[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
GRANT PROGRAM PROPOSAL
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-66
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-446 WASHINGTON : 2014
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana, Chairwoman
Peter T. King, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi, Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Mark Sanford, South Carolina (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Eric B. Heighberger, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Susan W. Brooks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 1
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Witnesses
Ms. Kris Eide, Director, Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, State of Minnesota, Testifying on Behalf of
Governors Homeland Security Advisory Council and the National
Emergency Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Steven M. Fulop, Mayor, Jersey City, New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Mr. David Troy Riggs, Director, Department of Public Safety, City
of Indianapolis, Indiana:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Mr. William R. Metcalf, EFO, CFI, FIFireE, Fire Chief, North
County Fire Protection District, State of California,
Testifying on Behalf of International Association of Fire
Chiefs:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
Mr. Randy Parsons, Director of Security, Port of Long Beach,
Testifying on Behalf of American Association of Port
Authorities:
Oral Statement................................................. 42
Prepared Statement............................................. 44
For the Record
The Honorable Susan W. Brooks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Letter and Questions Submitted to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency By Chairwoman Brooks and Ranking Member
Payne........................................................ 2
Letter From the Major City Chiefs Association, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major
County Sheriffs' Association, and the National Sheriff's
Association.................................................. 12
Letter From the National Fusion Center Association............. 13
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York:
Letter From Mayor Bill de Blasio, City of New York............. 51
STAKEHOLDER ASSESSMENTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GRANT PROGRAM PROPOSAL
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Tuesday, April 29, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Susan W. Brooks
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Brooks, Perry, Payne, Clarke, and
Higgins.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mrs. Brooks. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony regarding
FEMA's National Preparedness Grant Program proposal.
Before we begin I would just like to take a moment to
acknowledge those who are suffering from the severe weather
that has been plaguing our country for the last few days. It is
hitting many States and some of our Members, including the vice
chair of this subcommittee, Mr. Palazzo, from Mississippi, and
our full committee Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson, from
Mississippi--their State, others like Oklahoma and Arkansas
have truly been hit hard. Our thoughts and prayers go out to
those that are impacted and we certainly urge those who will be
impacted today and in the coming days, as we are in the
beginning of tornado season, to be safe and to listen to their
local authorities.
For the third year in a row the President's budget request
has proposed the consolidation of a number of homeland security
grant programs, including the State Homeland Security Grant
Program; the Urban Area Security Initiative, known as UASI; the
Port Security Grant Program; the Transit Security Grant
Program, into a new National Preparedness Grant Program. In the
past, Congress has denied this request due to a lack of detail
and the failure to send a legislative proposal.
This year FEMA did share its legislative proposal and it
has already been a topic of a great deal of discussion at this
subcommittee's budget hearing, at which Administrator Fugate
testified. Despite this lengthy discussion, questions remain.
As a result, Ranking Member Payne and I sent a letter to
Administrator Fugate with a number of detailed questions about
the proposal. As requested, we did receive a response to our
inquiry this past Friday and the information will be helpful to
our review of the proposal.
I ask unanimous consent to insert our letter and FEMA's
response into the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Chairwoman Brooks and Ranking Member Payne
April 9, 2014.
The Honorable W. Craig Fugate,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20472.
Dear Administrator Fugate: Thank you for taking the time to testify
before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications on March 25th regarding the President's Fiscal Year 2015
budget request for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As
you are now aware from our lengthy discussions during the hearing,
there is a great deal of interest in, and concern with, the National
Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) proposal among Subcommittee Members.
We have seen the benefits that the current grant programs have had
on our first responders' capabilities. In testimony before the
Committee on Homeland Security in May 2013, former Boston Police
Department Commissioner Ed Davis noted that the response to the Boston
Marathon bombings would not have been as comprehensive or successful
without the planning, training, exercises, and equipment supported by
federal homeland security grant funds. Any efforts to reform the
current system must be thorough, well-informed, and premised on the
goal of ensuring that our nation is best able to prevent, prepare for,
mitigate, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks.
As the Members of the Subcommittee review the NPGP legislative
proposal that was submitted to Congress along with the budget, many
questions remain. In fact, in some cases the budget documents,
information provided to our staff in briefings with representatives
from FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate, and information we received
from you at the hearing has been contradictory. Considering the impact
this proposal would have on the way first responders receive grants to
attain, maintain, and sustain core capabilities, there is no room for
this uncertainty.
In an effort to continue our oversight of this issue, we request a
response to the following questions no later than April 25, 2014.*
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* [Questions and responses follow.]
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We share your commitment to ensuring our nation's first responders
have the resources they need to accomplish their vital missions. We
appreciate your responses to these questions so we can continue this
discussion.
Sincerely,
Susan W. Brooks,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications.
Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications.
______
Questions Submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency By
Chairwoman Brooks and Ranking Member Payne, With Responses
Question 1a. The NPGP proposal seeks to change the focus of the
grants from terrorism to all hazards. These programs were established
in response to the September 11 attacks. While the terrorist threat to
the United States has changed since 9/11, it has not diminished.
What is the rationale for changing the focus of these programs?
Answer. The National Preparedness Grant Program proposal is focused
on all-hazards capabilities (natural, man-made, and technological).
FEMA is concerned about the consequences that occur as the result of
all hazards, including terrorism. Gaps in capability place States,
regions, and the nation at risk of the consequences of any type of
hazard, and the National Preparedness Grant Program focuses on filling
those gaps.
The National Preparedness Grant Program removes the nexus to
terrorism requirement and instead broadens the purpose to make grants
which enable recipients, including high-risk urban areas, States,
territories, local units of government, and Tribal nations to build and
sustain the core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness
Goal.
Question 1b. Have Homeland Security Grant Program funds been used
for non-terrorism purposes in the past? If so, please describe the
projects.
Answer. The 9/11 Act provides a ``Multiple-Purpose Funds''
provision that allows grantees to utilize their Homeland Security Grant
Program funding for non-terrorism capability-building, as long as the
capability can also be used to prevent, prepare for, protect against,
or respond to acts of terrorism.
For example, the Boston Urban Area used FEMA preparedness grant
funding to purchase a patient tracking system which is used every day.
During any type of Multi-Casualty Incident the patient tracking system
has a ``surge capacity'' which allows Emergency Medical Services
Incident Commanders to effectively track patients, their conditions,
and where they were transported. In addition, FEMA has supported 12
exercises directly involving the city of Boston. These have included
topics as diverse a chemical or biological attacks, hurricane
preparedness, hazardous materials events, and cyber attacks. Finally,
Boston has also conducted ``Urban Shield Boston'' which is a continuous
24-hour exercise, during which first responders are deployed to and
rotated through various training scenarios, including all-hazards. The
exercise involves over 600 emergency responders from 50 agencies, and
is designed to assess and validate the speed, effectiveness, and
efficiency of capabilities, as well as test the adequacy of regional
policies, plans, procedures, and protocols. This exercise incorporates
regional critical infrastructure, emergency operation centers, regional
communication systems, equipment and assets, as well as personnel
representing all aspects of emergency response including intelligence,
law enforcement, Explosive Ordinance Disposal Units, Fire, EMS, etc.
Question 1c. How would the risk formula be updated to account for
non-terrorism-related risks?
Answer. The risk methodology will continue to be an assessment of
the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences from acts of
terrorism. This will ensure that investment will continue to be made in
areas at the highest risk of terrorism. However, there will be a
renewed focus on the utilization of grant resources to address all-
hazards capabilities.
Question 1d. What new data would be considered?
Answer. FEMA will continue to use the existing data sets for
calculating risk. Each year, FEMA refreshes the data that is used in
the risk methodology to ensure that we are using the most recent data
available from publicly-available data sources and our DHS partners.
FEMA understands that the Nation's States and urban areas face diverse
risks, and we make every effort to capture this diversity as part of
each year's risk assessments. FEMA will also continue to solicit
stakeholder feedback regarding the risk formula to ensure we are
effectively assessing Nation-wide risk.
Question 1e. How do you envision the new all-hazards focus will
change the entities and regions receiving funding and the type of
investments supported?
Answer. FEMA expects that grant money will continue to be allocated
to jurisdictions facing the highest risk of terrorism. However,
consistent with recent guidance, grantees will be required to invest
their grant dollars against capability gaps identified as a result of
the THIRA process, which is an assessment of all hazards and risks,
including those related to terrorism, natural, and technological
disasters.
Question 1f. If this program would be changed to an all-hazards
program, why was the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program
excluded from consolidation?
Answer. The Emergency Management Preparedness Grant Program is
authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and Section 662
of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, as amended
(6 U.S.C. 762). It is designed to provide a system of emergency
preparedness for the protection of life and property in the United
States from hazards and to vest responsibility for emergency
preparedness jointly in the Federal Government and the States and their
political subdivisions. The Federal Government, through the EMPG
Program, provides necessary direction, coordination, and guidance, and
provides necessary assistance, as authorized statute, to support a
comprehensive all-hazards emergency preparedness system.
EMPG is the primary Federal funding source to ensure adequate
staffing of qualified emergency managers at the State and local levels.
By its nature, therefore, EMPG is fundamentally different from the
grants which support the development and sustainment of specific
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery
capabilities.
Question 2a. What problems has FEMA identified in the current
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) to necessitate a change?
Answer. The collaborative process envisioned through the National
Preparedness Grant Program is intended to break down stovepipes among
grant programs that target specific jurisdictions, sectors of the
economy or program areas. States, in coordination with their partners,
currently are conducting THIRAs to determine where their capability
gaps are greatest, but they lack the ability to strategically allocate
grant dollars where they will do the most good because those dollars
are pre-designated for ports, transit agencies, law-enforcement
activities, and myriad other uses.
Question 2b. How do the changes proposed in the NPGP ``fix'' those
problems? To the extent possible, please directly link language from
the NPGP proposal with the goals FEMA plans to achieve by implementing
the consolidation.
Answer. The proposed National Preparedness Grant Program draws upon
and strengthens existing grants processes, procedures, and structures,
emphasizing collaboration among Federal, State, territory, local, and
Tribal partners to understand existing capabilities, identify gaps, and
determine how best to address those gaps using all available resources,
including Federal grants. The approach in the National Preparedness
Grant Program would address the inability to strategically allocate
grant dollars where they will do the most good in filling capability
gaps.
Question 2c. Why is it not possible to remedy the problems
identified with more minor changes to the existing HSGP? Why is an
overhaul necessary?
Answer. FEMA and its State and local partners have made significant
progress in recent years to ensure grant dollars are used to close the
capability gaps identified through the THIRA process. The existing
grant construct creates artificial constraints in State and local
government's ability to allocate grant dollars where they will have the
most strategic benefit. Port grant dollars must be spent in ports, even
if a specific port has no additional security needs. Similarly, transit
dollars continue to be allocated to transit agencies, even if those
dollars may be more effectively used to address resource or capability
requirements in surrounding jurisdictions.
Question 3. Do you expect to achieve any efficiencies, either
administratively or through cost savings, from the proposed
consolidation? If so, please detail the expected efficiencies. Please
explain whether these efficiencies would be realized by FEMA, the
State, or the local grantees.
Answer. FEMA expects to realize programmatic and financial
efficiencies after the full implementation of the National Preparedness
Grant Program. While there will be an expected ``transition period''
while FEMA is simultaneously administering/closing-out the legacy
preparedness grant and awarding the new NPGP grant awards, eventually
FEMA will realize benefits in the following areas:
Fewer Funding Opportunity Announcements and fewer overall
grants to award. Processing time will improve.
Fewer monitoring trips due to the reduction in the number of
grantees. This will also allow for more targeted, risk-driven
monitoring.
Fewer operating procedures and training required for staff,
given the elimination of numerous, sometimes conflicting,
statutory requirements.
Question 4a. One of the stated purposes of grant consolidation has
been improved coordination and collaboration. What efforts has FEMA
made to encourage coordination and collaboration to this point?
Answer. FEMA has consistently encouraged collaboration and
coordination among its grantees, and has seen evidence of the success
of those efforts in the processes used to prioritize grant allocations
under the existing programs, (albeit within rather than across those
programs). The Urban Area Working Groups and Transit Security Working
Groups, for example, are exemplary of the type of collaboration and
coordination FEMA hopes to engender across levels of government,
disciplines, and sectors through the NPGP.
Question 4b. Why have those efforts not worked? Please provide
concrete examples of how NPGP would facilitate improved coordination
and collaboration.
Answer. Collaboration and coordination does work, within specific
programs. But the current construct serves as a disincentive for
grantees to collaborate across programs. For example, recipients of
Non-Profit Security Grant dollars have a difficult time breaking into
the planning process at the UASI level because they are seen as having
their own grant program. Similarly, port and transit agencies have
little incentive to collaborate with State or local jurisdictions on
strategic planning or priority setting because they have dedicated
grant programs they can use to address their own priorities--whether or
not those priorities make the most sense from a holistic, whole-of-
community approach.
Question 5a. The NPGP consolidates much of the decision making for,
and administration of, grant investments to the State Administrative
Agency (SAA). In its Annual Report to Congress on States' and Urban
Areas' Management of Homeland Security Grant Programs, the DHS Office
of Inspector General has repeatedly identified strategic planning and
oversight of grant activities as areas of improvement for the States.
Particularly in light of the new responsibilities SAAs would have
for managing port and transit grant applications, what new guidance
would FEMA provide to States to improve strategic planning and grant
management?
Answer. FEMA already has issued guidance to State and local
governments on the development of THIRAs and capability estimations
(CPG 201), the foundation of which is cross-jurisdictional strategic
planning. In addition, for the past several grant cycles, grantees have
been required to invest their grant dollars to address capability needs
identified through the THIRA and capability estimation processes.
Under the proposed NPGP, FEMA will require the engagement of
designated urban areas, ports, and transit authorities in State/
territory-generated Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments
and in the development of grant applications. FEMA will ensure adequate
collaboration and coordination by requiring:
A detailed description of the Senior Advisory Committee's
composition and an explanation of key governance processes,
including how the Senior Advisory Committee is informed by the
State or territory's Threat Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment, State Preparedness Report data reflecting
capability shortfalls, and the approach to address shortfalls
in core capabilities;
A description of the frequency of how often Senior Advisory
Committee will meet;
How existing governance bodies will be leveraged by the
committee;
A detailed description of how decisions on programmatic
priorities funded by State Homeland Security Program and Urban
Area Security Initiative are made and how those decisions will
be documented and shared with its members and other
stakeholders as appropriate; and
A description of defined roles and responsibilities for
financial decision making and meeting administrative
requirements.
Question 5b. What oversight activities would FEMA conduct to ensure
that SAAs invest funding based on risk and capability gaps?
Answer. FEMA already has greatly enhanced grant-monitoring
activities, both programmatically and financially, and holds grantees
accountable for meeting their financial and programmatic obligations.
In addition, starting in fiscal year 2014, FEMA began requiring
grantees to submit project-level data at the time of application. That
data includes narrative descriptions of how the proposed project will
address capability gaps and includes specific elements related to the
individual core capabilities being built or sustained under each
project.
Question 6a. Documents provided to Capitol Hill staff state that
the fiscal year 2015 NPGP proposal was re-proposed, ``with some
adjustments made to respond to broad stakeholder feedback solicited and
received during previous years.''
What ``adjustments'' were made in the fiscal year 2015 proposal
compared to the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2013 NPGP proposals?
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 National Preparedness Grant Program
responses to stakeholder feedback provide grantees greater certainty
regarding the sources and uses of available funding. For example:
FEMA will retain the requirement that 80 percent of grant
dollars awarded to a State be passed through to local units of
government, reflecting the reality that most of the
capabilities built and sustained with Federal grant dollars
exist not at the State level, but in local jurisdictions.
However, there are some capabilities, such as State-wide
communications interoperability, that are best addressed at the
State level.
FEMA clarified and revised language relating to governance
structures under the proposed NPGP. While FEMA can neither
prescribe nor enforce how a State should govern itself or
interact with its sub-State jurisdictions, the agency has laid
out the principles of sound governance structures to ensure
maximum involvement by local jurisdictions and other
stakeholders in the decision-making process.
The National Preparedness Grant Program calls for one,
unified grant application from each State Administrative Agent,
but is designed to ensure that projects proposed by transit
agencies, ports, local units of government, and non-profit
organizations are fully and transparently considered prior to
those applications being submitted.
Question 6b. What outreach have you done to stakeholders during the
development of this proposal? Please provide a list of the stakeholder
outreach engagements, the dates upon which they occurred, which
stakeholders were invited to participate, and which stakeholders
participated.
Answer. Since the original introduction of the proposed National
Preparedness Grants Program (NPGP), DHS/FEMA has worked with more than
100 partner organizations from State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments and the private sector.
The following stakeholder outreach and associated activities
focused specifically on providing forums to discuss the proposed
National Preparedness Grant Program:
2013
April 10-11.--FEMA leadership calls to the leadership of key
stakeholder associations, including the National Emergency Management
Association, International Association of Emergency Managers, National
Governors' Association, Governor's Homeland Security Advisory Council,
Big City Emergency Managers, National Association of Counties, National
League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, Council of State,
International Association of Fire Chiefs, International Association of
Fire Fighters, National Volunteer Fire Council, Congressional Fire
Services Institute, International Association of the Chiefs of Police,
National Sheriffs' Association, Major County Sheriffs' Association,
Major Cities Chiefs Association, National Homeland Security
Association, National Congress of American Indians, United South and
Eastern Tribes, American Association of Port Authorities, and American
Public Transportation Association.
April 12.--Conference call for State officials and State
stakeholder associations.
April 12.--Conference call for local officials, port and transit
officials, and local stakeholder associations.
April 24.--In-person meeting with local and State governmental
associations, including the National Emergency Management Association,
International Association of Emergency Managers, National Association
of Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Sheriffs'
Association, National Congress of American Indians, and United South
and Eastern Tribes.
April 26.--Intergovernmental Affairs fiscal year 2014 budget
briefing to local and State governmental associations (included
discussion of preparedness grants and NPGP).
May 14.--Conference call with nonprofit organizations.
May 15.--Conference call with Tribal organizations.
2014
March 7.--Conference call for State officials and State stakeholder
associations.
March 7.--Conference call for local officials, port and transit
officials, and local stakeholder associations.
March 13.--Conference call with Tribal organizations.
March 24.--Intergovernmental Affairs fiscal year 2015 budget
briefing to local and State governmental associations (included
discussion of preparedness grants and NPGP).
March 28.--In-person meeting with governmental association that
represent local officials, including United States Conference of
Mayors, International Association of Fire Chiefs, U.S. Council of the
International Association of Emergency Managers, Major County Sheriffs'
Association, American Association of Port Authorities, Congressional
Fire Services Institute, National Sheriffs' Association, National
Volunteer Fire Council, National League of Cities, National Association
of Counties, Major Cities Chiefs Association, National Homeland
Security Coalition (by phone), Big City Emergency Managers,
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Los Angeles Washington
Office, New York City Washington Office, Ventura and Santa Barbara
Counties Washington Representative, Chicago Washington Office.
April 9.--In-person meeting with D.C.-based Governors
Representatives.
In addition, FEMA and DHS officials have participated in numerous
``listening sessions'' at National conferences, such as the annual UASI
Conference, the National Homeland Security Consortium Conference,
meetings of the Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council, and
others, all of which have informed the development of the current
proposal.
Question 6c. How was the input provided by stakeholders
incorporated into the proposal? Please provide examples.
Answer. The fiscal year 2015 National Preparedness Grant Program
responses to stakeholder feedback provide grantees greater certainty
regarding the sources and uses of available funding. For example:
FEMA will retain the requirement that 80 percent of grant
dollars awarded to a State be passed through to local units of
government, reflecting the reality that most of the
capabilities built and sustained with Federal grant dollars
exist not at the State level, but in local jurisdictions.
However, there are some capabilities, such as State-wide
communications interoperability, that are best addressed at the
State level.
FEMA clarified and revised language relating to governance
structures under the proposed NPGP. While FEMA can neither
prescribe nor enforce how a State should govern itself or
interact with its sub-State jurisdictions, the agency has laid
out the principles of sound governance structures to ensure
maximum involvement by local jurisdictions and other
stakeholders in the decision-making process.
FEMA limited the expansion of the definition of ``local unit
of government'' to apply only to the proposed National
Preparedness Grant Program to avoid unintended consequences
related to eligibility for other programs, such as EMPG.
The National Preparedness Grant Program calls for one,
unified grant application from each State Administrative Agent,
but is designed to ensure that projects proposed by transit
agencies, ports, local units of government, and non-profit
organizations are fully and transparently considered prior to
those applications being submitted.
Question 7. How would high-risk urban areas be funded under the
NPGP proposal? Would funding under NPGP be set aside for UASIs with
applications submitted through the States as is the current practice or
will UASIs apply to the States in which they are located, with the
States determining the amount of funding their UASIs receive?
Answer. FEMA will identify and allocate National Preparedness Grant
Program sustainment funding specifically to Urban Areas through a
National-level risk assessment. The designated Urban Areas will submit
an application through their State Administrative Agency, as is
currently the case.
Question 8. How would high-risk urban areas be deemed eligible to
receive funding under this proposal? Would FEMA utilize a process
similar to the current process in which there is an assessment of the
top 100 metropolitan statistical areas?
Answer. The designation of high-risk urban areas will continue to
be based on an assessment of the relative threat, vulnerability, and
consequences from acts of terrorism. As prescribed in the 9/11 Act, the
calculation of the risk for the 100 most populous Metropolitan
Statistical Areas would directly inform the dedicated funding allocated
to urban areas.
Question 9. Police departments and their officers have played a
crucial role in preventing acts of terrorism since 9/11. State and
local police departments have been able to build and maintain
capabilities through the 25% set-aside for law enforcement terrorism
prevention activities. However, the NPGP proposal would eliminate this
25% set-aside.
What is the rationale for eliminating this set-aside?
Answer. The proposed National Preparedness Grant Program is
designed to provide States and their partners with the flexibility to
allocate dollars to address their self-identified priorities. States,
in collaboration with their partners, will determine where to apply
grant dollars in any given year to address capability requirements
across the five National Preparedness Goal mission areas of protect,
prevent, mitigate, respond, and recover. Requiring that 25 percent of
their funding be allocated to specific activities removes a significant
amount of that flexibility and is inconsistent with the overall
approach envisioned in the National Preparedness Grant Program
proposal.
Maintenance and sustainment of core law enforcement prevention
capabilities--including fusion centers, countering violent extremism
and State, territory, and local information sharing--remain key
administration priorities and law enforcement activities previously
funded under other grants, such as Operation Stonegarden and the Port
and Transit grant programs will continue to be eligible activities
under the proposed National Preparedness Grant Program.
The National Preparedness Grant Program will continue to support
State, territory, and local law enforcement efforts to understand,
recognize, and prevent pre-operational activity and other crimes that
are precursors or indicators of terrorist activity, in accordance with
applicable privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. Such
efforts include:
Maturation and enhancement of State and major urban area
fusion centers, including training for intelligence analysts
and implementation of Fusion Liaison Officer Programs;
Implementation of the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative, including training for front-line
personnel on identifying and reporting suspicious activities;
Continued implementation of the ``If You See Something, Say
SomethingTM'' campaign to raise public awareness of
indicators of terrorism and violent crime.
Question 10a. Local stakeholders have expressed concern about the
change to the definition of ``local unit of government,'' particularly
that the definition would greatly expand the eligibility for the grant
programs and could set a dangerous precedent for the expansion of the
definition under other Federal programs.
We understand that this problem was brought to FEMA's attention
during an outreach session, but the definition remains in the proposal.
What is the rationale for defining a unit of local government as you
did in the proposal?
Answer. The National Preparedness Grant Program consolidates
several grant programs, including the Transit Security Grant Program
and the Port Security Grant Program, eliminating direct funding for
port areas and transit agencies. The fiscal year 2015 proposal limits
the expanded definition of ``local unit of government'' to the National
Preparedness Grant Program only in an effort to ensure that those
agencies remain eligible for the local pass-through.
Question 10b. there an alternate way to define the universe of
subgrantees you are trying to capture?
Answer. The administration is willing to work with the Congress to
develop language that ensures eligibility for the intended universe of
subgrantees while minimizing the potential unintended consequences of
changing the definition of local unit of government.
Question 11a. The proposal would consolidate the Transit Security
Grant Program, Port Security Grant Program, and Intercity Passenger
Rail Program into the NPGP, resulting in previous direct grantees
having to apply to States for funding. In some cases, transit systems
and port authorities operate across State lines.
To which State would a transit system or port authority apply if
they operate in more than one State?
Answer. There are several options FEMA could consider for transit
and port stakeholders that have groups or regions covering more than
one State, depending on the specifics of the situation. With any of the
options, the key to success is the inclusion of all partners (Federal,
State, and local) and active participation in the already well-
established Regional Transit Security Working Groups and Area Maritime
Security Committees. These groups are critical for regional
prioritization and selection of projects to make application for grant
funding. A transit or port stakeholder would either propose their
grant-funded projects through the State in which they are located or
through a selected State that is part of the group or region in which
that entity is located. Considerations such as where the project is
located, impact, and benefit to a particular jurisdiction also may be
taken into account. This situation is not without precedent as there
currently are UASI regions, port areas, and transit systems that cross
State lines. FEMA is committed to working with its stakeholders to
develop processes that make sense for the individual entities under
their specific circumstances.
Question 11b. Would the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority be required to apply for funding from the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia to fund security enhancements to the
metro system?
Answer. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority could
work with the District of Columbia or with one or all of the three
contributing jurisdictions (Virginia, Maryland, and the District).
Considerations such as where the project is located, its system-wide
impact, and ancillary benefit to a particular jurisdiction should be
taken into account in determining how a project would be funded. Again,
cross-jurisdictional planning and coordination will be essential to
these processes.
Question 11c. Would transit authorities be eligible to receive both
sustainment and competitive funds? Would funding be set aside for these
entities?
Answer. Transit authorities would be eligible to receive both
sustainment and competitive funding under the National Preparedness
Grant Program, however there will not be specific amount of funding
set-aside for these entities. One coordinated State-wide/territory-wide
application will be submitted which will include project proposals from
local jurisdictions, ports, transit systems, non-profit organizations,
and other eligible entities.
Question 12a. According to the Congressional Justifications sent to
Congress, part of the new NPGP would provide sustainment funding to
States, while another part of the program would be competitive.
How would FEMA determine the amount of sustainment funding
available to States?
Answer. Sustainment funding allocations will be determined by
consideration of threat, vulnerability, and consequence factors, as
well as border security threats, and other known Federal priorities to
address all hazards. The relative amount designated for sustainment
versus the competitive pool will be a policy determination made by the
Secretary based on a review of priority capability gaps, and an
estimate of the amount of funding required to address those gaps,
identified through the FEMA Regional THIRAs.
Question 12b. Would FEMA continue to provide targeted funding
allocations on which States could base their applications?
Answer. Each State/territory will receive a base level of funding
allocated in consideration of threat, vulnerability, and consequences.
Question 12c. How would the competitive portion work? Please be
specific.
Answer. The competitive portion of the program will be awarded
based on the ability of an application to effectively and efficiently
address a capability requirement in a particular FEMA Region based on
that Region's Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments and
other National-level risk assessments.
Regional core capability requirements will be published in the
funding opportunity announcement (FOA) by FEMA region. All entities--
States, urban areas, non-UASI local units of governments, ports,
transit agencies, etc. will be eligible to propose projects that
address one or more of the capability gaps published in the FOA.
Applications will be peer-reviewed at the FEMA Regional level, and
evaluated again at the FEMA National level. Competition is not limited
to entities within a particular region; however, the efficiency of a
proposed project in addressing a regional capability gap will be a
significant component of the evaluation process (for example, a State
proposing to fill a response capability gap on the opposite side of the
country must show how it can do so efficiently and in a timely manner).
Question 12d. It is our understanding that previously-funded UASIs
may be eligible for funding under the competitive program. How would
that work?
Answer. As stated, all jurisdictions within a State, including
previously-funded UASIs, would be eligible to compete for funding under
the competitive component of the program. FEMA is concerned mainly with
ensuring that National-level capability requirements are addressed in a
cost-effective, efficient manner and believes that competition will
engender innovative approaches to ensuring capabilities are available
when and where they are needed.
Question 13a. The Congressional Justification notes that urban
areas, port authorities, and transit agencies will be required to
participate in State-generated Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessments in fiscal year 2015. We applaud this required
involvement but are concerned, as we discussed in our January 27, 2013
THIRA letter to you, that States have not adequately included local
stakeholders in their THIRA submissions to date.
How will this mandatory involvement be enforced?
Answer. FEMA cannot prescribe, nor can it enforce, how a State
chooses to organize itself or how it elects to interact with local
units of government, specific sectors of the economy, or other
stakeholders. However, to ensure that States are adequately engaging
with local governments, port and transit agencies, urban areas, non-
profit organizations, and other ``whole of community'' partners, FEMA
will enumerate the principles of strong, effective governance
structures and will require that each SAA submit:
A detailed description of the Senior Advisory Committee's
composition and an explanation of key governance processes,
including how the Senior Advisory Committee is informed by the
State or territory's Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment, State Preparedness Report data reflecting
capability shortfalls and the approach to address shortfalls in
core capabilities;
A description of the frequency with which the Senior
Advisory Committee will meet;
How existing governance bodies such as Urban Area Working
Groups and Transit Security Working Groups will be leveraged by
the Senior Advisory Committee;
A detailed description of how decisions on programmatic
priorities are made and how those decisions will be documented
and shared with its members and other stakeholders as
appropriate; and
A description of defined roles and responsibilities for
financial decision making and meeting administrative
requirements.
Question 13b. Will there be recourse for entities that believe they
have not been adequately included by the State?
Answer. FEMA cannot prescribe, nor can it enforce, how a State
chooses to organize itself or how it elects to interact with local
units of government, specific sectors of the economy, or other
stakeholders. However, FEMA can enforce the requirement that 80 percent
of the grant dollars awarded in any given year be passed through to
local units of government. FEMA cannot, however, adjudicate specific
disagreements between the States and individual entities nor can it
serve as an arbiter for local government who believe they have not been
adequately included in State-led planning efforts. This is currently
the case under HSGP.
Question 14. The National Preparedness Grant Program proposal seems
to place a premium on projects that are deployable. However, not all
grant investments will result in deployable assets, nor should they.
For instance, many vital prevention and mitigation projects, such as
the funding for fusion centers, the purchase of cameras or the
hardening of infrastructure, are not deployable.
How would FEMA strike a balance between the requirement of
deployable assets and the recognition that not all grant investments
result in a deployable asset or capability?
Answer. The emphasis in this requirement is that capabilities built
with Federal grant dollars should be considered National assets, not
the sole property of individual grantees. To that end, when
practicable, all assets supported in part or entirely with National
Preparedness Grant Program funding must be readily deployable or
otherwise shareable under existing mutual aid agreements. Funding may
be used for the sustainment of core capabilities that, while they may
not be physically deployable, support National response capabilities
such as Geographic/Geospatial Information Systems, interoperable
communications systems, capabilities as defined under the mitigation
mission area of the National Preparedness Goal, and in support of the
National Network of Fusion Centers.
Question 15. Under the current Homeland Security Grant Program,
States and urban areas with fusion centers are required to provide at
least one investment justification related to that fusion center.
Would this requirement continue under the National Preparedness
Grant Proposal?
Answer. The requirement to provide at least one investment
justification dedicated to fusion centers with the National
Preparedness Grant Program is and will continue to be a policy decision
left to the discretion of the Secretary. However, maintenance and
sustainment of core law enforcement prevention capabilities--including
fusion centers, countering violent extremism and State, territory, and
local information sharing--remain key administration priorities.
Question 16. How would the proposed peer review process work?
Answer. The review process will be in two parts--a regional review
panel score and a National review panel score. The review panels will
validate grant proposals via peer review to ensure that projects
support the building and sustainment of regional and National core
capabilities. Proposals for competitive funding will be evaluated by
the National and regional review panels on the ability of a
jurisdiction to build, maintain, and sustain the capability as a
Nationally-deployable resource that will benefit multiple jurisdictions
and increase the core capabilities for the region.
Question 17. According to the draft authorizing legislation
included with the budget request, the NPGP would ``build and sustain
core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal.'' While
fire fighting will be a key element of any response to a terrorist
attack, DHS does not identify fire fighting as one of its core
capabilities.
Would the NPGP eliminate funding for fire department that
historically received UASI and State Homeland Security Grant Program
funds?
Answer. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant program is not
proposed to be part of the National Preparedness Grant Program. Grants
will continue to be awarded through the Assistance to Firefighters
Grant to fire departments to enhance their ability to protect the
public and fire service personnel from fire and related hazards.
Additionally, fire departments would continue to be eligible to receive
funding through the National Preparedness Grant Program as a local
entity.
Question 18. The National Preparedness Grant Program proposal seeks
to maintain the current 2-year period of performance for grants. While
we appreciate the effort to ensure a more expeditious draw-down of
funds, we have heard concerns from both State and local representatives
about the impact of a 2-year period of performance. Particularly at the
local level, there is concern that once the administrative work is
done, there is very little time for grantees to expend the funds. This
has resulted, in many cases, in the procurement of items that can be
acquired quickly rather than projects that may not appropriately
address gaps identified in the Threat Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment that may take longer.
Is there any way to return to a 3-year period of performance while
still addressing the issue of the draw-down?
Answer. FEMA has made great strides over the past year in
encouraging grantees to draw down previously-awarded grant dollars more
expeditiously. At the start of fiscal year 2013, the remaining balance
on grants from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012 was $8.5
billion. One year later, at the start of fiscal year 2014, that number
had dropped to $4.6 billion, a decrease of approximately 45%. In fiscal
year 2012, FEMA introduced a 2-year performance period on all
preparedness grants in an effort to ensure that capability gaps are
addressed efficiently and effectively. Concurrently, the agency has
increased its scrutiny of requests for extensions to periods of
performance and only requests that meet strict criteria outlined in
Information Bulletin No. 379 are being approved. Fiscal year 2013 grant
funding was awarded in September 2013 and includes the same 2-year
period of performance. FEMA expects the draw-down balance to continue
to decrease as these new policies remain in place. FEMA is committed to
being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars and ensuring that all
Federal grant dollars that we disburse are used in a timely manner.
However, the agency also remains committed to re-evaluating the
feasibility and appropriateness of returning to a 3-year period of
performance at such time as the administration and the Congress feel
confident that grantees are efficiently and effectively managing these
Federal resources.
Mrs. Brooks. Today we are pleased to receive testimony from
a number of stakeholders who would be impacted by the NPGP
proposal. Your perspectives will be invaluable to this
subcommittee as we continue to evaluate the potential impacts
of this proposal.
To that end, I am interested in hearing your opinions of
the proposal this morning both for and against FEMA's proposal.
If you support the proposal, why do you support the proposal?
If you oppose it, why?
What alternative reforms might you suggest, if any? Are
there any reforms that could be made to the current grant
structure that would make it more efficient and better able to
meet your needs?
I am also interested in your perspective on how the Threat
and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, better known as
THIRA, and the capability estimation processes are working.
Have the addition of these requirements helped you better
address your security needs?
We know that these grants have definitely made a difference
in the country. One need only look to the response to the
Boston Marathon bombings just over a year ago to see the
contribution of the grants. It is for this reason that, as we
stated in our letter to Administrator Fugate, any efforts to
reform the current system must be very thorough, well-informed,
and premised on the goal of ensuring that our Nation is best
able to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from terrorist attacks.
Before I yield to my Ranking Member, I ask unanimous
consent to insert a letter from the Major City Chiefs
Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
the Major County Sheriffs' Association, and the National
Sheriff's Association into the record. The letter discusses
their perspectives on the NPGP proposal, and in particular, why
they believe it is important to retain the 25 percent law
enforcement set-aside.
I also ask unanimous consent to insert into the record a
letter from the National Fusion Center Association regarding
the importance of the set-aside for intelligence and
information sharing.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the Major City Chiefs Association, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major County Sheriffs'
Association, and the National Sheriff's Association
April 29, 2014.
The Honorable Susan W. Brooks,
Chairwoman, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, United States House
of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
Ranking Member, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, United States House
of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairwoman Brooks and Ranking Member Payne: On behalf of the
undersigned national law enforcement organizations, we write to express
our concern regarding the Administration's proposal to consolidate the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) current suite of
homeland security grant programs into the National Preparedness Grant
Program (NPGP).
Converting these sixteen programs into state-administered block and
competitive programs in which funding decisions are made without clear
local involvement will hinder state, local, and tribal law
enforcement's ability to support the national homeland security
mission. Furthermore, elimination of the mandatory 25% law enforcement
terrorism prevention (LETP) component for the Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP)
will negatively impact the ability of state, local, and tribal law
enforcement to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur.
Experience has shown that states' and urban areas' use of funds for
LETP activities have yielded tremendous benefits for homeland security.
These funds are critical to ensuring that state, local, tribal, and
territorial law enforcement and public safety assets, information, and
capabilities are leveraged in efficient and effective ways to support
the national homeland security mission.
Proposing the consolidation of these programs before trying to make
changes aimed at strengthening their effectiveness is premature. As
noted in the February 10, 2014 letter to Secretary Johnson, we
acknowledge that not all states or State Administrative Agencies (SAA)
in the country are properly using the funding to support terrorism
prevention activities as defined in the authorizing statute. That is
why we strongly recommend that the accountability for the intended
purpose of the LETP requirement be strengthened.
As the majority of the SAA's are not law enforcement-centric, this
consolidation proposal would further dilute, if not eliminate all
together, the focus on the prevention and investigation of terrorism.
As we all know, actions related to these two issues were the stimulus
in moving Congress to initiate and pass legislation to create the
homeland security grant programs.
Further, it is our suggestion that since the Department of Homeland
Security currently funds annual ``carve out'' grant programs for the
emergency management and fire service communities under the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program (EMGP) and Assistance to
Firefighters Grant Program (AFG), they should consider a similar carve
out for the law enforcement community equal to or greater in size to
the current 25% LETP. Whether ``stand alone'' or within the SHGP
construct, this carve out should be managed and administered by the
lead state law enforcement agency in each state (as designated by the
Governor) to ensure the focus on prevention and investigation of
terrorism is not lost. In addition, a percentage of these designated
funds should be prioritized and mandated for use to sustain the state-
and federally-recognized fusion centers that currently exist in the
nation.
On behalf of our Law Enforcement Associations, we thank you for
your attention and consideration of this matter. We look forward to
continued dialogue as we continue to work together on issues of
importance to the law enforcement field and our communities.
Sincerely,
Yost Zakhary,
Chief, City of Woodway, TX, and
President, International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Charles H. Ramsey,
Police Commissioner, City of Philadelphia, PA, and
President, Major Cities Chiefs Association.
Donny Youngblood,
Sheriff-Coroner, Kern County, CA, and
President, Major County Sheriffs' Association.
Aaron D. Kennard,
Sheriff (Ret.), Executive Director,
National Sheriffs' Association.
______
Letter From the National Fusion Center Association
April 29, 2014.
The Honorable Susan Brooks,
Chairwoman,
The Honorable Donald Payne, Jr.,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
RE: Statement for the Record Submitted by the National Fusion Center
Association for the Subcommittee Hearing ``Stakeholder Assessments of
the Administration's National Preparedness Grant Program Proposal''
Dear Chairwoman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
Subcommittee: We commend you for soliciting the input of stakeholder
groups regarding the administration's proposal to create a National
Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). On behalf of the National Fusion
Center Association I am expressing serious concern with the
administration's proposal to consolidate FEMA Preparedness Grants into
the NPGP.
The proposal would cause the elimination of the current statutory
requirement for grantees to allocate at least 25% of Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI) and State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)
grant funding to Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention (LETP)
activities. This requirement was enacted as section 2006 of the 2007
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. States and
UASI regions have allocated funding under this requirement in part to
augment state and local resources to develop and sustain fusion
centers.
In suggesting the elimination of the LETP requirement, the NPGP
proposal would make it significantly more difficult for the
administration to facilitate the on-going collaboration needed across
all states to advance its core priorities related to terrorism
information sharing and analysis. We strongly support the continued
focus by Secretary Johnson and DHS on robust information sharing and
analysis, including through support of the National Network of Fusion
Centers.
Terrorism prevention remains the most enduring homeland security
priority, and it cannot be done effectively without a strong,
dedicated, sustained funding source that encourages institutionalized
collaboration across all levels of government.
The capability to receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather
information that may be relevant to protecting the nation or preventing
an attack is not something that can be switched on or off from one
grant cycle to another. It must be a constant. And it must involve all
levels of government--including state, local, tribal, and territorial.
There is no other mechanism outside of the current LETP requirement
to ensure the development and sustainment of that nation-wide
information sharing and analysis imperative. The House Homeland
Security Committee's March 2014 report on the Boston Marathon Bombings
recommended that cooperation be expanded between federal and local law
enforcement, especially through fusion centers. The elimination of the
only dedicated stream of federal support to state and local law
enforcement for homeland security information sharing and analysis--the
LETP requirement--would make that recommendation exceedingly difficult
to achieve.
While the level of priority placed by grantees on certain types of
equipment, training, and technology may rise or fall from year to year,
the importance of information sharing and analysis in support of
detecting and preventing attacks should always be the top priority.
Weakness in these capabilities in any one state can potentially impact
all other states. The necessity of being connected--via networks and
personal relationships--is critical to public safety and first
responder decision makers at all levels.
Our partners in Federal law enforcement and homeland security
intelligence and analysis do not have access to the vast amounts of
potentially valuable investigative information that resides in state,
local, tribal, and territorial databases except through the National
Network of Fusion Centers and bilaterally on a regional or local basis.
The ability to receive reports on suspicious activities from the public
and trained public safety personnel in every state, analyze the
information, and ensure it is directed to the appropriate body for
action happens most efficiently through the Nation-wide Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). Events that occur in one
jurisdiction may relate to activity in another location across the
country, and the ability to have reliable up-to-the-minute situational
awareness and reporting is a must for state and local law enforcement
leaders and the elected officials to whom they may report.
These are just three examples of capabilities we have worked with
our partners to build in a systematic fashion over the past decade,
often using FEMA grant resources under the LETP requirement to do so.
Many of these capabilities are enabled through the National Network of
Fusion Centers. The hundreds of pieces of actionable terrorism-related
information provided through fusion centers to support Federal
investigations is evidence of the direct Federal interest in ensuring
these capabilities are ``always on''. Under the current statutory LETP
requirement, DHS, the states, and UASI regions have a mechanism to
ensure those activities can be supported.
But if that requirement is dissolved through the implementation of
the NPGP as proposed, then there will be no clear way to support
nation-wide terrorism information sharing and analysis. This would be a
step backward and make it harder to achieve the goals that this
committee, DHS, and all of us working in the field share.
We strongly recommend that the current Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention requirement be preserved. Thank you again for your thorough
consideration of stakeholders' perspectives on this important issue.
Sincerely,
Mike Sena,
President, National Fusion Center Association, and
Director, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center.
Mrs. Brooks. With that, I look forward to hearing from our
distinguished panel of witnesses and continuing our discussion
of the grant programs this morning.
I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne,
for any opening statements he may have.
Mr. Payne. Good morning. I want to thank Chairwoman Brooks
for holding this hearing and giving homeland security grant
program stakeholders the opportunity to share their thoughts on
the administration's proposal to consolidate targeted homeland
security grant programs.
I would like to take a brief moment to share my sympathies
with the people who were in the path of the storms and
tornadoes that have wreaked havoc on parts of the Great Plains
and over the South over the past few days. Our hearts are with
you.
Since serving as Ranking Member on this subcommittee, this
committee has tried on numerous occasions to understand the
administration's proposal to consolidate homeland security
grants. The administration first proposed the National
Preparedness Grant Program, NPGP, in its 2013 budget request.
At the time, the proposal surprised Members of Congress and
stakeholders alike because FEMA had not conducted outreach
prior to the budget's submission.
In response, this panel held hearings to try to learn more
about the NPGP. Stakeholder groups expressed frustration that
they were left out of the process and concern about how NPGP
would affect local preparedness capabilities and confusion
about how NPGP would be administered.
FEMA provided a general overview of how NPGP would work and
suggested that more detail would be provided in the legislative
proposal. Members of this panel were told that they could
expect the legislative proposal soon. FEMA never submitted the
legislative proposal and Congress ultimately rejected the
proposal.
In 2014 FEMA once again proposed to consolidate homeland
security grants into the NPGP. But still, it had not submitted
the legislative proposal nor did it appear it had made
appreciable effort to work out with stakeholders on a grant
reform proposal that both sides could support. As a result,
Congress rejected that proposal a second time.
I know that Members of this panel on both sides of the
aisle had hoped that the proposal this year would be different.
Unfortunately, many of the concerns this committee has raised
in the past have not been resolved.
FEMA deserves some credit for submitting a legislative
proposal this year. I also appreciate FEMA's effort to provide
more detail on how NPGP would work in the letter it sent to the
committee on Friday. FEMA's letter was timely and informative.
That said, the legislative proposal does not reflect the
interaction with stakeholders, clarity of vision, or detail
that I would expect from a document nearly 3 years in the
making. Moreover, despite the additional detail in the April 25
letter, I do not think that it made the case to overhaul
homeland security grants, particularly when so many
stakeholders have reasons and have raised concerns.
Further, despite Congress' urging, it does not appear that
FEMA engaged with stakeholders in the manner Congress had
envisioned. When this panel urged FEMA to work with
stakeholders as it continued to work on its grant consolidation
proposal, we had hoped that the dialogue would be on-going and
that stakeholders would see their comments reflected in an
updated consolidation proposal.
But that does not appear to be the case. For example, I
understand that the new definition of ``local unit of
government'' included in the legislative proposal caused a
great deal of concern among stakeholders, that these were
expressed to FEMA prior to the 2015 budget submission. Yet, the
new definition of ``local unit of government'' remains in the
administration's proposal.
The proposal would divert the current grant programs' focus
on terrorism to all-hazards without making a case for why this
is appropriate. Toward that end, I am particularly concerned
that the proposal would eliminate the requirement that 25
percent of the State and Urban Area Grant dollar funds fund law
enforcement terrorism initiatives.
Finally, I am concerned by the funding level sought, and I
am interested to learn whether this level of funding is
sufficient to maintain and develop the capabilities necessary
to prepare for and respond to acts of terror.
I look forward to learning from the witnesses how the
existing grant program has improved State and local homeland
security capabilities and how those capabilities would be
impacted by this proposal. I am also interested to know whether
the stakeholders here today have any concerns about homeland
security grants as they are currently administered and ideas on
how to improve them.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. I look forward
to your testimony.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
April 29, 2014
I want to thank Chairwoman Brooks for holding this hearing and
giving Homeland Security Grant Program stakeholders the opportunity to
share their thoughts on the administration's proposal to consolidate
targeted homeland security grant programs.
I would like to take a brief moment to share my sympathies with the
people who were in the path of the storms and tornadoes that wreaked
havoc on parts of the Great Plains and the south over the past few
days.
My thoughts are especially with families who lost their loved ones
or homes or businesses.
Since serving as Ranking Member of this subcommittee, this
committee has tried on numerous occasions to understand the
administration's proposal to consolidate homeland security grants.
The administration first proposed the National Preparedness Grant
Program (NPGP) in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
At the time, the proposal surprised Members of Congress and
stakeholders alike, because FEMA had not conducted outreach prior to
the budget submission.
In response, this panel held hearings to try to learn more about
the NPGP.
Stakeholder groups expressed frustration that they were left out of
the process, concern about how NPGP would affect local preparedness
capabilities, and confusion about how NPGP would be administered.
FEMA provided a general overview of how NPGP would work, and
suggested that more detail would be provided in the legislative
proposal.
Members of this panel were told that they could expect the
legislative language ``soon.''
FEMA never submitted the legislative language, and Congress
ultimately rejected the proposal.
In fiscal year 2014, FEMA once again proposed to consolidate
homeland security grants into the NPGP.
But it still had not submitted the legislative proposal, nor did it
appear that it had made an appreciable effort to work with stakeholders
on a grant reform proposal that both sides could support.
As a result, Congress rejected the proposal a second time.
I know that Members of this panel, on both sides of the aisle, had
hoped that the proposal this year would be different.
Unfortunately, many of the concerns this committee has raised in
the past have not been resolved.
FEMA deserves some credit for submitting a legislative proposal
this year.
I also appreciate FEMA's effort to provide more detail on how NPGP
would work in the letter it sent to the committee on Friday. FEMA's
letter was timely and informative.
That said, the legislative proposal does not reflect the
interaction with stakeholders, clarity of vision, or detail that I
would have expected for a document nearly 3 years in the making.
Moreover, despite the additional detail in the April 25 letter, I
do not think that it made the case to overhaul homeland security
grants, particularly when so many stakeholders have raised concerns.
Further, despite Congress' urging, it does not appear that FEMA
engaged with stakeholders in the manner Congress envisioned.
When this panel urged FEMA to work with stakeholders as it
continued to work on its grant consolidation proposal, we had hoped
that the dialogue would be on-going and that stakeholders would see
their comments reflected in the updated consolidation proposal.
But that does not appear to be the case.
For example, I understand that the new definition of ``local unit
of government'' included in the legislative proposal caused a great
deal of concern among stakeholders, and that these concerns were
expressed to FEMA prior to the fiscal year 2015 budget submission.
Yet, the new definition of ``local unit of government'' remains in
the administration's proposal.
The proposal would divert the current grant program's focus on
terrorism to all-hazards, without making the case for why this is
appropriate.
Toward that end, I am particularly concerned that the proposal
would eliminate the requirement that 25 percent of State and Urban Area
grant dollars fund law enforcement terrorism initiatives.
Finally, I am concerned by the funding level sought, and am
interested to learn whether this level of funding is sufficient to
maintain and develop the capabilities necessary to prepare for and
respond to acts of terror.
I look forward to learning from the witnesses how the existing
grant program has improved State and local homeland security
capabilities, and how those capabilities would be impacted by the
proposal.
I am also interested to know whether the stakeholders here today
have any concerns about homeland security grants as they are currently
administered, and ideas to improve them.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Members are reminded that additional statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 29, 2014
I would like to express my sympathies to those affected by the
tornadoes that have devastated communities across Oklahoma, Arkansas,
Missouri, and Mississippi. My thoughts are with them--particularly
those in Tupelo, Mississippi, which is in my District.
I appreciate this subcommittee's effort to give stakeholders a
voice in the debate surrounding the administration's grant
consolidation proposal.
This committee works diligently to consider the views of
stakeholders as it drafts and reviews policy proposals. It is
especially important that we do so when it is unclear whether the
administration effectively engaged with stakeholders. The preparedness
grant consolidation proposal is the latest example.
The preparedness grant programs administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency serve a vital role in every Congressional
District, enabling critical disaster response capabilities.
From the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland
Security Program, to the Port Security Grant Program and the Transit
Security Grant Program, we have seen first-hand the fundamental
benefits these programs have provided.
Over the past 10 years, we have invested over $39 billion in these
and other homeland security grant programs.
The capabilities and safeguards these programs have given to first
responder capabilities cannot be understated.
When we go back to our Districts, we hear anecdotal stories about
how Homeland Security Grant program funding supported a table-top
exercise to test a local Emergency Operations Plan or to purchase
technology that will help first responders do their jobs quicker,
better, and safer.
In light of the recent 1-year anniversary of the Boston Marathon
bombings, we cannot forget the outstanding performance and response
displayed by the Boston and Watertown Police Departments.
In his testimony before this committee in May 2013, former Boston
Police Department Commissioner Ed Davis noted that the response to the
bombings would not have been as comprehensive or successful without the
planning, training, exercises, and equipment supported by the Urban
Area Security Initiative.
It is no surprise that communities across the country are proud of
the preparedness capabilities that they were able to develop over the
past 10 years.
Thanks in large part to the targeted investments made possible by
the Homeland Security Grant Program, more of our Nation's communities
are able to rest assured that, in the unfortunate event of an
emergency, they are prepared.
But now, despite the milestones we have been able to accomplish
throughout the Nation, the capabilities we have so heavily invested in
could end up being suspended or mothballed.
Once again, the administration proposed the National Preparedness
Grant Program (NPG).
This underfunded proposal would haphazardly consolidate 18 targeted
homeland security grant programs into a single pot of money, forcing
groups who currently benefit from discrete funding sources to compete
against each other for the funds necessary to build and maintain
preparedness capabilities.
Although I appreciate FEMA's effort to provide greater clarity to
its vision for NPGP in its April 25, 2014 letter to Chairwoman Brooks
and Ranking Member Payne, Jr., I am not convinced it made the case for
consolidation.
As part of its rationale, FEMA asserts that this consolidation is
necessary to ensure better coordination of investments at the regional,
State, and local level and to avoid unnecessarily duplicative
investments.
But it has yet to explain how the proposed grant overhaul would
achieve that objective.
Moreover, as State and local governments struggle to maintain the
capabilities they have achieved over the last decade, FEMA has not made
the case for requesting only $1.04 billion to fund NPGP.
Finally, it is not clear whether or how FEMA incorporated feedback
from stakeholders as it drafted its proposal.
After 2 years of urging FEMA to engage in on-going outreach and
discussion with stakeholders, I was troubled to learn that this had not
occurred to the degree we had hoped before the National Preparedness
Grant Program proposal was resubmitted to Congress this year.
Accordingly, I cannot support the reform proposal until it is clear
that capabilities the concerns of stakeholders have been adequately
addressed and that the capabilities developed over the past decade will
be maintained and improved.
Mrs. Brooks. We are very pleased to have such a
distinguished panel before us today on this important topic.
To start out, Ms. Kris Eide has been the director of
Minnesota's Homeland Security and Emergency Management since
2005. In 2011 she was named homeland security advisor to
Governor Mark Dayton. As HSEM director, Eide has the overall
responsibility to ensure coordination of State agency
preparedness and emergency response to all types of natural and
other emergencies and disasters. I am sad to hear that it was
snowing today in Minnesota.
She serves as the State Emergency Response Commission and
represents HSEM on several State-wide committees and councils.
As homeland security advisor she is the lead point of contact
with the Department of Homeland Security and is responsible to
keep the Governor informed on emerging threats, events, and
responses.
She is also a member of the National Governors Association
Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council, and is on the
board of directors for the National Emergency Management
Association. She is testifying today on behalf of NGA and NEMA.
Ms. Eide holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in sociology from
the University of Minnesota and a master's degree in management
and administration from Metropolitan State University. In
addition, Eide earned an executive leadership certificate from
the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and
Security.
I now will yield to the Ranking Member to introduce our
next witness.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I am pleased to introduce Steven M. Fulop, mayor of Jersey
City, New Jersey. Steven attended Binghamton University, spent
time at Oxford University in England, and graduated in 1999.
After starting a career at Goldman Sachs in Chicago, he
transferred back to New Jersey and bought a home in Jersey
City, New Jersey.
When he witnessed the devastating attacks on September 11,
2001, Steve made the life-altering decision to leave his job at
Goldman Sachs and enlist in the United States Marine Corps. As
a member of the 6th Engineer Support Battalion he was deployed
to Iraq. Steve and his unit were awarded the Overseas Service
Ribbon, Meritorious Masts, and the Presidential Unit Citation.
We are happy to have Mayor Fulop here with us today to
testify before the subcommittee.
Thank you very much, sir.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank the Ranking Member.
Our next witness is Mr. Troy Riggs. Mr. Riggs serves as the
city of Indianapolis' director of public safety, a position he
has held since October 2012. Director Riggs came to
Indianapolis with more than 20 years of public safety
experience. His public service includes serving as an
assistance city manager and chief of police in Corpus Christi,
Texas.
Additionally, he served 20 years in Louisville, Kentucky
working his way from recruit to assistant chief and chief of
staff. He has also served as press secretary for a judge/
executive and has been a liaison to local, State, and Federal
governments. Mr. Riggs has an EMBA from Sullivan University and
a political science degree from the University of Louisville.
As someone who worked in public safety on behalf of the
city of Indianapolis, we are thrilled to have you leading our
public safety department in Indianapolis.
Next is Chief William Metcalf, who is the fire chief for
the North County Fire Protection District in Fallbrook,
California, a suburb of San Diego, and has served in that
position since 2003. He started his fire service career in 1974
with the Anne Arundel County, Maryland Fire Department, and
also served with the North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District
in Incline Village, Nevada.
Chief Metcalf also serves as the president of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs and is testifying on
their behalf today.
Chief Metcalf has an associate's degree in paramedic
science, a bachelor's degree in management, and a master's
degree in organizational leadership. He is also a graduate of
the Executive Fire Officer Program as a chief fire officer
designate.
Welcome.
Mr. Randy Parsons serves as the director of security for
the Port of Long Beach, a position he has held since October
2012. Prior to his position, he served as the Federal security
director at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport and later
at Los Angeles International Airport.
Prior to joining TSA, Mr. Parsons served for 20 years in
the FBI, during which time he served as the special agent in
charge for the counterterrorism program in the Los Angeles
office. He has led four joint terrorism task forces and
directed the operational readiness of personnel and systems for
crisis response.
Mr. Parsons earned his J.D. and Bachelor of Arts degree in
criminal justice from Washburn University and his Master of
Arts degree in criminal justice from Sam Houston State
University.
So welcome.
Welcome to all of you. I would just like for you all to
realize that your full written statements will appear in the
record.
Now I will recognize Ms. Eide for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KRIS EIDE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF MINNESOTA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF
OF GOVERNORS HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL AND THE
NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Ms. Eide. Thank you, Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne,
and Members, for the chance to testify today on behalf of
Governors, homeland security advisors, and State emergency
management directors. Hearings like this provide an important
opportunity to discuss how we all can better serve the American
people by ensuring preparedness at all levels of government.
Since 2003 Federal grant funds have supplemented billions
of dollars in State and local investment to build and sustain
emergency preparedness and response capabilities. These
investments have provided critical support for interoperable
communication systems, first responder training programs,
public preparedness campaigns, hazardous materials response,
urban search and rescue, and a robust information-sharing
network.
In my home State of Minnesota we have strengthened our
medical surge capabilities, improved situational awareness
during emergencies, and taken steps to address the emerging
threat of cybersecurity.
The most recent National efforts undertaken as a result of
the preparedness grant programs is the Threat Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment, or THIRA, and the State
preparedness reports. While FEMA continues to work with
stakeholders on refining these processes, they are only as
effective as the efforts they support.
Simply placing the THIRA and preparedness reports atop the
current grant structure fails to fully integrate all grantees
under the State THIRA or provide adequate visibility on funding
allocations across jurisdictions within the State. Duplicative
reporting requirements and increased administrative burdens
under the current framework further diminish return on
investment as more time and money must be spent on grants
administration and management.
Given the current fiscal environment, the need to reform
these grant programs has never been more urgent. Federal
funding for homeland security grant programs has decreased by
more than 75 percent since their inception, yet the structure
remains unchanged.
The reality is that the current suite of grant programs
perpetuates separation among constituencies and allows those
interests to operate in silos. This does not reflect on-going
efforts to align State and local capabilities with our National
preparedness objectives.
Today's dynamic threat environment requires a program which
prioritizes investment based on risk while maintaining State
and local abilities to sustain prior investments to support our
National goals. These programs must be flexible to address
changing hazards and ensure local investments are synchronized
with State-wide and regional priorities.
The NPGP proposal has evolved since its introduction in the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget. While we continue to
evaluate the details, we are encouraged to see the legislative
language in this year's budget and are eager to work with
Congress and the administration to pass comprehensive grant
reform.
One of the most important aspects of the NPGP proposal is a
strong State oversight role in grants administration. The
States are best positioned to achieve economies of scale, avoid
duplication of effort, leverage available assets, and avoid
gaps in critical capabilities.
As FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate pointed out recently
before this subcommittee, Governors have unique emergency
authorities, such as activating the National Guard, and are
responsible for requesting and coordinating disaster Federal
assistance when necessary. In order to properly use these
authorities, Governors, their homeland security advisors, and
State emergency management directors must have knowledge of the
capabilities, assets, and resources throughout their State.
This certainly is not meant to imply that States can do it
alone. Intergovernmental and public-private collaboration and
communication are the key elements in achieving a whole-
community approach to our National preparedness.
Incidents such as the 2007 I-35W Bridge collapse in my home
State or the response to the Boston Marathon bombing last year
demonstrate the need for strong partnerships. Even those two
examples highlight the diverse needs of our various grantees.
Grant programs must be flexible enough for us to ensure
priorities are being addressed in order of their importance.
Both the GHSAC and NEMA are continuing to review the NPGP
proposal and will provide this subcommittee with additional
feedback in the coming weeks. In the mean time, we have
submitted for the record principles and values we believe
should inform any grant reform effort.
The NPGP is an important next step in on-going efforts to
find common ground on a grants framework that has both State
and local buy-in and can ensure measureable return on the
Nation's investments. Regardless of what this change looks
like, only through comprehensive reform of these decade-old
programs can we achieve the type of accountability Congress
demands and the flexibility to address the most urgent
preparedness needs of our communities.
On behalf of my colleagues and States, I look forward to
working with you and my fellow panelists in this process. I am
happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Eide follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kris Eide
April 29, 2014
Thank you Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee for holding this hearing. I am Kris Eide, director of the
Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division of the Minnesota
Department of Public Safety and homeland security advisor to Governor
Mark Dayton.
I am here today representing the National Governors Association
(NGA) Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council (GHSAC) and the
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). I currently serve as
chair of the GHSAC Grants Committee and as vice chair of NEMA's
Preparedness Committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss how
comprehensive reform of Federal preparedness grant programs will better
serve State and local efforts to build and sustain capabilities to
address the various threats and hazards they face. My testimony will
discuss: (1) The continuing benefit of Federal investments in State and
local preparedness; (2) the enduring need for grant reform; (3) the
importance of a strong State role in grants administration; and (4) the
value of intergovernmental partnerships.
federal support remains essential
Federal funds continue to provide critical support to State and
local efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorist
attacks, natural disasters, and man-made events. As discussed in the
Department of Homeland Security's annual National Preparedness Report,
our Nation's level of preparedness has vastly improved since September
11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This is the result of
increased focus on building community resiliency, improved
coordination, and engagement among all levels of Government and more
than a decade's worth of Federal investments in training, equipment,
and personnel at the State and local level.
Since 2003, Federal grant funds have supplemented billions of
dollars in State and local investments to build and sustain
capabilities including interoperable communications, training of
personnel, enhancing information sharing and community preparedness,
and hazardous materials response. In recent years, strategic planning
efforts such as the State Preparedness Report (SPR) and Threat Hazard
Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) process have facilitated
intergovernmental coordination and helped align State and local
investments into capabilities that also meet National and regional
needs. These capabilities include special response teams in the areas
of weapon of mass destruction, urban search and rescue, and veterinary
rapid response teams in addition to agricultural warning systems.
Federal grant funds support standardized training for mass casualty
incidents, the National network of fusion centers and citizen and
community preparedness initiatives Nation-wide.
In Minnesota, Federal preparedness grants have funded a number of
critical projects and supported key investments that serve the entire
State. Some key examples include:
Cybersecurity monitoring for detection of network cyber
attacks and breaches. To date, the State's executive branch
agencies and 15 of the 87 counties have this detection and
deterrence capability.
Capabilities for medical surge through funding Ambulance
Strike Teams and Mobile Medical Teams. These assets were used
for two separate disasters to help with the evacuation of
medical and long-term care facilities.
Improvements to situational awareness and coordination of
emergency response through the purchase and sustainment of
State-wide video-teleconferencing and incident management
software systems. It has been estimated that the purchase of
the video-teleconferencing equipment has resulted in a 3-year
return on investment in time management and resource
identification and deployment.
Minnesota also has the largest land-mobile public safety
interoperable radio network in the country. Federal preparedness funds
have been used to augment the $240 million of State funds spent to
build the infrastructure and purchase equipment allowing for public
safety responders across the State to talk to each other. This system
was first used successfully following the collapse of the I-35W bridge
in 2007. Since then it has been used for special events, hostage
situations, and disaster response. The State and local governments
continue to spend approximately $11 million each year to maintain this
capability. Without Federal preparedness funds being used for those
items not eligible for State funding, the State would be nowhere near
the current 95% completion for the project.
grant reform will improve effectiveness
Federal funding for homeland security grant programs has decreased
by more than 75 percent since the program's inception in 2003, yet the
structure remains unchanged. Congress has recognized this continuing
disconnect and included language in annual appropriations bills as
recently as fiscal year 2012 to push for ``long-overdue'' and ``bold''
reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
administration of its State and Local Programs.\1\ Important
improvements have been made to processes for assessing risk and
strategic planning, but the current grant program design can no longer
achieve the type of accountability Congress demands and support the
preparedness capabilities our communities need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Report 112-91 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2012 Homeland
Security Appropriations bill (H.R. 2017), part of Public Law 112-33;
September 30, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given these on-going challenges and the current fiscal environment,
the need for reform of these preparedness grant programs has never been
more urgent. In the fiscal year 2013 budget, FEMA provided a proposal
to consolidate grant programs into a new National Preparedness Grant
Program (NPGP). Over the last 2 years, FEMA's NPGP proposal has helped
foster a dialogue on States' enduring challenges with the current suite
of 16 separate preparedness grant programs.
Although we continue working on clarifying and understanding the
finer points and their potential impacts on States, we remain
encouraged to see legislative language for NPGP accompany the
President's fiscal year 2015 budget request. This is an important
``next step'' for continuing engagement efforts with Congress and
stakeholders to find common ground on a grants framework that reflects
both today's fiscal realities and its dynamic threat environment.
Since 2003, the grant programs have allocated more than $40 billion
to State and local governments to build and sustain preparedness
capabilities. The successful outcomes supported by this investment must
be acknowledged. At the same time, the need to better align these grant
programs with today's fiscal realities and operational challenges must
also be recognized. At their inception, the grant programs were
required to address an unknown threat environment after September 11,
2001. More than $4 billion in funding was made available through State
and local preparedness grants in fiscal year 2003 alone. In addition to
fiscal changes, the environment now incorporates the new ``all-
hazards'' focus stemming from lessons learned after Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 and subsequent multi-State disasters. A key lesson from those
events is the importance of intergovernmental collaboration and
integrating preparedness planning and response activities to ensure
unity of effort. Declining budgets at all levels of government have
increased the need to leverage resources and facilitate cross-
jurisdictional coordination. We can no longer afford to operate in
separate silos.
Unfortunately, the current suite of grant programs perpetuates such
separations and no longer reflects on-going efforts to align State and
local capabilities with National preparedness objectives. Today's
dynamic threat environment requires a grants program that prioritizes
investments based on risk while maintaining State and local ability to
sustain prior investments that support National goals. Grant programs
must be flexible and agile to address changing hazards and ensure local
investments synchronize with State-wide and regional priorities.
Duplicative reporting requirements and increased administrative
burden under the current framework also diminish return on investment
(ROI) as more time and money must be spent on grants administration and
management. Comprehensive reform would better facilitate maximum
efficiency of taxpayer dollars and better enable accurate measure of
ROI over time. This flexibility with accountability can represent the
face of these reformed grant programs. For only through comprehensive
changes to the existing structures can we achieve a more effective
preparedness program for States and locals.
state oversight serves national needs
In addition to improving program effectiveness, comprehensive grant
reform also can facilitate improved accountability and transparency.
The SPR and THIRA should align preparedness investments with current
risk and identified capability gaps. Simply placing that process atop
the current grants structure fails to fully integrate all grantees
under the State THIRA or provide adequate visibility on funding
allocations across jurisdictions within the State.
A strong State role in the management of grant funds will better
ensure transparency, coordination, and the effective use of funds.
States are best positioned to achieve economies of scale, avoid
duplication of effort, leverage available assets, and avoid gaps in
critical capabilities. An enhanced State role would also better reflect
Governors' Constitutional emergency authorities.
As FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate pointed out in recent testimony
before this subcommittee, Governors have unique emergency authorities,
including the ability to deploy the National Guard.\2\ To properly use
these authorities to save lives and protect property, Governors and
their homeland security advisors, emergency management directors and
adjutants general, must have knowledge of capabilities, assets, and
resources throughout the State. By serving as the central point of
coordination among multiple jurisdictions and functional areas, States
play a key role in ensuring that scarce resources are used effectively
to meet identified National priorities that are tailored for regional
needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Testimony of FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, House Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications Hearing: The Federal Emergency Management Agency's FY
2015 Budget Request: Ensuring Effective Preparedness, Response, and
Communications; March 25, 2014; http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/
subcommittee-hearing-federal-emergency-management-agency-s-fy2015-
budget-request-ensuring.
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States currently employ a variety of governance structures to
administer and manage the grant programs, but remain in the best
position to oversee and coordinate all homeland security and emergency
preparedness activities within their boundaries. Currently, States have
no role in the use of port and transit security grants which limits
visibility on the use of funds within the State or the projects
receiving grant dollars. These funds could be used by a local area to
implement proprietary communications systems that are not interoperable
with surrounding areas or the State-wide system. These challenges make
it difficult to ensure coordination among all levels of Government and
ensure investments are aligned with city, State, and regional
preparedness goals.
We are encouraged that the NPGP proposal recognizes the importance
of State oversight and are committed to working with this committee to
explain how States are working with local stakeholders to ensure active
engagement throughout the grants process.
partnership is key to community preparedness
Intergovernmental and public-private collaboration and
communication are key elements in achieving a ``whole community''
approach to National preparedness. These concepts were recently
demonstrated in a number of ways, including the improved preparation
and response to Hurricane Sandy; the support provided by State and
local fusion centers on numerous successful criminal and terrorism
investigations, such as the Boston Marathon bombing; the on-going
implementation of a Nation-wide public safety broadband network; the
use of National Guard dual-status commanders to coordinate State and
Federal military forces during an emergency; and the development and
implementation of the National Preparedness System. The grants process,
including reform efforts, must include input from a variety of
stakeholders, and States are committed to working with our partners in
local and Tribal governments as well as the first responder community.
States use a variety of mechanisms to develop and implement
homeland security strategies and plans on an on-going basis. Integral
to all State efforts is the involvement of a multitude of State, local,
and Tribal stakeholders throughout the process. Most States have
regional councils or committees that are used to ensure coordination
with local officials, including police, fire, emergency medical
services, public health, county, and city management officials, non-
profit organizations and the private sector. These regional committees
provide for a transparent process that fosters collaboration and
partnership and aids in the distribution of the currently required 80
percent ``pass-through'' of funds to localities.
Active Federal, State, and local engagement is critical to
addressing emerging National security challenges and to sustaining our
current state of preparedness. No level of government can address any
of these issues independently. In an era of constrained budgets, we all
must learn to do more with less while ensuring the preparedness
priorities of States receive the necessary attention they require.
Effective partnerships are imperative to meet both the needs of our
communities and the National Preparedness Goal of ``a more secure and
resilient nation.''
states are partners in reform efforts
As Congress and this committee consider the NPGP proposal and
engage with stakeholders, NEMA and the GHSAC have offered several
documents outlining States' priorities and principles to inform grant
program reform. The documents are attached to this statement and
submitted for the record. Furthermore, we offer several recommendations
to ensure Federal investments in State and local preparedness remain
aligned with National preparedness goals and provide a clear value to
both communities and the taxpayer.
1. Value local decision-making and National assessment.--An
examination of preparedness must not consist solely of broad
goals and priorities, but also must form the basis for action.
FEMA should continue to improve the SPR and THIRA process to
ensure they provide value to States and local governments. The
THIRA should support State efforts to integrate core
capabilities thoughtfully and systematically into their
planning, analysis, and assessment processes.
2. Assess risk continuously across all levels of government.--
Threat assessment, such as THIRA, must be conducted independent
of funding allocations in order to adequately assess the
current risk and hazards of a locality, State, and region. This
must be a continuous process and not a yearly snapshot simply
for reporting purposes.
3. Encourage strategic plans versus spending plans.--The planning
process must focus on setting and achieving strategic goals
under changing and uncertain conditions. This is unlike the
current system where funding allocations are determined prior
to planning.
4. Allocate funds based on priority needs.--Funding allocations
should prioritize investments to address the most pressing
capability gaps identified in the State and regional THIRA and
SPR.
5. Measure progress to fill capability gaps.--The above steps allow
for an effective and meaningful measurement process. As
priorities in the State plans are funded, measureable gaps can
be identified, addressed, and reported to FEMA and Congress.
6. Provide consistency and support long-term planning.--Grant
reform should support FEMA's ability to provide States and
subgrantees consistent grant guidance and policy, ensure
realistic time lines and foster a culture of collaboration
among States, local governments, and other subgrantees. States
are working with FEMA to integrate the THIRA and SPR processes
into State emergency planning, and it should remain part of
broader restructuring and reform of FEMA grant programs.
Confronting today's dynamic threats requires an approach to
emergency planning that unifies homeland security partners and remains
flexible to changing priorities. The Nation must effectively build and
strengthen capabilities against a range of threats and reduce the
consequences of many hazards to reduce the risks to our communities.
These goals can only be accomplished, however, when the barriers and
stovepipes limiting flexibility and innovation are removed.
NGA and NEMA welcome the opportunity to work with this committee as
you assess the current grant programs, evaluate the NPGP proposal and
consider other potential reforms. We also look forward to working with
FEMA to identify and address key questions and concerns regarding their
proposal and other opportunities to improve administration of Federal
grant programs.
Chairman Brooks and Ranking Member Payne, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on this important topic. I am happy to answer
any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may have.
Attachment.--Governors' Principles for Homeland Security Grant Reform
The Department of Homeland Security provides State and local
governments with preparedness grant funding that provides support for
developing and maintaining critical homeland security and emergency
management capabilities. Over the last several years, these grant funds
have been significantly reduced. With decreased funding expected for
the foreseeable future, Congress and the administration are reexamining
the grant programs in order to make them more flexible and effective.
Currently, there are 18 major preparedness grant programs
administered by the Department of Homeland Security. Many of these
programs often overlap with others, creating unintended inefficiencies
and unnecessary administrative burdens. In addition, changing program
requirements often make the current structure complex and burdensome to
States.
Governors are supportive of efforts to reform these programs. As
reform proposals are considered by Congress and the administration,
Governors offer the following principles:
Principles:
Grants should be risk-based but continue to provide each
State and territory funding to support critical homeland
security and emergency management capabilities, including
personnel costs and the sustainment of investments.
Funding should focus on developing, enhancing, and
sustaining common core capabilities.
The Federal Government should work with States and
territories to develop consistent methods to measure or assess
progress in achieving common core capabilities.
Grant funding should be distributed through States and
territories to enhance regional response capabilities, avoid
duplication of effort, and ensure awareness of gaps in
capabilities.
Consistent with current law, States should be permitted to
use a portion of the grant funds for management and
administration in order to coordinate the efficient and
effective use of grant funds, provide necessary oversight and
comply with Federal reporting requirements.
Any reform to the current grant programs should provide
States with flexibility to determine which priorities should be
funded and where investments should be made within their
borders.
Any grant program should allow flexibility for any State
cost-share requirements.
The Federal Government should provide clear, timely, and
explicit guidelines for conducting threat assessments and how
those assessments will be used to determine base-level funding.
The Federal Government should be more transparent with
States in sharing the data used to populate the funding
formula/algorithm. States should be provided with a centralized
point of contact and reasonable time to review and inform the
data.
The Federal Government should ensure that reforms eliminate
inefficiencies, do not duplicate efforts, and do not place
additional administrative burdens on States.
Grants should allow for multi-year strategic planning by
States and local jurisdictions.
Attachment.--NEMA Proposal for a Comprehensive Preparedness Grants
Structure
December 2011
background
This Nation has made great strides in improving our safety and
security. We have more comprehensive interoperable communications
systems, regional response assets, a National system of intelligence
fusion centers, and an unprecedented level of collaboration and
teamwork among State and local responders.
Such programs as the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG)
Program and the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) have done much
to help public safety, law enforcement, emergency management, and a
myriad of other professionals conduct a broad range of preparedness
functions. From our neighborhood communities through all levels of
government, we have acquired resources, achieved collaboration, and
built systems to mitigate, prevent, prepare for, and respond to natural
hazards and terrorist threats.
The current grants structure is complex and often contradictory.
This creates unintended inefficiencies in investments and duplication
of efforts. The current and continuing fiscal condition of our Nation
requires us to invest every dollar more wisely than ever before. We
want to gain efficiencies in our grants so that we can increase the
effectiveness of our mission.
We cannot continue to segregate our efforts just because we did so
in the past. We must integrate our efforts so that we are agile in
confronting any threat to the homeland, whether it is natural,
technological, or human-caused. We must build strengths and
capabilities that are effective against many threats, reduce the
consequences of many hazards, and thus reduce the risks to our Nation.
We, therefore, require a comprehensive preparedness grants system to
fulfill the requirements of those professionals with critical homeland
security and emergency management responsibilities.
principles & values
This Nation--its people and their vital interests--deserves and
expects an effective and efficient National preparedness system
providing safety and security. Therefore, this system must:
Support and enable the five mission areas of Presidential
Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): Prevention, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation.
Build a culture of collaboration enabling a posture of
preparedness for all hazards--from nature, terrorists, or
technology--capable of disrupting the social and economic
equilibrium of our Nation.
Be agile and adaptive to confront changing hazards, emerging
threats, and increasing risks.
Be unified on goals, objectives, and strategy among Federal,
State, Tribal, local, and territorial partners and with the
private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the public
at large.
Build and sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation that is
well-organized, rigorously trained, vigorously exercised,
properly equipped, prepared for all hazards, focused on core
capabilities, and resourced for both the most serious and most
likely threats and hazards. This cadre will be an asset to the
Nation through mutual aid, other assistance between States and
regions, or for National teams.
Build, enhance, and sustain capabilities, self-reliance of
the public, and resilience of our communities and Nation.
Reflect the fiscal responsibilities and limitations of the
present and the future. This Nation deserves safety and
security, but it also deserves solvency. A State and local
grant system must enable investments in capabilities that are
of value to communities, regions, States, and the Nation.
Continually encourage innovation and ceaselessly weed out
waste and inefficiencies.
Encourage States and communities to self-organize with their
neighbors to protect vital supply lines and assets and
infrastructure of mutual value and to enable swift, coordinated
response.
Recognize that States, Tribes, territories, and local
communities know their jurisdictions best. They must have
flexibility to set priorities, design solutions, and adapt to
rapidly-changing conditions. This must be done with full
accountability.
Provide full visibility to States, Tribes, territories, and
local communities of all Federal homeland security and
emergency management activities, investments, and programs
within their jurisdictions. This disclosure is essential for
full understanding of capabilities to address threats, hazards,
and risks.
Reinforce the value of leveraging Federal investments with
contributions from States, Tribes, territories, and local
governments and demonstrate the day-to-day value to
jurisdictions.
Continue to encourage and enable wide participation in
review of projects and investments.
Recognize the complex interdependencies of our National
systems, particularly the movement of goods, services, and
people. The vulnerabilities of a jurisdiction often lie outside
its borders and outside its ability to address them.
purpose
We call upon Congress and the President to consider this proposal
to reform State and local grants for the safety and security of our
Nation. To this end, we seek to:
Encourage States, Tribes, territories, and local governments
to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans based upon their
evaluation of threats, hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities
facing them;
Outline a program of grants to States, Tribes, territories,
and local governments or combinations of governments improving
and strengthening the Nation's homeland security and emergency
management capabilities; and
Encourage research, development, competition, and innovation
enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency
management and homeland security and the development of new
methods for the prevention, preparedness, response, recovery,
and mitigation of natural disasters and acts of terrorism.
This proposal presents a system enabling greater effectiveness in
the mission with greater efficiency of resources. Over the past decade
States, Tribes, territories, and local governments have created new
organizational structures, gained invaluable experience, and increased
our capacity to manage multiple threats and hazards.
The high incidence of natural disasters and terrorist threats in
the United States challenges the peace, security, and general welfare
of the Nation and its citizens. To ensure the greater safety of the
people, homeland security and emergency management efforts must work
together with shared responsibilities, supporting capabilities, and
measurable progress towards a National goal. This unity of effort is
essential to achieve the vital objectives of PPD-8 and success of the
National Preparedness System.
This proposal outlines a system in which preparedness is a
deterrent, prevention is achieved through collaboration, mitigation is
a National value, and response and recovery encompass the ``whole of
community.'' But the system works only where the principles guide the
plans and where ideas lead to action. This reformed grant system shares
control with those on the front line, enables flexibility while
strengthening accountability, and ensures fiscal sustainability. State
and local governments cannot do this alone.
a comprehensive preparedness grants system
A truly comprehensive preparedness grants system must allow for
each State to determine core capabilities, set priorities in a flexible
manner, and measure performance and effectiveness. This proposal
recommends the creation or continuation of grants to coordinate
planning, measure effectiveness, develop and sustain a skilled cadre,
and invest in effective and efficient projects.
Planning
Conduct and maintain within each State a comprehensive
Threat Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) in concert
with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State officials.
Develop a comprehensive preparedness strategy to assess
current capabilities, determine future requirements, and
evaluate recent progress and initiatives.
The strategy will focus on identified gaps and contain goals
and objectives to fill those gaps. The objectives will be
prioritized and funds will be prioritized to fill the most
important gaps accordingly. Identifying existing additional
capability that is owned and maintained by other jurisdictions
and readily available for response through mutual aid should be
an important planning activity.
A Skilled Cadre
A skilled cadre is imperative within any comprehensive preparedness
system and should be supported through a grants program. This skilled
cadre includes emergency management and homeland security personnel.
Since such expertise remains the backbone of any system, their
responsibilities would include (but not be limited to):
Build and support State-wide emergency management and
homeland security all-hazards planning.
Provide comprehensive and appropriate levels of training and
conduct exercises for State and local personnel across the full
spectrum of emergency management and homeland security
responsibilities.
Support the National priorities outlined in PPD-8 and the
National Preparedness Goal.
Conduct public education and outreach to further whole-of-
community preparedness.
Within the skilled cadre grant, the existing EMPG would continue in
its present form, including allocation method, match requirement,
eligibility, management, appropriate funding, and flexibility. The
existing policy continues that allows emergency management to
administer EMPG if not the State Administering Agency (SAA).
A similar grant program will be established for State homeland
security professionals affording the same opportunity to build and
sustain a skilled cadre of personnel. This grant would be modeled after
EMPG which has been proven highly effective due to the flexibility it
provides along with accountability. EMPG currently maintains a 50-50
match requirement. Any match on the cadre-based grant for homeland
security professionals should be instituted with a soft match option,
and done so gradually over time in consultation with the States and
professions involved.
Investments and Innovation
Many capabilities identified in the comprehensive planning system
will require investment in longer-term projects and procurement to
achieve needed levels of effectiveness. An investment grant program
will enable decisions on priorities across the broad range of emergency
management and homeland security functions. This also enables swift
adjustments in priorities in light of changing threats or increasing
risks.
Unlike the homeland security cadre-based grant in which the SAA
determines the allocation of funds to State and local jurisdictions,
the investment grant focuses on sub-grantee applications for projects
and other investments based on similarly comprehensive planning efforts
at the local or regional level. States should establish and maintain a
multi-disciplinary review committee that advises on investments and
projects.
Eligible applicants to the investment grant include all currently
eligible grant recipients under HSGP, local governments or combinations
of governments, urban areas, regions, or other State-level agencies
conducting appropriate preparedness activities. States with urban areas
currently classified as ``Tier 1'' by DHS will continue to receive
funding specifically for those areas, upon completion of a
comprehensive preparedness strategy that has been approved by the
State. Funding that would have been allocated to other participants in
the current UASI program should be placed into the investment grant.
Eligible expenditures for investment grants should encompass all
functions of the currently separate programs and the priorities of PPD-
8, including equipment purchase and transfer, construction of emergency
operation centers or similar facilities, special response units,
critical infrastructure and key resource protection, medical surge,
protection and resilience, information sharing and intelligence, and
grant management and administrative costs. Pre-disaster mitigation
should be an eligible project under investment grants and due
consideration given to disaster loss reduction and resilience
initiatives. Substantial data exists to justify continued pre-disaster
mitigation programs in determining any set of priorities, and the
disaster mitigation community's interests groups must be intimately
engaged in the grant prioritization process. Flood mitigation
assistance and repetitive loss grants are not included as they are
funded through the National Flood Insurance Program by insurance
proceeds paid by policy holders. Furthermore, to continue supporting a
culture of innovation, up to 5 percent of the total investment grant
award may be distributed by DHS to unique and innovative programs
across the Nation to encourage best practices.
an overview of the system
Each State conducts and maintains a comprehensive Threat
Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) in concert with
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State officials.
A comprehensive preparedness strategy is developed to assess
current capabilities, determine future requirements, and
evaluate recent progress and initiatives.
The State is awarded three allocations from DHS, including
one for EMPG, one for the new homeland security cadre grant,
and one for the new investment and innovation grant.
Applicants will apply for funds from the investment grant
based upon completed preparedness strategies. Applications are
reviewed by a multi-disciplinary advisory committee, and the
SAA makes awards as appropriate.
conclusion
Our Nation faces enduring hazards, pervasive threats, and ever-
changing risks. Our current system lacks the agility to adapt swiftly
or convert ideas into action. We need the Nation to unite in a common
vision of National preparedness, resilience, and self-reliance. This
proposal enables States, Tribes, territories, and local government to
leverage their own resources with the Federal investment to build this
vision and be accountable for achieving it. We need all levels of
government, supported by all professions and disciplines, to unite in
this innovative National preparedness system.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Ms. Eide.
The Chairwoman now will recognize Mayor Fulop for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN M. FULOP, MAYOR, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY
Mr. Fulop. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, I am
Steven Fulop, mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify before you on the administration's
National Preparedness Grant Program proposal because I have
serious concerns about it--concerns which are shared by my
fellow mayors and other local government officials, emergency
managers, port operators, transit officials, police chiefs,
sheriffs, and the fire services.
We strongly support the existing menu of homeland security
programs because they are working. We recognize that they may
not be perfect and some changes may be needed, but they are the
product of years of work by Congress, by the administration,
State and local government, and first responders.
Jersey City is unique within our region and the Nation both
for its historical significance and critical infrastructure.
Jersey City, with its high population density, reliance on
public transit, and proximity to New York City, requires a plan
that is sensitive to our specialized needs and cognizant of
Jersey City's close interdependence with Newark, New York City,
and the Port Authority.
In a phrase, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for
emergency management and mitigation within our State. Emergency
management and preparedness is, by nature, regional. The
current funding structure, with its 13 independent grant
programs, and especially the UASI program, recognizes this
operational necessity.
The NPGP proposal offers no guarantee that these funds will
continue, and to scale back the regional emergency response
infrastructure that we have been building since 2002 would be
to place operational infrastructure, surety, and potentially
constituents at risk.
The synergies achieved from this regional approach aren't
merely financial. By planning, training, and conducting
exercise together, local fire chiefs, police chiefs, sheriffs,
public health officials, emergency managers, and State and
Federal officials develop working relationships and are able
and ready to work together when an incident happens to handle
the situation specific to our region.
The NPGP proposal rejects the pragmatic regionalist
approach to disaster and emergency management in favor of a
State-wide managed, individualized, product-based approach,
like those characteristics of other block grant programs in
which local governments compete for resources. The critical key
to emergency management is cooperation, not competition. This
proposal fosters the inverse of a desired governmental result.
Local government understands the risks and vulnerabilities
of their areas with a greater degree of detail and granularity.
The State has a poor track record of working with or even
contacting local emergency managers. We simply cannot address
security risks from 30,000 feet.
Even worse, State control of this process would also
potentially serve to politicize the process of funding
allocations. Passing funding through State government will add
another level of bureaucracy and erase any gains in
governmental efficiency achieved by the consolidation.
The consolidation prescribed by the NPGP will not only
reduce the degree of specificity of emergency planning, but
will also likely result in funding cuts for emergency
management. This would mean halting the expansion of our
security infrastructure and even potentially rolling back some
of the systems and procedures we have already in place.
If we didn't have the sophisticated communication
capabilities enabled by our command center we would have fared
far worse during Hurricane Sandy. While we appreciate the fact
that FEMA made changes in its fiscal year 2015 budget proposal
in response to some of the concerns raised, this proposal still
contains several items of concern.
Specifically: No. 1, consolidating the various programs
into a State program in which State official make all of the
funding decisions raises concerns about the program's continued
ability to protect key infrastructure such as our ports and
transit and increase the capacity of first responders.
No. 2, the proposal would greatly broaden the definition of
``unit of local government,'' a definition which currently is
contained in numerous Federal statutes.
No. 3, while the proposal maintains the requirement that
States pass through 80 percent of the funding to locals, it
does not ensure that funds would be used to meet locally-
identified needs and priorities.
No. 4, the proposal appears to fold the UASI program into
the NPGP program. Although the FEMA administrator would
continue to designate UASI, the draft legislation does not
specify whether there will be a separate funding stream, what
role the States will play in the UASI funding decisions, and
how we can be assured that the capabilities that have been
developed through this critical program will be sustained and
increased.
No. 5, it would eliminate the 25 percent set-aside for law
enforcement terrorism prevention, which is alarming.
No. 6, it appears that the funds would not be used for fire
fighting even though it is a key element of any response to a
terrorist attack.
No. 7, the legislative proposal requires that all grant-
funded assets be Nationally-deployable through the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact. While we understand the
importance of sharing assets Nationally, some of those funds
through these programs, particularly those that protect
critical infrastructure, simply are not deployable.
No. 8, the proposal places a great deal of emphasis on the
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, THIRA.
Yet currently many local governments have been left out of that
process entirely.
As the committee considers the suite of homeland security
programs and possibly reforms to them, I urge you to increase,
not decrease, local involvement and flexibility. Local
officials know best the threats they face and they know best
the gaps that exist in community preparedness.
Thank you for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fulop follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Fulop
April 29, 2014
Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
committee, I am Steve Fulop, mayor of Jersey City, NJ. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you on the administration's National
Preparedness Grant Program proposal, because I have serious concerns
about it--concerns which are shared by my fellow mayors and other local
government officials, emergency managers, port operators, transit
officials, police chiefs, sheriffs, and the fire service.
We strongly support the existing menu of homeland security programs
because they are working. We recognize that they may not be perfect and
some changes may be needed, but they are the product of years of work
by Congress, the administration, State and local governments, and first
responders. The Federal grant funds which the Department of Homeland
Security and its Federal Emergency Management Administration have
provided clearly have improved the Nation's planning, mitigation,
preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. I am not
alone when I say that we have hit our stride with the grant
administrators in the Federal and State government.
jersey city
Jersey City is unique within our region and the Nation both for its
historical significance; having served as a gateway to immigrants, the
proximity of the Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island, and critical
infrastructure, represented by the Holland Tunnel, the Port Jersey,
Greenville Yards, and major rail and road networks.
As a result, Jersey City faces unique risks, both from the threat
of terrorism, as well as natural disasters. Jersey City's demands ought
not to be merely included within a State-wide funding structure. In a
phrase, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for emergency management
and mitigation within our State. Jersey City with its high population
density, reliance on public transit, and proximity to New York City,
requires a plan which is sensitive to our specialized needs and
cognizant of Jersey City's close interdependence with Newark, New York
City, and the Port Authority.
Emergency management and preparedness is, by nature, regional. The
current funding structure with its 13 independent grant programs, and
especially the UASI program, recognizes this operational necessity.
Currently, Jersey City, as one of the core cities of its UASI region,
is guaranteed $1.5 million dollars a year, with the option to apply for
additional funding. The Northern New Jersey Region receives $30 million
dollars which reflects the unique status of Jersey City and Newark are
the two largest cities in the State. Additionally, the 7 northern
counties form a cohort by which municipalities apply for security
grants.
The NPGP proposal offers no guarantee that this funds will
continue, and to scale back the regional emergency response
infrastructure that we have been building since 2002, would be to place
operational infrastructure, surety, and potentially constituents at
risk.
The synergies achieved from this regional approach aren't merely
financial. Our municipal emergency personnel has had ample
opportunities to communicate, plan, and train with other emergency
management agencies such as the port authority police, other fire and
police departments, hospital networks, and private utilities. These
organizations develop working relationships and experience cooperation
to handle the potential situations specific to our region.
The NPGP proposal rejects the pragmatic regionalist approach to
disaster and emergency management in favor of a State-wide managed
individualized project based approach like those characteristics of
other block grant programs in which local governments compete for
resources. The critical key to emergency management is cooperation, not
competition, this proposal fosters the inverse of a desired
Governmental result.
Local government understands the risks and vulnerabilities of their
areas with a greater degree of detail and granularity. It is unclear in
the proposal as to how local government officials will participate in
Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment process to address
local issues. The State has a poor track record of working with or even
contacting local emergency managers. We simply cannot address security
risks from 30,000 feet. Even worse, State control of this process would
also potentially serve to politicize the process of funding allocation.
For example, the distribution of Federal Sandy Relief Aid was arguably
not entirely based upon objective data, slow to be forthcoming,
unresponsive to homeowners and business. In a word, the distribution of
the aid was in and of itself a ``disaster'' of our own making.
Passing funding through State government will add another level of
bureaucracy, and erase any gains in governmental efficiency achieved by
the consolidation. Additionally, the State of New Jersey has a mixed
track record of balancing the concerns of rural and suburban
communities with those of urban areas, especially when it comes to
emergency preparedness. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Sandy, the changes to the State Construction Code required that all
structures within FEMA flood zones be elevated. While that applies
buildings in shore towns, there is no way to elevate the housing stock
in Jersey City. I fear that if this proposal is accepted, this trend
will continue to emergency funding.
The consolidation prescribed by the NPGP will not only reduce the
degree of specificity of emergency planning, but will also likely
result in funding cuts for emergency management. This would mean
halting the expansion of our security infrastructure, and even
potentially rolling back some of the systems and procedures we have
already in place. Our local Office of Emergency Management has a
$200,000-per-year maintenance budget which allows us to keep our
software and communications systems up-to-date. Without the current
level of funding we would be forced to dismantle some of our critical
systems, such as our waterfront security network, CCTV system, fiber
communication system, and retire our Fireboats, because we would have
the funds to maintain them.
There is no clearer testament to the effectiveness of the current
funding structure than our response to Hurricane Sandy. If we didn't
have the sophisticated commutations capability enabled by our command
center, we would have fared far worse during Hurricane Sandy. The
ability to coordinate between emergency responders, utilities workers,
community stakeholders, and the citizens seamlessly was integral to our
control of the situation.
the national preparedness grant program proposal
The National Preparedness Grant Program proposal would consolidate
the existing suite of homeland security grant programs into State-
administered block and competitive grant programs in which funding
decisions are based on State and multi-State threat assessments.
While we appreciate the fact that FEMA made changes in its fiscal
year 2015 budget proposal in response to some of the concerns raised by
the Conference of Mayors and other organizations and for the first time
provided draft legislative language. That proposal retains the
provision that 80 percent of the funds be provided to local agencies
and brings more transparency to the State decision-making process.
It still contains several items of concern, however. These include
collapsing all of the current programs into a consolidated program that
would no longer guarantee the retention of key programs, removal of the
25 percent set-aside for law enforcement terrorism prevention, and
radically changing the definition of local government to include port
and transit authorities and private organizations. Specifically:
1. Consolidating the various programs into a State program in which
State officials make all of the funding decisions raises
concerns about the programs' continued ability to protect key
infrastructure, such as ports and transit, and increase the
capacity of first responders, the vast majority of whom are at
the local level. In a word, filtering the funding through the
State government adds an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy,
because ultimately, those actually dealing with emergencies are
local.
2. The proposal would greatly broaden the definition of unit of
local government, a definition which currently is contained in
numerous Federal statutes. While the proposed change is written
in a way that would try to limit its application only to the
NPGP, it could set a dangerous precedent for other laws and
programs.
3. While the proposal maintains the requirement that States pass
through 80 percent of the funding to locals, it does not ensure
that funds would be used to meet locally-identified needs and
priorities. In the past many local governments have indicated
they have had little opportunity for input, and sometimes
little opportunity to consent to the State use of the funds in
their jurisdictions.
4. The proposal appears to fold the Urban Area Security Initiative
Program into the NPGP. Although the FEMA administrator would
continue to designate UASI's, the draft legislation does not
specify whether there will be a separate funding stream, what
role the States will play in UASI funding decisions, and how we
can be assured that the capabilities that have been developed
through this critical program will be sustained and increased.
5. It would eliminate the 25 percent set-aside for law enforcement
terrorism prevention, which is alarming given the fact that
local police departments and their officers have played a
crucial role in preventing acts of terrorism since
9/11 and this the only funding designated specifically for
prevention.
6. It appears that the funds could not be used for firefighting,
even though it is a key element of any response to a terrorist
attack. The draft authorizing legislation specifies that the
NPG would ``build and sustain core capabilities identified in
the National Preparedness Goal,'' but DHS does not identify
firefighting as one of its core capabilities.
7. The legislative proposal requires that ``all grant-funded assets
. . . be nationally deployable through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC).'' While we understand the importance
of sharing assets Nationally, some of those funded through
these programs, particularly those that protect critical
infrastructure, simply are not deployable.
8. The proposal places a great deal of emphasis on the Threat and
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). Yet
currently many local governments have been left out of that
process and when they are involved in the process there does
not appear to be a mechanism in place to resolved differences
between a local government and the State government.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors and other organizations which
represent local governments, first responders, and emergency managers
have urged FEMA and the administration to work with them and with the
Congress to develop program reforms which incorporate the successful
elements of past and current programs and identify new approaches which
can have broad support. They further urge that any reform proposals
protect certain key programs, including the Urban Area Security
Initiative and port and transit security grants, which provide targeted
funding to local areas like Jersey City, which contain critical
infrastructure considered to be at the highest risk.
Particularly important is the incentive they provide for Federal,
Tribal, State, and local jurisdictions to work together. By planning,
training, and conducting exercises together, local fire chiefs, police
chiefs, sheriffs, public health officials, emergency managers, and
State and Federal officials develop working relationships and are able
and ready to work together when an incident happens. As last year's
response in Boston to the Marathon Bombings showed, this pre-planning
and coordination prevents confusion, and saves lives. (sandy section)
principles for program improvement
Finally, the local government, emergency manager, and first
responder organizations have suggested to FEMA that as it works with
Congress and stakeholders to improve its programs, it use the following
set of core principles:
Increase Transparency.--It must be clear and understandable to the
Federal Government and the public how the States are distributing
funds, why they are making these decisions, and where the funds are
going.
Increase Local Involvement.--Local Government officials, including
emergency managers and emergency response officials, know best the
threats and vulnerabilities in their areas. The Threat Hazard
Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) process must include the input
of local elected and emergency response officials, and the Federal
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) must be able to audit States
by comparing local risk assessments to the State level THIRA. Further,
local governments should have the opportunity to challenge a State
THIRA that inadequately reflects their needs or input.
Provide Flexibility with Accountability.--Any changes to the
existing Federal grant programs should allow Federal funding to meet
individual local needs, and preparedness gaps as identified at the
local level. Effective but sometimes less politically popular programs,
like mitigation, must still receive funding.
Protect Local Funding.--Since event impact and response are
primarily local in nature, grant funding should support primarily local
prevention and preparedness efforts, as is the case under the current
program structure. It is important that the vast majority of Federal
homeland security grants continue to fund local prevention and response
activities, including local emergency managers and first responders,
and activities that support their preparedness efforts.
Sustain Terrorism Prevention.--The current emphasis on supporting
law enforcement's terrorism prevention activities must be maintained.
The Federal grant funds should not be used to support larger State
bureaucracies at the expense of operational counterterrorism
preparedness, threat analysis, and information-sharing activities.
Provide Incentives for Metropolitan Area Regionalization.--While
FEMA's proposal focuses on States and multi-State regions (similar to
the FEMA regions), the homeland security grants must also support
preparedness in metropolitan intra-State and inter-State regions, such
as the National Capital Region.
conclusion
As this committee considers the suite of homeland security grant
programs and possible reforms to them, I urge you to increase, not
decrease, local involvement and flexibility. Local officials know best
the threats they face, and they know best the gaps which exist in
community preparedness. The homeland security grant programs should
support primarily local prevention and preparedness efforts since
disaster impacts and response are local in nature.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on this
issue of vital importance to me, my city, and my region, and to all
local officials, emergency managers, port and transit operators, and
first responders across the Nation. We look forward to working with you
to ensure the transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness of homeland
security grants.
Mrs. Brooks. The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Riggs for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID TROY RIGGS, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Mr. Riggs. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, thank you
for allowing me to be here today and testify in regards to the
National Preparedness Grant. It is certainly an honor to be
here and it is also a privilege to represent our 3,200
employees within the Department of Public Safety in
Indianapolis, Indiana.
I will have to confess that it seems like a good ideal to
combine programs to increase efficiencies and effectiveness,
but I have to say that I do not believe this proposal does a
good job of meeting the local needs of the city of
Indianapolis.
On reflection, if you look at recent years we have lost
about $1.2 billion in funding through Urban Area Security
Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grants Program--
reduction, once again, of $1.2 billion. This fluctuation in
appropriations has negatively impacted Indianapolis and other
cities in recent years.
In 25 years of working in law enforcement and public safety
I don't think there was anything as profound as 9/11, and the
issues that we faced as a result, and the funding that came
because of those issues. Many projects were started using grant
funding from homeland security grants, which helped us to
advance operation and develop capabilities that we were never
able to do in the past.
In Indiana the funding granted enabled us to start up the
fusion center, enhance our bomb response capabilities, and
allow us to install a video camera system in downtown
Indianapolis that oversees major events, including the recent
Super Bowl. When the city lost UASI funding in 2011 and 2013 we
were left without the financial means to continue to support
many of these operations.
The loss of funding created a financial burden on the city
that was already experiencing hardships with the budget due to
the downturn in the economy. Locally, we could not sustain our
operations and we had to make some tough decisions to continue
some critical operations.
We also had to make some tough decisions on how we were
going to staff our Homeland Security Department and also our
Regional Operations Center. The camera system's maintenance
agreement and software renewal was in question for 2014 until
we heard about the USAI monies which would be freed up in 2014.
In addition, one of our concerns is this proposal mentions
that the State will review and approve proposed projects. Now,
while the city has a very good relationship with our State
friends and government, I can see a time where that could not
always be the case and has been in some other positions that I
have had.
For instance, one of our concerns at this point is that
there is $4.9 million that will go to the city, most likely--or
go to the State, most likely in 2014; $3.9 million goes to the
State to be distributed throughout local governments and be
utilized for themselves. Out of that $3.9 million in 2013, the
city of Indianapolis received $10,000.
For the $1 million UASI funds that we believe we will
receive in 2014, $200,000 of that will go to the State,
$100,000 will go to the fusion center, and one of our partners
has asked for $400,000 to expand their camera system. If that
is approved that means in 2014 the city of Indianapolis,
Indiana, the economic giant of Indiana and the Midwest, will
receive a little over $300,000 out of $4.9 million that is
appropriated, and we would ask for you to look into our
concerns.
Thank you for allowing me to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Riggs follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Troy Riggs
April 29, 2014
If you support the proposal why? We do not support the National
Preparedness Grants Program Proposal.
If you oppose the proposal why? While it seems like a good idea to
combine programs to increase efficiency and effectiveness, we are not
sure this proposal does a good job of meeting local needs. On
reflection, in recent years combined appropriations for UASI--Urban
Areas Security Initiative and SHSGP--State Homeland Security Grants
Program were proposed at $2,250,000,000; under the proposed
streamlining of the National grants, those appropriations would be
reduced to $1,043,200,000. A reduction of $1,206,800,000.
The fluctuation in appropriations has negatively impacted
Indianapolis in recent years as we have moved toward using sound
business practices in our planning and day-to-day operations.
Following 9/11, many projects were started using grant funding from
Homeland Security grants which helped us to advance current operations
and develop capabilities to help us better prepare for a response
incident. The funding granted enabled the start-up of the Fusion
Center, enhanced our bomb response capabilities, allowed us to install
a camera system throughout the city on critical infrastructure sites,
and paid for staff to monitor those cameras.
When the city lost UASI funding in 2011 and in 2013 due to our
THIRA ranking, we were left without the financial means to support
operations. The loss of funding created a financial burden on a city
that was already experiencing budget shortfalls due to a dwindling tax
base and a struggling economy. Locally, we just could not sustain our
operations and had to make some tough decisions in order to keep the
most critical operations active. We also had to make some tough
decisions regarding how we staffed our homeland security department and
regional operations center. The camera system's maintenance agreement
and software renewal was in question of happening in 2014 because of
funding uncertainties until YR2014 UASI monies were announced. We are
still pursuing other ways to sustain equipment purchased previously
with grant funds in case we lose funding again.
In addition, the proposal has added the language that the State
``will review and approve the proposed projects'' on page 34. While the
city has a good relationship with the State, one has to wonder how any
future political climate could affect critical projects the city needs
to complete if the State has to approve them. The proposal also seems
to give the State more control over local projects just based on the
required approval. This language is very similar to the previous grants
program but adds the approval from the State.
The Metropolitan Statistical Analysis explains how we are
evaluated. These new programs require us to manage the risk from
significant threat and hazards to physical and cyber critical
infrastructure utilizing an integrated approach across our diverse
community:
Identify, deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare for threats
and hazards to the National Critical Infrastructure;
Reduce vulnerabilities of critical assets, systems, and
networks; and
Mitigate the potential consequences to critical
infrastructure of incidents or adverse events that do occur.
The success of this required integrated approach depends on
leveraging the full spectrum of capabilities, expertise, and experience
across the critical infrastructure community and associate
stakeholders. However, when the city of Indianapolis goes one funded,
the next year unfunded, and the following year funded, truly makes it
difficult to create a solid business plan with goals and objectives.
The on and off years of funding limits our capability to Incorporate
Resilience into Critical Infrastructure Projects and execute a Critical
Infrastructure Risk Management Approach.
Currently we only have 12 sites within the National Infrastructure
Index within Indianapolis Urban Area. This does not include places like
Eli Lilly's, Roche, Morse Reservoir, and JW Marriott. A level 1 and 2
critical infrastructure sites is now being evaluated by the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center as part of the National
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program.
To be a level 1 Site, the infrastructure has to meet at least two
of the four:
Greater than 5,000 prompt fatalities,
Greater than $75 billion in first-year economic
consequences,
Mass Evacuations with prolonged absence of greater than 3
months,
Severe degradation of the Nation's National security
capabilities.
To meet level 2 criteria must meet 2 of the 4:
Greater than 2,500 prompt fatalities,
Greater than $25 billion in first-year economic
consequences,
Mass Evacuations with prolonged absence of greater than 1
months,
Severe degradation of the Nation's National security
capabilities.
Level 2 Catastrophic Economic Impact criteria allows Indianapolis
to nominate infrastructure that, if disrupted, could result in greater
than $50 billion in first-year economic impacts. The convention
business is not currently under this criterion as we don't know the
first-year impact and would it meet the $50-billion-dollar impact.
What alternative reforms, if any would you suggest? We would
recommend more funding and the deletion of the approval from the State.
Their review of the plan should be sufficient. In addition, it would be
more efficient to award directly to the High-Risk areas instead of
having the State add a level of bureaucracy to the process. It also
delays funding being made available to Jurisdictions quickly. Our State
tends to utilize funds equally throughout the State, without
consideration to threat, risk, and vuinerabiiity, so, having all funds
in one will create less opportunities for Urban Areas for funding
prevention, investigation, and mitigation.
A recommended change would be to have UASI setup similar to how
Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces are funded. Having the funds go
through the State creates levels of bureaucracy. It also means the
urban will not get the full funding allocated. The State takes 20% and
takes additional funds for the Fusion Center, versus using State
Homeland Security Grant Funds.
Are there any reforms that could be made to the current grants
structure that would make it more efficient and better able to meet
your needs? The current system seems to work well. However, it would be
more efficient to award directly to the High-Risk Areas. This would
eliminate a level of bureaucracy and would get funding to the local
jurisdictions faster.
The THIRA process needs to be improved. UASI funding is
disproportionate throughout the United States based on rankings based
on one report. There are some cities that rank higher than Indy and we
just have to wonder whether or not the THIRA really assesses our threat
level accurately. For example, Pittsburgh and Kansas City were ranked
higher than Indy.
I am also interested in your perspective on how the Threat and
Hazard identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Capability
Estimation processes are working. Have the addition of these
requirements helped you to better address your security needs?
Integrated Picture of Risk. Risk management is one of the most
underappreciated aspects of preparedness, but could be one of the most
important. This is not specific to Indianapolis, but Nation-wide.
Threats cannot be isolated into singular events. Rather, the full range
of threats and hazards must be considered particularly how they relate
to resource allocation, gap assessment, and planning. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has enhanced the efforts to address
risk through the Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
(THIRA) process. Local officials can not only participate in the larger
THIRA process, but smaller-scale efforts could be utilized to assess
and add more emphasis on special events, along with short- and long-
term economic effects of an attack to natural disaster to the entire
region.
Local officials understand the risk picture, but the THIRA only
attaches risk to specific events. While the THIRA can aid in assessing
risk locally, such a process cannot be the sole prism through which
risk is viewed. The vision must be broad and integrated so as to
consider the full range of threats and hazards beyond singular events.
This issue expands beyond event-specific challenges as well.
Indianapolis is known as the No. 1 conference city in the United
States. We must consider the amount of revenue and job creation the
region receives, what would be the long-term impact and recovery after
an attack. How many conventions would consider changing locations? If
conventions moved then how many jobs would that impact? We could
possibly see a downturn that would not only affect the city, but also
the entire region. Indianapolis has a lot of commuters that live in
surrounding counties; if we seen a downturn and companies/hotels/
restaurants closed, we then would start to see vacant housing the
entire 9-county region.
Local police departments and their officers have played a crucial
role in preventing acts of terrorism since 9/11. State and local police
departments have been able to build and maintain capabilities through
the 25% set-aside for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.
However, the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) proposal would
eliminate this 25% set-aside. How would this impact public safety in
your jurisdiction? The deletion of the 25 percent required law
enforcement takes away for prevention and investigation requirements
and first responders become responders only with very little funding
for prevention initiatives and training.
According to NPGP documents and in FEMA response to Ranking Members
Payne and my letter, the dedicated investment jurisdiction for the
sustainment of fusion centers will be a policy decision left to the
discretion of the Secretary. As we have seen in recent events and
especially in the Boston Marathon bombing there is a lack of
intelligence and information sharing between Federal law enforcement
agencies and States and locals. I have visited my State's fusion center
and have seen how these centers can play a role in mitigating this gap.
Can you please how explain how you utilize your State's fusion center?
We, Indianapolis-Marion County provide the most support with Intel
Operators (1-IMPD-Indianpolis Metropolitan Police Department, 1-IFD-
Indianapolis Fire Department, 2-MCSO-Marion County Sheriff's Office).
We are also the highest users of the fusion center for day-to-day
criminal investigative work. District officers and detectives call upon
the fusion center several times a week for CLEAR Reports, BMV pictures
and reports, other State and Federal database request.
As part of the MET table-top exercise, I attached the summary that
the Naval Postgraduate School put together. Within the document it
talks about the fusion center being robust and supportive of
information sharing. However, it also identified questions among
multiple agencies who participated on the information sharing with the
FBI JTTF. The fusion center also provides us with a private-sector
liaison that works to share information and gain intelligence or
information. This has shown to be success during the last table-top
with the Naval Postgraduate School and the Joint Counter Terrorism
Awareness Table top completed in 2011.
The Fusion Center also provides us direct access with a U.S. DHS
Intel Officer that we work with weekly. The Intel Officer provides bi-
weekly secure briefings as part of the National information-sharing and
terrorist screening center reports for Indiana.
FOLLOW-UP: You have expressed how critical your State's center is
to the State and local law enforcement officials, if the dedicated
investment jurisdiction was eliminated, would the State be able to
maintain the center and if not, how would this affect your operations?
This question would be hard to answer as we don't know if the State
would maintain funding for the fusion center.
Thank you for the opportunity to share testimony on the proposed
National Preparedness Grants Program and we look forward to working
with you to ensure all localities will be able to continue to enhance
the safety and security and quality of life for residents and guests
alike. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you should require
further information.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Riggs.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Chief Metcalf for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. METCALF, EFO, CFI, FIFIREE, FIRE CHIEF,
NORTH COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE
CHIEFS
Chief Metcalf. Good morning, Chairman Brooks, and Ranking
Member Payne, and Members of the committee. I am Chief Bill
Metcalf from the North County Fire Protection District, located
in the San Diego suburb of Fallbrook, California, and today I
am representing the International Association of Fire Chiefs as
its president and chairman of the board. I thank the committee
for the opportunity to testify today.
The IAFC is committed to ensuring that America's first
responders have the necessary equipment, staffing, and training
to protect our communities. In any discussion of grant reform,
local first responders must be an equal participant with the
States in identifying threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. We
also must have an equal voice in allocating resources to
address them.
This year FEMA has again included a proposal to consolidate
the 16 homeland security preparedness grants into one program,
and the IAFC continues to have serious concerns with the
revised NPG proposal. We commend the subcommittee for
consulting with all stakeholders in this discussion about grant
reform and we thank Congress for not implementing past versions
of the plan.
The homeland security grant programs were created by
Congress to fill the gaps in our National preparedness system
that were exposed by the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. In past years,
resources developed with homeland security grants have been
used to respond to incidents as varied as last year's Boston
Marathon bombing, active-shooter incidents, and natural
disasters.
In my own agency we have used State homeland security
grants and UASI funds to improve communications
interoperability, improve fire station security, and train our
leadership to manage large-scale and complex incidents. The
success of FEMA's grants is that they provide an incentive for
local fire chiefs, law enforcement officials, emergency
managers, public health officials, State and Federal officials,
and other stakeholders to plan, train, and conduct exercises
together.
In April 2012, Chief Hank Clemmensen, my predecessor as
IAFC president, laid out seven principles for an effective
homeland security grant program. Those principles included
concepts such as sustainment of existing capabilities,
transparency, and local engagement. Using these criteria, the
new NPG proposal continues to have major problems.
For example, the IAFC is concerned that the NPG relies on
THIRAs to identify threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. In
addition, the NPG will use THIRA results to allocate funding.
However, throughout the Nation, local involvement in State
THIRAs is extremely uneven. In my case in California I can tell
you that local fire chiefs were not involved in the creation--
or have not been involved in the creation of the State's THIRA.
We also are concerned by the NPG's State-centric focus in
many regions. Preparedness depends on a multi-State
disciplinary approach. The National capital region is a good
example of this approach, and the NPG's State-centric approach
could build barriers to cooperation in multi-State regions.
The NPG is aimed at building and sustaining core
capabilities defined by the National Preparedness Goal. The
IAFC would like to see fire-fighting spelled out as a specific
core capability.
Overseas terrorists have used fires to sow confusion and
draw media attention and there is evidence that al-Qaeda's
adherents are looking to use fire as a weapon in the United
States. Fire-fighting must be recognized as a core capability
at the beginning of any response to an act of terrorism.
Additionally, the IAFC is concerned how the NPG will deal
with cities that are part of the UASI program. FEMA indicated
that there will be a process to sustain capabilities in UASI
cities. However, this process is not described in FEMA's draft
authorizing legislation for the NPG.
We are also concerned about the elimination of the 25
percent set-aside for law enforcement terrorism prevention
program. This funding acts as an incentive for law enforcement
agencies to adopt NIMS and engage in multi-disciplinary
planning and exercises.
In addition, we are concerned by FEMA's proposal to expand
the definition of ``local unit of government'' to include non-
Governmental and potentially not-for-profit entities. This
proposal would create a dangerous precedent in law for
expanding the definition of local government.
Finally, the IAFC is concerned that FEMA's fiscal year 2015
budget proposal would cut funding for homeland security
preparedness grants by approximately 18 percent. In light of
the continued terrorist threat, we ask Congress to sustain the
fiscal year 2014 funding levels for these programs.
Instead of the NPG program, simpler measures could be taken
to improve the effectiveness of DHS grant programs. For
example, FEMA could develop a system to allow grant recipients
to share information about successful uses of grant funds to
build and sustain capabilities. This proposal would allow
grantees to learn from each other and allocate resources more
effectively.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the importance of
assuring that local, State, and Federal partners are all equal
participants in the National preparedness system. From the
perspective of a local fire chief, both staffing and equipment
are locally owned. Local fire chiefs need to be involved in the
THIRA process.
On behalf of America's fire and EMS chiefs I would like to
thank you for holding today's hearing. As Congress considers
the issue of grant reform, we look forward to working with you,
FEMA, and other stakeholders to better protect our communities,
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Chief Metcalf follows:]
Prepared Statement of William R. Metcalf
April 29, 2014
Good morning, Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of
the subcommittee. My name is William R. Metcalf, EFO, CFO, FIFireE,
chief of the North County Fire Protection District, located in
Fallbrook, California. Today, I am representing the International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) as its president and chairman of the
board. I would like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to
represent the views of local firefighters and EMS responders in the
discussion about the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
National Preparedness Grant (NPG) Program proposal.
The IAFC is committed to ensuring that America's first responders
have the necessary equipment, staffing, and training to protect their
communities. In any discussion about grant reform, local first
responders must be an equal participant with the States in determining
threats, risks, and vulnerabilities and in allocating resources to
address them.
We remain greatly concerned by the NPG proposal. Twice previously,
FEMA has proposed the consolidation of the 16 homeland security grants.
The IAFC and other groups representing the fire and emergency service,
law enforcement, local governments, and other stakeholders have
expressed concern with this State-centric approach. The IAFC commends
Congress for asking FEMA for more details and not implementing past
versions of this proposal.
This year, FEMA submitted authorizing language with its new version
of the NPG proposal. While this proposal includes more details, we
continue to have serious concerns about the NPG proposal. The IAFC
believes that any successful grant reform proposal must treat Federal,
State, and local stakeholders equally in determining risks and threats
and in allocating resources and funding to meet these risks.
The homeland security grant programs were created by Congress to
help fill gaps in our National preparedness system as identified by the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina. Events
over the past years, including the Boston Marathon bombing last year,
the deadly 2011 tornadoes in Alabama and Missouri and the January 2011
active-shooter incident in Tucson, Arizona, all have demonstrated how
FEMA's homeland security grant programs have improved our Nation's
preparedness.
My agency is located immediately adjacent to Marine Corps Base Camp
Pendleton, and it responded to the massive fires in southern California
in 2003 and 2007. Using the State Homeland Security Grant Program and
the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), we were able to improve
regional radio interoperability and develop resilient internal
communications, improve the security of our fire stations and train our
chiefs and company officers to lead in large-scale and complex
incidents.
The success of the FEMA homeland security grants is that they
provide an incentive for local fire chiefs, emergency managers, police
chiefs, public health officials, and State and Federal officials to
plan, train, and exercise together. This preplanning and coordination
prevents confusion and saves lives during an incident.
concerns with the national preparedness grant program
In April 2012, Chief Hank Clemmensen, my predecessor as IAFC
president, testified before this committee. He laid out seven
principles for an effective homeland security grant program. These
principles included concepts like sustainment of existing capabilities,
transparency, and local engagement. Using this criteria, the new FEMA
proposal continues to have serious problems.
One of our greatest concerns is that the NPG still continues to
rely on the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
(THIRA) to identify risk, threats, and vulnerabilities and to allocate
funding. Throughout the Nation, local involvement in the State THIRAs
is sporadic. For example, I have not been involved or consulted in the
California THIRA. Local officials and first responders best know the
emergency response capabilities and risks to their communities. THIRAs
will continue to be flawed without active local involvement.
In addition, we remain concerned that the NPG program focuses on
increasing the State administration of the FEMA grants. In many urban
areas, the preparedness system relies upon a multi-State, multi-
disciplinary approach. By focusing on a State-based system, the NPG
creates stovepipes where current cooperation exists. In the Washington,
DC, area, the National Capital Region incorporates the city of
Washington and the States of Maryland and Virginia. While the proposal
would create links between the Urban Area Working Groups and the State
Administrative Agencies, we are concerned that the NPG's State-centric
approach will build barriers between multi-State regions.
Additionally, the IAFC is concerned about the capabilities of the
UASI cities that have been developed over the years. The administration
has indicated that there will be a process to allocate sustainment
funding to existing UASIs. However, this process is not described in
the authorizing legislation that accompanied the fiscal year 2015
budget request. We are concerned by FEMA's proposal to eliminate the
existing legislative language authorizing UASI funding without having
clear language that will replace it.
The NPG proposal is designed to build and sustain the core
capabilities defined by the National Preparedness Goal. However, the
IAFC remains concerned that fire fighting is not specifically listed as
a core capability in the National Preparedness Goal. Other missions of
the fire service are covered, including emergency medical response,
hazardous materials response, and building code enforcement. However,
terrorists deliberately used fire as a weapon during the 2008 Mumbai
incident and the 2012 incident in Benghazi to cut access and draw media
attention. In addition, the Al-Qaeda magazine, Inspire, urged its
followers to use wildfire as a weapon here in the United States to
cause damage and spread fear. Fire fighting will remain a core
capability in an effective National response system and must be
recognized as such.
The IAFC also is concerned by the elimination of the 25 percent
set-aside for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.
Currently, FEMA's homeland security grants support intelligence fusion
centers and information sharing between Federal, State, and local
officials. Federal funding acts as an incentive for local law
enforcement to share information and coordinate activities with local
fire and EMS departments. In addition, this Federal funding
incentivizes law enforcement agencies to adopt the National Incident
Management System and engage in multidisciplinary planning and
exercises.
One problem with the proposed authorizing language is that it would
expand the definition of ``local unit of government'' to include
nongovernmental organizations and potentially for-profit entities. FEMA
was forced to expand this definition, as it consolidated grants for
port authorities, nonprofit organizations, and transit agencies into
the NPG. However, we think that it creates a dangerous precedent to
redefine local governments to include nongovernmental and for-profit
organizations.
The IAFC also is concerned by FEMA's proposal to cut funding for
the homeland security grant programs. For fiscal year 2014, Congress
appropriated $1.266 billion for the homeland security grants. FEMA
proposes $1.043 billion for fiscal year 2015. This would result in an
approximately 18 percent reduction to homeland security grant funds. In
light of the continued terrorist threat to the United States, the IAFC
recommends that Congress continue to sustain the fiscal year 2014
funding levels for the FEMA's homeland security preparedness grants.
ideas for improvement of the existing grants
Taxpayer funds should be used effectively to improve National
emergency preparedness. There are administrative changes to the current
grants that FEMA can implement. For example, as Chief James Schwartz,
the chair of the IAFC's Terrorism and Homeland Security Committee,
testified last year, FEMA could develop a system for grant recipients
to share information about the successful uses of grant funds to
develop capabilities. Then, instead of having to reinvent the wheel
across the Nation, local jurisdictions could learn from each other's
projects to allocate their resources more effectively.
Also, it is important that local stakeholders be treated as equal
partners in determining threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and
capabilities. From a fire and emergency service perspective, all of the
resources--both equipment and personnel--are owned by local
jurisdictions. Local fire chiefs must be involved in the THIRA process.
The IAFC welcomes language in the latest THIRA Guide (Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 201), which urges State emergency managers to use a
whole-communities approach to complete their THIRAs by consulting local
fire, EMS, law enforcement, and public health departments.
Unfortunately, there still is a mixed record on local involvement in
the THIRAs.
conclusion
On behalf of the leadership of America's fire and EMS departments,
I would like to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify
at today's hearing. While we think it is good that FEMA has released
more information about this year's NPG proposal, it continues to have
many of the problems that we have identified in the past. As Congress
considers the issue of grant reform, we encourage you to consider
directing FEMA to work with all State and local stakeholders to develop
a detailed plan. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Chief Metcalf.
Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Parsons for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RANDY PARSONS, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, PORT OF LONG
BEACH, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT
AUTHORITIES
Mr. Parsons. Good morning. Thank you for inviting me as a
witness on behalf of the American Association of Port
Authorities, an alliance of the leading public ports in the
Western Hemisphere.
I am Randy Parsons, director of security for the Port of
Long Beach, where I oversee the security division for the
Nation's second-busiest container seaport. I also serve as a
co-chair of AAPA's Port Security Caucus, which crafts
recommendations on U.S. Government policy related to security
for the association's leadership.
Today I am here to discuss thoughts on the administration's
National Preparedness Grant Program proposal. AAPA and its
staff members have been engaged in discussions with the
administration and FEMA on this proposal for the last few years
and we are interested in further discussions to properly
address our concerns.
Our fundamental philosophical difference with the
administration is over who should be in control of the Port
Security Grant Program. In the proposal the administration
calls for funding to be determined at the State level,
consolidated with other homeland security grants. We strongly
believe the Port Security Grant Program should be maintained at
the Federal level.
In the past, the Port Security Grant Program has
distributed funds through a fiduciary agent that then funded
sub-grantee projects. FEMA abandoned this model and moved to
direct grants in order to speed up the draw-down of funds and
get projects done more quickly. This change was also made in
response to extreme displeasure from Congress over the slow
spending of funds. Why would we return to a discarded model?
Since 9/11 a key component of our Nation's effort to harden
the security of seaports has been the Port Security Grant
Program, currently managed by FEMA. These funds have helped
port facilities and regional agency partners to procure
vessels, vehicles; install detection systems such as cameras
and sensors; provide equipment, operations, and sustainment for
the systems recently installed.
At the Port of Long Beach we spent more than $280 million
to upgrade our security infrastructure, over $98 million of
which was provided by the Port Security Grant Program. The
Maritime Transportation Security Act and the subsequent SAFE
Port Act also carefully laid out a system to identify risks and
fund projects accordingly, with both National and local input.
FEMA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the National intelligence
community determined which ports should be in each risk
category.
State officials are invited to sit on these local area
committees and often do, but the responsibility to determine
who gets a grant resides with the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security. This is where we believe the authority
should continue to reside--at a Federal level, where the expert
knowledge of the risk environment and mitigation strategies
exists.
Seaports are international borders. Seaports must comply
with numerous Federal regulations, including those instituted
by TSA, CBP, the Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. Often States are not aware of these requirements and may
not have the expertise to determine maritime risks and
mitigation strategies to these international seaport borders.
If ports are lumped into the larger homeland security
equation, efforts to date will be marginalized and the focus on
ports will be lost. The separation of the grant funding served
to highlight the need to focus on the component of the Nation's
critical infrastructure and international border that was
largely ignored prior to
9/11.
Additionally, the proposal calls for decreases to overall
funding. Currently, the Port Security Grants are funded at 25
percent of their authorized level of $400 million. We would
hate to see a continued degradation of these efforts as a
result of additional grant funding restrictions.
We ask that as you assess this proposal, the Port Security
Grant Program be excluded from this consolidation and merger.
Due to limited time, I want to highlight additional
recommended program improvements that we strongly urge the
committee to consider, that include: Keep the funding separate
at the Federal level, similar to Firefighter Assistance Grants;
restore the port security funding to a healthier level--$100
million barely allows us to sustain what we have; the return of
the term of grant performance to a 3-year performance period
with extensions allowable to a maximum of 5 years--the current
grant term of 2 years is unworkable; provide a uniform cost-
share waiver of past grant funds and consider waiving the cost-
share overall.
Thank you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parsons follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randy Parsons
April 29, 2014
Thank you for inviting me as a witness on behalf of the American
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). AAPA is an alliance of the
leading public ports in the Western Hemisphere and our testimony today
reflects the views of our U.S. members. I am Randy Parsons, director of
security for the Port of Long Beach, in California, where I head up the
Security Division for the Nation's second-busiest seaport. I also serve
as the co-chair of the AAPA's Port Security Caucus which crafts
recommendations on U.S. Government policy related to security for the
Association's leadership.
Today, we are here to discuss AAPA's thoughts on the
administration's National Preparedness Grant Program proposal. As you
well know, this proposal was made several years ago, but just recently
the administration sent over an authorization bill to outline
specifically how the various programs would be changed and outline in
more detail how the new program would work. AAPA has been engaged in
discussions with FEMA over the last few years and our concerns still
have not been properly addressed in the proposal.
AAPA has a fundamental philosophical difference with the
administration over who should be in control of the Port Security Grant
Program. The administration in its National Preparedness Grant Program
calls for funding for the program to be determined at the State level,
along with other homeland security grants. AAPA strongly believes that
the Port Security Grant Program should be maintained at the Federal
level. In short, moving Port Security Grants to the State level is a
bad idea and is likely to result in a significant decrease in security
funds going to seaports, and ultimately putting our Nation at greater
risk.
In the decade since 9/11, a key component of our Nation's effort to
harden the security of seaports has been the Port Security Grant
Program, currently managed by FEMA. Port Security Grant funds have
helped port facilities and port areas to strengthen facility security
and work in partnership with other agencies to enhance the security of
the region. Port Security Grant funding has been used to procure
equipment such as vessels and vehicles, install detection systems such
as cameras and sensors, and provide equipment maintenance for the
systems recently installed.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed soon after 9/11,
and the subsequent SAFE Port Act carefully laid out a system to
identify risks and fund projects accordingly, with both National and
local input. FEMA, with input from the U.S. Coast Guard and National
intelligence information determines which ports should be in each risk
category and the local area committees develop plans to decrease these
risks. State officials are invited to sit on these local area
committees, but the responsibility to determine who gets a grant
resides with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
based on evaluation from the local and National U.S. Coast Guard
offices, FEMA, and other Federal partners. This is where AAPA believes
the authority to determine grants should continue to reside--at the
Federal level, where the expertise exists.
In order to continue to be effective, the grant process must evolve
in conjunction with port needs and vulnerabilities. Working with DHS,
efforts have been made to keep pace with this evolution. We fear that
if ports are ``lumped'' into the larger Homeland Security equation,
efforts to date will be marginalized and the focus on ports will be
lost. The separation of Port Security Grant funding served to highlight
the need to focus on a component of the Nation's critical
infrastructure and international border that was largely ignored prior
to the tragic events on 9/11. We have a significant fear that this
focus will be lost if the Port Security Grant Program does not remain
separate and fails to continue to evolve to meet emerging security
needs.
Seaports are international borders and must comply with numerous
Federal regulations including those instituted by TSA, Customs and
Border Protection, the Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. The Port Security Grants are often used to help facilities
address these Federal mandates. Often States are not even aware of
these requirements and do not have the expertise to determine risks to
these international seaport borders. AAPA strongly believes that the
responsibility for the grants should stay at the Federal level, since
border security (land, air, and maritime) is a National, not a State,
responsibility.
There are other concerns about this proposal. It expands the grants
to all hazards, cuts overall funding, and is likely to return to a
slower draw-down in funds. With the expansion of the grants to all
hazards, it is likely that far more projects will be eligible. We are
concerned that National disasters preparation and response would be a
high priority for certain States, resulting in even less for port
security. Additionally, the proposal calls for a significant decrease
in funding overall. Currently, Port Security Grants are only funded at
25 percent of the authorized level of $400 million. Merging the program
into other homeland security grants is likely to result in even more of
a decrease.
AAPA has fought hard to ensure the program makes all seaports that
serve as international borders eligible for the program. FEMA has
provided grants to seaports at all levels in order to ensure that we do
not have a soft underbelly of underprotected ports. We must not allow
for a weak spot that terrorists can capitalize on. There is no mandate
in the administration's proposal requiring States even to fund port
security and it is likely to result in some ports not getting funding
for needed projects.
The National Preparedness Grant Program proposal calls for all
funds to be distributed through the States, a model that resulted in
significant slow-down in fund use in the past. At one point the Port
Security Grant Program distributed the funds through a fiduciary agent
that then funded subgrantee projects. But, FEMA recently abandoned this
model and moved to direct grants in order to speed up the drawdown of
funds and get projects done more quickly. This change was made in
response to extreme displeasure by Congress over the slow spending of
funds. So, why return to this broken model?
Ports are already struggling to maintain their capabilities, much
less meet new and emerging concerns in such areas as infrastructure
protection, continuity of services such as power and water, protection
of our information technology capabilities, and response to the ever-
growing cyber threat. In a constantly-changing threat environment, any
further decrease in funding will make it difficult to maintain current
capabilities. At many ports, Port Security Grant funding has been a
critical component in their efforts to build a resilient port, and we
would hate to see a degradation of these efforts as a result of grant
funding reductions. Additionally, the proposed legislation highlights
the importance of core capabilities and the need to share capabilities
and drive funding to these capabilities. When States developed core
capabilities, however, they did not incorporate port needs and it is
unclear how the needs would be addressed in the future. It is,
therefore, unlikely that port needs would be funded properly.
While there might be good reason to merge other homeland security
grants, AAPA strongly believes that the Port Security Grant Program
should be maintained at the Federal level. That is where the expertise
resides and it corresponds to the Federal responsibility to control and
protect our international borders. Should you move this legislation, we
urge you to exclude the Port Security Grant Program from this
consolidation and merger.
Due to limited time, I have not included some needed improvements
to the program but include them in the recommendations below. In
conclusion, we strongly urge the committee to:
1. Keep the funding separate and at the Federal level, similar to
Firefighter Assistance Grants;
2. Restore port security funding to a healthier level; $100 million
barely allows us to maintain what we have;
3. Return the term of grant performance to 3 years with an
extension allowed to 5. The current grant term of 2 years is
unworkable;
4. Provide a uniform cost-share waiver of past grant funds; and
consider waiving the cost-share overall.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you very much.
We will now begin the questioning, and I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
This actually is for each of you. FEMA has shared with us
in their response, which we received Friday, a fairly lengthy
list indicating that they had conducted significant stakeholder
outreach in the development of this proposal, and I am curious
whether or not--beginning in 2013 through 2014--and I am
curious whether or not you personally or your organization that
you represent had an opportunity to share your thoughts on the
consolidation proposal with FEMA, and if you were consulted,
whether or not any of your recommendations were incorporated.
Ms. Eide, I don't know if you would like to begin?
Ms. Eide. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
FEMA did outreach to both the Governors Homeland Security
Advisory Council and to the National Emergency Management
Agency, and I was personally involved in several of these, both
face-to-face and webinars, teleconferences. We continue to
evaluate the NPGP proposal.
My colleagues across the State have been very vocal about
some changes to the management administrative costs of--from
current level of 5 percent to 3 percent. FEMA is taking that
back and going to be looking at the issue of that decrease in
the M&A costs.
Some of the other things that we have talked about--excuse
me--has been the governance structure, and I think that the
NPGP proposal can only be successful with a good governance
structure at the State level, which is inclusive of the current
grant program representatives. The FOA has included the members
that should be on a senior advisory committee at the State and
we continue to work with FEMA on some of those issues that we
have had concerns with.
Thank you.
Mrs. Brooks. Don't know, Chief Metcalf, as president of
your organization, were you involved personally and were any of
the recommendations you made included?
Chief Metcalf. Thank you.
I have been involved in a number of those meetings
personally, and our staff was also engaged in a number of
meetings with FEMA. I think it is fair to say that most of
those interactions were one-way, and in our attempts to better
understand the proposal, in many cases we were seeking
additional detail, additional clarification of what was going
to be contained in the proposal, and as you are aware, we have
only just received some of that additional clarification here
very recently.
In the absence of not really understanding the details of
the proposal we were hard-pressed to provide specific
suggestions, so we have not seen any of our concerns addressed
in the proposals--the iterations of the proposal to date.
Mrs. Brooks. So is it fair to say the International
Association of Fire Chiefs is continuing to make suggestions to
FEMA or is beginning to?
Chief Metcalf. We are glad to take every opportunity to
provide suggestions, yes.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Mayor Fulop, wondered whether or not the mayors have been
involved, or if you have been?
Mr. Fulop. I can't speak on behalf of all mayors. My
administration transitioned in in 2013. In the last year, to
the best of my knowledge, the answer has been ``no'' to your
question as far as outreach.
Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Riggs.
Mr. Riggs. I have not personally met but we have a chief
that is over homeland security that meets with them quite
regularly, brought up a lot of our concerns regarding local
issues, didn't see a lot of movement there. But he has been in
contact with them.
Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Parsons, on behalf of ports.
Mr. Parsons. We have received numerous e-mails from AAPA
that shows they are engaged at the National level. At the local
level we did receive a notice of the proposal that, as the
chief said, it was a fairly generic description. We
participated in a conference call with FEMA, and additionally,
we have reached out as a local port. I have made two trips back
to speak with our representatives personally and the FEMA
representatives that service our area.
We have not had any movement on the proposal positions that
we have seen here.
One comment I would like to make is the FEMA staff that we
have interacted with with grant applications, guidance,
direction, and extensions have been extremely helpful and
educational in providing guidance. In this arena it has taken
on a generic level. We haven't received information that we
feel we are capable of making detailed, informed decisions
other than some of the issues we have talked about here this
morning.
Mrs. Brooks. Well, I am pleased to hear that the staff has
been so helpful if you don't understand what you are required
to submit in those grant applications, so that is good.
My time is up.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mayor Fulop, in your testimony you expressed concern that
the proposed National Preparedness Grant would consolidate
decision-making for homeland security investments at the State
level. Now, I have raised similar concerns, particularly given,
you know, how certain Federal Sandy recovery funds were
administered by the State.
Can you speak in more detail about your concerns related to
how the homeland security grant funds would be invested if
investment decisions were ultimately made by the State?
Mr. Fulop. Well, to expand on that, I think that it has
been well documented in most of the New Jersey newspapers and
publications about concerns over how these Sandy dollars have
been administered and to what municipalities and the timeliness
of that administration. The concern that we expressed here is
when we are dealing with something as critical as
infrastructure and homeland security, that local municipalities
often know best and that flexibility and speed is critical, and
so we expressed concerns via the proposal here that that would
have an impediment on that process. I think that Sandy is a
good example of that.
Mr. Payne. You know, also, following up on that, why is it
important that local governments and first responders continue
to have a strong voice in how those security dollars are
invested?
Mr. Fulop. Yes. I would just reiterate that we collectively
are closest to the needs of the constituents and the
infrastructure needs. That is not to say that the States are
not aware, but I think that the speed and access at the local
level is critical.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. You know, as you have mentioned, you
know, we have had a very interesting situation in New Jersey in
reference to how these dollars have been allocated so, you
know, we have a clear example of what the concerns are if it
comes down from the State as opposed to the local levels. Our
UASI grants in our area regionally have been very successful,
and the municipalities of Newark and Jersey City have worked
well in that area. So thank you for those answers.
Along those lines, Ms. Eide, how do you respond to those
who share concerns I have about the States being the final
arbiter of the homeland security grant investments?
Ms. Eide. Congressman Payne, I certainly understand the
concern of our local units of government and I would, again,
get back to the governance structure that is set up at the
State level, and the inclusion of current grant program
representatives in addition to the different disciplines that
are part of any senior advisory committee. In Minnesota we have
a senior advisory committee that includes members from our UASI
area, it includes members from our area maritime security
committees, it includes members from our transit working
groups, and it includes local emergency management, fire, law
enforcement.
We, as a committee, review the grant applications from
local governments. We actually require THIRA at the local
levels. We also have six homeland security and emergency
management regions within our State that have a regional THIRA
and then we roll it up into a State-wide THIRA.
We look at those. We look at the priorities of our
communities, both urban and rural, and we make our funding
decisions as a collective group. I think through the
flexibility of a program such as the NPGP, a governance
structure really is the key to making sure that we own our
preparedness programs from local level up to the State.
Mr. Payne. So you feel to this point that the program has
not worked effectively based on how it is structured now?
Ms. Eide. That is correct. I think there is the opportunity
for disparate organizations to be able to work within their
silos in the way that it is now. If we were to have a
consolidated grant program with this flexibility built into it
based on local THIRAs, based on a good governance structure,
that it will eliminate a lot of the stovepipes that we have
been seeing.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Very quickly, Mr. Riggs, you know, I believe in your
testimony you mentioned or intimated that you had concerns of
potential relationships between local and States have sometimes
not necessarily being on the same page or used in a manner
which would not be conducive to affording your municipality its
allocation properly.
Mr. Riggs. Yes, sir. That is correct.
I will say that every State is different in many ways and
responsibilities for initial emergencies are handled
differently in different States. I have worked in three
different States now. I can tell you in Indianapolis we do work
closely with the State with our fusion center, but at the end
of the day, my interpretation of homeland security grants and
UASI and all these different grants we talk about were for a
major metropolitan area that had the most critical
infrastructure needs and the most difficult financial needs
that could actually hurt our economy.
Generally, when we see so much money going to the State and
going to rural areas--which we are not saying there is not a
threat there--but when we have 1.7 million people in our
geographical area and we respond outside of our city we think
that it makes a lot more sense to target those major cities
that have seen the brunt of terrorism and be prepared not just
for traditional measures but also for nontraditionals like
cyber crime.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now will recognize other Members of the
subcommittee for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses.
In accordance with committee rules and practice I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority in the subcommittee, and those coming in later
will be recognized in the order of their arrival.
At this time I will recognize the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ladies and gentlemen, thanks for your attendance and the
information today. I think maybe I will start out with Ms.
Eide.
You know, we have a limited amount of resources, right?
Everybody does. So, you know, I am looking--I listened to your
testimony and I can certainly understand each one of you has
the priority as you see it, as you should. You represent,
whether it is the port, whether it is your city, that is who
you represent in this regard and that is appropriate.
At the same time, somebody has to be the honest broker, so
to speak, that looks at the entire picture and prioritizes.
This is not about taking taxpayer money and just making sure
everybody gets their portion of it or a portion of it.
We have a mission here and a goal, which is to protect the
country in that regard and to secure it, and so I would imagine
there are certain threats that are higher at certain locations
and certain threats that don't happen at certain locations, as
best as we can tell. So we are trying to figure a way to most
efficiently mete that out--get that funding out and get those
projects taken care of and move on to the next one.
So with that having been said, is there any way to know how
individual grant recipients coordinate with--are coordinated
with other ones to make sure that duplication doesn't occur? Is
there any way currently to know that right now?
Ms. Eide. Congressman Perry, I--as a built-in process I
believe there is less of a chance of duplication in a
consolidated fashion. A very small example is we have a fairly
robust area maritime security committee within the cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul for the port there. Because the grant
applications did not go through the State either as a fiduciary
agent or as a decision maker, it went to the Federal
Government. None of the communities in our AMSC were given port
grants. It went down river into communities--two communities
that were not part of our port.
So not only duplication, but what we see is the lesser
priorities----
Mr. Perry. It would be misapplication at that point.
Ms. Eide [continuing]. Would be--that is the way that we
may see something like that. They have jurisdiction on the
Mississippi River in certain areas; they obviously identified a
need that they had. But it was not part of the area maritime
security committee. So those are the types of things that we
see by not having that close State coordination.
We have been working through our homeland security regions
within the State, and so we have a good handle on how a lot of
our locals are communicating with our border and our Operation
Stonegarden grants. We have a good handle on that because those
are a lot of--coordinated through our emergency management
committees and organizations.
Mr. Perry. I mean, I think that consolidation is the right
way to go, but I understand that there will be winners and
losers in this thing. I mean, again, we have scarce resources
and we must prioritize, and nobody likes to hear that but it--I
think it, unfortunately, it is the fact of the matter. It is
the reality.
While, listen, Mr. Parsons may be right. I mean, Long Beach
is a--it is a huge concern. Mayor, right outside of Newark with
New York City; maybe most of the resources should go there.
Maybe they really should, and that is going to disaffect some
other folks, wherever they are.
But I think a close collaboration with the people on the
ground, and each of your concerns is important, and then that
all has to be--come through one central clearinghouse and
somebody has to be a decision-maker and say, ``This is the
threat, this is the risk, and this is the highest one and here
is where I need you to put your resources. And when we are done
with this we will move on to these other things.''
One final question while I have a little bit of time left.
A number of local organizations expressed concern about the
definition of ``local unit of government,'' and that it would
greatly expand the eligibility for grant programs.
Personally, I see that as a good thing--I mean, expand
eligibility based on the fact that we want all the
information--but if somebody on the panel wants to answer the
question why we should be concerned about that, maybe that
would help us see the picture more clearly.
Anybody? Anybody feel comfortable, interested?
Mr. Mayor.
Mr. Fulop. Yes. I would just go back to the fact that--
recognizing there are scarce resources and the overlapping. I
can just speak anecdotally from the Jersey City standpoint,
with Newark and some of our regional partners, that there
hasn't been overlap, that the Government applicants have been
working, that this has been a process that has worked
effectively since 2002.
Recognizing that it has been effective and it is done and
served its purpose, I would just go back to the fact that there
isn't a reason to do a drastic changeover here, and that is
something that is scary from our standpoint, whether it is
increased number of applicants, whether it is an individual
person having more flexibility or discretion on where the
dollars go and taking it away from the people who know best at
the ground level. I think that a drastic change like what is
proposed here can have a huge impact on a program that has
worked effectively since 2002.
Mr. Perry. I thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Just one closing thought. It is great that it has worked
effectively, Mr. Mayor, for your town, for your concerns, but I
think the broader sense is that there have been some
shortcomings and there have been some misapplications and maybe
fraud, maybe some abuse, and we are the--you know, we are the
stewards, as you are, of the taxpayers' money and we owe it--
that is our duty to make sure that we are doing the best we
can. I might not agree with everything in this but I think that
it is worth a look.
I thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Clarke from the State of
New York for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman,
Ranking Member. I would like to thank you for having this
hearing and I would like to thank our panelists for sharing
their expertise with us this morning.
Before I start my questioning I would like to submit a
letter from the mayor of the city of New York, Mayor Bill de
Blasio, who knows first-hand the devastation of terrorist
attacks. Our city has been hit twice and has thwarted multiple
attempts and is still recovering from Superstorm Sandy, where
millions were impacted.
So I think that we can help provide some insights and just
reminding folks that when we were hit in 9/11 it was the local
first responders that had the obligation. If we had to wait for
the State of New York to respond we would still be at the pile
today.
So I just wanted to put that on the record.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Mayor Bill de Blasio, City of New York
April 28, 2014.
The Honorable Michael McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House Office
Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, H2-117 Ford House
Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: I write to
express my concerns with the proposal to consolidate the current suite
of homeland security grant programs into a single state-administered
block and competitive grant program, in which funding decisions are
based on state and multi-state threat assessments and population-driven
formulas. As federal budgets and resources grow tighter, I believe we
can maximize the nation's investment in homeland security by targeting
those areas most at risk. This is what the 9/11 Act set out to do.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the Federal government has
made significant investments in our nation's homeland security to keep
our communities and citizens safe. In New York City, we have utilized
Homeland Security Grant Program funds to build many new capabilities to
prevent, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of
terrorism and catastrophic events.
Crucial to these efforts has been the Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI) grant program--a stand-alone high-threat-based
funding source--that has funded many new regional preparedness
capabilities and strengthened regional collaborations and partnerships
among state and local entities. DHS's most recent proposal to
consolidate these and other grant programs into a uniform competitive
grant program threatens the successful efforts we have made in guarding
against threats.
As Mayor of the City of New York, I take national security concerns
very seriously. In our city, where more than 8 million people live, we
are protecting not only the nation's largest city, but also its
financial, communications, information, and cultural capital. And we
are doing this in coordination with the New York City Urban Area
Working Group that includes members from Nassau County, Suffolk County,
Westchester County, the City of Yonkers, the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, along with
representatives from New York State, DHS, and FEMA. Together we
coordinate regional planning, equipment use, joint training, and
development of response protocols.
The current framework for UASI and other programs works well and
reflects the principles of the ``Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment.'' The structure of UASI requires that urban areas work
closely with other jurisdictions to develop capabilities that serve
multiple purposes and that can be quickly deployed; this information is
used to make well-informed, cost-efficient, and risk-based decisions
about resources.
UASI, Securing the Cities, Port, and Transportation grants should
continue to be funded as stand-alone programs allocated based on risk.
Making cities, states, and sub-units of government compete against one
another for the same dollars does a disservice to the collaborative
approaches developed and refined over the years. It also creates the
potential for programmatic gaps, where areas previously funded are now
left with insufficient resources. I thank Congress for their foresight
on this issue in understanding that a range of program options offers
flexibility and the best defense against new and emerging threats.
I urge you to continue to preserve UASI and the array of homeland
security grant programs in their current form. Public safety and
homeland security are top priorities for municipalities, and the need
to prepare and train for emergencies, whether a man-made or natural
disaster, is a necessity for every jurisdiction. The proposed
consolidation threatens to upend much of the good work cities, states,
and federal partners have accomplished.
Sincerely,
Bill de Blasio,
Mayor.
Mrs. Brooks. Without objection, it is ordered.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
My first question is to Mayor Fulop and Director Riggs. As
you are aware, the current 25 percent set-aside for the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Act would be eliminated under
NPGP. What law enforcement terrorism prevention capabilities
have been enhanced in New Jersey and Indianapolis as a result
of this program, and would such programs have the resources to
be implemented without the 25 percent set-aside?
Mr. Fulop. I can't speak to whether it would have the
opportunity to continue to be implemented. What I can speak to
is that we have had critical infrastructure supplied from these
grants, whether it is the ability to work with regional
partners in the Hudson as it relates to water vessels that have
been provided by the Federal Government to provide homeland
security that Jersey City and some of the other partners in
Hudson are responsible for, or whether it is equipment for--
basic equipment for our fire department or our police
department, both of which have been supplied via these 13
different Federal grant programs.
I would go back to the fact that I share, as the mayor of
Jersey City, the same concerns you do, whether it is the
terrorism concerns via my proximity to New York City or it is
Superstorm Sandy. We have leveraged all of these programs to
the maximum, and it has worked for us.
Mr. Riggs. I would just add, I think this is critically
important. It could significantly erode our capabilities. Just
recently we held a table-top exercise involving State, Federal,
local officials, very good, about coordinating activity.
What we are trying to do in Indianapolis is really be ahead
of other cities to really start thinking about, what does
terrorism look like in the future? In a recent conference I
attended here with the Police Executive Research Forum we
talked about that very thing with Secret Service, Homeland
Security. We think about traditional terrorist attack, our fear
and what we are trying to prepare for and what we have used
this money to do is prepare for a traditional-type terrorist
attack or some type of cyber attack or a simultaneous attack,
which is kind-of the worst scenario.
I know that New York City has done a great deal along these
lines. We want to learn from your city as well, and start
enacting some of that in Indianapolis. The 25 percent helps us
do that.
Ms. Clarke. So the question for me is maintenance of
effort. So these funds get cut, do you have--or does your State
then pick up where these cuts are eliminated--or these funds
are eliminated?
Mr. Fulop. I can speak to the UASI grants as an example
of--that grant provided the city of Jersey City a water vessel,
which I mentioned earlier, which is state-of-the-art, has the
ability to detect biological, nuclear, any type of weapons. It
is responsible for the entire region and we partner with all of
the municipalities along the Hudson on our side of the river.
It is within our fire department is responsible for it. It
was provided by the Federal Government. Programs like that
would be a concern if we had to go through the entire State
process and another layer of government. It was something that
worked very, very well in the years following 9/11 and is
critical.
Mr. Riggs. When we lost UASI funding in 2011 and 2013 we
did not see any assistance. As a result, we don't believe we
would get assistance if we lost this.
The State has some very difficult decisions to make, as
well. What we have done to try to make sure this does not
become an issue is we started a 501(c)(3), a Department of
Public Safety Foundation, modeled after many police foundation
and fire foundations. We are using that money that is received
for training so if we lose Federal funds or we lose State
funding, we will try to use that funding to continue the
training; it is that important to us.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you for your testimony once again.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Higgins, from New York for 5
minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much.
You know, the administration has proposed a grant
consolidation three times now. I suppose the distinction with
this proposal is that it comes with a legislative resolution to
advance the same.
You know, I think when you look at the origins of the Urban
Area Security Initiative, it was established for a purpose. It
recognized that mayors, that police chiefs, that fire chiefs
were at a place where they could make a determination, so long
as they were coordinated well, as to the highest and best use
relative to the program's objectives.
I represent Buffalo. Buffalo was lobbed off the list
because of budget constraints.
Now, you know, Buffalo didn't ask to be put on the list.
You know, we met a criteria that we didn't want to meet, and
since the establishment of the program the Buffalo area, much,
probably, like Jersey City and others, have tried to use these
program resources in the most responsible way toward the goal
of mitigating potential terrorist attacks.
When you look at this proposal you are basically taking 18
programs, throwing it to the States, which creates another
layer of bureaucracy, which I think moves the program further
away from the areas that it was supposed to benefit in the
first place. Now you are left with folks who have been engaged
in this process for a half a decade. In many cases--in Buffalo
they are still meeting even though they don't get funding under
the program because they realize that based on their experience
when there was program funding, that it is better for the law
enforcement agencies and the first responders to coordinate.
So, you know, I don't think this is a solution; I think
this is a solution looking for a problem. I think the real
problem is getting funding back to the urban areas that are
vulnerable because of a formula established by the Department
of Homeland Security that made them vulnerable.
You know, not once, not once, not once did the Department
of Homeland Security say that, ``Well, because you took these
measures using the UASI program the threat of terrorist attack
is mitigated.'' I would argue that, you know, that is not the
case and these areas are more vulnerable.
In fact, Inspire magazine--it originates out of al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula--says in their magazine, last issue, that
Buffalo is more vulnerable. Why? Because they are no longer
getting funding.
Well, let me tell you something: If that is a magazine that
goes out and encourages homegrown terrorism, that in and of
itself should urge the Federal Government to restore funding to
that area that has been identified by a terrorist publication--
the only area in the entire country.
So, you know, I would ask for your input, based on what I
just outlined there.
Particularly the mayor, first I would like to hear from the
mayor.
Mr. Fulop. Yes. I think you hit the nail on the head. What
I said earlier was that the program at the State level, as
proposed today, creates a culture of competition between
municipalities and cities as opposed to cooperation, and that
is a huge difference that should not get lost here.
I would say that the Congresswoman to your right and people
in New Jersey share the experience of Sandy last year, when the
funds were administered via the State and there still are many
concerns via that process. I think that lessons can be learned
from that which are very relevant to not repeat here.
So I think all your comments were exactly spot-on, and I
think that the flexibility is crucial at the municipal level.
Mr. Higgins. We should be listening to the mayor.
Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Madam Chairwoman, I ask unanimous consent that
the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, be permitted to
participate in today's hearing.
Mrs. Brooks. Without objection, so ordered.
Would the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, like 5
minutes?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairwoman and the
Ranking Member for being courteous on my somewhat frequent
visits. You have a very important committee, and as you well
know, we are now in the backdrop of seeing what you as local
officials go through looking at the landscape from Arkansas
through Mississippi, Tennessee. I know that my State, the State
of Texas, was on alert, and certainly you know that as I just
heard the word Hurricane Sandy you know that, coming from the
Gulf region, it is a normal state of affairs to face
hurricanes.
I, too, am interested in this focus of uniting all of the
grants, and I am also interested in an issue that I probably
will have long years to overcome, and that is to be able to
directly give these Federal dollars to local municipalities and
to directly get the monies where they are most needed. So I
think I am going to stay focused on that area with one or two
other questions.
Mayor, you were the last to speak as I came in and I would
just like to hear your thought on the State, the Federal--and
this is by law, so I am not suggesting that this is done
without authority, but we have structured it where we do
Federal, State, and then the local government. In times of
emergencies like a hurricane, a tornado, and the local
jurisdiction is right in the eye of the storm, if you will,
share with me the impact of having that process in place as
opposed to monies directly coming to the local municipality.
Mr. Fulop. You are asking what would be a difference from
our standpoint when the money goes to the State as opposed to
the local municipality?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. If it was to be structured where
those grants or those dollars would come directly to the local
municipality.
Mr. Fulop. The more direct contact, I think generally from
my standpoint, the better and more efficient the process is. I
think that as it relates to Superstorm Sandy, that it has been
well-documented in most of the publications in New Jersey and
in New York that there have been many, many concerns about the
timeliness and the process for administration of the dollars
that came from the Federal Government that were initially
intended for the local municipalities--what locations they were
given to, how they were given, and the timeliness of that.
So this goes back to--look, you all have a very important
job. There is a lot to fix, obviously, in Washington. This is a
program that, at least from the local level, I can tell you
that, granted it can always be improved, but it is something
that has worked relatively well from our standpoint.
So just to reiterate what I have said earlier, since 2002
this has been a process that has worked, from our standpoint,
and we just ask you not to do something drastic in reforming
it, like you are proposing over here--or what is proposed over
here.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think that the reporting process
coming from the local government has been accurate and timely
so that you would--so you raised the question, ``Why
consolidate?'' Do you think there has been a problem with local
jurisdiction reporting on how the money has been used promptly
or giving details in terms of this move toward consolidation?
Mr. Fulop. I can't speak for every municipality. I think
that Jersey City tries to be as timely as possible with all of
our paperwork. We are fortunate that we are large enough that
we have the resources for that. Going back to what the
Congressman on your right mentioned is that many of the areas
that these are targeted at, these grants, are higher profile
areas across this country and most of those areas fortunately
would have the resources to report back to you in a timely
manner, so I don't really see it as a concern because they are
mostly larger urban areas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you do--well, let me not put words in
your mouth. The consolidation, would that, in your mind, create
a breach or a break in the flow of dollars in a timely manner
for the emergency?
Mr. Fulop. I think it could potentially create a break.
Ms. Eide. Representative, may I also answer that question?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, you may.
Ms. Eide. The Governor has unique authority in every State.
They have unique authority in things like activating the
National Guard and through their states of emergency. As we
have seen this week with the devastating tornadoes, there has
to be some decisions that are made at a higher level as to the
priorities. I think when you consolidate the grant programs you
are also looking at things from a larger picture and the
perspective of your State-wide and the Nation-wide protection
and security.
Obviously the urban areas have some very unique issues, and
I think through the cooperation of the UASI areas as they are,
and their communication with each other and their communication
with State emergency management and homeland security offices,
it shouldn't put that burden with--at the local level because
we have to make sure that through the sharing of resources we
can protect our entire State, whether it is urban, rural,
border, or on a----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Eide [continuing]. On a port.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Let me get Mr. Parsons.
For a long time States have complained that they lack
visibility of a port grant investments and port security plans.
Can you describe some of the efforts port authorities have
undertaken to improve coordination with State and local
governments?
Now, I will put a little bit of humor in it: Are you making
sure you have got press conferences to make sure the State is
seen at the press conference, as well? I am being a little bit
humorous, but is there an outreach that ports do to ensure that
coordination?
Mr. Parsons. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I haven't seen a place that plans and cooperates like
southern California. It is truly amazing. The venues for that
are many and varied; the area maritime security committees that
meet quarterly--there are State representation at those
meetings. California has its own maritime security committee
that meets at least biannually. There is interplay with
subcommittee of the AMSC.
I will tell you, again, I have never seen anything like the
number of planning meetings and the number of agencies that are
involved in every aspect of grant collaboration, and it is
truly amazing to go to one of these meetings. It is
collaboration.
The fire departments, law enforcement, everybody sits down
and lays their cards on the table and everybody understands, as
Congressman Perry said, that there isn't enough money to go
around to meet everybody's wishes, but it is a very collegial,
professional environment that understands mainly risk
priorities, and that is the principle driver in the decision-
making product. So you see agencies stand down from their
requests in reference to other agencies' requests.
The American Association of Port Authorities that I
represent here this morning do a great deal to promote that
kind of environment. We have conferences at least twice a year.
Local and State partners attend those conferences. The police
commander who sits in our building, the fire battalion chief
who sits with us, we work shoulder-to-shoulder.
So at least in our environment, the environment I am aware
of, which is California--and that is a pretty big playing
field--the State is very involved, they are invited, they
participate, and we listen to their input. I think that the
chance for duplication in our environment is not very likely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for your
indulgence. Are you all having a second round?
All right. Thank you.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
We will now begin our second round of questions, and I will
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
As we talked about earlier, I am interested in your
perspective on the Threat and Hazard Identification Risk
Assessment, the THIRAs, and the capability estimation processes
and how they are working.
So while we have talked about tremendous collaboration and
work, Chief Metcalf, and I just want to find out from all of
you at the--really the State level and very concerned about
your comment that local fire departments are not consulted as
these THIRAs, the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessments, are being put together, which are critical,
according to FEMA, in determining the level of funding that
different jurisdictions receive.
Chief, would you like to comment on THIRA?
Then would, you know, like to hear from a few others how it
has worked in your jurisdictions.
Chief.
Chief Metcalf. Thank you.
First of all, to be clear, we don't have any objection at
all to the business of threat assessment. That is a core part
of how we do business in the fire service every day is
understanding the specific threats in our communities and
prioritizing our resource applications, to meet those threats.
We get that.
What we don't see, or we--there is a process that has been
created here of trying to do this threat assessment and
allocation of resources at a macro level, at the State level,
that in many, many places around this country only happens at
the State level and there isn't an effective mechanism for
local jurisdictions to provide input. I think that when it
comes to our members, the greatest frustration is not that they
had the opportunity to have input and there--and we fell short
on our prioritization; it is that there hasn't been the
opportunity for input, period.
I was impressed to hear about the governance structure that
was put in place in Minnesota that sounds like it has a robust
way of providing input from the local all the way up to the
State level, but I can tell you that that is not the case
across the country in many, many places, and that is the source
of the frustration.
So I think that it is not an objection to the--we don't
have an objection at all to the business of threat assessment
and prioritization. It is making sure that we have an effective
way that local communities have input into that process.
Mrs. Brooks. Before I go to Ms. Eide to explain the
Minnesota process in a little bit more detail, are there any
other local officials that would like to comment on involvement
with the States' interaction with you with respect to THIRA,
whether your fire departments or yourselves? Either of you?
Director Riggs.
Mr. Riggs. I will just add that we had a very good process.
It was very close with the State, with our--for example, we
looked at the--a tornado was the situation we looked at. It is
a very real threat in Indianapolis and the surrounding areas.
One of the reasons it was such a good protocol for us was
it familiarized ourselves with each other, but also we were
able to reiterate we are the capital city in Indiana, we have
the largest police department, fire department, we have a
responsibility to our region and to our State. So we wanted to
make sure that we had a robust plan enough to respond to
anywhere in the State of Indiana when needed.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Ms. Eide, would you please talk a little bit more about
your process in Minnesota? Because it is not a National process
but maybe--and maybe should be a National model.
Ms. Eide. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
In a recent conference call there are several States that
also start at the local level, but we saw that the THIRA was
really the building block for good financial decision making.
Not much different than the current hazard mitigation planning
that goes on in every county in the country as far as
identifying what your risks are; this adds the threat component
to it.
We assigned a person full-time to creating some additional
tool kits from what FEMA did. We took three different
scenarios--one natural scenario, one technological hazard, and
one human-caused hazard--and we started at the large cities
over 100,000 population, and in every county.
Some of our counties only have 3,000 people who live in the
entire county, but every county has a local THIRA and they were
required to have the whole community participate--their large
employers, their critical infrastructure, not-for-profit
organizations, and different levels of Government and multi-
discipline departments in there.
Then when we went through these three scenarios then we
went into the capability estimation, and that is a little bit
more difficult and needs quite a bit of technical assistance
not only from our State level but also from FEMA. We then moved
it into the regions, so we rolled these--we rolled the county
THIRAs into a regional THIRA, and I have mentioned that we have
six homeland security regions.
So we used that information and the different types of
capability estimations so that we could look at our State-wide
region, and the cities within our UASI area did individual--the
counties in our UASI did individual, rolled up into our UASI
THIRA. It is going to be used as a best practice to be taught
to other States out at the Emergency Management Institute in
Emmitsburg, Maryland, and we are very proud of what we have
done.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you very much.
I will just take a personal point. I have some friends in
the audience, two of whom are from Minnesota, so I am sure they
appreciate your efforts. Thank you.
Ms. Eide. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Brooks. With that, I will turn it over to 5 minutes of
questions from Ranking Member Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
You know, before I ask my next question, I was interested
in the questions that the gentleman from Pennsylvania raised
and, you know, I think the key point he made was having honest
brokers. In New Jersey we have seen how potentially, you know,
these funds that were allocated for Sandy weren't necessarily
allocated in the manner and in a timely manner as they were
needed.
He also talked about fraud and waste. Well, if there is a
recipient that we find has those issues then the dollars should
be withdrawn. But to say that when Mayor Fulop talked about
having a program that worked in the region, you know, it is
like saying, ``So your UASI program is working well. We will
just subtract dollars from that since it is working and
allocate them somewhere else.'' It doesn't make too much sense
to me, but what do I know?
So I have a question for all the witnesses. In your
opinion, what about the existing homeland security grant
structure most significantly undermines its potential and what
solutions would you offer to fix it?
Chief Metcalf.
Chief Metcalf. Thank you.
I think the most--the factor that is most undermining today
is the uncertainty associated with the grant programs, that
every year there is a threat to one or more of them, every year
there is a--funding that doesn't come through that has been
appropriated or is--that doesn't make it to the local level.
There are UASIs that are in and out, changing eligibility
requirements, and it makes it very difficult for us to engage
in coherent planning efforts at the local level when there is
that degree of uncertainty around the programs, especially for
the last 3 years, where there has been this proposal on the
table that is a constant threat.
I think that one of the biggest suggestions that--or the
two suggestions that we would make is to increase or do a
better job of sharing best practices among grant recipients,
that there are great things being done out there that many of
us just don't hear about unless we happen to know someone in
those communities. So formalizing that process of sharing best
practices and sharing the success stories and the governance
structures that are working in the States and in the local
communities.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Riggs.
Mr. Riggs. Well, obviously coming from a large urban area,
we would like the focus to be on local municipalities and the
threats. But I am also a realist as well and understand that
the money is probably going to continue to come through States
in many ways, but if there are guidelines to make sure that our
critical infrastructure in cities are addressed, I think that
is important.
For instance, we have 1.7 million people in our region but
people come to our community every day. We are one of the top
convention areas in our Nation. We have millions of visitors
each and every year. There are tremendous threats.
Last week 70,000 guests in town; 2 weeks before, 40,000
firefighters. We are always doing assessments, we are always
planning for that. We would like to see a little bit more
attention put to the local municipalities.
Obviously we understand that there are major cities larger
than ours--New York, Houston, and others--that have other
issues. We understand that. But as New York has an issue it
affects the Nation, if Indianapolis has an issue it affects the
Midwest. We want to take our responsibility seriously.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you. Plus, next year the Final Four,
right?
Mr. Riggs. That is correct.
We are hopefully going to have, Congresswoman, an Indiana
team in there this year.
Mr. Payne. All right.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
At this time I would recognize the gentlelady from New York
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you once again, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Eide, in your testimony you made the case that a strong
State role in management of grant funds will make--will better
ensure transparency and efficient investment, and so I have a
couple of questions for you. One, how do you create a--
competitive process for distribution of funds, or do you, among
your counties or municipalities? How do you avoid the one-size-
fits-all inclination that comes from trying to administer such
a program?
No. 2, how do you respond to concerns that have been
expressed by local governments and first responders that States
do not distribute funds in a timely manner? Then what
safeguards and oversight tools will be used to enhance
transparency and efficiency?
Ms. Eide. Representative Clarke, those are very good
questions.
By creating the governance structure with grant allocation
committee on there to actually look at all the grant
applications that come in, throughout the year your governance
structure has to make sure that you are addressing the priority
areas. Then when it comes time for the grant funding
applications to come in, then we know what general buckets we
are going to be putting funding in to sustain what we have
already built and then to increase what needs to be increased.
Then taking those areas and making sure that we have a mix
of levels of government, a mix of disciplines on a grant
allocation committee so that, as Chief Metcalf said earlier, or
Mr. Parsons said earlier too, that we are all working together
and there will be less competition because they can see how
certain things will affect the State-wide safety and security
for the people that live there.
We feel that through something like the NPGP we can avoid
the one-size-fits-all because if--particularly if there
continues to be 2-year performance period, it can be very
difficult to spend that money in a 2-year period, particularly
if you have overlapping grant years. That can be difficult for
a grantee or a sub-grantee, particularly those that don't have
full-time staff, full-time grant staff to be dealing with a lot
of those. So we feel that this will be less of a one-size-fits-
all.
If we cannot spend the money in one area, such as the
Duluth Superior, the Minneapolis/St. Paul ports, then they can
be part of that decision that this should go into another area
that is a little bit more vulnerable at this particular time.
So I think it eliminates a lot of the competitive process.
Timely distribution is always going to be an issue whether
we consolidate grants or not. It is an issue now. A lot of it
has to do with the fact that there is uncertainty with
reporting requirements; there is overlapping timelines; we are
working under 3 fiscal years which crossed State and local
fiscal years.
It just is a very labor-intensive process for a lot of the
reporting and accountability. I think we have to build in
performance measures, and that is what we as the Governors
Homeland Security Advisory Council and the National Emergency
Management Association are really going to be focusing on is
the performance measurements and how do we determine how we are
buying down our risk or making our Nation more secure by using
these homeland security grants.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you.
I just have one more question, and this is to all of the
witnesses. The FEMA grant consolidation proposal relies on a
peer review process. Do you have any concerns with FEMA's
description of how these peer reviews will be implemented--for
those of you who--Chief?
Chief Metcalf. Yes. The fire service has a direct
experience of an existing peer review grant process through the
Assistance to Firefighters Grant, and we have found that peer
review process to work extraordinarily well. We are pleased
with that process and feel that it allows people that
understand the issues, understand the profession and are able
to see through the applications to make wise decisions.
So the concept of a peer review process we feel is an
excellent one. There is still not quite enough detail yet to
understand how the process would work as proposed by--in this
FEMA proposal, but in general, I think the fire service has a
positive track record with peer review grants.
Mr. Parsons. Thank you, Congresswoman.
A couple of points. I think that the peer review process
has worked well in the past. I think there has been a great
learning curve that has been worked through by the agencies in
terms of being more efficient and more effective. The days of
the big money pipeline are gone.
In my experience, people have got--the thing that concerns
myself, the AAPA, is the peer review process--and again, I
speak from a ports perspective who has received direct funding.
We protect an international border, which we support is a
Federal responsibility.
``One size does not fit all'' definitely applies to ports.
We have a different threat environment. We have different
adversaries; there are different ways they will attack us. We
have different assets as to how to mitigate that threat. We
have different databases that we use.
So I think to clarify the competition comment, ports, which
are substantial economic drivers to our Nation, would be
significantly disadvantaged by being consolidated and merged
into the overall picture. The best example is the ports of Long
Beach and Los Angeles. We are contiguous. There is no line in
the water.
The two ports accept approximately 40 percent of the
containerized cargo that comes into the United States. That is
a formidable critical asset to protect, and I would present
that--and I am with the chief--vulnerability assessments make
sense. Obviously in an environment like ours we have had a lot
of them. To develop and build capabilities off of those also
makes a lot of sense.
But to lump us in a category where there is such diverse
elements that go into the decision-making process--L.A. and
Long Beach are fierce competitors economically. As a security
philosophy we move as one. So in an environment like that the
peer review could have a substantial detriment for us.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, let me thank you for your
courtesies. More and more as I listen to the testimony it has
become clearer and clearer--I have been on this committee since
the heinous tragedy of 9/11, on the select committee that
helped formulate the Department and this committee, and I am
reminded of how stark the needs are of the local communities
when a tragedy hits.
Actually, FEMA was engaged during 9/11 because there were
people impacted and businesses, there were homes that were
impacted--apartment homes, there were people who were left
longing in their apartments with no resources. So FEMA goes
right in to the heart of the crisis. When we had Hurricane Ike,
combination of FEMA and others came in with points of
distribution for food and water right to the local
neighborhood.
So I am trying to find out how we have this balance and how
consolidation may be helpful, and I would say to Ms.--to the
director from the State of Minnesota, Ms. Eide, that your
vigorous structure seems valuable and I support it in your
State. I think my concern is whether it would be even-handed
across 50 States.
So I want to ask just a quick question, Mr. Parsons. Do you
have any confrontation or lack of respect for the State of
California between the Port of Long Beach? Do you hear the
State complaining because you get Port Security Grants?
Mr. Parsons. No. Madam Congressman, I have heard no such
comments.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You feel that you are keeping them
abreast, coordinating with them in an appropriate manner?
Mr. Parsons. I believe that we are. Frankly, there are some
logistical challenges. They are in Sacramento, 8 hours away by
vehicle, and in an airplane ride, and it does take extra effort
to do that, but I think----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you do do it, and the port grants
coming to you directly makes a more efficient utilization, in
your opinion?
Mr. Parsons. No question----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chief, I work with a lot of fire fighters
and I thank you very much for your service. I am going to ask
you the question as well, because I know my fire fighters--in
fact, my homeland security director is a former assistant chief
of the Houston Fire Department. Tell me whether or not--you
said one of the successes of FEMA homeland security grants is
that they provide incentives for local and regional entities.
If you lose that funding, what happens?
Chief Metcalf. Thank you.
I believe as much as Mr. Riggs has stated that the grants
today have fostered an environment of collaboration at the
local level, where we now come together and communicate and
share information in ways that we probably may have taken a
much longer time to get there without those incentives. I think
that if that goes away the value of that collaboration is still
appreciated--we still understand it; we still understand the
value, but as there is increasing competition for time and
resources and as a competitive nature may grow between
communities, I think we would--I fear we would see some of that
collaboration decline.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask two last questions. One of the
comments that have been made--and I will use ``comment'' as
opposed to ``criticism''--is our local communities buy trinkets
and so we need to have oversight over that. That is one. I
would like a response.
When I say that I think you understand what I am saying--
buy vehicles and other things, which I think are valuable. My
port has been able to buy fast-speed boats, et cetera, but--and
they have been utilized. But I want that--let's lay it out on
the table. Let's not be frightened of that.
The other point is, as I said, Minnesota has a vigorous
program. My concern is that that kind of leadership, with no
discounting of other States, may not be even-handed across 50
States. What may be good in one State may not be good in
others, but we know if it gets to the local jurisdiction that
is where the pain is.
Anyone can answer that question. I am going to go to Chief
first about the criticism of buying things and that there
should be more oversight over that.
Chief Metcalf. Thank you. Thanks for giving us the
opportunity to address that concern.
I believe there have been well-publicized instances of
perhaps inappropriate spending of these grant dollars, but in
the larger scheme of things they represent a tiny, tiny
fraction of the number of entities that are out there putting
these funds to excellent use. There are more than 35,000 fire
departments in this country that are doing excellent,
outstanding work every day on these issues.
In that have there been perhaps a few where there may have
been inappropriate spending? Clearly yes. But I believe that we
solve that problem by fostering and encouraging the
collaboration, by having fire--their fire service peers, in our
case, working to stamp out those inappropriate expenditures.
I think having structures like what was described in
Minnesota, where folks have the opportunity to defend their
purchases or explain their priorities to their peers in other
places is an excellent way to accomplish that.
So have there been inappropriate expenditures? Absolutely.
But I believe that what gets lost in that is the vast number of
places where good work is being done.
Mr. Fulop. Could I just add that yes, it is a valid
criticism. Municipalities often buy trinkets, unfortunately,
with a lot of these dollars. I think that is valid.
The point, though, is that aggregation of these programs as
proposed here won't solve municipalities purchasing trinkets.
They are not directly related.
Ultimately, what you will get out of this is a State
deciding who gets the trinkets instead of the Federal
Government deciding who gets the trinkets. So that portion
needs to be solved, but this is not a solution for that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I thank Madam Chairwoman. Thank you
very much.
If I was unclear, I am not for the consolidation and I
appreciate the answers that the--and I appreciate Ms. Eide, as
well. I appreciate the answers that have been given and I think
there are other ways of oversight and I hope that we will have
a way of working through this.
I thank you.
Mrs. Brooks. Well, I thank you. Thank you for your
interest--continued interest in the committee, since you were
here at the beginning and standing up this important
subcommittee and committee in Congress.
At this point that concludes our testimony and I want to
thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and while--and
the Members for their questions and participation. While I
appreciate these are incredibly difficult issues and
discussion, there might not be complete consensus among all of
our committee Members today, we take our role very seriously in
advising and in making determinations with respect to FEMA and
their proposal.
While we appreciate all the outreach that they have done
with the various associations that you all represent and your
organizations, I think there is obviously still a lot of
concern about the proposal. We appreciate that they submitted
on Friday lengthy responses to questions that we had and we
will continue to explore this.
But we also just want to thank all of you. I think that in
Government there is no role more important than the safety of
its citizens, and so each of you play incredibly critical roles
in the safety of the citizens that you protect and we all thank
you so very much.
The Members of the subcommittee will have--may have
additional questions for you, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing if you should receive any of those questions
from our committee. Pursuant to committee rule 7(c), the
hearing record will be open for the next 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]