[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LIBYA'S DESCENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-218
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-740 PDF WASHINGTON : 2014
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Gerald Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 6
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gerald Feierstein: Prepared statement.............. 8
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 38
Hearing minutes.................................................. 39
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 41
LIBYA'S DESCENT
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. We are going to ask if the members of the
committee could take their seats and the witnesses as well.
This hearing, entitled ``Libya's Descent,'' will come to order.
Less than 3 years ago Libya, at the time, if we think back, was
hailed as a successful example of multilateral engagement--NATO
and our allies all working together to stop the slaughter of
civilians and to free an oppressed people from dictatorship, as
was articulated at the time, to chart a prosperous path forward
for this country in North Africa.
Unfortunately, in the ensuing years we have a situation
since that date where the reality is that Libya has become
chaotic, violent, awash in terrorist organizations and more
militias than we can count. Its porous borders allow for the
easy transit of people, of weapons, of money from conflicts
across North Africa to Gaza to Syria to Iraq, and you have
rival governments now in Tobruk and Tripoli making competing
claims of legitimacy. Four months of fighting by the militias
there--the last 4 months we have seen an additional \1/4\
million people flee Libya and ``bring a climate of fear''--
those are the words of the U.N. special report--``a climate of
fear'' across the country.
Given this downward spiral, it was not surprising that our
Embassy in Tripoli had to be evacuated early this summer, and
last week some of us saw the online videos of militants
occupying that building. I think it reminded Americans of the
deadly terrorist attack on our facility in Benghazi that took
place 2 years ago when you see that occupation.
But you also saw these individuals doing belly flops into
the pool. It was a reminder that you can't have a policy of
neglect that then plays itself out into a humanitarian crisis
and what, frankly, is a national security crisis.
So a U.N. Security Council has called for a cease fire and
sanctions on those involved in the violence. But at the end of
the day the rhetoric has not been matched up with leadership
here and perhaps we should not be surprised that regional
states conducted the air strikes on Libya last month.
Regional states are now attempting to affect their
interests. They are hoping to help their favorite proxy in this
conflict. Some suggest that Libya may even be headed for a
partition or that neighboring Algeria or Egypt may intervene.
We cannot allow Libya to become the Lebanon of the 1970s and
1980s. We remember what happened in Lebanon. We remember how
long society struggled with the aftermath of that situation,
and what happened in Lebanon was that regional states played
out their feuds at the expense of the local population. And if
that is to be avoided, then Libya needs immediate attention. As
we will hear today, the administration is pushing all sides
toward a political solution.
But I don't see this happening without real pressure on the
factions, real leverage on those factions. Others advocate for
cutting off outside support for militias and compelling their
disarmament through threat of force. Such action would have to
be coupled with programs to unlock Libya's wealth in order to
train a security force for all Libyans.
But given how poorly the U.S. and coalition partners have
worked on Libya to date, it is tough to see such an effort
coming together. We have not really had a desire to lead in
Libya and it is an absolutely necessity, I think, right now,
that the administration lay out a strategy to lead in Libya.
We need to hear testimony today on the administration's
plan to respond to the very real threats to national security
that a failed Libya represents, and we need to also hear about
the different proposals for action in Libya that are being
discussed at the United Nations, at NATO, and among other North
African countries.
We need to hear what those options are, what those
discussions are. Libya and every conflict is, of course, rooted
in local conditions but the many Middle Eastern conflicts do
share a driving force of extremism, jihadists fueled by radical
ideology, armed and funded from outside the immediate area.
In this case, again, not surprisingly, Qatar is up to its
elbows in funding terrorist activity there or funding some of
these militias but other countries as well have their proxies.
It is a deadly accelerant that the administration has been
slow in recognizing and countering and part of this hearing
today is to bring some focus on it and bring some strategy into
it.
So I would now like to turn to our ranking member, Mr. Ted
Deutch of Florida, for his opening remarks. I would mention
that Eliot Engel was in New York for Primary Day yesterday so
he is on his way back and so ranking today is Mr. Ted Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What began in Libya as
the successful overthrow of the dictator Muammar Gaddafi has
tragically devolved into an environment that appears to have
put the country on the brink of becoming a failed state.
There were plans in place after the revolution in 2011 that
offered promising signs such as the formation of national
institutions, the reintegration of militias into a new national
military force.
But the Libya we see today is not the Libya that the Libyan
people who suffered so long under Gaddafi nor the world
envisioned. In late June of this year, the Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa held a hearing on Libya, entitled
``Libya at a Crossroads.''
Now, just months later it appears that Libya is on a path
away from democracy and stability and toward increased violence
and fragmentation. The fracturing of Libya's elected and state
institutions has left the country incapable of producing or
implementing any effective policies.
The recently elected House of Representatives has fled to
the eastern city of Tubruk while the unrecognized reformed
General National Congress dominated by Islamist former MPs sits
in the capitol of Tripoli.
The National Security Force had never achieved sole control
over security within its borders and has now suffered from
defections and divisions. Most of the country is now dominated
by various militant groups vying for control, weaving an
inconsistent patchwork of loyalties throughout the country.
The security situation has deteriorated to the point that
Libya's airport and much of Tripoli are dominated by Islamist
militias. The U.S. Government has relocated our Embassy staff
amid reports that a force aligned with a Libya Dawn coalition
is now claiming to be guarding our abandoned Embassy. Fear that
unrest inside Libya will not be contained within its borders is
permeating the region.
The instability has created an environment where
transnational extremist groups can easily travel in and out of
the country and porous borders have allowed for the easy flow
of weapons and foreign fighters.
Following their respective revolutions, Egypt to Libya's
east and Tunisia to the northwest have worked hard to resist
the pressures of radical militant groups from causing
significant unrest and moving their countries backward.
But having a failed state as a neighbor, in which terrorist
groups are free to consolidate and grow and are given free
access to significant amounts of weapons and resources, is not
a reality that either country can accept. So the question now
remains: Who on the ground can be a partner for the
international community?
There is no neat division of loyalty among the Libyan
people and it is difficult to determine which parties share our
interests. The members of the House of Representatives were
elected only a few months ago, albeit with a very low voter
turnout.
Possibly for this reason it lacks recognition and
legitimacy for many Libyans. The alternative body, the GNC,
defied the political roadmap in the Libyan constitution by
creating a parallel government separate from the elected body.
General Haftar's forces have been fighting Islamist groups
including Ansar al-Sharia, the group responsible for the attack
on our Benghazi mission nearly 2 years ago that led to the
tragic death of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other
Americans. But his forces have faced recent setbacks and his
political intentions are not entirely clear.
It also remains unclear what role other countries in the
region are playing in Libya's internal affairs. Nevertheless, I
believe the United States must remain engaged in Libya.
We must encourage a political process that results in the
recognition of one legitimate government and continue to offer
support through good governance, democracy assistance, and rule
of law development programs.
We must remain ready to assist in the training of a Libyan
General Purpose Force that is capable of reclaiming security
control in the country and encourage the Libyan Government to
take steps to finally commence this program.
As I have said, Libya's neighbors have a vested interest in
restoring stability to Libya. The United Nations has committed
a point person to work on negotiating a cease fire between the
various factions.
But the international community must be clear that
continued support for extremist Islamist groups by regional
actors cannot be tolerated.
Libya has a long way to go to repair the 42 years of
Gaddafi's rule, in which he tore down any semblance of
democratic governance and functioning institutions and
ultimately the future of Libya is in the hands of the Libyan
people.
Ambassador Feierstein, I look forward to your testimony to
hear how the State Department is determining the best approach
for the United States to take to prevent Libya from indeed
becoming a failed state, and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. We go to the chair
of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Ms.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, for 1 minute.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this timely hearing. As Mr. Deutch pointed out, our
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa held a hearing
with State Department officials on Libya's faltering transition
months ago and here we are again, only Libya's deteriorating
situation has gotten worse and Libya is teetering on the brink
of becoming a failed state.
After the air campaign in Libya in 2011, the Obama
administration turned its back on the long-term engagement that
Libya desperately needed for a smoother transition.
The political narrative that all was swell in Libya created
a breeding ground for the terrorist attack against Americans in
our consulate in Benghazi. After this void it was replaced by
militias, terrorist organizations, and other nonstate actors
that are ripping this country apart.
We want a concrete plan from the administration to address
how it is working to prevent Libya from turning into a larger
safe haven for terrorists and posing a serious threat to the
region and U.S. national security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Chairwoman. We are going to go
to--for 1 minute to Gerry Connolly of Virginia with the Middle
East Subcommittee and then to the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Judge Ted Poe of
Texas, for a minute.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr.
Ambassador.
I very much respect my dear friend, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of
Florida, but I cannot accept the gratuitous potshot at the
administration as if this President and the administration are
responsible for what has transpired in Libya.
Many of the same current critics criticized the
administration for not being more active in Libya at the time
of the revolution.
There are internal forces in Libya that have to be
understood and that are far beyond American control and the
reign of militias is one of them. When I went to visit Libya,
security at the airport was provided by a militia. That was
over 2 years ago, and unfortunately the situation seems to have
deteriorated.
So I think it is really important, and this I do agree with
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen--we can't look at the Libya situation with
rose-colored glasses. We have got to figure out what are our
next steps forward and what, if anything, can be done to try to
put us on a path toward stable governance. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. Mr. Poe.
Mr. Poe. No question about it, Gaddafi was a bad guy. But
when the United States decided to remove his legitimate
government and overthrow him, that was, to me, a strategic
political mistake that has consequences we see today.
Now, such decision, of course, was made without
congressional approval. When the United States gave the green
light to Qatar to send weapons to Libya and spread the
conflict, it spread throughout North Africa including to the
terrorist group AQIM.
AQIM used those weapons to take over a gas plant in Algeria
and kill one of my constituents, Victor Lovelady, and two other
Americans. Of course, we know about the U.S. Ambassador and
three other Americans killed in Benghazi.
When Gaddafi was gone, radicals of different stripes
including some affiliated with al-Qaeda had filled the vacuum.
The Government of Libya cannot govern because it has no
functional army and to me it is a failed state.
The people support the militia groups because they are the
ones--they provide the security so people support them. Now the
United States has pulled out of Libya, leaving terrorists to
play in the swimming pools owned by the United States.
Libya today is a result of a policy of removing a
government without congressional approval because we don't like
them. We are not safer because Gaddafi is gone. The world is
not safer and Libya is in chaos, and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. This morning we are pleased to be joined by
Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
Prior to his current position, he was the United States
Ambassador to Yemen from 2010 to 2013--tough post--and he
joined the Foreign Service in June of '75 and has served
overseas in eight different postings including Islamabad,
Tunis, Riyadh and Beirut--tougher posts.
The Ambassador also served as principal deputy assistant
coordinator and deputy assistant coordinator for programs in
the Bureau of Counterterrorism from '06 to '08.
Without objection, we are going to have the witness' full
prepared statement be made part of the record and members here
will have 5 calendar days in which they can submit any
statements or questions or any extraneous material for the
record.
So Ambassador Feierstein, if you would please summarize
your remarks. We will go 5 minutes and then ask you questions.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GERALD FEIERSTEIN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you very--thank you very much,
Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the
committee, for giving me this opportunity to come here today
and to discuss the situation in Libya and the administration's
response.
Since the 2011 revolution, millions of Libyans have
expressed high hopes that the country will seize the
opportunity provided by the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime to
build a new state based on strong democratic institutions and
providing a secure, stable framework that would put Libya's
vast energy resources to work on behalf of the Libyan people.
Instead, Libya's new political institutions and leaders
have failed to beat Libya's challenges. Despite the efforts of
many brave Libyans as well as the active engagement of the
United States and our international partners, too many of
Libya's power brokers and militia commanders have rejected
principles of dialogue, consensus building, and compromise in
favor of pursuit of narrow-minded interests and a scramble for
control of Libya's resources.
The weak central government ravaged by 42 years of
Gaddafi's misrule has proven incapable of providing security,
governance or access to economic opportunity. In the absence of
capable government, opportunistic criminals, militias, and
terrorist groups are battling for control.
Internecine clashes have been fuelled by domestic weapons
stockpiles and flows of fighters and weapons as a result of the
government's inability to secure Libya's long porous borders.
In recent months, hundreds of Libyan civilians have died as
a result of the conflict and the United Nations reports that
\1/4\ million people inside Libya have been displaced since the
recent clashes began.
Critical Libyan public infrastructure including Libya's
major airports in Benghazi and in Tripoli have also been
targeted by rival militias. Indeed, the conflict in parts of
the country is best understood primarily as a struggle over
resources and power and only secondarily over ideology.
Clearly, Libya cannot move forward without addressing its
lawlessness and violence and it cannot address the violence
without achieving a basic political framework for the path
forward.
But Libya's political transition has stalled and in recent
weeks the government itself has fractured into two competing
groups based in different cities, Tripoli and Tubruk, even as
most of the international community has been forced by the
violence to leave the country.
As fighting escalated in the Tripoli neighborhood where our
Embassy is located, the United States decided to suspend
operations temporarily and withdraw U.S. personnel from the
country. Ambassador Jones and a small team have relocated to
our Embassy in Malta from which they continue to carry out
their diplomatic and assistance duties.
It remains in United States interests to help remove Libya
from this cycle of violence. We want to see the fighting end
and competing factions commit to settling their differences
through a process of dialogue and negotiation.
In fact, despite the violence, we do see a potential path
forward. There are still many in Libya who understand that
their country needs an inclusive government that shares power
and resources in a fair and transparent way.
We are working closely with the United Nations, the
European Union, and other European partners to advance a
unified approach, encouraging all Libyans to adopt basic
principles of nonviolence and commit to a democratic state.
We are working to promote these principles directly with
Libyans from across the country and the political spectrum. We
and our allies also have a number of coordinated assistance
programs designed to help Libyans build a secure, democratic
and prosperous state that continues to operate through local
staff and existing networks on the ground.
Libyan spoilers need to understand that there are
consequences for violence and for actions that threaten Libya's
democratic transition. Consistent with that, we were able to
work with the members of the U.N. Security Council 2 weeks ago
to secure unanimous approval of a new resolution, U.N. SCR
2174, that provides for targeted U.N. sanctions against those
who undermine the political transition process.
We also are reaching out to Libya's neighbors and to others
in the region and beyond who have a strong interest in seeing a
stable, secure and democratic Libya. Our goal is to seek these
countries' support in pushing all Libyan factions into a
productive political process. Envisioning a peaceful and
prosperous Libya can be challenging, particularly when the
trajectory is negative. But if Libya could overcome its
discord, it has unique advantages that could support the
advancement of the democratic transition process and facilitate
building the state. If Libya's political factions were to work
together instead of fighting, they could boost oil and other
exports to capacity and use the proceeds to invest in Libya's
infrastructure, its health and education systems and, most
importantly, its people.
With a population of only 6 million, Libya offers enormous
opportunities. Supporting a political resolution to the current
impasse so that we can advance Libyans' efforts to build a
democratic state remains one of the United States' top foreign
policy goals.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I stand to answer questions
from the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feierstein follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Royce. Ambassador, thank you. Thank you very much.
A couple of quick questions.
One has been, how to pronounces this--Khoms, the town 125
miles east of Tripoli that we read about where it is sort of
the favorite jumping off point for these fighters that are
headed to ISIL. Can----
Mr. Feierstein. There is Derna.
Chairman Royce. Well, the region--let us just talk about
the region in general in the east. That is where so many of
these key al-Qaeda fighters came from in the past and now we
see these ISIS fighters coming out of that area.
Can you provide any more detail there about the route that
they are taking, you know, to get into the Iraq-Syria fight?
And then last week, we saw the story about the plane from Sudan
landing near the Libyan-Sudanese border and the government in
Libya claims that the plane was full of weapons, destined for
the Islamist Libya Dawn and for that militia, and in response
you saw the Sudanese military attache being expelled.
The Sudanese Government denied it, but at the same time you
had a situation where President Bashir warmly received the
Islamist party representative, the President of the former
Libyan General National Congress in Khartoum last week.
So we see that internecine situation where they are
engaged. You see that Qatar, which is not only engaged here but
with al-Nusra--funding al-Nusra, and then 90 percent of Hamas--
they tell us that 90 percent of Hamas' funding is now coming
from Qatar.
What can you tell us about these outside countries'
interests and who they are funding here and also the connection
to these young fighters getting whipped up and ending up
enlisting with ISIL?
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all of those
are important questions.
In terms of the flow of foreign fighters, I don't think
that there is one single route that they--that they pursue to
get to Syria or to Iraq. There are a number of different ways
that they transit from Libya into Europe, into Turkey, directly
into Syria.
So one of the things, of course, that we are talking about
in terms of what we are going to try to accomplish in
confronting ISIL and, as the President said, in defeating ISIL,
is, in fact, to work with our friends and partners around the
world to cut off this flow of foreign fighters and there are a
number of different steps that we need to take to do that and
the State Department--Ambassador Bradtke--is very much involved
in visiting and particularly in North Africa where we do have
serious concerns about the movement of foreign fighters.
Chairman Royce. Yes, but what is happening is that Sudan
and other countries are playing this role in creating absolute
chaos and out of chaos is coming, you know, more enlistments.
What role is Sudan playing right now in Libya? In the past,
we have talked about the role Sudan played, you know, in
supporting groups like the Lord's Resistance Army--Joseph
Kony--in trying to destabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Uganda and Central African Republic.
Well, you know, here is Sudan again playing a role. What
can you tell us about that role?
Mr. Feierstein. Yes, sir, and certainly the reports that
you mentioned of flights from Sudan bringing weapons into
Libya--we are very aware of those.
It is a serious problem. We have taken a broad position not
only with the Qataris and the Sudanese but across the board
that foreign intervention inside of Libya is unhelpful, it is
deepening divisions within that society.
It is provocative. It is promoting the very conflict that
we believe is the major obstacle and so we are looking--there
is a process under way--it is called the Tunis process--that
brings together Libya's neighbors in ways that we think are
constructive and helpful, and they met 2 weeks ago in Cairo and
issued a very helpful statement which basically said that they
are opposed to foreign involvement, foreign intervention in
Libyan affairs. Sudan is part of that process and we will be
looking to them for--to stop.
Chairman Royce. Well, I understand. Ambassador, I wish your
testimony made me feel better about the direction we are
headed.
I think that the reality is whatever our protestations and
whatever people are signing in terms of these statements of
disapproval, the reality is that Qatar and Sudan and other
states are pouring in weapons, pouring in money and creating
the instability, the chaos, out of which comes the threat, and
I think we need a strategy for what we are going to do--not
say--but what we are going to do with respect to the emir of
Qatar.
We need a strategy in terms of what we are going to do with
Khartoum. But anyway, my time has expired. I will go to Mr. Ted
Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Feierstein,
understanding that this might be classified, can you comment on
the reported action taken by the Egyptians and the Emiratis in
Libya and what are the ramifications of this kind of foreign
action at this point, given the internal chaos within the
country?
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you, Mr. Deutch, and as you
suggested, it is difficult to talk about that issue in this
setting. But we would be happy to come back and speak to you in
a classified setting and provide you with a fuller brief on
what we know about those issues.
But I would say that, as a general principle whenever there
are allegations like this, we do investigate them and we will
try to make sure that we understand what happened.
But, again, it goes back to the general principle, which is
what we see as the--as the danger of this foreign engagement
and the fact is that as long as we have this conflict going on
inside of Libya it is going to invite unhelpful engagement by
outside parties who are going to use this as an opportunity to
pursue their own goals, their own agendas.
And so the strategy that we have is to try to bring the
Libyans together, end the conflict inside of Libya and the
violence and begin a political process that will close off the
opportunities that outside actors have to engage unhelpfully
inside of Libya.
Mr. Deutch. All right. Thank you. I hope we have the
opportunity to pursue that further in the appropriate setting.
The prospect of Libya as a terrorist safe haven isn't just a
U.S. problem. It is a problem for the international community,
particularly our European friends, given the proximity.
What is our assessment of the links between the militants
in Libya and other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and do we know at
this point whether Libyan fighters are joining ISIL's ranks?
Mr. Feierstein. The links, of course, we do have--as was
mentioned in the opening statements, we do have a longstanding
issue with al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb--AQIM--which has
been a concern for many years. We watch very closely.
There have been some who have expressed interest in joining
their programs, their organizations with ISIL. We haven't
actually seen that happen yet.
We are certainly concerned about Libyan fighters who are
going to Syria or Iraq to join the fight there. It goes back to
the concern that we have overall about the flow of foreign
fighters and the need to stop that.
So all of these remain concerns and issues that are high in
our agenda. In terms of what we are doing, absolutely correct
that the Europeans are extremely concerned about this.
We have the European Union's border assistance
organization, EUBAM, that has established and has been trying
to push a program inside of Libya that would help secure Libyan
borders.
In terms of our own activities, we are supporting EUBAM but
we are also working with Libya's neighbors--with the Egyptians,
with Tunisia, with Algeria--to try to help them strengthen
their border security.
We are also, of course, very concerned about the flow of
weapons and trying to remove weapons from Libya and prevent the
flow of new weapons, and the U.N. Security Resolution 2174
includes new language on preventing the flow of weapons inside
of Libya.
So we are working across a number of different avenues of
effort to try to prevent the flow of fighters and weapons in
and out of Libya and to provide greater security.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. I am--I hope over the course of this
hearing you will have an opportunity to speak to the broader
issue of the reason that we should continue to be involved in
Libya.
Hopefully, you will have a chance to speak to the State
Department's view of not just why Libya is important--you have
spoken about that some, we have all spoken about that--but what
is--where are we going.
All of our discussions, understandably, are focused on the
near term and the intermediate term. Long term, though, what do
you expect Syria to--Libya, rather, to look like in 5 years? In
10 years?
What is the best that we can actually hope for? And I am
out of time but I do hope that you will have a chance to speak
to that. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Welcome,
Mr. Ambassador.
As Mr. Deutch pointed out, our subcommittee held a hearing
months ago on Libya, the same day that elections were being
held in that country, and while there may have been a cautious
optimism that the June 25 elections could have been an
important step toward stability in Libya, during the hearing I
made it clear that the timing of the elections was rushed
because it was announced only 1 month before the elections were
going to take place.
So it is not surprising that the elections ultimately
failed to bring about a large turnout nor the much desired path
toward democracy and the rule of law in Libya, and during that
hearing Ambassador Patterson was optimistic that the elections
in Libya, which were the third in less than 2 years, would be
an important step forward toward Libya's stability.
Now we see that that was misplaced optimism as the
situation is worse than ever. I cautioned then that as long as
the security situation remained tenuous in Libya so too will
the political will and the transition stall and that Libya's
economy would continue to falter.
So given the fact that your testimony admits that there is
an absence of a capable government, why were elections rushed
at the time when we knew that it wasn't sustainable for the
long term?
And I agree that elections are important but it is just one
part of a democracy and only when there is a political will to
govern effectively and inclusively.
The fighting in Libya continues to be overshadowed by a
struggle between secular forces against Islamists, but with
over 1,600 militias in this country this characterization is
actually oversimplified, but just in terms of trying to grab
the enormity of the problem--1,600 militias.
In our subhearing, Assistant Secretary Patterson said,
``The most urgent objective we have is for counterterrorism.''
Yet, 3 years after Gaddafi and over a year after the U.S.
committed to train the General Purpose Force, GPF, not a single
one of the 5,000 to 8,000 planned forces has in fact been
trained.
Seeing the need now more than ever for a security force in
Libya, why has this project not gotten off the ground?
How else do we plan on combating the terrorist threat that
is growing within Libya, short of direct U.S. intervention? And
not only has the internal fighting deteriorated but it has
already become a regional conflict. Unsecure borders allow
extremists and weapons smugglers unhindered access into the
country.
And then my third question is about the Friends of Libya
Summit. I know that these entities have been meeting off and
on. It was announced earlier that the U.N. General Assembly,
the African Union, and the Spanish Government will hold this
Friends of Libya Summit in Madrid.
Is this going to happen or is it just a continuation of
what has--the meetings that have already taken place? Is Egypt
trying to get support for its 10-point plan on Libya? Because I
notice that in your testimony you don't highlight that. Does
the State Department endorse this plan or not?
So my questions are the three questions: The General
Purpose Force training, what is the status of that?; looking
back, do we feel that we were rushing the election process and
being too enthusiastic about it?; and the Friends of Libya
Summit, Egypt's 10-point plan--are we endorsing that and what
is happening?
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. In terms of
the three specific points, the General Purpose Force is still
something that we want to pursue.
It is something that we have discussed with Prime Minister
al-Thani and the other senior leadership. We had an opportunity
to talk about that when he was here for the Africa Summit a
couple of weeks ago.
They, subsequently to those meetings, actually signed the
letter of agreement for the GPF and, of course, a part of the
issue there is the funding for it and their obligation to pay
for the training. But we are working on that and we hope to
move forward.
So as soon as circumstances permit, it is still our
commitment and our--and our desire to move forward on the
General Purpose Force. We continue to see that as an important
element of the overall security framework for Libya, going
forward.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. I asked too many
questions and I blab on too much. So I hope that you get to the
answers through another venue. Thank you so much.
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Dr. Bera of California is recognized.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairwoman. Libya continues to show
the difficult transition from autocratic authoritarian regimes
to democracy or some form of democracy.
I mean, we have seen it--seen the difficulty in Iraq and we
have seen the turmoil for decades in Lebanon and, again, Libya
proves that it is not a straight shot.
You know, I think playing off of the question that my
colleague from Florida, Mr. Deutch, asked, what does the long
term look like in Libya as well as some of these other states
that are making this transition?
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you for the question, and I think
that as I alluded in my opening statement, our view is that
Libya is still a country with enormous potential. It has, of
course, as we know, huge energy resources and established
infrastructure that can--that can export those resources
primarily to Europe, which is their major customer.
It is a relatively small population. We believe that with
the proper investment in health and education it is a
population that will be able to manage Libyan affairs very
successfully.
We believe and are committed to trying to help Libya
develop the governmental institutions that would allow it to
build a stable democratic society and we also believe that this
is what the majority of Libyans desire.
So I think that our view is that the path forward, if we
can stabilize the situation now; end the violence, get a
political process moving that allows Libyans to come to a
negotiating table and work out their differences, if we can do
those things then the international community including the
United States, including Libya's neighbors and the countries of
Europe are standing by to support the development of the
institutions that will allow them to move forward successfully
into the future.
Mr. Bera. So you touched on a key point. So if we look at
our own democracy here in America, time and time again we have
demonstrated when threatened we are willing to step up and
fight and die to protect our freedom and democracy.
You mentioned that, Ambassador, that the Libyan people
desire that democracy or that stability. Do you have a sense
that they are willing to step up and fight against, you know,
the militias that, you know, potentially are tearing their
country apart?
I mean, again, democracy, for it to have long-term
stability, has to come from within and the people have to be
willing to fight for it.
Mr. Feierstein. We couldn't agree more and I think that the
Libyan people demonstrated during the resistance in 2011 to
Muammar Gaddafi and the clique around him that they are
prepared to stand up and to fight and to die in defense of
their values and I do think, again, that what we see is still
the critical mass of Libyans who are ready to do that, who are
ready to work with us, the international community, ready to
work with each other to try to build the kind of society that
they would like to see for the future.
Mr. Bera. Great, and I have got two last questions. I will
try to get them in here. What percentage of the destabilizing
forces in these militias are actually coming external from
Libya, that are not fighting for the interests of the Libyan
people?
Mr. Feierstein. To the best of our knowledge and
understanding, sir, we believe that there are not very many
foreign fighters inside of Libya. This is mostly militias who
were drawn from the Libyan population.
Mr. Bera. Okay. And lastly, if we look at the Arab Spring
in total, it is interesting. The one country where the Arab
Spring purportedly started--Tunisia--while not without its own
challenges, appears to be relatively stable in this. Are there
any contrasts that we can draw or lessons that we can learn
from Tunisia?
Mr. Feierstein. Tunisia is, of course, in our view, as you
said, one of the states that has most successfully moved into
this political transition period.
I think that you could say that Tunisia, over the course of
its independent history, had a number of governmental
institutions that continue to function and that continue to
provide a framework for this successful transition.
I think also we should credit the wisdom of the Tunisian
political leadership, the people who actually came to power
after the Arab Spring, after the revolution there, made a
number of very smart decisions about how they were going to
work together--exactly the same kind of initiative that we
would like to see the Libyans demonstrate in terms of their own
transition.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Bera. Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Sir, I appreciate you being here. You know, I always get a
kick out of you guys when you come in and we talk about
promoting democracy over there and, you know, if you look at
the traditional democracies they only last about 200 years, and
a democracy is mob rule. It is majority rule.
The thing that has worked with our country is it is a
constitutional republic--that we go through a democratic
process to elect leaders--and, you know, when we look at the
history of these democracies, we are trying to promote
something that is unsustainable because they always fall into
decay and it has been proven over and over in history.
So I hope we change that dynamic. With saying that, you
know, when I look at what we have done in the Middle East over
the last 40 or 50 years, you know, we have spent over--we have
invested over $78 billion in Egypt, you know, and they are
struggling now, and the other countries that we have entered we
have seen them struggling.
One of my questions is how effective is the U.N. Security
Council in initiating and carrying out the cease fire that they
brokered at the end of August? I mean, do you see that as
something that is going to hold?
Is it going to be effective and is it going to lead to some
stability in that country? We have seen it so many times where
they go in there and just--it decays, and the thing that made
our democracy work, our republic work, is we had a group of
people that laid everything on the line to fight for freedom
and liberty.
Do they have that same sentiment? So go back to the U.N.
first. Do you see them initiating and carrying this out to be
effective? Go ahead and answer that first.
Mr. Feierstein. Congressman, first, let me say I couldn't
agree with you more that, really, the ability to sustain
democratic governance is really based on the stability of the
institutions that support it and then the reason--I mean, we
can talk about the reason that the U.S. has been successful
that way is because we had strong institutions that managed and
guided that democracy and kept it from deteriorating into mob
rule.
Where we are right now, of course, is that we have a new
SRSG--Senior Representative for the Secretary General,
Bernardino Leon, who has just taken over from Tarek Mitri as
the U.N. representative for Libya.
He has visited Libya over the last several days and held
talks with a number of the leading Libyan politicians and is
working very hard with our support and with the support of the
rest of the international community to try to get the violence
to stop and to move into that political dialogue.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. And then right now how effective or
successful will Khalifa Haftar be, in your opinion, since he
has an anti-Islamist view, versus the people that are fighting
that are of the more Islamic, maybe radical view?
Do you see that being successful, you know, because you
have got a divergence of ideologies and what we have seen
developing in Turkey and what you have seen developing in
Qatar, you know, those people are standing--like Turkey
realizes they can't survive without being a Muslim Islamist
state, and when you have somebody that is trying to develop
that in Libya, I just see that as a no-win. What is your
opinion on that?
Mr. Feierstein. Sir, I think that Khalifa Haftar actually
put his finger on something that was of concern to a great
number of Libyans, which was the drift of the country toward an
Islamist agenda, and I think he was successful at that. But,
unfortunately, his solution--his channel has been a violent
one.
He has pursued a very aggressive stance toward some of
these groups and he has ended up promoting a more polarized
society and in fact has led to the reaction to his position and
that has contributed directly to the violence.
Mr. Yoho. Let me interrupt you here because I am about out
of time. You said the country was drifting to the Islamist view
and he stopped that.
If it is drifting that way, is that not public sentiment of
what they want and so there is going to be resentment and there
is going to be that internal conflict? I don't see--I don't see
a good solution in that.
Mr. Feierstein. And this is exactly right--that there are
differences of view within that society. There are some people
who are supporting a more Islamic vision for their future and
there are some who are more secular.
So and, again, we believe that the important thing is that
there are elements on both sides of that divide who are
committed to a democratic future, who are committed to a more
open tolerant society. We want to support them.
Khalifa Haftar, unfortunately, has deepened the
polarization in the society through violence and has deepened
the divisions and made it more difficult to reach a political
negotiated solution.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. Mr. Connolly of
Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, in your testimony--in your written
statement you refer to the fact that our Embassy has been
relocated to Malta. So what is its mission? How does it
function? Malta is not that far away but it ain't in Libya.
Mr. Feierstein. Absolutely. The good thing, of course,
obviously, our intention is to get back to Libya as soon as the
security circumstances permit.
Mr. Connolly. So the purpose of relocation was a security
purpose?
Mr. Feierstein. The reason that we withdrew from Tripoli in
the first place was because there was fighting in the area,
immediately around the Embassy to the point where the security
of our personnel was in danger. Their ability to move around
and do their jobs was very, very limited.
Mr. Connolly. Well, let me--let me ask about that. I get
the point. Even from Malta, is there a central governor? Are
there ministers to whom they can relate and do their job?
Mr. Feierstein. Yes, sir. Ambassador Jones is able on the
phone and also in person--because many of the Libyan leaders
come through Malta on a regular basis and so she has been able
to meet with the foreign minister.
She has been able to meet with the prime minister. She was
here during the Africa summit and participated in all those
conversations.
Mr. Connolly. But let me--but I guess what I am getting at
is it is not just our functionality but the functionality of
the counterpart. I mean, to what extent would it be fair to say
that is all mythology? I mean, yeah, they may have that title
but they are not functioning as the minister of foreign
affairs.
You know, it is almost a Potemkin government, given the
role of the militias, given recent history in Tripoli in terms
of a takeover of the city for a while by an Islamist-oriented
militia.
What are we--I mean, are we going through sort of the
motions of diplomacy as if we are dealing with a real
structured government when in fact we are not?
Mr. Feierstein. No, sir. I think--first of all, of course,
Ambassador Jones is able to be in touch with a broad spectrum
of political leaders in Libya--not just the government, not
just the prime minister but across the board. So she is able to
carry out our efforts to mediate, to promote political
resolutions, to try to bring the parties together.
Mr. Connolly. What is it you think is the critical sine qua
non for trying to see a functioning government, if not a stable
government, emerge from this morass?
Mr. Feierstein. The sine qua non would be, one, an end to
violence; two, we would like to see full participation in the
House of Representatives, which is the Libyan Parliament.
Mr. Connolly. We Democrats would like to see that here in
our House of Representatives as well.
Mr. Feierstein. And, three, of course, we would like to see
the formation of a new government in Libya that would reflect
fairly the full spectrum of political representation inside the
House of Representatives. And so----
Mr. Connolly. Wouldn't that be an Islamicist-dominated
legislature, though, if it did what you just said--only
represented a spectrum of opinion?
Mr. Feierstein. No, sir. I think that if you look at the
election of the House of Representatives in June, it was a
fairly good cross section of what we consider to be the entire
political spectrum. Most of the members are independents and we
believe that it is a fair representation of the Libyan
population.
Mr. Connolly. So that is a hopeful analysis. Final
question, because I am going to run out of time, one of our
goals is to create a General Purpose Force. Is that correct?
And the reason for that, obviously, is to substitute that
ordered government force for roving militias, some of which may
have good intentions, some of which may have an agenda with
which we would disagree. But you can't have a stable
functioning government if you don't have the ability to police
in a normal functioning way.
What are the prospects for us to succeed in training 5,000
to 8,000 members of the GPF and to have it hold together and
not, you know, disintegrate as we have seen in some other
countries?
Mr. Feierstein. That is absolutely still our objective. As
I mentioned earlier, the Libyans have now signed the letter of
agreement that would allow us to go forward. There is still the
funding issue that we are waiting to resolve.
But as soon as the security conditions permit, we continue
to hold out as our objective to set up that force and to see it
take on its responsibilities for security in the country.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. My time is up.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Perry is recognized.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you,
Ambassador. I got to tell you, while I listened to your
testimony I feel like I am living in some kind of twilight zone
of altered reality here.
You know, even when you just speak of the last
questioners--you know, how do we expect to train these folks--
and you say well, we have an agreement with the Libyans to do
this, and I am thinking, you know, we have an--there is all
these militias.
They are having, essentially, a civil war. Like, what
agreement do we have and have you ever tried to train troops
under fire? I mean, it sounds--it sounds patently absurd. Let
me just ask you this.
You know, articles in the New Yorker and the Washington
Post essentially said that the administration has a policy
regarding Libya in particular and, in my opinion, in many other
things of leading from behind.
Assuming maybe that has some truth or not to it, in your
opinion, first of all, is there any truth to that? Is there
any--have we led from behind?
Mr. Feierstein. Sir, I think that if you look at the
history of our engagement with Libya since 2011, since the
uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, you will see that the United
States has been extremely engaged, beginning in September 2011
with Secretary Clinton's leadership at a meeting in Paris.
Mr. Perry. But forgive me for interrupting. Engaged is one
thing. Leading is another. Leading is a whole different
paradigm.
So are we engaged or are we leading? And for leading show
me or demonstrate--display to me how the oversight of our
leadership has contributed to the success or the failure of
what has happened in Libya.
Mr. Feierstein. What I would say, sir, is that the United
States remains the focal point--it remains the center of
gravity for the international community.
When the United States stands up and demonstrates resolve
and demonstrates direction, the international community
generally supports and falls into place behind. And so I think
in the case of Libya, if you are looking at what we have tried
to do in terms of promoting democracy and governance, building
institutional capacity, addressing some of the security issues
through the General Purpose Force and as well as border
security and some of the other activities, I think those are
all areas where the United States has played a leadership role
in coordinating and bringing together the full international
community.
I think that in the--in the period immediately before
Ramadan, right after the elections in June, you saw the United
States with our friends and partners in the international
community working very aggressively, trying to work out--the
chairwoman mentioned the 10-point plan.
We were very much involved in developing and negotiating
that 10-point plan with the Libyans. So I think over and over
again you see a----
Mr. Perry. Well, let me offer this conjecture. With all due
respect to the administration and the State Department, if it
is as you say, that we are leading and the international
coalition is behind us, that this is a breathtaking failure at
this point. And I don't know how it is going to end up but at
this moment it seems like a breathtaking failure of leadership
and actualization and implementation.
I mean, I look at 110, 111 EU personnel charged with
securing the border and I look at the size of the border of--
you know, I don't know what kind of program anybody is on that
think that that is going to work.
But to me just simple arithmetic says that it has no
absolutely--it is preposterous. That having been said, you
know, I think about some of the other comments that have been
made here regarding programs and sanctions.
Do you think that rebel forces fighting one another with
heavy weapons that they have procured from the failed state
care about sanctions? And what programs are working under the
auspices of, you know, thousands and hundreds of thousands of
displaced civilians trying to live among, you know, a war-
tattered country and a war zone with foreign fighters coming in
and arms coming in and going out?
I mean, that is this altered state of reality that I feel
like I am hearing here, and you say if we--if we can stabilize.
We are not stabilizing anything.
We are sitting here watching this thing burn down and we
are milling around with all these foolish policies that we
can't implement and we can't expect them to implement because
there is no governance there.
I mean, I am sorry but that is--I am listening to this
rhetoric here and it sounds like a bunch of mumbo jumbo that
means nothing on the ground. Am I wrong?
Mr. Feierstein. Sir, I don't want to underestimate the
challenges that are in front of us and, of course, they are
huge and it is a very difficult environment in which we are
trying to work.
But the fact of the matter is that there are opportunities.
The EUBAM mission that you mentioned, the border assistance
mission, is not to guard the border but to train the Libyans to
take on that responsibility themselves and at the end of the
day the Libyans are going to be responsible for what happens in
their country and they are going to have to do these things.
So we can work with them. We can help them. We can support
them. I think that many of the programs that we are--that we
are pursuing now, particularly on the governance side--trying
to build institutional capacity--are things that are going to
succeed over time.
But there is no--there is no getting around the basic point
that you are making, I think, which is that this is an
extremely difficult and challenging environment at this time.
We need to stick with it.
We need to try to push through this particular period and
to get the Libyans into a situation where many of the things
that we are trying to accomplish actually become effective and
implementable.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Perry.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Madame Chair. Mr. Ambassador, thank
you very much for your service. Thank you for your testimony
today.
A couple of points that I would love to get your
clarification on or just flush out to the extent that you can
in this setting, sir. First off, as you have just indicated,
the situation on the ground in Libya is very complex and very
complicated, going to take a period of time.
We are seeing instability throughout and a failure of
institutions throughout and governing institutions throughout
the Middle East and other parts of the world as well. This is
not a short-term solution.
Do you have--are you comfortable giving any sort of ball
park assessment? Is this months? Is this years? Is this a
decade? What type of forecast are we looking for--are we
looking at here, to the best you can assess at the moment?
Mr. Feierstein. Mr. Kennedy, I must say that it is
something when I was in Yemen we had the same question. We
dealt with the same things. To be entirely honest, I think that
this is a very long-term investment of time and effort and
energy.
The fact is that we are dealing with a society here that
had no institutional capacity, that had no governing capacity,
and so if we are going to succeed it is going to require a very
long-term effort on the part of the Libyans primarily, of
course, but also with the support of the international
community.
Mr. Kennedy. And, Ambassador, I know there was some talk a
few moments ago about some of the weapons that, at this point,
are rampant throughout Libya.
To the extent that you can say and can say in this setting,
are you aware of any of those weapons being transferred through
the Sinai into either--into Gaza or into other settings that
are being used to basically foment violence in Israel and the
surrounding areas, or into Syria, for that matter?
Mr. Feierstein. I couldn't say specifically that I know
whether they are going to Gaza. I can say that the concern
about the flow of weapons out of Libya into other troubled
regions--into Syria, Iraq or potentially into Gaza or the
Sinai--is something that we do watch very carefully and we are
very concerned about.
We actually have, with the support of the Congress and
based on congressional appropriations, we actually have a very
aggressive program of trying to recover a lot of these
conventional weapons.
We have, for example, secured over 5,000 MANPADS that were
in Libya. So we are working to try to dry up that resource and
also, of course, the new U.N. Security Council Resolution 2174
strengthened the arms embargo on Libya so that we are not
seeing a lot of weapons coming in.
Mr. Kennedy. And, Mr. Ambassador, I apologize if I am going
to ask you to repeat something. But given, as you just
forecasted, the length of the commitment, the challenge that
you are--you have outlined, this is not something, I don't
think, the United States can do alone.
Clearly, as you indicated, this is going to be the
responsibility primarily of Libyans but there is evidence,
certainly, at least from the U.S. press that there is other
nations that have been involved military in this conflict.
What is the appetite of other nations in the Middle East or
the surrounding nations there to actually help sustain--to
build up some of the civil society there?
This is not something that the United States is going to be
able to have the deciding outcome nor should we be, I think,
rebuilding an entire Libyan state. We have tried that once
recently.
Mr. Feierstein. Absolutely, and I think that there is a
broad agreement between the United States, the United Nations,
of course, our friends in the European Union as well as in the
region about what kind of society we would like to see emerge
in Libya.
We may not always agree on the tactics but I think that we
agree on the end state and I think that some of the Gulf
States, the Emiratis and some of the others, are absolutely
willing and committed to contributing to that.
Mr. Kennedy. The type of commitment, sir, that would
actually get us to where we need to go or where you believe we
need to--we need to get to?
I mean, the resources, whether it is military troops, civil
society funding that is going to be necessary to build up a
functioning government in Libya, is massive and that is--I
hesitate to believe that we here in the United States are going
to appropriate the sufficient funding to do that.
I hesitate to believe that other nations in the region are
going to hesitate to do that and if they are not then we are
going to be looking at a series of instability for or a
sequence of instability for an awfully long time.
Is there a commitment from other countries to actually do
this or to do it in a very real way or to just see what
happens?
Mr. Feierstein. Well, I think one thing--one point to make,
of course, is that Libya is not a poor country and so a lot of
the funding, a lot of the investment for these changes can come
directly from the Libyans.
I think in terms of institutional capacity building, the
United States, along with our partners in the European Union
primarily, are committed to taking on this--taking on this
obligation, this commitment to work with the Libyans to try to
achieve that.
I think also we can work with some of our friends in the
Gulf. Secretary Kerry is going to be meeting with the group
that includes our European as well as our--GCC and the Turks in
New York in 2 weeks to have exactly these kinds of
conversations.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Madame Chair, thank
you for the extra time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. One of our many
wonderful vets serving on our committee, Mr. Kinzinger, is
recognized.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
Ambassador, for being here. I am going to say on the outset I
was a supporter of intervention in Libya. I thought we did the
right thing.
I have, obviously, been very disappointed with the follow
through and what it looks like today and I think it is
important to kind of discover, as we are having this hearing,
you know, what a post-war looks like, especially as, you know,
what appears likely there will be intervention in Syria and
there are questions, rightly, about what Syria looks like post-
Assad which, hopefully, there is a post-Assad time in Syria.
I am sure it has probably already been touched on when I
wasn't here but, you know, the idea of leading from behind--and
I know that is something that has haunted the administration.
They probably wish they never would have said it.
But I think it is a reality and something that, you know,
is smart to understand that, you know, America does best when
it leads from the front and when America understands and,
frankly, I don't know why that is something we are ashamed of.
I mean, we ought to be very proud of the fact that if there
is a problem in the world people look not to Russia, not to
China, not to chaos. They look to the United States, and while
we can't do everything, I like to be in that position.
I like to be in the position where people look at us as a
force for good and a force for stability. So anyway, that said,
as the war raged, Gaddafi was killed and we saw a post-war.
Where I found a lot of concerns was in terms of being able
to build maybe a NATO mission afterwards or even a short time
period that the United Nations mission lasted. So let me ask
you a bit about the U.N. mission.
Why was the UNSMIL's mandate only for 3 months and then it
was extended for an additional 3 months? Did the administration
insist on a longer mandate tied to goals and objectives rather
than an arbitrary time line?
I was just in Liberia, for instance, and that has been a
mission that is successful but it is, obviously, quite ongoing.
Mr. Feierstein. Sir, I believe that the mission was
organized initially for 3 months and then an additional 3
months, as you said. My understanding is that that is not
uncommon for these kinds of missions to get that done.
Since March 2012, it has now been rolled over each time for
a 1-year period. So after the initial start-up, we have moved
into a more stable annual review.
Mr. Kinzinger. And do you think the administration was
being overly optimistic or unrealistic in its assertion of the
Libyan--the capacity of the Libyan Government and what accounts
for the administration's misunderstanding of the commitment
needed to assist the Libyan transition?
And I don't mean that accusatorialy but was it just we
maybe thought they could get their act together faster or what
was it?
Mr. Feierstein. I think that is absolutely a fair question
and I would say that in all fairness probably there was an
optimism, an over optimism perhaps, not only on the part of the
United States but also on the part of the Libyans themselves
and I think that it took a little bit of time before people
realized really how weak the institutions were inside of Libya
and how serious the internal divisions were so that as we moved
along, remembering, of course, that initially the Libyans
themselves did not want the foreign intervention.
They didn't want a lot of engagement on the part of the
international community and it was really only as these--the
situation became clearer did they begin to turn to the
international community and did we begin to respond.
Mr. Kinzinger. And I think that is a fair point. Is that
the same--why would the--how come the U.N. was not given a
peacekeeping mandate?
You know, if you look at, for instance, our experience in
Kosovo with KFOR and the NATO model engagement there, I mean,
it seems to be that, I think, is largely seen as a very
successful mission.
What is the reason? Is it the Libyans' request? What was it
that we didn't implement something like that? Is it a lack of
will on our side? Was it the lack of will on our NATO partners?
I think that is important, again, especially as we look to
Syria and the future there.
Mr. Feierstein. I think that very clearly the Libyans
themselves said that they would not welcome or support a
peacekeeping mission.
Mr. Kinzinger. Do you think there would have been--let us
say the Libyan--I know we are playing games, in essence, in
asking this but had the Libyans said we need a peacekeeping
force here, do you think there was the will not just in the
United States but in Europe to provide that?
Mr. Feierstein. It is a hypothetical question, of course--
--
Mr. Kinzinger. Right.
Mr. Feierstein [continuing]. Hard to answer, but I believe
that there would have been interest had that been a request
from the Libyans.
In fairness, of course, we have seen some talk in recent
days and weeks about some kind of an international
stabilization force and I can tell you that Secretary Kerry is
very interested in exploring that, although the divisions
within Libya are still an obstacle and still may prevent
something like that from happening.
Mr. Kinzinger. Good. And that is where I was going to go
with that and I appreciate it. Thank you for your service.
Thank you for being here, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Lowenthal
of California.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. As someone who is not on the
African Subcommittee and new to the Congress and learning about
Libya, this is a very depressing hearing, you know, and I am
not pointing fingers.
I am not saying anything that we have done. It is just I am
not sure I understand what a country--if this is a country on
the brink of a failed state what a failed state would look
like--I mean, this seems to me.
So I want to--before I ask you something I want to state
two things. One is I want to follow up on something that the
ranking member, Mr. Deutch, said.
I would like to have a classified hearing. I would like to
know what that role has been in terms of the Egyptians and just
what the United States knew about that and understood about
that. That is one, and also, I too would--while you lay out,
and I think it is a very positive thing, a potential dialogue
on how we could bring people together and how the Libyans--
there is tremendous potential--it still eludes me how we get
there and that leads to my question.
Could you give me--maybe others know--a little bit more
detailed explanation of who are--what are the political
factions that you have mentioned?
What are the militias? Can--you know, can you tell us a
little bit more about what is really there today and what
exists and who is the most powerful?
Mr. Feierstein. Well, a lot of the militias, of course, Mr.
Lowenthal, are a holdover from the resistance to Muammar
Gaddafi. So the two--the two militias that you talk about
mostly in terms of Tripoli are the Misratans and the Zintan.
Those are two towns inside of Libya, Misrata and Zintan,
and they both had militias that fought against Gaddafi in 2011,
and since 2011 they have kept the militias together. They have
occupied various parts of Tripoli.
The Zintan were the ones who were in control of Tripoli
International Airport and the conflict that erupted in Tripoli
a couple of months ago, which eventually led to the departure
of American diplomats as well as most of the other diplomats in
the city and most of the foreign community, were clashes
between the Misratans and the Zintan.
Now, you know, and we need--because there is not a clear
hard line and as I tried to say earlier on, I think that on
both sides of the political divide within Libya you see
different gradations, different ideas.
And so although the Misratans tend toward the more Islamist
side, that does not mean that they are Islamists--that they are
hardcore Muslim fundamentalists.
But they tend that way, and the Zintan tend more toward the
secular side. But that doesn't necessarily mean that they are
entirely, you know, liberal democrats. They have various
gradations also.
So you see a number of different elements. And then, of
course, you have Khalifa Haftar, who emerged in the area around
Benghazi who also has been extremely active and pushed what he
calls Operation Dignity, which he claimed was a move toward
defending secular elements, secular ideas inside of Libya,
which struck a very positive chord with many Libyans but also,
as I mentioned earlier, because he has chosen a violent path
has deepened the polarization in the society.
Mr. Lowenthal. Is there any one group that is on the
ascendency?
Mr. Feierstein. The Misratans have fundamentally succeeded
in eliminating Zintan control inside of Tripoli but, overall,
our assessment is that none of the actors inside of Libya have
the capacity or the ability to succeed militarily.
We think, at the end of the day, that the forces are
roughly in balance so that they could not win an outright
victory.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Ron DeSantis of
Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
Ambassador for coming. I am glad we are examining this because
I think and, understandably, a lot of the focus of both the
media and our time in Congress focuses on what is happening
with ISIS, the Gaza-Israeli conflict, Iran's pursuit of a
nuclear weapon and those are all very, very critical issues.
I think Libya really represents a catastrophic failure in
policy. If you look back in 2011, U.S. intervention was really
on the side of a lot of these Islamist rebels and I think that
that was a cruel lesson that we learned 2 years ago tomorrow
when our Ambassador was murdered by Islamic militants in
Benghazi.
Simply removing a dictator, no matter how unsavory that
individual is, is not, in this part of this world, going to
lead necessarily to anything better and it can actually
sometimes lead to more chaos.
In our policy we need to reorient it so that we are
vindicating our national interest but doing it in a way where
we are skewing, trying to socially engineer these societies.
It is just beyond our capacity to do. I think it is--I
think it creates a lot of unintended consequences. And so if
you look today, seems to me that there are far more Islamic
jihadists operating not only in Libya but in North Africa today
than there was prior to the intervention in 2011.
But that will be a question I ask to you. Do you
acknowledge that today there are more Islamic militants that
are armed and operating inside of Libya than there were prior
to 2011?
Mr. Feierstein. It is a hard question to answer. Let me
make a few points, if I may, sir. One, of course, is that the
reason that the United States and the international community
intervened in 2011 was because of the brutality of the Gaddafi
regime's----
Mr. DeSantis. Well, that was the posited initial reason but
that, surely, and I think you would have to acknowledge that
very quickly evolved into a regime change mission.
I mean, that may have been the initial pretext. But listen,
and I appreciate you wanting to clarify that. I do have a few
other questions.
I don't want--I just don't want to relitigate that. I was
just setting up kind of my posture on it just for the record
and I appreciate you wanting to engage.
But since my time is limited, can you just speak to the
number of militants? Do you think that there are more
terrorists operating in Libya today than there were prior to
2011?
Mr. Feierstein. And, again, and I appreciate that and the
specific--the specific answer is that it is very hard to say
because al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb is not new and is not
a result of 2011. It was there many years ago.
We know that there was a brutal war inside of Algeria for a
number of years in the 1990s which was driven by Islamic
extremism in that society and so those people were there and
that has been a factor in North Africa for many, many years.
So this is a longstanding challenge. I think that the
concern that we have and maybe the concern that you are
touching on is the fact that Libya is an ungoverned space now
and so that there is an ability of these organizations and
these groups to operate in Libya in a way that they perhaps
couldn't before.
Mr. DeSantis. Do you--understanding that and I agree, the
administration is proposing to lift longstanding restrictions
on Libyan nationals conducting flight training and nuclear
training in the United States.
Given this fact that you have acknowledged, doesn't that
seem like an odd time to want to do that, given that we know
there are Libyans inside of Libya who are very much hostile to
the United States?
Mr. Feierstein. Sir, I think and, of course, this is an
issue for the Department of Homeland Security, but we support
the lifting of that because Libya is the only country in the
world on which that restriction is applied, including countries
that are designated as state sponsors of terrorism, don't have
that restriction applied to them.
And even if we lift that particular restriction, of course,
Libyans who are coming or applying to come here would still be
subject to all of the regular safeguards that we would apply to
any visa applicant.
Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask you this, a final--my time is
close to being expired. President el-Sisi of Egypt has really
been strong to target Islamic groups in Egypt and throughout
the region and, of course, there are the reports that Egypt
conducted air strikes along with the United Arab Emirates.
Seems to me that a lot of the Islamist groups they try to
appeal for outside help to Turkey and Qatar. So what is the
administration's position?
Are we firmly in the side--on the side of Egypt and the UAE
and do we recognize that Turkey and Qatar are not playing a
constructive role in Libya or are we aligning ourselves
differently?
Mr. Feierstein. The position that we have taken both in
public and in private with all of those parties is that we
believe that unilateral foreign military intervention in Libya
is polarizing in that society, deepens the divisions and makes
it more difficult to try to achieve the kind of political way
forward. A negotiated solution to these differences that, in
our view, is the only way that we are going to resolve this
problem inside of Libya.
So we are opposed to all outside intervention that supports
any faction in its pursuit of a violent outcome to the
situation there.
Mr. DeSantis. My time has expired and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Karen Bass of Los Angeles, California.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for
clarifying our original reason for intervening in Libya. I
think sometimes when groups come to our attention here we think
they might be emerging for the first time.
You know, an example is Boko Haram. We heard of Boko Haram
for the first time but we know Boko Haram has been around for a
long time. I wouldn't want it left that we intervened on behalf
of Islamic jihadists.
But I did want you to address the regional implications
because part of what my colleague was saying, you know,
certainly was accurate. I think of the coup that happened in
Mali and its direct relationship to the destabilization in
Libya.
So I wanted to know if maybe you could give me an update on
what is happening in Niger and Chad that might be related to
Libya.
Mr. Feierstein. Well, we are very concerned, of course, on
precisely this issue of the potential bleed over of instability
in Libya to all of its neighbors and, certainly, we have had a
number of conversations with the Tunisians, who are very
concerned, as well as the countries of the Sahel.
During the Africa Summit, Undersecretary Sherman actually
had a session on security in the Maghreb and the Sahel that
discussed many of these issues and, you know, one of the things
that we are trying to do is to build up border security and the
capacity of those states to prevent the bleed-out of
instability in Libya into their societies and that would affect
the stability of those countries.
So we have the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Program. We
have a number of other initiatives that will help address
border security and, of course, more broadly we have a number
of counterterrorism initiatives and other initiatives in the
Sahel region to help build up the security and stability of
those societies.
Ms. Bass. You know, do you know what has happened to the--
there were many sub-Saharan Africans that were in Libya that,
right after Gaddafi fell, came under some brutal repression by
a variety of the militia forces, and do you know the status of
those groups--whether they were able to safely leave Libya?
Are they still there? Are they still going through what
they were going through after the fall of Gaddafi?
Mr. Feierstein. Ma'am, I am sorry. I remember the situation
very well. I don't know the answer to your question but will be
happy to get the answer and get it back to you.
Ms. Bass. All right. I would appreciate that. And then I am
not sure if this has come up before but understanding what has
happened in Tripoli, what is the status of the airport now?
Mr. Feierstein. The status of the airport is that it is
still closed. We believe it has been heavily damaged and that
it will require a great deal of reconstruction once the
situation stabilizes.
Ms. Bass. Are there planes that the militia groups have
access to?
Mr. Feierstein. No, ma'am. We have seen the reports. There
were some assertions that 11 planes had been taken from the
airport. We have actually had an opportunity to examine that
issue and we can say categorically that that is absolutely
without foundation.
Ms. Bass. Gaddafi's son?
Mr. Feierstein. Another question I am going to have to take
back and get back to you.
Ms. Bass. Okay. All right. Thank you. I yield.
Chairman Royce. Okay. Ms. Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate you spending your time here
with us this morning. Do you have any State Department
personnel left in Libya?
Mr. Feierstein. No, ma'am.
Ms. Gabbard. It is--I have got a couple of questions here.
I will try to get through them quickly. There have been some
different references to the fighting forces on the ground in
Libya. Some are calling them rival militias.
There has been some talk of a sectarian civil war, others
of Islamic extremists of varying names, whether they are al-
Qaeda or other--go by other names. Which is it?
Is it Islamic extremists who are trying to take over
territory? My understanding is that this isn't a sectarian
civil war necessarily, and how would you characterize it?
Mr. Feierstein. I think that that is absolutely correct,
although as I mentioned earlier, the different groups have
different colorations in terms of where they fall on the
political spectrum. Some are more secular.
Some are more Islamist. But it is not necessarily a
sectarian conflict. Our view is that primarily it is a fight
for power and for resources and for influence.
Ms. Gabbard. I think it is difficult to see any so-called
political solution on the horizon, given the situation on the
ground, given there is no State Department personnel, and I see
from what occurred since 2011 with the lack of governance there
that, really, as has been noted earlier today, change needs to
come from the Libyan people, that we don't have a good track
record of nation building in other countries and that this
needs to occur organically within that country.
AFRICOM commander--U.S. AFRICOM Commander General Rodriguez
recently warned that al-Qaeda adherents and affiliates there in
Libya are gaining strength as ``arms, ammunition, explosives
from Libya continue to move throughout the region in northwest
Africa,'' and others within the Department of Defense have
stated that if this situation is left unchecked then we will
continue to see the threat to the United States and our
interests heightened as we are seeing in other areas in the
Middle East. What are we doing to prevent that?
Mr. Feierstein. Well, I think that, again, all of the
programs that we have--I think that your basic point is exactly
the right one, which is that this is something that the
solutions need to come organically from inside of Libya from
the Libyan people, and actually we are seeing some positive
signs that there is a dialogue going on among the Libyan people
that we hope would lead to some kind of a political path
forward.
It is nascent, it is very low key, but it is there and we
believe that over time hopefully the Libyans on both sides of
the political spectrum, on all sides of the political spectrum,
will actually come together and agree on a dialogue, agree on a
negotiation.
That is the only way that we are going to be able to get
past this period of militias and the violence and get into a
situation where we can begin to work on some of the
institutional capacity building on the security side as well as
the governance side that, over the long term, will resolve
those issues and resolve our concerns.
Ms. Gabbard. Wouldn't you say as that dialogue and those
conversations are going on, though, that you have these Islamic
extremists who are continuing to gain strength in the region,
not only affecting Libya but others?
Mr. Feierstein. It is a concern without doubt and again, I
think that over the long term, although we in the international
community can help and we will help in institutional capacity,
but our view is that the vast majority of the Libyan people
don't want that.
They don't support that kind of a vision, and that if we
have viable governing institutions--if the House of
Representatives gains traction, if we see broad participation
in that and the creation of a government that fairly represents
the various elements in the House of Representatives that the
Libyan people will rally around and that the Islamic extremists
in that society are relatively small and can be managed and
eliminated.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. My concern directly is in how
this--how they and how this affects our interests--the
interests of the United States, the safety of the American
people.
It wasn't very long ago that ISIS was determined to be a
very so-called small threat that didn't need to be taken
seriously and, obviously, we are seeing that that is not the
case.
So our targeting and our concern with these Islamic
extremists there needs to be in a broader vision of recognizing
that this isn't about a specific country whether it is Libya or
Iraq or Syria.
This is about a greater threat that is posed directly to
the American people. Thank you.
Mr. Feierstein. And we agree with that completely, of
course.
Chairman Royce. Lois Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me--let me follow
that and I think it is important for the public to understand
why we spend our time on these issues.
So I would like you, in 4 minutes and 51 seconds, if you
could, tell us what you believe is the strategic importance of
Libya and the region, why we intervened and what lessons we
have learned.
Mr. Feierstein. Well, I think that the strategic importance
of Libya touches on a number of issues. One, of course, is that
Libya is a major provider of energy resources to the world.
Before the 2011 revolution, they were producing about 1\1/
2\ million barrels of oil a day. They are back now to about
800,000, which is growing by the day.
They are a very important provider of energy to--
particularly to Europe and so in terms of the overall global
economy, Libya plays a very important role. They are
strategically located in the region. They have a long coastline
on the Mediterranean.
One of the issues that we have seen, of course, unrelated
to the issue of Islamic extremism or security is the flow of
immigration and the destabilizing effect that that flow has had
on southern Europe because of the inability of Libya to control
its borders and to prevent that flow through.
I think that, again, as your colleague mentioned just a
moment ago, we have serious concerns about the impact of or the
potential impact of Libya as an ungoverned space for groups
like al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, which
is the group that was responsible for the attack on our
facility in Benghazi 2 years ago, to continue to metastasize,
to prevent or to pose a threat to its neighbors, to Tunisia, to
Algeria, to the states of the Sahel, to Egypt.
Egypt is--has great concerns about the flow or the possible
flow of extremists across their border into the western desert
of Egypt and so we see that potential, the potential that
eventually you might see increasingly a linkage between the
extremism inside of Libya with other parts of the Middle East--
Syria, Iraq, et cetera--and eventually a threat to security and
stability around the world.
And so we have a positive--we have a positive strategic
interest, which is in seeing Libya as a secure stable producer
of energy resources and an important factor in promoting global
economic security, and then there is also the negative impact
of an ungoverned Libya and how that might threaten our
security.
Ms. Frankel. And what lessons have we learned from the
intervention and the chaos that we see there now?
Mr. Feierstein. Well, I think that where we are now is that
there is a greater recognition today, I believe, in what kind
of challenge we confront inside of Libya and the fact that
helping the Libyans move to a secure stable state with capable
institutions that can provide basic services to the citizens,
that can govern, that can provide security is going to be a
long-term challenge which is going to require a long-term
commitment on the part of the United States and our partners in
the international community to help the Libyans achieve that
objective.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I waive the rest of my
time.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of
California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I have sat here in this room while
the administration gets berated because somehow you are not
able to achieve a loving and peaceful world at--and achieve it
without any American casualties.
We don't have control of what is going on on the ground in
Syria or Iraq or Libya, and somehow if we only had somebody in
the White House with a different personality that everyone in
the Middle East would do what we said and we would be in
control and we would achieve it all without any troops on the
ground.
Are you aware of any strategy that has realistically
proposed a method to achieve American leadership from the
front, control of what is going on, the destruction of all
dangerous evil forces without substantial American casualties?
Have any of the think tanks here in Washington come up with
such a ground plan? You could give me a one-word answer.
Mr. Feierstein. No, sir. I think----
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. It is--you know, destroy all
dangerous evil is a great slogan. But the real slogan for an
effective foreign policy is managing a messy world and I guess
you can't--that isn't poetry.
But the fact is that if we wanted an orderly Libya we
could, you know, conjecture how many hundreds of casualties a
year we would have to suffer to implement that immediately and
not by--you know, obviously leading from behind is a terrible
slogan but influencing from afar involves a lot fewer
casualties than taking control on the ground.
I want to focus a little bit on money. I am the only CPA on
this committee, and having already dismissed the idea of
glorious slogans, pinch pennies now is probably the least
glorious slogan.
But this is a very rich country. American taxpayers have
spent billions of dollar to help the Libyan people. Libya
acknowledges over $6 billion of debt to bankers, to other
governments. Doesn't acknowledge one cent of debt to the United
States.
What have we done? I mean, know Libya is supposed to pay
for the military training in Bulgaria but it is not happening.
We are--the Libyan special operation forces are being trained
at the taxpayer expense.
How forceful has the State Department been in saying, you
ought to be paying us for the billions of dollars we spent a
few years ago and at very minimum the gravy train stops now--if
you don't have the cash we will take the notes secured by the
oil?
Or is American--the interests of the American taxpayer not
high on the list?
Mr. Feierstein. Sir, I think, as you mentioned, Libya is
not a country without resources, although, unfortunately, one
of the institutional capacities that they are lacking is the
capacity to manage their money.
Mr. Sherman. I am not saying these promissory notes would
be--well, by today's credit rating agencies they might be given
Triple A.
But no sane credit rating agency would give them a Triple A
rating. But at least get us something. Have you gotten--do you
have the promissory notes that would be paid once Libyan
security is reestablished, whenever that happens?
Mr. Feierstein. I think that, certainly, as we go forward
and we begin to discuss these programs and these training
initiatives that we would like to do with the Libyans that the
issue of paying for it is----
Mr. Sherman. Can you go back and get the Libyans to assume
financial responsibility for the Libyan Special Operations
Forces training going on today? Is that a priority for the
State Department?
Mr. Feierstein. The--on the General Purpose Force having
the Libyans----
Mr. Sherman. And I am focused on the Libyan Special
Operation Forces because that is happening now at taxpayer
expense.
Mr. Feierstein. And, Congressman Sherman, I think that the
fundamental point is that what we are doing in Libya now we are
doing because we believe that it supports the interests of the
American people. So the Libyan Special Operations Forces is
precisely aimed at trying to prevent the kind of terrorism----
Mr. Sherman. We are selling $11 billion worth of arms to
Qatar presumably because we think that is consistent with our
foreign policy. I am not so sure it is. We are not giving them
away. We sell weapons to Australia. Presumably, that is in our
national interest.
So why do you defend giving money to Libya rather than
taking promissory notes when it is far more--just as much in
our interest to provide weapons and training to Australia or
Canada, et cetera?
Do people at the State Department care enough about the
taxpayer to at least get promissory notes for what we are
providing to Libya now?
Mr. Feierstein. What we are providing to Libya now we are
providing because we believe that it is in the interest of the
United States to provide it. We don't provide them with
weapons. If they want weapons they purchase them in the same
way that the Qataris do.
Mr. Sherman. But we charge Australia for training. We
charge European--the NATO allies for training. We charge for
nonlethal supplies.
Sir, you are hiding behind this idea that it is in our
interest so we shouldn't charge for it, which really means the
State Department doesn't care about the taxpayer, because every
time we provide training and weapons that is consistent with
our foreign policy, every time we allow our businesses to do
business abroad it is consistent with our national policy, and
just saying we are going to give away money because the people
we are giving it to are consistent with our foreign policy is
basically saying you want to give away money.
I yield back. I hope you will take this message back.
Chairman Royce. Let me just close here, if I can, by
thanking Ambassador Feierstein for his testimony before our
committee this morning. We thank the members, too.
Obviously, Ambassador, you have your hands full. As Mr.
Lowenthal on this committee said, it is a depressing situation
and as the administration works to get a strategy together, a
plan together, we hope you will continue to engage with the
committee on that.
At that point, we adjourn for now and thank you again,
Ambassador.
Mr. Feierstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]