[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO SECURE
AMERICA'S BORDER
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY &
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 31, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-90
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
______________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
89-419PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
_________________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota KATHERINE CLARK, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS COLLINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Research and Technology
HON. LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana, Chair
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
MO BROOKS, Alabama FEDERICA WILSON, Florida
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois ZOE LOFGREN, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas SCOTT PETERS, California
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming AMI BERA, California
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona DEREK KILMER, Washington
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
CHRIS COLLINS, New York EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
------
Subcommittee on Oversight
HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DAN MAFFEI, New York
Wisconsin ERIC SWALWELL, California
BILL POSEY, Florida SCOTT PETERS, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
(II)
C O N T E N T S
July 31, 2014
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Larry Bucshon, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 7
Written Statement............................................ 7
Statement by Representative Daniel Lipinski, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 8
Written Statement............................................ 9
Statement by Representative Paul Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Dan Maffei, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 12
Written Statement............................................ 13
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 14
Written Statement............................................ 15
Witnesses:
Dr. K. Jack Riley, Vice President, RAND National Security
Research Division; Director, RAND National Defense Research
Institute
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 18
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 31
Dr. Joseph D. Eyerman, Director, Health Security Program, RTI
International; Director for Research and Management, Institute
for Homeland Security Solutions, Duke University
Oral Statement............................................... 49
Written Statement............................................ 51
Discussion....................................................... 57
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. K. Jack Riley, Vice President, RAND National Security
Research Division; Director, RAND National Defense Research
Institute...................................................... 68
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 71
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Prepared statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 82
Supporting information requested by Representative Lamar S.
Smith, Chairman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 84
TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO SECURE AMERICA'S BORDER
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology and
Subcommittee on Oversight,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Larry
Bucshon [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and
Technology] presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Bucshon. Good morning. This joint hearing of the
Subcommittee on Research and Technology and the Subcommittee on
Oversight will come to order.
Good morning, and welcome to today's joint hearing titled
``Technology Needed to Secure America's Border.''
In front of you are packets containing the written
testimony, biographies and Truth in Testimony disclosures for
today's witnesses.
Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing
involving two Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will
operate procedurally so that all Members understand how the
question-and-answer period will be handled. We will recognize
those Members present at the gavel in order of seniority on the
full Committee and those coming in after the gavel will be
recognized in order of arrival. I recognize myself now for five
minutes for an opening statement.
Twelve years ago, the Homeland Security Act established the
Directorate for Science and Technology within the Department of
Homeland Security. The S&T Directorate manages and carries out
science and technology research for our federal homeland
security needs. The Directorate is also responsible for
coordinating this research with other federal research
entities. The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
shares oversight of the S&T Directorate with the Homeland
Security Committee.
Since this spring, this Subcommittee had been planning a
joint hearing with our counterparts in the Homeland Security
Committee to hear from the Department of Homeland Security S&T
Directorate, so this has been a long-planned hearing. It is
just that today is the day that it would work for us to do
this. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security could
not work that into their schedule but there will be another
hearing in September that will complete this hearing.
Unfortunately, we could not make the calendars come
together, like I said, and I am looking forward to the
Department of Homeland Security testifying in September.
The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible for developing new
technologies from basic research to development for use,
including technologies that can help to secure our Nation's
border. From unmanned aerial vehicles, to tunnel detection,
from anti-counterfeit standards to biometrics, there are
existing and promising new technologies that can act as force
multipliers for Border Patrol agents and the Coast Guard to
augment their day-to-day work on border security related
issues.
We will hear this morning from the Government
Accountability Office, which has issued a series of reports
about DHS technology research and development, and from two
private-sector experts, each of whom can contribute on a
different aspect of border security technology. I look forward
to hearing from all of our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bucshon follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Subcommittee on Research and Technology
Chairman Larry Bucshon
Twelve years ago, the Homeland Security Act (PL 107-296)
established the Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T
Directorate) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The S&T Directorate manages and carries out science and technology
research for our federal homeland security needs. The Directorate is
also responsible for coordinating this research with other federal
research entities. The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
shares oversight of the S&T Directorate with the Homeland Security
Committee.
Since this spring, this Subcommittee had been planning a joint
hearing with our counterparts in the Homeland Security Committee to
hear from the Department of Homeland Security S&T Directorate.
Unfortunately, we could not make our Subcommittee's calendars meet this
month so we will use this hearing to inform a joint hearing in
September. At that hearing, we will focus on testimony and discussion
with the head of DHS S&T.
The DHS S&T Directorate is responsible developing new technologies
from basic research to development for use, including technologies that
can help to secure our nation's border. From unmanned aerial vehicles,
to tunnel detection, from anti-counterfeit standards to biometrics,
there are existing and promising new technologies that can act as force
multipliers for border patrol agents and the Coast Guard to augment
their day to day work on border security related issues.
We will hear this morning from the Government Accountability
Office, which has issued a series of reports about DHS Technology
research and development, and from two private sector experts, each of
whom can contribute on a different aspect of border security
technology. I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses.
Chairman Bucshon. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Lipinski, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing today, and thank you to our witnesses for providing
valuable testimony on this issue.
Today we will hear about how the Department of Homeland
Security can improve its research and development efforts on
technology to secure America's borders. With growing turmoil
around the world, the threats we face at our borders are more
pressing than ever. These threats include terrorists and
criminals entering our country, human trafficking, drug
trafficking, and other dangerous materials and substances being
smuggled into the United States. As has been said many times,
those wishing America harm only need to get it right once. To
keep America safe, we need to get it right every time. This
daunting task falls largely on the shoulders of DHS.
As a member of both the Science, Space, and Technology
Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
I am especially concerned with border security as it relates to
transportation. Last week I met with the Commissioner of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Gil Kerlikowske, on their
efforts to develop technologies such as the fingerprint
scanners at O'Hare Airport in Chicago as part of CBP's Global
Entry program.
Science and technology plays a critical role in addressing
our homeland security challenge. However, the Department has
been plagued with problems in its planning and management of
research and development. The agency is young, having been only
created 11 years ago. While I do not envy the task of stitching
together several government programs and functions into a new
agency, I remain concerned that several of the problems we saw
in the agency's initial years remain today.
As GAO has previously stated, the Department cannot tell us
how much they invest in R&D. There is a lack of effective
communication between operational components and the Science
and Technology Directorate. Furthermore, there is still no
strategic plan in place to guide the Department's research and
development activities.
It is important to understand the steps the agency goes
through when identifying and solving a technological problem,
whether for border security or another mission need. When
agents in the field identify a technological challenge, how is
this need passed along to the researchers developing the
technology? The communication between the operational
components of DHS and the researchers at the Science and
Technology Directorate has to be improved.
Once a technology is developed, it must be thoroughly
tested and evaluated to see that it not only functions as
intended, but is adapted for the environment in which it will
operate. Understanding how CBP agents or other customers in the
field will use the technology and what additional improvements
should be made is a key step in successfully deploying the
technology. Without understanding the human elements in this
process, I am concerned we could be investing significant
federal resources in potentially unusable technology. I look
forward to hearing from Dr. Eyerman about the importance of
social science in the evaluation and deployment of new
technologies at DHS.
Securing our borders is a difficult and complex problem.
People and materials can enter by air, land, and sea. This
requires our border security efforts to not only effectively
communicate internally, but also coordinate with other federal
agencies, as well as state and local governments. I hope our
discussion today provides the Committee with recommendations to
inform our oversight and legislative responsibilities for R&D
at the Department of Homeland Security. And I look forward to
hearing about how public- and private-sector innovation can
help protect the American border.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Subcommittee on Research and Technology
Ranking Minority Member Daniel Lipinski
Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today, and thank
you to the witnesses for providing valuable testimony on this issue.
Today we will hear about how the Department of Homeland Security
can improve its research and development efforts on technology to
secure America's borders. With growing turmoil around the world, the
threats we face at our borders are more pressing than ever. These
threats include terrorists and criminals entering our country, human
trafficking, drug trafficking, and other dangerous materials and
substances being smuggled into the U.S. As has been said many times,
those wishing America harm only need to get it right once--to keep
America safe, we need to get it right every time. This daunting task
falls largely on the shoulders of DHS. As a member of both the Science,
Space, and Technology Committee and the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, I am especially concerned with border
security as it relates to transportation. Last week I met with the
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Gil Kerlikowske, on
their efforts to develop technologies such as the fingerprint scanners
at O'Hare Airport in Chicago as part of CBP's Global Entry program.
Science and technology plays a critical role in addressing our
homeland security challenges. However, the Department has been plagued
with problems in its planning and management of research and
development. The agency is young, having only been created 11 years
ago. While I do not envy the task of stitching together several
government programs and functions into a new agency, I remain concerned
that several of the problems we saw in the agency's initial yearsremain
today.
As GAO has previously stated, the Department cannot tell us how
much they invest in R&D. There is a lack of effective communication
between operational components and the Science & Technology
Directorate. Furthermore, there is still no strategic plan in place to
guide the Department's research and development activities.
It is important to understand the steps the agency goes through
when identifying and solving a technological problem, whether for
border security or another mission need. When agents in the field
identify a technological challenge, how is this need passed along to
the researchers developing the technology? The communication between
the operational components of DHS and the researchers at the Science &
Technology Directorate must be improved.
Once a technology is developed it must be thoroughly tested and
evaluated to see that it not only functions as intended, but is adapted
for the environment in which it will operate. Understanding how CBP
agents or other customers in the field will use the technology and what
additional improvements should be made is a key step in successfully
deploying the technology. Without understanding the human elements in
this process, I am concerned we could be investing significant federal
resources in potentially unusable technology. I look forward to hearing
from Dr. Eyerman about the importance of social science in the
evaluation and deployment of new technologies at DHS.
Securing our borders is a difficult and complex problem. People and
materials can enter by air, land, and sea. This requires our border
security efforts to not only effectively communicate internally, but
also coordinate with other federal agencies, as well as state and local
governments. I hope our discussion today provides the Committee with
recommendations to inform our oversight and legislative
responsibilities for R&D at the Department of Homeland Security. And I
look forward to hearing about how public and private sector innovation
can help protect the American border.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. The Chair now
recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, the
gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Broun, for his opening statement.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Dr. Bucshon, and I welcome all
of you all here today as witnesses, and I am looking forward to
hearing from all of you all about this very important issue.
Earlier this month, I traveled to the southern border of
our country with the Homeland Security Committee. We held a
field hearing in McAllen, Texas, on July 3rd where we discussed
the recent surge of unaccompanied minors (UACs) crossing the
border. I was astounded to learn that the number of children
illegally entering the United States from Central America has
grown from approximately 5,000 of them a year to an estimated
57,000 so far this year, and they are projecting up to 90,000
in this fiscal year. An influx of this extent raises questions
about the security of our southern border. Currently, Border
Patrol agents are inundated with processing unaccompanied
minors and not fulfilling their primary mission to safeguard
the border against terrorists entering the country under the
radar as well as drugs and other things that are entering. It
is a national security issue as far as I am concerned.
In order to protect the nearly 2,000-mile southwest border,
patrol agents would benefit from advances in modern technology
such as video monitors, sensors, radars, cameras, thermal-
imaging devices, and drones. However, there are many flaws
within the various DHS components that conduct technology
research and development, which include problems in the
management, coordination, and acquisition of items needed to
help secure our American border.
A 2012 GAO report notes that, ``The Department of Homeland
Security does not know the total amount its components invest
in research and development and does not have policies and
guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across
the Department.'' Further, a 2013 GAO report cites examples
where projects were delayed and cancelled due to an inability
to obtain data from DHS. This is intolerable.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate states on its
own Web site that it is ``the primary research and development
arm of the Department of Homeland Security and manages science
and technology research, from development through transition,
for the Department's operational components and first
responders to protect the homeland.'' How can this primary
research and development arm not have any idea of the total
amount of taxpayer money being invested on technology to
detect, prevent, and mitigate threats to our Nation? This is
not the prescription to protect our homeland.
As the Chairman of this Committee's Oversight Subcommittee,
I value transparency and accountability. The S&T Directorate
needs to lay out a clear and comprehensive plan to manage
research and development activities and coordinate with other
entities to ensure the deployment of effective state-of-the-art
technology in a timely fashion. Absent a strategic technology
roadmap, our citizens will remain vulnerable to threats
stemming from our unsecure border.
Thank you, Dr. Bucshon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this very important hearing, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Subcommittee on Oversight
Chairman Paul Broun
Earlier this month, I traveled to the Southern border of our
country with the Homeland Security Committee. We held a field hearing
in McAllen, Texas, where we discussed the recent surge of unaccompanied
minors crossing the border. I was astounded to learn that the number of
children illegally entering the United States from Central America has
grown from under 5,000 a year to an estimated 57,000 so far this year.
An influx of this extent raises questions about the security of our
Southern border. Currently, border patrol agents are inundated with
processing unaccompanied minors and not fulfilling their primary
mission to safeguard the border against terrorists entering the country
under the radar.
In order to protect the nearly 2,000 mile Southwest border, patrol
agents would benefit from advances in modern technology such as video
monitors, sensors, radars, cameras, thermal-imaging devices, and
drones. However, there are many flaws within the various DHS components
that conduct technology research and development, which include
problems in the management, coordination, and acquisition of items
needed to help secure the American border.
A 2012 GAO report notes that, ``The Department of Homeland Security
does not know the total amount its components invest in research and
development and does not have policies and guidance for defining R&D
and overseeing R&D resources across the Department.'' Further, a 2013
GAO report cites examples where projects were delayed and cancelled due
to an inability to obtain data from DHS.
This is intolerable. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate
states on its own website that it is ``the primary research and
development arm of the Department of Homeland Security and manages
science and technology research, from development through transition,
for the Department's operational components and first responders to
protect the homeland.'' How can this primary research and development
arm not have any idea of the total amount of taxpayer money being
invested on technology to detect, prevent, and mitigate threats to our
nation? This is not the prescription to protect our homeland.
As the Chairman of this Committee's Oversight Subcommittee, I value
transparency and accountability. The S&T Directorate needs to lay out a
clear and comprehensive plan to manage research and development
activities, and coordinate with other entities to ensure the deployment
of effective state-of-the-art technology in a timely fashion. Absent a
strategic technology roadmap, our citizens will remain vulnerable to
the threats stemming from an unsecure border.
Thank you again, Chairman Bucshon, for holding this very important
hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you, Dr. Broun. The Chair now
recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Mr. Maffei of New York, for his opening statement.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Chairman Bucshon, for holding this hearing, and I want to
thank Chairman Broun as well and Ranking Member Lipinski.
Our current system and approach to immigration is clearly
not working. The challenges are complex and must be dealt with
in a bipartisan way. The only way to fully address these
challenges and make sure the crisis of unaccompanied children
coming over the border is taken care of is to enact bipartisan
comprehensive immigration reform. That is why I have
cosponsored the bipartisan legislation that would, bolster
security at our borders and uphold the immigration laws already
on the books. The Senate has already passed this bipartisan
immigration reform bill by a wide margin, and I do believe it
is time for the House to act as well, at least to bring it up
for a vote.
What is essential is that we strengthen our borders and
enforce our laws. That is essential to any nation's
sovereignty, to control its own borders. But I want to say that
I agree with Mr. Broun, my friend, Mr. Broun from Georgia, that
border security must be focused on keeping terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction as well as illegal firearms and
dangerous drugs entering the United States, again, the need for
reform.
For the purposes of this hearing, I look forward to hearing
witnesses' testimony on the research, development, and
implementation of new technologies on America's border and
potential new technologies that might be more effective. It is
unfortunate that the Committee was unable to obtain witnesses
from the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate or host a joint hearing with the House
Homeland Security Committee, as there is much overlap in this
area, and that would have been more helpful.
That said, I am very grateful to the Chairs for calling
this hearing. It is extremely important. It is important in my
district, which does have a border. It is a border with Canada,
but I do want to also know what is going on in the northern
border, and I know Dr. Maurer would probably share that
interest since his family is from Wayne County, which is in my
district and does have that water border with Canada.
Being able to accurately monitor the integrity of U.S.
borders is essential to maintaining border and national
security, which is essential to our sovereignty. I look forward
to our witnesses helping us to better understand the science
behind these issues, and evaluate how technology can augment
and support the human resources that are ultimately responsible
for maintaining our border security.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maffei follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Subcommittee on Research and Technology
Ranking Minority Member Dan Maffei
Thank you Chairman Broun and Chairman Buschon for holding this
hearing today.
I believe we need to get serious and work to secure and strengthen
our borders and enforce the laws already on the books. Our current
system and approach to immigration is not working and we need
comprehensive reform now, which is why I've cosponsored bipartisan
legislation that would, bolster security at our borders and uphold the
immigration laws already on the books. The Senate has already passed
this bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill by a wide margin
and it is time for the House to act as well. Border security is also
about keeping terrorists and weapons of mass destruction from reaching
our shores.
For the purposes of this hearing, I look forward to hearing witness
testimony on the research, development, and implementation of new
technologies on America's border. It is unfortunate that the Committee
was unable to obtain witnesses from the Department of Homeland
Security's Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate or host a joint
hearing with the House Homeland Security Committee, as there is much
overlap in this issue area.
My District shares a nautical border with Canada, and I would like
to know learn more about what is being done to secure the Northern
Border, in addition to the Southern Border.
Being able to accurately monitor the integrity of U.S. borders is
essential to maintaining border and national security. I look forward
to our witnesses helping us to better understand the science behind
these issues, and evaluate how technology can augment and support our
human resources that are ultimately responsible for maintaining U.S
border security.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you. I now recognize the Chairman
of the full Committee, the gentleman from Texas.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, we all are aware of the impact of illegal immigrant
children who stream across our southern border. This is both a
national security and a humanitarian crisis that we cannot
allow to continue. A country that has lost control of its
borders has lost control of its future.
The President has ignored, failed to enforce, undermined,
and unilaterally changed current immigration laws. As a result,
millions of young people have risked their lives to make the
dangerous trip and come here illegally. Further, the
Administration has yet to present a plan to secure our Nation's
borders. As border agents are forced to turn increased
attention to the surge of minors concentrated in certain areas
along the border, it leaves much of the rest of the border
unprotected.
Technology is a key component to securing our 2,000 mile
Southern border. Customs and Border Protection and National
Guard troops cannot be everywhere. Sensors deployed along the
border can detect and track the ``coyotes'' who smuggle
children as well as illegal drugs and firearms across the
border. Sensors will help Border Patrol agents know where
coyotes are so that they can intercept and stop them. And
ground-penetrating radar can find buried tunnels that
crisscross our border.
We need to get this technology in the hands of our
immigration officers. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland
Security has a poor track record when it comes to developing
and fielding sensors and tactical communications infrastructure
along the southwest border.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds the
Department of Homeland Security's research and development
efforts to be ``fragmented and overlapping.'' The Department's
Science and Technology Directorate will spend $1.2 billion this
year on numerous projects, some related to border security, but
many are not. As in previous years, the GAO found hundreds of
millions of dollars being spent each year on duplicative R&D
projects by other offices within the Department. Frankly, no
one knows who is in charge of research and development, or what
the goal is. The GAO reports that the Science and Technology
Directorate lost touch with its end users about what
technologies and R&D projects should be a priority.
Today's witnesses will testify on the need for the
Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan to secure
America's borders and how best to carry out that plan. Research
and technology are key components to securing America's
borders.
In September, we will hear from the Department of Homeland
Security Undersecretary for Science and Technology, a position
created by this Committee in founding the Department, in a
joint hearing with the Homeland Security Committee. We are
working with them on draft legislation to set priorities for
the Science and Technology Directorate on how to secure
America's borders. I look forward to working with my colleagues
in the weeks ahead to turn this goal into a reality.
While there may be mixed feelings about the current
situation on our southern border, we should all be able to
agree that we can and we must secure America's borders with the
help of technology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Full Committee
Chairman Lamar S. Smith
Thank you, Chairman Bucshon for holding this hearing. We all are
aware of the impact of illegal immigrant children who stream across our
Southern border. This is both a national security and a humanitarian
crisis that we cannot allow to continue. A country that has lost
control of its borders has lost control of its future.
The President has ignored, failed to enforce, undermined, and
unilaterally changed current immigration laws. As a result, millions of
young people have risked their lives to make the dangerous trip and
come here illegally.
Further, the Administration has yet to present a plan to secure our
nation's borders. As border agents are forced to turn increased
attention to the surge of minors concentrated in certain areas along
the border, it leaves much of the rest of the border unprotected.
Technology is a key component to securing our 2,000 mile Southern
border. Customs and Border Protection and National Guard troops cannot
be everywhere.
Sensors deployed along the border can detect and track the
``coyotes'' who smuggle children--as well as illegal drugs and
firearms--across the border. Sensors will help Border Patrol agents
know where coyotes are so that they can intercept and stop them. And
ground-penetrating radar can find buried tunnels that crisscross our
border.
We need to get this technology in the hands of our immigration
officers. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security has a poor
track record when it comes to developing and fielding sensors and
tactical communications infrastructure along the Southwest border.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds the Department of
Homeland Security's research and development (R&D) efforts to be
``fragmented and overlapping.''
The Department's Science and Technology Directorate will spend $1.2
billion this year on numerous projects, some related to border
security, but many are not. As in previous years, the GAO found
hundreds of millions of dollars being spent each year on duplicative
R&D projects by other offices within the department.
Frankly, no one knows who's in charge of research and development,
or what the goal is. The GAO reports that the Science and Technology
Directorate lost touch with its end-users about what technologies and
R&D projects should be a priority.
Today's witnesses will testify on the need for the Department of
Homeland Security to develop a plan to secure America's borders and how
best to carry out that plan. Research and technology are key components
to securing America's borders.
In September, we will hear from the Department of Homeland Security
Undersecretary for Science and Technology--a position created by this
Committee in founding the department--in a joint hearing with the
Homeland Security Committee.
We are working with them on draft legislation to set priorities for
the Science and Technology Directorate on how to secure America's
borders.I look forward to working with my colleagues in the weeks ahead
to turn this goal into a reality. While there may be mixed feelings
about the current situation on our Southern border, we should all be
able to agree that we can--and we must--secure America's borders with
the help of technology.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you, Chairman.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
Chairman Bucshon. At this point I would like to introduce
our witnesses. Our first witness, Dr. Jack Riley, is Vice
President of RAND's National Security Research Division and
Director of the National Defense Research Institute. Dr. Riley
received his bachelor's from the University of Michigan, his
master's from Georgetown, and his Ph.D. from the RAND Graduate
School.
Our second witness is Mr. David Maurer. He is a Director at
the U.S. Government Accountability Office's Homeland Security
and Justice Team. Mr. Maurer earned his bachelor's from
Michigan State, the competition right next door, and his two
master's degrees from the University of Michigan and National
Defense University.
Our third witness is Dr. Joseph Eyerman. Dr. Eyerman is Co-
Director of the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, a
senior research methodologist, and the Director of RTI
International Center for Security, Safety and Defense. Dr.
Eyerman received his bachelor's from Muskingum University, his
two master's degrees from Florida State University and Miami
University, and his Ph.D. from Florida State University.
Welcome to all our witnesses.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each after which Members of the Committee will
have five minutes each to ask questions.
It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Oversight to
receive testimony under oath. Does anyone have a problem with
that? If not, please stand and raise your right hand. Do you
solemnly swear to affirm to tell the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect that all
the witnesses--you may be seated. Let the record reflect that
all the witnesses participating have taken the oath.
At this point I recognize Dr. Riley for five minutes to
present his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. K. JACK RILEY, VICE PRESIDENT,
RAND NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION;
DIRECTOR, RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Dr. Riley. Thank you, Chairmen Bucshon and Broun and
Ranking Members Lipinski and Maffei, for the opportunity to
testify today about strategic planning and technology needs for
air, land and sea border security.
Almost exactly eight years ago, I testified before two
Homeland Security Subcommittees on this same topic, and at that
time I said, and I quote, ``We have woefully underinvested in
developing, evaluating and refining a comprehensive and
integrated border security strategy. We have invested in
numerous border security programs and initiatives but the
impacts and the costs and the cost-effectiveness of virtually
all of these initiatives are poorly understood.''
Unfortunately, nearly a decade later, the same concerns
still largely apply. So let me turn to three points that I will
make in this testimony.
First, we need to invest in measurement and data so that we
have an empirical basis from which to have policy debates;
second, we need to invest in more systematically understanding
the cost-effectiveness of programs and policies; and third and
finally, we need to systematically track and document how
border control efforts affect the larger economy and society.
Let me start my first point by explaining why the data gaps
are so worrisome. Effective border security begins with
understanding why and how people and contraband cross the
border. Different motivations may require different policies.
Migration, for example, motivated by the desire for economic
betterment may be best controlled by a combination of border
deterrence and labor-market enforcement. In contrast, smuggling
of contraband may be best addressed by deterrence and
technological detection.
In my written testimony, I detail some of the ways in which
we can capture this kind of data. However, as far as I can
tell, none of these estimation methods have been formally
adopted nor do they receive continued support for development
and refinement. They should, however, so that they can become
the foundation for a border security scorecard.
I will turn now to my second point, why it is important to
know about cost-effectiveness. Imagine that Secretary Johnson
is presented with the opportunity to add 10,000 Border Patrol
agents. Using the kind of data I just mentioned, he could not
only assess the effectiveness of additional agents but give
guidance on where and how to deploy them. We could also give
guidance on what technologies might be good substitutes for or
complements to the additional personnel. But equally
importantly, we could say something about how migrants and
smugglers would adapt to the presence of additional personnel.
Indeed, with better data, we might be able to predict how
behavior might adapt, and correspondingly modify our policies.
At minimum, we would likely detect the changes in behavior
earlier, which in turn would help improving future
policymaking.
Third, a word about the broader economic and social
implications of the border. Policies designed to improve
control over the border can propagate widely throughout the
economy and society. To give one example, after 9/11 we changed
visa policies to make it more difficult for terrorists to
travel to the United States. However, by making it more
difficult, we deter not only terrorists but also an unknown
number of legitimate travelers--foreign tourists, foreign
students, qualified foreign workers, whose presence provide
great benefits to our economy and the vibrancy of our culture.
In short, border enforcement directly and indirectly touches on
every aspect of the economy and our livelihoods, and we should
be systemically tracking these effects so that we understand
the full costs and the full benefits of border security
programs.
At the beginning of this oral statement I mentioned I have
three points. However, I want to add a fourth. Border security
is one of the greatest analytic challenges of the post-9/11
generation. It is a topic that can and should attract the best
and the brightest minds. But it remains frustratingly difficult
to work on the topic both because of departmental restrictions
on access to the data that are collected and also because of
departmental restrictions on publishing and academic
engagement. Good science demands public scrutiny and rigorous
academic engagement. I urge this Committee and the
Subcommittees to exercise its oversight role and help make this
topic better grounded in science and more attractive to the
best analysts and researchers.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Riley follows:]
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Chairman Bucshon. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Mr. Maurer for five minutes for his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID C. MAURER,
DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Bucshon, Chairman Broun,
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Lipinski, Ranking Member Maffei,
and Members and staff. I am pleased to be here this morning to
talk about the results of our recently issued work looking at
research and development at the Department of Homeland Security
and how those efforts are being used to enhance border
security.
R&D matters at DHS for a couple of reasons. First, the
taxpayers provide DHS over $1 billion a year to support
research and development. For that reason alone, the Department
needs to ensure its R&D activities work as planned. R&D can
also help DHS better execute its various missions. For example,
improved technology to detect people or nuclear material helps
DHS secure the border and ultimately the homeland.
DHS has made important strides in recent years towards
taking a more strategic approach. For example, the Science and
Technology Directorate has a strategic plan, periodically
reviews its portfolio of projects, and has developed new ways
to coordinate with other DHS components. That last point is
especially important since S&T strives to conduct its R&D work
side by side with the eventual end users. But that said, DHS
clearly has a lot of work ahead to bring coherence and
structure to its research and development efforts.
Our work over the past two years identified three key areas
where DHS needs to improve. We found that DHS needed to define
R&D, do a better job tracking R&D, and improve how it
coordinates R&D. I will briefly expand on these three points.
In September 2012, we reported that DHS lacked a common
definition of research and development, and we found a lot of
activity across the Department that could be considered R&D,
and by law, S&T is responsible for coordinating and overseeing
all of it, but they can't do that if the various DHS components
aren't working from the same definition and agree on what
should be coordinated. Our work also found several problems in
DHS's efforts to essentially track R&D. As it turned out, DHS
struggled to answer basic questions such as how much are you
spending, which components are doing R&D, what projects are
currently underway, and do completed projects meet the needs of
their customers. For example, we found that DHS did not know
how much its components invested in R&D, and that makes it
really difficult to oversee activities across the entire
Department. This inability to centrally track R&D also places
DHS at risk of overlapping and duplicative efforts. We
identified 35 instances where contracted R&D activity in one
component overlapped with another.
Our work also identified problems in DHS's ability to
coordinate R&D. There are several R&D coordination mechanisms
within DHS but they need to work better. For example, the
report we issued last year on border and maritime found a mixed
picture.
The good news is that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
and the Coast Guard regularly reach out to end users of their
completed R&D Projects. However, S&T lacked any formal approach
to follow-up with the end users of its deliverables. S&T's
customers are also much more likely to report that S&T
deliverables did not meet end-user needs, and in some
instances, we were unable to locate an end user for an S&T
project. For example, S&T spent more than $1 million on a
project to enhance CBP's ability to track maritime vessels
without having a specific customer at CBP. Our recent work also
found problems in DHS's coordination of R&D work with the
national labs.
So what is DHS doing to better define, track and coordinate
R&D? On the plus side, the Department now has a common
definition for R&D, and that is an important first step.
However, while DHS has taken some actions, they are still not
sufficient to address our recommendations to improve how they
track and coordinate R&D, and that is important because clearly
defined, closely tracked and well-coordinated R&D activities
will help translate state-of-the-art science into usable tools
that can help enhance the security of our borders. We will keep
the Committee informed on the Department's ongoing efforts to
address our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. That concludes my opening remarks.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
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Chairman Bucshon. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Dr. Eyerman for five minutes for his
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH D. EYERMAN, DIRECTOR,
HEALTH SECURITY PROGRAM, RTI INTERNATIONAL;
DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT,
INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY SOLUTIONS,
DUKE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Eyerman. Good morning, Chairman Bucshon, Chairman
Broun, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Lipinski and Ranking
Member Maffei, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I
thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding
technology needed to secure America's borders. I have prepared
written testimony, and request that it be entered into the
record.
I have been working closely with DHS Science and Technology
Directorate on a series of program and technology evaluations
for the past six years in my role as Director of the Institute
for Homeland Security Solutions at RTI International. Our work
with DHS is part of a larger RTI Project to better understand
the human factors that contribute to the transition of new
technologies into the public sector and the private market.
I am a social scientist by training, and in my role with
IHSS, I have had the opportunity to apply social science
research methods to the evaluation of DHS programs and the
application of new technologies. In my expert opinion, social
science can help us understand the general public, that is, the
customers, and the DHS staff who will use the new technologies.
This is just as important when developing technologies for
securing our borders as it is for the next big project from
Apple or Google. Failure to understand the customer can cause
us to develop new technologies that are never adopted or never
used to their full potential. This increases cost and delays
the transition to application.
In our work with the DHS, we use social science methods to
support technology development by S&T programs to better
understand the end users and customers and things like staffing
and training requirements, usability of the new technology, and
public perceptions about privacy and safety. As part of our
work, we have been fortunate enough to employ these methods in
support of several DHS technologies including a DHS S&T-funded
assessment of the rapid DNA pilot test, part of a study to
develop technology for field DNA tests to support applications
by refugees for entrance into the United States; a DHS S&T-
funded examination of non-technical barriers encountered by
program managers designed to identify trends and patterns that
can guide the program managers in the transition of future
technologies; and finally, an assessment of non-technical
factors that will contribute to the safe and successful
transition of unmanned aircraft into the routine aspects of our
economic and social lives.
Some of the key findings of these studies that are relevant
to the transition of DHS technology to border security are,
first, strong and potentially beneficial technologies can be
derailed by non-technical problems stemming from a failure to
understand the needs and abilities of the workforce, the
complexities of public perceptions and the willingness of the
public to accept certain types of technologies into their daily
lives. Second, the social science evaluation model is rarely
applied to new technologies by DHS, and when it is applied, it
is used in a limited and non-standard manner. This may delay
the transition of technologies and may limit our ability to
assess the impact and effectiveness of those technologies on
the agency missions. Finally, complex technologies can develop
at a slower rate than the operational realities of the
components. This often results in technologies that are
developed without a clear operational partner for
implementation because needs have changed and priorities have
shifted.
My written testimony includes more detail on these and
other technology assessments. We continue to examine these
challenges and make recommendations for changes that will
expedite the transition process to bring new technologies to
bear on our security needs in a more efficient and timely
manner.
Thank you for your interest, and thank you for any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Eyerman follows:]
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Chairman Bucshon. Thank you very much. I want to thank the
witnesses for their testimony, and at this point remind Members
that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. The
Chair at this point will open the round of questions. I
recognize myself for five minutes.
Dr. Riley, what is the feasibility of adopting existing
surveillance systems such as those used in Iraq and Afghanistan
on the southern border?
Dr. Riley. It is hard to answer the question without
additional information.
Chairman Bucshon. Well, for example, DoD has surveillance
equipment that we currently use in Iraq and Afghanistan, mobile
equipment and others that have some potential that we may not
need to do duplicative scientific and technical research on
that would make them applicable with the dual-use purpose of
being used on the southern border, a similar concept.
Dr. Riley. I would be in favor of a structured test to
understand how they would work at the U.S. border and in which
ways they can be effective, but at this point I am not
convinced that we need significant investment in new
technologies more than we need careful assessment of what we
already have in place and how well the pieces work together.
Chairman Bucshon. Understood.
Mr. Maurer, from your past work with S&T, what are the most
important lessons learned that you would like--you would share
with the new S&T leadership?
Mr. Maurer. Well, I think first and foremost, I would
highlight the two remaining outstanding areas they have to show
some more progress on, which is namely do a better job tracking
and a better job coordinating the R&D efforts, not just within
the Science and Technology Directorate but across the entire
Department. S&T has had statutory responsibility, and frankly,
they have struggled with having a close--having close
coordination with some of the other operational components that
are doing R&D activities. I would encourage them to take action
on that front and ensure that what they--the other thing I
would have them do is ensure that they are more tightly in tune
with the needs of the eventual end users of the technologies
they are developing. They are making strides toward that. His
predecessor spent a lot of time and effort trying to get S&T
more tightly bound with not just R&D but getting involved in
acquisition as well, and I think that is a good step.
Chairman Bucshon. I would agree with that, that it may very
well be important to coordinate with the potential end user,
although sometimes the end users don't really know what they
might need until the inventors or people invent something that
might be useful. I think Apple did that. That was kind of why
they did no product research because they felt like people
didn't really know what they would use until you develop it. So
there is two arguments there, but I do think better
coordination is very important.
Through its authorizing statute, DHS S&T is responsible for
developing a national policy and strategic plan for the federal
government's civilian efforts to identify and develop
countermeasures for emerging terrorist threats. S&T is also
tasked with coordinating the development and management of
science and technology agenda for DHS. To the best of my
knowledge, DHS S&T has not yet accomplished either of these
responsibilities.
Dr. Riley and Mr. Maurer, both of you testified about the
lack of coordination for border technology R&D within DHS. As
we look toward reauthorizing the S&T Directorate, should these
strategic planning and coordination responsibilities remain
within DHS S&T? If so, how can we prompt movement on these
important tasks? If not, where might they better be situated,
and why? Mr. Maurer?
Mr. Maurer. Yeah, I think it is important under the current
statutory framework for S&T and the Department to do what the
law required them to do, which is establish a strategy for
within the Department and work with our partners across
government. The broader policy issue of whether they should
continue to have that responsibility and others, there is
reauthorization language, is really a policy consideration. One
thing that is important to keep in mind is that the amount of
money that DHS spends on R&D is about one-sixth of the total
that is spent across the entire federal government on Homeland
Security-related R&D. So somebody somewhere is going to have to
be involved in trying to bring coherence and coordination and
oversight on that--on those funds.
Chairman Bucshon. Dr. Riley?
Dr. Riley. I will just add that one of the things that may
or may not help--I am not sure I have made up my mind on this--
is better use of Under Secretary of Policy in the Department of
Homeland Security. Right now that is an Assistant Secretary
position, and one of the ways in which stitches may be dropped
between the generation of technology and implementation and
effective use of them is perhaps not having a counterpart on
policy formulation and execution.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you. I recognize Mr. Lipinski for
his line of questioning.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you.
Dr. Eyerman, you have been working directly with DHS S&T
for the past six years in evaluating their programs. In the
latter part of your testimony, you listed a variety of barriers
to successful transition of new technologies from the
laboratory to the operational setting in the DHS components.
Could you elaborate on what DHS can do to further the transfer
of technology to users, and do you have any idea what has held
DHS back in developing a strategy to address these challenges?
Dr. Eyerman. Thank you for your question, Mr. Lipinski. I
would say there are two issues that have affected the ability
to increase the involvement of social science research in DHS
technology transition. One is the absence of a standardized
process for inserting social science research that involves the
end users and the customers and the DHS staff in the study
design, the project implementation and the assessment of the
results, and I think that is primarily due to a lack of
coordination within S&T around the social sciences. At one
point there was a division in S&T focused on the human factors.
That division has been removed and merged in with another
division, and staff have been eliminated.
Mr. Lipinski. Was there any particular reason that that was
removed that you know of?
Dr. Eyerman. I don't know the reason behind that. That is
beyond my knowledge. I do know that many of the staff were
retained but the second barrier, I think, to the adoption is
the number of staff that are focused on social science research
methods at DHS. I think the first issue could be addressed with
better coordination and planning and a standardized process for
inserting evaluation of the customers and the workers in the
R&D cycle. The second one is more of a staffing and budget
issue.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you.
Dr. Riley, you mentioned in your testimony that after many
years, we are still lacking the analytic capability to measure
the effectiveness of our border security tools and policy
mechanisms. I understand your solution for measuring this is
further investment in developing a strategy for R&D and
investment in technology infrastructure. Considering there are
various types of illegal border activity with no one-size-fits-
all solution, what types of technologies should we invest in to
get the necessary data and models?
Dr. Riley. Well, in terms of technology development and
investment in that area, I think one of the things I would be
looking for is a tighter and better designed requirements
generation process so that we understand where the frontline
providers of border security feel the need for new technologies
and perceive the need for additional technology development.
There has been some progress made in that area but generally,
for example, the connection between technology transfer and
requirements development in DHS is not as mature as it is, say,
in the Department of Defense.
Mr. Lipinski. What is the reason for that? Just, it has not
been developed?
Dr. Riley. I think growing pains, and there are significant
structural differences between the Department of Defense and
the Department of Homeland Security but I think the mere
process of trying to incorporate all of the different elements
that went into DHS and get them functioning smoothly is
probably a limiting factor.
Mr. Lipinski. Okay. And Mr. Maurer, according to multiple
GAO reports, DHS is missing a strategic plan, which we had
talked about. Further, it can't track its investments in R&D
and thus cannot identify the total investment it has made in
R&D. GAO has made recommendations to solve these problems but
DHS has been quite vague, saying that it has taken some steps
to update guidance. Since your office has been monitoring their
progress, do you have an idea as to what has been getting in
the way of developing this plan?
Mr. Maurer. That is a really good question because we have
been recommending--some of this goes back to a report that was
issued two years ago, so DHS would be better placed to give the
specific reasons. Our sense is that they certainly made
progress on defining R&D, so that is the first step, but we
would like to see them develop a strategy for the whole
Department. We would like to see them develop a way to clearly
articulate what processes and coordination mechanisms need to
be in place, have a more effective way of implementing the
various R&D projects across the Department. I would hope that
the relatively new Under Secretary would take this on as one of
his top priorities in his new role.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. That--I yield back.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you, and I now recognize Chairman
Broun for five minutes.
Chairman Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow
up on a question. In my opening statement, I mentioned that DHS
needs a technology roadmap to manage its R&D activities. What
is DHS's biggest impediment to developing that organized and
comprehensive national border security strategy? I will start
with Mr. Maurer.
Mr. Maurer. I would say that probably the biggest challenge
they face is just the sheer complexity of the task that they
are trying to accomplish. It involves predominantly at CBP but
it is going to involve Science and Technology and other parts
of the Department as well. It is a multifaceted problem, which
touches on many different aspects of the Department, so it is a
difficult challenge that they face, and trying to come up with
a comprehensive strategy is also difficult. Now, we have been
somewhat critical of the Department on different aspects of
border security and their ability to measure the impact of the
technology investments, for example, that they have made over
the past many years. If they can make progress on that front,
that would help get them further down the road where they need
to be on developing a comprehensive strategy for border
security.
Chairman Broun. Well, if you can give us part of what we
call QFR, questions for the record, recommendations of how to
get over this impediment.
Dr. Riley, do you have any comments on this also?
Dr. Riley. Just jotting a note to myself. The border is
obviously a complex issue. Different pieces of bureaucracy even
within the Department of Homeland Security touch on the border,
and nobody really owns it. We need to find a way to get a
greater single point of accountability on the breadth of border
issues, whether that is something that is, as I said in
previous comment, integrated in an Under Secretary for Policy,
whether it is the appointment of a border czar as we have done
on other policy issues in other contexts. I am not quite sure.
But there is no single point of accountability on the border,
and having that may be something that prompts progress.
Chairman Broun. Mr. Maurer, let me read to you a few
sentences from your own testimony related to DHS R&D
activities. You said, ``S&T officials told us at the time that
a process did not exist at DHS or within S&T to prevent overlap
or unnecessary duplication. We also found in September 2012
that neither DHS nor S&T tracked all ongoing R&D projects
across the Department including R&D activities contracted
through the National Laboratories. As part of our review, we
identified 11 components that reimbursed the National
Laboratories for R&D from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, but
S&T's Office of National Laboratories could not provide us with
any information on those activities and told us it did not
track them. As of July 2014, DHS has not developed new policy
guidance.''
These are issues going back for a couple of years. Now, I
understand that in some areas, DHS appears to be taking initial
steps to meet GAO's multiple recommendations such as conducting
portfolio reviews across the Department and collecting feedback
from customers, but this Department is no longer in its
infancy. In fact, it has been around for over a decade now, and
when I read that DHS has not yet determined the most effective
path to guide R&D across the Department or that S&T has not
developed new policy guidance, I have to ask, should some or
all of DHS's R&D components be placed on GAO's high-risk list,
which, as you know, is reserved for agencies in program areas
vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement, or are
they in most need of transformation? So should they be on the
high-risk list?
Mr. Maurer. Well, to some extent, they already are. We have
an existing high-risk area for----
Chairman Broun. But have you named them on the high-risk
list?
Mr. Maurer. Specifically to R&D?
Chairman Broun. Yes.
Mr. Maurer. We don't have a specific shout-out to R&D but
the problems that they face in terms of coordination and
tracking are rooted in more fundamental issues with the
Department's inability to stitch itself together in a
comprehensive way, so we have a high-risk area for management
at DHS, which has been critical of DHS's efforts to develop a
common approach to acquisition and financial management,
information technology, human capital. A lot of these things
are the building blocks of organizations, and to some extent
are some of the root causes as to why DHS doesn't have
visibility over R&D spending. They don't have the financial
systems that allow them to do that, for example.
Chairman Broun. Well, my time is about up. I encourage you
to put them on the high-risk list because just by your own
testimony, there is just tremendous problems there, and I think
they should be and I encourage you to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you. Votes have been called but we
do have some time, so we are going to go ahead--I am going to
go ahead and recognize Mr. Maffei for his line of questioning,
and then we will see where we are and then go from there.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Maurer, first of all, I apologize for giving you a
doctorate in my opening statement. You can pick that up after
the hearing.
I really appreciate the work of all the witnesses on this,
and it has been a very informative hearing.
One thing I want to ask you, Mr. Maurer, is, DHS has had
some rather large R&D failures. One example is that they
canceled a very large and one of the most comprehensive
technological investments, SBInet, after investing nearly a
billion dollars. Has this changed at all the way they are
approaching it, and are they able to salvage any of that
technology?
Mr. Maurer. You are absolutely right. SBInet was a failed
project at DHS. DHS has a slightly different approach to
developing new technology for the border. They have the Arizona
Technology Plan. DHS's current approach is to rely more
extensively on commercial off-the-shelf technology and using
that to deploy for security--for helping secure the border. We
still have some concerns about how that particular program is
being implemented, specifically in the area of testing. We have
issued reports and we have testified previously that we don't
believe that the amount of testing that is going to be done for
the Arizona Technology Plan is sufficient. That was one of the
root causes of the problems that plagued SBInet, so our hope is
that DHS will take us up and adopt our recommendation.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you.
Dr. Riley, can you give me any sense, how robust is this
technology? I don't want to be cynical but sometimes you get
the impression that--I mean, I have got a bunch of friends from
high school who are really good technically and they could come
up, set up motion sensors, cameras, lasers, even UAVs now, and
for much a cheaper cost do a lot of the same thing. Tell me I
am wrong.
Dr. Riley. The technologies are good and mature. I think
one of the areas where DHS and, frankly, many government
agencies struggle is kind of the tooth to tail, where do you
have the people to back up and integrate with the technology to
make the most and best effective use of it. DHS is making
progress in this area. Their acquisition processes are
maturing, but they are certainly not perfect at this point.
Mr. Maffei. Thanks.
Dr. Eyerman, do you have anything to add, particularly
involving that human--the human element there?
Dr. Eyerman. Absolutely. I completely agree with Dr.
Riley's comments. We worked on an evaluation of a technology
for biometric identification at the airports. The technology
was quite ready. It was off the shelf. It was effective. The
problem was, is the technology couldn't be integrated into the
human systems, and that is where it would break down, because
if it was integrated into the human systems, it would result in
large delays at the airport. It was unclear who would be
responsible for implementing the technology, and there were
serious cost implications for the airlines which couldn't be
addressed by the technology, only by research into the humans.
Mr. Maffei. Thank you very much. I am going to yield my
final two minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut, Ms.
Esty.
Ms. Esty. Thank you.
A quick question, a follow-up for you, Mr. Maurer. You had
mentioned that only a sixth of the R&D funding around border
issues is actually done with DHS. We have already heard
considerable testimony how that isn't even managed very well.
So where is the other five-sixths? Who are the lead agencies
and how should we be thinking about who sets the strategic
goals, how can they be better coordinated? I would really like
your advice, and then if others want to chime in. Thank you.
Mr. Maurer. Sure. Absolutely. DHS is one-sixth of the total
pie for all of Homeland Security R&D, so we don't know how it
breaks out specifically for border, but the other five-sixths
for all Homeland Security, a lot of it is being done at DoD and
the Department of Health and Human Services. Writ large one
thing that would help that overall coordination is the
development of the statutorily required, government-wide
approach to Homeland Security R&D, and that is something that
has been on the books for a number of years.
Ms. Esty. Thank you. Anybody else?
Dr. Riley. I will just say that I think in conversations
and discussion about the border, it is common to lapse into
thinking only about the southern land border and we really need
to be more careful thinking holistically about air, sea and
land borders north and south.
Ms. Esty. Coming from Connecticut, we think about this in
terms of our ports, and it is an issue. We have the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve in my state. We have nuclear plants all up
and down the East Coast that are right on the coast, and I
heartily agree. We can't just be thinking about the southern
border. Thank you.
Chairman Bucshon. I now yield to the Chairman of the full
Committee, Mr. Smith.
Chairman Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to enter into the record two
items from Petro Data Communications.
Chairman Bucshon. No objections. So ordered.
Chairman Smith. Thank you.
[The information appears in Appendix I]
Chairman Smith. And let me say to our witnesses, we are
going to try to squeeze in two more questions in the next 7 or
8 minutes, so if you could give brief responses to my
questions, we will see if that works.
Dr. Riley, let me address my first question to you, and
that is, in 2011, the Administration canceled a Secure Border
Initiative. In 2012, it withdrew 1,200 National Guard troops
from the border. Do you think the result of those actions made
it easier for illegal immigrants to cross the border?
Dr. Riley. It is difficult to say, Mr. Chairman, but both
of those were important initiatives that I frankly would like
to see followed through on in the near future.
Chairman Smith. Okay. Thank you.
My next question is to all three of you all, if you would,
and that is, how would you grade the Department of Homeland
Security on its use of technology today to secure the border?
Real quickly, Dr. Riley?
Dr. Riley. Incomplete.
Chairman Smith. Dr. Maurer?
Mr. Maurer. I would say the same thing, incomplete.
Chairman Smith. Okay. And Dr. Eyerman?
Dr. Eyerman. I agree.
Chairman Smith. Okay. What type of technology are they
using, Dr. Riley or Dr. Maurer?
Mr. Maurer. There is a large range of technologies from
unmanned aerial stats and----
Chairman Smith. You are saying just a lot more they could
be doing? Is that what you meant by ``incomplete''?
Dr. Riley. It is simply too complicated an issue to grade
out in a few minutes before a Committee like this, I think.
Chairman Smith. Okay. Well, we will take the ``incomplete''
for the time being.
Mr. Maurer, I want to ask you a question about the GAO. In
2011, you took a look at, I think, 873 miles of border and you
said only 15 percent was under control of the Border Patrol.
What did you mean by ``under control''? How would you define
that?
Mr. Maurer. In that report, we were using a measure that
CBP used at that time for operational control of the border.
CBP no longer uses that particular measure in their effort to
assess border security.
Chairman Smith. But my question was, what did the
definition mean when you undertook this study of control of the
border only 15 percent?
Mr. Maurer. I think that was part of the problem, and that
is part of the reason why CBP moved away from that definition.
It was open to a wide interpretation.
Chairman Smith. I think the reason they moved away because
it was embarrassing that only 15 percent of the border was
under full control, myself, but again, full control, I was told
in a previous hearing, meant that there was a high likelihood
that illegal immigrants would be intercepted.
Mr. Maurer. That is correct. That tracks back to the work
that we did in 2011.
Chairman Smith. Okay. Which led to 85 percent of the border
under something less than full control.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield now the
remainder of my time to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Schweikert.
Chairman Bucshon. I ask unanimous consent to allow Mr.
Schweikert to participate in the hearing. Without objection,
the Chair then-- it is ordered.
Mr. Schweikert. You mean I could have objected to myself
being here?
Okay. Let us see if we can do a quick lightning round here.
Dr. Riley, in your written testimony, and I think actually in
your spoken testimony, there was a comment about some of the
access to data and how much data was sort of off the books or
you were not allowed to gain access to. Can you give me a quick
snippet of how that affects trying to create policy and design?
Dr. Riley. It limits the ability to interact in the
academic and analytic communities, and it has a stifling effect
on being able to develop innovative approaches to border
security.
Mr. Schweikert. So if Dr. Eyerman is trying to look at data
sets to build human interaction, he doesn't actually have
enough robust data sets to work from?
Dr. Riley. It is not only the availability of the data,
although that is certainly the case. Those data need to be
collected and the data sets built, but it is also the ability
to draw on our academic partners. IHSS has a consortium with
Duke and UNC, and many of the universities won't work on data
that is not publishable.
Mr. Schweikert. Well, and formerly Dr. Mr. Maurer, you
actually almost just touched on this, that for many of us who
are trying to get our heads around border policy, being from a
border state, the definitions keep changing on me. One day we
calculate it this way, the next day we calculate it this way.
One day, for human smuggling, you know, if you are captured in
this distance, you are considered deportation. The next day
that is redefined. When you are doing your analysis, is this a
continued problem of constantly moving the definitions, let
alone the access to the actual data for the researchers?
Mr. Maurer. That certainly makes it more difficult to have
a consistent--they don't have consistent measures for assessing
border security, and they change from year to year going back
to 2011, so that does make that more challenging. And we have
had reports that have talked about the important need for that,
most critically having a need to assess the impact of the
technologies that have been deployed on the border. We have
been critical of CBP's inability to demonstrate the extent to
which deployed technology, what impact it has security.
Mr. Schweikert. Mr. Chairman, I know I am over time but
from my understanding, this is actually a bigger issue than a
lot of people understand. It is hard to know what you are
chasing when two things happen: they don't tell you or they
change that definition. And then there's the whole more
cultural decision of can you ever have a large bureaucracy be
as nimble and flexible when trying to design fixed technologies
when the other side is incentivized to constantly beat that
technology and be more nimble for the profit side. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Bucshon. Thank you.
At this point I would like to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony. We will not be returning after votes. We
will be adjourning here shortly as everyone has been able to
ask their questions. Your written testimony and your oral
testimony is very valuable to the Subcommittee. Members of the
Committee may have additional questions for you, and we will
ask that you respond to those in writing. The record will
remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written
questions from Members.
At this point the witnesses are excused and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. K. Jack Riley
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses by Mr. David C. Maurer
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
Prepared statement of Full Committee
Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Additional supporting information requested by
Full Committee Chairman Lamar S. Smith
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]