hope that the JTTF's look beyond law enforcement, to understand the
threat-intelligence needs of non-traditional partners and how soon they
would require this information.
The JTTFs should have regularly scheduled briefings with non-
traditional partners. This dialogue would promote better understandings
of each other's needs. For example, if a JTTF were to comprehend the
capacities, capabilities, or risks to EMS, hospitals, or public health
departments, it may influence what information they share and when they
choose to do so.
Another suggestion on how to best use resources from fusion centers
is to establish practices that streamline the ability to take higher-
security classification material and revise it to a level where it can
be disseminated to more stakeholders.
As a hypothetical (non-terrorism) example, imagine the FBI or DEA
issues a Law Enforcement Sensitive report warning of a serious
contamination or additive to illicit drugs being trafficked on the
streets. Security requirements would prohibit the representative from
sharing this information with non-law enforcement personnel, including
EMS field providers, drug outreach workers, hospital emergency
department clinicians or poison control center staff. There is a
process to review and redact information that would lower it to FOUO,
allowing it to be shared at lower levels. Admittedly I am not familiar
with the time required for such approval or any remaining limitations
on sharing. I would recommend that JTTFs and fusion centers discuss and
plan for a process by which information can be shared with necessary
public safety, public service, and public health and health care
entities, as appropriate, to ensure the right information gets to the
right people in sufficient time to meet the desired objective of
protecting the public.
Question 2a. Many fusion centers have developed Terrorism Liaison
Officer (TLO) programs, which are one-way ``non-traditional partners,''
including the fire service and EMS, can gain situational awareness on
current terrorist tactics, techniques, and practices. Do your
departments have dedicated Terrorism Liaison Officers?
Question 2b. Do your local fusion centers provide training to the
TLOs on how to properly report suspicious activities that may be
observed on a call?
Answer. I have read about various Terrorism Liaison Officer
programs in other jurisdictions. Boston EMS does not have a dedicated
TLO per se, however, our EMS liaison at the BRIC has been offered and
received several DHS and other agency-sponsored trainings. This
includes but is not limited to analyst trainings, conferences,
exercises, training in the proper handling of Classified materials, a
security clearance, suspicious activity reporting, and regularly
receiving bulletins and briefings that may be of interest to EMS. In
his capacity as our representative to the BRIC he will train our
personnel in the field on what they should look for and consider
reporting. Our EMS representative at the BRIC does not enter SAR data
directly into the database. He provides the data to staff at the BRIC
who vet the information and decide whether to enter it. The EMS
representative will also share information from threat assessments,
particularly as they relate to large public gatherings or events, to
EMS providers in the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region as well as
the hospitals and public health agencies.
Currently, the BRIC is working to develop the TLO concept and bring
in more non-traditional partners. I wish to emphasize that although it
is important to receive the necessary training and clearances to
participate in a fusion center; those are only the first steps. To be
truly effective as a member of a fusion center, law enforcement and
non-traditional members must be trusted members of the team. They
should be present for the daily briefings. They should have access to
analysts, GIS specialists, the Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facility when needed and other resources at the fusion center, as our
EMS representative has. Developing that relationship as a trusted agent
in a fusion center will enhance the likelihood that critical
information is shared and utilized, not merely collected.
Questions From Honorable Susan W. Brooks for James Hooley
Question 1. In 2012, FEMA reduced the period of performance for
grants from 3 years to 2 in an effort to address the amount of funding
that had yet to be drawn down by grant recipients. Has the reduction in
the period of performance had an impact on your ability to expend the
grant funds on projects that truly address your capability gaps?
Answer. The FEMA-reduced period of performance for grants from 3
years to 2 has presented a significant challenge to the Metro Boston
Homeland Security Region, negatively impacting the ability to develop
and sustain core capabilities. This approach is creating a bias towards
buying more assets, rather than implementing the life-cycle planning
envisioned by the National Preparedness Goal.
Prudent grant management requires extensive procedures allowing for
accountability and compliance as funding is transferred from the
Federal level to the State, from the State to the region, and then from
the region to a local department or a vendor, in addition to EHP
reviews. While each step is in many respects essential, they can create
time-consuming delays and chokepoints.
With each investment, extensive effort is placed on determining how
best to spend the grant dollars. Regrettably, a 2-year grant cycle
leaves minimal time for the final and most essential step of spending
the grant funding. Investments in planning, exercises, and systems
development take time and an on-going commitment of stakeholders, in
identifying appropriate contractors and in managing the work through to
completion. With the 2-year grant cycle and no extensions, we have
found ourselves again and again in a position where investments must be
prioritized based on their time to completion, rather than their
benefit to the region, resulting in a disproportionate investment in
equipment. While funding may be spent in a timelier manner, the
downstream effect has been a compromise to the overall objectives of
the grant.
As a first responder, I see the direct benefit of the Homeland
Security grant funding. Being mindful of how each dollar is invested
impacts our safety and our ability to protect the public. On April 15,
2013, we were able to utilize not just the equipment, but also the
years of planning, exercises, training, and preparedness to maximize
life-saving efforts. As the chief, I also oversee our operational
budget; I understand the challenges associated with fiscal
accountability and the need to work within stringent annual time lines.
Ultimately, it is my hope that we can work toward building efficiencies
within the grant management process to reduce delays, but also allow
the awarding jurisdiction sufficient time to effectively meet the goals
of the grant.
Question 2. FEMA has indicated that it would be willing to
``reevaluate the feasibility and appropriateness of returning to a 3-
year period of performance.'' Provided we can ensure that an efficient
and effective draw-down of these grant funds continues, would you be
supportive of a return to a 3-year period of performance?
Answer. I, and the Metro Boston region as a whole, would be in full
support of the return to a 3-year period of performance. It would
enhance our ability to meet our preparedness goals. Adequately
addressing an identified capability gap includes developing a strategy
that will incorporate planning, training, and exercising, in addition
to equipment.
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Brian A. Jackson \1\ \2\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT411z1.html.
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applying lessons learned from past response operations to strengthening
national preparedness addendum
Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information
developed in a JTTF to outside organizations, such as State and local
law enforcement, and fusion centers?
Question 1b. Perhaps some sort of integration between JTTFs and
fusion centers?
Question 1c. Do you have any other suggestions as to how we can
make the best use of the resources in the fusion centers?
Answer. The sharing of information from JTTFs to other
organizations clearly has to be done with care, given concerns
regarding maintaining the integrity of criminal investigations and
eventual prosecution. This has been a challenge identified for domestic
intelligence more generally, not just with respect to the JTTFs.\3\ A
recent report by three of my RAND colleagues based on discussions with
a number of State and local law enforcement officials took on the issue
of JTTFs and intelligence sharing directly. Though the group was not a
scientific sample of the community, it did represent a set of senior
representatives from a number of major departments and agencies at
varied levels of government.\4\ Those participants highlighted
continuing challenges with the interaction between JTTFs and local law
enforcement, as well as complaints about the nature of the information
that was shared. There was also the suggestion of some local
departments pulling back from participation in JTTFs because of
perceptions of continuing information-sharing problems.
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\3\ Jackson, BA., ed., ``The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in
a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S.
Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency,'' Santa Monica, Calif.,
RAND Corporation, 2009.
\4\ Jenkins, B.M., A. Liepman, H.H. Willis, ``Identifying Enemies
Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of
Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing,'' Santa
Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, 2014.
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Questions were also raised in those discussions about the
effectiveness of information sharing between fusion centers and police
departments, though there is clearly variation across the country. The
group specifically took on the question of whether fusion centers could
be used to better link JTTFs to State and local police departments, and
few participants thought that was the right solution. Differences that
exist between fusion centers also make it hard to generalize--and the
absence of good and objective measures of what they are producing means
that there isn't a common yardstick to use to identify, for example,
particularly effective fusion centers as candidates to potentially play
this bridging role. In the absence of such measures, seeking to use
fusion centers in that sort of bridging function could be piloted in
one or more sites to assess the viability and effectiveness of the
approach.
More systematic measures and assessment of fusion centers would
also make it possible to better identify what resources currently exist
in individual centers--which are generally viewed to vary considerably
in capability across the country--and is a needed first step to
determine how they could be better leveraged. Following the 2012 Senate
report on the fusion center program,\5\ some researchers--including at
RAND--have made progress to developing methods for such evaluation.\6\
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\5\ Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, ``Federal
Support for and Involvement In State and Local Fusion Centers,''
Majority and Minority Staff Report, Washington, DC, October 3, 2012.
\6\ For example, Jackson, B.A., ``How Do We Know What Information
Sharing is Really Worth?'' Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation,
2014.
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