[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN AND ITS IMPACT ON
BORDER SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 12, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-55
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Steve Daines, Montana Eric Swalwell, California
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Vacancy, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Vacancy Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, II, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 3
Witnesses
Mr. Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
THE ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN AND ITS IMPACT ON
BORDER SECURITY
----------
Wednesday, March 12, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Jackson Lee,
O'Rourke, and Gabbard.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security, our
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the CBP's
border technology plan and its impact on securing our Nation's
borders, and we are very pleased today to be joined by
Assistant Commissioner, Mark Borkowski, again.
Welcome back to the committee.
He is from the Office of Technology Innovation and
Acquisition at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Rebecca Gambler, we welcome you back to the committee as
well.
Rebecca is the director of homeland security and justice
issues with the Governmental Accounting Office, and I will more
formally introduce them after we do our opening statements.
Technology has really been an integral part of the proposed
solution to secure the vast and rugged terrain of the Southwest
Border for a long time, and it is one part of an overall set of
solutions that must include manpower, intelligence, and where
appropriate, infrastructure.
Unfortunately, a series of miscues and missteps has plagued
Customs and Border Protection's previous efforts to produce a
large-scale border security solution.
The prior program known as SBInet was the subject of many
criticisms from the GAO and the Congress before then-Secretary
Napolitano canceled the program actually in 2011, and our goal
in holding today's hearing is to ensure that we are finally on
the path to success after a number of false starts.
Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent for SBInet. We
have a grand total of 53 miles of the border under surveillance
to show for it. That is just 53 miles out of nearly 2,000, so I
don't think any of us can say that that is an acceptable
outcome.
I am sure there is enough blame to go around for that, but
we are not here today to assign blame. We are here today to
make sure that moving forward the American people get the
border security that they need, that they want, that they have
paid for, certainly that they deserve.
In this time of limited budgets we cannot repeat the
mistakes of the past and this subcommittee will hold the CBP
accountable to ensure that the largest and most expensive part
of the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, the
integrated fixed towers, is on track.
Years of delay have not inspired Congressional confidence
in the IFT project or the larger Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Plan. According to the GAO report said to be
released today, some of the smaller-scale purchases do not meet
the needs of the Border Patrol and others have been contracting
challenges.
More troubling, CBP did not concur with several of GAO's
recommendations when it comes to testing the IFT and the
integration of the smaller-scale technologies into a master
schedule, and I certainly hope to hear more of the rationale
for that non-concurrence.
On a very positive note, I was certainly pleased to see
that the Department did release the $145 million award for the
IFT contract last year--excuse me, last week--but for many of
us in Congress, this is a project that has certainly taken far
too long.
It has been 3 years since the cancellation of SBInet. We
may not see additional border security capabilities come on-
line until later this summer. To that end, we are troubled as
well by the current roll-out time line that will deploy eight
towers fairly rapidly in the Nogales area, but then we are
going to have a gap of time before other towers are deployed.
Mr. Borkowski is shaking his head, so I know he is going to
be addressing these concerns, and I appreciate that. I
certainly would encourage the Department to move quickly to
resolve any outstanding impediments to the deployment of this
technology quickly consistent with the operational needs of the
men and women of the Border Patrol.
It has taken several years to get technology deployed to
Arizona and in that time the threat has shifted actually to
south Texas. Our procurement process has to be more agile and
quicker otherwise by the time we deploy a solution, the threat
may have moved elsewhere.
I also want to work with the Office of Technology
Innovation and Analysis to help bring effective technology to
the border faster. We should look to the Department of Defense
and some of the novel models that they have used to solve this
very challenge.
Our committee and this subcommittee in particular has a
vested interest in securing the border. We have worked on a
bipartisan basis to pass legislation that defines operational
control as a 90 percent effectiveness rate and as for a
comprehensive border security technology plan so that the
Department is not putting technology on the border in an ad hoc
way.
Each piece of technology that we put on the border should
align with the Border Patrol's operational needs and must
support the twin goals of increasing our situational awareness
and effectiveness in keeping those that would do us harm out of
our country.
The development of border security metrics will help with
this effort because without metrics there is no way to measure
success or failure. Congress and the American people have to
know what increase in security we are achieving with their
taxpayer dollars.
GAO recommended that the Department work toward a better
understanding of how technology contributes to border security
and we certainly all have a very keen interest in that effort.
We certainly look forward to hearing how the Department has
learned the lessons from previous failures and assurances that
the taxpayers are getting tangible, measurable border security
from the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan.
At this time, the Chairwoman would recognize our Ranking
Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for any statements she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so very much,
and together we are concerned about this technology as we have
been discussing technology throughout this session of Congress.
I want to acknowledge the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
O'Rourke, and the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard, present
for this hearing. I want to thank Chairwoman Miller for holding
today's hearing on the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology
Plan.
As a senior Member of both this committee and the Judiciary
Committee and as a Member from a border State, I have closely
followed DHS' efforts to deploy much-needed technology and
resources to our Southwest Border.
Unfortunately, DHS has a poor track record with its major
border security technology acquisitions.
More recently, the SBInet program was canceled by Secretary
Janet Neapolitan in 2011 after delivering only 53 miles of
border security technology in Arizona at a cost to the American
people of about $1 billion.
That is a mouthful, and I hope however that that does not
alter or dismiss the value of technology and the reality that
technology can really work.
Now 3 years later, CBP is moving forward with the Arizona
Border Surveillance Technology Plan which is intended to
provide additional border security capability in Arizona. I
would take note of Congressman Barber and former Congresswoman
Giffords who raised this issue continuously so I know the
concept is important.
Already though, there may be some cause for concern. The
Government Accountability Office released a report today that
CBP is not following all best practices and DHS guidance for
acquisition management with this new program.
Given the challenging nature of these kinds of acquisitions
and the limited staffing resources CBP has to carry them out,
it is imperative that the agency follows all guidelines to
minimize risks to the plan and get a successful result.
I hope to hear in detail from our GAO witness today about
what the most pressing challenges are with respect to
scheduling, cost estimates, testing, and performance metrics
for the plan.
I also hope our CBP witness will provide convincing answers
about how they are addressing these challenges to prevent a
repeat of the problems that ultimately undermine SBInet.
We simply cannot afford to spend another $1 billion on
border security technology that fails to deliver as promised.
Madam Chairwoman, as I even say that amount I get a sense
of fear for going down that route again. Certainly, the Border
Patrol must have resources that will meet its needs to address
the ever-changing threats it faces among our borders and as
well those threats that impact the American people.
With that in mind, I am particularly interested in hearing
from CBP about how it intends to ensure the plan technology
will meet the Border Patrol's needs especially given scheduling
delays that have occurred and the dynamic in nature of the
border security mission.
I believe collectively Chairwoman Miller and myself have
been a very supportive team of CBP. We have worked to ensure
funding and I would hope that this hearing would not be
perceived as accusations against CBP but only instructive
collaborative efforts to make what we all want and that is a
safer homeland.
Specifically it is my understanding, the chief of the
Border Patrol recently communicated that his agency no longer
needs as many integrated fixed towers in Arizona and instead
requires more mobile technology to deploy to increasingly
problematic tech areas along the border in South Texas.
Having been to the border, both borders, but in South Texas
particularly at night when we first began to give mobile
equipment to CBP I can assure you that it is a reality of how
important that equipment is.
I hope that the needs of the Border Patrol and the
requirements of their mission are always being considered
throughout this process, and I look forward to hearing from our
CBP witness about how this recent request will be resolved.
Again, I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I
look forward to a robust discussion about how we can ensure the
Arizona border technology plan succeeds where its predecessors
did not.
Madam Chairwoman, just a moment as I conclude.
All of us have had our eyes poised, if you will, on the
Malaysian air liner tragically lost; our sympathy to those
families who are both mourning and waiting and now in a very
confused state.
But I know that everyone was struck by the issue of the
false passports that two individuals managed to get on. We have
no conclusion. We have speculation. We do not know.
But I know that, Madam Chairwoman, all of us on Homeland
Security were aghast that most countries are not using the
database check, and I believe that because we are a border
security subcommittee that it would it be very helpful for us
to leap into that.
I know that there is jurisdiction, cross-jurisdiction with
Judiciary, but I would love to request a hearing on that
because it is brought to our attention. A tragedy has occurred.
We cannot suggest or we do not have the facts as to what might
have provoked that, but I believe that that is a sore that is
waiting to spread and creating a devastating degree of
nonsecurity around the world, so I hope that we will have a
discussion about that and as we do many other items of
importance.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady. I certainly thank the
gentlelady for her comments about the Malaysia flight, and as
you mentioned, we all share shock and certainly our prayers
going out to the families of those that are missing, where no
one knows where they are or what has happened.
Certainly that is one of the great mysteries I think that
any of us have ever seen, but it is interesting you mention
about the passports because we have already been talking to
staff about putting together sort-of looking at what is the
entire passport issue and the other countries and how they are
in compliance or noncompliance with looking at some of these
things.
Now it appears--again speculation--we are only talking
about what we are reading in the papers I guess, that these two
with the stolen passports were not on the watch list, but we
will see where that goes, but I certainly appreciate those
comments and we do, as I think this committee, subcommittee,
and our full committee needs to take a look at that entire
issue as well.
In regards to the subject at hand, I would also just remind
other Members of the committee that opening statements might be
submitted for the record and we are certainly pleased to have
as I mentioned two very distinguished witnesses to speak to our
subcommittee today.
Mr. Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for
the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition at the
United States Custom and Border Protection in July 2010.
In this role he is responsible for ensuring technology
efforts are properly focused, on mission, and well-integrated
across CBP. Prior to his appointment as assistant commissioner,
Mr. Borkowski was the executive director for the Secure Border
Initiative.
Ms. Rebecca Gambler--I welcome back again to the
committee--is an acting director in the U.S. Government
Accountability's Office of Homeland Security and Justice team.
She leads GAO's work on the border security and immigration
issues, and their full written statements will appear in the
record.
At this point, the Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Borkowski
for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Borkowski. Well, thank you.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of
the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come
and describe to you where we have been, where we are, where we
think we are going.
You laid an agenda quite a bit of material that I will do
my best to cover at least with some introductory things, and I
will look forward to the questions.
I also do want to note that we certainly have appreciated
the support of this committee. We recognize that it has
required a tremendous amount of tolerance and forbearance on
your part as we have gone through the last 2 to 3 years of
trying to get ourselves to the point where we finally have
contracts awarded, so we appreciate the support.
We understand it has been frustrating. We understand that
you are at least as frustrated as we have been by the delays,
but I will try to take you through where we are, how we got
there, and why we think maybe we are about to turn the corner.
You both mentioned SBInet and the history of SBInet. SBInet
taught us a lot of things as we all well know. It taught us how
not to buy things for the Department of Homeland Security, but
as Ms. Jackson Lee mentioned, it also taught us that technology
does some very good things.
Where we did deploy the two SBInet deployments, it had a
near-immediate effect on our ability to deal with those areas
of the border, and although I couldn't give you something more
quantitative than this, as we fly over those areas today, a
year or 2 years after they have been deployed, the activity in
those areas is down tremendously.
So technology not only supports the actual gaining of
control of an area but it tends to stand as a sentry afterwards
and maintain that reduced activity which then gives us more
flexibility to move Border Patrol agents and other technology,
so we have learned that technology is a significant factor when
it is deployed properly. So we all share the interest in
getting the technology out there.
But some of the lessons that we learned from SBInet are
lessons that we tried to apply into the current Arizona
technology plan and there are a couple of key lessons that I
want to really emphasize because they get to the point as to
why we non-concurred with a couple of the GAO recommendations.
Put simply, in our view, the GAO recommendations are
driving us back to what we don't want to do, an SBInet. Put
simply, that is the issue.
What do I mean by that? SBInet was a system development.
Now that is a term of art in my business and I have struggled
with--because to me the difference between SBInet and IFT is so
clear because I have done this--I have trouble explaining it--
but think of it this way.
If you went to buy a car you would have a choice. You could
say, ``I am going to pretend there are no cars to buy, and I am
just going to go ask somebody to build me a car from scratch,''
or you could go to a car dealer and pick what is off the lot.
We normally buy things in the Government unfortunately that
first way as if there is nothing on the lot, and you can
imagine what the costs, but it turns out in this business there
is a lot of stuff on the lot and so we went to buy it on the
lot. That is a big deal and we disaggregated pieces. We didn't
tie it all together. We broke them apart.
It turns out that that has had a significant effect because
in almost everything we have bought we have bought it for lower
than we anticipated cost. I attribute it to the non-
developmental nature and the fact that we are willing to be
flexible about the technical definition of requirements and I
would be prepared to discuss that in more detail as we go, to
the point where we have the freed-up resources that have
allowed us to do things like fly Aero stats over South Texas.
When you talk about putting things in Texas we have started
to do that with money that was freed up from savings generated
by the strategy in the Arizona technology development plan.
So we think we are making progress. As you mentioned, we
awarded the IFT contract last week. I will tell you compared to
the initial estimate, we saved 75 percent, and I know that
sounds unbelievable and we are going to study that as to how
did that happen.
How could it be 75 percent savings, but as we have started
to dig in, we think we are learning some lessons that may apply
and provide that kind of experience in the future if we change
our strategies.
So in that context, as we have been buying these things, we
have also been trying to strengthen our competency, the
technical detail about how you buy these things and that is
where the GAO has come in.
While it is true that the GAO report continues to note
areas of weakness, I would also point out that if you go back
over the last few years I believe if you read these reports
over the last few years you are going to see an improving
trend.
I believe that the issues that we are finding are becoming
increasingly business frankly arcane, and we really are to the
point where we have to make decisions about trading off cost
versus perfection.
So while we agree with the recommendations generally, where
those recommendations tell us to tie things together that
should be broken apart, which is what the IMS recommendation
does, or tells us to build a new car rather than buying a car
on the lot, which is what the test and evaluation
recommendation would tend us to, we would object to those.
We think it is a better approach to take this new method of
buying--let's try that for a while and then generate lessons
learned from that. So that is kind of where we are at this
point. I look forward to your questions, and again, I very much
appreciate the committee's support and forbearance to this
point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Borkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Borkowski
March 12, 2014
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you
today to discuss the status of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
(CBP) border security technology programs in Arizona, and to reflect on
the most recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report about the
management of those programs.
I appreciate the partnership and support we have received from
Congress, this subcommittee, and your staff, whose commitment to the
security of the American people has enabled the continued deployment of
key border security technologies, even in the face of significant
challenges. I am confident that our collective efforts will continue to
result in a better-managed and more secure border.
This subcommittee is familiar with the outcome of CBP's SBInet
program, an earlier component of the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) that was designed as a
comprehensive and integrated technology program to provide persistent
surveillance across the northern and southern land borders of the
United States, starting with the border of Mexico. The program
experienced significant schedule delays and cost overruns because it
did not allow necessary flexibility to adapt to differing needs in the
various regions of the border. SBInet eventually delivered systems to
two Areas of Responsibility in Arizona that continue to operate
successfully. Nevertheless, DHS cancelled SBI on January 14, 2011,
because it was too costly and the idea of one, all-encompassing program
was unnecessarily complex for border technology.
Since 2011, we have learned from the issues identified in from the
SBInet approach and moved away from an all-encompassing SBInet concept.
Instead, DHS and CBP have approached our border technology requirements
in more manageable pieces tailored to specific regions on the border.
Working closely with the Border Patrol to develop requirements, we
created a menu of different, sophisticated technology systems, ranging
from small to large, simple to complex. For Arizona, we selected
systems from the menu and tailored those technology solutions based on
realistic capabilities of current technologies and the operational
needs of particular areas. We then created detailed acquisition plans
for each of the technologies on the menu and have been in the process
of buying and deploying them for the last few years. We refer to this
approach as the Arizona Technology Plan (ATP).
ATP or ``the Plan'' is not a program as traditionally defined
within the acquisition business. Instead, it is a set of programs that,
taken together, will provide what we believe is the optimal set of
systems for our current operational needs. One key point is that the
Plan is not a so-called ``system of systems.'' In fact, our acquisition
strategy moved intentionally away from the ``system of systems''
concept because we had learned from our SBInet experience that this
approach was unnecessarily complex and costly.
Another change in CBP's ATP acquisition strategy based on lessons
learned from SBInet, is a shift from pursuing what is known as ``system
development'' toward a concept of leveraging ``non-developmental
items.'' Put simply, system development involves the creation of a
system that does not currently exist. System development is a very
disciplined and exhaustive process that requires engineering design,
analysis to compare the design to requirements, comprehensive testing,
and eventually deployment and operation. System development is an
appropriate acquisition approach when: (1) The requirements are
understood with high confidence, (2) there is limited flexibility to
relax the requirements, and (3) no existing system meets the
requirements. However, system development is costly, challenging, and
often risky--more so when the conditions that would support system
development do not exist. In the case of SBInet, we did not have a
highly confident understanding of the requirements, or a solid
justification for why our requirements were inflexible. Therefore, it
was unclear whether existing systems would be adequate for our needs.
Based on lessons learned from SBInet, we explicitly and intentionally
rejected system development as our approach for the programs within the
Plan.
For the programs under the ATP, we embarked on a non-developmental
item (NDI) approach because after conducting extensive market research,
we had high confidence that technology systems already existed that
could provide most, if not all, of the capabilities we felt were
required. CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA),
which I oversee, worked collaboratively with the Border Patrol to
develop the technical requirements. We also created the flexibility to
trade those requirements against cost. Under this NDI strategy, we
created an opportunity to do things like buy a system that met 90
percent of our interests at 50 percent of the cost, as compared to a
system that might have met 100 percent of our interests but at twice
the cost.
STATUS OF ARIZONA TECHNOLOGY PLAN PROGRAMS
While acquisition of the programs within the Plan is admittedly
behind schedule I believe our actions have been prudent and have
actually resulted in some very positive outcomes. In short, we elected
to trade schedule for higher likelihood of success in the ultimate
deployments of the NDI technologies and to take advantage of
opportunities to reduce costs.
Using the NDI approach, most of the programs within the Plan are on
contract and many have already been deployed, including: Agent Portable
Surveillance Systems (APSS); Thermal Imaging Devices; Underground
Sensors (UGS); and some Mobile Video Surveillance Systems (MSC).
Although it is too early to declare complete success, the early
indications of the ATP acquisition strategy are quite positive and, in
some cases, far exceed our expectations.
For example, the most complex and costly program within the Plan is
the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) program. This program, ostensibly,
looks something like the old SBInet program. As such, it is often
treated as if it were SBInet renamed. However, IFT is not SBInet. It is
an NDI program, and it is a narrowly-tailored solution to select parts
of the border.
Early external assessments of the program questioned whether NDI
systems for IFT existed and whether CBP's program cost estimates were
too low. While the specific numbers are still sensitive, I can report
that we received far more proposals from industry for the IFT contract
than we anticipated and, for that matter, more than I have ever seen
for this type of procurement during my roughly 30 years in this
business. The proposals were quite credible, and the sheer number
rebuts any doubts about NDI availability. Also, almost every program in
the Plan has been contracted at less than our initial estimates--often
much less. The IFT contract, for example, came in at a savings
approaching 75 percent of our initial estimate. Although we will likely
have routine changes in the contract over time that will add slightly
to the final cost, a 75 percent cost savings leaves a lot of room for
those routine changes. It is also important to note that, because these
are NDI systems, we have been able to use firm fixed-price contracting,
which reduces the risk to the Government of substantial and
uncontrolled cost growth, compared to cost reimbursable contracts for
system developments like SBInet.
We attribute these positive indications to our acquisition
strategy, our thorough market research, our staff's hard work, our
willingness to trade schedule for risk reduction, and our on-going
dialogue with industry. DHS and CBP acknowledged that we needed to do
things differently if we wanted a better result from past acquisition
failures. In a sense, our approach to the Plan was an experiment. While
not without risk, we believe the plan represents the most viable option
for a successful acquisition process, one that might prove to be a
useful model going forward. As I indicated, we are quite encouraged by
what we have seen so far.
The cost savings alone have already had a major impact for us. We
have harvested those savings to do many of the things that this
subcommittee has advocated. For instance, we have worked closely with
the Department of Defense (DoD) to receive or borrow their
technologies. We currently have three DoD aerostats flying over the
Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector as part of an extended Field
Deployment Evaluation. While undergoing evaluation, the systems
concurrently support real-world operations and boost technological
capabilities in a high-priority area of the border. We are able to fund
this exercise, as well as a number of other notable efforts, because of
the cost savings incurred as a result of our Arizona Technology Plan
strategy.
GAO RECOMMENDATIONS
CBP's border security efforts are critically important, and we
appreciate GAO's engagement with CBP's technology acquisition
activities from the SBInet days through the present. GAO has been
consistently objective and has always been very open to our thoughts
and opinions. It is important to consider the latest GAO report in the
context of our history to date. While the recent March 2014 report,
``Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions
Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness,'' continues
to identify some areas of potential weakness and risk, I believe it
also demonstrates a continuing improvement trend. Piece by piece, we
are building the program management infrastructure that did not exist
in the early days of SBInet. The GAO has helped us prioritize our
efforts over the years and deserves great credit for helping to point
the way to better performance.
In the latest report, we concur with many of the GAO
recommendations because they represent well-established best practices
for any acquisition program--including the non-developmental programs
that comprise the Plan. In most of these cases, we are aware of the
shortcomings highlighted by the GAO. However, we also recognize that,
we had to prioritize the activities that offered the least risk to our
success by conducting a cost-benefit analysis. For example, although we
did not complete formal independent cost estimates for our programs, we
had substantial data and market research to give us high confidence in
the conservatism of our life-cycle cost estimates. Similarly, while it
is true that not all required acquisition documentation was formally
approved at set times, the documents were virtually final, well-
understood, and complete enough to enable key decisions with little
risk. Going forward, we will strive to perform better in these areas.
We have non-concurred with two of the GAO recommendations, mainly
because they contradict the foundation of the acquisition strategy we
implemented for the Plan. Each program in the Plan has an Integrated
Master Schedule (IMS), as required by our policy and practice. However,
the GAO recommends CBP create an IMS for the Plan, as if the Plan
itself is a program or ``system of systems.'' As discussed above, CBP
intentionally designed the Plan not to be a system of systems. It has
been the separation of the old SBInet program into nearly independent
and dis-aggregated elements that has, in my view, enabled the positive
trends we have seen to date. We maintain an appropriate level of
integration and schedule connection among the programs in the Plan;
however, the GAO recommendation runs counter to the lessons learned
from SBInet and risks returning us to an acquisition strategy we
already know to be high-risk.
Similarly, the GAO calls for formal Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E), as if the Plan were a system development. As noted above, CBP
structured the Plan with NDI programs as a result of lessons learned
from SBInet. Since we are familiar with the technologies, we are
willing to trade requirements and performance for cost and other
benefits. We have committed to purchasing, at firm-fixed price, a
system that will perform to the specifications asserted by the
contractor. Formal OT&E would create unnecessary bureaucracy, threaten
the NDI nature of the program by creating a set of requirements that
may demand system development activities, and compromise the nature of
the Plan that has already suggested very positive results.
For example, we will manage IFT as we have done for several of the
other programs in the Plan. We have worked with the Border Patrol to
define the kind of operational experience and analysis Border Patrol
agents believe they need to understand and assess the system
performance. We have documented this agreement in the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan. This meets much of the intent of formal OT&E,
does it without unnecessary bureaucracy, and provides the Border Patrol
with oversight, control, and data to influence decisions about future
deployments and potential system upgrades.
CONCLUSION
In short, we concur with the GAO where the recommendations
represent best practices and risk reduction for acquisitions like the
Arizona Technology Plan. We do not concur where those recommendations
are inconsistent with the intentional design of the programs in the
Plan and where implementation of those recommendations would compromise
the foundation of the Plan.
Some have characterized our acquisition approach to the Plan as
innovative--especially with regard to how it leverages NDI
opportunities and offers an opportunity to trade-off requirements.
Innovation in acquisition means we will apply lessons learned,
experiment with new things, and break new ground. We have a solid
understanding of where we need to break new ground, and we look forward
to working with the GAO as we continue our efforts to develop what
could become a new set of best practices.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman very much. I think we do
have a lot of questions after that.
At this time, the Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Gambler.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify in today's hearing
to discuss GAO's work reviewing the status of DHS' Arizona
Border Surveillance Technology Plan.
This plan followed DHS' announcement in January 2011 that
it was canceling further procurements of Secure Border
Initiative Network Systems referred to as SBInet. DHS announced
the launch of the secure border initiative in 2005 as a multi-
year, multi-billion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S.
borders.
SBInet was intended to include various technologies such as
fixed sensor towers and tactical infrastructure to create a
virtual fence along the Southwest Border.
After a cost of about $1 billion, SBInet systems are now
operating along 53 miles of Arizona's border.
The Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan includes a
mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to provide security for the
remainder of the Arizona border.
My remarks today will focus on three areas related to CBP's
management of the plan and its efforts to assess the
contributions of planned and deployed technologies to border
security.
First, we reviewed CBP's schedules and life-cycle cost
estimates for the plan and its highest-cost programs and we
compared them against best practices. Those best practices, if
followed consistently, are designed to help agencies better
ensure the reliability of their schedules and cost estimates.
Overall, the schedules and estimates for the plan's
programs reflected as some but not all best practices. For
example, we found that the schedules for some of the programs
were not fully credible because CBP had not identified all
risks that would be most likely to delay the programs.
CBP also has not developed an integrated master schedule
for the plan. Such a schedule could help provide CBP with a
comprehensive view of the plan and more reliably commit to when
the plan will be fully implemented.
We also found that CBP has not independently verify its
life-cycle cost estimates for two of the plan's programs, the
integrated fixed towers and remote video surveillance system.
Second, we reviewed the extent to which CBP followed key
aspects of DHS' acquisition guidance in managing the plan. CBP
followed this guidance in some areas, but for the plan's three
highest cost programs we found that DHS and CBP did not
consistently approve key acquisition documents when called for
in DHS' guidance.
For example, for the integrated fixed towers DHS approved
four of the six required documents at the time they were to be
approved but two other documents, the life-cycle cost estimate
and the test plan were not approved on time based on
documentation we received from CBP.
With regard to the test plan this plan calls for CBP to
conduct limited user testing of the integrated fixed tower to
determine mission contributions for 30 days at one site along
the Arizona border, however such an approach is not consistent
with DHS' acquisition guidance which calls for operational
tests and evaluation of systems to occur in the environmental
conditions in which a system will be used.
Conducting unlimited user tests at one location for 30 days
could limit the information available to CBP on how the towers
will perform in other locations and under different
environmental conditions along the border.
More robust testing is particularly important in light of
the previous challenges we identified in testing of SBInet
systems.
For example, we previously reported that some SBInet test
plans were not defined in accordance with the guidance. We
concluded that not doing effective testing can unnecessarily
increase the risks of problems going undetected until late in a
system's life cycle.
Thus, conducting more robust testing on the integrated
fixed towers could help CBP better ensure that the towers meet
Border Patrol's operational needs.
Finally, DHS had the database through which Border Patrol
can record whether or not an asset such as a camera assisted in
an apprehension or seizure. This indicator is referred to by
the Border Patrol as an asset assist.
Data on asset assist, if used with other performance
metrics or indicators, could help CBP assess the contributions
of surveillance technologies to apprehensions and seizures.
However Border Patrol does not require agents to record data on
asset assist, and thus the agency does not have complete data
to help assess technologies' contributions to border security
efforts.
In closing, we have made recommendations to DHS in all of
these areas to help the Department in its efforts to manage and
implement the plan. DHS has agreed with some but not all of
these recommendations and has actions planned or under way to
address some of them. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts
in response to our recommendations.
This concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
March 12, 2014
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the findings
from our March 2014 report, being released today, in which we assessed
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) efforts to develop and implement the Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan).\1\ In recent years, nearly
half of all annual apprehensions of illegal entrants along the
Southwest Border with Mexico have occurred along the Arizona border,
according to DHS data. A top priority for CBP is preventing, detecting,
and apprehending illegal entrants. In November 2005, DHS announced the
launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multi-year, multi-
billion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing
illegal immigration. CBP intended for the SBI Network (SBInet) to
include technologies such as fixed-sensor towers, a common operating
picture, and tactical infrastructure to create a ``virtual fence''
along the Southwest Border to enhance CBP's capability to detect,
identify, classify, track, and respond to illegal breaches at and
between land ports of entry.\2\ At a cost of about $1 billion, in 2010,
CBP deployed SBInet systems, referred to as Block 1 systems, along the
53 miles of Arizona's 387-mile border with Mexico that represent one of
the highest-risk areas for illegal entry attempts. However, in January
2011, in response to internal and external assessments that dentified
concerns regarding the performance, cost, and schedule for implementing
the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the
cancellation of further procurements of SBInet systems.\3\
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\1\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-
14-368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 3, 2014).
\2\ The SBInet fixed-sensor towers were intended to transmit radar
and camera information into a common operating picture at work stations
manned at all times by U.S. Border Patrol agents. The SBInet Common
Operating Picture was intended to provide uniform data through a
command center environment to Border Patrol agents in the field and all
DHS agencies, and to be interoperable with the equipment of DHS
external stakeholders, such as local law enforcement. Tactical
infrastructure includes pedestrian and vehicle fences, roads, and
lighting. Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide
for the arrival at, or departure from, the United States.
\3\ See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to
Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, GAO-10-
340 (Washington, DC: May 5, 2010), and Secure Border Initiative: DHS
Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology
Investment, GAO-08-1086 (Washington, DC: Sept. 22, 2008).
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After the cancellation of SBInet in January 2011, CBP developed the
Plan, which includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help
provide security for the remainder of the Arizona border. Under the
Plan, CBP identified seven programs to be implemented ranging in
estimated costs from $3 million to about $961 million. The three
highest-cost programs under the Plan are the Integrated Fixed Tower
(IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance
Capability (MSC), accounting for 97 percent of the Plan's estimated
cost.\4\ In November 2011, we reported on CBP's development of, and
estimated life-cycle costs for, implementing the Plan.\5\ Specifically,
we reported that CBP needed more information for the Plan and its costs
before proceeding with implementation, and we recommended that CBP,
among other things, determine the mission benefits to be derived from
the implementation of the Plan and develop and apply key attributes for
metrics to assess program implementation, conduct a post implementation
review and operational assessment of SBInet, and update the cost
estimate for the Plan using best practices.\6\ DHS concurred with these
recommendations and has actions under way to address some of them.
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\4\ The IFT consists of towers with, among other things, ground
surveillance radars and surveillance cameras mounted on fixed (that is,
stationary) towers. The RVSS includes multiple color and infrared
cameras mounted on monopoles, lattice towers, and buildings and differs
from the IFT, among other things, in that the RVSS does not include
radars. The MSC is a stand-alone, truck-mounted suite of radar and
cameras that provides a display within the cab of the truck.
\5\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information
on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington,
DC: Nov. 4, 2011). A Life-cycle Cost Estimate provides an exhaustive
and structured accounting of all resources and associated cost elements
required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program.
\6\ Measures and key attributes are generally defined as part of
the business case in order to explain how they contribute to the
mission's benefits. See Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular
No. A-11, Part 7, Section 300, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and
Management of Capital Assets (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the
President, July 2010).
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My testimony today is based on and summarizes the key findings of
our report on the status of the Plan, which was publicly released
today. \7\ Like the report, my statement will address CBP's efforts to:
(1) Develop schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the Plan in
accordance with best practices, (2) follow key aspects of DHS's
acquisition management framework in managing the Plan's three highest-
cost programs, and (3) assess the performance of technologies deployed
under SBInet and identify mission benefits and develop performance
metrics for surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan. To
conduct work for the March 2014 report, we analyzed DHS and CBP program
schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates and interviewed DHS and CBP
officials responsible for developing and overseeing schedules and cost
estimates, including officials from CBP's Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA), which manages implementation of the
Plan. We also analyzed DHS and CBP documents, including DHS Acquisition
Management Directive 102-01 and its associated DHS Instruction Manual
102-01-001, program briefing slides, budget documents, Acquisition
Decision Memorandums, and program risk sheets.\8\ Finally, we analyzed
performance assessment documentation and metrics used by CBP to
determine the effectiveness of technologies deployed under SBInet and
interviewed CBP officials responsible for performance measurement
activities, and analyzed CBP data on apprehensions, seizures, and asset
assists from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 to determine the extent
to which the data could be used to measure the contributions of SBInet
technologies in enhancing border security.\9\ We conducted this work in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. More
detailed information on the scope and methodology of our published
report can be found therein.
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\7\ GAO-14-368.
\8\ DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, Jan. 20, 2010, and
DHS Instruction Manual 102-01-001, Acquisition Management/Instruction
Guidebook, Oct. 1, 2011.
\9\ An asset assist is what happens when a technological asset,
such as a SBInet surveillance tower, or a non-technological asset, such
as a canine team, contributes to apprehensions or seizures. In our
March 2014 report, apprehensions data included individuals arrested and
identified as deportable aliens, consistent with Border Patrol's
definition.
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CBP'S PROGRAM SCHEDULES AND LIFE-CYCLE COST ESTIMATES REFLECT SOME BUT
NOT ALL BEST PRACTICES
In our March 2014 report, we assessed OTIA's schedules as of March
2013 for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs and found that these program
schedules addressed some, but not all, best practices for scheduling.
The Schedule Assessment Guide identifies 10 best practices associated
with effective scheduling, which are summarized into four
characteristics of a reliable schedule--comprehensive, well-
constructed, credible, and controlled.\10\ According to our overall
analysis, OTIA at least partially met the four characteristics of
reliable schedules for the IFT and RVSS schedules (i.e., satisfied
about half of the criterion), and partially or minimally met the four
characteristics for the MSC schedule, as shown in Table 1. For example,
we reported that the schedule for the IFT program partially met the
characteristic of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule
risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis was not based on
any connection between risks and specific activities.
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\10\ GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Program
Schedules, GAO-12-120G (exposure draft) (Washington, DC: May 2012). We
developed this guide through a compilation of best practices that
Federal cost-estimating organizations and industry use. According to
this guide, for a schedule to be comprehensive, among other things, the
schedule should: (1) Capture all activities, as defined in the work
breakdown structure, (2) reflect what resources are needed to do the
work, and (3) establish the duration of all activities and have
specific start and end dates. To be well-constructed, among other
things, all schedule activities are sequenced in the order that they
are to be implemented with the most straightforward logic possible. To
be credible, the schedule should reflect the order of events necessary
to achieve aggregated products or outcomes, and activities in varying
levels of the schedule map to one another. Moreover, a schedule risk
analysis should be conducted to predict a level of confidence in
meeting the program's completion date. For a schedule to be controlled,
the schedule should be updated periodically using actual progress and
logic to realistically forecast dates for program activities, and a
baseline schedule should be maintained to measure, monitor, and report
the program's progress.
TABLE 1.--SUMMARY OF OUR SCHEDULE ASSESSMENTS FOR THE THREE HIGHEST-COST PROGRAMS UNDER THE ARIZONA BORDER
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remote Video Mobile
Schedule Characteristic Integrated Fixed Surveillance Surveillance
Towers Systems Capability
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comprehensive....................................... Partially met Partially met Partially met
Well constructed.................................... Substantially met Partially met Partially met
Credible............................................ Partially met Partially met Minimally met
Controlled.......................................... Partially met Partially met Minimally met
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source.--GAO analysis of Customs and Border Protection data.
Note.--Not met--CBP provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally met--CBP provided
evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met--CBP provided evidence that satisfies
about half of the criterion. Substantially met--CBP provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the
criterion. Met--CBP provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion.
We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling best practices are
applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules. DHS concurred with the
recommendation and stated that OTIA plans to ensure that scheduling
best practices are applied as far as practical when updating the three
programs' schedules.
Further, in March 2014 we reported that CBP has not developed an
Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best
practices. Rather, OTIA has used the separate schedules for each
individual program (or ``project'') to manage implementation of the
Plan. OTIA officials stated that an Integrated Master Schedule for the
overarching Plan is not needed because the Plan contains individual
acquisition programs as opposed to a plan consisting of seven
integrated programs. However, collectively these programs are intended
to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be
used along the Arizona border with Mexico. Moreover, while the programs
themselves may be independent of one another, the Plan's resources are
being shared among the programs.
OTIA officials stated that when schedules were developed for the
Plan's programs, they assumed that personnel would be dedicated to work
on individual programs and not be shared between programs. However, as
OTIA has initiated and continued work on the Plan's programs, it has
shared resources such as personnel among the programs, contributing, in
part, to delays experienced by the programs. According to schedule best
practices, an Integrated Master Schedule that allows managers to
monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take, and how
the activities are related to one another is a critical management tool
for complex systems that involve the incorporation of a number of
different projects, such as the Plan.\11\ Thus, we recommended that CBP
develop an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan.
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\11\ GAO-12-120G.
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DHS did not concur with this recommendation. In particular, DHS
stated that maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan
undermines the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual
programs making up the Plan and that a key element of the Plan has been
the disaggregation of technology procurements. However, we continue to
believe that developing an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan is
needed. As we reported in March 2014, this recommendation is not
intended to imply that DHS needs to re-aggregate the Plan's seven
programs into a ``system of systems'' or change its procurement
strategy in any form. The intent of the recommendation is for DHS to
insert the individual schedules for each of the Plan's programs into a
single electronic Integrated Master Schedule file in order to identify
any resource allocation issues among the programs' schedules.
Developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan
could allow OTIA insight into current or programmed allocation of
resources for all programs as opposed to attempting to resolve any
resource constraints for each program individually.
In addition in March 2014, we reported that OTIA's rough order of
magnitude estimate for the Plan and individual Life-cycle Cost
Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs met some but not all best
practices for such estimates. Cost-estimating best practices are
summarized into four characteristics--well documented, comprehensive,
accurate, and credible.\12\ Our analysis of CBP's estimate for the Plan
and estimates completed at the time of our review for the IFT and RVSS
programs showed that these estimates at least partially met three of
these characteristics--well-documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In
terms of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with
independent cost estimates in accordance with best practices. We
recommended that CBP verify the Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT
and RVSS programs with independent cost estimates and reconcile any
differences.
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\12\ GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices
for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP
(Washington, DC: March 2009). The methodology outlined in the Cost
Estimating and Assessment Guide is a compilation of best practices that
Federal cost-estimating organizations and industry use to develop and
maintain reliable cost estimates throughout the life of an acquisition
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS said it concurred with this recommendation, although we
reported that DHS's planned actions will not fully address the intent
of the recommendation unless assumptions underlying the cost estimates
change. In particular, DHS stated that at this point it does not
believe that there would be a benefit in expending funds to obtain
independent cost estimates and that if the costs realized to date
continue to hold, there may be no requirement or value added in
conducting full-blown updates with independent cost estimates. DHS
noted, though, that if this assumption changes, OTIA will complete
updates and consider preparing independent cost estimates, as
appropriate. We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to
verify the Life-cycle Cost Estimates with the benefits to be gained
from verification with independent cost estimates. However, we continue
to believe that independently verifying the Life-cycle Cost Estimates
for the IFT and RVSS programs and reconciling any differences,
consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure the
reliability of the estimates.
CBP DID NOT FULLY COMPLETE DOCUMENTS FOR ACQUISITION DECISIONS
CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE
In March 2014, we reported for the Plan's three highest-cost
programs--IFT, RVSS, and MSC--DHS and CBP did not consistently approve
key acquisition documents before or at the Acquisition Decision Events,
in accordance with DHS's acquisition guidance. An important aspect of
an Acquisition Decision Event is the review and approval of key
acquisition documents critical to establishing the need for a program,
its operational requirements, an acquisition baseline, and test and
support plans, according to DHS guidance. On the basis of our analysis
for IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs under the Plan, we reported that the
DHS Acquisition Decision Authority approved the IFT program and the CBP
Acquisition Decision Authority approved the RVSS and MSC programs to
proceed to subsequent phases in the Acquisition Life-cycle Framework
without approving all six required acquisition documents for each
program. Furthermore, we reported that one document for the IFT
program, five documents for the RVSS program, and two documents for the
MSC program were subsequently approved after the programs received
authority to proceed to the next phase. DHS plans to complete and
approve those documents for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs that have
not yet been completed and approved.
With regard to one of the required documents--the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan--we reported in March 2014 that this document
for the IFT program, which was approved by DHS in November 2013, does
not describe testing to evaluate the operational effectiveness and
suitability of the system. Rather, the Test and Evaluation Master Plan
describes CBP's plans to conduct a limited user test of the IFT.
According to the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the limited user test
will be designed to determine the IFT's mission contribution. According
to OTIA and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, this testing is
planned to occur during 30 days in environmental conditions present at
one site--the Nogales station. CBP plans to conduct limited user
testing for the IFT under the same process that is typically performed
in any operational test and evaluation, according to the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan. The November 2013 IFT Test and Evaluation
Master Plan notes that, because the IFT acquisition strategy is to
acquire non-developmental IFT systems from the marketplace (sometimes
referred to as a commercial off-the-shelf system), a limited user test
will provide Border Patrol with the information it needs to determine
the mission contributions from the IFTs, and thus CBP does not plan to
conduct more robust testing. However, this approach is not consistent
with DHS's acquisition guidance, which states that even for commercial
off-the-shelf systems, operational test and evaluation should occur in
the environmental conditions in which a system will be used before a
full production decision for the system is made and the system is
subsequently deployed.
As we reported, we recognize the need to balance the cost and time
to conduct testing to determine the IFT's operational effectiveness and
suitability with the benefits to be gained from such testing. Although
the limited user test should help provide CBP with information on the
IFTs' mission contribution and how Border Patrol can use the system in
its operations, the limited user test does not position CBP to obtain
information on how the IFTs may perform under the various environmental
conditions the system could face once deployed. Conducting limited user
testing in one area in Arizona--the Nogales station--for 30 days could
limit the information available to CBP on how the IFT may perform in
other conditions and locations along the Arizona border with Mexico. As
of November 2013, CBP intended to deploy IFTs to 50 locations in
southern Arizona, which can include differences in terrain and climate
throughout the year.
We recommended that CBP revise the IFT Test and Evaluation Master
Plan to more fully test the IFT program, before beginning full
production, in the various environmental conditions in which IFTs will
be used to determine operational effectiveness and suitability. DHS did
not concur with this recommendation and stated that the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan includes tailored testing and user assessments
that will provide much, if not all, of the insight contemplated by the
intent of the recommendation. However, as we reported in March 2014, we
continue to believe that revising the Test and Evaluation Master Plan
to include more robust testing to determine operational effectiveness
and suitability could better position CBP to evaluate IFT capabilities
before moving to full production for the system, help provide CBP with
information on the extent to which the towers satisfy Border Patrol's
user requirements, and help reduce potential program risks.
CBP HAS IDENTIFIED MISSION BENEFITS, BUT DOES NOT CAPTURE COMPLETE DATA
ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ITS SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES
We reported in March 2014 that CBP has identified the mission
benefits of its surveillance technologies, but does not capture
complete data on the contributions of these technologies, which in
combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators,
could be used to better determine the contributions of CBP's
surveillance technologies and inform resource allocation decisions. CBP
has identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be
deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and
agent safety.
While CBP has defined these mission benefits, the agency has not
developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance
technologies to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we recommended in
November 2011.\13\ In our April 2013 update on the progress made by the
agencies to address our findings on duplication and cost savings across
the Federal Government, CBP officials stated that operations of its two
SBInet surveillance systems identified examples of key attributes for
metrics that can be useful in assessing the Plan's implementation for
technologies.\14\ For example, according to CBP officials, to help
measure whether illegal activity has decreased, examples of key
attributes include decreases in the amount of arrests, complaints by
ranchers and other citizens, and destruction of public and private
lands and property. While the development of key attributes for metrics
for the two SBInet surveillance systems is a positive step, CBP has not
identified attributes for metrics for all technologies to be acquired
and deployed as part of the Plan. Thus, to fully address the intent of
our recommendation, CBP would need to develop and apply key attributes
for performance metrics for each of the technologies to be deployed
under the Plan to assess its progress in implementing the Plan and
determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.
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\13\ GAO-12-22.
\14\ GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial
Benefits, GAO-13-279SP, (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2013).
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Furthermore, we reported in March 2014 that CBP is not capturing
complete asset assist data on the contributions of its surveillance
technologies to apprehensions and seizures, and these data are not
being consistently recorded by Border Patrol agents and across
locations. Although CBP has a field within its Enforcement Integrated
Database (EID) for maintaining data on whether technological assets,
such as SBInet surveillance towers, and non-technological assets, such
as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of illegal
entrants, and seizure of drugs and other contraband, according to CBP
officials, Border Patrol agents are not required to record these
data.\15\ This limits CBP's ability to collect, track, and analyze
available data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of
surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border
Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform resource allocation
decisions.
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\15\ In addition to maintaining data on asset assists, the Border
Patrol collects and maintains data on apprehensions and seizures in
DHS's EID.
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We reported that according to our analysis of EID asset assist data
for apprehensions and seizures in the Tucson and Yuma sectors from
fiscal year 2010 through June 2013, information on asset assists was
generally not recorded for all apprehension and seizure events.\16\ For
instance, for the 166,976 apprehension events reported by the Border
Patrol across the Tucson sector during fiscal year 2010 through June
2013, an asset assist was not recorded for 115,517 (or about 69
percent) of these apprehension events. In the Yuma sector, of the 8,237
apprehension events reported by Border Patrol agents during the
specified time period, an asset assist was not recorded for 7,150 (or
about 87 percent) of these apprehension events. Since data on asset
assists are not required to be reported, it is unclear whether the data
were not reported because an asset was not a contributing factor in the
apprehension or seizure or whether an asset was a contributing factor
but was not recorded by agents.
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\16\ In our March 2014 report, we defined an ``apprehension or
seizure event'' as the occasion on which Border Patrol agents make an
apprehension of an illegal entrant or a seizure of drugs or other
contraband. The event is recorded in the EID and a date and unique
identifying number are assigned. An event can involve the apprehension
of one or multiple illegal entrants or types of items, and each
individual illegal entrant apprehended or type of item seized in the
event is associated with the assigned unique identifying number. Our
analysis of apprehension events included instances in which an event
had at least one deportable individual.
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As a result, CBP is not positioned to determine the contribution of
surveillance technologies in the apprehension of illegal entrants and
seizure of drugs and other contraband during the specified time frame.
We reported that an associate chief at Border Patrol told us that while
data on asset assists are not systematically recorded and tracked,
Border Patrol recognizes the benefits of assessments of asset assists
data, including those from surveillance technologies, such as the
SBInet system. The associate chief further noted that these data in
combination with other data, such as numbers of apprehensions and
seizures, are used on a limited basis to help the agency make
adjustments to its acquisition plans prior to deploying resources,
thereby enabling the agency to make more informed deployment decisions.
We recommended that CBP require data on asset assists to be
recorded and tracked within EID and that once these data are required
to recorded and tracked, analyze available data on apprehensions and
technological assists, in combination with other relevant performance
metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of
surveillance technologies to CBP's border security efforts. CBP
concurred with our recommendations and stated that Border Patrol is
changing its data collection process to allow for improved reporting on
asset assists for apprehensions and seizures and intends to make it
mandatory to record whether an asset assisted in an apprehension or
seizure. DHS plans to change its process by December 31, 2014.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
I think, Mr. Borkowski, I will pick up right where Ms.
Gambler on her last point there about this asset assist.
I am not quite sure the mechanics of how that would work,
but I suppose that is something out in the field where as they
would--as they are going through their checklist of how an
apprehension happened or whatever the incident was.
What is your thought about why you are not accumulating
that kind of information? Is it just too much of a burden for
the folks out in the field or you don't think it would be worth
its time or what?
Mr. Borkowski. I think the issue at this point is just
having the systems and the capacity to do that. We generally
have the information. The question is how do we get that
recorded and documented, but the Border Patrol is working on
that and it is committed to doing that because we believe it
does tell us something.
I would caution about how much it tells us, right, because
you get in situations where various components came together to
produce an apprehension and it is tempting to say this
apprehension was caused by the agent or this apprehension was
caused by the technology.
Ultimately, we like to get that sensitivity--how much can
we attribute to technology, but the reality is these things
merge together. So I think we want to collect the data, but I
would caution until we collect it and study it, it is still an
open question as to how much utility that will provide us
downstream in terms of a reasonable performance metric.
Mrs. Miller. You know I asked that question because as you
are aware, this subcommittee unanimously and the full committee
unanimously passed our border bill which is going to be an
accountability matrix at the border in utilizing various kinds
of systems and whatever we can to really be able to effectively
have accountability and measure our success or failure for that
matter, so that won't be the end of that line of questioning I
would guess.
I also wanted to pick up on something you mentioned about a
75 percent savings. As you said, to paraphrase, it is something
that doesn't normally happen in Government to have a 75 percent
savings, and I guess I would ask both of you this question of
whether or not Ms. Gambler was surprised to see the 75 percent
savings, and what was the construct of that budget request to
have a 75 percent savings.
I know that the Department of Homeland Security would have
had to review your budget request. Did they have all the pieces
available? It certainly calls in to--makes us think a bit about
some of the budget requests that we are seeing.
Mr. Borkowski. I think what is important to understand is
first of all where those numbers come from. Life-cycle cost
estimate, right. That was a term you heard. In life-cycle cost
estimates there are a bunch of methodologies of generating
them, but they are all based on experience.
When it comes right down to it, you get a life-cycle cost
estimate based on your past experiences and you try to find the
closest examples of systems like the things you are buying and
what did they cost.
But when your experience is all based on that, ``I am not
going to the lot to buy a car. Instead I am going to go find
somebody; I am going to ask them to build me a car from
scratch.'' That is where most of our cost experience is from,
so that is what comes into a life-cycle cost estimate.
The GAO looks at this. We look at this. Did they follow
best practices? The answer is largely I would argue it did
based on the way we do life-cycle cost estimates.
But we tried to buy these differently. We tried to buy them
by going to the lot. You can imagine the difference it would
cost me to get a car if I went to Sam's manufacturing plant and
said build me a car from scratch or if I go to the local Ford
or Chrysler or GM dealer, whoever I go to.
I think in your own mind you can imagine the difference
between those, so that is factor No. 1. By the way, I was
surprised by 75 percent. When we built the life-cycle cost
estimate, and I think if we go back to testimony of this
committee and similar discussions, there was some concern; is
that number too low?
We were arguing we put contingency in it because we are
doing something that we haven't done before, but I was
surprised by 75 percent to be honest. I was hopeful we would
have cost savings. I was actually surprised by 75 percent.
Here is the other thing that happens, and I have been
trying to find a good way to make this case because these are
subtle things that are hugely important as it turns out.
A lot of times when we want performance in something--let's
say I want 90 percent probability detection. When I am
designing that from scratch because of the way we test it, I
actually have to design it to say 93, 94, 95 percent even
though what I want is 90 percent.
The reason is the statistics that go into testing to be
sure that I really get 90. So I am trying to think of an
analogy here, and I am in your area, not mine, but this is what
it looks like to me.
You are running a campaign for election and you have got
two candidates. You need 50 percent of the vote and you run a
poll. The poll says I have 51 percent.
Now you may feel comfortable about that but in the fine
print it says with a margin of certainty plus or minus 3
percent, which means the poll really said you have somewhere
between 48 and 54, so now you have a decision I would think. Do
you go after that last 3 percent to make sure you don't hit the
48?
That costs a lot more than the first 3 percent cost. That
is exactly what happens to us when we buy things. Going from 90
to 95 percent to guarantee I got 90 percent--that costs a lot
more than the first 5 percent did.
When I go and buy the things off the lot and I say look
tell me what you have got and we will accept your definition of
it because I don't really care about 1 or 2 percent either way,
huge cost savings. So it looks like that is what happened here.
I think that this is something new, and that is another
point I think when we do something new we have to tailor the
past practices to the thing that is new.
I believe we need to study this some more. I believe the
jury is still out, but it looks to me like a good deal of this
is real.
Mrs. Miller. I am going to ask Ms. Gambler to respond as
well, but in regards to your analogies being from the motor
city, I would stay away from the campaign analogies. Stick with
the car analogies. They are better.
[Laughter.]
Mrs. Miller. Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. I would just add that I think that what will
be important going forward and in looking at the contract and
the deployment of these IFT's is how CBP, how the Government
will hold the contractor accountable and provide that oversight
for the systems that are being deployed.
From our perspective what isn't clear from the test plans
that we have seen from CBP thus far is how they will be able to
ensure that the IFTs once deployed are meeting the Border
Patrol's operational needs and will work and the locations and
under the conditions that those technologies planned to be
deployed.
So I think what is critical here going forward is how CBP
will be positioned to have the information it needs to provide
oversight for the contractor in the systems that are being
deployed.
Mrs. Miller. Just one other question and for both of you as
well and this would be in regards to the testing that has been
done which the GAO mentioned is one of the recommendations, and
you had some concerns about all of that.
We just want to make sure it is working, right? When we
think about the lessons learned and the involvement or not
enough involvement perhaps of those that are--the customers
really--the end-users of this is the folks in the field.
Could you expand a little bit on the testing that was done
and why you feel that this is going to work and why you are--
why GAO is raising this as a concern about the amount of
testing that was done and how it all unfolded?
Mr. Borkowski. First of all, what was done was a demo.
Remember, we wanted something that was on the lot so we wanted
bidders to prove to us that it was really on the lot and it
wasn't just a brochure.
So the bidders actually had to take their system out to the
field, take it out of the box, turn it on, and show that it did
what they said it would do, which is unique. We don't normally
do that.
By the way, most of industry asked us to do that because
they said, you know, Fred is going to lie to you but I am
telling the truth, but you won't know it unless you make both
of us prove it.
So it was a demo. It was not a full-blown test. However,
these are systems that have been around for a while and we were
able to get an initial indication of that.
The other thing that I want to emphasize is, it is not like
there will be no testing. There will. There is a term of art
that is being tossed around here called operational test and
evaluation, but there is a whole bunch of different kinds of
test and evaluation, so we will have extensive testing that
these systems produce the results that were committed to in the
contract.
That will start with something called system acceptance
test, which technically is developmental test and evaluation,
so there is a whole rubric here that comes into play.
Then limited user testing is a test that is operational
test and evaluation designed to meet the Border Patrol's desire
to get answers to its questions.
So what we have actually done, rather than formal
operational test and evaluation is sat down with the Border
Patrol and said, what do you want to check out? What do you
want to know about the system?
That is all documented. It is all committed. All of that
testing will be done to advise the Border Patrol on how much
more of this it wants to do.
So we are doing the intent of that, but when I go to formal
operational test and evaluation I create aspirational goals
that get me to that 3 percent more problem that I was
describing and that is what we want to avoid.
So we have tailored the approach to this, but there is
extensive testing intended in this plan.
Mrs. Miller. Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. I think what is key here is that testing helps
an agency manage risks and it doesn't necessarily mean that
there is going to be fewer problems. It just means you are
getting information on potential risks or potential risks of
problems to a system earlier on in the process than you might
otherwise have.
That information is key to providing program managers with
what they need to know and what they need to do to address any
issues that comes up, and then positions them to be able to
address those issues earlier in the process.
So from our perspective there is an opportunity here for
CBP to do more robust testing than what they currently plan to
do to help ensure that the technology that is delivered by the
vendor meets Border Patrol's needs and will operate in the
different environments where the towers are intended to be
placed.
We think this is important given--or in light of some of
the testing challenges that SBInet encountered including, for
example, the Army Test and Evaluation Command identifying that
there were some issues with how terrain affected the radars of
SBInet. The ATEC officials referred to it as a technology
terrain mismatch.
So we think in light of those challenges there is an
opportunity here for CBP to do some additional testing that
would give them the information they need to effectively manage
the program.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman recognizes the gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Gambler, if I might pose a question to
you. Based on your work on the Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Plan and GAO's prior work on SBInet are there
similar challenges of warning signs you are seeing with the
plan that GAO believed contributed to some of SBInet's
failures? What must be done to address these warning signs?
Ms. Gambler. Based on our work, DHS and CBP certainly have
followed best practices and DHS' acquisition guidance in
certain areas, but we did report that they faced similar types
of challenges in managing the plan as they encountered under
SBInet.
For example, for both SBInet and the new Arizona technology
plan we identified that CBP has schedules and life-cycle cost
estimates that don't substantially meet best practices in all
areas.
As I mentioned, for both SBInet and the Arizona technology
plan, we identified some challenges with test plans for those
two systems and for both SBInet and the Arizona technology plan
we identified in both cases that CBP hadn't identified
performance metrics for assessing basically what we are getting
for the technology. So in those areas there are similar types
of challenges between the two systems.
What we have done is made recommendations to DHS and CBP
both on SBInet and the new Arizona technology plan to get at
some of those challenges to make sure that they more fully
adopt and use best practices for scheduling and life-cycle cost
estimating and also that they establish metrics for assessing
the contributions of technologies to border security and that
they collect data to be able to assess those metrics.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have an update? Have they begun to
do that specifically with life cycles and the test plan? Do you
have a report that says where they are now?
Ms. Gambler. So the recommendations we made with regard to
SBInet have largely been closed because SBInet has been
canceled. In terms of the recommendations that we have made as
it relates to the Arizona technology plan, we made those----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I know that SBI has been--I am speaking
about going forward. The new proposal.
Ms. Gambler. Sure. We made those recommendations in the
report being released today and CBP does plan to take some
actions in response to that.
For example, the Border Patrol is starting to work to make
changes to how it collects data on asset assists so that it can
set some metrics for how to assess contributions of border
surveillance technologies and CBP also has plans to look at
their schedules and life-cycle cost estimates as well.
As they are updating those, they have plans to make sure
that they do more fully comply with best practices.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How do you know that?
Ms. Gambler. That is what they reported to us in terms of
what they plan to do, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and we will
continue to monitor their progress in response to those
recommendations as they start to implement those actions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How long would they need for compliance?
How long would they need to engage in the process?
Ms. Gambler. For the different recommendations they have
set different time frames for completion. Some of them are 6
months to a year out and we will, as I said, continue to
monitor their progress and would be happy to update you on
their progress as they go forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So as we stand now from the
recommendations made by GAO, CBP is not in compliance? Going
forward, not on SBInet, which I know has been canceled.
Ms. Gambler. Correct. CBP right now has not yet implemented
the recommendations we have made.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is the give-and-take to--again I am
going back--what is the give-and-take to expect compliance?
What is the engagement and the report back that you get?
Ms. Gambler. For recommendations that we make on any
report, we regularly follow up with the agency to determine the
status of actions they are taking in response to the
recommendations.
That could be exchange of documents or meetings with agency
officials and then we make an assessment of the extent to which
the actions that the agency has taken are responsive to the
intent of our recommendation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. When do you expect then to get back with
CBP on these present recommendations?
Ms. Gambler. Some of the recommendations they indicated
about 6 months or so, that we might be able to start getting
some information from them, so that would probably be the time
frame that we will start to follow up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Borkowski, you acknowledge SBInet and
in my statement I acknowledged that it was $1 billion in cost.
You have now engaged with Elbit Systems of America on the
deployment of integrated fixed towers and that valued contract
was $145 million although the initial projected cost was $600
million.
To what do you attribute the significant cost discrepancy?
Do we have a quality product? You just heard GAO, Ms. Gambler,
mention that you are not yet in compliance. You have indicated
at least 6 months on certain aspects of the testing aspect.
So would you comment on again the cost discrepancy? Is this
a lesser technology than originally planned? Do you think you
will see more inaccuracies? Are you confident that we have got
the best contractor, but more importantly, is this a true
answer to SBInet?
Mr. Borkowski. With the last question, we are not trying
to--in terms of the correction of the errors that led to
SBInet, I think it is a good chunk of the way, 80, 90 percent
of the way there. I do think that.
Is this a good contractor? The system--we had many bidders,
many bidders, and of those many bidders we saw several systems
that appear to work right out of the box.
The one that we awarded is actually used for border
security in Israel as it turns out, but there were other
bidders who had very effective systems of that worked right out
of the box, so that is something different.
Our sense is that the quality is high, and I think the cost
difference is due to what I tried to describe earlier. When we
buy things and go to a specialty shop to build them from
scratch we pay more than when we buy something off the lot.
Now if there is nothing off the lot to buy then we are
stuck with going to a specialty vendor and that is the way we
bought SBInet. The problem was there was stuff on the lot, so
when we changed to that you have a significant impact.
Then when I go to those folks and say look, I am not asking
you. I am going to tell you what I am interested in, but I am
not asking you to go to the last 3 percent. Tell me what you
can do, give me some reason to believe that, and if that is
good enough for me I will buy it.
It is that last 3 percent cost that cost you an arm and a
leg, so I think those are all things that led to this
significant cost reduction. By the way, that $145 million
covers 50 towers in Arizona and 7 years of operations and
maintenance, so it is quite a bit of functionality that we get
out of it.
What we saw in the demos was very impressive. I don't know
if the Border Patrol would say this, but when they described
what they saw in that system in the demo, they almost were
raving about it to be frank. Hopefully that will get us to
where we want----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Let me ask if I might, will you wrap this into the question
that I am going to give you? I just want to make sure you
answer, Ms. Gambler, that you will be making a definitive
effort to follow through on the life cycle and test plan
testing.
But my question that I want to ask is in my statement I
mentioned the Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher informed the
office that the Border Patrol needs fewer integrated fixed
towers in Arizona than originally planned and instead wants
more mobile surveillance technology to be used in South Texas--
more mobile surveillance technology to be used which has
increasingly become a hot spot for illicit cross-border
activity in recent years meaning more of that in South Texas.
Given that it has been 3 years since the cancellation of
SBInet, keeping in mind the dynamic situation along the border,
how confident are you that the number and type of technologies
planned for the Arizona border is appropriate? How do you plan
to address Chief Fisher's inquiries, if you would?
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Borkowski. Certainly. Chief Fisher has maintained the
requirement for all of the IFTs but he has said they are lower
priority, so there is a subtle distinction there, but he says
that is still a requirement.
However, he would like to divert resources and do things in
South Texas first. So what we have done there is, as you know,
we have for example put up and these are demonstrations and
evaluations, they are kind of temporary activities, but we have
flown some aero stats there.
The one part of the Arizona technology plan is a system
called the mobile video surveillance system also known as a
scope truck. It has got an infrared camera that is long-range
that sees. The Border Patrol asked us to divert those to South
Texas. That contract will be awarded around June.
In addition, the contract that awarded it mobile
surveillance capabilities, those are going to Arizona and will
free up resources that will then be moved to South Texas;
mobile resources that will be moved to South Texas.
The other element of this is that again, as I have said we
have saved some cost and the Border Patrol has asked us to
prioritize those costs savings not in filling in the IFT in
Arizona just yet, but in applying those resources to continue
the kinds of things we have been doing in moving mobile video
surveillance systems using DOD technology in South Texas. So to
this point that is what we are able to do relatively quickly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I look forward to this
continuing dialogue. I think it is going to be crucial as this
system is put in place. I hope there is some synergism between
GAO and DHS in getting this right. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Just to remind the committee, we are well over $17 trillion
in debt. That is how big our financial hole is as a Nation.
Hearing after hearing before the Oversight Management and
Efficiency Subcommittee which I chair, we have identified DHS
programs that have overspent and failed to fully deliver.
Having been down there to the border in Arizona I know
first-hand how rugged the terrain is. I was surprised to see
that CBP plans only to test the towers in one location for 1
month, and I question how much sense that makes.
Mr. Borkowski, I get the need to get these towers deployed.
Listen, I appreciate technology being used, and I like the idea
of integrated towers. I like the idea of aero stats. I like the
idea of more different surveillance that can aid the CBP
officers on the ground.
We have got to have a multi-pronged approach. That includes
fencing, that includes personnel, and that includes
surveillance, so I get that. I get the need to deploy these
quickly, but we have been down this road before of inadequate
testing with SBInet. So what makes you think that you are in
the best position for success with only one test?
Mr. Borkowski. Again, I think it is a misnomer to say there
will be only one test. There will be extensive tests and the
plan as it is written says we will test for as long as the
Border Patrol wants to test.
In fact, the appropriations act that was passed has
language that we supported and already intended to do which
says we will not do subsequent deployments until the chief of
the Border Patrol says he is comfortable doing subsequent
deployments.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this. This is pretty expensive
technology. This contract is a fairly substantial reward. How
much testing, real testing have been done by the contractor at
no cost to the Government because we have got to be good
stewards and if they want the contract they have got to--in the
private sector, if somebody wants a contract, they get out
there, they do all the testing, and they prove to the purchaser
of their equipment that they have done the testing, so how much
of that has gone on to save the taxpayers?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, we did run, as I said, demonstrations.
We did make them take their system and put it up out along the
Southwest Border, turn it on, and show us how it worked for a
couple of days, but remember----
Mr. Duncan. For a couple of days.
Mr. Borkowski. Well, but they also, remember, they have
deployed these in Israel. They have been using them for a
significant amount of time.
There is another element to testing that I think is getting
lost in the discussion here, and it goes to this idea of a
system development versus an off-the-shelf system.
A lot of this discussion about testing incrementally comes
when you say okay, I am going to build--let's go to the car
example. If I were going and building a car from scratch and
designing it from scratch and went to Joe's manufacturing
company, when Joe built the carburetor, I would test the
carburetor.
When Joe built the engine, I would test the engine. I would
test all of the sub pieces, and then I start to put
subcomponents together and test, and then I put the whole thing
together and test. That is the kind of testing you do as you
go.
But when you have a whole car already built and you bought
it off the lot, you don't tear it apart to test the carburetor
and the engine. You test the whole car, and you test it once
you have bought it.
That is exactly what we are doing. It is a change in
paradigm because we are not doing system development, but we
are doing testing.
So I don't think we are all getting the accurate picture
here. That testing as I say we have designed with the Border
Patrol to say we will test everything you want to test to
answer your questions, and we will not do another thing until
you tell us you are comfortable but I still have to buy the
car. I went and bought it off the lot. I do have to buy the car
so I can test it and that is what we are doing.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate that. Let me shift gears here for
just a minute. The GAO's report raises questions as to whether
acquisition management lessons learned from SBInet are being
applied to the new technology plan.
I understand that there is some disagreement and that CBP
has not concurred with all of the recommendations of the most
recent report, so why did the Department not concur on two of
GAO's suggested recommendations?
Mr. Borkowski. Basically, because in our view, those two
recommendations drive us back to system development, back to
that approach that says I am not going to buy the car off the
lot, I am going to go to Joe's manufacturing company and build
one from scratch.
Plus, the other thing that they do is they take us back to
the days of SBInet where we had everything all tied together as
one program and couldn't pull the pieces apart.
So the one recommendation we non-concurred on was for
something called an IMS, an integrated master schedule, which
again is a sort of a term of art. It is a schedule but it is a
schedule on steroids.
It has got all kinds of interconnections and networking at
very low levels of detail and each program has an integrated
master schedule, and we did that on purpose. We want separate
programs. I want to be able to buy IFT whether or not I buy
RVSS and so forth and so on.
The GAO says that we should take all of those separate
programs and create an IMS for them as one program. That is not
consistent with DHS practice and what it has the effect of
doing is turning us back into SBInet. We think that is a really
bad idea.
The second recommendation that we non-concurred with had to
do with operational test and evaluation. Not in the spirit,
because as I have already explained, we are going to do all of
those things with the Border Patrol, but when you do formal
operational test and evaluation you set targets.
As I was explaining to the Chairwoman, if I set a target of
90 percent I actually have to pay to get to 95 percent to prove
I can do 90 percent. We do not want to do that. We do not want
to pay that premium. We do not need to pay that premium, so in
our view, those two recommendations are driving us exactly back
to the things we tried not to do after we got out from under
SBInet.
Mr. Duncan. I am following acquisition very closely, so I
am interested to see how this actually transpires.
I don't want to sit here, Madam Chairwoman, 2 years from
now and try to justify to the American taxpayer why we had
another SBInet and wasted their money. I hope this works.
I am interested in seeing it, and I am going to wish for
the success because security at the Southwest Border is very
important to folks in South Carolina and across this Nation.
I have got some other comments and questions. I will just
wait.
Ms. Gambler, I want you to chime in so I am going to wait
for the second round hopefully and with that, I will just yield
back.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Could I just ask you to yield just for one
moment?
I just want to thank you for the work you have done on
contracts or procurement. I have said it on some of the
hearings. I just want this one sentence. We all want this to
work. We are in a new world and again I just want to repeat
that our critique today is to make it better for America.
I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Thanks to the lady and the critique will make
it better. I think that is what the Chairwoman is wanting on
this to make sure that, (A) acquisition is happening. We are
not spending taxpayer dollars recklessly and that we are making
good decisions for the Nation. We are applying best management
practices and we will secure the border and stop the flow of
illegals into the country.
With that, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Absolutely.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
For Mr. Borkowski, how much will we spend on the Arizona
Border Surveillance Technology Plan?
Mr. Borkowski. I am trying to add up the pieces in my head
here. Our original estimates back when we first advertised the
planned----
Mr. O'Rourke. I just want to know what we are going to
spend.
Mr. Borkowski. I am thinking it will be $500 million to
$700 million for deployment plus up to 10 years of operation
and maintenance. I am thinking it will be in that ballpark when
it is all said and done.
Mr. O'Rourke. Five hundred million dollars to $700 million
for deployment and what is O&M cost over 10 years?
Mr. Borkowski. It is included in that number, so I would
expect it would be roughly 50-50 between the deployment cost
and the O&M cost for 10 years. That is a ballpark figure.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. Going back to SBInet which I understand
you were the executive director of before moving to this
current position, we spent $1 billion and have a 53 miles
monitored, so roughly just under $19 million a mile.
In learning from SBInet and looking forward to what we are
doing here with the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology
Plan, one of the pieces that was missing before I think were
performance metrics that we would be able to look at and know
whether or not we had a success.
What are the performance metrics for this?
Mr. Borkowski. The performance metrics for this are
basically to--and we tailored them--to ask technology to look
in areas where technology can see.
So you heard for example that we couldn't see through rough
terrain----
Mr. O'Rourke. I want to know to answer my colleague from
South Carolina's question, in 2 years, in 5 years, in 10 years,
when we are looking back at the $600 million plus that we have
spent, how do we know that it was a success?
What are the objective numbers that I am going to be able
to look at to make an objective judgment on whether or not that
was money well-spent?
Mr. Borkowski. When you combine this technology with
effectiveness ratio, I think you will get the numbers you are
looking for. So what we will be able to tell you is, is or is
not something going on, how much activity is in that area, and
then the Border Patrol will be able to tell you of that
activity how much did they interdict. I believe that is what
you are looking for.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. I don't know that I totally understand
that. I would hope that when we are going to spend this kind of
money on the heels of I think one of the worst, most missed
managed Federal projects in SBInet, a billion-dollar boondoggle
that didn't work and netted us 53 miles, I am not sure how we
are doing in those 53 miles.
When the GAO assesses that, makes recommendations, and you
choose not to implement those recommendations when you don't
have clear performance metrics, when you don't have an
integrated master schedule, when you don't have the true life-
cycle cost estimates, when you say something like tell me what
you can do and I will buy it to a vendor when I think we had
vendors really controlling the situation in SBInet and kind of
designing it as they went along.
When you say that you are flexible on the technical details
but you don't have a coherent way to measure what we are going
to do, I am worried that we are going to have something akin to
SBInet again.
To again answer the concerns from my colleague from South
Carolina I watched a couple of years ago as a private citizen
in an El Paso border community the god-awful waste that was
SBInet and I swore that I would never allow something like that
to happen again.
So I don't want to hope that we are not going to have this
problem again. I want to stop it in its tracks now before we
get there. If we had not had the problem with SBInet, I think
some of what we are talking about today might be forgivable or
understandable, but following that why not follow the
recommendations of the GAO?
I think it is--frankly it is a very difficult to hear you
say that the GAO is trying to point you in the direction of
replicating the errors of SBInet basically blaming the GAO for
sending you back into SBInet when I think it was the GAO that
uncovered the awful problems within SBInet.
I really--I have just got to say for the record, Madam
Chairwoman, I think we need to stop this program now until you
can adequately describe what the performance metrics are, what
the value is that we are going to get for this money that is
adding to the National debt and a better answer as to why you
are not going to comply with the recommendations from the GAO.
I find today's testimony just very troubling for all of the
reasons we have talked about from border security to the value
of taxpayer dollars to official oversight and accountability
from CBP.
I think this money could be much better used in much better
ways.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I will conclude.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his statement and
his concerns.
Neither myself or the Ranking Member have any additional
questions.
Does the gentleman from South Carolina wish to ask--take
some additional time?
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
I would just like for Ms. Gambler to chime in on the last
question I asked about the Department not concurring with GAO's
suggested recommendations and the differences between what GAO
has said and what maybe Mr. Borkowski testified to.
Ms. Gambler. Thank you, Congressman Duncan.
From our perspective our findings and our recommendations
are not intending for DHS or CBP to create a system of systems
or re-aggregate programs under the Arizona technology plan.
Rather, they are intended to help ensure that CBP
consistently follows best practices and acquisition guidance
and those best practices and acquisition guidance exist and are
designed to help ensure that acquisitions are managed
effectively and efficiently and that acquisition programs
deliver to meet operational needs.
So for example, with regard to the integrated master
schedule recommendation that we made--again, our intent isn't
for CBP to re-aggregate programs under that schedule.
The intent of our recommendation is that DHS or CBP would
take the schedules that they have for the individual programs,
insert them into one master schedule file, and by doing that
CBP could look at resource constraints or resource issues
across the different programs and resolve those issues as they
come up rather than resolving them on a program-by-program
individual basis.
Mr. Duncan. I apologize for interrupting you. They don't
have a master schedule now for the complete program to my
understanding. Is that correct?
Ms. Gambler. That is what our finding is, yes.
We would also added that an integrated master schedule is
viewed as being a good practice because even where there aren't
direct linkages between programs, in cases where programs are
being reported to a single customer or single client, in this
case the Border Patrol, it is helpful to have the schedules
inserted into one file so that for reporting purposes the
customer or client can have a comprehensive or a concise view
of the programs and understand when the programs will be
completed and when the overall plan will be completed.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
I really don't have anything further, Madam Chairwoman. I
just wanted to give Ms. Gambler a chance to chime in and I ran
out of time.
Thank you so much for going back.
Mrs. Miller. You are welcome.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, I don't have a question
either. I just want to say this as I keep hearing integrated
systems let me be very clear. Coming from Texas and being
engaged in the border for all of these years, I want to see the
strategic approach that is in a bill that has not yet passed
the floor of the House, but a very good bill.
I want to hear about California, Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, and as we are discussing this, this is the title of
this hearing--dealing with the Arizona fixed issues, I want to
make sure that we are consistently saying to DHS, we want a
consistent, responsible, respected border approach to allow for
the free flow of those who come to do us good and who want to
come and do many things that have added to our economy but also
to be able to be in a block for those who want to do us harm.
But we want to hear about Texas and Arizona, New Mexico,
and California collectively together as it relates to the
Southern Border and of course I always make mention of the
Chairwoman's very important area, the Northern Border.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank all of the--certainly thank the
witnesses today, and I thank my colleagues for that which I
think is a very informative hearing. As it was just mentioned
by the Ranking Member, we actually have, as you know Mr.
Borkowski, SBInet that was deployed on the Northern Border and
a section actually in my district and we have had pretty good
success with it.
It may be the one area of SBInet that people point to as it
has been quite helpful in that particular area, but also as has
been mentioned here we have this border bill that we hope to
see some movement on in the House and one of the biggest
components of that and I think has been a lot of debate across
the country is how the Senate bill in our mind treats border
security as just throwing huge pots of money at the border
again in an ad hoc fashion without really having these
accountability matrixes, et cetera and something that we all
discussed during the construct of that bill was SBInet and the
amount of money that we spent there and the failures that we
have had there, et cetera.
So I think as you can see clearly from this subcommittee
and I think we can say as well the full committee we are really
going to be watching this thing. We are really going to be
looking at it, so there remains a number of questions.
At this time I would say to the Members of the committee if
they have any additional questions for the witnesses, we would
ask you witnesses then to respond in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record will be
held open for 10 days, and without objection, the committee
stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]