[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-110]
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S READINESS POSTURE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 10, 2014
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RON BARBER, Arizona
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
Jamie Lynch, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 10, 2014, The Department of Defense's Readiness
Posture........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 10, 2014......................................... 39
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THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2014
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S READINESS POSTURE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 3
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................ 1
WITNESSES
Campbell, GEN John F., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....... 4
Ferguson, ADM Mark, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 6
Paxton, Gen John M., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 7
Spencer, Gen Larry O., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Campbell, GEN John F......................................... 46
Ferguson, ADM Mark........................................... 63
Paxton, Gen John M., Jr...................................... 73
Spencer, Gen Larry O......................................... 93
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Statement of the American Legion............................. 107
Transmittal letter for Section 347 report on European
Infrastructure Consolidation Initiative.................... 110
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 113
Mrs. Noem.................................................... 113
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 113
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 149
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 142
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 117
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S READINESS POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 10, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:02 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wittman. Good morning. I am going to call to order the
Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services
Committee, and want to welcome our panelists this morning. And
welcome all of our members for today's hearing focused on the
Department of Defense's readiness posture.
This morning we have with us General John Campbell, Vice
Chief of Staff of the United States Army; Admiral Mark
Ferguson, Vice Chief of Naval Operations of the United States
Navy; General John Paxton, Assistant Commandant of the United
States Marine Corps; General Larry Spencer, Vice Chief of
Staff, United States Air Force.
This hearing is critically important, as we try to
understand and evaluate this year's budget request and proposed
investment as the services seek to address gaps created by
sequestration.
Although we recognize that the Bipartisan Budget agreement
provided some relief, sequestration is not going away and the
problem it creates persists.
The budget we have before us today obviously doesn't
include or address the Overseas Contingency Operations [OCO]
supplementary requirements, which have been so critical to
sustaining our force in recent years.
So we will be challenged to understand the full funding
picture, but there is no doubt that there are a multitude of
enduring, high-priority activities funded by that account. It
is imperative that we find a way to mitigate the billions of
dollars in funding for these essential and enduring activities
from the OCO to the base budget as we ramp down operations in
Afghanistan.
My top priority is to ensure that no soldier, sailor,
airman, or marine ever enters into a fair fight. All of us
recognize the shortfalls and it is our duty and responsibility
to ensure our men and women who serve have the necessary tools
to dominate in any operational environment.
As I look across the services at respective readiness
posture, I want to highlight a few issues that I think are
noteworthy.
The Air Force flying-hours program cuts from last year have
only restored approximately 50 percent of those pilots back to
appropriate training levels.
The facilities sustainment accounts represent only 65
percent of the total requirement.
The Navy proposes possible future reductions in force
structure to include phased modernization of 11 Aegis cruisers
and amphibious warships over the next few years, in addition to
an out-years request to retire a carrier.
The Marine Corps is establishing crisis response task
forces in the Middle East and South America, but has not been
given the $33.8 million in additional resources to properly
resource them.
The Army has identified approximately $1.73 billion in
unfunded training needs.
And not to be overlooked, shortfalls and backlogs in the
depots persist for all the services for fiscal year 2015.
I want to make one thing very clear from my perspective. I
have taken the opportunity to travel on numerous occasions to
visit with our men and women in uniform, both at home in
training status and overseas while they are deployed in combat
zones.
I make the same two observations everywhere I visit,
whether it is on the deck of an aircraft carrier or at a
training range or on a FOB [Forward Operating Base]--we have
the best and brightest the Nation has to offer, and these men
and women are trained and ready. They have volunteered to do an
inherently dangerous job and there is nothing safe about
serving in the military. But these are well-trained
professionals and they mitigate risks and they make it safe.
My fear is that Congress and this Nation are taking these
men and women's service and their safety for granted. They
operate in a dangerous world doing dangerous and daring things.
This danger is mitigated because they are trained, ready, and
prepared to do their jobs.
The threat of sequestration is not over. If sequestration
persists, if we continue to hack away indiscriminately at our
DOD [Department of Defense] budget, our readiness will erode to
levels that will take decades to fix. We will lose our
initiative and our edge in power projection, influence, and
forward presence around the globe.
We will create gaps that will be filled by adversaries and
we will see more men and women die in training accidents and
killed in combat because we did not properly resource their
mission and we did not provide them with the best training and
equipment to do their jobs.
This is absolutely reprehensible and irresponsible.
I look forward to hearing greater details about the fiscal
year 2015 budget request, the status of readiness, and how
existing gaps and shortfalls will be satisfied to ensure we
have the most ready, capable, and proficient military in the
world.
I would now like to turn over to our ranking member, Ms.
Madeleine Bordallo, for any remarks that she may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And to each of our witnesses this morning, thank you for
your testimony and for your service to our great Nation.
And Admiral Ferguson, I understand that this will be your
last testimony as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and that
you will be headed over to Europe soon. So thank you for your
leadership and service to our great Navy.
We hold this hearing at a critical point for the Department
of Defense. By allowing sequestration to go into effect in
2013, Congress--Congress created the largest single challenge
and risk to the readiness of our military in many, many
decades.
We reduced that risk with passage of the Balanced Budget
Agreement in December of 2013. But sequestration will return in
a little over a year if we don't find a permanent solution.
I hope that our witnesses can discuss how they balanced
readiness and risk in the current budget submission before us
for consideration. We know the Department has used the
additional funds from the Balanced Budget Agreement to buy back
readiness. But where do we assume risk now?
And further, I hope our witnesses will discuss the
challenges in future budgets if we do not find a permanent
solution to sequestration. How will each of the services meet
the Department's strategic objectives to have a flexible,
agile, and deployable force should sequestration continue? How
does the current budget find the right balance between meeting
operational requirements, strategic guidance, and budget
realities?
And beyond the quarterly readiness reports to Congress, how
do we truly measure the risk that is being taken in our
budgets? The quarterly readiness reports give us a sense of
readiness at a point in time. But how do we really quantify or
qualify that risk?
In particular, I hope that our witnesses can touch on
training capacity and access to training in the Asia-Pacific
region. One of the critical components of the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region is ensuring that our military remains ready
to deploy to support a variety of contingencies, as well as
engaging in more training opportunities with partner nations.
How is this reflected in the fiscal year 2015 budget, as
well as in future budgets?
And further, I hope General Campbell can discuss how this
budget affects the readiness of the Army National Guard. I
understand the operation and the maintenance account for the
Army National Guard sees a decrease at $827 million in fiscal
year 2015 from fiscal year 2014 levels.
I understand this may be a result of savings from depot
maintenance requirements for a smaller force. But I am
concerned that there will be no national training center
rotations in fiscal year 2015 for the National Guard.
I hope that our witnesses can elaborate on this matter
because I am concerned that this is an indication of greater
challenges in ensuring the Guard is ready to deploy and support
contingencies and operations abroad.
I have been very supportive of the strategic guidance that
requires a right-sized military force that is trained, that is
equipped and ready to deploy to any variety of operational
requirements and contingencies.
I appreciate that the fiscal year 2015 budget request buys
back a lot of readiness that was lost or deferred as a result
of sequestration last fiscal year.
However, if we do not find a permanent solution to
sequestration, I fear that we risk the ability to meet not just
immediate operational requirements, but that we will be unable
to execute the DOD's strategic guidance.
And this is simply unacceptable. We can fix the problem
that Congress created.
And I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
Gentlemen, again, thank you for joining us this morning.
Thank you for your service to our Nation and we will begin with
your testimony.
And General Campbell, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Campbell. Sir, thank you very much.
Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, other
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much
for the opportunity to discuss the readiness of your United
States Army.
I appreciate your support and commitment to our soldiers,
our Army civilians, our families, our wounded warriors, and our
veterans.
I would like to take a quick moment to send our regards to
our brother-in-arms at Fort Hood, Texas. Our Nation's leaders
attended a very emotional memorial ceremony yesterday and we
continue to keep the families of the victims in our thoughts
and prayers; so, thank you for that.
Today, the Army remains globally engaged with more than
66,000 soldiers deployed, including 32,000 in Afghanistan, and
about 85,000 forward-stationed in over 150 different countries.
While the restoration of some funding in fiscal year 2014
helps the Army restore readiness, it is not sufficient to fully
eliminate the void in core capabilities created over the past
decade of counterinsurgency operations and made greater by
sequestration.
The current level of fiscal year 2015 funding will allow
the Army to sustain readiness levels achieved in fiscal year
2014, but will only generate minimum readiness required to meet
the defense strategy.
The anticipated sequestration reductions in fiscal year
2016 and beyond will severely degrade manning, readiness, and
modernization efforts and will not allow us to execute the
strategic guidance.
To really understand our current and future readiness, I
need to quickly provide a little bit of context on what
happened in fiscal year 2013.
Due to fiscal year 2013 Budget Control Act spending caps,
the Army canceled seven combat training rotations and
significantly reduced home station training, negatively
impacting readiness and leader development. These lost
opportunities only added to the gap created between 2004 and
2011 as the Army focused exclusively on counterinsurgency.
In the event of a crisis, we will deploy these units at a
significantly lower readiness level. They will accomplish their
mission; but, sir, as you said, probably with higher
casualties.
Further results of sequestration fiscal year 2013 include
the deferment of approximately $716 million worth of equipment
reset in fiscal year 2014 and also fiscal year 2015.
The Army was also forced to cut routine maintenance for
non-deployed units, thereby creating an additional $73.5
million in deferred cost that carried over to fiscal year 2014.
We have lost some of our most skilled civilians, many in
highly technical fields, as a result of a 6-week furlough that
cut their pay by 20 percent and 2 years of frozen salaries and
performance-based salaries.
In order to preserve funding for readiness and
modernization, the Army is in the process of an accelerated
drawdown to 490,000 in the Active Component, 350,000 in the
Army National Guard, and 202,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve by
the end of fiscal year 2015.
By the end of fiscal year 2017, we will further decrease
end strength to 450,000 in the Active, 335,000 in the Army
National Guard, and 195,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve Component.
Seventy percent of these cuts will come from the Active
Army and the reductions will reverse the force mix ratio going
from 51 percent Active and 49 percent Reserve Component mix in
fiscal year 2012 to a 46 percent Active, 54 percent Reserve
Component in fiscal year 2017. So, we will have more reliance
on our National Guard and our Reserve.
In conjunction with this rapid drawdown, the Army is
reorganizing the brigade combat teams and restructuring our
aviation formations to achieve a leaner, more efficient force
that balances operational capability and flexibility.
As we continue to draw down and restructure over the next 3
to 4 years, the Army will have readiness and modernization
deficiencies.
Fiscal realities have caused us to implement tiered
readiness as a bridging strategy. Under tiered readiness, only
20 percent of the total operational force will conduct
collective training to a level necessary to meet our strategic
requirements.
And we have accepted risks to the readiness of multi-
functional and theater support brigades, as well as in our home
station training, installation readiness and infrastructure.
Base operation support levels remain under-resourced and
must be a future priority as additional funds become available.
This year and next are critical to deciding the fate of
what is the greatest Army in the world. Cuts implemented under
the Budget Control Act and sequestration have significantly
impaired our readiness.
Further, I am concerned about the impact of Army base funds
in fiscal year 2015 if the Overseas Contingency or OCO, sir, as
you talked about, is not acted upon by the start of the fiscal
year.
Absent approval of OCO funding, we would be required to
support OCO-funded missions with base funds, which would
immediately begin degrading readiness across the total Army.
Ultimately, the Army is about people. And as we downsize,
we are committed to taking care of those who have sacrificed so
much for our Nation over the past 12-plus years of war.
Assisting our transitioning veterans, our wounded warriors,
our Gold Star families will remain a top priority and we must
protect the programs that support their needs.
I thank you again for your steadfast and generous support
of the outstanding men and women of your United States Army.
Please accept my written testimony for the record, and I am
honored to sit here with my fellow Vices.
Mark, thank you for your service here; too bad we will not
do another testimony together.
But I look forward to the questions from the subcommittee.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Campbell can be found in
the Appendix on page 46.]
Mr. Wittman. General Campbell, thank you very much.
Admiral Ferguson.
STATEMENT OF ADM MARK FERGUSON, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Ferguson. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Bordallo, and distinguished members of the committee, good
morning. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
As we conclude over a decade of conflict and extended
stability operations, your naval forces remain on watch around
the globe.
Forward presence is our mandate. Our forward deployed
forces are where it matters, when it matters--thanks in good
measure to your support.
Since we testified last year, America's naval forces helped
shape events and provided immediate options to the President
during times of crisis around the globe.
Our global presence reassures our allies and partners,
deters aggression, and provides a ready response to
humanitarian crises. It confronts piracy and supports
counterterrorism operations from the sea.
The Bipartisan Budget Act has improved our forward
operations and readiness over fiscal year 2013.
Through the remainder of this fiscal year, we are restoring
fleet training, maintenance and operations and we will recover
a substantial portion of our ship maintenance backlog.
Our fiscal year 2015 Navy budget request with Overseas
Contingency Operations or OCO funding will provide the
resources necessary to train, maintain, and operate our planned
fleet structure.
Our request with OCO will also sustain required levels of
readiness to support the adjudicated Global Force Management
Allocation Plan for naval forces. To remain a balanced and
ready force across the Future Years Defense Plan, this budget
proposes slowing cost growth in compensation and benefits,
maintaining the option to refuel or inactivate one aircraft
carrier and a carrier air wing.
The budget also proposes, as the chairman mentioned,
inducting 11 guided-missile cruisers and three dock landing
ships into a phased modernization period.
This phased modernization approach, while fiscally driven,
will reduce force structure risk in the 2030s and beyond by
extending the service life of these ships.
In recognition of reduced funding levels from our PB14
submission, our request also reflects a reduction of nearly 80
aircraft and 3,500 weapons when compared to last year.
We have endeavored to reset in stride across a decade of
high-tempo operations. The Navy will require approximately 5
years beyond the end of Operation Enduring Freedom to complete
the reset of the force. This period and the length of it
reflects unique ship depot maintenance demands which are
limited by operational schedules and the capacity of our depot
infrastructure. Our budget request also proposes lower
investment in our shore infrastructure. We are mindful that
this backlog will compound over time and must eventually be
addressed.
Accordingly, we will continue to aggressively pursue
opportunities such as reprogramming or realignment of funds in
the year of execution to modernize and sustain our shore
facilities. As we look to the future, a return to sequestration
spending levels in fiscal year 2016 and beyond will lead us to
a Navy that would be insufficient in size and capability to
meet the needs of the country. Under that scenario, additional
force structure reductions would be required to fund adequate
readiness of the remaining force. Under sequestration, further
reductions in procurement, in maintenance, training, and
operations would be required and damage to the industrial base
would likely be severe.
Despite these challenges, we are fortunate to continue to
enjoy the highest quality force in our history. These
outstanding men and women who serve our Nation at sea make us
the finest Navy in the world. And on behalf of all our Active,
Reserve, and civilian sailors, I wish to express my
appreciation for your efforts and your continued support of
them and their families. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ferguson can be found in
the Appendix on page 63.]
Mr. Wittman. Admiral Ferguson, thank you very much. And now
we will go to General Paxton.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Paxton. Good morning, Chairman Wittman. Thank you
Ranking Member Bordallo and distinguished members of the
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to report on the
readiness of your United States Marines Corps.
Today, as always, your Marine Corps is committed to
remaining our Nation's force in readiness, a force that is
truly capable of responding to crisis anywhere around the globe
at a moment's notice. As we gather here this morning, almost
37,000 marines are forward deployed or stationed around the
world, promoting peace, protecting our Nation's interests and
securing our defense. There are more than 6,000 Marines in
Afghanistan who continue to make a huge difference to our
Nation and our allies in the world. All of your marines who are
forward remain well-trained, well-equipped, well-led, and at
the highest state of readiness.
Our readiness was proven last year, as your Marine Corps
displayed its agility and responsiveness in saving lives in the
aftermath of the super typhoon that struck the Philippines in
November and then shortly thereafter with the rescue of
American citizens in South Sudan over Christmas. Both of these
indicate the reality and the necessity of maintaining a combat-
ready force that is capable of handling today's crisis today.
Such an investment is essential to maintaining our Nation's
security and our prosperity into the future.
We fully appreciate that our readiness today and the
ability to maintain it in the future are directly related to
the fiscal realities that face our Nation and particularly the
Department of Defense budget. As our Nation continues to face
fiscal uncertainty, we are making the necessary choices to
protect our near-term readiness and to place your United States
Marine Corps on the best trajectory to meet future defense
requirements.
I look forward to elaborating on examples of the choices
that we have made and how they impact our training proficiency,
our equipment maintenance, and our unit readiness, to name a
few.
As we navigate the current fiscal environment, we will
strive to maintain balance across what we call our five pillars
of readiness. Number one is to recruit and retain the high-
quality people. Number two is to maintain a high state of unit
readiness. Number three is to maintain combatant commanders--to
meet, rather, combatant commanders' requirements for our
marines. Number four is to ensure that we maintain appropriate
infrastructure investments. And number five is to keep an eye
towards the future by investing in the capabilities that we
will need to meet tomorrow's challenges.
As we begin this hearing, I would like to highlight a few
points from my written statement. First, with regards to high-
quality people. United States Marine Corps continues to achieve
100 percent of its officer and enlisted recruiting goals for
both the Active and the Reserve Component while exceeding DOD
quality standards. Marine Corps remains committed to
attracting, mentoring, and retaining the most talented men and
women who bring diverse backgrounds, cultures, and skills into
the service of our Nation.
Second, United States Marine Corps has and always will
source our best-trained, most ready forces to meet combatant
commander demand requirements. In doing so, the Marine Corps
has accepted risks to both personnel manning and to equipment
readiness in our non-deployed units in order to fully support
forces who are forward deployed and those who are next to
deploy.
We have taxed our home station units as the billpayers to
ensure that marines in Afghanistan and our Marine Expeditionary
Units have everything that they need. As a result, as we sit
here this morning, slightly more than 50 percent of our non-
deployed forces are experiencing some degree of degraded
readiness in their ability to execute what we consider to be
core missions.
Third, we continue to foster a rich heritage and a strong
partnership with our naval counterparts. As we look to the
future, we all realize that sea-based and forward-deployed
naval forces provide day-to-day engagement, crisis response,
and assured access to the global commons.
A critical component in building, training, and maintaining
an expeditionary forward presence is the availability and
readiness of amphibious ships. This is why we ask for a
continued congressional support for the Navy and for our naval
shipbuilding and surface-to-ship connector programs in order to
maintain an adequate fleet that is modern and combat-ready, and
particularly on the amphibious ships. Doing so enables
continuous naval expeditionary presence and projects power
across the globe whenever and wherever our Nation needs it.
I thank each of you for the opportunity this morning, for
your faithfulness, and I request that the written testimony be
accepted for the record. Thank you very much. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Paxton can be found in
the Appendix on page 73.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Paxton. Without objection.
We will now go to General Spencer.
STATEMENT OF GEN LARRY O. SPENCER, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. AIR FORCE
General Spencer. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to share the Air Force's current readiness
posture. Readiness is critical for your Air Force, especially
as the time and place of our next crisis are never certain and
rarely what we expect.
The Air Force's range, speed, and agility enable us to
quickly respond in hours, not days, to national missions, a
national security threat, or a humanitarian event from home to
anywhere on the globe. The cornerstone of our success depends
on airmen who are exploiting and mastering emerging
technologies not only in warfare, but also in space and
cyberspace, giving us the ability to project global military
power on a scale our adversaries cannot match. However, decades
of sustained combat operations have stressed our force and
decreased our readiness to unacceptable levels.
We are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain our
advantage when it comes to effectively operate in contested
environments and against adversaries with access to increasing
levels of advanced warfighting technology. We will continue to
maintain our ability to respond to today's requirements, but we
must also regain and further maintain our ability to operate in
the most demanding threat environments, but we need your help
and support to get there.
The Air Force defines readiness as having the right number
of airmen, with the right equipment, trained to the right skill
level, and with the right amount of support, force structure,
weapons, and supplies to successfully accomplish what the
Nation asks us to do. A good readiness plan depends on an
optimum level of health in all of these areas, but
sequestration has slashed our budget by billions of dollars,
forcing us to make the difficult decision to cut force
structure in order to help preserve our near-term readiness.
In order to maintain our readiness health, we had to look
beyond flying hours and exercises. We took a close look at the
preservation of modernization efforts to help us maintain our
technological edge. This includes preferred munitions; live,
virtual, constructive environments that can replicate the
threats we may face; and installation support that allow us to
literally fight and power project from our bases.
Additionally, weapon sustainment health is also critical to
our readiness plan. As many of you with logistic centers and
depots in your districts know, you witness firsthand how these
centers contribute to the sustainment and readiness of all of
our aircraft and equipment. Said another way, while adequate
flying-hour funding ensures the aircraft on our ramps are ready
to fly, weapon system sustainment readiness funding ensures we
have the adequate numbers of aircrafts on our ramps to fly in
our missions and to complete our flying goals.
Because every aircraft and every piece of equipment counts,
we are driven to seek the most efficient and effective way to
ensure we are ready to sustain the warfighter in any
environment. Investments in Air Force capabilities and
readiness are essential if we are to maintain our agility and
flexibility. Where we struggle is with last year's
sequestration trigger that placed the Air Force readiness
posture at an unacceptable level of risk that we are still
working to recover from.
The loss of time and experience flying, maintaining,
supporting, and integrating those aircraft equated to a loss of
critical readiness for our airmen across the entire force. Our
highly sophisticated and capable force cannot be reconstituted
overnight, if our readiness is allowed to atrophy. This is why
we desperately need your help to de-trigger sequestration going
forward. The Air Force appreciates the temporary relief that
the Bipartisan Budget Act provides and it puts us on a gradual
path to recovery. But our analysis indicated it will not fix
readiness during the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program].
Because our readiness is heavily influenced by ongoing
operations, we need to ensure we can meet these requirements
while also training for the full spectrum of potential
conflict.
As demonstrated after the conclusion of every major combat
operation in recent history, there will continue to be high
demand for Air Force capabilities even as we begin our drawdown
from Afghanistan.
If we are not able to train for scenarios across the full
range of military operations against a backdrop of increasingly
contested air, space, and sovereign environments around the
world, we face unacceptable risk to mission accomplishment and
to our joint forces.
Mr. Chairman and committee members, today's Air Force
provides America an indispensable hedge against the challenges
of an uncertain future. Properly trained and equipped, your Air
Force can set the conditions for success in any conflict, in
any region of the world, whenever we are called upon.
Sequestration and the demands of sustained combat have
decreased our readiness, but with your help we can execute our
plan to slowly fix this. Thank you for your time this morning
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Spencer can be found in
the Appendix on page 93.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you very much, General Spencer.
I would ask now for unanimous consent to include into the
record a statement from the American Legion to the Subcommittee
on Readiness. Is there objection?
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
Mr. Wittman. Gentlemen, thanks again for your testimony. I
am going to defer my questions until the end to give our
members a chance to ask their questions. So I will now go to
Ranking Member Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to address each of the witnesses, but if you
could make it brief, to describe the risk associated with this
year's readiness budget, as well as the risk you foresee in
future years if sequestration is not eliminated. What happens
if sequestration returns in 2016? If you could be specific.
And I will begin with General Campbell.
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am.
As in the read testimony as I talked very briefly in the
opening, as General Odierno, as Secretary McHugh through all
their testimonies have said, sequestration would impact your
Army in that we would not be able to do the Defense Strategic
Guidance if we go with full sequestration.
Right now we are on a path to go from 570,000 in your
Active Component in 2010 to 490,000. We were going to do that
in fiscal year 2017. Sequestration is forcing us to do that
earlier in fiscal year 2015. Then we are on a path to go from
490 to 450,000 in your Active.
We have been--at 490 we are at moderate risk to get all the
tasks accomplished that you expect us to do and to finish
strategic guidance. At 450, our Chief, our Secretary have
testified that we are at significant risk at 450.
Below 450, moving down to potentially 420, that number is
out there based on trying to keep things in balance, we would
not be able to accomplish what is required in the Defense
Strategic Guidance. That is plain and simple.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Ferguson. First of all, let me talk about the size
of the Navy. It would be smaller.
We would procure one less submarine, three fewer destroyers
of the Arleigh Burke class, four fewer support ships, one less
afloat forward staging base, and so you would see immediate
decrease in force structure.
We would see that our investment in weapons and capability
against a high-end adversary would be degraded because we could
not procure those systems across the future.
We would see less surge capability in the force that we
could surge to meet national requirements.
Our infrastructure, we would defer additional investments.
It would degrade over time. And we would see less investment in
spare parts, in maintenance, and in capability.
We would be a smaller, less capable Navy, and unable to
meet the tenets of the Defense Strategic Guidance.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General Paxton.
General Paxton. Thank you, ma'am.
When we moved into OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF
[Operation Enduring Freedom], through the great support of
Congress, the Marine Corps expanded to 202,000; we knew that
that would be unsustainable and probably not needed for the
Nation in the aftermath of the conflict.
The optimal size for the Marine Corps would be 186,800.
Under sequestration, in order to give you a balanced and
forward and ready force, we can support 175,000. So that is a
significant decrease in the number of uniformed personnel in
the Marine Corps, first and foremost.
Second, that force would be ready and forward and balanced,
but we would be mortgaging the readiness of the next-to-deploy
units in order to keep that unit forward and ready.
And then the third piece, ma'am, is that with those forward
units would be moving at a 1:2 dep-to-dwell instead of the
optimal 1:3.
So due to sequestration, we would have a smaller force, we
would be mortgaging future readiness and the readiness of our
bench strength, and then we would be turning forces over more
frequently.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
And General Spencer.
General Spencer. Congresswoman, just briefly, just to make
sure we get this in context, based on sequestration last year
we were in the hole, readinesswise. We had to stand down 13
combat-coded fighters and bombers. And we are now trying to
climb out of that hole.
With sequestration, specifically for the Air Force, we
would divest 80 more aircraft. To be more specific, we right
now struggle to meet 60 percent of the COCOM [combatant
command] requirements for ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance]. We would have to reduce those by 10 additional
combat air patrols.
We would divest the entire KC-10 fleet. We would divest the
entire Block-40 Global Hawk fleet. We would take further cuts
to our readiness in terms of depot support, weapons systems
sustainment support.
So we would be a smaller Air Force. We would--as was
mentioned before, under sequestration we could not meet the
current defense strategic ops.
Ms. Bordallo. I wish to thank all of you. It is a gloomy
picture, I must admit.
General Campbell, can you elaborate on what is driving the
$827 million reduction in the National Guard O&M [Operations
and Maintenance] account? And can you elaborate on the
rationale behind why the Army National Guard will have no
planned national training center rotations in fiscal year 2015?
I truly am concerned that this is evidence of relegating
the Guard to strategic reserve status and not maintaining their
operational capabilities.
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am.
Well, first off, as I think everybody knows, you have asked
your Army to cut $75 billion in the next 5 years--$75 billion.
So we have got to balance. So what the Chief and the Secretary
are trying to do is make sure we have the best total Army.
I have gone into combat with our National Guard, our U.S.
Army Reserve, and our Active in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have
all served us very well.
But as we move forward we have to get smaller, as all of
the other Vices have said. But what you expect us to do is to
balance that. And as we do that, we have to take out end
strength.
Your Army is about people. So we have to take out end
strength; we have to take out force structure. We can't take
out that end strength fast enough based on the uncertainty of
sequestration.
The $827 million you talked about, the O&M, is based on the
sequestration, as you talked about.
On the CTC [combat training center] rotations, right now if
we get the additional monies that we have asked for in the
Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative, $7.5 billion of
that, we plan to have two National Guard rotations at the
combat training centers in fiscal year 2015. So we are planning
for two, but that is dependent upon these additional monies
that will help in the short-term readiness piece.
Brigade combat teams. We are going in the Active force from
45 in 2010 to 32. But that is only going at 490,000. As we go
to 450, we are probably going to have to take out more brigade
combat teams. On the order of maybe four on the Active side.
Now brigade combat teams only make up 30 percent of the
total force, but they are sort of the pacing item--carriers for
the Navy, fighter squadrons for the Air Force, is brigade
combat teams for your Army.
On the National Guard we have 28. We continue to have 28.
But if we go down to 335, we are probably going to have to take
out two of those National Guard brigade combat teams.
We will continue to work this very hard with our National
Guard, with our U.S. Army Reserve. As I talked about earlier,
we are going to have more reliance on our National Guard and
our Army Reserve based on 56 or 46/54 percentage as we move to
the future. But we have to have it in balance.
Our Chief and our Secretary have testified over and over
that we cannot go back to a strategic reserve for our National
Guard. They are better manned, equipped, trained, and led than
they ever have been. We have got to maintain that.
But we can't maintain that as an operational reserve if we
keep all of the end strength, if we keep all of the force
structure, and we have no readiness in our National Guard. So
we have to balance that and we will continue to work that very
hard.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General.
I have one final question, Mr. Chairman. This is for
General Spencer. As we refocus on the Asia-Pacific region, I am
wondering if the Air Force is looking seriously at its
rotational presence in the Asia-Pacific region and its cost and
impact to the O&M accounts.
Have we seriously looked at the cost-benefit of how we do
rotational presence and whether innovative ways of keeping a
permanent presence of some assets in the region would make more
budget sense?
General Spencer. Yes, Congresswoman, we have thought about
that. And it is a balance, obviously.
So if we had a sequester, as an example, and we look at
additional reductions to O&M, money that we would already--our
readiness account, if you will, money that we would use for
tankers to drag fighters across their rotations or other--or
parts, and that sort of thing, we clearly have looked at the
balance between keeping--the cost of keeping forces back home
and pulling them across the--you know, such a long distance or
forward stationing them.
So we have got some analysis that we are working on, as we
speak, to try to look at that balance, if we take that sort of
cut, exactly how would we adjust to make sure we maintain our
presence forward.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
I will now go to Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your service. And
thank you for being here so early in the morning.
General Spencer, I know you--excuse me--you probably share
my appreciation for the Keesler Air Force Base, given the fact
that they were named the best Air Force base in the nation in
2013.
I had the opportunity a few weeks ago to speak with
Secretary James and General Welsh and to invite them personally
down to Keesler to see firsthand the fine facilities, the
airmen, and our south Mississippi community, so I want to
extend that invitation to you.
And, of course, I always extend it to my colleagues, as
well, and anyone who would like to come see Keesler Air Force
Base.
The latest Air Force budget proposal contains the third
plan in 3 years to try to move the C-130J planes from Keesler
Air Force Base. I fought to kill the first two, previous
proposals, and I am going to continue to ask the hard questions
for this third proposal. Because, quite frankly, this move
doesn't make any sense. It doesn't make sense from a cost
perspective and it doesn't make sense from a readiness
perspective.
The latest proposal to send these planes and these airmen
to Little Rock seems like it would cost $27 million, just to
move this unit.
That doesn't even take into account the $58 million in
construction investment that has been completed at Keesler in
recent years in order to accommodate these planes.
And then there is also the cost of retraining personnel for
work on a completely different plane, and that also takes time.
So in past hearings, I focused on the questionable costs of
moving these planes, but I want to focus today on the readiness
factor. And so, my question to you, General Spencer, from a
readiness perspective, how much time and use of these planes
does the Air Force stand to lose if this move goes forward?
General Spencer. Well, obviously, we wouldn't--well, let me
back up a second. I think you have heard before that we--and
when we look at every one of our weapons systems, as we looked
at these reductions.
And we did an analysis on each one and bounced those
against campaign plans to see where we could take less risk.
Our C-130 fleet overall is in excess of the requirement.
And so, what we decided to do, then, is sit down with the
Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve and look at the entire C-130
fleet, and look at where they are located and try to figure out
where is the best place for them to be, based on the mission
that we have, and allow us to also draw down C-130s.
And so, based on that sort of chessboard, if you will,
there was a holistic plan----
Mr. Palazzo. General, not to interrupt, because I might--
want to ask a question of General Paxton, how does this affect
readiness? I mean, we have a unit that has been in combat,
broke some serious awards over there.
And from our perspective, we are hearing that it may take
12 to 24 months just to train up this unit, to get it to a
state of readiness. And if we want to get it to the state of
readiness that this unit already has, it could possibly take
another 12 to 24 months.
General Spencer. No, I----
Mr. Palazzo. Is----
General Spencer. No, I do not agree that it would take 12
to 24 months.
Mr. Palazzo. Well, will you provide me some----
General Spencer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Palazzo [continuing]. Justification for that? I would
appreciate that.
General Spencer. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, sir.
General Paxton, my second question is for you.
A few weeks ago General Amos testified before our committee
that the Marine Corps needs more amphibious ships. In fact, CNO
[Chief of Naval Operations] Greenert said we should use 50
ships. We got retired generals and admirals out there saying we
have got to have more of these ships as well.
So we have got a need. The Navy says it is 38 ships. Under
fiscal constraints, they can make do with 33. Right now, we
have only got 28 ships, and we could drop as low as 22 in the
next 10 years.
We are not anywhere close to the 38, and certainly not
anywhere near the 50. And so, I just want to know, how--I mean,
I understand how important these ships are to have survivable
amphibious lift, like the LPD. It is important to our Marines
and our Navy personnel.
And we have got to provide our service members with the
capabilities they need.
So my question is, does the Navy-Marine Corps team require
more amphibious lift? What can we do to ensure that the Marine
Corps requirements are being met, that our homeland is
protected, and that we can get our troops to and from where
they need to be?
And how would increased amphibious lift capabilities
provide flexibility to our services as the world becomes a much
more dangerous place and not safer?
General Paxton. Thank you, Congressman Palazzo.
And I believe the Navy and Marine Corps team are pretty
close on this, and we have been fairly consistent.
And if I could just add maybe a fine point to the numbers
there. The most pressing set of circumstances for the Navy-
Marine team is the steady-state demand requirement. And both
Admiral Greenert and General Amos have been on record to say
that given the studies, that somewhere between 48 and 54 is the
optimal amphibious lift capacity that we need.
The 38 has to do with getting amphibious lift and getting
our forcible entry element into the current--the two major
theater war plans. So we have accepted, the Navy-Marine team
years ago accepted 33 as a fiscally constrained goal.
We are below that right now. We have 31 that are
commissioned and on the waterfront. And then, when you account
for those that are in and out of maintenance, that is the loss.
So to your specific question, sir, absolutely. We could use
and we would like to have more ships.
The challenge is, the Navy and the Marine Corps both have
maintenance requirements and capital investment requirements,
so there is a higher class sub and other things like that. So
the challenge for us is to get that balance within the current
top line.
In order to get more amphibious ships, we know that we need
to just increase the top line for the entire Navy-Marine team,
so that the Navy isn't forced to go into these really tough
decisions between a carrier, a submarine, and an amphib ship.
But we need more amphibious ships, sir.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, General.
General Paxton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Palazzo. My time is expired. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo.
We will now go to Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony this
morning.
Admiral Ferguson, in your testimony you indicated that the
fiscal year 2015 budget request will provide the maintenance
funding necessary to maintain, train, and operate the proposed
operational fleet.
Again, that is subject to getting the OCO sort of
supplement to hit the number you need, is that correct?
Admiral Ferguson. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Courtney. And approximately how much is that number?
Admiral Ferguson. Well, our OCO requirements are broken
into three pieces. The first is what we look at as the support
operations, that the combatant commanders. That is about $3.3
billion.
The second piece is reset, as we try to recover some of the
backlog of maintenance. That is about another $2.2 billion,
$2.4 billion, or so.
And then the last piece is about another $2 billion, which
is the enduring, things of maintenance, another piece.
So it is approximately $7 billion to $8 billion for us.
Mr. Courtney. Well, that is helpful in terms of, you know,
focusing in it for us, so that we can make sure we keep an eye
on it through the process here this year.
You know, I was pleased to see on page 1 of your testimony
that you listed as, in terms of one of the priorities for the
Navy is to sustain a relevant industrial base. I mean I think
sometimes, you know, the readiness discussion doesn't focus on
that enough.
And, again, I appreciate that.
You know, since we have sort of stabilized 2014 and
hopefully, you know, we have got, I think, actually some
overlap in terms of the two sides for the 2015 budget that we
are going to be voting on later today that will protect the
priority that you described.
I guess in terms of the industrial base, I think that
Admiral Kevin McCoy once described a goal of the Navy in terms
of sort of viewing the shipyards as sort of one shipyard, that
it makes no sense to be laying off a nuclear welder in one
shipyard at the same time there is a backlog of work in another
shipyard where they need nuclear welders.
And I guess, again, given the fact that we have retained--
you know, we have achieved some stability, I mean, do you sort
of see that still as sort of a basic goal, in terms of
protecting the industrial base?
Admiral Ferguson. Well, as a capital intensive service, as
you know, I mean, we rely heavily on both the innovation in the
industrial base, the development of new systems, and the repair
capability.
All our naval shipyards are at capacity right now in
working, and they have a backlog in work that will carry them
through the next 5 years.
So, our industrial base, we are extraordinarily reliant on
each of them to provide that both technical expertise you
referred to as well as the capacity and innovation.
So we do treat them and look at it as a holistic piece as
we go forward.
Mr. Courtney. Right. I think that is the right approach. I
think General Campbell described sort of the damage that was
done to the workforce with sequestration and furloughs is that,
you know, when you--when people have to leave, you know, they
have still got to feed their family. And sometimes, even, you
know, when things get restored, they don't come back, because
they have found something somewhere else to feed their family.
And, again, that one shipyard approach, in terms of
protecting the industrial base I think is really the balanced
way to make sure that, you know, once we are out of the woods
here with sequestration--I am an optimist; I think we are going
to get there--you know, that we have got people who are ready
to do the work.
So, thank you for your testimony and your service and good
luck with your next endeavor.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
I want to now go to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. General Spencer, you were at Robins Air Force
Base from 1980 to 1982, I see.
And I have the privilege of representing that area; would
like to represent you--invite you back, I should say, and join
you at the base and give you an opportunity to meet some of the
men and women that are there today.
One of the concerns that I have as we have gone through
these talks has been the proposal of arbitrary cuts to the
civilian workforce.
I personally think we broke faith with them with the
furloughs and the other things, and I think that they are a
vital role in national defense. And if we don't have our
civilian workforce providing the weapon systems that we need
and making sure that they are maintained and we end up having
to put more uniformed personnel in those positions.
So, my question for you is if these arbitrary cuts to the
civilian workforce that have been proposed were put in place,
what would the impact on readiness be for the Air Force?
General Spencer. Yes, thank you for the question. Because
quite frankly, we haven't treated our civilian workforce very
well.
We had a sequestration which forced us to carry thousands
of vacancies. We then had to do a government shutdown; we
actually had to furlough civilian employees.
And so, one of the misconceptions I think there is--and I
can just speak for the Air Force--is that, you know, we have
civilian employees that are sort of doing administrative work.
And whereas we do--I mean, and that is important work, as
well--we have 180,000--roughly 180,000 civilians in the Air
Force, 5,000 of them work in the National Capital Region; the
other civilians are out in depots, turning wrenches every day.
And in the case of our air training--Air Education and
Training Command as an example, the entire maintenance of the
airplanes that we have to train our pilots are maintained by
civil service employees.
So if you cut--are doing across-the-board arbitrary
reduction to civilians in the Air Force, it is--the impact on
readiness is going to be devastating. We can't make it up.
You can't cut civilians off a flight line or in a depot
that are fixing airplanes and expect the work to be done. You
just--it just won't happen.
Mr. Scott. Well, thank you for your comments and thank you
for your service.
Gentlemen, if any of the rest of you would like to comment
on the proposed cuts to--just arbitrary cuts to the entire
civilian workforce, I would appreciate your opinion.
Admiral Ferguson. Congressman, from the Navy's perspective,
we are in a similar position to the Air Force--less than 15
percent of our civilians are in the National Capital Region.
And the rest are in, you know, over 30,000 in naval
shipyards; we have, you know, thousands in our aviation depots.
And just like the Air Force, they provide the readiness;
they work on our aircraft and systems--they repair them; they
train; they care for our families and our children in our
daycare centers.
I mean, they are indispensable to what we do and to execute
the mission every day.
General Campbell. Sir, same thing with the Army. At the
height, probably fiscal year 2010, we had 285,000 Department of
Army civilians. Today, we are about 250,000.
As the Army end strength continues to go down, there will
be a proportional cut to our civilians, as well.
I agree with General Spencer--fiscal year 2013 was a very,
very tough year for our civilians. We need to do better in the
future.
We have to give them some certainty or we will continue to
lose the best and brightest. We will have a hard time
recruiting the best and brightest that will stay with us.
It is a total force with Army civilians--Army military, as
well.
General Paxton. And Congressman, for the record, I would
concur with my mates here.
And then in particular, we have less than 5 percent of our
civilian workforce who are here inside the National Capital
Region and they are essential to what we do at our depots and
all around the Marine Corps. So, I concur with my mates, sir.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, General. I have a cousin, actually,
that works at your depot in Albany.
So, thank you for your service. And with that, I will yield
the remainder of my time.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
We will now go to Mr. Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to all the witnesses for being here today and
for your long and patriotic service to our country.
What you said this morning and what we have heard at
previous hearings worries me deeply, as I know it does my
colleagues, and you, of course, as well. There are very serious
threats to our national security in the path we are on.
In terms of the cuts that we are talking about and future
cuts that might come, we are putting our country in a very
dangerous position in the world, not only in protecting this
nation, but in protecting and standing up with our allies and
abiding by our treaty obligations.
General Spencer, I would like to direct a question to you.
It is an issue that I am very concerned about and I think it
seriously threatens our readiness.
As you know, General, last year, our Congress approved the
National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA].
And in there, there was a provision that said the A-10
Thunderbolt would not be divested--or not--you wouldn't take
action to divest it during calendar year 2014.
It specifically said no preparatory actions for future
divestment within calendar year 2014.
And it has been since reported, General, that the Air Force
may not have allotted any flight hours for the A-10 weapon
school, may have canceled A-10 modernization and ended the
normal sustainment process for fiscal year 2015, which begins
October 1st.
This, in my opinion, General, would clearly demonstrate a
complete disregard for congressional intent within the NDAA.
General, how and when will the Air Force rectify this
violation and ensure that the A-10 continues to fly as we said
it should?
Congress intended that the Air Force would keep the A-10
flying--not only because it is an important aircraft, but also
because it is critical to the defense and protection and
support of our troops on the ground.
I recently returned from Afghanistan where I heard that
story over and over again--how important it is to their
protection. So, General, please tell me, when will we see this
violation rectified?
General Spencer. All right, thank you, sir, for the
question, Congressman. First of all, we are not going to
violate the law.
And the airplane is funded through fiscal year 2014, so I
am not sure where those reports came from; but we understand
the NDAA.
The flying hours are there for the airplane, so we are not
going to violate the law in terms of funding.
If you will allow me, based on the second part of your
question, you won't find anybody in the Army or the Air Force
say the A-10s are not a good airplane. It is a good airplane.
But it is an airplane; it is not a mission. And we are
talking about a mission here, which is CAS [close air support],
and we have--as you have heard before, we have multiple
aircraft that can perform that mission.
So, we are not walking away from the mission at all. Again,
when--as you have heard, when we take--when we lose $8 billion
to $10 billion a year, we have to stop doing something. We have
to cut something.
And so, as I mentioned before, we looked at--across our
entire portfolio. We balanced all of our weapon systems against
the COCOM demands and the war plans and the campaign plans that
we have and we took risk across every area, not just in CAS;
but we took risk in every area.
We have got--you know, I heard someone once say that close
air support is a game changer. I don't--I think it is, but we
have a lot of game changers.
Air superiority is a game changer so no one can drop bombs
on our folks; command and control is a game changer; ISR is a
game changer.
So, if we had the money, we wouldn't have cut the A-10. But
again, we try to focus on the mission, not necessarily the
platform.
Mr. Barber. I do want to speak to that issue momentarily.
But I would like to ask you, General, to look into these
allegations and these reports that the Air Force is in
violation of our provision in the NDAA--and let us have an
answer in writing as soon as possible.
General Spencer. Yes, sir.
[Mr. Barber received a classified briefing in response.]
Mr. Barber. Let me then follow up on what you were saying,
actually, a moment ago. Senator Graham recently asked General
Welch if the Air Force would keep flying the A-10 if Congress
could find the money to sustain the mission over the next 5
years. And I would like to pose the same question to you, sir.
If we found the money, would the Air Force keep flying the A-10
if the money was not an issue?
General Spencer. Well, if money wasn't an issue overall, of
course we would. But if you are asking me that if you gave us
money back, is the A-10 our first priority, the answer is no.
I mean, as an example, we are having to reduce our AWACS
[Airborne Warning and Control System] fleet by seven airplanes
just to take the money to upgrade the remaining airplanes. That
would be a higher priority than the A-10.
But if you are saying Congress gave us the money and said,
``Fund the A-10,'' of course, we would.
Mr. Barber. My time is up. But I just want to leave you
with one question for the record, sir; and that is could you
get us the analysis that led you to the decision that the A-10
should be divested--the monetary analysis and the combat
mission analysis?
General Spencer. Yes, sir. I will get that for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Barber. Thank you for your time, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Barber.
We will now go to Mrs. Noem.
Mrs. Noem. Thank you.
General Spencer, I wanted to visit with you a little bit
about Ellsworth Air Force Base----
General Spencer. Sure.
Mrs. Noem. Which is in South Dakota. It is home to roughly
half the B-1 bomber fleet.
And last year at this time, they were grounded due to
sequester. So, is it safe to assume that that will not be a
situation that could happen in the near future?
General Spencer. Well, we certainly hope not. I mean, keep
in mind, when we had sequester last year, it hit us in the
middle of the year.
And so, we were faced with--we already had our budget. We
had 6 months to make up a year's worth of cut.
And so, we had no--I mean, we were going to--you know, we
couldn't go anti-deficient. And so, we had to just stop--you
know, stop hiring, stand down airplanes. So short of something
like that, we certainly hope not.
Mrs. Noem. Okay. So where are we at in the process of
getting these squadrons back to the Tier 1 combat readiness
status?
General Spencer. Yes, ma'am. That is a continuous process
every day. You know, obviously, some systems are able to bounce
back faster than others. But again, keep in mind that what we
are talking about here is that we put pilots down and so they
start to lose their certification over time. We had maintenance
folks who work on these airplanes, same thing.
And so, as we spin them back up, it is not like a pilot can
go jump in an airplane and say, okay, I had a couple of months
off, now it is time to fly. I mean, you know, they have
training in refueling. They have training on ranges on dropping
bombs, you know, that sort of across-the-board full-spectrum
training to meet any threat from a high-end threat to sort of a
coin fight. We expect our pilots and crews to be able to
respond across that full spectrum.
So we are in the process of doing that now. That is why we
are so worried about sequestration going forward because as we
have--we had sort of a temporary break with 2014 and 2015, and
we are starting to recover. And oh, by the way, it is not just
the pilots and the flying, it is the ranges that they fly on,
it is buying the proper emitters that have our pilots fly
against the realistic threats that they are going to see. It is
red-flag exercises out in Nellis. I mean, it is the whole
readiness package, if you will, that we are trying to get back
up to speed.
Mrs. Noem. So can you give me some perspective on where we
are in that process or, you know, do we have a timeframe for
when we get back to Tier 1?
General Spencer. Yes, you know, we estimated initially
about a year or so. About 50 percent of those are getting
pretty close, but about 50 percent of them are not.
Mrs. Noem. Okay.
General Spencer. But again we are slowly climbing out of
that hole, but which is what scares us so much about 2016, if
we go back to sequestration.
Mrs. Noem. Okay. So I wanted to ask you one more thing
about--my understanding of the fiscal year 2015 funds is that
it does fund flying hours at capacity. In the case of the B-1s,
though, 3 of the 36 combat-coded aircraft are not fully
staffed. They don't have the same crew ratio or flying hours
programmed against them, as other combat-coded aircraft. And so
what is the reason for the difference on those particular
aircraft and would you still consider this funded at capacity?
General Spencer. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question
because, without going classified, it is one thing to fund the
flying hours that we can execute. You know, again, it is not
just about flying hours. First of all the depots and the
maintenance folks have to have the airplanes ready to go. And
so, of those airplanes that we are able to get on the flight
line, we have fully funded the hours that they can execute.
But that is only a part of readiness. I mean, when we look
at readiness, it involves personnel, as you mentioned, the crew
members, having the right training personnel, having the number
of personnel. So, no, clearly, our readiness posture is not
what we would like to to be right now, again, without getting
classified.
Mrs. Noem. Well, can you speak to, on those three aircraft
what the readiness level would be?
General Spencer. No, those three, ma'am, if I could I would
like to get back to you on those, if I could?
Mrs. Noem. Okay. Let's do that. And with that, I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Noem. And now we will go to
Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Spencer, it is
certainly a delight to see a fellow Saluki before me today. And
I was glad Mr. Scott asked you to come down to Robins Air Force
Base. Since you were stationed in Scott, I would like you to
come to Scott Air Force Base.
General Spencer. Sure. I would be happy to.
Mr. Enyart. And while you are there, we will go down to
Carbondale and we will visit a few old haunts that you and I
might have crossed paths in back in the late 1970s.
General Spencer. Yes, definitely.
Mr. Enyart. General Campbell, before I came to this
hearing, I had the Army Aviation Caucus breakfast with one of
your predecessors, General Jack Keane. And General Keane, I
thought, had some very interesting remarks for us.
And General Keane this morning said that, in our Army,
aviation is fully integrated into the Army, unlike in other
nations. And in other nations, aviation tends to come in from
the outside. And it is his opinion that that is one of the
reasons that Army Aviation does such a great job and does such
a great job with all of its missions, whether it is close air
support or a utility lift or intel, or whatever. Would you
agree with General Keane's assessment on that?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely, we have the best
aviation in the world today. And as we move forward, we have
got to make some very, very tough decisions. The ARI [Aviation
Restructuring Initiative], as you know, makes some of those
very tough decisions. But I think at the end if we go with ARI,
we will continue to have the very best aviation in the world.
And it is integrated down to the lowest levels.
I commanded the 101st Airborne Division, the largest
aviation, two combat aviation brigades with that division,
taking them to combat. So I understand the importance of that
integration from the air to the ground. But he is absolutely
right.
Mr. Enyart. And I agree with you. I think that is very,
very important. And I was glad to hear your remarks about the
importance of the Army National Guard and the importance of the
Army Reserve, as we move forward in changes in our defense
posture. And so I would assume from your remarks that you would
agree that the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve
essentially serves as the shock absorber, if you will, for when
we need to rapidly increase the size of our Army.
General Campbell. Yes, sir. That is one term I have heard
used. Bottom line, we have to have a total force. We have to
have Active, Guard, and Reserve. If we have to balance that,
and as we have to make some very tough decisions based on the
budget, we want to continue to have a National Guard as manned,
equipped, trained and led, the very best. We don't want to go
back to a strategic reserve. To have an operational reserve,
there is probably going to be some small proportional cuts in
their end strength and force structure, so we can keep
readiness so they can continue to be an operation reserve.
Mr. Enyart. And I agree with you, General. I think that is
absolutely the right policy as we move forward. And having
served when it was the strategic reserve and later having
served when it was such an important part of our overall combat
force, I agree entirely with you.
And that is why I am so very, very concerned about the
Army's proposal with Army Aviation, to strip AH-64 Apaches out
of the Army and National Guard. You need to train as you fight.
We all agree to that, and that is why the Army National Guard
needs those and they need to be in that shock absorber for the
American military.
But I have another question for you. General Keane
indicated this morning that--and of course, he has been very
active, he has remained as an adviser to General Petraeus, when
Petraeus would come in in Afghanistan. And so, he has not just
been out of the loop for the last 10 years.
But he indicated that we fought, Iraq and Afghanistan, we
fought two wars. We didn't fight them contemporaneously. We
fought them sequentially. And he said that we fought them
sequentially, and that was when we had an Army of 570,000
Active soldiers. We fought them sequentially because we could
not fight two wars at the same time.
And he made a very interesting remark, and I don't want to
misquote him, but he said something about we were fighting
against guys who were armed with AK-47s and RPGs [rocket-
propelled grenades] and we couldn't fight two wars at the same
time. We couldn't beat them. Now of course, Iraq was a little
different story than Afghanistan, in terms of their armaments.
But we spent trillions of dollars on our defense. We spend
hundreds of billion of dollars on our military. And what is it
that we are doing wrong that we can't defeat folks with RPGs
and AK-47s when we have the finest military in the world that
we spend hundreds of billions of dollars on.
So that is a thought I would like you to take back and
think about. We need to think a little out of the box. And I
think we need to look much more at strategic agility and some
other concepts, because we don't seem to be getting the job
done, even though we have spent a nation's fortune on it. I
yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Enyart. We will now to go Mr.
Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank all who
are here this morning, generals and admiral.
Admiral Ferguson, my question is directed to you. Part of
our essential role of oversight on House Armed Services and
specifically within the Readiness Subcommittee, you know, I
have reviewed carefully the SRM [Sustainment, Restoration, and
Modernization] document, the bullet points that are laid forth
on that particular aspect of the budget. And the priorities
that are set, I really have a question about that, specifically
as it relates to how much the Navy is directing toward energy
and really alternative energy and energy goals.
I have gone at this with a good man I respect greatly,
Secretary Mabus. We have talked about this extensively. And as
I see what is actually here before us, that only 70 percent of
the SRM account is being really funded. Yet, over a hundred
million dollars or over 7 percent of the budget is being
directed toward the energy goals.
And so I would like to hear from you what the rationale is
on that and I will give it careful consideration. But I
approach this as a skeptic just because of my own experience.
And I think the priorities are not in the right order at this
time. But I certainly want to afford you the opportunity to
walk us through that.
Admiral Ferguson. Great, thank you, Congressman.
I will start in the broader sense, is that as we started to
balance this budget presentation, like the other services, we
faced a reduction. In our terms it was about $31 billion across
the FYDP.
And so the missions haven't changed the demand for
presence, and so as we started to prioritize, we prioritized
presence forward, we prioritized keeping the forces--those
operational forces ready to be sustained and generate forward
force. And we started to take risk in our procurement accounts,
in the size of the force structure of the Navy, and in our
shore infrastructure.
As you look at the SRM account, we focused at the 70
percent level in our investments for the DOD model. And we look
to the year of execution, as funds become available, to either
reprogram or to cover them.
We would like to invest more because we realize that is a
deferred maintenance backlog that is going to accumulate over
time.
We invested in this budget in the key safety and
operational factors, in barracks. There is no demolition
included in this budget, for example, which we would like to
demo some old facilities. But the very key safety issues and
operational issues that support the force went into this shore
infrastructure.
With respect to energy, the investments that we have in
there and those projects, one, they provide a return on
investments for energy efficiency for our bases. They show
future savings that will accrue to the service. They support
issues of Federal compliance that we have to meet. And
fundamentally, they improve our infrastructure. We are looking
at our naval shipyards. We are looking at other places in the
electric grid where we have to do improvements.
So we try to balance in this broader context those projects
that would show a return on energy because it is a strategic
imperative for us to get more efficient in the future.
Mr. Rigell. I appreciate your response. From my own
experience in commercial buildings and other things, I do know
that perhaps as an older building, an older HVAC [heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning] system or something is
replaced, the efficiency is much greater.
That said, the more that we have dug into this and as we
give careful examination to it, I remain holding this view that
we have placed a disproportionate amount of emphasis on this
over some of the things that I think would help our service
members more directly.
And I would ask again that there be a consideration of
moving some of those funds over from energy into those aspects
of modernization and the SRM account that would have a more
direct and immediate impact.
And I thank you for your service and all of those who are
serving and are with us today.
And I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Rigell.
We will now go to Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for
being here.
And I just wanted to state for the record that I think
Congress has put all of you in a very, very difficult position
and that we simply cannot have it both ways.
We can't expect the military to stay strong and properly
fund our programs, especially those in our districts that we
know how important and critical they are, and still do these
cuts.
So you do have my sympathy and it is a message I think that
this committee has tried repeatedly to share with other Members
of Congress. So I just wanted to be on the record for that.
Now I read your statements, but my question is, were these
written before Crimea? Is this written before we saw the
Russians fairly aggressive on borders now?
What does this mean to readiness now? Does this mean any
pivot, any change? Do you foresee extra requirements and needs?
I didn't hear anything addressed on that and I know this
has been a topic that had me concerned and other members as
well concerned about do we have to pivot back a little bit?
Should we continue closing down the bases in Europe? Have we
moved too quickly?
So if you could look ahead a little bit and tell me what
you think we need to do and are you comfortable with where we
are and what we are doing right now. And I am going to ask each
one of you. Thank you.
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am.
My statement was written after the Crimea piece. But as you
say, a month and a half ago if you thought we were going to
talk about Russia in Crimea, we would have been saying,
``What?''
And I think what it goes to is what the chairman said up
front--is that we live in a very volatile, very complex, and
probably more dangerous world than we have ever lived in
before. And so we have to take that into consideration. I think
all the service chiefs have been up front in voicing this.
And as we do this, we continue to come down and we continue
to come down at a time when your Nation is still at war in
Afghanistan. So all these factors make that very tough.
What you asked all your services to do is maintain a
balance, provide the very best capabilities that we can at the
budget that you give us. And I think we take a look at all the
different scenarios, we run simulations, we run models, and
then we owe our Congress in terms of risk where we are at and
what we can and cannot do.
And I think Crimea is just another example of how dangerous
our world is, and that if we continue to go down too fast, we
will not be able to respond accordingly to different nations in
the world here.
So it does concern us. I think there is a whole bunch of
policy things that we probably will not get into on that part
of it. But we are very cognizant.
Your Army has to be able to go all over the world. And so
there is a rebalance to the Pacific. We think we have been able
to do that. But we are also maintaining forces in Afghanistan
and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and all the combatant
commands.
As one of the other Vices said, it is kind of funny here--
as we continue to draw down, the demand for your services, I
know for the Army, the requirement and demands continue to
grow. So it is going in the opposite direction.
Ms. Shea-Porter. What about the bases in your----
General Campbell. Ma'am, we are looking--OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] is running a European infrastructure
consolidation review with all of the services. The Vices are
part of that senior review group, as we take a look at that.
I think as you know, we came from four brigade combat teams
down to two. The mitigation effort for that is to have a NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] response force. We have a
brigade that will rotate and do exercises with our NATO
partners. We will continue to look at that very hard.
But again, we are going to have to cut additional brigade
combat teams as we go forward. And my fear is that if we say we
are going to cut that someplace in CONUS [continental United
States] the United States, a Member of Congress will say, ``You
can't do it in my State.'' So go to Europe.
Well, if you go to Europe, we have certain NATO obligations
and treaties that we must fulfill. And I think we are probably
on the cutting edge with right now being where we are bare
bones. And I think General Breedlove as EUCOM [U.S. European
Command] commander said that, as well.
So we will continue to look at that very hard. We have to
make sure we don't have excess and all the services are looking
very hard on where we can consolidate in Europe and continue to
be more efficient, give us the biggest bang for the buck.
But when I joined the Army, we were probably over 300,000
in Europe. We are down to about 28,000 Army in Europe today.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Great concern. Thank you.
Admiral Ferguson. Congresswoman, my statement was written
concurrently or after. And I would say that, from the Navy
perspective, we are improving our presence in Europe. I have a
keen interest in that, since that is where I am going next.
And so we are bringing online and finishing an Aegis
missile site that is going to be based in Romania. We are
stationing four of our advanced guided-missile destroyers in
Rota, Spain. And providing missile defense coverage for Europe
and be available there.
So we are seeing demand for naval forces just like the Army
not relenting in Europe. And so, as you think about the
readiness piece, the point I would ask you to think about is,
is from the naval perspective, we are investing in the forces
forward and pushing them forward.
And they are a force multiplier for us because one ship in
Rota, Spain, is equivalent to three in the United States that
rotate.
So they are there. But that surge force, the non-deployed
readiness, is where we have to watch very carefully that we
have forces that can surge forward in times of a crisis.
With respect to the basing structure, the Navy downsized
its basing structure over the last 10 to 15 years, getting out
of London, many of the northern European bases. We feel very
confident that the structure we have--Rota, Spain, Sigonella,
Naples, Souda Bay, use of Augusta Bay--that the structure there
is very supportive, looking both south toward Africa and those
challenges, as well into Europe. So we feel very confident in
our base structure. And again, confident that we have sustained
the presence and are building it over time in Europe.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
General Paxton. Thank you, Congresswoman.
And as I mentioned in--to your first question, statements
were written concurrent, so we were aware of what was going on
in Crimea and Ukraine and influences the way we do--prepare for
the testimony, ma'am.
One of the five pillars that I mentioned by which the
Marine Corps measures readiness is our ability to meet
combatant commander requirements.
So to anticipate what EUCOM or SACEUR [Supreme Allied
Commander Europe] could need over there and how any of the
force services I think would respond is always foremost on our
list. Because as we are fond of saying, the enemy always gets a
vote here.
To Congressman Palazzo's question earlier, though, I mean,
our amphibious ship capability and our MEUs [Marine
Expeditionary Units], our expeditionary units, we used to have
a fairly heel-to-toe and substantive footprint in the
Mediterranean that we could move up into the Black Sea if we
needed, or as Admiral Ferguson noted, could shift down to the
littorals in the North African continent.
But most of that MEU now is part of the theater reserve for
the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility] and they move through
the Red Sea and then are disaggregated and used by that
geographic combatant commander.
So, we only get access to that amphibious capability either
on the way in or on the way out from the CENTCOM AOR.
So, to have additional shipping, to not be in a 1:2 dwell
and to be able to put naval forces--Navy and Marine--in the
Mediterranean that could respond would certainly be a benefit,
I know, that General Breedlove and the folks over there.
And as with the other Vices here, we watch the European
infrastructure--and that is an ongoing requirement that we have
at OSD to make sure we get that right; that when we establish
what the fiscal limits are on the floor is that we have
sufficient basing capability and it is flexible enough that we
can expand from there.
So, thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
General Spencer. Congresswoman, I also prepared my
statement concurrently with the recent events.
But, you know, I generally sleep pretty good at night. But
the--you touched on something that does keep me up at night,
and that is that we are prepared to respond to anything across
any spectrum of conflict that may arise.
And none of us have been very good at predicting what is
going to happen next. I don't think anyone could have predicted
9/11--that we would be in Afghanistan.
And the type of conflict we have been in over the last
decade, you know, is sort of low-end, if you will, in terms of
conflict. None of us like any conflict.
And I worry sometimes that we have been lulled into that
is--you know, that is the way it is always going to be until
things like this happen and so, you know, and if you look at--
this is why we are all so afraid of sequestration.
Because if you look at our budgets over the last century--
if you look at World War II, you know, we went up in spending;
the threat came down, we came down.
Korean War, Vietnam, Cold War--they all had something in
common. We built up, the threat went down, we came down.
We are coming down now in funding and the threat is not
coming down. And it is more dangerous. And that bothers me.
That keeps me up at night.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you.
I yield back. Thank you for allowing me to ask that.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thank you, Ms. Shea-Porter.
Gentlemen, I want to ask an overarching question. I have
read all your statements; they do a very good job about
expressing where the challenges are looking at what is needed
to sustain.
But I think there are three levels of concern here about
readiness. Current states of readiness, the resources necessary
for that readiness--and they occur at three different levels.
One is where are we in a state of readiness now; where
would we be if OCO dollars were to disappear; and where would
we be in the face of sequestration?
And I am going to ask you for your assessment--where we are
now, where you would be if OCO were to disappear, where you
would be if the sequester were to go into place.
And what would the risk entailed in those three scenarios
look like? And I would like for you to be very, very specific
about what that risk would look like.
And General Campbell, I will begin with you in getting your
appraisal about those three elements and then where we would be
risk-wise with our Nation's military.
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question. As you
know, for all of us, this is about prioritization. And if
everything is a priority, then nothing is a priority. So, we
really look hard at that.
And then our senior leadership always makes decisions in
terms of risk--risk to force and risk to mission. And we have
to take all that into consideration.
And the uncertainty of the budget has caused us to be all
over the map on the risk piece. And so, that is what keeps me
up at night--is the uncertainty of not knowing as--along with
what Larry said on the world that we live in today; we have to
prioritize that.
So, I talked about tiered readiness. I talked about
progressive readiness--and progressive readiness is really what
we were able to do when we had a predictable budget and we were
growing.
And so, in Iraq and Afghanistan, progressive was an Army
Force Generation model that had brigade combat teams--all the
enablers have what they need at a certain points in time; they
continue to get ready, then they deploy.
We don't have that luxury now. So, we have to prioritize.
And on tiered readiness, what we do is we make sure that
the deployers--so, everybody going to Afghanistan, you are
going to have what you need. If you are in Korea and forward
deployed, you are going to have what you need. If you are in
the Global Response Force, you are going to have what you need.
But everybody else, based on that, their readiness is going
to continue to drop. And therefore, if we have other
contingencies that we have to respond to, ma'am, as you talked
about, it is going to take more time and more resources.
If we don't have that time, you are still going to expect
us to deploy these soldiers and they are going to go at more
risk.
So, today, what I would tell you is that all of our forces
going to Afghanistan, we are providing them the right
resources; all in the Global Response Force, the right
resources; forward deployed like in Korea, the right resources.
We are building up our short-term readiness based on what
you have given us for 2014 and 2015. But again, as everybody
stated, we went down in a hole in 2013. That is going to take
some time.
But I feel much better today than where I was 2 or 3 months
ago, because we are building it up.
With the additional monies, we will fund our combat
training centers. We will be able to get more brigades through;
we will have much higher readiness
But if sequestration comes, that drops back off, and then
we will only be able to focus on a smaller number; and again,
it will probably be those forward deployed--it will be those in
a Global Response Force.
If OCO goes away, what I would tell you--OCO funds
everything in Afghanistan for us. But it also funds a lot more
that we have been accustomed to. And we are now trying to
figure out what we can do if we don't have that OCO.
So, Operation Spartan Shield for CENTCOM--many of those
forces, forward deployed Patriots--those type of things; the
missile defense--that is all covered in OCO right now. And if
we had to bring that back into our base budget, that means we
are going to have to cut more things. So, we have to look very
hard.
The issue with OCO is we go year to year. And so, there is
no predictability. But your Army is working very hard on how we
can work through the OCO piece.
As you know, in 2013 with sequestration, because of the
issues with OCO, we had to figure out how we could pay the war-
fight. And we had to take money out of our base budget to pay
for the war-fight because of the issues that we had with OCO.
And people think, as we come down, that our OCO requirement
is going to go down. It is the opposite. As you come out and
all that equipment we have to bring out, our OCO--and go back
and look at Iraq and people go back and look at how much OCO we
spent in the last 6 months and the first 6 months after coming
out of Iraq; it was much higher.
So, you know, when we look at it--``ah, you don't need
OCO''--that is absolutely wrong. We have been very consistent
on OCO for reset.
So, in the future, if we don't have OCO to reset the
equipment that we need for any of these contingencies, that
risk would drive up even higher.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Campbell.
Admiral Ferguson.
Admiral Ferguson. I will echo that all of us are in the
difficult prioritization business. So, our current state of
readiness today.
We are meeting about 44 percent of the combatant commander
demand for naval forces. So, that means that we are funding two
carrier strike groups, two amphibious ready groups, about 13
submarines--you know, some number, approximately 10, of missile
defense ships.
But it is a supply-based model in a sense that the
readiness dollars that we are given--we ensure those forces are
fully trained, ready, confident to meet the demands.
And we take risk in the surge and we take risk in what is
available in non-deployed forces. We have a backlog in aviation
depot maintenance; we have a backlog in ship depot maintenance.
With the money you have given us under the BBA, we are working
through that to get through it.
As you talk about sequestration, I gave Ranking Member
Bordallo a list of the procurement things.
But there are some other force structure things that would
happen. We would have to decommission the carrier and the air
wing. We could not afford it--it is a $7 billion bill to us
across the next 5 years.
We would have to put six additional guided-missile
destroyers into phased modernization plan, take them out of
service; we would reduce aircraft procurement, as well. And so,
you know, we would have to draw down those accounts with
greater backlogs and maintenance.
So, the law--the sequestration piece, as I articulated, is
a smaller Navy. And we now start to not meet--we won't be able
to meet the strategy because of the force demands.
And there is a mismatch between what the combatant
commanders are asking for versus what we will be able to
provide.
On OCO, as I mentioned, it is about $7-$8 billion a year.
It funds the CENTCOM operations that we are having, and AFRICOM
[U.S. Africa Command]; it funds all the [Operation] Enduring
Freedom for us. As I said, about $2.2 billion is reset--so,
that is a maintenance backlog that would just accumulate--and
accumulates every year in a growing way and compounds.
And then the last piece is there is some enduring--it is
about $2 billion that we would have to migrate over time into
the base budget. But we would lose that, as well.
We would have to go into the other accounts to cover that
bill at $7-$8 billion a year procurement, research and
development.
We start to mortgage our future to trade--to meet the
demands of the present and have less surge to answer what the
Nation's call is. That is the summary for us.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Admiral Ferguson.
General Paxton.
General Paxton. Thank you, Chairman Wittman.
Sir, within the Marine dollar, if you will, we spend
roughly 63 cents of that dollar on our manpower accounts to get
the right people, to properly train them, to put them in the
right units, to make sure they are at the right position, ready
to deploy.
The next 27 cents on that dollar is the actual operations
and maintenance cost to get them around the world and do what
our Nation needs them to do.
Right now, it is that last 10 cents on the dollar that is
split between our facilities sustainment, restoration,
modernization, and our overall modernization accounts.
So, as both General Campbell and Admiral Ferguson said, we
are actually--we are mortgaging our future.
There is a cost to the All-Volunteer Force. We are
incredibly proud of it. It is the best Army, best Navy, best
Air Force, best Marine Corps our Nation has had in many, many
years, and has served us very, very well, our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, in conflict the last 12 years.
But there is a cost to the All-Volunteer Force. So the OCO
money is what is actually so important to all the services for
the actual execution of the missions and then the reset
afterwards.
As General Campbell said, we have the same challenge in the
Marine Corps. Fortunately, we have reset about 79 percent of
our equipment coming out of Afghanistan. A year ago, when I was
before the committee, it was $3.2 billion and almost 3 years to
finish the reset. That is down to about $1.3 billion now and
only about 21 percent still left over there.
But that is not an insignificant amount of equipment that
we need to train on and it is not an insignificant amount of
money. So the OCO is very, very important to us.
And the risk in the future, sir, as General Spencer said
earlier, with each time that we don't have the equipment we
need, it is not properly reset, it is not in the maintenance
pipeline, then we still have the squadrons that need to fly and
the pilots are ready to fly, but there is less forward aircraft
for them to do that.
And we get this death spiral. And they don't get the night-
vision ops they need, they don't get the feet dry ops they need
on the big deck carrier, and the bounces. And it takes us
longer and longer to be ready.
So the risk for our force and to the Nation is actually the
risk to the mission in that we would probably be slower to
respond to the fight, get in there, do exactly what we need
with the first round, but our bench won't be as deep and
unfortunately we will probably see more casualties.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Paxton.
General Spencer.
General Spencer. Mr. Chairman, a similar story to my
colleagues here. Currently our readiness is not where we need
it to be.
You know, the current war that we are in, the combination
of sequestration, standing down airplanes last year, has put us
in a position we don't want to be in.
And it--some might say, well, you are over flying in a war,
you are getting ready. No, some of the challenges that the
Congresswoman mentioned, they are--our pilots and our crews are
not training for the--have not been training. So we are not
where we need to be today.
If OCO disappears, then that risk goes up because--for
several reasons. One is, we need to reset once we come out of
Afghanistan. So we need to bring airplanes back, get them into
depot. We need to bring equipment back, get the equipment
repaired.
And we also need to make sure that our folks get back and
get trained.
In addition to that, so reset is just a piece of that. The
other half of that is we have enduring bases that we have been
told are going to remain.
So bases that are over there, that are in the theater right
now, that are being paid for by OCO, that are costing us $2
billion a year, we would have to drag that money into the base
budget, and it is going to come right out of readiness account
because we can't take it from anyplace else.
And then--so you are talking about level of pain all the
way down to sequestration. So it is a--again, that is what we
all talk about.
As I mentioned to you I think the other day, or maybe it
was yesterday, we--this is not--we don't get a Super Bowl and
get to lose and come back. I mean, we have to win. And so we
want to make sure that when we go, it is not a fair fight, we
win and we come back. That is what the American people expect.
That is why we are so worried about this.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
General Spencer, can you give us your assessment of what
increased risk would be for the Air Force? And what is the
manifestation of that?
General Spencer. Well, if--as you look at our current--if
we go into sequestration as an example, and it has been said,
we will not be able to--and I am not sure--folks may not
understand the impact of this, the current Defense Strategic
Guidance that we have, we cannot do it. So we just won't have
the capacity to respond to what we say we can respond to today.
And so, now would we go? Absolutely we would. We would go
with everything we had. But you are talking about now a longer
conflict. You are talking about more lives lost. You are
talking about something the American people don't expect from
us.
Mr. Wittman. Right.
General Spencer. So it is serious. It is deadly serious.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, General Spencer.
I want to go back to General Campbell. You had mentioned a
little bit earlier your assessment of what increased risk would
look like for the Army under these different scenarios.
Can you give us a little additional elaboration on that?
General Campbell. Sir, again, the Army is all about people.
We don't have the big platforms but it is people. So for our
money, about 48 percent of that goes to the people. And the
risk is as we continue to downsize that piece, we can't bring
the people down quick enough to keep in balance and that is
what we need to do.
We don't want to have a hollow Army like we had after
Vietnam. To do that, you have to balance your modernization,
your end strength, your force structure, and your readiness.
And we continue to try to do that.
Again, the uncertainty is the greatest piece that inhibits
us from having the opportunity to do that. I am also worried
about the risk that we have for the All-Volunteer Force that
General Paxton talked about. You know, we have the greatest
services because we have had this All-Volunteer Army for the
last 40-plus years.
But they are watching now what Congress is doing, what we
are doing. Are we taking away their pay? Are we taking away
compensation? Do we not value their service?
I would disagree with Mr. Enyart where he talked about--he
didn't say lose, but I got the impression he said we were
losing. If we try to tell our soldiers in the last two wars
that we are losing, that is absolutely wrong.
If you go to Iraq, if you have been there, we set the
government up for success. Now that has changed since we left.
We are doing the same thing in Afghanistan. And so our men and
women of all the services, I think, have done incredible for
the wars.
But I worry about if we will be able to maintain the best
talent, as we go forward. If they know that we are not going to
be able to take care of them, if they know that we are not
going to have the money to provide them the best training, the
moms and dads won't have their children come in the service.
My son enlisted in the Army. He is on his second tour in
Afghanistan today. He comes back and says, ``Hey, Dad, you
generals, you have to get it right. We have to have what we
need.'' He definitely understands what he is doing over there
is making a difference in the lives of many Afghan people and
that big part of the region.
And my fear is that we will not continue to bring in the
best and brightest that our Nation has to offer.
We have less than one-half of one percent serve this
country. Several years ago, probably 3 out of 10 young men and
women could serve in any of the services, would qualify. That
number is probably about 22.5 percent today based on medical
issues, criminal issues, obesity, on and on.
So that is something we got to look--we are looking at the
50-meter targets. We better start looking at these 300-meter
targets to enable us to keep the best men and women coming into
all of our services. That is the risk.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Campbell.
Admiral Ferguson, I would like you to elaborate a little
bit, too, on what increased risk would be in terms of how the
Navy envisions that?
Admiral Ferguson. Under sequestration?
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Ferguson. Okay.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Ferguson. As I mentioned earlier, we would be a
smaller Navy. We would have less capability against the high-
end adversary. And pacing that high-end adversary in terms of
our ability to project power into certain environments around
the world.
Second, less capacity. In the sense that as a smaller
force, we would have less to surge to a second operation if we
are engaged in a first one around the globe.
With a smaller force under sequestration, we would have
great pressure from the combatant commanders to deploy for
prolonged periods of time, turn around the forces quicker. You
wear out the equipment at a faster pace.
But the concern, to echo General Campbell, is a concern
about the people. We are predominantly a career force. And we
rely on a very high caliber of young men and women that come
into the service with great technical skills and scores and a
great commitment to serve.
They are extraordinary. And we rely on them. And you know,
we have to be concerned about the retention of that force as a
career force in the future.
And to me, that is the institutional risk that if they look
around and they see that they don't have the spare parts to do
their job, they are not getting trained, they are--I spent some
time with a group of aviation commanding officers out at North
Island. And I try to visit the force before I testify. And
their number-one issue, the young pilots', was the flight time
so they can gain the skills and experience to serve.
And they were frustrated that they were lacking parts, that
they were lacking airplanes with flight hours, or the flight
time in order to develop their own professional skills and
serve.
And I think we have to be extraordinarily mindful of the
fact that they look to their future to be proficient and great
leaders in their field.
And if they don't see the investment of the parts, the
training, and in their future, we are at risk of losing them.
And to me, that is the institutional risk that we face.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask you to expand a little bit on that.
I think it is spot-on about the institutional risk and the
retention issues that come from that.
Tell me what does it mean, though, in terms of the lives of
our sailors as they go to sea, as they go into aircraft, or if
we put them in situations where they don't have as much
training or they don't have the full skill set when we put them
into those situations in a combat situation.
Give me your perspective on that, if you would?
Admiral Ferguson. Yes. I would tell you that, and I think I
speak for all of us, we consider it a sacred trust that we
don't send untrained people into combat. We have to give them
the very best.
And so, when we make these trades, we will ensure that the
forces we have are ready. But those that are not on that cyclic
deployment, that are sitting back at shore station, are the
next to go, they will see this degradation under sequestration.
And to me, that is where the elements of retention loss may
start to grow.
And so, you know, we will always invest in them, but it
will be a smaller force; they will have less behind it. And,
you know, as I think ahead about the strategic challenges in
the future, the 3 to 5 years, it will be upon balancing this
demand and the retention and the risk.
Because when you get into a retention crisis, those of us
that lived through it in previous years, it is awful tough to
pull out of it, once it starts.
Mr. Wittman. If we get into a demand scenario where you
have, obviously, that ready force that is ready to go, but the
demand signal surpasses that and then you have to go to those
units that don't have that elevated tier of readiness, give me
a perspective on what it means there.
I mean, I look at it from this perspective: We either have
two choices. We either say we are not going to send them, which
in many instances is not a choice, or if we send them, at
increased risk to them and few of them coming back from the
battlefield under that scenario.
I wanted to get your perspective on that.
Admiral Ferguson. Well, certainly I think in sequestration,
there are two risks. The first risk is that because we haven't
made investments in our future capability, there is not enough
force structure, that they are at a disadvantage in facing a
high-end adversary.
That is--and then, it is very easy to do the modeling,
after that, and you have to adjust the war plans or adjust the
execution of your mission or you accept higher risk with loss
of assets and the accompanying casualties.
You know, we would certainly apply every level of effort to
avoid that, but that is--you know, as you project out, under a
sustained period of sequestration with a smaller Navy, against
a high-end adversary, I think that is a risk that you have to
be very careful of.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Gentlemen, thank you. I appreciate what you have laid out
for us with the challenges going forward. I appreciate, too,
every one of you saying that in these scenarios increased risk
means a lot of different things to the Nation, but at the end
of the day, it is about the brave men and women that volunteer
to put themselves into harm's way, and that that increased risk
does mean for them potentially, if we don't get this right,
higher casualties, issues with sustainment of the force.
All those things I think are very, very compelling about
why Congress needs to do its job to address this issue and make
sure that things are properly resourced.
We understand the challenges with this Nation's budget. We
understand the deficit and the debt. Those things are very
important, too. But we also understand our constitutional
responsibility under Article I, Section 8, and that is
something that I think all of us here need to remind ourselves
of that, every day.
And we appreciate each of you for your leadership. Please
thank your soldiers, your sailors, your marines, and your
airmen for their service to our country.
And please pass on to them, too, the thanks of this
committee and this Congress to their families, who also
sacrifice in keeping this Nation safe.
Gentlemen, thank you again.
If there are any--no other questions?
Ms. Bordallo. I do.
Mr. Wittman. You do? Yes?
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
make a few personal comments.
After hearing from the vice chiefs this morning from all
the services, I think this indeed presents a grim picture.
And I just returned with the chairman from a very
interesting trip to Afghanistan and different places in Africa.
And I was amazed at the morale of our service men there. In
spite of the harsh conditions that they are undergoing, they
seem to be pleased with what they are doing and happy to go
helping with the training of the soldiers in these different
countries.
And it would be a shame, as you said, you know, to continue
to cut the budgets and find that they do not have the equipment
and so forth. And I think it will bring down recruitment,
definitely.
So I just want to say that we were just so astounded with
the friendliness and the performance of our men and women in
service in all these different areas.
And I just hope that Congress can rectify what has happened
with the decrease in the budgets. And that is the--and I praise
you for continuing to try to work out things as much as you
have to, to cut the funding from every program under your
supervision.
And, again, I want to thank you for your testifying this
morning. And, as I said, I hope we can rectify some of these
problems.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
If there are no other comments, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 9:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 10, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 10, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 10, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 10, 2014
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
General Spencer. Due to the experience and training of the flight
crews and maintainers at Little Rock Air Force Base, we expect they
could be at full operational capability much sooner than the usual 12
to 24 months needed for other units that do not have Little Rock's
level of experience. This move will not affect readiness. The Fiscal
Year 2015 President's Budget (FY15 PB) request reduces the C-130 fleet
from 358 (FY14) to 318 aircraft (FY15), then increasing to 328 (FY19)
with C-130J procurement. This number is still above the tactical
airlift operational requirement. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
General Spencer. The Air Force provided the operational analysis
briefing, with focus on the A-10 divestment decision, to Congressman
Barber on May 9, 2014. [See page 21.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. NOEM
General Spencer. In the Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget, the
Air Force requested authority to retire three combat coded B-1
aircraft, but this was reversed in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12 NDAA). The FY12 NDAA actions did not
provide funding for these aircraft and the Air Force topline did not
permit funding. The Air Force maintains the aircraft as combat coded,
but in backup aircraft inventory (BAI) status, which earns no manpower
or flying hours. We maintain their ability to meet Defense Planning
Guidance, meaning we are funding sustainment and modification to keep
the airframes relevant. In order to operate these B-1s daily as a
primary aircraft, it would require $58 million per year--$26 million
for active duty officers and enlisted personnel and $32 million for
flying hours. [See page 22.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 10, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. What level of unit readiness does the President's
Budget Request assume? If funded at the budget request level, how long
until we regain sufficient full spectrum readiness?
General Campbell. The President's Budget (PB) balances risk from
low core readiness (due to the Army's commitment to counterinsurgency
operations since 2001) with re-structuring and end-strength drawdown in
order to build decisive action readiness across the full spectrum of
conflict.
Additionally, the combined effects from the Budget Control Act
(BCA), previous shortfalls to Overseas Contingency Operations funding
(OCO), and the impacts from emergent and undocumented demand for Army
forces by combatant commanders has impacted and delayed this
transition. For example, the BCA forced the cancellation of seven
combat training center rotations in FY13, while all but select Army
units were forced to reduce training to the squad and platoon levels.
Given these other variables and funding at the PB levels, the Army
will not regain the appropriate balance across modernization,
procurement, readiness, and manpower accounts until FY 2019 and will
regain sufficient full spectrum readiness across the total force by FY
2023.
Mr. Wittman. Much of the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) Fund is aimed at mitigating short-term
readiness shortfalls. If funded at the budget request levels, what
additional readiness shortfalls are present within the Army? Can we
expect the OGSI to mitigate all or most of these? What is the impact or
risk if OGSI is not funded?
General Campbell. The combined effects of sustained operational
demand for Army forces and budget reductions have resulted in a decline
in unit readiness across the Total Army. In order to build decisive
action capabilities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, the Army has prioritized
funds to train forces in the Army Contingency Force (ACF); however, due
to top line funding decreases, the Army has accepted risk in the
readiness of multifunctional and theater support brigades as well as in
home station training, facilities, and equipment sustainment and
modernization programs.
The Army's 7.5 billion dollar share of the Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) is currently programmed in our base budget
submission to accelerate training readiness (2.0 billion dollars),
enhance installation readiness (2.4 billion dollars) and continue
equipment modernization (3.1 billion dollars). While this infusion
would not eliminate all risk, the OGSI provides the necessary resources
to mitigate several areas of concern left uncovered at the budget
request level to include: expansion of progressive operational training
beyond the ACF to meet Combatant Commander demands and improve Army
National Guard and US Army Reserve readiness levels; increasing
installation sustainment and base operation support levels to 90% of
requirements across the Total Army; and accelerating equipment
modernization to ensure we maintain the technological advantage over
any potential adversary.
The current level of funding programmed for FY15 only generates the
bare minimum level of readiness required to meet the Defense Strategy.
The budget caps in FY16 and beyond further hinder our ability to shape
the Army for the future while simultaneously and severely degrading
Army readiness and modernization efforts. Our objective is to preclude
hollowness in our force as we continue to draw down and restructure the
Army by achieving balance between readiness, end strength and
modernization. The OGSI is an essential tool in this process.
Mr. Wittman. The Army in particular has faced cuts in force
structure (depth/capacity) and deferred much needed modernization
(capability). How would this dual degradation in depth and capability
impact the ability to respond to a major contingency? How would you
characterize the risk associated with the Army's current state? Is
today's Army today sufficient to meet OPLAN and CONPLAN requirements?
General Campbell. If allowed to continue, the Budget Control Act
spending caps can result in an Army end-strength of 920,000 in FY19. At
this force level, the Army would not have the appropriate depth/
capacity or capability to successfully conduct all components of the
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), under terms acceptable to the United
States. With a total Army end-strength of 920,000, it is likely that
U.S. forces would be unable to sustain conflict long enough to
mobilize, train, and deploy additional formations. Further, the Army
would be unable to respond quickly or decisively enough to ensure an
outcome consistent with American goals and objectives; any outcome that
is achieved would come at a much higher cost in terms of blood,
treasure, and time.
I would characterize the risk associated with the Army's current
state as moderate. Although the Army presently has the force structure
to meet DSG requirements, it lacks the readiness to ensure success
under terms acceptable to the nation.
Mr. Wittman. Budget materials cite the creation of, and the
provision of, resources to support the training of an Army Contingency
Force (ACF) consisting of infantry, armor, and Stryker BCTs, an
aviation task force, and associated enabling units. How large will the
ACF be in terms of BCTs? If the Army is uncertain, how is there
confidence that the budget request is adequate to support the training
and operational requirements of the ACF?
General Campbell. The amount of Army units dedicated to the Army
Contingency Force (ACF) is certain. However, the amount of contingency
forces remains classified. The ACF was designed to provide combatant
commanders with the most ready contingency force possible given
constraints from global demand for rotational forces and reduced
funding due to the Budget Control Act (BCA) and other resourcing
shortfalls. The amount of forces designated to be in the ACF has grown,
and is expected to continue growing, as both funding is restored and
operational commitments lessen or change.
Today, there are three variables impacting the training and
operational requirements of the ACF. First and foremost, funding is
required to adequately build readiness and train units to a level of
proficiency that is necessary to maintain an appropriate contingency
readiness posture within Army units. Without adequate funding, the Army
will be unable to build readiness to man, equip, sustain, and train
units during this vital transition period from counterinsurgency to
decisive action operations. Second, predictable and sustainable demand
for forces from the combatant commanders is needed to adequately plan
and balance resources for current operations against the need to build
a contingency force. Recent emergent and undocumented demand for Army
forces, while not un-expected, further impacts the ability of the Army
to re-build contingency readiness. Finally, the combined effects of the
accelerated drawdown to 490,000 active component Soldiers and BCT re-
organization by the end of FY15 have impacted the readiness of ACF
units. These effects include impacts to Soldier and equipment
availability and unit training proficiency.
The ACF was designed as a bridging strategy to maintain a
contingency capability for crisis response until the Army can re-build
a sustainable readiness posture across the Total Army.
Mr. Wittman. What level of unit readiness does the President's
Budget Request assume? If funded at the budget request level, how long
until we regain sufficient full spectrum readiness?
General Campbell. The President's Budget (PB) balances risk from
low core readiness (due to the Army's commitment to counterinsurgency
operations since 2001) with re-structuring and end-strength drawdown in
order to build decisive action readiness across the full spectrum of
conflict.
Additionally, the combined effects from the Budget Control Act
(BCA), previous shortfalls to Overseas Contingency Operations funding
(OCO), and the impacts from emergent and undocumented demand for Army
forces by combatant commanders has impacted and delayed this
transition. For example, the BCA forced the cancellation of seven
combat training center rotations in FY13, while all but select Army
units were forced to reduce training to the squad and platoon levels.
Given these other variables and funding at the PB levels, the Army
will not regain the appropriate balance across modernization,
procurement, readiness, and manpower accounts until FY 2019 and will
regain sufficient full spectrum readiness across the total force by FY
2023.
Mr. Wittman. Much of the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) Fund is aimed at mitigating short-term
readiness shortfalls. If funded at the budget request levels, what
additional readiness shortfalls are present within the Services? Can we
expect the OGSI to mitigate all or most of these? What is the impact or
risk if OGSI is not funded?
General Campbell. The combined effects of sustained operational
demand for Army forces and budget reductions have resulted in a decline
in unit readiness across the Total Army. In order to build decisive
action capabilities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, the Army has prioritized
funds to train forces in the Army Contingency Force (ACF); however, due
to top line funding decreases, the Army has accepted risk in the
readiness of multifunctional and theater support brigades as well as in
home station training, facilities, and equipment sustainment and
modernization programs.
The Army's 7.5 billion dollar share of the Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) is currently programmed in our base budget
submission to accelerate training readiness (2.0 billion dollars),
enhance installation readiness (2.4 billion dollars) and continue
equipment modernization (3.1 billion dollars). While this infusion
would not eliminate all risk, the OGSI provides the necessary resources
to mitigate several areas of concern left uncovered at the budget
request level to include: expansion of progressive operational training
beyond the ACF to meet Combatant Commander demands and improve Army
National Guard and US Army Reserve readiness levels; increasing
installation sustainment and base operation support levels to 90% of
requirements across the Total Army; and accelerating equipment
modernization to ensure we maintain the technological advantage over
any potential adversary.
The current level of funding programmed for FY15 only generates the
bare minimum level of readiness required to meet the Defense Strategy.
The budget caps in FY16 and beyond further hinder our ability to shape
the Army for the future while simultaneously and severely degrading
Army readiness and modernization efforts. Our objective is to preclude
hollowness in our force as we continue to draw down and restructure the
Army by achieving balance between readiness, end strength and
modernization. The OGSI is an essential tool in this process.
Mr. Wittman. Which readiness accounts are you most concerned about?
What can we do to help? If provided with extra budgetary authority,
what would you seek to do?
General Campbell. For FY15, the priority Army readiness accounts
include Operation and Maintenance funding for all components in Land
Forces (Sub Activity Groups 111-116) that are vital to executing the
collective training required for units to build readiness to deploy.
Additional funding would support restoring training readiness for Non-
Contingency Force units, Multi-Functional Brigades, and other enabler
units throughout the Total Force. Any additional remaining funding
would support critical Skill Progression (Enlisted) and Additional
Skill Identifier training, as well as technical and war-fighting skills
training and Reserve Component Training Pay and Allowances for Schools.
This would enable Soldiers to complete Initial Skill Acquisition/
Specialized Military Occupational Specialty training and Leader
Development training. Additionally, the Army's investment programs for
Combat Training Center Support, Non-System Training Devices, Close
Combat Tactical Trainer, Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer and
Gaming Technology in support of Army Training, remain vital to the
modernization and life cycle management of current Training Support
Systems, and would benefit from additional funding as well.
Mr. Wittman. Can you articulate the impact of cancelled training
that occurred over the last two years as a result of sequestration?
General Campbell. Sequestration caused the Army to cancel seven
Combat Training Center rotations in FY13 and two rotations early in
FY14. This directly delayed the Army's ability to return to Decisive
Action proficiency in support of Unified Land Operations and denied
essential leader development training for a large cohort of leaders;
specifically, 270 company commanders, 180 field grade officers and 54
Battalion commanders missed this critical developmental experience.
Sequestration also forced the Army to reduce funding for all units to
individual/crew/squad level in FY13, which created a significant
reduction in unit readiness that requires extensive time to regenerate.
The Bipartisan Budget Act has provided some relief to begin rebuilding
readiness in FY14 and FY15, but that readiness is again in jeopardy in
FY16 when the Budget Control Act spending caps exert more downward
pressure on funding.
Mr. Wittman. How dependent are you on OCO for day-to-day
operations? How will the dependence change after the majority of, or
possibly all, combat troops are out of Afghanistan?
General Campbell. The Army is critically dependent on OCO to
support the day-to-day war fighting demands of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). After the departure of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan,
the Army must continue to satisfy Combatant Commanders' operational
demands, such as Operation Spartan Shield, Integrated Air and Missile
Defense, and other overseas missions. Current U.S. National Security
Policy dictates a sizeable U.S. troop presence in key regions to
support U.S. vital interests and those of our allies. Many of these
requirements are paid for from OCO. Furthermore, the Army needs OCO
funding for three years after the last piece of equipment returns from
Afghanistan so that it can fully execute the equipment Reset program.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe the enduring, non-Afghanistan-related
requirements your service funds through OCO. How would you address
those requirements in the absence of OCO?
General Campbell. Some overseas operations, including Operation
Spartan Shield in the Persian Gulf, are primarily supported with OCO
funding in FY14. Many of these forces support operations in
Afghanistan, but may remain in Central Command the theater following
the end of the conflict to support any other efforts. Without OCO,
these requirements would still need support and would demand tough
decisions in the base budget that would impact readiness, sustainment,
and investment accounts. The end of OCO funding would increase demand
for base budget resources, impacting operations world-wide, including:
Resolute Support, Operation Spartan Shield, Horn of Africa, and the
Philippines. These overseas presence missions are critical for security
and maintaining relationships with our Allies.
The eventual end of OCO funding with no corresponding increase to
the Army's base budget would lead to reduced readiness due to
shortfalls in programs such as Depot Maintenance and Reset. The Army
will require Reset funding for three years after the last piece of
equipment leaves Afghanistan. The Army will require over $9 billion in
Reset funding through FY18. Training previously funded with OCO for
readiness will need to be part of the base budget when the OCO-funded
Deployment Offset stops. Increasing pressure on static or declining
toplines will impair our ability to sustain training readiness and to
restore infrastructure and equipping readiness in future years.
The Army has used OCO funding for these critical requirements and
will require funding in the future to pay these bills. The Army's Base
Budget topline will need to increase to capture these enduring
requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe your service's efforts to migrate
enduring requirements into the base budget. How challenging has
sequestration made that task? What is most at-risk?
General Campbell. The Army is in the process of updating the
validation of enduring Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and other
requirements that need to be brought into the base budget. Fiscal
uncertainty and funding under sequestration compels prioritization and
trade-offs between funding current operations, training to build
readiness, and modernization. Over the long term, if the Army is not
provided adequate base funding for enduring OCO requirements, it will
significantly degrade combat readiness.
Mr. Wittman. Although you may not be able to discuss specifics
until the FY15 OCO budget is officially released, how confident are you
in the adequacy of this year's OCO budget request? How much of your
services' operations, maintenance, and training requirements are met by
the base budget?
General Campbell. The Army is confident that if the pending FY15
OCO budget request is enacted it will adequately support warfighting
requirements.
The FY15 Army base budget funds 19 Combat Training Center exercises
that will validate Brigade Combat Team readiness for units designated
to achieve a high level of readiness. All other units will achieve
lesser training readiness at battalion or lower levels. The ARNG and
USAR are funded to achieve Individual/Crew/Squad levels of readiness.
The budget request funds depot maintenance to less than 50% of the
requirement, reflecting risk taken to meet Army priorities, but still
supporting critical requirements and core capabilities in aviation,
communications and electronics systems, embedded software systems,
general purpose items, and combat and tactical power. Facility
sustainment is funded at less than 65% across all compos, with the
Active Force funded at 62%.
Mr. Wittman. How would your overall readiness be affected by the
elimination of OCO? What training would be curtailed? What
infrastructure would be affected? How would ability to maintain
equipment and fully staff units be affected?
General Campbell. Terminating Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding too early would have very serious consequences on the Army's
ability to rebuild and sustain readiness. Many of the Army's enabling
capabilities are funded in OCO to include such activities as commercial
satellite airtime, enduring portions of the Criminal Investigation
Command's (CID) Deployable Forensics Labs, contract MEDEVAC, and
Contractor Logistics Support. The Army is still reliant on OCO funding
to support portions of forward deployed unit costs, such as those
involved in Operation Spartan Shield and the on-going Integrated Air
and Missile Defense (IAMD) mission in the Persian Gulf, as well as
significant network operations costs. There are enduring capabilities
such as comprehensive Soldier and family fitness activities that
engender resilience throughout the force. Elimination of OCO funding
would force the Army to find offsets within base funding to support
these actions.
From a readiness perspective, the training of next deploying units
is funded via OCO. This training is non-negotiable. If OCO is
prematurely ended, the Army must accept additional risk by curtailing
or eliminating decisive action training for non Army Contingency Force
(ACF) units, and potentially even reducing training for units in the
ACF as well, to offset the bill. Equipment maintenance would also
suffer as the Army would focus all maintenance on the next deploying
and deployed forces creating additional risk in our other formations
and creating a backlog of reset and other depot maintenance activities
that eventually must be cleared.
While the elimination of OCO funding would not directly impact Army
infrastructure accounts, these accounts would most likely suffer
indirectly as a result of the need to reduce base accounts in order to
offset critical activities formerly supported by OCO. This would result
in reduced construction of new projects as well as an overall
degradation of facilities with authorized repairs only addressing base
life, health and safety concerns.
In addition, if Congress does not provide at least 3 years of OCO
funding for Reset, some of the Army's most modern and capable equipment
that was used in Afghanistan will not be Reset, thereby negatively
impacting equipment serviceability and availability. Reset funding is
critical to reversing the effects of combat stress on equipment and has
been instrumental in sustaining readiness at over 90% for ground and
75% for aviation systems. Resetting the remaining equipment in
Afghanistan will improve Total Army Readiness of equipment on-hand from
approximately 88 percent to 92 percent. Reset funding must be spread
over a three-year period to align with available Industrial Base
capacity and flow of equipment retrograde. These factors include: the
volume of equipment currently undergoing Reset; the pace of equipment
retrograde from theater; the available capacity within the industrial
base; and the repair cycle times of major systems. For example, due to
the previously mentioned factors, the Army cannot immediately and
simultaneously Reset all of our returning AH-64 Apaches. Each AH-64
Apache takes approximately 27 months to Reset, our longest repair cycle
time.
Finally, without the 2.5 billion dollars in FY15 OCO for the non-
enduring above 490,000 end strength, the Army would have to take
drastic personnel actions, such as halting all Permanent Change of
Station moves, jeopardizing re-organization and unit readiness. The
Army would cut contracts for service and support resulting in unit
manning issues due to borrowed military manpower offsets and a
corresponding skills mismatch as a result of the cuts. The impact to
our civilian workforce would be particularly painful and would include
hiring freezes, continuing the talent drain among our workforce of
continued presence and readiness support.
Mr. Wittman. In light of the civilian personnel hiring freezes and
furloughs in FY2014, what impacts, if any, were there on the shipyards
and aviation depots? How were they mitigated or what risk was assumed?
What is the civilian personnel hiring plan for the shipyards in FY15?
General Campbell. Although the Army does not own any shipyards, the
Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD) provides aviation depot maintenance
capability through the overhaul, repair, modification, retrofitting,
testing and modernization of helicopters and associated components for
government agencies and U.S. allies. The FY13 and FY14 furloughs and
hiring freeze negatively impacted CCAD productivity, workforce
availability, and capability. During FY13, CCAD experienced a 40%
increase in workforce resignations over historical norms. The loss of
employees resulted in production delays, increased repair cycle times,
and a loss of revenue. The Army was able to mitigate risk in these
areas by prioritizing critical requirements for production, making
adjustments to production lines where required, and revising production
schedules to meet customer requirements. The CCAD Depot Commander
conducted multiple town hall meetings and training to ensure the
workforce was apprised of workload and operational changes.
Additionally, the commander developed a training plan to address
critical skills lost during this time for its depot employees.
Due to the decrease in aviation maintenance workloads, CCAD has
sufficient manpower and does not plan to hire additional personnel in
FY15.
Mr. Wittman. How will each of your services achieve the
headquarters reductions ordered by Secretary Hagel and at the same time
ensure critical functional capabilities are not lost? What is your
strategic human capital plan?
General Campbell. In response to the Secretary of Defense's
guidance, Army senior leaders conducted reviews to consolidate and
reorganize organizations, programs, and functions across several focus
areas--readiness; institutional and operational headquarters
reductions; operational force structure; installations services and
investments; the acquisition workforce; Army cyber; and command,
control, communications and intelligence. As a result of this effort,
the Army will achieve greater efficiency across our core institutional
processes, consolidate functions within the acquisition workforce, and
reduce headquarters overhead by up to 25 percent.
In regard to specific headquarters reductions, authorizations
associated with critical functional capabilities will be retained. Less
critical, but still necessary functions such as administrative or
technical support positions, will be prioritized. While critical
functions will still be executed, risks to less critical functions will
be evaluated with commands to determine where and how those functions
should best be executed, such as transfer to other commands,
automation, or reducing expectations. Where reductions cannot be
achieved through efficiencies, the balance will occur by eliminating
authorized, non-critical positions that have not been filled due to
previous hiring freezes and attrition. Finally, backlogs of lower
priority administrative or technical actions will be monitored and
mitigated to avoid potential disruptions to higher priority functions.
Mr. Wittman. Can you address the impact of the furlough on the
military and civilian workforces? Have you seen spikes in post-furlough
separations or retirements? Do you anticipate another furlough will be
required?
General Campbell. Furloughs degraded medical services to Soldiers,
civilians, Veterans, retirees, and family members; delayed maintenance
services; slowed contracting; and decremented nearly every support
function at every installation.
There was a negative impact on morale coming on the heels of three
years of frozen pay and performance-based bonuses. Some of our best and
brightest employees left to seek employment in the private sector.
Since the furlough, we have seen an increase over previous years in the
number of separations and retirements. Given the negative effects of a
furlough on the workforce, the Army is not planning nor are we
anticipating another one.
Mr. Wittman. How did the Secretary's mandatory 20% headquarters
cuts impact readiness accounts, if at all?
General Campbell. The Army foresees no direct impact on the
readiness of operational forces as a result of the Secretary of
Defense's mandatory 20% headquarters cuts.
Mr. Wittman. Considering the significant variability associated
with the budget and the resulting force structure, why does the
Department feel that it is an appropriate time to request an additional
BRAC round?
General Campbell. Army force structure and end-strength are
declining alongside our available funding. We must carefully balance
end-strength, modernization, and readiness. The Army cannot afford to
retain force structure at the expense of readiness. Now is the
appropriate time to request BRAC because the money is gone. If we do
not shed excess overhead, hundreds of millions of dollars will be
wasted each year in maintaining underutilized buildings and
infrastructure. Without BRAC authorization, the Army will be
constrained in closing or realigning any installations to reduce
overhead. This ``empty space tax'' on our warfighters will result in
cuts to capabilities elsewhere in the budget.
The Army has conducted some facility capacity analyses to support
an end-strength of 490,000 Active Component Soldiers. Preliminary
results indicate the Army will have about 15-20% excess capacity at its
installations (over 160 Million Square Feet) by 2019. The average
excess capacity is about 18 percent. Force structure cuts will only
increase the amount of excess capacity. At roughly $3 per square foot
for sustainment, the ``empty space'' or ``under-utilization tax'' on
our budget rapidly compounds.
Distributing a smaller budget over the same number of installations
and facilities will result in rapid decline in the condition of Army
facilities. Multiple years of empty and unoccupied facilities retained
by the Army will transform an asset that could otherwise be repurposed
to host another mission realigned from another installation or disposed
of to benefit the local community, into a liability requiring
demolition.
Mr. Wittman. Please provide an update as to when the Department is
expected to complete the European Infrastructure Consolidation
Initiative as required by Section 347 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Why does the Department feel it
is appropriate to request an additional round of BRAC prior to
completing the assessment of infrastructure in Europe?
General Campbell. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
transmitted the report required by section 347 of the FY12 NDAA to
Congress on April 16, 2013. Subsequently, OSD provided an initial
briefing on the European Infrastructure Consolidation Initiative on
March 13, 2014, per H.Rpt. 113-102 (pg. 321), and projected that it
could provide the Congress the results of the European Infrastructure
Consolidation (EIC) assessment by the end of June, 2014.
The Army has downsized force structure and footprint in both Europe
and Asia for many years in the post-Cold War era. Since 2006, Army end-
strength in Europe has declined 45 percent, and we are on track to
shrink the supporting infrastructure, overhead, and operating budgets
by over 50 percent. Similarly, in Korea, the Army decreased the number
of Soldiers by about a third (10,000 Soldiers) and is on pace to shrink
acreage and site footprint by about half.
The Department feels it is appropriate to request an additional
round of BRAC prior to the EIC completion because changes in the
European force structure have predominately been inactivation of units
in Europe. The Army's first two Brigade Combat Team (BCT) inactivation
decisions were announced in February 2012 and were made in Europe--the
170th BCT at Baumholder, Germany, and the 172nd BCT at Grafenwoehr,
Germany. The 170th BCT was inactivated in FY 2013 and the 172nd was
inactivated in early FY 2014. Since these forces are not returning to
the U.S., there is no opportunity to utilize domestic excess
infrastructure to support restationing.
Current Army Capacity Analysis reflects 10 to 15 percent excess
capacity in Europe versus an average of 18 percent in the United States
(domestic). Force structure cuts will only increase the amount of
excess capacity as we reduce the Active Component force structure below
490,000. At roughly $3 per square foot for sustainment, the ``empty-
space'' or ``underutilized tax'' on the Army budge rapidly compounds.
This ``tax'' will directly impact critical Army readiness, training and
modernization requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess
infrastructure exists in the Department? What empirical support can the
Department provide to support a request for additional BRAC rounds?
General Campbell. The Army has conducted facility capacity analyses
to support an end-strength of 490,000 Active Component Soldiers.
Preliminary results indicate the Army will have about 15-20% excess
capacity at its installations by 2019. The average excess capacity is
about 18 percent.
At roughly $3 per square foot for sustainment, the ``empty space
tax'' on our budget rapidly compounds. Paying nearly $500M a year to
maintain over 160 million square feet of excess or under-utilized
facilities on our books will result in cuts to capabilities elsewhere
in the budget.
Further Army end-strength and force structure cuts will only
increase the amount of excess capacity.
Mr. Wittman. What readiness challenges does the Navy face if
sequestration persists beyond FY2015?
Admiral Ferguson. A return to sequestration spending levels in FY16
and beyond will lead us to a Navy that would be insufficient in size
and capability to conduct the missions of the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance (DSG). Under that scenario, additional force structure
adjustments, to include the inactivation of one nuclear aircraft
carrier and one carrier air wing, would be required to fund adequate
readiness of the remaining force. This would result in a smaller and
less capable Navy with insufficient capability and capacity to execute
at least four of the ten primary DSG mission areas: Counter Terrorism
and Irregular Warfare, Deter and Defeat Aggression, Project Power
Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges, and Provide a Stabilizing
Presence. Continuing to address this challenge on an annual basis
without a realistic Future Years Defense Plan planning horizon sub-
optimizes decision-making, reduces future ability to provide ready
surge forces, delays the introduction of new capabilities and upgrades,
risks long-term gaps in the professional development of our personnel,
and ultimately increases cost.
Mr. Wittman. What would be the impacts to the Navy's readiness if
we maintained our current force structure with the current funding
levels?
Admiral Ferguson. Navy's budget assumes phased modernization of 11
CG and 3 LSD class ships and defers funding for refueling of CVN73
pending a path ahead for long term funding to support 11 carriers and
10 carrier air wings. If forced to retain existing force structure at
current funding levels, this will leave us with a force less ready now
and in the future. We will not have sufficient funding to fully
maintain our ships--a burden which will fall hardest on our surface
combatants and amphibious ships--and these platforms will not reach
their expected service lives. We will be forced to reduce training for
units not required for an immediate deployment, reducing Navy
contingency response capacity and impacting the professional
development of a generation of future leaders. Navy would also be
forced to look at reducing recapitalization and modernization,
increasing the risk of falling behind potential adversaries in terms of
capability and relevance.
We must remain a balanced and ready force. The FY15 President's
Budget provides the right balance between capability, capacity and
readiness for the level of funding directed by the Bipartisan Budget
Act and fiscal guidance. If forced to retain force structure and
overhead, we increase risk not only to readiness and our ability to
implement the defense strategy, but also to a forces ability to respond
effectively to future challenges.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe your plan to lay up the 11 cruisers:
For how long? At what cost? What are the anticipated savings? How can
you ensure they will be returned to active service in future years in
light of the persisting budget fiscal challenges? What is the
alternative if Congress does not approve the layup plan?
Admiral Ferguson. The Navy's budget must include sufficient
readiness, capability and manpower to complement the force structure
capacity of ships and aircraft. This balance must be maintained to
ensure each unit will be effective, no matter what the overall size and
capacity of the Fleet. To preserve this balance and modernize cruisers
while avoiding a permanent loss of force structure and requisite ``ship
years,'' our FY15 Navy budget request proposes to induct 11 Ticonderoga
Class cruisers (CG) into a phased modernization period starting in FY
2015.
Only fiscal constraints compel us to take this course of action; CG
global presence is an enduring need. The ships will be inducted into
phased modernization and timed to align with the retirements of CGs
such that the modernized ships will replace one-for-one the retiring
ships when they finish modernization. This innovative plan permits us
to reapply the CG manpower to other manning shortfalls while
simultaneously avoiding the operating costs for these ships while they
undergo maintenance and modernization.
The plan to modernize and retain the CGs adds 137 operational
``ship years'' to the Battle Force and it extends the presence of the
Ticonderoga class in the Battle Force to 58 years. It avoids
approximately $2.2 billion in operating and maintenance costs across
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). In addition, it precludes Navy
from having to increase our overall end strength by about 3,400 people
(approximately $1.6 billion over the FYDP), which would otherwise be
required to fill critical shortfalls in our training pipelines and
fleet manning.
The ships undergoing phased modernization will be brought back into
active service to replace, on a hull-for-hull basis, the retiring ships
(CG 52-62) as those ships reach the end of their service life in the
2020's. In general terms, this will mean that phased maintenance
periods will vary between four and 11 years for each cruiser. The cost
per ship will vary based on individual hull material condition of the
ship and previously completed modernization. The range is approximately
$350-$600M per ship which includes induction, sustainment,
modernization, and maintenance costs. Initially, Navy will leverage the
Ship's Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund (SMOSF) for those
ships specifically named in the FY14 National Defense Authorization Act
(CGs 63-66, 68-69, 73). Navy has an enduring requirement for 11
cruisers to fulfill the Air Defense Commander role. There is no
replacement cruiser, thus Navy will have to return these ships to
active service. In order to provide additional assurance that the CGs
will return to active service in future years in light of the
persisting budget fiscal challenges, the Navy has built a transparent
plan which includes direct Congressional monitoring of funding and work
accomplishment.
If Congress does not approve the phased modernization plan or
provide the funding to retain the force structure, the Navy's only
remaining alternative would be to pursue decommissioning the ships.
This will result in a permanent loss of force structure.
Mr. Wittman. If the cruisers are laid up, how will the Navy meet
the COCOM force presence requirements? And, what risk does the Navy
assume in doing so?
Admiral Ferguson. The Navy will maintain 11 of its most capable Air
Defense Commander CGs and increasing number of DDGs to meet the
adjudicated Global Force Management Allocation Plan. Under the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan, surface combatant deployment lengths
will increase to eight months, providing increased presence to mitigate
the effects of CG modernization.
Our FY15 budget request supports meeting the President's strategic
guidance. Eleven Cruisers is the minimum number of purpose-built Air
Defense Commander platforms necessary to support the 10 deploying
Carrier Strike Groups. A reduction from 22 to 11 adds acceptable risk
to the Navy's multi-mission air warfare capacity, strike flexibility,
and redundancy.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe the benefits of the Optimized Fleet
Response Plan (OFRP). Under OFRP, what ability do you have to surge
assets in response to unanticipated COCOM demand and requirements? And,
what risk do you assume?
Admiral Ferguson. OFRP is a supply-based system designed to meet
the adjudicated Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)
requirements while safeguarding time to conduct maintenance on our
capital intensive force, providing adequate time to train, and
developing some degree of schedule predictability for our Sailors and
their families.
OFRP delivers a standard eight month deployment in a 36 month CSG
operational cycle that yields comparable levels of global presence and
increases the total operational availability (21 months) of the units.
This assumes funding is provided for post-deployment readiness
sustainment as reflected in the budget request. This improves the
return on investment for maintenance and initial training and increases
surge capacity when fully implemented.
To further enhance readiness, Navy is also improving the alignment
of our manning processes with the OFRP cycle. This force generation
model also allows us to train all units to a single, high deployment
certification standard and sustains alignment of units within the
strike group, improving continuity of command.
With time to reset the force and funding at the level of the
President's budget, Navy will rebuild surge capacity across the FYDP to
have ready forces available to support execution of the Combatant
Commanders' Operational Plans as well as other lesser contingency
operations. Actual employment of surge is not included in the budget.
Contingency operations or other ``Requests for Forces'' should,
whenever possible, use forces already deployed. Units surging from
homeport should be limited to those that can complete the operation
within their scheduled period of operational availability and within
operational tempo guidelines to avoid impacting the maintenance and
training cycle, or negatively impacting Sailors and their families.
Within these guidelines, risk to scheduled global presence, platform
service life and Sailor quality of service is mitigated. Risk to long
term readiness increases with funding below PB levels, unfunded surge
operations, surging units during maintenance or training phases, or
exceeding operational tempo guidelines.
Mr. Wittman. In the FY2015 budget request, there are known
maintenance shortfalls that persist from FY2014--due to descoped ship
maintenance availabilities, and 89% of required aircraft depot
maintenance funding. What is your ability to relieve the backlog? Or,
will shortfalls be expected to persist?
Admiral Ferguson. The FY14 Appropriations Act (baseline and OCO)
fully funded the ship maintenance requirement. The FY14 OCO
appropriation also included $347M to reset the backlog of maintenance
on surface ships with dry docking availabilities in FY14. The FY14
reset request does not fully liquidate the surface ship maintenance
backlog that developed over the past decade. Full liquidation of that
backlog is expected to require $1.8B of reset funding and take through
the end of the FYDP to complete.
The ship maintenance account is highly dependent on supplemental
funding. In PB15, OCO funds the reset requirement, 40% of the enduring
surface ship maintenance requirement, and 14% of the enduring carrier
and submarine maintenance requirement.
The FY14 Appropriations Act funded all required aviation depot
maintenance. Navy has mitigated a significant portion of the projected
FY14 aviation depot maintenance backlog through aggressive inventory
management efforts. However, there will be approximately $62M of
aircraft and engines/modules backlogged at the end of FY14 that will
need to be programmed for maintenance in FY15. This backlog would be
inducted in the first quarter of FY15 ahead of any new work previously
scheduled to begin in FY15. Given aviation depot maintenance baseline
funding levels ( 80% of requirement), the projected result is $218M of
aircraft and engines/modules backlog at the end of FY15 going into
FY16. This backlog will be addressed through additional OCO requests.
Mr. Wittman. What level of unit readiness does the President's
Budget Request assume? If funded at the budget request level, how long
until we regain sufficient full spectrum readiness?
Admiral Ferguson. Navy builds the requirement for our readiness
accounts to meet the expected presence levels in the adjudicated Global
Force Management Allocation Plan. The certified models that are used to
develop the requirement identify the funding required to maintain and
train Navy forces to deploy at a readiness level of C2 or better and to
meet all pre-deployment certification requirements.
To fund these activities in the present fiscal environment, Navy is
accepting risk in several areas, notably in shore infrastructure. This
includes prioritizing the most critical military construction (MILCON)
requirements, focusing sustainment funding on key operational
facilities, and improving energy efficiency. Less critical MILCON and
repairs are deferred, adding to an existing backlog resulting from
prior year deferrals, and further exacerbating our shore readiness
posture.
While the forces we deploy are full spectrum ready, Navy continues
to take risk in the readiness of non-deployed forces--reducing our
total surge capacity and increasing the time required to provide those
forces that can be made ready. A larger part of the total force is C3/
C4, and they have material or training deficiencies that prevent their
rapid employment. Further, Navy is taking additional risk in
modernization, slowing the introduction of improved capabilities to the
Fleet. This increased risk is most likely to manifest if we are faced
with a technologically advanced adversary.
Mr. Wittman. Much of the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) Fund is aimed at mitigating short-term
readiness shortfalls. If funded at the budget request levels, what
additional readiness shortfalls are present within the Services? Can we
expect the OGSI to mitigate all or most of these? What is the impact or
risk if OGSI is not funded?
Admiral Ferguson. One of our FY15 budget priorities was to focus on
critical afloat and ashore readiness to ensure the force is adequately
funded and ready. Our budget request (compared to a BCA revised caps
level) improves our ability to respond to contingencies (surge
capacity) by increasing the readiness of non-deployed forces. However,
it increases risk to ashore readiness in FY15, compared to the FY14
budget request, by reducing facilities sustainment, restoration, and
modernization (FSRM) and military construction (MILCON) investments.
This reduction adds to backlogs created by the deferrals in FY13 and
FY14, exacerbating an existing readiness problem.
The OGSI is a one-year FY15 initiative that requests funds for
additional discretionary investments that can spur economic growth,
promote opportunity, and strengthen national security. The FY15 base
budget request provides the resources needed to gradually restore
readiness and balance. However, it does not provide funds to accelerate
readiness improvements in FY15. The OGSI provides the resources needed
in FY15 to make faster progress by improving Navy facilities and adding
additional resources for FSRM, accelerating the modernization of key
weapons systems, and making faster progress toward restoring readiness
lost under sequestration. Without OGSI funding, readiness can only be
restored at a more gradual pace with the risks noted above.
Mr. Wittman. Which readiness accounts are you most concerned about?
What can we do to help? If provided with extra budgetary authority,
what would you seek to do?
Admiral Ferguson. A balance of adequate funding across all the
readiness accounts is essential to sustaining the long term readiness
of the Fleet. I am particularly concerned that we maintain the
operations accounts (Flying Hour Program and Ship Operations) to
support the safety and proficiency of our operators as well as the
advanced combat capabilities of our strike groups and other deploying
units. The Ship Maintenance and Aviation Depot Maintenance accounts are
critical to the long term readiness of the force and ensure our
platforms reach their expected service lives. We must also adequately
fund the supporting enabler accounts (Aviation Support, Ship Support
and Aviation Logistics) as well as the spares accounts if we expect to
achieve the appropriate balance in our readiness accounts. While we can
take short term risk in one account or another, continuing to do so
will ultimately produce significant readiness impacts with long term
consequences.
In our effort to ensure our Fleet units operating forward have what
they need, we have further reduced investments in our shore
infrastructure. Although a justifiable short term strategy, this will
also produce significant and expensive long term impacts if sustained.
Investing 3.5% in our shipyard and depot infrastructure will not keep
pace with need, and funding 70% of the Facilities Sustainment,
Rehabilitation and Modernization requirement only meets emergency
requirements and limited investment. While we have focused our shore
investment in support of operational requirements to include piers and
airfields, at this level of funding the long term health of the entire
infrastructure is at risk.
If additional funds were available above those already requested in
the FY15 budget request, Navy would propose investments in the
following areas:
Fleet Maintenance: Additional depot maintenance activity
to accelerate recovery from sequestration, improve operational
availability of Fleet aircraft and meet the statutory requirement of 6%
for capital investment in depot facilities.
Afloat Readiness: Improve availability of Combat
Logistics Force platforms, increase JHSV operations and increase
funding for aviation logistics.
Critical Spares: Improve sparing for aviation platforms
to address reduced readiness, enhance safety and provide greater
flexibility for training and operations.
Shore Readiness: Reduce the level of risk in sustaining
Navy shore infrastructure, including facility sustainment, restoration
and modernization as well as increased funding for military
construction.
Modernization: Accelerate rate of delivery of key
capabilities to the Fleet to ensure technological superiority over
potential adversaries.
Manpower/Training: Increase training support to achieve
readiness levels and improve manpower management.
While each of these potential investments are important, they are
not of a higher priority than items already in the FY15 Navy budget
submission.
Mr. Wittman. Can you articulate the impact of cancelled training
that occurred over the last two years as a result of sequestration?
Admiral Ferguson. Sequestration broadly impacted Navy training in a
number of areas. Our rotational deployment cycles and forward
operations require us to preferentially fund primary pre-deployment
training and overseas operations and training events in support of
Combatant Commander named operations and theater engagement plans.
Under sequestration, this prioritization had some critical readiness
impacts, including:
Unit level training/Operator Proficiency: Perhaps the
most pervasive impact of sequestration is the lack of funds to fully
support the training that ship and squadron commanding officers conduct
outside of required training cycle events to improve unit readiness and
develop the experience base of their junior officers and enlisted
crewmembers. This has potential long term impacts on leadership and
professional skills, safety and retention. We were forced to reduce
some air wings to ``tactical hard deck''--a minimum safe-to-fly level
of training, and reduce steaming days and flying hours across the board
for non-deployed units. While the Navy Safety Center cannot yet draw a
direct link to reduced readiness activity, the number of aviation Class
A mishaps this year is up notably from our five year average.
Deferred pre-deployment training: Additional contingency
response capacity is generated by completing pre-deployment training of
units. Under sequestration, Navy held units at lower levels of training
until required to meet deployment timelines. Non-deployed units are
therefore less ready to surge in the event of crises.
Furlough readiness impacts: The large majority of the
Navy civilian workforce is engaged in generating current and future
readiness. Although our public shipyard direct workforce was exempt
from furlough, the individuals supporting material procurement,
engineering, contracting and other important enablers of their work
were not. Our aviation depot workforce was furloughed along with
training organizations and the acquisition workforce that procures and
modernizes the future Navy. All of these damage readiness well beyond
the actual number of days it is imposed, and when combined with lengthy
hiring freezes in order to manage within a sequestered budget, it
reduces readiness disproportionately to the cost it avoids.
Mr. Wittman. How dependent are you on OCO for day-to-day
operations? How will the dependence change after the majority of, or
possibly all, combat troops are out of Afghanistan?
Admiral Ferguson. The Navy's OCO funding can be split into four
parts:
1. Increased operating tempo for flying and ship operations or
operating forward. Navy funds the increased operating tempo required of
our aircraft and ships in the Middle East through OCO as well as
expeditionary units operating forward.
2. Afghanistan operations. Navy funds in-country operations for
expeditionary units and air operations for Marine Corps aircraft.
3. Enduring requirements. Additionally, Navy funds some remaining
enduring requirements through OCO, which include air and ship depot
maintenance above 80 percent of the modeled requirement for ship
operations to fully support operational requirements, base support
operations for several locations in the Middle East, and operating
support for expeditionary units.
4. Reset. Lastly, Navy funds the reset or repair of equipment,
aircraft, and ships returning from theater. Reset of these items will
take up to five or six years based on scheduling of maintenance
activities.
Once the Afghanistan operations end, the Navy will have three parts
of their OCO funding requirements remaining. The enduring requirements
combined with the increased flying and ship operations above baseline
levels when deployed to the Middle East would result in a substantial
amount of continued OCO dependence after the majority of combat troops
leave Afghanistan. These activities currently require up to $4.0
billion in OCO funding per year. Additionally, the Navy OCO reset
requirements are currently estimated to total $2.2 billion over the
next five to six years.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe the enduring, non-Afghanistan-related
requirements your service funds through OCO. How would you address
those requirements in the absence of OCO?
Admiral Ferguson. Navy has been working to transition OCO funded
enduring activities to baseline over the last few years. However, we
have only been partially successful in meeting that goal. At present,
our baseline funding only includes about 80% of the enduring aviation
and ship depot maintenance requirements--the remaining 20% are funded
as part of the OCO request. Navy enduring requirements funded in OCO
also include base support operations for several locations in the
Middle East and operating support for expeditionary units. In addition
to the operating costs imbedded in the Navy's OCO funding request, the
Navy will also have a long-term need for reset funding in order to
recover deferred maintenance and material condition for the ships and
aircraft that have been operated over the last decade at rates higher
than anticipated when they were procured.
Specifically, without OCO funding, the enduring requirements
necessary to meet the Navy's operational requirements, combined with
the increased flying and ship operations above baseline levels when
deployed to the Middle East, would represent a shortfall of between
$2.5B and $4B annually. In addition, our reset requirement is estimated
to be approximately $2.2B, which would need to be funded over the
period from the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East to a point
in time about 5 years after that happens.
Navy has funded all enduring flying hour operations in baseline for
several years. Increased operating tempo required of our aircraft and
ships in the Middle East continue to be OCO funded. For the foreseeable
future, the Combatant Command and Joint Staff expect continued
increased flying and ship operations above baseline levels when
deployed to the Middle East. The Navy continues to work with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to identify and plan for the possible
transition of enduring requirements from OCO funding to the baseline.
However, absent additional funding, the Navy would be forced to cut
back on its expenditures in other critical areas or reduce the level of
presence we can provide to the combatant commanders.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe your service's efforts to migrate
enduring requirements into the base budget. How challenging has
sequestration made that task? What is most at-risk?
Admiral Ferguson. Navy has been working to transition OCO funded
enduring activities to baseline over the last few years. However, we
have only been partially successful in meeting that goal. At present,
our baseline funding only includes about 80% of the enduring aviation
and ship depot maintenance requirements--the remaining 20% are funded
as part of the OCO request. Navy enduring requirements funded in OCO
also include base support operations for several locations in the
Middle East and operating support for expeditionary units. In addition
to the operating costs imbedded in the Navy's OCO funding request, the
Navy will also have a long-term need for reset funding in order to
recover deferred maintenance and material condition for the ships and
aircraft that have been operated over the last decade at rates higher
than anticipated when they were procured.
Specifically, without OCO funding, the enduring requirements
necessary to meet the Navy's operational requirements, combined with
the increased flying and ship operations above baseline levels when
deployed to the Middle East, would represent a shortfall of between
$2.5B and $4B annually. In addition, our reset requirement is estimated
to be approximately $2.2B, which would need to be funded over the
period from the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East to a point
in time about 5 years after that happens.
Navy has funded all enduring flying hour operations in baseline for
several years. Increased operating tempo required of our aircraft and
ships in the Middle East continue to be OCO funded. For the foreseeable
future, the Combatant Command and Joint Staff expect continued
increased flying and ship operations above baseline levels when
deployed to the Middle East. The Navy continues to work with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense to identify and plan for the possible
transition of enduring requirements from OCO funding to the baseline.
However, absent additional funding, the Navy would be forced to cut
back on its expenditures in other critical areas or reduce the level of
presence we can provide to the combatant commanders. Sequestration
would further drive our base down, pressurizing already difficult
decisions and adding risk to our balance between force structure,
modernization, and readiness.
Mr. Wittman. Although you may not be able to discuss specifics
until the FY15 OCO budget is officially released, how confident are you
in the adequacy of this year's OCO budget request? How much of your
services' operations, maintenance, and training requirements are met by
the base budget?
Admiral Ferguson. The Navy, in conjunction with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), is currently working on the
FY15 OCO requirements to be included in the budget request.
In FY14, the OCO budget included incremental costs to sustain
operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair, as well as
equipment replacement. These costs included aviation and ship
operations, combat support, base support, USMC operations and field
logistics, mobilized reservists and other special pays. The FY13
President's budget reflected the start of the transition out of
Afghanistan, and this effort to transition to Afghan responsibility is
continued in FY14. We continue this transition and anticipate
requesting similar incremental costs in the FY15 OCO request.
Our FY15 budget baseline funds enduring aviation and ship depot
maintenance baseline requirements to 80%. Our baseline budget also
funds ship operations to 45 days per quarter for deployed forces and 20
days per quarter for non-deployed forces, and flying hour operations to
a T-rating of 2.5 Navy/2.0 USMC. The Navy's FY15 baseline readiness
funding meets the preponderance of Combatant Commander operating tempo
requirements, properly sustaining and maintaining ships and aircraft,
and sustaining the enduring flight hour readiness requirement for both
Navy and Marine Corps.
Navy will require OCO funding for some remaining enduring
requirements. This includes aviation and ship depot maintenance above
80 percent, ship operations to fully support operational requirements,
base support operations for several locations in the Middle East, and
operating support for expeditionary units. Without OCO funding, these
enduring requirements, combined with the increased flying and ship
operations above baseline levels when deployed to the Middle East,
would result in the need for an additional $2.5 to $4.0 billion per
year in baseline funding. Absent additional funding, the Navy would be
forced to cut back on its expenditures in other critical areas or
reduce the level of presence we can provide to the combatant
commanders.
Mr. Wittman. How would your overall readiness be affected by the
elimination of OCO? What training would be curtailed? What
infrastructure would be affected? How would ability to maintain
equipment and fully staff units be affected?
Admiral Ferguson. OCO funding, in addition to our base budget,
continues to play a critical role in maintaining the capability,
capacity, and readiness necessary for the Navy to support our Combatant
Commanders, in addition to meeting the missions of the Defense
Strategic Guidance. For over ten years, OCO funding has allowed the
Navy to operate at a war-time operational tempo throughout the Middle
East. As the land war draws down, Navy is uniquely challenged because
our forces continue to serve and provide presence in the CENTCOM region
as land-based forces depart. The demand for naval presence in this
theater remains high and is likely to increase elsewhere as we
rebalance to the Pacific.
If the Navy remains at our current level of operations, it will not
be sustainable within our base budget alone. OCO funding is also
necessary to reset our ships and equipment after a decade of higher
tempo wartime operations. The capital asset nature of our ships makes
longer-term supplemental reset funding more critical to the Navy. In
the current fiscal environment, any transition from OCO into base at
the current base topline, or worse under sequestration levels, would
drive our base down and pressurize already difficult decisions as we
work to balance between force structure, modernization, and readiness.
Without additional supplemental funding, this balance will suffer. For
readiness specifically, we could be forced to delay maintenance
activities for our ships and aircraft, reducing their operational
availability and service life. Training could be reduced, preventing
ships and aircraft from being ready and available for contingency
operations.
In FY14, the OCO budget included incremental costs to sustain
operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair, as well as
equipment replacement. These costs include aviation and ship
operations, combat support, base support, USMC operations and field
logistics, mobilized reservists and other special pays. The FY13
President's Budget reflected the start of the transition out of
Afghanistan, and this effort to transition to Afghan responsibility is
continued in FY14. We continue this transition and anticipate
requesting similar incremental costs in the FY15 OCO request.
Mr. Wittman. In light of the civilian personnel hiring freezes and
furloughs in FY2014, what impacts, if any, were there on the shipyards
and aviation depots? How were they mitigated or what risk was assumed?
What is the civilian personnel hiring plan for the shipyards in FY15?
Admiral Ferguson. The FY2013 hiring freeze and overtime funding
restrictions created a capacity shortfall for naval shipyards resulting
in deferral of approximately 75,000 man-days of planned work from
FY2013 to FY2014. Navy mitigated the impact by lifting the hiring
freeze in June 2013, commencing aggressive recruitment efforts, and
exempting shipyards from civilian furloughs. Even with those efforts,
the number of personnel at the end of FY2013 was about 200 below the
budgeted end strength.
Commander, Fleet Readiness Center (COMFRC) lost 12 working days on
all production lines across the Fleet Readiness Centers. This issue was
exacerbated by the FY2013 hiring freeze and resulted in COMFRC
understaffing its FY2014 requirement by just under 600 Full Time
Equivalent personnel. Additionally, the furlough resulted in 43
aircraft and 289 engine repair delays and caused a net operating loss
of approximately $8 million to this working capital funded
organization.
The following table provides information on the staffing
requirements for FY 2015 for the four Naval Shipyards (Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard (PNSY), Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY), Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Activity (PSNS & IMF), and Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY &
IMF)).
Naval Shipyard FY15 Controls
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PNSY NNSY PSNS & IMF PHNSY & IMF
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY14 End Strength 4,772 9,551 12,250 4,455
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hires 387 890 492 245
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attrition (225) (690) (700) (270)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planned FY15 End Strength 4,934 9,751 12,042 4,430
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Wittman. How will each of your services achieve the
headquarters reductions ordered by Secretary Hagel and at the same time
ensure critical functional capabilities are not lost? What is your
strategic human capital plan?
Admiral Ferguson. Our FY 2015 President's Budget request achieves
savings through significant headquarters reductions, placing us on
track to meet the 20% reduction by FY 2019 required by Secretary of
Defense fiscal guidance. To protect the Navy's ability to rebalance to
the Pacific and continue to execute on-going overseas contingency
operations, less pressure is applied to fleet operational headquarters
staffs and more on other staffs. Specifically, Fleet Forces Command,
the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Navy Component Command headquarters were
allocated a 5% reduction. This decision required additional pressure to
be placed on other staffs in the Navy to compensate for the protection
of the fleets.
The headquarters reductions are designed to streamline management
through efficiencies and elimination of lower-priority activities,
protecting critical functional capabilities. The reductions will be
based on projected mission requirements and are consistent with
legislative requirements including 10 USC 2463.
Mr. Wittman. Can you address the impact of the furlough on the
military and civilian workforces? Have you seen spikes in post-furlough
separations or retirements? Do you anticipate another furlough will be
required?
Admiral Ferguson. We have seen the impact of furlough on our
workforce in the following ways:
Reduced readiness. Reduced Department of Navy's (DON)
maintenance and sustainment capacity by losing 6 days of work for
logisticians, comptrollers, engineers, contracting officers, and
planners.
Financial Hardship. The furlough created a significant
financial hardship for the men and women dedicated to public service.
The workforce lost 6 full days of pay, and corresponding leave
retirement contributions in 2013.
Morale of the Force. Internal surveys indicate a decrease
in trust in the institution among the workforce and a perceived
devaluation of the contribution of our Civilian Sailors to the DON
mission. The furlough also dampened the enthusiasm of the workforce, as
evidenced by a five-point drop in the Office of Personnel Management
federal employee viewpoint survey and a decline in employee engagement.
While there has been no increase in post-furlough separations or
retirements among active duty members, the DON has seen an increase in
civilians exploring the possibility of retirement through the
retirement application process. To date, there has been no increase in
post-furlough civilian separations or retirements from the Department
of the Navy.
We cannot rule out the possibility of additional furloughs should
sequestration be required in FY16 and beyond.
Mr. Wittman. How did the Secretary's mandatory 20% headquarters
cuts impact readiness accounts, if at all?
Admiral Ferguson. To enable the rebalance to the Pacific and
continue to execute theater presence missions and on-going overseas
contingency operations, Navy applied less pressure on operational
warfighting headquarters and took the larger reductions in ashore
overhead headquarters organizations. As a result, there is no expected
direct impact to the major Fleet readiness accounts (Ship Operations,
Flying Hour Program, Ship Maintenance or Aviation Depot Maintenance)
from the 20% headquarters reduction. The specific funding lines that
support ship and aircraft maintenance and operations were not affected
by the 20% headquarters reduction.
That said, there are some minor reductions to two support accounts
(Ship Support and Air Support)--which total $1.45M across the FYDP
which could cause second order affects to longer-term readiness. As an
example, reductions in the Planning, Engineering and Design accounts
could manifest in delays in executing contracts, less deck plate
supervision for the work that is being done at ship depots and less
personnel available to execute the quality control functions we have
been doing in the past. The long-term impact of these issues would
likely be more re-work required, cost overruns for slower
identification of deficiencies and less efficient execution of work-
packages.
Since all of the reductions are phased-in over the next 4 years, it
is unlikely that these cuts will result in any immediate impacts. We
will manage our way through these reductions and search for
productivity improvements/efficiencies as well as identify lower-
priority, less critical tasks that can be cancelled or deferred to
permit those remaining personnel to execute our most critical missions.
If necessary, we will consider divesting less critical missions. Until
the 2017-2018 timeframe, the cuts are limited and are planned such that
we can evaluate long term impacts.
Mr. Wittman. Considering the significant variability associated
with the budget and the resulting force structure, why does the
Department feel that it is an appropriate time to request an additional
BRAC round?
Admiral Ferguson. The last BRAC analysis the Department of the Navy
performed was back in 2004. Since that assessment was completed, we
have reduced force structure, the number of personnel in the Navy, and
consolidated commands and staffs. Therefore, it is the appropriate time
to review base structure, force laydown, and assess our capacity in
order to reduce the costs of infrastructure sustainment.
Mr. Wittman. Please provide an update as to when the Department is
expected to complete the European Infrastructure Consolidation
Initiative as required by Section 347 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Why does the Department feel it
is appropriate to request an additional round of BRAC prior to
completing the assessment of infrastructure in Europe?
Admiral Ferguson. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst
of a comprehensive review of its European infrastructure to create
long-term savings by eliminating excess infrastructure, recapitalizing
astutely to create excess for elimination, and leveraging announced
force reductions. DOD is analyzing infrastructure relative to the
requirements of the defined force structure, emphasizing military
value, operational requirements, joint utilization, and obligations to
our allies. DOD expects to complete its analysis in late spring and
anticipates providing a classified report outlining the findings soon
after.
Even significant closures overseas, though, will not be sufficient
to make the needed reductions in DOD's excess infrastructure. This
underscores the need to conduct the same effort with respect to DOD's
domestic infrastructure, in concert with the overseas review to
maximize its comprehensiveness and creativity.
Regarding the Section 347 report on the European Infrastructure
Consolidation Initiative, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter submitted the analysis on April 16, 2013 (transmittal letter
attached).
[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]
Mr. Wittman. Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess
infrastructure exists in the Department? What empirical support can the
Department provide to support a request for additional BRAC rounds?
Admiral Ferguson. The last BRAC analysis DOD performed was back in
2004, and at that time the DOD reported an average of 24% excess
capacity as compared to the metrics established by the 1989 baseline
inventory.
Since that assessment was completed, however, the capabilities of
our weapons systems and platforms have advanced and our warfighting
tactics have evolved, as has planning criteria for our infrastructure.
Further, while the 2005 BRAC round included a number of closures within
the DON, the Navy has not experienced the same level of force structure
reductions as has the Army and Air Force. A new BRAC round would give
us the opportunity and rigorous process to take a hard look at our
infrastructure and force laydown to determine if the Navy has excess
capacity today.
Mr. Wittman. General Paxton, you've mentioned the effects of
sequestration on Marine Corps Readiness both in its current state and
into the future. We understand that the corps has done diligent work in
redesigning a force structure around 175,000 marines, which is based on
fiscal constraints. You and the Commandant have testified that the
optimal force structure for the Marine Corps is 186,600 marines to meet
all crisis response and steady-state requirements of the nation.
Can you briefly discuss what the Marine Corps loses in regards to
readiness with this reduced force structure?
Can you also provide the committee with your assessment of what
specific capabilities the Marine Corps stands to lose if the full
implementation of the BCA continues beyond FY15?
Lastly, can you provide the committee an assessment on the ability
of the Marine Corps to regenerate capabilities/capacities lost due to
sequestration if and when emergent threats arise or major combat
operations are required.
General Paxton. Under current levels of funding, the 175k force
will be an extremely capable and ready force, optimized for steady
state operations, but will assume risk in the execution of a Major
Combat Operation (MCO) and will stress personnel tempo rates at the 1:2
deployment-to-dwell ratio in the active component and a 1:4 ratio for
the Reserves. The 175k force will not be sized to rotate in MCOs (i.e.,
the force will be ``all-in'' to meet the demands of an MCO at a 1:0
unit deployment-to-dwell ratio). The 175k force is not the 186.8k force
level the Marine Corps desires, but it is the best balanced force to
meet the strategic and fiscal realities of the near future while
simultaneously preserving the ability to rapidly grow in times of
crisis. The 175k force will maintain an average of C2 readiness across
all operational units, will restructure unit and institutional training
for emerging security demands, will expand use of simulation and
virtual training, and will rely on Navy investments in steaming days
and flight hours which impacts readiness.
The 175k force at full sequestration levels will be a high risk
force. Funding for Marine Corps modernization will be reduced or
depleted, funding for readiness will be reduced, funding for
infrastructure will be reduced, and Marine Corps capability to deter
and defeat aggression will be reduced. Specifically, full sequestration
in the FY15-19 timeframe will result in reduction in funding for MDAPs,
G/ATOR, and CAC2S, while JLTV will be delayed one year and may be
forced to cancel. Modernization to the Marine Corps' most crucial
capabilities--ACV and F-35B--will be preserved. Additional risk will be
manifested over time as equipment and modernization yields less viably
equipped Marines. Marine Corps bases and stations will, over time, see
a diminished ability to provide the training ranges to keep Marines
trained. Within 5-7 years the Marine Corps may be forced to make the
choice between deploying a fully equipped Marine or a fully trained
Marine. Although the Marine Corps will continue to serve the nation as
America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness at whatever end-strength the
nation is prepared to fund, full implementation of the BCA beyond FY15
will negatively impact Marine Corps modernization, infrastructure, and
readiness accounts, reducing Marine Corps capability to fulfill key DSG
missions (Countering Terrorism & Irregular Warfare, Deterring &
Defeating Aggression, Projecting Power Despite A2AD Challenges, and
Providing a Stabilizing Presence).
Although the 175k force is the current planned force, history shows
the Marine Corps will not be held at 175k forever; end-strength
fluctuations are natural and necessary. Rather than ignore this
reality, it is best to plan for it and accept risk in the areas that
can be reconstituted when needed. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)
refers to this concept as ``reversibility.'' The Ground Combat Element
(GCE) is the element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that
can most rapidly be reconstituted during times of crisis; it is the
most reversible. The Air Combat Element is arguably the least
reversible. Aircraft are considered long-lead items because of the
length of time required to move from concept to reality. Additionally,
aviation units require more senior personnel who take longer to
develop. The 175k force reduces structure in areas that can be restored
the most rapidly in times of crisis, thereby preserving reversibility.
Mr. Wittman. Does the budget request for the Marine Corps fully
fund current and planned crisis response capabilities? If not, why?
What are your future plans for developing and growing crisis response
elements? Where will future capabilities be based?
General Paxton. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis
Response (SPMAGTF-CR), in support of USEUCOM/USAFRICOM, is an enduring
capability for the Marine Corps and supports our priorities for forward
presence, steady state operations and crisis response. It is funded in
the President's Budget 2015 (PB-15) request. The Marine Corps'
rebalance to the Pacific is also funded in PB-15. The rebalance
provides forward presence, steady state operations, and crisis response
capabilities to that region. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) presence
in support of USCENTCOM and the 31st MEU in support of USPACOM are also
funded. Lastly, Marine Security Augmentation Unit funding was submitted
as part of PB-15.
The Marine Corps requested funding in the USMC FY-15 Unfunded
Priority List (UPL) submission for SPMAGTFs in support of USCENTCOM and
USSOUTHCOM. These capabilities were not funded in the [baseline]
budget, because they were in development at the time of submission.
SPMAGTF-CENT is scheduled to deploy in the fall of this year and will
be comprised of a Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) element in Jordan
and a Security Force in Yemen. The Marine Corps and USCENTCOM are in
the process of coordinating host nation support for the Crisis Response
element and associated aviation assets. SPMAGTF-South is scheduled to
deploy in May of 2015. Although it is not planned to have as robust a
crisis response capability as the SPMAGTFs in USCENTCOM or USEUCOM/
USAFRICOM, it will have the ability to conduct TSC and support
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response missions. The Marine Corps
and USSOUTHCOM are in the process of coordinating host nation support
for elements of the SPMAGTF.
Mr. Wittman. The budget request summary highlights support for the
continuation Marine Unit Deployment Program (UDP) in FY15. How many
deployments to you anticipate? With the updated strategic guidance, do
you anticipate a UDP-type arrangement outside of Okinawa?
General Paxton. The Unit Deployment Program consists of sustained
presence of three reinforced infantry battalions that conduct six month
deployments. This results in six deployments per year. One of these
battalions will rotate to Darwin, Australia for a six month period each
year as the Marine Rotational Force (Darwin).
Mr. Wittman. What level of unit readiness does the President's
Budget Request assume? If funded at the budget request level, how long
until we regain sufficient full spectrum readiness?
General Paxton. The FY15 budget preserves near-term readiness to
support an increased forward presence in the Pacific, and crisis
response capabilities, such as those demonstrated in the Philippines
for humanitarian assistance and disaster response and later with the
evacuation of American citizens from South Sudan. In partnership with
the Navy, we utilize Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) and Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEU) that are forward deployed. Additionally, the
budget resources the land-based Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Force-Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR), located in Spain and Italy.
SPMAGTF-CR is not intended to replace, but rather compliment the ARG-
MEU. The Navy-Marine Corps team is committed to forming capabilities
that would provide other crisis response capabilities to U.S. Central
and Southern Commands. The help of Congress is needed to secure these
future capabilities.
Full spectrum readiness depends on a budget that balances current
unit readiness and long-term investments--balanced institutional
readiness is essential to regaining full spectrum readiness. Currently,
this balance is misaligned as resources that would have otherwise been
applied to non-deployed units and investments accounts are re-
prioritized to deployed and next-to-deploy units to safeguard near-term
operational unit level readiness. Tough choices have been made in these
fiscally challenging times to protect this near term readiness. Whereas
the President's budget protects near-term readiness, fully
reconstituting the Corps after over a decade of war is at risk if
funding is not available for equipment modernization and needed
infrastructure essential for full spectrum readiness. Force level draw
down savings are not expected to be realized until 2019, at which time
the Corps would be on a path to balanced institutional readiness.
Mr. Wittman. Much of the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) Fund is aimed at mitigating short-term
readiness shortfalls. If funded at the budget request levels, what
additional readiness shortfalls are present within the Services? Can we
expect the OGSI to mitigate all or most of these? What is the impact or
risk if OGSI is not funded?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps prioritized near term readiness at
the expense of infrastructure sustainment and equipment modernization.
The programs requested via the OGSI will help mitigate the risk
associated with those reductions.
Mr. Wittman. Which readiness accounts are you most concerned about?
What can we do to help? If provided with extra budgetary authority,
what would you seek to do?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps prioritized near term readiness at
the expense of infrastructure sustainment and equipment modernization.
If additional funds were available, the Marine Corps would request
support of the OGSI/UPUL.
Mr. Wittman. Can you articulate the impact of cancelled training
that occurred over the last two years as a result of sequestration?
General Paxton. No significant training was cancelled as a result
of sequestration. The Marine Corps explicitly protected training and
near-term unit readiness at the expense of equipment modernization and
installation sustainment. The Marine Corps' concern is that in
achieving short-term readiness goals to meet DOD guidance, in the long-
term it will reduce overall readiness across the Infrastructure
Sustainment and Equipment Modernization pillars of institutional
readiness. Funding cuts to these pillars, under sequestration, will not
be sustainable due to their impacts on future readiness.
Mr. Wittman. How dependent are you on OCO for day-to-day
operations? How will the dependence change after the majority of, or
possibly all, combat troops are out of Afghanistan?
The majority of Marine Corps OCO funding supports the incremental
costs of combat operations, equipment and infrastructure repair,
equipment replacement, military pay for mobilized reservists, deployed
pay and allowances, and end-strength above the baseline active duty
force (182.7K in FY15). However, as the Marine Corps transitions from
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to steady state operations,
including forward presence and crisis response, some of the activities
currently funded via OCO will likely migrate to the baseline to support
enduring missions and requirements. The Marine Corps currently
estimates this amount to be between $200 and $450 million. This
represents approximately 8 to 11 percent of our total FY 2014 OCO
request of $4.0B.
The $700 million realigned from baseline to OCO in FY 2014 by the
Congress in the 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act is also an enduring
requirement, and is reflected in the FY15 budget as such.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe the enduring, non-Afghanistan-related
requirements your service funds through OCO. How would you address
those requirements in the absence of OCO?
General Paxton. The majority of Marine Corps OCO funding supports
the incremental costs of combat operations, equipment and
infrastructure repair, equipment replacement, military pay for
mobilized reservists, deployed pay and allowances, and end-strength
above the baseline active duty force (182.7K in FY15). However, as the
Marine Corps transitions from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
to steady state operations, including forward presence and crisis
response, some of the activities currently funded via OCO will likely
migrate to the baseline to support enduring missions and requirements.
The Marine Corps currently estimates this amount to be between $200 and
$450 million. This represents approximately 8 to 11 percent of our
total FY 2014 OCO request of $4.0B. Examples of enduring requirements
include: CENTCOM operations and presence, redeployment of forces post
OEF, intermediate and operational maintenance requirements, as
equipment is deployed in support of non-OCO missions, commercial
satellite bandwith, and information systems requirements.
The Marine Corps has made modest gains in its efforts to fund
enduring requirements in the baseline, but will face challenges to
migrate the requirements identified above as sequestration has resulted
in reduced top lines for all the Services. The ability to continue to
fund missions with OCO has enabled the Marine Corps to limit further
reductions in operation and maintenance and procurement accounts
(infrastructure sustainment and equipment modernization) in order to
support a ready and capable force.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe your service's efforts to migrate
enduring requirements into the base budget. How challenging has
sequestration made that task? What is most at-risk?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps has made modest gains in its
efforts to fund enduring requirements in the baseline, but will face
challenges to migrate the requirements identified above as
sequestration has resulted in reduced top lines for all the Services.
The ability to continue to fund missions with OCO has enabled the
Marine Corps to limit further reductions in operation and maintenance
and procurement accounts (infrastructure sustainment and equipment
modernization) in order to support a ready and capable force.
The majority of Marine Corps OCO funding supports the incremental
costs of combat operations, equipment and infrastructure repair,
equipment replacement, military pay for mobilized reservists, deployed
pay and allowances, and end-strength above the baseline active duty
force (182.7K in FY15). However, as the Marine Corps transitions from
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to steady state operations,
including forward presence and crisis response, some of the activities
currently funded via OCO will likely migrate to the baseline to support
enduring missions and requirements. The Marine Corps currently
estimates this amount to be between $200 and $450 million. This
represents approximately 8 to 11 percent of our total FY 2014 OCO
request of $4.0B.
The $700 million realigned from baseline to OCO in FY 2014 by the
Congress in the 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act is also an enduring
requirement, and is reflected in the FY15 budget as such.
Mr. Wittman. Although you may not be able to discuss specifics
until the FY15 OCO budget is officially released, how confident are you
in the adequacy of this year's OCO budget request? How much of your
services' operations, maintenance, and training requirements are met by
the base budget?
General Paxton. The majority of Marine Corps OCO funding supports
the incremental costs of combat operations, equipment and
infrastructure repair, equipment replacement, military pay for
mobilized reservists, deployed pay and allowances, and end-strength
above the baseline active duty force (182.7K in FY15). However, as the
Marine Corps transitions from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
to steady state operations, including forward presence and crisis
response, some of the activities currently funded via OCO will likely
migrate to the baseline to support enduring missions and requirements.
The Marine Corps currently estimates this amount to be between $200 and
$450 million. This represents approximately 8 to 11 percent of our
total FY 2014 OCO request of $4.0B.
In FY2011, the Marine Corps requested $4.0B (5% of the DOD's $85.3B
request). With continued support from Congress for our manpower, combat
operations, pre-deployment training equipment repair and replacement,
and our reset requirements, we believe we can maintain a ready and
capable force albeit with some near term risks in our infrastructure
sustainment and equipment modernization accounts.
Mr. Wittman. How would your overall readiness be affected by the
elimination of OCO? What training would be curtailed? What
infrastructure would be affected? How would ability to maintain
equipment and fully staff units be affected?
General Paxton. In FY2011, the Marine Corps requested $4B (5% of
the DOD's $85.3B request). With continued support from Congress for our
manpower, combat operations, pre-deployment training equipment repair
and replacement, and our reset requirements, we believe we can maintain
a ready and capable force albeit with some near term risks in our
infrastructure sustainment and equipment modernization accounts.
Mr. Wittman. In light of the civilian personnel hiring freezes and
furloughs in FY2014, what impacts, if any, were there on the shipyards
and aviation depots? How were they mitigated or what risk was assumed?
What is the civilian personnel hiring plan for the shipyards in FY15?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps has no shipyards or aviation
depots and, thus, defers to Navy on civilian furlough and pay freeze
impacts on those entities.
Mr. Wittman. How will each of your services achieve the
headquarters reductions ordered by Secretary Hagel and at the same time
ensure critical functional capabilities are not lost? What is your
strategic human capital plan?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps supports measures such as the 20%
reduction to management headquarters which is designed to enhance
efficiency and cost effectiveness of our workforce. Due to fiscal
constraints, the Marine Corps had already established an Executive
Steering Group to determine how to minimize stress and maintain faith
with our civilian workforce in this austere environment. As a result,
the Marine Corps phased the management headquarters reduction at
approximately four percent per year beginning in FY 2015. In addition,
since 2009, the Marine Corps has restrained growth by prioritizing
civilian workforce requirements and realigned resources to retain an
affordable and efficient workforce. Similarly, the Marine Corps has
identified active duty military billets within headquarters
organizations that will be eliminated to achieve the 20% reduction in
management headquarters by 2019. Such billets, the Marine Corps feels
are appropriate for reduction and will not negatively impact functional
capabilities of headquarter elements.
Mr. Wittman. Can you address the impact of the furlough on the
military and civilian workforces? Have you seen spikes in post-furlough
separations or retirements? Do you anticipate another furlough will be
required?
General Paxton. About 90% of our civilian Marines suffered 48 hours
of administrative furlough between 8 July and 17 August 2013. Some
suffered financially because of 6-days lost pay. The lapse in
appropriations furlough during 1-4 October affected about 63% of our
appropriated funded (APF) civilians and 26% of our non-appropriated
funded (NAF).
Over 60% of our civilian Marines are veterans; a great many are
retired and former Marines. They come to work for the Marine Corps
because they believe in and are committed to our mission. Through
anecdotal evidence, we know that our civilians are frustrated with
continued budgetary uncertainty, and the increasing publicity in media
that portrays them as unproductive and overpaid is stressful and
demoralizing.
We have not seen any spikes in separations or retirements.
The Marine Corps does not anticipate another furlough. Our civilian
Marine appropriated-funded workforce is less than 5% of USMC total O&M
budget. That represents a ``best value'' for the defense dollar, as the
leanest of all services, with a ratio of one appropriated funded
civilian to every ten active duty Marines. Frankly, sequestration
actions break faith with our civilians, and will jeopardize the
expertise and continuity necessary to support our military as
commitment to federal service wanes.
Mr. Wittman. How did the Secretary's mandatory 20% headquarters
cuts impact readiness accounts, if at all?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps supports measures such as the 20%
reduction to management headquarters which is designed to enhance
efficiency and cost effectiveness of our workforce. Due to fiscal
constraints, the Marine Corps had already established an Executive
Steering Group to determine how to minimize stress and maintain faith
with our civilian workforce in this austere environment. As a result,
the Marine Corps phased the management headquarters reduction at
approximately four percent per year beginning in FY 2015. In addition,
since 2009, the Marine Corps has restrained growth by prioritizing
civilian workforce requirements and realigned resources to retain an
affordable and efficient workforce. Similarly, the Marine Corps has
identified active duty military billets within headquarters
organizations that will be eliminated to achieve the 20% reduction in
management headquarters by 2019. Such billets, the Marine Corps feels
are appropriate for reduction and will not negatively impact functional
capabilities of headquarter elements.
Mr. Wittman. Considering the significant variability associated
with the budget and the resulting force structure, why does the
Department feel that it is an appropriate time to request an additional
BRAC round?
General Paxton. The last BRAC analysis the Department of the Navy
(DON) performed was back in 2004, and at that time the Department
reported having about 21% excess capacity as compared to the metrics
established by the 1989 baseline inventory; the DOD average was 24%.
Since that assessment was completed, however, the capabilities of
our weapons systems and platforms have advanced and our warfighting
tactics have evolved, as has planning criteria for our infrastructure.
Further, while the 2005 BRAC round included a number of closures within
the DON, the Marine Corps has not experienced the same level of force
structure reductions as has the Army and Air Force. A new BRAC round
would give us the opportunity and rigorous process to take a hard look
at our infrastructure and force laydown to determine how much excess
capacity the Marine Corps has today. However, the Marine Corps feels
that it is appropriately aligned with its bases and infrastructure for
its future force structure going forward.
Mr. Wittman. Please provide an update as to when the Department is
expected to complete the European Infrastructure Consolidation
Initiative as required by Section 347 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Why does the Department feel it
is appropriate to request an additional round of BRAC prior to
completing the assessment of infrastructure in Europe?
General Paxton. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the midst of
a comprehensive review of its European infrastructure to create long-
term savings by eliminating excess infrastructure, recapitalizing
astutely to create excess for elimination, and leveraging announced
force reductions. DOD is analyzing infrastructure relative to the
requirements of the defined force structure, emphasizing military
value, operational requirements, joint utilization, and obligations to
our allies. DOD expects to complete its analysis in late spring and
anticipates providing a classified report outlining the findings soon
after.
Even significant closures overseas, though, will not be sufficient
to make the needed reductions in DOD's excess infrastructure. This
underscores the need to conduct the same effort with respect to DOD's
domestic infrastructure, in concert with the overseas review to
maximize its comprehensiveness and creativity.
Regarding the Section 347 report on the European Infrastructure
Consolidation Initiative, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter submitted the analysis on April 16, 2013 (transmittal letter
attached).
[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 110.]
Mr. Wittman. Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess
infrastructure exists in the Department? What empirical support can the
Department provide to support a request for additional BRAC rounds?
General Paxton. The last BRAC analysis the Department of the Navy
(DON) performed was back in 2004, and at that time the Department
reported having about 21% excess capacity as compared to the metrics
established by the 1989 baseline inventory; the DOD average was 24%.
Since that assessment was completed, however, the capabilities of
our weapons systems and platforms have advanced and our warfighting
tactics have evolved, as has planning criteria for our infrastructure.
Further, while the 2005 BRAC round included a number of closures within
the DON, the Marine Corps has not experienced the same level of force
structure reductions as has the Army and Air Force. A new BRAC round
would give us the opportunity and rigorous process to take a hard look
at our infrastructure and force laydown to determine how much excess
capacity the Marine Corps has today. However, the Marine Corps feels
that it is appropriately aligned with its bases and infrastructure for
its future force structure going forward.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe the readiness challenges the Air Force
faces if we revert to sequestration level funding after FY15.
General Spencer. The Fiscal Year 2015 President's Budget funding
levels are the minimum required to achieve Air Force readiness goals by
2023. The reality of the Air Force budget is that without sufficient
readiness funding, we assume greater risk across the full range of
military operations required to support the defense strategy. Current
fiscal constraints pose difficult choices between our strategy-based
modernization/acquisition programs and the need to simultaneously
address our near- and long-term full-spectrum readiness shortfalls.
Without adequate readiness funding, the Air Force cannot maintain a
ready force or even begin reversing our long downward readiness trend,
which we are currently addressing in FY14-15 under the funding provided
by the Bipartisan Budget Act.
The return of Budget Control Act (BCA) funding levels would
significantly impact our ability to adequately resource flying hours,
weapons system sustainment, depot maintenance, training ranges,
preferred munitions, and large-force exercises. If BCA funding levels
return, readiness will decline across all Air Force core missions and
we will not be able to meet our 2023 readiness goals.
Our units will have to fly at reduced training rates and the Air
Force will again be forced to stand down units, similar to actions
taken in FY13. As the Department indicated in the sequestration
reports, the Air Force will be forced to consider additional force
structure options, such as divesting the KC-10 and Global Hawk Block 40
fleets and reducing by ten the number of MQ-9 orbits. BCA funding
levels mean cuts to our readiness and recapitalization/modernization
accounts and will result in fewer ready forces available to support the
defense strategy. The result will be a less capable, smaller force that
is even less ready for tomorrow's fight.
Mr. Wittman. What would be the impacts to the Air Force's readiness
posture if we maintained our current force structure with the current
funding levels?
General Spencer. The Bipartisan Budget Act's (BBA) funding levels
do not resolve the long term readiness issues that stemmed from the
imposition of the Budget Control Act and years of declining readiness.
Anticipated funding based on the BBA helps reverse the readiness
decline, but it will likely not fix Air Force readiness during the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP); this is one of the reasons that
PB15 seeks increased resources (above the BBA level) in Fiscal Year
2016 (FY16) and beyond. Achieving a ready Air Force will be an
estimated ten year process, with recovery sometime around 2023. The
longer term readiness picture remains uncertain due to the resource
drain stemming from the Air Force's inability to shed excess force
structure and the looming threat of a return to sequester-level budgets
in FY16 and beyond.
If the Air Force were to maintain its current force structure at
current funding levels, we would be forced to shift critical funds out
of our readiness and recapitalization/modernization accounts. Depending
on the outcome of these budget-driven tradeoffs, units will be forced
to fly at reduced training rates and the Air Force will again be forced
to stand down units, similar to actions taken in FY13 and from which
(as of May 2014) the Air Force has yet to fully recover. This would
result in fewer ready forces to meet the requirements of the defense
strategy and a less capable, smaller force that is even less ready.
Mr. Wittman. If Congress fails to grant the Air Force authority to
cut A-10s, do you anticipate implications for force readiness? If so,
can you provide specifics?
General Spencer. Yes, we do expect negative impacts to readiness if
we are not permitted to divest the A-10. Without a $4.2 billion
addition to the Air Force's topline that is necessary to maintain the
current A-10 fleet across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the
Air Force would be forced to shift critical funds out of our readiness
and recapitalization/modernization accounts. Without these savings,
units will be forced to fly at reduced training rates and the Air Force
will again be forced to stand down units, similar to actions taken in
fiscal year 2013 and from which (as of May 2014) the Air Force has yet
to fully recover. This would result in fewer ready forces to meet the
requirements of the defense strategy and a less capable, smaller force
that is even less ready.
Mr. Wittman. The budget request funds only 65% of facility
sustainment requirements. What is the impact of this budget decision?
What tradeoffs were made to justify this determination? When do you
anticipate this issue to be addressed? How much budget authority is
required?
General Spencer. The Air Force's Fiscal Year 2015 President's
Budget (FY15 PB) budget decision accepts near-term risk with long-term
effects in facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization
(FSRM). The impact of this budget decision is further degradation of an
already older/aging infrastructure. The current fiscal environment
required difficult choices. We prioritized readiness and modernization
over facilities to balance capacity, capability, and readiness. The
FY15 PB supports that strategy, but a return to sequestration-level
budgets will make the choices worse.
Mr. Wittman. How much excess capacity does the Air Force currently
have with respect to installations and facilities? How did you
determine this percentage? What current information do you have to make
this determination?
General Spencer. The Secretary of Defense's 2004 Sec. 2912 Report
to Congress stated the Air Force had 24 percent excess infrastructure.
Broad mission categories were parametrically assessed, compared to
mission requirements, and yielded a non-specific, excess capacity
result. The 24 percent conclusion was mission focused (i.e., bomber,
depots, training) and not base-by-base.
This excess infrastructure was not sufficiently addressed by the
base realignment and closure round in 2005 (BRAC 2005). Only eight
minor installations were closed and less than one percent of Plant
Replacement Value (PRV) was reduced. Since BRAC 2005, the Air Force has
further reduced its force structure by approximately 500 aircraft and
eight percent of military manpower authorizations. Add to this the FY15
PB proposal to reduce force structure by an additional 500 aircraft and
up to 20,000 Airmen, and the need for BRAC becomes even more
compelling.
Mr. Wittman. Last year, the committee provided the Air Force with
budget authority to demolish a number of excess buildings across
installations. What is the status of demolition projects and do you
need additional authority this year?
General Spencer. In FY14, Congress authorized $2.88B in Facilities
Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM). From this FSRM, the
Air Force had planned for $29M in Demolition.
Due to budget constraints, the Air Force made the decision to
target resources on ``mission-critical, worst-first'' infrastructure
needs, and defer demolition (low risk) to focus resources on mission-
enabling renovations (restoration and modernization).
The Air Force has currently funded five projects in fiscal year
2014 (FY14) worth $4.1 million and is prepared to fund 12 more projects
in FY14 worth $8.3 million.
Mr. Wittman. Which readiness accounts are you most concerned about?
What can we do to help? If provided with extra budgetary authority,
what would you seek to do?
General Spencer. The Air Force's primary readiness concern is to
ensure adequate funding levels for flying hours, weapons system
sustainment (WSS), ranges, preferred munitions, simulators, and
exercises. Without adequate funding, the Air Force cannot maintain a
ready force or even begin reversing our long-standing downward
readiness trend, which we are currently addressing under the Bipartisan
Budget Act. The Air Force will prioritize flying hours, WSS, ranges,
munitions, simulators, and exercises to recover readiness and to meet
our 2023 readiness goals.
Mr. Wittman. Can you articulate the impact of cancelled training
that occurred over the last two years as a result of sequestration?
General Spencer. Loss of high-intensity training has eroded the Air
Force's full-spectrum readiness. As of May 2014, nearly 50 percent of
the units stood down in fiscal year 2013 (FY13) due to sequestration
had yet to recover to their suboptimal, pre-sequester readiness levels.
Sequestration forced the cancellation or curtailment of weapons school
classes and several major exercises in FY13, including RED FLAG, which
has further eroded the Air Force's readiness and made us less prepared
to decisively win in future contingencies in contested and highly-
contested environments.
If desired, we can provide more detail in a classified forum.
Mr. Wittman. What level of unit readiness does the President's
Budget Request assume? If funded at the budget request level, how long
until we regain sufficient full spectrum readiness?
General Spencer. PB15 funding levels enable the Air Force to
achieve its readiness goals by 2023. Below this funding level, we
assume greater risk across the full range of military operations that
are required to support the defense strategy. Current fiscal
constraints pose difficult choices between our strategy-based
modernization/acquisition programs and the need to simultaneously
address our near- and long-term full-spectrum readiness shortfalls.
Without PB15 funding levels, the Air Force cannot realize a ready
force. The Air Force began reversing our long-standing downward
readiness trend in Fiscal Years 2014-15 with funding provided by the
Bipartisan Budget Act.
The return of Budget Control Act (BCA) funding levels would
significantly impact our ability to adequately resource flying hours,
weapons system sustainment, depot maintenance, training ranges,
preferred munitions, simulators, and large-force exercises. If BCA
funding levels return, readiness will decline across all Air Force core
missions and we will not be able to meet our 2023 readiness goals.
Mr. Wittman. Much of the $26 billion Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative (OGSI) Fund is aimed at mitigating short-term
readiness shortfalls. If funded at the budget request levels, what
additional readiness shortfalls are present within the Services? Can we
expect the OGSI to mitigate all or most of these? What is the impact or
risk if OGSI is not funded?
General Spencer. The Fiscal Year 2015 President's Budget (FY15 PB)
request continues to rebuild readiness levels for the Air Force by
funding all executable flying hours, sustaining space enterprise
capabilities, and investing in cyber operations readiness. However,
emergent requirements in the nuclear enterprise and critical shortfalls
for Combat Air Force exercises, ranges, and training still remain. The
Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative (OGSI) and the Air Force
unfunded priority list (UPL) seek to mitigate all of these shortfalls
in FY15 by funding over $100 million in nuclear force improvement
program initiatives, increasing funding for combat training ranges, and
restoring installation support funding that directly enhances Air Force
preparedness for combat, contingency, and day-to-day operations. If the
OGSI/UPL is not funded, it will take the Air Force longer to return to
full-spectrum training and achieve necessary readiness levels required
to fully execute combatant commander requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Which readiness accounts are you most concerned about?
What can we do to help? If provided with extra budgetary authority,
what would you seek to do?
General Spencer. The Air Force's primary readiness concern is to
ensure adequate funding levels for flying hours, weapons system
sustainment (WSS), ranges, preferred munitions, simulators, and
exercises. Without adequate funding, the Air Force cannot maintain a
ready force or even begin reversing our long-standing downward
readiness trend, which we are currently addressing under the Bipartisan
Budget Act. The Air Force will prioritize flying hours, WSS, ranges,
munitions, simulators, and exercises to recover readiness and to meet
our 2023 readiness goals.
Mr. Wittman. Can you articulate the impact of cancelled training
that occurred over the last two years as a result of sequestration?
General Spencer. Loss of high-intensity training has eroded the Air
Force's full-spectrum readiness. As of May 2014, nearly 50 percent of
the units stood down in fiscal year 2013 (FY13) due to sequestration
had yet to recover to their suboptimal, pre-sequester readiness levels.
Sequestration forced the cancellation or curtailment of weapons school
classes and several major exercises in FY13, including RED FLAG, which
has further eroded the Air Force's readiness and made us less prepared
to decisively win in future contingencies in contested and highly-
contested environments.
If desired, we can provide more detail in a classified forum.
Mr. Wittman. How dependent are you on OCO for day-to-day
operations? How will the dependence change after the majority of, or
possibly all, combat troops are out of Afghanistan?
General Spencer. The Air Force currently executes over $9 billion
per year in OCO operations and maintenance (O&M) funding. This funding
covers flying hours, weapon system sustainment (WSS), transportation,
and base operating support (BOS) for Air Force-operated installations
in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (CENTCOM AOR). Over
80 percent of our OCO BOS costs are for installations located outside
of Afghanistan. We anticipate those requirements and costs will endure.
The Air Force does not anticipate significant changes in CENTCOM
enduring requirements. Operations over the last 20 years suggest the
demand for Air Force capabilities will remain high even after combat
operations cease, particularly in terms of continued rotational
deployments and sustaining the bases in the CENTCOM AOR that are not in
Afghanistan. If OCO is no longer available, the Air Force will need a
topline funding increase to the baseline budget or supplemental funding
to continue operations to support combatant commander requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe the enduring, non-Afghanistan-related
requirements your service funds through OCO. How would you address
those requirements in the absence of OCO?
General Spencer. The Air Force anticipates a number of enduring
requirements, particularly in terms of continued rotational deployments
and sustaining the Air Force-operated bases in the U.S. Central Command
area of responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) that are not in Afghanistan. If we
continue to deploy and sustain these bases, all of the associated costs
(e.g., flying hours, weapon system sustainment (WSS), base operating
support (BOS)) must be funded, either by baseline growth or continued
supplemental funding. Without increased baseline or continued
supplemental funding, we will be forced to fund these requirements
within the current operations and maintenance (O&M) baseline. This
could result in similar impacts seen during fiscal year 2013
sequestration: insufficient flying hours to maintain readiness,
standing down flying units, less ready units for emergent requirements,
and potentially not enough ready units for rotational demands, such as
theater security packages in U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) or CENTCOM.
The Air Force would either need increased baseline or supplemental
funding as the magnitude of the efforts cannot be sustained in current
baseline funding levels. The impact of no overseas contingency
operations (OCO) funding depends on requirements. If all of the
requirements--to include flying hours, transportation, WSS, and BOS--
were to go away, the Air Force would only need OCO funding for a finite
reset period of a few years, after which there would be minimal impact
to terminating OCO funding. However, as stated earlier the Air Force
does not anticipate significant changes in the CENTCOM requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Please describe your service's efforts to migrate
enduring requirements into the base budget. How challenging has
sequestration made that task? What is most at-risk?
General Spencer. The Air Force is focused on maximizing full
spectrum readiness requirements. As overseas contingency operations
(OCO) missions decline, funding for flying hour and weapon systems
sustainment (WSS) programs will require additional baseline funding to
return to full spectrum readiness training as the Air Force continues
to execute the same number of flying hours and depot maintenance
levels. The Air Force incrementally increased the OCO-to-base funding
request for WSS in the fiscal year 2015 (FY15) Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) to account for this enduring requirement. Programmed
increases start in FY16 by approximately $1 billion to $1.5 billion a
year, increasing base funding from 70 percent to 80 percent of the WSS
requirement. This is the only OCO to base transfer the Air Force has
made in the FY15 budget submission. However, this plan is not
achievable if the Air Force has to maintain Budget Control Act levels
in FY16 and out.
Mr. Wittman. Although you may not be able to discuss specifics
until the FY15 OCO budget is officially released, how confident are you
in the adequacy of this year's OCO budget request? How much of your
services' operations, maintenance, and training requirements are met by
the base budget?
General Spencer. The Air Force is confident that the fiscal year
2015 (FY15) overseas contingency operations (OCO) budget request will
be adequate to properly fund the OCO mission. The Air Force is
maximizing the use of operations and maintenance (O&M) dollars to help
recover full-spectrum readiness, which is directly tied to operations,
maintenance, and training requirements. Readiness recovery needs a
stable level of funding and reduced operations tempo over time rather
than a total requirement funded in a single year.
Mr. Wittman. How would your overall readiness be affected by the
elimination of OCO? What training would be curtailed? What
infrastructure would be affected? How would ability to maintain
equipment and fully staff units be affected?
General Spencer. The Air Force relies on overseas contingency
operations (OCO) funds to adequately resource weapon system sustainment
(WSS) accounts. WSS is a critical component of overall readiness,
encompassing depot maintenance, contract logistics support (CLS), and
sustainment engineering. WSS directly impacts fleet availability and
the ability of front line units to generate aircraft at a rate that can
support the flying hour program, and, hence, the ability to train for a
full spectrum of operations called for in the defense strategy.
The elimination of OCO funding would significantly impact Air Force
full-spectrum readiness. Should OCO funding be unavailable in future
budgets and without an equivalent increase to the Air Force's topline,
depot throughput and weapon system repair capabilities would be
significantly impacted and jeopardize the Air Force's ability to meet
2023 readiness goals.
In addition, the Air Force needs adequate flying hours to generate
trained and ready aircrew. We anticipate continued deployment
requirements in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility
(CENTCOM AOR) even after combat operations end, and if the Air Force is
compelled to resource these flying hours from the baseline flying hour
program (vice OCO or supplemental funding), readiness will
significantly degrade.
Finally, operations, sustainment, repair, maintenance, and
construction of some overseas infrastructure and real property assets
are funded through OCO. These costs are significant. The elimination of
OCO funding would greatly reduce the ability of the Air Force to
provide engineering capabilities and services to the combatant
commanders, limit their ability to generate combat power, and reduce
readiness across the Air Force. An alternate funding source, or
migration of these costs to the Air Force base budget and an equivalent
increase to the Air Force topline, will be required.
Mr. Wittman. In light of the civilian personnel hiring freezes and
furloughs in FY2014, what impacts, if any, were there on the shipyards
and aviation depots? How were they mitigated or what risk was assumed?
What is the civilian personnel hiring plan for the shipyards in FY15?
General Spencer. The Air Force focused on recovering from
sequestration in fiscal year 2013 (FY13) and getting depot production
back on track in 2014. FY13 sequestration negatively impacted the time
required to perform depot maintenance at Oklahoma City Air Logistics
Complex, Ogden Air Logistics Complex, and Warner Robins Air Logistics
Complex. We expect to fully recover from flow day delays by December
2014. In terms of depot maintenance manpower, the Air Force manages
workforce based on the available funded workload per Title 10 USC 2472.
As a result, any personnel actions underway at the depot in FY14 are
not expected to add risk to the funded workload.
Mr. Wittman. How will each of your services achieve the
headquarters reductions ordered by Secretary Hagel and at the same time
ensure critical functional capabilities are not lost? What is your
strategic human capital plan?
General Spencer. The Air Force has undertaken a fundamental process
review across all levels of headquarters to identify and streamline
staff capabilities, while ensuring we do not lose all critical
functional capabilities resident on the staff. Where applicable, we are
moving organizations with key warfighting-enhancing capabilities out
from under the Headquarters Air Force and to the major commands
responsible for conducting those operations. Within the headquarters
reductions, the strategic human capital plan will maximize use of all
voluntary measures, such as voluntary early retirement authority and
voluntary separation incentives, in order to achieve any necessary
headquarters reductions.
Mr. Wittman. Can you address the impact of the furlough on the
military and civilian workforces? Have you seen spikes in post-furlough
separations or retirements? Do you anticipate another furlough will be
required?
General Spencer. The furlough decreased the morale and sense of
value of the civilian workforce. We are working to rebuild trust, and
we do not anticipate the need for a furlough in fiscal year 2014 (FY14)
or beyond. The impacts of the furlough have translated into very
minimal impacts to current recruitment efforts and the retention of
civilians. In fact, there was a downward trend in the overall number of
civilian retirements from FY12 to FY13.
Mr. Wittman. How did the Secretary's mandatory 20% headquarters
cuts impact readiness accounts, if at all?
General Spencer. The Air Force implemented the management
headquarters cost reduction per Secretary Hagel's direction in the
Fiscal Year 2015 President's Budget (FY15 PB) submission. The cost
reduction in management headquarters overhead allowed the Air Force to
maintain more funding in readiness accounts within the FY15 PB
submission than would have been possible otherwise.
Mr. Wittman. Considering the significant variability associated
with the budget and the resulting force structure, why does the
Department feel that it is an appropriate time to request an additional
BRAC round?
General Spencer. An additional base realignment and closure (BRAC)
round is needed now to allow the Air Force to properly address its
excess infrastructure, and thus focus limited resources on remaining
essential force structure and readiness.
Annually, the Air Force expends $5 billion on facilities and $9
billion to operate installations. It is becoming more and more
difficult to sustain installation infrastructure, with sustainment
funds reduced from 80 percent in the Fiscal Year 2014 President's
Budget (FY14 PB) to 65 percent in the FY15 PB. The Air Force has
accepted near-term risk (with long-term detrimental effects) in order
to keep installations running.
In the absence of BRAC, the Air Force has pursued other available
avenues to reduce costs, demolishing 48.8 million square feet of aging
building space since 2006 and saving $300 million in the process.
Demolition cannot address the full extent of Air Force excess
infrastructure, however, and another BRAC is necessary to reduce long-
term costs in the face of continuing budgetary pressures.
Mr. Wittman. Please provide an update as to when the Department is
expected to complete the European Infrastructure Consolidation
Initiative as required by Section 347 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Why does the Department feel it
is appropriate to request an additional round of BRAC prior to
completing the assessment of infrastructure in Europe?
General Spencer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC) analysis and recommended
scenarios is expected to be complete in summer 2014. The EIC has
progressed sufficiently to validate infrastructure requirements and has
revealed opportunities for reductions and savings. The EIC also
validated the current force structure requirement in Europe, which will
remain relatively constant in order to support the national strategy
and alliance commitments.
But the potential savings are not enough to offset the declining
Department of Defense (DOD) budget and contracting forces the
Department anticipates in the coming years. The Fiscal Year 2015
President's Budget (FY15 PB) requests a BRAC round in 2017, which
allows the Department two years to prepare. The process will begin by
providing Congress a certified force structure plan and installation
inventory. BRAC authority will allow the Air Force time to conduct the
appropriate analysis, authoritatively measure and compare force
structure and infrastructure requirements, and validate operational and
support requirements.
We know at this juncture an additional round of BRAC, that best
aligns infrastructure to anticipated mission and personnel end states,
will provide significant savings. For these reasons the Department
requests a BRAC even as the EIC report concludes.
Mr. Wittman. Has the Secretary of Defense assessed whether excess
infrastructure exists in the Department? What empirical support can the
Department provide to support a request for additional BRAC rounds?
General Spencer. The Air Force has not conducted a capacity
analysis to determine the current level of excess infrastructure since
the base realignment and closure round in 2005 (BRAC 2005). For BRAC
2005, as part of Section Sec. 2912 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, the Secretary of Defense's 2004
BRAC report to Congress stated that the Air Force had approximately 24
percent excess infrastructure capacity.
The BRAC 2005 Commission recommendations for the Air Force resulted
in eight closures, but only reduced Air Force infrastructure by
approximately one percent of plant replacement value. Since then, the
Air Force has reduced force structure by approximately 500 aircraft and
eight percent of its military authorizations. The Fiscal Year 2015
President's Budget further proposes to reduce force structure by an
additional 500 aircraft and cut military authorizations by up to 20,000
Airmen. We therefore believe the Air Force currently retains excess
infrastructure capacity.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. The DOD and Army budget submissions highlight
reductions in depot maintenance personnel as an area of cost savings.
By what percentage does the Army plan to reduce its depot maintenance
workforce in FY15? What is the risk?
General Campbell. The DOD and Army budget submissions do not
highlight reductions in depot maintenance personnel as an area of cost
savings. Personnel reductions to the organic industrial base would not
result in any direct savings because these personnel are employed on a
reimbursable basis. The FY15 President's Budget submission projects a
3.8% (818 people) reduction of civilian personnel from industrial
operation activities.
The personnel reductions are aligned with declining workloads, will
not result in a loss of required critical skill sets, and demonstrate
that the Army is effectively executing its strategic vision outlined in
The Army's Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan; specifically, depot
and arsenal work force and infrastructure will be sized and adjusted
accordingly over time to sustain core depot and critical manufacturing
capabilities to support war fighting equipment during current and
future contingency operations.
Ms. Bordallo. DOD indicates that the budget protects core
functions. Under the FY15 budget proposal, does the Army fund core at
each of its 5 primary maintenance depots? If not, where does it fall
short?
General Campbell. The Army's goal is to satisfy 100% of core
workload requirements. Currently, the Army projects funding 72% of its
total core requirements in FY15, but falls short in meeting minimum
core requirements for ground vehicles (Stryker, Bradley, Paladin,
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, etc.) and communications electronics systems
(AN/TPQ-36, SMART-T, etc). Currently, these weapon systems do not need
depot level repair above the budgeted level because of low Operating
Tempo rates and reduced fleet ages as a result of the Army's robust
Reset and Recapitalization programs. The Army will mitigate these
shortfalls through Army funded programs, other Service funded work,
repair of Foreign Military Sales equipment, and like system work
requiring similar artisan skills.
Ms. Bordallo. Are there any areas where there is insufficient FY15
workload proposed for assignment to a depot to meet the core
requirement, but funded workload that meets the definition of core is
contracted to the private sector? The committee is aware of those types
of situations taking place in Fiscal Year 13 in the Army and would like
to know under what authority the Department or a military service could
take such an action. Is that taking place in the current fiscal year?
General Campbell. The Army has core shortfalls due to reduced
available workload for ground vehicles (Stryker, Bradley, Paladin,
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, etc.) and communications electronics systems
(AN/TPQ-36, SMART-T, etc). Currently, these weapon systems do not need
depot level repair above the budgeted level because of low Operating
Tempo rates and reduced fleet ages as a result of the Army's robust
Reset and Recapitalization programs. The Army is able to mitigate these
shortfalls through the provision of depot level repairs in support of
the Foreign Military Sales program, other Service workload, and like
system work requiring similar artisan skills.
A small percentage of ground vehicle and communication electronics
system workload that is contracted to private industry could be used to
meet Army core requirement shortfalls in FY15. However, this contracted
workload was initially identified as above core requirements and the
majority of the work is performed under public-private partnerships,
Title 10 U.S. Code 2474, between the organic depots and original
equipment manufacturers. The Army currently projects 59.4% of its depot
level workload will be performed in organic depots and 40.6% of that
work to be contracted to private industry in FY15.
Ms. Bordallo. How was the analytically based workforce-to-workload
review conducted that was designed to preserve mission essential skills
and capabilities that suggested the proposed reductions in depot
maintenance personnel in the Army? Who conducted the review and when
was it conducted? Please share the findings with the committee.
General Campbell. The Army re-calculated its core depot
requirements using the Department of Defense Instruction 4151.20, Depot
Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination process. Core requirements
are based on the number of weapon systems and other military equipment
assigned to Army organizations and required to deploy in support of
contingency and emergency operations.
The analytically based workforce-to-workload review begins by
converting the equipment densities required to support these operations
into annual peacetime repair quantities and then converting the repair
quantities into annual direct labor hour requirements. Once core
requirements are determined, the workforce capabilities and skills
necessary to support the core workload requirements are established at
selected organic depots.
HQDA G-4, in coordination with the Army Materiel Command, completed
the Army's Biennial Core Report that will be released to Congress this
summer. The Army core requirements will continue to evolve as force
structure and equipment densities required to support joint warfighting
scenarios change.
Ms. Bordallo. The budget submission indicates that changes reflect
Component-identified opportunities for reshaping their civilian
workforces through realignments and workload reductions consistent with
Departmental strategies, and with due consideration of statutory total
force management and workload sourcing mandates. What realignments are
you proposing for depots or the organic industrial base to ensure
efficiency of operations? What statutory mandates were considered in
making proposals for large scale reductions in Army depot personnel?
General Campbell. The FY15 President's Budget submission projects a
3.8% (818 people) reduction in civilian personnel across all Army
Organic Industrial Base (OIB) activities. Title 10 U.S. Code, Section
2472, was considered in making these personnel reduction decisions to
efficiently support the declining workloads, without the loss of
critical workforce skill sets.
The Army Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan provides the
strategy and management framework to size the OIB workforce to sustain
core depot and critical manufacturing capabilities as the Army draws
down from a decade of combat operations, and adjusts to declining
workload requirements. This plan is designed to ensure the OIB remains
effective, efficient, and capable of meeting future Army contingency
requirements. As part of this strategic plan, the Army will develop a
Human Capital Investment Plan for depots and arsenals that will inform
future personnel alignment decisions.
Currently, OIB facilities adjust the size of their workforce to
meet the workload demand through a judicious use of Government
temporary and term personnel, and contractor support and use overtime
compensation to meet surge workload requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of reset dollars do you expect to
allocate to organic depots? How much of that workload is core?
General Campbell. The Army expects to execute approximately 80% of
its FY14 Sustainment Reset funding within organic industrial base
facilities; approximately 45% of that workload satisfies Army's core
workload requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of depot maintenance requirement is
funded in FY15?
General Campbell. 44% ($1.19 billion) of the Army's critical depot
maintenance requirements are funded in the FY15 budget request. The
Army has assumed a level of risk in depot maintenance as we work toward
a balanced program in future budget submissions. The Army views this
level of risk as manageable so long as the Congress supports OCO
funding requirements for equipment Reset.
Ms. Bordallo. In calculating core, the military services have
increasingly placed an emphasis on minimum capabilities; however, the
statute also requires efficient operations. Under the FY15 budget,
should we assume that each of the services' organic primary maintenance
depots and shipyards have been workloaded and funded at efficient
levels before workload is planned for the private sector?
General Campbell. Army depots are assigned available workload to
meet the intent of 10 USC Section 2464, Core Depot-level Maintenance
and Repair Capabilities, prior to outsourcing workload to the private
sector.
Although depot level work load is declining commensurate with the
end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army continues to balance
depot level workload between organic and the private sector. Adhering
to 10 USC Section 2474, which authorizes the use of Public Private
Partnership, the Army employs the Army's Organic Industrial Base
Strategic Plan to set conditions for establishing complementary
capabilities between organic and commercial industrial base providers.
This practice ensures the Army appropriately assigns available depot
level workload to each sector. The Army also adheres to 10 USC Section
2466, which limits the Army to using no more than 50% of funds received
in a fiscal year to contract for the performance of such workload by
non-Federal Government personnel.
Ms. Bordallo. In light of section 832 of the FY12 NDAA (Public Law
112-81), regarding the assessment, management, and control of O&S costs
for major weapon systems:
What predictive analysis and modeling processes have been
the most effective at weapon systems optimization across the
enterprise? Are there specific examples of successes or best practices
that might be cited?
How are modeling and simulation results comparing to
actual performance once the decisions have been implemented? Although
some savings may take time to materialize, are there indications of ROI
are they achieving?
In accordance with the NDAA section 823, how should DOD
be using predictive analysis and modeling and simulation to understand
the real impact of the DOD 5000.2 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/bei/pm/
ref-library/dodi/p50002r.pdf) on the effectiveness and efficiency of
the DOD enterprise?
a. What predictive analysis and modeling processes have been the
most effective at weapon systems optimization across the enterprise?
General Campbell. The Army has placed increased emphasis on
estimating weapon system operating and sustainment (O&S) costs early in
the acquisition process. Estimates for O&S are conducted and updated at
specific stages throughout the lifecycle of a program, including
Analysis of Alternative studies, Milestone Decision reviews, and Full
Rate Production Decisions/Full Deployment Decisions. The Army Costs
Review Board (CRB) was established to provide an independent service-
level cost position for programs. The cost position is a development to
divestment lifecycle cost estimate.
The life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) is an effective predictive
analysis and modeling tool for optimizing investment in new equipment
capabilities. The LCCE helps identify nearly all program costs up
front, which informs analysis regarding the affordability of the
system. Additionally, the LCCE can be used to identify critical high
cost sub-systems and components that ultimately drive operation and
sustainment (O&S) costs. These high cost items can be emphasized during
the design phase both to minimize O&S cost impacts and posture the Army
to sustain these systems. The LCCE can also be used to identify trade
space in the requirements, which provides program managers the
flexibility to trade performance where it will not gain capability for
better sustainability that will lower O&S costs.
The estimate development process is collaborative, with
participation from all stakeholder Army agencies, and includes the O&S
resources that contribute to weapon systems. The estimate incorporates
Lifecycle Sustainment Plans and uses actual cost data from the
sustainment of current weapon systems. This enables leadership to make
cost-informed decisions early in the acquisition strategy planning
process. The CRB process results in defined programs with high-quality
cost estimates that are documented, defendable, and affordable.
The Army also has implemented the Long-range Investment
Requirements Analysis (LIRA) process to manage the lifecycle of weapon
systems from a holistic approach over a 30 year period. LIRA uses input
from multiple organizations within the Army to synchronize across the
modernization, sustainment, training, and installation communities,
coordinating materiel development schedules to eliminate production/
sustainment gaps and redundant solutions for identified requirements.
LIRA also reviews Science and Technology initiatives, operational
testing efforts, key decisions and timelines, total lifecycle cost
assessments, program new starts or transitions to sustainment,
potential infrastructure adjustments and timelines for developing
training and requirements, to eliminate redundancies and promote
efficiency. LIRA provides a strategic view of investments over time and
informs the Army's overall investment strategy to meet the long term
vision and goals.
In addition to these broader initiatives, the Army is also
controlling O&S cost at the program level through incorporation of
Condition-Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) and Item Unique Identification
(IUID) on Army weapon systems as part of the design process. CBM+ is a
proactive maintenance capability that predicts and reports impending
system failures by monitoring system health indicators. IUID is a
capability to identify and track individual items and systems
throughout the lifecycle. The combined objectives of both efforts are
to increase platform availability, readiness, and safety; increase
maintainer efficiency and productivity; and decrease logistics
footprint and maintenance support requirements. To date, the Army has
installed CBM+ sensors on 2,835 aircraft, 1,425 missiles, and over 200
tactical wheel vehicles.
b. Are there specific examples of successes or best practices that
might be cited? The emphasis on O&S cost reduction has been implemented
for all Army programs, from upgrades to Blackhawk helicopters to the
design of a new light tactical vehicle. These best practices will
ensure systems are sustainable and will increase efficiencies in their
respective logistics infrastructures and footprints. The Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is an example of a program controlling cost
through best practices. The JLTV program has used historical data and
an independently certified lifecycle cost estimate to identify critical
requirements driving O&S cost, along with continuing analysis at
milestone decision points to continue affordability through the
lifecycle.
c. How are modeling and simulation results comparing to actual
performance once the decisions have been implemented?
Due to the newness of these recently implemented policies and the
lack of currently fielded systems that were designed with O&S as a main
requirement, there is not yet sufficient data to compare M&S results
with actual performance. The Army is committed to fielding highly
sustainable systems and is still searching out new as well as refining
old methods to further reduce O&S costs.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of reset dollars do you expect to
allocate to organic depots? How much of that workload is core?
Admiral Ferguson. Slightly less than 10% of PB15 reset funding is
expected to be allocated to organic depots. None of the work executed
with this OCO funding is core workload (as defined by 10 USC
Sec. 2464).
The majority of reset funding will support ship depot maintenance
to liquidate the backlog of maintenance on our surface ships undergoing
depot availabilities in FY15. All reset work will be conducted in the
private sector and will include no core workload.
Some reset funding will support aviation airframe depot
maintenance. This maintenance is conducted primarily in organic depots,
but includes no core workload.
Some reset funding will support Navy Expeditionary Combat
Enterprise depot maintenance. None of this funding will be allocated to
organic Navy depots or fund core workload.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of depot maintenance requirement is
funded in FY15?
Admiral Ferguson. Navy's FY15 baseline budget request funds 80% of
ship and aviation depot maintenance requirements.
Ms. Bordallo. In calculating core, the military services have
increasingly placed an emphasis on minimum capabilities; however, the
statute also requires efficient operations. Under the FY15 budget,
should we assume that each of the services' organic primary maintenance
depots and shipyards have been workloaded and funded at efficient
levels before workload is planned for the private sector?
Admiral Ferguson. The Navy's organic primary maintenance depots and
shipyards have been funded to perform at an efficient level.
Specifically, the workload and funding at the Naval shipyards are set
at levels that ensure the efficient performance of depot and
intermediate-level maintenance, modernization, and emergency repair
work on nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.
Core capability is maintained to perform maintenance on unique
surface ship systems, while nearly all of conventional surface ship
maintenance is performed in the private sector. Likewise, the workload
and funding at Fleet Readiness Centers are set at levels that ensure
the efficient performance of depot-level maintenance, modernization,
and special re-work on aircraft and engines.
Ms. Bordallo. In light of section 832 of the FY12 NDAA (Public Law
112-81), regarding the assessment, management, and control of O&S costs
for major weapon systems:
What predictive analysis and modeling processes have been
the most effective at weapon systems optimization across the
enterprise? Are there specific examples of successes or best practices
that might be cited?
How are modeling and simulation results comparing to
actual performance once the decisions have been implemented? Although
some savings may take time to materialize, are there indications of ROI
are they achieving?
In accordance with the NDAA section 823, how should DOD
be using predictive analysis and modeling and simulation to understand
the real impact of the DOD 5000.2 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/bei/pm/
ref-library/dodi/p50002r.pdf) on the effectiveness and efficiency of
the DOD enterprise?
Admiral Ferguson. The industry standard in forecasting future
Operating and Support (O&S) phase costs entails the use of compiled
actual system performance data as well as statistical regression
analysis of extrapolated data of analogous systems. To that end, the
Department of Navy (DON) maintains a database compliant with Section
832 of the 2012 NDAA, called the Visibility and Management of Operating
and Support Costs. It catalogs historical costs and operational metrics
for DON weapons platforms. Modeling of O&S costs is accomplished using
the Operating and Support Cost Analysis Model. Together, these
databases represent the DON authoritative data source for historical
costs and associated operational/logistic metrics for DON weapons
systems.
Best practices for modeling O&S costs are captured in the March
2014 O&S Cost Estimating Guide maintained by OSD Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE). The Navy staff also tracks O&S phase return
on investment which is used in its coordination of a yearly Total
Ownership Cost (TOC) reduction process. This process evaluates,
selects, and prioritizes affordability candidates within the Navy for
inclusion in Navy program/budget development. In February 2012, lessons
learned from these efforts were captured in the DON TOC Guidebook
detailing the means to mitigate and reduce weapon system O&S related
costs. Navy's TOC efforts also serve as an input to major acquisition
program gate reviews where they are used to assess the life cycle
management of cost reduction initiatives. Additionally, opportunities
to better control or reduce TOC are a key element in the models that
develop program/budgetary requirement inputs for Navy's operations/
maintenance accounts.
For Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Cost and Economics) (DASN (C&E)) performs
independent cost estimates and assessments, to include O&S costs, prior
to milestone reviews. Unless specifically designated to do so, they do
not perform cost analyses on ACAT II and below, nor does DASN (C&E)
maintain a repository of all O&S specific models and simulations. DASN
(C&E) is not chartered to continue involvement in programs beyond the
``full rate production'' milestone, as programs enter execution.
DOD Instruction 5000.2R was canceled in lieu of DOD Instruction
5000.02 (December 2013). This instruction requires CAPE to review all
cost estimates and cost analyses for major defense acquisition/
information system programs, including estimates of their O&S costs.
Any questions regarding the impact of modeling and simulation on the
effectiveness/efficiency of the DOD Enterprise are better directed to
OSD CAPE, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (OSD (AT&L)), or Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Research, Development & Acquisition ASN(RDA).
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of reset dollars do you expect to
allocate to organic depots? How much of that workload is core?
General Paxton. Due to the recent increase in FY15 reset
requirements stemming from the Marine Corps' decision to increase its
enduring requirement for MRAP vehicles, the Marine Corps is conducting
analysis to determine the optimal source of repair strategy for its
FY15 reset workload. The Marine Corps plans to validate its FY15 reset
requirements and source of repair strategy during its annual depot
maintenance requirements review in August of 2014, and expects to
solidify its FY15 workload sourcing strategy by the end of the fiscal
year.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of depot maintenance requirement is
funded in FY15?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps is funded to approximately 83% of
its FY15 baseline depot maintenance requirement and the Marine Corps'
FY15 OCO request accounts for 100% of planned FY15 depot maintenance
OCO requirements. The Marine Corps appreciates the continued support of
the Congress for our depot maintenance and Operation Enduring Freedom
reset requirements. Although the Marine Corps baseline is not funded to
100%, the Marine Corps remains confident that it can manage baseline
risk by prioritizing and optimizing depot maintenance requirements
through its Enterprise Lifecycle Maintenance Planning (ELMP) process.
Ms. Bordallo. In calculating core, the military services have
increasingly placed an emphasis on minimum capabilities; however, the
statute also requires efficient operations. Under the FY15 budget,
should we assume that each of the services' organic primary maintenance
depots and shipyards have been workloaded and funded at efficient
levels before workload is planned for the private sector?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps considers numerous factors when
sourcing depot maintenance workload including depot providers'
capability, capacity and ability of the depot to meet quality standards
and timelines; best value for the government; previously established
Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) decisions; and preserving its core
organic workload to maintain depot viability. The Marine Corps is
confident that our organic depot is sufficiently resourced in FY15 to
support efficient operations per the statute.
Ms. Bordallo. In light of section 832 of the FY12 NDAA (Public Law
112-81), regarding the assessment, management, and control of O&S costs
for major weapon systems:
What predictive analysis and modeling processes have been
the most effective at weapon systems optimization across the
enterprise? Are there specific examples of successes or best practices
that might be cited?
How are modeling and simulation results comparing to
actual performance once the decisions have been implemented? Although
some savings may take time to materialize, are there indications of ROI
are they achieving?
In accordance with the NDAA section 823, how should DOD
be using predictive analysis and modeling and simulation to understand
the real impact of the DOD 5000.2 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/bei/pm/
ref-library/dodi/p50002r.pdf) on the effectiveness and efficiency of
the DOD enterprise?
General Paxton. The Marine Corps has initiated the transition from
a document-based to a model-based engineering approach for acquisition
by implementing the Framework for Assessing Cost and Technology Tool
(FACT). FACT, a government-owned, web-based tool, provides the
framework that integrates disparate data and models into a decision-
support system that permits concurrent engineering analysis. This
predictive modeling solution allows for bottom-up, detailed system
designs to be built, explored in a top-down concurrent cross-domain
fashion, filtered and scored against a set of dynamically assigned
requirements. For example, the Marine Corps' modeling and simulation
system engineering assisted I MEF in integrating networks, databases,
command and control devices, ground and air training virtual
simulations and training simulators to enhance home station training.
Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) uses FACT among other
predictive life-cycle modeling capabilities to support various life-
cycle analyses and Marine Corps ground weapon systems programmatic
decisions. By using such modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities,
multiple risks can be examined to include the potential impacts of
executing particular courses of action throughout the weapon system
lifecycle. Decisions made during the early stages of acquisition could
have an impact during the O&S phase. For example, conducting predictive
analysis throughout the systems engineering process (SEP), Analyses of
Alternatives (AoA) and Business Case Analyses (BCA), design changes, or
updates to maintenance support strategies can assist decision-makers in
implementing a course of action with a defined degree of confidence in
a resultant outcome in terms of O&S cost and performance.
While the capability is maturing in knowledge and application, to
include organic capability, the Marine Corps is applying a predictive
analysis strategy that will support continuous process improvement
(CPI) across the full range of actions required to maintain and sustain
ground equipment. Recent analyses results indicate that there is an
inherent ROI which indicates statistical probabilities of outcomes
based on available data.
The application of Model Based engineering and the use of model
based systems engineering will have an impact on the effectiveness and
efficiency of the DOD enterprise.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of reset dollars do you expect to
allocate to organic depots? How much of that workload is core?
General Spencer. Approximately 39 percent of the Air Force's Fiscal
Year (FY) 15 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request for Weapon
System Sustainment (WSS) funding is planned for work at organic depots.
In addition, approximately 23 percent of the Air Force's FY15 Flying
Hour Program (FHP) OCO submission request is projected to pay for Depot
Level Reparables using OCO dollars. Since the Air Force does not have a
final approved or funded FY15 OCO position, these numbers may change.
If the current submission is funded, 30 percent of the total WSS
and FHP OCO requests would fund work used to sustain a core
requirement.
Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of depot maintenance requirement is
funded in FY15?
General Spencer. The Fiscal Year 2015 President's Budget baseline
funds Total Force Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) for depot maintenance
activities at approximately 70 percent without Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding. The Air Force will likely request additional
OCO funding, which would improve the total force WSS position to over
80 percent. This includes depot maintenance activities in depot
purchased equipment maintenance and contractor logistics support.
Ms. Bordallo. In calculating core, the military services have
increasingly placed an emphasis on minimum capabilities; however, the
statute also requires efficient operations. Under the FY15 budget,
should we assume that each of the services' organic primary maintenance
depots and shipyards have been workloaded and funded at efficient
levels before workload is planned for the private sector?
General Spencer. Yes, for the Air Force under the fiscal year 2015
(FY15) budget, our depots are work-loaded and funded to ensure
effective and efficient operations. The Air Force considers the
retention of a strong and viable industrial baseline critical to our
ability to successfully complete the Air Force mission. In the
Department of Defense (DOD) core process, the Air Force identifies
required core capabilities and also allocates the workloads necessary
to sustain effectively the core capabilities and efficient depot
operation within public sector facilities. Specifically, the Air Force
has issued policy to ensure the identification and establishment of
sufficient organic core depot level capability on current and future
weapon systems.
But the greatest challenge facing the Air Force depots is budget
uncertainty. The uncertainty drives risk in planning for the Air Force
depot customers due to schedule and availability of assets. The budget
uncertainty does not allow the depots to size to the workload early in
the planning process, resulting in staffing uncertainty, impacting
workforce stability, lowering workforce morale, and causing unnecessary
production variance, all of which drives less efficiency and
effectiveness at the depots. The budget uncertainty impacts all levels
of suppliers supporting the depots' workload, since we cannot provide
them a firm forecast. Many of the suppliers are small businesses, and
the inability of the Air Force to provide them with a firm demand
forecast increases inefficiency and drives longer delivery times of
material in support of depot production. All of these challenges will
only be exacerbated if sequestration returns in FY16.
Ms. Bordallo. In light of section 832 of the FY12 NDAA (Public Law
112-81), regarding the assessment, management, and control of O&S costs
for major weapon systems:
What predictive analysis and modeling processes have been the most
effective at weapon systems optimization across the enterprise? Are
there specific examples of successes or best practices that might be
cited?
General Spencer. We have been doing predictive modeling for
operations and sustainment (O&S), primarily peacetime costs, since
2005. We developed cost estimating relationships (CERs) that were
suitable for estimating these costs with system concept information and
very generic support concepts. We have made a number of improvements to
our methodology, including:
-- Developing growth rates with causal factors to account for
sustainment cost growth over time;
-- Including costs to upgrade and modify the aircraft;
-- With the advent of performance based logistics, accounting for
more complex sustainment strategies and evaluate those impacts; and
-- Developing and demonstrating predictive models for cost and
system availability for fielded systems with more detailed information
to support the ongoing improvement in cost and performance.
Based on the further interest over the last few years to improve
product support we are developing methodology that accounts for more
variables to directly evaluate impacts of system/component reliability,
design improvements for sustainability, and product support strategies.
This will directly support the new requirements in the law, but bear a
higher cost in resources to develop, validate, and execute the
methodology.
Developing cost estimates from analogous historical actual cost
data is the most effective approach to produce realistic estimates and
identify cost drivers for improvement. Life Cycle Management Control
(LCMC) demonstrated this approach on the E-4B program using actual
costs from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost Database and program
subject matter experts to predict future costs and identify cost
reduction opportunities. Similar methodology has been developed and
applied for multiple studies on new requirements for tankers, trainers,
bombers, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and other systems over the
last eight years. In the last two years, we integrated trade space
analysis into that updated cost methodology allowing us to generate
cost capability metrics that now inform requirements and program
decisions. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) has completed six pilot
studies and is developing guidance and training to promulgate that
trade space analysis capability.
Ms. Bordallo. How are modeling and simulation results comparing to
actual performance once the decisions have been implemented? Although
some savings may take time to materialize, are there indications of ROI
are they achieving?
General Spencer. Due to the 15 year or longer long lead time
between when the development planning studies such as analyses of
alternatives are completed and O&S activities are conducted, we have
not been able to verify the impact of the new methodology yet. However,
for studies conducted on programs in sustainment, we have received
positive feedback on the utility and results. These results are being
captured in new reporting requirements. Return on investment ROI
calculations will be possible in the future since O&S costs are being
included in the Selected Acquisition Reports SAR and other reports form
the program offices.
Ms. Bordallo. In accordance with the NDAA section 832, how should
DOD be using predictive analysis and modeling and simulation to
understand the real impact of the DOD 5000.2 (http://www.acq.osd.mil/
ie/bei/pm/ref-library/dodi/p50002r.
pdf) on the effectiveness and efficiency of the DOD enterprise?
General Spencer. The Air Force defers on this part of the question
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. The Navy's proposal to terminate the Tactical Tomahawk
program beginning in Fiscal Year 2016 has the potential to decimate the
defense industrial base that supports this weapons system, and the
highly-specialized small turbine engine manufacturing capability in
particular. Without sustainment funding to support the industrial base,
there are doubts that it will be available to support the Navy's
planned rectification of older Block IV Missiles projected for FY 2019.
What does the Navy plan to do to ensure that the industrial base will
be viable to support the recertification of older Block IV Missiles
given the lack of program funding in FY16 through FY19?
Admiral Ferguson. The industrial base is estimated to remain active
through FY17 delivering missiles ordered in FY15. Industrial activity
will be extended past FY17 as a result of rotatable spares buys in
FY16. Additionally, there is substantial non-recurring engineering
investment requiring Raytheon Missile Systems and vendor base
contributions for recertification stand-up and Tactical Tomahawk
modernization. These investments total more than $642.2M throughout the
Future Years Defense Program.
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