[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-112]
P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS OVER IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 19, 2014
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, June 19, 2014, P5+1 Negotiations Over Iran's Nuclear
Program and Its Implications for United States Defense......... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, June 19, 2014.......................................... 33
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 2014
P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNITED STATES DEFENSE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R., Distinguished Fellow, Brookings
Institution.................................................... 8
Singh, Michael, Managing Director, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 5
Tobey, William H., Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.................. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 37
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R............................... 67
Singh, Michael............................................... 56
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 39
Tobey, William H............................................. 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. Walorski................................................ 79
P5+1 NEGOTIATIONS OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNITED STATES DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 19, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
testimony from outside experts on the P5+1
negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and its implications
for United States defense. Today we have with us Mr. William
Tobey, Mr. Michael Singh, and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Our
witnesses have an immense amount of experience working Iran
issues, and we appreciate them sharing their perspectives with
us today.
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People's Republic of China, French Republic, Russian
Federation, United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am concerned that the scope of negotiations with Iran
over its nuclear program was flawed from the outset. We know
that Iran would be allowed to keep its nuclear capabilities,
ability to enrich, and breakout capability. We know that Iran
has had and may continue to have undeclared sites.
We know that there are military dimensions to Iran's
nuclear program that it refuses to address. And we know that
the nuclear program is but one facet of Iran's overall grand
strategy, which includes its sponsorship of terrorism, the
largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, and other
conventional military capabilities that continue to threaten
the region and beyond.
Yet none of these issues appear to be within the scope of
the comprehensive deal. Our ally Israel has called this a bad
deal. Our friends and allies in the region have both publicly
and privately conveyed their deep reservations about this deal.
I worry that the President wants to achieve a nuclear deal with
Iran at almost any cost.
Some will argue that this deal is better than no deal and
that it would slow down Iran's nuclear program. But how much
time does it really buy us?
International sanctions, which took a decade to put into
place, were finally starting to bite. Had the Administration
maintained a strong regional presence, Congress' robust
sanctions, and a clear resolve to use the military option if
necessary, we could have set the conditions for Iran to change
its strategic calculus.
Yet, through these negotiations, we have done the opposite.
In fact, Iran already thinks that the P5+1 have legitimized its
nuclear enrichment capability, thereby validating its nuclear
calculus.
The American public is understandably war-weary. I do not
desire to go to war with Iran either, and that is precisely why
I am concerned about the Administration's approach in these
negotiations. If the Administration signs on to a comprehensive
deal that legitimizes Iran's capability to enrich and that does
not dismantle the nuclear program as well as the arsenal
surrounding Iran's nuclear program, I fear that a future
President may have to seriously contemplate taking military
action to enforce such a deal or to protect our allies in the
region. This is the worst possible outcome.
This is a very serious and complicated issue. And, again, I
thank our expert panel for being here today, and I look forward
to their testimony and insights.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, let me just say, if, in fact, the United States
agrees to the kind of deal that the chairman just described,
then I think it would be a grave and terrible mistake. But what
you just described, there is no resemblance whatsoever that I
can see to what I have heard we are trying to accomplish.
And let me be clear on one point. Without question, Iran is
a bad actor, you know, independent of the nuclear issue. Since
1979, they have been pretty much nothing but a bad actor on a
lot of different issues. And we will have to confront that no
matter what. Whether we get a nuclear deal or not, Iran is
going to continue to be a challenge and continue to be a threat
that we have to measure and contain.
But the question, the calculus that we have made is, are we
better off with that Iranian threat if we can take the nuclear
piece of it off the table? And I think there is no question
about it. Iran is terrible; Iran with a nuclear weapon would
be, you know, a much, much more difficult situation to deal
with. So any steps that we can take to stop them from getting a
nuclear weapon, I think, are important.
And the sanctions regime has, in fact, been working. It
drove them to the table. It drove them to the table because of
the impact that it has had on their economy, which has been
devastating.
And I am well aware of what Iran wants. What Iran wants is
they would love to be able to get a nuclear weapon without
international condemnation. That is what they would love to
figure out. But, unfortunately for them and fortunately for us,
that is not going to happen. If they pursue the nuclear path,
there will be sanctions and there will be huge economic
consequences, as there already have been.
Point number one, we did not lift those sanctions in the
interim agreement. It was a very, very small piece that was
given to them. All of the sanctions put in place are still
there. It is still having its impact on the economy. It gives
Iran an incentive to come to the table.
Now, if they come to the table and don't offer something
that gives us confidence that they will not develop a nuclear
weapon, then we shouldn't take the deal, absolutely. But
pursuing these negotiations is the logical extension of
sanctions. If we say to Iran, look, no matter what you do, no
matter what you say, we are simply going to keep sanctioning
you, then we give them incentive to just go ahead and build a
nuclear weapon.
And I think one of the biggest mistakes that I have heard
in this debate, and I would be interested in hearing your
comments on it: Everybody says that Iran is hell-bent to get a
nuclear weapon, that they have made that decision, they are
working towards it. And that simply isn't true. And the reason
I know that is not true is because, back in 2005, I was told
that Iran was 6 months from having a bomb. And I believe that
is true. I think they have been 6 months from having a bomb for
9 years. They have chosen not to build one. Why? Why? Because
of the sanctions, because of what they are concerned about.
So there is absolutely an opportunity to stop them from
going down that road. Now, it is not easy, and I will evaluate
this agreement based on whether or not it truly does stop them,
but we have to at least try. I am going to be very interested
from our witnesses today, what is the minimum in a negotiated
agreement that we need.
Now, I will tell you, you can't unring the bell. There is
no agreement that is going to make us positive that, under no
circumstances, never, ever, ever will Iran pursue a nuclear
weapon again. But there are things that we can do that will
significantly take down their enrichment, that will put in
place a coercive inspections regime that will give us
confidence that they are not building secret facilities. And if
we can get that agreement that will tell us that we are going
to know if Iran breaks it, then I think that is worth doing to
stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
It is a difficult thing, and I will close by--one thing, I
am not optimistic. I am not optimistic that Iran will be
willing to give up what they need to give up in order to get
this deal. And if that comes to pass, we will have to continue
with the sanctions regime. We will have to continue trying to
discourage them in that way. But I think it is folly not to at
least pursue it to see if we can take the nuclear weapon off
the table and deal with Iran on these other issues, you know,
as we have dealt with them before.
The choice here isn't, you know, we can force Iran to give
up all of their bad behavior. I wish that option was on the
table. The choice here is, can we take a realistic step that is
going to stop them, continue to stop them, from getting a
nuclear weapon? And that is what I want to hear our witnesses
talk about. What are those specifics that we are going to need
to have, in your estimation, to give us that confidence? And
then what your level of optimism is about, you know, whether or
not we can reach this agreement and whether or not Iran is
truly serious about it.
I yield back and look forward to the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Tobey.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TOBEY, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER FOR
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL
Mr. Tobey. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, it is a
privilege to testify on a matter of surpassing importance.
Preventing Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon is a matter of
vital national security interest to the United States.
Should we be satisfied with a deal that simply pushes Iran
from 2 months to 6 months away from the nuclear threshold? Or
should we expect more--that is, evidence of a fundamental
decision not to pursue nuclear weapons?
Last April, Secretary of State Kerry noted that Iran had
reached a point perhaps only 2 months away from being able to
produce sufficient fissile material to fabricate a nuclear
weapon and raised the possibility of pushing that timetable
back 6 to 12 months.
Accepting a situation in which Iran insists on keeping a
loaded weapon on the table but simply moves its finger farther
from the trigger would not appear to offer sound prospects for
long-term success. If Iran has not made a fundamental decision
to foreswear nuclear weapons in return for better relations
with other nations, Tehran will work to erode the firebreak by
means overt and covert. And we have seen this situation in the
past in North Korea.
How can we judge whether or not Tehran has made such a
fundamental decision, and how might we ensure that it endures?
Satisfaction on three points would provide such insight and,
just as important, offer the means to verify compliance or to
detect cheating. These three potential elements of an agreement
focus on preventing covert activities. They are: resolving
concerns regarding possible military dimensions of Iran's
nuclear weapon program; comprehensive monitoring of nuclear-
related procurement and manufacturing; and enhanced authorities
for the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].
The first and most important step to ensure that Iran's
nuclear weapons activities have truly ceased and will not
restart is to get to the bottom of what the International
Atomic Energy Agency calls ``possible military dimensions to
Iran's nuclear program.'' Who did what, when, and where?
The declaration can be verified by personnel files,
invoices, manifests, inventories, disposition records,
equipment, and buildings. The IAEA will construct a mosaic of
the Iranian program. Some tiles will be missing, others might
be fake, but the best way to understand the program and to
ensure that it has stopped is to have as complete a picture as
possible to identify and resolve inconsistencies.
The November 2013 interim agreement calls for a joint
commission to facilitate resolution of past and present issues
of concern. The White House fact sheet on the deal contends
that this includes possible military dimensions of the Iranian
nuclear program, but such an outcome is by no means assured.
The second step to guard against resurgence of a covert
Iranian nuclear weapons program would be to authorize the IAEA
to monitor comprehensively all nuclear-related and dual-use
procurements by Iran to ensure that they are used solely at
declared facilities. Credible information on undeclared nuclear
procurements could be considered prima facie evidence that Iran
is violating the agreement. As a part of this process, the IAEA
will also need to monitor related production within Iran.
A third step to guard against resurgence of a covert
Iranian nuclear weapons program would be to enhance the powers
of the IAEA beyond the Additional Protocol. Evidence of
Nonproliferation Treaty cheating is often subtle, taking the
form of inconsistencies and irregularities. The IAEA must have
ongoing authorities to pursue these anomalies should they
arise, including access to documents, people, and facilities.
These terms--getting to the bottom of possible military
dimensions, comprehensive procurement monitoring, and enhanced
authorities for the IAEA--cannot guarantee Iran's compliance
with a deal to block its pursuit of nuclear weapons. They can,
however, test Tehran's willingness to abide by a deal and, even
as the negotiations proceed and if a deal is concluded, act as
a deterrent to those who might seek to cheat on it.
Would insisting on these terms be worth risking the
possibility of no deal? Mr. Chairman, given the stakes invoked
in the Iranian nuclear issue, we cannot afford a situation in
which Tehran pretends to comply and we pretend to believe it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Singh.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Singh. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the
committee, it is an honor to be here today. Thank you for
inviting me.
The Iran nuclear negotiations are often reduced to a set of
technical issues, such as breakout time, inspection regimes,
and so forth. Those are vitally important issues, and my
colleague here on the panel covered them, I think, very well,
some of them.
But I think it would be a mistake to view any agreement as
primarily or merely technical, because any agreement is going
to have profound strategic implications for the United States
for good or for ill. And what makes a deal a good deal or a bad
deal I think needs to be measured not just in terms of breakout
time but in terms of how it advances or sets back American
interests in the Middle East and beyond. And I am going to talk
a little bit about what I think needs to be in a deal beyond
the technical issues to accomplish that.
We all know that the nuclear weapons program has three
elements. There is fuel fabrication, weaponization, and a
delivery vehicle. And let me just go through each one of these
things briefly.
Fuel fabrication. Again, I am not going to cover in detail
the centrifuges and so forth; my colleague has done that well.
We need to recognize, though, that the technical compromises we
make, however merited they may be or not, will also have
strategic implications. They will send messages to folks in the
region, especially if we are moving back from a position that
we once held. And we need to make sure that we communicate what
we are doing very clearly and that we take into account those
strategic implications when we make compromises.
We also need to take into account that whatever we permit
Iran to keep in terms of nuclear capabilities, others in the
region and beyond will have an incentive to match. And so we
have to also think about what we allow Iran in terms of the
implication for the global nonproliferation regime and our
global interests, therefore.
When it comes to weaponization research, here I would just
identify myself with Mr. Tobey's comments on making sure that
Iran comes clean on what it has done in the past. This will not
only facilitate the work of the inspectors by giving them a
roadmap to Iran's full nuclear ecosystem, it will give them a
baseline for comparing future Iranian declarations and any
intelligence information which we gather about Iran's
activities, and it also helps us to determine exactly how much
progress Iran did, in fact, make on weaponization and whether,
in fact, they have stopped--issues where I don't think that we
can say we are 100 percent certain at this moment.
I would also say that, just as a practical matter, we can't
really expect much from this agreement going forward if it
doesn't begin with transparency. If it begins with obfuscation
or dishonesty, I think it starts on the wrong foot.
The third element is missiles, Iran's delivery vehicles.
This is controversial, in a sense, because the Iranians have
said it can't be included and P5+1 officials have been
ambiguous on the matter.
But if you look at Iran's missile capability--Mr. Chairman,
you said Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle
East. That is right, as far as I know. They are also the first
country to develop 2,000-kilometer-range missiles without first
having a nuclear weapon. We also see that Iran's missiles,
because they have poor accuracy, are not suited for
conventional payloads; they are part of a nuclear weapons
program. Iran is working, as you know, on a space launch
program and could have, according to the Defense Department,
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] by 2015 at the
earliest.
So, in a sense, this is the leg of Iran's nuclear program
which needs the most work. And I think that we need to be sure
that Iran doesn't use the time and space provided by an
agreement to perfect this last leg of their nuclear program so
that in a couple years they come out having all three legs
where they want them and ready for breakout.
One more thing on this. Addressing missiles and
weaponization will also ensure that, because there are these
competing power centers in Iran--civilian, military, and so
forth--that those military power centers, and not just the
civilian ones, are bound by any agreement we reach and that
inspectors will have insight into what the military is doing on
the nuclear front, as well, not just the civilian authorities.
One additional consideration for the agreement I think has
to be the enforcement mechanism. It is one thing to have great
inspections and robust inspections and to have strict limits,
but what do we do if Iran cheats? We need to decide that up
front. And I think that, as a condition of U.S. agreement, we
need to ensure that the U.N. [United Nations] Security Council
gets behind very vigorous enforcement mechanisms.
I think we also need to plan what happens if Iran bends
those lines that we have set instead of breaking them. If they
delay inspections or harass inspectors, we need to know what we
will do in response and what our allies are prepared to do in
response as a condition of our agreement.
Finally, this issue of regional issues and whether they
should be part of an agreement. For me, I think this is a very
difficult issue, because on the one hand we are concerned about
far more than just Iran's nuclear program. And many of our
allies in the region, especially our Arab allies, are more
concerned about Iran's regional activities in places like Syria
and elsewhere than they are about even Iran's nuclear program,
and they don't like the prospect of our relieving pressure
before those issues are addressed. At the same time, though, I
think that they worry about the optic of our dealing
bilaterally with Iran on these regional issues over their heads
and right now don't necessarily trust us to come to the right
conclusions on those regional issues.
So I think, in balance, what we need to see is we need to
leave those regional issues out of the nuclear negotiations but
deal with them very firmly separately, ensure that we leave
pressure in place and sanctions in place to put pressure on
Iran on those issues and, frankly, also improve and make firmer
our commitment to the Middle East security in places like
Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere as part of the context, the broader
context, for this agreement.
I also worry when it comes to regional issues that, as we
saw from Iranians yesterday, from President Rouhani's chief of
staff, that they view the regional issues as leverage to get us
to dilute our positions on the nuclear front.
Mr. Chairman, let me just end by saying that, whether we
like it or not, many people, including in the region, see this
as the most important issue in the region, with everything else
that is going on. And we are going to be judged, in terms of
our commitment to the Middle East, in terms of our commitment
to our own interests, by how this agreement comes out and how
firm and strong an agreement it is.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Pickering.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING, DISTINGUISHED
FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Smith. It is a pleasure and honor to join you and all
the members of the committee, and I thank you very much for the
invitation.
Since 2013, we have seen a shift in the U.S.-Iran
relationship. Official bilateral talks held confidentially, the
important election for the President of Iran, won by Hassan
Rouhani, and the successful completion of the first step of
negotiations with the November 24th, 2013, Joint Plan of Action
have opened the door to progress. Today this committee wishes
to discuss how this progress and a possible comprehensive
agreement can impact U.S. strategy in the region and beyond.
The U.S. strategic objective in the Middle East should be a
stable and secure region, open to commerce, to ideas, and to
interchange. States in the region should have the opportunity
to cooperate, enjoy peaceful relations and trade among
themselves. It should be a region without nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and, I would certainly add, without a strong
offensive missile capability, particularly at longer ranges.
I want to be clear that I strongly oppose Iran acquiring
nuclear weapons and am deeply concerned about its support for
terrorism and Hezbollah, its violations of human rights of its
citizens, and its threats against Israel.
I recently led a delegation for the Iran Project to Israel
and exchanged points of view with the highest levels of the
Israeli government, military, and intelligence leadership, as
well as respected foreign policy experts. We were well-
received, and we had engaged discussions of key issues
pertaining to Iran and its nuclear program, which lead to a
greater understanding of Israeli assessments and outlook on
this issue. We plan to continue these informal exchanges.
The U.S. strategy should be to develop policies in support
of its long-term goal of a more stable and secure Middle East
through peaceful processes, with the use of force reserved only
to address the most extreme and unmanageable threats to U.S.
security. At the same time, we must recognize that this part of
the world is likely to pass through many years, perhaps
decades, of turmoil, violence, and problems that only the
leaders and the people of the region can resolve finally for
themselves. What role the U.S. can play and what goals we have
laid out are important.
An important variable in looking at the strategic outcome
is whether the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran can be
reached and on what time scale. Here, as we assess the
strategic implications of that, there are two cases, obviously:
an agreement or no agreement.
Before we assess these two scenarios, however, there are
important implications for the U.S. policy in terms of what has
already been agreed. And it is instructive to acknowledge that
Iran has, in fact, complied with its commitments taken last
November in the Joint Program of Action. The IAEA, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, which has long been
skeptical of Iran's seriousness, has provided monthly reports
verifying the scale and timeliness of its actions.
And, under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran agreed to take
several major steps to limit its nuclear capacity. In my
testimony, I list these, but the most important is to get out
of the 20-percent enrichment business and to convert that
stockpile to something that cannot be rapidly enriched to
higher levels.
But there also have been a number of other important steps,
including capping the number of centrifuges, limiting
centrifuge production, capping enrichment at 3 to 5 percent,
keeping the enrichment stockpile at the size and level it was
when the agreement went into effect on the 20th of January, and
preventing the startup of new centrifuge types and their use in
the Iranian program, all of which the IAEA says Iran has been
complying with.
And, for the first time, the expanded safeguards have
covered verification, something along the lines that Mr. Tobey
and Mr. Singh have talked about. And I believe these represent
a serious and important start.
The consequences for U.S. strategic and defense issues and
interests in the Middle East without an agreement are
important. We are left there with two really unpalatable
options: containing a nuclear-armed Iran or going to war. It is
possible that Iran will decide not to pursue a nuclear weapon--
and Mr. Smith referred to their attitudes on this up until
now--even if an agreement is not reached. But understanding the
consequences of alternative strategies to diplomacy is also
important.
And let me be clear about that. There are limits on the use
of force in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The use of
military force by Israel or the United States, at best,
according to the best experts' estimations, could set the Iran
program back only 2 to 4 years. It would not eliminate it.
Iran's nuclear capability is unfortunately in the minds of its
scientists at the moment, which can't be taken out by the use
of force alone. In fact, military intervention, short of a
decision by Iran to go for a nuclear weapon, might actually
stimulate that kind of a decision, and that is important to
consider.
The failure to reach a diplomatic solution would have
profound political implications inside Iran, as well. It will
certainly weaken the moderates and embolden the hardliners,
which would most certainly impact questions of human rights,
political openness and freedoms, and all of the other related
issues that concern us worldwide.
Moreover, if an agreement is not reached, the U.S. and its
allies in Western Europe will have no alternative but to fall
back on adding more sanctions, which presents, in itself, new
problems. We have learned from the past year that sanctions
have worked to get the Iranians to the table to negotiate
seriously about issues of great importance to our national
security. Yet the imposition now of more sanctions to achieve a
better deal will not, in my opinion, having looked at the
Iranians for a long period of time, lead to Iranian
capitulation on this issue.
Sanctions are not in themselves alone the objective but are
clearly the means to reach a specific goal--in this case,
preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Sanctions work
best, if at all, only when the diplomacy around them can work.
And additional sanctions during the diplomatic process could
very well upend the entire course of the discussions, losing
the transparency that we have gained in the Joint Program of
Action and rolling back the important progress we have already
made.
If the U.S. were to walk away from a deal that most of the
other P5+1 partners believe fulfills our main objective, those
countries are no longer likely to see value in abiding by the
strict sanctions regime that has been set in place under
American leadership. This would leave us alone to enforce
largely unilateral sanctions, which we know are unfortunately
less effective.
The consequences of reaching a comprehensive agreement are
the opposite. The impact of an agreement that meets U.S.
security needs would enhance our security as well as that of
the other nations in the region. It would include a significant
reduction in the Iranian program, the institution of the kind
of intensive monitoring system that has been recommended by the
other witnesses and with which I agree, the prevention of Iran
from achieving a nuclear weapons capability.
And my testimony assumes that neither the U.S. nor Iran
would accept an agreement which was not in their long-term
interest. Such an agreement, if it holds, could mark the
beginning of a longer process of further efforts, including
resolution of many of the problems between the two countries.
Early efforts could take many different forms, including
confidence-building measures; attempts, as Mr. Singh has
outlined, to discuss and agree on regional questions as well as
longstanding questions between the U.S. and Iran stemming back
to the fall of the Shah.
The process would be long, tenuous, and demanding. No early
establishment of full diplomatic relations or normalization of
those would be likely. Thirty-five years of mistrust and
misunderstanding won't disappear overnight despite the
emergence of areas of mutual interest, such as the possibility
for cooperation on Afghanistan and now, quite possibly, on
Iraq.
Even if the U.S. were to expand its relations with Iran
over coming years, we are unlikely to ever want to accept Iran
as a hegemonic force in the region nor withdraw U.S. military
presence from the region. We have simply too much at stake with
our friends and allies in the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]
states, in Iraq, and with Israel to shift our strategic focus
on the Gulf. Despite recent signs of instability and
uncertainty in Syria and Iraq, the U.S. is unlikely to engage
in seismic shifts in its policies.
Regional strategic implications are harder to read and
predict. The sharpening of sectarian conflict between Sunni and
Shia, which we are reading about in the papers this morning,
has impeded a rapprochement between Arabs and Persians across
the Gulf. Yet both sides, at least on the surface, still
profess to be committed against war and open for high-level
visits and even seeming agreement, if not full cooperation.
Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors will need to be
satisfied and assured that the U.S. stands with them even as
they seek some regional accord with the parties in the region,
including Iran. More importantly, the U.S. support of Israel's
security must and will remain the cornerstone of American
interest in the region, and U.S. relations with Iran will not
change this commitment.
Rather than being taxed with building new relations with
nations at odds with each other, whether it is Israel or across
the Gulf, the U.S. needs to act carefully to achieve better
balances on both sides without upsetting its own relationships.
And this is a major challenge for our diplomacy.
Without a comprehensive agreement, we can expect even more
strategic challenges. Could the absence of an agreement
encourage Iran to push for nuclear weapons? The answer to this
is not clear, but, certainly, all contingencies have to be
considered.
The U.S. seeks a reduction in breakout time for Iran in any
dash to a nuclear weapon, which is outlined in the
comprehensive agreement. Without an agreement, the U.S. and
others could still use sanctions, negotiations, and other
measures short of force to prevent a potential breakout. Should
that fail, in the event Iran were to decide to break out, the
implication is clear that the U.S. would keep open its option
to use force.
My testimony then summarizes those points. It talks about
the comprehensive negotiations and where they are. Just a brief
set of statements on where I believe those negotiations are
today and how we envisage things for the future.
Both parties seem committed to finish the current process
by July 20th, 2014. The early stages went quite smoothly.
Serious differences, however, remain. And they are reported to
cover enrichment, the numbers and other characteristics of
centrifuges and the amount of low-enriched uranium which would
be allowed to be produced under the deal; the Arak reactor and
plutonium output; possible military dimensions concerns, now
being handled by the IAEA, which, also, my colleagues here at
the table focused upon; the extent of inspection, which I
believe is extremely important; sanctions relief; and the
duration of an agreement. There are possible paths through each
of these issues, and an agreement will have to require very
tough compromises.
Iran is focused on creating a peaceful civil program, it
says, protecting what it has already achieved, in part to
address domestic political opposition in Iran, which remains
strong. The U.S. seeks a minimal Iran civilian program capable
of meeting its current needs without significant increases in
breakout time. The scope of subjects to be resolved is
reportedly agreed, and some progress has already been made on a
number of these issues.
My humble opinion is that it will be a real stretch and a
hard push to get all of this in place by the 20th of July, much
as it represents important advantages for the parties on both
sides.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering can be
found in the Appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Tobey, Mr. Singh, in your testimony, you describe what
should be included in any comprehensive deal with Iran.
As I said in my statement, I am pessimistic that the
Administration will push the P5+1 to sufficiently address in a
comprehensive deal Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism, its
ballistic missile program, any covert activities, and the
conventional military programs that support the military
dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.
If the Administration does not address these facets that
support Iran's nuclear program and its ability to project
power, what would be the implications for security in the
region and beyond?
Mr. Singh. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I could just start on
that, I think that if we do not address especially the other
elements of Iran's nuclear weapons program, its nuclear weapons
capabilities, besides fuel fabrication--and let me be clear, I
think it is very important that we extend Iran's breakout time
as much as possible. I don't think it was wise to abandon our
position arguing for no enrichment in Iran and no plutonium
activities in Iran, but we are well beyond that point now,
obviously.
If we don't, however, address those other two legs of the
nuclear stool, as it were, then we really haven't fully
addressed even the nuclear weapons program. And I think that we
will leave Iran in a position where it can continue to work
towards a nuclear weapons capability and perfect a nuclear
weapons capability, even if it has paused certain elements of
its fuel fabrication program.
We also, I think, put at greater risk the chance that Iran
could covertly develop a nuclear weapon, because it would be
openly and permissibly working on those other elements of a
program, which means it would only covertly have to address the
fuel fabrication side of things.
I think, also, for our image in the region, our prestige in
the region, an agreement which is very minimalist will result
in some, as I mentioned in my testimony, negative
reverberations within the region, because people will see it,
in a sense, as a triumph for Iran and as a sign, again, that
the United States has a weakening commitment to the region.
Ambassador Pickering. Mr. Chairman, may I make a remark or
two on your question, which I think is extremely important.
Since the beginning of the negotiation effort, beginning
with the Bush administration and now the Obama administration,
there has been a very strong reluctance to add to the nuclear
negotiations other issues, however important they are. And that
reluctance was based in, I think, a well-founded concern, which
Mr. Singh mentioned in his discussion related to his testimony,
and that was that the more things we add to the present deal,
the more likely it is we are going to have to pay in the coin,
if I could put it this way, of nuclear concessions to get the
kind of additional objectives we want.
And that it is very clear, as Mr. Singh said, that a
missile without a nuclear capability is much less dangerous
than one with. And, therefore, focusing our time and attention
and putting every effort behind putting the nuclear business in
a situation where we believe we have now high confidence that
they will not develop a nuclear weapon, which is the objective
of the comprehensive agreement, in my view, is probably worth
the priority we have assigned to it, rather than to attempt to
create a kind of grand bargain, including both the missiles and
the nuclear weapons issue at the same time.
I have thought a great deal about this because, seemingly,
on the surface, dealing with missiles is persuasive. But
missiles without a warhead puts us in a lot stronger position
to deal with missiles as a second issue, and I would certainly
recommend very strongly that missiles not be left behind.
But I think it is important to consider the thinking of
both Administrations in this.
Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, my fellow panelists have dealt
with other aspects of your question. I would like to focus on
the covert problem, as I did, really, in my testimony.
I think a failure to deal with the covert issue and
focusing on--you know, there are really three ways in which
Iran could attain a nuclear weapon. They could break out of the
treaty using declared facilities, they could sneak out of the
treaty using undeclared facilities, or they could buy a weapon
or materials from some other state. Those are the theoretical
possibilities.
A lot of the focus of the negotiations has been on the
overt facilities, putting in place a firebreak that would make
it a longer period during which they would need to break out of
the treaty. I am concerned that the most likely path that Iran
would take would be use of covert facilities. And that is why I
recommended the three elements of a deal that I did.
The Chairman. I might be very naive, but it seems to me, if
they were just wanting to have nuclear capability to provide
energy for their nation, they wouldn't have to have their
facility under a mountain. It could be open. They could have
inspectors. I mean, it could be totally transparent.
And it just seems to me that it is so obvious what their
real goal is that anything else that we think about is just
kind of superfluous to the situation. I just think we just play
right into their hands. The longer we talk, the more they are
able to do. And it just seems that we just play right into
their hands on this whole subject.
Is Mr. Smith gone?
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the fact that we are holding this hearing
today. As you know, the 18 years I have been here in the
Congress, I think I have been on the subcommittee that deals
with this for 16 of those 18 years. So I am incredibly
interested in this topic.
And I think that there is real doubt by many of us here
that there is going to be a deal by July 20th on the P5+1. And
I think when we hear the chairman and, you know, his
understanding of the situation, our understanding, the
negotiations that are going on with respect to the number of
centrifuges and giving that up, the Arak heavy water reactor,
all of these issues, I think, give us an inability to trust
that even if we made a deal that the deal would be followed
through.
When I look back, I look at the fact that Iran has defied
six U.N. Security Council resolutions that have called for it
to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and
that it has consistently pursued, I believe, a very covert
action of enrichment in its capabilities. And it is, of course,
very evident that it has ignored or not allowed IAEA inspectors
full access to nuclear-related sites.
So my questions--I have several. The first would be, how
can the P5+1 more effectively pursue better monitoring and
verification processes during these ongoing negotiations? That
would be my first question.
And how can we ensure that the IAEA inspectors can have
better access to Iran's facilities? Because a lot of this
negotiation deals with ability to verify and actually go in and
seek out these issues.
So that would be my first set of questions to whomever.
Yes, Doctor?
Ambassador Pickering. Perhaps I could begin.
I think that your point is very important, and, indeed,
full inspection and monitoring is a critical question in
dealing with a lot of potential issues.
The Joint Plan of Action itself has unprecedented new
monitoring arrangements in the current 6-month period for the
International Atomic Energy Agency, including for the first
time ever inspection of centrifuge parts, production, and
centrifuge assembly plants, including daily access to Iran's
nuclear facilities, something that has been, I think, speeded
up and is unusual, and including, instead of providing the
world with quarterly reports of what is happening in Iran, the
IAEA is now providing monthly reports on Iranian compliance
with all of the aspects of the Joint Plan of Action.
The IAEA is clearly, in my view, at an absolute minimum,
going to have to apply something called the Additional
Protocol, something the Iranians agreed to for a period of 2
years. They signed but did not ratify. And at the end of the 2-
year period, because of their objections to continued Western
insistence that they go to zero centrifuges and zero
enrichment, they resumed a regular inspection cycle rather than
the Additional Protocol.
The Additional Protocol provides a great deal more access,
including at the choice of the IAEA, rather than on the basis
of prior agreement. I, myself, have believed for a long period
of time we also ought to draw lessons from the Iraq inspections
that were under a separate negotiated arrangement with Iraq
stemming out of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and indeed
the period after that and a series of U.N. resolutions. That,
at a minimum, in my view, should give the IAEA anytime,
anywhere access, which was the standard in Iraq.
And it turned out, in fact, that that standard was a lot
better, despite the fact that the Iraqis had on occasion tried
to resist those inspections. Nevertheless, it was the
mobilization, put it this way, of international strength and
support, our military presence in the area, the no-fly zone,
and, indeed, other capabilities which, in the end, I think
helped a great deal to get the kind of level of assurance that
we had. Those kinds of approaches are important.
Finally, since Iraq and, indeed, since the Additional
Protocol, new technical techniques for examining and following
the kinds of activities that should constitute part of the
inspection mechanism should themselves be incorporated in any
new ramified inspection arrangement with regard to Iran.
That obviously has to be based on access, but with the
access of the Additional Protocol and what I would suggest
beyond that, I think we have gotten close to the kind of
inspection that can give us not absolute certainty but at least
a high confidence that our system can not only monitor what is
already going on but have a reasonable chance of finding covert
activities.
The reasonable news is that, up until now, when Iran
started hidden activities, we had a very good indication
through our national intelligence mechanism several years ahead
of the actual declaration of those facilities, about which the
Iranians disputed with the U.N., but, nevertheless, we knew.
I think, finally, we have a huge envelope of ambiguity
against the Iranians in attempting covert activity,
particularly if we make our capacity to respond to that, up to
and including the use of force if necessary, as clear and on
the table as a part of the agreement; the ambiguity being that
the uncertainty on their side and the consequences of failing
to comply with the agreement become a great deal more punishing
than the uncertainty on our side.
And that is helpful in deterring the Iranians from moving
in that direction, but I would be the first to say we will
never achieve 100 percent. We can achieve very high confidence,
as you know. On a regular basis, General Clapper is able to
tell us in his annual report that the Iranians have not made a
decision to make a nuclear weapon, and he continues to say this
with what he calls high confidence, which, as I read the
intelligence in this particular issue and the judgments about
intelligence, is a pretty solid basis for making that kind of
conclusion.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to put on the
record that if we are to continue down this particular path of
this negotiation, this ``anytime, anywhere'' issue for me is
really a make-or-break. Because, you know, the problem is not
what they are going to let us take a look at; the problem is
what they don't show us in what they have. And that is where
all of these issues have occurred.
And thank you for your indulgence on the time, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I join with you that I am very concerned about
superfluous, to me, almost wishful thinking, as world peace is
at risk with the potential of Iran developing a nuclear
capability. And I appreciate, too, that the concerns we have
really are bipartisan. There is just such a concern.
We need to, I think, refresh our memories. And that is
that, in considering these negotiations with Iran, a state
sponsor of terrorism, I believe that the President is putting
American families at risk by ignoring the clear threats of
Iran's rulers. In fact, I believe that weakness will lead to
conflict and more attacks worldwide.
In 1983, we should not forget, but somehow people have,
that the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut was by Iran.
It was the largest explosive device since Hiroshima; 305
personnel were killed. We should remember that, of course, it
was Iran that produced the IEDs [improvised explosive devices]
to kill American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, killing
civilians too. And it is horrific that these IEDs were used,
vehicle-borne, to purposely kill Iraqi children. This was not
an accident.
The President has failed to encourage the Green Revolution,
where the young people of Iran wanted change, regime change.
And the people seeking regime change actually were shot and
killed in the streets and were not given the encouragement they
should. And we know Iran is the culture of ancient Persia, and
there is a great history that should be reestablished but not
through an authoritarian regime.
And, just this spring, we know that Iran was transshipping
missiles to terrorists. But, fortunately, Israel has stopped
this transfer.
The message that we should understand--at rallies in
Tehran, the signs that are carried are in English for our
benefit, and they are very clear. They say, ``Death to America.
Death to Israel.'' That is what they mean.
In light of that, Mr. Singh, as Iran refuses to reveal the
extent of its nuclear program now while talks are ongoing, what
would make anyone believe that they would reveal the extent of
these programs accurately once a comprehensive agreement is
reached?
In your view, should the P5+1 sign a comprehensive deal
with Iran if Iran has not fully satisfied all the IAEA concerns
regarding possible military dimensions?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Congressman.
I think it is an excellent question. I think the answer is
``no,'' that this has to be a key element of what we do.
Right now, this is being pursued by the IAEA, this question
of possible military dimensions. And let's face it, that word,
``possible,'' is a bit generous. These are military dimensions
to a program. That is what the weaponization research is for.
And these clearly need to be resolved, and we need to see
Iran come clean. Because it is important, I think, that this
start from, as Mr. Tobey said, a clear strategic decision by
Iran to leave the military elements of its program behind. And
unless they are willing to do that, then I don't think we
should sign an agreement.
I think it is also very important for the inspectors. And
the Congresswoman's question about how do we strengthen
inspections, I think that having these issues resolved, having
Iran come clean on its past activities is absolutely key to
that so the inspectors have a roadmap, have a baseline.
But there are other elements to that, Congressman. I think
we need to make sure that we keep our own intelligence
resources in place, that we don't start drawing them down
because we think this issue is finished after an agreement is
signed. We have to keep our eye on Iran.
I think it is important that we keep military forces in the
region, that we don't draw those down, thinking that the
problem is solved after an agreement is signed, because, again,
we need a credible enforcement mechanism and a credible
military threat if necessary, which hopefully we will never
have to use. So I do think that that is an incredibly important
part of the program.
Look, I think that what we really want to see is a
strategic decision by Iran to forego any hope of having nuclear
weapons in the future. We would like to see a broader shift by
Iran such that we could have a better relationship with them.
But I don't see yet evidence of that shift, nor am I
necessarily confident that if we sign a nuclear agreement you
will start to see that kind of broader easing of tensions. We
could hope for that, but I think we need to be clear-eyed, we
need to be realistic.
And we are going to need to continue to push back, I would
say, far harder than we are now on Iranian shipment of arms,
Iranian support for terrorism, and other activities like that,
in part to show our allies that we are not stepping back from
the region in the wake of an agreement.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate that very much. And I share
your concern. And, hey, the thought that we would be
considering military dimensions--as we know, they are
developing a ballistic missile capability that could attack
southeastern Europe all the way back over to India. So our
allies are at risk.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Davis.
Ambassador Pickering. Mr. Wilson, could I just make a
comment on what Mr. Singh----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired, so we need
to move on.
Ambassador Pickering. Okay.
The Chairman. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you.
It seems to me that we are looking at a number of
continuums here, I mean, from what I guess we might see as
ideal to absolutely horrible, in addition to the time factors
that we are looking at. And I wonder if you could talk a little
bit about that and where time itself fits into this and who it
is serving.
The sanctions seem to have had an impact in terms of
bringing Iran to the table, but how much longer and how more
aggressive if we were to move in that direction in a different
way? Where do you see that? I mean, is there a breaking point
here, in some ways, in terms of Iran and the impact of those
sanctions and, certainly, the public reaction as well? Some
people have talked about face-saving measures, things that are
needed. Could you help out with that?
Ambassador Pickering. Perhaps I could take a shot at that.
I think that up until November it was, I think, quite clear
to all of us, as Iran made larger amounts of 20-percent
material and increased the number of centrifuges it had in
operation on a regular basis, that time was not on our side.
At least momentarily, through the 20th of July, the Joint
Plan of Action gets rid of the 20-percent material, keeps the
level of low-enriched uranium stockpile the way it was at the
beginning, allows the introduction of no more centrifuges, and,
indeed, does a great number of things, not everything, but does
a great number of things that I think are helpful.
And various estimates have been made of the amount of
breakout time that particular agreement allows us, perhaps
going from as low as 2 weeks to something on the order of 2 or
3 months. These are just estimates. I don't know that anybody
can, you know, prove this on a stack of Bibles, but I think it
is a more comfortable position.
It also set a standard for the comprehensive agreement. The
comprehensive agreement must be based on our agreement about an
ongoing Iranian civil nuclear program as the basis. It says
``joint agreement,'' but that means our agreement has to be
there. That is an extremely important standard that has to be
met.
If time does not allow us until the 20th of July, we have
another opportunity, because the Joint Plan of Action allows
another 6 months----
Mrs. Davis. It includes another step, right.
Ambassador Pickering. It includes that. And presumably, but
I don't know, it would have to be decided whether, in fact, all
of those limitations will apply, will there be any more
sanctions relief or no more sanctions relief.
My own view would be the status quo, as it exists now,
should be extended for additional negotiations if it looks like
we have made real progress. If we don't, then we have to face
the hard decision as to whether we walk away from the table.
And the consequences of that----
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Ambassador Pickering [continuing]. I have laid out in my
testimony. I think it is very important.
I would like just to add one more point. Mr. Singh seems to
put a lot of faith--he and I don't agree on a lot of things,
but I agree on most of what he and Mr. Tobey have said here
today, particularly on inspection.
But Mr. Singh seems to put a lot of faith in the notion
that the Iranians would somehow tell us that they have been
involved in a weapons program and they now no longer are, and I
would not. The history with Iran and perhaps with North Korea,
I would put a lot of faith in the ideas that they and I have
put forward, that it is through inspection and intelligence
collection and the best job we can do in squeezing that program
down that will give us the faith that they aren't going to go.
And even if they say, in fact, well, we made these steps
and we are not serious and we are not going to do it again,
thank you very much, I would not at that point be convinced. I
would want very much to see an ongoing program of monitored,
verified action on their part.
Mrs. Davis. Yeah. And I guess there is an expectation
there. I would think that they anticipate also that that is
part of the deal.
Do you--we are going to go past July 20th, likely.
Mr. Singh. I think so.
And to be clear, I would say that both are necessary, not
just one or the other. I think we have to have an accounting of
past work as well as ongoing, very intrusive inspections, where
I agree with Ambassador Pickering, for whom I have great
respect, that we need to have Iraq-style on-demand inspections.
I have a hard time believing that the current differences
that we have between the United States side and our P5+1
partners and Iran on the issues of centrifuges, sanctions
relief, the timeline of an agreement can be bridged before July
20th, especially the centrifuge issue, because there we are
very far apart.
And it is hard, in a sense, to understand the Iranian
position. Because Iran, if it really just wants nuclear power--
remember, most states in the world that have nuclear power
import their nuclear fuel. We here in the United States import
a good portion of our nuclear fuel. Iran itself, for its one
working nuclear reactor, imports its nuclear fuel.
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Mr. Singh. And so it is hard to make sense of that position
absent a desire for nuclear weapons.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I guess the first thing I should do is to ask
for diplomatic immunity here today, because I have heard some
things that leave me bewildered or even astonished.
I have heard statements that the goal of Iran is to gain
nuclear weapons without international condemnation. And I
think, if Iran could gain nuclear weapons, with or without
international condemnation, if that was the only thing that
they had to worry about, that they would proceed tomorrow.
I have heard it said that there is evidence that they don't
intend to do it because they have chosen not to build, when
every piece of evidence we have says that they have been
pursuing this for a long time.
I have heard it said, you know, that we need to just cap
the enrichment to 3 to 5 percent, when most people who are
familiar with that process know that, from the time we find
uranium in the ground until the time that we can take it to
4\1/2\ percent, we are 80 percent or more the way there to a
fissile material, to a weapons-grade material.
I have heard it said that we could possibly, only possibly,
set them back 2 to 4 years, that somehow we would suggest that
the United States of America could not prevent Iran from
gaining nuclear weapons if the commitment was there. And I find
that just, again, hard to express here.
I have heard it said that there are conclusions that there
is a high confidence that they have not made the decision to
pursue a nuclear weapons capability, and I would suggest to you
that that involves having to have clairvoyance and, especially
in the face of any available evidence, points exactly to the
opposite.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that this Administration is placing
us all on a trajectory where Iran gains a nuclear weapons
capability and sets the entire world walking in the shadow of
nuclear terrorism. And I find it just astonishing that there is
such a casual cognitive dissonance here that somehow that we
don't seem to understand how significant the issue really is.
To see the world's leading sponsor of terrorism gaining a
nuclear weapons capability will cause us to need a new
calendar. It will change everything. Our children will never
walk in peace again if that happens. The American people
understand that, and I am astonished that some of the most
erudite leaders in this country don't seem to grasp that.
Mr. Chairman, under the interim agreement, Iran is
essentially protected in a protocol for enrichment up to 3 to 5
percent, and Mr. Chairman, I would suggest to you, sir, that
that is the whole ball game; that if Iran can enrich uranium or
produce plutonium that it is within their power to proceed to a
nuclear weapons capability at will. The breakout is just a
matter of a few months at most.
And Mr. Chairman, I guess I need to calm down here a little
bit and just ask one basic question: You know, we have seen the
United Nations Security Council adopt multiple resolutions
since 2006 demanding Iran's full and sustained suspension of
all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and
Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA on all outstanding issues
related to its nuclear activities. And to date, Iran has
violated almost all of those resolutions. And if Iran's nuclear
aspirations are only for peaceful purposes, why would they
continually violate these resolutions and hide their nuclear
facilities, as, Mr. Chairman, you said, under a mountain, a
very appropriate question in my mind, for decades in these
secretive compounds?
So my question, and I am going to send it to Mr. Singh if I
could, and incidentally, sir, I think your analysis has been
excellent here today. The interim agreement did not fulfill the
demands of the United Nations Security Council resolutions and
the question is: Do you have confidence that any final deal
will satisfy those resolutions?
Mr. Singh. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
It does not look like a final deal will satisfy those
requirements. What the resolution said was that--and these were
often unanimous resolutions--said that Iran had to suspend its
enrichment reprocessing and heavy-water-related work. Right
now, the heavy water reactor at Arak is continuing, although
they have suspended some elements of that under the interim
agreement, but it looks like as part of a final deal, they will
be permitted to continue with that work. Enrichment we have
conceded also on enrichment, as you have indicated, and so, no,
I can't say that a final agreement would----
Mr. Franks. So, Mr. Chairman, ultimately, the centrifuges
are going to continue to spin and this Administration is going
to continue to fiddle.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thanks for being here. First
question really goes to transparency in this process, and I am
wondering, Ambassador, is it possible or realistic, and if so,
how, to create an environment where the IAEA has full access to
the entirety of the Iranian nuclear program to include the
military sites, and if they are refusing to reveal the extent
of their research and development [R&D] now, what would give us
any assurance or confidence that once an agreement is reached,
that we would have access both to the sites and to the extent
of their R&D? And how can we reach an agreement unless we have
this?
Ambassador Pickering. The purpose of the present agreement
is to satisfy your second point; that is, that the IAEA will be
satisfied that all of the actions taken by Iran under the
rubric of possible military developments, that is, actions they
took between 1998 and 2003, which we have good reason to
suspect were involved in the militarization of their nuclear
program, have to be explained and revealed, if I can put it
that way, for the reasons that Mr. Singh made clear, and with
which I agree, that we can't inspect future programs if we
don't know how they misbehaved in the past. And so that is very
important.
That work is apparently going ahead. Will it be done by the
20th of July? I very much doubt it. And that will be an
important factor in the consideration. But I don't think we
should have a comprehensive deal until we are satisfied on that
point. With respect to the first question, is it possible for
us to put into place a regime under which we could expect any
time, anywhere, and the answer to that is yes. The difficulty
is, is it possible to put into a place where we know exactly
what is going on in the head of the Iranian leadership at any
particular time and at any particular moment? At the moment, we
have not yet, with all respect, solved that problem. That is a
traditional problem of intelligence where, in fact, we can know
a great deal. We may know a lot. Congressman Franks was rather
disparaging of General Clapper a moment ago, the Director of
National Intelligence, who continues to say, year after year,
he believes with high confidence, and if Mr. Franks doesn't
really know, he should ask General Clapper because it is
important that he understand why General Clapper agrees with
high confidence that Iran has not made a decision to go for a
nuclear weapon.
But the principal problem is going anywhere and looking at
everything gives us a leg up. But it doesn't give us total,
absolute, 100 percent, you know, vacuum-proof confidence that
we can do it.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you. And the second question
for Mr. Tobey: With your involvement and experience with North
Korea, I am wondering what lessons learned should we be
cognizant of now to make sure that this deal does not end up
with the situation where we are today where we continue to deal
with a nuclear threat from North Korea?
Mr. Tobey. There is a very direct lesson. At the time of
the agreed framework, there was a dispute between the IAEA and
North Korea about whether or not they would have access to
certain of the material in North Korea that would give them
definitive knowledge of what North Korea had done in the past.
The United States actually undermined the IAEA by saying it
wasn't worth blocking a deal to go back and understand what had
happened before. And unfortunately, that--I think it was done
in good faith, and in--with some reasonably credible view that
in a time when communist regimes were falling all over the
world, the North Korea problem would solve itself within 5
years, and it wasn't worth risking no deal to understand
history.
My point about understanding the possible military
dimensions in Iran, is that it is worth and it is necessary to
have a good deal. And one thing I would clarify with respect to
the possible military dimensions, the point has been made that
they halted in 2003. Actually, what the IAEA has reported is
that there are indications that some activities relevant to the
development of nuclear explosive device continued after 2003,
and that some may still be ongoing. So this isn't all about
history. This is about the future.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last month, I offered an amendment to the National Defense
Authorization Act, which stated that the United States should
only agree to a comprehensive agreement with Iran if three
conditions are met: One, Iran must cease enriching uranium;
two, Iran must cease pursuing or developing nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons and ballistic missile
technology; and three, Iran must stop supporting terrorism.
These are positions taken by the House in the past. This
language was adopted by this committee, and the bill passed
unanimously out of this committee and passed the House by a
strong bipartisan vote. So let the record reflect that this now
is the position of the U.S. House of Representatives.
For Mr. Tobey or Mr. Singh, can you describe the difference
between the Israel and the U.S. definitions of what the red
line is that should not be crossed, must not be crossed by
Iran?
Mr. Tobey. Well, I am actually a little unclear as to what,
if any, red lines the United States has drawn with respect to
Iran. I think it was pretty clear from Prime Minister
Netanyahu's speech at the United Nations, where he had the
graphic that production of 20 percent enriched uranium beyond a
certain level was unacceptable to Israel. So I guess that would
describe the difference as I understand it.
Mr. Lamborn. And, Mr. Singh, how would you answer that?
Mr. Singh. I think that Mr. Tobey is right. I think that
the Israelis--but also not just the Israelis. I mean, the
Israelis are very vocal on these points, but I think their
basic view is shared by quite a few of our allies in the
region, that some of the concessions that we have already made
in the negotiations go too far for their comfort level. And so
there is a lot of nervousness about what we are prepared to
concede in this agreement, what we have already conceded in the
negotiations, and what sort of stance we will have after an
agreement is reached if in fact an agreement is reached.
And so I would say that we--there are significant gaps
between the U.S. and our allies, both Israel and the Arab
allies, and it is very important that as part of our Iran
policy, broadly, we address these differences; that we address
these concerns that our allies have, lest we find ourselves
again in a strategically much worse position after an agreement
is signed.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, when I look at--my personal opinion is
that when you look at those differences, I am inclined to agree
with them more than the Administration's position on which is
the better approach.
Changing subjects here, Secretary Kerry indicated that we
are open to cooperate with Iran on the ISIS [Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria] crisis in Iraq. Do you think that if such
cooperation with Iran were to take place, that that would give
them license to be more aggressive in the region, thus
impacting the nuclear negotiations? Mr. Tobey.
Mr. Tobey. Well, I think, actually, what Iran has--some
Iranian officials already have said is that the crisis in Iraq
should give them greater leverage on the nuclear matter. In
other words, if the United States expects Iranian help in Iraq,
the United States should show greater flexibility in the
nuclear talks. I think, of course, that were we to pursue such
flexibility, it would be a disaster.
Mr. Lamborn. Another question, changing subjects. There has
been some discussion in the Senate and it has been squelched,
but I know Senators Menendez and, from Illinois, Kirk, want to
have a--pass a bill, have sanctions in place in case the
negotiations break through, do not go forward, as an incentive
to the Iranians to keep negotiating. Would either of you two
agree with that being a good bill to pass at this time?
Mr. Tobey. I think the notion of contingent sanctions being
real to the Iranian Government is a constructive one for the--a
good outcome.
Mr. Singh. I would just add to that, look, I think in any
negotiation like this there has to be an ``or else'' that is
out there for the Iranians. And I think that ``or else'' can
take multiple forms, a credible military threat, which I think
right now isn't very credible, or contingent sanctions.
Mr. Lamborn. And I agree with both of you. I am glad to
hear you say that.
And Mr. Pickering, my last question, if Iran were somehow
to develop a nuclear weapon, what would be--can you list some
of the other countries in the region that would want to have
their own nuclear program and/or weapon, just so the public can
be aware?
Ambassador Pickering. Well, I can. I think that we have
always been concerned that countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Egypt less so because of the turmoil in Egypt at the present
time, although Egypt still a formidable potential power for
moving in this direction, and in the past, we saw indications
over the last three or four decades of Egyptian interest in
this area.
Mr. Lamborn. Any others? Any others?
Ambassador Pickering. I think the United Arab Emirates,
although we have a very tight 123 agreement with them that
rules out enrichment and reprocessing, and so that is
important. Could I just mention on contingency sanctions? My
sanctions--we have contingency sanctions in place at the
present time.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired.
Ambassador Pickering. But the Iranians believe, in fact,
that sanctions will happen immediately when the President wants
it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I--we need to stay within the
timelines or we won't be able to get all of the questions in.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, it is good to see you. I want to return to
the inspection regime, and you know, what we are talking with
Iran right now, is that--or all the things we are asking them
to do are all reversible, right, not enriching the uranium
beyond the 20 percent and the like. But going back to the
inspection regime, how confident are you, given U.S.
intelligence and IAEA's verification capabilities, that a 6-
month breakout window would be a sufficient period of time for
us to actually even detect and counter them doing so? I mean,
do we have the intelligence capabilities right now to even
detect? I am afraid that we are going to--they are going to be
further down in that 6-month window, and we won't even detect
it, and we won't be able to react in time.
Ambassador Pickering. I think it is a very good question.
My own sense is that there are some people who would like to
have the breakout window as long as 5 years. There are some who
might agree on 3 years. The U.S. Government is purported to
have said 6 months to 12 months, maybe more if they could get
it, would be very useful.
I think breakout is just one measure. The important
questions that my two colleagues and I have put before you on
inspection and monitoring, are really a key. In effect, if you
don't know what is going on, no amount of breakout time is of
any value. So we have to look at this as a whole nexus of
factors and elements that we have to take into account. And so
it is very important.
I think that breakout time, as my testimony makes clear, is
designed to provide us an opportunity before using force, which
the President has kept on the table and says it is on the
table, to see if we can stop a breakout short of the use of
force. But the use of force is not taken off the table by an
extension of breakout time. It shouldn't be, in my view. It is
still there. A use of force might stop a breakout. It might not
stop a breakout, but it appears to be one of the better factors
that we have going for us in that particular set of issues.
I am not sure if I have addressed your question well, but I
think that it is that combination of doing our best to know
what is going on. I think our intelligence has been pretty
good. But anybody who believes their intelligence is perfect is
in trouble.
Ms. Duckworth. Well, thank you. I want to follow up on
that, you know, and sort of go back to what you said earlier
about the need for inspections and that we can't come from a
position where we trust that Iranians will tell us that they
are doing things in secret, and you know, if an agreement is
reached which involves sanctions relief, I mean, how do we
assure that the relief is not abused to advance a secret
program beyond the inspection regime? And also you know, are
there additional steps that the U.S. needs to take to combat
the illicit procurement activities? And I am thinking
specifically, they are going to have, if we reduce some of
these sanctions, greater access to other markets. They are
going to have more participation with other potential
providers, and they are not going to tell us, Hey, we are
secretly buying this stuff on the side because we now have
access. What other things can we do beyond the inspection
regime to ensure that we safeguard----
Ambassador Pickering. I think we have heavily relied on our
intelligence in the past to look at procurement activities. The
IAEA does not have an intelligence system. It relies, in
effect, on tip-offs from the intelligence systems of the big
powers and other countries that have good intelligence. And in
the past, intelligence has sometimes erred. But in my view, it
is better to make a mistake and go look at it than it is to
make the mistake of not taking into account what you think you
are seeing and not look at it. And that is very, very
important.
I do agree that as we have gotten down into procurement,
particularly into centrifuge construction, and the making of
the rotors for the centrifuges, which are a very important
element, and some of the specific materials that are not
available to the Iranians or the Iranians have trouble making
and are heavily dependent on the import is significant, it is
very significant to look at that kind of material and take a
look at whether, in fact, there may be covert operations using
that material because the material balance between what we know
and the material balance between what they import will show
differences which will give us that kind of telltale.
So there are useful ways of looking at these particular
problems that can give us confidence, even high confidence. I
keep telling you, however, I think there is nothing perfect.
But I would rather go with the deal, with all of the monitoring
and access that we have been talking about here at this table,
and on which I think we have an agreement, than not go with a
deal and have no monitoring and access at all.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Duckworth.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And you know, the testimony we heard today ranges across
the board to--from being very optimistic to being pessimistic,
talking about inspections. Do we truly believe that the IAEA is
going to have the power to do the inspections necessary,
because I do believe that we need to be more than just hopeful
that we are getting the right information, and we hear that,
well, we are never going to be certain. Well, I would rather
err on the side of certainty, over-inspect than under-inspect.
Do we have any confidence that we can have that occur on
inspections?
Mr. Tobey. The IAEA has very important, significant
verification capabilities, great technical expertise. But
ultimately, their power to sort of use those authorities is a
political one. It depends on the board of governors in the
first instance and, after that, the United Nations Security
Council. So if it comes to a point where there is a dispute as
to what they should be looking at and what they shouldn't, it
will be resolved politically in the Security Council.
Mr. Singh. And if I could just say, Congressman, that I
think this may sound obvious, but the bigger the program you
leave Iran with, the harder the inspections are. And so I would
encourage us not to see the size of the program and the rigor
of the inspections as somehow a tradeoff that, well, if you
have got good inspections, you can give them a lot more
residual capacity. I think you would want to help the
inspectors by ensuring that program is as constrained as
possible and that it has that political backing via a very
strong enforcement mechanism to which we have a credible
commitment.
Ambassador Pickering. And Mr. Nugent, I think it is
extremely important that we get a Security Council resolution
supporting the agreement and hopefully one that says that if it
is necessary to use force, sanctions, and pressure, we have the
right to do so.
Mr. Nugent. Well, I appreciate that succinct answer. There
was a comment made about their covert activities, and I guess
that really is the crux of it. You know, you have heard the
chairman talk about, well, you know, if you are doing this for
peaceful means, why would you have the facility under a
mountain? Well, you wouldn't. I mean, you just wouldn't. But
what are the chances, I guess, and this is the hard question,
because intelligence is great. But we know that the
intelligence community has missed the mark on so many issues.
But once you miss it, it is almost impossible to go back and
correct the issue, talk about covert opportunities that they
have, or even the opportunities to purchase a weapon.
Mr. Tobey. Verification is the process of presenting a
complete picture of the entire fabric of activities. And if
there are inconsistencies, loose threads, pulling at those
loose threads until you understand exactly what happened. And
if you actually have access to people and documents and places,
it becomes very difficult to hide those things, especially when
the inspection process interacts with intelligence means.
Mr. Nugent. But do we have that today?
Mr. Tobey. It is not in place today. It is my hope that any
agreement would have that as a key component.
Mr. Singh. Congressman, if I could just add, you asked,
what confidence do we have? A former Deputy Director General of
the IAEA, Olli Heinonen, has pointed out that if Iran doesn't
have a covert element to its program now, it would be the first
time in decades that they don't have that. Remember that all of
these facilities we are talking about, Arak, Natanz, Fordow,
were once clandestine facilities, which were exposed, which
were not declared by Iran, but exposed, and they are all still
in place and all still functioning.
Mr. Nugent. And lastly, we talked about ballistic missiles.
Why would we have a ballistic missile or in development of a
ballistic missile for conventional versus the need, obviously,
to have a delivery vehicle if you are going to go down the
weaponization of nuclear? Why would you be spending time and
money on development of ballistic missiles if your intention
was just to use it as a conventional delivery system?
Mr. Tobey. It makes no military sense. There could be some
argument that it could be useful as a terror weapon, not
particularly appealing either.
Ambassador Pickering. I would just have to add that, of
course, Iran and Iraq fought an 8-year war. They all had
ballistic missiles at that time. They had no nuclear weapons.
We were worried about nuclear weapons, but the nuclear weapon
program came along in Iran after that war.
Mr. Nugent. And I guess the last thing is, I just have a
hard time trusting Iran just from the mere fact when I was in
Iraq in 2011, an Iranian warhead was use to kill five of our
soldiers. And they didn't get that off the shelf at Walmart.
And I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, thank you for being here today and for your
testimony. As a cosponsor of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran
Prevention Act, I am very concerned, as many of my colleagues
are, about a nuclear Iran and what that would mean for our ally
in Israel. I was in Israel last August and I saw firsthand the
threats on every border. But every official I met with, whether
they were military or political, from all across the spectrum,
said one thing consistently, and that is: We have to stop Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon. And I agree with that. We cannot
be talking about containment. We have to talk about prevention.
And I understand the importance of attempting a diplomatic
solution. And I hope that there is some success here. But I
remain skeptical about Iran and how trustworthy they could be
on any agreement. In fact, when I was meeting, along with other
Members, with representatives from the Administration we asked
them, Have you identified, has intelligence identified all of
the Iranian nuclear facilities? And they said, No, we haven't
because some are hard to find. And entering into the
negotiations or an agreement on that basis is very worrisome to
me. And I think we need to be very careful about it.
So I would like you, if you could, to comment on that issue
of whether or not we can, in fact, reach an agreement that
would identify the facilities so they can be inspected.
Secondly, I am concerned about the removal of sanctions. I
think it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to rebuild
sanctions if an agreement does not get concluded. And I would
like you, if you could, to comment on that.
And then, finally, I want to go to the issue that was
raised earlier by my colleague about the recent advice we have
been getting across the board that we should perhaps have some
discussions with Iran about joining together to secure Iraq
from ISIS. It seems to me that this is a peculiar step for us
to take with Iran, given our position on Syria and historically
on Iran, so I would like you to explain in a little bit more
detail if you could, to how the negotiations, if they occur,
with Iran and ISIS in Iraq, how will they affect in any
specific way the P5+1 negotiations? And conversely, can the
P5+1 negotiations further complicate and potentially worsen an
already delicate situation with Iraq, and how would these
negotiations potentially affect our relationship with Israel?
I know I have given you a lot, but I wanted to get all of
the questions in so we could conserve on time and perhaps you
could respond as quickly as possible. Thank you.
Ambassador Pickering. Perhaps I could take a shot at a
couple of the points that you make. I think that Iran has said
they want to use the Iraq issue to see if they can effect a
nuclear negotiation. The U.S. has said very clearly, it is not
going to do that. And I think that that is important. I don't
see the President at the moment rushing into Iraq again. I
think, if anything, he is consulting up here and being very
cautious about it, but we can all have our own ideas about that
particular issue.
I think on the question of inspections, you have gotten us
into Don Rumsfeld's unknown unknowns. Of course, by
definitions, unknown unknowns are not knowable, and there is no
way to get around that. What we do, I think, see is that Iran's
nuclear capacities are understood and known. We know where the
pieces are, and I don't believe there are pieces that we don't
know about in terms of the chain of facilities required to do
enrichment, the chain of facilities required to produce heavy
water. They have no capacity to produce plutonium in a
reprocessing plant at the present time. So we see most of that.
The really interesting question is, could there be an entirely
black covert program going on? And Olli Heinonen, whose views I
respect, may not have been referring to anything that large. He
may have been referring to individual experiments about pieces
of activity that we saw back before 2003. We don't know.
But it is important to believe at least that we have a
pretty good chance, and I think there is agreement here at the
table, of finding bigger pieces that would be important in
producing the nuclear fuel or conforming and configuring the
warhead that we are worried about, and there I have some
confidence that we are in better shape.
Mr. Barber. Okay, I know we have very little time.
Quickly, Mr. Tobey, Mr. Singh?
Mr. Singh. Let me just say on sanctions relief that I think
we should, that if there is an agreement, sanctions relief
should be backloaded, that anything that is irreversible, and I
agree that sanctions would be very hard to put back together,
should come at the end of the process once we have seen what
Iran's track record is. And even then, I think there are a
number of sanctions that are going to have to stay in place
because they address issues like terrorists.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Barber.
Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Like many of my
colleagues, I am a skeptic about the reality of what these
talks can produce for us. But I am even further concerned by
some of the testimony we have already heard about what might be
the threat to the talks by introducing as a sidebar issue, this
issue of the potential of some help or some cooperation between
the United States and Iran in the Iraq ISIL [Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant] issue.
I heard, Mr. Tobey, you made some pretty strong comments
about that. From my experience in negotiating, if I introduce a
new issue in negotiations, the person with whom I am
negotiating is going to want something back in return for that.
Are we, in fact, endangering our position in the
negotiations over this agreement by introducing, even as a
sidebar issue, this whole issue of some communication or
cooperation between the United States and Iran with regard to
the ISIL issue in Iraq?
Ambassador Pickering. I think, sir, that Iran will be moved
to do what they think they need to do to save Prime Minister
Maliki and his regime. In my view, that fundamentally means
changing Mr. Maliki's view on how he deals with the minorities
in his own country. The ISIS people have scooped up lots of
people who have been antagonized by Mr. Maliki among the Sunni
population. And you remember back when we moved into Anbar and
changed our policies and worked with the Sunnis. He has done
exactly the opposite. He hasn't helped them. He hasn't
supported them. He has put them in jail. He has treated them
very badly. ISIS has made a lot of progress because, in fact,
it has captured Sunni villages in northern Iraq.
We now have to trust to see whether Maliki can do two
things at once: can change his policies with respect to his
minorities and begin to bring them back on his side; and at the
same time, provide a significant defense so he doesn't lose his
capital at the same time.
Mr. Byrne. But my concern is is that we are introducing
into the negotiations with regard to this agreement a new
issue.
Ambassador Pickering. I am not introducing the issue, and I
don't think the U.S. is going to introduce the issue.
Mr. Byrne. Well, we have some reports that they are. If
that is true, does that change our position?
Ambassador Pickering. Well, you know, I have reason to
believe that those reports are at this point very tentative
kinds of things. I think people are thinking better of this
now. I hope they are. My own view is that Iran has to look out
for its own interests in Iraq; that it is not up to the U.S. to
teleguide them, to make deals with them. I think it is very
important, particularly not at the expense of the issue we are
here to discuss today, the nuclear deal.
Mr. Byrne. Let me ask Mr. Singh and Mr. Tobey to respond to
that.
Mr. Singh. What I would say is I think that U.S. officials
have tried to clarify that we don't want to see these two
issues linked, and I think that is right. I think one of the
dangers we have, though, is, again, the sort of perception in
the region, and I think that when we are sitting there, sort of
talking with the Iranians about these issues, it does raise
those kind of worries in the region about, are we sort of
sitting here and deciding regional issues on a bilateral basis
with Iran, which our allies absolutely don't want to see us do
and, frankly, isn't a wise thing for us to do from a policy
perspective.
And I agree with Ambassador Pickering. The Iranians see
these things as leverage over us, and we don't want to see them
linked at all. I think, more importantly though, what we really
don't want to see, we don't want to see any increased Iranian
involvement in Iraq. We want to see Iran out of regional
conflicts, not further in regional conflicts.
Mr. Byrne. Mr. Tobey.
Mr. Tobey. I think greater Iranian involvement in Iraq
would be against U.S. interests for its own sake, and I think
it would be against U.S. interests in the P5+1 talks. I don't
know what the Administration is doing with respect to talking
to Iran about this.
Mr. Byrne. Okay, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Kilmer.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here.
I had a couple of questions for the panel. What I want to
get a better understanding of is what the barriers are to Iran
actually developing a nuclear weapon. Is it knowledge about how
to do it? Is it a resource issue? Is it a capability issue? And
in the event that a deal is actually reached, is there
something that the P5+1 can do to ensure that we keep those
barriers up and you don't see an erosion of those barriers?
Mr. Singh. Well, I guess what I would say is, as I
mentioned, there are three elements to a nuclear weapons
program. You have got the fuel fabrication, where there is no
great challenge before Iran on that side, except just doing it.
They could produce highly enriched uranium to weapons grade
with the technology they have now and with the knowledge they
have now, as far as I know. The danger would be detection. The
danger would be if they chose to do that, what reaction would
that prompt from Israel or from the United States in terms of a
military response?
On the weaponization research side, it is difficult to say,
but what I have seen from the IAEA, what I have sort of seen in
news reports, leads me to suggest that they have done a lot of
weaponization research and perhaps at least on a theoretical
basis, they have gone far along on that.
On the missiles, on the question of delivery vehicle, which
is third leg, I think there, what I have seen is a lot
spottier. It is not clear to me that they have, that they are
close yet to an ICBM to be able to deliver a missile against a
faraway foe or being able to put a nuclear warhead onto even a
shorter range missile. And again, that is one of the reasons I
am concerned that an interim agreement--I am sorry, a
comprehensive agreement might allow them to continue that work
and to perfect that leg of the program even while it pauses
some of the other areas where it is further along. But on that
question, I would say that what you would really need to get is
an update from the Defense Department about exactly where do
they stand on that particular leg.
Mr. Kilmer. Anything either of you want to add?
The other thing I want to get an understanding of, you
know, it seems to me one that of the greatest dangers when a
nation becomes a nuclear nation is their ability to transfer
that knowledge to non-state actors or to non-nuclear nations.
You know, as part of this conversation, is there anything that
can be done to limit Iran's ability to transfer whatever
knowledge they have to non-nuclear states or to non-state
actors?
Mr. Tobey. I think returning to understanding these
possible military dimensions to the program is also key to that
because it would allow the IAEA to understand who was involved
in these programs and what they are doing, what they continue
to do even today, and, therefore, could provide the basis for
both the IAEA and perhaps even other nations to keep watch to
make sure that those contacts are diminished.
Ambassador Pickering. I think there is some good news here
that every country that has developed a nuclear weapon, with
the exception of Mr. A. Q. Khan in Pakistan, has had two
imperatives on its plate: One is to make sure no other country
or organization ever gets another--a nuclear weapon. And
putting nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists,
particularly when should those be exploded, there are pretty
good telltales as to where that particular weapon came from, is
a very dangerous enterprise. And so the deterrence goes to the
fabricator in some ways, and that is something that at least we
have some hope there.
The second thing they always have a problem with when they
get a nuclear weapon is what they are going to use it for. But
we don't want to see that. And here, I think it is extremely
important that the major effort now being made is to prevent
them from getting a weapon, and if that should fail through not
getting an agreement, which I think is a very important part of
this, then we do face, as I said earlier in my testimony, the
question of whether we have a war or an Iranian nuclear weapon.
I think that those two outcomes, with the failure of a
negotiated effort or the failure of a combination of sanctions
and a negotiated effort, are things we ought to keep crystal
clear in our mind.
Mr. Singh. If I could just add to that, Congressman, I
would say that I think I would be more concerned than
Ambassador Pickering on this score because we have seen Iran
share technology with its non-state proxies, like Hezbollah, on
the missile front in a way that has really destabilized the
region. Most of the technology that Hezbollah has that it has
actually deployed in the field in combat, as far as I know, is
obtained from Iran, based on earlier Iranian advances. And I
think it is actually more common than Ambassador Pickering
suggested that nuclear states do end up sharing nuclear
technology with others.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Kilmer.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. We
appreciate you spending your time with us. If there are any
further questions from the committee, they will submit them to
you in writing. We would ask that you respond back.
Hearing no further business before the House Armed Services
Committee, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 19, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 19, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 19, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI
Mrs. Walorski. President Rouhani announced to reporters on June 14
that ``If we can't reach a final agreement in negotiations by July 20 .
. . conditions will never go back to the past. The sanctions regime has
been broken.'' Do you agree with his assessment? What options to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon exist if negotiations
fail? Under what conditions do you think Congress should enact
additional sanctions?
Mr. Tobey. In the days before the July 20 deadline, Iran took
aggressive stands seemingly to advance its bargaining position. In
addition to the Rouhani statement, according to press reports,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stood before a banner that read, ``America
cannot do a [expletive] thing'' and taunted President Obama. Moreover,
Iran announced that it would not agree to an extension of the interim
agreement, unless Washington paid a substantial price, and Khamenei
issued a demand for enrichment capacity that had no relation to
reality.
I do not believe the sanctions regime has been broken, although it
has been weakened. Sanctions cannot prevent the Iranian regime from
building nuclear weapons, if Tehran is determined to do so at all
costs. They can, however, impose penalties so severe that any decision
to do so would entail significant risks. I would recommend that
Congress enact additional sanctions if Iran refuses come to an
agreement that would not only limit activities at declared facilities,
but also signal a strategic decision to abandon any nuclear weapons
ambitions. Two indicators of such a decision would be full disclosure
of the so-called ``possible military dimensions'' of Iran's nuclear
program, and a willingness to accept strict and verifiable controls on
the import and domestic manufacture of nuclear-related equipment and
materials.
Mrs. Walorski. President Rouhani announced to reporters on June 14
that ``If we can't reach a final agreement in negotiations by July 20 .
. . conditions will never go back to the past. The sanctions regime has
been broken.'' Do you agree with his assessment? What options to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon exist if negotiations
fail? Under what conditions do you think Congress should enact
additional sanctions?
Mr. Singh. Sanctions regimes tend to degrade over time due to
declining enforcement and compliance, and/or efforts by the sanctioned
state to develop workarounds. We already see both effects at work in
the case of sanctions on Iran. China, for example, imported record
levels of oil from Iran in the first six months of 2014, yet drew no
response from the United States. This is possible in part because of
Iranian efforts to exploit loopholes in sanctions, in part by exporting
condensate products not covered by U.S. legislation, and by exporting
oil to Syria, apparently without receiving payment. Due to the
degradation of sanctions over time, it is important both to enforce
them vigorously and to maintain their momentum by imposing new
sanctions and blocking workarounds. For these reasons, the Joint Plan
of Action (JPOA)-mandated ``pause'' in the imposition of new nuclear
sanctions and to some extent the enforcement of existing sanctions is
problematic. If the current round of nuclear negotiations ends without
an agreement, it may be difficult to resuscitate sanctions, in
accordance with Iranian President Rouhani's prediction, for two
reasons. First, oil importers such as China and India--already
reluctant to comply with unilateral U.S. sanctions--may accept the
Iranian argument that sanctions are no longer merited, especially if
Iran continues to honor some or all of the limitations on its nuclear
work imposed by the JPOA. Second, having already significantly reduced
(albeit temporarily, in the case of China) their oil imports from Iran,
importers may determine that the cost of further reductions outweighs
the benefit. Nevertheless, if negotiations fail, strengthening
sanctions in hopes of persuading Iran to refrain from further advancing
its nuclear efforts and to approach negotiations more realistically
will remain the United States' best course of action. It will also be
important to enhance the credibility of American military threats, to
which end our willingness to intervene in Iraq is potentially
beneficial. It is important to bear in mind that Iran--like all parties
to a negotiation--will evaluate any potential deals not in isolation,
but in comparison to the most likely alternative. If that alternative
is even heavier economic pressure and the credible possibility of a
military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran may be more likely
to accept the sort of stringent nuclear limitations we require,
especially if those limitations are paired with various incentives. In
that vein, I think it is important that Congress and the White House
first ensure that existing sanctions not suspending by the JPOA
continue to be vigorously enforced. In addition, they should send a
clear and unified message that additional sanctions will be imposed on
Iran and military action will be contemplated if the current round of
negotiations does not produce a deal by the new deadline of November
24. Ideally that message should be echoed by allies internationally.
This is a matter on which, whatever their tactical differences, the
legislative and executive branches--and key U.S. allies in the Middle
East, Europe, Asia, and elsewhere--share the same objectives and
strategy.
Mrs. Walorski. President Rouhani announced to reporters on June 14
that ``If we can't reach a final agreement in negotiations by July 20 .
. . conditions will never go back to the past. The sanctions regime has
been broken.'' Do you agree with his assessment? What options to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon exist if negotiations
fail? Under what conditions do you think Congress should enact
additional sanctions?
Ambassador Pickering. I do not agree with his assessment. The bulk
of the sanctions continue in force. If negotiations fail because Iran
does not agree with a reasonable approach, there will be continued
world support for sanctions. If the responsibility is reversed, it will
be harder to get cooperation, but sanctions on banking and financial
transactions pose the question to citizens of other states--``Do you
want to do business in Iran or the U.S.?'' That is a powerful tool of
influence.
To prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (Iran says it does
not wish to obtain such a weapon and the U.S. DNI reports on an annual
basis that Iran has made no such decision with high confidence) there
are additional sanctions which could lead to reopening negotiations,
sanctions and threats of military force which might also lead to an
agreement not to produce a weapon and, as the President has indicated,
he will keep all options on the table including the use of military
force in the case Iran should move toward building such a weapon.
Congress should consider additional sanctions if negotiations truly
breakdown and cannot be restarted, should there be clear evidence of
Iran moving its nuclear program in a military direction, and in any
case should the President ask for further sanctions.
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