[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP): THREAT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-68
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Filemon Vela, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Chair (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Alex Manning, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania, and Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
WITNESSES
Panel I
Hon. Trent Franks, A Representative in Congress From the State of
Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Panel II
Mr. Peter Vincent Pry, Congressional EMP Commission,
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, and Executive
Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Michael J. Frankel, Senior Scientist, Penn State University,
Applied Research Laboratory:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Chris Beck, Vice President, Policy and Strategic Initiatives,
The Electric Infrastructure Security Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP): THREAT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
Thursday, May 8, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry
presiding.
Present: Representatives Perry, McCaul (ex officio),
Clarke, and Vela.
Also present: Representative Franks.
Mr. Perry. Ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threats to
critical infrastructure posed by electromagnetic pulse, or EMP.
Before we begin today's hearing, I ask unanimous consent
that Congressman Franks be permitted to participate in today's
hearing, and, without objection, so ordered.
At this time I would like to recognize the Chairman for a
brief set of opening remarks.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Chairman and Mr. Perry for his
leadership in chairing this committee hearing, Ms. Clarke as
well. I just got back from the World War II memorial service. I
spoke, talked about my father, who was a World War II veteran,
bombardier. I mention that not to talk about my dad, but
because this issue really goes back to the advent of the
nuclear age, and it is an issue that the American people really
don't know much about. They are not familiar with this issue.
Some would say it is a low probability, but the damage that
could be caused in the event of an EMP attack both by the sun,
a solar event, or a man-made attack would be catastrophic. We
talk a lot about a nuclear bomb in Manhattan, and we talk about
a cybersecurity threat, the grid, power grid, in the Northeast,
and all these things would actually probably pale in comparison
to the devastation that an EMP attack could perpetrate on
Americans.
We have extraordinary capability in this country to do
great things. We are a responsible Nation with our power and
with our might. But a nation, a rogue nation, with that type of
capability in the wrong hands could be devastating.
Again, I want to commend the Chairman. I want to commend
Congressman Franks for his leadership. I don't think any Member
of Congress knows this issue more than he does, and I know your
testimony in the record will be very valuable as we look at
developing legislation to deal with this very critical and
important issue to our National security.
With that, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I recognize myself at this time for an opening statement.
I would like to thank everyone for attending today.
Chairman Meehan is unable to attend, but as Vice Chairman of
this subcommittee, I am honored and privileged and pleased to
chair this important hearing on the threat and consequences to
our Nation's critical infrastructure from electromagnetic
pulse, EMP.
In 1962, the United States conducted a test named STARFISH
Prime where the military detonated a 1.4-megaton thermonuclear
bomb about 25 miles above Johnston Atoll in the in the Pacific.
In space, six American, British, and Soviet satellites suffered
damage, and 800 miles away in Hawaii, burglar alarms sounded,
street lights blinked out, and phones, radios, and televisions
went dead. While only 1 percent of the existing street lights
were affected, it became clear that electromagnetic pulse, or
EMP, could cause significant damage.
EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that
results from certain types of high-energy explosions or from a
suddenly fluctuating magnetic field. A frightening point is
that EMP can be generated by nuclear weapons, from naturally-
occurring sources such as solar storms, or specialized non-
nuclear EMP weapons.
Nuclear weapon EMPs are most catastrophic when a nuclear
weapon is detonated at a high altitude at approximately 30
kilometers, or 20 miles, above the intended target. The
consequences of such an attack could be catastrophic. All
electronics, I mention all electronics, power systems, and
information systems could be shut down. This could then cascade
into interdependent infrastructure such as water, gas, and
telecommunications. While we understand that this is an extreme
case, we must always be prepared in case a rogue state decides
to utilize this technology.
Now, currently the nations of Russia and China have the
technology to launch an EMP attack, and we have speculated that
Iran and North Korea may be developing EMP weapon technology.
This is why we must remain vigilant in our efforts to mitigate
the effects of an EMP attack.
Since most critical infrastructure, particularly electrical
infrastructure, is in the hands of private owners, the Federal
Government has limited authority to mandate preparedness. While
some people criticize the lack of DHS action on compelling the
private sector to harden their systems against EMP, it is
important to note that DHS has no statutory authority
whatsoever to regulate the electric grid. My hope is that this
hearing will be successful in educating the public on the
threat of EMP and will alleviate some of the fears that people
have on EMP attacks.
I thank the witnesses at this time for their time and look
forward to their testimony.
[The statement of Vice Chairman Perry follows:]
Statement of Vice Chairman Scott Perry
I would like to thank everyone for attending today. Chairman Meehan
is unable to attend but as Vice Chairman of this subcommittee, I am
honored and pleased to chair this important hearing on the threat and
consequences to our Nation's critical infrastructure from
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).
In 1962 the United States conducted a test named STARFISH PRIME,
where the military detonated a 1.4 megaton thermonuclear bomb about 25
miles above Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. In space, six American,
British, and Soviet satellites suffered damage and 800 miles away in
Hawaii, burglar alarms sounded, street lights blinked out, and phones,
radios, and televisions went dead. While only 1% of the existing street
lights were affected, it became clear that electromagnetic pulse, or
EMP, could cause significant damage.
EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results
from certain types of high-energy explosions or from a suddenly
fluctuating magnetic field. A frightening point is that EMP can be
generated by nuclear weapons, from naturally-occurring sources such as
solar storms, or specialized non-nuclear EMP weapons. Nuclear weapon
EMPs are most catastrophic when a nuclear weapon is detonated at high
altitude, at approximately 30 kilometers (20 miles), above the intended
target. The consequences of such an attack could be catastrophic; all
electronics, power systems, and information systems could be shut down.
This could then cascade into interdependent infrastructures such as
water, gas, and telecommunications. While we understand this is an
extreme case, we must always be prepared in case a rouge state decides
to utilize this technology.
Currently, the nations of Russia and China have the technology to
launch an EMP attack, and we have speculated that Iran and North Korea
may be developing EMP weapon technology. This is why we must remain
vigilant in our efforts to mitigate the effects of an EMP attack. Since
most critical infrastructure, particularly electrical infrastructure,
is in the hands of private owners, the Federal Government has limited
authority to mandate preparedness. While some people criticize the lack
of DRS action on compelling the private sector to harden their systems
against EMP, it is important to note that DRS has no statutory
authority whatsoever to regulate the electric grid.
My hope is that this hearing will be successful in educating the
public on the threat of EMP and will alleviate some of the fears that
people have on EMP attacks. I thank the witnesses for their time and
look forward to their testimony.
Mr. Perry. At this time the Chairman now recognizes the
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New
York, Ms. Clarke for a statement she may have.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman, and welcome to
the gavel, and thank you for chairing this hearing on
electromagnetic pulse and the threat to our critical
infrastructure today.
I, too, want to extend a warm welcome in return to our
colleague Congressman Franks to our subcommittee. I believe
that the last time you testified before us was back in 2012.
Congressman Franks and I co-chaired the EMP Caucus here in
Congress. Though we are from different ends of the continent,
we share a concern about the vulnerability and resiliency of
our Nation's critical infrastructure.
I also want to welcome back Dr. Chris Beck, who will appear
on Panel II. He was my past subcommittee director, and it is
good to see.
I am very interested in the testimony today and hoping to
hear about how we can assess the risk of solar geomagnetic
storms and other EMP threats that create vulnerabilities for
our critical infrastructure. Since we know the electric grid is
vulnerable to physical natural threats like heavy weather, EMPs
from solar weather, and malicious cyber threats, it is
important for the subcommittee to have a fuller understanding
of the threats.
As I see it, the main risk from a terrorist attack
succeeding against the electric power industry would be a
widespread power outage that lasted for an extended period of
time. The most critical components of the transmission system
are the high-voltage and extra-high-voltage transformers, or
EHVs, but we must not forget the other major components of the
electric transmission system that are vulnerable to terrorist
attack: The transmission lines, transmission towers, and
control centers.
Utilities rarely experience loss of an individual EHV
transformer, but recovery from such a loss takes months,
especially if no spare is available. Conversely, utilities
regularly experience damage to transmission towers and
substations due to weather and malicious activities and are
able to recover from this damage fairly rapidly.
Experts generally agree that a failure, for whatever
reason, involving several key EHV transformers could cause
blackouts lasting weeks and deteriorated service for an area
that could last months, and that the economic consequences of
such an attack would likely be large.
We also know that public-private partnerships are the
keystone to solving this challenge, especially because the
large majority of our electric grid is privately held by
investor-owned utilities, or they are part of the rural
electric cooperatives network, utilities owned by their member
customers in 47 States, or the public power municipal
utilities.
The Electric Power Research Institute, or EPRI, an
industry-funded energy research consortium, is also addressing
high-voltage transformer vulnerabilities, and in cooperation
with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, EPRI
has been developing conceptual designs for recovery
transformers which would enable rapid temporary replacement of
damaged high-voltage transformers. High-voltage and extra-high-
voltage transformers are very large, extremely difficult to
transport, and, until 2009, primarily manufactured overseas,
complicating rapid recovery and restoration efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security has a variety of
efforts for EMP and all-hazards risks including research on
technologies to improve resiliency in the electric grid
corridor. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate has co-
sponsored with private utilities an exercise and a fast
turnaround transformer replacement project. This effort is
known as the Recovery Transformer Project, or RecX, and it
hopes to increase the resiliency of the transmission power grid
through the use of more mobile and modular transformers.
This applied research effort has developed a prototype EHV
transformer that can quickly be deployed to a site via a series
of large trucks and trailers and then installed, assembled, and
energized rapidly. The prototype RecX was demonstrated last
year and installed in the grid at a host utility, and it is
currently undergoing a 1-year observational period to verify
its performance.
However, within DHS, identifying specific EMP-threat-
related programs in their budgets is difficult because EMP-
specific preparedness and response is not the primary purpose
of most programs generally characterized as all-hazards
threats. Some see this as a problem; however, under the current
sequester budgetary constraints, funding sources for mitigation
and response preparedness for low-probability risk compete
directly with today's on-the-ground first-responder needs.
Unfortunately EMP events of all sorts have become the
darling of the internet and late-night talk radio, forecasting
``the end of civilization as we know it'' conditions. They
include all kinds of lurid descriptions of hypothetical
catastrophic social events that will, without any doubt in
their minds, occur when an EMP event happens, according to
these soothsayers. It can be disturbing.
EMP-related events have even been popularized in
melodramatic TV shows. Books of science fiction have
popularized EMP end-of-day scenarios; and, of course, the
internet has innumerable EMP sites that tout the devastation to
come.
Since I have been on this committee, I and others have been
careful not to use our positions of influence to promote fear
in the public. While the threat of an EMP event is real, I
believe we need to use scientific, risk-based, and, frankly,
common-sense plans and exercises to give us a clearer picture
of how to prevent and respond in the event of an EMP incident.
More complete understanding of preparedness, response, and
recovery activities related to any type of EMP incident could
provide a thoughtful background that can assist the Nation's
resiliency if high-impact EMP events do occur.
I look forward to the testimony today, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
May 8, 2014
I'm very interested in the testimony today, and hoping to hear
about how we can assess the risk of solar geomagnetic storms and other
EMP threats that create vulnerabilities for our critical
infrastructure.
Since we know the electric grid is vulnerable to physical natural
threats like heavy weather, EMPs from solar weather, and malicious
cyber threats, it is important for the subcommittee to have a fuller
understanding of the threats.
As I see it, the main risk from a terrorist attack succeeding
against the electric power industry would be a widespread power outage
that lasted for an extended period of time.
The most critical components of the transmission system are the
High-Voltage and Extra-High-Voltage transformers, or EHVs. But we must
not forget the other major components of the electric transmission
system that are vulnerable to terrorist attack--the transmission lines,
transmission towers, and control centers.
Utilities rarely experience loss of an individual EHV transformer,
but recovery from such a loss takes months, especially if no spare is
available.
Conversely, utilities regularly experience damage to transmission
towers and substations due to both weather and malicious activities,
and are able to recover from this damage fairly rapidly.
Experts generally agree that a failure, for whatever reason,
involving several key EHV transformers, could cause blackouts lasting
weeks and deteriorated service for an area that could last months, and
that the economic consequences of such an attack would likely be large.
We also know that public/private partnerships are the keystone to
solving this challenge, especially because the large majority of our
electric grid is privately held by investor-owned utilities, or they
are part of the Rural Electric Cooperatives network, utilities owned by
their member-customers in 47 States, or the Public Power municipal
utilities.
The Electric Power Research Institute, or EPRI, an industry-funded
energy research consortium, is also addressing High-Voltage transformer
vulnerabilities, and in cooperation with the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, EPRI has been developing conceptual designs
for ``recovery transformers'' which would enable rapid temporary
replacement of damaged High-Voltage transformers.
High-Voltage and Extra-High-Voltage transformers are very large,
extremely difficult to transport, and until 2009 primarily manufactured
overseas, complicating rapid recovery and restoration efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security has a variety of efforts for
EMP and ``all-hazards risks'', including research on technologies to
improve resiliency in the electric grid sector.
The DHS Science & Technology Directorate has co-sponsored with
private utilities an exercise in a fast turnaround transformer
replacement project.
This effort is known as the Recovery Transformer Project, or RecX,
and it hopes to increase the resiliency of the transmission power grid
through the use of more mobile and modular transformers.
This applied research effort has developed a prototype EHV
transformer that can quickly be deployed to a site via a series of
large trucks and trailers, and then installed, assembled, and energized
rapidly.
The prototype RecX was demonstrated last year, and installed in the
grid at a host utility, and it is currently undergoing a 1-year
observational period to verify its performance.
However, within DHS, identifying specific EMP threat-related
programs and their budgets is difficult, because EMP-specific
preparedness and response is not the primary purpose of most programs
generally characterized as ``all-hazards threats.'' Some see this as a
problem.
However, under the current sequester budgetary constraints, funding
sources for mitigation and response preparedness for low probability
risks, compete directly with today's on-the-ground first responder
needs.
Unfortunately, EMP events of all sorts have become the darling of
the internet and late-night talk radio forecasting ``end of
civilization as we know it'' conditions.
They include all kinds of lurid descriptions of hypothetical
catastrophic social events that will, without any doubt in their minds,
occur when an EMP event happens, according to these soothsayers.
It can be disturbing. EMP related events have even been popularized
in melodramatic TV shows. Books of science fiction have popularized EMP
end-of-days scenarios, and of course, the internet has innumerable EMP
sites that tout the devastation to come.
Since I have been on this committee, I, and others, have been
careful not to use our positions of influence to promote fear in the
public.
While the threat of an EMP event is real, I believe we need to use
scientific, risk-based, and frankly, common-sense plans and exercises
to give us a clearer picture of how to prevent and respond in the event
of an EMP incident.
A more complete understanding of preparedness, response, and
recovery activities related to any type of EMP incident, could provide
a thoughtful background that can assist the Nation's resiliency, if
high-impact EMP events do occur.
Mr. Perry. The Vice Chairman thanks the Ranking Member.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
Scientists tell us that it is likely that a powerful geomagnetic
solar storm, capable of affecting parts of the U.S. and Canadian
electrical grid could occur. When it will occur, we are not quite sure.
What we do know is that last year, 2013 was forecasted as the next
period of elevated solar activity, known as ``solar maximum'', and we
are in a high-activity part of a cyclical process.
The popularity of an EMP event occurring in the United States has
taken on the dimensions of a doomsday--end of civilization as we know
it--scenario, and it includes all sorts of catastrophic events
surrounding possible solar storms, and other kinds of EMP attacks.
These stories are rampant throughout current media--fiction books
have been popularized about it, the internet has innumerable sites that
tout the devastation to come, and it is the subject of late-night talk
radio regularly.
Since I have been on this committee, I have urged my colleagues not
to use our positions of influence to promote fear in the public.
While the threat of an EMP event is real, I believe we need to use
common-sense, risk-based scenarios and exercises to give us a picture
of how to prevent or respond to an EMP event.
Many blame the current administration for their frustrations about
EMP. However, no one from the Federal Government is here today to
testify about the issue.
Today, we will not hear from Government specialists and experts
from the Department of Energy or Homeland Security on this issue.
It is the responsibility of this committee to know the probability
of such an event, and the likelihood and severity of the effects on the
electric grid and other critical infrastructure.
What's important to me is that in this time of increasingly tight
budgets, and the current sequester budget for homeland security, we
must depend on sophisticated risk analysis to guide us in making the
tough decisions about our spending priorities.
Furthermore, we need to explore how we can leverage this risk
analysis to sensibly prioritize our spending and especially make use of
the existing public/private partnerships to deal with such a threat.
Mr. Perry. We are pleased to have two distinguished panels
of witness before us today on this important topic. The
Honorable Trent Franks represents Arizona's Eighth
Congressional District, serving in Congress since 2003. Prior
to coming to Washington, Representative Franks was president of
Liberty Petroleum Corporation, a small oil exploration company
established in 1996. He had previously held positions in the
Arizona State Legislature and in the Governor's Office for
Children.
Since coming to Congress, Representative Franks has been an
advocate for robust preparation against a potential EMP event,
natural or man-made. He launched the Congressional EMP Caucus
and has pushed for passage of the Secure High-Voltage
Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act, or the
SHIELD Act.
Thanks for being here. Your full written statement will
appear in the record. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Franks
for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT FRANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA
Mr. Franks. Good afternoon, Chairman Perry, and Ranking
Member Clarke, and fellow distinguished Members on the
committee. I believe the subject of this hearing today is one
of profound implication and importance to our country, and I am
very grateful to you for allowing me to testify.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, America is so
reliant on our electric grid that we specifically consider it,
``critical infrastructure.'' With each passing year our society
becomes increasingly dependent on technology and an abundant
supply of electricity. Our household appliances, food-
distribution systems, telephone and computer networks, our
communication devices, water and sewage plants would all grind
to a halt without electric power.
At the same time, the use of modern computerized control
systems along with the increased size and integration of our
grid has made it far more vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse
or geomagnetic disturbance than ever before. Consequently,
nearly every single facet of modern human life in America is
now susceptible to being crippled by a major natural or man-
made EMP event, and nearly every space, weather, and EMP expert
recognizes the dramatic disruptions and cataclysmic collapses
these pulses can potentially bring to electric grids.
In 2004 and 2008, the EMP Commission, which some of the
members of that will be here today, testified before those of
us on the Armed Services Committee that the U.S. society and
economy are so critically dependent upon the availability of
electricity that a significant collapse of the grid
precipitated by a major natural or man-made event, EMP or
otherwise, could result in catastrophic civilian casualties.
Let me say that again. Could result in catastrophic civilian
casualties. That conclusion is echoed by separate reports
recently compiled by the Department of Defense, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Energy, the National Academy
of Sciences, along with various other Government agencies and
independent researchers.
We now have 11 Governmental agencies' studies on the severe
threat and vulnerabilities we face from EMP and GMD, all of
which came to very similar conclusions. In fact, you should
have in front of you booklets both from the Center for Security
Policy and the Heritage Foundation that give some insight into
some of these studies.
We as a Nation have spent billions of dollars over several
decades hardening our nuclear triad, our missile defense
capabilities, and numerous other critical elements of our
National security apparatus against the effects of
electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of electromagnetic
pulse that might be deliberately generated against us by an
enemy; however, our civilian grid upon which the Department of
Defense relies upon for nearly 99 percent of its electricity
needs, is completely vulnerable to the same kind of danger. Mr.
Chairman, our enemies are actually and acutely aware of that
vulnerability, and it constitutes, in my opinion, an invitation
to them to use the asymmetric capacity of an EMP weapon against
us should they choose to do so.
To address this National security threat, Chairman Pete
Sessions and I have introduced the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act, H.R. 3410, which is now before your committee,
and we would like to specifically thank Ranking Member Yvette
Clarke for co-sponsoring this critical legislation. H.R. 3410
enhances the Department of Homeland Security's threat
assessments for geomagnetic disturbances and electromagnetic
pulse blackouts, which will enable practical steps to protect
the electric grid that serves our Nation. This legislation will
also help the United States prepare for such an event by
including potential large-scale extended blackouts into
existing National planning scenarios. It allows us to plan for
protecting and recovering the electric grid and other critical
infrastructure from an EMP event. Perhaps most importantly, Mr.
Chairman, it advances an awareness program to educate and, I
hope, motivate all of us inside and outside of Government to
proactively protect against this potentially devastating danger
to our country.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me suggest to you all that
there is a moment in the life of nearly every problem when it
is big enough to be seen and still small enough to be
addressed. I believe we now live in that moment as it relates
to the threat of natural or weaponized EMP.
The challenge to ultimately and comprehensively protect our
people and Nation from all of the various perils of natural or
man-made EMP will be long and lingering, but the time to
protect our Nation from the most devastating scenario is now.
The threat is real, and the implications are profoundly
sobering. Your actions today to protect America may gain you no
fame or fanfare in the annals of history; however, it may
happen in your lifetime that a natural or man-made EMP event so
big has an effect so small that no one but a few will recognize
the disaster that was averted, and for the sake of our children
and future generations, I pray it happens exactly that way.
I thank you, and God bless you all.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Franks follows:]
Statement of Hon. Trent Franks
Good afternoon Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Clarke, and fellow
distinguished Members on the committee. I believe the subject of this
hearing is one of profound implication and importance and consequently
I am grateful to you all for allowing me to testify here today.
With each passing year, our society becomes increasingly dependent
on technology and an abundant supply of electricity. Our entire
American way of life relies upon electrical power and technology. Our
household appliances, food-distribution systems, telephone and computer
networks, communication devices, water and sewage plants would grind to
a halt without it. Nearly every single facet of modern human life in
America is susceptible to being crippled by a major Electromagnetic
Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance event. We are so reliant on our
electric power grid that we specifically consider it ``critical
infrastructure''.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, it strikes at my very
core when I think of the men, women, and children in cities and rural
towns across America with a possibility of no access to food, water, or
transportation. In a matter of weeks or months at most, a worst-case
scenario could bring devastation beyond imagination.
The effects of geomagnetic storms and electromagnetic pulses on
electric infrastructure are well-documented, with nearly every space,
weather, and EMP expert recognizing the dramatic disruptions and
cataclysmic collapses these pulses can bring to electric grids. In
2008, the EMP Commission testified before The Armed Services Committee,
of which I am a member, that the U.S. society and economy are so
critically dependent upon the availability of electricity that a
significant collapse of the grid, precipitated by a major natural or
man-made EMP event, could result in catastrophic civilian casualties.
This conclusion is echoed by separate reports recently compiled by the
DOD, DHS, DOE, NAS, along with various other Government agencies and
independent researchers. All came to very similar conclusions. We now
have 11 Government studies on the severe threat and vulnerabilities we
face from EMP and GMD.
recent events
Mr. Chairman, as you can see, we have known the potentially
devastating effects of sufficiently intense electromagnetic pulse on
the electronic systems and its risk to our National security. More
troubling, our enemies know.
More than a year ago, an unknown number of shooters with AK-47s
knocked out 17 large transformers during a highly-choreographed assault
on the PG&E Metcalf Transmission Substation in California. While the
power company was able to avoid blackouts, the damage to the facility
took nearly 4 weeks to repair.
This is not an isolated incident and world-wide adversaries are
taking notice in the vulnerability of our grid. Just last month,
Connecticut officials released a report discussing their efforts to
protect utility and distribution companies because hackers and cyber
attackers around the world have made attempts to penetrate their
systems.
the threats
We as a Nation have spent billions of dollars over the years
hardening our nuclear triad, our missile-defense capabilities, and
numerous other critical elements of our National security apparatus
against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of
electromagnetic pulse that might be generated against us by an enemy.
However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon
for nearly 99% of its electricity needs, is completely vulnerable to
the same kind of danger. This constitutes an invitation on the part of
certain enemies of the United States to use the asymmetric capability
of an EMP weapon against us.
We also face the threat of a natural EMP event. Since the last
occurrence of a major geomagnetic storm in 1921, the Nation's high-
voltage and extra-high-voltage systems have increased in size more than
ten-fold. We are currently entering an interval of increased solar
activity and are likely to encounter an increasing number of
geomagnetic events on earth.
legislation
To this end, I introduced The Critical Infrastructure Protection
Act, H.R. 3410, which currently lays before your committee. I'd like to
thank Ranking Member Clarke, and my EMP Caucus co-chair for
cosponsoring this critical legislation. H.R. 3410 enhances the
Department of Homeland Security's threat assessments for geomagnetic
disturbances and electromagnetic pulse blackouts which will enable
practical steps to protect the electric grid that serves our Nation.
This legislation will also help the United States prepare for such an
event by implementing large-scale blackouts into existing National
planning scenarios. It allows us to plan for protecting and recovering
the electric grid and other critical infrastructure from an EMP event.
In addition, it advances an educational awareness program to protect
critical infrastructure and constructs a campaign to proactively
educate emergency planners and emergency responders at all levels of
government.
summary
Mr. Chairman, the challenge to ultimately and fully protect our
people and Nation from all of the various perils of natural or man-made
electromagnetic pulse will be long and lingering. But the time to
protect our Nation from the most devastating scenario is now; the
threat is real, and the implications are sobering.
Your actions today to protect America may gain you no fame or
fanfare in the annals of history. However, it may happen in your
lifetime that a natural or man-made EMP event so big has an effect so
small that no one but a few will recognize the disaster that was
averted. For the sake of our children and future generations, I pray it
happens exactly that way.
Thank you and God bless all of you. Thank you and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman thanks Representative Franks and
welcomes you to the dais at this time.
Mr. Franks. Were there any questions, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Perry. Are there any questions, Ms. Clarke? We don't
have any questions at this point.
Mr. Franks. I would then also refer you once again to the
materials that we brought to the committee.
Mr. Perry. Absolutely. If the other panel will be seated.
While they are doing so, I ask unanimous consent to enter into
the record a statement by Rules Committee Chairman Pete
Sessions, who wanted to attend this hearing today, but was
delayed on the floor. Without objection.
[The statement of Mr. Sessions follows:]
Statement of Hon. Pete Sessions
Last month's anniversary of the attacks on the Metcalf Power
Station remind us that attacks on key elements of the Nation's bulk
power distribution system--popularly known as the ``electric grid''--
have exposed a serious lack of resiliency in this critical
infrastructure. We are on notice that, if as a result, the power was to
be disrupted for protracted periods; the consequences could be nothing
short of catastrophic.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the subcommittee for holding this
hearing to address what is arguably the most serious of the threats to
the grid: The possibility that a single nuclear weapon detonated in
space high over this country could unleash intense electromagnetic
pulses (EMP), disrupting for many months--if not indefinitely--the
supply of power to large area.
Until recently, information about EMP was Classified and many of us
have little knowledge of the serious danger such threats represents to
everything we hold dear.
Unfortunately, even if those who wish to do this country harm know
about our grid's vulnerability to EMP choose not to exploit it, the
bulk power distribution system will be subjected to effects similar to
what are known as the E-3 pulses caused by nuclear detonations in
space.
Roughly every 150 years, the sun emits in the earth's direction an
intense coronal mass ejection, or solar flare, that can severely damage
or destroy unprotected electronic devices and electric systems. Such
solar storms are known as ``Carrington Events,'' named for the
scientist who first identified the phenomenon when it last occurred in
1859--155 years ago.
Whatever its source, the consequences of such electromagnetic
pulses could be devastating for many millions of people who would be
left without access to potable water, food, bank accounts, medications,
communications, transportation, and many other important
electronically-based activities--possibly for the indefinite future.
Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Threat Commission,
believes that, if the power goes out and stays out for even 1 year's
time, as many as 9 out of 10 of us would perish.
Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, we need not face such a horrific
prospect. We know how to protect electrical and electronic devices from
the effects of EMP. In fact, the Department of Defense has been doing
it with respect to the military's nuclear deterrent and command-and-
control systems for over 50 years.
There are, in short, proven and easily implementable techniques
that can now be applied to ensure the resilience ofthe U.S. electric
grid and the things that depend upon it in 21st Century America--which
is just about everything.
A first step towards such corrective action would be for the
adoption ofthe Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA), H.R.
3410. It will require the Department of Homeland Security to make EMP
one of its National planning scenarios. This legislation represents the
first step toward raising awareness about the gravity of the threats to
our grid and the other critical infrastructures that depend upon it.
I commend the subcommittee for focusing on this potentially
existential danger and urge your Members to give early and favorable
consideration to the CIPA.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, gentlemen. I will start with
introductions.
Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is the executive director of the Task
Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional
advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United
States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is
also the director of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum,
an advisory body to Congress on policies to counter weapons of
mass destruction. Dr. Pry has served on the staffs of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an
EMP Attack, the House Armed Services Committee, as an
intelligence officer with the CIA, and as a verification
analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Dr. Michael Frankel is a senior scientist at the Penn
State--and I must pause for a moment. We are, just in case you
are wondering who I am, where I went to school--at the Penn
State University Applied Physics Laboratory, and one of the
Nation's leading experts on the effects of nuclear weapons.
Formerly he served as the executive director of the
Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from
EMP, and as the chief science officer for L-3 Communications.
In prior Government service, Dr. Frankel served various
National security capacities, including with the Office of
Advanced Energetics and Nuclear Weapons at the Department of
Defense, the Nuclear Phenomenology Division at the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, and as a research physicist at the
Naval Surface Weapons Center. Also known for his expertise in
directed energy and advanced energetic materials, he has made
seminal contributions to key strategic defense programs and has
been active in international scientific exchanges.
Dr. Chris Beck is the vice president for policy and
strategic initiatives for the Electric Infrastructure Security
Council. Dr. Beck is a technical and policy expert in several
homeland security and National defense-related areas, including
critical infrastructure protection, science and technology
development, WMD prevention and protection, and emerging threat
identification. Dr. Beck served on the staff of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, as well as a staffer for
Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez. Before Government service, Dr.
Beck was a post-doctoral fellow and adjunct professor at
Northeastern University.
Thank you all for being here. The full written statements
of witnesses will appear in the record, and at this time the
Chairman recognizes Dr. Pry for 5 minutes for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT PRY, CONGRESSIONAL EMP COMMISSION,
CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION, AND EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL AND HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pry. Thank you for this opportunity to testify at your
hearing on the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse to
critical infrastructure.
Natural EMP from a geomagnetic super-storm like the 1859
Carrington Event or the 1921 Railroad Storm, a nuclear EMP
attack from terrorists or rogue states as practiced by North
Korea during the nuclear crisis of 2013 are both existential
threats that could kill 9 of 10 Americans through starvation,
disease, and societal collapse.
A natural EMP catastrophe or nuclear EMP attack could black
out the National electric grid for months or years and collapse
all the other critical infrastructures, communications,
transportation, banking and finance, food and water, necessary
to sustain modern society and the lives of 310 million
Americans.
Passage of the SHIELD Act to protect the National electric
grid is urgently necessary. In 2010, after the House
unanimously passed the GRID Act, if one Senator had not put a
hold on the bill, today in 2014 the Nation would already be
protected since it would take about 3\1/2\ years to harden the
grid. Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act,
H.R. 3410, to create a new National planning scenario focused
on EMP is urgently necessary. As the National planning
scenarios are the basis for all Federal, State, and local
emergency planning, training, and resource allocation, an EMP
National planning scenario would immediately and significantly
improve National preparedness for an EMP catastrophe.
The single most important thing Congress could do to
protect the American people from EMP and from all the other
threats to critical infrastructures is pass the Critical
Infrastructure Protect Act, which bill is soon or will be
before this committee for consideration.
Thousands of emergency planners and first responders at the
Federal, State, and local level want to protect our Nation and
their States and communities from the EMP threat, but they are
seriously hindered and even prohibited from doing so because
the EMP threat is not among the 15 canonical National planning
scenarios utilized by the Department of Homeland Security.
Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would
immediately mobilize thousands of emergency planners and first
responders at all levels of government and educate millions of
others about the EMP threat and how to prepare for it.
Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would
immediately help States that are frustrated with the lack of
action on EMP in Washington and are trying to launch
initiatives protecting their electrical grids from EMP, as is
being attempted now in Maine, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Florida.
Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would
educate all States about the EMP threat and help them protect
their critical infrastructures. For example, projects in New
York and Massachusetts to harden their State grids against
severe weather caused by climate change should include
protection against an EMP event, which is the worst threat to
the grid. If the grid is protected against EMP, it will
mitigate all lesser threats, including cyber attack, sabotage,
and severe weather.
Given the amounts of money being spent in New York and
Massachusetts on grid hardening against severe weather,
significant EMP protection can probably be accomplished now
within their current budgets, but the cost of EMP protection
will increase significantly if they delay and attempt
remediation later.
EMP is a clear and present danger. A Carrington-class
coronal mass ejection narrowly missed the earth in July 2012.
Last April, during the nuclear crisis with North Korea over Kim
Jong-Un's threatened nuclear strikes against the United States,
Pyongyang apparently practiced an EMP attack with its KSM-3
satellite that passed over the U.S. heartland and over the
Washington, D.C.-New York City corridor. Iran, estimated to be
within 2 months of nuclear weapons by the administration, has a
demonstrated capability to launch an EMP attack from a vessel
at sea. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy commenced patrols
off the East Coast of the United States in February.
Thank you for your attention to EMP, which is the least
understood but gravest threat to our society. This concludes my
remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Vincent Pry
May 8, 2014
Thank you for this opportunity to testify at your hearing on the
threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to critical infrastructure.
Natural EMP from a geomagnetic super-storm, like the 1859
Carrington Event or 1921 Railroad Storm, and nuclear EMP attack from
terrorists or rogue states, as practiced by North Korea during the
nuclear crisis of 2013, are both existential threats that could kill 9
of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal collapse.
A natural EMP catastrophe or nuclear EMP attack could blackout the
National electric grid for months or years and collapse all the other
critical infrastructures--communications, transportation, banking and
finance, food and water--necessary to sustain modern society and the
lives of 310 million Americans.
Passage of the SHIELD Act to protect the National electric grid is
urgently necessary. In 2010, after the House unanimously passed the
GRID Act, if one Senator had not put a hold on the bill, today in 2014
the Nation would already be protected, since it would take about 3.5
years to harden the grid.
Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA) to
create a new National Planning Scenario focused on EMP is urgently
necessary. As the National Planning Scenarios are the basis for all
Federal, State, and local emergency planning, training, and resource
allocation, an EMP National Planning Scenario would immediately and
significantly improve National preparedness for an EMP catastrophe.
The single most important thing Congress could do to protect the
American people from EMP, and from all other threats to critical
infrastructures, is pass the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act,
which bill is or soon will be before this committee for consideration.
Thousands of emergency planners and first responders at the
Federal, State, and local level want to protect our Nation and their
States and communities from the EMP threat. But they are seriously
hindered and even prohibited from doing so because the EMP threat is
not among the 15 canonical National Planning Scenarios utilized by the
Department of Homeland Security.
Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would
immediately mobilize thousands of emergency planners and first
responders at all levels of government, and educate millions of others,
about the EMP threat and how to prepare for it.
Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would
immediately help States that are frustrated with lack of action on EMP
in Washington, and are trying to launch initiatives protecting their
electrical grids from EMP, as is being attempted now in Maine,
Virginia, Oklahoma, and Florida. Passage of the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act would educate all States about the EMP threat and help
them protect their critical infrastructures.
For example, projects in New York and Massachusetts to harden their
State grids against severe weather caused by climate change should
include protection against an EMP event, which is the worst threat to
the grid. If the grid is protected against EMP, it will mitigate all
lesser threats, including cyber attack, sabotage, and severe weather.
Given the amounts of money being spent in New York and
Massachusetts on grid hardening against severe weather, significant EMP
protection can probably be accomplished now within their current
budgets. But the cost of EMP protection will increase significantly if
they delay and attempt remediation later.
EMP is a clear and present danger. A Carrington-class coronal mass
ejection narrowly missed the Earth in July 2012. Last April, during the
nuclear crisis with North Korea over Kim Jong-Un's threatened nuclear
strikes against the United States, Pyongyang apparently practiced an
EMP attack with its KSM-3 satellite, that passed over the U.S.
heartland and over the Washington, D.C.-New York City corridor. Iran,
estimated to be within 2 months of nuclear weapons by the
administration, has a demonstrated capability to launch an EMP attack
from a vessel at sea. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy commenced
patrols off the East Coast of the United States in February.
Thank you for your attention to EMP, which is the least understood
but gravest threat to our society. This concludes my remarks.
Attachment
what is emp?
Nuclear, Natural, and Non-Nuclear EMP
An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a super-energetic radio wave that
can destroy, damage, or cause the malfunction of electronic systems by
overloading their circuits. EMP is harmless to people biologically,
passing through their bodies without injury, like a radio wave. But by
damaging electronic systems that make modern society possible, that
enable computers to function and airliners to fly for example, EMP can
cause mass destruction of property and life.
A single nuclear weapon detonated at high altitude will generate an
electromagnetic pulse that can cause catastrophic damage across the
entire contiguous United States to the critical infrastructures--
electric power, telecommunications, transportation, banking and
finance, food and water--that sustain modern civilization and the lives
of 310 million Americans. Nature can also generate an EMP causing
similarly catastrophic consequences across the entire contiguous United
States--or even across the entire planet--by means of a solar flare
from the Sun that causes on Earth a great geomagnetic storm. Non-
nuclear weapons, often referred to as radio frequency weapons, can also
generate an EMP, much more limited in range than a nuclear weapon, that
can damage electronics, and could cause the collapse of critical
infrastructures locally, perhaps with cascading effects over an area as
large as a major city.
nuclear emp
Any nuclear warhead detonated at high altitude, 30 kilometers or
more above the Earth's surface, will generate an electromagnetic pulse.
The immediate effects of EMP are disruption of, and damage to,
electronic systems and electrical infrastructure. EMP is not reported
in the scientific literature to have direct harmful effects on people.
Because an EMP attack would detonate a nuclear warhead at high-
altitude, no other nuclear effects--such as blast, thermal radiation,
or radioactive fallout--would be experienced by people on the ground or
flying through the atmosphere. However, because modern civilization and
life itself now depends upon electricity and electronics, an EMP attack
is a high-tech means of killing millions of people the old-fashioned
way--through starvation, disease, and societal collapse.
Gamma rays, and the fireball from a high-altitude nuclear
detonation, interact with the atmosphere to produce a super-energetic
radio wave--the EMP--that covers everything within line-of-sight from
the explosion to the Earth's horizon. Thus, even a relatively low-
altitude EMP attack, where the nuclear warhead is detonated at an
altitude of 30 kilometers, will generate a damaging EMP field over a
vast area, covering a region equivalent to New England, all of New
York, and half of Pennsylvania. A nuclear weapon detonated at an
altitude of 400 kilometers over the center of the United States would
place an EMP field over the entire contiguous United States and parts
of Canada and Mexico.
The EMP generated by a nuclear weapon has three components,
designated by the U.S. scientific-technical community E1, E2, and E3.
E1 is caused by gamma rays, emitted by the nuclear warhead, that
knocks electrons off of molecules in the upper atmosphere, causing the
electrons to rotate rapidly around the lines of the Earth's magnetic
field, a phenomenon termed the Compton Effect. The E1 component of
nuclear EMP is a shockwave, transmitting thousands of volts of energy
in mere nanoseconds of time, and having a high-frequency (short)
wavelength that can couple directly into small objects, like personal
computers, automobiles, and transformers. E1 is unique to nuclear
weapons and is too fast and too energetic to be arrested by protective
devices used for lightning.
The E2 component of a nuclear EMP is comparable to lightning in its
energetic content and medium (milliseconds) frequency and wavelength.
Protective devices used for lightning are effective against E2.
E3 is caused by the fireball of a nuclear explosion, the expanding
and then collapsing fireball causing the Earth's magnetic field to
oscillate, generating electric currents in the very large objects that
can couple into the low frequency, long (seconds) wavelength part of
the EMP that is E3. The E3 waveform can couple directly only into
objects having at least one dimension of great length. Electric power
and telecommunications lines, that run for kilometers in many
directions, are ideally suited for receiving E3. Although E3 compared
to E1 appears to deliver little energy, just volts per meter, this is
multiplied manifold by power and telecommunications lines that are
typically many kilometers long, building up E3 currents that can melt
Extremely High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, typically designed to handle
750,000 volts. Small electronics can also be destroyed by E3 if they
are connected in any way to an E3 receiver--like a personal computer
plugged into an electric outlet, which of course is connected to power
lines that are ideal E3 receivers, or like the electronic servo-
mechanisms that operate the controls of large passenger airliners, that
can receive E3 through the metal skin of the aircraft wings and body.
Protective devices used for lightning are not effective against E3,
that can build up energy sufficient to overwhelm lightning arrestors
and bypass them through electrical arcing.
EMP and its effects were observed during the U.S. and Soviet
atmospheric test programs in 1962. The 1962 U.S. STARFISH nuclear
detonation--not designed or intended as an EMP generator--at an
altitude of about 400 kilometers above Johnston Island in the Pacific
Ocean, surprised the U.S. scientific community by producing EMP. Some
electronic systems in the Hawaiian Islands, 1,400 kilometers distant,
were affected, causing the failure of street lights, tripping circuit
breakers, triggering burglar alarms, and damage to telecommunications.
In their testing that year, the Soviets executed a series of nuclear
detonations in which they exploded 300 kiloton weapons at approximately
300, 150, and 60 kilometers above their test site in South Central
Asia. They report that on each shot they observed damage to overhead
and underground buried cables at distances of 600 kilometers. They also
observed surge arrestor burnout, spark-gap breakdown, blown fuses, and
power supply breakdowns.
In the years since 1962, the U.S. scientific and defense community
established incontrovertibly, by means of nuclear tests and EMP
simulators, that an EMP attack could have catastrophic effects by
destroying electronic systems over broad regions--potentially over the
entire contiguous United States.
Because so much information about EMP was largely Classified for so
long, myths abound about EMP, that the EMP Commission has endeavored to
correct in its Unclassified reports and briefings. For example, a high-
yield nuclear weapon is not necessary to make an EMP attack. Although a
high-yield weapon will generally make a more powerful EMP field than a
low-yield nuclear weapon, ALL nuclear weapons produce gamma rays and
EMP. The EMP Commission found, by testing modern electronics in
simulators, that ANY nuclear weapon can potentially make a catastrophic
EMP attack on the United States. Even a very low-yield nuclear weapon--
like a 1-kiloton nuclear artillery shell--will produce enough EMP to
pose a catastrophic threat. This is so in part because the U.S.
electric grid is so aged and overburdened, and because the high-tech
electronics that support the electric grid and other critical
infrastructures are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than
the electronics of the 1960s.
The EMP Commission also found that, contrary to the claim that
high-yield nuclear weapons are necessary for an EMP attack, that very
low-yield nuclear weapons of special design can produce significantly
more EMP than high-yield nuclear weapons. The EMP Commission found
further that Russia, probably China, and possibly North Korea are
already in possession of such weapons. Russian military writings call
these ``Super-EMP'' nuclear weapons, and credibly claim that they can
generate 200 kilovolts per meter--many times the 30 KVs/meter
attributed to a high-yield (20 megaton) nuclear weapon of normal
design. Yet a Super-EMP warhead can have a tiny explosive yield,
perhaps only 1 kiloton, because it is specially designed to produce
primarily gamma rays that generate the E1 electromagnetic shockwave
component of the EMP effect. Super-EMP weapons are specialized to
generate an overwhelming E1, and produce no E2 or E3 but do not need
to, as their E1 is so potent.
In 2004, credible Russian sources warned the EMP Commission that
design information and ``brain drain'' from Russia had transferred to
North Korea the capability to build a Super-EMP nuclear weapon ``within
a few years.'' In 2006 and again in 2008, North Korea tested a nuclear
device of very low yield, 1-3 kilotons, and declared these tests
successful. South Korean military intelligence, in open-source
reporting, independently corroborates the Russian warning that North
Korea is developing a Super-EMP nuclear warhead. North Korea's
proclivity to sell anything to anyone, including missiles and nuclear
technology to fellow rogue nations Iran and Syria, makes Pyongyang's
possession of Super-EMP nuclear weapons especially worrisome.
Another myth is that rogue states or terrorists need a
sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile to make an EMP attack.
In fact, any missile, including short-range missiles that can deliver a
nuclear warhead to an altitude of 30 kilometers or more, can make a
catastrophic EMP attack on the United States, by launching off a ship
or freighter. Indeed, Iran has practiced ship-launched EMP attacks
using Scud missiles--which are in the possession of scores of nations
and even terrorist groups. An EMP attack launched off a ship, since
Scuds are common-place and a warhead detonated in outer space would
leave no bomb debris for forensic analysis, could enable rogue states
or terrorists to destroy U.S. critical infrastructures and kill
millions of Americans anonymously.
natural emp
Mother Nature can also pose an EMP threat. The Sun emits solar
flares and coronal mass ejections that can strike the Earth's
magnetosphere and generate a natural EMP in the form of a geomagnetic
storm. Geomagnetic storms rarely affect the United States, but
regularly damage nations located at high northern latitudes, such as
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Damage from a normal
geomagnetic storm can be severe. For example, in 1989 a geomagnetic
storm over Canada destroyed the electric power grid in Quebec.
The EMP Commission was the first to discover and report in 2004
that every hundred years or so the Sun produces a great geomagnetic
storm. Great geomagnetic storms produce effects similar to the E3 EMP
from a multi-megaton nuclear weapon, and so large that it would cover
the entire United States--possibly even the entire planet. Geomagnetic
storms, even great geomagnetic storms, generate no E1 or E2, only E3,
technically called the magnetohydrodynamic EMP.
Nonetheless, E3 alone from a great geomagnetic storm is sufficient
to end modern civilization. The EMP produced, given the current state
of unpreparedness by the United States and every nation on Earth, could
collapse power grids everywhere on the planet and destroy EHV
transformers and other electronic systems that would require years to
repair or replace.
Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without
electricity. Within days of a blackout across the United States, a
blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators
would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would
transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities would
have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food
supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long
operate in a blackout. Government and industry also need electricity in
order to operate.
The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given
current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse.
The last great geomagnetic storm was in 1859, called the
``Carrington Event'' after the astronomer who noted the phenomenon. The
1859 great geomagnetic storm caused fires in telegraph stations and
burned the just-laid transatlantic cable, but its effects were not
catastrophic because electronic systems were few and not essential to
society in 1859. Great geomagnetic storms are recognizable in
historical records because they produce highly unusual effects, like
the appearance of the Aurora Borealis at the equator, that even common
people often record in letters and diaries. No great geomagnetic storm
has occurred in the modern era, in which society depends for its very
existence on electronics. Most specialists believe a great geomagnetic
storm is overdue, since this once-a-century phenomenon last occurred in
1859. Many scientists believe a great geomagnetic storm is most likely
to occur during the solar maximum, when solar flares and coronal mass
ejections that cause geomagnetic storms increase sharply in frequency.
The solar maximum recurs every 11 years, next in 2012-2013.
NASA and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a blue-
ribbon study independently confirming the warning of the EMP Commission
about the threat posed by a great geomagnetic storm. The EMP Commission
and the NASA-NAS reports, and several subsequent independent studies,
conclude that if a great geomagnetic storm like the 1859 Carrington
Event happened today, millions could die.
non-nuclear emp weapons
Radiofrequency weapons of widely varying designs--some using
conventional explosions to generate an EMP, others using microwave
emitters to direct energy at a target, for example--can destroy,
damage, and disrupt electronic systems at short ranges. Non-nuclear EMP
weapons seldom have ranges or a radius of effect greater than 1
kilometer, and usually much less than this.
Some scientists credibly claim that non-nuclear EMP weapons can be
developed having a radius of effect of tens of kilometers. However, no
nation has yet demonstrated such a capability, including the United
States, which has worked to develop advanced radiofrequency weapons for
many years. Even such advanced non-nuclear EMP weapons would still be
limited and localized in their effects, compared to the Nation-wide
effects of a nuclear EMP attack or the planetary effects of a great
geomagnetic storm.
Microwave radiation is the lethal mechanism usually employed by
non-nuclear EMP weapons, an effect somewhat comparable but not
identical to E1 from a nuclear weapon. Radiofrequency weapons produce
no E2 or E3 pulse.
Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-
nuclear EMP weapon without great trouble or expense, working from
Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using
parts available at any electronics store. In 2000, the Terrorism Panel
of the House Armed Services Committee sponsored an experiment,
recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt
constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on Unclassified
design information and parts purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1
year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs.
One was designed to fit inside the shipping crate for a Xerox machine,
so it could be delivered to the Pentagon mail room where (in those more
unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon's
computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to fit inside a
small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and
disrupt computers--and perhaps the National economy.
Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully during a
special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army's
Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat.
Terrorists, criminals, and disgruntled individuals have used home-made
radiofrequency weapons. The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a
wide variety of such weaponry.
Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that could be used as
radiofrequency weapons are publicly marketed for sale to anyone,
usually advertised as ``EMP simulators.'' For example, one such
simulator is advertised for public sale as an ``EMP Suitcase.'' This
EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and
operated by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy
radiofrequency output to destroy electronics. However, it has only a
short radius of effect. Nonetheless, a terrorist or deranged individual
who knows what he is doing, who has studied the electric grid for a
major metropolitan area, could--armed with the ``EMP Suitcase''--black
out a major city.
a clear and present danger
Emphasis is warranted that the nuclear EMP threat is not merely
theoretical--it is real, a clear and present danger. Nuclear EMP attack
is the perfect asymmetric weapon for state actors who wish to level the
battlefield by neutralizing the great technological advantage enjoyed
by U.S. military forces. EMP is also the ideal means, the only means,
whereby rogue states or terrorists could use a single nuclear weapon to
destroy the United States and prevail in the War on Terrorism or some
other conflict with a single blow. The EMP Commission also warned that
states or terrorists could exploit U.S. vulnerability to EMP attack for
coercion or blackmail: ``Therefore, terrorists or state actors that
possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons
may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base,
they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a
few such weapons by using them--or threatening their use--in an EMP
attack.''
The EMP Commission found that states such as Russia, China, North
Korea, and Iran have incorporated EMP attack into their military
doctrines, and openly describe making EMP attacks against the United
States. Indeed, the EMP Commission was established by Congress partly
in response to a Russian nuclear EMP threat made to an official
Congressional Delegation on May 2, 1999, in the midst of the Balkans
crisis. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation and a former
Ambassador to the United States, warned: ``Hypothetically, if Russia
really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO's
bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire an SLBM and detonate a single
nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting
EMP would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems,
shutting down everything.''
China's military doctrine also openly describes EMP attack as the
ultimate asymmetric weapon, as it strikes at the very technology that
is the basis of U.S. power. Where EMP is concerned, ``The United States
is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world'':
``Some people might think that things similar to the `Pearl Harbor
Incident' are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it
could be regarded as the `Pearl Harbor Incident' of the 21st Century if
a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy's crucial information
systems of command, control, and communications by such means as . . .
electromagnetic pulse weapons . . . Even a superpower like the United
States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces,
cannot guarantee its immunity . . . In their own words, a highly
computerized open society like the United States is extremely
vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the
U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to
iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks . . . When a
country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically .
. . it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems
. . . The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other
country in the world.''
Iran--the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism--in
military writings openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as
the ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ``If the world's
industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves
against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate
within a few years . . . American soldiers would not be able to find
food to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.''
The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that
Russia has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably
developed what Russia describes as a ``Super-EMP'' nuclear weapon--
specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP fields in
order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military
forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North Korea too may
possess or be developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon, as alleged by
credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source
reporting from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear
weapon, even a low-yield first generation device, could suffice to make
a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Iran, although it is
assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively testing missile
delivery systems and has practiced launches of its best missile, the
Shahab-III, fuzing for high-altitude detonations, in exercises that
look suspiciously like training for making EMP attacks. As noted
earlier, Iran has also practiced launching from a ship a Scud, the
world's most common missile--possessed by over 60 nations, terrorist
groups, and private collectors. A Scud might be the ideal choice for a
ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be
executed anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike
a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude EMP attack leaves
no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ``fingerprints.''
emp vulnerabilities
Today's microelectronics are the foundation of our modern
civilization, but are over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than
the far more primitive and robust electronics of the 1960s, that proved
vulnerable during nuclear EMP tests of that era. Tests conducted by the
EMP Commission confirmed empirically the theory that, as modern
microelectronics become ever smaller and more efficient, and operate
ever faster on lower voltages, they also become ever more vulnerable,
and can be destroyed or disrupted by much lower EMP field strengths.
Microelectronics and electronic systems are everywhere, and run
virtually everything in the modern world. All of the civilian critical
infrastructures that sustain the economy of the United States, and the
lives of 310 million Americans, depend, directly or indirectly, upon
electricity and electronic systems.
Of special concern is the vulnerability to EMP of the Extra-High-
Voltage (EHV) transformers, that are indispensable to the operation of
the electric grid. EHV transformers drive electric current over long
distances, from the point of generation to consumers (from the Niagara
Falls hydroelectric facility to New York City, for example). The
electric grid cannot operate without EHV transformers--which could be
destroyed by an EMP event. The United States no longer manufactures EHV
transformers. They must be manufactured and imported from overseas,
from Germany or South Korea, the only two nations in the world that
manufacture such transformers for export. Each EHV transformer must be
custom-made for its unique role in the grid. A single EHV transformer
typically requires 18 months to manufacture. The loss of large numbers
of EHV transformers to an EMP event would plunge the United States into
a protracted blackout lasting years, with perhaps no hope of eventual
recovery, as the society and population probably could not survive for
even 1 year without electricity.
Another key vulnerability to EMP are Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition systems (SCADAs). SCADAs essentially are small computers,
numbering in the millions and ubiquitous everywhere in the critical
infrastructures, that perform jobs previously performed by hundreds of
thousands of human technicians during the 1960s and before, in the era
prior to the microelectronics revolution. SCADAs do things like
regulating the flow of electricity into a transformer, controlling the
flow of gas through a pipeline, or running traffic control lights.
SCADAs enable a few dozen people to run the critical infrastructures
for an entire city, whereas previously hundreds or even thousands of
technicians were necessary. Unfortunately, SCADAs are especially
vulnerable to EMP.
EHV transformers and SCADAs are the most important vulnerabilities
to EMP, but are by no means the only vulnerabilities. Each of the
critical infrastructures has their own unique vulnerabilities to EMP:
The National electric grid, with its transformers and generators
and electronic controls and thousands of miles of power lines, is a
vast electronic machine--more vulnerable to EMP than any other critical
infrastructure. Yet the electric grid is the most important of all
critical infrastructures, and is in fact the keystone supporting modern
civilization, as it powers all the other critical infrastructures. As
of now it is our technological Achilles Heel. The EMP Commission found
that, if the electric grid collapses, so too will collapse all the
other critical infrastructures. But, if the electric grid can be
protected and recovered, so too all the other critical infrastructures
can also be restored.
Transportation is a critical infrastructure because modern
civilization cannot exist without the goods and services moved by road,
rail, ship, and air. Cars, trucks, locomotives, ships, and aircraft all
have electronic components, motors, and controls that are potentially
vulnerable to EMP. Traffic control systems that avert traffic jams and
collisions for road, rail, and air depend upon electronic systems, that
the EMP Commission discovered are especially vulnerable to EMP. Gas
stations, fuel pipelines, and refineries that make petroleum products
depend upon electronic components and cannot operate without
electricity. Given our current state of unpreparedness, in the
aftermath of a natural or nuclear EMP event, transportation systems
would be paralyzed.
Communications is a critical infrastructure because modern
economies and the cohesion and operation of modern societies depend to
a degree unprecedented in history on the rapid movement of
information--accomplished today mostly by electronic means. Telephones,
cell phones, personal computers, television, and radio are all directly
vulnerable to EMP, and cannot operate without electricity. Satellites
that operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather,
scientific, and military purposes are vulnerable to EMP and to
collateral effects from an EMP attack. Within weeks of an EMP event,
the LEO satellites, which comprise most satellites, would probably be
inoperable. In the aftermath of a nuclear or natural EMP event, under
present levels of preparedness, communications would be severely
limited, restricted mainly to those few military communications
networks that are hardened against EMP.
Banking and finance are the critical infrastructure that sustain
modern economies. Whether it is the stock market, the financial records
of a multinational corporation, or the ATM card of an individual--
financial transactions and record keeping all depend now at the macro-
and micro-level upon computers and electronic automated systems. Many
of these are directly vulnerable to EMP, and none can operate without
electricity. The EMP Commission found that an EMP event could transform
the modern electronic economy into a feudal economy based on barter.
Food has always been vital to every person and every civilization.
The critical infrastructure for producing, delivering, and storing food
depends upon a complex web of technology, including machines for
planting and harvesting and packaging, refrigerated vehicles for long-
haul transportation, and temperature-controlled warehouses. Modern
technology enables over 98 percent of the U.S. National population to
be fed by less than 2 percent of the population. Huge regional
warehouses that resupply supermarkets constitute the National food
reserves, enough food to feed the Nation for 30-60 days at normal
consumption rates, the warehoused food preserved by refrigeration and
temperature control systems that typically have enough emergency
electrical power (diesel or gas generators) to last only about an
average of 3 days. Experience with storm-induced blackouts proves that
when these big regional food warehouses lose electrical power, most of
the food supply will rapidly spoil. Farmers, less than 2 percent of the
population as noted above, cannot feed 310 million Americans if
deprived of the means that currently makes possible this technological
miracle.
Water too has always been a basic necessity to every person and
civilization, even more crucial than food. The critical infrastructure
for purifying and delivering potable water, and for disposing of and
treating waste water, is a vast networked machine powered by
electricity that uses electrical pumps, screens, filters, paddles, and
sprayers to purify and deliver drinkable water, and to remove and treat
waste water. Much of the machinery in the water infrastructure is
directly vulnerable to EMP. The system cannot operate without vast
amounts of electricity supplied by the power grid. A natural or nuclear
EMP event would immediately deprive most of the U.S. National
population of running water. Many natural sources of water--lakes,
streams, and rivers--would be dangerously polluted by toxic wastes from
sewage, industry, and hospitals that would backflow from or bypass
wastewater treatment plants, that could no longer intake and treat
pollutants without electric power. Many natural water sources that
would normally be safe to drink, after an EMP event, would be polluted
with human wastes including feces, industrial wastes including arsenic
and heavy metals, and hospital wastes including pathogens.
Emergency services such as police, fire, and hospitals are the
critical infrastructure that upholds the most basic functions of
government and society--preserving law and order, protecting property
and life. Experience from protracted storm-induced blackouts has shown,
for example in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, that
when the lights go out and communications systems fail and there is no
gas for squad cars, fire trucks, and ambulances, the worst elements of
society and the worst human instincts rapidly takeover. The EMP
Commission found that, given our current state of unpreparedness, a
natural or nuclear EMP event could create anarchic conditions that
would profoundly challenge the existence of social order.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. Pry.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Frankel for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FRANKEL, SENIOR SCIENTIST, PENN STATE
UNIVERSITY, APPLIED RESEARCH LABORATORY
Mr. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, honorable Members. My
name is Mike Frankel. As the initial bio mentioned, I am a
theoretical physicist by trade. I have spent much of my career
in Government service with a focus on understanding nuclear
weapons and their effects. I am appearing before you today
pursuant to my service as the executive director of the EMP
Commission during the entire span of its activity. I have
provided extended remarks for the record, and what I wish to do
in the few moments here is just make a few summary remarks and
recommendations.
There are a number of important legacies of the Commission;
not the least, as Dr. Pry just mentioned, is highlighting the
effects of a so-called supersolar storm, which was first
identified as a vulnerability by the Commission and I think is
now part of the regular discourse, and which the Nation is
still, as far as I can see, unprepared to deal with.
Another important analytic insight provided by the
Commission was its understanding and raising the alarm for the
prospect of simultaneous failures of the system. All engineers
design their systems against single-point failure. We saw an
instance of that. Recently there was an incident reported in
the Wall Street Journal where a PG&E substation was attacked by
an individual, individuals with rifles. The entire substation
went off-line. Transformers were damaged, but the population
didn't notice anything. It was a single-point failure of a
single station. The control systems functioned as they were
supposed to. Electricity was rerouted, et cetera.
It was the large number of failures that the EMP Commission
analyzed that fall within a large geographical area provided by
the EMP footprint which kind-of raised the alarm of many
multiple failures. Nobody designs against multiple failures.
Here and there you may find some engineers who design against
two simultaneous failures. But these failures can be affected
not just by EMP. They could be affected by cyber. The important
thing is that if there are simultaneous failures over large
areas, the analysis of the Commission was things are very
likely to fail, and restoration will take a very long time.
Another important point which I would like to make here,
which wasn't made by the EMP Commission in its report, is the
nexus between EMP and cyber. Both of those are modes of attack
on our electronic systems which sustain our society. They work
even kind-of in the same way. They reach out through the
electrical distribution system, and they inflict currents,
voltages on the system so the system will not operate the way
the owner expects them to. If resources are being allocated to
prevent the cyber threat, it seems foolish not to also address
at the same time one end of the cyber threat, which is the EMP,
kind-of the ``stupid cyber'', if you will.
Finally, what I would like to do in the last minute or so
that I have left is touch on the reception which the EMP
Commission's recommendations received. The recommendations were
pointed towards both the Defense Department and to the
Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Defense
considered the recommendations; in fact, concurred with most of
them. An action plan was promulgated. Funds were allocated in
the outyears. The Defense Science Board was stood up, and
essentially EMP research and alertness was reinvigorated within
the Department of Defense and the acquisition community there.
No similar reaction was noted in the Department of Homeland
Security. There was no office of responsibility designated at a
confirmed level. Funds weren't POM'd. There are still 75
recommendations pointed towards the Department of Homeland
Security within its purview that could increase the resilience,
survivability, and recovery of our electric grid were it
subject to such an event, and it will be, at least through the
natural EMP of the sun; and something needs doing, and now is
the time to do it.
I thank you for the opportunity to make these remarks, and
that concludes my own remarks. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Frankel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Frankel
May 8, 2014
Mr. Chairman and Honorable Members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today about an important but relatively
neglected vulnerability that affects the resilience of all of our
Nation's critical infrastructures. My name is Mike Frankel. I'm a
theoretical physicist by trade and presently a member of the senior
scientific staff at Penn State University's Applied Research
Laboratory. I've spent a career in Government service developing
technical and scientific expertise on the effects of nuclear weapons,
managing WMD programs, and performing scientific research in a variety
of National security positions with the Navy, the old Defense Nuclear
Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I appear before you
today pursuant my service as the executive director of the EMP
Commission during its entire span of activity, commencing with
authorization if the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
of 2001 and culminating with delivery of its final, Classified,
assessment to the Congress in 2009 The conclusions of the Commission
were documented in a series of five volumes, three of them Classified,
and in particular the Commission's perspectives related to
infrastructure protection were documented in an Unclassified volume
``Critical National Infrastructures,'' released in November 2008. What
I'd like to do is expand on some of the Commission's conclusions in
light of recent developments since submitting our final report. I
should also like to emphasize a new topic that was not referenced in
that final report, and that is the nexus between the cybersecurity
threat and EMP.
One of the major insights of the EMP Commission was to highlight
the unique danger to the electric grid caused by simultaneous failures
induced by the large number of components that fall within an EMP's
damaging footprint on the ground. As first reported in the journal
Foreign Affairs and picked up a month later by the Wall Street Journal,
on the night of April 16, 2013, a locked PG&E substation was
infiltrated and a number of high-voltage transformers attacked by
still-unidentified individuals firing rifles. Damaged transformers went
off-line but the SCADA controls automatically re-routed the electrical
distribution along alternate paths. In this case, standard engineering
practice which designs around the possibility of single point failure,
kicked in just as it should, and little effect was noticed by the
general population. However, it took nearly a full month to repair the
damaged transformers and return them to service. An important analytic
contribution of the Commission was to highlight the possibility of
highly multiple numbers of component failures, as might be expected
within the wide area encompassed by an EMP event footprint. No one
designed against such a possibility and it was the Commission's
conclusion, based on its own analyses and on a close collaboration with
power industry engineers, that such a scenario would inevitably lead to
very wide-spread, and very long-term collapse of the Nation's electric
grid, with potentially devastating economic and ultimately physical and
health consequences. The PG&E incident should remind us that the
Commission's analytic insight extends far beyond EMP. While in this
case only a single substation was attacked, had there been a
coordinated physical attack against many simultaneous targets, or for
that matter by localized EMP sources such as readily available HPM/RF
sources, it seems inevitable that electric service to much larger
fraction of the population would have been compromised and for an
indefinitely prolonged period. And of course, the same result could be
achieved by simultaneous cyber-attack, with much reduced physical
exposure by the perpetrators. So there's a real vulnerability there
that needs to be addressed.
I should also like to turn some attention to the generally
unremarked overlap between electromagnetic vulnerability of the type
described by the EMP Commission and the more general issue of cyber
vulnerability. While not often considered in tandem, it is more correct
to consider EMP vulnerabilities as one end of a continuous spectrum of
cyber threats to our electronic-based infrastructures. They share both
an overlap in the effects produced--the failure of electronic systems
to perform their function and possibly incurring actual physical
damage--as well as their mode of inflicting damage. They both reach out
through the connecting electronic distribution systems, and impress
unwanted voltages and currents on the connecting wires. In the usual
cyber case, those unwanted currents contain information--usually in the
form of malicious code--that instructs the system to perform actions
unwanted and unanticipated by its owner. In the EMP case, the impressed
signal does not contain coded information. It is merely a dump of
random noise which may flip bit states, or damage components, and also
ensures the system will not behave in the way the owner expects. This
electronic noise dump may thus be thought of as a ``stupid cyber''.
When addressing the vulnerability of our infrastructures to the cyber
threat, it is important that we not neglect the EMP end of the cyber
threat spectrum. And there is another important overlap with the cyber
threat. With the grid on the cusp of technological change in the
evolution to the ``smart grid'', the proliferation of sensors and
controls which will manage the new grid architecture must be protected
against cyber at the same time they must be protected against EMP.
Cyber and EMP threats have the unique capability to precipitate highly
multiple failures of these many new control systems over a widely
distributed geographical area, and such simultaneous failures, as
previously discussed, are likely to signal a wider and more long-
lasting catastrophe.
Another important legacy of the EMP Commission was to first
highlight the danger to our electric grid due to solar storms, which
may impress large--and effectively DC--currents on the long runs of
conducting cable that make up the distribution system. While this
phenomenon has long been known, and protected against, by engineering
practices in the power industry, the extreme 100-year storm first
analyzed by the Commission is now widely recognized to represent a
major danger to our National electrical system for which adequate
protective measures have not been taken and whose consequences--the
likely collapse of much of the National grid, possibly for a greatly
extended period, may rightly be termed catastrophic. At this point, the
only scientific controversy attending the likelihood of our system
being subject to a so-called super solar storm, is related to the time-
constant. But these events have already occurred within the last
century or so, they will occur again. We should be ready.
The most important legacy of the EMP Commission however, was in the
recommendations which were provided that would, if acted upon, protect
key assets of both the civilian and military infrastructures, and it is
here that I should like to point to an important divergence in the
Government's response. The (Classified) recommendations that were
provided to the Department of Defense were formally considered, in the
large main concurred with, and then acted upon. The Secretary of
Defense issued a Classified action plan, out-year funding was POM'd in
the FYDP, an office and an official of responsibility were appointed, a
standing Defense Science Board committee was stood up, an active
research program is maintained, and survivability and certification
instructions were issued by both DOD and by USSTRATCOM. Today, while
vigilant oversight continues to be warranted, an EMP awareness pervades
our acquisition system and operational doctrine. The response on the
civilian side of the equation was not so rosy. The final report of EMP
Commission contained 75 recommendations to improve the survivability,
operability, resilience, and recovery of all the critical
infrastructures, and in particular of the most key of all, the
electrical grid. Most of these recommendations were pointed towards the
Department of Homeland Security. While there have been some
conversations, it has been hard to detect much of an active resonance
at all issuing from the Department. They have not, as far as I know,
even designated EMP as a one of their 10 of 15 disaster scenarios for
advanced planning circumstances. And this at a time when they do
include a low-altitude nuclear disaster--certainly disastrous but not
one that would produce wide-ranging EMP.
In the end, it is hard to deal with 75 recommendations, all at
once. But the solution is not to ignore all of them. If there is only a
single essentially a no-cost step I would leave this committee with, it
would be to task the Department of Homeland Security with responding to
the still-languishing recommendations of the EMP Commission. The
Department of Defense did issue a response, as mandated by the
legislation which originally created that Commission. But no such
mandatory response was levied at the time on the Department of Homeland
Security, which did not even exist when the Commission legislation was
passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2001. The
DHS should be required to explain which recommendations they concur
with and/or with which they non-concur, and why. They should be asked
to prioritize amongst the 75 and come back with implementation
recommendations, or explain why they think it is unnecessary. And
finally, I would also urge the committee to support passage of the
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act.
I wish to thank the committee for this opportunity to present my
views of this most important issue.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. Frankel.
The Chairman will now recognize Dr. Beck for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS BECK, VICE PRESIDENT, POLICY AND STRATEGIC
INITIATIVES, THE ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. Beck. Thank you, very much, Chairman Perry, Ranking
Member Clarke, Mr. Franks, and Mr. Vela. Thank you for holding
this hearing on one of the most significant threats to our
National and homeland security.
As was mentioned earlier, before I joined EIS Council, I
did work for this committee focusing on critical infrastructure
protection and science and technology issues, and it was
through that exposure to this particular threat that I found it
to be so significant that I wanted to work on it full time.
The Electric Infrastructure Security Council's mission is
to work in partnership with Government and corporate
stakeholders to host National and international education,
planning, and communication initiatives to help improve
infrastructure protection against electromagnetic threats, or
E-threats, and other hazards. The summary of my remarks
basically are gleaned from international summit meetings that
EIS Council hosts, and which are chaired by Mr. Franks and Ms.
Clarke, and with that, I want to give a summary of some of the
findings of those discussions as well as other discussions.
The problem with EMP or GMD is that developed nations are
vulnerable to serious National power grid disruption from
electromagnetic threats, both natural and malicious. The
severity can range from regional blackout with serious economic
consequences to, in the worst-case scenario, a catastrophe that
would threaten societal continuity.
The timing of the events for severe space weather--the most
recent severe events occurred roughly 90 and 150 years ago, but
the timing of the next such occurrence, as with all extreme
natural disasters, is unknown. Local, or nonnuclear, or
subcontinental, or nuclear EMP could also occur at any time,
possibly encouraged by on-going vulnerability or triggered by
changing geopolitical realities.
Key questions that need to be addressed are: What should
our National strategy be? We could take a couple of approaches
there: Hope for the best and accept the status quo; or
encourage cost-effective resilience, restoration, and response
planning. Looking at response, it is important to define the
path, who should be involved, and how broad our response should
be.
A common theme of all the many summit deliberations,
Government reports, et cetera, over the past several years is
that the risks associated with severe E-threats are serious. It
is hard to find anyone who would assert that in today's world
hoping for the best is a good strategy for GMD, EMP, or
intentional electromagnetic interference, or IEMI.
The path forward consists of organization and coordination.
Given the grid's organic design, the consensus of Government
studies is that a coordinated planning and standards will be
important. Finding the best possible balance between broadly-
accepted proactive corporate coordination and Government action
will be important to assure fast, effective progress in
achieving an E-threat-resilient grid.
Who should be involved? Given the likelihood of a large
regional power outage after a National or malicious e-threat,
power companies will need to be operating in an environment of
extensive response and recovery support from Federal and State
government authorities, as well as community response,
nongovernmental organizations. So the evolution of planning to
address these concerns should include the broadest possible
involvement of all of these stakeholders, each contributing in
its own domain of authority and expertise.
For all E-threats under consideration here, efforts of
prevention, if they are to be effective, must primarily be
focused where the impact will occur, in the power grid. For
severe space weather, there is clearly no other alternative.
For malicious threats, EMP and IEMI, U.S. and allied government
security officials and experts at the highest level agree that
neither deterrence nor active military measures can alone
guarantee the security of our homeland against a determined
aggressor prepared to use such weapons.
In conclusion, I should note that there appear to be no
significant technical or financial barriers to mitigating this
threat. The technologies and operational procedures needed are
well understood, and the cost, based on both Government
estimates and recent corporate experience, is reasonable.
I would welcome the opportunity to discuss any of these
points in greater detail, and this concludes my prepared
testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beck follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Beck
May 8, 2014
introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this hearing on one of the
most significant threats to our National and Homeland Security. As many
of you know, before I joined EIS Council, I worked for this committee,
focusing on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Science and
Technology issues. It was through that work that I first became aware
of the threats facing our critical electric infrastructures, and I
found the issue to be so important that I felt compelled to focus on it
exclusively.
The Electric Infrastructure Security Council's mission is to work
in partnership with Government and corporate stakeholders to host
National and international education, planning, and communication
initiatives to help improve infrastructure protection against
electromagnetic threats (e-threats) and other hazards. E-threats
include naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), high-
altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) from nuclear weapons, and non-
nuclear EMP from intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI)
devices--the focus of today's hearing.
emp--defining the issue
The Problem.--Developed nations are vulnerable to serious national
power grid disruption from e-threats, both natural and malicious.
The Severity.--The impact can range from a broad regional blackout
with serious economic consequences to, in the worst case, a catastrophe
that would threaten societal continuity. With even the most benign
scenarios projecting high societal costs, the committee is correct to
focus on this as an issue deserving serious attention.
The Timing.--For severe space weather, the most recent events
occurred roughly 90 and 150 years ago, but the timing of the next such
occurrence, as with all extreme natural disasters, is unknown. Either
local (non-nuclear) or sub-continental (nuclear) EMP could occur at any
time, encouraged by on-going vulnerability, and triggered by changing
geopolitical realities.
key questions
1. What Should Our National Strategy Be?
At top level, there are two alternative paths:
a. Hope for the best: Accept the status quo.
i. For severe space weather, this means hoping the most
optimistic projections will turn out to be correct, and the
impact will not be catastrophic.
ii. EMP has been called, ``The most powerful asymmetric weapon
in history.'' This approach means hoping no terrorist
organization or rogue state will ever take advantage of the
power of such devastating weapons.
b. The other alternative:
Encourage cost-effective resilience, restoration, and response
planning.
2. If We Respond, What Is the Path?
How should we address interconnect-wide interdependence, and how
should we proceed with implementation?
3. If We Respond, Who Should Be Involved?
Who should take responsibility to define the path, and implement
it? How should the balance between public mandates and private,
corporate initiative be determined?
4. How Broad Should Our Response Be?
Should both GMD and EMP be included?
consensus recommendations
1. Hope vs. Preparation: Choosing a Strategy
A common theme of all the many Government reports studying these
risks, also reflected in the deliberations of the Electric
Infrastructure Security Summits over the last several years, is that
the risks associated with severe e-threats are serious. It is hard to
find anyone who would assert that, in today's world, ``hoping for the
best'' is a good strategy for GMD, EMP, or IEMI.
2. What Is the Path?
Our National power grid is organic in design, but administratively
complex. This means approaches are needed that address both of these
factors.
Organization and coordination.--Given the grid's organic
design, the consensus of Government studies is that
coordinated planning and standards will be important.
Finding the best possible balance between broadly-accepted,
pro-active corporate coordination and Government action
will be important to assure fast, effective progress in
achieving an e-threat resilient grid.
Technical.--A key point, not always recognized, is there
is no need to ``gold plate'' the system.
For Severe Space Weather, there is already growing discussion
of a range of strategies, and none of the approaches under
active discussion--from planning measures to comprehensive
automated hardware protection--appear high in cost,
relative to existing logistics budgets and investment
models.
For EMP, protection planning can focus--not on hardening every
component in the power grid--but on protection of a
fraction of grid facilities and hardware. In other words,
enough resilience investment, and associated restoration
planning, to protect enough generation resources and
critical loads to allow for both effective restoration and
for prioritized support to critical users and
installations.
2. Who Should Be Involved?
Given the likelihood of a large regional power outage after a
natural or malicious e-threat, power companies will need to be
operating in an environment of extensive response and recovery support
from Federal and State government authorities, as well as community-
response NGOs. Thus, the evolution of planning to address these
concerns should include the broadest possible involvement of all of
these stakeholders, each contributing in its own domain of authority
and expertise.
3. How Broad Should Our Scope Be?
For all the E-threats under consideration here, efforts at
protection, if they are to be effective, must primarily be focused
where the impact will occur--in the power grid. For severe space
weather, there is clearly no other alternative. For malicious threats,
EMP and IEMI, U.S. and allied government security officials and experts
at the highest levels agree that neither deterrence nor active military
measures can alone guarantee the security of our homeland against a
determined aggressor prepared to use such weapons.
In conclusion, I should note that there appear to be no significant
technical or financial barriers to mitigating this threat. The
technologies and operational procedures needed are well understood, and
the cost--based on both Government estimates and recent corporate
experience--is reasonable. One of the primary needs is for education to
increase awareness and therefore willingness to address the problem,
and for coordination to address the administrative complexity of our
Nation's power grid.
This summary of consensus-based themes and recommendations
reflects, I believe, not only the conclusions of the many major
Government studies of these issues, but also the deliberations of the
past four international Electric Infrastructure Security Summits, with
participation by the highest levels of many departments and agencies of
the U.S. and allied governments, and of a broad range of scientists and
domain experts working in this field.
I would welcome the opportunity to discuss any of these points in
greater detail.
This concludes my prepared testimony, and I would be happy to
answer any questions.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. Beck.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for
questions. These generally go out to each one of you, and one
just came to mind as Dr. Beck was talking.
So let me ask you this. If we do harden and protect the
grid, but this affects potentially all electric and electronic
devices, so even though we harden the grid and power stations
and can produce power and so on and so forth, will the systems
in individual homes and businesses, like refrigerators and
heating and cooling systems, will they be affected to the point
where they will all need to be replaced, or even while we have
power to our homes, none of the lights will come on and so on
so forth? Can anybody illuminate the answer to that question?
Mr. Pry. Well, it depends on the scenario. If you are
talking about a geomagnetic storm, it puts at the wavelength of
that, which we call E3, or magnetohydrodynamic EMP is so long
that it needs to couple into long lines, like power lines,
railroad tracks. It won't couple into automobiles,
refrigerators, personal computers, and things of that sort. So
under that scenario, yes, if you basically keep the electric
grid on, you will be able to recover the rest of the society
pretty promptly.
In the nuclear case of a nuclear EMP, it has an
electromagnetic shock wave that we call E1. This can couple
into personal computers, automobiles, and the like, and so you
will have deeper societal damage; but then, again, it depends
on the kind of weapon used. If it is a primitive, first-
generation nuclear weapon, you know, it is not likely to do
that across the whole country. It would be more limited to a
several-State-size region. If it is the worst-case kind of a
nuclear weapon, like a super EMP weapon, which is what we think
Russia, China, and probably North Korea have, you know, then
you are talking about a scenario where you are having massive,
deep damage to personal computers, and refrigerators, and
lights and the rest. But if you don't have the bulk power
system surviving, there is no hope of recovery under those
circumstances. Under that worst-case scenario, what you are
doing is you are mitigating a catastrophe and turning it into a
manageable disaster, a situation where you won't have massive
loss of life, hopefully.
Mr. Perry. Next question I have is we know that the EPA has
promulgated a bevy of regulations on power plants under the
current administration. Probably the most obtrusive regulation
has been the Mercury and Air Toxics rule, or utility MACT,
which has shut down numerous power plants across the country,
and there is a claim that some power plants are grandfathered
in and avoid updating their facilities in order to avoid new
regulations from the EPA.
Do you have any knowledge, is it possible that some power
plants are unwilling to update their facilities and protect
against EMP attacks in order to avoid new regulations from the
EPA? Is there any knowledge here based to answer that question?
It might not necessarily be for you folks here, but----
Mr. Frankel. I have no specific knowledge about that, but I
do know that the power companies are generally reluctant go in
and try to refit the generation plants. Any time you ask people
to spend money and that it sounds like a mandate to them, there
is a reflexive negativity to that.
Mr. Perry. Sure.
How would you rate the likelihood that the United States
will face an EMP event from either a high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse, a HEMP, or a massive solar storm?
Mr. Frankel. I will take that one. You guys can as well.
I think that the likelihood that the United States will
face at some point a so-called massive solar storm, and thus
our entire system will be under the footprint, if you will, of
a massive solar storm, is about 100 percent. It will happen.
The uncertainty here, I believe, is the time constant. It could
happen next year, it could be 100 years, but probably not 1,000
years.
The probability that we will be faced with a nuclear HEMP I
would say is unknown. I don't call it high. I don't call it
low. I would say it is an unknown probability.
Mr. Beck. I would agree with both of those statements.
Mr. Pry. I would concur and also point out that the
National Intelligence Council that writes the Classified
National intelligence estimates and speaks for the whole U.S.
intelligence community considered this issue so important that
they put out an Unclassified study called Global Trends 2030,
which is available on the internet, that describes eight black
swan scenarios that could alter the course of global
civilization by or before 2030. In the judgment of the National
Intelligence Council, the recurrence of something like a
Carrington Event, a geomagnetic superstorm, is one of those
events that by or before 2030 could change the course of global
civilization.
Mr. Perry. That is hardly comforting.
My time, however, has expired, so the Chairman recognizes
the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, for
questions.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
witnesses for their testimony here today.
I just wanted to clarify for the record from Dr. Pry and
Dr. Frankel, I see that both of you served as staff on the EMP
Commission in 2004 or thereabouts, but I am trying to get a
sense of what organizations you are representing today, and how
can we learn more about those organizations?
Mr. Frankel. I am representing only my status as a senior
scientist at the Penn State University. I am not representing--
I do some work for the Department of Defense, but I am in no
way representing them.
Ms. Clarke. You are not representing Penn State either, are
you?
Mr. Frankel. No. Penn State, I would say, does not have a
position about EMP.
Mr. Pry. We both served on the Congressional EMP Commission
through its life, from 2001 to 2008. I am currently the
executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland
Security, which was an effort to continue the EMP Commission,
because the Commissioners, including the chairman, believed it
was terminated prematurely before its work was completed. So
this task force is an attempt to continue the EMP Commission in
some way. Dr. Graham, for example, who is the chairman of that
Commission, is the chairman of my task force, and I am here
today representing the task force.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. Very well. Thank you very much.
First of all, I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, if we could
submit for the record the international E-Pro report. This
report was prepared by Dr. Beck under a DOE contract and
describes EMP status internationally.
Mr. Perry. Without objection, so ordered.*
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* The information is retained in committee files.
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Ms. Clarke. For our colleagues, there are additional copies
on the table for those who may be interested.
Dr. Beck, we all know that extreme atmospheric weather and
solar weather that could potentially produce EMPs and other
natural disasters can threaten lives, disable communities, and
devastate generation transmission and distribution systems.
Efforts to harden the electricity grid must focus on three
elements: Prevention, recovery, and survivability, and these
elements will apply to a situation in which a potential EMP
event is involved.
A recent storm such as Hurricane Sandy, which affected my
district, pinpointing affected areas was problematic as was
finding a clear route for crews through streets that were
blocked by fallen trees. As a result, crews were sometimes
idled because they could not reach affected areas.
First, preventing this kind of damage in the distribution
system will require changes in design standards and
construction guidelines, maintenance routines, and inspection
procedures. Second, recovery and resiliency planning ought to
provide for rapid damage assessment and readily available
replacement components. Third, survivability refers to the
ability to maintain some basic level of electrical
functionality to individual consumers and communities in the
event of a complete loss of electrical service from the
distribution system.
Would you give us your views on how DHS can help the
electricity sector focus and plan for an EMP event involving
what it commonly refers to as resiliency issues which would
incorporate prevention, recovery, and survivability?
Mr. Beck. Thank you for the question. I think that the
position for DHS of what DHS can provide really is leadership.
The DHS is not a regulatory agency. It functions by enhancing
public-private partnerships and information dissemination, and
as such they have the ability to work across multiple sectors.
They work with the first-responder community, they work with
science and technology, they work with industry to provide
frameworks and guidelines for all, the whole spectrum that you
mentioned. That can be from protecting or mitigating equipment
themselves, that can be about operational procedures, and it
can also be about educating first responders and local
authorities on what the situation might look like in the event
of one of these events and how best to prepare for planning.
So as an example, with Superstorm Sandy, you mentioned that
debris, downed lines, these kinds of things were a major
problem. There was flooding, et cetera. In an EMP or GMD
scenario, that particular issue will probably not be something
to worry about, but there would be other planning. You
mentioned the electricity crews. Well, as Dr. Frankel
mentioned, with a Nation-wide footprint, there could be outages
in a lot of areas, and so preparation for having electrical
crews be ready for the kind of restoration that will be needed,
that kind of thing I think is the area where DHS could provide
the best leadership.
Ms. Clarke. My time has lapsed, but, gentlemen, was there
anything that you wanted to add to that response? Yield back.
Mr. Frankel. Well, I would add that the recommendations of
the EMP Commission directed at the Department of Homeland
Security are still kind of languishing out there, and I think
they are still pretty good.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman thanks the gentlelady for the first
round anyhow, and the Chairman recognizes Representative
Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was struck by the last remark that you made. As you know,
the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 stood up the
Department of Homeland Security and created a Presidentially-
appointed position for an assistant secretary for
infrastructure protection. That is the quote. The mission is to
recommend measures necessary to protect the key resources and
critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination
with other agencies of the Federal Government, but in your
estimation you are suggesting that that hasn't been fulfilled.
Do you think that passing this Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act would catalyze some change in that direction? I
will pass that to you, Dr. Frankel, and if anyone else wants to
address it.
Mr. Frankel. I absolutely do think that that is almost a
necessary first step. Now, you mentioned the Department of
Homeland Security was stood up in 2002 or 2003. It was actually
stood up after the legislation which created the EMP
Commission, and, as such, only the Secretary of Defense was
mandated to actually take a look and respond. He could have
rejected them, or, as it turned out, he looked at them and
accepted them, but there was no such, you know, belly button
identified within the Department of Homeland Security, which,
of course, didn't exist at the time, and so it was hard to find
anybody who owned the problem.
There indeed was an assistant for infrastructure
protection. In fact, I believe I recall going in with Dr.
Graham and briefing him, or perhaps General Lawson, and--but
nevertheless, you know, kind-of the ripples died out, and there
is no detectable resonance these days.
Mr. Franks. Well, the military seems to get it. I mean, it
doesn't seem to be a fact--I have heard, in the very highest
echelons of our military command in the United States, them
deem this or term this cybersecurity and EMP as kissing cousins
because they affect the same networks, and because in a sense
EMP is like an ultimate cybersecurity threat because if you
have no electricity, you have no networks.
But with that said, NERC is currently undergoing a
rulemaking procedure to look at protecting the grid from GMD,
not so much EMP yet, and from my vantage point it appears that
they may be using some faulty science or data that justify
inadequate standards that, in my judgment, don't go far enough.
It also appears that the standard may include only procedural
and operational changes, and it leaves, in my judgment, our
citizens at risk.
It appears to me that hardware-based solutions eliminate,
to a large extent, the worst of the most catastrophic element
that might happen here. Can you tell me and this committee the
importance of using hardware-based solutions versus just
procedural methods to protect just against vulnerabilities? I
would like to start over here with Dr. Pry and go through the
group here, because I may not have another opportunity.
Mr. Pry. Before answering that question, I would like to
add that, you know, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act
is provisioned to establish a scenario focused on EMP. A
National planning scenario on EMP was one of the core
recommendations of the EMP Commission, so that legislation
would be realizing this long-delayed goal of the Commission.
A hardware-based solution to this is absolutely necessary.
Operational procedures alone are not going to work against
either a geomagnetic disturbance or--and certainly not against
a nuclear EMP attack. The United States--well, not the United
States, NERC, but the NERC, the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, has been resisting that and trying to
argue that operational procedures would be sufficient for
dealing with a geomagnetic storm, a Carrington-class
geomagnetic storm, and frankly it has been junk science.
I know this and can say this because I have been on their
Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force, and other members of my
task force are still on the NERC Geomagnetic Disturbance Task
Force. They can't keep us off it. Under the law they have to
allow outside independent observers, and we have been able to
watch that process and see the junk science process in action
where they basically cook the books to try to convince people
that operational procedures will suffice.
The most notorious example of this was the NERC's 2012
report that asserted that if a Carrington-class geomagnetic
superstorm happened today, that they would be able to recover
the grid in 24 hours, and then weeks after they delivered that
report, we had a weather event sweep through Washington, DC,
that caused a black-out of large parts of the area that lasted
more than a week, you know, which showed that they can't even
cope using operational procedures with normal terrestrial
weather, let alone an unprecedented thing like a Carrington
Event.
Moreover, our closest NATO allies in the United Kingdom,
who are also very concerned about this, within a few weeks of
the NERC 2012 report coming out put out their own report that
also assessed that they had to harden their grid because
operational procedures alone wouldn't be sufficient to protect
against either a natural or nuclear EMP.
You know, NERC stands alone in this belief among all the
studies that have been done by the U.S. Government and even by
our allies that operational procedures will suffice, and, you
know, I think we are just seeing the same old story again where
industry will do whatever it can to resist having to spend the
money on the hardware, just like the cigarette industry, just
like I like to think of the zeppelin industry in the 1920s that
convinced everybody, you know, that travel by hydrogen balloon
was safe, that they could use operational procedures to make
zeppelin travel safe even though helium was available and it
would cost a little more to use it, and in effect NERC has got
us all on the Hindenburg, and we are flying toward a rendezvous
with a geomagnetic catastrophe in the future.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know if the
others had any response. I know I am certainly out of time.
Yield back.
Mr. Perry. If you ask the question, the others can respond.
Mr. Frankel. I concur with Dr. Pry that hardware solutions
are, indeed, called for. I am not as familiar with the specific
studies that he is referring to, but it is my impression that
we have a problem of overfamiliarity, if you will, for the
NERC. This is a well-known physics phenomenon, the inducing of
these currents by these geomagnetic storms, and the power
industry has known about this pretty much forever. They have
procedures and things in place to prevent that sort of thing,
and I think they are just a tad too comfortable with their
ability to deal with this thing, and the thing that we are now
talking about is the possibility that will be of an intensity
that they simply have not prepared for. Yes, it is low
frequency, but it is very high probability--I think I said 100
percent before--that it will happen at some point, scale it on
the 100-year scale. I think they are not willing to go that--
like, yes, they know about geomagnetic storms; yes, they have
indeed protected against geomagnetic storms, but they haven't
really taken that final step to protect against the kind of the
super-Katrina kind-of analogue, and I feel that is what we are
faced with here.
Mr. Beck. I would just comment that FERC Order 779 is a
two-phase approach where the first phase was operational
measures, and the second phase had to do with the more detailed
analysis up to and including hardware-based solutions. The
trade-off is one basically of complication and ability to
respond in a timely manner.
Operational procedures may be effective in a manageable-
sized geomagnetic disturbance when there is decent warning,
which may be available if the storm is slow moving. For massive
solar storms, typically the velocity is higher; the warning
time is less. This would really put stress on the operators as
they tried to go through those procedures. But it was a place
to start because it could be done immediately where there needs
to be more analysis and understanding of some of the hardware-
based solutions.
But ultimately a mixture would probably be best, and
certainly if you include EMP, where warning time would be zero,
then operational procedures would be unbelievably challenging
for the operators to be able to deal with an EMP event using
operational procedures alone.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman thanks the gentlemen.
We are going to, without objection, move to the second
round. I would like to start with Dr. Pry.
You mentioned in your testimony a satellite passing over
the Washington-New York corridor. I would like you to describe
the importance or the potential importance of that, and in that
context also please describe the National electric grid
interconnection, what regions of the country are most
vulnerable to grid collapse as a result of EMP attack.
Mr. Pry. Well, the KSM-3 satellite was orbited by North
Korea in December 2012, about 3 months before we had our
gravest nuclear crisis with North Korea when in February 2012
they ignited--they conducted their third nuclear test,
violating international law, and when the United States
international community moved to impose additional sanctions to
punish North Korea for this, they started threatening to make
nuclear strikes against the United States. There was a nuclear
crisis so grave during the period from February 12 through the
end of April that, you know, the President was sending B-2
bombers over the demilitarized zone to do practice bombing runs
and demonstration exercises; strengthened the National missile
defense, including moving a THAAD interceptor to Guam just in
case Kim Jong-Un tried to deliver on these nuclear threats.
In the midst of this crisis, the KSM-3, which was still
orbiting, its orbit followed the exact orbit that the Soviets
had come up with in the Cold War for a secret nuclear weapon to
conduct a surprise nuclear attack called a fractional orbital
bombardment system. It is basically a space launch vehicle that
uses a nuclear weapon disguised as a satellite, and instead of
launching over the North Pole and following a normal ballistic
trajectory toward the United States, it launches south and
crosses over the south polar region and comes up from--
approaches from the south because we don't have any ballistic
missile early warning radars in that location or interceptors,
and we are blind to the south and defenseless, and so you would
be able to detonate a warhead and do an EMP attack and catch us
by surprise. That was the plan during the Cold War, and the
trajectory and the altitude of this satellite were precisely
the same as the kinds of fobs that the Soviets had used.
Between April 8 and the 16th of April, it went from the
center of the United States, and on the 16th was passing over
the Washington, DC/New York corridor, which is the ideal
location for putting down a peak field, because if you look at
where our EHV transformers are located, they are most deeply
located, the largest numbers of them, the map is just almost a
solid block of red because it is so densely concentrated, the
EHV transformers in that area. If you wanted to take down the
eastern grid, that would be the best place to place a peak EMP
field. Taking out the eastern grid is really all you have to do
because 75 percent of our power is generated in the eastern
grid. The western grid is the next most important, and the
Texas grid is the third most important. But that was the KSM-3
threat and its relationship to the grid system.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
Speaking of those, the transformers, it has been noted that
the Extremely High-Voltage, the EHV transformers which are
indispensable to the electric grid, are expensive and hard to
replace. If you know, what is the lead time for manufacturing
new or replacement transformers, and given that there are
limited manufacturers in the United States, where are the
suppliers located?
Mr. Pry. There are two places that manufacture these for
export, South Korea and Germany, and we are still dependent on
them. I know there is a DHS briefing going around that says we
have limited capabilities to manufacture EHV transformers in
the United States. In fact, we currently don't really have
demonstrated capability to manufacture these transformers in
the United States yet. They have to be made by hand the way
they were made back in Nikola Tesla's day, the inventor of the
EHV transformer.
So every one is custom made, every one has a unique role to
play in the grid. They aren't mass produced. It is not easy.
There is a lot of--they have to be custom made, and there is a
lot of artisanship, as it were, that goes into the making of
these transformers. Brazil tried to become independent of
making its own EHV transformers, oh, maybe a decade ago, and it
took them 5 years before they were able to start attempting to
make their first transformers, and they didn't perform well. So
now Brazil gave up on that, and it has to import them.
So it remains to be seen if the United States can actually
manufacture any of its own EHV transformers yet. We haven't
manufactured one and put them out in the field and seen if they
last and stand up to this. It takes 18 months under normal
conditions to build one of these transformers.
Mr. Perry. Has the United States ever manufactured them, or
is it something that we did and then got out of?
Mr. Pry. We did. We invented them. We invented all of the
technology that goes into the electric grid, you know, back
near the turn of the century. Nikola Tesla. The first electric
grid in the world was up near Niagara Falls, the first
hydroelectric station, and the thing that makes the grid
possible, the cornerstone of our modern civilization, is the
EHV transformer invented by Nikola Tesla because it makes it
possible to take power from a place like Niagara Falls and
project it long distances, down to New York City, for example.
Then there is another transformer at the end of the line that
steps it down so it can be used locally. But like so many
things that we invented and we used to manufacture and exported
to the world, we don't make it here anymore.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman's time has expired.
Recognize the Ranking Member.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to add to the DHS question that I had raised
earlier that one of the observations of the Sandy event was the
unintended consequence of the grid going--the electricity going
out was that people forgot that fuel stations are run through--
by electricity, and so we ended up having a fuel crisis at the
same time.
So there is sort of a collateral damage piece to this that
I hope is acknowledged as we go through this discussion about
what happens in areas when just in a short period of time
electrical shortages occur or the grid goes out, because even
if you were trying to move physical assets, if you don't
prepare for things like fuel stations that are run by
electricity, you will have a massive issue.
Dr. Beck, I wanted to talk about the international nature
of what we are talking about here, because your report speaks
to that, and I know in your London conference on grid security
last year, there were representatives from business and
industry in addition to governments. Could you describe the
conversations and discussions about how the insurance industry
is viewing EMP and geomagnetic disturbances in the electric
industry?
Mr. Beck. Yes. The past Washington summit was a first
meeting of what we called the three-sector roundtable, which
was the electric power sector, Government, and the insurance
industry representatives, that met to try to talk through some
of these issues about how they might be addressed.
The insurance sector has long been the sector with the most
expertise on risk analysis, which is basically what they do and
how they develop their products. It is difficult in occurrences
like this where the typical traditional risk analysis method is
to use an actuarial method where you have a large database of
previous events, and you can look at probabilities over time.
It becomes much more difficult to do that when you have events
like a large geomagnetic storm that don't occur very often and
haven't--very large storms have not occurred during the time
that we have had a ubiquitous and electric grid.
So that is a challenge, but it is--and those discussions
are on-going. It is a difficult question to address, but it is
very encouraging that those discussions have begun, and that
they are getting input from the electric power sector, from
governments. It is a way perhaps beyond or in addition to a
regulatory approach that could incentivize the industry. It
could provide a business case or a cost mechanism, as the
insurance industry has done in other industries, for example
with fire codes. Fire insurance, you can get a better deal on
your fire insurance if you have a sprinkler system. Well,
perhaps an electric utility could get a better deal on their
insurance, have they done engineering analysis on their system
on what their GMD vulnerability is, for example.
As I said, those are on-going discussions that are in their
early stages, and so I don't have any specifics on. There
aren't recommendations yet, but that kind of approach where you
have the insurance sector playing a role and paying attention
to this--you know, this threat is, I think, a very encouraging
sign.
Ms. Clarke. How do you plan to propose international
standards if there are so many different individualized systems
that need specialized mitigation? I mean, just another case in
point, when there was a major Northeast corridor blackout, and
it originated actually in Canada and then came all the way down
and took out New York City, you know. How do we look at the
differences and come up with the specialized mitigation?
Mr. Beck. Good question. Basically, so first of all, you
are absolutely right, the report that you mentioned earlier,
EIS Council did a survey of 11 countries, their different
experiences with geomagnetic disturbances principally, but also
EMP, and their different approaches, which were a mixture of
hardware and procedural approaches, and from that I would say
you are correct that each country has a unique grid, but there
are lots of similarities in that the physics of electric
transmission generation is the same. So you have transformers,
you have generators, you have transmission assets, you have
generation assets, and you have loads.
Those are the same everywhere, so while any specific
mitigation method--for example, Finland has a very robust grid,
and they don't really use operational procedures; they are all
hardware-based. So they have very tough transformers. They
compensate their long transmission lines with series capacitors
which have an ancillary benefit of blocking currents. They use
special reactors to ground that have a resistance that dampen
currents that come in. So they have a very robust system based
on hardware solutions.
Another example of that is New Zealand that uses grounding
resistors to protect some of their transformers. Other
countries, including the United Kingdom, a mixture of some of
the other Scandinavian countries use a more blended approach of
procedural and hardware solutions.
So I wouldn't say--I think standards are excellent in--for
example, used by the International Electrotechnical Commission
or the IEEE that put out recommended standards for certain
types of performance and parameters through--under which these
components should operate safely, and that gives the industry
something to guide on. But it is, I think, more of a question
of information sharing so that there is a suite of options out
there that are tested and peer reviewed that can then be used
by the industry or by governments, et cetera, to address the
problem.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Perry. The Chairman thanks the gentlelady.
The Chairman recognizes Representative Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your forbearance and just the privilege you have given me to be
on the dais here today.
I just have two remaining questions really, and, Dr. Pry,
just a quick response here. I know a lot of us as we consider
this issue, we realize that if indeed we did lose our grid, in
a worst-case scenario, and we are not projecting a worst-case
scenario, but if it did happen, really the aftermath where
society would begin to tear ourselves apart seems to be the
most frightening aspect of it to me. So the cost of doing
nothing is significantly high, and I think you have
demonstrated that well, but could you give us a sense of how
expensive it would be to harden our bulk power system enough to
recover from a major event; in other words, where we keep our
main components intact, and we can bring our grid back on-line?
I have been told that a couple, $3 billion over 5 years might
do it, and that might be less than $1 per year per ratepayer.
Am I accurately expressing that?
Mr. Pry. Yes. In fact, your estimate is high compared to
the Congressional EMP Commission's estimate, which was that it
would cost about $2 billion over 3 to 5 years to harden the
bulk power system, and $10-20 billion over that same period,
you know, would protect all of the critical infrastructures.
The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission put out an
estimate in 2010, in its 2010 report, that it could be paid for
by--it would increase the rate, the average ratepayer's
electric bill. Your annual electric bill would be increased by
20 cents annually amortized over a period of years, so you
would hardly even feel the pain, you know, that way.
It is not necessary--in addition to the cost of hardening
the country, perhaps we should also keep in mind the cost to
States, because while the preferred solution, of course, is to
do this Nationally, the Commission noted that it is possible
for a State to island its grid, and some States are planning to
do exactly that because they are so frustrated that Washington
has not taken any steps since 2008 and the Commission delivery
of its report.
As I said last year, it has only taken a year for Maine to
pass a bill. Virginia did so earlier this year, and Florida is
working on passing the bill now to island its State, you know,
in a State grid. I think that this is a germane example. North
Carolina is interested in islanding its grid, and they are
considering legislation as well. It would probably--it would
cost something like $5-10 million to harden the whole State of
North Carolina, which is less than what we are spending on a
program in the Department of Defense called SPIDERS, which is
spending $30 million to----
Mr. Franks. You said $5-10 million, correct?
Mr. Pry. Five to ten million dollars for the State of North
Carolina, which has six military bases in it, okay? The SPIDERS
program from the Department of Defense is spending $30 million
to provide energy security for just three military bases.
Mr. Franks. Well, that was the main point I was making was
that, you know, when we were in Israel, some of us--in fact,
some of you on the panel and I were in Israel about a year-and-
a-half ago; I just returned from Israel. They--to use their
terminology, they consider this a very attractive problem--and
this is just to show you how the Israelis deal with these
things--they said, because it represents something that is very
dangerous, but very, very--something that can be addressed with
reasonable cost.
Mr. Pry. Yes.
Mr. Franks. So they are moving forward in a very
significant way.
My last question, Mr. Chairman, it goes to all of them, and
I will start down here with you, Mr. Beck. At present it is not
really clear who is in charge of protecting the Nation against
solar and nuclear EMP or IEMI. Would you be in favor of DHS
taking the role? If not, who should do it? If you can each
articulate briefly who you think should take the lead on this,
what do you think really this represents to America in terms of
threat and danger, how serious is it, what keeps you up, and
what is the next step?
Mr. Beck. Thank you. You saved the easy question for last,
which is nice.
Well, the U.S. electric grid is the most complicated in the
world both by physical design; by the overlapping regulatory
authority, 50 States, a Federal Government, 3,500 electric
companies, et cetera.
When we did the international study, it was pretty easy,
and one of the things where lessons learned was easy was
because you could look at Finland, which has one company and
one regulator, right? So a much easier thing to deal with. Here
it is--that does make it very difficult, and so I have to--in
all honesty, and not to try to duck the question, but the
answer is somewhat complicated because there are all these
agencies, and there isn't just one agency that is in charge.
So I do think it makes sense, especially in the discussion
that we are having before this committee, that DHS plays a
major role because of, I think, the vast utility in addressing
this issue through infrastructure protection. We talked about
DOD can't do it, it is not--at least certainly the solar
threat, there is no deterrence possible, et cetera. So leading
from an infrastructure protection standpoint is very important,
and then the structures then that flow from that where you have
the Department of Energy and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission as the sector-specific agencies, that can make
sense, but it certainly has to be done in coordination with the
State-level governments as well.
Mr. Frankel. Yes, certainly the Department of Homeland
Security, I think, has the primary responsibility, but we
should also not forget the Department of Energy. They have
offices of energy assurance, and they should also be playing
some role. Right now I don't discern exactly what it is, but
somewhere between those two, with DHS in the primary role, I
think that is where you look for leadership.
I want to at least mention the Department of Defense not in
a leadership role in this instance, but they are doing a lot of
relevant work developing hardening techniques. Worried about
their own networks and things of that sort, but they have very
important technology support to contribute to that sort of
thing. But in the end it is not their responsibility, and it is
not their mission, and they are not going to do it. You need to
look at those two Departments for leadership.
Mr. Pry. I agree with what has been said. The Department of
Homeland Security, especially when you are looking at the role
from the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act for planning,
training, and resource allocation for emergency planners and
responders--under the Department of Homeland Security, within
the Department of Homeland Security, the logical regulatory
authority to work most closely over the electric grid should be
the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the U.S. FERC,
and this would be addressed by the SHIELD Act that Mr. Franks
is sponsoring in front of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee.
I think this is really like the--almost equally important
with the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act in terms of its
passage, because the reality and the reason we have this
problem is because the electric power industry exists in a 19th
Century regulatory environment. I mean, there is no Federal
agency that has the kind of regulatory authority relative to
the electric power industry that, for example, the Federal
Aviation Administration has over the airline industry, you
know. I think all Americans and even Tea Party Republicans
would agree that, you know, we need an FAA so you have
independent inspectors who will go out and see, you know, is
there metal fatigue in the wings of this aircraft, and when
that airplane can't fly, and that if an airplane crashes, you
have an FAA to inspect the crash and find out what happened so
that it never happens again. We do this because hundreds of
lives are at stake, and we need to maintain the public safety.
That is why we have an FAA.
But the U.S. FERC doesn't have that power. It can ask the
NERC, which represents the industry, and previously was a trade
association, by the way, and unofficially is a lobby for the
electric power industry, and NERC is the one that is in charge.
They regulate themselves through the NERC. The FERC can ask
them to come up with a plan.
I mean, here is a great example is the great 2003 Northeast
blackout was caused by a falling tree branch that caused
cascading--it took them 10 years for NERC to come up with a
plan, vegetation management plan. So not just--you know, cyber
5 years; they were asked for a plan some 5 years before they
started moving on that.
So U.S. FERC, I say, would be the tip of the spear for
dealing with the electric power industry.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for your
forbearance, and thank you for the opportunity here today, and
thank all of you.
Mr. Perry. Ladies and gentlemen, votes have been called. I
want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and
the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee
may have some additional questions, and if they do, we ask that
you submit them in writing and so there can be responses.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]