[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2014
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 9, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
2014 ANNUAL REPORT
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2014
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 9, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-906 WASHINGTON : 2014
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20402-0001
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
CARL LEVIN, Michigan Cochairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California FRANK WOLF, Virginia
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
CHRISTOPHER P. LU, Department of Labor
SARAH SEWALL, Department of State
STEFAN M. SELIG, Department of Commerce
DANIEL R. RUSSEL, Department of State
TOM MALINOWSKI, Department of State
Lawrence T. Liu, Staff Director
Paul B. Protic, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Executive Summary............................................. 1
Overview..................................................... 2
Key Recommendations.......................................... 8
Findings and Recommendations by Issue........................ 15
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 58
II. Human Rights................................................. 61
Freedom of Expression........................................ 61
Worker Rights................................................ 71
Criminal Justice............................................. 81
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 90
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 100
Population Planning.......................................... 103
Freedom of Residence and Movement............................ 108
Status of Women.............................................. 112
Human Trafficking............................................ 116
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 120
Public Health................................................ 124
The Environment.............................................. 127
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 133
Civil Society................................................ 133
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 139
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 148
Access to Justice............................................ 157
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 162
V. Tibet......................................................... 172
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 186
VII. Endnotes.................................................... 191
Political Prisoner Database................................ 191
Freedom of Expression...................................... 192
Worker Rights.............................................. 199
Criminal Justice........................................... 207
Freedom of Religion........................................ 216
Ethnic Minority Rights..................................... 225
Population Planning........................................ 227
Freedom of Residence and Movement.......................... 234
Status of Women............................................ 238
Human Trafficking.......................................... 242
North Korean Refugees in China............................. 246
Public Health.............................................. 249
The Environment............................................ 253
Civil Society.............................................. 260
Institutions of Democratic Governance...................... 265
Commercial Rule of Law..................................... 276
Access to Justice.......................................... 283
Xinjiang................................................... 288
Tibet...................................................... 300
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau........................ 313
I. Executive Summary
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC),
established by the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 (19 U.S.C.
1307) as China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization,
is mandated to monitor human rights and the development of the
rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the
President and the Congress. The CECC is also mandated to
maintain a database of political prisoners in China--
individuals who have been imprisoned by the Chinese government
for exercising their civil and political rights under China's
Constitution and laws or under China's international human
rights obligations. The Commission consists of nine Senators,
nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior
Administration officials appointed by the President and
representing the Department of State, Department of Labor, and
the Department of Commerce. The Commission's Executive Branch
members have participated in and supported the work of the
Commission. The content of this Annual Report, including its
findings, views, and recommendations, does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the
policies of the Administration. The report covers the period
from fall 2013 to fall 2014.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 17 to 0.
Overview
Human rights and rule of law conditions in China overall
did not improve this past year, and declined in some of the
areas covered by this report. The Chinese government and
Communist Party continued to emphasize authoritarian control at
the expense of human rights and the rule of law. The limited
space for peaceful expression, assembly, and religious practice
in China constricted further. The government tightened
restrictions on rights advocates, civil society, human rights
lawyers, domestic and foreign journalists, the Internet, and
religious institutions. Additionally, the government denied
medical treatment to imprisoned activists and targeted the
family members and associates of rights advocates for
retribution. The release of an unprecedented White Paper on
Hong Kong and a National People's Congress Standing Committee
decision fueled concerns over Hong Kong's ``high degree of
autonomy'' and prospects for universal suffrage. The government
continued with harsh security measures that failed to protect
rights in ethnic minority regions that have experienced tragic
incidents of violence and self-immolations in recent years.
These negative developments overshadowed potential areas of
progress that include the announced abolition of the
reeducation through labor system and environmental law and
judicial reforms.
Nearly 2 years into what likely will be a 10-year tenure,
President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has already
left his mark on the nation. His priorities have included
introducing the notion of the ``Chinese dream'' to spur a
``great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation'' and launching a
campaign against corruption that has swept up some of China's
highest officials. His administration faces major challenges: a
slowing economy, income inequality, ethnic tensions, severe
pollution, and food safety problems. As this report shows,
however, Xi and his administration continue to adhere to the
authoritarian model of his predecessors, one whose core tenets
are unchallenged leadership of the Party and extensive efforts
to suppress perceived threats to the Party. Under this model,
which Party leaders assert guarantees ``social stability'' and
a ``harmonious society,'' China's 1.4 billion citizens cannot
participate freely in policymaking or governance. They do not
possess a meaningful right to vote. They do not enjoy the basic
freedoms of expression, religion, and association provided in
China's Constitution. The Chinese government refers
deferentially to the concept of rule of law. In practice,
however, it routinely ignores or manipulates domestic and
international laws for political purposes or to advance China's
economic interests.
China's adherence to this model poses a serious challenge
to U.S.-China relations and China's own development. There is a
direct link between concrete improvements in human rights and
the rule of law and the security and prosperity of the United
States and China. The health of the U.S. economy and
environment, the safety of the food supply, and the stability
of the Pacific region depend on China complying with
international law, enforcing its own laws, allowing the free
flow of information, removing currency controls, and protecting
citizens' basic human rights. Improved compliance with
international law and greater respect for human rights will
foster goodwill, trust, and confidence between China and the
United States. Providing citizens with more avenues for justice
and greater freedoms will help China address corruption, labor
unrest, ethnic tensions, and food safety. It will increase
stability and improve China's standing worldwide. This future
is possible, however, only if China's leaders move in a new
direction and begin to view human rights and the rule of law as
essential components of, rather than as impediments to,
economic and social progress.
major developments in 2014
Three major developments this past year suggest that
President Xi and his administration may exercise greater
control and tolerate less dissent than previous
administrations. First, the Party sought to expand and
strengthen its authority on key issues including Hong Kong, the
Internet, media, ethnic minority regions, religion, and civic
engagement. Second, the Party moved to address policies
unpopular with Chinese citizens and the international
community, but reforms fell short of official claims and their
implementation remained secondary to the Party's political
priorities. Third, China's engagement in the international
arena was marked by attempts to control the narrative on human
rights and the rule of law, to deflect attention from its own
abuses, and to dilute well-
established international standards. A description of each
trend follows.
Strengthening Authority in Key Areas
The Communist Party sought to strengthen its authority in
areas where it believed challenges were taking shape, viewing
significant events and developments as threats rather than as
opportunities for constructive engagement and transparency. The
Party Central Committee convened the Third Plenum of the 18th
Party Congress in November 2013, amid some hope that
significant reforms would result. In its pronouncements,
however, the Party ruled out political reforms, signaling
instead that economic and legal reforms emerging from the Third
Plenum would be firmly controlled by the Party.
The Party constricted the already narrow space for
tolerable dissent as it intensified its crackdown against
individuals and groups of citizens calling for improved
government policies and greater public participation.
Participants in the New Citizens' Movement, for example, held
peaceful, small-scale demonstrations and meetings to press the
government for reforms that included increased transparency of
officials' assets and educational equality for the children of
migrant workers--concerns that the government has said it
shares. Noteworthy for its intolerance of even modest calls for
reform, the crackdown began in early 2013 with scores of
detentions and continued this year with courts meting out harsh
prison sentences to key figures, including rights advocates Xu
Zhiyong, Liu Ping, and Wei Zhongping. Detentions accelerated in
the lead-up to the 25th anniversary of the violent suppression
of the 1989 Tiananmen protests in June 2014, as the Party
suppressed attempts by citizens to publicly, and in some cases
privately, commemorate this significant historical event.
China's small contingent of rights lawyers were targeted,
including noted public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang. Human
rights groups estimate that authorities detained more than 200
people during the ongoing crackdown.
Important developments in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR) during this reporting year afforded
the Chinese government and Party an opportunity to affirm the
``high degree of autonomy'' and ``one country, two systems''
framework guaranteed to Hong Kong under the Basic Law. China's
leaders instead chose to emphasize Chinese sovereignty and
control over Hong Kong. As public debate in Hong Kong increased
in the lead-up to a major decision that would determine how
open and fair Hong Kong's first ``universal suffrage'' election
for its Chief Executive would be in 2017, China's central
government dismissed large-scale expressions of support for
democracy that attracted broad segments of Hong Kong society,
notably the younger generation. Chinese authorities issued a
first-ever White Paper on Hong Kong that emphasized centralized
control as opposed to Hong Kong's autonomy, and challenged Hong
Kong's judicial independence by requiring that all Hong Kong
judges as well as government officials be patriotic (``love
China and love Hong Kong'') rather than simply serve and
interpret the law. The central government dismissed as
``illegal and invalid'' an informal referendum on Chief
Executive candidate nomination avenues in June 2014 that
attracted some 800,000 Hong Kong residents, even though pro-
Beijing elements in the SAR organized their own informal
signature campaign from July to August to condemn the Occupy
Central movement. In August, the National People's Congress
Standing Committee issued its decision on Hong Kong's electoral
reform, which severely restricted the ability of candidates to
freely run for Chief Executive. The central government's
actions raise concerns about the future of the fragile freedoms
and rule of law that distinguish Hong Kong from mainland China
and underpin Hong Kong's financial reputation and prosperity.
Chinese officials also confronted a sharp increase in
tragic incidents of violence involving members of the Uyghur
ethnic minority group. Officials responded with a singular
focus on security and economic measures without addressing
decades-long resentment against Chinese policies that deny
Uyghurs their cultural, religious, and linguistic rights, and
without attempting to balance security with civil liberties and
the free flow of information. In September 2014, authorities
imposed a life sentence on prominent Uyghur scholar Ilham
Tohti, a peaceful, moderate critic of China's policies who had
sought to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and the majority Han
population. The sentence was a clear sign the Party would not
tolerate thoughtful debate or reconsideration of its policies
toward the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
In Tibetan areas of China, the rate of tragic self-
immolations among the Tibetan ethnic minority slowed, and
followed an increase in harsh security and punitive measures.
One county issued provisions imposing collective punishment
intended to deter Tibetans from self-immolating. Chinese
government leaders showed no willingness to reexamine policies
toward Tibetans that deny them cultural, religious, and
linguistic rights or to engage in dialogue with representatives
of the Tibetans' exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.
The Party sought to tighten information flows within and
out of China in an attempt to ensure the dominance of the
Party's viewpoints and guarantee that information unfavorable
to the Party remained unseen. Chinese companies remained some
of the least transparent in the world, aided by vaguely worded
secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of key information, a
major concern given the global influence of Chinese companies
and reports of illegal subsidies and corruption, especially
among China's more than 140,000 state-owned and state-
controlled enterprises. Among the Party's most formidable
challenges is controlling China's 632 million Internet users--
the most of any country in the world--and 250,000 news
reporters and staff. Authorities detained over 100 citizens in
a crackdown on Twitter-like microblogs, which Chinese citizens
had flocked to as a rare space to share information more
freely. In the wake of the crackdown, posts on one of China's
most popular microblogging sites reportedly dropped 70 percent.
Chinese journalists, already subject to numerous restrictions,
faced ideological requirements and additional restraints on
their ability to report critically on the government and share
information with foreign reporters. The government used access
to China as a form of retaliation against foreign journalists
and scholars. Foreign journalists, who play a key role in
disseminating information about China given the pervasive
restrictions imposed on their domestic counterparts, faced
delays and denials of visas as punishment for their reporting
on sensitive issues such as the finances of the relatives of
China's top leaders. They received ominous warnings about
reporting in the lead-up to the 25th anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests. The Chinese government blocked scholars who
sought to enter China for research.
Authorities also sought to further restrict the limited
space for religious practice. Christians in particular were
targeted over apparent concern at the growing popularity of
Christianity in China. The government used a campaign against
``illegal structures'' to demolish church buildings and remove
religious symbols, including structures that previously had
been approved by the government.
Domestically, Interference Hinders Reforms
The Party moved to address policies unpopular with Chinese
citizens and the international community, but reforms did not
measure up to official claims and their implementation remained
secondary to the Party's own political priorities. During the
Party's Third Plenum, officials suggested that China might move
toward greater compliance with international trade rules by
announcing that market forces would play a decisive role in the
allocation of resources. The announcement, however, provided
few details and included the significant caveat that state-
owned enterprises, the source of many violations, would
continue to play a leading role in the economy.
In another heavily touted Third Plenum announcement,
officials formally announced the abolition of the reeducation
through labor system, a form of arbitrary detention used for
decades to detain activists, Falun Gong practitioners, and
other marginalized groups without trial or basic procedural
protections. The move was a welcome development, but the net
effect of this policy shift was unclear, as reports emerged
that authorities increased the use of other facilities, such as
``legal education centers'' and compulsory drug detox centers,
to arbitrarily detain citizens. China's criminal justice system
saw some improvements, with defendants generally gaining
greater access to counsel. Suspects in politically sensitive
cases, however, appeared not to benefit. Torture, abuse, and
denial of access to counsel continued to mar high-profile
cases, including those involving Ilham Tohti, Xu Zhiyong,
Pastor Zhang Shaojie, and a group of human rights lawyers who
sought to assist unlawfully detained Falun Gong practitioners.
In other areas, reforms resulted in limited or superficial
changes to some policies, but failed to address the fundamental
rights abuses that underpinned flawed policy. The government
announced, for example, a slight modification in the country's
population planning policy to allow a couple to have a second
child if one of the parents was a single child, but failed to
abolish a policy that itself violates international standards
and leads to abuse by officials. The government continued to
take steps toward limited easing of restrictions that prevent
citizens from freely changing their residence, but failed to
address the policy's violation of international standards on
freedom of residence.
The government continued to manage labor relations through
the government-affiliated All-China Federation of Trade Unions,
the only legal trade union in China, despite its relative
ineffectiveness in responding to strikes and other labor
protests emerging across a variety of industries and regions
this past year. The Party took no steps to allow workers to
organize independent unions. At the same time, authorities
stifled the efforts of more independent labor non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to support workers, in some cases
detaining NGO staff. There continued to be reports of child and
forced labor. The government's crackdown on individual civil
society advocates expanded to increase surveillance and
harassment of independent grassroots and foreign NGOs during
this reporting year. Paradoxically, the government continued to
claim that it was loosening restrictions on so-called non-
governmental ``social organizations,'' to provide services to
society and alleviate the government's burdens, but not to
remove basic restrictions on freedom of association and foster
a vibrant, free civil society.
Internationally, Manipulating the Discussion on China
China's engagement in the international arena was marked by
attempts to control discussion of human rights and the rule of
law and to deflect attention from its own abuses. In October
2013, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), to which China was
reelected in November 2013, conducted its second Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government's human rights
record. Chinese officials harassed and detained citizens who
sought to participate in China's submission to the UNHRC for
the review, including civil society activist Cao Shunli, and
refused to allow independent civil society organizations to
participate, resulting in China's submission reflecting only
the Party's views. Cao died later, just weeks after her release
from custody, raising questions about her condition in
detention and lack of access to appropriate medical treatment.
At the March 2014 UNHRC session in which the outcome of China's
UPR was adopted, the Chinese government refused to accept most
substantive recommendations, including a recommendation urging
it to provide a clearer time frame for ratifying the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
China signed in 1998 and has repeatedly pledged to ratify. At
the session, UN staff caught a Chinese representative
monitoring and photographing the daughter of imprisoned Chinese
dissident Wang Bingzhang, and China tried to prevent her from
speaking at the session. The Commission's review of China's
various reports to human rights bodies this past year showed
that not one of the organizations that China claimed to have
consulted was independent from the government. China refused to
cooperate with a UN inquiry into North Korea's human rights
abuses and criticized the resulting report as ``divorced'' from
reality.
Despite being a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) for 13 years, China still has not complied with many of
its obligations, including ending subsidies and preferential
treatment for state-owned enterprises and providing
transparency regarding subsidies, laws, and regulations. The
U.S. Trade Representative reported this past year that China
had imposed duties in retaliation for countries bringing WTO
cases against China. In May, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
indicted five members of China's military on charges of
committing cyber theft after they allegedly targeted companies
that had been involved in trade actions against China. American
and other foreign companies reported that they were unfairly
targeted for antimonopoly enforcement in a move that some
observers believed was intended to protect Chinese companies
and could violate China's WTO commitments. China reportedly
failed to comply with a WTO ruling against it involving grain-
oriented electrical steel. As of this report's publication,
China still had not signed the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement.
Amid greater international debate over the appropriate
limits of government restriction and surveillance of the
Internet, China sought to manipulate news coverage related to
alleged state-
sponsored computer hacking and position itself as a victim of
cyber theft rather than as a sponsor or perpetrator. Chinese
state-run media featured such reports prominently, despite
well-documented evidence that China is a leading source of
intellectual property theft through cyber and other means.
After the DOJ's indictment of members of China's military,
China suspended a cyber working group with the United States
intended to develop rules of engagement for the Internet. China
sought to advance the concept of ``Internet sovereignty,''
which, if implemented, would give countries greater leeway to
restrict the Internet within their borders under the guise of
``national sovereignty,'' eroding international law that
provides for freedom of expression ``through any medium'' and
``regardless of frontiers.''
Key Recommendations
This Commission recognizes that only China's leaders and
the Chinese people can determine how to proceed with their
domestic affairs, but believes the international community has
a responsibility to monitor compliance with international
standards and to encourage their development and
implementation. Based on the findings of this year's report,
the Commission makes the following 13 main recommendations to
Congress and the Administration to encourage China's compliance
with international human rights standards and the development
of the rule of law.
Administration Coordination. The Administration
should further strengthen interagency coordination to ensure
that agencies interacting with the Chinese government are aware
of human rights and rule of law issues relevant to their areas
and are seeking opportunities to engage with Chinese officials
on these issues at bilateral dialogues and other meetings.
During such engagements, agencies including the Departments of
State, Justice, Energy, Commerce, Defense, Labor, Agriculture,
Education, Health and Human Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the U.S. Trade Representative, should
broaden discussions to link human rights and rule of law
improvements in China with advances in economic, security,
environmental, and diplomatic interests. An integrated human
rights diplomacy with China, coordinated across the entire U.S.
Government, and led by the White House, should be reflected in
any new National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review, or Quadrennial Defense Review undertaken by
the White House, State Department, or Defense Department.
Administration Engagement. The Administration
should continue to raise pertinent concerns relating to issues
covered in this report, including, where appropriate,
transparency, public participation, good governance, worker
rights, environmental and public health concerns, and the rule
of law, at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the
U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, other
bilateral meetings, and in multilateral organizations where the
United States and China are members, and coordinate information
and priorities with other countries as appropriate. The
Administration should consider sending higher level officials
to the U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue and the U.S.-China
Legal Experts Dialogue.
Human Rights Advocates and Civil Society. Members
of Congress and the Administration should, wherever possible,
publicly recognize the work of Chinese rights advocates,
independent NGOs, civil society, and human rights lawyers in
promoting the rule of law and protecting human rights in China,
and seek ways to ensure they are allowed to participate in
international forums and dialogues.
Visa Policy. Members of Congress and the
Administration should work together to ensure existing visa
laws and policies, including Section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and Presidential Proclamation 8697, effectively
address Chinese government violations of human rights. Members
of Congress and the Administration should share information
regarding implementation of current visa policies with respect
to Chinese officials, and consider whether additional
legislation or other measures are necessary to address issues
such as visa delays and denials to American journalists,
scholars, and human rights activists.
Hong Kong. Members of Congress and the
Administration should renew the reporting requirements of
Section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992,
paying particular attention to the development of democratic
institutions in Hong Kong and China's obligations under
international treaties and agreements, and should ensure
developments in Hong Kong are featured in other reports related
to China. Members of Congress and the Administration should
increase support for Hong Kong's democracy through statements
and meetings at the highest levels and visits to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong issues should be raised in meetings in Beijing with
central government officials given their overriding role in
deciding questions of Hong Kong's political development.
Press Freedom. Members of Congress and the
Administration should give greater public expression, including
at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and detention
of both domestic and foreign journalists, the denial or delay
of visas for foreign journalists, and the censoring or blockage
of foreign media Web sites. U.S. officials should consistently
link press freedoms to U.S. interests, noting how censorship
and restrictions on journalists and media Web sites prevent the
free flow of information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, food safety problems,
and corruption, and acts as a trade barrier for foreign media
and companies attempting to access the Chinese market.
Forced Labor, Child Labor, Prison Labor. Members
of Congress and the Administration should ensure existing laws
and policies intended to prevent the importation or government
purchase of goods made with forced labor, prison labor, or
child labor, including Section 1307 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
Executive Order 13126 (Prohibition of Acquisition of Products
Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor), Executive Order
13627 (Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons
in Federal Contracts), effectively address forced labor, prison
labor, and child labor concerns in China. Members of Congress
and the Administration should consider whether additional
legislation or other measures are necessary to increase supply
chain transparency, close loopholes such as the consumptive
demand exemption in the Tariff Act, remove obstacles to
effective enforcement of U.S. trade law, and ensure that
parties live up to existing agreements regarding trade and
forced and prison labor products being exported to the United
States.
Commercial Rule of Law. Members of Congress and
the Administration should ensure China makes concrete
improvements in ending currency controls, subsidies for state-
owned enterprises, and other policies outlined in this report
that violate China's existing international trade obligations
as a condition for progress in any U.S. trade-related
negotiations with China, and ensure transparency and full
public participation by all segments of American society in
such negotiations.
Ethnic Minorities. The Administration should
address issues of human rights, security, and stability in
China's ethnic minority regions at bilateral security dialogues
and any exchanges with Chinese military or police officials by
sharing best practices and strategies and building cooperative
exchanges on ways to balance civil rights and national security
policy, to differentiate between peaceful dissent and acts of
violence, to protect human rights during ``anti-terrorism''
campaigns, and to recognize the international protections
applying to refugee populations.
Population Planning. Members of Congress and the
Administration should publicly link, wherever there is
supporting evidence, the imbalanced sex ratios exacerbated by
China's coercive population planning policies with potential
regional humanitarian and security concerns--trafficking,
crime, increased internal and external migration, and other
possible serious social problems--and discuss these issues in
bilateral security dialogues. Members of Congress and
Administration officials should urge the Chinese government to
abolish all birth restrictions for families and instead employ
a human rights-based approach to providing freedom to build
their families as they see fit and privacy for all citizens,
especially women.
Internet Freedom. Members of Congress and the
Administration should sustain, and where appropriate expand,
programs that develop and widely distribute technologies that
will assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil society
organizations in circumventing Internet restrictions in order
to access and share content protected under international human
rights standards. They should continue to expand Internet
freedom programs for China at the Department of State and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide digital security
training and capacity-building efforts for bloggers,
journalists, civil society organizations, and human rights and
Internet freedom activists in China.
Areas of Potential Progress. Members of Congress
and the Administration should consider acknowledging and
further inquiring with Chinese officials about areas of
potential progress, including the announced abolition of the
reeducation through labor system, efforts to curb wrongful
convictions and increase protections for criminal defendants,
amendments to the PRC Trademark Law that increase statutory
damages for trademark infringement, revisions to the PRC
Environmental Protection Law that include provisions that could
improve transparency, and efforts to strengthen protections for
persons with disabilities and victims of domestic violence, as
well as other potentially positive developments noted
throughout this report.
Raising Political Prisoner Cases. Members of
Congress and the Administration should consider raising more
frequently with Chinese officials, both privately and publicly,
cases of political or religious detention or imprisonment in
China. In addition to calling for the release of individuals,
Members of Congress and the Administration should also
consider, where relevant and credible, raising specific issues
of concern, including prison conditions, an individual's health
and access to medical treatment, the possibility of sentence
reductions and medical parole, an individual's access to family
and legal representation, and harassment of the individual's
family or friends. Members of Congress and the Administration
are encouraged to consult the Political Prisoner Database
(http://ppdcecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on
individual prisoners or groups of prisoners. Below are some of
the many cases requiring legal and/or humanitarian efforts
across the issues covered by this report:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name and CECC
record no. Case Summary Current Issues
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pu Zhiqiang Pu Zhiqiang, a prominent Pu Zhiqiang suffers
2014-00174 public interest lawyer, was from several medical
detained in May 2014 and ailments including
formally arrested in June diabetes, high blood
2014. Pu had attended a pressure, and high
private event commemorating cholesterol. Pu told
the 1989 Tiananmen protests his lawyer during a
prior to his detention. detention visit in
June 2014 that ``his
health was
worsening,'' in part
due to inadequate
medical treatment for
his diabetes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lobsang Jinpa Lobsang Jinpa, a Tibetan Lobsang Jinpa was
2012-00275 Buddhist monk, was described in a May
sentenced to 5 years in 2014 media report to
prison in February 2013. He be in ``failing
may have provided health'' due to
information to foreign kidney and liver
media about a June 2012 ``ailments,'' to be
double self-immolation. suffering from poor
nutrition, and to
have been denied
medical care. Based
on his detention date
and sentence, he
would have been
eligible for medical
parole in May 2014.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhang Shaojie Zhang Shaojie, a Christian Zhang Shaojie's case
2014-00126 pastor at an officially was reportedly marred
sanctioned church, was by several procedural
sentenced to 12 years in violations, including
prison in July 2014. Zhang repeated attempts by
had reportedly been in a authorities to impede
dispute with local his access to legal
officials over land that counsel and reports
was to be allocated for the of officials
building of a new church. detaining or coercing
false testimony from
witnesses.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liu Xiaobo Liu Xiaobo, a prominent Liu Xiaobo remains
2004-03114 intellectual and long-time imprisoned at the
political reform advocate, Jinzhou Prison in
was sentenced to 11 years Liaoning province.
in prison in December 2009. Based on his
Liu was a drafter and detention date and
organizer of Charter 08, a sentence, he would
treatise advocating have been eligible
political reform and human for parole in June
rights. 2014. Liu was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize
in December 2010 for
``his long and non-
violent struggle for
fundamental human
rights in China.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liu Xia Liu Xia, wife of political Authorities continue
2010-00629 reform advocate Liu Xiaobo, to subject Liu Xia to
has been confined to her surveillance and
home in Beijing other restrictions on
municipality since October her freedom of
2010. Authorities have not movement and
charged or convicted her of expression. In
any crime. February 2014, Liu
was hospitalized amid
reports of her
worsening health due
to heart problems and
severe depression.
Authorities
reportedly refused to
allow her to travel
abroad for medical
treatment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liu Ping Liu Ping, a rights advocate, Liu's lawyer reported
2013-00161 was sentenced to 6 years in July 2013 that she
and 6 months in prison in had become ``very
June 2014. Liu had weak'' and ``lost a
participated in peaceful great deal of
demonstrations calling for weight'' in
officials to disclose their detention.
assets. Authorities have
denied Liu Ping
medical care for
severe diarrhea
reportedly caused by
poor sanitary
conditions in
detention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ilham Tohti Ilham Tohti, a professor and Ilham Tohti suffers
2012-00275 prominent Uyghur advocate, from several medical
was convicted of the charge ailments including
of ``separatism'' and heart disease,
sentenced to life in prison pharyngitis,
in September 2014. prostatitis, and an
unknown liver
condition. Tohti
reportedly told his
lawyers during a
visit in June 2014
that he had ``been
mistreated in
detention,''
including
authorities'
depriving him of food
and adequate water
for 10 days.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chen Kegui Chen Kegui, the nephew of Chen Kegui suffers
2013-00120 legal advocate Chen from appendicitis.
Guangcheng, was sentenced Chen's mother
to 3 years and 3 months in reported after a
prison in November 2012 December 2013 prison
following his uncle's visit that his
escape from illegal home ``complexion looked
confinement in April 2012. very bad'' and that
``he was clutching
his abdomen and
sweating profusely.''
Authorities have
repeatedly rejected
appeals for his
release on medical
parole.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zhu Yufu Zhu Yufu, a long-time Zhu Yufu suffers from
2004-02253 democracy activist, was several medical
sentenced to 7 years in ailments including
prison in February 2012. coronary heart
Authorities have imprisoned disease, cerebral
him in the Zhejiang No. 4 arteriosclerosis, a
Prison in Zhejiang lumbar disc
province. herniation, and
hypertension.
Authorities have
reportedly denied Zhu
adequate medical care
in detention and have
repeatedly refused
applications for his
release on medical
parole.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chen Xi Chen Xi, a democracy Chen Xi suffers from
2008-00379 advocate, was sentenced to chronic enteritis.
10 years in prison in Chen's wife reported
December 2011. Authorities after a May 2014
have imprisoned him at the prison visit that his
Xinyi prison in Guizhou ``body had become
province. very weak and thin.''
Authorities
reportedly have
denied Chen adequate
medical care despite
suffering ``severe
diarrhea'' for over a
year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xu Zhiyong Xu Zhiyong, a prominent Xu Zhiyong's case was
2005-00199 rights advocate and a reportedly marred by
promoter of the New procedural
Citizens' Movement (NCM), violations, including
was sentenced to 4 years in intimidation of
prison in January 2014. Xu witnesses and barring
had been active for many independent observers
years in legal reform and from the courtroom.
educational equality Xu had told an
causes. associate that the
police offered him a
deal that suggests
the political
motivation behind his
case: renounce the
NCM and be spared
prison.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Findings and Recommendations by Issue
A summary of specific findings follows below for each
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.
Freedom of Expression
Findings
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to restrict expression in ways that
contravened international human rights standards,
including Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such
standards permit countries in limited circumstances to
restrict expression to protect interests such as
national security and public order, official Chinese
restrictions covered a broader range of activity,
including peaceful dissent and expression critical of
the Chinese Communist Party and government.
The Chinese government continued to take steps
to expand the country's telecommunications
infrastructure and provide greater Internet access,
particularly via mobile devices. There were 632 million
Internet users in China at the end of June 2014,
including 527 million who accessed the Internet from
mobile devices.
Officials in the Chinese government and
Communist Party expressed heightened concerns regarding
their ability to control the Internet and signaled a
renewed effort to strengthen control. Some reports
described the Internet or online public opinion as a
``struggle,'' ``battleground,'' or ``new challenge and
new test'' for authorities, and some cited ``propaganda
and ideological work'' guidance from President Xi
Jinping as their basis. Authorities launched a campaign
against popular microblogs, detaining over 100
microbloggers and contributing to, according to one
study, a decrease in posts of as much as 70 percent on
Weibo, the most popular microblogging platform.
Chinese authorities continued to block and
filter sensitive online content, in some cases through
censorship campaigns. Under high-level Party
leadership, officials launched a ``Sweep Away
Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications''
campaign that appeared to give authorities leeway to
strengthen government and Party control over the
Internet more broadly. Among the topics censored this
year were environmental protests, corruption
investigations, and the 25th anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests and their violent suppression. U.S.
company Google experienced service disruptions in China
shortly before the Tiananmen anniversary. Another U.S.
company, LinkedIn, began censoring sensitive online
content originating in China, including a video
expressing support for victims of the violent
suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
Authorities continued to detain or harass
rights and democracy advocates, Internet writers, human
rights lawyers, citizen journalists, and others who
exercised their right to freedom of speech in a
crackdown that some international media and individuals
in China described as the worst in recent decades.
Authorities used vaguely worded criminal charges and
extralegal harassment to punish citizens for free
expression. Those detained or harassed for exercising
freedom of expression included 16-year-old microblog
user Yang Zhong; rights advocate Hu Jia; ``citizen
journalists'' Liu Xuehong, Xing Jian, and Wang Jing;
and Internet user Qin Zhihui. Liu Xia--an artist and
poet, and the wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize
laureate Liu Xiaobo--remained under illegal home
confinement with no charges reported against her.
Authorities also targeted individuals who sought to
commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen protests in private
meetings, memorial services, or online spaces. Examples
include leaders of the advocacy group Tiananmen Mothers
Ding Zilin and You Weijie; filmmaker He Yang; Internet
users Gu Yimin and Zhang Kunle; journalist Gao Yu;
commemoration participants Chen Wei, Yu Shiwen, Shi Yu,
Fang Yan, and Hou Shuai; and university student Zhao
Huaxu.
The Chinese government and Communist Party
continued to control the press in violation of
international standards. Beginning in 2014, China's
media regulator, the State Administration for Press,
Publications, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT),
began requiring the country's 250,000 news reporters
and staff to participate in a political training
program as part of the annual press card renewal
process. The program reportedly would include a test
with content related to ``socialism with Chinese
characteristics'' and the ``Marxist view on the
press.'' SAPPRFT also instructed media organizations to
forbid journalists from publishing reports that are
critical without receiving approval from their
employers, from reporting on issues outside of their
designated issue areas, and from publishing critical
reports through their own personal Web sites or
publications.
Outspoken journalists and newspaper staff
continued to face reprisals for making comments
officials deemed sensitive or conducting investigative
reporting. Examples include the arrest of journalist
Liu Hu, the firing of China Central Television
journalist Wang Qinglei, the firing of Tencent
journalist Zhang Jialong, the reassignment of
journalist Luo Changping, and the detention of
newspaper employee Xin Jian.
International media organizations and U.S.
Government officials expressed heightened concerns over
the ability of foreign journalists to report
independently in China. In December 2013, authorities
delayed visa renewals for approximately two dozen
journalists in connection with reports from their media
organizations on the assets of Chinese leaders' family
members.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Give greater public expression, including at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government, to the issue of
press freedom in China, condemning the harassment and
detention of both domestic and foreign journalists, the
denial or delay of visas for foreign journalists, and
the censoring or blockage of foreign media Web sites.
Consistently link press freedoms to U.S. interests,
noting how censorship and restrictions on journalists
and media Web sites prevents the free flow of
information on issues of public concern, including
public health and environmental crises, food safety
problems, and corruption, and acts as a trade barrier
for foreign media and companies attempting to access
the Chinese market. Raise these issues with Chinese
officials during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
and other bilateral dialogues. Assess the extent to
which China's treatment of foreign journalists
contravenes its WTO or other obligations.
Continue, and where appropriate expand, programs
that develop and distribute widely technologies that
will assist Chinese human rights advocates and civil
society organizations in circumventing Internet
restrictions, in order to access and share content
protected under international human rights standards.
Continue to expand Internet freedom programs at the
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors for China to provide digital security
training and capacity-building efforts for bloggers,
journalists, civil society organizations, and human
rights and Internet freedom activists in China.
Raise with Chinese officials, during all
appropriate bilateral discussions, the costs to U.S.-
China relations and to the Chinese public's confidence
in government institutions that occurs when the Chinese
government restricts political debate, advocacy for
democracy or human rights, and other forms of peaceful
political expression. Emphasize that such restrictions
contravene international standards for the restrictions
on free expression, particularly those contained in
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Emphasize that
such restrictions erode confidence in media and
government institutions. Submit questions for China's
next Universal Periodic Review asking China to explain
what steps it will take to ensure its restrictions on
free expression conform to international standards.
Urge Chinese officials to end unlawful detention
and official harassment of Chinese activists, lawyers,
and journalists subject to reprisals for exercising
their right to freedom of expression. Call on officials
to end the illegal home confinement of individuals such
as Liu Xia; and release or confirm the release of
individuals detained or imprisoned for exercising
freedom of expression, such as Qin Zhihui, Gu Yimin,
Zhang Kunle, Gao Yu, Yu Shiwen, and Hou Shuai. Raise
these cases in bilateral dialogues, such as the U.S.-
China Human Rights Dialogue, U.S.-China Legal Experts
Dialogue, and Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well
as through multilateral mechanisms, such as the UN
Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review and
the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
Worker Rights
Findings
The Chinese government's laws and practices
continue to contravene international standards on
freedom of association. Chinese workers are not free to
form or join trade unions of their own choosing. The
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the
official union under the direction of the Chinese
government and Communist Party, is the only legal trade
union organization in China.
The ACFTU continues to prioritize economic
development and ``social stability'' in its approach to
labor relations, while ACFTU support for workers has
remained largely absent amid continued labor unrest.
Collective bargaining in China remains limited
in both law and practice. Despite the ACFTU's promotion
of collective contracts and collective wage bargaining
in recent years, the collective contract and
consultation process remains problematic in part
because trade unions lack autonomy and genuine worker
representation.
In the absence of effective support by the
ACFTU, labor non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
other civil society actors have emerged to play a
larger role in advising and supporting workers.
Representatives of such organizations, however, face
harassment and detention. In April 2014, authorities
detained labor NGO workers Zhang Zhiru and Lin Dong for
assisting striking workers at a shoe factory in
Dongguan municipality, Guangdong province. Many labor
rights organizations also operate under uncertain
conditions as they often are unable to register as a
``social organization'' with authorities.
The Commission continued to observe reports of
workers organizing strikes and demonstrations in a
variety of industries and regions across China, often
prompted by systemic labor-
related grievances, such as factory closings or
relocations, and nonpayment of wages and benefits.
Chinese authorities had varied responses to labor
protests, in some cases tolerating strikes that were
limited to demands for wages and benefits. At the same
time, the Commission continued to observe reports of
authorities using force against or detaining
demonstrating workers.
A reported increase in labor unrest comes amid
widespread economic and demographic shifts that
observers contend are emboldening workers and affording
them greater bargaining power in the workplace.
Moreover, experts contend the increased activism of
workers reflects a growing awareness of their rights
and a greater confidence in taking collective action to
redress workplace grievances.
Migrant workers remained marginalized and
vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace, facing
problems such as wage arrears, social discrimination,
and low levels of labor and social welfare protection.
Continued barriers to public services in urban areas
have led to an estimated 61 million migrant children
being left behind by their parents to be raised in the
countryside by other guardians or alone. These children
reportedly have higher school dropout rates and are
more at risk of sexual abuse.
Despite China's laws and commitments under
international standards prohibiting child labor, the
use of underage workers remained evident in the
electronics manufacturing industry, with instances also
reported in other sectors. In December 2013, Chinese
media reported on the discovery of at least nine
underage workers working in two electronics factories
in Shenzhen municipality, Guangdong province. Systemic
problems in enforcement and a lack of sufficient
resources reportedly continue to constrain efforts to
reduce child labor.
Dispatch labor continues to be a significant
problem despite legal reforms in recent years intended
to limit its proliferation. In January 2014, the
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued
the Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch, which should
restrict the use of dispatch labor. At the same time,
the heavy reliance on dispatch labor by a number of
industries presents a clear challenge to achieving
these limits.
Despite wage levels continuing to increase
this past year, the rate of increase has not kept pace
with rising living costs, particularly for food and
housing. Income inequality between different regions,
industrial sectors, and groups of workers has steadily
increased.
Workers in China continue to face significant
occupational health and safety risks. Officially
reported fatalities have been consistently reduced over
the past few years; however, unsafe working conditions
and workplace abuses remain common. Despite legal
measures aimed at preventing workplace accidents and
establishing a system to handle safety violations,
systemic problems in implementation and enforcement, as
well as the lack of meaningful worker participation in
workplace decisions that impact safety and health
continue to constrain efforts to reduce industrial
accidents.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Ensure existing laws and policies intended to
prevent the importation or government purchase of goods
made with forced labor, prison labor, or child labor,
including Section 1307 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
Executive Order 13126 (Prohibition of Acquisition of
Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor),
Executive Order 13627 (Strengthening Protections
Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts),
effectively address forced labor, prison labor, and
child labor concerns in China, and consider whether
additional legislation or other measures are necessary
to increase supply chain transparency, close loopholes
such as the consumptive demand exemption in the Tariff
Act, remove obstacles to effective enforcement of U.S.
trade law, and ensure that parties live up to existing
agreements regarding trade and forced and prison labor
products being exported to the United States.
Reexamine the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on
Prison Labor and 1994 Statement of Cooperation between
the United States and China in light of the Chinese
government's lack of compliance with its obligations
under these bilateral agreements and consider whether
additional legislation or other measures are necessary
to prevent the importation of goods from China
manufactured through prison labor. Increase the
presence and resources of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement officers in China to better pursue
investigations into the importation of forced labor
products.
Engage in dialogue with government officials,
workers, and trade union officials in locations that
have experienced successful cases of collective
bargaining and identify ways to increase awareness of
those experiences including through sponsoring
education initiatives and conferences on collective
bargaining that bring together civil society, trade
union officials, workers, and government officials.
Where possible, prioritize programs that demonstrate
the ability to conduct collective bargaining pilot
projects in enterprises with no functioning union
present.
Convey support in all appropriate bilateral
dialogues for functioning collective bargaining and
direct elections of trade union representatives,
emphasizing the benefits increased worker
representation have for resolving workplace grievances
and preventing wildcat strikes. Engage in dialogue with
government, trade union officials, and employers to
identify opportunities to increase awareness of
successful experiences with direct elections of trade
union representatives and to provide elected trade
union officials with ongoing training and support.
Support the U.S. Department of Labor's annual
Labor Dialogue and its annual Work Safety Dialogue with
the Chinese government. Support the ongoing cooperation
between the U.S. Department of Labor and the China
National Coal Association by increasing work on and
funding for technical cooperation and exchange projects
regarding industry regulatory compliance, worker
representation at coal mines, and safety and health
improvements.
Encourage the expansion of exchanges among U.S.
collective bargaining practitioners and Chinese labor
rights advocates in non-governmental organizations,
lawyers' associations, academia, and the official trade
union through conferences and other exchange projects
sponsored by relevant U.S. government agencies.
Prioritize exchanges that emphasize face-to-face
meetings with hands-on practitioners and trainers.
Engage the Chinese government in discussions
about establishing a multi-stakeholder initiative to
address the challenges of child labor and its root
causes, including policies and programs to provide
access to education and to alleviate poverty.
Participants in the initiative would include the U.S.
and Chinese Governments, multinational corporations,
and relevant civil society organizations.
Encourage Chinese officials through all
appropriate bilateral discussions to publish detailed
statistical data on child labor and information on
measures taken to prevent the employment of children
under the age of 16. Seek opportunities to support
capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese labor
and legal aid organizations involved in defending the
rights of workers. Encourage Chinese officials at local
levels to develop, maintain, and deepen relationships
with labor organizations and businesses inside and
outside of China, and to invite these groups to
increase the number of training programs in China.
Support China's increased engagement and
cooperation with the International Labour Organization
(ILO) through selected funding for ILO technical
cooperation projects with China. Request that the ILO
increase its work with China on observing core labor
standards including freedom of association and the
right to organize.
Criminal Justice
Findings
Developments in criminal justice this year
were driven by the Chinese Communist Party and
government's paramount concerns: ``maintaining social
stability'' (weiwen) and ensuring the continuance of
one-party rule.
Chinese authorities have intensified their use
of vaguely defined non-political crimes to suppress and
punish dissent, rights advocacy, and perceived
challenges to Party rule. For example, Xu Zhiyong, a
prominent rights advocate and a promoter of the New
Citizens' Movement was sentenced to four years in
prison in January 2014 for ``gathering a crowd to
disturb order in a public place.'' Authorities
criminally detained public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang
and a number of other rights advocates and lawyers for
``picking quarrels and provoking trouble'' in the run-
up to the 25th anniversary of the violent suppression
of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
The Chinese government announced the abolition
of the extrajudicial reeducation through labor (RTL)
system, a move that was welcomed domestically and by
the international community, including this Commission.
However, many other forms of extrajudicial detention
remain (including custody and education, compulsory
drug detox centers, ``legal education centers,''
``reprimand centers,'' and other forms of ``black
jails''), which authorities are reportedly using more
frequently to arbitrarily detain citizens in the
aftermath of the abolition of RTL.
Reports indicate that since the revised PRC
Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) took effect on January 1,
2013 the ability of criminal defense lawyers to meet
with their detained clients has improved except in
``politically sensitive'' cases. Although the revised
CPL contains provisions aimed at increasing the rate at
which witnesses appear in court to provide testimony in
criminal cases and excluding illegally obtained
evidence, thus far there has been little improvement.
Provisions in the CPL that, if implemented effectively,
would enhance rights of criminal suspects and
defendants, are routinely ignored by authorities in
``politically sensitive'' cases. For example, Uyghur
scholar Ilham Tohti was held incommunicado for more
than five months without access to his lawyer, and
Urumqi procuratorial authorities failed to provide
advance notice to Tohti's lawyer before his indictment,
in contravention of the CPL. Courts also denied
lawyers' witness requests in the trials of Pastor Zhang
Shaojie and rights advocate Xu Zhiyong.
A disturbing development that emerged during
this reporting year was authorities' use of state
television to broadcast the videotaped ``confessions''
of several high-profile suspects, including veteran
journalist Gao Yu and Sichuan mining tycoon Liu Han.
Such ``confessions''--obtained while in police custody
and without the presence of a lawyer--deprive detainees
of their fair trial rights and presumption of
innocence.
The government and Party have continued to
highlight the problem of confessions coerced through
torture and wrongful convictions. Torture and abuse in
custody nevertheless remained prevalent. In spring
2014, for example, authorities detained and tortured
four human rights lawyers who sought to provide legal
assistance to unlawfully detained Falun Gong
practitioners in Heilongjiang province. Torture is
pervasive in ``legal education centers'' and other
detention facilities that are used to detain Falun Gong
practitioners.
The denial of adequate, timely medical care
for detainees garnered much attention this year when
authorities denied necessary medical care to activist
Cao Shunli, who died two weeks after her release from
detention. Other detainees whose health was at risk in
2014 include Ilham Tohti and Chen Kegui.
The government continued to treat data on the
use of the death penalty as a ``state secret'' and
rejected recommendations made during its Universal
Periodic Review in October 2013 that it publish
official statistics on the application of the death
penalty. Although the trend is toward fewer executions
in China, according to Amnesty International, the
Chinese government executed more people in 2013 than
the rest of the world combined. The government has
stated that it will further reduce the number of death
penalty eligible crimes, which currently stands at 55.
Organs are still harvested from executed
prisoners. In April 2014, a health official stated that
the Chinese government was unable to announce a
specific timetable for ending the practice of using the
organs of executed prisoners for organ transplants
because of the low number of donors and a severe organ
shortage.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to publicly commit to
a specific timetable for ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which the Chinese government signed in 1998
but has not yet ratified.
Call on the Chinese government to abolish all
forms of extrajudicial detention, including compulsory
drug detoxification centers, custody and education
facilities, ``legal education centers,'' ``reprimand
centers,'' and other forms of ``black jails,'' and
ensure that the fair trial rights of Chinese citizens
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
ICCPR are guaranteed.
Encourage the Chinese government to establish an
independent national human rights institution (NHRI)
for the protection and promotion of human rights
according to the Paris Principles, as was recently
recommended by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights after its review of China's compliance
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in May 2014. The NHRI could focus its
work in a manner that reflects priorities established
by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, such as prevention of arbitrary detention and
torture.
Urge China to release Chinese citizens who have
been detained or imprisoned for vague crimes in
connection with their rights activism and advocacy,
such as Xu Zhiyong, and public interest lawyers Pu
Zhiqiang and Chang Boyang. Support technical assistance
and exchange programs that focus on issues relating to
health care in detention facilities, including health
care standards and their formulation, funding
mechanisms, delivery of services, complaint procedures,
and monitoring and oversight.
Remind the Chinese government of its commitment
to invite the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to
visit China, and encourage China to issue an invitation
promptly.
Press China to extend invitations to all UN
special rapporteurs and other special procedures that
have requested to visit China, including the UN Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the
special rapporteurs on freedom of association and
assembly, the situation of human rights defenders, and
the independence of judges and lawyers.
Support programs and international cooperation on
issues relating to the role of criminal defense lawyers
in defending rights of suspects and defendants through
the criminal justice process, in particular the
critical role of witnesses in criminal trials and
mechanisms for their protection.
Urge China to announce a specific timetable for
ending the practice of harvesting organs from executed
prisoners.
Freedom of Religion
Findings
The Chinese government continued to restrict
Chinese citizens' freedom of religion during the
Commission's 2014 reporting year. China's Constitution
guarantees ``freedom of religious belief'' but limits
protection only to ``normal religious activities,'' a
term applied in a manner that contravenes international
human rights protections for freedom of religion,
including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Chinese
government continued to recognize only five religions--
Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and
Taoism. Groups wishing to practice these religions are
required to register with the government and are
subject to ongoing government controls. Both registered
and unregistered religious groups deemed to run afoul
of state-set parameters continued to face harassment,
detention, imprisonment, and other abuses, and the
government continued to outlaw some religious and
spiritual communities, including Falun Gong.
The Chinese government continued to use laws,
regulations, and policy measures to control religious
practices in China, rather than protect the religious
freedom of all Chinese citizens.
Authorities continued to ensure that Buddhist
doctrine and practice conform to government and Chinese
Communist Party objectives.
Authorities continued to deny Catholics in
China the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy
See to select bishops. Authorities harassed and
detained Catholic clergy who refused to cooperate with
the government and Party, including Bishop Joseph Fan
Zhongliang (d. March 2014), Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin,
priests Tian Dalong and Peng Weizhao.
Authorities launched a three-year (2013-2015)
``decisive battle'' campaign aimed at reducing Falun
Gong activities and ``transforming'' Falun Gong
practitioners. The new campaign has been carried out at
all levels of government, and authorities set specific
``transformation'' quotas to meet local goals.
Authorities harassed and detained persons who attempted
to assist Falun Gong practitioners, including four
lawyers who attempted to provide legal assistance to
Falun Gong practitioners detained at the Jiansanjiang
``legal education center'' in Heilongjiang province.
Authorities continued to regulate the
confirmation of Islamic religious leaders and annual
overseas pilgrimages. Local governments across China
continued to control the content of sermons and the
interpretation of Islamic scriptures. Authorities in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region banned Uyghur
Muslim students, civil servants, and hospital employees
from observing Ramadan. In contrast, Chinese
authorities afforded Hui Muslims greater freedom of
religion, allowing them to observe Ramadan and to make
overseas pilgrimages in growing numbers.
The government and Party continued to control
and guide the interpretation of Protestant doctrine and
theology in an effort to conform the Christian faith to
Party goals and ideology. Chinese authorities harassed,
detained, imprisoned, and interfered with religious
activities of members of both registered and
unregistered Protestant communities who ran afoul of
government or Party policy. This past year, the
Commission observed a trend of increasing government
harassment against officially sanctioned churches. In
particular, authorities in Zhejiang province launched a
three-year campaign (2013-2015) to address ``illegal
structures'' and targeted both registered and
unregistered protestant churches for church demolition
and cross removal.
Authorities maintained control over Taoist
doctrine, clergy appointments, sites of worship, and
religious activities.
Despite lacking formal central government
recognition, some religious communities, such as the
Eastern Orthodox Church, have been able to operate
inside China, and continued to appeal to the Chinese
government for official recognition.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to
all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and to remove its framework for recognizing only select
religious communities for limited state protections.
Stress to Chinese authorities that freedom of religion
includes the right to freely adopt and practice
religious beliefs, and that China's limited protections
for ``normal religious activities'' do not meet
international standards for freedom of religion.
Stress to the Chinese government that the right
to freedom of religion includes: the right of Buddhists
to carry out activities in temples independent of state
controls over religion, the right of Buddhist clergy to
select monastic teachers under Buddhist procedures and
standards, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan
Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right
of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See
in matters relating to the practice of their faith,
including to make bishop appointments; the right of
Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong
inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in
preaching, overseas pilgrimage, the selection and
training of religious leaders, and the observance of
Ramadan without state interference; the right of
Protestants to worship free from state controls over
doctrine and worship, free from harassment, detention,
and other abuses for public and private manifestations
of their faith, including the display of crosses; and
the right of Taoists to interpret their teachings free
from government guidance.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens
confined, detained, or imprisoned for peacefully
pursuing their religious beliefs including the right to
hold and exercise those beliefs. Such prisoners
include: Sonam Lhatso (a Tibetan Buddhist nun sentenced
in 2009 to 10 years' imprisonment for her activism
calling for Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama's
return to Tibet); Thaddeus Ma Daqin (the Auxiliary
Bishop of the Shanghai diocese who has been under
extralegal confinement since July 2012 for renouncing
his affiliation with the Chinese Catholic Patriotic
Association); Wang Zhiwen (a Falun Gong practitioner
serving a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful
protests in 1999); Abdukiram Abduveli (a Uyghur
religious leader who has been imprisoned for 21 years,
and is now serving an additional sentence that expires
in 2019); Zhang Shaojie (a pastor of an officially
sanctioned church in Nanle county, Henan province,
sentenced to 12 years in prison for a church land
dispute with the local government); and other prisoners
mentioned in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database.
Call on the Chinese government to implement
accepted recommendations from its October 2013 UN
Universal Periodic Review, including: taking necessary
measures to ensure that rights to freedom of religion,
as well as religious culture and expression, are fully
observed and protected; cooperating with the UN human
rights system, specifically UN special procedures and
mandate holders; facilitating visits for UN High
Commissioners and special procedures to China; taking
steps to ensure lawyers working to advance human
rights, including religious rights, can practice their
profession freely and promptly investigate allegations
of violence and intimidation impeding their work; and
considering possible revisions to legislation and
administrative restrictions to provide better
protection of freedom of religion.
Call on China to eliminate criminal and
administrative penalties that target religious and
spiritual movements, which have been used to punish
Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom
of religion. Specifically, call on China to abolish
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which criminalizes
using a ``cult'' to undermine implementation of state
laws) and Article 27 of the PRC Public Security
Administration Punishment Law (which stipulates
detention or fines for organizing or inciting others to
engage in ``cult'' activities and for using ``cults''
or the ``guise of religion'' to disturb social order or
to harm others' health).
Encourage U.S. political leaders to visit
religious sites in China to raise awareness and promote
freedom of religion, in keeping with international
human rights standards.
Ethnic Minority Rights
Findings
During the 2014 reporting year, Chinese
authorities enforced harsh restrictions and crackdowns
on ethnic minorities, particularly those living in the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other Tibetan
autonomous areas of China, the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), and the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region (IMAR). Authorities tightened
controls on ethnic minority advocates who sought to
peacefully assert their distinct cultural, linguistic,
and religious identities and who criticized state
policies.
During the 2014 reporting year, Mongol herders
protested state and private exploitation of their
traditional grazing lands, raising concerns such as
inadequate compensation, loss of livelihood due to
environmental destruction, and involuntary
resettlement. Security officials reportedly detained
and beat many of the herders and obstructed the
protests.
On May 13, 2014, Mongolian authorities
reportedly forcibly returned Mongol rights advocates
Dalaibaatar Dovchin and Tulguur Norovrinchen to China.
The forced repatriation of the two rights advocates
suggests increased Chinese government pressure on
Mongolian authorities to restrict rights advocacy
carried out by Chinese citizens in Mongolia. At the
time of their deportation, Dovchin reportedly had a
valid student visa and Norovrinchen reportedly had a
valid Asylum Seeker Certificate issued by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees.
During the 2014 reporting year, Mongol rights
advocate Hada remained in poor health in extralegal
detention despite his completion of a 15-year prison
sentence on December 10, 2010. Hada's case highlights
state repression of Mongols' peaceful protest and
assertions of cultural identity. According to Hada's
wife Xinna, authorities threatened her with detention
after she spoke publicly about her husband's continued
extralegal detention, and maintained restrictions,
including on the freedom of movement, on her and the
couple's son, Uiles.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Continue to build the capacity of Mongol, Uyghur,
and Tibetan groups working to advance human rights,
environmental, and economic development and rule of law
in China through U.S. foreign assistance funding and
through encouraging additional support from both United
Nations and non-governmental sources.
Using forums including the U.S.-China Joint
Committee on Environmental Cooperation and the U.S.-
China Energy Policy Dialogue, urge Chinese officials to
investigate the environmental impact of the dumping of
toxic waste due to mining activities in the IMAR, and
urge IMAR officials to examine herders' complaints
regarding the death of livestock and degradation of
grazing lands due to pollution caused by mining and
other development projects. Convey to the Chinese
government the importance of respecting and protecting
ethnic minority cultures and languages. In accordance
with the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, urge Chinese
officials to provide ethnic minority students and
parents a choice of what language or languages of
instruction should be used at schools they attend in
the TAR, XUAR, and IMAR.
Urge Chinese authorities to refrain from
pressuring the government of Mongolia to forcibly
return Mongol Chinese citizens due to their rights
advocacy. Under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to which
China has acceded and to which Mongolia is considering
accession, countries are obligated to refrain from
repatriating those who fear persecution upon return to
their country of origin.
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained or imprisoned for advocating ethnic minority
rights, including Mongol rights advocate Hada, former
medical school principal Batzangaa, and other prisoners
mentioned in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database.
Urge Chinese authorities to end restrictions on
the freedom of movement and other unlawful restrictions
against Hada's wife Xinna and son Uiles. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights grants ``everyone . . . the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state.'' Urge Chinese authorities to
engage with the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the UN
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regarding Hada's
continued detention.
Population Planning
Findings
In November 2013, the Chinese government
announced a slight modification of China's population
planning policy, allowing couples to bear a second
child if one parent is an only child. Experts predict
the change will affect a limited number of couples,
mostly concentrated in urban areas. In addition,
experts anticipate that many couples may choose not to
bear a second child even if they are now eligible. Thus
far China has seen a smaller increase in births than
predicted. Meanwhile, Chinese and international experts
continued calls for the cancellation of the one-child
policy.
Chinese government officials continued to
implement population planning policies that interfere
with and control the reproductive lives of Chinese
citizens, especially women. Officials employed various
methods including fines, withholding of social benefits
and permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and
arbitrary detention to punish policy violators.
The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is
not consistent with standards set forth in
international agreements, including the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the
Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and
their families, and additional abuses engendered by the
system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies
against ``out-of-plan'' children, also violate
standards set in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. China is a State Party to
these treaties and has committed to upholding their
terms.
Chinese law prohibits official infringement
upon the rights and interests of citizens while
implementing population planning policies but does not
define what constitutes a citizen's right or interest.
Chinese law does not stipulate punishments for
officials who demand or implement forced abortions.
Provincial population planning regulations in at least
22 of China's 31 provinces explicitly instruct
officials to implement abortions for ``out-of-plan''
pregnancies, often referred to as a ``remedial
measure'' (bujiu cuoshi), with no apparent requirement
for parents' consent.
The Chinese government's population planning
policies continue to exacerbate the country's
demographic challenges, which include an aging
population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex
ratio.
Reports emerged highlighting local
governments' misuse or incomplete disclosure of money
collected through population planning fines (termed
``social maintenance fees''), noting that in some
localities officials were permitted to retain a
percentage of proceeds made from these fees, and that
in some cases officials spent collected ``fees'' on
personal expenditures. Such monetary benefits could
serve as incentives for officials to implement illegal
or coercive collection measures.
Authorities in some localities denied birth
permits and hukous--household registration permits--for
children whose parents disobeyed local family planning
requirements. People who lack hukous in China face
considerable difficulty accessing social benefits
afforded to registered citizens.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Publicly link, wherever there is supporting
evidence, the imbalanced sex ratios exacerbated by
China's population planning policies with potential
regional humanitarian and security concerns--
trafficking, crime, increased internal and external
migrations, and other possible serious social,
economic, and political problems--and discuss these
issues in bilateral security dialogues.
Urge the Chinese government to take recent policy
relaxations further, abolishing all birth restrictions
on families, and instead employing a human rights-based
approach to providing freedom to build their families
as they see fit and privacy for all citizens,
especially women. In meetings with the Chinese
government, highlight the concluding observations of
the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
Press Chinese officials to reevaluate the PRC
Population and Family Planning Law and bring it into
conformance with international standards set forth in
international agreements, including the 1995 Beijing
Declaration; the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo
International Conference on Population and Development;
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
Call on China's central and local governments to
vigorously enforce provisions under Chinese law that
provide for punishment of officials and other
individuals who violate the rights of citizens when
implementing population planning policies and to
clearly define what these rights entail. Urge the
Chinese government to establish penalties, including
specific criminal and financial penalties, for
officials and individuals found to commit abuses such
as coercive abortion and coercive sterilization--
practices that continue in China. Urge the Chinese
government to prohibit material, career, and financial
incentives and disincentives that motivate officials to
use coercive or unlawful practices in implementing
family planning policies.
Encourage the Chinese government to ensure
citizens' lawful right to the knowledge of various
contraceptive methods available to them and to ensure
citizens' right to choose whether and which to use.
Support the development of international
cooperation and legal aid and training programs that
help citizens pursue compensation under the PRC State
Compensation Law and that help citizens pursue other
remedies from the government for injuries suffered as a
result of official abuse related to China's population
planning policies.
Urge Chinese authorities to heed the
recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child to ``reform family planning policies in order
to remove all forms of penalties and practices that
deter parents or guardians from registering their
children'' and ``abandon the hukou system in order to
ensure birth registration for all children.''
Freedom of Residence and Movement
Findings
The Chinese government continued to largely
enforce the household registration (hukou) system first
established in 1958. This system limits the right of
Chinese citizens to freely determine their place of
residence. The hukou system's regulations classify
Chinese citizens as either rural or urban and
confer legal rights and access to social services based
on that classification. The implementation of these
regulations discriminates against rural hukou holders
who migrate to urban areas by denying them equal access
to social benefits and public services enjoyed by
registered urban residents. The hukou system conflicts
with international human rights standards guaranteeing
freedom to choose one's residence and prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of ``national or social
origin, birth or other status.''
The Chinese government continued to make
uneven progress toward reforming the hukou system. The
State Council and Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party issued a plan for urbanization in March
2014 that anticipates 100 million people obtaining
urban hukou status by 2020. The plan, however, does not
provide for issuing urban hukous to all migrants moving
to cities. Instead, it calls for easing restrictions on
urban hukous according to city size, retaining strict
control over the populations of large cities but
loosening restrictions on smaller cities.
Several local governments have proposed or
implemented policies that seek to ease restrictions on
some rights and privileges of migrants lacking urban
hukous. However, a number of these reforms carry
qualifying conditions which many migrants find
difficult to meet, including educational, financial,
and employment requirements, among others.
Chinese officials continued to deny citizens
who criticize the government their internationally
recognized right to leave the country. There were
numerous reports of dissidents being denied passports
and the right to exit the country. Uyghurs and
Tibetans, in particular, continued to face heavy
restrictions on obtaining passports. The Chinese
government also continued to deny the right of return
to those expressing views the government perceives to
be threatening, in violation of international
standards.
Chinese authorities continued to violate the
internationally recognized right which provides that
``[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall . . . have the right to liberty of movement . . .
.'' Authorities increased restrictions on freedom of
movement during politically sensitive periods,
preventing, for example, human rights lawyer Mo
Shaoping from meeting with the German vice chancellor
in Beijing municipality in April 2014, and Tibetan
writer and activist Tsering Woeser from attending an
event she had been invited to at the U.S. Embassy
during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
in July.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs, organizations, and exchanges
with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions
engaged in research and outreach to migrant workers in
order to advance legal assistance and anti-
discrimination programs for migrant workers and
encourage policy debates on the hukou system.
Encourage U.S. academic and public policy
institutions to consult with the Commission on avenues
for outreach to Chinese academic and public policy
figures engaged in policy debates on the reform and
eventual abolition of the hukou system.
Stress to Chinese government officials that
noncompliance with international agreements regarding
freedom of movement negatively affects confidence
outside of China that the Chinese government is
committed to complying with international standards
more generally.
Raise specifically Chinese authorities'
restrictions on the freedom of movement of rights
defenders, advocates, critics, and their families,
including, among others: Liu Xia, an artist and poet,
and the wife of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Liu Xiaobo; Catholic bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin; and
Tibetan writer and activist Tsering Woeser; and
restrictions on the right to leave the country and the
right of return, for example, in the cases of the late
human rights defender Cao Shunli and rights advocate
Yang Jianli.
Status of Women
Findings
Chinese laws contain provisions that aim to
protect women's rights, but ambiguity and lack of
clearly outlined duties for law enforcement agencies
and private entities hamper implementation.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights issued its concluding observations on
the second periodic report of China in May 2014, noting
persistent gender disparities in China, ``especially in
relation to employment, wages, housing and access to
higher education'' as well as ``the disadvantaged
position of rural women, in particular in having access
to education, health, employment and land tenure . . .
.''
Female representation in all levels of
government in China falls short of international
standards and standards under Chinese law, underscoring
long-held concerns about protection of women's rights
and interests.
Gender-based discrimination continues in
employment and education in China despite provisions
under Chinese law that prohibit it. Employers continue
to discriminate against women in recruitment,
promotion, wages, and retirement. Universities across
China implement gender restrictions in enrollment.
Domestic violence reportedly affects 25
percent of Chinese families, yet national-level legal
provisions lack a clear definition of domestic violence
and do not specify the duties of public and private
sector organizations in prevention, punishment, and
treatment. The Supreme People's Court issued a report
in February 2014 providing 10 model cases that aimed to
guide lower courts in adjudication of domestic violence
criminal cases. As of June 2014, draft domestic
violence legislation reportedly had been included in
the State Council's 2014 legislative work plan.
Chinese law fails to adequately define,
prevent, and punish acts of sexual violence against
women, including rape, forced prostitution, and sexual
harassment. Central authorities issued several guiding
documents this past year that aim to strengthen
prevention and punishment of the sexual assault of a
child. Advocates continue to call for authorities to
close loopholes in Chinese law that may allow lighter
punishments for perpetrators whose victims are between
12 and 14 years old.
Local officials continue to employ coercion
and violence against women--including forced abortions,
forced sterilizations, and forced contraceptive use--
while implementing national and local population
planning policies. Over 1,000 Chinese women sent a
letter calling on Chinese officials to ``protect
women's right to life and health'' during the drafting
and execution of China's population planning policies.
In violation of Chinese law, authorities
continue to subject women to arbitrary detention,
extortion, physical violence, verbal abuse, and forced
labor in the enforcement of anti-prostitution laws.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support exchanges, training, and legal programs
in China that increase women's political participation,
promote women's land rights, educate women vis-a-vis
rights awareness and advocacy, and increase supervision
over village committees to ensure adequate protection
of women's rights and interests in accordance with
national-level laws and policies.
Press the Chinese government to faithfully
implement the recommendations from the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights following its
review of China in May 2014, to adopt measures to (a)
``ensure the strict enforcement of the Law on the
Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women''; (b)
``eliminate the persistent disparities between men and
women and promote full access to higher education,
employment and housing''; (c) ``eliminate the
persistent gender wage gap''; and (d) ``eliminate
multiple-discrimination faced by rural women, in
particular in access to education, health, employment
and land tenure.''
Press the Chinese government to enact
comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly
defines domestic violence in criminal and civil law,
allocates adequate resources for addressing domestic
violence, assigns responsibilities to government and
civil society organizations in addressing domestic
violence, details procedures for victim support and
protection, and specifies punishments for offenders.
Urge officials to release drafts of this legislation
for public comment. Support technical assistance
programs that increase awareness among judicial and law
enforcement personnel on issues pertaining to domestic
violence.
Urge the Chinese government to revise or enact
comprehensive national-level legislation to provide a
clear definition of sexual harassment and specific
standards and procedures for prevention and punishment.
Support technical assistance programs that increase
awareness among judicial and law enforcement personnel
on issues pertaining to sexual harassment. One area in
which the U.S. Government could offer technical
assistance is in developing workplace protocols and
reporting mechanisms that ensure confidentiality and
prevent retaliation.
Encourage the Chinese government to heed the
recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women to incorporate gender
education into the training of judges, judicial
officers, lawyers, and prosecutors.
Call on the Chinese government to stop coercion
and violence against women during population planning
implementation and to clarify provisions under Chinese
law that would protect women against such abuses. Urge
the Chinese government to establish specific penalties
for those who engage in coercive or violent population
planning enforcement, including forced abortion, forced
sterilization, and forced contraceptive use.
Human Trafficking
Findings
China remains a country of origin, transit,
and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and
children. The majority of human trafficking cases are
domestic and involve trafficking for sexual
exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage. The
full extent of the forced labor problem in China is
unclear, as the Chinese government releases limited
relevant statistics.
Chinese and international experts link China's
ongoing human trafficking problem to several political,
demographic, economic, and social factors, including a
severely skewed sex ratio, lack of awareness and
education on trafficking prevention, and challenging
conditions in border countries.
The Chinese government acceded to the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP
Protocol) in December 2009 and has since taken steps to
revise domestic legislation and update policy efforts
to comply with the UN TIP Protocol. The State Council
tasked local governments with implementing a 2013-2020
national anti-trafficking action plan, and one year in,
it is difficult to assess whether the State Council has
provided adequate resources and training to local
authorities for implementing the plan's objectives or
whether local governments are able to budget the funds
necessary to finance anti-trafficking work as the plan
has recommended.
As Chinese law conflates human smuggling,
illegal adoption, and child abduction with human
trafficking, accurate official statistics on the number
of trafficking cases the government investigated and
prosecuted during this reporting year are not
available. In cooperation with international
organizations, Chinese authorities took steps to
improve protection, services, and care for victims of
trafficking, but appeared to continue focusing efforts
only on women and children. Chinese authorities did not
release detailed information on services provided or
the number of victims identified and assisted.
The Chinese government does not offer legal
alternatives to deportation for foreign victims of
trafficking and continues to deport North Korean
refugees under the classification of ``economic
migrants,'' regardless of whether or not they are
victims of trafficking.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
commitments under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children and to bring anti-trafficking legislation into
alignment with international standards. Specifically,
urge the Chinese government to distinguish in
legislation the crimes of human smuggling, child
abduction, and illegal adoption from that of human
trafficking, and to expand the current legal definition
of trafficking to include all forms of trafficking,
including offenses against adult male victims, certain
forms of non-physical coercion, and the commercial sex
trade of minors. Such legal distinctions could be added
to the agenda for discussion at the next U.S.-China
Legal Experts Dialogue. Accordingly, urge the Chinese
government to undertake rigorous and methodical
research on human trafficking in order to publish data
that reflects an accurate definition of human
trafficking as provided under the UN TIP Protocol.
Urge the Chinese government to take action to
address root factors that contribute to China's
trafficking problem. Such action could include working
to balance China's sex ratio by raising awareness of
the value of women and by combating discrimination
against women in education and employment.
Call on the Chinese government to provide more
protective services for trafficking victims. Support
expanding training programs for law enforcement
personnel and shelter managers that help raise
awareness and improve processes for identifying,
protecting, and assisting trafficking victims. Support
legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of
both foreign and Chinese trafficking victims.
Object to the continued deportation of North
Korean trafficking victims as ``economic migrants.''
Urge the Chinese government to abide by its
international obligations under the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol with regard to North Korean trafficking
victims and provide legal alternatives to repatriation.
North Korean Refugees in China
Findings
Throughout the Commission's 2014 reporting
year, the Chinese government continued to detain and
repatriate North Korean refugees to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in violation of its
obligations under international human rights and
refugee law.
A UN Commission of Inquiry report released in
February 2014 condemned China for forcibly repatriating
North Korean refugees to the DPRK, stating that such
actions ``could amount to the aiding and abetting of
crimes against humanity'' in the DPRK.
Throughout the reporting year, China appeared
to strengthen measures to stem the flow of North Korean
refugees into China, including increasing border
security and detaining and repatriating refugees to the
DPRK. Christian missionaries and aid groups also
reported that Chinese authorities have been cracking
down on Christian-run NGOs and businesses working along
the China-North Korea border.
Heightened security on both sides of the
China-North Korea border appears to be limiting the
outflow of North Korean refugees into China and
neighboring countries. The number of refugees who
reached South Korea in 2013 increased only slightly to
1,516 compared with 1,509 in 2012, reflecting a trend
that has seen a significant drop in the number of
refugees entering South Korea since 2009.
Trafficking of North Korean women in China
remained a significant problem. Reports suggest that
over 70 percent of North Korean refugees in China are
women, of which a high number are being trafficked
primarily for the purposes of forced marriage or sexual
exploitation.
Children born to North Korean women remained
largely deprived of basic rights to education and other
public services in China.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Insist Chinese officials respect the principle of
non-refoulement and stop forcibly repatriating North
Korean refugees to the DPRK.
Incorporate regular discussion on North Korean
refugees into all appropriate bilateral and
multilateral dialogues with China, including ongoing
dialogue with China on denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
Formulate a multilateral framework with China and
other concerned governments for the handling of North
Korean refugees that addresses China's concerns about
stability and criminal activity along the border with
international principles on human rights and refugee
protection.
Urge Chinese officials to abide by their
obligations under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women to prosecute
human traffickers operating in China and along the
North Korea-China border.
Urge Chinese officials to legalize the status of
North Korean women who marry or have a child with a
Chinese citizen, and ensure that all such children are
granted residency status and access to education and
other public services.
Public Health
Findings
Violence against hospital personnel was a
focal public health issue in China during the
Commission's 2014 reporting year. Medical experts
attribute the increasing number of violent incidents
against hospital personnel to weak mechanisms for
resolving medical disputes, among other factors.
The first year of implementation of China's
first-ever Mental Health Law was marred by reports of
public security officials forcibly committing
petitioners to psychiatric hospitalization despite
provisions in the law intended to prevent this form of
abuse.
In May, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention censured China in an opinion on the case of
Xing Shiku, a petitioner from Heilongjiang province,
whom authorities have kept in a psychiatric facility
for more than seven years, concluding that Xing's
detention violated Articles 9 and 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The Commission observed reports of detention
and deprivation of personal freedom of individuals who
have been engaged in public health outreach and
advocacy. In January, public security officials
criminally detained Akbar Imin, a Uyghur public health
worker. Beijing authorities kept advocate Hu Jia under
home confinement for almost six months, releasing him
after the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests. Public security authorities also raided the
office of Zhengzhou Yirenping, a public health and
anti-discrimination non-governmental organization (NGO)
in Henan province, in connection with the arrest of
human rights lawyer and Zhengzhou Yirenping co-founder
Chang Boyang.
During this reporting year, the Chinese
government issued government work plans to strengthen
the existing legislative framework to prohibit health-
based discrimination in access to employment and
education. For example, a plan issued in January 2014
aims to increase access to compulsory education for
students with physical and intellectual disabilities.
Physical eligibility standards for employment as civil
servants and teachers, however, still contain
provisions that discriminate against individuals with a
range of health-related conditions.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Recommend that the Chinese government work with
hospitals, medical and legal professionals, and
community groups to develop rule-based mechanisms to
resolve patient-hospital disputes, including support
for the registration of non-governmental patient
rights' advocacy groups.
Call on the Chinese government to strengthen
implementation of the Mental Health Law (MHL) and stop
forcibly committing petitioners and others without
mental illness to psychiatric facilities (bei
jingshenbing). Urge the Chinese government to establish
an independent panel made up of legal and medical
professionals from both within and outside of the
government to monitor and report on implementation of
the MHL, particularly in the use of involuntary
commitment and treatment. Increase support to Chinese
civil society organizations and advocates in monitoring
implementation of the MHL.
Call on the Chinese government to immediately
release from custody Akbar Imin, a Uyghur public health
worker who has worked with Uyghur migrants in Beijing
on HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, and drug abuse
harm reduction; Zhengzhou-based human rights lawyer
Chang Boyang; petitioner Xing Shiku; and other public
health advocates and petitioners mentioned in this
report and the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database. Call on the Chinese government to cease
harassing public health advocacy NGOs.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of laws and regulations that
prohibit health-based discrimination in access to
employment and education, and in the development of a
barrier-free environment, including revision of the
national physical eligibility standards for civil
servants and teachers that discriminate against persons
with health-related conditions. Where appropriate,
share with Chinese officials the United States' ongoing
experience and efforts through legal, regulatory, and
non-governmental means to promote the rights of persons
with disabilities in education and employment. Expand
the number of site visits and other exchanges for
Chinese officials to observe and share experience with
U.S. rights groups, lawyers, and state and federal
agencies.
The Environment
Findings
During the Commission's 2014 reporting year,
widespread and severe environmental challenges
continued to confront China. Pollution problems have
had consequences for citizens' health and reportedly
have led to increasing environmental migration by
China's more prosperous citizens. Soil pollution in
China has been linked to food safety concerns both
domestically and internationally. Overall, groundwater
quality worsened over the past year and 280 million
people in China still use unsafe drinking water. Dirty
migration--whereby polluting industries move to less
developed areas where environmental protection efforts
have been weaker and information disclosure has been
lower--also remains problematic. Chinese citizens, as
well as U.S. and South Korean officials, expressed
concern about China's worsening air pollution.
Developments during the reporting year
indicate central authorities have raised the priority
of regulating threats to environmental quality. Chinese
authorities made substantial revisions to the
Environmental Protection Law, the first revisions since
1989, which if duly implemented have the potential to
improve transparency and public oversight, diminish lax
implementation and enforcement, and reduce non-
compliance. The revised law allows for a narrow, select
range of environmental organizations to file public
interest cases in court, although it is uncertain if
authorities will grant standing to groups lacking
strong links to government agencies.
Despite regulatory advances, significant
challenges still hinder the development of the rule of
law in the area of environmental protection, including
citizen access to the courts, weak deterrence
mechanisms, and noncompliance with environmental
statutes. Environmental authorities increased
application of criminal statutes to environmental
cases. Nevertheless, many companies in China surveyed
in 2013 reportedly remained out of compliance with
pollution standards. Corruption and disregard for the
law are widespread in the environmental sector, and in
some cases have been linked to pollution incidents.
Problems with pollution and environmental degradation
are among the primary triggers of environmental mass
incidents. There were several mass protests against
pollution, including a peaceful protest against a
chemical plant in Maoming municipality, Guangdong
province, that turned violent. Chinese citizens and a
human rights group have called for an investigation
into the possible excessive use of force by security
officials during the Maoming protest.
During the reporting period, observers
asserted that Chinese authorities advanced
environmental transparency to some degree. As of
January 2014, 179 cities had started to disclose to the
public real-time information on air quality. A national
measure also came into force in January requiring
China's approximately 15,000 ``key enterprises'' to
self-monitor and disclose air, water, noise, and other
pollutant emissions data. The revised Environmental
Protection Law stipulated requirements for authorities
to make full environmental impact assessment reports
available to the public. Authorities publicly disclosed
limited general data from a national study on soil
pollution after previously refusing to provide
information in response to a Chinese citizen's 2013
open information request on the grounds that the data
was a ``state secret.'' Censorship on environmental
issues continued, however, and Chinese citizens still
face significant challenges in accessing environmental
information.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Acknowledge revisions to the Environmental
Protection Law and encourage Chinese leaders to
strengthen the rule of law in the environmental sector.
Support U.S.-China bilateral exchanges focused on
improving regulatory enforcement and compliance tools
and urge Chinese authorities to be more responsive to
citizen demands for a cleaner environment. Engage
Chinese officials and others who seek to devise a fair
compensation system for environmental and ecological
damages.
Continue to fund programs under the U.S.-China
Ten-Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and
Environment. Add reduction of soil contamination and
environmental transparency to the list of Focus Areas
for U.S.-China EcoPartnership projects. In addition,
urge the participation of independent Chinese
environmental non-governmental organizations in the
U.S.-China EcoPartnership projects.
Support programs that seek to raise the technical
and operational capacity of Chinese environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including programs
that build the capacity of NGOs to fully utilize
opportunities to file environmental public interest
lawsuits. Urge Chinese authorities to fully implement
provisions providing for public participation in
environmental policy and project decisions.
Support efforts by Chinese and U.S. groups
working to expand awareness of citizens' environmental
rights in China and to promote the protection of those
rights. Include environmental law and transparency
issues in the U.S.-China Human Rights and Legal Experts
Dialogues. Also include discussion of human rights
dimensions of climate change in the U.S.-China Climate
Change Working Group.
Support continued expansion of environmental
information disclosure in China and encourage Chinese
leaders to fully implement strengthened provisions for
disclosure of full-text environmental impact assessment
reports to the public. Share with Chinese officials
U.S. Government experiences with the Toxics Release
Inventory Program and other U.S. programs that seek to
provide more environmental transparency. Continue U.S.
Government engagement with relevant individuals and
organizations in developing China's capacity to
reliably measure, report, publicize, and verify carbon
emissions reduction strategies and techniques. In
future U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
meetings, expand upon previous discussions regarding
environmental transparency and the reliability and
transparency of greenhouse gas data.
Civil Society
Findings
During the Commission's 2014 reporting year,
the Chinese government and Party continued a crackdown
on civil society activists that began in early 2013
that violated international standards of freedom of
expression, association, and assembly. Authorities
sentenced a number of individuals previously detained
in 2013 because of their calls for greater government
accountability and citizen participation. These
individuals included Xu Zhiyong, a legal rights
advocate and promoter of the New Citizens' Movement
whom authorities sentenced in January 2014 to four
years in prison. Authorities also harassed and detained
individuals who attempted to monitor China's compliance
with its international human rights obligations and to
commemorate the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests and their violent suppression.
The Commission also observed increased
harassment of Chinese non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) this past year, especially those working on
public health and anti-discrimination advocacy.
The government and Party neither engaged nor
consulted with independent civil society advocates and
organizations in formulating country reports submitted
for reviews of China's compliance with several of its
international human rights obligations that took place
during this reporting year, an issue raised by several
UN commissions and Chinese and international rights
organizations. Some organizations asserted that the
approximately 16 to 22 NGOs and government-affiliated
organizations listed as consulting groups in China's
reports were primarily government- or Party-organized
groups. The Chinese government also rebuffed UN and
international human rights organizations' inquiries
into the detention, deteriorating health, and death in
March 2014 of human rights defender Cao Shunli.
Central government and Party documents, such
as the Party Central Committee Third Plenum Decision on
Certain Major Issues Regarding Comprehensively
Deepening Reforms, included support for the
participation of non-governmental ``social forces'' in
the social services sector. This policy support
reiterated points in the institutional reform plan of
March 2013 that aim to shift some government functions
in the provision of public services to non-governmental
``social organizations''--the government's term for
non-governmental entities.
The Chinese government and Party missed its
own stated deadline to issue revisions to the three key
national regulations on ``social organizations'' by the
end of 2013, although at least 26 provinces and
municipalities moved forward with interim regulations.
The local provisions promote direct registration of a
limited spectrum of ``social organizations,'' but
maintain a ``dual management'' system for religious,
political, and legal groups, among others, which
compromises such groups' organizational autonomy by
requiring the oversight of sponsoring organizations.
Government procurement of services from the
non-
governmental sector in China is still in its early
phase and the regulatory framework is not fully
developed.
Beijing and Shenzhen municipalities issued
draft or interim charity regulations during this
reporting year, but the timing for national charity
legislation remains unclear. Two areas of contention in
the development of the regulatory framework for
philanthropy concern the types of charitable
organizations allowed to publicly fundraise and to what
extent the government will control charitable giving.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call for the release of Xu Zhiyong as well as
other civil society and rights advocates sentenced to
prison terms for politically motivated reasons. Call on
the Chinese government to cease harassment of civil
society advocates and organizations who work on rights
protection and public advocacy, or who seek to exercise
their right to public participation. Strongly urge the
Chinese government to establish an independent
investigation panel that includes Chinese human rights
lawyers to examine Cao Shunli's treatment in detention
in the months prior to her death in March 2014.
Urge China to comply with international human
rights conventions regarding the role and participation
of civil society organizations in country reporting,
policy development, and monitoring the implementation
of its human rights obligations.
Encourage the Chinese government to revise its
regulatory framework for ``social organizations'' in
China to allow all non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) to benefit from planned reforms in accordance
with the rights to freedom of association and assembly
guaranteed in Articles 21 and 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Increase support to U.S. non-governmental
organizations in China to develop projects that build
the capacity of independent grassroots NGOs to advocate
for equal legal and operating rights for all
organizations, including for registration and open and
transparent competition for government procurement
projects.
Institutions of Democratic Governance
Findings
China's political institutions do not comply
with Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) or standards in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). During
the October 2013 UN Human Rights Council's Universal
Periodic Review of the Chinese government's human
rights record, China rejected numerous recommendations
to ``ratify'' or ``establish a clear timeframe'' to
ratify the ICCPR. China did, however, accept
recommendations to ``[t]ake steps toward the
ratification of ICCPR.''
While central Chinese leaders expressed a
commitment to reining in excessive government power,
they gave no indication that they would undertake
political reforms to bring China into compliance with
the ICCPR or the UDHR. Central leaders in the Chinese
Communist Party issued a major policy document in
November 2013 that used only general language about
improving China's existing ``socialist democratic
political system'' and ``strengthening the system for
restraining and supervising the use of power.'' The
document emphasized the continuing dominance of the
Party and the goal of ``strengthening and improving the
Party's leadership over overall reform.''
The Party continued to dominate political
affairs, penetrating every level of society. To
facilitate recentralization of Party authority, top
leaders created new leadership organizations, headed by
Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping.
Central Party officials sought to increase intraparty
discipline and exert ideological control through a
``mass line'' campaign, which involved political
indoctrination and self-
criticism sessions for officials, and a society-wide
campaign to promote the cultivation and practice of
several ``core socialist values.''
Authorities continued to harass, detain, and
impose prison sentences on individuals who exercised
their rights to freedom of speech, assembly,
association, and demonstration, including over 100
people in the two months prior to the 25th anniversary
of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and their violent
suppression by authorities. Among those affected were
Pu Zhiqiang, Xu Guang, Chang Boyang, and Zhao Huaxu, as
well as democracy advocates and rights defenders such
as Liu Benqi, Qin Yongmin, and Sun Feng. Others
remained in prison, including Zhu Yufu (7 years), Cao
Haibo (8 years), Chen Xi (10 years), and Liu Xianbin
(10 years). The death of human rights defender Cao
Shunli, who urged Chinese leaders to allow independent
public participation in drafting China's national
reports to the United Nations, prompted concern that
her death was linked to Chinese authorities' denial of
timely and proper medical care while in detention.
People's congress and village committee
elections continued to be plagued by government
interference, corruption, and procedural
irregularities, as exemplified by the spring 2014
elections in Wukan village, Guangdong province. While
the 2012 elections in Wukan had been held up as a model
of democracy, the 2014 elections were marred by
detentions of candidates and other problems,
illustrating a decline in democratic governance.
Authorities imprisoned anticorruption and
transparency advocates, some of whom identified
themselves as associated with the New Citizens'
Movement, including Yuan Dong (one year and six
months), Zhang Baocheng (two years), Ding Jiaxi (three
years and six months), Zhao Changqing (two years and
six months), Li Wei (two years), Liu Ping (six years
and six months), Wei Zhongping (six years and six
months), and Li Sihua (three years). Authorities also
continued to hold in detention several others awaiting
trial, including Huang Wenxun, Yuan Xiaohua, Yuan
Fengchu, Yang Maodong, and Liu Jiacai.
Amid increasing public concern over
corruption, authorities stepped up detentions and
investigations of officials suspected of corruption,
including Zhou Yongkang, former secretary of the
Communist Party Central Committee Political and Legal
Affairs Commission. Despite official reports that the
anticorruption campaign has yielded results, there
reportedly also have been allegations of torture of
several lower level officials detained on suspicion of
corruption. Some observers assert that central Party
authorities, including Party Secretary General Xi
Jinping, are using the anticorruption drive to
recentralize authority, purge political rivals, and
place their own people into positions of power.
Some Chinese officials and government agencies
have sought to be more accessible to the public, but
transparency is still lacking. The Ministry of Finance
directed all organizations that receive government
allocations to publicly disclose their budgets. Central
government authorities urged officials to improve
transparency in a number of specific sectors, while
safeguarding secrets. Open government information
requests by Chinese citizens reportedly are increasing
but numerous problems with accessing information
remain.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support U.S. academic and intelligence research
programs to shed light on the structure, functions, and
development of the Chinese Communist Party, including
its ideological campaigns, and the Party's roles within
companies, government agencies, and legislative,
judicial, and non-governmental institutions. Urge
Chinese officials to further increase the transparency
of Party affairs.
Call on the Chinese government to release people
detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to
freedom of speech, association, and assembly; for
engaging in peaceful demonstrations; for calling for
transparency of officials' personal finances; or for
calling for political reforms within China. These may
include those who sought to commemorate the 25th
anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, have
associated themselves with the New Citizens' Movement,
or other prisoners of conscience mentioned in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Support joint U.S.-China cooperative programs to
develop independent monitoring systems for village
committee and local people's congress elections and
encourage central and local Party and government
leaders to implement free and fair elections across
China. Continue to support democracy promotion programs
that are adapted to China. Support U.S. academic and
other U.S.-China joint programs aimed at expanding
public participation in political and policy
decisionmaking.
Support organizations working in China that seek
to improve government transparency, especially efforts
to expand and improve China's government information
disclosure initiatives. Such projects might include
joint efforts to better publicize the Open Government
Information (OGI) Regulations at local levels and to
train citizens and groups on how to submit OGI
requests. Encourage Party and government officials to
ensure regulations, rules, and policies are made
public.
Commercial Rule of Law
Findings
China acceded to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on December 11, 2001. The Chinese government,
however, continues to practice state capitalism. The
interventionist policies of the Chinese government,
including subsidies and preferential treatment for
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), are not compatible with
China's WTO commitments. In the first half of 2014, two
significant WTO dispute panel decisions were issued
addressing a rare earths dispute, where China's export
quotas were found to be inconsistent with WTO rules,
and an automobile subsidies dispute, where China's
duties on American automobiles were found to be in
breach of China's WTO obligations. During the reporting
year, the Chinese Communist Party Third Plenum Decision
emphasized a decisive role for the market in allocating
resources, but acknowledged that SOEs would continue to
play a primary role in China's economy.
China remained noncompliant with its WTO
commitments with regard to disclosing subsidies and
providing regulatory transparency on draft laws and
regulations. Corporate reporting at Chinese companies
is also limited, and the Chinese government tightly
controls media reporting on the wealth of government
officials and their families. During the 2014 reporting
year, American regulators, private companies, and
investors had difficulty obtaining information on
Chinese companies, including the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission in its fraud investigations of
China-based companies. Many American technology and
media companies remained blocked in China, including
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Dropbox, the New York
Times, and Bloomberg News.
Reports of the significant theft of U.S.
intellectual property originating from China continued
throughout the 2014 reporting year. The U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) brought an indictment against five
Chinese military hackers for allegedly hacking
Westinghouse Electric; U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld;
United States Steel; Allegheny Technologies; United
Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy Allied Industrial and Service Workers
International Union (United Steelworkers); and Alcoa.
Several of these companies and United Steelworkers had
challenged China's trade policies, raising concerns
that the alleged hacking may have been done in
retaliation. The Chinese government took steps to
improve protection for intellectual property rights
(IPR) this past year, including higher statutory
compensation in the amended PRC Trademark Law and
beginning draft revisions to the PRC Anti-Unfair
Competition Law. American companies, however, had
difficulties in effectively protecting IPR in China.
During the reporting year, the DOJ began criminal
prosecutions in two significant cases involving the
theft of agricultural trade secrets by Chinese
nationals.
Chinese outbound investment continued to
increase significantly, and annual Chinese foreign
direct investment (FDI) into the United States now
exceeds U.S. FDI into China. During the 2014 reporting
year, major investments by Chinese companies in the
United States were in agriculture, IT, health care, and
real estate. In the first half of 2014, the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
reviewed potential security concerns regarding the
planned acquisitions by Lenovo Group of an
International Business Machines (IBM) server unit due
to the use of the IBM servers by U.S. Government
intelligence and defense agencies.
Chinese authorities increased the number of
antimonopoly reviews, including reviews of potential
abuses of dominant market positions. In June 2014, the
Ministry of Commerce blocked a network of A.P. Moller-
Maersk, CMA CGM, and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company
due to Antimonopoly Law concerns. The proposed network
had been approved by the U.S. Federal Maritime
Commission and the European Commission. This was the
first time since 2009, when Coca-Cola's acquisition of
the Chinese beverage company Huiyuan was blocked, that
a deal was blocked outright. During the reporting year,
Chinese authorities conducted investigations in many
sectors, and American companies targeted included
Qualcomm and Microsoft. In September 2014, the US-China
Business Council reported that 86 percent of firms that
responded to its survey had some concern with China's
antimonopoly enforcement activities. Companies'
concerns included selective and subjective enforcement,
lack of regulatory transparency, and use of
administrative intimidation tactics. According to a
September 2014 U.S. Chamber of Commerce report, China's
enforcement activities may be a violation of its WTO
commitments.
Intervention by the Chinese government
continued to contribute to significant undervaluation
of the Chinese yuan. The yuan reportedly reversed a
trend of appreciation this past year, depreciating by
1.5 percent in February 2014, for the largest two-week
decline since 2005, and depreciating 2.68 percent for
the year to April 2014.
Serious food safety problems continued in
China and were also a concern for U.S. companies
operating in China and American consumers. In June
2014, the National People's Congress released a revised
draft of the PRC Food Safety Law for public comment
that strengthens preventative regulations, improves
supervision, and provides for stronger penalties. In
July 2014, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration had
more active import alerts for China than any other
country. The U.S. Government plans to increase the
number of inspection staff in China, however, there has
been difficulty in obtaining visas for them.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Ensure that China makes concrete improvements in
ending currency controls, subsidies for state-owned
enterprises, and other policies outlined in this report
that violate China's existing international trading
obligations, as a condition for progress in any U.S.
trade-related negotiations with China, and ensure
transparency and full public participation by all
segments of American society in such negotiations.
Direct the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to
create a public database of all of China's commitments
in its WTO accession agreements. USTR annual reporting
on China's WTO compliance should identify any
compliance concerns, together with the individual
commitments potentially implicated, and whether or not
USTR took action. USTR should also create a public
database of all of China's commitments made pursuant to
the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT) and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) and its predecessor. USTR, with the
assistance of the Department of Commerce and the
Department of the Treasury, should use both databases
to more comprehensively report on China's
implementation of its commitments.
Develop and support a project surveying Internet
restrictions in China and their impact on U.S.
businesses. The U.S. Trade Representative should
consider reporting on Internet censorship in its annual
reports on China's WTO compliance and reports on
Foreign Trade Barriers. An additional formal request
through the WTO should be made for detailed information
on China's Internet restrictions, and a WTO dispute
should be considered, if warranted. In meeting with
Chinese government officials, urge the Chinese
government to stop blocking access to U.S. media and
technology companies in China, including the New York
Times, Bloomberg News, Google, Facebook, and Dropbox.
Work with the Chinese government to stop cyber
theft originating in China. Efforts should also be made
to strengthen the protection of trade secrets in China,
including the revision of China's trade secret laws.
The U.S. Government should provide additional support
to American companies litigating significant
intellectual property cases in China, including raising
the litigation in discussions with Chinese leaders and
at the S&ED and the JCCT. One matter in which the U.S.
Government may consider is providing additional support
to AMSC's (formerly American Superconductor) ongoing
commercial litigation against Sinovel Wind Group
Company, which involves over US$1 billion in damages.
The U.S. Department of Justice should consider
reporting on an annual basis intellectual property
cases involving Chinese companies and Chinese
nationals.
Urge the Chinese government to improve
transparency on corporate information and stop abusing
the state secrets law. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission should make obtaining full access to
corporate documents for Chinese companies listed on
U.S. stock exchanges a key focus of the bilateral
dialogue with the China Securities Regulatory
Commission. The Chinese government should be encouraged
to enhance transparency, provide a clear and narrowly-
tailored definition of state secrets that complies with
international law, and clearly define permissible due
diligence activities.
Discuss with Chinese officials and take further
action in the WTO to ensure that China fully implements
adverse WTO dispute decisions, eliminates subsidies for
Chinese state-owned enterprises, and fulfills its
transparency obligations under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement. Up-to-date and complete notification by
China of Chinese national and provincial subsidies that
benefit state-owned enterprises and discriminate
against American investment should be obtained.
Ensure that U.S. Government food and drug safety
inspection officials are able to obtain visas and
conduct unannounced inspections of Chinese facilities
that are exporting to the United States. Strengthen
capacity-building programs for Chinese food and drug
regulators based on U.S. best practices. Support NGOs
working on food safety in China, and encourage Chinese
government efforts to improve food safety transparency
and oversight.
Access to Justice
Findings
In June 2014, the Chinese government announced
that six provinces and municipalities would serve as
pilot sites for certain judicial reforms in an effort
to limit interference by local governments in the work
of the courts. The reforms include divesting local
governments of their control over local court funding
and appointments, and centralizing such power at the
provincial level. The limits of judicial reform were
made clear, however, when, shortly after the
announcement, the state-run Global Times stated in an
editorial that the goal of improving ``judicial
justice'' in the new reforms did not mean that China
was moving toward ``judicial independence'' (sifa duli)
or ``separation of powers.''
The Supreme People's Court (SPC) took steps to
increase judicial transparency and accountability in
line with the November 2013 Chinese Communist Party
Third Plenum Decision. The SPC issued measures
requiring all courts in China to publish their
effective written judgments (with some exceptions, such
as cases involving state secrets and individual
privacy) on the publicly accessible Web site Judicial
Opinions of China, effective January 1, 2014. Increased
judicial openness was one of eight main areas of focus
in the SPC's fourth five-year reform plan released in
July 2014.
The Party and central government issued a
number of documents instituting reforms to the
petitioning (xinfang) system--one of the areas of
reform outlined in the Third Plenum Decision. Xinfang,
also referred to as the ``letters and visits'' system,
is a popular mechanism outside of the formal legal
system for citizens to present their grievances to
authorities, either in writing or in person. The goals
of the petitioning system reforms include, among
others, reducing the number of in-person petitions by
promoting online and written petitions, and ensuring
that all law- and litigation-related petitions are
handled by courts and resolved through legal channels.
The measures prohibit officials from unlawfully
detaining petitioners and accepting complaints from
petitioners who have skipped levels in an attempt to
reach higher level authorities.
In late December 2013, the first-ever draft
amendment to the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL)
was submitted to the National People's Congress
Standing Committee for review. The proposed revisions
address the main problems with the ALL, which are
widely referred to as ``the three difficulties'':
difficulties filing administrative litigation cases,
trying ALL cases, and enforcing ALL judgments. Whether
the ALL amendments will lead more petitioners to file
lawsuits rather than use the petitioning system--a
desired outcome of the revisions--remains to be seen.
Authorities intensified the degree of
harassment and abuse of human rights lawyers and
defenders this year, particularly in the run-up to the
25th anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989
Tiananmen protests. Incidents against human rights
lawyers included official violence against lawyers
advocating for detained Christian Pastor Zhang Shaojie
in Henan province, and the detention and torture of
four rights lawyers, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, Wang
Cheng, and Zhang Junjie, in Heilongjiang province. In
May and June 2014, officials criminally detained a
number of well-known rights lawyers for political
reasons, including Beijing-based Pu Zhiqiang, Henan-
based Chang Boyang and Ji Laisong, and three Guangzhou-
based human rights lawyers: Tang Jingling, Wang
Qingying, and Yuan Xinting.
Rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng was released from
prison in early August 2014. Reports emerged soon after
that authorities had maltreated him during his more
than two and a half years in Shaya Prison in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. As a result of the
abuses he suffered, Gao lost 50 pounds, has serious
dental problems, and has difficulty speaking
coherently.
Despite increased repression, Chinese human
rights lawyers took new steps to protect their own
rights, for example, by forming the China Human Rights
Lawyers Group, which provides legal services and advice
to citizens detained for exercising their civil rights.
Moreover, in June 2014, more than 40 rights lawyers
signed a pledge to voluntarily assist other lawyers and
their families if they are targeted by authorities.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call for the release of detained rights lawyers,
including Pu Zhiqiang, Chang Boyang, Tang Jingling,
Yuan Xinting, and other rights lawyers whose personal
liberty has been unlawfully restricted.
Call upon the Chinese government to permit rights
lawyer Gao Zhisheng to travel to the U.S. for medical
treatment and to be reunited with his wife and two
children, who now live in the U.S. While Gao is still
in China, the Chinese government should ensure his
freedom of movement domestically.
Urge the Chinese government to protect the
fundamental civil and professional rights of China's
human rights lawyers, and to investigate all
allegations of abuse and ensure that those responsible
are brought to justice.
Support programs implemented by U.S. non-
governmental organizations and other entities that
partner with China's human rights lawyers and non-
profit legal organizations to enhance access to justice
and lawyers' rights to represent defendants free of
government interference. Expand support to bring
Chinese human rights lawyers, advocates, and scholars
to the United States for study and capacity building
through such programs as the U.S. Department of State's
International Visitors Leadership Program.
Increase support to U.S. law schools and other
organizations for programs with Chinese counterparts to
advance the judicial and administrative law reforms
currently underway in China.
Consider including regulation of the legal
profession and lawyers' codes of conduct in the agenda
for future bilateral Legal Experts' Dialogues.
Xinjiang
Findings
Deadly clashes that took place during the
Commission's 2014 reporting year in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), or involved Uyghurs outside
of the XUAR, led to more than 300 fatalities.
President Xi Jinping and top officials
emphasized anti-
terrorism security measures while also cracking down on
peaceful religious activity and failing to address
concerns that anti-terrorism measures should also
protect civil rights.
Overseas rights advocates and analysts voiced
concern that authorities' overly broad security
measures and crackdowns, restrictions on peaceful
religious activity, and constraints on expressions of
Uyghur cultural identity have heightened tensions in
the XUAR, and that Chinese officials failed to
distinguish between violence or terrorism and peaceful
dissent. Officials and state media acknowledged that
economic and social inequality have exacerbated
regional instability but have emphasized economic
development projects without addressing Uyghurs'
concerns over threats to their language, culture, and
religion.
Overseas rights advocates and analysts also
raised concerns that authorities had used excessive
force against Uyghur protesters, including during the
deadliest violence in the XUAR in five years, which
took place in Kashgar prefecture on July 28, 2014.
Officials characterized the violence as a terrorist
attack that left nearly 100 people dead, but rights
advocates disputed the official portrayal of the
violence.
Domestic and international observers raised
concerns about the Chinese government's lack of
transparency regarding the violent events that took
place in the XUAR, including restrictions on
journalists and social media discussion.
The space for online Uyghur expression
remained limited. A report released by a Uyghur human
rights organization in June 2014 documented a marked
increase in the degree of government- and self-
censorship of Uyghur online expression in the years
since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the
regional capital of Urumqi, when authorities shut down
a number of popular Uyghur-run Web sites and detained
more than 100 Uyghur Web site administrators. According
to research cited by the report, moderators on at least
one Chinese social media site censored a much higher
proportion of postings by users in the XUAR than
postings by users in Beijing municipality.
Research this past year showed an increase in
Uyghurs being prosecuted for ``endangering state
security,'' a category of crimes that officials have
broadly interpreted at times to include peaceful
activism, free expression of ethnic identity, and
independent religious activity. Among those prosecuted
for this category of crimes include the Uyghur
university professor Ilham Tohti, a reportedly peaceful
critic of government policy in the XUAR who also sought
to build a dialogue between Uyghurs and the majority
Han Chinese population. In February 2014, he was
arrested along with four young Uyghurs, Mutellip Imin,
Perhat Halmurat, Shohret Tursun, and Abduqeyum Ablimit,
who had contributed to the Web site Tohti founded,
Uyghur Online. In September 2014, Tohti was convicted
of ``separatism'' and sentenced to life in prison.
Tohti told his lawyers in June 2014 that
detention center authorities had subjected him to
abuse, including denying him food for 10 days and
shackling him for nearly three weeks. One of Tohti's
lawyers, Li Fangping, reported that prosecutors had
failed to provide complete evidence for Tohti's defense
team to review. The law firm of another lawyer, Wang
Yu, withdrew her from the case after receiving pressure
from Beijing officials.
Tohti's wife Guzelnur told Radio Free Asia in
May 2014 that security personnel had placed her and the
couple's two sons under ``heavy surveillance'' at their
Beijing home since Tohti's detention in January 2014,
although they had recently reduced this surveillance.
Guzelnur also said the couple's oldest son was
suffering from heart problems due to the psychological
stress of his father's detention.
Authorities reportedly detained Abduweli Ayup,
Dilyar Obul, and Muhemmet Sidik in August 2013 after
they opened a Uyghur-language kindergarten in Kashgar
city and attempted to open a Uyghur-language school in
Urumqi. The Tianshan District People's Court in Urumqi
city reportedly tried Ayup, Obul, and Sidik on July 11,
2014, and sentenced them on August 21 to prison terms
ranging from one year and six months to two years and
three months on charges of ``illegal fundraising.''
During this reporting year, regional
authorities monitored, controlled, and punished Uyghurs
for peaceful Islamic practices. Civil servants in some
localities were required to sign pledges certifying
that family members would not engage in ``illegal
religious activities,'' with penalties including
restrictions on access to higher education for their
children.
Regional officials reiterated strategies for
economic and political development that prioritize
state economic and political goals over respecting the
rights of XUAR residents, including those outlined in
the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.
As in past reporting years, the Commission
continued to observe job announcements that reserved
positions exclusively for Han Chinese, including civil
servant and private-sector jobs, in contravention of
Chinese labor and anti-discrimination laws. Private and
public employers also continued to reserve more
positions for men, leaving non-Han women to face both
ethnic and gender discrimination in the employment
process.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support efforts to raise greater public awareness
of human rights conditions in the XUAR, as well as
initiatives to protect Uyghur culture, and increase
avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human rights, and
undertake more frequent human rights-focused visits to
the XUAR.
Call on the Chinese government to increase
transparency when reporting instances of violence and
terrorism or the criminal prosecution of defendants in
cases involving violence, separatism, and terrorism,
including by providing data on the exact number of
``endangering state security'' trials concluded every
year, as it did between 2008 and 2012.
Call on the Chinese government to allow domestic
and international journalists and observers greater
freedom to independently verify official media accounts
of violent and terrorist incidents.
Call for the release of Ilham Tohti, Mutellip
Imin, Perhat Halmurat, Shohret Tursun, Abduqeyum
Ablimit, and other Uyghurs who were detained or
imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of
expression.
Object to the detention, arrest, and conviction
of Uyghur educators and language rights advocates like
Abduweli Ayup, Dilyar Obul, and Muhemmet Sidik.
Call on the Chinese government to consult with
non-Han Chinese parents, teachers, and students
regarding what language or languages of instruction
should be used in XUAR schools, from the preschool to
the university level. Call on Chinese officials to
provide parents and students a choice of instruction in
the Uyghur language and other non-Chinese languages
prevalent in the XUAR, as mandated in Article 4 of the
Chinese Constitution and Article 10 of the PRC Regional
Ethnic Autonomy Law. Urge Chinese officials to support
the development of educational materials in the Uyghur
language and in other non-Chinese languages.
Call on the Chinese government to adhere to
domestic laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of
religious belief, as well as international regulations
guaranteeing religious practice free from state
restrictions.
Encourage U.S. companies conducting business or
investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to
promote equal opportunity employment for ethnic
minorities and to support development projects that
incorporate consultation with ethnic minorities
regarding the economic, political, and social impact of
such projects. Encourage U.S. companies investing in
XUAR business opportunities to actively recruit ethnic
minority candidates for employment positions and
implement mechanisms to eliminate hiring and workplace
discrimination, and urge Chinese counterparts to
provide equal opportunity employment to ethnic
minorities.
Tibet
Findings
Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's
representatives and Chinese Communist Party and
government officials has been stalled since the January
2010 ninth round, the longest interval since such
contacts resumed in 2002. The Commission observed no
indication during the 2014 reporting year of official
Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into
account Tibetan concerns regarding the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China.
The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation
reportedly focusing on political and religious issues
declined steeply during the Commission's 2014 reporting
year, and followed an increase in Party and government
security and punitive measures. The Commission has not
observed any sign that Party and government leaders
intend to respond to Tibetan grievances in a
constructive manner or accept any accountability for
Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies. One Sichuan
province county issued provisions in April 2013
(unreported until February 2014) imposing collective
punishment intended to deter Tibetans from self-
immolating.
Pressure on Tibetan Buddhists to accept
Communist Party and government control of the religion
remained high. Party leadership continued to
characterize the Dalai Lama as a threat to Tibetan
Buddhism's ``normal order'' instead of as a principal
teacher, and urged that he be ``separated'' from the
religion and the title ``Dalai Lama.'' State-run media
reported that a deployment of Party cadres to every
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) village, monastery, and
nunnery, completed in March 2012, involved 60,000
cadres--nearly triple the 21,000 initially reported.
Officials detained, imprisoned, or beat to death a
number of monastic leaders, interfered with identifying
a reincarnation, and imposed a ban on travel for
religious purposes to Mount Kailash.
The Commission observed no indication this
past year that Party and government leaders intend to
develop a ``harmonious society'' inclusive of Tibetan
preferences toward their culture and language. The
government asserted that learning and using Tibetan
language is ``protected by law'' but officials closed
non-government-run programs and detained Tibetans who
promoted use of the language. The Party accepted no
accountability for Tibetan grievances contributing to
protests and blamed them on external factors,
especially the Dalai Lama. In September-November 2013,
a prominent example of crackdown developed in one
Tibetan county: as of September 1, 2014, the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database contained
records of 58 detentions related to the crackdown
including 15 resulting in prison sentences of up to 18
years.
The Party and government continued to
prioritize economic development as a prerequisite for
``social stability.'' Authorities reportedly detained
or imprisoned Tibetans who protested against mining
activity, seizure or forced sale of land related to
mining, or development projects that allegedly damaged
the environment. The westward railway segment from
Lhasa city to Rikaze (Shigatse) city reportedly was
``put into use'' in August 2014 and provided the first
extension since the Xining-Lhasa segment of the
Qinghai-Tibet railway opened in 2006. After 2009, TAR
yearbooks ceased to report county-level population
data, hindering demographic analysis.
As of September 1, 2014, the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database contained records of 639
Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed
currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 621 are
records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10,
2008; 44 percent of them are Tibetan Buddhist monks,
nuns, teachers, or trulkus. This past year, officials
detained, imprisoned, or beat to death monastic leaders
including Abbot Gyurme Tsultrim, Abbot Karma Tsewang,
chant master Thardoe Gyaltsen, Geshe Ngawang Jamyang,
and Abbot Khedrub. Officials detained or imprisoned
cultural advocates, including writer Tsultrim Gyaltsen,
singer Gebe, and environmental activists Choekyab and
Tselha. Officials released filmmaker Dondrub Wangchen
upon completion of his sentence in June 2014; as of
September 1, authorities had not permitted him to
travel to the United States for reunification with his
family.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese government to resume contact
with the Dalai Lama or his representatives and engage
in dialogue without preconditions. Such a dialogue
should aim to protect the Tibetan culture, language,
religion, and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and
counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan
provinces. A Chinese government decision to engage in
dialogue can result in a durable and mutually
beneficial outcome for the government and Tibetans that
will benefit local and regional security in coming
decades.
Urge the Chinese government to recognize the role
of government regulatory measures and Party policies in
the wave of Tibetan self-immolations and other
protests. Stress to Chinese officials that
strengthening the measures and policies that Tibetans
resent is unlikely to promote ``social stability'' or a
``harmonious society.'' Urge the government to refrain
from using security and judicial institutions to
intimidate Tibetan communities by prosecuting and
imprisoning Tibetans with alleged links to a self-
immolator or for sharing self-immolation information.
Urge the Chinese government to refrain from using
intrusive management and legal measures to infringe
upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists' right to the
freedom of religion. Urge the government to cease
treating the Dalai Lama as a security threat instead of
as Tibetan Buddhism's principal teacher. Urge the
government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to
identify and educate religious teachers in a manner
consistent with Tibetan Buddhist preferences and
traditions. Stress to Chinese officials that increasing
pressure on Tibetan Buddhists by aggressive use of
regulatory measures, ``patriotic'' and ``legal''
education, and anti-Dalai Lama campaigns is likely to
harm social stability, not protect it.
Request that the Chinese government follow up on
a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government
that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the
Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as
an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his family. Urge the
government to invite a representative of an
international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi
Nyima so that he can express to the representative his
wishes with respect to privacy.
Stress to the Chinese government the importance
of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and
language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant
Tibetan culture by honoring the Chinese Constitution's
reference to the freedoms of speech, association,
assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the
security establishment, courts, and law to infringe
upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights.
Stress the importance of respecting Tibetan wishes to
maintain the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese
languages in teaching modern subjects, and to refrain
from criminalizing Tibetans' passion for their language
and culture.
Encourage the Chinese government to take fully
into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
the government plans infrastructure, natural resource
development, and settlement or resettlement projects in
the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the government to
engage with appropriate experts in assessing the impact
of such projects and in advising the government on the
implementation and progress of such projects. Encourage
the government to report accurately and comprehensively
data on population in Tibetan areas of China.
Continue to stress to the Chinese government the
importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan
protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security
campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the
government to provide complete details about Tibetans
detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-related and
self-immolation-related ``crimes.'' Continue to raise
in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials
the cases of Tibetans who remain imprisoned as
punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights.
Encourage the Chinese government to respect the
right to freedom of movement of Tibetans who travel
domestically, including for the purpose of visiting
Tibetan economic, cultural, and religious centers,
including Lhasa; to provide Tibetans with reasonable
means to apply for and receive documents necessary for
lawful international travel; to respect the right of
Tibetan citizens of China to reenter China after
traveling abroad; and to allow access to the Tibetan
autonomous areas of China to international journalists,
representatives of non-governmental organizations,
representatives of the United Nations, and U.S.
Government officials.
Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
Findings
The Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau confirm
the applicability of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to both territories.
The Basic Law of Hong Kong provides specifically for
universal suffrage, while Macau's does not.
On August 31, 2014, the National People's
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued a decision
on Hong Kong's electoral reform that restricted the
ability of candidates to freely run for Chief Executive
(CE). Pro-democracy advocates criticized the decision
for failing to ensure ``genuine'' democracy, and the 27
pro-democracy Legislative Council (LegCo) members
pledged to veto electoral reform proposals that follow
the decision's framework. The decision followed a five-
month Hong Kong government consultation on electoral
reform in advance of the 2017 CE election and a July
2014 report by the CE to the NPCSC on Hong Kong public
opinion regarding electoral reform. The NPCSC in 2007
ruled that Hong Kong may implement universal suffrage
at the earliest in the 2017 CE election.
Statements by mainland Chinese and Hong Kong
officials raised concerns that the central government
will restrict Hong Kong elections. Some officials and
legal scholars rejected pro-democracy activists and
legislators' proposals to publicly nominate CE
candidates, arguing that only the nominating committee
named in Article 45 of Hong Kong's Basic Law could
nominate candidates. Pro-Beijing legal experts also
said that any candidate for CE must ``love the country
and love Hong Kong'' to be eligible, and that a CE who
``confronts the central government'' would be
unacceptable.
Pro-democracy legislators and activists
continued to press for universal suffrage in electing
the CE and LegCo. In June 2014, nearly 800,000 people
reportedly voted in an online referendum on electoral
reform held by pro-democracy groups. On July 1,
hundreds of thousands of people marched through
downtown Hong Kong to protest the Chinese government's
perceived increasing interference in Hong Kong. The
Occupy Central movement threatened to hold civil
disobedience protests in Hong Kong's financial district
as a last resort if the electoral reform plan presented
by the Hong Kong government did not adhere to Hong
Kong's Basic Law and international standards for free
and fair elections.
Hong Kong journalists and media reported
threats to press freedom from self-censorship, direct
and indirect governmental and economic pressure on
reporting, and violent attacks on journalists.
According to one international media non-
governmental organization, press freedom continued to
deteriorate in Hong Kong in 2013, with Hong Kong's
international ranking dropping to 61 from 58 the year
before.