[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LIBYA AT A CROSSROADS:
A FALTERING TRANSITION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 25, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-206
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin GRACE MENG, New York
LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State................. 7
The Honorable Derek Chollet, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense..... 18
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Anne W. Patterson: Prepared statement.............. 10
The Honorable Derek Chollet: Prepared statement.................. 20
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 40
Hearing minutes.................................................. 41
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Statement by A Omar Turbi............................. 42
LIBYA AT A CROSSROADS:
A FALTERING TRANSITION
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
our distinguished chairman, Mr. Royce, for as much time as he
may consume. Thank you, Mr. Royce, for being with us. I will
then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, the
witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the
record. Members may have 5 days to insert statements and
questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in
the rules. The chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
The Arab Spring uprising in the Middle East and North
Africa of 2011 brought with them a period of brief hope for the
future of democracy in the region. Millions across many nations
demanded changes to the way their countries were being run and
in many cases run by dictators who held a stranglehold on power
for decades, unrelenting and unyielding. In some countries, the
people managed to usher out the ruling party and for a moment,
it appeared as though we were ready to see democracy rule the
day. However, the lack of infrastructure, the lack of
democratic institutions in these countries, as well the lack of
political will have all but dashed those hopes and Libya,
unfortunately, is one of the prime examples of this. Once
Gaddafi was removed from power, those seeking to reform the
government quickly proved that they were not up to the task and
the country fell into a further state of disunity as armed
militias battled for supremacy and control over Libya's future.
Libya has been plagued by instability, both political and
economic, and its factious nature has left it on the verge of a
civil war that poses very real and serious and imminent
national security challenges for us in the United States. To
make matters worse, the porous nature of its borders has
allowed extremists to flock to Libya, adding an even greater
complexity to the downward spiral and increasing the likelihood
of an all out civil war. Libya has become a terrorist safe
haven and the worst case scenario for all who had hoped that
the Arab Spring would bring democracy to the region. We are now
witnessing this crisis in Iraq and we certainly cannot afford
for both nations to become entrenched safe havens for
extremists to destabilize the region and attack our allies and
our national security interests.
With the prevalence of so many weapons readily available to
all, foreign fighters are flocking to Libya by the droves and
we are seeing Libyan weapons showing up in conflicts across the
entire region. So what must the United States do to help Libya
avert a possible civil war, bring the political factions
together to help resolve their differences, stabilize the
security situation in the country, fight back the influx of
extremists and shore up its borders and secure U.S. national
security interests?
The problem in Libya is that there are multiple crises
going on at the same time, all with their sets of issues, but
all linked together and the fate of Libya resides in
successfully navigating not one or some, but all of these
issues. Libya cannot secure its borders, nor can it repel the
extremist invasion. It cannot take advantage of its oil
revenues and reserves and it cannot stabilize or stimulate its
economy. The political factions remain deeply divided. And as
such, the state building process has stalled, the government
has not been able to establish a means to protect its borders
and control the extremists or make the much needed economic
reforms.
Today, the people of Libya are voting to choose members of
a new Parliament. We hope that this is a new step forward into
the path to stability, but as long as the security situation
remains tenuous so, too, will the political transition stall
and the economy falter. It is a seemingly unending spiral that
leads to only further deterioration unless something is done
immediately. The United States must remain engaged rather than
continue its hands-off policy in Libya. We must find ways to
work with the political parties to resolve their issues so that
they can form a government that can de-escalate tensions and
the fighting and finally get Libya back on the transition to
democracy. After all, it was the administration that played a
large role in the ouster of Gaddafi, but then left as quickly
as we got there, leaving in our wake the mess for the Libyans
to clean up themselves, knowing that they hadn't the
organization or the ability to do so.
What we are witnessing today is in part a consequence of
that. And we now face an uphill battle that the administration
cannot sidestep or sit on the fence and hope things work in our
favor. We must prevent Libya from turning into another Iraq and
we must avoid this from becoming yet another tragic strategic
defeat in the Middle East and North Africa for U.S. foreign
policy.
And without objection, Mr. Deutch passed his turn for now
and I am pleased to yield to the chairman of our committee, Mr.
Royce. Thank you again for being here, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Well, thank you, chairwoman and Mr. Deutch,
thank you very much and also welcome, Ambassador Anne
Patterson, good to see you, and Mr. Chollet.
Last month, the President made a case for collective
action, if you saw that speech. And indeed, coalitions were
mobilized during the first Gulf War. More recently, coalitions
helped end a war in Sierre Leone and hit al-Qaeda in Mali. We
should always look to share the cost of actions which we take.
But part of being a leader means holding our coalition partners
accountable, making sure they fulfill the commitments they
make. Unfortunately, this administration has failed in the role
in Libya. It has been clear since the beginning that it was
singularly focused on getting rid of Gaddafi, on ousting
Colonel Gaddafi. The administration's lack of interest in
leading has allowed our coalition partners to fail.
Despite the acknowledged weaknesses of the Libyan
transitional government, this administration allowed NATO to
head home knowing the job was not done. The United Nations
didn't fare any better. The U.N. mission didn't fulfill even
the modest task it was given. The EU was charged with border
security, a commitment that was made, but never kept. The EU
didn't send border security assistance teams into Libya until
2013 and only sent a portion of what was promised.
If the administration's policy was to let others take
action, then the U.S. was to make sure others fulfilled their
commitments. There is no doubt that the Libyans have done a
lousy job guiding their country during the transition. And
ultimately, the Libyans must take ownership of their future.
But we can and we should be supportive. Assisting Libya today
will require that we sit down with allies and partners to
assess the needs. We must be clear with our allies about our
shared goals and objectives and what is expected of each other.
We also need to be realistic about our own ability to
accomplish our diplomatic objectives in such a dangerous
environment. The protection of our diplomats must be a priority
as we consider how to engage in Libya. We learned the hard
lesson of the dangers of expeditionary diplomacy in Benghazi.
Today, terrorists are using Libya as a training ground and
a base to destabilize the entire region. Weapons and people
from across North Africa including Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in
the Maghreb are meeting up in Libya and they are organizing in
Libya. We know terrorists are actively trying to destabilize
Tunisia and Egypt and Algeria. We know terrorists trained in
Libya are fighting both in Syria and in Iraq. Libya is rapidly
slipping into chaos. And as we have seen in Iraq, a terrorist
element in control of valuable natural resources poses a
serious threat to the state, to its neighbors and to the United
States. Madam Chairwoman, I would ask unanimous consent if I
could----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Not an objection.
Mr. Royce. This unanimous consent is for a statement of Mr.
Omar Turbi to be included as part of the official record.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for
joining us. Without objection, we will make that a part of the
record. We appreciate your time.
And now I am pleased to yield to my good friend, the
ranking member of our subcommittee, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for calling
today's hearing. Assistant Secretaries Patterson and Chollet,
welcome to the committee. And we are so pleased to have the
opportunity discuss recent events in Libya and U.S. strategy
toward Libya going forward.
Since the 2011 ouster of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya struggled
to find its political footing, to put it mildly. What began as
a promising transition to democracy has resulted in a series of
rushed elections that has yielded a largely powerless central
government.
Today, Libyans will again vote to elect a new
representative body to replace the deadlocked General National
Congress. But one must ask whether Libyan people are still
invested in elections. Despite U.S. assistance focused on
building up state institutions which have been virtually
nonexistent for 40 years, Libya is struggling to create a
strong central government that can provide both security and
services to its people. The power vacuum left an opening for a
well armed and well funded militant groups to seize control. In
late 2013, the level of violence dramatically increased,
resulting from the brazen abduction of the Libyan prime
minister. 2014 has been marred by both political and security
setbacks. The General National Congress has been unable to meet
due to attacks by gunmen. The Ambassador of Jordan was
kidnapped in Tripoli. Prime Minister Zeidan was ousted in a no
confidence vote. A successor has yet to be named and a
successor has yet to be named to acting Prime Minister Al-Theni
and many important ministerial positions continue to remain
unfilled.
As a result of the turmoil, militias have been emboldened.
Militants have seized control of many of Libya's oil production
facilities. Pauses in oil production have resulted in a
reported loss of $30 billion creating a massive shortfall for
this oil-based economy. In May, former exile, General Hifter
and forces loyal to him, began launching attacks on militia
groups in and around Benghazi. What exactly are General
Hifter's intentions and despite his proclamation of wanting to
restore security to Libya, many believe that his long-term goal
is to seize government power. U.S. policy toward these actions
has been unclear, as officials have expressed concern about his
actions, but haven't condemned them. I hope Assistant Secretary
Patterson, you can offer some clarity here today.
The general lawlessness and lack of state security has
given rise to the notion that Libya is now a safe haven for
terrorists. The implications of this cannot be ignored. North
Africa's porous borders will provide easy transport of fighters
and weapons. Libyan fighters radicalized in Syria or Iraq could
easily return to Libya or any of its North African neighbors.
Terrorist groups like Ansar al-Shari'a are recruiting from
Libya's rural regions. These factions and others, many loosely
affiliated with al-Qaeda, have reached nearly 250,000 strong.
This political chaos and devolving security situation has many
asking, quite frankly, why the U.S. continues to remain
invested in Libya. I believe, as I stated, that the
implications of letting Libya become a failed state or a
terrorist safe haven are far too great for our national
security. It is strategically positioned as a transit point
between North Africa and the Middle East, and has water access
to Europe.
Counterterrorism cooperation between our allies in these
regions has to be a top priority, but do we even have a viable
Libyan counterterrorism institution to partner with? Clearly,
the deteriorating security situation poses the most immediate
challenge, but the only way that the Libyan Government can
stabilize the security situation long term is through
strengthening institutions that will legitimize the government
in the eyes of the Libyan people. Libya, unlike many of its
Arab Spring neighbors, doesn't need U.S. dollars. It needs U.S.
expertise.
Assistant Secretary Patterson, I look forward to hearing
how we are continuing to provide assistance and operate
programs that help build state institutions, strengthen rule of
law and good governance. And I hope you will address whether
the conditions set forth on the nearly $100 million of
assistance we are providing continue to be met.
As we continue our efforts to train and build a capacity of
the general purpose force, how can we ensure that these troops
are committed to taking responsibility for Libya's security? We
are unfortunately seeing the effects of an apathetic military
in Iraq.
Assistant Secretary Chollet, I hope you will expand on the
current status of our training programs, whether any progress
has been made, and what kind of coordination is taking place
among our European partners who are assisting these efforts. We
know that the path to true democracy doesn't simply include
holding some elections. The Libyan people spent 40 years under
Gaddafi's brutal rule and they need to chart their own path
forward. But I do believe that the United States is equipped to
provide the kind of technical assistance needed to increase the
capacity of the Libyan Government.
The deteriorating security situation has made it
challenging for U.S. personnel to operate in Libya and the
American public's view of Libya is undoubtedly and rightfully
colored by the tragic events of September 12, 2012. This is
precisely why we look to you both today to help all of us and
help the American people understand why what happens in Libya
in the coming months and years directly affects the United
States. I thank you both for being here today and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for that
opening statement.
Mr. Chabot, our subcommittee chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador Patterson,
having chaired this committee in the last Congress, I have
enjoyed working with you both in Egypt when I visited there a
couple of times following the revolution and in your current
capacity and you certainly have not shied away from the world's
hot spots and we appreciate your service.
As disappointments go, Libya ranks pretty high on the list.
I traveled there in 2012, a little less than a month before our
friend Chris Stevens and three other brave Americans were
murdered in Benghazi and while the security situation was
tenuous at best, there did seem to be some sense of optimism
among the Libyans I met with at that time. Gaddafi was dead and
gone. Elections had been held and a new generation of leaders
was convening to plan the future of a democratic Libya. Sadly,
things have gone downhill since then.
Libya has abundant energy resources and port facilities
that could jump start a domestic economy that was for so long
controlled by a dictator. A safe and stable Libya could become
a magnet for investment and tourism, but right now that is an
area that seems to be a pipe dream.
I hope today we can have some productive discussion about
how very dangerous and unstable Libya can get from here to
there.
And Madam Chair, I would note that I have a judiciary
hearing on the unprecedented numbers of children and young
people coming across our southern border and so I will be
sharing my time back and forth here.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I
know that there are many subcommittees and committees meeting
at this time, so thank you so much.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the
ranking member as well for holding this hearing and to our
witnesses, thank you. Wonderful to see you both again.
Appreciate your tremendous service to this country.
I am looking forward to your testimony today. It is
obviously an extraordinarily important topic as you have heard
from my colleagues. The one question I might add on top of this
is trying to take a bit of a longer view as well. We have had a
number of hearings in this committee over the course of the
past 18 months or so about U.S. policy in various countries in
North Africa and the Sahel. If you look at demographics, if you
look at access to opportunity, if you look at the longer term
and about the next decade or so you are having probably close
to 100 million people coming of age trying to find work with
very little access to transportation, food, security,
healthcare or a job.
And so yes, as we are focused on and rightfully, the
immediate impacts of trying to create a safe and secure Libya,
as we are throughout much of this region, what are we doing to
try to make sure we are not putting out fires here every day
for the next 10, 15, 20 years?
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Weber of
Texas is recognized.
Mr. Weber. I am ready to get going.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Connolly of
Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. I just think that in some ways this
hearing is very timely and very opportune, but Libya is a bit
of a morality tale about how limited our reach can be. There
are lots of people who wanted us to intervene in a very robust
way during the Arab Spring, but I am not sure, even had we done
that, the outcomes we are looking at today would have been very
different. And that is the problem. It is great to feel
wonderful in the beginning of a revolution, but generally a lot
of revolutions have bad outcomes or less than desirable and
noble outcomes. And I think we are seeing that in Libya today.
So I am going to be very interested in hearing the
testimony, but what is our part to leverage and influence the
future course of Libya in a way that we hope is democratic and
open and inclusive and that serves our interests as well those
of Libya's?
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. DeSantis of
Florida. Dr. Yoho. Let us go. Thank you.
And now we are pleased to introduce our panelists. First,
we welcome back a good friend of our subcommittee, Ambassador
Anne Patterson, who is Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Patterson has been our U.S.
Ambassador to El Salvador, Colombia, Pakistan, and most
recently, Egypt. She has also served as Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and
Deputy Inspector General at the State Department. Welcome,
Madam Ambassador.
We also have with us Mr. Derek Chollet who is the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Prior
to this position, he served in the White House as Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic
Planning on the National Security Council staff and at the
State Department as the principal Deputy Director of the
Secretary's Policy Planning staff. Thank you both for being
here. As I said, your remarks will be made a part of the record
and feel free to summarize. We will begin with you, Honorable
Ambassador Patterson.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen,
Ranking Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, for
inviting me to discuss the situation in Libya and the
administration's response.
Libya's transition faces significant challenges that will
require intensive engagement by the U.S. and our international
partners for many years. Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime,
Libyans have been struggling to build a stable and effective
democratic government that provides a secure environment and
economic opportunity. The stakes for the United States, as well
as for the Libyan people, are substantial.
Libya is a relatively large country with a comparatively
small population whose unifying ties are relatively weak and
where strong, local and tribal ties make national unity
difficult. During the past 3 years, the national government has
been unable to provide adequate security and services for its
people. Weapons from Gaddafi's substantial caches have floated
on to the market, some traveling across borders into the Sinai
and into Syria.
The security vacuum has permitted over 100 militias and
other armed groups dissatisfied with the government to target
critical oil infrastructure, disrupt the economy, and incite
tensions between Islamist and secularist groups. Judges,
politicians, and civic leaders are routinely murdered. Working
with our colleagues at DoD and the FBI, militia leader, Ahmet
Abu Khattala, was removed from the battlefield and will face
U.S. justice.
Amidst this chaos, Libya's oil production, the sole source
of government revenue, has fallen to 20 percent of capacity
around 280,000 barrels per day. These disruptions have severely
hampered Libya's economy and ripple through the entire country,
amounting to up to $30 billion in lost revenue.
U.S. national security interests require vigorous U.S.
engagement to support Libya. We are pursuing several important
initiatives to try and arrest further political and security
instability and to help revive Libya's private sector so it can
play a crucial role in stabilizing the country and we would
like to do more.
First, in the immediate term, we are urging Libyans to
agree to general principles to build consensus and guide the
remainder of the political transition and stressing that
political differences must be settled through dialogue and
compromise. Ambassador David Satterfield is meeting intensively
and working closely with key Libyan stakeholders, U.K. special
envoy Jonathan Powell, and with U.N. and international envoys.
Second, we are working with Libya, its neighbors, and the
international community to strengthen Libya's internal security
and tightening border security.
Finally, once there is sufficient political stability and
security, we have created a framework that partner countries
will use to coordinate their assistance in key areas. We are
also encouraging the U.S. private sector to come in and help
rebuild Libya's economy and its institutions.
Despite the many worrying events, we do see some positive
steps occurring in Libya's economy and in its democratic
transition. Last week, I spoke at a symposium at the Wilson
Center that focused on rebuilding Libya's economy. The experts
and Libyan ex-patriots acknowledged the many challenges Libya
poses for companies interested in investing there. But they
also underscore Libya's great economic potential and how
Libyans generally want U.S. companies to invest there.
We are currently providing more than $100 million in
assistance to Libya. Given the government's historic
weaknesses, one of our crucial missions is to train Libyans in
the fundamentals of public administration and finance. We have
also focused our efforts together with our European partners on
promoting democratic processes that are crucial for long-term
stability and we have been providing targeted technical
security assistance such as securing and neutralizing Gaddafi
era chemical weapons stockpiles. Libya is now free of all
weapons of mass destruction.
Today in Libya, voters went to the polls to elect a new
legislature to be called the Council of Representatives.
Today's elections are a milestone in Libya's transition and a
symbol of Libya's continued commitment to democracy.
Libya's constitutional drafting assembly has also begun
drafting a new Constitution which we are hopeful will create a
new Constitution that will include separation of powers and
respect for the dignity of all Libyans.
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, we approach our
diplomatic engagement with Libya with our eyes wide open. To
protect our national security interests and to preserve broad
future opportunities for U.S. companies, we need a sustained,
diplomatic engagement with Libya. We will continue to consult
with the Congress as we go forward, but we will need to broaden
our support to Libya with a range of programs in the months
ahead. It is my view that we will need to expand our in-country
diplomatic and development presence and activities.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Mr. Chollet.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch,
members of the subcommittee. I am grateful to speak to you this
afternoon about Libya and the Defense Department's approach for
addressing Libya's immense security challenges. I will focus my
remarks on four issues: The general purpose force,
counterterrorism training, border security, and our efforts to
secure the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.
First, the key factor in Libya's transition is security and
the successful development of the Libyan armed forces. Last
year, at the request of the then Libyan prime minister, the
United States committed to help train a Libyan General Purpose
Force of 5,000 to 8,000 personnel. This kind of force will help
the Libyan Government form its core military. Libya has
committed to fully fund this training which is estimated at
roughly $600 million over the duration of the program which can
take up to 8 years. In this effort, when started, will be
executed by our Africa command. And I want to stress that
building Libya's military is not an American effort alone. It
has strong international support from others including the
United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey which have all begun training
and have committed to training a combined 7,000 personnel in
the coming years. And just yesterday, 255 troops trained by
Italy completed their training and returned to Libya.
So although the United States stands by this commitment,
progress has been slow. Several factors have hampered the
execution of our training mission. The most important is
Libya's political turmoil and a deteriorating security
situation which makes it difficult to have the necessary U.S.
personnel on the ground in Tripoli to execute this program.
Other factors include a lack of vetted training candidates, a
lack of pledged Libyan funding, and weak security institutions.
To help build Libya's security institutions and enhance
military professionalism, the Defense Department recently had
40 Libyan military personnel attending U.S. professional
education courses, including senior service colleges via the
IMET program. And additionally, the Libyans have funded a
national security seminar for 25 Libyan military leaders to be
students at NDU, National Defense University, last year. We
also hope to provide defense advisors to the Libyan Ministry of
Defense in the future via the Ministry of Defense Advisor
Programs and the Defense Institution Reform Initiative.
Now in addition to this effort to build a general purpose
for us, the second line of effort is working with the Libyan
Government to develop its counterterrorism capacity through the
Global Security Contingency Fund. And this will help train
several hundred Libyan special forces personnel.
Third, as was mentioned, Libya's border regions have become
major areas of instability and the cross border movement of
violent extremists, the trafficking of weapons and the massive
influx of immigrants is deeply concerning. This is especially a
worry to those countries such as Egypt and Italy, who are the
recipients of the flow of Libya's weapons and people. And with
congressional support we have developed a program to help build
Libya's border security capacity through the Global Security
Contingency Fund. And we are coordinating our efforts with the
European Union who has focused its program on border security.
And fourth, on Embassy security, we maintain a laser focus
on the immense challenges and risks of operating in an
uncertain security environment and we will do what it takes to
protect our people and to bring to justice those who do us
harm. Given our concerns about security in Tripoli, we have
placed additional U.S. military forces in the region to respond
to a variety of contingencies and stand ready to respond as
needed. Alongside our efforts to prevent attacks, we also
maintain an unrelenting commitment to hold accountable to those
who harm Americans.
And Madam Chair, as this committee knows, and as Ambassador
Patterson mentioned, on June 15th the U.S. captured Abu
Khatallah who was a key figure in the September 11, 2012
attacks in Benghazi. The success of this mission was due to the
combined efforts of our military, law enforcement, and
intelligence personnel, and as the President stressed just last
week, with this operation, the United States has once again
demonstrated that we will do whatever it takes to see that
justice is done when people harm Americans.
Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the
subcommittee, after the fall of Gaddafi in the fall of 2011,
President Obama made clear that ``we are under no illusions.
Libya will travel a long and winding road to full democracy and
there will be difficult days ahead. And we have been living
through those days recently. But the United States, together
with the international community, is committed to the Libyan
people.'' And so with this in mind, we continue to support
Libya's transition and to do so we will work closely with the
Libyans, our international partners, and the Congress. Although
our efforts have been complicated by Libya's tumultuous
politics and tense security environment, we remain committed to
strengthening Libya's security institutions.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chollet follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to both of our
witnesses and I will begin with the question and answer period.
Thank you.
Libya is as unstable as ever and the current government, as
you testified, Mr. Chollet, is unable to provide security for
its own institutions, infrastructure, or exercise control over
its vast and porous borders. Our efforts to strengthen the
defense capabilities of the Libyan Government is this General
Purpose Force, but we haven't even begun training them 3 years
after Gaddafi. So what were we doing these past 3 years while
Libya became the wild, wild West? Why didn't we remain engaged,
knowing that the Libyan people would be ill equipped, ill
prepared to face the immediate challenges and how has our
disengagement contributed to the current situation on the
ground?
We know that Gaddafi had a large stockpile of weapons and
even sealed stockpiles of chemical weapons and that once he
fell, it was a mad dash to try to recover those. We even
allocated over $40 million in an effort to keep them out of
terrorist hands, yet Libyan arms have been used not only in
Libya, but in Mali, in Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, Lebanon, and
Syria, probably everywhere else.
Furthermore, Qatar was shipping weapons to Libyan rebels
despite an arms embargo on Libya during the 2011 uprisings and
we did nothing to stop that. In fact, many sources say we
condoned it. Unsurprisingly, many of these weapons fell into
the hands of terrorists. How did we fail to recover Gaddafi's
arms and actually end up indirectly supplying the terrorists
with even more weapons? And what is the status of our efforts
on that front now? How heavily armed are these groups today?
Ambassador Patterson, today, the people of Libya are going
to the polls, as we have said, to select members of their new
Parliament. However, it seems that the administration is bent
on keeping its hands off policy in Libya despite seeing where
that has gotten us. Reuters published an article last night
about our policy in today's election and it quotes an unnamed
U.S. Government official saying that our policy won't change
significantly no matter what the outcome of the elections are
and the administration has acknowledged there is only so much
that it can do in Libya. Is that our Libya policy? We help
create the mess, but we are going to keep as far away as
possible that we can't do anything to right the ship?
And the rapidly deteriorating security situation certainly
looms heavy over this election. The timing of the election was
also rushed as they were only announced last month. What has
the administration done to help the Libyans ensure that the
elections are credible and that the results will be truly
representative of the people of Libya? Can you give us the
latest assessment on the elections? What are the major issues?
How do we plan to deal with the new government to reverse
course in Libya? Thank you to both.
Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. Thanks, Madam Chair. On the issue of Libyan
weapons, for many years it has been a great concern of ours.
The amount of weapons in Libya and the flow of those weapons
outside of Libya, whether it is headed toward Mali or across
into Egypt. We have had some successes, particularly, for
example, on the chemical weapons issue which was a very
concerning situation after the fall of Gaddafi and through our
efforts we helped secure the chemical weapons facility in
Wadan, but then very importantly over the course of 2013 spent
about $50 million to help destroy weaponized munitions that had
been undeclared prior to the fall of Gaddafi, so identify
those, secure those munitions and then ultimately destroy them.
That was administered through our Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program.
Secondly, on MANPADS, shoulder fired air defense missiles,
again, Libya had a tremendously large stockpile of these
weapons that Gaddafi had amassed. And the Department of
Defense, working very closely with our partners in Department
of State, spent roughly $40 million to help identify and
destroy large stocks of those MANPADS. So we feel as though
even though we are still very concerned, there are some
successes we have had.
Very quickly on the General Purpose Force and the training
effort, as I said in my statement we are not where we want to
be on that effort. There are many reasons for that. It is only
a year ago that the Libyans asked for assistance in training
such a force, so we have worked very hard, the Department of
Defense through my office, through AFRICOM, but with our State
Department colleagues as well on scaling up this effort. One of
the reasons why it has been slow is because our Libyan partners
and the lack of capacity on their end to help hold up their end
of the bargain in terms of paying for this program. As I
mentioned, it is about $600 million, at least our piece of it,
to be scoped.
It is important to note that our allies with the gun
training, modestly, are doing so out of pocket. The Libyans
have not paid them so the training that they are doing is
something they are doing out of their own budgets. But the
second issue, I would just say the problem of identifying and
vetting Libyan personnel. We want to make sure that the folks
that we do train are qualified and capable of being trained and
one of the challenges we face is given the security environment
we can't have the personnel on the ground in Tripoli right now
to help execute this program. So there is a chicken and an egg
situation here where security is a huge problem, but because of
the lack of security, we can't have the necessary personnel on
the ground to help execute programs to improve Libyan security.
So that is the dilemma we face.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Ambassador Patterson?
Ambassador Patterson. Madam Chairman, I heard this morning
that 97 percent of the polls opened on time. Participation
seems steady, but slow, but it is 112 degrees there, so they
are hoping that participation will go up in the afternoon. I
think, Madam Chairman, that we have tried to be very much
engaged in this electoral process. We trained over 400 election
observers. We provided three advisors to the Electoral
Commission through IFA, a very respected institution. National
Democratic Institute is working with political parties to train
particularly young people and women, and to do capacity
training. And then we have funded civil society organizations
who are promoting voting mobilization and voter education. So
we have tried and I can talk about the Constitution process,
too. So we have tried to totally lean forward and support this
election process which is going okay so far and we are hoping
that it will result in a new legislature in a few weeks.
Madam Chairman, we have a program should the political
situation and security situation stabilize, to very
substantially increase our presence and our involvement in
Libya because the range of what they need, as Mr. Deutch
noticed, is technical assistance more than money. They have a
crying need for assistance on issues like public finance and
budget management or managing the revenues from the petroleum
sector. And we are very anxious to be engaged with them in
those areas. So we are planning to up our capacity there.
As Derek says, a lot of it comes down to the amount of risk
we are willing to take and the amount of people we are willing
to put on the ground. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And now I turn to
the ranking member. Mr. Deutch, for his questions.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Assistant Secretary
Patterson, why is the U.S. in Libya? What are our interests?
What is our strategy for operating there if the current
security situation remains unchanged?
Ambassador Patterson. The most urgent, if I could say, the
most urgent objective we have is counterterrorism. Because it
is critical that Libya not become essentially an ungoverned
space and become a threshold to attack our allies and
neighbors, mostly immediately Tunisia and Algeria, but also
there has been a very dramatic effect on Egypt as arms have
flowed in from Libya into the Sinai and affected Israel's
security. There is an issue of regional stability, particularly
again with Egypt and Tunisia. The Libyan people deserve, after
decades of a ruthless dictator, a better life in democracy and
we certainly want to contribute to that.
And then there is the effect, I think, on our European
allies with migration from Libya into Europe. But I would say
the most urgent objective there is the counterterrorism
objective.
Mr. Deutch. So just to continue that, Mr. Chollet, are we
seeing fighters from Libya going to Syria for training and then
returning to Libya and are there fighters from other North
African countries going to Libya for training and then going
back to their countries?
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, I think clearly Libya has become
a magnet and it has been for many years and several years now a
magnet for extremists, terrorists to go there. It is a vacant
lot in many places in Libya and that tends to attract those
types of people.
In terms of the flow both in and out, I would like to
actually get back to you on that, maybe even provide you a
classified answer if I could, because clearly it is something
that is concerning and I know as Ambassador Patterson mentioned
with our European allies and in particular, the Italians who
are seeing a tremendous migration flow coming up out of Libya.
Some of them are Libyans, but some of them are from other
African countries that are using Libya as a transit point. The
Italians are very worried that among those migrants will be
extremists. So far, we have not seen that, but that is
something we have got to be watching carefully just given the
sheer volume of people flowing up north through the
Mediterranean from Libya.
Mr. Deutch. Assistant Secretary Patterson, getting back to
the know how that we can provide, what civil society programs
are ongoing where we are taking the lead and where have we had
positive impact? What else can we be doing to impact civil
society in a positive way?
Ambassador Patterson. I think we have had a positive effect
on the election process. I think we have had a positive effect
on NDI training the parliamentarians and we plan to do more of
that. IRI, for instance, is working with the Ministry of local
government to work on local councils on decentralization. We
have given a number of grants to civil society for small
municipalities to encourage dialogue, to train, for instance,
city councils and efforts like how to undertake a budget.
We are going to send up a number of--we have had women
empowerment programs which have been quite successful, although
very limited. And these are precisely the sorts of things that
have had a limited impact, but we very much would like to
expand. And they are not wildly expensive either. You can get a
lot of bang for your buck here.
Mr. Deutch. Can you just go back and connect the dots then
between these types of civil society programs and the reasons
that it is important for us to be in Libya? How do these
programs help address the rationale that we have to be in Libya
to begin with?
Ambassador Patterson. Because, sir, there is essentially,
no--let me put it this way, there are extremely limited
government structures. And I think we were all taken by
surprise when Gaddafi left, about the sheer lack of government
institutions. So when civil society is mobilized and for
instance when we empower these local councils and work with
these local councils, they can make local government more
responsive and learn how to engage with local government.
I think on the training, for instance, the parliamentarians
or the political parties, this is entirely virgin territory. If
we can train a political party, train people how to
participate, it will help build Libyan institutions and we need
to do it very broadly and aggressively.
Mr. Deutch. And finally, when you say it is a good return,
good bang for the buck, can you give some numbers to that? How
much do those sorts of programs cost?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, we have given grants, for
instance, through NEFE and through USAID. We have given small
grants, $15,000, $20,000, and some larger investments in the
electoral process. But you can do a lot. Women's empowerment,
for instance, all over the region, we have given very small
grants, $25,000, $50,000 to NGOs to train women to start their
own businesses and that is, I think, a very productive use of
our funds.
Mr. Deutch. Very helpful. Thank you, both.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. And we
will turn to Mr. Weber of Texas.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair. Secretary Patterson, in
August 2011, Secretary Clinton--well, before I go there, let me
do this. Recent unrest in Egypt. Of course, you saw the regime
go down. You saw the military get involved. You saw Morsi go
and Sisi come up. Has that impacted Libya in any way? Do we see
any kind of influx from Egypt since it borders Libya?
Ambassador Patterson. The Egyptians are very concerned
about their border with Libya. It is about 700 miles
essentially of sand. They have upped their presence on the
border. They have a UAV base now on the border, so yes, they
are quite concerned about that. I think there has been some
success in stopping the weapons flow, but there were plenty of
weapons that flowed into Egypt before they were active on the
border.
Mr. Weber. How many UAVs do they have--would you hazard a
guess?
Ambassador Patterson. I don't know, but I can get that
figure. They are quite new and they were supplied by a
neighboring country. They are quite new.
Mr. Weber. And who manufactured those UAVs?
Ambassador Patterson. I think they are a Chinese
manufacturer, but supported by the United Arab Emirates. They
were basically a military-assistance program from the United
Arab Emirates.
Mr. Weber. Okay, do we have good intel on the ground in
Libya?
Ambassador Patterson. We have better and better intel on
the ground, like most of these situations. And I can talk to
you about that later. But let me be clear, there are huge
portions of space in Libya that we do not have good information
about, but our intelligence picture as is usually the case in
these situations, the more you look, the more you learn. And I
think our intelligence picture has gotten substantially better
over time.
Mr. Weber. How would you describe the relationship between
the current Egyptian regime, if you will, and the Libyan
regime?
Ambassador Patterson. I think it is professional and
cordial, but what the Egyptians are extremely concerned about
is the fighting in eastern Libya spilling over into their
territory. So that is a major strategic concern for the
Egyptians, but they have relations with the government. They
have a large number of guest workers in Libya, always have had,
and that is an important source of remittances.
Mr. Weber. And are they maintaining forces along that 700-
mile stretch?
Ambassador Patterson. They have maintained some forces
there, but it is very hard to patrol, 700 miles of sand, of a
border that is essentially unprotected.
Mr. Weber. I am kind of going to back into my original
question. In 2011, Secretary Clinton stated that ``the Libyan
people made this revolution and they will lead the way forward,
but they deserve our help. From the beginning, the United
States has played a central role in marshalling the
international response to the crisis in Libya. The United
States will stand with the Libyan people and our international
partners in the weeks and months ahead to help the Libyans
write the next chapter in their history.''
Disappointingly, the decision to ``stand with our
international partners'' seems to have been interpreted as
allowing them, that is the Libyan people, to fail. Does the
administration, in your view, bear any responsibility for the
unfulfilled commitments, i.e., of our allies, NATO, U.N.,
European Union, EU? And what does ``allowing others to lead''
mean if the United States is not going to hold the others
accountable for their commitments? Are we setting a dangerous
precedent here?
Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Weber, I think all our
international partners have found this situation
extraordinarily difficult. And we have had a very high degree
of cooperation, particularly with our European allies and also
with the U.N. But let me give you a specific example on police
training. I think it is widely recognized that the Libyans are
desperate for professional police force because basically the
militia performed that function. But our international partners
have tried to do that. And what they have run into is tribal
and ethnic conflict. They have run into difficult issues of
vetting because they don't want to take people in their
territory who are problematic. So I think it has been a
challenge for everybody concerned to move forward in Libya.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Ms. Patterson, is
there a Libyan Government?
Ambassador Patterson. There is a prime minister. He is--
yes, he is a transitional prime minister. There is a Parliament
that will dissolve itself when the new Parliament comes into
office. There is a constitutional drafting committee that seems
like a relative bright spot. They have principles. They are
meeting in committee. They are formulating the principles of
the new Constitution. So there is some semblance of a
government, yes.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I mean the fact that people have titles
doesn't form a government. I mean wasn't the Parliament just
sort of temporarily abducted recently?
Ambassador Patterson. And the prime minister, too.
Mr. Connolly. And the prime minister.
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, the last prime minister.
Mr. Connolly. So they don't have a functioning police
force. There is not really a functioning army.
Ambassador Patterson. No, their militia basically provide
that function.
Mr. Connolly. And there are lots of different militias?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Some of which are friendly and some might be
less friendly?
Ambassador Patterson. Some are friendly, some are less
friendly, all are outside essentially the rule of law. I think
our intelligence community counted something like 125 separate
militia. But the leadership, what is surprising, Mr. Connolly,
is not just leadership, there was nothing in the bureaucracy.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Ambassador Patterson. So any time you wanted a contract
signed and some of our businesses have really dramatic stories
about this. You wanted a contract signed. You wanted a dispute
resolved. You wanted to do what any government would consider
normal business. It was almost impossible and that is what our
corporations have run into, but they say with endurance, you
can probably get this done. But there is nothing below this.
Mr. Connolly. I am very sympathetic with that which is why
I was maybe not as enthusiastic about the original revolution,
not because I like Gaddafi, or that regime, but the question
always is okay, what happens after?
Now what you just described is it is hard for me to see
much of a difference between the Libya you are describing today
and the Libya I visited 2 years ago. I mean it sounds like
nothing has changed. When I landed in Tripoli, a militia
guarded the airport. They were the security at the airport. We
were talking about civil engagement and we were very excited
about empowering women and other groups in society. And we were
hopeful about elections that were pending. We were hoping a
functional government might emerge from that. And I am not
trying to lay blame, but it just sounds to me like not much has
happened in Libya in 2 years. We are still talking the same
language about the same hopes and not much has materialized
other than maybe a deterioration in the internal security
situation. Would that be a fair statement?
Ambassador Patterson. I think it would certainly be a fair
statement that there has been a deterioration in the political
situation and in the security situation, but Mr. Connolly, I
don't see any real alternative to U.S. policy except to push
ahead on these objectives. We have to stay there. We have to
try and engage with the political actors who want to
participate in political life and we have to try and improve
the security situation.
Again, I think our overriding security and national
interest simply demand that we try.
Mr. Connolly. I agree with you, Ms. Patterson. But I guess
what I am asking is what are reasonable milestones for
measuring progress though? If, in fact, in the 2 years since I
have been there we have seen deterioration rather than progress
and that happens. Well, we don't want to be having this hearing
10 years hence saying well, yes, nothing has changed. The
militias are still running it and there isn't a functional
government and there is no army. And civil society, we are
still trying to push for it, but not much has happened. I mean
at what point do we say well, no, here are some real milestones
we have to help them reach or they have to reach and that is
the organizing principle for us and our allies in terms of aid
investments and training programs and the like.
Ambassador Patterson. I think one of our first milestones
would be formation of the General Purpose Force to have some
true national security apparatus that could protect the
population that was truly national in scope. And that strikes
me as our most urgent priority and guideline as you would say
that we have to do.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chollet, would you mind commenting and
then my time is up.
Mr. Chollet. Yes, sir. I would agree with Ambassador
Patterson in terms of that initial milestone. I would say two
of the things that have changed is what I mentioned previously
which is the chemical weapons that have been undeclared were
secured and many of the MANPADS, thousands of the MANPADS, were
identified and destroyed. Those were two of the most urgent
issues we faced----
Mr. Connolly. I am sorry, I didn't hear the second one.
Mr. Chollet. The MANPADS, the shoulder fired air defense
missiles. Thousands of those were identified and destroyed
thanks to your support through funding to the State Department
and to the Defense Department we were able to get that done.
Now I don't want to sugarcoat it. We still have huge concerns
about Libya's security, but some of these training efforts that
are underway, moving too slow, we are frustrated by the
bureaucratic dysfunction within Libya. If we can get that
underway a year from now, hopefully we will be able to report
on progress.
Mr. Connolly. And one observation, I do think what has
unfolded since the revolution in my opinion actually justifies
the reluctance of the Obama administration to get too far into
Libya despite importunities to the contrary because it was not
at all clear what would succeed and Gaddafi, and what our
leverage was. I mean sometimes we listen to rhetoric up here or
in the press and even around the world and you would think
somehow America is all powerful and just with the whisk of a
wand we can make everything better and we can dictate the terms
of how it gets better. That is not the case. And Libya is a
great example of that.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Secretary
Patterson, back in 2009, Gaddafi was considered by both the
Bush administration, the Obama administration, a lot of senior
Republicans, I know in the Senate as being a key
counterterrorism outlier. And I know there was a lot that
happened in the intervening periods, but as we look at Libya
today compared to that 2009 period where there seemed to be a
lot of agreement in Washington from what I can tell, do
Islamist Jihadists have a wider berth to operate in Libya today
than they did 5 years ago?
Ambassador Patterson. Sure. If I might add, these societies
run by ruthless dictators were never viable. They were always
going to come crashing down. So we will just have to deal with
that and there is no going back. But yes, they have now a
terrorist safe haven in parts of eastern Libya.
Mr. DeSantis. And there has been discussion about weaponry
going to Syria and some of these other places. Is it the case
that over the last 5 years Islamic Jihadists have had a greater
access to weapons within Libya?
Ambassador Patterson. Everyone has had greater access to
Libyan weapons. I think Gaddafi must have had enormous caches
that were underestimated, but a lot of it has leaked onto the
black and gray market as well.
Mr. DeSantis. So it just seems to me--and then Ansar al-
Sharia, the group responsible for the Benghazi attack in 2012,
were they allied with Gaddafi or were they part of the
``rebels'' from 2011 as far as you can tell?
Ambassador Patterson. I don't know the answer to that,
Congressman. I will have to get back to you.
Mr. DeSantis. I know we picked up Abu Khattala. The
administration had--I think it was under--we were under the
impression in Congress that the administration's position about
responding to the Benghazi attack was that they did not have
the legal authority to conduct a kinetic attack against Ansar
al-Sharia. Is that correct? Is that the administration's
position in terms of how they see their authority if they
wanted to engage kinetically as a reprisal for the Benghazi
attack?
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman, I think we better refer
that question to the Justice Department. I would feel more
comfortable with that. This gets into some tricky legal issues
that I am not fully competent to answer.
Mr. DeSantis. And is Abu Khattala, is he currently under
the cognizance of the Defense Department or the Justice
Department right now?
Ambassador Patterson. Again, Congressman, we should refer
that question to the Justice Department which is managing this
case.
Mr. DeSantis. Can you say, Mr. Chollet, if the Defense
Department has control over him?
Mr. Chollet. Sir, he is en route back to the United States.
He faces criminal charges on three counts and I will refer all
questions on this really to the Justice Department.
Mr. DeSantis. I just wanted to, since you are here, just
shift gears a little bit. A lot of people are concerned about
what is going on in Iraq and a lot of focus, justifiably so, is
focused on ISIS and clearly they are a problem. But I have
really been alarmed by reports of the Shiite militias who are
now being activated. It seems like they are the leading
``defense'' for the Malaki regime. It seems like a lot of the
Iraqi army has melted away and most alarmingly is the presence
of the Quds Force commander in Baghdad.
When I was in Iraq, as U.S. forces were defeating al-Qaeda
in western Iraq, you had the Quds Force and you had the Shiite
terror groups. They were blowing up hundreds of U.S. service
members in Baghdad and eastern Iraq. And it is very, very
concerning. And so what can you tell me about the footprint of
Quds Force in particular in terms of being activated to fight
against ISIS in Iraq? Either one, whichever one wants to take
it.
Mr. Chollet. Congressman, I had seen those reports as well
about the Iranian infiltration within Iraq and particularly
among the Shia militia. I think what I would like to do, sir,
is if we could get back to you perhaps in a closed setting and
we could give you a full brief of our understanding of what is
going on, particularly regarding the Shia issue. I think you
are right to identify it. But I think, if we could, that would
be the way I would like to handle that.
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman, yes, we have had a
number of briefings up here with your colleagues, and we would
be happy to come up here in the next few days and talk to you
in a closed setting.
Mr. DeSantis. Great. And I think that it seems to me when
we debated Syria we kind of focused on Assad and he is backed
by Hezbollah in Iran, and rightfully so. And there was not as
much focus on the people. And I think most of them were more
Islamist, in nature, fighting. But now that ISIS is moving in
Iraq there is a lot of focus and again, understandably so. But
I kind of feel like a lot of people are neglecting the extent
to which the Shiite groups are anti-American. And, of course,
Iran Quds Force and Prime Minister Netanyahu made a point this
weekend, we want both of those groups on both sides to be weak
ultimately. We don't want to choose one side or another and
strengthen any of them unwittingly. So I really appreciate
that. I look forward to hearing more and I yield back to the
chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. Dr.
Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for being here
today, both of you. What is the status of the efforts to draft
Libya's new Constitution?
Ambassador Patterson. Sir, the Constitution drafting
committee, it has about 60 members. Some didn't take their
seats. It is meeting in a little town called Bayda which is
relatively peaceful. They have developed a set of principles.
They have broken down into committees to discuss, to specialize
and then they will go back and draft their Constitution. We
don't know the timeframe, but so far so good. And we have been
providing some assistance to civil society to engage with these
drafters.
Mr. Yoho. Is there are a lot of Libyan civilian
participation in that or is it the government figures or
military figures? In the process of addressing the question
such as civilian control of the military and the role of
Islamic law, how does that equate in that?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, those are all in the principles
and have been discussed in the first stages. The constitutional
drafters, members were elected. And one thing we have been
trying to encourage, as have other international partners, is
that these drafters engage with the public, with civil society
as they draft the Constitution. I will send you a copy of the
principles they are working off of.
Mr. Yoho. Do you know if they have property rights involved
in that or is that going to be a component of that?
Ambassador Patterson. I have seen things on the oil
revenues and frankly, I can't remember if they have property
rights. But I will get back to you.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, let me switch gears. I would like to talk
about the MANPADS. The report that I have got and I have read,
the numbers are skewed. The numbers go all over the place. I
have seen from 15,000 to over 30,000 MANPADS. A lot of them
came from the United States of America, the way I understand
it. And Mr. Chollet, you were talking about how we have spent
$40 million tracking these down and trying to get rid of them.
How is that money spent? Is that accounted for? I mean go
through the process. Are we hiring contractors to do that? Is
it our military? Who is actually doing the collection of those
in the accountability of that?
Mr. Chollet. Yes, sir, absolutely. I can start. And first,
I should say in terms of the number of MANPADS and again, this
was the most urgent issue, one of the most urgent issues we
faced several years ago right after Gaddafi's fall, the
estimates widely varied, in part, because we just didn't know.
Gaddafi was not the world's best bookkeeper in terms of what he
actually had in stock and also the estimates, the high end
which we operated from was an estimate driven from our
assessment of the amount of MANPADS they had acquired since the
'70s. So that did not account for the MANPADS they used, the
MANPADS that had been stolen, the MANPADS that were broken over
the past 30-plus years. So nevertheless, it was a State
Department administered program. It was done by contractors,
primarily, but there was a team, a team at the State
Ambassador, I will let Ambassador Patterson speak to this more,
that specializes in MANPADS that work out of the Political-
Military Affairs Bureau at the Department of State. And they
went into Libya soon after the fall of Gaddafi and began a
program first to identify the stockpile, assess what they had
and then begin the process of destroying those MANPADS.
Mr. Yoho. Okay, my concern is, you know, I look back at
when President Obama demanded that Gaddafi must step down. I
remember that so succinctly and I see that same thing going now
in Iraq. Karzai must step down. And for us not to know what is
on the ground, what is there and what the replacement is going
to be to fill that vacuum just scares us to death and I know it
scares a lot of our partners in the Middle East to death. And I
don't want to make the same mistakes we made in Libya. You must
step down and they say be careful what you wish for, because if
it did happen, we weren't in a position I don't feel that we
could get somebody in there immediately that we could work
with. Correct me if I am wrong on that.
Mr. Chollet. See, Iraq and Libya are completely different
cases. I would argue we probably have a better intel picture
right now of what is going on in Iraq than we did in Libya
under Gaddafi, that is for sure. And all I can say, sir, again
not to in any way minimize the challenge we are facing in Libya
today, we have shown through some of these relatively modest
programs that we have been able to take care of what we
consider to be urgent security threats we faced in terms of the
chemical weapons and the MANPADS.
Mr. Yoho. Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I thank the panelists
for being with us. We enjoy that you are always accessible and
we remain committed to working with you to see if we can fix
this mess. Thank you so much and with that the subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs
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