[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-105]
RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 8, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
88-450 WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone (202) 512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll free). E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, April 8, 2014, Russian Military Developments and
Strategic Implications......................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, April 8, 2014........................................... 37
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014
RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Chollet, Hon. Derek, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense................. 4
Pandolfe, VADM Frank C., USN, Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense.......... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Chollet, Hon. Derek.......................................... 45
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 41
Pandolfe, VADM Frank C....................................... 51
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Washington Post editorial, ``John Kerry's Departure from
Reality''.................................................. 59
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Dr. Wenstrup................................................. 63
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen.
The committee meets to receive testimony on ``Russian
Military Developments and Strategic Implications.'' Immediately
following this hearing, Members will receive a classified
briefing by representatives from our intelligence community.
Joining us today are Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Derek Chollet and Joint Staff
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy Vice Admiral Frank
Pandolfe.
Thank you both for being here today and for your service to
our Nation.
Before we get started, I would like to welcome
Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard to the committee. Congresswoman
Gabbard brings a wealth of experience and unique perspective,
having served our Nation as an enlisted soldier and officer.
With Tulsi and Colleen Hanabusa, the service men and women of
the U.S. Pacific Command and in the great State of Hawaii are
well represented.
We look forward to working with you.
The events unfolding in Ukraine are deeply troubling, from
Russia's invasion and occupation of a sovereign country to its
amassing of tens of thousands of troops along Ukraine's borders
and further north under the ruse of conducting snap exercises.
Just this past weekend, we saw reports that Russia is provoking
further unrest in eastern Ukraine, attempting to create a
reason to invade.
Yet these actions are only the most recent and perhaps most
aggressive of a broader campaign to challenge the West and to
reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in Europe.
Mr. Putin is directing a multidimensional military
modernization effort. Russia is re-arming at an alarming rate,
with military spending up roughly 30 percent. It stands in
flagrant violation of a major nuclear arms control treaty and,
under the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty,
is building up its nuclear forces by over 100 warheads since
the last declaration, while the U.S. reduces its own forces.
As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently wrote
in an op-ed, and I quote, ``Mr. Putin is playing a long game,
and the West must also play a strategic long game. Yet the
administration's policies have rested largely on reset,
cooperation, and further nuclear cuts.''
Just last week, Deputy Under Secretary Christine Wormuth,
testifying on the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review], stated that
they ``probably would have added some additional sentences
about Russia, given recent developments.'' That is hardly a
reexamination of our Nation's policy towards Moscow.
And while the QDR states that our military is sized to and
capable of effectively deterring aggression, there are serious
concerns about our ability to do just that, especially with a
near-peer competitor.
Our friends, as well as our adversaries, are watching our
every move. It should come as no surprise that senior Japanese
officials raised this issue with Secretary Hagel during his
recent visit, as they seek to understand what our policy with
regard to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea signals for our
commitments to our allies.
This hearing is an opportunity to examine the strategic
implications of Russia's military developments and recent
actions. Secretary Chollet and Admiral Pandolfe, I hope you can
also discuss how these developments are influencing any
reexamination of U.S. policy towards Russia, including our
force posture in Europe, how we reassure our allies and
partners, and our defense investments.
Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before our committee,
and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, welcome our
witnesses today, look forward to their testimony and their
expertise on this issue.
And I want to join you in welcoming Congresswoman Gabbard
to the committee. It is great to have her here. Obviously,
Hawaii is a critical piece of our national security strategy
and Department of Defense activities in Asia and beyond, so it
is great to have that expertise there. And with her, I believe,
11 years of service, now as a captain in the Army National
Guard, her service in Iraq, I think that expertise is going to
serve the committee very, very well.
And I thank you for being here. Welcome to the committee.
This is an incredibly important hearing, as we try to
confront the challenges that the chairman, I think, described
very well. What Russia has done in the Ukraine is a blatant
violation of international law, a blatant violation of all
manner of different treaties which Russia has signed, and is
something that we in the U.S. and I believe every other nation
in the world must do all we can to discourage and to send the
message that it won't be tolerated and that type of behavior is
outside of the international norm.
Because it can potentially lead to destabilization in many
places. If it becomes accepted that you can simply decide to
take over another country and annex parts of them, it does not
contribute to the international order.
Now, this is a difficult situation. It is easy to say that
we should not tolerate that; much more difficult to do. I don't
think anybody on this committee wants to go to war with Russia
over the Ukraine. But we do want to find a way to stop them
from further aggression. And I think there are options.
And, overall, this is a very unfortunate choice that
President Putin has made, and it is not in the best interests
of Russia. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a real
opportunity for Russia to move in and become one of the partner
of nations, a great power that could participate with other
great powers in building a more peaceful, prosperous, and
stable world. They had that option.
President Putin has chosen not to take that. He has chosen
to further isolate Russia and find further conflict. I think
this is a huge mistake. We have already seen the impact on the
Russian economy. If Russia had been more willing to embrace the
West and work with us, I think it would have led to greater
economic opportunity and greater prosperity.
The Russian population is in a very bad place right now.
They have an aging population; they have an economy that is in
trouble, rampant with corruption. It is not going to help them,
to further destabilize their very own region and further turn
the international community against them.
I very much agree with President Obama, who said these
actions by Putin are more a sign of weakness than they are a
sign of strength. The question is, what do we do in response? I
think initially we have to take whatever steps we can to try
and economically isolate them. We have begun that process; I
think we should continue it.
But key to all of this will be NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] and the EU [European Union]. Whatever amount of
business we do with Russia, whatever our economic leverage over
Russia is, the EU has at least 10 times that. They can make
decisions to show Russia that this type of behavior won't be
tolerated much more easily than we can.
So I am very interested to hear from our witnesses about
what our best approach is to working with our partners in
Europe and to get full-scale cooperation in not just condemning
Russia's actions but to make them pay a price for it that will
make them think that this is not in their best interests.
This is not easy. Regrettably, in many, many countries
throughout the world, we have found that we cannot simply force
them to behave in ways that we would like them to. But we have
to try to alter this behavior, certainly condemn it, but try to
find ways to hopefully make sure it does not happen in the
future and to defuse the ongoing situation in the Ukraine.
There is continuing concern that it will spread beyond Crimea
into the eastern Ukraine and become even more of a problem.
So, very curious to hear from our witnesses today about how
we can contain that and respond to the Russian aggression in
the Ukraine in a way that will not make the situation worse but
hopefully will change Putin's calculations in the future.
With that, I yield back and look forward to the testimony
of the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Chollet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you,
Congressman Smith, members of the committee, for this hearing
today. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak with you
on U.S. policy and actions in the wake of Russia's incursion in
the Ukraine and how the Department of Defense has worked with
our allies and international partners to address this issue.
Russia's unlawful military intervention against Ukraine
challenges our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. It
changes Europe's security landscape, it causes instability on
NATO's borders, and it is a challenge to the international
order.
Since the outset of this crisis, the United States has
pursued three courses of action: first, demonstrating support
to Ukraine's transitional government; second, reassuring allies
and deterring Russia from further military threats to Europe;
and third, imposing costs on Russia for its illegal actions.
The Department of Defense has an important role in
achieving these objectives in all three areas. First, to
support Ukraine, the United States has worked with partners
like the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the U.N. [United
Nations], the EU, the G-7 [Group of Seven], to provide Ukraine
with political backing and economic assistance, including an
$18 billion package from the IMF.
For our part, the Department of Defense is working with
Ukraine to review, prioritize, and grant its defense assistance
requests for materials and supplies that would serve to support
Ukraine without taking actions that would escalate this crisis
militarily.
The initial round of this process was completed last week,
with the delivery of 300,000 MREs [meals ready-to-eat] to
support Ukrainian forces in the field. This is the support that
they had asked for. We have maintained senior-level defense
dialogues with Ukrainian counterparts throughout this crisis.
And we have led efforts at NATO to offer Ukraine greater access
to NATO exercises, invite Ukraine to participate in the
development of military capabilities, and provide capacity-
building programs to the Ukrainian military.
The second course of action is reassuring U.S. allies and
deterring Russia from further military action in Europe. As
President Obama said recently during his trip to Brussels and
his meeting with the NATO Secretary General there, the NATO
alliance is, quote, ``the bedrock of America's security as well
as European security.'' And just last week, NATO celebrated its
65th anniversary.
Reassurance measures so far include augmenting NATO's
peacetime Baltic air policing mission; deploying air assets and
personnel to Poland to supplement the U.S.-Poland aviation
detachment, or AVDET, training rotation; and extending the USS
Truxtun stay in the Black Sea to conduct exercises with
Romanian and Bulgarian naval forces. We will also send another
ship to the Black Sea within a week.
NATO has also established orbits of Airborne Warning and
Control System, or AWACS, aircraft over Poland and Romania,
both to serve as additional assurance to allies that border
Ukraine and to enhance NATO's situational awareness of
activities in the region.
The third course of action is imposing costs on Russia.
Russia's violations of its own agreements and international law
require a vigorous, coordinated response, and the United States
has led the international community in isolating Russia
diplomatically.
Along with the European Union, Canada, and Australia, the
U.S. has imposed visa restrictions and comprehensive sanctions
on a growing list of Russian officials, one Russian bank, and
members of Putin's inner circle, along with Ukrainians who
played a role in undermining that country's sovereignty and
misappropriating Ukrainian assets. As the President has made
clear, the sanctions we have imposed to date are not the end of
what we can do.
At the Department of Defense, we have put on hold all
military-to-military engagements with Russia, including
exercises, bilateral meetings, port visits, and planning
conferences. Although we have worked hard over two decades to
try to build a cooperative, transparent defense relationship
with Russia, the violations of international law and the
undermining of stability in Europe mean that we cannot proceed
with business as usual.
NATO and many allies have likewise suspended military
cooperation engagements with Russia, while maintaining the
channels for dialogue that can serve to deescalate this crisis.
And while we do not seek military confrontation with Russia,
its actions in Europe and Eurasia may require the United States
to reexamine our force posture in Europe and our requirement
for future deployments, exercises, and training in the region.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, members of the committee,
let me conclude by saying that Russia's unlawful actions in
Ukraine have dire implications for international and regional
security. This has caused a paradigm shift in our relations
with Moscow. And this crisis is not one that has been generated
by the West or the United States; it is a crisis of choice
pursued by Russia to further what I believe is a distorted view
of its own interests, which will only lead to its further
isolation.
Finally, I want to thank the Congress for passing the
Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic
Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014. This act is closely aligned
with the Administration's objectives. It demonstrates
solidarity with Ukraine, helps to reassure our allies, and
imposes further costs on Russia for its actions.
Since the stakes are high and the international principles
are so fundamental, it is important that the United States
speak with one voice during this crisis, and I appreciate that
we are doing so.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Chollet can be found
in the Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Vice Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR FOR
STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5), JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Admiral Pandolfe. Good morning, Chairman McKeon, Ranking
Member Smith, and distinguished committee members. Good
morning, and thank you for this opportunity to update you on
Russian military developments.
You just heard a review of actions taken by the United
States, the NATO alliance, and the international community in
response to Russia's unlawful military intervention in Ukraine.
Russia's seizure of Crimea is a flagrant violation of
international law, and it reintroduces into Europe the threat
of external aggression. By doing so, Russia has set back
decades of international progress.
The United States military and the wider NATO alliance have
supported our response to this unwarranted intervention. We
have given support to Ukraine by way of material assistance,
defense consultations, and the offer of enhanced training. We
are reassuring our NATO allies, with whom we have Article 5
security guarantees, by sending additional air power to the
Baltic States and Poland, increasing our surveillance over
Poland and Romania, and sending naval ships into the Black Sea.
And we are helping to impose costs on Russia by halting all
bilateral military-to-military interaction. However, as noted
by Mr. Chollet, we are keeping open channels for senior-leader
communications to help deescalate the crisis.
I now would like to widen the focus of my remarks beyond
Ukraine to discuss the evolution of Russian conventional
military power, thereby providing context to today's events.
At the height of its military power, the Soviet Union was
truly a global competitor. With millions of people under arms,
vast numbers of tanks and planes, a global navy, and an
extensive intelligence-gathering infrastructure, the Soviet
military machine posed a very real and dangerous threat.
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, that
arsenal fell into disrepair. Starved of funding and fragmented,
Russian military capabilities decayed throughout the 1990s.
From the start of his term in office in 2000, President
Putin made military modernization a top priority of the Russian
Government. When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, a number of
shortcomings were noted in its military performance. This led
the Russian Government to further increase investment in its
military services.
Since 2008, those efforts have had some success. Russian
military forces have been streamlined into smaller, more mobile
units. Their overall readiness has improved, and their most
elite units are well-trained and equipped.
They now employ a more sophisticated approach to joint
warfare. Their military has implemented organizational change,
creating regional commands within Russia. These coordinate and
synchronize planning, joint service integration, force
movement, intelligence support, and the tactical employment of
units.
Finally, the Russian military adopted doctrinal change,
placing greater emphasis on speed of movement, the use of
special operations forces, and information and cyber warfare.
As noted, they instituted snap exercises. These no-notice
drills serve the dual purpose of sharpening military readiness
while also inducing strategic uncertainty as to whether they
will swiftly transition from training to offensive operations.
Today, Russia is a regional power that can project force
into nearby states, but it has very limited global power
projection capability. It has a military of uneven readiness.
While some units are well-trained, most are less so. It suffers
from corruption, and its logistical capabilities are limited.
Aging equipment and infrastructure, fiscal challenges, and
demographic and social problems will continue to hamper reform
efforts.
The United States, in contrast, employs a military of
global reach and engagement. The readiness of our rotationally
deployed forces is high, and we are working to address
readiness shortfalls at home.
And we operate within alliances, the strongest of which is
NATO. Composed of 28 nations, NATO is the most successful
military alliance in history. Should Russia undertake an armed
attack against any NATO state, it will find that our commitment
to collective defense is immediate and unwavering.
Russia's military objectives are difficult to predict, but
it is clear that Russia is sustaining a significant military
force on Ukraine's eastern border. This is deeply troubling to
all states in the region and beyond, and we are watching
Russian military movements very carefully.
I spoke with General Breedlove, the Commander of U.S.
European Command and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, last
Friday. He is formulating recommendations for presentation to
the North Atlantic Council on April 15th. These recommendations
will be aimed at further reassuring our NATO allies. As part of
this effort, he will consider increasing military exercises,
forward-deploying additional military equipment and personnel,
and increasing our naval, air, and ground presence. And he will
update Members of Congress on those recommendations at the
earliest opportunity.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for this opportunity to
address your committee. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Pandolfe can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Chollet and Admiral Pandolfe, as I mentioned in
our opening statement, at our QDR hearing last week, Deputy
Under Secretary Wormuth commented that, in light of recent
events, they would have added some additional sentences on
Russia in the QDR. I would think that a more comprehensive
policy review is necessary.
Can you please describe specific steps that the Department
is taking to reexamine U.S. policy towards Russia and our
posture in Europe? Additionally, what immediate steps is the
Department taking to provide assistance to Ukraine to reassure
other allies and partners in the region and to deter further
Russian aggression?
Secretary Chollet. Mr. Chairman, I will begin.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have taken some
very important steps immediately for our NATO partners, with
the Baltic air policing mission, which is adding 6 F-15s, and
then also the 12 F-16s to the Polish aviation detachment, which
has been very warmly welcomed in both Poland and in the Balts,
as well.
We have also been in very close touch with our Ukrainian
colleagues. And this goes back to when this crisis was first
unfolding earlier this year, when Secretary Hagel had multiple
phone calls with the Ukrainian Defense Minister at the time, at
that point urging the Defense Minister not to get involved in
the Ukrainian crisis. And to the Ukrainian military's great
credit, they did not get involved in the crisis as it was
unfolding.
Since then, we have worked very closely with the Ukrainians
to try to understand their needs and to try to address those as
quickly as possible. So there was a team in Kiev last week, a
team from the Department of Defense as well as EUCOM [U.S.
European Command] representation, what is called the Bilateral
Defense Commission, to meet with Ukraine to talk with them
about their urgent needs but also the strategy that they are
seeking moving forward.
And we are working through some of those requests, as I
mentioned in my opening statement. We have worked through what
they saw as the most urgent, which is to get them some MREs,
because their forces have been in the field for a very long
time and need those supplies.
In terms of your question, sir, about the QDR, it wouldn't
surprise you to hear that I concur with my colleague's comments
that she made last week to this committee. We clearly would
have changed some of the tone, perhaps, of the QDR, given what
has transpired over the last several weeks and Russia's
egregious violation of international law.
That said, I think the fundamental strategy of the QDR
still holds. And things like the commitment to maintaining a
strong technological edge, the importance and the reaffirmation
of the transatlantic alliance and working with our strong
partners, the commitment to build partner capacity and
institute policies to pursue that objective, those are all
things that we were doing before this crisis and we are going
to certainly continue to do in the days ahead.
And then, finally, as Admiral Pandolfe mentioned, General
Breedlove has been tasked by the North Atlantic Council [NAC],
NATO's governing body, to come up with a variety of new ideas
about ways that we may reassure our NATO allies moving forward,
and those are things that he is working through right now. And
he is due to present those to the NAC--and then, as the Admiral
said, as soon as possible to you--next week.
Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, I would agree with what Mr. Chollet
says.
The process of assessing our relationship with Russia is
ongoing. We continually review our strategic relationships
within the Pentagon as a matter of course, quite frankly, every
year, as we build the next set of plans, the next set of
budgets, the next set of strategy documents.
And, clearly, the actions the Russians have taken,
described I think quite accurately as a paradigm shift, are
causing us to look very hard at some of the assumptions which
underlay the planning and prescriptions of the past.
And not just in the United States, either. NATO is
undertaking a very similar process of assessing where the
Russians are going and where we will go as a collective
alliance with the Russians in the future.
The Chairman. Vice Admiral, you said in your statement,
``Today Russia is a regional power that can project force into
nearby states but has very limited global power projection
capability.'' I think that is basically the same words the
President used last week.
By your definition, what would be a power or a nation--what
nation would you consider has power to project, the ability to
project power globally?
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, sir, one important caveat is my
statement was focusing on conventional Russian military power.
I think it is important to note that the Russian nuclear
arsenal is intercontinental in reach and does have, at that
level of the employment of force, extreme range.
Regarding the employment of conventional military power on
a global scale, I would argue that the United States is really
unique in our ability to operate globally. And that is largely
a function of the alliances of which I spoke. We have the
support, in terms of basing and cooperative training and
operations, of a host of other nations who share our values and
our vision for the international order.
And not just our military technologies or people, but that
systems of alliances and basing is what really allows the
Western forces, with the United States at the center, to
operate on a global scale.
The Chairman. So the United States would be the only
country that, take away nuclear capability, has the ability to
operate globally?
Admiral Pandolfe. Again, I would think, on a regular basis,
on a routine basis, in a significant level of force, I think
that is an accurate statement, sir.
The Chairman. How many ships do we have in our Navy right
now?
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, last time I checked, it was 287. I
am not exactly sure what it is today.
The Chairman. And how many does Russia have?
Admiral Pandolfe. I would have to go back and check that,
sir.
The Chairman. I saw something last week that they had 300
ships just in the Black Sea.
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, numbers of ships is certainly one
factor, but you also, as you well know, sir, have to look at
the tonnage of the ships, the capabilities of the ship, whether
they are oceangoing global ships or whether they are, quite
frankly, littoral, regional ships with much shorter ranges and
capabilities that are geared towards shorter-range missions.
The United States Navy today really is unique in its
ability to operate globally and project power globally.
The Chairman. Can you get that number back to us on the
record, how many ships, comparing apples to apples, Russians
have compared to our Navy?
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we look at the specifics of the crisis right now, how
would you assess the risk of Russia going further into the
Ukraine, most likely, obviously, into the eastern Ukraine? That
is where they have amassed troops, where we have heard in
recent days that there are Russian nationalists within Ukraine
that have seized government buildings and, you know, committed
other actions. What do you think the calculation is?
Because, obviously, the next escalation of this crisis
would involve that. And that, I mean, certainly there is the
long-term, you know, how do we build our relationship with
Russia, how do we contain, you know, any global threat. But
right now, you know, keeping the crisis from spreading is all
about keeping them out of the eastern Ukraine.
You know, how do you see the likelihood of Russia making
that decision? And what can we and our allies do to try to
discourage that action?
Secretary Chollet. Well, Congressman, I know we have a
closed session later, and our intelligence colleagues can
perhaps provide a little more granularity.
But what I would say to that is we are very concerned about
Russia's buildup on Ukraine's eastern border. We have been very
clear at all levels of our government, from the President on
down, that this is a worrying development and that we want to
see Russia deescalate and move forces out of that area.
The events of the weekend, as you mentioned, have been very
concerning. As the White House said yesterday, there is strong
evidence that some of the actions taking place inside Ukraine,
the folks were perhaps paid by the Russians. These aren't
spontaneous demonstrations, we believe. And a move into eastern
Ukraine would clearly be a very serious escalation of this
crisis.
Mr. Smith. What do we do?
Secretary Chollet. So, what we can do. Well, first, at
every opportunity we have, we are--including yesterday
Secretary Kerry talked to Foreign Minister Lavrov again--making
clear that their behavior is unacceptable and that there will
be consequences for their actions. We have shown that there
already have been consequences for the actions they have taken,
and there are more to come if they were to continue along this
course.
So punishing Russia is clearly one avenue. The second is to
reassure our partners and allies. We have been very clear, the
President when he was in Europe several weeks ago made this
very clear, our commitment to Article 5, NATO's collective
defense commitment, is ironclad. And we are not just saying
that, we are trying to demonstrate through our actions, whether
it is the Baltic air policing or the Polish aviation rotation,
that we mean what we say along those lines.
So this is a very delicate situation. It is very
concerning. I don't want to try to sugarcoat it at all, because
Russia has a tremendous amount of capability right now deployed
on Ukraine's border. And we are watching it very, very closely.
Mr. Smith. Let's say--just one final question, because most
of the questions I have would be better for the classified
session.
Let's say that Russia goes into the eastern Ukraine. In
essence, we wind up, you know--Ukraine winds up probably being
split in half, or some things that are somewhat similar,
although on a grander and more problematic scale than what
happened in Georgia in 2008, where you have two provinces that
are now effectively part of Russia. Now you have a situation
where you would have a much larger country, effectively, part
of that. What do you think Putin's long-term vision is beyond
that?
I know we are very concerned--I met with a consul from
Lithuania back in Seattle over the past week. You know, they
are very concerned about what Russia would do there. What do
you think Russia--because, obviously, it is a whole different
step when you go into a NATO country. I mean, that would
basically mean war.
Do you think Putin understands that and would be limited to
the Ukraine? Do you think there is a risk that there are other
places? And are there other places, other than the Baltic
nations, that Russia may have designs on that we need to be
worried about?
Secretary Chollet. Well, sir, I always hesitate to try to
put myself in Putin's head, but what I can say is that Russia's
behavior clearly seems to be motivated by a sense--and I
believe it is a distorted view of their own interests--that
they are better off having client states around them that are
completely beholden to Moscow.
We don't have that view. We believe that it is up to the
countries around Russia itself to decide their own destiny.
Russia clearly has interests, legitimate interests, in its
neighborhood, but the way it is seeking to pursue those
interests is deeply counterproductive, I believe, to what I
think is its own interests, but also a clear violation of
international law and absolutely unacceptable.
So how far this goes, I don't want to speculate. That is
why what we are doing is to make very clear to Mr. Putin and to
his entire leadership that their behavior is unacceptable,
their actions are unacceptable, and that there will be
consequences for actions they have already taken or any further
actions they may take.
Mr. Smith. What are the most important consequences, do you
think, that would show that Russia is paying a price for this
that we have taken or will take?
Secretary Chollet. I think, sir, the main are economic. And
that is why we have focused so much on the sanctions initially.
The Russian economy is distorted, itself, mainly through
petrochemicals. And we have both tried to target particular
individuals, obviously, but also the President now, through
Executive order, has the ability to look at sectoral sanctions.
Now, as he said in his statement about 2 weeks ago on this
subject, when we get into that neighborhood of actions, those
are things that could affect us. And we want to be sure that we
are smart about the way forward and that we aim before we shoot
when it comes to sanctions. But I think, clearly, that is the
pressure point that will have the greatest effect on Russian
perceptions.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I want to pursue, kind of, what the chairman was
talking about: how big a deal this is, essentially.
And your responsibility is plans and policies for the
Department of Defense across the whole world. I think most
people assume that we didn't really have to worry much about a
European war anymore, that the economic integration had made
that a thing of the past.
You answered the chairman saying something about a paradigm
shift, at least with our relations to Russia. But can you
expound a little bit about how big a change this is or is not,
related to our national security interests when you look at it
worldwide? How big a paradigm shift is this for us?
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, this is a big deal. I mean, the
presumption of our relationship with Russia in the post----
The Chairman. Admiral, can you speak right into the
microphone, please?
Admiral Pandolfe. I said this is a big deal. The
presumption of our relationship with Russia, the foundation of
our relationship with Russia, was that they were a cooperative,
emerging power that was buying into the international order, to
include the laws which govern behavior within the integrated
economic and legal system.
Their actions, both in Georgia and most recently in Crimea,
have clearly indicated that they have limits to the degree to
which they are willing to accede those rules. And they are
challenging the international order, which most nations rely on
for their security and for their prosperity.
So, clearly, it is a paradigm shift, as the words have been
used by a number of leaders. And to Chairman McKeon's point, we
are reassessing the way forward with the Russians.
I do think, however, we have to keep it in global
perspective, as well. As noted, Russia is an important country
and it is a regional power, but we have other interests
throughout the world which we also must continue to pay
attention to. And we must balance our energies to maintain
security and stability not just in Europe but in the Middle
East and the Far East, as well. And, quite frankly, I think,
working with our allies, that is exactly what we are doing.
Mr. Thornberry. But wouldn't you also agree that, in those
other parts of the world, they are watching to see what happens
here, how we handle this? So if you are North Korea or Iran or
China, you are watching to see how the United States responds
to this Russian incursion. And the potential is that those
other places in the world are going to get more dangerous, not
less, if they think we have an anemic response, right?
Admiral Pandolfe. I think others are watching, and they are
watching not just the response of the United States but the
response of NATO, the response of the European Union, the
response of the United Nations, and the entire system of
international states, as is threatened by the actions of, in
this case, Russia. And they are looking to see that the cost
that we are threatening to--that we have imposed thus far and
we are threatening to impose further should this aggression
continue.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I guess that leads me to wonder
whether adding a few sentences to the QDR is enough of a
reassessment. If it really is a paradigm shift, if it is that
big a change, isn't it more logical that we need to make a
bigger reassessment of our own capabilities, how much we spend,
what our own approach to these security issues are?
Again, I think of it, especially from your view, not only
what happens in Ukraine, but what happens in North Korea and
Iran and the South China Sea and all these other places around
the world.
Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, as I mentioned in my first answer,
the process of assessing risk, of allocating forces, and
investing in relationships is an ongoing process. It never
stops. It is shaped in each and every day by the actions in the
world around us. And, clearly, the actions of Russia of late
will impact our assessments as we move forward in those
assessments.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, my last question is, do you think our
process of reassessment is keeping up with the pace of events
around the world?
Admiral Pandolfe. I do. I think that we have a concerted
and disciplined effort to try to measure risk. And we work very
hard at it with the intelligence communities, with our
colleagues, the State Department, the Office of Secretary of
Defense.
And I think, as I mentioned a moment ago, it is a
continuous process. We adjust as we go. But I think,
fundamentally, the strategy as prescribed in the QDR is correct
and that they have done a very nice job of looking around the
world at the contending interests and values.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you very much for your
testimony today and your service to our Nation.
I would like to start by going back to the chairman's
question about Russian ability to project global power. And
what is the current status of their aircraft carriers and their
battle groups?
Admiral Pandolfe. I would like to start by saying, in the
closed session in an hour or so, there will be an intelligence
official whose specialty is this kind of question.
My understanding, having operated in 6th Fleet up until
about 6 months ago, is that the Kuznetsov, which is their last
remaining carrier, is operational. It has a limited air wing of
a few airplanes, if I remember correctly, something less than a
dozen, and that it has periodically deployed to the
Mediterranean and then come back to its northern Russian bases.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Admiral.
Let me turn to something else. In January, Director Clapper
stated that, and I quote, ``Following the measured improvements
to Russian military capabilities in the past year, it is
setting its sights on the long-term challenges of
professionalization and rearmament. The military in the past
year has taken an increasingly prominent role in out-of-the-
area operations, most notably in the eastern Mediterranean but
also in Latin America, the Arctic, and other regions, a trend
that will probably continue,'' end quote.
He also stated, again I quote, ``Moscow is negotiating a
series of agreements that would give it access to military
infrastructure across the globe,'' end quote.
Could you provide any additional details about Russia's
ambitions in these out-of-the-area operations and
infrastructure access initiatives, and particularly whether and
how those have changed after Russian occupation of the Crimea?
And, again, further, what should be the United States'
response?
Secretary Chollet. Well, sir, I can start. And as the
Admiral said, I know in the closed part of this hearing today,
our intelligence colleagues can provide a little bit more in
terms of what Director Clapper was talking about.
Again, as the Admiral said in his opening statement, the
Russians have embarked on a military modernization effort. It
is something we have watched very closely. It is something that
they started after the 2008 Georgia war and the shortcomings
that they perceived in their military at that time.
I think we have seen some of the effect of that
modernization, clearly, in Ukraine, particularly the special
forces at work. And Russia has been, as you noted and as
Director Clapper was quoted as saying, has been working to
broaden out as much as it can, but still within a region. And I
think its power projection is not global right now, but whether
it is in the Arctic or whether it is in the Med, they are
clearly trying to expand out.
That said, they are limited in what they can do. Despite
their modernization efforts, they have tremendous challenges in
their military in terms of the professionalization of the
military and in terms of the demographics in their country, as
well.
So, as I said, it is something we watch closely and we
don't take lightly and we are focused on.
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir, I would agree with that.
From the reports I have read on their efforts toward
professionalization and rearmament are that they have had some
success, but it has been also mixed success in terms of the
larger force. The force has gotten smaller; it has been
streamlined. But as I understand it, the readiness is uneven,
and the degree to which they have professionalized their
military is incomplete. Nonetheless, they continue to work
toward those goals. And they are long-term goals, as I
understand it, for the Russian military.
In terms of out of area of operations, my observation is
that they are relatively limited. They have operated heavily in
the eastern Mediterranean in support of the Syrian Government,
but, beyond that, I think that I would describe them as
periodic and limited in scope.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
Turning to NATO, how have interactions within NATO changed
since Russia's invasion of the Crimea? And with the show of
aggression by the Russians, do you feel that it is more likely
that more NATO member countries are going to begin to meet
their treaty obligations for defense expenditures?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, the NATO consultations have been
very intense. I don't know that--I wouldn't characterize it as
a change. I would describe it more as an intensification of
NATO meetings and engagements, in addition to, as I mentioned,
more exercises. So I think that this has shown, this whole
crisis has shown, the value of the strong transatlantic
alliance and the investment we have made over many, many
decades into NATO.
I hope--and we have a NATO summit coming up in Wales this
September--I hope that this crisis is a proof point and will
provide an impetus for those members who are not spending the
kind of resources we would like to see on defense to spend
more. But this has been an ongoing challenge we have faced for
many years, in terms of getting more European governments to
step up.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And, Mr. Secretary, I am like most Members here in this
committee; I have listened to testimony for the last 3 months
from the service chiefs about all the problems facing our
military, and this is going to bring me to my question in just
one moment.
Mr. Putin obviously has been listening to the testimony by
our service chiefs, as well. And even Secretary of Defense
Hagel, who I have great respect for, has made comments that we
are going to have to change the way that we organize our
military and their functions and their responsibilities.
My concern--and I hear this back in my district, which is
eastern North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base
and a couple of other bases--is that here we go again. The
Nation--we are what is called a debtor nation. We have to
borrow money, primarily from China, to fund our debt. And under
George Bush, we raised the debt ceiling seven times in the 8
years that he was President of the United States. Under
President Obama, we have raised the debt ceiling five times--
seven times in 5 years.
This is the point I am trying to make. I hope in your
discussions with primarily the Germans and the French and the
Brits, I don't think that they have been as concerned or as
engaged publicly--and maybe you can reassure me that I am
wrong--in the fact that this primarily is their fight.
Now, I understand that we have these treaties, and I
understand the role of NATO. And I do support NATO, by the way.
But here we go again in trying to take the lead, so to speak,
on this problem in Europe. And I think that, quite frankly,
sometimes, instead of being the leader, we should be supporting
these other nations, let them take the lead, let them be the
ones that say to Putin, if you go any further, you are going to
see the German troops or the French troops or the Brits.
Can you respond and give us any inside feelings, if not
policy, but inside feelings, that they understand that this is
their responsibility more than it is America's responsibility?
And we want to be a team player, but we don't want to be
captain of the team.
Secretary Chollet. Sir, great question.
First, I would like to say, I believe U.S. leadership
remains indispensable. NATO is a collective security alliance;
there are 28 partners. But we are the most consequential and
important partner of that alliance.
But, second, I would say the Europeans clearly have close
interests in what is happening in Ukraine and Russia's
behavior. It is just in their neighborhood, it is much closer.
And the Europeans have stepped up in this crisis.
Chancellor Merkel, for example, of Germany has been on the
phone constantly with Putin and other senior Russian officials
to make the very same arguments we have been making about the
unacceptability of their actions. The EU, like the United
States, the EU has stepped up in terms of sanctions,
sanctioning Russian officials and other close allies of Putin
in Moscow.
That is absolutely critical, because the ties between
Europe and Russia are much stronger than the ties between the
United States and Russia. So for any sanction to be meaningful,
in terms of trying to get the attention of Russian officials,
Europe has to be absolutely involved.
That is why, when President Obama was in Europe several
weeks ago, he had a G-7 meeting on the margins of the Nuclear
Security Summit and also very important talks in Brussels and
then later in Rome about this crisis.
So I think that you are absolutely right, Europe has to be
a part of this. I wouldn't say it is more their concern than
ours. I would say it is our collective concern.
And Europeans are stepping up. I can provide for you--I
don't have it off the top of my head. I have listed for you
several examples in which the United States is contributing
capabilities in Poland or the Balts to help reassure those NATO
partners. The Europeans are doing so, as well. And we can
provide you with some specifics on what other countries are
doing to help reassure those countries that are most concerned
about Russia's behavior.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, before I close--I got 29 seconds--
I hope that the Administration--we were surprised, as Members
of Congress, when we took military action against Libya. And I
hope that if the Russians cross any line that would be of great
concern to our country, that the President and his
representatives would come to Congress and enlighten us as to
what they are concerned about.
So I ask you, sir, to make sure that that message is passed
back to the Administration.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to hear your insights on this,
especially understanding that what has gone on in Ukraine is
clearly not just about Ukraine and that we strategically really
need to look at this with what Putin's end state is and that it
is something far broader.
Mr. Chollet, you mentioned the biggest consequence--or the
biggest cost that we can affect for Russia is its economy. But
given the fact that, really, over a long period of time,
strategically, they have distributed their energy supplies and
really gotten to a point where they have a lot of leverage,
what kind of consequence, realistically, can we set in the
short term that will be meaningful and get a strong message to
Putin without having unintended negative consequences on us?
Secretary Chollet. Well, as you mentioned at the end, that
balance between ensuring we can have a consequence,
particularly in the economic realm, that would be meaningful to
Russia but not blow back on the United States is tricky
sometimes.
I think that the economic sanctions we have already
announced are going to have an effect. I think, as the
President has outlined, we could do more along those lines if
Russia's behavior continues along the course it has been on.
Third, I would not underestimate the impact of Russia's
diplomatic isolation. As we saw just several months ago with
the Winter Olympics, Mr. Putin very much enjoys the
international spotlight. And he was planning this summer to
host the G-8 [Group of Eight] leaders in Sochi. That meeting
will not happen. And Russia is finding itself more and more
alone in the world. And that will have an effect, as well.
So I think that there are steps we can take, there are
steps, as I mentioned in the previous question, that our
European allies can take and have taken to ensure that Russia
feels the pinch economically and the consequences for its
behavior but also is isolated in the world.
Ms. Gabbard. With regard to the military capabilities that
you discussed, Russia's developments and really looking towards
a more mobile special-force type operation, what can be done
for Ukraine and possibly other bordering countries?
Knowing that a tank-to-tank kind of direct, one-on-one type
of conflict is not realistic in any circumstance, how can we
assist Ukraine to better defend itself using some of these
similar unconventional means?
Secretary Chollet. We have had a pretty modest defense
relationship with Ukraine over the years. It is a little over
$4 million per year in FMF [Foreign Military Financing] that we
have provided them. So the baseline we are working from is
relatively small.
That said, as I mentioned earlier, we have had ongoing
consultations with the Ukrainians, not just about the urgent
crisis of today but their needs of tomorrow and how they are
working to reform and modernize their own military. That starts
mainly in the nonlethal space, and it is things like helping
with logistics. IMET [International Military Education and
Training] has been very important for them, the education and
exchanges, as they have tried to professionalize their
military.
So there are ways that we can help. And we are actively
working through those ideas with them, understanding that we
are starting from a pretty modest baseline of defense support
for them.
Admiral Pandolfe. I would like to concur with that. Defense
consultations were held in Kiev last week, and they looked at,
amongst other things, you know, strengthening their defense
establishment and building a program of training and exercises
to help provide the kind of skills that you are referring to.
Ms. Gabbard. Good. I look forward to hearing more about
that and, also, really, what kind of timeline is being looked
at, considering what is happening, kind of, the updates on a
minute-to-minute basis in eastern Ukraine. MREs are great and
necessary and helpful, I am sure, but I am sure there are also
many other ways that we could be of assistance in helping them
or empowering them to be able to defend themselves.
Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both of you for being here today.
I have visited Russia a number of times, and I have been
encouraged by the advance of free enterprise, of what I saw to
be a level of democracy, but it is sad to see this
extraordinary culture reverting to one-man control.
The benefits of economic freedom for Russia and its
citizens are being undermined by isolating itself from being a
law-abiding nation which is not trustworthy at home or abroad,
with uncontrolled corruption destroying jobs.
With that in mind--and, again, it is really disappointing,
because I just had such high hopes. And, indeed, we have a
significant Russian-American population in my community that is
truly in distress that things are going so badly at home with
corruption.
With that in mind, what are our NATO allies doing in
Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, reacting to
Russia's aggression toward Ukraine? What are we doing to assure
our allies and partners that the United States and NATO remain
committed to deter aggression and preserve territorial
integrity, in particularly the Baltic republics? What are we
doing?
For each of you.
Secretary Chollet. Sir, first, I would just, on your
opening comment, just to comment on that, I agree with you that
Russia is not the Soviet Union----
Mr. Wilson. No.
Secretary Chollet [continuing]. And Russia has made great
strides as a country and as a people over the last 20 years
since the end of the Cold War. And we can see the great
potential of that society. And that is why the events of the
last several months are so disappointing and so alarming.
On to the question specifically about reassuring our
partners, our close NATO allies, Poland and the Baltics, are
very concerned about what is happening in Ukraine. This is
something that--this is a nightmare unfolding for them.
And they are asking for our help. And that is why we have
taken the steps we have already taken, in terms of deploying
some assets there for exercises and training, to both send a
message but also, on the ground, help the capabilities of our
partners. That is why General Breedlove has been tasked by NATO
to look at further measures that we, as an alliance, can take,
not just the United States but the United States and our NATO
partners can take, to further reassure our allies.
And we have also stayed in very close touch at very high
levels. The Vice President was in Poland and the Baltics
several weeks ago for important consultations. Secretary Hagel,
Secretary Kerry, the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs have all been
in touch with their counterparts in the respective NATO
countries. Secretary Kerry was in Brussels last week for an
important NATO session. Secretary Hagel will be going to NATO
again in June for another important session.
So we are trying to have a constant, ongoing dialogue with
them about hearing their concerns, hearing their needs, and
trying to address those as fast as possible.
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir, I would like to just build on
that.
So, in the most immediate sense, we have sent additional
fighter aircraft to the Baltic States to reinforce those that
were there previously. We have done the same with Poland. So
there are additional aircraft flowing to both of those
locations. There has been additional tanker support sent to
provide greater coverage. There are NATO AWACS aircraft flying
orbits over Romania and Poland to provide greater situational
awareness and support for those nations, as well. So these are
the concrete steps that have been taken thus far to reassure
our NATO allies.
And, as mentioned, the Foreign Ministers, when they met
last week in Europe, directed General Breedlove to now
formulate the next set of proposals to build on those actions
and to come back to the NAC on the 15th. And he is doing that.
Mr. Wilson. And, Admiral, are the borders of the Baltic
republics and Poland well-defined and -defended?
Admiral Pandolfe. My understanding is they are well-
defined. I would rather defer discussions of defense
preparedness for the closed session.
Mr. Wilson. And I just can't imagine how important that
will be.
But, Mr. Secretary, again, the American people need to
know----
Secretary Chollet. Right.
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. That, with the drawdown of the
American military in Europe, I am concerned that this is giving
encouragement to Russia on its aggression.
I am equally concerned, the last month, not only have we
had this but we have had missile testing by North Korea. We
have had Iran continue their enrichment of nuclear weapons and
announce, in a visit by the Foreign Minister in Tokyo, that it
is an illusion that they would stop. And we have had missiles
being sent to Hamas in Gaza to threaten Israel, all in the last
month. And, plus, China has expanded its air defense zone to
threaten our allies in the Pacific.
All of this, I think, is an indication of weakness. And we
know: Peace through strength.
Thank you very much.
Admiral Pandolfe. Sir, before I would conclude my last
answer, I want to reiterate that we do have Article 5 defense
guarantees, security guarantees, with the Baltic States. That
is clearly understood. And we will stand by those.
Mr. Wilson. And Poland.
Admiral Pandolfe. And Poland, yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, the Russian military is still largely conscript.
I am all the way over here on stage left, all the way to
your right, the lonely person all the way over here.
The Russian military is largely still conscript-based. Have
we seen any changes--although they have been trying to move
towards a more professional military, an all-volunteer force,
they have yet to do that.
Have we seen any increase in the size of the conscript
call-ups? Or have there been any moves towards the mobilization
of reserve forces?
Admiral Pandolfe. The Soviet military was about 4.3 million
people. The current Russian military is less than 1 million. My
understanding is that there are some conscripts still in that
force, but there are also a number of volunteers now.
So there is not as much--I am not even--I don't even
believe it is a majority conscript force any longer. So they
have changed the complexion of the force.
As mentioned earlier, their efforts towards
professionalization of the force have had some success, yet,
not total success, because they do still rely on conscripts as
well.
To the best of my knowledge--and we could have this
followed up in the next session--I don't know of any changes in
their call-ups of late.
Mr. Enyart. It is my understanding that Russia had been
somewhat cooperative in regard to negotiations with Iran.
How is that progressing? Do you see a deterioration in that
relationship?
Secretary Chollet. We have not yet, sir. Russia has played
a role in the P5+1 [Five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council plus Germany] process with Iran. Russia also, as you
know, has been a part of the effort to get Syria's chemical
weapons out of that country.
And, so far, we have not seen any appreciable impact on
those efforts as a result of our deep differences over this
Ukraine crisis.
Mr. Enyart. I just had, immediately prior to walking into
this hearing, I had three Polish officers come visit me in my
office. And they were veterans of Afghanistan, and several of
them had served with soldiers that I used to command in the
Illinois National Guard in Afghanistan.
And I am certainly glad to hear you saying that we will
stand by our NATO commitments, and I would anticipate that we
would stand by our NATO commitments, because I assured them
that, just as they have stood by us in Iraq and in Afghanistan
for the last dozen years, that we would stand by our NATO
commitments.
As we draw out of Afghanistan, do you see that this will
free up our hand, that is, give us greater logistics capacity,
to otherwise respond in Central Europe or around the world, as
need be?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, first on Poland, I just want to
reiterate that Poland is a terrific partner of ours. We have
very, very close defense relations.
Poland is one of the European countries that is stepping up
and spending a significant amount of resources on its own
defense and seeking to modernize its military, and that is an
effort that we are helping them with.
I was with Secretary Hagel in Warsaw several months ago for
a visit, and we are looking forward to hosting the Defense
Ministry here in Washington soon. So we are in very close touch
with our Polish partners.
In terms of how retrograde out of Afghanistan may help us,
you know, that is something that we are sorting through in
terms of having that material be freed up.
One of the discussions we have ongoing--it is not related
to the Ukraine crisis, but it is related to the Afghanistan
point--is many countries around the world, not just in Europe,
talked to us about perhaps acquiring some of that equipment as
excess defense articles, as they are seeking to modernize and
replenish their militaries.
So that is something we are taking a close look at as part
of this ongoing reassessment that the admiral discussed that we
are constantly doing as a result of this crisis.
Mr. Enyart. Just one final comment, as I am almost out of
time.
But when I was frequently in Central Europe during my
previous occupation, I frequently told our NATO friends that,
in my view, when we have peace in Central Europe, we have
peace, relatively speaking, in the world. And so I think this
clearly is a very critical situation that we have to deal with.
I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry [presiding]. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander
for Europe, was in town about a week ago meeting with Members.
Loretta Sanchez and I hosted a bipartisan briefing that he
participated in. Carol Shea-Porter was with us.
And the commander publicly released to us that there were
80,000 troops that constituted--that had been mobilized by
Russia on the border of Ukraine that constituted an invasion-
ready force.
In classified setting, he went over how he gets to that
number and what it was constituted of, which, of course, I
won't go into today, but he described to us, disclosed to us,
how that number was derived.
There are a number of other numbers that are being
circulated. Ukraine says 80- to 100,000. The State Department
began to say 40-. Now the Department of Defense is saying 40-
seems to be a wild range of what those numbers are.
Quite frankly, I trust the Supreme Allied Commander General
Breedlove to know what he is facing, and he has publicly said
it is 80-.
But regardless of the wide swing of the number, Admiral, I
would appreciate it if you would give us some description or
understanding of the magnitude of that force. I think, quite
frankly, that there has not been enough public discussion, and
certainly it is something that we can discuss publicly. Google
Earth can tell you a lot about what we are seeing.
What is the magnitude of that force's capabilities?
Breedlove is describing it as an invasion-ready force. What do
you see when you look at the type of equipment capabilities
that are being amassed on the border of Ukraine?
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, like you, I spoke with General
Breedlove about this, and I will leave the numbers and how we
get to different sets of numbers for the next session, where
the intelligence experts can walk us through that.
But what General Breedlove made clear is it is a
substantial force. It is a very large force. It is
extraordinarily capable, in our estimation.
It is a combined armed force. So you have fixed-wing and
rotor-wing aircraft. You have armored units. You have
artillery. You have light infantry.
And we have seen, as part of results of the modernization
of the Russian military, their ability to employ these
different elements of military power in a synchronized and
integrated manner.
So it is a threat which we are taking very seriously.
General Breedlove, Secretary General of NATO, and others have
been very clear about this, and we are watching it very
closely.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Secretary, the--there are a number of voices that say that
we are not doing enough, Washington Post being one. This is an
editorial from the Washington Post. It says, ``President
Obama's foreign policy is based on fantasy.''
The walk-off line of the editorial is, ``As Mr. Putin
ponders whether to advance further into Eastern Ukraine, say,
he will measure the success of U.S. and allied actions, not
their statements.''
This is not a partisan statement. This is the Washington
Post. I ask that this editorial be entered into the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Turner. Sending MREs is basically expanding our school
lunch program. That is the equivalency. It certainly isn't
strong actions. I am very concerned that we are not doing
enough to actually assist the Ukrainians in giving military
advice and assistance.
If Russia does go into Ukraine and the Ukraines decide and
desire to defend themselves, certainly our advice and--both as
to what they are facing and as to their military configuration
would be important. Many people have called for that.
We definitely see a Russia that has changed course. We now
have a standing use of--authorizing use of force to Putin by
his parliament that includes areas of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, because he said all Russians
that are in non-Russian territory.
In looking at your background and working with the Dayton
Peace Accords and Holbrooke and Talbott and being from Dayton,
I have a high regard for your background and expertise.
Shouldn't we be doing more? And what else can we be doing
besides just MREs?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, thanks for your question.
First, I think we are doing a lot to support Ukraine. What
Ukraine really needs badly is help with its economy. That is
why the IMF decision was very important. That is why----
Mr. Turner. Sir, just a second.
With all due respect, their economy is going to be
irrelevant if we wait a few more weeks. Right? Because they are
just going to be----
Secretary Chollet. Well, they need urgent help. And I think
that the assistance we can provide, the Europeans can provide--
and we are grateful to the Congress for the assistance that you
have decided on--is very important, number one.
Mr. Turner. Don't you think military assistance is what
they really need if they are going to be facing an invasion,
advice, a description as to what is coming over the hill?
Secretary Chollet. So, as we discussed earlier, we had a
team in Kiev last week for defense consultation talks, a joint
civilian-military team to talk through both what they need for
this urgent crisis and what they need for the future.
And they have prioritized. Nonlethal assistance first. And
the MREs are very urgent for them. It is something that they
need. They had troops in the field who needed it because they
needed resupply. So that is meaningful to them that they are
getting this.
And we are talking through with them further requests for
support, and that is something we will be working through in
the coming days.
Mr. Thornberry. The time of the gentleman is expired.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Many of the questions that--I have already been asked. I
guess, again, I want to reiterate the point that, in our QDR,
there was very little focus on Russia.
If there is a rewrite of the QDR, what focus do you expect
in that document would be placed on Russia?
Secretary Chollet. Well, Congressman, we are not planning a
rewrite of the QDR. That said, I think that it is--as we have
acknowledged, if we were to rewrite it at this moment, there
would be some--certainly some language changes because the
world is dynamic and it is always changing and what has
happened over the last several weeks since the QDR was put to
press is very significant.
But, to repeat, I think the fundamental strategy outlined
in the QDR and the budget that the Secretary and the chairman
have outlined before you is one that will fulfill our interests
and help us respond to this crisis.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask, then. It seems that a lot of the
focus--and you keep going back to the economy and our friends
over there in needing economic support. There is also a way to
hurt the Russians right now.
I mean, their economy depends on the price of a barrel of
oil in many cases. And, you know, you have--the President
refuses to sign the Keystone Pipeline bill that, quite
honestly, would drop the price of a barrel of oil and
potentially hurt Putin.
Has that played into these discussions in any way, shape,
or form? I mean, is--the ability to drop the price of a barrel
of oil and what that would do to the Russians?
Secretary Chollet. Not at the Pentagon. That conversation
has not come up, although the discussion of how we might
further impact the Russian economy in terms of any response to
what Russia may do here on out is something that has come under
discussion.
And the President has publicly announced that he is--has
the authority to have sectorial sanctions, which could include
the Russian energy industry.
But I want to be clear that those are not necessarily cost-
free exercises in terms of our own interest. So we want to be
very careful with how we execute on something like that, but
Russia's behavior could lead us to that.
Mr. Scott. But sending F-16s and MREs--really, dropping the
price of a barrel of oil would do more to--in response to the
Russian's actions than sending F-16s and MREs, wouldn't it?
Secretary Chollet. Well, the F-16s and MREs are more about
reassuring our partners and showing them, in deed as well as
word, that we have got their back, that we are committed to
Article 5 and we are committed to working with them.
Clearly, Russia has been riding its energy industry for
many years now. So anything we might be able to do to impact
its energy sector would have an impact.
Mr. Scott. Well, what do you think--you know, what do you
think Putin thinks belongs to him? I mean, is he trying to put
the whole motherland back together?
Secretary Chollet. Again, I always hesitate to try to get
into Putin's head. He has said publicly that the collapse of
the Soviet Union was a great historical tragedy.
That is obviously something I think certainly this
Administration, all of the American people, most of the world,
disagree with.
And Russia's actions seem to indicate a view that having
client states around its periphery is in its interest. We have
a very different view.
We do not believe that decisions can be made about those
countries without those countries involved. The Ukrainian
people should have a choice for their own destiny.
We don't deny that Russia has legitimate interests and a
long history with Ukraine. It is the cradle of Russian
civilization, after all.
Mr. Scott. Okay. But----
Secretary Chollet. But there is a right way and a wrong way
to go about addressing this.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Isn't the key question whether or
not Putin stops or he has to be stopped?
Secretary Chollet. We believe that Russia's behavior at
this point, its actions in Crimea, absolutely unacceptable, and
there have been consequences.
Mr. Scott. Do you think it stops----
Secretary Chollet. Further actions, so far, we have been
very concerned about his build-up of troops on the border. So
far, those have not moved, but we are watching that very
closely and making it clear that, if his actions continue, that
there will be consequences.
Mr. Scott. Are they moving supply lines in, though?
I mean, obviously, when you put your troops forward, you
have got to put supply lines in for fuel and for food and for
other things.
Are they pushing supply lines forward so that they can keep
those troops that are at the front supplied?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, if I could, I would like to bring
that to the closed part of the session to get a greater
description of what is going on on the eastern border.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to our witnesses for being here today.
I want to, Admiral, if I could with you, delve into the
whole issue of intelligence gathering.
The recent developments with the Russian military in the
Ukrainian crisis I think bring up some very serious questions
about how we get information that allows us to take appropriate
action and be out in front of things.
So I would like to ask for your perspective, Admiral, on
the importance of intelligence gathering and how it helps
develop our strategy when a crisis such as the annexation of
Crimea occurs.
As you may know, I represent Fort Huachuca in southern
Arizona. It is home to Army Intelligence Center of Excellence,
which is an important aspect in our human intelligence
capabilities. And many of the soldiers that come through Fort
Huachuca play a critical role in DOD's [Department of
Defense's] intelligence gathering.
However, it seems to me that much of the current focus on
intelligence, Admiral, revolves around technical capabilities,
such as surveillance and reconnaissance platforms and cyber
capabilities.
Human intelligence, however, has long been a staple of our
collection capabilities, accessing populations and information
that technical approaches cannot reach.
So given the focus on tactical human intelligence, or
HUMINT, for the past 13 years in Afghanistan and Iraq, are the
current HUMINT assets in the European Command's area of
responsibility sufficiently prepared or resourced for an
Eastern European mission set?
And can you tell me, Admiral, how critical a role do these
assets have in the particular situation we are here to talk
about today between Ukraine and Russia as it continues to
develop? Admiral.
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, it is very difficult to talk about
the specifics of intelligence in an open hearing. I would be
happy, again, to take this further in the closed hearing.
Writ large, however, clearly intelligence at all levels--
strategic, tactical--of all types--technical, human--is very,
very important and it has to be worked into a holistic view of
not only what is happening, but what will happen next. And that
is an art as well as a science. And we work at it very hard.
So I will leave it at that, but I think we can pick this
theme up again later and give you more details of--that answer
your specific questions.
Mr. Barber. Yeah. I really would like to have that further
briefing. I understand that some of this cannot be discussed in
an open meeting--or an open hearing.
But, you know, there have been a lot of criticisms. Did we
know what was going on? Did we know that troops were amassing?
What did we try to do? Were we positioning ourselves? And if we
could get to that in another setting, that would be very
helpful.
And I guess the final question, Admiral, is: Do you think
the DOD budget cuts, as a main concern of all of us, the
services' personnel reductions, our Nation's strategic pivot to
the Asia-Pacific region, and the drawdown of forces in
Afghanistan--could they, do you believe, have a negative effect
on our ability and our missions for HUMINT collections
capabilities for the Eastern European area or perhaps could
they enhance it?
Admiral Pandolfe. That is a very specific question
regarding the impact of a wide set of efficiencies on a
specific area. I don't know of how these cuts would necessarily
impact that particular area in a negative way.
I can research that for you, however, and come back--take
that for the record and come back with a more focused answer.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Barber. If you could, that would be helpful.
I am concerned, as I think many Members are, that it
doesn't--a month doesn't go by that we don't have another
front, it seems, opening up.
You know, we have been dealing with Afghanistan, Iraq,
Africa, the Middle East, of course. And now we are dealing with
Russia and the Russian Federation, apparently, Putin's ambition
to rebuild the Soviet Empire.
And now our attention has to--must turn to the European
theater and the European region and how we staff it on many
levels not only in terms of troops on the ground and air assets
and Navy assets, but how we inform ourselves about what next
move this empire builder might have.
So it would be helpful if we could get a sense of where you
are headed, given what has happened in Crimea, which I think
most people 6 months ago would not have imagined would have
been going on.
So how are we positioning ourselves to deal with his future
ambitions would be helpful to know.
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir. I will get back to you on that.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Chollet, the Russians are flagrantly in violation
of the Budapest Memorandum concerning Ukraine. Russia is a
serious, strongest supporter and a consistent ally of Iran.
President Obama immediately after his election cancelled
the third site missile defense plan with Poland and the Czech
Republic, which pleased Putin.
How could President Obama's and Secretary Hillary Clinton's
highly touted Russian reset have failed so spectacularly? What
did you do wrong?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, I think even though we are very
disappointed with where we are with Russia today, we saw some
tangible impact of our policies in the first several years of
this Administration under a different Russian leadership with
President Medvedev, but the work with them on Iran, for
example, was something that was very important. We also
codified a new arms reduction agreement on nuclear forces,
which was very significant.
And even since then, we have seen Russian cooperation in
other areas, for example, on Syria in the chemical weapons
destruction process, which continues. Even despite the
turbulence of this crisis and the U.S.-Russian relationship, we
have been able to maintain our cooperation on that very, very
important issue.
So while, I think, even the President and everyone involved
in the U.S.-Russian relationship over the last several years
are not happy with where we are today, we do believe that we
had some successes early on in this Administration.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I would really question a lot of that
assessment.
And let's talk about the New START Treaty. According to
recent press reports and open sources, the Russian Federation
is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, or INF, which this Administration has known about for
some time, but has chosen to remain quiet about.
Why is the Administration covering up Russian INF treaty
violations? Is it an attempt to protect the deeply flawed New
START Treaty?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, we have--we take our treaty
obligations very seriously and we expect all of our--those who
enter into a treaty to take their obligations very seriously.
So the INF issue is something we have been studying very
closely.
I know that colleagues of ours have been talking to the
Congress throughout this process, and I know that the State
Department, which is the lead in our interagency for this
effort, will be issuing a report on this matter soon.
And perhaps some of the specifics you have referred to we
can get into in the closed session later today.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I hope that what you did wrong wasn't to
think that authoritarian regimes respond to reason rather than
to strength. I think they respond to strength better than to
reason.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you so much for being here, gentlemen.
I am a little concerned about our allies' contributions in
NATO itself. NATO clearly has a significant role to play in
this crisis. But I am concerned about its ability to leverage
its limited capabilities that it has.
In 2013, I believe, only three European nations--Estonia,
Greece, and the United Kingdom--contributed the required 2
percent or more of their GDP [gross domestic product].
Another three nations--France, Turkey, and Poland--each
gave 1.9 and 1.8 percent, respectively. We contribute
approximately 70 percent of the NATO budget.
Could you explain for us the current state of our NATO
allies' military and the current role they are playing in the
Ukrainian crisis and whether they can respond decisively, given
these levels of commitment?
Secretary Chollet. Ma'am, you have highlighted a great
concern of ours and something we have been working on for many
years, as you know, trying to work with our European partners
to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense and to try
to spend that--spend those resources wisely.
As I mentioned in a previous question--and some specifics
we can follow up with you on after this--it is not only the
United States that have been contributing some capability to
theater in the past several weeks in response to the Ukraine
crisis as a way to reassure our partners. Other countries--the
Brits, the Germans, the French, the Poles themselves--have as
well. And we can give you some of the specifics on that as part
of followup.
But it doesn't--it doesn't obviate the basic point that you
made, which is there is a capabilities gap that is widening. It
is something that many Secretaries of Defense, going back at
least to Secretary Gates, have talked about. And it is one of
the big pieces of business we are going to try to address this
summer--or this fall, in September, at the Wales NATO Summit,
how, moving forward, we can ensure that the NATO alliance
collectively, each member in its own way, can be stepping up
meaningfully to deal with security threats as they come our
way.
Ms. Duckworth. One of the components of this is the
relationship through the State Partnership Programs, something
that has been incredibly important and something that EUCOM
commander, AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] commander, Special
Forces, have all said has been a vital part of their
operations. Especially in the case of Poland, the State of
Illinois has been in the State Partnership Program with Poland
for almost 25 years now. It is one of the first in the Nation
to do that.
That is a very special relationship. That is, you know, I
watched my Polish counterparts grow up as I grew up in the
military together. And I was--I would think that, as nations
like Poland are starting to step up to take the lead among NATO
allies with what is happening in the Ukraine and in that region
of the world, that that State Partnership Program would be even
more important as we move forward.
Can you speak a little bit to the program and how you see
it changing or growing or its role in this crisis.
Secretary Chollet. The State Partnership Programs we have
with Poland--and I am very familiar with Illinois' great
cooperation with Poland over many years--but throughout Central
and Eastern Europe have paid great dividends over the years,
and these are extremely important relationships to our partner
countries.
Every single Defense Minister that comes into the Pentagon
that Secretary Hagel sees will mention the importance of the
State Partnership Program that they have, and often, as you
know, these Defense Ministers, when they visit Washington, will
also visit the State where they have a partnership.
And it is not just something that--where they have helped
with training and exercises, but they have deployed in the
field together in places like Afghanistan.
So I think it was with a great vision and foresight several
decades ago that the State Partnership Program was established.
It is something that we deeply believe in, and work to augment
and support in any way we can.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
What type of missions are our allies, the NATO allies,
performing right now? And are they adequately equipped to
perform these missions effectively in this region as part of
NATO and how are our allies forces----
Secretary Chollet. And this is in terms of the Ukraine
crisis?
Ms. Duckworth. Yes.
Secretary Chollet. Well, as I said, we can get you some
specifics on exactly what every country is contributing in
their own way. And I guess I will stress in their own way. They
are capable with what they are contributing. I think, overall,
we would like to see more capability within the alliance across
the board.
But it is not just the United States that has been stepping
up in the last several months. Other of our closest partners,
the Brits and the Germans in particular, have been working in
their own way, but also along the similar lines of us. It is
about exercises. It is about training and working with the
Balts and the Poles in particular to try to reassure them.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
Admiral Pandolfe, thank you for your 35 years, I think now,
of service to the cause of freedom.
Supreme Allied Commander General Breedlove recently stated
in regard to the Russian violation of Intermediate Range and
Nuclear Forces Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise
missile--and he said, ``This is a militarily significant
development. Weapon capability that violates the INF that is
introduced into the greater European landmass is absolutely a
tool that will have to be dealt with. It can't go unanswered.''
The recently released QDR mentions cooperation with Russia
10 times to include further reductions in our nuclear
deterrent. While it obviously was drafted before the events
unfolded in Ukraine, it was drafted with full knowledge of the
Russian INF treaty violations.
And, further, the Administration has succumbed to Russian
objections that halted the missile defense field planned for
Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic.
And given all of the present events, I mean, I am wondering
what plans or capability this Administration has, Mr. Chollet,
to counter this Russian--I mean, other than perhaps threatening
to do to the Russian economy what they have done to ours. I
mean, that is a little drastic.
But what, in terms of military capability, do we have
arrayed there that would be any deterrent to the Russian
efforts there, again, given these comments I have just made?
Secretary Chollet. Well, Congressman, we have significant
military capability in the European theater, but, also,
capability elsewhere that could be surged to the European
theater in case we were in a situation where we were
implementing our Article 5 commitment to the NATO alliance, the
collective defense commitment that we take as a member of NATO.
So--and we have been very clear with the Russians that we
take Article 5 seriously, that we are unwavering in our support
for our European partners.
And we have tried to demonstrate that unwavering support
through several of our actions, including the deployment of
some aircraft to the Baltics and Poland in particular, which is
very significant for those countries and has been warmly
welcomed and has gotten a lot of attention.
And we are considering further steps we may take to
reassure those partners and other Central and Eastern European
partners, and that is an effort that General Breedlove has
undertaken. And we expect in the next week or so he will have
some more concrete ideas that he can share with us.
Mr. Franks. Well, I won't count on that except to say that
it appears that Mr. Putin hasn't gotten the memo.
Prior to the invasion of Crimea, Russian forces were
obviously very prepared. They were trained. They were ready for
the mission. And, meanwhile, NATO forces were not.
Has this Administration arrayed forces that would be the
kind of deterrent to Russia in that region that--sort of a
follow-on to the question.
But, more importantly, how has the budgetary limitations
that may be affecting our force posture in the EUCOM--how have
you proposed to try to address that?
Secretary Chollet. And, sir, I would say it wasn't as
though we were unprepared. Ukraine, of course, is not a member
of NATO. But the NATO alliance----
Mr. Franks. But we have that little Budapest agreement with
them. I mean, you know, it is not like--I am sort of astonished
that we have stepped back from that. I mean, of course, Russia
has done so in an even more dramatic fashion.
Secretary Chollet. Yeah. And it wasn't an Article 5
agreement where there is a commitment----
Mr. Franks. So it really wasn't that big a deal. Right?
Secretary Chollet. Oh, no. It was a very big deal. And the
fact that Russia has violated every letter of that agreement is
a huge concern for us.
But we have been working very closely with our NATO
partners to ensure that they have the capability that they need
and that, if necessary, we augment that capability with our own
to make clear that the Article 5 commitment holds.
The budget environment has clearly had an impact around the
world on the U.S. military. That is no secret. And that is why
we have sought to try to do some innovative things, for
example, these rotational deployments that we launched several
years ago in Poland where F-16s and C-130s will rotate through
Poland, will exercise with our Polish partners, will train with
them, and then rotate out.
It is not a permanent presence, but it is something that,
particularly in this budgetary environment, pays great
dividends moving forward.
So we have augmented that as a result of this most recent
crisis, and we are exploring ways to further develop exercises
along those lines.
Mr. Franks. Admiral Pandolfe, would you give us just your
best insight as to what this committee and the country's
response should be related to the Ukraine crisis.
Admiral Pandolfe. I think the courses of action laid out by
Mr. Chollet make great sense. I mean, clearly, we want to
continue to provide assistance to Ukraine, and we are doing
that primarily by economic avenues.
But we are also considering--``we'' being the
Administration--other requests that they have. We are
reinforcing our NATO allies to assure them of their security,
and we are making clear to the Russians that their actions are
going to cost them and their people and their future
significantly.
I mean, their economy is now intertwined in the global
economy. It is not the Soviet Union. Their stock market is down
significantly. They can't get investment into their energy
fields, which is how they generate their income. They can't get
people to buy their debt. I mean, the future of Russia is going
to suffer because of the actions of this government.
We have made that clear and we have made clear that there
is more to come--much more to come of a more serious nature
should they continue this aggressive action contrary to their
promises and to international law.
Mr. Franks. I yield back.
Mr. Nugent [presiding]. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Smith is recognized.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to explore a little bit this option--or this
notion that, you know, there must be something more that we
could do that could cause Putin to change his mind, because I
think we all share that frustration.
He is making decisions that, as you have stated, do not
appear to be in the best interest of his own country, certainly
threatens stability. We wish we could just make him stop.
So I have a little bit of a preamble here, but then I have
a question about, you know, what more could we be doing.
Because I do want to challenge a little bit this notion that
somehow, you know, aggression always responds better to
aggression than appeasement.
I think that is what has led to many, many wars, is the
notion that we always have to ramp it up in order to show the
other side that we are serious and then, of course, the other
side is thinking, ``Well, we have to ramp it up, too, in order
to show we are serious'' and pretty soon you are at war.
I mean, you can look at World War I and that is exactly
what happened. Nobody wanted to appease anybody and, at the end
of the day, they said, ``Well, we have made this commitment. So
we just got to do it'' and millions of people died and there
was a horrific impact on Europe.
And then, of course, after World War I, you know, we could
not possibly have been more aggressive with Germany after they
were defeated. You know, we sort of pounded them economically
and in all manner of different ways and we all saw how that
turned out.
So this notion that, if we are somehow just tough enough
with an irrational adversary, that will lead to good things, is
one that I always want to make sure does not stand unchallenged
because it can lead to some very, very bad results.
Now, further, in dealing with Russia specifically, many of
the Russia experts that I talked to back in the 1990s at the
University of Washington and elsewhere felt that our decision
to expand NATO was one of the things that made Russia feel
insecure and sort of pushed them towards Putin and made Putin's
argument easy. ``See, the West is coming for us.''
Now moving into Eastern Europe and sort of caused that
backlash of the strength we showed in expanding NATO and then,
to some degree, arming some of the former Soviet satellite
states, you know, led to the reaction of Putin and his
leadership.
Now, I am not suggesting that there is any sort of easy way
to do that. I just want to counter the notion that somehow, if
you just show strength, this all goes away. There is very, very
little historical precedent for that being true.
So with that as sort of a preamble, what would we do right
now?
You know, there is frustration on the panel and everyone
else. ``We need to do more. If we just did more, if we showed
we were serious, then Putin would turn back around.''
I do always like to remind everybody that, you know, the
U.S. military was never stronger than it was in 2008. We--you
know, $700 billion a year we were spending. I think, at that
point, we were spending more money on our defense than the
entire rest of the world combined.
We had just invaded two countries and deposed their
leadership, and Putin went in and basically annexed two parts
of Georgia in the midst of that. So, obviously, strength alone
is not the answer in there. It comes with considerable risk.
So as you are looking at the options here, you know, and
people are saying, ``Do more,'' what would ``do more'' look
like?
And I have heard your answer, and I tend to agree with it,
that, basically, we are showing the Russian people that Putin's
actions are hurting them, that their economy is going down when
it wasn't that high to begin with and, eventually, that begins
to have an impact.
But if we were to sort of, you know, step back for a moment
and say, ``Let's accept this notion that somehow, if we just
appeared to be strong enough, Putin would for some reason
abandon all of his perceived interests,'' what would that look
like? What is it that we would do to show that we were ``being
stronger'' to change his calculus?
Secretary Chollet. Well, Congressman, I very much
appreciate your comment and agree with almost everything you
have said.
In terms of what we could do more, it is along the lines of
operation that we have outlined here for you this morning.
General Breedlove is currently looking at ways we can do more
to reassure our NATO partners and to explore ways that, in the
near term, but over in the medium and long term, we can
strengthen the ties that we have through NATO, improve their
military capabilities, the interoperability that the alliance
has developed over these now--this decade-plus of war together
in Afghanistan.
So that is more, and that is something we may do,
regardless of whatever Putin's next move is.
Mr. Smith. I agree with you.
But specifically to the Ukraine, I mean, what you just
described are sort of the options that are considered not
enough.
But where the Ukraine is concerned, I mean, have you
seriously considered, you know, arming the Ukraine specifically
and say, ``Hey, Russia is coming. We are going to start arming
you to the teeth and fight a proxy war with them''?
Secretary Chollet. So our overall approach throughout this
entire crisis has been we seek to deescalate tensions and that,
as the President has been very clear about, there is not a
military solution to the Ukrainian crisis.
That said, we have been in very close touch with our
Ukrainian counterparts throughout the crisis and most recently
last week with an expert team in Kiev, talking with them about
the urgent needs they have, but, also, their medium- to long-
term plan for their own military modernization and reform,
which has a ways to go. Let's be honest.
Mr. Smith. Right. That is an understatement.
Secretary Chollet. So there is certainly more we can do.
And what we are doing is trying to be thoughtful and work
through with them on what the next steps may be.
Now, whether or not that has any effect on Mr. Putin's
mindset is anyone's guess, but it also just may be the right
thing to do, anyway.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. No. I think it is the right thing to do,
anyway.
But Mr. Putin's mindset, I can't see it having an impact.
His mindset is based on--you know, I think has been correctly
described that, basically, he wants to build a--he wants to
return Russia to its glory, basically.
His mistake is in perceiving how to do that. The
devastating and economically annexing small parts of the former
Soviet Union are not going to lead to that result. And I think
what we have to do is convince him of that.
Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Nugent. Mr. Coffman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you so much, both of you, for your dedicated
service to our country.
I was in the United States Army's 1st Armored Division in
the early 1970s, along to fill the gap in then West--the West
German-Czechoslovakian border, and it was really a great
demonstration of peace through strength in terms of, I think,
what was a very effective containment policy, containment
doctrine, in terms of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies.
And it seems that we were lulled in--and justifiably so--in
the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union that NATO had
to--NATO needed a new mission. NATO had to be repurposed. And
so we looked at deploying NATO to places like Afghanistan.
It seems like now we need to take NATO back to its original
purpose of being a buffer to Russian expansion in the region.
And so, first of all, I commend you in terms of your
comment by saying that, you know, it is rotational forces. It
is joint military exercises as opposed to the reestablishment
of a large U.S. military permanent presence that we had in
Western Europe when I was there.
I think we can more effectively demonstrate our support for
our NATO allies, but I am concerned--and this was raised
earlier in testimony--about the commitment of our allies--our
NATO allies.
And we, in terms of exercising U.S. leadership, need to
convince our allies that they need to step up to the plate in
terms of defense spending, that this cannot be on--the burden,
on the backs, of the U.S. military and U.S. taxpayers.
And so what can we do to get our NATO allies to be the
necessary force multiplier in order to be that buffer to
Russian expansion by at least going to 2 percent of gross
domestic--of defense--GDP spending, 2 percent as a minimum?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, first, thank you for your service
in Europe and elsewhere.
And you have, you know, put your finger on what is the key
issue, and it is something that we have been working for many
years, but, also, have been frustrated by for many years, which
is the defense spending and capabilities of some of our NATO
partners.
And that Article 5 commitment has always remained the
cornerstone of the NATO alliance. Even over the last two
decades, there was--NATO has gone out of area, whether first in
the Balkans, counter-piracy mission, but, of course, most
notably in Afghanistan.
So we work very closely with our partners to try to
encourage them and, also, help them make the case to their own
publics about spending greater resources on defense.
We at the Defense Department try to work with our defense
colleagues around NATO countries to help them make smart
decisions about what systems to buy and how we might be able to
help them think through that.
I also think this is an area where the Congress and all of
you on the committee and your counterparts in the House and
over on the Senate side have a very important role to play as
well.
Because, as you know, these are political decisions in
these NATO democracies, political decisions about how much
money and resources to spend. And the European economies have
been suffering as much or, in many cases, way more than the
United States economy.
And so working with your counterparts to help make the case
for why it is important for all 28 NATO allies, not just the
United States and a handful of others, to maintain that 2
percent threshold and a strong robust spending on defense.
But there is no silver bullet here. This is not something
that we are going to be able to solve with one speech or one
effort.
It is something that we are constantly working on, whether
it is bilaterally or whether it is the NATO summit this
September in Wales in which capabilities will be a big theme of
the summit in Wales.
And I think the Ukraine crisis, if anything else--if there
is a silver lining to anything that has happened here, it has
helped remind everyone of the importance of the Transatlantic
Partnership and NATO specifically, but also been a reminder to
all of us and our European partners in particular about the
importance of having a strong defense and spending the
necessary resources that have that.
Mr. Coffman. I am running out of time here, but I want to
make a statement here that I had met with the ambassador from
Hungary to the United States just prior to the Russian
incursion into Crimea.
And what he informed me that the most important thing that
the United States could do would be to export LNG, or liquefied
national gas, to break the Russian hold on Europe in terms of
its dependence on energy resources.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Nugent. Dr. Wenstrup is recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Do you have concerns that Russia could restrict the parts
that are needed for the helicopters that have been sold to the
Afghan National Security Forces?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, we do.
Dr. Wenstrup. And so how are we approaching that, if we are
at all, to try to assure that the Afghan forces will be
adequately taken care of?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, you are touching on an issue that
we thought a lot about and I know we talked with you and this
committee about, and that is the Russian supply of the Mi-17
helicopters, which is a critical capability for the Afghan
National Security Forces [ANSF] as they are seeking to develop.
And that is why we have been very mindful and careful when
we have gone about contemplating certain sanctions to ensure
that our other interests, a strong ANSF in Afghanistan, are
being served.
So we have an existing contract with a Russian entity that
is supplying those Mi-17 helicopters. We are seeking to
complete that contract and expedite it as much as possible and,
if necessary, look for ways to mitigate any sort of disruption
in the supply.
Dr. Wenstrup. What is our role in that supply line? I mean,
will they--the maintenance of these aircraft, is that coming
directly from Russia? Is it coming through us? What is our role
in that negotiation?
Secretary Chollet. Sir--and I want to get back to you more
specifically, but my understanding is our role is in support of
the ANSF, but it is the Russians who actually have the
knowledge of how to operate these aircraft and maintain them.
Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I would think certainly within our
military we have people that are familiar with those aircraft.
So my question is: Are we part of that supply line? Is it
coming through U.S. means and then being delivered to the
Afghans or are they getting it directly?
Secretary Chollet. Yeah. I don't--sir, I want to get back
to you specifically.
Dr. Wenstrup. Sure.
Secretary Chollet. I don't believe so. I think it is--we
are not part of that supply line. But we could get back to you
with more specifics on how that actually works.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 63.]
Dr. Wenstrup. Sure. Obviously, we have a vested interest in
their success and being able to maintain that.
You know, the other question I had--and maybe you can't
answer that--but, you know, we have had this dual effort with
the space station with the Russians and especially since we
have stopped the Space Shuttle.
Where is that in all of this picture going on today, if you
have any insight on that?
Secretary Chollet. Sir, if we could take that one for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 63.]
Dr. Wenstrup. If you would, I would appreciate it. Thank
you.
And I have no further questions. I yield back.
Mr. Nugent. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. No.
Mr. Nugent. We appreciate it.
Gentleman, I am going to hold my questions until the
classified briefing. But I do appreciate your time that you
spent here answering questions for the committee. And with
that, we adjourn.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 8, 2014
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 8, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 8, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 8, 2014
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP
Secretary Chollet. NASA and Roscosmos will continue to work
together to maintain the safe and continuous operation of the
International Space Station (ISS), where humans have lived continuously
for more than 13 years. The success of the ISS program depends on the
mutual dependence of all partners, and reflects the unique
contributions each partner provides in support of the program. We
believe that it is in the interest of all the ISS partners to continue
our normal operational and programmatic cooperation, and not to allow
disruption of any of the activities that have maintained a continuous
human presence on orbit for more than a decade. I defer additional
questions regarding the ISS to NASA. [See page 36.]
Secretary Chollet. Sir, I agree with you that we have a vested
interest in the success of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF);
the rotary-wing capability we are building for them around the Mi-17
helicopter is critical to this success.
Because the Department of Defense (DOD) is investing a substantial
amount of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds and DOD counternarcotics
funds in the procurement and sustainment of the Afghan fleet, DOD asked
the Department of the Army to establish the Project Manager-Non-
Standard Rotary-Wing Aircraft (PM-NSRWA) under Program Executive
Office-Aviation in 2010. PM-NSRWA serves as the life-cycle manager for
Afghanistan's Mi-17s and is our lead entity for interfacing with the
Mi-17 supply line.
Because the Mi-17 is a Russian-made helicopter, the manufacturing
is performed in Russia and the parts supply line originates
predominantly with Russian companies. For procurements of new aircraft,
PM-NSRWA contracts with Rosoboronexport (ROE) rather than the
manufacturer because we are buying military variants, and Russian
defense exports must go through ROE. For maintenance, spare parts
procurement, and overhauls of the Mi-17s, PM-NSRWA contracts with U.S.
companies, which then use subcontractors to buy spare parts mainly from
the Russian manufacturers to ensure they obtain certified parts and to
perform overhauls at Russian-certified overhaul facilities.
Using Russian-certified parts and overhaul facilities is important
to maintaining official Russian airworthiness certification of the
aircraft, which ensures that our air advisors--who are crucial to
developing Afghan aviation capability--are flying on well-maintained
aircraft. To support airworthiness certification of the aircraft, PM-
NSRWA also contracts with the Mi-17 manufacturer for engineering
services to ensure the manufacturer has cognizance of the aircraft. PM-
NSRWA also contracts for technical bulletins about the aircraft. [See
page 36.]
[all]