[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-106]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
AND THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
PROGRAM: COMBATING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION IN A CHANGING
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 8, 2014
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DUNCAN HUNTER, California DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Tom Nelson, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, April 8, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request for the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Chemical Biological
Defense Program: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in a
Changing Global Environment.................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, April 8, 2014........................................... 23
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
AND THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM: COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats
and Capabilities............................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1
WITNESSES
Hersman, Rebecca K.C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Department of Defense.. 4
Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 5
Spencer, Carmen J., Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical
and Biological Defense, Department of Defense.................. 6
Weber, Andrew C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, Department of
Defense........................................................ 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hersman, Rebecca K.C......................................... 35
Myers, Kenneth A., III....................................... 45
Spencer, Carmen J............................................ 62
Weber, Andrew C.............................................. 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 77
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
AND THE CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM: COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. Subcommittee will come to order. Today we
are holding a hearing on combating weapons of mass destruction
in a changing global environment.
This is part of our regular series of hearings in
preparation for the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act and
we are focusing today primarily on the budget for the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA] and Chemical Biological Defense
Programs.
So I appreciate very much all of our witnesses being here.
Hopefully you all understand that schedules are difficult, with
four votes and a variety of things.
So with that in mind, I am going to forego any further
opening statement and yield to the distinguished gentleman from
Rhode Island.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
My opening statement is going to be very brief, but the
report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], as the
ones before it, recognized that the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, be they nuclear, biological, chemical, or
radiological, remains a great threat to our country, our
allies, and our friends. Conventional strategic deterrence is a
key component to our national defense, and the nuclear surety
program is an important part of that.
However, keeping WMD [weapons of mass destruction] out of
the hands of violent extremists remains a significant
challenge. In an increasingly connected world there is real
potential for those weapons-related technologies to spread and
evolve, especially when you are dealing with dual-use
technologies, which are hard to know what the original purposes
were, whether it is going to be nefarious intent or for
something that is necessary or positive.
Accordingly, the QDR states that the global prevention,
detection, and response efforts are essential to address
dangers across the WMD spectrum before they confront the
homeland.
Our witnesses today represent organizations critical to
those tasks, and I look forward to hearing about your efforts.
However, it appears that the trends for your budget
requests are on a downward path, and I find that concerning.
Funding is decreasing as the threats we face are becoming more
prolific and sophisticated, including as yet unknown pathogens
or nontraditional chemical agents or weaponized biologics.
Today we seek a better understanding of how these budget
proposals will meet our national security requirements for
countering WMD. Look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with that I will yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
I will just say I share his concerns. I think he is right.
We are pleased to have Mr. Andrew Weber, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs; Ms. Rebecca Hersman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction; Mr. Kenneth Myers, Director of Defense Threat
Reduction Agency; and Mr. Carmen Spencer, Joint Program
Executive Officer, Chemical and Biological Defense.
Without objection, your complete written statements will be
made part of the record, and you will each be recognized to
summarize your comments if you can.
Mr. Weber.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW C. WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Weber. Thank you.
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting us to testify about Department of Defense [DOD]
countering weapons of mass destruction programs. I am pleased
to be here with my esteemed colleagues.
While my testimony for the record provides more detail, I
want to briefly highlight two examples of what we have achieved
recently through our country's investments in countering
chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. The first is the
Department's contribution to destroying serious chemical
weapons materials, which the Assad regime used to kill
civilians in Syria last summer and posed a looming threat to
Israel, Jordan, and the region.
This week a team of U.S. Army civilians arrived in Rota,
Spain, to begin their mission of neutralizing some of Syria's
most dangerous chemicals. They will perform this work aboard
the motor vessel [MV] Cape Ray using Field Deployable
Hydrolysis Systems.
Carmen, Ken, and others on our team led some of the
greatest scientists, engineers, and managers in the Department
of Defense to develop these systems within just 6 months based
on safe, proven chemical weapons destruction technology--a true
testament to what the Department of Defense can contribute to
U.S. and international security. I hope you will join me in
keeping the team aboard the Cape Ray in your thoughts through
the coming months as they help to eliminate the destabilizing
threat of Syria's chemical weapons program.
Their work follows on the heels of our success in assisting
the Libyans in destroying the last of Gaddafi's weapons of mass
destruction. Through DOD's Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction [CTR] program, we provided security upgrades,
technical expertise, and support to the transitional council
and elected government of Libya.
This February I joined our Libyan partners, U.S. Ambassador
Deborah Jones, the director general of the Nobel Prize-winning
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and
others to celebrate the destruction of Libya's last chemical
weapons. In both Tripoli and at the destruction site near
Waddan, we had the honor of meeting dozens of Libyan workers
who have put an end to the threat of Gaddafi's weapons of mass
destruction.
These are just two recent examples of our success in
leading U.S. innovation and developing international
partnerships to mitigate the risk of states, terrorist
organizations, or rogue individuals accessing and using
chemical, biological, and nuclear materials.
The President's fiscal year 2015 budget request allows us
to continue countering the threat of weapons of mass
destruction in an astonishing variety of ways. Our work ranges
from pathogen consolidation and medical biodefense and
countermeasure work, biodefense preparedness with the Republic
of Korea, to nuclear counterterrorism and threat reduction
cooperation with two of our closest allies--the United Kingdom
and France--to our efforts to improve our response to a
potential nuclear incident or accident here in the United
States.
I hope my testimony for the record highlights that we are
leading the Department of Defense in innovation and agility,
countering the weapons of mass destruction threats that exist
today and foreseeing, preparing for, and preventing those that
may emerge in the future. This work is critical for protecting
the American people and promoting U.S. security interests
globally.
I appreciate the opportunity you have given us to testify
today and would be pleased to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weber can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Ms. Hersman.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA K.C. HERSMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Hersman. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin,
and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today
with my colleagues from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense about
DOD's ongoing efforts to counter the threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction.
Pursuit and potential use of WMD by actors of concern pose
a grave threat to the security of the United States as well as
that of our allies and partners around the world. The constant
evolution of weapons materials, tactics, and technologies will
continue to challenge our ability to deter, detect, and defend
against these threats.
At the same time, the interconnectedness of global
communities allows WMD threats to proliferate at the speed of
an airliner, a missile, or even the Internet. Countering such
threats requires flexible and agile responses, capable
partners, as well as whole-of-department, whole-of-government,
and even whole-of-international-community solutions.
For DOD, cooperation is a force multiplier, enabling swift,
comprehensive action to respond to existing and emerging WMD
threats. The extraordinary effort to deal with serious chemical
weapons program unprecedented in its scale, speed, and
complexity, is a case in point.
Today, thanks to our international partners and support
from Congress, Syria's chemical weapons program is on the path
to elimination. The centerpiece of the U.S. contribution, the
motor vessel Cape Ray, is outfitted with DOD's recently
developed Field Deployable Hydrolysis Systems and manned by the
finest experts from our operational and technical communities.
It is now ready to neutralize the most dangerous chemicals in
the Syrian arsenal in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound
fashion.
This type of creative, collaborative approach to a WMD
challenge can't be the exception; it must be the rule.
In addition to chemical weapons threats, other WMD concerns
warrant similar collaborative approaches today. On the
biological front, advancing technology, unsecured pathogen
stores, and weak national controls create dangerous
opportunities for hostile state and non-state actors to
acquire, proliferate, or use biological agents with potentially
catastrophic consequences.
To protect our forces, reduce risks to our citizens, and
respond effectively to crises, DOD must build holistic
solutions across its bio-prevention and biodefense efforts. We
will continue to prioritize efforts to secure pathogens
worldwide, foster a strong bio-security culture, enhance
detection and strategic warning, and integrate more effectively
with partners.
At the same time, we must protect our forces against a
broader range of biological agents and preserve their ability
to dominate the battlefield even when biological risks are
present. We recognize that DOD's efforts to protect our forces
and our security from biological threats rely heavily on the
broader public health infrastructure, and accordingly, we have
strengthened relationships with health services, academia, and
industry partners.
This need for cross-cutting collaboration is required at
the international level, as well. The administration's Global
Health Security Agenda, which calls for accelerated
international progress in improving capacities to prevent,
detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease, is
fully aligned with DOD priorities and allows us to leverage our
existing investments effectively in support of enhanced global
capacities.
Of course, nuclear threats also remain a prominent concern.
Unless arrested and reversed, the nuclear ambitions of
countries like North Korea and Iran can imperil the interests
of the United States and our allies and partners around the
world, creating instability and increasing the likelihood that
other nations may seek to become nuclear-armed states.
Our goal remains to prevent proliferation and prevent the
loss of control of nuclear materials, components, or weapons
themselves through better nuclear security and proliferation
prevention efforts. At the same time, however, DOD will
continue to work closely with U.S. interagency and foreign
partners to enhance our planning and capabilities for nuclear
terrorist threats or incidents.
Looking ahead, our counter-WMD efforts must address not
only today's challenges but also those that may emerge in the
future. In doing so, we must bring the full countering WMD tool
kit to bear, leveraging partnerships and lessons learned to
respond quickly and decisively.
I thank you for your support for the fiscal year 2015
budget and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Myers.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY
Mr. Myers. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin,
members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to
share with you the work being done to counter the threats posed
by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction.
There are three entities co-located at our facility at Fort
Belvoir: the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the United States
Strategic Command Center [SCC] for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction, and the United States Strategic Command
[USSTRATCOM] Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination.
Each one of these entities has different mission areas,
authorities, requirements, and funding, but they are all
located together and intertwined in order to leverage expertise
and coordinate efforts.
Our success is determined by what doesn't happen--what we
prevent, what we help to interdict, what we eliminate, what we
mitigate, and how prepared we are to respond.
As a combat support agency we are available 24 hours a day
to support the combatant commands and military services to
respond to any WMD threat. This requires us to not only address
current needs but also to anticipate future threats to our
warfighters.
At our Defense Agency role we manage a research and
development portfolio to develop tools and capabilities. In
fact, DTRA provides the Special Operations Command with all of
their counter-proliferation science and technology.
As a USSTRATCOM Center, we support the synchronization of
Department of Defense planning efforts to counter weapons of
mass destruction. And the complementary Standing Joint Force
Headquarters for Elimination provides operational support for
U.S. military task forces in hostile environments.
One of the best examples of the capabilities that DTRA/SCC
can provide and the missions that we take on is our work in
Syria. We had the expertise to evaluate the serious WMD threat;
we developed the needed technology with Carmen Spencer and his
team at Edgewood; and we provided planning support to all
aspects of the operation. Now the Cape Ray, the ship that
houses the two Field Deployable Hydrolysis Systems, stands
ready to begin destruction once all the chemical materials are
out of Syria.
Another mission-critical area for us is the intersection of
terrorism and the acquisition of WMD materials, particularly
biological threats. This is an emerging and evolving threat and
we are expanding our areas of cooperation to stay one step
ahead.
We work closely with the Centers for Disease Control [CDC]
and we often pursue global health security projects together
internationally. CDC handles public health issues but they are
not equipped to address the security threats posed by deadly
pathogens. We are.
I am proud to announce that earlier this year we signed a
memorandum of understanding and strategy for joint work with
the CDC. These documents will maximize our effectiveness
related to bio-threats around the world and ensure there is no
duplication of efforts.
Finally, DTRA/SCC recently completed the destruction of
weaponized mustard agent in Libya. As ASD [Assistant Secretary
of Defense] Weber mentioned, we destroyed 517 mustard-filled
artillery rounds, eight 500-pound aerial bombs, and 45 launch
tubes.
I am proud of what our team has achieved and believe that
we are good stewards of the taxpayer's dollar.
As we look to fiscal year 2015, I am confident that we are
prepared to address future WMD threats around the world. I am
hopeful that the committee will fully support our budget and
allow us to continue our important work.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I
would be pleased to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Spencer.
STATEMENT OF CARMEN J. SPENCER, JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Defense
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I am going to provide
an update regarding the program's contribution to the mission
of countering weapons of mass destruction.
The fiscal year 2015 budget request for the program
includes $320.5 million for procurement, $553.6 million for
advanced development, and $407.2 million for science and
technology efforts, for a total of $1.387 billion. The budget
request supports the program's four enduring strategic goals of
equipping the force, preventing surprise, maintaining our
infrastructure, and leading the enterprise.
Continued realization of these goals is significantly
impacted by progress in our emphasis areas of medical
countermeasures, diagnostics, biosurveillance, and
nontraditional agent defense.
Medical countermeasures include capabilities to protect our
warfighters against chemical, biological, and radiological
threats. We develop both prophylaxes, such as vaccines to
immunize personnel, and therapeutics to treat personnel in the
event of exposure.
To harmonize our efforts with other Federal agencies, DOD
participates in a Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasures Enterprise, which is led by the Department of
Health and Human Services. Typifying coordination within this
interagency body is the Portfolio Advisory Committee, which
works to ensure that we align DOD and Health and Human Services
resources for medical countermeasures development.
To accelerate the fulfillment of our unique requirements we
are establishing the DOD Medical Countermeasures Advanced
Development and Manufacturing Capability. The intent is
flexible and modular manufacturing to support DOD quantities,
which are significantly less than Health and Human Services
quantities for the overall U.S. population. We are working with
our unique industrial base, which in this specialized area is
normally small business.
With respect to DOD diagnostics, the ability to rapidly
identify agents of concern, we have sharpened our portfolio by
increasing the capability of our fielded product while moving
forward to develop our follow-on system. The plan is for this
follow-on capability, known as the next-generation diagnostic
system, to replace the currently fielded joint bio agent
identification and diagnostic system beginning in 2017.
Consistent with the National Strategy for Biosurveillance
and Global Health Security Agenda, we are applying our
expertise and equipment to improve situational awareness for
the warfighter. A prime example is our ongoing Joint United
States Forces Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition
advanced technology demonstration, also known by the acronym
JUPITR. Currently underway, this effort is providing specific
detection and analysis resources to address the need for
biosurveillance on the Korean Peninsula.
Regarding nontraditional agents, the fiscal year 2015
budget request supports continued evaluation of threats and the
testing of developmental technology to enhance the capability
of our current systems. To address the need for a near-term
capability to combat emerging threat materials we have already
provided 57 domestic response capability kits to the National
Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, which
include detection, personnel protection, and decontamination
capabilities.
Lastly, for the mission to destroy Syrian chemical weapons
the DOD created the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System, a
transportable, high-throughput neutralization system designed
to convert chemical warfare material into compounds unusable as
weapons. The DOD response in this case is an excellent example
of innovation and agility.
An acquisition effort was launched in February 2013 and the
first system delivered less than 6 months later. The capability
is now deployed. When the ship Cape Ray receives Syrian
chemical warfare materials it will head out to international
waters to carry out the process of destruction using the
capability that the U.S. would not have had but for this rapid
effort.
As this subcommittee is well aware, a confluence of
technological, political, economic factors are making the
current security environment as challenging as any the Congress
and the President have faced in the Nation's history. Continued
collaboration is critical to maintaining the technological
advantage currently held by our forces.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, and members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the men and the women of the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, thank you again for
the opportunity to testify, and thank you for your continued
support.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Before we begin questioning I might just alert everyone of
two facts. One is, it seems votes have been moved up much
sooner, and so we are going to have votes called here in 10, 15
minutes or so.
Secondly, Mr. Weber, by previous agreement, has to go to
another subcommittee at 3:30 p.m., so if we have questions for
him we are probably going to have to get him now because by the
time we come back he will have been taken away from us. So I
might just alert everybody to that.
I will yield first 5 minutes to Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weber, I will go ahead and take advantage of that
opportunity.
In your current role you are charged to prevent and protect
against nuclear, chemical, and biological threats, just as you
have done throughout your many years of public service, and I
know that you have great insight in the impact of nuclear
weapon use or EMP [electromagnetic pulse] attack could have on
our critical infrastructure, including, of course, DOD. I know
that DOD has, over the years, spent ridiculous amounts of money
hardening--in a good way, in my judgment--hardening our triad
and our missile defense capabilities and things because of the
potential of having to deal with that--having to fight through
that environment.
And after 10 years of debate in the Pentagon and the
Congress we still are here with very little effort made to
protect our national civilian grid upon which the military
depends upon for 99 percent of its electricity needs, at least
in CONUS [contiguous United States]. Can you tell me where the
threat of EMP attack falls on your priority list and what you
are doing today to protect our nation from this asymmetric and
potentially very dangerous threat?
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Congressman.
The potential threat of electromagnetic pulse is high on
our priorities. We work very closely with the services. The
Defense Threat Reduction Agency plays a critical role in this
and Director Myers may want to add to my response.
It starts with building radiation hardness into our
systems, having standards that are required. As we design the
systems we work with the services to ensure that they will
function in an EMP environment.
The testing that we do at Pax River [Naval Air Station
Patuxent River] is an important part of this and we focus on
our nuclear command and control systems and our platforms
related to the nuclear weapons enterprise, but also to the
whole range of general purpose capabilities that the services
are producing.
And then finally, DTRA conducts survivability assessments
of our bases around the world, and EMP and radiation hardness
is part of those assessments.
As far as the critical infrastructure, that is primarily,
in the United States, the responsibility of the Department of
Homeland Security and we work closely with them. But we also
work within the Department to try to increase their awareness
and share our capabilities, really, which are the best in the
government of the United States.
Mr. Franks. Well thank you, sir.
Mr. Myers, from what I am seeing, you know, DOD considers
nuclear survivability, including EMP survivability, an
important factor in its credible deterrent posture, and it has
given special attention to all DOD assets considered critical
to ensuring our national security missions. And back in the
1990s the DOD implemented the Military Standard 188-125 to
protect themselves from EMP. At that time I thought it was a
very good standard.
Now we have a few more decades of information. Do you
believe that the MIL Standard 188-125 is still the best
guideline for protecting critical infrastructure for our
national defense against an EMP attack? And are you aware of
any tests--I want you to be careful about what you have to say
as far as any sensitive information--are you aware of any tests
that may have found that standard inadequate, and what is DTRA
doing today to defense against that threat?
Mr. Myers. Thank you, Congressman. As Assistant Secretary
Weber mentioned, the EMP threat is something the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency is very involved in. We work closely with our
colleagues, the combatant commands, military services, as well
as the Defense Science Board, which is also looking at this
issue.
Sir, with your warning in mind, if it is okay I would like
to take your question for the record----
Mr. Franks. I think it is very important, Mr. Myers, and I
asked the question for a very important reason so I hope you
will do that. And just----
Mr. Myers. I will, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 77.]
Mr. Franks [continuing]. To reiterate, MIL Standard 188-
125, and it might be good to--perhaps to give our office a
briefing if there is some opportunity to get some insight as to
why we think that is important.
Mr. Myers. We would be happy to do that, sir. And I know we
have experts from the Defense Reduction Agency who have briefed
this committee on a couple of occasions and we will continue to
be available to do so at the committee's request.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Weber, I will start with you and then others
can comment as well, but let me get right to it in that much of
the current guidance that we have for our strategy on
countering weapons of mass destruction quite frankly is several
years old. The most recent military strategy on the subject is
from 2006.
However, the world climate has changed significantly since
then. Have we considered updating our military strategy for
countering WMD?
Mr. Weber. Yes. Absolutely. That strategy is in the process
of being updated, and I will ask my colleague, DASD [Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense] Hersman, to elaborate since her
office is leading that effort.
But the strategy is being updated to reflect changes since
the last strategy was issued, to reflect the global nature of
these threats, and as you noted in your opening remarks, the
increasing availability and proliferation of dual-use
technologies around the world and an increased emphasis on
prevention.
Mr. Langevin. Good. Thank you.
Secretary Hersman.
Ms. Hersman. Thank you.
Indeed, the process to develop a new Department of Defense
strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction is well along.
We are in the final stages of the approval and signature
process, and that document will, upon signature, replace the
National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction from 2006.
Mr. Langevin. What is the anticipated completion date?
Ms. Hersman. It is in the final stages, sir, of going
through, we would expect in a matter of weeks to a month or
two----
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Ms. Hersman [continuing]. For signature.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I know we all look forward to
having that document completed then.
Let me turn to this then: The fiscal year 2015 request for
DTRA is $180 million less than the fiscal year 2014 enacted,
and the majority of those cuts are out of the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program. It is my understanding that Moscow's
unwillingness last year to renew the old CTR umbrella agreement
has reduced the amount of work that we can do in Russia, but
this hardly seems to explain all of the cuts.
Are there priorities or goals that are being deferred or
scrapped because of the budget cuts? And are there other
initiatives that the program could be pursuing?
Mr. Weber. Congressman, we are accepting some risks. These
are prevention programs, and as Director Myers noted, it is
when we fail to prevent something, you know, that is the
ultimate metric for these programs.
I am comfortable that our investments in biological threat
reduction on a global basis as part of the President's Global
Health Security Agenda, in cooperation with CDC, which is
really at an unprecedented level, is fully adequate.
We perhaps could do more in the area of global nuclear
security because our partners in the Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration are also in a
difficult budgetary climate, and I think there is some room--
some potential opportunities for increased partnership with
them, and those--our dialogue with our partners there is
underway.
And also in the area of all-hazards CBRN [chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear] preparedness and
response, I think there are some opportunities to work with
more partners to enhance their capacity to prevent, plan, and
prepare for, and deal with the consequences of a CBRN incident.
So we would like to work with this subcommittee moving forward
to identify future areas of effort.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Secretary Hersman, do you have something to add?
Ms. Hersman. I agree fully that the budget is sufficient
for the requirements we have identified for the upcoming year.
We believe, in addition to the decline in resources that we had
to apply to Russia, also the investments we have made in
chemical weapons destruction through fiscal year 2014 we think
will be completed in that year.
But we do evaluate the program fully every year and are
prepared to evaluate new requirements, for example in
proliferation and prevention, as we go forward in the process.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I know my time is expired but I will
just say that I think some of these cuts--they really raise red
flags with me, very concerning. Clearly the threats have not
gone away, they haven't diminished, and yet we are cutting
areas that I believe that we are cutting off our nose to spite
our face, and I am concerned that we are going to regret the
day that we didn't put proper investments into the programs
under your responsibility.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Weber, before we lose you let me just ask a couple
things. We held a hearing in October with outside experts on
bio dangers and defenses. In your opinion, are the dangers to
our national security from biological agents growing or
shrinking?
Mr. Weber. The dangers from biological threats to our
country and our friends and allies is increasing. As the
ranking member noted in his opening remarks, technologies are
increasingly available.
And I think the threat of biological terrorism is--of the
different weapons of mass destruction terrorism threats, is
probably the most likely because it lends itself to small,
violent extremist organizations or even individuals. And
therefore, it is a much harder problem to deal with. We are
very concerned about state biological weapons programs--for
example, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] bio
program, which is quite sophisticated.
But when we look at non-state actors, it is really any
country in the world could unwittingly provide the materials
and the technologies needed for terrorist groups to develop a
bioterrorist weapon. So this is why we are putting so much
emphasis on this in our fiscal year 2015 budget request.
Mr. Thornberry. One of the suggestions made by that outside
group of witnesses was a coordinator in the White House would
be of assistance in helping make sure that all of the different
agencies of government--not only Department of Defense, but HHS
[Health and Human Services], FDA [Food and Drug
Administration], Homeland Security--were better coordinated in
this very difficult area that is not just something that faces
our troops; it is something that can face homeland, sir. Just
generally, do you think that is a good idea or not?
Mr. Weber. The White House has played a very important
leadership role. Especially in the last few years, we have
increased our investments on our medical countermeasures
capabilities.
And the advanced development and manufacturing facility
that Carmen Spencer mentioned that we are funding through the
Department of Defense is going to give the Department an
agility, an on-demand production capability for small batches
for our forces or perhaps even for just special operations
forces that could be exposed to threats that wouldn't
necessarily be as great a concern to the homeland. For example,
we are the only ones that have a bot [botulinum] toxin and a
ricin toxin vaccine program.
Mr. Thornberry. And I want to get back into that probably
after--in greater detail, but my question was, do you think it
would be helpful to have someone at the White House coordinate
across these different departments and agencies that otherwise
basically are left to do so voluntarily?
Mr. Weber. It is always helpful, of course, and we do have
coordination from the White House, from both the
counterterrorism side, the resilience side, as well as the
countering WMD side. The mechanism we use for day-to-day
programmatic coordination of our portfolio is the Public Health
Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise that is chaired by
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are active
partners in that.
So we have good coordination day to day.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Well, I may want to talk more about
this in just a moment.
Let me just check. Mr. Johnson, do you have a question
specifically for Mr. Weber? Because he will not be able to come
back, probably, after votes.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I do.
Mr. Thornberry. I will yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Weber, what did you learn about the benefits of
programmatic flexibility and anticipating of emerging threats
from the Syria chemical weapon destruction mission?
Mr. Weber. The lessons from the Syrian chemical weapons
destruction mission were that we need that agility and
flexibility and close partnership with the Intelligence
Community. Based on extraordinarily good intelligence on the
composition of the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile, we were
able within just 6 months to tailor-make a capability for that
stockpile, and it is the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System
that is now mounted on the Cape Ray vessel. So that was one
lesson.
Another lesson was programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program give us the flexibility to act
quickly. We used those program resources to help neighbors of
Syria--in particular, Jordan--improve its capability to deal
with CBRN incidents, to interdict at its borders CBRN
proliferation.
So the lessons are that we need that flexibility, we need
that close cooperation with the Intelligence Community, and we
need an expeditionary capability.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. And to what extent has budget cuts
impacted your ability to fulfill future mission requirements?
Mr. Weber. Well I would say in general the budget
situation--and fortunately we have a little bit of stability in
2014 and 2015, but this looming threat of sequestration coming
back in fiscal year 2016 creates uncertainty and is forcing the
Department to make very, very, very hard choices.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
I will yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. With that we are going to--Mr. Weber, you
are excused because I think we are going to be pretty much an
hour or 45 minutes or so.
And so if you all, hopefully, can have a little flexibility
in your schedules, Tom will buy you a bottle of water or
something. And in the meantime, we will stand in recess and
then we will come right back after votes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Thornberry. We will go ahead and get started as Jim is
working his way back over here again.
Thank you all for your patience and understanding with our
schedule.
Let me go back to a question I asked Mr. Weber and see if
you all would like to comment. The point was made in our
previous hearing, as Mr. Weber said, this is a growing problem,
one of the more likely scenarios of terrorists using WMD would
be with bio, but it gets complicated for all the reasons you
all know very well. And some sort of mechanism to assist in
greater coordination among the departments and agencies of the
government they thought was significantly needed.
Now, you know, I will just say, okay, I know there is
coordination going on now. But the question is, particularly
with something like this that goes across several different
departments, civilian and military--I--maybe it is a little
similar to cyber, where we do have someone in the White House
who is coordinating cyber across different agencies. Shouldn't
we have someone whose specific job responsibilities it is to
coordinate in the area of biodefense?
Ms. Hersman, we will start with you.
Ms. Hersman. Mr. Chairman, I would have to reiterate, we
have an extensive and robust interagency coordination process
that includes representatives from the various elements of the
White House, and they convene all of those departments and
agencies that you describe across bio threats. We saw this in
terms of the Global Health Security Agenda, where those
meetings were co-chaired and brought together in the
development of that, along with the very strong interest that
the President has brought to the overall problem of countering
biological threats.
From my personal vantage point, I don't feel that I have
observed a deficit of coordination. In terms of
organizationally, how it would be best represented within the
White House, I would need to defer to them.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Well I will just say, convening a
meeting is not necessarily the end-all be-all in this problem.
And I think your point is a good one: There is no substitute
for Presidential interest and leadership in this or any other
area. But the President cannot do everything and cannot follow
it day to day.
Let me move to another specific issue that came up during
that hearing, and that is the--and several of you all
referenced it in your opening comments--DOD's own capability to
manufacture biodefense drugs and vaccines, and whether or not
it might be more efficient and in other ways better to have an
agreement with HHS and their manufacturing capabilities rather
than DOD having its own. Explain to me why DOD needs its own
facilities.
Mr. Spencer. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. Mr. Spencer, you mentioned that in
your opening comments.
Mr. Spencer. Yes. For example, Big Pharma and Health and
Human Services, they are concerned about diseases that will
impact the entire U.S. population, so when they put their
business case analysis together they are talking literally tens
of millions of doses, and that is what interests Big Pharma.
In DOD we are talking biological threats of interest that
can affect our Armed Forces globally wherever they may have to
deploy, and we are talking tens of thousands, maybe if we are
lucky up to 200,000 potential doses. Big Pharma is not
interested in that.
As a result of that, we have to deal with small business,
and that is a good thing. And our dedicated facility that we
are constructing now in Florida will enable us to have a
facility that we can go to whenever we need it to develop
advanced development and produce the vaccines that we need on
very short notice, in conjunction with the FDA, to meet our
battlefield requirements. And it will also give us an
opportunity to mentor and work with small business to develop
their capabilities.
But it really is a partnership between DOD, small business,
and the Food and Drug Administration to make this a success.
That is why we need a dedicated facility for DOD.
Now that said, we work very hard and we meet monthly with
Health and Human Services to develop our prioritization for
what we are both developing to ensure that there is no overlap,
no waste of resources, and we are both doing what is best for
the Nation for both not only the Armed Forces but for the
Nation as a whole.
Mr. Thornberry. Why do you need your own facility versus
walling off part of one of the bigger HHS facilities dedicated
for DOD's use?
Mr. Spencer. Having the ability to go directly to a
facility that we control, where we control the schedule, the
priority of what goes in there, is modular, very flexible under
today's technological standards, and pre-FDA-approved for the
types of vaccines that we need to develop is critical for us.
Again, HHS in their facilities, they are not focused on
developing weaponized biological agents that are very toxic and
very deadly. They are more focused on endemic diseases and
preparing the U.S. population.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I hope they are prepared for a
biological terrorist event. I think you could be a good
influence on them, and then maybe they could be a helpful
influence on you all.
I mean, I hear your point. I think it is important. I just
worry that we are going down two different paths--separate
paths--and the world is not going to work that way; it is all
going to be jumbled up together and it is going to be hard to
pick out one versus another. And obviously, this sort of dual-
track preparation comes at added cost, as well.
I would yield to Mr. Langevin for any questions he would
like.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I will echo the chairman's concern. And I am worried
that we are going to see duplication of effort or the
investment being too thin across a variety of the areas because
the resources aren't just there, as opposed to trying to better
coordinate and focus on the real threats that we do face--the
country.
And I would take issue with the statement that HHS may not
be focused on weaponized biologics. I know, for example, having
chaired the former Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, that HHS was, in fact, looking at
biodefenses for anthrax, including weaponized anthrax. So I
know that they do have a focus on that. It has been a while and
I don't know exactly what, you know, again, the progress that
has been made.
But I would tend, in these times of reduced resources, I
think it makes much more sense to reassess and to see how we
can better coordinate these activities and make sure the
investments being made are in the right areas based upon the
most likely threats or types of things that might be developed
that would threaten our populations or our troops.
So let me, on this--to give point, let me just turn to a
question. In a recent Defense Science Board report from October
of last year titled ``Technology and Innovation Enablers for
Superiority in 2030,'' the board concluded that the opportunity
for technological surprise is greatest for WMDs and expressed
concerns about the ability to detect the signatures associated
with weapons of mass destruction, given the advancements of
technologies that would reduce or even eliminate some of the
signatures we depend upon today. The impacts of such
technological shift would be extremely grave in many regards.
Could each of you respond to the board's conclusion and
assess whether you feel our counter-WMD efforts are posturing
us appropriately to deal with future threats? And perhaps, you
know, in that you could address my concern about not sufficient
coordination with each--across government on WMD.
Mr. Myers. Ranking Member Langevin, I will take a first try
at your question.
First and foremost, our counter-WMD programs are based upon
the threat. It is based upon the evaluation that we are
receiving from the Intelligence Community. That is what is
guiding us.
So the prospect for surprise is always there. It is always
a concern. But we are staying very closely tied with the
information that we are receiving from resources and sources
all over the world. And in a lot of cases those sources and
resources that we are getting information from are partners
that we are cooperating with in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the
Middle East, in Southeast Asia.
And one of the things that we have been discussing today is
the focus on the biological threat, as you both have pointed
out. And one of the things that has occurred during my tenure
at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a real shift.
I mean, 5 years ago when I was before this committee I was
talking about a lot of the efforts that we had underway in
Russia in the former Soviet Union in terms of nuclear,
chemical, and biological threats. And today we are here talking
to you a lot about our programs in Africa, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia.
And I believe that is for two reasons: one, we have been
successful in working with the states, the former Soviet Union,
and addressing many of the threats that are there; but
secondly, we are trying to stay one step ahead of the threat,
and we know there are violent extremist organizations [VEOs]
and terrorist groups that are seeking weapons of mass
destruction in those new areas, and that is why you will see
our budget continue to evolve, because we are seeking to stay
one step ahead.
We are also trying to get upstream, if you will--further to
the left, in terms of disrupting potential VEO and terrorist
efforts. I will tell you, I--as Assistant Secretary Weber was
answering the question earlier, just in the last 2 weeks we
have seen an Ebola outbreak in Guinea, and we have seen a ricin
incident at Georgetown University. I mean, polar ends--polar
opposite, if you will, on the threat spectrum, if you will--
obviously one naturally occurring, one man-made.
But it really shows a diversity of the threat that we are
trying to address.
I would also say, I have been to visit our employees
working in these locations, and I will just share one story or
one vignette. A health clinic in Sub-Saharan Africa--it was
there because there are significant outbreaks of anthrax and
other types of infectious diseases, and this health clinic
keeps those strains on file so they can compare potential
outbreaks against what they have there.
And the problem that they encounter--they have a real-world
health reason to have these things, and the concern is the
safety and security in which they are being stored. Do people
know who has access to it? Is the security surrounding it more
than just a wax seal on the refrigerator?
Is there a computerized tracking mechanism so everybody
knows who was the last person in the room? Who was the last
person who had access to it? Why did they have access to it?
What were they doing with it?
And it is these types of programs or these types of
projects that we are attempting to stay one step ahead of the
threat. And I will tell you, every single dollar that we can
spend at the source makes our response and makes our efforts
much more effective and more efficient than if we try to
intercept or intercede or react once the threat has left its
source.
So I would just say, in direct response to your question,
Congressman Langevin, we are working very, very hard to stay
ahead of the curve. We have to be perfect every single day. And
so far we have got a pretty good track record, but the future
is clearly ominous.
Mr. Langevin. But that doesn't really go to the heart of
the question of why shouldn't we reassess how we are doing this
and pull resources and have--much better coordination and
collaboration? I mean, that is what science is. It is research;
it is investment; it is collaboration and sharing knowledge.
And wouldn't that be a force multiplier in itself that would
yield return on investment and hopefully help to speed the
defenses for WMD or particularly advanced biologics that we
would--that would threaten our populations?
Mr. Myers. Ms. Hersman and I were just discussing who might
be the best person to respond to your question, Congressman.
Let us split in two, if you would, and I will kind of take the
technical side and Ms. Hersman will tackle the policy side.
On the technical side, sir, I would just say that that kind
of cooperation and coordination is occurring today. And I
understand that is not the question that you are asking, but I
just want to put your mind at ease a little bit.
That is exactly why we developed the relationship that we
did with the Centers for Disease Control, and that is why we
are pursuing similar relationships with the other actors that
you outlined. And it is because it is very difficult to
distinguish sometimes what phase this threat may be in. Is it
in a public health stage? Is it in a security stage?
And right now what we are doing with the Centers for
Disease Control is actually sitting down with them on a daily
basis and developing country strategies. In other words, if we
are going to engage in country X, the country teams that are
working in that from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, from
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy, from
elsewhere, as well as the Centers for Disease Control and
Department of Health and Human Services are sitting down and
identifying who is going to do what in each of the elements
that are identified as a potential threat risk or opportunity
for engagement.
Again, I will leave the policy side to Ms. Hersman but I
just want to assure you that that kind of coordination is
happening right now. It is getting started, clearly could
always move faster, could always do more countries quicker. But
we are doing that right now and I think you are going to see a
significant improvement in the days and weeks ahead on that
matter.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Ms. Hersman. Thank you. I would just add--I would agree,
first of all, that indications and warning for WMD development
programs and activities are indeed becoming harder to come by,
and the opportunity for more strategic knowledge about how that
development is occurring is, in fact, more difficult,
especially as programs get smaller, are more focused on
breakout capabilities within states, or smaller even laboratory
or bench scale capabilities on behalf of potential non-state
actors.
I think as we look ahead we need to think about, are there
new areas to look for indications and warning and how might we
want to target our resources and our efforts overall? A couple
I may suggest: First of all, we need to look carefully at
following people and not just things and capability
development, because at the end of the day, sometimes it is, in
fact, the people who may be our indications and warning whether
that represents an insider threat in a facility or a location
or very good network tracking of potential non-state actors.
The other thing that we are trying to look very carefully
at is, where do we see problems becoming co-located, whether
that is the presence of endemic disease and potentially hostile
actors and weak government controls in a location, or where are
there just opportunities in ungoverned territories and the
presence or influx of extremist elements where they might have
freedom of action to develop capabilities? We want to turn and
look carefully there so that we can try to identify some of
those problems before they fully emerge.
Mr. Myers. Sir, if I may, I--let me make one last statement
with regard to--if Mr. Weber were here I know he would be
making this statement to you, so let me mention this. One of
his biggest priorities over the last 12, 24, perhaps even
longer is really increasing our ability to understand
situational awareness--up-to-the-minute developments and
changes so that we can be aware, we can serve and provide
information and expertise to the combatant commands, to the
military services. The situational awareness tool has been a
high priority for him and has been for the Department.
We are making some significant strides, and I think when
you see--as that continues to mature and as you see that
developing to an everyday tool, I think the comfort level will
also increase significantly.
Sorry to interrupt.
Mr. Langevin. That is okay. Thank you.
Mr. Spencer. One comment. Preventing technological surprise
and trying to get to the left of an incident is critical for
the warfighter. As a result of that, in our basic and applied
research a significant amount of money, based upon what we know
today on nontraditional agents and emerging threats, we are
pooling the resources of academia as well as industry by giving
them just enough data to come up with innovative approaches to
very, very tough problems.
Additionally, based upon what we know today on emerging
threats and nontraditional agents, we have tested and
revalidated the current capabilities--protective capabilities--
of all of our protective gear that we provide to our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines to make sure that it can withstand
the threats that we know today.
Mr. Langevin. Well, we are going to have to continue to
keep focus on this, and I--again, I hope we are not squandering
time and resources on a very serious problem. So thank you for
your work.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Myers, can you just give us a brief overview of
Cooperative Threat Reduction and what it is doing today?
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. The largest area of expenditure for
the program is in the biological threat reduction area, as we
have just been discussing. And it is also--you can really watch
the numbers over the last several years--really focused on
these new areas of engagement--Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle
East, Southeast Asia. So that would be the largest portion of
the CTR program.
Secondly, I would point out to you that the Proliferation
Prevention Program is another large area of investment. And
this is where we are seeking to engage with partner countries
to help them become better partners with us in terms of
deterring or potentially interdicting and/or detecting WMD
proliferation. I will give you a couple of examples.
We are working very carefully with the coast guard of the
Philippines to help them develop a capability to have better
maritime situational awareness around their islands where there
is an awful lot of traffic. Obviously a concern is WMD
proliferation, but obviously drugs, human trafficking, and
things such as that. So there are dual-use benefits.
Obviously this year the other major area of investment is
our work in Syria, and the outfitting of the Cape Ray with the
Field Deployable Hydrolysis System that Carmen Spencer's team
built and put together, and the operations and the security
that is engaged with that.
In addition, we still have ongoing nuclear security
projects that we are engaged in as part of the President's
strategy and the import he has placed on the threat of nuclear
terrorism. We have a number of projects, in terms of building
centers of excellence to share best practices on security and
safety as well as ongoing security efforts in countries around
the world.
And lastly, obviously, we are maintaining--we must maintain
an ability--a capability to continue to respond to these
unforeseen or unknown threats today. So Libya is a perfect
example. We knew of the threat there for a number of years; we
were able to develop, through our research and development, an
arm of the agency, a technical solution to that, again, with
the experts in Carmen Spencer's shop. And when the opportunity
for cooperation with the Libyan government appeared we were
able to move very, very quickly.
Lastly, I would be remiss if I didn't tell you, while all
these programs are going on we are making sure that we have the
ability in-house to do the audits and examinations to ensure
that the money and the assistance and the projects and the
contracts that we are executing are actually meeting the
requirements that were identified and serving the U.S.
taxpayers wisely and appropriately.
Mr. Thornberry. Are there any of those CTR projects in
Russia still?
Mr. Myers. Yes. There are projects that were ongoing with
the Russian Federation at the beginning of the hostilities in
Ukraine, and a number of them were put on pause and were put on
hold.
Mr. Thornberry. And so right now all of those projects are
on hold or not all of them?
Mr. Myers. At the current time I believe they are--I am
sorry. There are three projects that will be moving forward in
the near future--continuation of them. I can run through them
with you if you would like.
Mr. Thornberry. Please.
Mr. Myers. The first is a dismantlement of the Delta III
ballistic missile submarine, and the view was that that was in
U.S. national security interest to continue. Secondly was the
transportation of nuclear fuel from an Alfa and a Papa
submarine, and I think that that is it. Those are the only
projects that are moving forward at this time.
The other projects that are underway are currently delayed
or on hold.
Mr. Thornberry. And about how many of them are there that
are on hold?
Mr. Myers. As far as I know, just one.
Go ahead.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. Ms. Hersman.
Ms. Hersman. Those two projects actually represent the bulk
of current activities that were identified as part of this
transition from the traditional CTR program with Russia and
that were going to be administered through this arrangement
with DOE [Department of Energy]. Most of the other activities
are fairly small-scale, but we have established mechanisms in
cooperation with DOE so we can engage in joint projects and
multilateral efforts with the Russians under CTR auspices.
But those two are the bulk of the ongoing activity.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Other than the CTR programs we have
just talked about, are there other efforts we still have
ongoing with Russia in chemical or biological or nuclear areas?
Mr. Myers. Sir, the only thing I would add directly in a
bilateral sense with Russia is obviously we are continuing the
audits and examinations to ensure that the assistance or the
cooperation we have had in the past continue to meet the letter
of the requirements that were jointly developed by the United
States and Russia, so that is ongoing. And obviously, this is
not a bilateral CTR issue, but there is a level of cooperation
and coordination with the situation ongoing in Syria.
Mr. Thornberry. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Myers. And they are playing a role there on the ground
and also in support offshore with security.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. On the subject of Syria--and I am not
sure if Mr. Spencer or Ms. Hersman can answer this best,
whichever one of you: Why are we waiting to get all the
material out before we start to do something with it?
Ms. Hersman. If I may, I will start. There is both a
policy-level and a technical answer to that question.
First and foremost, the team that is waiting is being led
by the Danes and the Norwegians, and the Maritime Task Force is
off the coast of Latakia and is coming in and out to take the
shipments onboard. It is vastly preferable to move all of those
chemicals that will be moving onward to destruction locations
for ``Priority Two'' chemicals or those ``Priority Ones'' that
will be coming aboard the Cape Ray, and to make those movements
all in one step.
In the case of the Cape Ray, we need to go through a
transload operation and have the Cape Ray join up at the Port
of Gioia Tauro in Italy to transfer those items from the Danish
vessel, the Arch Ventura. There is a strong preference to do
that transload in one movement, and that will enable the
technical side to make best use of the equipment and to destroy
those chemicals most effectively.
If we were to shuttle back and forth we would lose a lot of
time in transition and we would have some additional
significant complexities in terms of managing how we would do
those transload operations multiple times. The Italians
strongly prefer a single operation.
Mr. Spencer. From a technical perspective, the operators
onboard the MV Cape Ray are my operators, and there are 64
brave volunteers going on this mission. It is a dangerous
mission. Any time you are handling live chemical agents and
going through a destruction process there is an inherent danger
that is imposed.
Transloading and handling the chemicals is the most
dangerous part, and we would prefer to do that in one shipment,
as Ms. Hersman stated.
Also, once we start destroying the chemical agents
themselves onboard the Cape Ray we would prefer to have them
all there, start once, start slow, our primary concern being
safety and protection of the environment, and get it done as
quickly and as safely as we possibly can. And doing it in one
large batch will enable us to accomplish that in much quicker
time.
Mr. Thornberry. One other thing I wanted to ask about, back
on the subject of bio agents. Some years ago I participated in
a war game at National Defense University, where the bio agent
was foot-and-mouth disease in cattle. And whoever would like to
describe this, can you--we talked about, obviously, the human
diseases, but there is the potential for animals' diseases to
also play a huge role in a potential bioterrorist event, or
other hostile act, is pretty enormous, too.
Describe for me a little bit how we are bringing in the
animal health part of this.
Ms. Hersman. I would fully agree that veterinary and
agricultural biological agents can pose a grave hazard and a
substantial economic disruption anywhere they might
materialize. I am familiar with the war game that you attended,
and it was enlightening, I think, for many of us who
participated. So it is a top priority to make sure that
veterinary and agricultural elements are brought overall with
the human health aspects when we look at countering biological
threats.
I know we account for that within our Cooperative
Biological Engagement Program through the CTR program. They
actively partner with both sides of that equation, on the
agricultural and veterinary elements within countries as well
as in their public health sector.
For some of those details I would like to turn to Director
Myers, however.
Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, our engagement on the agricultural
level is as important as on the health side. In fact, it very
often allows us to meet a whole new range of partners and
individuals in these host countries and in these governments.
Very often when we seek to engage a new partner, sometimes
agricultural cooperation will move faster than on the health
side for a variety of different reasons--local politics or just
where our interests might align. So we approach each engagement
ready to move forward at a brisk pace on whichever side, or
both simultaneously, that we can.
I would also point out to you that we are engaged on a
multilateral level on the agricultural front, just as we are on
the health side. And, you know, the FAO [U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization] is the equivalent of the World Health
Organization, WHO, and we, again, are engaged with them,
working with them. And, you know, as you point out, we have--
when we engage on the health side there is an interest in our
partners' countries because the lives of their population may
be at risk, but the same is true on the agricultural side as
well, and there is also the additional benefit on their side in
terms of potential impacts on their--on local industry and food
markets.
Mr. Thornberry. Well with all this coordination that you
all have talked about here domestically for domestic terrorism
preparation, that would include animal health as well.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. I will use a foreign example, but we
very often will invite the Department of Agriculture to come
with us when we engage some of these foreign partners just
because of the level of expertise, just because of the parallel
initiatives.
So I would suggest to you that the--again, the coordination
is good there, and we seek out our agricultural colleagues very
often.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. I think that is all we have for you
all. I think we were easy on you today.
But I do appreciate, again, your flexibility and I think
the point you all make is very good. This is dangerous work and
this is important work, and it is kind of like, as we deal with
terrorism in general, we need to be right 100 percent of the
time because that one time that slips through has potentially
catastrophic consequences.
So thank you for what you and your folks do.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 8, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 8, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 8, 2014
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Myers. DOD MIL-STD-188-125-1 is a standard for High-Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Protection for Ground-Based Command,
Control, Communications, Intelligence (C4I) facilities performing
critical time-urgent missions against a MIL-STD-2169C, DOD HEMP
Environment. It provides performance criteria for hardening critical
DOD fixed facilities against nuclear HEMP using an electromagnetic
shielded barrier and electrical surge arrestors, and test protocols to
validate HEMP hardness. The provisions of MIL-STD-188-125-1 were not
developed for protecting critical civil infrastructure networks such as
the electric power grid or telecommunications. To effectively protect a
system, the standard must be applied in its entirety in order to
achieve the strict time requirements that DOD demands for its C4I
systems. However, MIL STD 188-125-1 allows for building size
scalability. For example, an entire civil facility may not be critical
but only certain systems or subsystems that provide critical functions
and fit into a room. In this case the room can be retrofit hardened
into an EMP protected asset.
MIL-STD-188-125-1 was formally reviewed on April 7, 2005 and
determined to be the best guideline for DOD use in acquisitions. DTRA
is currently in the process of reviewing MIL-STD-188-125-1 again this
year, and plans to re-issue an update in about one year. On the
critical infrastructure side, there are other power grid initiatives
being implemented by DHA, DOE, and FERC.
MIL-STD 188-125-1 was designed to protect designated C4I facilities
against the MIL-STD 2169C HEMP environment which is the Department's
nuclear high-altitude EMP threat. We are not aware of any tests that
have shown that the standard is inadequate for the purpose for which it
was developed. We are continuously reviewing the standard and ways to
improve our test protocols and security.
If requested, we are prepared to give a briefing on MIL-STD-188-
125-1 to any Member of Congress and their staffs. [See page 9.]