[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-164
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction..................................... 7
Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International
Security & Counterterrorism Issues, International Affairs &
Trade Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 52
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable John F. Sopko: Prepared statement.................. 9
Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.: Prepared statement............. 54
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 84
Hearing minutes.................................................. 85
EXAMINING U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN
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TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, we will then recognize
other members seeking recognition, for 1 minute each. We will
then hear from our witnesses, and we thank them, first of all,
for their patience and understanding, and that goes for the
audience as well. We had 16 votes, so we thank you for the
time.
And the witness' prepared statements will be made a part of
the record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements
and questions for the record subject to the length limitation
in the rules.
Before we begin, I would like to express my most sincere
condolences to the family and friends of the five American
troops who were killed in Afghanistan just yesterday. No words
can adequately express the debt of gratitude that we owe to
those brave troops, and our thoughts and our prayers are
certainly with them and their families at this troubling time.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Last year,
this subcommittee convened a hearing with Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR, Stuart Bowen, on the
lessons learned from the United States' stabilization, relief
and reconstruction operations in Iraq. The purpose of that
hearing was to examine SIGIR's final report to get a better
understanding of how the U.S. approaches reconstruction
efforts, and where we can improve so that we won't be
confronted with the same problems and repeat the same mistakes.
The major takeaway from that hearing, in addition to the
billions of dollars in wasted taxpayer money, was that the
United States Government was unable to adequately plan, execute
and oversee such large scale operations. So have we learned any
lessons from Iraq? And have we learned to use our assistance
more effectively and more efficiently?
While we may have implemented a few reforms as a result of
the recommendations from these oversight entities in front of
us, sadly it seems that we still have a long way to go to be
good shepherds of taxpayer dollars. Having seen previous GAO
and SIGAR reports related to oversight and accountability of
U.S. assistance in Afghanistan, several things are strikingly
obvious.
One is that GAO and SIGAR have undertaken an important task
keeping Congress informed on that status of our operations
there, but now with the troop presence winding down their
abilities will be severely restricted due to the security
situation and lack of access. This will make it difficult for
them, and subsequently for us in Congress, to keep proper tabs
on all of the U.S. funded projects in Afghanistan. Another is
that for all of our effort and desire to do good in
Afghanistan, we have some very glaring deficiencies that must
be addressed.
The U.S. has allocated over $103 billion to Afghanistan
relief and reconstruction. However, the Afghan Government is
still not capable of handling such a large infusion of money,
of goods and of equipment, and it is incapable of achieving
long term sustainability.
This is particularly telling with many of our
infrastructure projects, like in the health sector, where often
times USAID would fund projects that are way too large and way
too ambitious, and it leaves the Afghans with facilities that
are larger and more expensive to operate, like the Gardez and
the Khair Khot hospitals. And then these hospitals go unused
and unstaffed because the Afghans can't find the funds nor the
staff to operate them.
These efforts are not economical and are not practical. As
a result, it is a waste of taxpayer dollars. The result of this
large infusion of money to an incapable Afghan system is
twofold. A report released this year commissioned by General
Dunford and conducted by the Joint Coalition Operational
Analysis, JCOA, determined that the vast influx of money
overwhelmed the Afghan Government's capacity. This helped
foster an environment of corruption that has worked against our
interests from the start, and as General Allen once said,
corruption is the existential, strategic threat to Afghanistan.
The other result is that it created an environment in which
we are not tackling the root cause of the issue. The only way
for Afghanistan to maintain and sustain the progress it has
made under these relief and reconstruction efforts is to
continue to rely on donor contributions to fill the revenue
gaps. And that is not sustainable for Afghanistan nor is it
sustainable for us in the United States, or we risk losing all
of those gains.
In 2009, the administration decided it was going to pledge
to provide 50 percent of the developmental aid to Afghanistan
in direct assistance. In fact, GAO reports that we went from
$470 million in 2009 to over $1.4 billion in 2010. However,
that same year several reports, including one commissioned
directly by USAID, cited how decidedly ill equipped the Afghan
ministries were to receive direct assistance.
Both GAO and SIGAR raised the warning flags and recommended
that USAID identify and assess the risks associated with direct
assistance, but SIGAR is now reporting that USAID had ignored
these recommendations and may have approved direct assistance
without mitigating these risks.
So how are we to conduct proper oversight of State, of
USAID, of DoD, to ensure that they are fully complying with the
recommendations of SIGAR and GAO and the rules and regulations
laid out by Congress to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are put to
their best use? SIGIR identified several major lessons that
should have been learned in Iraq that should be applied in
Afghanistan, and included the need to implement better
interagency coordination and use our funds wiser, more
efficiently and more effectively.
If we are still running into the same problems in
Afghanistan as we did in Iraq now that we are transitioning, is
it time for Congress to reexamine how we conduct these
operations and consider implementing some much needed reform?
The obvious answer is yes. Of course, yes.
And with that I am pleased to yield to the ranking member,
my good friend Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. I thank you, Madam Chairman. I also would like
to extend my condolences to the five troops who were killed
yesterday in Afghanistan. We spend a lot of time here talking
about what our Government does, but it is ultimately the men
and women who serve our Government in tough places like this
that we need to keep in mind. And on this day we keep in mind
the families of the five.
Today's hearing comes on the heels of the President's
announcement that 9,600 American troops will remain in
Afghanistan until 2016. After almost 13 years, trillions of
dollars and thousands of American lives lost, this news was met
with the mixed reactions that we have come to expect when we
talk about Afghanistan, from those who cannot bear the thought
of even one more American life sacrificed to those who believe
that it is our responsibility to remain and protect our
national security interests.
A recent Gallup poll found that for the first time since
the war in Afghanistan began, more Americans now view the war
as a mistake. After the United States has given so much in
blood and treasure, what do we have to show for it? Have our
resources been wisely spent? Have we strengthened U.S. security
at home and abroad?
The Department of Defense and State Department and USAID
all continue to have significant civilian presence and projects
throughout Afghanistan. These agencies have done tremendous
work in an extremely challenging environment. And the civilians
on the ground working to rebuild and reform put their lives in
danger every day and they deserve to be commended for the work
that they are doing.
But as our presence in Afghanistan draws down, are we
putting the necessary measures in place to ensure that the
programs that we have instituted and the infrastructure that we
have built to strengthen Afghanistan's security capability,
governance and civil society are sustainable and will remain in
place long after we leave?
Accounting for billions of dollars across multiple agencies
is no easy task. I believe that the good folks at State and
USAID have taken significant steps to deal with corruption in
the Afghan Government and to combat any potential uses. An
additional independent oversight of these efforts is necessary
and welcome to create programs that run as efficiently as
possible.
In 2008, Congress established the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction with a goal of not just tracking
waste, fraud and abuse, but to recommend more efficient and
effective methods for completing the enormous task of
reconstruction in Afghanistan. Thanks to the work of SIGAR as
well as oversight investigations conducted by GAO, they have
identified a number of key challenges to U.S. reconstruction
efforts such as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government
and the many persistent security challenges.
And it is clear that evidence of these challenges can be
seen throughout our footprint in Afghanistan. GAO identified
numerous weaknesses in interagency coordination and overlap of
funding accounts between DoD, State and USAID, creating the
potential for duplication of projects and programs.
While GAO recommended the creation of a shared interagency
database in 2010, it appears that little progress to advance
that recommendation has been made. In 2012, GAO went so far as
to recommend that Congress take legislative action to require
that U.S. agencies report information on their development
related activities in a shared database. While USAID agreed
with this recommendation, DoD did not.
SIGAR has also raised serious concerns over State and
USAID's ability to terminate contracts when contractors are
found to have ties to insurgent or opposition forces. The
agencies lack the authorities to swiftly terminate, restrict or
avoid a contract awarded to a person or an entity identified as
supporting the enemy or opposing U.S. forces, and under
existing law the agencies will likely have to pay up to the
full cost of any contract to complete a termination.
Implementation of these broad reforms and other
recommendations will help maximize our assistance and achieve
greater results. Unfortunately, on a micro level SIGAR has also
found numerous examples of wasted funds, like the $12.8 million
utility equipment purchased to meet urgent needs in support of
the counterinsurgency strategy that sat unused in storage
controlled by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
I know that our witnesses today will highlight other
examples of concern, but I would like to use the remainder of
my time to focus on how we can better our coordination,
transparency and accountability going forward.
Our development work in Afghanistan will not end when the
last American troop leaves in 2016. Many of our ongoing
programs have been tremendously successful. We have made great
strides in building the capacity of the Afghan justice sector,
instituting desperately needed health programs and dramatically
increasing access to education, especially for women.
How can we sustain these programs going forward with the
ultimate goal of course being to one day transition them to
complete Afghan control? With the decreased footprint on the
ground, will we be able to provide needed oversight to make
sure that our projects stay on track?
USAID has developed an extensive remote monitoring process
that has been used successfully in a number of other
challenging environments. I hope that our witnesses will
address today critical components required for these monitoring
programs and when they believe this type of remote monitoring
can be successful in Afghanistan.
Any development work of this scale will face its fair share
of failures and successes, but I believe we are doing important
work that directly impacts the security of this country. It is
my hope that today's hearing will shed light on how we can
continue to ensure that Congress, State, DoD, and USAID are
working together to ensure that aid is provided in the most
effective and efficient way possible.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch.
So pleased to yield to Mr. Chabot, our subcommittee
chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you
for calling this hearing to continue this subcommittee's
oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Many
of us have ongoing concerns about the future of Afghanistan.
President Obama's recent announcement that he was pulling
all but 9,800 U.S. troops out by year's end and then halving
that in 2015, and then pulling all our troops out by the end of
2016 is troubling. Announcing a departure date no matter what
the conditions on the ground just tells the Taliban how long
they have to wait for us to leave before they can then, at
least in their mind, take over the country.
This announcement puts at risk, I am afraid, the sacrifice
that our men and women in uniform have made in that country,
not to mention the billions of dollars the U.S. has invested in
stabilization or even reconstruction efforts. I fear that we
may see something similar to what we saw in Iraq when we all
thought that there would be a number of troops that would
remain there. They were all pulled out. Fallujah, we see it
fall to Al Qaeda. We now see rather than a U.S. ally there, we
have extreme Iranian influence, and I would hate to see a
repeat of that.
So thank you very much for holding this.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And obviously, this situation relative to Afghan
reconstruction is sobering at best, $103-billion commitment
over the past 12 years. And you look at the condition of that
country, you have the Afghan economy is about $20 billion. In 1
year we spent 75 percent of that, some $15 billion in
reconstruction, $75 billion for a turbine in the southwest, a
$230-million highway project in the east, $4 billion in
training and equipping Afghan security forces.
And I think any assessment of the condition of all of those
projects is one that requires a lot of explanation when we
consider that Congress last year approved $53 billion to
rebuild the roads and bridges of America, a nation of 300
million, and yet we spent $89 billion over a 12-year period
rebuilding the roads and bridges of Afghanistan, a nation of
some 31 million.
So at the very least, the corrupt nature of the government,
the inadequacy of the Afghan security forces does not justify
the commitment that we have made. So I look forward to
listening to the work of the Inspector General and the rest of
the panel in exploring these issues more deeply.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Weber of Texas.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to be short.
Let us go.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cicilline?
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member
Deutch, for holding today's hearing. I too want to extend my
sympathies to the families of the five soldiers who were killed
yesterday in Afghanistan.
As we begin drawing down combat operations in Afghanistan,
I think it is important to say again that the responsibility
rests with the Afghan people to operate, build and maintain
their own civilian and military capacity. And the United States
has built an important foundation for Afghanistan's future, but
long term security and sustainable peace in the region can only
be accomplished when the people of Afghanistan take on these
responsibilities.
Some have argued that helping to rebuild Afghanistan's
schools, bridges, roads and hospitals has been important to our
mission, and some like me believe that it is time for us to
return our focus to supporting our own schools, bridges, roads
and hospitals. But I hope that all would agree that we need to
be sure that whatever funds have been used and will be used are
used wisely and that they are building programs that are
sustainable and institutions that are sustainable.
But as Mr. Higgins just said, I think there is a lot of
explanation that needs to be provided when you look at the
magnitude of the resources that have been invested when we have
urgent needs here in our own country. So I look forward to
hearing the two witnesses today, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline.
Ms. Meng?
Ms. Meng. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Deutch for calling this important hearing. It is
important that we conduct this oversight in order to ensure
that American taxpayer dollars are being used appropriately and
to ensure that our various agencies and departments are working
efficiently here and making use of best practices. Without
appropriate oversight, money will go to waste in Afghanistan.
I also look forward to a discussion of how we can discuss
with the American people the issues that are the subject of
this hearing. Afghanistan is an emotional issue for the
American people as we have seen this past week with the case of
Sergeant Bergdahl. As we finally leave Afghanistan, we need to
make sure we are communicating effectively and honestly with
the American people about our departure and what will come
next. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Ms. Meng.
And so now we are pleased to introduce our witnesses.
First, we are pleased to welcome Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, John Sopko. Mr. Sopko has more than
30 years of experience as a prosecutor, congressional counsel
and senior Federal Government advisor. He spent over 20 years
on the Hill--poor thing--serving in the Senate and House of
Representatives including on a House Select Committee on
Homeland Security and in the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. Mr. Sopko was sworn in as the Special Inspector
General on July 2nd, 2012.
Secondly, we welcome Mr. Michael Johnson who is a senior
executive and director of International Affairs and Trade at
the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO. In his role, he
assesses U.S. counterterrorism and security efforts focusing on
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other terrorist safe havens. Prior to
this position, Mr. Johnson was an assistant director in GAO's
Homeland Security and Justice team and he also spent the year
detailed to the House of Representatives Homeland Security
Committee.
We thank you, gentlemen, for your patience, for your
expertise, for waiting around, and we are so pleased to yield
to you now. And we will start with Mr. Sopko.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen,
Ranking Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, it is a
pleasure to be here today to discuss my agency's oversight of
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Today's hearing as you
have noted is very timely. As you are well aware, we are in the
midst of a pivotal transitional year in Afghanistan.
The ongoing military, political and economic transition
will undoubtedly shape Afghanistan's future for many years to
come. For instance, this week's Presidential run-off election
could result in the first peaceful democratic transition of
Presidential power in Afghanistan's history. Likewise, just a
few weeks ago, the President announced his plan to reduce our
military presence to approximately 10,000 troops by the end of
2014, and by the end of 2016 the U.S. presence in Afghanistan
will be reduced to a normal Embassy operation in Kabul with a
small security assistance office.
These events may lead many to incorrectly assume that the
reconstruction effort is also coming to an end, when in fact it
is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This is
largely due to previous commitments made by the United States
and international community at the Chicago and Tokyo
conferences, in addition to the weak state of Afghanistan's
economy and the limited capability of the Afghan Government to
collect revenue.
Since 2002, Congress has appropriated roughly $103 billion
for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan. This is more than
the United States has ever spent to rebuild any single country
in our history. To give this number some context, by the end of
this year we will have spent more money on Afghanistan
reconstruction than we did to rebuild Europe under the Marshall
Plan after World War II. And this year alone, we plan to spend
more money on Afghanistan reconstruction than we spend on the
next four countries, that is Israel, Egypt, Pakistan and Iraq,
combined.
Now an unforeseen consequence of this historic investment
by the United States and our allies has been that we have built
infrastructure and a security force and a national government
that the Afghans cannot currently sustain on their own. For
example, the Afghan Government generates roughly $2 billion a
year in annual revenue while it needs as much as $10 billion
annually to cover all government operations including the
important Afghan National Security Forces.
As a result, for many years to come the Afghan Government
will depend on external assistance from the United States and
the international community to meet this budget shortfall.
Accordingly, it is critical that effective management and
oversight remain a top priority for all U.S. agencies as we
prepare to enter a post-2014 reality in Afghanistan. This is
extremely important given that roughly $18 billion in
authorized and appropriated reconstruction funds remain to be
spent by U.S. agencies as of March 31st, 2014, including
approximately $7 billion by the State Department and USAID.
Today, SIGAR and our oversight comrades at GAO and the
other IGs are already contending with a restricted oversight
access. In fact, based on our best estimate it is likely that
far less than 20 percent of Afghanistan will be accessible to
civilian U.S. oversight personnel by December of this year.
That is more than a 50-percent decrease since 2009.
Despite these challenges, SIGAR is committed to its
oversight mission and is developing innovative methods to adapt
to the evolving security environment. Given what is at stake
for the United States, the international community and the
Afghan people, SIGAR believes oversight must be, to use a
military term, mission-critical. If it is not, the historic
investment we have made to date and the billions more yet to be
spent on reconstruction will be significantly vulnerable to
possible waste, fraud and abuse.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sopko follows:]
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & COUNTERTERRORISM ISSUES, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS & TRADE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to discuss key issues
relating to U.S. efforts and Afghanistan. Since 2003, GAO has
issued over 70 products including a special publication in 2003
highlighting key issues for oversight. We have also just been
to numerous congressional hearings and briefings on U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan. During the course of our work we have
made over 150 recommendations on a range of actions that should
be taken to improve program planning, implementation,
management and oversight.
Today I would like to highlight a few key issues. Among
them are the need to mitigate against the risk of providing
direct assistance to the Afghan Government, the oversight and
accountability of U.S. development projects, and as the chair
noted, the need for a comprehensive database and the need for
contingency planning as the U.S. transitions to a predominately
civilian-led presence.
Regarding direct assistance to the Afghan Government, in
2010, the U.S., along with other international donors pledged
to provide at least 50 percent of its development assistance
support through direct assistance. This was contingent on
certain controls being in place, and as the chair has noted, we
reported in 2011 that the U.S. fulfilled its pledge by nearly
tripling its awards during the first year. We went from about
$470 million in Fiscal Year 2009 to about $1.4 billion in
Fiscal Year 2010.
We also reported that while USAID had established and
generally complied with various financial and other internal
controls, it did not always assess the risk of providing direct
assistance. Although USAID took steps in response to our
recommendations, we have since learned of SIGAR's follow-on
findings that USAID may have again approved direct assistance
to some Afghan ministries without mitigating against all
identified risks.
Regarding oversight and accountability of the USAID
development projects with respect to Afghanistan, since 2002
U.S. agencies have allocated over $23 billion for governance
and development related projects. While USAID is taking some
steps in response to our prior reviews to improve its
monitoring and evaluation efforts, USAID continues to
inconsistently apply performance management procedures.
USAID has also fallen short in maintaining institutional
knowledge in some areas and still needs to strengthen its
oversight of its contractors. Additionally, as the ranking
member noted in his opening statement, to avoid the potential
overlap and duplication and to ensure a full accounting of
USAID, DoD and State funded development projects, GAO has made
multiple recommendations and, actually, dating back to 2008,
including suggested congressional action leading to
establishment of a comprehensive shared database to account for
U.S. funded projects. Although State and USAID have taken some
steps to designate a database, nearly 6 years later we continue
to report on the need for a database. This is due in part to
the lack of DoD action.
Regarding the need for contingency planning, in February
2013 we reported that while circumstances in Iraq are somewhat
different from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be
learned from that transition and when you transition from a
military to civilian-led presence.
As we have reported, program implementation, oversight and
accountability in Afghanistan have and are very likely to
continue to be challenged by multiple factors, including a
dangerous security environment, the prevalence of corruption
and the limited capacity of the Afghan Government.
As we have also highlighted, contingency planning is
critical to the successful transition and to ensuring that the
environment is conducive to carry out operations and to also
carry out oversight. The plans to invest billions more in
Afghanistan, the challenging working environment and
uncertainties of the bilateral security agreement underscore
the continued need for contingency planning and continued
oversight of U.S. efforts.
In closing, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch
and members of the subcommittee, I would like to personally
thank the dedicated GAO staff who have put their lives on the
line in carrying out oversight. I also thank the Congress and
members of the subcommittee for their support and for calling
this hearing on key issues, and note that GAO stands ready to
assist the Congress and the administration in ensuring that
there is oversight and accountability of the U.S. partnership
in Afghanistan.
I thank you for the opportunity again to testify. This
concludes my statement and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to you both for excellent
testimony, and I will begin with the question and answer
segment of our hearing.
Corruption is so systemic, it is so pervasive in
Afghanistan that it only serves to exacerbate the already
difficult obstacles facing the government's ability to govern
effectively. Not only that but it undermines the security of
both the international forces and the Afghan people. It erodes
the people's confidence in their government, and it leads them
to distrust us and it leads to the waste of billions, billions
of taxpayer dollars.
Yet for all of these warnings and all of the reports we
have had about corruption in Afghanistan, we have yet to
develop an anti-corruption policy. Even Karzai, Karzai, if you
can believe it, acknowledged that this is a major obstacle to
progress. How is it even possible that we still don't have an
anti-corruption policy even as we are sending billions of
dollars in direct assistance to Afghan ministries despite all
the warnings, and do we have any insight into updated amounts
of direct assistance?
And sticking with the direct assistance issue, after the
assessment that the Afghan ministries were not ready, were not
capable of receiving direct assistance, and after
recommendations from GAO to mitigate all identified risk before
proceeding with direct assistance, USAID apparently continued
anyway without regard to these warnings. Why did USAID continue
to provide direct assistance despite the warnings, and are
there any other instances where USAID has ignored
recommendations? Also, how would you characterize your
relationship with USAID, and what does Congress need to do to
ensure that USAID is in full compliance before going forward
with these high risk programs?
I am also greatly concerned about the duplication of
efforts where we see overlaps between State and DoD on
infrastructure projects because there is no central and
comprehensive database. I know that is one thing you both would
say is seriously lacking and something that we need to address.
What else would you say the Congress needs to do to ensure that
USAID, State, DoD are all accountable for these billions of
dollars that we are spending in Afghanistan and what tools do
you need us to give to you to ensure that you have everything
you need to continue to do your work?
I know it will be extremely difficult for you with the
troop drawdown and the uncertainty over the BSA, but we want to
help you to keep you safe while you continue to perform your
duties. Thank you.
Mr. Sopko. Madam Chair, starting with your last point and
that is on assistance that we can need, I think it would be
useful for Congress to respond with the very valid
recommendation that GAO has made about a centralized database.
And I don't know if that is authorization language or
appropriations language. One of the hardest problems we have,
and I am certain GAO and I know my colleagues in the other IGs
have, is we don't even know where the money has been spent. So
you start with that problem. And by requiring the agencies to
put together that database that would be extremely useful.
We are starting to do that ourselves. I think in some of
the background material we gave you, we are actually trying to
collect this information. But it really isn't the role of the
Inspector General to be the first one to collect this. This is
something that should be done.
As for the issue about direct assistance, I think a serious
problem here was that USAID had finally done some really good
assessments, and we praised them in our audit that came out
earlier this year about the direct assistance. They assessed
the Afghan ministries, and what we had hoped they would have
done would have been to actually use that as leverage to
bargain on conditionality, to get in place particularly in the
future, where it is going to be more difficult to go out there
and kick the tires of the programs. But unfortunately they
waived it, and we don't really have an answer on why they
waived it.
Mr. Johnson. I can actually chime in with some updated
numbers, and first to your point about corruption. Corruption,
as we all had said in the beginning, will remain a challenge
and has been one of the biggest challenges we have had of the
U.S. and of the space in operating in Afghanistan.
With regards to direct assistance funding, the latest
figures we have is roughly the amount is $800 million for 2012
and approximately $900 million in 2013 in direct assistance.
That shows a drop-off from the 1.4 and it is closer to their
target of 50 percent but not quite has that met that goal. So
it has come down somewhat but it is still pretty significant.
In terms of what more Congress can do, I would definitely
agree, as we sort of suggested, that you consider mandating
that there be a shared database or a comprehensive database
that has the entire inventory of development projects,
especially given over $23 billion has been invested of the
taxpayers' money and that as I mentioned earlier, USAID has
taken action. Afghan Info has been designated as the official
database.
However, the Department of Defense, despite various
briefings with USAID and others, have basically not agreed to
routinely put their stuff in that database automatically and
share that database and use that database or any other database
for that matter. And so we basically would suggest that
Congress now may need to mandate that given the CERP funding,
given the AIF funding of the task force and business
operations, all the potential funding that exists there.
And we looked at this a little more in-depth comparing
those three programs to the USAID funded efforts under ESF or
development assistance, and we didn't necessarily find exact
duplication, but we found 53 cases of potential duplication and
overlap between the agencies.
And the reason why we can definitively say that is because
the data that DoD was maintaining did not go down to the level
it needed to go down to of capturing data on the villages that
were receiving the assistance. So we think a shared database
would encompass all that sort of information. I think also
continuing holding hearings like you are doing today on key
oversight issues would put the attention of the Congress on the
agency requesting money every year, additional funding.
With respect to USAID's cooperation with GAO and probably
the oversight community as well, I would say that over the last
2 years or 18 months there have been some significant
challenges in terms of our normal operation with USAID. They
have been one of the more cooperative agencies, but we have run
into major challenges in trying to carry out our mission for
the Congress.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Yes, Mr. Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. Chairman, if I could just add, I echo the
statement by my colleague from GAO in that although we have had
very good support from DoD on cooperation, particularly under
General Dunford, General Cole and a number of those colleagues
over there, we have had some problems with USAID in getting
access particularly through over classification and, we think,
improper classification of some material as unclassified,
sensitive but unclassified.
But can I just add to my colleague's numbers? I think he
was focusing on the State and USAID direct assistance, but we
have to keep in mind the biggest player in all of this is DoD.
And so to direct assistance, DoD is giving approximately $4.2
billion right now in direct assistance, and that is going
directly to the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense
and also going through some of the trust funds. So that is the
biggest player. And although we are focusing on the USAID
ministerial assessments, there still has never been a
ministerial assessment on the Ministry of Interior and the
Ministry of Defense by DoD and we have highlighted that as a
potential problem.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Our ranking member, Mr. Deutch, is recognized.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Sopko, did I understand you said that more money is
spent on Afghanistan reconstruction than the Marshall Plan?
Mr. Sopko. By the end of this year taking into
consideration inflation, et cetera.
Mr. Deutch. So what is the total amount? As you analyze it
today, what is the total amount spent by this country on
Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. The appropriations on the Afghanistan
reconstruction is $103 billion, I believe.
Mr. Deutch. And for both of you, as you analyze what you
refer to as waste, fraud and abuse, but fraud and abuse
ultimately is waste as well, from all of the responses and all
of the good reports that you have put out, is there a total
amount? Of that $103 billion is there a total amount that has
been wasted?
Mr. Johnson. I am not in a position to give you an exact
figure on that. That is something we haven't looked in-depth at
in terms of a range of figures. But we do know that there has
been some various inefficiencies. There are some concerns about
whether there is really an inventory of everything. The biggest
problem is that many of the agencies weren't keeping good
performance metrics for us to look at whether or not the money
had been used for its intended purpose or met its goals.
Mr. Sopko. I agree. We can't come up with an estimate. We
would be spending all of our time trying to figure out what was
lost in the past. We are looking forward. I think it is safe to
say a lot of money has been wasted. Probably more wasted than
actually stolen, and that is the problem. And I think going
back, if we don't even know where the money was spent it is
hard for us to come up and quantify particularly GAGAS
standards, which is a generally accepted auditing standards,
how much money was really spent.
Mr. Deutch. And explain it again. We don't know where the
money was spent and how much of that $103 billion, do you think
we don't know where it was spent?
Mr. Sopko. Well, first of all, you have to take, out of the
$103 billion that is authorized and appropriated, as I
mentioned, $18 billion is still in the pipeline. So that money
is still safe. It hasn't gone out and been obligated yet. The
vast majority of the money, over 60 percent, I believe, was
spent by DoD. So that could be on CERP programs, it could be on
numerous programs. I am not saying that is wasted, but I am
just saying that is where the money is, mainly DoD. DoD is the
big player in Afghanistan reconstruction.
Mr. Deutch. And so I also want to move forward, but for
everything that you have looked at, Mr. Johnson, for all your
reports, there are plenty of examples that you pointed to,
right, where because of the lack of systems in place, because
of lack of oversight, because the contract, all the myriad of
reasons that we have discussed there has been some significant
amount of waste, it would be helpful if there were some range,
even of the reports that you have got, of the review that you
have done, where you know there is--here is my point. I want to
look forward too.
But as we deal with this issue of a shared database, it is
a whole lot easier to convince all of our colleagues here and
those who may not be inclined to support a shared database, why
it is important, if beyond speaking generally about the types
of problems that exist, we can point out that of $103 billion
taxpayer dollars that X percent has been wasted. So I am not
asking you to recreate the wheel, but based on all the analysis
that you have done you must have some sense.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think we can speak in broader terms
and give specific examples, but I think it gets back to the
point that Mr. Sopko noted that a lot of stuff wasn't done
efficiently or it cost a lot more than it probably would have
cost in other contingency areas as well.
I would note the ANSF, for example, where the biggest
amount of the U.S. contribution has been on the security side,
and obviously that goal was supposed to have been accomplished
back in 2008 where the Afghan Security Forces were supposed to
be fully capable and competent and independent operations.
Well, what happened over time and over the many years that we
put billions of dollars and enormous amounts of money, the
benchmarks continue to be reset every single year. We have
lowered the standards of their capability ratings.
Initially, we had been trying to do it the U.S. way in
trying to get these guys to operate the way our security forces
operate. Well, that wasn't deemed to be ultimately Afghan right
or Afghan first. So we wasted a lot of money in the beginning
buying U.S. type equipment, training on those equipment that
they couldn't maintain or sustain. We built a force that
obviously the Afghan Government cannot sustain, but they are
going to continue to be relying on donors to support.
The U.S. contributed 90 percent of the Afghan public
expenditures related to security issues. The United States has
paid for that. So we are the largest contributor on the
security side. And in terms of waste and efficiencies there, it
could have been done more efficiently, is what I would say
would really be the message there.
And we could give you some examples where USAID was going
to go in and build a road that perhaps DoD had already done.
That is why you need a shared database. So USAID, as they noted
to us, would like to know what DoD is going to be leaving
behind so they will have some indication of what is already
there as they move forward with their planning.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. And what is the biggest impediment to
your shared database since it has now been years since you
proposed it?
Mr. Johnson. Well, we don't really see a major impediment.
DoD's position is that they are concerned about the security of
the database itself, whether there are sufficient firewalls to
prevent others from getting in. USAID is showing us that that
would not be a problem. I honestly think it is a reluctance on
the part of DoD to engage with USAID in completing this
database that has been put in place.
They actually send, they give them a disc, I think it is
every month or so, every 2 or 3 months for USAID to upload. So
the data is getting in there eventually but it is not readily
available.
Mr. Deutch. Finally, does the hesitancy on the part of DoD
stem in any way from concern about what we see going forward?
Since 60 percent of the $103 billion is DoD funded, and we are
not in the position to identify the total amount of waste, is
there a concern in going forward? Some of what you described,
Mr. Johnson, I would suspect our friends at DoD would view
differently than the way you have described it in terms of
change of standards and why those standards were changed.
Concerns for security.
What do we do to help convince them that this is ultimately
necessary, and again I just go back to where I started. I would
really urge you, for all of the analysis that has been done it
would be immensely helpful for us to have a conversation not
just about going forward, but if we can't acknowledge that we
have spent $100 billion and we know billions have been wasted
but we can't even really identify some ballpark of what that is
and where that comes from, then it makes it even harder to
support. Forget the creation of a shared database, it makes it
harder to support continued funding if we are not even going to
identify where the problems were to start with. And with that I
yield back, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. And now I
am so pleased to yield to a real war hero of both Iraq and
Afghanistan, fighter pilot Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair, you are too nice.
And thank you all for being here. The important thing to do at
the very top of this is for everybody to remember why we are in
Afghanistan in the first place, and that is it was a beautiful
day in September and we were attacked right in the United
States of America when we thought we were completely defensible
by two oceans, and thousands of Americans lost their lives.
And since that day on September 11th, thousands of
Americans have lost their lives in carrying freedom for the
Afghan people, and I think importantly too, thousands of
Afghans have lost their lives. And we see today in the, I
guess, kind of the post war mission of Afghanistan, the Afghan
people and the Afghan security forces are really stepping up to
secure their country.
There are going to be a lot of challenges. In fact, 2 weeks
ago the President announced his plan to withdraw nearly all
American service members from Afghanistan at the beginning of
2014, combat mission ending at the end of 2014. He is going to
leave in place approximately 9,800 service members, and the
following year those numbers will be reduced to the amount
necessary to provide security at our Embassy in Kabul.
I would bring, and I notice that this is the purpose of the
hearing, to memory, the parallels between what has happened in
Iraq and I think what the President has outlined for
Afghanistan. In fact, today I read the news and found out that
Mosul, the place where I had been multiple times in the war on
Iraq, has just fallen to extremists, and they see what happens
in a post American situation.
With that said, the reduction of force is going to place a
significant demand on the Afghan National Security Forces. As
the GAO has reported, between Fiscal Years 2002 and 2013,
nearly 65 percent of the agency funding went toward supporting
Afghanistan security in areas such as developing the security
forces and counternarcotics effort. Questions are, with the
looming U.S. troop drawdown more of the onus is going to be
placed on the Afghan National Security Forces to maintain the
stability in the country. A large portion of the $103 billion
we have invested has gone to them in the security. Are they now
prepared to take the lead and can they help sustain an
environment in which development of infrastructure projects
which we put in place will succeed?
And this is important, because for 13 years we fought to
create an environment that they can take over. And I want to
make sure that at the end of the day we are not in a hurry that
just to fulfill a campaign promise so that 13 years of efforts
by the American people and by the Afghan people don't go to
waste. Because I think in 20 years, history books will judge us
very harshly if that is the case.
So Mr. Sopko, I will go with you first. Is there an
environment where in a post America era they can succeed?
Mr. Sopko. The answer to that question is a couple of
points. Yes, of course they can succeed. There have been great
successes with the military. You have seen the Afghan military
hold their own over the last fighting season, and I think
everyone is hopeful that they will continue in that robust
fashion.
There are concerns. And the major concerns that we have
highlighted and I believe General Dunford has highlighted is
that you need the BSA. If there is no BSA there is every
likelihood there will be failure.
Mr. Kinzinger. But we can assume it will be. It seems like
it is on track to, so----
Mr. Sopko. We are very hopeful. I have no inside
information, but that is what I have read in the press that it
is very hopeful that both candidates have said they would sign
it.
But the second issue which, I think, again, I can't speak
for General Dunford there, he is really the expert on the
military capabilities. But it is basically the back end, it is
the tail of the ANSF, the salaries, the support, the buildings,
the getting the fuel, the getting them to understand and how to
do that which is what he is working on, and I think the vast
majority of the assistance going forward will be trying to make
the military capable to do that.
We are looking at, we have looked at spare parts, we have
looked at fuel, we have looked at literacy, and in all those
areas there are serious problems. So we have to make certain we
get those right.
Mr. Kinzinger. And I understand you are not a policymaker
so I am not putting this on you, but I think my big concern in
this is in 2016 the President has put out an outline that says
counterterrorism is a good mission in 2016, advising and
supporting the Afghan Government is a good mission in 2016, but
in 2017 it is not a good mission because we are going to pull
all of our troops out, only for Embassy security.
So my question is, assuming now that we have basically 2
years in which to miraculously bring the Afghans to where they
can operate without American assistance, there is a lot of
progress that has to be made in 2 years. If all troops happened
to be out today, if we happened to pull them all out today,
what do you think would happen to the future of Afghanistan and
those reconstruction projects if that were to happen today? And
that gives us a benchmark for where we need to be in 2 years so
that it doesn't fall apart.
Mr. Sopko. I would have to refer to the testimony, I think,
of General Dunford. I think it was over here in the House Armed
Services Committee, or maybe it was the Senate Armed Services
Committee, just last month where he said if we pulled out today
there would be a collapse. I have to rely on his expertise. We
have not done a study on that. I don't have any audits on that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay, thank you, and I think the point there
is if all troops were out today we would see another collapse.
Instead of having a mission for the next couple of years we
want to focus on withdrawal and we are focused on pulling out.
It might be smart to actually have a mission past 2016 in which
we can have a long term gain when we get Afghanistan where they
need to be.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I know you want to look forward, but I think before we do
that we need to glance backward and see what we have learned or
not learned. Reading your reports, Mr. Sopko, and press stories
and including press stories with IGA and listening to your
testimony and now Mr. Johnson's today, I have got to tell you
one has the awful sense of deja vu all over again.
We have been in Vietnam, for example, lots of aid money
thrown at Vietnam. Biggest aid mission in the world was in
Vietnam. There was no aspect of life in South Vietnam we
weren't having to finance. And the waste, the fraud, the abuse,
the inefficiency, the lack of metrics to show what we did or
didn't do positively has an eerie echo in your testimony today.
When I, as the chairwoman knows, used to be a staff member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we used to have a
chart of what aid would produce every year that was very
helpful, and it was called the all-spigots chart. The all-
spigots chart, showing all sources of assistance from the
United States, from IMET and ESF to a map to development
systems and other spigots. When you refer to $103 billion total
reconstruction funding, is that all spigots? Does that include
all of the DoD money?
Mr. Sopko. No, it does not include war funding. Straight
Title 10. This is just reconstruction. So $103 billion.
Mr. Connolly. For the entirety, for the duration of this
war?
Mr. Sopko. And only U.S. funding.
Mr. Connolly. Only U.S. funding. And would that include
CERP?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it would, sir.
Mr. Connolly. All right, let us take that as our universe.
I know you are reluctant to say how much got wasted. Tell me
how much you are comfortable with in looking at it that you
think actually performed fairly well by some metric. We have
got to have some metrics here.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, I would love to tell you 50
percent, 60 percent, 70 percent or whatever, but I live in
unfortunately in the world of GAGAS, Generally Accepted
Government Accounting Standards, and I can't say that. And I
know my good colleague over in Iraq reconstruction once came up
with a number and it was later shown to be wrong or nothing
supporting it.
I can't say that. I look at specific programs and the
specific program we can say that succeeded or didn't succeed or
they want to risk. A lot of times we are going in and alerting
people that you run a risk of fraud or waste or abuse, so I
assume my colleague in GAO has the same. We can't come in and
say they have lost X amount or they have succeeded. Now we have
identified some successes.
And actually I asked, and I think the last time I testified
before another committee I said I sent a letter to the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the head of
the USAID said give me your success stories and why. And I
thought that would be used, that we could use that in our
analysis of lessons learned. But I just can't answer that
question because I don't have a basis for saying what
percentage.
Mr. Connolly. Okay, let me just tell you the consequence of
not being able to answer that question.
I am picking up where you left off.
It says to the public, by implication, that all of it was
wasted. If you can't cite metrics, not anecdotes but metrics,
30 percent absolutely went to the purpose intended and is
performing well, another 20 percent sort of in a little grayer
category and then 50 percent is wasted, or whatever the metrics
may be. But if the answer is I can't answer that question at
all, then it suggests to the United States taxpayer $103
billion in reconstruction went down the drain in Afghanistan,
100 percent.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, with all due respect, I think every
inspector general you asked, whether it is the Department of
Energy IG, VA IG, HHS IG, could not answer that question. So I
don't know if the American people merely jump at the response
or the answer that then all of the money is being wasted. I
don't think anyone, any IG, you cannot give us enough money to
answer that question. We would be spending all of our time
trying to highlight what worked.
And if you actually look at our legislation, we look at the
'78 Act and my act, it is not to find out what has worked. My
brief is given to me by you and it is to highlight problems,
not successes.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, but you also demurred in the answer to
my colleague's question, Mr. Deutch, all right, how much is
wasted? So we can't put a metric on how successful we have been
and neither can we apparently have enough, to Mr. Deutch's
question, about how much do we feel confident was wasted in
retrospect.
Mr. Johnson?
Mr. Johnson. If I can testify, the biggest problem that we
both face as an oversight entity is that there is poor data
being collected. And when data is collected--I will give an
example of USAID when we looked at the alternative development
program or the agriculture program. Enormous amount of data was
coming in to USAID from the implementing partners. Well, USAID
didn't use the data. They didn't assess the data and actually
their ADS requires them to approve their implementing partners'
indicators and targets. They weren't even approving it. So they
were giving money to the implementing partners and they were
carrying out missions and reporting results, and USAID was not
using it. So for us to come in, we can look at----
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Well, Mr. Johnson, I appreciate your
answer. This is 2014. We have been running bilateral and
multilateral aid programs since immediately after World War II.
This is not a new subject. What do you mean we are just
throwing money and USAID has no records to be able to evaluate
the efficacy of the program? How is that possible? Let alone
$103 billion?
Mr. Johnson. That is a good question and it is something,
with the recommendations we have made and the oversight
community and congressional action, perhaps USAID and others in
State Department will be more accountable on terms of when they
come up and ask you guys for money and they don't have metrics.
Mr. Connolly. Would the chair indulge me just one last--
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. Please continue.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Sopko and Mr. Johnson, but something that bothered me
when I was in Afghanistan and Iraq was CERP. Because it is in a
category of, in a sense it was well intentioned walking around
money so a military officer, commander, could see a problem and
fix it on the spot. I see your bridge is out. Let me help
repair it.
That program, however, became an enormous equivalent
bilateral aid program run by the military who are not experts
in economic development. And it is all cash and so one worries,
in a category of what could go wrong with that I wonder if you
could just share with us your observation and the vicissitudes
of a CERP program.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, you are highlighting an issue that
we have serious concerns with, I think many Members of Congress
had serious concerns with, and I think that if I can make a
comment, probably a little bit out of my league, I think it was
a wise decision that in your consolidated appropriations bill
of 2014, I think CERP funding was pretty well cut.
But there was nearly $2.29 billion obligated of which $2.26
billion has been disbursed. In January of this year we sent an
inquiry letter to DoD and ISAF regarding all the unobligated
funds, all the performance metrics, and any assessments that
had been done. We are still in the process of doing that and
once it is done I am happy to report back to you and the other
committees on what we are finding.
I think there are serious concerns. It was a good
intention. But if I can answer, use that question to try to
answer your question and Mr. Deutch's question is, okay, even
taking that CERP money, some of it actually worked. It is going
to be so difficult to focus and try to do that. And you are
just taking the CERP. That is only $2 billion. To do that for
everyone of these programs, it is going to be very difficult to
say what percentage worked and what percentage didn't.
We have to get the metrics. We have to buy their metrics.
What my colleague and I are saying is we are not given the
metrics or they don't use the metrics. So how do we determine
whether CERP works or not? I mean I have been berated by DoD
for even questioning the CERP proposal, because it saved lives.
Now I don't know what that means. Maybe it did save lives and
maybe that was the metrics that they wanted to use.
But it is hard for me to then take that thing, saving
lives, and saying the $2.2 billion was wisely spent. That is
where you see the predicament we are in, and I think Mr.
Johnson is probably in the same predicament over in GAO.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr.
Connolly. And while some of us can say, well, when I was in
Iraq or when I was in Afghanistan, here is a man who was really
in Iraq. An Iraq vet who is still serving our country valiantly
in the Air Force Reserve, Mr. Collins is recognized.
Mr. Collins. Madam Chairman, I do appreciate that. And Mr.
Connolly you might want to stay here for just a moment because
as much as we disagree, my good friend, we are getting ready to
agree wholeheartedly right here.
But this is, look, you all have pointed out some things. I
came for some other questions and I am going to get to those in
a minute, but let me just say if anybody from USAID is here,
DoD is here or you are watching by camera, the only way is if
these who are supposed to oversight what is being spent tell me
that they are not getting the metrics to spend money, they are
not getting the metrics on how to even evaluate these programs,
then maybe it is time to cut the money off. Maybe it is just
time to say let us stop.
If you can't handle it because there is, this is the
problem that I have seen so far and I am for, being in the
military we have got to rebuild, we have got to help the
country out. I have got no problem with that. But I have a huge
problem with no accountability.
And the people in the Ninth District of Georgia do not get
it. We are not spending Monopoly money here. We are not
spending money that just pops out of the air and somebody says
it is free health care, free this. It is not that. It comes out
of my back pocket and your back pocket. It is tax dollars. We
have got a VA system that has problems and issues. We have got
other issues in this country, and we have got this problem
where we are just blowing money and we don't even get the
metrics where Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sopko can't even do their
job? Are you kidding me?
We even have this commit? I mean, Madam Chair, this is
amazing to me. I feel for you that you are trying to do a job
with no metrics. You are trying to do a job in which they are
given money and say go spend it, be happy, see if it works or
not. But we are not going to provide you the metrics. And if
DoD gets upset at your question, Mr. Sopko, so what? Send them
to me. I will ask the same questions. They can get mad at me.
This is ridiculous.
I submitted language in the State and Foreign Ops
Appropriations bill forcing USAID and State Department to take
a closer look at the funds it is allocating to various
reconstruction projects it has got over in Afghanistan.
Frankly, as we have just said, over $100 billion between DoD,
USAID, the others, what promise do we have if we continue this?
And I agree with my friend, Mr. Kinzinger. There are some
things that we need to do to hopefully keep this country stable
and not have to send our sons and daughters back there in the
matter of a few years or send others there. But how can we take
it seriously if USAID and others can't even provide metrics
because they don't want to? How can we have any effect? Would
either one of you would like to answer that?
Mr. Johnson. It is definitely difficult, and that is part
of the way we do our work. We need to measure the U.S. progress
against the U.S. identifies strategic goals and objectives. And
in order to do that we absolutely need metrics. Those metrics
need to be collected routinely and not every so many years.
But they should be collecting those depending on the type
of program it is throughout the lifetime of the program and
making those available to us. They should be approving those
metrics that they are asking their implementing partners to
carry out in some of the projects. And quite frankly we did
find several deficiencies in that area.
I think later on it probably came up, how do you gather and
collect information in a war zone or in an environment like
this? Well, they have done it in other locations. They have
done it in the tribal area in Pakistan where that is that they
have collected data using other alternative means to get that
data and to have those metrics and report on progress. So I
don't think it is something that can't be done in Afghanistan.
They just need to commit to doing it.
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, can I add something to my
colleague, and it is something that Congressman Connolly
alluded to. And that is, lessons learned from Iraq, lessons
learned from Vietnam. I cited a report done by USAID in 1988,
and it is a lessons learned report on USAID's operations in
Afghanistan from 1950 to 1979. I couldn't find anybody in our
Embassy or anybody at USAID who had ever read it. This is 12
years. If I was being assigned to USAID, I think I would want
to read my lessons learned report from 1950 to 1979.
I spoke to a very prominent general, a wise general who
says, I am in the Army. We do lessons learned report by going
to the bathroom and pulling paper. We write them like crazy.
The problem is they are not applied.
And I think one of the things you can do and Congress can
do is mandate that each of the services do these lessons
learned reports, but more importantly that USAID and State do
them, and in the future, as we all know, this will be an all-
government approach to a problem. And that means we need to
mandate that USAID, State and DoD, and any other agencies
involved, probably the intel community, do combined lessons
learned reports on contingencies.
Remember, under Goldwater-Nichols, you created purple in
the military. You have not created purple in contingencies. You
are not requiring State and USAID to do the same in-depth
analyses and lessons learned like all of the various--I know,
sir, you have served in the military so you understand the
lessons learned reports. The TRADOC produces doctrine. You are
not seeing combined doctrine coming out on the next
contingency. So I throw that out. If you want to make certain
we succeed, maybe not for Afghanistan but at least we have
learned from our mistakes before we do it again. That is
something you may want to consider, sir.
Mr. Collins. Madam Chair, if you will just indulge me for
just one moment. I think the thing, and I understand what you
are saying here. What bothers me is just simply looking at this
as a simple business plan. You don't get money for just, I have
an idea, let us throw money at it. Is there a way that maybe we
could metric that, say, the metrics have to be applied first
before the money is ever transferred? Because once the money is
gone it doesn't matter. They don't care. Once the money is gone
it doesn't matter.
I think the problem we have here, and I will go back to Mr.
Connolly's statement. And where there is good about it, I
think, I come from a background where neither or. I am a male.
So if you tell me nothing has happened and everything has
happened I will discount it immediately and I will show you
where it is wrong.
So something in the middle has gone well and a lot of
things are done wrong, but when we look at this repeatedly, the
people of America, Ninth District, they want the truth. They
want the honesty of what is going on, and they will accept the
truth even if it is hard, but they will not accept
incompetence. And this is simply incompetence that you have
unveiled. Now it may be veiled in community service. USAID may
call it whatever they want to call it. DoD may call it whatever
they want to call it. Anybody else may call it what they want.
It is incompetence. Plain and simple, fallible incompetence.
And I don't understand how we continue to do this, and it
just, frankly, disturbs me. I don't think we have learned a
lesson. You just stated it. We have not learned anything. We
have to do hot washes. When I transferred out of Iraq I had to
do lessons learned. And I had to actually tell the person
coming in who took my job, here is the lessons learned. And it
didn't just involve where is the latrine and where is the DFAC.
It had to do with what we found on the ground and how you
worked it out.
I applaud your work, but in some ways I feel for you. You
are in a no-win situation. And this country ought to be ashamed
of what we are doing in this area because we can do better. We
can do better. If we truly want to fix it, we truly want to
work it, we can do better. The agencies that I am talking to
today, my office is 513 Cannon, come and explain your
incompetence to me.
Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And just in
conclusion, as our memo points out as of March 31, 2014,
cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in
Afghanistan total approximately $103.17 billion in Fiscal Year
2002. This is more than the United States has ever spent to
rebuild a single country. SIGAR findings financial audits were
not conducted for 99 of those 140 assistance awards, and USAID
did not meet their strategies objective to use performance
indicators to measure and evaluate its performance toward
meeting the strategies goal.
And GAO has previously reported on systematic weakness in
USAID's monitoring and evaluation of programs carried out by
its implementing partners in Afghanistan, GAO and other
oversight agencies, however, have highlighted gaps that show
USAID continued to inconsistently apply performance management
procedures, falls short in maintaining institutional knowledge
and needs to improve oversight of contractors.
The subcommittee will continue to do its work. And we thank
you, gentlemen, for appearing before us. With that the
subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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