[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE ONGOING STRUGGLE AGAINST BOKO HARAM
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 11, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-220
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana--5/20/14
noon deg.
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin--5/
29/14 noon deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council.. 8
Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe, manager, Justice for Jos Project, Jubilee
Campaign USA................................................... 27
Mr. Anslem John-Miller, representative to the U.S., Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People............................... 56
The Honorable Robin Renee Sanders, chief executive officer,
FEEEDS Advocacy Initiative (former United States Ambassador to
Nigeria)....................................................... 67
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 13
Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe: Prepared statement........................... 31
Mr. Anslem John-Miller: Prepared statement....................... 61
The Honorable Robin Renee Sanders: Prepared statement............ 72
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 100
Hearing minutes.................................................. 101
Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe: Information on Boko Haram attacks............ 102
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations: Remarks by Dr. Zuhdi Jasser of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom.................. 107
THE ONGOING STRUGGLE AGAINST BOKO HARAM
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. Since November 2013, the U.S. Government has
declared Boko Haram and its affiliate, Ansaru, to be Foreign
Terrorist Organizations. This supposedly provides further tools
with which to fight such organizations and their sponsors.
However, an administration that resisted the FTO designation
for so long continues to downplay its significance. This
hearing is intended to provide information on that reluctance
on obstacles to our effective security and our military
assistance to the Nigerian Government in its antiterror fight.
Boko Haram is a Nigerian terrorist group whose name in
Arabic is ``People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet's Teaching and Jihad.'' The name Boko Haram is from
Hausa meaning that conventional education, boko, is forbidden.
According to various reports, Boko Haram began in 2003 when
about 200 university students and unemployed youth created a
camp in Yobe State near the Niger border to withdraw from what
they considered to be corrupt, sinful and unjust Nigerian
Government, and their community was supposedly founded on
Islamic law. The group was then known as the Nigerian Taliban.
Violent clashes with Nigerian security forces nearly
destroyed the group several times, but it charismatic leader,
Mohammed Yusuf, kept the group alive until his death while in
police custody in July 2009. Since Yusuf's death there have
been various spokesmen. Abubakar Shekau is now considered to be
the leader. Furthermore, a breakaway group known as Ansaru has
appeared on the scene, but still coordinates with the original
Boko Haram.
Because of its repeated attacks against Christian targets
during holy days such as Christmas and Easter, Boko Haram is
seen by some as principally an anti-Christian organization.
This past year alone, Boko Haram terrorists are believed to
have killed more than 1,000 Christians in Nigeria. In fact, it
is estimated that more than 60 percent of Christians killed
worldwide because of religious intolerance die in Nigeria.
However, it would not be a completely accurate
interpretation of the facts to assume that what is happening in
Nigeria is just a Muslim-Christian conflict. The kidnapping of
nearly 300 Nigerian schoolgirls in the Borno State, town of
Chibok, on April 14, has caught the attention finally of the
international community, albeit 2 weeks after the incident.
However, the kidnapping of 8 additional girls after that has
been an afterthought; and the kidnapping of another 20 women
last week has yet to receive much notice.
Prior to the April kidnappings, Boko Haram had generally
killed boys, but let girls go, warning them to go home and give
up their dreams of education. There have been previous
incidents, however, in which girls have been kidnapped, though
not in large numbers as in Chibok.
Now Boko Haram leaders realize that kidnapping girls gets
worldwide publicity; and whether these girls are recovered or
not, and God willing they will be, they know that they can do
this again and get publicity for their nefarious group. The
very news media used to galvanize pressure on Nigeria to obtain
freedom of the kidnapped girls is being used by Boko Haram to
brag of its ability to disrupt social society and taunt
Nigerians and their government about their ability to take
women and girls away.
Several videos--and I have watched them; I am sure many of
you have as well--purportedly of the kidnapped Chibok girls
have been released, echoing previously used al-Qaeda tactics in
this regard.
In the past 2 years, our subcommittee has sent a staff
delegation to investigate the Boko Haram threat, and this past
September Greg Simpkins, our subcommittee staff director, and I
visited Abuja and Jos to further look into the matter. And,
frankly, we went to firebombed churches. We met with Archbishop
Kaigama as well as Muslim leaders in Jos and had very, very
eye-opening meetings with the survivors, some of whom had lost
limbs, certainly they had lost loved ones to these
firebombings.
Just on Monday I returned from another 4 days in Abuja
where I took time and met with a number of victims who had
suffered so much, as well as government leaders. Last week in
Abuja, one of the Chibok girls who escaped early on in the
ordeal met with our delegation. This brave young woman has
suffered so much and was clearly traumatized and in emotional
pain. You could hear it in her voice, you could see it in her
eyes as she sat motionless recounting her story, yet she spoke
not of herself, but of her concern for her friends and her
classmates who remain in captivity.
I met with a Muslim father of two girls abducted from the
Chibok school. Fighting back tears, he said the agony was
unbearable. Again, this is a Muslim father. The story of his
daughters underscored the fact that Boko Haram brutalizes
Muslims as well.
I also met with another Boko Haram victim, including a
Christian mother of two, whose two daughters were abducted back
in February 2012. She told us her husband was shot on the spot.
Three months later they took the two daughters and abducted
them. And then 3 months later Boko Haram gunmen returned and
asked if her son had converted to Islam. When she said no, they
shot him on the spot and killed her son. Again through her
tears, which were almost uncontrollable, she recounted the
horror of losing a husband, a son, and having two of her
daughters kidnapped.
We have wasted more than a year not using all of our tools
because of the specious argument that doing so would provide
publicity to terrorists. And now the administration is
downplaying what the FTO designation can, indeed, accomplish.
There must be a robust use of the benefits of this designation
if we are to be successful in the battle against terrorism in
Nigeria.
The three criteria for an organization to be declared an
FTO are that it must be a foreign organization; it must be
engaged in terrorist activity; and it must threaten the
security of the United States nationals, U.S. national
security, or the economic interests of the United States.
Clearly Boko Haram and Ansaru meet the test, and, again, that
is why I introduced H.R. 3209 last year to urge the
administration to declare Boko Haram a foreign terrorist
organization.
I want to point out that the meetings with our Embassy
people were very fruitful, and I want to applaud them for their
diligence and for their commitment both on the intelligence
side, on the training side of just a small but not
insignificant group of Nigerians, particularly in
counterinsurgency, as well as humanitarian efforts that they
have embarked upon to try to help those who are suffering so
much.
Boko Haram and Ansaru do wage attacks on the Nigerian
Government as we all know, and they also have domestic targets
as well. Nevertheless, their actions prove their participation
in the global jihad movement that wages violent war worldwide
to establish their skewed version of Islam as a prevailing
religion globally.
Various actions such as to the bombing of the U.N. office
way back in 2011 in Abuja and numerous statements from Boko
Haram spokesmen indicate that there is this international
intent, and sadly they are growing. They are not diminishing;
they are growing. This international focus has been confirmed
by American and Nigerian intelligence. In fact, there was at
least one American present during the U.N. office bombing in
2011 which we would have hoped the administration would have
acknowledged. I and members of our full committee asked that
question as recently as a hearing that was held, chaired by
Chairman Royce.
When then-Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson told us in a
July 2012 hearing on Nigeria that Boko Haram's attacks were
caused mostly by an animus against the Nigerian Government, I
believe he was wrong in the apportionment of cause and effect.
There is a tremendous animus toward the Nigerian Government and
an effort to embarrass President Jonathan; however, Boko Haram
is determined to convert or kill Christians and Muslims that
they believe oppose them.
Poverty did not create Boko Haram. That would be an insult,
I would suggest respectfully, to the poor. Religious
fanaticism, however, is what it is underlying and it is
foundational.
Underdevelopment in northern Nigeria provides fodder for a
level of discontent with the Federal Government. It provides at
least tacit northern support for anyone opposing the
government. If northern Nigeria were its own country, it would
be among the poorest, least educated, least healthy countries
in the entire world.
Largely due to the terrorist violence in the north, an
estimated 3.3 million Nigerians are displaced, making Nigeria
the world's third largest displaced population behind only
Syria and Colombia. Many of those displaced people are farmers,
which will certainly disrupt the next harvest and further
impoverish Nigeria's suffering people. Yet the blame for
perennial lack in development in northern Nigeria should not be
heaped on the Federal Government alone. We have been told that
northern states have money for development, and one national
legislator from the north acknowledged that each member of
Nigeria's Parliament has at least $1 million--not Nigerian
naira, but American dollars equivalent--at his or her disposal
for his constituent services. National and state governments in
Nigeria have to be pushed to do more on development with money
they already have.
Finally, it is imperative that we provide the training and
support for Nigerians to develop their own capacity to help
Nigeria end the Boko Haram threat. The Leahy law, which forbids
U.S. support to military and security forces involved in human
rights violations, is seen as an obstacle, to some extent, to
achieving that goal, and I say that as someone who has been
very supportive of the Leahy amendments both for DoD and the
State Department over the many years.
In this hearing room 15 years ago, when Indonesia was
matriculating from Suharto to Habibie, and we were training the
Kopassus group, an elite group of Indonesians, we had no idea
which ones we trained and whether or not they were out there
doing urban guerilla warfare and shooting people in Jakarta
when violence erupted there. So there is a need for the Leahy
law, but it has to be very carefully looked at so that fine
infantry and soldiers who have the capability to be leaders are
not screened out, and therefore diminishing the ability of the
Nigerians to wage an effective campaign against Boko Haram.
I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague Ms.
Bass for opening comments.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. As always, I
thank you for your leadership of this subcommittee and for
convening today's hearing.
I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses, and
I look forward to hearing your perspectives on the ongoing
crisis in northern Nigeria, including an assessment of Boko
Haram's recent activities; the U.S., Africa Union, and
international efforts to locate the kidnapped girls and
mitigate the threat of Boko Haram; and what is ultimately at
stake if efforts to quell the group's heinous crimes are not
implemented with sufficient resources and all deliberate speed.
Since the April 15 kidnapping of nearly 300 girls by armed
militants, international attention from both advocates and the
international community has been focused on locating the girls
as well as addressing the overarching security challenges
caused by Boko Haram.
Following President Obama's initial condemnation of the
attacks and kidnappings, the U.S. Government committed to
provide technical and logistical support in the effort to
locate the missing girls and support the Government of Nigeria
in addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram. These efforts
began with a joint assessment mission to Nigeria led by the
AFRICOM Commander David Rodriguez and the State Department's
Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights. Following the assessment, a multidisciplinary
U.S. team was deployed to Nigeria, including military and law
enforcement personnel capable of sharing with the Nigerians
expertise in intelligence, investigations, hostage negotiating,
and victim assistance.
U.S. military assistance to Nigeria, I understand, is
currently focused on military professionalization, peacekeeping
support and training, and border and maritime security. This
includes providing commercial satellite data and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support to Nigeria's military,
and the two governments reached an intelligence-sharing
agreement in mid-May. To further support this effort, President
Obama has deployed approximately 80 U.S. military personnel to
neighboring Chad to contribute to the rescue efforts.
I know that a lot has been said about the State
Department's initial reticence to designate Boko Haram as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization, and as I understand there were
several practical reasons to avoid such a designation in the
past. The practical effects of the designation were few, I
believe, given limited information suggesting material support
for the group from individuals in U.S. jurisdiction. It is my
understanding that they have raised most of their money from
committing local crimes.
Many U.S. officials cautioned also, as the chairman stated,
that the FTO designation might actually serve as a recruitment
and fundraising tool. Additionally, some global
counterterrorism experts have made similar arguments about
potential complications related to the FTO designation,
suggesting a designation could inadvertently give additional
visibility and credibility to a group among international
Jihadists, or could make the operations of U.S.-based relief
agencies in Boko Haram areas more difficult. Given the
religious component to the conflicts in northern Nigeria, some
experts also cautioned against that designation on the grounds
that it could fuel perceptions that the U.S. was taking sides
between Muslims and Christians.
These and other concerns related to the designation were
shared by State Department officials, according to former
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie
Carson.
It should be noted that the FTO designation primarily
triggers the freezing of any assets a group might have in U.S.
financial institutions, bans FTO members' travel to the U.S.,
and criminalizes transactions with the organization, but does
not convey authorization for direct U.S. military action
against a terrorist group.
Since the designation, however, was made in November 2013,
it is unclear if it has had any impact on Boko Haram's
financing as the extent to which they raise funds from abroad
is also unclear.
As we prepare to hear from today's witnesses, I hope we can
learn critical lessons from the vast experience and use them to
move forward to increase support for the most effective
measures that bring an end to the scourge of Boko Haram in
northern Nigeria. I am committed to working toward this end and
look forward to working with my colleagues in Washington and on
the continent to find the most effective and sustainable
solutions.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass.
I would now like to yield to Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am ready to get
going.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking
Member Bass for calling this timely hearing.
Obviously, the grave situation of the nearly 300 girls,
that were kidnapped near Chibok is something that continues to
distress many of us. You know, according to the United Nations,
we have seen over 500 schools that have been destroyed in
northern Nigeria by Boko Haram, leaving over 15,000 students
without access to education and scores more, thousands more,
who are now really fearful about obtaining that education. And,
you know, it is those acts of terrorism that started to drive
folks from just a normal civilized life.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on what more
we could do to help better support those within Nigeria, but
then also, you know, when Ranking Member Bass touched on
sources of funding, better funding of Boko Haram, you know, if
I read some of the reports from Nigerian troops and so forth,
many of them feel as though, you know, again, if I were to
trust the reports, that they are underequipped compared to the
Boko Haram troops and forces; so, you know, if they are going
into the north and into some of the more difficult terrain to
fight against one of the more better-equipped armies in
Nigeria.
One thing that we could do short of actually sending troops
in would be to look for those sources of funding, and look for
those foreign sources of funding, and try to as effectively as
possible address the sources that are funding the Boko Haram
troops and their equipment.
In addition, I think I stand with Chairman Smith and
Ranking Member Bass and the members of this subcommittee that
we are committed to doing what we can as the people of the
United States working with the international community to
continue to aggressively address and fight the terrorism that
is coming out of Boko Haram.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Bera, thank you very much.
Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Bass, for holding today's hearing on this very important issue.
And even though we are working, obviously, together with some
of our international partners to secure the return of hundreds
of girls kidnapped by Boko Haram to their homes and to their
families, we continue to learn of additional heinous acts
perpetuated by this terrorist organization. In fact, earlier
this week it was reported that Boko Haram brazenly abducted an
additional 20 girls just miles away from the site of the
kidnapping in April.
This continued terrorization and intimidation is something
that no civilized society can tolerate, and certainly we all
agree no child in the world should live in fear of being
kidnapped, forced into marriage, slavery, or killed solely
because they pursue an education or practice of a different
religious faith.
With an estimated 5,000 people killed by Boko Haram-related
violence, it is incredibly important that the international
community continue to strongly condemn these actions, and
remain focused on this terrorist group, and work together to
hold Boko Haram accountable for these really despicable
actions.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about
our efforts to respond to the horrific violence of Boko Haram
and to doing all that we can to respond to the crisis in
northern Nigeria. I thank the witnesses for being here, and I
yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. I yield to my friend Mr. Stockman.
Mr. Stockman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just quick comments, and then I thank you for coming before
us today.
One of my concerns is, which I expressed to the chairman,
is the interpretation of some Nigerians regarding United States
efforts. And I would think that we are transparent, but
apparently there are some that believe we have ulterior motives
for helping. I can assure you, regarding the chairman, that his
sole purpose has been throughout the world is his compassion
for others, and that if the leadership or anyone in Nigeria
interprets our help or wanting to help as anything other than
that, then it is incorrect. And I am a little bit alarmed at
the way it is being portrayed, and I can assure you from our
standpoint, our motives are there to help and not to have a
political agenda.
The other thing I am concerned about, which I would like to
get answers to, I don't know if it is a proper forum or we have
to have a closed hearing, but I would like to know what kind of
weapons. It is my understanding that some of the weapons from
Libya have made it into the hands of the terrorists, and, if
so, how many weapons and how much? Do we have any comprehensive
count of what has ended up in their hands and how they are
being used?
If that is the case, everybody knows Libya was an armed
camp. Ghadafi kept many weapons. For us to sit by and pretend
that the terrorists don't have weapons or weapons that could be
harmful to Nigeria, I think, is a mistake. People say the best
way that you can cure alcoholism is by first admitting you are
an alcoholic; but if we don't have an understanding admitting
that we have a problem, then we can never cure the problem. And
I think we need some honest debate, not criticism--we are not
here to criticize--but honest debate on what is going on so we
can help.
Mr. Chairman, I think our intentions here today are to find
out how we can help in the proper way and not being offensive,
not being a big foot, a big print, but doing something that is
real and not interpreted in a negative way. And with that,
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Smith. I would like to now introduce our very
distinguished panel, beginning first with Dr. Peter Pham, who
is the director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in
Washington. He is the incumbent vice president of the
Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa, an
academic organization that represents more than 1,000 scholars,
and is editor-in-chief of the organization's Journal of the
Middle East and Africa.
Dr. Pham was the winner of the 2008 Nelson Mandela
International Prize for African Security and Development. He
has authored half a dozen book chapters concerning Somali
piracy, terrorism, and stabilizing fragile states, as well as
more than 80 articles in various journals.
We will then hear from Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe, who is the
manager of the Justice for Jos Project at the Jubilee Campaign,
and an experienced attorney specializing on international
matters focusing on Nigeria. Exiled to the U.S. after becoming
a political detainee during the brutal years of Nigeria's
military dictatorship, Mr. Ogebe has played a key role in
shaping U.S. policy toward Nigeria and its quest for democracy.
He has experience in managing, designing, and implementing
complex international projects and programs in Nigeria.
Mr. Ogebe is presently practicing as a legal consultant on
Nigeria admitted to the Washington, DC, bar. He holds the
distinction of being the first specialist on Nigeria out of
100,000 lawyers licensed in Washington, DC.
Then we will here from Mr. Anslem Dornubari John-Miller who
served as the chairman of the National Caretaker Committee of
the National Union of Ogoni Students, as well as the Movement
for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the parent body under
which the Ogoni nonviolenct struggle for environmental and
social justice is being carried out. While in a refugee camp in
Benin, he founded the National Union of Ogoni Students, where
he educated the public on the situation of the Ogoni and drew
attention to the plight of the refugees who are predominantly
students and youth.
Once resettled in the United States in 1996, he continued
his work for the Ogoni people, where his efforts resulted in
the resettlement of over 1,000 families in the United States.
And then we will hear from Ambassador Robin Renee Sanders,
who is CEO of FEEEDS Advocacy Initiative and owns FE3DS, both
of which craft economic development and business strategies for
African countries. In these organizations, she focuses on food
security, education, the environment, energy, economic
development and self-help programs, particularly for small and
medium enterprises. Prior to this she served as U.S. Ambassador
to Nigeria and the Republic of Congo, and was the U.S.
Permanent Representative to ECOWAS, the Economic Community of
West African States. She has served twice as the Africa
Director at the National Security Council at the White House.
This is a very distinguished panel, and we look forward to
your insights and recommendations.
Dr. Pham.
STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA CENTER,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I would like to
thank you not only for the specific opportunity to testify
before you today on the subject of the ongoing struggle against
Boko Haram, but also thank you for the sustained attention
which the Committee on Foreign Affairs, this subcommittee, and
other Members of the U.S. House have given to this challenge.
In it is oversight capacity, the House on this issue has
been very much ahead of the curve. The very first congressional
hearing on Boko Haram was in 2011, at which I had the privilege
of testifying; at that time Boko Haram was considered so
obscure that all of the participants at that event could have
been convened in the proverbial broom closet. Sadly, our
analysis proved prescient, and rather than fading away, Boko
Haram today poses an even greater menace to Nigeria and its
people, their neighbors, and, indeed, the international
community as a whole.
With your permission, I will present a summary of my
current assessment of Boko Haram and then ask my prepared
statement be entered into the record of this hearing.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, your full statement and that
of all the witnesses and any extraneous material you would like
included in the record will be made a part of the record.
Mr. Pham. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, the emergence of Boko
Haram cannot be understood without reference to the social,
religious, economic, and political milieu of northern Nigeria
which have been marked by persistent corruption and relatively
few improvements in socioeconomic indicators of well-being
since the restoration of constitutional order to the country,
leaving many communities in the north with the perception that
they are falling further behind their counterparts. This has
given Boko Haram's message calling for a radical transformation
of Nigerian society a wide resonance across the region even if
the tactics the group has adopted are repugnant to the
overwhelming majority of Nigerians irrespective of their ethnic
identification or religious affiliation.
In this context the group proved a useful instrument for
the ambitions of certain politicians in northeastern Nigeria,
including Ali Modu Sheriff, who availed himself of the support
of the group's leaders and their organization in his successful
2003 bid for the governorship of Borno State, and subsequently
appointed a prominent Boko Haram member, Alhaji Buji Foi, to
his cabinet as State Commissioner of Religious Affairs during
his first term, thus giving the sect access to not only not
inconsiderable public resources, but also public persona.
Eventually the group's relations with state and local
authorities soured, tensions escalated, until, as you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in 2009 security forces moved against
the group. Founder Mohammed Yusuf was captured and shot, and
not before more than 700 people were killed, numerous public
buildings, including government offices, police stations,
schools and churches, were destroyed.
With most of its leaders as well several prominent backers
dead, the group receded from public attention, and a number of
analysts even argued that it was finished. But far from being
dead, the group underwent a dramatic transformation with help
from foreign Jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda in Islamic
Maghreb and al-Shabaab, emerging in what might be described as
version 2.0, adopting one of the most deadly instruments in the
Jihadist arsenal, the suicide bomb, and via attacks in 2011 of
the Nigerian police force and United Nations headquarters in
Abuja, demonstrating itself capable of carrying out attacks far
from its usual areas of operation.
2012 proved to be another significant milestone in Boko
Haram's evolution. While foreign links were a critical part of
its ideological and operational shift from version 1.0 to the
far more lethal 2.0, the takeover of northern Mali by various
al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militant groups at the end of March
2012 provided a whole new set of opportunities leading to what
I might term version 3.0.
During the nearly 10 months in which AQIM and its allies
held sway over northern Mali, Boko Haram was able to set up a
number of bases in the territory where hundreds of recruits
received ideological instruction, as well as weapons and other
training that subsequently raised its tactical sophistication
and operational tempo of Boko Haram's attacks in Nigeria,
elevating the group to the level of a full-fledged insurgency.
Following the French-led intervention in Mali, the
militants, possibly accompanied by a few foreign nationals,
returned to northern Nigeria not only with training and some
combat experience in desert warfare, but also vehicles and
heavy weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles. Within weeks
Boko Haram fighters were raiding military barracks for even
more weapons; staging increasingly bold prison breaks;
destroying numerous schools, hospitals and other government
buildings; and engaging the Nigeria military in pitched open
battles, and in some cases totally overrunning border towns.
By the middle of 2013, the militants had effectively
evicted Nigerian Government troops and officials from at least
10 local government areas along the borders of Niger, Chad, and
Cameroon, and set themselves up as the de facto authority in
the region, often replacing Nigerian flags with their own
banner, taxing and otherwise ordering citizens about, and
creating a large area roughly the size of the State of Maryland
within which they operated with even greater impunity.
The foreign influence is discernible in the proliferation
of the kidnappings for ransom, abductions being almost a
signature trait now. The kidnapping victims now have included
not only the schoolgirls from Chibok, but previously a French
family of seven, subsequently freed after the payment of a
ransom of $3 million reportedly and the release by Cameroonians
of some 16 Boko Haram members; a French priest, two Italian
priests, and a Canadian nun, all of whom were subsequently
freed; and, more recently, 10 Chinese citizens abducted from a
work site in northern Cameroon and still missing.
Kidnapping for ransom, not only of higher-profile foreign
nationals, but hundreds of Nigerians whose families have had to
offer more modest payments, with most being reported in the
order of $10,000 to $20,000, although more than $\1/4\ million
has been paid for more prominent abductees, represent only part
of the funding stream for Boko Haram, which is rather
diversified. As I previously noted, the group enjoyed a
partnership with state and local politicians as recently as 6
or 7 years ago and, thanks to these well-placed supporters,
appears to have benefited from public resources. There is
reason to believe that even after the uprising and suppression
of the group in 2009, some political actors funneled resources
to it, albeit for a slightly different calculus than earlier
politicians. Some cells have also been accused of carrying out
bank robberies and other such, although the extent to which
these crimes were committed by and for the benefit of Boko
Haram as opposed to being criminal acts blamed on the group is
subject of some debate.
Two key aspects to bear in mind are that Boko Haram has
developed a very diversified and resilient model for supporting
itself, and that as it increasingly takes on more and more the
character of an insurgency, it can essentially live off the
land with very modest additional resources required, both
factors rendering efforts to cut off funding particularly
challenging.
On the other hand, in a region where more than two-thirds
of the population lives on less than $1 a day, the funding, no
matter how modest, can go very far. For example, it is widely
known that Boko Haram leaders pay Almajiri youth literally
pennies a day to track and report on troop movements and in
some cases to move weapons around.
A comprehensive strategy is therefore required to respond
to the burgeoning threat posed by Boko Haram, some of the
elements of which would include, first, invest in better
information and analysis.
Secondly, encourage the Nigerian Government to deal
forthrightly with the threat. Over the years the somewhat
lackadaisical attitude that some senior Nigerian officials have
taken toward Boko Haram has been perplexing. It should be noted
that not only has the Nigerian military been largely
ineffectual in its efforts to contain the insurgency, some
military units spearheading the fight against Boko Haram such
as the Army's 7th Division, are so dysfunctional that just last
month its soldiers were reported to have opened fire on their
commanding general. Worse still are the instances of actual
complicity with the militants, the motivations behind which run
the gamut from political opportunism and/or cynicism to
corruption; to social, ethnic, and perhaps even familial ties
to the militants; and perhaps most concerning of all,
ideological sympathy for the extremist agenda.
In addition, address legitimate grievances. At the same
time, confronting Boko Haram will require that the government
carefully measure its response. The government, Federal and
state, must also better address legitimate grievances which
have rendered meaningful segments of the population amenable to
the extremist message.
Finally, promote specialized training for Nigerian security
forces. Undoubtedly the Nigerian security forces, both military
and police, could use assistance in the fight against Boko
Haram; however, the need is less a matter of personnel and
equipment than training, especially in intelligence and
investigations. With a defense budget of approximately $6
billion, Nigeria does not want for material resources; however,
what does want is lack of maintenance and how to use that
equipment. One of the reasons the U.S. recently had to deploy
and unmanned aerial vehicle to Chad to overfly northern Nigeria
looking for the schoolgirls is because for want of upkeep, none
of the Aerostar tactical drones purchased from Israel by
Nigeria several years ago today fly.
That being said, tailored efforts that meet vetting
requirements stipulated by U.S. law can and should help
Nigerian forces strengthen their civil-military affairs
capabilities, facilitate interactions between military forces
and civilians, and other useful skills.
Finally, having just returned a day and a half ago from my
second trip in a month to the region, we need to help
strengthen regional cooperation and the capacity of Nigeria's
neighbors. Boko Haram has used Nigeria's porous borders and the
limited capacities of neighboring countries to its advantage.
Greater cooperation and intelligence sharing between states in
the region needs to be encouraged and facilitated by
international partners. In this regard the regional summit in
Paris last month is a step in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, members of the
subcommittee, nothing justifies the outrageous kidnapping of
the Nigerian schoolgirls, and every realistic effort should be
expended to secure their freedom. However, until the profound
pathologies which beset the body politic and institutions of
Africa's most populous and wealthiest country are addressed,
and until Nigeria's international partners move beyond mere
rhetorical gestures, it is well nigh inevitable that the
tragedy of the Chibok schoolgirls will sadly be repeated many
times over as the kidnappings of some 20 women from a nearby
hamlet just days ago underscore.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Pham, thank you very much for your
comprehensive testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. And Mr. Ogebe.
STATEMENT OF MR. EMMANUEL OGEBE, MANAGER, JUSTICE FOR JOS
PROJECT, JUBILEE CAMPAIGN USA
Mr. Ogebe. Yes. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith,
Ranking Member Bass, and distinguished Congressmen. I thank you
kindly for once again giving me the opportunity to engage with
you on the topic that currently agitates the conscience and the
consciousness of many on our globe today.
I want to share with you some of the perspectives from our
recent visits to Nigeria, and I would ask your indulgence that
my full statement be submitted for the record.
May I say, sir, that it took the U.S. 25 months after first
two Americans were attacked by Boko Haram before the
designation of Boko Haram as an FTO occurred. It took the UK 16
months, after the first British citizen was killed, before the
UK designated them, and it took the U.N. 33 months after the
bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Abuja before they imposed
sanctions on Boko Haram, and on June 2, the EU finally
designated Boko Haram a terror group even though the first
European citizen was killed 25 months earlier.
So this shows there has been a systematic pardon by the
international community to drag their foot on a group that is
now recognized to be the second deadliest terror group in the
world after the Taliban.
May I just say that one of the things we noticed on my
recent trip to Nigeria last week is that when I was in Nigeria
in April, the average deaths a week were approximately 100. In
the 4 days we were in Nigeria last week, the average was 100 a
day, and so the world is unanimously against Boko Haram, but
Boko Haram is still horridly against the world.
May I go on to say with regard to--I have six points here
with regard to the status of Boko Haram's activities, but I
will only mention two. One of them is the elevated gender-based
violence. And that, of course, we have seen with the abduction
of the women, but in addition to the abductions, this week we
had, for the very first time, a report of a female suicide
bomber, so Boko Haram is continuing to evolve its tactics and
its horrors.
The point number 5 here I will skip to is increased global
Jihadi ties, and this is important. A British radicalized
Nigerian citizen has been implicated in the bombing in Abuja
that took almost 100 lives. Now, why this is important is that
we have only seen three British radicalized Nigerian terrorists
undertake attacks.
The first attack was against the United States of America
when the underpants bomber tried to blow up a Delta plane. The
second attack was last year when a British radicalized Nigerian
beheaded a British soldier on the street, and then the third
one was in April when they attacked a bus station in Nigeria.
What this tells us is that Britain is becoming a source
destination and transit country for terrorists who want to
attack in Syria as well as in Nigeria, and this, I suppose,
validates the fact that global terror is working hand in hand
to undermine global security.
Now, if I may go ahead, I would want to talk about
Nigeria's response to the insurgency, and I want to point out,
as my colleague already has, that, you know, Nigeria's multi-
million-dollar CCTV cameras and Nigeria's satellite have
dropped out of the sky, so there are so many aspects of the
dysfunction and inefficiencies in the system that complicates
the threat metrics in Nigeria.
I would want to point to point number 4 here where I talk
about inadequate victim relief and psychosocial support. We met
with parents of missing kids, and one of them told us how at
least two parents that he knows have died from the sheer trauma
of the not knowing what has happened to their kids. This is
just the horror that keeps on giving, if one may use that
expression.
One of my concerns in trying to work with Nigerian
Government leaders, especially those working refugee issues on
why they have not been able to repatriate or assist IDPs was
that all of that is under the national security advisor, and I
would think that something as critical as care for citizens and
displaced people would not be the forte of the NSA. The NSA has
a lot of issues on his hands, and so Nigeria has this unwieldy
bureaucracy that makes it not effective.
Maybe I should touch on point number 5 with regard to
dwindling troop morale. We have heard, of course, of the mutiny
that occurred. There was reports yesterday about possible
defections to Boko Haram, but it is easy to see that all is not
well in the military establishment in Nigeria.
I have a sub-header here on the international response, and
particularly with regard to the U.S. Our findings indicate that
the offices in the U.S. Embassy that should liaise with the
Nigerian authorities on some of this critical issues are
overstretched and understaffed. One of the diplomats expressed
that they were sent out of Nigeria to a neighboring country at
a critical stage in the investigations concerning the missing
girls, and so that has, of course, been a concern for the folks
at the Embassy who want to work on these issues.
Similarly, I am aware that some years ago, the Treasury
office that was located in our consulate in Lagos which is
responsible for tracking financial crimes and transfers and
things of that nature, was, for some reason, moved to South
Africa, and so you begin to wonder, where are the resources to
implement the FTO and to--and to trace terror financing, which
is badly needed.
I would like to skip, if I may, to point number 3 in my
statements, and I am talking here about the competitive
disadvantage the United States has with regard to the area
surveillance they are currently undertaking in Northern Nigeria
in the hope of finding the girls. The problem with this is that
this is an hour late and a dollar short because what has
happened is that Boko Haram began aerial evasion techniques
1\1/2\ years ago when they were in northern Mali. They were
already conducting drills to evade drones, and so when we come
in 1\1/2\ years later, they are at least 1\1/2\ years ahead of
us in that strategy.
I would like to draw attention to another, I think for me,
the most unsettling point here, which is poor intelligence. We
met last week with one of the escaped girls, one of the Chibok
girls who escaped from the terrorists, and to our shock and
consternation, she had not been interviewed by the Nigerian
police, she had not been interviewed by the Nigerian Army, and
so the impression we have is that for some reason, 2 months
after their abduction, the investigations have not been going
very well if this key witness has not been interviewed by
anyone.
I think it was particularly unsettling that it would take
an American NGO and an American Congressman to find out the
facts of what happened to her. And several pieces of
information she gave us last week are not even in the public
domain, and so I am concerned that the multi-disciplinary force
that the U.S. sent in has not been effectively able to work
with the Fusion Centers in Nigeria to show them the basic
groups of how to conduct a missing person investigation.
I have several recommendations here, and I am going to just
probably work on two. The first is the U.S. needs to provide
technical assistance to Nigeria to set up a victim compensation
fund similar to what we had for 9/11. There does not seem to be
a sense of urgency on the Nigerian side to provide relief and
systematic assistance to victims of this atrocity, and the
United States needs to encourage Nigeria to do that and share
with them the model that was used very effectively after 9/11.
But let me say here that in addition to sharing with Nigeria
that model, the United States has the ability to fund such a
victim relief or compensation fund, not by using taxpayers'
money, but by releasing Nigerian funds that have been frozen in
the United States or have been subject to asset forfeiture. We
think that this is one way to get the Nigerian Government not
only to do what is right, but to do it in a transparent manner
that directly benefits citizens that have been impacted by this
situation.
I want to give kudos, if I may, to the State Department.
This year they decided to start funding child terror camps for
children who survive terror and they come to the U.S. to a 9/11
camp and get trauma care, and so this is a notable action by
the State Department that we would like to applaud.
Let me maybe throw a challenge now to many Americans,
including the American Congresswoman and American Ambassadors
who have actually gone to school in Nigeria and say that this
is a time to stand with this country to ensure that there is
not a rollback of education.
So I am prepared to wrap up my remarks. I want to maybe
point out that one of the real concerns for us with regard to
the battle against Boko Haram is the fact that the United
States, State Department in particular, has continued not to be
very frank and truthful about the threats, the goals of the
organizations, their objectives, and so on and so forth. I was
particularly concerned to read Ambassador Carson saying a
couple of weeks ago that Boko Haram does not present a threat
to the United States of America today. Let me point out beyond
any doubt that not only has Boko Haram remained a threat to the
U.S., it has attacked four American citizens that I know of. It
has attacked an American diplomat working with United Nations,
it has attacked an American diplomat working at the American
Embassy in Abuja, and it has attacked two American charity
workers working in northern Nigeria. It beats me why the State
Department has not acknowledged that still to date.
As I wrap up, I do want to point out that the release and
the prisoner swap with Sergeant Bergdahl could potentially have
a negative impact on the ability of the Nigerian Government to
negotiate with the terrorists to free the girls. I think that
it presents itself as a victory to the Taliban, and as a
result, Boko Haram may decide that, you know, we want the
bigger stakes to be able to release the girls. I, therefore,
would encourage the U.S. to consider the global ramifications
of its dealings with terrorists in that nature before they take
them, because the danger now is that American citizens might
become human bitcoins for terror trades around the globe
because the terrorists obviously are in constant touch and in
constant leakages around the world.
And so these are some of the few quick points I wanted to
make, and I wanted to again thank you very much for the
opportunity to share some of this thoughts with you, and I
commend your courage and your lead in taking this up this issue
at a time when no one was paying attention. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ogebe follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ogebe, thank you very much for your
testimony. I just want to note for the record that it was you
who set up the meeting for me and my staff director to meet
with the young 18-year-old survivor of the Chibok abduction.
She left before they had even gotten a kilometer away from the
school, but still was extraordinarily traumatized, so thank you
for setting that up.
Mr. John-Miller.
STATEMENT OF MR. ANSLEM JOHN-MILLER, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
U.S., MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI PEOPLE
Mr. John-Miller. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, all
protocols observed. I thank you and members of your committee
for giving me the opportunity to address you on current
developments in Nigeria as they relate to the atrocities of the
Boko Haram and how the United States and Nigeria can continue
to work together to put an end to the activities of this
terrorist group.
First, I commend the Government and people of the United
States for condemning the kidnappings of the Chibok girls and
the Obama administration's effort with the Nigerian Government
to secure the release of these girls. I am very positive that
with such collaboration, the Chibok girls will ultimately be
reunited with their families. On the current efforts to rescue
the abducted Chibok girls, I must emphasize that the United
States and other countries involved encourage the Nigerian
Government to employ every means available at its disposal,
including diplomacy, to secure their release. While I continue
to maintain my position that no government should negotiate
with any terrorist group, I am deeply concerned that if the
same principle is adopted in the case of the Chibok girls,
their return may not be in the near future.
Since the abducted girls are Christians, they risk being
killed by the leader of Boko Haram because he knows that the
girls remain Christians, despite their so-called conversion. He
may resort to killing the girls if force is employed in their
rescue just to blackmail the Governments of the United States,
Nigeria, and others. In this regard, I commend the efforts of
ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has initiated some moves to
secure the release of the girls through dialogue and diplomacy.
While the United States and the international community's
attention is focused on how to secure the release of the
abducted Chibok girls, it is important to note that this
sophisticated and coordinated attacks that Boko Haram was
carried out after the abduction of the girls show that the
organization remains strong, bold, and determined to inflict
unimaginable harm and destruction on Nigeria so that the
Nigerian State will plunge into total anarchy and chaos,
thereby making it ungovernable.
As such, the ongoing war against Boko Haram in Nigeria
should be treated--should not be treated with levity or treated
as a local Nigerian crisis, but should be elevated to the
status of the war against al-Qaeda. The United States Congress
should, therefore, work closely with the Obama administration
to develop comprehensive counterterrorism strategies that will
help Nigeria to crush Boko Haram and put an end to the carnage
and sufferings of the people of the northeastern part of
Nigeria and the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and
Niger Republic. Many terrorism experts and scholars have
attributed poverty and underdevelopment in the northeast of
Nigeria as the cause of Boko Haram and prescribed provision of
job opportunities and development of the region as a solution
to the problem, and I partly agree only in the context that
poverty and idleness makes youths of the area vulnerable and
easy targets for recruitment as Boko Haram operatives. However,
I strongly believe that if the youth recruited were not
interested in terrorism, they would have resisted because
poverty, underdevelopment, and idleness is not confined only to
northeast region of Nigeria, but visible everywhere in the
country, especially in the Ogoni and the Niger Delta regions.
Solving the problem of Boko Haram in Nigeria cannot be
achieved without addressing the issue of corruption. While
there has been much focus on corruption at the national level
of governance in Nigeria and the military, very little
attention has been paid to the level of corruption at the state
and local government levels in the northeast and other parts of
the country. Nigeria operates a Federal system of government.
We share power between Federal, state, and local governments.
These states and local governments receive monthly allocations
from the Federal Government and are expected to use the funds
to provide basic amenities and develop their states and local
governments.
However, such funds end up in the private accounts of the
state Governors and the local government chairmen installed by
the governors, resulting in paltry sums of money being spent on
programs that have direct impact on the lives of the citizens
of the state and local communities.
To address the problem of corruption in Nigeria, I propose
that the United States Government partner with Nigeria to
encourage transparency and accountability at all levels of
governance. The United States should also, through its Justice
Department, investigate and confiscate all funds stolen by
those in power at all levels in Nigeria and saved in banks in
New York, Dubai, London, and so on, and prosecute the culprits.
The benefits those corrupt politicians enjoy now such as
sponsoring themselves and their families on limitless trips to
the United States and other developed countries to spend
holidays, buying expensive cars and luxury houses, and
educating their children in the best schools in foreign
countries at the expense of suffering masses should be stopped
forthwith.
It is only such decisive steps that will send a clear
message to the rulers of Nigeria that the United States is
serious about tackling corruption in Nigeria. While a few
people may argue that the United States confiscating and
arresting corrupt Nigerian politicians anywhere in the world
may amount to interfering in the internal affairs of a
sovereign nation, I posit that such a step is reasonable and
morally justified, especially since corruption breeds
discontent and provides a platform for its victims to be
recruited as agents of terror.
Closely related to corruption are the human rights abuses
committed by the Nigerian soldiers. It is no secret that
Nigerian soldiers torture and commit terrible human rights
abuses when deployed to various communities, and as such
discourage the local population from cooperating with them and
providing intelligence that would have helped in accomplishing
their missions. A clear example is the activities of Major Paul
Okuntimo, the then chairman of the disbanded Rivers State
Internal Security Task Force who committed all sort of
atrocities in Ogoniland during the height of the Ogoni struggle
in the 1990s. Despite the extrajudicial killings and crimes
against humanity, Major Paul Okuntimo and his men committed in
Ogoni, he remains a free man walking on the streets of Nigeria
instead of being locked behind bars.
In recent times, several allegations of human rights abuses
has been leveled against the soldiers deployed to northeast to
fight the Boko Haram insurgency, and to date, no investigations
have been carried out to unveil the truth or otherwise of the
allegations. With such negative perception about the soldiers,
the citizens find it very difficult to collaborate with them,
and without the involvement of the locals who know the Boko
Haram operatives, it is very difficult to defeat the terrorist
group.
To address this issue, the United States Government should
prevail on Nigeria to set up an independent judicial panel or
empower the National Human Rights Commission to investigate
such allegations, and any soldiers incriminated be prosecuted
so as to serve as a deterrent to others. A case in point is to
also influence the Nigerian National Assembly to immediately
pass the Enforcement and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity,
War Crimes, Genocide and Related Offenses bill of 2012.
The declaration of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization by the United States Government after the initial
reluctance is a welcome development because it paves way for
the United States Government to take various steps, including
freezing of bank accounts, deployment of drones, and other
assets to fight the terrorists. However, one major step that
should be taken that will make the current war against Boko
Haram successful is to work with the Nigerian Government to
identify the sponsors of Boko Haram and bring them to justice.
On occasions, notable commanders of the Boko Haram have
been apprehended while hiding in the houses of influential
politicians without the host politicians being questioned and
investigated over their ties with the terrorists arrested.
With such developments, civilians who would have provided
credible and actionable intelligence are afraid that doing so
would put them at risk, and inasmuch as this ugly trend
continues, the Boko Haram insurgency will continue.
To address this challenge, I urge the Congress to mandate
that the Justice Department to immediately initiate steps to
collaborate with the Nigerian security and intelligence
services to investigate, arrest, and persecute all alleged
sponsors of Boko Haram in the United States, or alternatively,
the United States should work with other permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council to set up a special terrorism court
to try all those arrested for involvement in the activities of
Boko Haram in Nigeria. Persecuting the sponsors and operators
of Boko Haram in an international court will send a clear
message to members and potential members of the terrorist group
that the international community is very serious about bringing
them to justice.
It is imperative to note that Boko Haram insurgency has
both religious and political undertones. The inflammatory and
incisive statements made by some Islamic clerics and
politicians, especially from the northern part of Nigeria prior
to and after the election of President Goodluck Jonathan in
2011 has also served as an incentive to the insurgents. Shortly
after the 2011 Presidential election, some notable politicians
from the north called on the masses in northern Nigeria to
revolt against the newly-elected President. With such
statements coming from such influential leaders, their
supporters subsequently rioted and attacked innocent graduates
who were employed by the Independent National Electoral
Commission, INEC, to help conduct the elections.
To date, no single individual involved in instigating those
unwarranted attacks on innocent graduates who devoted their
time and efforts for the service of their country have been
brought to justice. It is also crucial to note that the
intensification of the attacks by Boko Haram is linked to the
forthcoming 2015 general elections, and as such, necessary
steps have to be taken by the United States and the
international community to ensure that the outcome of the 2015
general elections are devoid of all forms of malpractice
because such would help in maintaining stability in Nigeria. A
major step in this direction is to mobilize international
observers to ensure that all votes are counted immediately at
the polls and at the polling stations in the forthcoming 2015
general elections.
As the United States Government seek ways to assist Nigeria
in addressing some of our challenges, it is also instructive
that both countries identify flash points where future crisis
might erupt and take proactive steps to address them. A clear
example of such flash points is the case of Ogoni. The Ogoni
people, since the 1990s, had made presentations to the Nigerian
Government and Shell and the international community to address
the environmental challenges caused by reckless oil exploration
in the area. To date, nothing has been done about it.
In August 2011, the United Nations Environment Programme
released the report of its findings in Ogoniland and submitted
a report to President Jonathan who promised to promptly
implement the report. In anticipation of a massive protest by
the Ogoni people for failure of the government to implement the
report after 1 year, the government, in 2012, established the
Hydrocarbon Pollution Control and Restoration Agency, HYPREP.
Despite their reservations, the Ogoni people assured the
government and Shell that they will work with the government to
implement the report. However, it is sad to note that to this
date, very little attention has been paid to that. However, the
United States has a role to play. It should encourage the
Nigerian Government to address issues that are legitimate and
will also be flash points in future.
While the UNEP report remains unresolved, hundreds of Ogoni
refugees and political asylum-seekers remain stranded in the
Federal Republic of Benin, living under dehumanizing conditions
such as no access to food, medication, education, and the rest.
One of the cardinal solutions to the Ogoni problem has--as
advanced by the Ogoni people, has been to ask the Nigerian
Government to at least establish a Bori state. To date, not
much has been said about that. However, it is difficult to
assess that the outcome of the ongoing national conference in
Abuja will be helpful given the majority versus minority
efforts.
Lastly, I would call on the United States Government that
as a strong partner of Nigeria, they continue to work with the
Nigerian Government to encourage address our problems. However,
one major step that can be taken is to appoint a special envoy
that will work with the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission to
coordinate the efforts because so far, it is clear that both
the United States has what it is doing on one hand and the
Nigerian Government on the other hand. Once again, thank you
for giving me opportunity to address you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. John-Miller.
[The prepared statement of Mr. John-Miller follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. I would like to now welcome Ambassador Sanders.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBIN RENEE SANDERS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, FEEEDS ADVOCACY INITIATIVE (FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA)
Ambassador Sanders. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, and
members of the committee, I want to thank you for inviting me
here today to testify before you. I just returned from Nigeria
and was in-country when the international community became more
aware of the horrible kidnapping of 247 girls by Boko Haram on
April 14, 2004.
Honorable members, you have asked the panel today to
discuss the ongoing crisis in Nigeria, and there are several
components to this issue. However, my remarks will be based on
my knowledge of the region, as I have been in every state in
Nigeria and traveled by road from Abuja to Boko Haram's current
expanded territory at least four times during my tenure there;
what I know of Boko Haram before and since its resurgence,
noting that it existed since the late 1990s; and my
conversations and firsthand observation while on my recent
trip.
I will address three things: The security environment in
Boko Haram and areas of possible additional assistance; why
Boko Haram was not initially considered an FTO or Foreign
Terrorist Organization; and address what I am hearing on Chibok
by my contacts.
First, the Nigerian security services in the face of Boko
Haram. Current Nigerian services have never experienced
anything like what they are facing with Boko Haram today. They
need to understand that Boko Haram is unlike the Niger Delta
conflict, and they need to toss out that playbook in records to
this conflict. Boko Haram is executing asymmetrical warfare,
and for the most part, this is outside of the framework of the
security forces and their capability to effectively respond.
The Nigerian security services have been in recent
conflicts, particularly the military, in recent conflicts in
northern Mali, including the initial Nigerian Force Commander.
The troops that have also served in Darfur are probably the few
that have had the closest experience to asymmetrical warfare,
which they are facing now. It is good that Nigeria has accepted
international assistance.
From my time on the ground, they have always had--I am
talking about the Nigerian military and security services--the
following challenges: Airlift, and these are also concurrent
with my recommendations. Airlift. Airlift is key to troop
rotation. As I heard reports on the ground of PTSD while I was
there, it is important because of the distances and tough road
travel in the northeast, and airlift is also important because
it will help them react faster to the changing situation on the
ground as they try to cover 600,000 square miles of territory
about the size of either Georgia or Wisconsin.
The services need additional materiel, a special mobile
communications equipment, vehicles, technology-based bomb
detection equipment. From what I saw in many places when I was
on the road there, the bomb detection equipment is quite
rudimentary, and they certainly need improved control over the
porous borders, as we have already heard from my colleagues.
They need improved military planning, logistics, equipment
supplies, including sufficient spare parts and fuel. They need
to expand its small special forces unit and its 24/7
counterterrorism center, both which were stood up or begun to
stood up while I was there. They need to establish a satellite
CT center closer to the northeast so information doesn't take
so long to reach and be analyzed. They need more rapid response
forces or what we call mobile units and probably more outposts.
Security service personnel and resources are both stretched
thin. Realignment is better needed to address the current
threat, improvement in strategic communication and review of
existing communication approaches because what they have now is
not working internally or externally with affected communities,
particularly with the families.
I would suggest a liaison committee led by someone
respected for their human rights values that engages with and
keeps the families informed, not someone who is a spokesperson
used to dealing with the press, but a real advocate for the
families.
I traveled through Kano last month by road, and on my way
to visit an agricultural project, I did observe a lot of the
checkpoints along the way. There are about 30 to 50 kilometers
apart. I did not see the ability to communicate between most
checkpoints. I understand that in the northeast this is more
acute as distances between some checkpoints are greater, adding
to what we already know that information is not reacted to in a
timely or effective matter. I am not excusing the poor
responses and late reaction date. I am just providing
recommendations from a strategic perspective on things that can
be and need to be addressed right now, and I would hope that
the assistance packages for Nigeria are including this.
I also want to highlight that I think that this is a long
war and a long conflict. Nigeria is at the beginning of this,
and they have to realize this. This is no longer a localized
conflict or insurgency. There is no easy fix, and every attack
in response to Boko Haram cannot be viewed as a death knell
blow to it. Long-range security framework to terrorist threat
is what is needed. The security services need to regroup,
reapproach, readdress in order to begin to get off their heels
on the defensive and get more on an aggressive offensive
footing.
Right now, the security services are outgunned and out-
strategically played. One thing I also want to put into the mix
on which I am not sure there has been much focus is the
language differences. Most of the security services in the
northeast are Hausa speaking, while the majority of the village
populations in both Borno and parts of Yobe are Kanuri
speakers. Just like the U.S. Military had to ramp up on its
Arabic speakers for Iraq, the Nigerian military will need to
increase its Kanuri speakers as well.
My next comment will be an unpopular thing to hear from
many, but there are people and elements in the Nigerian
military who are committed and serious, but they are under-
supported and need resources. This does not dilute the issues
of the very real challenges for security forces and reports in
the past of corruption and failure to respond. That being said,
I had several rank and file security service members come up to
me on my last trip to say, ``Madam, you know some of us. You
know we are not all bad. We do our jobs for our country. Tell
people this, Madam,'' and I said that I would.
I highlight this to underscore who is going to fight this
war, who is going to fight this conflict if it is not for the
Nigerian security forces, along with assistance from the
international community. They are the vanguard on this
conflict, so we need to help them pull up their bootstraps as
an institution, address any challenges that they might have,
get it together so that they can effectively fight and fight
the security threat they are facing. If this entire security
structure becomes demoralized, then who is going to fight this
conflict?
There have already been reports of one or two incidents
where military units allegedly have shown their frustration by
shooting at commanders' convoys. One happened when I was there.
Relationships with neighbors on terms of sharing intelligence.
Neighbors around Nigeria, they need to really work together and
begin to really share not only resources but human intelligence
information from villagers in Nigeria as well as neighboring
countries. This will be critical elements to fighting this war,
this conflict.
There has to be better control of the porous borders and
cooperation. P-3 surveillance planes can assist with this, but
in the end, on-ground human intelligence is going to be key.
Boko Haram also has been brutal, so brutal that that several
villages and markets have completely disappeared. And I really
appreciate your comment, Mr. Chairman, about raising the food
security issue. Food is becoming scarce as planting and
commerce have both dried up. The international community also
needs to keep an eye on the food security situation as food
shortages could become a real issue down the line.
Turning to the question of the designation of Boko Haram as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As I said earlier, Boko Haram
has been around since the late 1990s and was more commonly
referred to then and going forward, up until about 2003, as the
Nigerian Taliban. Prior to the last 4 years, it executed
localized sabotages, attacks on police stations, and recruited
young people into the group but no kidnapping at that time.
Evidence of some Boko Haram contacts with AQIM started to
surface about 9 months after the extrajudicial killing of its
then leader Muhammad Yusef and his key lieutenant Al Haji Buji
Foi in July 2009. This was shared with the then-government.
I was in Nigeria when Yusef was captured and killed, almost
before the cameras, by Nigerian police. From early 2010 until
August 2011, almost a full year, there was a lull with some
small acts and again localized. The morphing of Boko Haram to
using al-Qaeda or AQIM-like tactics to achieve the goal of
establishing an Islamic extremist caliphate began really
surfacing in mid 2011 with the bombing of the U.N. headquarters
in Abuja. And since then, Boko Haram has continually gotten
more expansive in both its reach and brutality from 2010 to
2014.
I will expect disagreement on this, but earlier than August
2011, before it bombed the U.N. headquarters in Abuja, in my
view, Boko Haram would not have met the third leg of the cited
FTO designation in the law. It must be a foreign organization;
check. It must be engaged in terrorist activity; check. Its
terrorist activity or terror must threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or national security. That didn't really start to
happen until 2011, and the rest of the designation also
outlines that you have to have a consistent record over time in
order to start making the case for FTO which began at that
time.
Chibok. First, my heart goes out to the families and the
missing girls wherever they might be as I know they are
suffering, scared, and afraid. In Paris Monday, there was a
global conference on women, and one of the things that was said
regarding the Chibok girls is that this tragedy is the epitome
and dehumanization that girls do not have the right to control
their own fate, their own education, and who they might choose
to marry.
Despite reports out of Nigeria, I do not think, and this is
my personal view and assessment from having just been out
there, that most of the girls have been in Nigeria for a long
time. We have no idea how long ago the videos being shown were
taken. And these terrorist groups learn from each other, and
Boko Haram is nothing but strategic; therefore, I think it is
unlikely that most, maybe not all, the girls have been put into
smaller groups, taken across the border to Chad or Cameroon or
elsewhere, or even if they remain in Nigeria or some of them
do, they are probably in smaller groups or in singular
situations. So again, the human intelligence factor, the
HUMINT, that means everybody working together, sharing on
ground resources is going to be critical to hopefully finding
some of them.
I also do not want us to forget that from January through
March 2014, young girls were being kidnapped, killed,
terrorized, and brutalized by Boko Haram. Yesterday, as we
already heard, more than 20 more women were reported kidnapped
near Chibok.
During January through March 2014, young girls were burned
to death in their dorms, other kidnapped, divided up based on
their physical maturity level, and those who showed signs of
puberty had their throats cut. All of these actions show that
Boko Haram Shekau is acting on one of his stated goals, that he
would make the mothers and the daughters of Nigeria suffer in
revenge for the capture of Boko Haram family members by
Nigerian security forces.
I highlight all of these things to underscore that we as
the international community cannot be sporadic on these
horrible human rights violations and brutality of young girls.
We must do all we can to protect the young women in the north,
and I have a few recommendations, mostly on the human side of
things just in case the current assistance packages are not
including these things.
I strongly believe that more trauma and grief counseling
for the families and the returned girls must be at the top of
the list. I already mentioned the liaison committee by someone
respected for their human rights values that can help keep the
families informed and also to avoid the similar tragedy that
happened in Malaysia with the families not being informed and
not kept in the loop. Ensure that the girls that have returned
and their families are protected so they don't become victims
again.
As I am sure, Boko Haram is watching what happens with
them. If we protect their faces, this doesn't mean that Boko
Haram elements can't figure out who they are, so we need to be
careful with their safety. I also believe that President
Jonathan should meet with the families, even if it is not in
Chibok.
And I am not making an apples-and-oranges comparison
necessarily, but if the world community can mobilize tons of
financial technical human resources to find the missing
Malaysia plane of 239 people, it can mobilize the same, it can
mobilize the same, to find the 247 girls, no matter in what
country they are located.
Things such as mistrust among neighboring countries in
sharing intelligence information must take a back seat. I do
see an array of assistance but nowhere near the level of
mobilization that is probably needed by the entire
international community full-time, all the time.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you Ranking Member Bass, and
members of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sanders follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Ambassador, thank you very much for your, again,
comprehensive statement, but also your very comprehensive
recommendations as to what should be done. You asked the
threshold question, who is going to fight this war, and of
course it is Nigerian military. I think your point about that
Boko Haram is executing asymmetrical warfare, that is, for the
most part, is outside of the framework of the security forces
and their capacity to effectively respond is a very profound
and necessary statement.
People are wondering why the success has not been gleaned
by the military. I remember in Darfur, meeting with troops that
had been deployed there as peacekeeping. This isn't a
peacekeeping mission. This is, as we all know, a
counterinsurgency mission that requires a very, very
specialized set of skills and training, and as Dr. Pham has
pointed out in his testimony, you know, the 650-man battalion
that is being trained up, while that is good, that is certainly
only a drop in the bucket, I would respectfully submit, as to
what is necessary.
So my first question to the panel would be--as I said in my
opening, I am very much in favor of vetting, as you pointed
out, Dr. Pham, in your statement. Vetting is important,
tailored efforts that meet the current vetting requirements can
help Nigerian forces strengthen their civil-military affairs
capabilities, but there are some aspects to vetting and
exclusion of certain individuals who are capable and are not
human rights abusers that may be excluded because of the
current modalities employed by the Leahy amendment, and I was
wondering if any of you, perhaps the Ambassador or Dr. Pham or
any of our distinguished panelists would like to speak to that.
Your point about the command and control and the ability to
communicate, Madam Ambassador, is right on. I was there on the
ground for 4 days and heard some of the U.S. experts and
others, not being critical, but being observing what is taking
place. The ability to communicate quickly, effectively with
actionable information has to be at the top; otherwise, Boko
Haram is gone, they have moved on, they have either abducted or
killed in another area, and now they are somewhere else, so I
think your point was extremely well taken there.
Maybe there is a need, if you would speak to this as well,
$6 billion. I have heard as much as $8 billion for their
defense budget. Given their oil reserves and capacity there,
money shouldn't be an object to ensuring that there is, for
want of a better word, an emergency supplemental funding to
make sure that the bullets, the capabilities are there,
including command and control, in a very, very expedited way so
that the troops that are trained, properly vetted,
counterinsurgency capacity can wage a battle, as you pointed
out, Madam Ambassador, this is going to be a long-term battle.
I think we kid ourselves if we think this is going away anytime
soon, especially since it is in ascendancy, not descendancy, so
if you could speak to that issue as well.
And finally, on the issue of intelligence. I am very proud
of what the United States is doing and very impressed by the
capabilities of our men and women who are providing
intelligence at the Fusion Center. It is, as you said, Dr.
Pham, a very light footprint. It is very important that there
not be a huge international presence, the likes of which could
be counterproductive, particularly to the propaganda war being
waged by Boko Haram but very, very well focused capacity,
assistance, and training, it seems to me, ought to be
quadrupled, particularly in the area of training. I mean, they
have the troops. They have the motivation. They just need a
specialized skill that those of us in the West have been
fighting, particularly our militaries, for so long in combating
al-Qaeda and other kinds of groups, so if you could speak to
those issues, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly
address your three points and defer to my colleagues. On the
Leahy amendment, we all share the belief that, by and large,
the Leahy law protects U.S. interests in the long term, but you
do raise the question of the exclusion of qualified individuals
who might be useful in this current fight.
I would emphasize, I think, that the Leahy law, as I
understand it, excludes battalion- and brigade-level units that
have been implicated in, or at least well-documented human
rights abuses. In many respects, what is needed in many of
these units to raise morale in not only training but reforming
of new units to give them a new identity, a new start. Before I
turn away, I don't want to say the Leahy law is irrelevant, but
in a way we have got to work around. Although, already we have
vetted 187, I believe, Nigerian military units and 173 police
units, so there are actually whole Nigerian units that could
receive assistance even now in their current form, but for
other units, I think we can get qualified people, and sometimes
that is the best thing. We have learned our own experience of
the last decade in some of the wars, sometimes pulling people
from different units and forging them together is the best way
to move ahead. So I think we can--there are workarounds. We
just need to be creative about it.
Secondly, with respect to resources, I would tend to
emphasize that we can get more, no puns intended, bang for our
buck with Nigeria's neighbors. Nigeria is a wealthy country. It
can afford--it needs training, but it can afford resources. The
neighbors are less well-off, especially countries that have
demonstrated a political will to fight the terrorists, Niger
being a good example of that, but simply don't have the
resources, and there, because it is a smaller country, smaller
military, we can better account for the funding being spent and
the multiplier effect of having them seal their borders which
Boko Haram has been using to cross, crossing Niger, Chad, other
countries, might be a better use of our limited resources and
then devote our resources in Nigeria to training rather than
materiel, which Nigerians are more that capable of paying for
themselves.
And finally, on the intelligence issue. I probably would
agree with your assessment on the good that we have done with
the small number we put there, and we certainly can increase
that. One thing, I would be remiss if I didn't use this
opportunity to raise the fact that we do not yet, after years
of constantly talking about this year in and year out, and
Ambassador Sanders, I think, will be able to comment on, we
have yet to deploy a diplomatic mission north of Abuja. This is
an area with arguably the largest Muslim population in all of
Africa, larger than even Egypt's population if you think about
the number of Nigerians in the north. We don't have a
diplomatic installation. We don't have even the lightest of
footprints to build bridges, to gather knowledge of the people
and to build relationships, which will help in--when we have to
ramp up in these cases, an we need to revisit this with, I
think, far greater urgency than even in the past. Thank you.
Mr. Ogebe. Yes. I have a couple of quick points here, sir,
and the first is that as we worked on advocacy to bring about
the designation, the FTO designation, we found that it was
easier to blacklist a foreign army under Leahy than it was to
get a designation for a terror organization, and so that was, I
thought, ironic.
Secondly, the guidelines for appealing an FTO designation
are easier than for reversing a blacklist under Leahy, so I
think there needs to be some kind of parity between the two
because we need some of this foreign armies to help us with
regional security considerations.
The second point I wanted to quickly address was military
capacity. Nigeria used to have a really outstanding Air Force,
but all the years of military dictatorship saw attrition,
internal attrition as generals--one general after the other
killed off some of the best pilots, and so on and so forth,
they had, so we now see a Nigerian Air Force that is a shell, a
real shell of its former self. And last year Boko Haram
attacked an air force base and destroyed five jets, and the
Army's response was, oh, you know, oh, the jets were faulty
anyway, so it wasn't a big loss. But what are they doing having
five broken down jets in your base in the first place?
I think the one last point I will make on this is that part
of the problem with the military strategy is that there is so
much disinformation that it is difficult to even know where to
help them. They are not being truthful about losses, about
combat incidents, and so on and so forth, so you don't know
what really is going on. And from what we can tell, they are
taking a really bad bashing, as the Boko Haram video of the
attack on Giwa barrack shows. They are really getting the short
end of the stick in this battle. Thank you.
Ambassador Sanders. Thank you for your questions, Mr.
Chairman. I want to start on the intelligence issue because I
think we need to have a broader discussion about expanding what
we mean by that. Certainly I am 100 percent behind you in terms
of the capability of U.S. intelligence. I had the privilege of
having access to that, so I do respect that, but I am actually
talking about human intelligence on the ground, having a way to
either better communicate with villagers and locals living in
the area so you get a better sense of what is going on, which
is why I kind of raised the language issue because I remember
being up there and being with Hausa speakers in terms--even the
military police contingents that were with me and not being
able to communicate once we got outside of Maiduguri with the
population outside of the capital because they weren't speaking
the same language.
So when you look at some of these outlying areas, I was
wondering whether or not, as part of this communication is that
needs to be looked because maybe they are just not being able
to communicate with each other. I am not reducing the issue any
by saying that, but I think it is an issue that needs to be
looked at. We found that for ourselves in Iraq, and I think it
may be an issue for the Nigerians to pay attention to, so those
two things.
In terms of intelligence also, the CT center, which I won't
say where it is, but I think they need to really have a
satellite center closer to the area of conflict because if
everything has to come back to where that center is located to
be analyzed and reacted to, you are looking at days and
sometimes weeks here to do that, so that is a reality that I
think--I won't say it is a quick fix, but it is certainly a
reality that can address some of the issues.
And then in terms of troops, I don't know how many of the
troops who serve in Darfur and Mali are either being included,
maybe they are not even based in the north, I have no idea, but
are they in this group that has been vetted that can actually
provide some intel in terms of how you deal with asymmetrical
warfare to their colleagues on the ground. I think that is a
big issue.
They have only a small special forces unit, and so maybe
that is additional--I think maybe the trainers that we have
there now from the U.S. are helping to do that, but their
special units need to be expanded, and they have to have more
mobile units than they have right now.
Transportation from one point to another. I don't know if
you have been up there or my colleagues have been up there in
recent times, but it is a very, very difficult environment to
travel in, so I can't--I can't underscore enough the need for
equipment, vehicles, and others.
On the human rights issue--sorry.
Mr. Smith. Would you yield briefly? Would you encourage the
Nigerian Government to do an emergency supplemental as we would
do here, as we have done time and again to appropriate
additional funds, because I heard story after story of too
little ammunition, too little of everything, and how do you
fight a battle or a war when you don't have the capability in
terms of munitions?
Ambassador Sanders. I have two responses to that. One, I
think the money is there and they have enough money to do it. I
don't think the money is being deployed properly, and I don't
think it is getting where it needs to be. So you can add more
money to the fire, but if it still doesn't get deployed where
it needs to be and utilized properly, you are still going to
have the same issue, so I would stress deployment and
utilization of the resources they have more effectively and
more efficiently and getting them to the right people that need
to have it, and certainly, in the northeast, they are short on
a lot of things, even fuel, you know, to get from one place to
another.
On the human rights issue, one of the things that I had
suggested when I was on the ground recently, not this year but
the end of last year, was really looking at having fast track
military courts on human rights issues so that there is
transparency in the process, that the public knows, the
military knows, and there is a sense of addressing impunity if
things do happen in the human rights arena. So, that hasn't
been done yet, and I still think that that is something that
they can do.
The neighbors, cannot be stressed enough, their role is
extremely important. They don't have the resources, but it is
not only just resources. There is a general mistrust in sharing
intelligence across countries, and I think that somehow we,
maybe we can play a facilitating role in helping address that
mistrust because without that kind of coordination,
cooperation, and communication, then all the human intelligence
stuff that we are talking about, even hard intelligence, is not
going to be useful if it is not responded to in an effective
and coordinated manner.
On the FTO. I can just say this. I think that the--and then
I will go back to Leahy, but on FTO, I would encourage, Mr.
Chairman and Ranking Member Bass, that your subcommittee and
your staff take a look at the details of the FTO. We are in a
completely new global environment. When you look at the date on
some of these updates, 1985, 1988, 1989, you know, we are in a
completely different global world today than we were at that
time, and we have a--I won't say a Cold War element here
because it is not, the dates don't correspond, but in a way, it
is structured that way, and in the end, I think that a closer
look needs to be taken for the FTO so that we don't wait 12
months, 25 months, 33 months to designate an organization that
needs to be designated as such. So I would encourage that.
I have already talked about the equipment issue. On
presence in the north. That is really a thorn in my side, I
must say, and I presume that my colleagues, who are on the
ground there, feel the same.
We have tried, I know, to establish a presence in the north
several times. When I was there, there was an administrative
decision at least. We didn't get to implementation phase to try
to have a small consulate in Kano. There were a lot of
administrative challenges to executing on the ground, most of
which was security. How do we protect the Americans that would
be there? What we did have there in Kano, in Bauchi, and in
Borno, and I went to all three sites, we did have an American
corner presence. I don't think because of the state of
emergency that we can have those anymore, and the security
situation; so the diplomatic issue, fundamentally and
theoretically is absolutely on target. The reality, though,
makes it a challenge for us as a government. How do we protect
the people that are there, and how can they effectively do
their jobs if they are then hunkered down and can't get out? So
that is the reality that we have to talk about because American
lives come first.
On the Leahy amendment on vetting, I think that we can find
qualified people and elements. As I said, I know a lot of them
personally. I have worked with them firsthand. I went to every
single military exercise that I could get to to really have a
better sense of what the capability was and the environment
was; and as I said, there are a lot of good, dynamic people in
the Nigerian security services. I had two military police
responsible for my protection when I was there for 3 years, top
notch guys.
So I would argue that, you know, let's walk the fine line
that we have to walk on this, provide the training and
assistance that we need to provide to the elements that we are
sure of that have not been implicated in human rights
violation. If they can stand up a fast-track military court to
be able to address those other issues, let's get that done. And
I think that I have addressed all of your initial questions.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. I really want to thank all
of the panelists. I think this has been an exceptional hearing,
and I appreciate your information and your input and your
recommendations. I just had a couple of questions. The report
suggests that the Nigerian Government has been hesitant to
accept U.S. assistance and, as a matter of fact, my
understanding is we were trying to provide that assistance
right away, and there was reluctance on their part; and I
wanted to know if members of the panel could respond to that
and maybe provide us some kind of insight. I would also like to
know if that has changed.
In my comments, I did go through several ways that I know
our Government has been involved; but that doesn't necessarily
mean it is all that welcome. And, Ambassador Sanders, and this
also applies to other members of the panel, too, I wanted to
know what you feel specifically, especially in the north, are
the most pressing concerns. I know it is poverty, but what
exactly does that mean? And I did understand that there was a
Nigerian entrepreneur who said that he is going to go up to the
north and provide some jobs. I don't know how specific or
realistic that is. And I would, you know, agree with the
panelists. It might have been Mr. John-Miller, I am not sure,
who said that it is not just about poverty, but poverty does
set the stage. When people are desperate, they will join forces
like Boko Haram. So, anyway, I wanted to know about that.
And this is just a side note for Dr. Pham. You said that
the Nigerians had drones from the Israelis, but the drones
don't fly, and I just wanted you to finish that. You made that
comment, but I wanted you to explain about that. Thank you. You
can start, Dr. Pham.
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. I will start with
the last one on the drones. Two years ago on the ramp-up after
the big wave of attacks on 2011, Nigeria purchased a number of
drones from Israel, Aerostar drones. They also purchased, and
the government allocated, reportedly $20 million for a
maintenance contract. The Israeli firm that was supposed to
maintain the drones came, set up shop. They never got paid, and
so after a few months of this, although the money was
allocated, they closed up shop and went away. They are in
business to make money. They went away, and then no one picked
up the slack. The money was allocated, and the good Lord knows
where the money went. And so 2 years later when the drones are
needed, not being maintained for 2 years, they don't fly; and
that is just one anecdote, and one could find others.
A couple years ago some of my colleagues at the Atlantic
Council, in the Africa Center, did an analysis of the Nigerian
fleet and how many of the vessels listed in the battle order
were in dry dock, and it was a good two-thirds of the fleet. So
it is a systematic problem. It is not going to be solved
overnight, and it doesn't reflect on individuals who really
want to serve their country. But it is a systematic issue. But
they did have the drones. That is an open source bit of
information out there that they have the drones, but none of
them fly.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. Would other witnesses like to respond
to some of the other issues I raised?
Mr. John-Miller. Well, on the issue of the north and what
should be done, it is not just an issue of underdevelopment in
poverty, because like I said in my presentation, poverty is all
about a place. If you go to the Niger Delta and look at the
landscape, you will agree that the situation is not as grave as
the Niger Delta. And even when the Niger Delta took up arms,
when they were told, look enough is enough, they listened. So
to tell me that poverty is responsible for the situation, that
is not accurate. It has to be looked at from the lens of
politics. The belief has been that it is a north-south divide
when it comes to political offices.
When a President comes from the north, obviously power
changes hands when Yar'Adua came, and unfortunately he passed,
power went to Goodluck Jonathan from the Niger Delta. And the
belief was that when Jonathan completes his 4 years, it should
go back to the north. With the belief that Jonathan is about to
complete his 4 years and go, that is one of the reasons why you
see the intensification of attacks. So this issue has to be
addressed. As far as leadership in Nigeria is concerned, it is
open to all. Not just a matter of one zone producing the elite
of the country and then for some reason when the other one is
unable to produce, it now brings up issues, and then there is
crisis.
It is also clear that corruption, until we deal with the
issue of corruption, no matter the human intelligence we have
and all that, corruption invades every aspect. Look at the case
of the military. How can you have a functional military when
the budget of the military is unbelievable, but where are the
weapons to show that the budget actually was spent on the
weapons.
Ms. Bass. And one of the reasons why I asked you the
question was I was just trying to identify some solutions.
Mr. John-Miller. Right. So what should be done is this. The
U.S. Government and the international community needs to sit
down with the leadership of Nigeria and make it imperative to
them that this the trend that corruption is having on the
situation in the country.
Ms. Bass. So the first question I was asking was about
Nigerians' reluctance to accept U.S. assistance, so within that
context, how can we do what you just said?
Mr. John-Miller. Okay. I read in the papers, and I am also
going to bring you back to the issue of culture and also
ethnicity as also part of it. When the U.S. responded that they
were going to give the Nigerian Government drones and all that,
everybody welcomed it. I issued a statement. It was just a few
northern politicians who opposed it, and the reason for
opposing it is that they see it as a way of empowering
Jonathan; and if the assistance is accepted, it will certainly
expose them, who are the sponsors of Boko Haram.
So in their way, they don't want anything that will give
opportunity for the security operatives to unveil the real
sponsors of Boko Haram. That is why no matter what you do, they
will always criticize that. The best thing that should be done
is to come out clearly and say as long as this is terrorism, if
you are implicated, you will be picked up. This is a national
security issue. It has nothing to do with politics. If you even
look at the arguments over whether the Chibok girls are
abducted or not, you will see that it is politics. The Borno
government is saying that the Federal Government is not doing
enough. The Federal Government is saying, no, you are not doing
enough. You will see that there is no unity amongst the levels
of government; and when it comes to terrorism, the safety of
lives and property of the citizens comes first.
Ms. Bass. Okay. Maybe I can hear from the other two
witnesses.
Mr. Ogebe. Yes. I was going to say that part of the
reluctance of Nigeria not accepting foreign assistance is this
persona, this whole persona of, oh, big brother Africa; you
know, we are the world. We take care of everyone; no one takes
care of us. So that clearly was a constraint. But talking to
some of the military sources in Nigeria for example, regarding
the FTO, they did hint that there was a reluctance by
politicians to have finances being tracked and all of that. So
that may have been why they were not gung ho about FTO
designation themselves. But I think that Nigeria is now at the
point where they realize they can't go it alone. And if this is
any encouragement to you, some of the families we met last week
told us how they were contributing $70,000. These are poor
peasant families. But a witch doctor in Cameroon had apparently
offered to help them bring back their girls, and these poor
families were trying to raise that money; and here is what they
told us. They said when we heard in the news that the Americans
were coming, we decided not to raise that money, and that was
for me very uplifting. And that was for me very uplifting. And
I think it illustrates the point that they were retreating back
into the dark ages because their government had failed. And
then they saw a glimmer of hope from the world, and that is why
the majority of them are excited about America's intervention.
Ms. Bass. Okay. Thank you. Let me go on to Ambassador
Sanders.
Ambassador Sanders. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. You are
absolutely right in terms of there being a resistance to
receiving U.S. military training more than anything else, not
necessarily equipment, but really sort of the training. I saw
that firsthand when I was on the ground. I spent my first 12
months or 18 months fighting back their concerns about AFRICOM.
If you put things back in context, you know, do a little bit of
history on this issue, AFRICOM had really just been stood up
for a couple years before, and there was this phobia about
AFRICOM on the continent. When I landed in Nigeria, the phobia
on AFRICOM was at an all-time high, not wanting a military
footprint on the continent, all of those things that we have
now seen kind of dissipate.
I have always been a big advocate of AFRICOM in terms of
its capability for training, the intel it brings to the table
and everything else. As I said, my team and I worked really
hard to change that dynamic around in Nigeria. So, yes, you are
absolutely right. There was that resistance early on, and maybe
things would have been different. Now I see a huge change in
that. As you said, the AFRICOM commander was just there. I know
he went to several locations, not just in the capital, and I
think that is a real turning point for Nigeria.
Let me just put one word of caution on the table though. As
we move forward, now that we have this open door and there is a
desire for our assistance and our help, I also think we have to
remember that this is a military that thinks of itself as a
professional military. It has served in peacekeeping operations
probably more than any other African country in the world. They
were the top peacekeepers from the African continent. Their
force commanders were in Mali. Their force commanders were in
Darfur. They were in Liberia, for instance. So we have to keep
that in mind as we go in and try help them and assist them. And
keep that in mind that we can't also add to the demoralization
that they may be feeling now. We need to be going in with the
best foot forward, which I am sure our guys are doing, but I
just want to put that out there for the record.
In terms of the poverty issue, definitely that is a feeder
issue. It is not, I would say, I was always in the camp of
saying that I didn't see poverty being the driver. I actually
saw when I was up there, I had a session with religious
leaders. I had a session with students from Maiduguri
University my last time up there before I left. And then I did
an open town hall in downtown Maiduguri, one of the toughest
environments I have ever had to speak in.
What I walked away with from that encounter, at least the
last one, which is very tough, very hostile to the U.S., all of
those things, I walked away saying this is really more about a
clash of civilizations, really a different world perception of
where people, where the fundamentalist groups want to take
their country. So how do we address that?
What I saw this last time was a slight change in that
because Boko Haram has been so brutal, that therecruitment and
feeder issues have diminished somewhat in their ability to
attract people to their entity, and that to me is a good sign
that maybe we as an international community can capitalize on
by then addressing the sectoral development issues, because the
attraction for Boko Haram, I think, has been diminished quite
significantly because of their brutality.
I was at one session with a group of students at the
University of Maiduguri, and I will never forget this young
woman, and she stood up and said, ``Why doesn't the U.S. like
people of Islamic faith?'' There was that initial sense, I
thought, from a lot of young people in that part of the region.
I don't see that as much now because of the brutality of Boko
Haram.
So I think we have an opportunity here to capitalize on
that changing tide that has happened on the ground and really
come in with some fundamental development tools to address
education, health care, but more importantly, potable water and
sanitation I would put at the top of the list, as well as
really providing an enabling environment for people to live
their lives in quality and in peace.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Gentlelady Jackson Lee from Texas is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
courtesies to a member of the Judiciary Committee and Homeland
Security Committee and a former member of this committee that
has had a very strong commitment to the continent, and of
course to these issues, to our children, and to this crisis
dealing with Boko Haram.
Let me thank each of the witnesses and take note of
Ambassador Sanders for her service to the country and to
Jubilee for its very in-depth persistent presence in some of
the more difficult areas.
So I am going to start with Mr. Pham on the presence or
non-presence of the African Union and whether or not they can
pose an effective catalyst for a concerted purposeful action
against Boko Haram. Do they have the necessary assets to view
this as an attack on Africa and to be able to be helpful?
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, for that
question. First, let me begin by saying Boko Haram is a threat
not just to Nigeria but to Africa itself. In that respect, it
should be and it ought to be a concern for the African Union as
a whole. That being said, the African Union faces several
constraints which we have to be realistic about what it can do
in this particular situation. The first constraint is the
reluctance still, as Ambassador Sanders just mentioned in her
response to the ranking member, of Nigeria to its going down,
but there is still a resistance to outside, if you will,
interference which the African Union would have to overcome.
Secondly, the African Union, unfortunately, its
counterterrorism center is based in Algiers. And part of that
is it enters into the very murky and complex politics of
Algeria, its relationship with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
its relationships with Boko Haram. It gets into a whole bunch
of weeds. So although the legitimacy of the African Union
should be brought into play, its condemnation, its convening
power, in reality, we are facing a situation that requires
immediate action and resources which by the time the African
Union got it all together, it is definitely way too late for
the poor girls from Chibok and for the current effort. So for
now we should use what we can from the African Union, use its
convening power, its moral authority, but recognize there are
very severe institutional dynamics which limit its ability to
act effectively in this particular situation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I don't want to pursue that frailty, but
that disappoints me greatly. The African Union, as I understand
it, based still in Ethiopia, is it, has military resources and
assets as I thought, and I am just shocked that this is not a
potent enough issue that they cannot be engaged. I am not going
to ask you to respond, but I am just going to say on the
record, I am disappointed, and I hope they will have an
opportunity to meet some of their representatives here. I know
we have met some of them in Africa, but I am just shocked
because some of us as Members of Congress have indicated that
that would be a good partnership to look at it from the African
perspective.
There has got to be some military force that has a
concerted effort, and I heard Ambassador Sanders' comments
about the resources that Nigeria has; and I also heard your
comments tragically that this has been going on since the
1990s, so it has now mushroomed, and it is now at a point where
it is going to be that much more difficult to contain it, but
contain it we must. That is my view of it. Contain it we must,
and we must use not only the resources that we did looking for
the Malaysian flight, which I truly believe we should as well.
This is too rich a world, even with the developing nations, but
I frankly believe that we should use the resources that we are
using collectively as a world family against al-Qaeda, because
when you hear the word al-Qaeda, hair stands on the top of
everyone's head, and every resource that they have is thrown at
it. In this instance, not only are we missing world support,
but we are missing world resources.
Let me ask Mr. Ogebe, thank you for being here representing
Jubilee. Can you speak to the religious crisis that we are
facing, and is there any way to part the waters on the
religious crisis? Because if we are to go to Kano where it is
sort of the centerpiece, does someone get on a van and come
with a peace flag, a white flag, and say let's bring everybody
together? Is that a reality at this point in time? And I might
just want to put on the record, Mr. Chairman, I am aghast, and
I am going to get to the two other witnesses, that the loose
existence of official military garb, uniforms, can be co-opted,
put on terrorists, and innocent persons in a church literally
shot down in cold blood. The worst of it is that they were
receiving these individuals, welcoming them as people who were
coming to help them, save them, protect them. Emmanuel?
Mr. Ogebe. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Yes, the
religious motivations of Boko Haram are explicit, and clearly
they have conducted what I consider a pre-genocide on the
Christian minorities of northern Nigeria. Now, speaking
particularly with regard to their attacks on religious
communities, last year they attacked over 60 churches, and in
the same time frame they attacked about two to three mosques.
So overwhelmingly their focus is on Christian targets,
government targets, and occasionally they attack Muslim groups
that cooperate with the military authorities. Now that said,
the concern that you make with regard to their access to
military uniforms is very valid, and this really has created a
credibility crisis for the genuine security forces because
there are people showing up in uniforms and carting away girls
whom they say they are going to protect.
And that had just happened again last week when they showed
up in the church and rounded up people and said we are here to
protect you and massacred scores of people in that village.
Some of our findings are that at one point, the Nigerian
chief of staff, in an effort to boost, recruitment of
northerners into the army, enrolled a lot of people. There are
mass recruitments. And the records indicate that the night
before graduation, after all of the training, a lot of these
people deserted; so they deserted with knowledge and tactics of
the Nigerian military, and they deserted with uniforms. So when
you watch some of the videos of the attacks, you can see that
these are very well-trained people who know the ropes of the
Nigerian military's tactics.
Secondly, and this is sad, this goes to the issue of
corruption again. For many people in the security forces, they
have to buy some of their own equipment, including their own
guns and uniforms. And so if you open source uniforms and guns
and bullets, you will clearly have a problem of proliferation
falling into bad hands.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you may have a problem, if the
chairman is kind enough to indulge me, I am sorry, if I can
continue, you may have a proliferation of mismatched uniforms
not letting the people know what is what. Let me just pose this
question. I want to get to the other witnesses, because maybe I
am being idealistic. First of all, would anyone listen to a
ceasefire? Would anyone listen to the carrying of a white flag
to go into the region and say, I want to sit down--and I see a
smile--I want to sit down and at least talk about a ceasefire
and a cessation of the violence, then begin to talk about the
issues, because in the testimony that has been given in the
questionings of the ranking member, there were the issues of
extreme poverty, but there is also issues that the country
itself has enormous wealth, but we know that the northern
region is enormously impoverished, which may have been the
genesis of a lot of this. Is there any, any hope of some kind
of effort like that, and who would be the leaders of that
effort?
Mr. Ogebe. Well, with regard to the poverty, let me quickly
polish that off. Boko Haram is killing Christians within their
community who are as poor as them, or in some cases, even
poorer because those Christians tend to be denied access to
government services because they are religious minorities. The
Christians could very well be terrorists as well if poverty was
the simple reason or rationale for this, and they are not doing
that.
With regard to the idea of the ceasefire, Boko Haram does
not respect humanitarian corridors or any of the conventions
that civilized people respect in combat, for example, allowing
medics to come in, allowing relief to come in. They have
actually gone out of their way to kill medical workers, so they
may not be open to moral suasion from any source. That said, at
this point because of the world headlines, the global spotlight
on them, they may be open to approach.
I will say that we have contacts who have contacts who
communicate with Boko Haram; and I tried to find out while I
was out there last week whether they were open to talking, and
apparently that channel has been silent for a while. I think,
Congresswoman, if you wanted to lead that effort, we would be
solidly behind you; but I can't think of anyone who would lead
the charge as far as trying to broker a ceasefire. But
certainly with the media headlights, which they clearly like--
they are media savvy--there may be a window to actually have a
dialogue with them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. So on this side of the table,
let me now call for a ceasefire, and let me join with my
colleagues here, Chairman Smith, and the members of this very
esteemed subcommittee, and therefore, say that we want a
ceasefire. We want to save lives. I know there are many experts
at this table, but if they can hear the sound of our voices, we
have just asked for a ceasefire, and I am not taking this
lightly. This is baffling and outrageous, but I do believe that
there has to be some moment where we can find a way to save
these girls.
May I ask the last two witnesses this question, and
Ambassador Sanders, you in particular have just come back, for
those of us who may be headed in that direction, what should we
be looking for? What should we see? What should we ask? And to
Mr. John-Miller, we thank you for your service. Again, I am
going to ask you the question about any hope for a ceasefire
from a humanitarian perspective that then gives us the
opportunity to bring these girls back. We are hashtagging it.
We are press-conferencing it. These girls are still scattered,
still away from their families, and still frightened; and so I
would ask you that. I am going to go to Ambassador Sanders
first, what we should be focused on.
Ambassador Sanders. Thank you, Congresswoman. I wanted to
just briefly say something on the AU, and I will go right to
your questions. I just wanted to let you know that the ECOWAS
countries have trained together before and have worked together
before in conflicts, so maybe that is where the additional
troop support could come from as opposed to the broader AU, and
maybe it could be under a U.N.-AU mandate with Nigerian troops
in the lead but having additional support from troops who have
been involved in asymmetrical warfare. So that is a
possibility. They have had a lot of exercises together as
ECOWAS, and that is a possibility.
In terms of who you should meet, certainly you need to meet
people in the security services. That would include the
military, the police, and their equivalent of the CIA
basically. I think you will get a sense from them of where they
think their challenges are, and you can hear what they say, and
then you can hear what our trainers are saying or those that
are there to help on the U.S. assistance packages, and see
where those things meet. And maybe there are still gaps, but I
know that our team there is doing a top notch job. They always
have. But I do think that those are key.
Then I would also include the Justice Ministry in that as
well because you want to make sure that everything possible on
the justice and non-impunity side is being done as much as
possible, so I would add that to it.
I would lastly want to just say both Muslims and Christians
have been killed in this conflict; and I would like to see us
always talk about this conflict in that context. If you go back
to what Shekau said a couple of years ago about trying to have
an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria and really starting in
the region where the state of emergency is, if you look at one
of those states in particular, Adamawa used to be about 50
percent Muslim and 50 percent Christian. The idea is to make
Christians so fearful that they move out of the region.
And I think that we can't add our voice to that kind of
dynamic, so we need to be very careful about making sure that
we are talking about this as both Christians and Muslims,
particularly moderate Muslims, being under siege there. But
their goal to have an Islamic caliphate means that they don't
want anybody who is not Muslim in the north, and that includes
moderate Muslims as well.
So I think we just have to be really careful that when we
talk about the devastation and the killing and the abuses and
the brutality, everyone who is not part of Boko Haram is
subject to that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What I would say is, I asked Mr. John-
Miller to finish my questioning, what I would say is that the
idea behind the ceasefire, however it may be expressed here at
the table, is really--was really to focus on the idea of the
populations, the Christian and Muslim populations, who equally
have been victimized, to actually see if they could be the
fathers of this ongoing crisis. But what I would say is that is
a very good point. It is a point that I pursued and will be
pursuing as well. Yes?
Ambassador Sanders. I had one more thing to add on the
ceasefire issue, and unfortunately, I am going to end up in the
pessimist column on this. Because I said earlier that I think
this is about a clash of civilization in terms of how Boko
Haram sees the world, I do not see them agreeing to a
ceasefire; and I think that we have to keep that in mind as we
look at strategic planning and how to address this conflict. I
said earlier that we need to eliminate the current playbooks
here and come up with a new playbook to address this threat.
But if you are talking about and you are hearing what Shekau
actually is saying and those that are following him are saying,
these are not people that you are going to be able to reason
with for a ceasefire; and I hate to say that, but I think we
need to keep that in mind.
Certainly we can make the effort and the approaches because
I agree with you, we have got to do everything possible; but I
also think we have to be realistic and also look at the
possibilities they are not going to respond to any overtures of
a ceasefire.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am so grateful that we have this hearing
to hear these kinds of very pessimistic facts, but to be
realistic in how we approach this. And that is my point, that
we may be in an arena that is more unique than we have ever
had. And we have moved heaven and earth when we hear the word
al-Qaeda and its subsets; we now have maybe a subset that is
growing exponentially, and my fear is that it moves throughout
the continent where we are trying to work against conflicts. So
Mr. John-Miller, if I could finish with you on the questioning.
And might I do this, Mr. Chairman, and let you know that we
have some young people from the YES Prep North Forest area ECS
Region 4 and CloseUp who are in this room, and I hope they are
understanding that our hearing is about saving lives and having
tolerance of different groups; so I welcome them here.
Mr. John-Miller, your take on this whole epidemic of
violence, and also, why don't I let you focus on the
possibility, or not the possibility, but the getting these
girls back.
Mr. John-Miller. Well, my solution is this. I am an
optimist, and I strongly believe that every effort put in that
direction is wanted. When the U.S. decided to help Nigeria
publicly, I do realize that a lot of northerners welcomed the
idea, although a few of them really rejected it. But when
someone like President Obasanjo stepped in, we began to see
some changes because a lot of northern leaders began to say
they wanted ceasefire. They want to talk to Shekau and all
that. So I think that one thing we can do is encourage
President Olusegun Obasanjo to go ahead with what he is doing.
I think one of the aspects that complicates the matter is the
fact that from information reaching us, he is not all that good
with the current President; but if they can keep their personal
differences aside and look at this issue as a national issue, I
am sure that Obasanjo is going to be able to do something about
it, particularly when it comes to bringing back the girls.
I also strongly believe that someone like the Reverend
Jessie Jackson has earned the trust and respect of northerners
in Nigeria, and he interacts with a lot of them. And the
leaders in the northern part of the country play a big role. If
these individuals are made to understand the reality of the
fact that what is going on is going to drive away the
development, is going to cause a lot of chaos in the country,
certainly they would be willing to work with individuals to
bring an end to it.
So I would recommend strongly that if it is possible people
like Obasanjo and the Reverend Jackson should be saddled with
that responsibility to at least help to look into the issue. If
some people might argue that it is like giving Shekau more
authority, that he is an individual, but the fact remains that
like I stated earlier, if adequate diplomacy is not used, he
will not release those girls, and any attempt to use force, he
will kill them.
So I would strongly suggest that people like Obasanjo and
the Reverend Jackson should be looked into to possibly initiate
that. I have also met with them, discussed it with them; and
they are very optimistic that if given the support and mandate,
they can be able to really make a dent or make a headway, so I
want us to look at that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, as I close, let me thank you
very much and thank the witnesses. I know that there is more
that I could have garnered from this. I do want to say this on
the record. I am pleased of the efforts that the United States
and President Obama have taken, and I know they are prepared to
do more particularly with the intelligence effort, the
strategic persons that were on the ground, the ability to use
the intelligence gathered to help with the finding of the
girls.
I gleaned from your statements, Mr. John-Miller, that
emissaries--we have done it before, Mr. Chairman--so I am going
to put everything on the table that we raise with Nigeria, we
raise with the United States, we raise with the United Nations,
just as there was an envoy to Darfur, there is one to South
Sudan, and we know that those issues are still boiling, that we
may need to do the envoy in this instance. And I also think,
Ambassador, the ECOWAS is a great team. They have been
successful in the past maybe with the embrace, as you said, of
the African Union and the United Nations.
I am throwing my hands up, Mr. Chairman, but I am not
giving up. I am frankly believing that we have to keep this on
a front burner to save lives, and I would ask, if they can hear
my voice, for the people of Nigeria in the northern area to
know that they are not abandoned and that there are those of us
that feel the pain and certainly can't equal their pain of loss
of life, children, husbands, wives, and other family members or
the loss of these girls; but we feel the pain, and I am just
committed to trying to help as much as I can.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership, and I thank
Congresswoman Bass for her great leadership on this issue and
your kindness for allowing me this time on the committee. I
yield back.
Mr. Smith. I thank my good friend from Texas for being a
vital part of this hearing and look forward to hearing of her
upcoming travel. Thank you so much.
Let me just conclude with a few final questions. I know you
have been very, very patient with your time, and the
subcommittee deeply appreciates it.
Ambassador Sanders, again, I think it is worth reiterating.
You testified ominously that Nigeria is at the beginning of a
long war or conflict, and that they have to realize this; it is
no longer a localized conflict or insurgency. There is no easy
fix or response, and I think that sobering analysis needs to be
fully understood and appreciated by everyone.
You also talked about that there needs to be regrouping,
reapproach and readdress in order to get off their heels, that
is, the Nigerian security forces who are on defense and go on
aggressive offense. And I think we need to put exclamation
points behind that, and that is why that training more rather
than less and an acceptance by the Nigerians that there is a
special skill-set that needs to be imparted that has been
learned the hard way through our military; and, of course,
there are others involved in this as well. So thank you for,
you know, bringing that sobering analysis to the committee.
You have also pointed out about the trauma issue. And,
again, Mr. Ogebe brought several traumatized victims, moms,
dads, that young girl who is one of the lucky ones who escaped
Chibok. And noting parenthetically, and I think everybody knows
this, the Boko Haram troops were wearing uniforms. They looked
like they were the military. That is why the young girls in a
very orderly fashion got into the vehicles. They thought it was
the military. It was not, of course. They were terrorists. But
the trauma counseling that you have called for I think is
extraordinarily important.
Years ago, I wrote the Torture Victims Relief Act which
deals with those who have suffered trauma from torture. And I
did serve as chairman of the Veterans Affairs Committee for a
number of years, and I served on the committee for a quarter of
a century. PTSD is such a significant mental health issue, and
it would seem to me that these individual girls, those who have
been abducted, all those who have been involved who have been
victimized, there needs to be much more done.
Mr. Ogebe, you talked about the victims compensation fund,
and I do hope that President Goodluck Jonathan is listening and
his staff. Put those resources toward the families; get them
the kind of help, particularly psychologically, that they are
so much in need of. Otherwise that trauma imbeds. It goes
deeper. It acts out in many, many ways. We learned that
especially with our Vietnam veterans when 10 years, 15 years
down the line, huge problems manifested; and people who weren't
aware of PTSD didn't have a clue, and that includes wives and
husbands and families.
I like your idea, Madam Ambassador, about President
Jonathan meeting with the families. Invite them to the villa.
Have a meeting with them and put his arms around them and say
we care for you because you know with the election coming up,
one of my takeaways from 4 days on the ground last week was
that the election is serving as an acceleration phase for more
terrorism. No ebb tide. They will get worse, not better. And as
you pointed, several of you pointed out, the ability to bring
bombs into Abuja itself and to breach the security perimeter is
very real as witnessed by the attack in the bus station just
very recently.
Let me also point out, and I think it is worth bearing,
when Greg Simpkins and I were there last September, we did meet
with folks involved with President Jonathan's Presidential
Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution which was
reaching out to Boko Haram, but it was a bridge to nowhere.
Maybe hope springs eternal. There might be something, but I
would share your thoughts, Madam Ambassador. We are dealing
with Joseph Kony. We are dealing with Charles Taylor, Slobodan
Milosevic. We are dealing with bloodthirsty people who have
been enabled and empowered to do more rather than less killing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would the gentleman yield for just one
moment?
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want to say that you have captured
just the essence of the vitality of this hearing, and I want to
add to what you are saying about the President. No one person
can single handedly fight Boko Haram, but there are things that
can be done. To my knowledge, there is no victims fund
established, relief fund, that has been set up by the Nigerian
Government for the victims who have lost people. I don't know
what the status of these girls' families, but if they are
mourning and are at a central point, just as the families of
the Malaysian flight. They have left their homes. They are at a
point, they are in need not only of the warm expression of
concern; so I would like to make sure I put on the record that
I hope, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can write a joint letter with
your committee that we want a victims relief fund set up for
this crisis that is ongoing by the Nigerian Government, and I
think it is key that we do so.
Mr. Smith. Well, I have raised it. Mr. Ogebe has raised it
repeatedly. I do know the personnel from the Nigerian Embassy
are here. The Ambassador was here earlier. It seems to me this
is something that could be done very easily because those
families are left to fend for themselves, and as you mentioned,
Madam Ambassador, the possibility, hopefully not the
probability, but the possibility of being reabducted remains
very real. Boko Haram is capable; and so, please, if you could
respond.
Ambassador Sanders. I just wanted to add one more thing on
the trauma and grief. I had it briefly in my statement, but I
feel like I need to reiterate it. The PTSD also for the
military, and I say that because I heard that a lot from some
of the rank and file service members that I saw. Poor troop
rotation in the area is one reason. So when we are looking at
trauma and grief counseling, you know, hopefully in our
package, we are also looking at that for the Nigerian military
because I am hearing more and more about PTSD for them as well
that have served in the northeast. So I just wanted to add that
to the mix.
Mr. Smith. And if I could add and, again, having served on
Veterans Affairs Committee for a quarter of a century, the
Veterans Administration, notwithstanding the problems that are
facing it now in terms of waiting lists, has literally written
the book on how to deal with PTSD; so perhaps our own VA might
be of some assistance in dealing with those thorny issues of
deep psychological injury that the military as well as victims
suffer. Would anyone like to say anything before we conclude?
Professor Pham?
Mr. Pham. I just want to make two brief observations, Mr.
Chairman. One is I agree with Ambassador Sanders that
realistically, Boko Haram has not shown itself a respecter of
persons. Even the traditional authorities are well respected in
Nigeria. They have threatened the Sultan in Sokoto. They have
attacked the brother of the Shehu of Borno. These are
traditional figures that enjoy great moral suasion. I hope for
the best but I join Ambassador Sanders about not being
particularly sanguine about the prospects.
The other point I want to make is that Congresswoman
Jackson Lee made an excellent point. The Pan-African dimension
of tactics. A lot of the tactics that we have just discussed in
the last few minutes are African tactics they have learned from
other places. AQIM in its previous incarnation as the GSPC, and
even before that as the GIA, the idea of wearing uniforms and
using the uniform of the military is something they perfected
to an art, and they still use in Algeria, and that Boko Haram
has picked up. The idea of submitting, as Mr. Ogebe brought up,
submitting to training as a way of outsourcing, if you will, in
a very perverse way the training of your own fighters. We saw
that year in and year out in Somalia when clan and even al-
Shabaab militia would enroll with the former transitional
Federal Government, receive the training, take the training
uniform and weapons, and then move en masse to firing those
weapons back on the people that train them.
Again, they have had these connections. They are picking
these things up. These ideas move very rapidly across
frontiers, and this is why Boko Haram is even now more of a
danger than it has been, because the means of communication
that facilitate our getting information also facilitate them
getting information and exchanging, if you will, best
practices.
Ambassador Sanders. One last thing, and it is really on the
heels of what Dr. Pham just said. It is a perspective I have
coming out of the diplomatic corps in terms of how we share
information, and maybe there are things that we need to pay
attention to. These groups do learn from each other. When I
looked at the Westgate situation, I thought that they had
learned from the Boston Marathon bombers because they brought
in a change of clothes so that some of them could actually
leave the mall with civilian clothes on or change of clothes or
harder to identify.
I think what Boko Haram has learned from Westgate is the
separation of the hostages and moving them around. I think that
we have to pay attention to, you know, what we are saying out
there and what we are hearing out there so that we don't add to
the arsenal of things that they use to further impose violence
and brutality on civilian populations.
So I would add that I agree wholeheartedly with my
colleagues on the panel and everything that they have said, but
particularly on this issue, I think we need to pay attention to
the fact that they are paying attention to what we say and what
we do and what we share; and they capitalize on that, and then
they use it in the brutal way that we have seen here in the
case of Nigeria.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Emmanuel?
Mr. Ogebe. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I agree with what Ambassador
Sanders has said. There is a lot more that one would have
wanted to share, but I have put it in my paper so that we don't
provide fodder to the terrorists who are clearly paying a lot
of attention to all that is being said.
I do want to quickly mention two things: The first is with
regard to the fact that last week we met with a Muslim father
who has two daughters who are missing, and a Christian father
who has one daughter. They traveled 2 days together to come to
Abuja to meet with us. And there is something about the pain
and the travesty of this experience that is making these people
bond together; and as the Ambassador said earlier, hopefully we
can seize the moment and help unite these communities so that
they can turn on the terrorists that have devastated their
lives.
And so part of what we as non-profits plan to do is to
continue to encourage the young girls with scholarships and so
on and so forth, and these are some of the initiatives that we
are working on stealthily because of the sensitivity of the
subject matter.
The last thing I want to say is, I want to use this
opportunity, and Mr. Chairman, you will forgive me for my abuse
here, but I want to pay tribute to my mother who was a northern
Nigerian schoolgirl who cried in school when her teacher said
that girls don't read science. They only read arts. And she
insisted that she wanted to be a doctor, and they finally put
her in the boys school because boys were taught science; and
she became the first female doctor from northern Nigeria. And I
want to pay tribute to other young girls today, including those
in captivity, who want to have that same opportunity that my
mom had; and I thank you for the opportunity to say that today.
Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimonies,
very, very incisive. Hopefully we can take this and obviously
work with the administration, work with other Members of
Congress and the Senate to do far more than we have done. I do
want to thank Embassy Abuja, including our DCM, and the two
human rights officers, Helena and Michelle. I will go with just
first names today, and Maria for their wonderful work, their
professionalism. They were very helpful during my 4 days on the
ground, and we will continue working with them; and without
objection, testimony from the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom, Mr. Jasser, will be made a
part of the record. And again, I thank you for your testimony,
and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
Material submitted for the record by Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe, manager,
Justice for Jos Project, Jubilee Campaign USA
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations