[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING TERRORISM IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-61
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Filemon Vela, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Vacancy
Steve Daines, Montana Vacancy
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Vice Loretta Sanchez, California
Chair William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Vacancy (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., Analyst and Advisory Board Member,
Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. William F. Roggio, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Andrew C. Kuchins, Ph.D., Director and Senior Fellow, Russia
and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
ASSESSING TERRORISM IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND
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Thursday, April 3, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King and Higgins.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. King. Good afternoon. The Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will
come to order. Ranking Member Higgins is not here, but I have
discussed that with him. In view of the votes that will be
coming up sometime in the next 15 minutes or half-hour we are
going to start the hearing and the Ranking Member will deliver
his statement when he arrives.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining terrorism in the Caucasus and the threat which that
poses to the homeland. I recognize myself for an opening
statement, which I will keep brief. I will include my full
statement in the record.
Caucasus are a volatile region, home to several extremist
networks that are aligning themselves with al-Qaeda's global
jihadist movement and spreading out to join conflicts outside
their traditional homeland.
Most alarmingly, we saw this with the Boston bombers, and
showing that this conflict has inspired violent extremism
around the world, including the U.S. homeland. Sadly, we
approach the 1-year anniversary of the Boston Marathon
bombings, that were at least partly inspired by the insurgency
in the Caucasus and caused three deaths and more than 200
serious injuries. Militants from the region have also
reportedly fought in the Balkans, attacked U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have taken leadership positions
with terrorist organizations in Syria, such as the al-Nusra
Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
In this hearing, we will explore the threat that these
groups pose both inside and outside the region, as well as
examine the potential these networks may eventually pose to
U.S. interests. Also, we will discuss the extent to which the
Russian invasion of Crimea could impact any cooperation we have
with the Russians regarding working against these terrorist
groups. I look forward to the hearing, and I really want to
thank the witnesses for being here.
As I said, I will insert the remainder of my statement into
the record, unless the Ranking Member objects.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
April 3, 2014
The Caucasus are a volatile region home to several extremist
networks that are aligning themselves with al-Qaeda's global jihadist
movement, and spreading out to join conflicts outside their traditional
homeland. Most alarmingly as we saw with the Boston bombers, this
conflict has inspired violent extremism around the world, including the
U.S. homeland.
Sadly, we approach the 1-year anniversary of the Boston Marathon
bombings that were at least partly inspired by the insurgency in the
Caucasus that caused 3 deaths and more than 200 serious injuries.
Militants from the region have also reportedly fought in the
Balkans, attacked U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have
taken leadership positions with terrorist organizations in Syria, such
as al-Nusra front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
This hearing will explore the threat that these groups pose both inside
and outside the region, as well as examine the potential threat these
networks may eventually pose to United States interests.
While al-Qaeda senior leadership is weakened, its brand and
ideology is thriving and spreading. The Arab Spring, U.S. troop
withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan and the civil war in Syria have
breathed new life into al-Qaeda. Today we see elements of al-Qaeda
operating in 16 countries, new jihadist media publications that
leverage the latest social media technology to reach new audiences
inspiring violence around the globe, and a growing army of jihadists
gaining battlefield experience in the Syrian conflict.
Instability in the ethnically-diverse Caucasus region has been an
on-going problem for centuries: A simmering cauldron mostly contained
within the borders of the Russian Federation. In recent years the
Russian government's tactics have transformed the battle from a
nationalist fight, with anti-Russian roots to a struggle based on
Islamist ideology. This conflict is now showing signs of boiling over
into unstable havens of terrorist activity in other parts of the world,
and is threatening Europe and potentially the homeland.
We also have to examine recent actions by Russia to annex Crimea,
part of the sovereign nation of Ukraine. How will these actions and
whatever additional hostile actions Russia may take in the region
impact intent of the Caucasus Emirate?
Chechens trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to the
September 11, 2001 attacks, and Osama bin Laden's network supplied
fighters and funds to them during the second Chechen war.\1\ A Chechen
now leads the ISIS forces in northern Syria and has masterminded a
series of strategic defeats of Assad's troops.\2\
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\1\ Zachary Laub, ``Instability in Russia's North Caucasus Region''
Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 2014, available at: http://
www.cfr.org/russian-federation/instability-russias-north-caucasus-
region/p9021.
\2\ Alan Cullison, ``Meet the Rebel Commander in Syria that Assad,
Russia and the U.S. All Fear'', Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2013,
available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303309504579181962177007316.
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While the current threat to homeland from the Caucasus today
appears minor, we must remember that we have made the mistake of
underestimating the threat from terrorists in places like Afghanistan,
Somalia, and Yemen before. The Obama administration designated the now-
deceased leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku Umarov, as a global
terrorist in 2010 and the United Nations Security Council al-Qaeda
Sanctions Committee has both Umarov and the Caucasus Emirate on its
list of terrorists.
As this subcommittee has stressed time and again, global terrorism
does not require regiments of hardened soldiers with sophisticated
weapons to have a lasting impact on society. Rather, a handful of
committed murderers using household pressure cookers, or hijacking
commercial airplanes can fundamentally change the course of history if
they are disciplined and able to successfully conduct just one or two
dramatic acts of violence. Al-Qaeda is an opportunistic ideological
movement that thrives in ungoverned spaces such as the Caucasus.
Fifteen years ago, most experts would not have forecasted an attack
on the homeland to originate from Nigeria, Pakistan, or Yemen, but this
committee's mandate is to examine emerging threats to homeland security
and I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses regarding the
state of terrorist groups in the Caucasus, and the export of jihadists
from the region to Syria and other safe havens of terrorist activity
that threaten the United States and the West.
Mr. King. I am pleased to welcome the Ranking Member, Mr.
Higgins, from New York and ask him if he wants to give an
opening statement.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I will submit my opening statement for the record so
that we can get right to the panel of expert witnesses.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
April 3, 2014
I look forward to hearing today's testimony as we continue to
expand our knowledge of the threats, groups, and counterterrorism
efforts within the Caucasus region. Several inter-ethnic conflicts that
developed at the end of the Soviet Union remain unresolved and continue
to fuel tensions within the Caucasus region.
Specifically, a historical exclusionary political system and
competition over land and resources has fueled conflicts in the multi-
ethnic Russian republics of the North Caucasus. While several
extremists groups have emerged and then later disappeared as a result
of these conflicts, one group, the Caucus Emirate, remains active
today. The Caucasus Emirate has admitted to planning and executing
numerous terror attacks in the Caucasus region and in Moscow since its
founding in 2007. Two of the most deadly attacks claimed by the
Caucasus Emirate have occurred in Moscow.
On March 29, 2010, two suicide bombers killed 40 people and wounded
more than 100 people after attacking two metro stations. On January 24,
2011 a suicide attack at Moscow's busiest international airport killed
35 people and wounded as many as 180 people. While all of the attacks
executed by the Caucasus Emirates deserve our attention, I am
especially concerned by these two attacks on high-impact transportation
targets.
As the Representative of the Buffalo-Niagara region, I have a keen
awareness and concern for high-impact transit targets. Buffalo is home
to the Peace Bridge, one of the busiest crossings at the Northern
Border. Over 30 billion dollars of annual commerce travels through the
Peace Bridge in Buffalo, Niagara region. An attack, similar to those
carried out by the Caucasus Emirate in this area could be catastrophic.
For this reason and many more, I remain disturbed that the Buffalo-
Niagara Region is not considered ``high-risk'' enough for State and
locals in this area to receive funding under The Department of Homeland
Security's Urban Area Security Initiative ``UASI'' program.
Without UASI funding, the local law enforcement and emergency
personnel do not have the ability to sustain the advancements they have
made since 9/11. How can the Buffalo-Niagara region be expected to
protect and respond to attacks and threats without the same basic
funding provided to other, less utilized transit targets?
I want to emphasize that many experts assert that based on known
threats and capabilities an attack on the United States from the
Caucasus Emirate or other Caucasian groups is unlikely as these groups
are generally not preoccupied with the United States. However, the
Caucasus Emirate has stated that it has no conflict with the United
States and it will not harm any civilians, including Russians, yet this
has not always been the case. Therefore, I believe it is fair to both
consider and discuss this group and others in a global context, their
roles within the larger global jihadi network.
Mr. King. All right. I thank the Ranking Member. I also
acknowledge that the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee is
here and remind all the Members of the committee that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 3, 2014
I would also like to thank the witnesses for testifying to further
this committee's efforts to better understanding terrorist threats,
their makeup, and the activities of extremists groups within the
Caucasus region.
The Boston Marathon bombing and the Sochi Olympics spurred a
growing interest in the Caucasus region, and I commend the subcommittee
for exploring the topic. However, the subcommittee must be cautious in
its approach. There is an opinion that many within the Caucasus region
have been radicalized into an extremist mentality of global war. Many
want to suggest this was the mentality of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, brother of
alleged co-conspirator Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
Mr. Chairman, like I have reminded you that on several occasions
throughout our years on this committee, our words go beyond these four
walls. We must remember that we have a responsibility to the people of
Boston and the rest of the American public, not to create a defense for
the capital case against Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. While others suggest that
there is a possibility that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was inspired by extremist
groups in the Caucasus region, I believe that speculation about any
influence he may have received is not helpful to the prosecution.
Just last Friday, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's defense team filed motions
based on a report by committee staff. While I do not believe we need to
jeopardize the prosecution of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev by speculating on
Tamerlan's dealings in the Caucasus region, I do believe it is
necessary for us to understand not only which groups are becoming
radicalized in the Caucasus region, but also, why this is happening.
The Caucasus region continues to be plagued by poverty, high
unemployment, and challenges in governance and stability.
Like in other regions, it is possible that these social problems
are being exploited to boost recruitment. There is also evidence that
suggests religious ideology plays only a limited role in the violence
of extremist groups in the Caucasus region, but is used to mask the
business of organized crime. According to reports, approximately one
quarter of the violence in the North Caucasus is from organized crime.
Mislabeling acts of organized crime as ``terrorism'' diminishes the
real threats of terrorism in the region.
Moreover, since 2009, when Russia ended its counter-terrorism
operation in Chechnya, there has been a surge in violence and security
forces within the North Caucasus region. While it is unclear if
violence in the region has created a need for more security forces, it
is well-documented that the actions of these security forces--
continuous engagement in a brutal and violent harassment and religious
profiling--feeds a cycle of insurgency. It is clear that the
instability of governance throughout the Caucasus region continues to
prohibit religious freedoms and rights, which ultimately fuels al-
Qaeda, its affiliates, and other extremists groups. Ultimately, if we
hope to gain a serious understanding of terrorists and extremist
threats, we must do a thorough examination.
Rather than viewing terrorists and insurgencies in an over-
generalized way, I encourage all Members of this committee to seek more
information to understand the global and local dynamics fueling the
insurgency in the Caucasus region.
Mr. King. Before introducing our distinguished panel of
witnesses, though, I wanted to recognize Jim Nichol from the
Congressional Research Service. He is here today. It is his
last day of work before retirement. He has been a significant
resource to this committee, both when I was Chairman and
Ranking Member and certainly, now, under Chairman McCaul in
preparation of this hearing. He served CRS and the Congress for
more than 30 years. There is no one on the Hill that knows
about Eurasia and his expertise will be missed.
Mr. Nichol, we want to congratulate you and thank you for
your years of service and dedication and for doing the
impossible of making us look reasonably smart. So thank you
very much.
Now, for today's hearing we will be hearing testimony from
three expert witnesses: Dr. Gordon Hahn, Dr. William Roggio,
and Dr. Andrew Kuchins.
I want to welcome all three witnesses here, and I will ask,
first, Dr. Hahn. He is an analyst and advisory board member for
Geostrategic Forecasting Corporation, a global think tank that
provides qualitative and quantitative analysis and business
intelligence solutions to prominent geopolitical and
geoeconomic threats. He is senior associate in Russia and
Eurasia program with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. He is the author of numerous scholarly and analytic
articles on jidadism in Russia and Eurasia, and has authored
two books on Russia.
We are pleased to have you here today as a witness, and you
are recognized for approximately 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GORDON M. HAHN, PH.D., ANALYST AND ADVISORY BOARD
MEMBER, GEOSTRATEGIC FORECASTING CORPORATION
Mr. Hahn. Thank you for the invitation, Representative
King, and the committee and the help from the staff. I am gonna
start off talking about my main conclusions first so I get to
them in case we run out of time, then give a little background,
and then talk about--focus a little bit on the Caucasus Emirate
mujahedin in Syria. Okay, in terms of main conclusions, I do
not foresee the Caucasus Emirate directly undertaking
operations to attack the United States homeland, on its own, in
the short- to mid-term. However, the Caucasus Emirate-
affiliated militants will, sooner or later, be involved in
global jihadi plots to do so.
They will probably be from among those fighting in Syria,
perhaps those also fighting in AfPak. These are the so-called
mujahedin, or those who have emigrated, or made the hijrah, to
fight on another front. Also returning mujahedin and/or IK
Caucasus there in mujahedin, remaining in Russia could attempt
to attack U.S.-related soft targets in Europe and Eurasia, in
particular inside Russia, with attacks that could include
embassies, schools, various public venues, transporter
pipelines.
The Caucasus Emirate could partner in carrying out such
attacks with foreign groups and groups, its mujahedin now more
closely networked with in Syria, such as al-Qaeda or AQ and At-
Takfir wal-Hirja, which attempted an attack in Moscow last
year, or groups from central Asia that are--have made the
hijrah through the AfPak region and are now also some are
located--fighting in Syria; groups like the Islamic movement of
Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, and some others.
In Russia, I suspect that the Caucasus Emirate will see the
lowest annual tally of attacks in this year, since its
inception in 2007, because of the exodus of mujahedin to Syria.
Okay, in terms of background, I have been arguing for many
years--pretty much alone amongst Cretologists, but not among
terrorist experts--that beginning in the 1990s, the extremist
Chechen nationalist separatist movement, the Chechen republic
of Ichkeriya and continuing with its global jihadi successor
organizing, the Caucasus Emirate, Chechen and North Caucasus
militants who had ties to the global jihadi revolutionary
movement, including al-Qaeda, and that the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria was becoming jihadized and likely would become part of
the global revolutionary movement and partner with al-Qaeda or
other global jihadi groups.
Months after publication of my book, the then-Chechen
Republic, which Dokku Umarov abolished the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeriya, established the Caucasus Emirate took the position
of emir instead of president, took the jihadi nom de guerre Abu
Usman, and declared the Caucasus Emirates enemies to be Russia,
the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and any country
fighting Muslims anywhere around the world.
In October 2007, in addition to the Imarat Kavkaz, some--
since October 2007, in addition to the Caucasus Emirates, some
2,400 insurgent terrorist attacks and jihadi-related
incidences, including 54 suicide bombings. The Caucasus Emirate
mujahedin and North Caucasus lone wolves have inspired by it
have plotted or carried out insurgent terrorist attacks across
the globe from Waziristan to Azerbaijan in the East and from
Europe to Boston in the West.
In sum, many years ago the Caucasus Emirate became not just
a threat for Russian national security, but an emerging one for
U.S. and international security. I want to talk a little bit
about the new emir. The reports came out, the Caucasus Emirate
confirmed, that Emir Dokku Umarov had been killed sometime last
year. They confirmed this a couple of weeks ago. The new emir
is one Sheik Ali Abu Muhammad ad-Dagestani--he was born
Aliaskhab Alibutatovich Kabekov and is likely to radicalize
and, perhaps, further globalize, and even deterritorialize the
Caucasus Emirate further, given his deeper religious and Abu
Dagestani roots.
In July 2011, Dagestani stated, ``We are doing everything
possible to build the caliphate.'' In his most recent lecture,
he said, ``Oh, Allah, punish the Jews, the Americans, the
Russians, Iran and Bashar Assad, their followers and helpers.''
Sheikh Dagestani is 42 years old. He was born on January 1,
1972. He has been the kadhi--that is, the Sharia court judge--
for the Caucasus Emirate for the last--going on 4 years. He
faces three basic challenges that I can see.
First is reinvigorating the Caucasus Emirates non-Dagestani
networks in Chechnya and in Gushedia. Second, maintaining a
balance of power between different ethnic groups. Third and
most important, dealing with the negative effects on Caucasus
Emirate because of the exodus-emigration of fighters--of
Caucasus Emirate fighters and other North Caucasus radicals to
Syria. The Caucasus Emirate has had some global reach, as I
alluded to before. They have had three foreign plots, all of
them failed: One in Belgium, one in the Czech Republic, and on
in Azerbaijan in 2012.
They have inspired three plots, only one of which was
successful. Unfortunately for us, that successful attack was in
Boston last year. But the most important move by the Caucasus
Emirate abroad has been to Syria, as I mentioned before. IK-
affiliated emirs, such as Tarkhan Batirasvili, are playing the
leading role--at least the leading combat role--among the
foreign mujahedin fighting in Syria that is now the main global
front in the global jihad.
Despite apparent reservations, Umarov appears to have
backed three key emirs' hijrah to Syria in late 2011. Then they
would take leading positions in the jihad there. According to
the most prominent of these emirs, Batirashvili, Emir Umarov
initially financed their activities. First, Batirashvili and
the other emirs allied with al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-
Nusra, and then shifted towards the ISIS. Through 2012,
hundreds of IK and North Caucasian mujahedin and other foreign
muhajarine--that is, emigres consolidated around these Chechen
emirs--by March 2013 their group, Jeish Mukhajirin va Ansar,
the army of emigrants and helpers, or JMA, reportedly numbered
more than 1,000.
As relations between al-Nusra and ISIS deteriorated and
devolved into violent clashes, Batirashvili took the lifetime
loyalty oath, or bayat, to ISIS Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and
was promoted to the position of the ISIS' military emirs. So we
have a Chechen holding one of the top posts in this al-Qaeda-
affiliated organization. He did this in October 2013. A schism
resulted from this and some other factors, leaving at least
three major Syrian-based groups, a foreign muhajarine led by
Caucasus Emirate emirs. One of them is even named now the
Caucasus Emirate in Shama or in Syria.
There is also now for the first time, by the way, a
Caucasus Emirate in the Horasan organization that is in AfPak.
We don't know exactly where they are--presumably they are in
Waziristan. I want to briefly review nine implications--or
maybe I won't get through all. I don't know how much time I
have left--nine implications of the hijrha of----
Mr. King. Actually, if you could try to do it like in the
next 1\1/2\ minutes, sir.
Mr. Hahn. Okay, okay.
Mr. King. Thanks.
Mr. Hahn. First is the debilitating effect on the Caucasus
Emirate's capacity. Second is that the high profile of the
Caucasus Emirate and other North Caucasus and Russian mujahedin
in the Syrian jihad strengthens the Caucasus Emirate's ties to,
and profile within, the overall global jihadi revolutionary
movement, offering opportunities for greater access to
recruits, financing, and weapons. Third, Caucasus Emirate
fighters in Syria could acquire some of Assad's chemical
weapons.
Fourth, because of the first three implications I mentioned
and the advent of a new emir there is a very high likelihood
that the new emir is going to change tactics and, perhaps,
strategy. That is, globalize the organization more, radicalize
it more, maybe even more emphasis on spectacular attacks and
suicide bombings. Fifth, likely is the expansion of Caucasus
Emirate fighters to other global jihadi fronts. Sixth, a
corollary of the fifth is the development of a--because of the
networking in Syria--of a Eurasian--more tightly-knitted
Eurasian group of fighters two hubs; one in the North Caucasus,
another in central Asia. Because all these groups are now in
Syria and in AfPak, together, fighting.
Seventh, the new vulnerability to Shia-dominated Azerbaijan
to attacks by the Sunni-dominated Caucasus Emirate and other
fighters in Syria. Eighth, the possibility of a disastrous rout
of Caucasus Emirate forces, damaging its capacity for years to
come. Then finally, because of the ties between the Caucasus
Emirate and foreign fighters in Syria, we are likely to see
Russia be move up higher on the agenda of the global jihad in
terms of targeting.
With that, I close.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hahn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gordon M. Hahn
April 3, 2014
introduction
For a decade voices resonated in U.S. media and think tanks
asserting that Chechen separatists and the Caucasus Islamists, such as
those who forged the IK, had nothing to do with al-Qaeda and the global
jihadi revolutionary movement, despite a plethora of contrary evidence.
Some of those same voices still can be heard today.
Contrary to those voices' claims and expectations, we now see the
Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate or IK) mujahedin and their lone wolves
inspired by them carrying out insurgent and terrorist attacks across
the globe from Waziristan in the East to Boston in the West.
In fact, for nearly 2 decades, beginning with the extremist Chechen
national separatist movement, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI),
and continuing with its global jihadist successor organization, the IK
founded on October 31, 2007, Chechen and North Caucasus militants have
had ties to the global jihadi revolutionary movement (al-Qaeda, its
affiliates, and allied groups), including al-Qaeda (AQ). Indeed, in
September 2009, Jordan's Sheikh Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi, whom the
United States Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)
designated ``the most influential living Jihadi Theorist,'' endorsed IK
as a major jihadist organization and urged Muslims to support it ``so
the Emirate becomes the door to Eastern Europe.''\1\ Consistent with
Maqdisi's call, IK would expand operations into Europe and elsewhere
abroad.
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\1\ ``Fatva Sheikha Abu Mukhammada al'-Makdisi o fitne v Imarata
Kavkaz,'' Islam Umma,9 September 2010, 10:44, http://islamumma.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=- article&id=1253:2010-09-10-07-35-
03&catid=130&Itemid=485 and ``Fatwa Sheikha Abu Mukhammada al'-Makdisi
(da ukrepit ego Allakh),'' Kavkaz tsentr, 10 September 2010, 20:55,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/09/10/75149.shtml.
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Though rejected by most, I have been arguing since at least 2006
that the IK has been part and parcel of that movement, supporting its
goal of a global caliphate, and employing signature jihadi tactics such
as suicide bombing or ``istishkhad'' attacks and other mass-casualty
attacks. Since 2007 Umarov and CE ideologists have stated repeatedly
that the organization is part of the global jihadi revolutionary
alliance and supports AQ and other jihadi groups, though many refused
to listen. CE websites now publish jihadi literature alone, including
that of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Anwar al-Awlaki, and
hundreds of others. Published fatwas justify the use of weapons of mass
destruction to kill ``millions'' of Americans, and translated issues of
AQ's journal Inspire and articles like ``Make a Bomb in Your Mom's
Kitchen'' instruct prospective mujahedin how to build IEDs from
pressure cookers as the Tsarnaevs did. After U.S. forces brought
justice to Osama bin Laden in May 2011, the now-deceased IK amir Dokku
``Abu Usman'' Umarov said the AQ amir's reward in Paradise for his
service to jihad would be ``great'' and asserted that neither the death
of jihadi leaders nor the desires of ``the United States, Russia, or
the UN'' can stop ``Islam's rebirth.''\2\ Thus, long ago IK became not
just a threat for Russian national security but an emerging one for
U.S. and international security.
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\2\ Umarov said in full: ``We ask Allah that He accepts the
martyrdom of Sheikh bin Laden, because that man abandoned his wealth
and peaceful worldly life for the sake of protecting Islam. And that is
a great goal, and the reward for it is great. With regard to the
question of whether bin Laden's death will affect the situation in the
world, in my opinion the infidels do not believe themselves that their
lives will become easier. According to all signs, it is clear that the
world is in such situation that the death of the leaders of the Jihad
in no way can stop the process of Islam's rebirth. It is the kind of
cause that will move forward, regardless of whether the United States,
Russia or the UN want it or not.'' ``Amir Dokku Abu Usman o bin Ladene,
Imarate Kavkaz i poteryakh modzhakhedov,'' Kavkaz tsentr, 17 May 2011,
http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/05/17/81607.shtml.
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Since its October 2007 founding, the IK has carried out or been
involved in some 2,400 insurgent and terrorist attacks and violent
incidents, including 54 suicide attacks, inside Russia. Those attacks
have produced approximately 9,000 casualties, including more than one
thousand civilians. For comparison, the IK's attacks in Russia
constitute approximately 6 percent of jihadi attacks globally, a ratio
that does not include IK mujahedin attacks in Syria.\3\
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\3\ This is a snapshot estimate derived from comparing IK and
global jihadi activity in December 2013. Specifically, it compares
IntelCenter's global data with my own data on IK operations derived in
part from reports on Kavkaz uzel (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru) and ``IMARAT
KAVKAZ. Svodka boevykh operatsii modzhekhedov za mesyats Safar 1435 g
kh. (5.12.2013-2.01.2014 g.),'' Umma News, 14 January 2014, http://
ummanews.com/news/last-news/11967----------1435----5--2013--2--
2014-.html. IntelCenter tracked 2,077 people killed and 2,558 people
injured in 688 terrorist/rebel attacks worldwide in December 2013.
``Global Casualty Data for Terrorist/Rebel Attacks, Dec. 2013,''
IntelCenter, 15 January 2014, http://us5.campaign-archive1.com/
?u=16cbb24e56cdcd360e9954d7a&id=32cc518d96&e=722a32839a. My own
estimate for the same month in Russia was 42 insurgent and terrorist
attacks. It should be taken into account that December is not usually
the busiest month for CE activity given the cold and snow in the
Caucasus mountains where many of the IK mujahedin winter. Moreover,
this does not count attacks carried out by CE-affiliated mujahedin in
Syria.
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the ik's new amir
The death of the CE's founder and first amir Dokku ``Abu Usman''
Umarov, perhaps as early as July 8, and the announcement of his
successor ``Sheikh Ali Abu Muhammad ad-Dagestani'' (born Aliaskhab
Alibutatovich Kebekov) has potential to bring change to IK, pushing it
even a more radical direction. Sheikh Dagestani is an ethnic Avar from
Dagestan and has been (and may still be at least for now) the IK's
Shariah Court qadi or chief judge since autumn 2010. In July 2011 IK's
new amir publicly-endorsed AQ's and the global jihadi revolutionary
movement's goal of creating a global caliphate, noting: ``We are doing
everything possible to build the Caliphate and prepare the ground for
this to the extent of our capabilities.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Stennogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad--`Otvety na
voprosy'--1 chast','' Guraba.info, 8 July 2011, 00:18, http://
guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--i-q-q-1-.html and
VDagestan.info, 8 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/
%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b8%d0%b9%d0%b8%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b1%d1%83%d0%bc%-
d1%83%d1%85i%d0%b0%d0%bc%d0%bc%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%-
d1%82%d1%8b%d0%bd%d0%b0%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be/.
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His ascension to the IK's top leadership post is the culmination of
the rise to dominance within the IK of its Dagestan network, the so-
called ``Dagestan Vilaiyat'' or DV. From April 2010 through 2013 the DV
has been the IK's spearhead, with Dagestan seeing approximately 70
percent of the IK's some 1,700 attacks and violent incidents in Russia
and the DV carrying out more than half of the istishkhad attacks during
the same period, including those outside the North Caucasus.
Sheikh Dagestani's rise also marks the culmination of the IK's
theo-ideological and strategic jihadization. As the IK's qadi,
Dagestani was the IK's chief theologian and ideologist, charged with
ensuring the compliance of Umarov's and other amirs' actions with the
Koran and the Sunna. Therefore, he was at the forefront of
strengthening Islamist knowledge among the IK mujahedin. In a hundred
or more video lectures, ad-Dagestani exhibits superb knowledge of the
Koran, the Sunna, and the Arabic language, unlike his predecessor. His
video lectures are replete with Koranic citations delivered in Arabic
with the appropriate musical-style recitation and elongated vowel
inflection. His first statement after that announcing his succession of
Umarov was delivered entirely in Arabic to the IK mujahedin fighting in
Syria.\5\
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\5\ For both the Russian-language transcript and Arab-language
video, see ``Amir IK Ali Abu Mukhammad: Poslanie s sovetom
mudzhakhidami Shama VIDEO,'' Kavkaz tsentr, 20 March 2014,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/03/20/103638.shtml. The Arab-
language video is also at VDagestan.com, http://dagestan.com/
obrashhenie-amira-ik-k-bratyam-v-sirii.djihad.
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the ik's global reach
Since at least 2010, IK has undertaken operations and inspired
attacks outside Russia on a limited scale. The years 2010 and 2011 saw
IK's first two major forays into Europe. In November 2010, a
``Shariah4Belgium'' cell was uncovered, including Chechens, Moroccans,
Belgians, and Dutch. It used a Russian-language website tied to al-
Qaeda to recruit fighters, raise funds, and plan attacks on NATO
targets. In April 2011, a DV-tied cell, including Dagestanis, was
uncovered in the Czech Republic, planning attacks in a third country.
In April 2012, Azerbaijani security forces foiled a second DV
(Dagestani Vilaiyat) foreign plot to carry out attacks in Baku and
elsewhere in the southern Caucasus country, home to the strategic Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.\6\ There was also an alleged, still
shadowy plot to assassinate President Vladimir Putin reported in late
February 2012. Operations for the assassination were to be in Ukraine,
with operatives from Kazakhstan moving through Turkey and the Middle
East.\7\
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\6\ For details of the Azerbaijan plot, see Gordon M. Hahn, Islam,
Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (from here on cited as IIPER),
Nos. 56 and 58, http://csis.org/files/publication/
120507_Hahn_IIPER_56.pdf and http://csis.org/files/publication/
120621_Hahn_- IIPER_58.pdf.
\7\ For details on the Putin assassination plot, see Gordon M.
Hahn, Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report, No. 53, 12 March
2012, Center for Strategic and Internationmal Studies, http://csis.org/
files/publication/120312_Hahn_IIPER53.pdf.
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IK likely inspired the Chechen Lars Dakaev's failed plot to bomb
the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten that published caricatures of
Mohammed, setting off violent demonstrations around the Muslim world,
as well as a foiled plot to attack targets in Gibraltar during the 2012
London Summer Olympic Games and later elsewhere in Europe being planned
by a group of three terrorists, two of them from the North Caucasus.
The leader of the group planning the latter attack, an ethnic Chechen
and/or Dagestani, Eldar Magomedov, was said by the Spanish court and
police to be AQ's leading operative in Europe based on U.S. and Russian
intelligence. The IK certainly inspired the successful Boston Marathon
bombings that killed four and wounded 260.\8\
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\8\ For my detailed report on IK's inspiration of Tamerlan and
Jokhar Tsarnaev, see Gordon M. Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Comes to
America: The Boston Marathon Bombing, Geostrategic Forecasting
Corporation (GFC) White Paper, October 2013,
www.geostrategicforecasting.com/products-page/whitepapers-
studiesandreports/boston-marathon-attack/.
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But nowhere does the IK's increasingly de-territorialized and
global orientation resonate with such large implications as it does in
Syria.
the ik in syria
North Caucasian mujahedin, especially those affiliated with the IK
in the past and present, are playing the leading role among foreign
mujahedin fighting in Syria. Amir ad-Dagestani underscored the Syrian
jihad's importance for the IK by making it the subject of his first
video lecture after announcing his assumption of the IK leadership. He
noted: ``When jihad began in Shama, we were overjoyed, first, because
we studied Islamic sciences in Shama, but second because we studied the
hadiths which tell about the achievements of Shama, about the fact that
in the end-time of troubles the faith will be in Shama, that Allah's
angels will spread their wings over Shama, that the best land is in
Shama, and that the Heavenly Group will be in Shama at the end of
time.''\9\
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\9\ ``Amir IK Ali Abu Mukhammad: Poslanie s sovetom mudzhakhidami
Shama VIDEO.''
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Despite having an ambivalent attitude towards the emigration of IK
mujahedin to Syria, Umarov appears to have backed three key amirs who
made the ``hijra'' and took over leading positions in the Syrian jihad:
Tarkhan Batirashvili (jihadi nom de guerre ``Abu Umar al-Shishani'' or
Abu Umar the Chechen), Muslim Margoshvili (Abu Walid), and (Seifullah
al-Shishani) Ruslan Machaliashvili (sometimes Meslikaev). They all
appear to be ethnic Chechen Kists with ties to Georgia's Pankisi Gorge
and previous connections to the CE. They arrived in Syria as a group in
late 2011 or early 2012 and were initially financed by Umarov,
according to Batirashvili, the most prominent of them.\10\
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\10\ ``Interv'yu s Abu Umarom Ash Shishani,'' Beladusham.com,
www.beladusham.com/0392.html, last accessed 26 March 2014.
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Through 2012 hundreds of North Caucasian mujahedin and other
emigres or muhajirin from Russia, Eurasia, Europe, and the Muslim world
began to consolidate around the Chechen amirs through 2012. By late
2012 they formed the brigade ``Kataib al-Mujahirin'' (KaM), with
Batirashvili serving as its amir, and allied with the AQ-affiliated
Jabkhat al-Nusra.
In March 2013, Batirashvili received the ``bayat'' or Islamic
loyalty oath from two Syrian rebel units, ``Kataib Khattab'' and
``Jeish Muhammad,'' which included some 600 fighters who joined the
KaM.\11\ According to the IK's main website, ``Kavkaz tsentr,'' the
KaM, renamed ``Jeish Mukhajirin va Ansar'' (the Army of Emirants and
Helpers) or JMA, now numbered more than a thousand militants.\12\
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\11\ ``Siriya: K brigade `Kataib Mukhadzhirin' prisoedinilis' dva
siriiskikh podrazdeleniya,'' Kavkaz tsentr, 22 March 2013,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2013/03/22/96932.shtml.
\12\ ``Siriya: Prisyaga siriiskikh modzhakhedov Amiru Armii
mukhadzhirov i ansarov Umaru Shishani,'' Kavkaz tsentr, 26 March 2013,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2013/03/26/97014.shtml.
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The JMA, in particular amir Batirashvili, began to drift towards
the then AQ-affiliated group, the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham
(Syria) or ISIS, recently denounced by AQ amir Zayman al-Zawahiri for
its radical excesses. JMA amir Batirashvili was appointed military amir
of the ISIS's northern front in summer 2013. As relations between Nusra
and the ISIS deteroriated and devolved into violent clashes,
Batirashvili took the lifetime bayat to ISIS amir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
and was promoted to the ISIS's overall military amir in late
October.\13\
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\13\ ``Operatsiya `Fatikh','' FISyria.com, 7 December 2013, http://
fisyria.com/?p=1630.
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This prompted a series of splits within the JMA, producing at least
three major Syria-based jihadi groups led by Chechen amirs from the IK
or the North Caucasus in addition to Batirashvili's ISIS-loyal JMA:
Margoshvili's Jund al-Sham (JS) appears to function
autonomously;
Jeish al-Khalifat Islamiya (Army of the Islamic Caliphate)
or JKhI, the amir of which--Machaliashvili--was killed in
February and which is allied with JS but taken the bayat to
Nusra Front amir Abu Muhammad al-Jolani;\14\
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\14\ See the announcement in ``Dzheish Khilafa Al-Islamiya
ob'yadenilas s Dzhabkhat an-Nusra,'' Usudu Sham, December 2013, [sic].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and the Imarat Kavkaz in Sham (Syria) or IKS led by the IK's
JMA/ISIS envoy, Salahuddin, appointed by late IK amir Umarov.
In sum, IK-affiliated amirs are playing the leading role among the
foreign mujahedin fighting in Syria--the main front in the global jihad
at this time. Batirashvili's rise to the ISIS's top ranks and the
eulogy to Machaliashvili by al-Nusrah amir Jolani testify to this
fact.\15\ Greater testimony comes from the IK-affiliated amirs' leading
command role and their North Caucasian-dominated jamaats' combat role
in key battles, in particular those in and around Aleppo. Moreover, IK
is in a more intimate relationship with AQ than ever before.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Jolani noted that he and Machaliashvili fought closely
together in Guta and elsewhere and that ``the Caucasus always will give
birth to new heroes, and they will restore the former influence of the
Umma.'' ``Amir `Dzhabkhat an-Nura' Abu Mukhammad al'-Dzhavlani ob amire
Sefullakh Shishani,'' Kavkaz tsentr, 10 February 2014,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/02/10/103115.shtml.
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implications of the ik muhajirin in syria
The Caucasus mujahedin's important role in the Syrian jihad has at
least nine implications for the the global jihadi revolutionary
movement and the struggle against it in Russia and the West.
First, the the flood of many hundreds of IK mujahedin and other
North Caucasian and Russian Islamists to the jihad in Syria is having a
debilitating effect on the IK's capacity in the North Caucasus and
Russia. Even if only several hundred IK fighters have gone to Syria,
this is a relatively large number to take away from IK in the Caucasus
which only reached some 1,000 fighters. Thus, the Caucasus-Russian
hijra to the Syrian jihad is having a debilitating effect on the IK's
four networks, including the spearhead Dagestani network, the so-called
Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV). But all three other vilaiyats--the OVKBK,
Chechnya's Nokchicho Vilaiyat (NV) and Ingushetiya's Galgaiche Vilaiyat
(GV)--are seriously crippled by the hijra to Syria. Since it began in
2011, the number of insurgent and terrorist attacks in Russia (99
percent of them in the North Caucasus) has declined steadily. By my own
estimate there were 583 in 2010, 546 in 2011, 465 in 2012, and 439 in
2013. According to IK-affiliated figures, in the second Arabic month of
2014, the decline in the number of attacks in Russia reached a nadir,
declining to 10 from 31 during the same period in 2013.\16\ This and IK
Umarov's death late last year go a long way towards explaining the IK's
failure to attack the February-March Sochi Winter Olympic and Para-
Olympic Games, despite its leaders' many threats going back many years
to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Compare the CE's own data for those Arabic calendar months in
2013 and 2014 in ``IMARAT KAVKAZ. Svodka boevikh operatsii modzhakhedov
za mesyats rabbi as-sanii 1434 goda po khidzhre (12 fevralya-12 marta
2013 g.),'' Umma News, 13 March 2013, http://ummanews.com/news/kavkaz/
10099------------1434----12---12--2013-.html and ``Svodka Dzhikhada za
mesyats Rabi as-Sani 1435 g. kh. (02.02.2014-02.03.2014g.),'' Kavkaz
tsentr, 10 March 2013, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/03/10/
103490.shtml, respectively.
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Second, the high profile of the IK and other North Caucasus and
Russian mujahedin in the Syrian jihad relative to their actual numbers
raises the IK's ties to, and profile within the overall global jihadi
revolutionary movement. The IK now has stronger ties to AQ and other
global jihadi groups and fighters from across the globe, including
those from countries in the immediate region such as Turkey,
Azerbaijan, and Iraq. These stronger ties to the global jihad open
opportunities for greater access to recruits, financing, and weapons.
Third, JMA/IK fighters in Syria could acquire some of Assad's
chemical weapons and manage to transport them into Russia for WMD
attacks. On the eve of the Sochi Olympics one amir Umar of a IK DV
``diversionary group'' called ``Ansar al-Sunni'' not only claimed
responsibility for the December 2013 Volgograd sucide bombings in
Volgograd, but warned Sochi that ``attacks up to and including chemical
attacks'' were ready to be approved by IK amir Doku Umarov.\17\
Umarov's death may have delayed this attack, or perhaps the chemical
materials had not yet been acquired or transported to the Caucasus.
Moreover, there is some evidence that rebels in Syria may have acquired
chemical agents from Bashar al-Assad's stockpiles. On 30 May 2013,
Turkish authorities arrested a JaN fighters in possession of about 2
kilos of sarin nerve gas, but no information has been made public about
their nationalities.\18\ Days later, on June 1, Iraqi officials
announced that they interdicted an AQ cell plotting to launch sarin gas
attacks in Iraq, Europe, and possibly North America.\19\ A recent
article by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh contends that CIA
analysts reported to the Obama administration in the spring of last
year that Syrian rebels may well have acquired some of Assad's
stockpiles of chemical agents.\20\ Certainly, with the chaos of an on-
going civil war in Syria and the more than 40 sites at which Assad's
chemical weapons have been reported to be located, it is possible that
one or more jihadi groups could have acquired chemical materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ For more on the potential chemical threat, see Gordon M. Hahn,
``Considering the Caucasus Emirate Chemical Threat to Sochi,'' Russia
and Eurasia Program Blog, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 7 February 2014, http://csis.org/blog/considering-caucasus-
emirate-chemical-attack-threat-sochi.
\18\ Karen Hodgson, ``Reports claim Al Nusrah Front members in
Turkey were planning sarin gas attacks,'' Long War Journal, 31 May
2013, www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/
on_may_30_the_turkish.php.
\19\ Thomas Jocelyn, ``Crisis in Syria: Implications for Homeland
Security,'' Testimony of Thomas Joscelyn (Senior Fellow, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies and Senior Editor, The Long War Journal) Before
the House Committee on Homeland Security, United States Congress,
September 10, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20130910/
101297/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-JoscelynT-20130910.pdf.
\20\ Seymour M. Hersh, ``Whose Sarin,'' London Review of Books,
Volume 34, Number 24, 13 December 2013, www.lrb.co.uk/2013/12/08/
seymour-m-hersh/whose-sarin.
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The first three implications plus the advent of a new era in the IK
under its new amir, Sheikh ad-Dagestani' (Kebekov), raises a fourth
possible implication: A shift in IK tactics, strategy, and/or goals.
The goals of building the global caliphate and its affiliate in the
North Caucasus, the IK, will remain. However, the more religiously-
steeped Dagestani, who will surely seek to leave his mark both on the
local IK and global jihad, could turn to even greater reliance on
suicide bombings, mass casualty attacks, and joint operations with
foreign jihadi groups perhaps beyond Russia's borders as ways of
compensating for lost capacity and maintaining a higher profile given
the drain of potency to Syria. He may also change strategy by trying to
expand operations more aggressively into the predominantly ethnic
Russian North Caucasus regions of Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Rostov and
to Volga Tatar regions as an ethnic and cultural bridge to the Crimean
Tatars.
A fifth implication could be the expansion of IK and North
Caucasian mujahedin involvement on many of the global jihad
revolutionary movement's various fronts; something we have already seen
as summarized briefly in this report's introduction. For example,
Chechens fighting in Syria were reported to be among a flood of
extremists, including also Egyptians, Tunisians, and Syrians, heading
to the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon Lebanon and joining the
Abdallah Azzam Brigades' Ziad Jarrah Brigades and Lebanon's Jund al-
Sham in order to carry out attacks in Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and
Tripoli.\21\
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\21\ Linda Lundquist, ``Extremists, including Chechens, Egyptians,
Tunisians, and Syrians, are reportedly flocking to the Ain al-Hilweh
refugee camp,'' Long War Journal, 8 February 2014,
www.longwarjournal.org/today-in/2014/02/
security_forces_in_zahle_detai.php.
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This fifth implication raises a possible sixth--the formation of a
more closely-linked Eurasian network of jihadi organizations with a
second pillar after the IK in the North Caucasus becoming Central
Asia's jihadi groups on the eve of the Western withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the possible return to power of the Taliban. There are
significant numbers of Central Asian mujahedin who have arrived in
Syria from the homelands and from AfPak where a series of Central Asian
jihadi organizations--the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad
Union, Tajikistan's ``Jamaat Ansarullah'', and Kazakhstan's ``Jund al-
Khalifat''--are on their own hijra in AfPak. The IK and these groups
already exchange personnel, including the travel of North Caucasians to
these AQ-tied groups' training camps in AfPak, as well as video
propaganda messages for mutual support. More recently, a group calling
itself the ``Imarat Kavkaz in Khorosan'' and its amir Abdullah
announced their presence somewhere in AfPak.\22\ Now these groups are
mingling using their common, if often weak Russian-language knowledge
and their peoples' common colonial experiences with Russia that will
build bonds beyond those forged in combat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ ``Obrashchenie Amira mudzhakhidov Imarata Kavkaz Abdullakha k
mudzhakhidam Kavkaza i musul'manam Rossii,'' Kavkaz tsentr, 20 March
2014, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2014/03/20/103616.shtml.
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Seventh, Azerbaijan is increasingly vulnerable to jihadi terrorist
activity given its geographical proximity to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq
and its use as a travel route by militants traveling to and from the
Syrian and North Caucasus/Russian jihadi fronts. As noted in the
introduction the IK already attempted a major plot in Azerbaijan in
2012. Azerbaijan also has been plagued, if rarely, by jihadi terrorist
attacks and CE incursions into its northern regions.
Eighth, there is the possibility of disaster for the IK in Syria.
In a major routes of the jihadis by Syrian forces, the bulk of its
fighters could be wiped, or IK mujahedin may be so discouraged by the
divisions and bloodshed between jihadi groups that they abandon their
caliphate and emirate dreams.
Ninth, given the IK's even greater integration into the global
jihad and Russia's support for the Bashir Assad regime against which
the jihadists are fighting, Russia is likely to move higher on the
global jihadi revolutionary movement's target list. One Syrian ISIS
commander told a Western journalists that Russia would be a target of
the ISIS: ``Russia is killing Muslims in southern Muslim republics and
sends arms and money to kill Muslims in Syria as well . . . I swear by
God that Russia will pay a big price for its dirty role in the Syrian
war.''\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, ``As Foreign Fighters Flood
Syria, Fears of a New Extremist Haven,'' New York Times, 9 August 2013,
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/world/middleeast/as-foreign-fighters-flood-
syria-fears-of-a-new-extremist-haven.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=-
edit_th_20130809&_r=0.
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potential threat to the u.s. homeland
Although I do not foresee the IK undertaking operations to attack
the U.S. homeland on its own, I would expect that IK- or North
Caucasus-affiliated militants, especially from among those fighting in
Syria and AfPak will sooner or later be involved in international plots
to do so. We have seen this already in the AQ plot uncovered in Spain
and France during the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games. In that plot,
two Chechens, one of whom was identified as AQ's top operative in
Europe by the Spanish court based on U.S. and Russian intelligence.
We should also be on guard against similar plots or even plots
organized by the IK alone targeting U.S.-related soft targets in Europe
and Eurasia, in particular in Russia. In addition to AQ and At-Takfir
wal-Hijra--the latter of which undertook a plot to attack Moscow last
year \24\--IK could partner with the four more or less Russian-
speaking, Central Asian jihadi groups in AfPak with which it maintains
ties mentioned above as well as the Waziristan-based Volga Tatar
``Bulgar Jamaat,'' elements of which have also made the hijra to Syria
and fight along IK-affiliated groups there.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``V Moskve arestovany 15 chlenov ``At Takfir val'-Khidzhra',''
Kavkaz uzel, 29 November 2013, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/234336/.
\25\ To reiterate, the four AfPak-based, Central Asian groups are:
The Islamic Jihad Union, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan's Jamaat Ansarullah, and Kazakhstan's Jund al-Khalifat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
implications for russian foreign and security policy
Russia's greater vulnerability to attacks by global Sunni jihadi
groups as a result of the IK's growing ties with the global jihadi
revolutionary movement raises several foreign policy implications.
First, all else remaining equal, Moscow will have greater reason to
maintain its relationships with Iran and Syria hoping against hope that
the Shiites can at least absorb and contain the Sunni jihadi threat.
Second, this likely will complicate non-proliferation efforts in
both Iran and Syria and make it more difficult to remove Assad from
power and secure Israel's national security.
Third, any major attack emanating from IK or other jihadi groups in
Syria could raise tensions in a Russo-Turkish relationship potentially
burdened by Istanbul's pan-Turkish impulse to protect Crimea's Tatars
from real or perceived Russian transgressions.
Fourth, the same is true regarding Russia's relations with the Arab
Gulf and Western states supporting the Syrian rebels.
In sum, the Syrian civil war and jihad is reshaping the
geopolitical and security landscape across Eurasia. For the IK, the
Syrian jihadi crucible could provide new momentum through a pivotal
jihadi victory in the region or swallow up the IK's mujahedin in a
grand jihadi failure. Either way, this will have important implications
for Russian national security and foreign policy and for Eurasian and
international security as well.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Hahn.
Our next witness, Mr. William Roggio, is a senior fellow at
the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-profit,
nonpartisan policy institute focusing on foreign policy and
National security. At the foundation, Mr. Roggio is the editor
of The Long War Journal, which provides original reporting and
analysis of the global war on terror. He is also the president
of Public Multimedia, Inc., a non-profit media organization
dedicated to covering the long war. He was embedded with the
U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army in Iraq in 2005, 2006, and
2007, and with the Canadian Army in Afghanistan in 2006.
We are privileged to have you here today as a witness, we
thank you for being here, and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. ROGGIO, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Roggio. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you for the
invitation to speak today. I agree--with what Dr. Hahn said
about the al-Qaeda's--or the Islamic Caucus Emirate's links to
al-Qaeda. They are historical, they are well-documented, and
they span decades. You know, not only has Dokku Umarov, the
former emir, you know, threatened the United States. But he has
said, prior to his death in July he had said that the Islamic
Caucus Emirates is part of the global jihad.
You can see this by how this group and how its fighters are
dispersed in the major theaters. The Islamic Caucus Emirates
fighters have been spotted in Afghanistan and Pakistan for
years. They haven't had the prominence that we are now seeing
in Syria. They have operated more in the shadows. But they
served as combat-enablers, basically special forces. They
impart critical tactics and serve in--embedded with not just
the Taliban but with al-Qaeda forces and other groups in the
region.
They supported groups like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
and Islamic Jihad Union. As Dr. Hahn had mentioned, a group--
the Caucus mujahedin in the Emirate--in the Kurasan was formed,
and this group announced its presence in 2011. This group had
actually said that it was loyal to the Taliban. So we are
seeing--I think it is a key indication of how this group has
networked throughout the region.
They--al-Qaeda has long had roots in the Caucasus. Bin
Laden supplied--provided support for Ibn Khattab and Shamil
Basayev. Our mujahedin fought in Chechnya and in the Caucasus
in the 1990s from the beginning. Al-Qaeda also routinely
highlights the importance of the Chechen theater. Zawahiri
himself, in multiple speeches he talks about the importance of
the fighting and the history of the fighting in Chechnya. They
are upheld as ideal fighters. He, at one point in one speech
said--he said follow the Chechen's lead in their resistance to
democracy and resistance to Russian rule.
Chechnya has been used as a recruiting tool in al-Qaeda's
propaganda. Some of the 9/11 hijackers, they initially were--
wanted to--they were gonna be deployed to fight in Chechnya,
but were re-tasked to actually conduct the attacks. Islamic
Caucus Emirates employs al-Qaeda's tactics: Suicide bombing,
suicide assaults, roadside bombings, and all of the other tools
in the insurgency. We see this even in a recent video that was
just released the other day in Syria.
We see a training camp from the army of the immigrants and
supporters--that is a Chechen-led group, obviously, or Caucus
Emirates-like group. This camp looks just like an al-Qaeda
training video that they have released over the decades. You
see fighters navigating obstacle courses, you see fighters even
in an IED class. Building IEDs and then deploying them. Same
types of IEDs that have been used against U.S. forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
But where we are really seeing the Islamic Caucus Emirate
having its greatest effect is in Syria. While in Afghanistan
and Pakistan it largely operated in the shadows, I think in
Syria it has really advertised its fighting. That is because
instead of having, say, scores of fighters in the Afghan-
Pakistan region you now have hundreds if not thousands of
fighters from the Caucasus. I think Dr. Hahn laid out a very
good, detailed description of how the Islamic Caucus Emirates
fighters began to form and coalesce inside Syria.
It has become quite effective. We are now seeing fighters
that are appearing in videos--fighters and commanders, they are
appearing in videos--with al-Qaeda leaders or al-Qaeda-linked
fighters. Including one sheikh, Abdullah Mohaisany, who has
taken sides with al-Qaeda in its dispute with the Islamic State
of Iraq. They are seen on the battlefield celebrating. You have
two Chechen commanders, you have a leader of the group called
Ahrar al-Sham, which is in the Islamic front.
You have a top Saudi cleric, extremely popular Saudi
cleric--who definitely is tied to al-Qaeda, all celebrating
moments after overrunning a Syrian military position. One of
the--the fighters from the Caucasus are considered some of the
most tactically-proficient fighters amongst the jihadists. I
think this is where they are having a major impact in Syria.
They are imparting those tactics that they did on a smaller
level in Afghanistan, and they are making these Syrian Islamist
groups and jihadist groups far more effective.
I think that is why we are seeing them having such--success
against Syrian military formations. The other--I think the
biggest concern I have is how they are interacting, in
general--the fighters from the Caucasus are interacting in
general--with all these other jihadist groups. We even have--
there is this one person who identifies himself as an American.
His name is Abu Mohamed Amriki, which means, obviously, ``the
American.'' He is currently being investigated for his ties. He
claimed to live in the United States for 10 to 11 years.
He is pictured with top leaders from the Caucus Emirates,
such as Omar al-Shishani, who is now the military emir of the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. As these individuals are
interacting with Westerners or, better, joining the battlefield
in Syria, or from countries that, you know--that would easily
access the United States, I am deeply concerned with the
tactics and capabilities that they are imparting.
Thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:]
Prepared Statement of William F. Roggio
April 3, 2014
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, Members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me here to discuss the terrorist threat
emanating from the Caucasus. Unfortunately, as we saw nearly 1 year ago
today at the Boston Marathon, the jihad in the Caucasus has already
impacted lives here in the United States.
There is still much we do not know for certain about Tamerlan
Tsarnaev's travels in Dagestan and Chechnya, but we do know that, at a
minimum, he was sympathetic to the jihadists operating there. Tamerlan
Tsarnaev and his younger brother were, of course, responsible for the
attacks on the Boston Marathon. As a report by the House Homeland
Security Committee noted just last month, it ``is reasonable to assume
that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was at least inspired by'' the ``activity and
ideology'' of jihadists fighting in the Caucasus and he was ``driven to
take part in the vision of global jihad which they share with al-
Qaeda.'' Indeed, the Imarat Kavkaz or ``IK'' (otherwise known as the
Islamic Caucasus Emirate) does have links to al-Qaeda. And Tsarnaev is
known to have sympathized with the IK and its fighters.
The IK has openly proclaimed itself a threat to the United States
and the West, and we should take these threats seriously. The U.S.
State Department certainly does. In May 2011, the State Department
officially designated the IK as a terrorist organization. ``The
designation of Caucasus Emirate is in response to the threats posed to
the United States and Russia,'' Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the State
Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, said at the time. ``The
attacks perpetrated by Caucasus Emirate illustrate the global nature of
the terrorist problem we face today,'' Benjamin added.\1\ In June 2010,
the State Department added Doku Umarov, who was then the emir of the
IK, to the U.S. Government's list of Specially Designated Global
Terrorists.\2\ And in May 2011, Foggy Bottom offered a reward of $5
million for information leading to Umarov's location.\3\ In both its
June 2010 and May 2011 announcements, the State Department noted that
Umarov and the IK pose a threat to the United States and other
countries. Indeed, Umarov described the IK as ``a part of the global
Jihad'' in a July 2013 statement in which he called for further attacks
aimed at disrupting Russia's plans for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in
Sochi.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, ``Designation
of Caucasus Emirate,'' May 26, 2011; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2011/05/164312.htm.
\2\ U.S. State Department, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, ``Designation of Caucasus Emirates Leader Doku
Umarov,'' June 23, 2010; http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/
143564.htm.
\3\ U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, ``Rewards for
Justice--Doku Umarov Reward Offer,'' May 26, 2011; http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164314.htm.
\4\ Kavkaz Center, ``Caucasus Emirate Emir Dokku Abu Usman urged to
prevent Olympic games in Sochi,'' July 3, 2013; http://
www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2013/07/03/17994.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the fact that Umarov was recently killed, there are good
reasons to suspect that the IK will continue to pose a threat to
American and Western interests both in and outside of Russia. As with
other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, the IK will continue to spend most of
its resources waging insurgencies, both inside Russia and elsewhere.
Still, in my testimony today, I will highlight several key reasons why
the IK poses a terrorist threat to the West. Those reasons are:
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda helped transform the insurgency
in Chechnya from a nationalist one into part of the global
jihad.--Al-Qaeda's senior leadership established its influence
within the Caucasus long ago. While al-Qaeda was headquartered
in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, Osama bin Laden maintained a
network of training camps and other facilities that shuttled
fighters to several jihadist fronts, including Chechnya.\5\
During the 1990s al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
funneled cash and other support to Muslim rebels in Chechnya
through a charity in Baku, Azerbaijan.\6\ Ayman al-Zawahiri
himself, then the head of the EIJ, as well as second-in-command
of al-Qaeda, set out for Chechnya in late 1996. He was
accompanied by other dual-hated al-Qaeda-EIJ operatives.
Zawahiri was arrested in Dagestan before he reached Chechnya
and spent several months in prison. Zawahiri's trip to the
region underscores, from al-Qaeda's perspective, the importance
of supporting the jihad in Chechnya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 64.
\6\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda's efforts in Chechnya have clearly borne fruit. Two highly
influential jihadists in Chechnya became closely allied with
al-Qaeda's senior leaders. Shamil Salmanovich Basayev (a
Chechen) and Ibn al Khattab (a Saudi) established the Islamic
International Brigade (IIB). ``In October 1999,'' according to
the United Nations Security Council committee responsible for
sanctioning al-Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated groups,
``emissaries of Basayev and al Khattab traveled to Osama bin
Laden's home base in the Afghan province of Kandahar, where Bin
Laden agreed to provide substantial military assistance and
financial aid, including by making arrangements to send to
Chechnya several hundred fighters to fight against Russian
troops and perpetrate acts of terrorism.'' Also in 1999, bin
Laden ``sent substantial amounts of money to'' Basayev, al
Khattab and other jihadists in Chechnya. The money ``was to be
used exclusively for training gunmen, recruiting mercenaries
and buying ammunition.'' By the end of 2002, IIB leaders ``had
received several million dollars from international terrorist
organizations, including al-Qaeda.'' Al-Qaeda continued to
raise funds for the IIB after the 9/11 attacks.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning al-Qaeda and
associated individuals and entities, ``QE.1.99.03. Islamic
International Brigade (IIB),'' September 7, 2010; http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/1267/NSQE09903E.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 1995, the U.N. notes, ``Arab Afghans''--that is, men from
throughout the Arab world who traveled to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan during the 1980s--accounted for a ``substantial''
number ``of those fighting against Russian troops.'' Al-Qaeda
not only supported the jihad inside Chechnya, but also made
sure to integrate Chechens into its operations in Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda's elite ``055 Brigade,'' which fought alongside the
Taliban against the Northern Alliance, ``included a number of
Chechens, many of whom were believed to be followers of'' IIB
leaders. In October 2001, al Khattab supported al-Qaeda's fight
against coalition forces by sending ``additional fighters to
Afghanistan'' and promising ``to pay the volunteers' families a
substantial monthly stipend or a large lump-sum payment in the
event of their death.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fighters from the Caucasus are present in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region to this day. The International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) has identified ``Chechen'' fighters in Afghanistan as
recently as May 2011, when it noted that a foreign fighter
network in Kunduz ``facilitates foreign suicide bombers
including Chechens and Pakistanis throughout the province.''\9\
A group calling itself the Caucasus Mujahideen in Khorasan
announced its presence in October 2011, saying it was in direct
contact with its ``brothers'' in Russia.\10\ The United Nations
has noted that Umarov, the deceased head of the IK, supported
both the Islamic Jihad Group and the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU).\11\ Both groups are based in South Asia and
closely allied with al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ISAF Press Release, DVIDS, May 31, 2011; http://
www.dvidshub.net/news/71346/isaf-joint-command-morning-operational-
update.
\10\ Bill Roggio, ``Fighters from `Caucasus Mujahideen in Khorasan'
issue message to `brothers' in southern Russia,'' The Long War Journal,
Oct. 22, 2011; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/10/
fighters_from_caucas.php.
\11\ United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning al-Qaeda and
associated individuals and entities, ``QI.U.290.11. Doku Khamatovich
Umarov,'' March 10, 2011; http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/
NSQI29011E.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda has repeatedly highlighted the fighting in Chechnya
in its propaganda videos.--After the U.S.S. Cole bombing in
October 2000, Osama bin Laden ordered his media committee to
produce a propaganda video that included a reenactment of the
Cole bombing, as well as footage from Chechnya and other
jihadist hotspots.\12\ The plight of Muslims in Chechnya
remained a theme in al-Qaeda's messaging in the years that
followed. And al-Qaeda continues to present the fighting in
Chechnya as part of its global jihad. In January of this year,
Ayman al-Zawahiri praised Chechen fighters, saying that the
``fighting for Chechnya is another page of the pages of eternal
jihad to as to achieve true justice in the name of Allah.''
Zawahiri asked if other jihadists would be willing to follow
the Chechens' example: ``Are we, as Muslims, ready to take the
path of the Chechens, and enroll in the ranks of the fight in
the name of Allah?'' Zawahiri called on Muslims in Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia to follow the Chechens' lead in rejecting
democracy and waging jihad.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 191.
\13\ SITE Intelligence Group, ``Zawahiri Praises Chechen Fighters
As Models for Jihad,'' January 25, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The jihad in Chechnya has been used to recruit terrorists--
including a number of the 9/11 hijackers--who were repurposed
for attacks against American interests.--As the 9/11 Commission
reported, al-Qaeda's Hamburg cell traveled ``to Afghanistan
aspiring to wage jihad in Chechnya,'' but al-Qaeda ``quickly
recognized their potential and enlisted them in its anti-U.S.
jihad.''\14\ The Hamburg cell included the terrorists who flew
the hijacked planes on 9/11. Some of the muscle hijackers from
Saudi Arabia initially wanted to fight in Chechnya.\15\ Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, also attempted
to join the ranks of the main jihadist leader in Chechnya, Ibn
al Khattab.\16\ And in August 2001, French authorities provided
evidence to the U.S. Government that Zacarias Moussaoui, who
was slated to take part in a follow-on attack after 9/11, had
his own ties to Khattab.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 160.
\15\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 233.
\16\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 149.
\17\ 9/11 Commission Report, p. 274.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IK has adopted al-Qaeda's tactics, including the use of
suicide bombers in attacks against civilians. The organization
has developed expertise in committing mass casualty terrorist
attacks. Since the formation of the IK in 2007, the group has
executed multiple suicide attacks against security forces,
government officials, and civilians. The attacks have not been
confined to the Caucasus region of Russia; IK has struck in the
heart of Moscow several times. Two of the most deadly IK
attacks in Moscow over the past several years are the January
24, 2011 suicide attack at the Domodedovo International Airport
in Moscow that killed 35 people and wounded scores more \18\
and the March 29, 2010 suicide attack by two female bombers, or
Black Widows, who killed 39 people in the Moscow metro.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Bill Roggio, ``Caucasus Emirate leader claims Moscow airport
suicide attack,'' The Long War Journal, Feb. 7, 2011; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/02/caucasus_emirate_cla.php.
\19\ Bill Roggio, `` `Black Widow' female suicide bombers kill 37
in Moscow metro blasts,'' The Long War Journal, March 29, 2010; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/female_suicide_bombe_3.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other major suicide bombings include the June 22, 2009 attack that
wounded Yunus Bek Yevkurov, the President of the Republic of
Ingushetia and suicide attacks on Oct. 21, 2013,\20\ Dec. 29,
2013, and Dec. 30 2013 \21\ that targeted transportation nodes
(a bus, a train station, and a trolley respectively) in the
city of Volgograd. All of these attacks were executed by the
suicide teams of the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and
Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM), a unit that
predates the IK and was responsible for attacks such at the
school siege in Beslan, the destruction of commercial airlines,
and the theater siege in Moscow.\22\ The IK is closely linked
to the RSRSBCM.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Lisa Lundquist, ``Suspected `Black Widow' suicide bomber kills
6 in southern Russia,'' Oct. 21, 2013; The Long War Journal, http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/a_suspected_black_wi.php.
\21\ Bill Roggio, ``Suicide bomber strikes again in southern
Russia,'' Dec. 30, 2013, The Long War Journal; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12/suicide_bomber_strik_8.php.
\22\ Benjamin Shapiro, ``Caucasus jihad: Terror tactics back on the
horizon?'', The Long War Journal, May 21, 2009; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/caucasus_jihad_terro.php.
\23\ United Nations Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning al-Qaeda and
associated individuals and entities, ``QE.1.99.03. Islamic
International Brigade (IIB),'' September 7, 2010; http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/1267/NSQE09903E.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IK's threat against the 2014 Olympics in Sochi was real,
despite the fact that no terrorist attack materialized.--In
June 2013, Doku Umarov called on his supporters to use
``maximum force'' to stop the 2014 Olympic Games. ``Today we
must show those who live in the Kremlin . . . that our kindness
is not weakness,'' Umarov said. ``They plan to hold the
Olympics on the bones of our ancestors, on the bones of many,
many dead Muslims buried on our land by the Black Sea. We as
mujahideen are required not to allow that, using any methods
that Allah allows us.''\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Miriam Elder, ``Russian Islamist Doku Umarov calls for attacks
on 2014 Winter Olympics,'' The Guardian, July 3, 2013; http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/russia-islamist-attack-olympics-
sochi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Russian government erected substantial security barriers in
order stop terrorists from striking the Olympic festivities. It
is likely that these measures either stopped an attack from
occurring, or dissuaded the IK from attempting one. If the
opportunity for an attack had presented itself, there is little
doubt that the IK would have taken it. And the IK would not
have discriminated between Russian government officials/
civilians and others who were visiting the games from abroad.
That is, the IK's threat against the Olympic Games was not just
a threat against Russia, but was in fact a threat against the
international community.
The IK operates as part of al-Qaeda's global network. As
we've learned over the past several years, the terrorist threat
against the United States can come from any part of al-Qaeda's
international network. The IK is integrated with this network.
Today, this can best be seen in Syria, where multiple IK
commanders and other affiliated fighters have joined the
insurgency against Bashar al Assad's regime.
Jihadist from the IK play a pivotal role in the fighting in Syria,
and leaders from the Caucasus command large numbers of Syria
and foreign fighters in several jihadist groups operating in
the country. Those groups include the Al Nusrah Front for the
People of the Levant, al-Qaeda's official branch in Syria; the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham, or ISIS, an al-Qaeda
splinter group; and the Islamic Front, an Islamist alliance
that is allied with the Al Nusrah Front. Both the Al Nusrah
Front and the ISIS are on the U.S. Government's list of
Specially Designated Global Terrorist entities.
Fighters from IK originally fought in the Kateeb al Muhajireen wal
Ansar, or the Brigade of the Emigrants and Helpers. This group
was formed in February 2013 and was led by Omar al Shishani (a
Chechen).\25\ Kavkaz Center noted that the group ``includes
volunteers from the Caucasus Emirate.''\26\ In March 2013, the
group expanded and rebranded itself the Jaish al Muhajireen wa
Ansar, or Army of the Emigrants and Helpers. Syrian jihadist
groups merged with Abu Omar's forces at this time.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Bill Roggio, ``Chechen commander leads Muhajireen Brigade in
Syria,'' The Long War Journal, Feb. 20, 2013, http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/chechen_comman- der_le.php.
\26\ Kavkaz Center, ``Syria. Appeal of Emir of Brigade of Emigrants
Abu Omar al-Chechen,'' Feb. 7, 2013; http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/
content/2013/02/07/17333.shtml.
\27\ Bill Roggio, ``Chechen commander forms `Army of Emigrants,'
integrates Syrian groups,'' The Long War Journal, March 28, 2013;
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/
chechen_commander_le.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Army of the Emigrants and Helpers served as the vanguard for
jihadist forces in Syria. It was spotted at the tip of the
spear during the fighting at nearly every crucial battle in
2013. The group launched joint assaults with the Al Nusrah
Front and the ISIS to overrun Syrian military bases. The Army
of the Emigrants and Helpers has shot down a Syrian helicopter
with a surface-to-air missile and used a captured BMP armored
fighting vehicle as a suicide car bomb in order to penetrate
the perimeter at a Syrian military base.\28\ \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Bill Roggio, ``Muhajireen Army fires on Syrian helicopter with
surface-to-air missile,'' The Long War Journal, June 27, 2013; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/06/
muhajireen_army_fires_on_syria.php.
\29\ Bill Roggio, ``Muhajireen Army uses BMP to launch suicide
assault on Aleppo airport,'' The Long War Journal, June 27, 2013;
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/06/
muhajireen_army_uses.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Army of the Emigrants and Helpers splintered in the fall of
2013 as ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front clashed over a leadership
dispute and the former's unwillingness to submit to sharia
courts. Abu Omar al Shishani took a faction of fighters and
joined the ISIS. Three commanders, known as Saifullah al
Shishani, Salahuddin Shishani, and Abu Musa al Shishani, joined
the Al Nusrah Front. Salahuddin has even been photographed in
Syrian sitting in front of an IK flag. And another commander,
known as Muslim al Shishani, reformed the Army of the Emigrants
and Helpers and remained independent from, but allied with, the
Al Nusrah Front and the ISIS.
The prevalence of IK fighters and leaders on the Syrian battlefield
has serious, long-term ramifications for the global jihad. IK
members are interacting with and sharing their tactical skills
with Westerners and others. For instance, a jihadist who
identifies himself as an American and is known as Abu Muhammad
al Amriki has been seen in photographs with Omar al
Shishani.\30\ He is also seen fighting alongside IK fighters
and even speaks in Russian.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Bill Roggio, `` `American' jihadist in Syria pictured with
dangerous ISIS commanders,'' The Long War Journal, March 19, 2014;
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/
american_jihadist_in.php.
\31\ The video can be found on YouTube, see: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPNIOL34bA4&feature=youtu.be.
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Thank you again for inviting me to testify today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Roggio. Appreciate your testimony.
Now, Dr. Andrew Kuchins is a senior fellow and director of
the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He is an expert on Russian foreign and
domestic policies, with his more recent scholarship being
dedicated to U.S.-Russian relations and the Russia-Asian
strategy; and the role of energy in the Russian Far East.
From 2003 to 2006, Dr. Kuchins was a senior associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he served
as director of its Russian and Eurasian program, and was the
director of the Carnegie Moscow Center in Russia. I am glad
they got your nameplate straight. We are very privileged to
have you here today as a witness, Dr. Kuchins.
You are recognized, thank you.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. KUCHINS, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR
FELLOW, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Kuchins. Thank you very much Chairman King. It is a
great pleasure and honor for me to have the opportunity to
speak before the committee today, and, along with the two very
distinguished colleagues. I should say out the outset that I
agree very, very much with what my predecessors have said,
particularly about the dangers of the links between fighters
from the North Caucasus and their link-up with those in Syria,
and the potential implications.
The thrust of my remarks will be somewhat different. In my
view, the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from
the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation is likely
to increase in the years ahead. The judgment is based on my
perception of several on-going trends and phenomena. I want to
make, basically, six points. One, the governance problems in
the Northern Caucasus that plague the region at large are
growing. While the incidents of violent acts may have subsided
moderately in the past few years, the underlying issues of poor
governance, economic deprivation, high unemployment, and
endemic corruption are all getting worse.
In addition, oppression on the basis of religion by the
Russian state is increasing in the face of the growing role of
Islam, including radical and violent Salafi groups in ideology
in the North Caucasus, in Russia more broadly. Many people who
may have initially been quite moderate in their views and goals
have been radicalized by the very unpleasant experiences of
themselves or those close to them in encounters with Russian
state authority.
Two, the growing resonance of Russian nationalism and
national politics is feeling increasing resentment about the
subsidization of the region. This sentiment, which has been
captured by the popular phrase ``stop feeding the Caucasus'' is
pushing the Russian government to curtail government spending
toward the region just as the strains of economic stagnation in
the Russian economy at large--there is a less than a 1 percent
annual growth at the moment--are putting pressures on the
budget more broadly. The near-term prospects for the Russia
economy have much greater downside risk today than upside
potential.
In a CSIS report on the Northern Caucasus published in
2011, we concluded that the Northern Caucasus is increasingly
looking like a virtually ungovernable region under kind-of a
different jurisdictional administrative regime than that which
prevails in the rest of the country; maybe more akin to the
Fatah in Pakistan. This is also reflected in growing sentiment
among Russians that people from the Caucasus are not ``nosh''
or ``ours.'' That this is a region populated by peoples that
are not really Russia, certainly not Ruski, maybe even not
Rasiski.
Three, Islam, as it is in many countries and regions of the
world, is becoming a more significant part of individual's
identity in the Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russia
Federation, notably the Volga Region and other large cities.
Not surprisingly, we see increasing voice for Islam being
expressed in the political context. Chechen leader, Ramzan
Kadyrov for example, has embraced and promoted this in
Chechnya, even endorsing the implementation of Sharia law. We
also see greater prevalence of radical Salafi strains of Islam,
as well as overt linkages with global jihadist ideology, which
is largely facilitated by the internet, as well as the direct
links that Gordon and Bill talked about.
Four, significant numbers, likely, hundreds not thousands,
according to available data, of jihadists from the Northern
Caucasus have left for Syria to take up arms against the Assad
regime. Here, they have become battle-hardened veterans with
much deeper ties to global jihadist financial, ideological,
arms, and warfare training networks. Vladimir Putin's strong
stance supporting Assad only deepens their hatred of the ruling
order in Russia and their desire to demolish it if, and when,
they return to Russia.
The success of the mujahedin in Afghanistan in the 1980s
was a watershed event for the emergence and consolidation of
embryonic jihadist networks If there were a similar success in
Syria for the jihad-inspired forces in taking down the Assad
regime, we should also anticipate how this event could prompt
another quantum leap in the capabilities of jihadist networks
globally in terms of recruiting, financing, training, among
other areas. Already, as my colleagues have laid out, the
linkages between the Northern Caucasus and the battleground in
Syria have strengthened in many ways. We should anticipate that
the success--and even to a lesser extent, even with the--if it
were to--with failure of jihadists in Syria could dramatically
increase the dangers that groups and individuals present in the
Northern Caucasus.
The Obama administration has consistently under-appreciated
this factor as a major reason for Vladimir Putin's staunch
support for the Assad government for the past 3 years.
Five, the poor state of U.S.-Russia relations was already a
contributing factor in suboptimal counterterrorism and
intelligence sharing that, in part--a lesser part for sure--
facilitated the intelligence failure represented by the Boston
bombing by the Tsarnaev brothers in April 2013.
Committee Members know far better than I that intelligence
sharing, even with our closest allies, is a complicated and
challenging task. Intelligence sharing with a partner like the
Russian Federation, where mutual trust is very low, is that
much less likely to be successful and useful. Since the mutual
intelligence failure of the Boston bombings a year ago--again,
clearly, the lion's share of this responsibility falls on U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement institutions, given that the
act took place on U.S. territory--U.S.-Russia relations have
dramatically worsened over issues including, but not limited
to, the Snowden affair and Russia's military occupation and
subsequent annexation of Crimea.
As we sit here today, it is extremely difficult for me to
imagine that existing problems in U.S.-Russia intelligence
sharing on interactions between dangerous individuals and
groups in the Northern Caucasus with like-minded individuals
and groups in the United States or elsewhere, who may pose a
threat to the U.S. homeland--will improve. Realistically, the
current dysfunctional status quo in U.S.-Russia
counterterrorism cooperation will be politically hard to
maintain.
Six, a far more dangerous threat to the U.S. homeland could
emerge if Russian government intentions regarding how it
manages its own terrorist threat changes in certain ways. What
do I mean? My previous point suggested expectations of
cooperation from Russia to help contain threats that we had
identified as at least, to some extent, mutual in the past are
likely to be disappointed.
A far more acute danger for the United States would emerge,
however, if the Russian government decided, for reasons to
contain the threat of jihadist-inspired terrorists committing
terrorist acts on a Russian territory and/or to asymmetrically
punish the United States, they could be a facilitator for
attacks on the U.S. homeland. Always with plausible deniability
of course.
Alternatively, but with a similar result, could we imagine
that Moscow and Tehran could conclude to direct other Islamic-
inspired, non-Salafi jihadists--terrorist networks to wreak
havoc on the U.S. homeland, out of mutual interest--to
asymmetrically punish the United States. So in conclusion, I am
virtually certain that the problems in the North Caucasus, to
some degree, have increased the threat to the U.S. homeland.
Although we do not know or understand everything that
transpired between the act of the Tsarnaev brothers to set off
the bomb at the Boston Marathon a year ago, and their links and
interactions with groups and individuals in the Northern
Caucasus, for me this terrorist attack is indisputably
demonstrated that, in some form, what is going on in the
Northern Caucasus increases the overall threat assessment for
the United States.
The confluence of the on-going Syrian imbroglio, the
Iranian nuclear problem, and the dramatic worsening in U.S.-
Russia relations that has no end in sight, is certainly
increasing the threat to the United States. There are clear
links from the problems in the Northern Caucasus to this
threat, but they are not the only reason that Russia's position
could very significantly increase the threat to the U.S.
homeland. That is my final point.
This brings me--and it revolves around the psychology and
the potential intentions of Vladimir Putin and, more ominously,
those around him who may have much darker motivations and
intentions. Mr. Putin has been underestimated by Russian as
well as foreign elites, very always to their regret since he
emerged on Russia's national political stage in 1999.
Undoubtedly this is a phenomenon that he personally has
encountered and manipulated to his benefit since his youth.
Americans, but not only Americans, also have deeply
underestimated the national psychological trauma that the
collapse of the Soviet Union constituted for Vladimir Putin and
tens of millions of other Russians. We need to conceptualize
the Russian Federation as continuing to endure something akin
to post-traumatic stress disorder. Mr. Putin resonates so well
with the majority of Russians because he taps directly into
this very, very rich psychological vein.
I do not pretend to know much about psychology, but I do
know that if PTSD is not treated its symptoms get worse, not
better, over time. Mr. Putin, as he did in Brussels last week,
and--sorry, as a starting point I would recommend to our
President to refrain from publicly taunting Mr. Putin as he did
in Brussels last week, and caution other American politicians
and officials from doing the same. I would also recommend that
the President and other officials refrain from revealing in
public to Mr. Putin and others around the world what are our
deepest fears that keep us up at night.
In addition, I urge all to carefully read the speech Mr.
Putin gave to the federal assembly on March 18 in Moscow.
Because it is possible that historians in the future may mark
that moment as the tipping point of Weimar Russia into a
fascist state.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kuchins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew C. Kuchins
April 3, 2014
It is my view that the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland
emanating from the Northern Caucasus region of the Russian Federation
is likely to increase in the years ahead. This judgment is based on my
perception of several on-going trends and phenomena:
(1) The governance problems in the Northern Caucasus that plague
the region at large are growing. While the incidence of violent
acts may have subsided moderately in the past few years, the
underlying issues of poor governance, economic deprivation,
high unemployment, and endemic corruption are all getting
worse. In addition, oppression on the basis of religion by the
Russian state is increasing in the face of the growing role of
Islam, including radical and violent Salafi groups and
ideology, in the North Caucasus and Russia more broadly. Many
people who may have initially been quite moderate in their
views and goals have been radicalized by the very unpleasant
experiences of themselves or those close to them in encounters
with Russian state authority.
(2) The growing resonance of Russian nationalism in national
politics is fueling increasing resentment about the
subsidization of the region. This sentiment, which has been
captured by the popular phrase ``Stop Feeding the Caucasus,''
is pushing the Russian government to curtail government funding
toward the region just as the strains of economic stagnation
(less than 1 percent annual GDP growth at current estimations)
are putting pressure on the budget more broadly. The near-term
prospects for Russian economy have much greater downside risk
than upside potential. In a CSIS report on the Northern
Caucasus published in 2011, we concluded that the Northern
Caucasus is increasingly looks like a virtually ungovernable
region under a different jurisdictional administrative regime
than that which prevails in the rest of the country, similar to
the FATA in Pakistan. This is also reflected in growing
sentiment among Russians that people from the Caucasus are not
Nash (ours), and that this is a region populated by peoples
that are not really Russian.
(3) Islam, as it is in many countries and regions of the world, is
becoming a more significant part of individuals' identity in
the Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation
(notably the Volga Region and other large cities).\1\ Not
surprisingly, we see increasing voice for Islam being expressed
in the political context. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, for
example, has embraced and promoted this in Chechnya, even
endorsing the implementation of Sharia law. We also see a
greater prevalence of radical Salafi strains of Islam as well
as overt linkages with global Jihadist ideology, which is
largely facilitated by the internet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sergey Markedonov, The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic
Groups in Russia's Volga Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, January 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Significant numbers (likely hundreds, not thousands according
to available data) of Jihadists from the Northern Caucasus have
left for Syria to take up arms against the Assad regime. Here
they have become battle-hardened veterans with much deeper ties
to global jihadist financial, ideological, arms, and warfare
training networks. Vladimir Putin's strong stand supporting
Assad only deepens their hatred of the ruling order in Russia
and their desire to demolish it if and when they return to
Russia. The success of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the
1980s was a watershed event for the emergence and consolidation
of embryonic Jihadist networks. If there were a similar success
in Syria for the Jihad-inspired forces in taking down the Assad
regime, we should also anticipate how this event could prompt
another quantum leap in the capabilities of Jihadist networks
globally in terms of recruiting, financing, and training, among
other areas. Already the linkages between the Northern Caucasus
and the battleground in Syria have strengthened in many ways,
and we should anticipate that the success (and to a lesser
extent, even failure) of Jihadists in Syria could dramatically
increase the dangers these groups and individuals present in
the Northern Caucasus. The Obama administration has
consistently underappreciated this factor as a major reason for
Vladimir Putin's staunch support for the Assad government for
the past 3 years.
(5) The poor state of U.S.-Russia relations was already a
contributing factor in sub-optimal counter-terrorism and
intelligence sharing that in part facilitated the intelligence
failure represented by the Boston bombing by the Tsarnaev
brothers in April 2013. Committee members know far better than
I that intelligence sharing even with our closest allies is a
complicated and challenging task. Intelligence sharing with a
partner like the Russian Federation where mutual trust is very
low is that much less likely to be successful and useful. Since
the mutual intelligence failure of the Boston bombings a year
ago (though clearly the lion's share of this responsibility
falls on U.S. intelligence and law enforcement institutions
given that this act took place on U.S. territory), U.S.-Russian
relations have dramatically worsened over issues including but
not limited to the Snowden affair and Russia's military
occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea. As we sit here
today, it is extremely difficult to imagine that existing
problems in U.S.-Russia intelligence sharing on interactions
between dangerous individuals/groups in the Northern Caucasus
with like-minded individuals/groups in the United States or
those elsewhere who may pose a threat to the U.S. homeland will
improve. Realistically, the current dysfunctional status quo in
U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation will be politically
hard to maintain.
(6) A far more dangerous threat to the U.S. homeland could emerge
if Russian government intentions regarding how it manages its
own terrorist threat changes in certain ways. What do I mean?
My previous point suggests that expectations of cooperation
from Russia to help contain threats that we had identified as,
at least to some extent, mutual in the past are likely to be
disappointed. A far more acute danger for the United States
would emerge, however, if the Russian government decided, both
for reasons to contain the threat of Jihadist-inspired
terrorists committing terrorist acts on Russian territory and/
or to asymmetrically punish the United States, to be a
facilitator for attacks on the U.S. homeland--always with
plausible deniability of course. Alternatively, but with a
similar result, could we imagine that Moscow and Tehran could
collude to direct other Islamic-inspired (i.e. non-Salafi
Jihadists) terrorist networks to wreak havoc on the U.S.
homeland out of mutual interests to asymmetrically punish the
United States?
In conclusion, I am virtually certain that the problems in the
Northern Caucasus to some degree have already increased the threat to
the U.S. homeland. Although we do not know or understand everything
that transpired between the act of the Tsarnaev brothers to set off the
bomb at the Boston marathon a year ago and their links and interactions
with groups and individuals in the Northern Caucasus, for me this
terrorist act indisputably demonstrated that in some form what is going
on in the Northern Caucasus increases the overall threat assessment for
the United States. The confluence of the on-going Syrian imbroglio, the
Iranian nuclear problem, and the dramatic worsening in U.S.-Russia
relations that has no end in sight is certainly increasing the threat
to the United States. There are clear links from the problems in the
Northern Caucasus to this threat--but they are not the only reason that
Russia's position could very significantly increase the threat to the
U.S. homeland.
This brings me to my final point that revolves around the
psychology and potential intentions of Vladimir Putin and, more
ominously, those around him who may have much darker motivations and
intentions. Mr. Putin has been underestimated by Russian as well as
foreign elites, virtually always to their regret, since he emerged on
Russia's national political stage in 1999. Undoubtedly, this is a
phenomenon that he has encountered and manipulated to his benefit since
his youth. Americans, but not only Americans, have also deeply
underestimated the national psychological trauma that the collapse of
the Soviet Union constituted for Vladimir Putin and tens of millions of
other Russians. We need to conceptualize the Russian Federation as
continuing to endure something akin to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD). Mr. Putin resonates so well with the majority of Russians
because he taps directly into this rich psychological vein. I do not
pretend to know much about psychology, but I do know that if PTSD is
not treated its symptoms get worse, not better, over time. As a
starting point, I would recommend to our President to refrain from
publicly taunting Mr. Putin (as he did in Brussels last week), and
caution other American politicians and officials from doing the same. I
would also recommend that the President and other officials refrain
from revealing in public to Mr. Putin and others around the world what
are our deepest fears that keep us up at night. In addition, I urge all
to carefully read the speech Mr. Putin gave to the Federal Assembly \2\
on March 18 because it is possible that historians in the future may
mark that moment as the tipping point of Weimar Russia into a fascist
state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Vladimir Putin, ``Address by President of the Russian
Federation,'' Kremlin.ru, March 18, 2014, accessed March 29, 2014,
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889.
Mr. King. On that encouraging note----
Mr. Kuchins. Yes!
Mr. King [continuing]. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Kuchins,
for your testimony.
Mr. Kuchins. There is the bad news.
Mr. King. In view of the schedule, I think we will have a
chance to get through most of the hearing. When you are talking
about the terrorist jihadist network in the Caucasus, are there
any ethnic or geographic differences which would split them? Or
does the Islamist theology, or dogma, unite them?
Mr. Hahn. Yes, okay. It is a complicated story. There was a
split in August 2010 involving the majority of the Chechen
emirs from Emir Umarov and the rest of the Caucasus Emirate.
However, it was not based on ethnicity, per se, and it was
certainly not based on any rejection of the Salafist takfir's
goal of creating the caliphate, as the splitters themselves
stated explicitly. It was more a result, I believe, of
competition between the different networks, right?
So if you have a--the Chechen network is based on the
Chechen Republic, the Dagestani network is based on the
Dagestani Republic. The Dagestanis were on the rise in terms of
the number of attacks and becoming more prominent. The kadhi,
the Sharia court judge of the Caucasus Emirate was a Dagestani.
So there was a certain sense among the Chechens that they were
getting--they were moving on to this--they were being pushed
aside, essentially, within the movement. That is what drove it.
So in the--so there is not really inter-ethnic tensions,
per se. There is tension between networks. The overriding
ideology is anti-ethnic; that is, they don't believe--it is
sort of like the communist ideology, right? They don't believe
in ethno-national compartments, right? They believe in an
overriding ideology that unites all Muslims. So if you--
assuming that your Islamic faith complies with their view of
Islamic faith. So ethnicity is something to be put on the
second plane.
Mr. King. Okay. Mr. Roggio.
Mr. Roggio. Yes, I agree with what Dr. Hahn had said. I
think their ideology ultimately resolved that dispute, that
split that existed in 2010. To amplify the point that he made
that they look to be inclusive, they even have recently stated,
with the Russian invasion of the Crimea, that they were
permitting any jihadists in the Crimea to fight alongside--if
any--if fighting did begin against a Russian occupation, they
permitted fighters to join alongside what they would consider
to be secular fighters in order to punish the Russians.
So they are--I think we are seeing this in Syria, as well,
the al-Qaeda. They are trying to be a little bit more
inclusive. I--that doesn't make them more moderate. It only
makes them more dangerous.
Mr. King. Dr. Kuchins.
Mr. Kuchins [continuing]. The vast majority of Muslims in
the Northern Caucasus, and the Russian Federation at large, of
course, are not global jihadists. There is, I think however,
quite serious ethnic or national competition, to some extent--
that is maybe not the right way to phrase it--amongst different
strains of Muslim thought. I mean, in Dagestan, for sure, you
have the--probably the oldest and the deepest and the most
sort-of serious school, I think, of Islam within the Northern
Caucasus.
If you go back historically to elsewhere in the Russian
Federation, you go to the Volga region--to Tartarstan,
Bashkidistan--they also have extremely rich and deep tradition
in their interpretation of the Koran and Muslim practices. In
other places, Chechnya and the, you know, the understanding of
the Koran would be considered, I think, by many serious
scholars, of which I am not of this, quite superficial and, you
know, sort of less significant in ways.
Not significant--not less significant for the purposes of
global jihad, but sort of in the pantheon of comparative Muslim
religious life.
Mr. Hahn. Can I just qualify one thing I said in my
remarks?
Mr. King. Sure.
Mr. Hahn. That split that I mentioned actually was
overcome, right? These Chechen emirs returned to the Caucasus
Emirate, and that is evidence in and of itself that they didn't
reject the global jihadi goals of the Caucasus Emirate.
Mr. King. My time is almost expiring. Could each of you
give a brief answer, if possible, as to why IK or any of the
other groups was not successful in attacking the Olympics?
Mr. Hahn. I can outline three reasons, basically. One
potential reason is, depending on the timing, it was the death
of Umarov. Because he basically controlled a group called the
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs Brigade that would have carried out
suicide bombings to attack Sochi or around Sochi or some--at
the time of Sochi. The other was very intensified
counterterrorist operations in which, of course, the Russians,
as usual, violated human civil rights on occasion.
But they also targeted the correct spot, and that was
Buinaksk in Dagestan where there was a very dangerous cell
involving ethnic Russians who had become mujahedin. Third was
the exodus of fighters to Syria--the most capable, the most
fervent, fighters, mujahedin and Caucasus Emirate--because of
the lack of capacity and the repression in the North Caucasus
are leaving Syria, where they can operate more openly and more
effectively.
Mr. King. Mr. Roggio.
Mr. Roggio. Yes, I think the--one, the Russians laid down a
significant security blanket, that was quite effective and
multilayered, limited their capacity to conduct attacks.
Second, I agree with Dr. Hahn. I think the exodus of fighters
from the region to Syria certainly took--you know, it limited
their capacity to focus and conduct attacks.
Mr. King. Dr. Kuchins.
Mr. Kuchins. I would agree with what Gordon and Bill just
said. The honest answer, though, is that I was surprised that
there wasn't an attack, either in Sochi itself or somewhere,
elsewhere in the Russian Federation, particularly after the two
successful attacks in Volgograd in late December. So it appears
that they decided to keep their powder dry. The problem is not
going away.
Certainly, the most recent act by Russia in Crimea and the
Crimea--there, for the Crimean Tartars is only gonna add more
fuel to their furor. They are going to--they are gonna come
back. The problem is not going away.
Mr. King. The Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I have
often heard Vladimir Putin characterized as being more tactical
than he is strategic. He seems to be appealing to Russian
nationalist aspirations to somehow reconcile the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Dr. Kuchins, you had indicated that the Obama
administration underestimates Caucasus Emirate as a factor in
Putin's involvement or support in Syria. Can you collaborate on
that?
Mr. Kuchins. I have been struck, over the past 3 years--
particularly if you go back to the reactions to the
administration or our former ambassador to the United Nations,
Susan Rice, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton--to their
surprise that the Russians did not vote with us on the
sanctions against Syria in the the U.N. Security Council. I am
mystified as to why they were surprised. There should have
been--there was no indication whatsoever that the Russians
would ever vote with us on sanctions against Syria.
But what really struck me subsequently was the way we,
they, kind-of castigated the Russian position in moral terms,
in some kind of moral degradation. I think rather than trying
to look a little bit more seriously into the substantive
reasons as to why the Russians have not been with us on Syria.
For me, if you look at them, I don't find it very difficult to
come up with a series of reasons that make pretty good sense in
the Russian context, in the Russian context of their interest,
and they are not simply about just blocking the United States'
interests.
They're not even--certainly, the desire to prevent, you
know, military regime change is an important factor for the
Russians. But even that, I think, is not right at the heart of
the matter. We could never answer to the Russians, effectively,
what would happen if Mr. Assad goes? Can you explain to me why
it would be more stable in the region if Mr. Assad goes? That
was the question from the Russians, and I don't think that we
could ever give them a satisfactory answer.
Then subsequently, when the Russians see what happened in
Egypt, when they see what happened when they saw what happened
in Libya, it only confirmed what were their preconceptions
going in that this Arab Spring and this wave of democratization
in the Middle East would result in greater instability and
danger.
Mr. Higgins. But, you know, it seems--there was a debate 6
months ago here about authorizing the administration to use
military force in Syria if they determined that was necessary.
I think a lot of the concern at that point was, you know, this
was really not, in Syria, a fight for freedom and democracy. It
was really a fight for power. In that part of the world, which
is highly pluralistic--you know, minorities are aligning
themself with Assad for one reason, survival.
Because, you know, in that part of the world if you are not
on top you get slaughtered. You know, the one thing that wasn't
coming from the administration at that time, they were trying
to use 100,000 people being killed because of chemical weapons
in Syria. Well, the opposition, the best fighters--and I think
it has been identified here--were all al-Qaeda affiliates,
including the Caucasus Emirate. You know, they were beheading
people. So you can choose your own demise, I guess.
But, you know, this is what makes that situation, I think,
the larger situation in that part of the world complicated. To
find the right entry point if, in fact, there ought to be one.
Because, you know, a great book by Marwa Mawasher, ``The Second
Era of Awakening,'' he argues this, that without pluralism in
the Middle East, in that region, you are never gonna have peace
and stability. Because it is not, again, a fight for freedom or
democracy, regardless of what these revolutions, you know,
express to be their objective. What you really have is
minorities afraid that, you know, if Assad goes they will be
next to be attacked.
Because, as we know, Syria is about 75 percent Sunni, and
Sunnis take control. This is the problem that we have made in
Iraq. You know, Nouri al-Malaki is pushing Americans away 5
years ago, saying, ``Well, we have other allies in the
region.'' He was talking about Ahmadinejad in Iran. Then,
because of his failure to embrace the Sunni population, he has
got a Sunni problem, he has got an al-Qaeda problem. So now he
is back to the United States, saying, ``We need financing for
our arms because we have to fight this problem.''
Who caused the problem? You did. I think that, you know,
permeates throughout the Middle East. I just think this is
another iteration of the manifestation of that inability to
embrace minorities. To convey to them, you know, life ain't
great but we are not gonna slaughter you. That is a big problem
here.
I yield back.
Mr. King. The gentlelady from Texas is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank both the Chairman and the
Ranking Member for their courtesies in this committee. I sit on
the full committee and serve on another committee, but this is
a crucial moment in our history.
Let me just go to Dr. Hahn very quickly. You mentioned
Azerbaijan. I just want to know if--Azerbaijan is leaning as
far as they can, in my belief--these are my words--toward
Europe. What are you saying about the terrorist presence,
Chechen presence, in Azerbaijan? Or is it on the border, or--
because don't you think that they are certainly a bright light
in the region? Dr. Hahn.
Mr. Hahn. One of the problems is that Azerbaijan is a
transit route for some of the mujahedin going from the North
Caucasus to Syria and back. Since they are predominantly
Sunnis, and they are fighting the Shiites in Syria, there is a
possibility, certainly, that they would try to carry out
attacks against Shia-dominated Azerbaijan. Also, in the past
there was----
Ms. Jackson Lee. In their travels going through, but not
that Azerbaijan would be coddling any of----
Mr. Hahn. No, no, no, no. No, I didn't mean to say that.
The other issue is that there have been incursions from the
north, from Dagestan into Azerbaijan, by Caucasus Emirate
mujahedin. The other issue is that there was a Dagestani plot,
Dagestanis from the Caucasus Emirate, to attack the Eurovision
games in Baku in 2012. It was a Mumbai--the plot was a Mumbai-
style plot in which they were gonna try to assassinate the
president, they were gonna try to attack the Eurovision music
festival, bomb a couple of hotels, then retreat from the
capitol and then set up an insurgency in the mountains.
That was uncovered in spring and summer 2012. So there is a
Sunni--there has been a pattern of a potential Sunni threat to
Azerbaijan.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, they are in the region.
Mr. Hahn. Right.
Ms. Jackson Lee. They remain under threat. Let me move
quickly, because of the time--and thank you very much.
Mr. Roggins, as I note, the North Caucasus do not have a
dominant ethnic Russian. There is a multiple ethnicities there.
Are they in the line of Russia's eyesight? Are they in a
position to fend Russia off, because there is not a dominant
political body that wants to associate with Russia? How will
Russia--how do you perceive that playing out? Rebel fights or
terrorist fights? Russia leaving them alone? Russia wanting
them to go away? How do you perceive that?
Mr. Roggio. Well, currently the Caucasus Emirates really is
the only opposition to the Russians. The rest of the--Dagestan,
Ingushetia, Chechnya, they are Russian republics with their
governments. The fight in Chechnya really was the insurrection
there, and that has largely been put down and just replaced by
the Caucus Emirates current jihad against the Soviet regime. I
am sorry, the Russian regime.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it is a standoff in that----
Mr. Roggio. Yes. You know, look, this has been going on for
years. It has been ebb-and-flows. Right now, the Russians seem
to have the upper hand. But as we have seen, they have declared
the Caucus Emirates dead, or their predecessors dead in the
past. They have come back and regenerated their forces.
Conducted attacks even inside Moscow. You know, so it is an
ebb-and-flow, but this is a persistent group with an ideology
that appeals to a certain segment of the population and it is
not going away.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Is it Mr. Kuchins?
Mr. Kuchins. Kuchins.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Kuchins. Thank you very much. Well, there
is a lot that I want to ask you. But let me just quickly say,
as I looked at the comments that the President made--might I
take issue a little bit with taunting--I think it was the
President who gave a little leeway for Putin in terms of making
negative comments prior to the interaction on Ukraine just in
trying to keep relationships. I think if it was anything, the
President gets criticized for either not being strong or being
strong.
Putin has brought his problems on himself. We didn't
contribute to Soviet Union's demise. The people rose up and the
Cold War ended and independent-minded individuals decided to
move into their own sovereign nation. So the question for us,
for Putin, is whether or not he will live in the world order.
Which is we have sovereign nations and we don't necessarily
take well to people invading other countries. Which is Ukraine,
and Crimea which is associated with Ukraine.
My question to you, then, is Russia has its own share--
affairs on terrorism, either inside the country or around its
borders. Isn't that a full plate for it to then be engaged in a
full-scale war with the West? When I say that, through
promoting or coddling terrorists so that they can launch from
Russia. Their own people are under threat, their own people are
not stable. If we continue the sanctions, if they continue to
look as if they are gonna move 40,000 to 80,000 troops into
Ukraine, I can't imagine that a combination of Western minds--
European Union, the NATO coalition--is not going to have to
find a way to be very strong with it if it starts with
sanctions.
Mr. Kuchins. The challenge that we face, and particularly
our President faces, I think, is really trying to understand
the mind of Vladimir Putin and the calculations and the
framework that he has. They are very, very, very different. I
think if we look at Russian history, Russians have shown a
remarkable capacity to endure incredible economic hardship and
deprivation. To do things that we would consider absolutely
inconceivable because of the hardship that they would entail
for things that have been decided that, you know, are to
achieve the greater good.
So we have to be very cautious in applying, I think, our
mindset on Mr. Putin and his elite. The second thing, and this
is what has been very, very disappointing to me in the United
States' response to Crimea, is that I think there has been a
deep mismatch in rhetoric and action. It began on the very
first day, on February 28. It really simply hasn't been, it
hasn't been corrected effectively. I am afraid that we may--
``we,'' the United States of America--our leadership may not
understand, I think, the magnitude of the danger that Mr. Putin
potentially could present.
You know, just for example, there was an opportunity last--
2 weeks ago in Brussels, where the President made a speech.
That was to be the speech that was gonna be the--kind of the
hallmark of the trip. I can't tell you how disappointed I was
personally with the speech. Because the speech was all about
ideals, platitudes, values kind-of at 30,000 feet. There was
not one thing said about what the United States and the
Europeans can, should, will do to support Ukrainian
sovereignty.
So I completely agree with you that we have to focus like a
laser beam on supporting Ukrainian sovereignty. For the
Ukrainians and Kiev, and around the country, who have no
interest in joining the Russian Federation, I am sure when they
heard that speech they cried. When they read it in Moscow they
laughed. We have--if we create this perception, too-permissible
of an atmosphere, Putin is gonna further make a deep, deep,
deep, miscalculation. I think he is making miscalculations, and
ultimately--to put in vernacular terms, ``screwing himself
over.''
But it is the collateral damage that he could cause in
doing so. The Soviet Union and Mr. Gorbachev went out with a
whimper. I don't see that happening with this guy. There is no
question in my mind that whether he invades Eastern Ukraine or
not, I mean, whatever he and the Russians are doing it is
ultimately at the goal of depriving Ukraine of its sovereignty.
Fundamentally depriving Ukraine of its sovereignty, that is the
goal.
That goal is not gonna stop. He is going to be relentless
about it. He is gonna use every possible trick in the KGB
Russian----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Kitchen.
Mr. Kuchins [continuing]. Historical--to pursue that. So
frankly, I would actually like to see--to me, what the strength
right now is to showing, not showing but doing, providing
Ukrainians the capability--and they have shown a remarkable
lack of capability over the last 10 years themselves. They have
created the problem themselves because of their dysfunctional
governance, the total failure of the Orange Revolution 10 years
ago, unfortunately.
Hopefully, you know, as Samuel Johnson said about the
imminence of the beheading will focus the mind. That Ukrainian
elites will realize that, literally, their independence and
their sovereignty is at stake if they don't get it together.
But they need help on this, from us on that. The change, the
calculation, in Mr. Putin's mind that we and the Europeans are
not gonna roll over. There is nothing Mr. Putin would like to
do better than to expose the Transatlantic Alliance as a
complete sham.
There is nothing Mr. Putin would like to do more, and it is
all there in that March 18 speech, to basically undo the
covenants, the agreements of the post-Cold War order. Because
in his view and the views of the people around him they are
unfair, they are unjust to Russia. They took advantage of
Russia's weakness, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Kuchins.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back to the gentleman. Thank you.
Mr. King. Time is running down on the vote. I have one
question for Dr. Hahn, if I could. If you would try to limit
your answer to about 90 seconds, and then any written
supplement you want to provide would be greatly appreciated.
In your testimony you mention that the new emir seems to be
more aggressive as far as a global jihad. Then we have the
factor of more and more people from the Caucasus going to
Syria. As far as a threat to the United States, the homeland,
are there any red flags we should be looking for? Is there
anything that you would look out there as a warning signal to
us that we should be on the lookout over the next 6 months,
year, 2 years?
Mr. Hahn. Well, if the emir or someone close to him started
to emphasize the United States more in his rhetoric that would
be one signal. I think most of these things are gonna be hard
to identify. It is gonna be--you know, it is gonna be North
Caucasus mujahedin getting involved in the kind of camps that
Bill--William Roggio described previously. Because we have had
this report of al-Qaeda, right, planning to set up camps
specifically in Syria for the purpose of attacking the United
States in Syria.
So it is really indirect. It is the threat from the
Caucasus Emirate is--for the present is indirect in that it is
part of the global jihadi revolutionary movement. So it is very
much likely to be involved in any plots organized through Syria
by al-Qaeda or other groups. Because they are gonna try to have
an international flavor to any plot. A good model might be the
2000 plot to hijack a plane in Frankfurt, where the plan was to
have a Pakistani, I believe an Arab of some nationality, and a
Chechen.
The Chechens eventually pulled out of that plot, and it
never came off. So I think we are gonna see that kind of a
model more in the global jihad.
Mr. King. Time is running down to vote. If either of you
would want to add to that, Mr. Roggio, Dr. Kuchins?
Mr. Roggio. Just real quick. Yes. Yes, sir. Thank you. Real
quick, the camps. One of the key things, this has been al-Qaeda
historically has done this. They use those camps to train for
the local jihad, and they siphon off a small amount to conduct
its--what they call its ``external operations.'' The question
is--is al-Qaeda interested in that right now to conduct attacks
on the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad? Or are they
interested in focusing all their efforts in--because they are
being quite successful in their local insurgencies in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, et cetera.
That is what we don't know right now. But the fact that
this camp run by the Caucasus Emirates was disclosed, two other
camps run by the al-Nusra Front, which is al-Qaeda's official
affiliate. They are in action and they look just like the
videos you used to watch back in the 1990s of--you know, of al-
Qaeda fighters going through the motions. That is really what
disturbs me the most. I think we need to keep an eye on these
camps that are out there and, perhaps, take some direct action
if needed.
Mr. King. Dr. Kuchins, we have about 30 seconds, then I
have to----
Mr. Kuchins. Well, the one major takeaway I took from the
Boston bombing is that we really need to raise our awareness
level and our monitoring level of, you know, what is happening
in the Northern Caucasus and jihadists that we know are from
the Northern Caucasus; where they are traveling, what they are
doing. It is a level that we look at places like Yemen and
other countries and regions. That we are at a higher kind of
risk level for us. I think the Northern Caucasus needs to be at
that higher level.
Mr. King. Thank you, Doctor. Let me thank all the
witnesses. Also thank you for accommodating us with the
compressed schedule today.
Unfortunately, the vote schedule was different from what we
thought it was going to be. But, again, you managed to get an
awful lot in. If you have any other thoughts you want to give
us, believe me we would look forward to it. I want to thank you
for your testimony today, for your cooperation. I also thank
the Ranking Member for his cooperation in holding this hearing.
So thank you very much. With that, the meeting stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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