[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT:
HOW TO PREVENT A REAL LIFE ``GRAVITY''
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 9, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-74
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
__________
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN KELLY, Illinois
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota KATHERINE CLARK, Massachusetts
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS COLLINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Space
HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair
RALPH M. HALL, TEXAS DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland, RMM
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAN MAFFEI, New York
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MO BROOKS, ALABAMA Massachusetts
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
CHRIS COLLINS, New York EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
May 9, 2014
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Mo Brooks, Vice Chairman,
Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 13
Written Statement............................................ 13
Witnesses:
Lt Gen. John ``Jay'' Raymond, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air
Force Space Command; and Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 17
Mr. George Zamka, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 31
Written Statement............................................ 33
Mr. Robert Nelson, Chief Engineer, International Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission
Oral Statement............................................... 42
Written Statement............................................ 44
Mr. P.J. Blount, Adjunct Professor, Air and Space Law, University
of Mississippi School of Law
Oral Statement............................................... 49
Written Statement............................................ 51
Mr. Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation
Oral Statement............................................... 65
Written Statement............................................ 67
Discussion....................................................... 90
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Lt Gen. John ``Jay'' Raymond, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air
Force Space Command; and Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command...................... 106
Mr. George Zamka, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 113
Mr. Robert Nelson, Chief Engineer, International Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission...................................... 120
Mr. P.J. Blount, Adjunct Professor, Air and Space Law, University
of Mississippi School of Law................................... 126
Mr. Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor, Secure World Foundation..... 138
SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT: HOW TO PREVENT A REAL LIFE ``GRAVITY''
----------
FRIDAY, MAY 9, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mo Brooks
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Brooks. The Subcommittee on Space will come to
order. Good morning. Welcome to today's hearing titled,``Space
Traffic Management: How To Prevent A Real Life 'Gravity'''. In
front of you are packets containing the written testimony,
biography, and truth in testimony disclosure for today's
witnesses. Before I begin my opening statement, let me say that
the topic we are discussing is one that I know is of great
interest to Chairman Steve Palazzo, and he would be here
leading the discussion today if he had not been pulled away by
the death of a close friend this week. I also understand he
will be including a statement for the record. I would like to
offer my condolences to him and his family during this time. I
recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement.
The focus of this hearing is how to prevent a real life
``Gravity''. As was imaginatively portrayed by Hollywood last
year, the threat of debris in key orbits around the Earth is a
very real and serious issue. While the movie elevated orbital
debris to the forefront of the public's attention, this
Committee is no stranger to the topic. Today we will continue
assessing the key questions involved in space traffic
management, and what Congress may do to ensure the safety and
security of the space environment.
There are two important facets of this discussion. The
first is an assessment of what we are doing right now to track
and mitigate orbital debris. The second is what more needs to
be done without burdening the space industry with unnecessary
bureaucratic hurdles to success. At present, the Joint
Functional Component Command for Space, or JFCC Space, is
tracking approximately 23,000 objects in orbit around the
Earth, including 4,000 payloads, of which 1,200 are active. The
current systems available for tracking cannot detect objects
smaller than four inches in size. This means we can't track a
fleck of paint traveling at 17,500 miles an hour, which in and
of itself, although small, can cause serious damage.
The Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007 demonstrated just
how volatile the space environment can be. This test resulted
in the largest creation of debris in history. So far, almost
3,400 individual objects associated with this event have been
catalogued, and the list is still growing. Additionally, in
2000, the collision of a decommissioned Russian communication
satellite, dubbed Kosmos-2251, and an active U.S.
Communications satellite called Iridium-33 created a debris
field that resulted in over 2,000 pieces of debris. Combined,
these two events account for almost a quarter of all the
objects that JFCC is tracking.
While tracking existing debris is obviously key to this
discussion, we must also focus on preventing the proliferation
of these objects in the first place. There are two key agencies
involved in the mitigation of debris, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission. Both
of these agencies have developed regulations specific to the
creation of orbital debris, and I am eager to hear from them
today.
The FAA is responsible for the mitigation of debris as it
pertains to launch and reentry of transportation vehicles. The
National Space Transportation Policy released in November of
2013 directed the Department of Transportation to execute
exclusive authority over these activities. While this was not a
change in the status quo, Dr. George Nield, Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at the FAA,
testified before this Subcommittee that his agency was ready to
start a larger discussion on an expansion of their authority to
regulate on orbit activities. It is unclear what specific
authority the FAA is asking for, and how it would anticipate
working with other agencies to implement this authority.
Regardless of the Administration's plans, Congress will need to
carefully weigh the costs and benefits of increased authority
for the FAA against the possible overregulation of a still very
young industry.
In 2005, the FCC asserted jurisdiction to regulate orbital
debris from commercial satellites which require their licenses
for the use of spectrum. The Commission based this assertion
largely on the broad mandate in the Communications Act of 1934
to encourage ``the larger and more effective use of radio in
the public interest.'' Although Congress has not provided
authority for this type of regulation explicitly, there seems
to be some ambiguity in the nature of their mandate to utilize
the spectrum effectively and efficiently.
The efforts of Federal agencies should be viewed within the
context of separate international and private sector efforts.
The United States has the most advanced space situational
awareness system in the world, but tracking and cataloging the
space environment more effectively may come from key
partnerships. We cannot afford to ignore these important
partners.
As commercial human spaceflight increases in the coming
decades, we must be sure that the nation can protect the
health, welfare, and safety of our government astronauts and
private spaceflight participants. It is also imperative that we
secure key orbits to protect assets that are critical to our
economy. Similarly, we cannot allow national security assets
that are used to keep our country safe to be threatened by the
proliferation of debris.
The debris events caused by the Kosmos and Iridium
collision in 2009 and China's ASAT test in 2007 demonstrated
that the space environment is vulnerable and ever changing. We
must be vigilant to ensure our national interests are
protected.
I appreciate the appearance of our witnesses today, and I
look forward to hearing from them.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space Vice Chairman Mo Brooks
The focus of this hearing is how to prevent a real life `Gravity.'
As was imaginatively portrayed by Hollywood last year, the threat of
debris in key orbits around the Earth is very real and a serious issue.
While the movie elevated orbital debris to the forefront of the
public's attention, this committee is no stranger to the topic. Today
we will continue assessing the key questions involved in space traffic
management and what Congress may do to ensure the safety and security
of the space environment.
There are two important facets of this discussion. The first is an
assessment of what we are doing right now to track and mitigate orbital
debris. The second is what more needs to be done without burdening the
space industry with unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles to success.
At present, the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, or
JFCC SPACE, is tracking approximately 23,000 objects in orbit around
the Earth, including 4,000 payloads, of which 1,200 are active. The
current systems available for tracking cannot detect object smaller
than four inches in size. This means we can't even track a paint fleck
travelling at 17,500 miles an hour, which can cause serious damage.
The Chinese Anti-Satellite test in 2007 demonstrated just how
volatile the space environment can be. This test resulted in the
largest creation of debris in history. So far almost 3,400 individual
objects associated with this event have been cataloged, and the list is
still growing. Additionally, in 2000, the collision of a decommissioned
Russian Communications Satellite dubbed Kosmos-2251 and an active U.S.
communications satellite called Iridium-33 created a debris field that
resulted in over 2,000 pieces of debris. Combined, these two events
account for almost a quarter of all the objects JFCC is tracking.
While tracking existing debris is obviously key to this discussion,
we must also focus on preventing the proliferation of these objects in
the first place. There are two key agencies involved in the mitigation
of debris, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal
Communications Commission. Both of these agencies have developed
regulations specific to the creation of orbital debris and I am eager
to hear from them today.
The FAA is responsible for the mitigation of debris as it pertains
to launch and reentry of transportation vehicles. The National Space
Transportation Policy released in November of 2013 directed the
Department of Transportation to execute exclusive authority over these
activities. While this was not a change in the status quo, Dr. George
Nield, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at
the FAA testified before this Subcommittee that his agency was ready to
start a larger discussion on an expansion of their authority to
regulate on orbit activities. It is unclear what specific authority the
FAA is asking for, and how it would anticipate working with other
agencies to implement this authority. Regardless of the
Administration's plans, Congress will need to carefully weigh the costs
and benefits of increased authority for the FAA against the possible
overregulation of a still very young industry.
In 2005, the FCC asserted jurisdiction to regulate orbital debris
from commercial satellites which require their licenses for the use of
spectrum. The Commission based this assertion largely on the broad
mandate in the Communications Act of 1934 to encourage ``the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest.'' Although Congress
has not provided authority for this type of regulation explicitly,
there seems to be some ambiguity in the nature of their mandate to
utilize the spectrum effective and efficiently.
The efforts of federal agencies should be viewed within the context
of separate international and private sector efforts. The United States
has the most advanced space situational awareness system in the world,
but tracking and cataloging the space environment more effectively may
come from key partnerships. We cannot afford to ignore these important
partners.
As commercial human spaceflight increases in the coming decades, we
must be sure that the nation can protect the health, welfare, and
safety of our government astronauts and private spaceflight
participants. It is also imperative that we secure key orbits to
protect assets that are critical to our economy. Similarly, we cannot
allow national security assets that are used to keep our country safe
to be threatened by the proliferation of debris.
The debris events caused by the Kosmos and Iridium collision in
2009 and China's ASAT test in 2007 demonstrated that the space
environment is vulnerable and ever changing. We must be vigilant to
ensure our national interests are protected.
I appreciate the appearance of our witnesses today and I look
forward to hearing from them.###
Chairman Brooks. I now recognize the Ranking Member from
Maryland, Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome
to everyone to today's hearing.
Mr. Chairman, while the accuracy of the events depicted in
the fictional movie ``Gravity'' can be questioned, there is no
doubt that it has made the public at least a little bit more
aware of the danger of orbital debris, and that is probably a
good thing. But in the real world, the nature of the danger was
brought into stark focus by the aftermath of the 2007 anti-
satellite test conducted by China. This incident is said to
have created an estimated debris population of 150,000 objects
larger than one centimeter in size. The resulting increase in
space debris has made the space environment more hazardous to
military, civil, and commercial satellites and spacecraft for
years to come.
So what are we doing to make space travel safe from orbital
debris? Well, today a number of government agencies have a role
in orbital debris mitigation. Three of those agencies are
represented on the panel today. The DoD Strategic Command is
responsible for tracking orbital debris. The FCC has
jurisdiction for mitigating orbital debris from satellites, and
FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation regulates
orbital debris from commercially licensed launch and re-entry
vehicles. However, what isn't quite clear is which agencies
have, or could have, legitimate roles in space traffic
management. That is, the authority to tell a space operator to
move a spacecraft should the potential for collision from
debris or another spacecraft require it.
Other questions also come into mind. Should space traffic
management be carried out by one or more existing agencies, or
perhaps by a new organization? What needs to happen for the
information on space debris and potential collisions to get to
the people who need it, and when they need it? Is the current
system for information transfer working, or does it need
improvement? Because the causes and consequences of orbital
debris are international in scope, does successful space
traffic management require an international approach? And,
lastly, what liability should the agency or agencies in charge
of space traffic management assume if its direction to a
satellite operator to move a spacecraft results in a collision?
These are just a few of the questions that this
Subcommittee will need to address if we aim to lay the
groundwork for ensuring the safety of future space flight from
orbital debris and other spacecraft. Mr. Chairman, these are
complex issues, and so I hope today's hearing will start to
shed light not only on the important issue of orbital debris,
but also on the approaches Congress might consider for
potential space traffic management and regulatory regime.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Subcommittee on Space
Ranking Member Donna F. Edwards
Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing.Mr. Chairman, while
the accuracy of all of the events depicted in the movie ``Gravity'' can
be questioned, there is no doubt it has made the public more aware of
the danger of orbital debris.
And that's a good thing.
The real world nature of the danger was brought into stark focus by
the aftermath of the 2007 anti-satellite test conducted by China. This
incident is said to have created an estimated debris population of
150,000 objects larger than 1 centimeter in size. The resulting
increase in spacedebris has made the space environment more hazardous
to military, civil, and commercial satellites and spacecraft for years
to come.
So what are we doing to make space travel safe from orbital debris?
Today, a number of government agencies have a role in orbital
debris mitigation. Three of those agencies are represented on the panel
today:
DOD's Strategic Command is responsible for tracking
orbital debris.
FCC has jurisdiction for mitigating orbital debris from
satellites.
And FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation
regulates orbital debris from commercially licensed launch and reentry
vehicles.
However, what isn't quite clear is which agencies have or could
have legitimate roles in space traffic management--that is, the
authority to tell a space operator to move a spacecraft should the
potential for collision from debris or another spacecraft require it.
And other questions come to mind:
Should space traffic management be carried out by one or
more existing agencies or perhaps by a new organization?
What needs to happen for the information on space debris
and potential collisions to get to the people who need it and when they
need it?
Is the current system for information transfer working,
or does it need improvement?
Because the causes and consequences of orbital debris are
international in scope, does successful space traffic management
require an international approach?
And what liability should the agency or agencies in
charge of space traffic management assume if its direction to a
satellite operator to move a spacecraft results in a collision?
These are just a few of the questions this Subcommittee will need
to address if we aim to lay the groundwork for ensuring the safety of
future spaceflight from orbital debris and other spacecraft.
Mr. Chairman, these are complex issues.
I hope that our hearing today will start to shed light not only on
the important issue of orbital debris but also on the approaches
Congress might consider for a potential space traffic management and
regulatory regime.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,
from Texas, Ms. Johnson, for a statement.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, and good morning. I want
to welcome our witnesses to this morning's hearing, and I look
forward to your testimony. I will be brief in my remarks, so
that we will have enough time to hear from our experts.
Orbital debris, or space junk, as it is sometimes called,
is not science fiction. It is a reality, and something that has
implications for the way we operate both our crewed spacecraft
and our commercial and government satellites. It is a growing
problem. Dealing with the increase in orbital debris will not
be easy. As our witnesses will testify, the issues associated
with this mitigation, and its potential removal from orbit, are
complex.
A number of agencies are involved, not all of whom are
represented at today's hearing. I am pleased that the
bipartisan NASA reauthorization bill that we recently marked up
now contains several provisions related to orbital debris. I
believe that their inclusion is a useful start to addressing
this complex set of issues. That said, I would caution against
legislating further in this area until we have a better
understanding of the issues involved. This morning's hearing
will provide a good starting point for our Members to learn
about both the challenge presented by orbital debris, as well
as some of the potential approaches to dealing with that
challenge. I am pleased that this Subcommittee is holding this
hearing.
In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Full Committeee
Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you very much. I want to welcome our witnesses to this
morning's hearings, and I look forward to your testimony. I will be
brief in my remarks so that we have enough time to hear from these
experts before we have to go vote.
Orbital debris, or ``space junk'' as it is sometimes called--is not
science fiction-it is a reality, and something that has implications
for the way we operate both our crewed spacecraft and our commercial
and government satellites. It is a growing problem.
Dealing with the increase in orbital debris will not be easy. As
our witnesses will testify, the issues associated with its mitigation
and its potential removal from orbit are complex. A number of agencies
are involved, not all of whom are represented at today's hearing.
I am pleased that the bipartisan NASA Authorization bill that we
recently marked up now contains several provisions related to orbital
debris. I believe that their inclusion is a useful start to addressing
this complex set of issues.
That said, I would caution against legislating further in this area
until we have a better understanding of the issues involved. This
morning's hearing will provide a good starting point for Members to
learn about both the challenge presented by orbital debris as well as
some of the potential approaches to dealing with that challenge. I am
pleased that the Subcommittee is holding it.
In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. If there are
Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your
statements will be added to the record at this point.
At this time, I would like to introduce our witnesses. Our
first witness is Lieutenant General John ``Jay'' Raymond,
Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and
Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, U.S.
Strategic Command. As the U.S. Air Force's operational space
component to U.S. STRATCOM, General Raymond leads more than
20,500 personnel, responsible for providing missile warning,
space superiority, space situational awareness, satellite
operation, space launch, and range operations. As Commander,
JFCC Space, he directs all assigned and attached U.S. STRATCOM
space forces, providing tailored, responsive, timely local and
global space effects in support of national U.S. STRATCOM, and
combatant commander objectives.
Our second witness today is Mr. George Zamka, Deputy
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation at
the Federal Aviation Administration. Mr. Zamka came to the FAA
directly from NASA, where he served as an astronaut, and most
recently as a research and instructor pilot at the Johnson
Space Center. He is a retired Colonel in the Marine Corps, and,
as a pilot, has more than 5,000 flight hours in fighter,
attack, test, research, and training aircraft. He was selected
as an astronaut by NASA in June 1998. He has spent more than
692 hours in space.
Our third witness is Mr. Robert Nelson, Chief Engineer,
International Bureau, Federal Communications Commission. He is
responsible for leading the Bureau's work on technical issues,
including satellite communications and cross-border technical
issues. Prior to serving as the Bureau's Chief Engineer, he was
chief of the Bureau's satellite division, and chief of the
satellite division, engineering branch. Before joining the
Commission, Mr. Nelson had various engineering positions in the
private sector.
Our fourth witness is Mr. P.J. Blount, Adjunct Professor of
Air and Space Law at the University of Mississippi School of
Law. He is also an adjunct professor in the Department of
Political Science and Law at Montclair State University.
Previously he served as research counsel for the National
Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law, at the University
of Mississippi School of Law. He teaches space security law,
international telecommunications law, human rights law, and
cyber law. He serves as the assistant executive secretary of
the International Institute of Space Law.
Our final witness is Mr. Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor at
the Secure World Foundation. As technical advisor, Mr. Weeden
conducts research on space debris, global space situational
awareness, space traffic management, protection of space
assets, and space governance. Prior to joining SWF, Mr. Weeden
served on active duty as an officer in the United States Air
Force, working in space and intercontinental ballistic missile
operations. As part of U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space
Operation Center, Mr. Weeden directed the orbital and analyst
training program and developed tactics, techniques, and
procedures for improving space situational awareness.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee
will have five minutes each to ask questions. I now recognize
General Raymond for five minutes to present his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
JOHN ``JAY'' RAYMOND,
COMMANDER, 14TH AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND;
AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT
COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Raymond. Chairman Brooks, Representative Edwards,
Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before
you as the United States Strategic Commands Commander of the
Joint Functional Component Command for Space. I greatly
appreciate the opportunity to address the Committee, and I look
forward to working with you to advance our Nation's space
capabilities. Before going further, though, I would ask--if I
could be so bold to ask you for a favor, and just please pass
along my condolences to Chairman Palazzo.
It is my highest honor to represent the 3,300 soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines and civilians that make up the
Joint Functional Component Command for Space. These
professionals, along with our exchange officers from Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom ensure our Nation, our allies,
and our joint war fighters have continued access to the space
capabilities that enable the American way of life.
JFCC Space is the world's premier provider of space
situational awareness data and products. Over the past few
years, we have bolstered our commercial and international
partnerships. We have implemented two-way sharing agreements,
and we have worked collaboratively to refine our sharing
processes. Additionally, we are on track to deliver a new
command and control system called the Joint Space Operations
Center Mission System, or JMS for short, and additional space
situational awareness sensors, the combination of which will
give us increased capability, and improve space situational
awareness for the United States and our partners.
Although maintaining awareness of the space domain is no
small task, I am confident that the men and women of JFCC Space
are prepared to meet the challenges with a spirit of dedicated
innovation and devotion to duty, providing our Nation, our
allies, and our joint war fighters assured access to the
world's premiere space capabilities. I thank the Committee for
your continued support as we strive to preserve the space
domain, and enhance the space capabilities which are so vital
to our nation.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Raymond
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Brooks. Thank you for your timely testimony.
The Chair next recognizes Mr. Zamka for his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. GEORGE ZAMKA,
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Zamka. Chairman Books, Ranking Members Edwards, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me. This is my first opportunity to speak before the
Subcommittee, and I am particularly fortunate to be able to
speak about the FAA's efforts regarding orbital debris
mitigation. Aside from launch and reentry, orbital debris poses
the highest risk to human spaceflight. During my two space
missions, we flew upside down and backwards to protect our
shuttle windows from orbital debris, and even doing that, we
had cracks on our windows from various small debris strikes.
With regard to orbital debris mitigation, it is helpful to
review the operations to which the FAA's authority applies, and
where it does not. The FAA is the sole Federal Government
agency with authority to license commercial space
transportation activities. That authority is limited by the
Commercial Space Launch Act to the launch and reentry of a
vehicle. Under that authority, at the end of launch, the FAA
requires the operator of a launch vehicle to safe their vehicle
and ensure there is no post-separation contact with their
deploying payload, in order to prevent orbital debris
generation. The FAA also imposes launch window limitations
based on a launch collision avoidance analysis with habitable
spacecraft, such as the International Space Station.
The FAA does not currently have authority to regulate on
orbit. The only agencies with any regulatory authority in
between launch and reentry events are the FCC, for
communications satellites, and NOAA, for remote sensing
satellites. The FAA interfaces with the FCC and NOAA regularly
through payload reviews, and our primary partners in developing
effective orbital debris rules are the Department of Defense
and NASA.
The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has been a strong
partner in the development of FAA rules, and is an invaluable
resource. The DoD's Joint Space Operation Center, or JSPOC,
provides tracking information and debris detection data that we
use to evaluate the effectiveness of launch debris mitigation
efforts. Only the DoD has legislative authority and capability
to share space situational awareness information, including
notifications of impending collisions, and near collisions, to
cooperating space operators, but it lacks any enforcement
authority.
An issue of oversight and enforcement authority emerges
with the increasing number of commercial space transportation
vehicles, which will operate differently from communications or
Earth observing satellites. Rather than travel to and remain in
one stable orbit, commercial transportation vehicles will move
in between orbits and rendezvous with, attach to, and deliver
cargo and people to other orbiting space vehicles. These
orbital operations could cause collisions that would create
orbital debris.
As Congress explores the issue of orbital debris and
transportation hazards, the FAA urges the Subcommittee to
consider at least two possible options, separately or in
combination. First, it should consider whether a regulatory
agency should authorize transportation on orbit by license. In
that scenario, an agency with the proper expertise would, as
part of a license evaluation, review the operator's plans and
debris mitigation measures in advance of operations.
In a second scenario, that may require additional
discussion, we would consider the benefits of an agency with
enforcement authority providing notices of impending hazards
and collisions. That agency would serve as a referee, advising
of impending high risk events, and facilitating a safer orbital
environment for all commercial and governmental operators.
This Subcommittee is familiar with the orbital debris
environment that consists of spent rocket bodies and debris
traveling in different directions at speeds 5 to 10 times that
of a bullet, and carrying tremendous energy into any collision.
Because of minimal atmospheric drag in Earth orbit, objects in
orbit tend to stay in orbit, at least for a very long time. For
example, TIROS-2, which was launched over a half century ago,
was recently added to the 60-day reentry prediction list.
Collisions between orbiting objects can cause a lot of
debris. We talked about the Iridium/Kosmos collision that
created over 2,000 of the 23,000 tracked objects on orbit.
Orbital debris affects human spaceflight as well. The ISS has
executed 18 debris avoidance maneuvers, and ISS crew Members
have been required to shelter in their Soyuz life boats at
times when hazardous debris was detected with too little
warning to plan and carry out a debris avoidance maneuver.
As space transportation capabilities and operations
continue to advance, and as the risk posed by orbital debris
increases, plans for mitigation become ever more critical. It
is time to explore the orbital safety of commercial space
transportation under the Commercial Space Launch Act.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I
will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Zamka follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Zamka.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Nelson for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. ROBERT NELSON, CHIEF ENGINEER,
INTERNATIONAL BUREAU,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Nelson. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Edwards, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to speak with you today about the FCC's role in
orbital debris mitigation, and how we fit into the overall
efforts of the United States Government with respect to this
issue.
In 1973, the FCC licensed the first purely private U.S.
communication satellites, and the first such satellite began
operations in the geosynchronous orbit in 1974, slightly more
than 40 years ago. Under the Communications Act, the FCC is
charged with licensing radio communications. The Act recognized
that radio transmissions do not stop at national boundaries,
and as a result, the Act was drafted with the understanding
that regulation needed to extend outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States. At the same time, FCC
licensing does not extend to U.S. Federal Government
transmitters, which are authorized by NTIA in the Commerce
Department.
FCC licensing and regulation are governed by a core
principle of the Communications Act, that issuing a license
requires a finding that the public interest must be served. In
that vein, the FCC, in 2004, recognizing work done by NASA and
other agencies, adopted debris mitigation regulations for the
satellite services it licenses. The FCC concluded that debris
mitigation rules would help preserve the United States'
continued affordable access to space, the continued provision
of reliable U.S. space based services, as well as the
contingent safety of persons and property in space, and on the
surface of the Earth.
FCC satellite licenses have always included, as one of the
terms, of the assignment of an orbital location. Deviation from
that license term is basis for an enforcement action. The FCC
licensing process includes an opportunity for public comment,
and this has, on occasion, resulted in objections to a proposed
license modification, based on collision risk. In 2004 debris
mitigation rules added a requirement to describe debris
mitigation plans. Specifically, the FCC rules require license
applicants to describe steps taken to avoid accidental
explosions, to identify and avoid collision risks, and to
safely dispose of a satellite at the end of its mission. The
FCC rules also include a requirement to dispose of
geostationary satellites, consistent with an International
Telecommunications Union recommendation adopted in 2003, and a
requirement that all satellites be left in a safe
configuration. The satellite applicant's plans are evaluated as
a part of the licensing process.
The FCC is one of three agencies that license U.S.
commercial activities in space, the other two being the FAA for
launch and reentry activities, and NOAA for remote sensing.
Consistent with long established radio frequency management
processes, the FCC is the licensing authority for radio
frequency use by private launch vehicles and remote sensing
satellites. However, the FCC has recognized the FAA's statutory
role under the Commercial Space Launch Act, and it recently
reiterated that it would not apply its debris mitigation rules
to commercial space transportation activities that are subject
to FAA regulation. The FCC also recognized NOAA's statutory
role concerning post-mission disposal of the remote sensing
satellites it licenses.
Although the FCC licensing process is independent from NOAA
and FAA processes, the FCC consults with these agencies as
needed. Consultation is often related to status of particular
cases and the progress of licensing activities. Further, FCC's
regulations and licensing make use of scientific and technical
work done by NASA. The FCC does not operate any orbital debris
tracking equipment, such as radar and telescopes. And, like
much of commercial satellite industry, the FCC's main sources
of satellite tracking data are DoD's JSPOC, as well as the
satellite operators themselves, derived from their radio links
with their satellites.
The efforts to improve space situational awareness of the
JSPOC and commercial operators, through such mechanisms as the
Space Data Association, are an important element to an overall
debris mitigation strategy. To be clear, data sharing between
JSPOC and commercial operators is on a spacecraft operator to
spacecraft operator basis. The FCC is not an intermediary in
this process.
In conclusion, I thank the Committee for this opportunity
to describe the FCC's rules concerning orbital debris
mitigation, the sources of the FCC's authority on these rules,
and the FCC's interaction with other Federal Government
agencies concerning this important topic. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Nelson.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Blount for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. P.J. BLOUNT, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
AIR AND SPACE LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL OF LAW
Mr. Blount. Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member Edwards,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss this
important topic. Space traffic management is a complex issue,
and I will try to briefly summarize my written statement.
Space traffic management as a concept contains two
different elements. There--these are the technical capabilities
needed to control space traffic, and the legal regime which
governs appropriate behavior. I will primarily be addressing
the legal aspects of space traffic management, and will do so
in the context of the international obligations of the United
States.
International space law encompasses a variety of principles
that set the bounds of appropriate state conduct in outer
space. These principles are broad in scope, and largely
undefined. The lack of definition means that the United States
is in a unique position to influence the content of these norms
to help create a safe and secure space environment.
International space law grants all states the right of free
access to outer space. Additionally, states shall, under
Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty, engage in space activities
with due regard to the corresponding interests of other states,
and states are given a right and an obligation to seek
consultations when there may be harmful interference between
space activities. This treaty provision emphasizes
international cooperation and coordination in space activities.
Article 9 also creates an obligation to not harmfully
contaminate the space environment.
Under Article 6 of the same treaty, states are
internationally responsible for the activities of non-
governmental actors, and are required to authorize and
continually supervise these activities. This is an
extraordinary provision in international law which generally
does not hold states responsible for the activities of their
non-governmental actors. This provision gives states an
affirmative obligation to oversee non-governmental actors to
ensure that they behave responsibly in space.
As I have already mentioned, these provisions are
substantially undefined. They require states to engage in space
activities in such a manner as to preserve space for use and
exploration by all for peaceful purposes. However, these
provisions leave the contours of what constitutes responsible
behavior up to states, who have traditionally cooperated and
coordinated on an ad hoc basis. Notably, these provisions have
failed to set meaningful limits on the creation of orbital
debris.
The United States has traditionally been a leader in the
development of international space law, and space traffic
management should be no different. When provisions of treaties
are unclear, state practice in regards to those provisions
often help to define the content of the--the content and
meaning of those provisions. For example, following the United
States lead, Article 6--the Article 6 obligation to authorize
and supervise has been implemented by states as licensing
regimes.
The United States is in a unique position in the
development of domestic space traffic management regime to
influence the meaning of international norms and the
international frameworks developed to coordinate space traffic
management among states. To this end, in my written testimony,
I have identified three key principles that should be taken
into account when developing a domestic space traffic
management system.
First, mechanisms providing for data transparency and
access are critical to ensuring proper management of space
traffic. It is essential to controlling domestic operations, as
well as coordinating international cooperation.
Second, a space traffic management system, whether
organized in one agency or many, needs to ensure that the--that
a government agency has unambiguous jurisdiction during all
phases of space operations. This provides regulatory
predictability, which can help foster the commercial space
industry, and it also ensures that the United States complies
with its obligation to continually supervise non-governmental
actors.
Finally, whatever government entity or entities is vested
with the jurisdiction to manage space traffic, that agency
needs also to vested with technical competence to ensure that
it can properly oversee these operations. Jurisdiction to
management operations will be meaningless without the technical
capabilities to do so.
The maintenance of a safe and secure space environment is
in the national interest of the United States. Civil,
commercial, and military operations are all dependent on a
space environment free of interference from other actors. To
this end, the United States should be a leader in developing a
space traffic management system that can foster such an
environment, both domestically and internationally.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again
for the opportunity. I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blount follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Blount.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Weeden for five minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MR. BRIAN WEEDEN,
TECHNICAL ADVISOR,
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION
Mr. Weeden. Thank you, Chairman Brooks, Ranking Member
Edwards, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Secure
World Foundation is dedicated to the long term sustainability
of the space environment so that all of humanity can continue
to use space for benefits here on Earth. The growth in space
debris, and increasing congestion of critical regions of Earth
orbit, present significant challenges to space sustainability,
and addressing those challenges is a key part of our work.
Regarding the threat that space debris poses, there are
three categories of complementary activities that can help
address that challenge. The first is space debris mitigation,
limiting the creation of new debris from human activities in
space. The second is active debris removal, also known as
remediation, which aims to remove some of the existing pieces
of debris to help prevent future growth in the debris
population, or to reduce the collision risk to satellites in
highly congested regions. The third activity is space traffic
management, which I defined in my testimony as minimizing the
negative impact of space debris on space activities. All three
of these activities are enabled by a fourth, space situation
awareness, broadly defined as characterized in a space
environment, and its impact on activities in space.
The U.S. government's strong efforts on space debris
mitigation over the last decade and a half are a good start,
but need to be part of a more comprehensive approach. My
written testimony outlines three major steps that can be taken
in this direction. The first is to find ways to harmonize the
implementation of debris mitigation guidelines across the
various regulatory agencies that currently have authority.
Doing so can result in a more efficient and effective process,
with benefits to commercial industry and innovation.
Second, this Subcommittee can call on the executive branch
to articulate a comprehensive strategy for dealing with
existing space debris, which may potentially include active
removal.
Third, this Subcommittee can work with the executive
branch, and other Committees with jurisdiction, to re-examine
the rules and responsibilities for space situation awareness
and space traffic management.
The key question facing this government moving forward is
whether or not the Department of Defense should continue to be
the single Federal agency responsible for all space situation
awareness activities, and providing operational space traffic
management for the world. I believe the answer is no. While
space surveillance began as a national security function, it
has evolved into more than just national security. It plays a
fundamental role in the breadth of space activities being
conducted by not only the military, but also civil government
agencies, and the private sector.
Thus, I believe it is time for the U.S. government to shift
responsibility for part of the SSA mission that directly
supports safety of space flight to a Federal entity other than
the DoD. The shift will allow this new entity to focus on
building relationships with commercial and foreign actors, take
better advantage of private sector innovation, and establish
trusted services with all space actors. The DoD would certainly
retain responsibility for, and a focus on, the national
security aspects.
Making this challenge is not--making this change is not
without considerable challenges. First and foremost is
determining which Federal department or agency should be
assigned this new role. One option is to assign it to an agency
that already has existing authority for regulating and
licensing private sector space activities. Another option to
assign it to a Federal agency that already has significant
expertise in space operations and space debris. A third option
would be to assign it to a new Federal agency with both
regulatory powers and operational responsibility. Which of
these options is best depends upon the long term priorities and
goals for the U.S. government, and the role it wants to play in
global space activities.
This proposed shift in responsibility, I believe, puts the
U.S. government in a better position to harness the private
sector innovation currently ongoing, and improve its own
capabilities and security in orbit. It is very similar to the
DoD's current approach for both satellite communications and
space-based remote sensing. In both of these areas, the
government focuses its efforts on exclusive niche capabilities
the private sector cannot provide. The end result has been an
increased capability for the military, lower cost to the
taxpayer, and a booming commercial industry.
It has become almost trite to point out that the space
world has changed, but in the context of this hearing, it is
worth making the point again. The continuing expansion and the
number of space actors, the types of space activities, has
created a complex space environment. Technological diffusion
has commoditized space capabilities, fueled a surge of private
sector innovation, and created the possibility for many new
uses of space for benefits here on Earth. It is vitally
important for the U.S. government to evolve its approach to
stay abreast of this ongoing change and continue to maintain
its leadership role in supporting the safety of space
activities, and encouraging innovation.
Thank you for your time, and I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weeden follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Weeden, and I thank the
witnesses for their testimony. As an aside, it looks like we
are going to have our second set of votes somewhere around
11:30, roughly 40, 45 minutes from now. Hopefully we will be
able to complete these proceedings before those House floor
votes are called.
Reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning to
five minutes, the Chair will, at this point, open the round of
questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
As a part of my five minutes, and recognizing the
prerogative that the Chair has, I would like to, at this point,
recognize the Falcon Rocket Team from Huntsville, Alabama. If
you would please stand? We have got Coach Bobby Murphy here
with us, Members John Aslan, Jack Aslan, Victor Murphy, Dave
Green, Matt Kellogg, and Jorge Estrada. The competition is
tomorrow. They are representing the State of Alabama. And I
want to encourage you all to do what you can to represent our
community, inasmuch as we often boast that we are the
birthplace of America's human space flight program. And thank
you for being here for this hearing today. This challenge that
we are facing today may be one that we need you all to solve
tomorrow.
With that having been said, let me proceed with my--well,
with that having been said, let me proceed with my first
question. Dr. Henry Hertzfeld of the George Washington
University recently testified before the Committee that FAA
should ``clearly be defined, and preferably limited to, those
issues directly related to launching and re-entry.'' His
comments appear to be somewhat inconsistent with the request
that the FAA is making here today. Can each of you comment on
Dr. Hertzfeld's statement concerning the FAA's potential role
in this space debris matter? Go ahead, at your leisure. Whoever
wants to poke the button first.
Mr. Zamka. Mr. Chairman, it seems like I might be the
liable first guy. The FAA's current authority ends at the end
of launch. That is the last time an operator has contact with
their launch vehicle. The FAAs current authority begins at the
beginning of reentry. That is when the safety checks begin. So,
that is our current authority. What we have experience with is
talking to the operators, and dealing with orbital debris
mitigation. We are also on-site as the operators are conducting
their operations, as part of our inspection and enforcement
function. So, we have existing experience and credibility with
the launch operators.
What I will refer you to in my testimony that is new, and
that would be worth considering, are the new classes of
vehicles that will operate on orbit. These are vehicles taking
personnel, cargo, and servicing up to human space stations, and
also servicing satellites.
General Raymond. I would just add that, consistent with
what my panelist partner just said, we work very closely with
the FAA on the licensing of launch vehicles. In commercial
space launches that we conduct off of our ranges, we have FAA
representation there with us as we go. I would just add that we
are--consistent with the national space policy, we think it is
important that you look at--that this hearing happened, and
that you look at different agencies to be able to take on the
lead Federal agency role. We are not going to pick one or the
other, but I think it is important that you explore that, and
we are interested in exploring that going forward.
Mr. Nelson. Well, the FCC hasn't ruled in--on any of
these--on this issue. It is probably important to point out FAA
has had a role in the past, for instance, with air transport
and human, and you know, human transport issues. And the fact
that they are involved directly with a launch vehicle
situation, carrying that through may be an appropriate
situation, in regard to transport or, you know, further launch
operations.
Mr. Blount. I actually do not answer this question. My
testimony is to who should have this authority. I think that
there are ways that we can envision either a single agency, or
fragmented agency authority, were we have different agencies
handling different functions. However, I do think that General
Raymond's point about having a lead Federal agency is very
important. An agency that can coordinate this information, make
sure that all the involved parties and stakeholders are
coordinated, is very important. And I think that currently FAA
looks like the most appropriate for that, but I don't think
that it is necessary that it goes there.
Mr. Weeden. I would add that one of the key questions here
is what kinds of powers are we talking about, and would that
extend to telling satellite operators what to do? I mean, that
is a very complicated question, because a lot of these
scenarios, when you are getting into potential close
approaching space objects, we don't know a yes or no answer
whether or not two things will collide, except in very, very
specific cases, like, for example, a planned rendezvous between
two satellites. In most other cases, it comes down to
statistics and probability, and so you are having to make a
judgment call based upon what is your level of risk. And I
think the hesitancy by Dr. Hertzfeld is to give a government
agency the power to somehow tell a private operator what that
level of risk should be, and what they should do with it.
Now, I think, on the other side, the situations where that
would probably need to be exercised are not as numerous as many
people might think. Most close approaches are between either
two pieces of debris that no one controls, or a satellite under
control and a piece of debris. The only situations where maybe
that might come into play of mandatory control would be if,
perhaps, human safety was in question.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you. At this point, the Chair
recognizes the Ranking Member, Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses. I want to follow up on this, because, Mr. Zamka, in
your prepared statement, you are urging us to look at two
issues. One is whether a regulatory agency should authorize
transportation on orbit by license, and then the second is the
benefit of an agency with enforcement authority providing
notices regarding impending hazards and collisions.
And I guess--I mean, from my standpoint, I am really not
prepared to legislate yet, because I feel like there is still a
lot we need to know. So I wonder if you might comment about
what parties would need to be at a table, and in what venue, to
begin to explore what Congress needs to do in this area, and
might that be a better approach than going right to identifying
an agency that would have authority--sweeping authority that we
don't even know about yet?
Mr. Zamka. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. We
really just want to begin the exploration as to what the
solution might be. A very important part of that is having the
right players at the table. So industry, who has to deal with
the risk and the expense, for instance, of deciding to do a
debris maneuver to avoid a collision, is certainly an important
player. There are a lot of working solutions out there amongst
commercial operators, and there are numerous ways of dealing
with it, shy of regulation, shy of enforcement. We don't want
to get ahead of any particular solutions that are out there.
But, I would certainly say that industry, and the agencies that
are involved with on-orbit authority now, would certainly be
good players.
Ms. Edwards. And before I go to Mr. Nelson, I will--General
Raymond, I wonder if you could comment about the role that you
would see at a future environment with a whole bunch of other
actors at play, both domestically and internationally. What,
then, is the role of the Department of Defense in this?
General Raymond. Well, clearly, ma'am, the Department of
Defense is focused on national security, and space situational
awareness is absolutely foundational to everything that we do
in space for a national security purpose. So, when you have
these discussions, one of the things that I think we need to
really be careful about as we go forward is making sure that we
have the ability to do what we need to do to protect our
nation, and protect our nation's satellites.
Ms. Edwards. All right. And Mr. Nelson?
Mr. Nelson. Yeah, I--following up on what I said earlier,
and Mr. Zamka's comment, I would suggest, at least from the
point of view of an orbital maneuver situation, or enforcing an
orbital maneuver to take place, that, at least from the point
of view of the folks that we work with, it is in their best
interest to move, and that is how they would take a look at it.
If they were aware that there was--a potential collision was
coming along, I am sure that they would end up moving that
satellite in order to take care of that. It is just inherently
in their best interest, even from--especially from a financial
point of view.
So, from having to have somebody that would have to go
through and actually force them, and say--to do that, it is
probably an unlikely situation to carry through. And, further,
as you point out, the international aspects of this, we only
have a certain percentage of the satellites that are on orbit.
And the issue of telling some other foreign country's satellite
to have to move is--it raises its own issues.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. And, Professor Blount, I wonder if
you could talk to me about the liability that the agencies
either should have or do have who should be in charge of space
traffic management, and what liability they should assume when
it is a direction to a satellite operator to move a spacecraft,
or its failure to provide a timely alert that results in a
collision, or debris?
Mr. Blount. It--can I clarify that question, that you are
asking about the liability of the Federal agency to the space
operator?
Ms. Edwards. The liability of that the agency has or should
have.
Mr. Blount. I think that liability is a very interesting
question, because these are, obviously, very expensive pieces
of equipment that are moving at very fast speeds, and can cause
a lot of damage. And there is--when you define a Federal agency
that is going to be in charge, they take on a responsibility.
And part of these points that I have--point out that we should
have in the legislation is this idea of technological
capability.
And so, right now, that capability is vested with the DoD,
and if we name a Federal agency, let us say the FAA or the FCC,
then there becomes a question of where are they getting their
data? Are they going to have to rely on DoD to get their data,
and then are they going to do this collision analysis, or are
they going to have to rely on DoD to do the collision analysis,
or are they going to have to rely on SDA to do the collision
analysis? And so, until the problems of where data comes from,
and how it is going to be managed by that agency, come through,
then it is going to be very difficult to determine who is going
to be liable for these actions.
I will just quickly add that, at the international level,
the state is liable, and so the way that we manage our domestic
assets is going to be very important, the way that we interact
internationally, because we could be on the hook for something
that a commercial actor does.
Ms. Edwards. Well, and it does seem to me--and, Mr.
Chairman, I will conclude. It does seem to me that there is a
fair amount of risk that is inherent when you can't entirely be
accurate if it comes to predicting how you move a satellite, or
how you move a spacecraft. So, you know, these liability issues
I think we are going to have to explore if we are going to go
shoving responsibility to some other lead agency.
And with that I yield. I mean, I think, Mr. Chairman, we
have a lot more questions to ask and answer before we come to a
point where we need to legislate in this area. Thank you.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr.
Bucshon of Indiana.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on
what do we do with the debris that is already there? And, I
mean, we are talking mostly about regulating--a regulatory
climate right now, but I am interested in--anyone can answer
this. What is happening with R&D about how to either capture or
deflect the orbit of existing space debris? Because I think--it
seems to me that 50 years from now, we may not even be able to
fly in space if we keep going the way we are at all, because we
won't be able to get out of the way of stuff flying around the
Earth.
So is there anything going on on? Obviously, when you
capture this stuff, you have to be going at similar speeds, or
else it is just going to destroy whatever you try to capture it
with. Mr. Zamka, maybe you could start?
Mr. Zamka. Yes, sir. It is a difficult problem because of
the high speeds involved, and, essentially, you would have to
rendezvous with that particular piece of debris in order to
capture it, and then bring it down. As part of our Center of
Excellence function--thanks very much for supporting that--we
have six tasks in work to begin to characterize that debris, be
able to better predict where it is going to be, and then
identify potential efforts at remediation. There are some
things that are out there that could increase the drag, or use
a magnetic field to begin to bring those pieces down sooner,
but it is a difficult problem.
Probably the most important thing relative to today is that
any plan to remediate debris on orbit is dependent on not
creating more debris now. As we have seen, any single accident
can create a tremendous amount of debris.
Mr. Bucshon. Yeah, and--like you pointed out, deflecting
the orbit, either magnetically or physically, is a possibility,
I guess. And some of the--I mean, it seems like we could
probably come up to solve the problem for the bigger stuff, but
all the little stuff, you know, like the stuff that hit the
space shuttle, it is going to be really, really hard to get
that stuff out of the orbit, it seems like.
Mr. Zamka. Yes, sir. One of the challenges we have is that
human spaceflight, our telecommunications satellites, and a lot
of our Earth observing satellites are all in the same low Earth
orbit regime, which is where a lot of the debris is, so that is
where we have to work.
Mr. Bucshon. Yeah. Mr. Weeden, you had a comment?
Mr. Weeden. Yes. There is quite a bit of work going on on
this within the scientific and technical community, both on
studying the problem, and on looking at some technology that is
still in the early level, but is--early stages, but with the
promising ones that might need to be adapted down the road.
NASA works with a number of other space agencies to do studies
on this issue, and they have done a lot of modeling. One of the
big questions the technical community is grappling with is, do
we go after the big things, or the little things? Because it
generally is different types of technology. You are not going
to have one solution that does both. And we probably--and doing
both means twice as much money, probably.
And the difference is if the big debris is the source of
new debris in the future. So, removing them, you are kind of
controlling long term growth. But the small debris is the
current threat to satellites, so removing that is a short term
lowering of risk. And that is kind of a choice between which
strategy is more important. And that debate is going on right
now within the scientific community.
Mr. Bucshon. Okay. As far as mitigation in the future, and
this would apply probably only to U.S. players, because we
can't control the international community, but is there any
talk about penalizing financially people that generate space
junk? Anyone want to talk about that? I mean, it seems to me,
if you are a private entity, or you are--and you put something
up into space, and it generates a bunch of problems----
Mr. Weeden. Um-hum.
Mr. Bucshon. --you know, who--what can we do about that? Is
there a way to financially address that?
Mr. Weeden. There have been discussions and proposals,
mostly in academic journals in the past, of some sort of a tax
or something on people that generate debris. The recurring
problem is, who has authority to put that in place? As you
mentioned, it is an international environment. There are more
than 60 countries that are now launching satellites and space
objects, and each of them has authority over their own private
sector activities.
Mr. Bucshon. Yeah, let me just point out, I mean, I am not
promoting new taxation----
Mr. Weeden. Yeah.
Mr. Bucshon. --like if you fly something into space, you
get taxed ahead of time. However, let me just point out that
the reality is if there is not some incentive not to do
something, I wouldn't call it a tax, I would call it penalty.
If you do--say you send something up, it blows up, and
generates 1,000 pieces of space junk, you know, if you send
something up, nothing happens, it comes down, fine. But if, you
know, there has to be some incentive for people not to generate
this stuff.
Mr. Weeden. I would say, there is an added complication
that, in the areas where debris is the worst, mainly low Earth
orbit, between about 600 to 800 kilometers, it is mostly
government satellites. There is not a lot at the--at the
moment, there is not a lot of private actor--private sector
activity there.
Mr. Bucshon. But there will be.
Mr. Weeden. There will be in the future, but at the moment
there is not a lot there. So the question is, how do you
incentivize governments?
Mr. Bucshon. Yeah. Good luck. I yield back.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Bucshon. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Schweikert of Arizona.
Mr. Schweikert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is sometimes
terrifying what makes us laugh, isn't it? It is--first
question, and I just want to make sure I sort of understand
some of the hierarchy and the mechanics. First off, a U.S., but
private commercial satellite, DirecTV, or satellite television,
or something of that nature, it is put up in space. Does it
carry insurance? Mr. Nelson?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. Most companies do have insurance on their
satellites. Larger ones may actually self-insure, so they will
put up money based on----
Mr. Schweikert. But whether they, you know, put up the
fund, or--but somehow there is an insurance product there?
Mr. Nelson. Yes.
Mr. Schweikert. How about if I am the French, or East
Indian, or, you know, private telecommunication, or private
cable, you know, or television provider? Do they carry
insurance? Do they have, you know, a national indemnity? And
considering they are often, you know----
Mr. Nelson. It, you know, different countries have
different rules concerning how they go about--as an example,
what I am aware of is the United Kingdom. For any of the folks
that might launch under their flag, they have a Space Act, and
some of the requirements, for instance, is indemnification of
the crown, so to speak. So they--it depends on the country, and
what the rules are associated with their activity.
Mr. Schweikert. And Mr. Chairman, and to our witnesses,
where I am trying to head is, these are very expensive objects,
both, you know, the--those from the private, and those that are
governmental, have great, great value. We already know that
there is sort of an insurance regime of some mix. It may not
be, you know, universal in design. So we know we have
incentives because of the value. We know there is some
structure out there. So what happens today? How do they
communicate today?
General, let us say we have--you see something heading
towards my DirecTV satellite. Do you communicate with them?
General Raymond. Congressman, thanks for the question.
Absolutely. We are very interested in maintaining a safe space
domain. So the--my organization, and specifically the command
center that I have, the Joint Space Operation Center, located
at Vandenberg Air Force Base, tracks the 23,000 objects that
you have heard about. And of those objects, we--not only do we
track them, but we detect for potential conjunctions.
Mr. Schweikert. But what I am after right now, because
you--that was part of your testimony, and that was very
helpful, is sort of the communication regime right now. So it
is the satellite that is providing television for Australia----
General Raymond. Right.
Mr. Schweikert. --do you communicate with them?
General Raymond. We do. So if--is--where I was going, if we
detect a potential conjunction on any active satellite that is
up in space, any country, if we detect a conjunction, we will
make an emergency notification, because it is in all of our
best interests not to have a----
Mr. Schweikert. Now, does it go--is it bilateral? Does it
come the other direction, where the private tracking firm that
is managing, you know, do they communicate back to you?
General Raymond. Yes, sir. We have two-way sharing
agreements with 41 different companies. We have it with five
different nations. There is two-way sharing going back and
forth. Largely, though, the tracking capabilities that are out
there are our tracking capabilities, and largely we are the
ones that are doing this for the world.
Mr. Schweikert. And do any of those private firms ever
provide their statistics saying, hey, we actually believe you
missed our orbit by a few yards, a few this, few degrees? We
have some wobble, you know, we have some elliptical? What--I
mean, do they share that sort of data back and forth?
General Raymond. For those that we have agreements with,
they provide owner--what we call owner-operator--the address in
space, if you will. We track it with a radar. They have the
exact address of theirs, and we--they do provide that back and
forth. The challenge that we have today is that our command and
control system that we have doesn't allow us to automatically
ingest that. We are putting a new command system in place as we
speak called the Joint Space Commission Operation Center System
that will allow that automated--automatic ingestion of owner-
operator data.
Mr. Schweikert. Okay. Mr. Chairman, as my buddy here--and
we were talking sort of one-off a moment ago, as we see the
commercialization of space, we know we have the incentives. We
have very valuable objects up there. You know, we know we have
the need. We know we have sort of a communication structure,
and we also know it is ultimately going to be international. Is
there a way where we could ever get these parties where they
have sort of an automated information exchange back and forth,
and others are also carrying the cost of this? So, thank you,
Mr. Chairman, yield back.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Schweikert. The Chair next
recognizes Mr. Hall, the former Chair of the Science, Space,
and Technology Committee.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I, of course, thank
you for holding this hearing. I guess, General Raymond, some
time ago, maybe 15 years ago, we had a hearing on astronauts--
on asteroids, and, to our surprise, we found out one had just
passed in what they said was 15 minutes of the United States.
Nobody knew about it, and no one gave us any warning about it,
or spoke about it. And I invited people from France, England,
Japan, and others. Japan is the only one that answered, because
it is a world problem, not just the U.S., but got very little
hope from most of the--very few of them showed.
We had some good hearings on that, and some things that
would scare you to death. I guess give us some kind of a sense
of the process that goes in when you want to protect our
national security and our commercial assets could be threatened
by orbital debris, and what other degree there is? Or how much
warning did NASA have to avoid their threats that they have
had? I don't think they have had one--been instances where they
have. Just give us a general answer to my question. If it is
too general, I will----
General Raymond. Sir, we track, as we said, every object.
We do that for NASA as well. We actually have NASA operators
that sit on our JSPOC floor with us. We take very seriously the
protection of the International Space Station. You heard from a
previous panelist that the space station had moved 16 times. In
fact, just last month, we recommended to NASA that they move it
twice.
There is a layered approach to doing this. We detect where
the debris is, and then, as it gets into a certain area around
the space station, we then put more energy on that debris,
refine the orbital accuracy of that--of our position estimate
of that debris, and then we make recommendations with the folks
sitting on the floor. So it is something that we take very
seriously, and there is a set process with NASA operators. We
also do that for all of our DoD satellites. And, again, as I
mentioned earlier, for any conjunction that we see is going to
hit on an emergency basis, we notify the world.
Mr. Hall. I know you must have processes for the government
operators, to warn them about any possible collision, but what
type do you--work do you have with the private operators? How
do they know this, and how do you contact them? Or how do they
contact you, or how do they watch you and listen for you?
General Raymond. Sir, we have a tracking network of about
21 different centers around the globe that track what I will
call element sensor addresses in space of objects, debris, or
satellites. We post that on a website, www.spacetrack.org.
Anybody can get on there, and all of the addresses, or a large
portion of the things that are in space, we put out there
publically for everybody to have.
Mr. Hall. Now, the private operator just is--operation--
government operators to know of your work?
General Raymond. They have that data. For those that enter
into agreements with us, we actually go beyond that, and we
provide some services to them in addition to that data. And
then, again, on an emergency basis, even for those that don't
have----
Mr. Hall. How many of them know that they need to have that
agreement with you?
General Raymond. They all know, and we have got 41
different companies now that have it, and we have got five
different nations that we have signed agreements with, and
there are five or six more in the hopper right now going
through the negotiations of that as we speak.
Mr. Hall. I think your work is very, very important, and I
thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Hall. The Chair next
recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I
had another hearing, a markup from another Committee, and I
will be reading your testimony. And I think this issue is
vitally important for the future of not only the United States,
but of all of humankind. The debris issue is not a secondary
issue. Debris is something that will limit humankind's ability
to use space for our benefit, and to uplift mankind, humankind.
This is--and we are getting to a point of saturation now where
either we deal with it, or we will suffer the consequences of
this limited--and this limit on the benefits that we can
utilize space for.
One need only take a look at how we rely on space for
weather, for communications, you name it. We have got--we have
brought down the cost of telephone calls so dramatically with
the use of space. We have agriculture that now depends on
space, and GPS. We have whole economies based on space that are
now in jeopardy because we are not cleaning up our trash. And
we need to make sure that we are just not--track it. It is
like--tracking trash in space is not the answer. What the
answer is, eliminating the trash from space.
And this shouldn't be just something the American taxpayer
needs to bear the burden of. We need to make sure that we have
an initiative. We should--hopefully this hearing will provide
step number one towards creating an international initiative to
clear space debris from orbital space. And I would imagine that
our friends in the EU, and Russia, and perhaps--I can't speak
for China, considering the fact that they have contributed so
much to this problem as of late. But we should make this an
international effort, and the steps should be made to get this
thing moving. Otherwise, we are putting all of these wonderful
assets that we have invested in, and that are currently helping
improve the condition of humankind, we are putting them at
risk.
Let me note we--the Chairman, our Chairman of the full
Committee, just mentioned that--we talked about near Earth
objects, and--when he was Chairman, and I think that we
probably have something where we are tracking them a little bit
more than what we were then, but I don't think that we have
done anything that--right now that we could count on to say, if
we see a near Earth object that is going to hit the Earth and
destroy large numbers of people, whether or not we have a
system in place that we could then activate to deflect that
near Earth object. I don't believe that system is in place.
Well, we have got two major threats there, things we should
be able to work on with our allies, and friends throughout the
world, in order to achieve this as a human goal, a goal for all
of humankind, as I say. So thank you very much for your
testimony, I will be reading it. I am sorry that I missed the--
and I would be happy to yield to my colleague from Maryland. Is
that--will you--did you want some time? I would be happy to
yield.
Chairman Brooks. Does the gentleman from California have
any more questions?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am done.
Chairman Brooks. All right. Thank you. The Chair, at this
point, subject to the call for votes on the House floor, is
going to entertain a second round of questions, and I am going
to defer my second round at this point, and recognize the
Ranking Member from Maryland, Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And the
reason I wanted Mr. Rohrabacher to stay is because, in Mr.
Weeden's testimony, he had a recommendation for the executive
branch to clarify its strategy for assessing the orbital debris
removal, and it really struck a chord because in our bipartisan
Committee passed bill just a couple of weeks ago, we actually
included a provision in there that would require NASA, in
collaboration with other relevant Federal agencies, to review
the concepts and technological options for removing orbital
debris from low Earth orbit.
So, I mean, getting to this question of not just looking at
it and knowing where it is, all very important, but what's
going to be our strategy for removing it? Because we actually
need to free up some of that space too for all the additional
activity that is going on. And so I wonder if any of you have
any views, Mr. Weeden, starting with you, about what an
effective approach NASA might take to address this particular
provision, assuming that it does become law?
Mr. Weeden. That is a very interesting--very challenging
question, because, at the moment, there is no single technology
that seems to be the answer. There are a couple of different
technologies that have some promise. And so I think a first
step would probably be to figure out what those technologies
are, and then look for, how are we going to mature those
technologies? Because, at the moment, they are--they exist. We
generally know, theoretically, they are probably going to work,
but most of them have not been demonstrated in an operational
manner.
So it will be identifying what the most promising
technologies are, and then some sort of a strategy to mature
them, do risk reduction, and--toward some sort of a
demonstration mission on orbit of one or more of these
technologies. And I think that is probably going to have to be
an international demonstration--mission in nature, given the
nature that all the debris is international, right? A county
can only really touch the things that it owns, and so there is
going to have to be some level of cooperation there.
Ms. Edwards. Well, given that the United States mostly
tracks all of it, it would--I would assume that we should be
able to get some cooperation. General Raymond, is there a role
that DoD can play in terms of maturing some of these
technologies?
General Raymond. Ma'am, there are a lot of discussions that
are going on around the world on this problem, and it is an
important issue. I think there are roles that we could help. I
have not heard, to date, though, any specific technology that
is out there that I see is something near term that us going to
be able to solve this problem.
Ms. Edwards. Mr. Nelson, I think you wanted to----
Mr. Nelson. Yeah. I think Mr. Weeden touched on it. The
technologies, and being able to take the items out of orbit,
and getting them out of orbit, is very important. Obviously,
the sooner you get it out, the likelihood is that they won't
crash into something else.
The point--the issue, though, it comes down to is whether
or not you take out--and you are--made that mention as well,
somebody else's piece of debris. The flags are flying on--even
if it is not usable, that particular item is, you know, has the
flag of another country. So there probably is going to have to
be some sort of treaty work, or something along those lines, or
agreements made between nations in order to be able to
effectively work that out.
Ms. Edwards. Right. Well, I know that Goddard Space Flight
Center has some rather robust activity going on now to try to
look at ways to re-service some of these decommissioned
satellites as a way to get them back in service, not put, you
know, new ones up, but that too is a long way down the line,
but something that I think we need to invest in. And with that,
Mr. Chairman, I will yield.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher, we have time
for another round of questions on your end, if you have any
additional questions. The House floor vote has not yet been
called.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would just like to suggest that we make
this the first step, and not just a public relations--I mean,
this is a problem, you know. We can do something in Congress to
work with these folks, and to work with people internationally.
I have--when I travel overseas, I am on the Foreign Affairs
Committee, I always--when I go to another country, I go and
talk to their space people. And every time I talk to the space
people, whether it is Russia, or Japan, or Europe, they all are
in tune with the--this is a challenge that we--that we are
going to have to someday deal with, because it is coming to the
point now where it is imperative to deal with it, because it is
limiting what we can do in space.
So, let me see, it was--I would just say--okay. Have any of
you had any talk with, for example, the Russians, or the EU, or
Japan on this issue?
Mr. Zamka. Sir, the FAA is engaged with a lot of
international partners, to include the European Space Agency,
and we have letters of agreement with Spain and Curacao.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Zamka.Because it is such a big international problem,
there is international will to attack it. One thing that we
have an opportunity to do here is identify a civil agency that
can represent the United States, which is the biggest operator
out in orbit, to take a leadership role as we begin to address
the problem.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, is, you know, one--I remember one of
the directors of the space program in Russia telling me that
they had been thinking about some--almost a bulldozer type of
thing, where you had a--some kind of a big shield in front of
a--something that would go forward and get a hold of some of
this debris. We actually--are we studying anything that would
be--I mean, there is one idea. I mean, I am not saying that is
good or bad. Are we really--have--you mentioned that we don't
have any--or is there a program on that is actually trying to
develop the technology in this?
Mr. Weeden. At the moment I am only aware of one NASA
funded program to do some technology development. It refers to
what is known as an electro-dynamic tether, which is a
spacecraft that can use the combination of electrical field and
the Earth's magnetic field to maneuver without using fuel,
aside from sunlight.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Um-hum.
Mr. Weeden. And it is--the technology is fairly early
stages, but it could be one of the more efficient ways of
moving around to gather debris. I am not aware of any other
U.S. government funded programs to do the technology
development. But I will say that, in reference to your question
about international efforts, next month there is going to be a
meeting hosted by CNES, the French Space Agency, that has
participation from Japan, from NASA, from Russia, from a number
of other countries, to--it is a 3 day workshop, looking at
technology, and engineering solutions for his.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Really?
Mr. Weeden. And this----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Where will that be?
Mr. Weeden. That will be in Paris. This is--and they have
held this workshop every two years. This is the third instance
of it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And what days are they?
Mr. Weeden. It will be June 16, 17, 18, around there.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that
someone from this Committee go to that hearing--or that
meeting.
Chairman Brooks. Is that a request?
Ms. Edwards. Mr. Chairman, he may have to compete with the
Chairman and the Ranking Member.
Chairman Brooks. Does the gentleman from California have
any more questions? All right. Let me exercise my prerogative
and now ask my question.
General Raymond, if an event like the Kosmos-Iridium
collision happened today, how would JFCC respond? Specifically,
can you give the Committee a sense of the process that goes
into actions to protect our astronauts on the International
Space Station, or other national security and commercial assets
that could be threatened by such an event?
General Raymond. Yes, sir, thank you for the question. If
we--if an event happened where two satellites collided,
obviously, it would generate debris. We would detect that
debris with our network of sensors around the globe. We would
characterize that debris. We would get an orbital element, or
the address in space, if you will, of that debris, and we would
refine that over time, and we would put that debris into our
catalog.
Once it is in the catalog, as I discussed earlier, we have
the process in place that we do for every active satellite on
orbit. We would screen against that debris to ensure that we
provided proper warning, if something were to collide.
Chairman Brooks. That is the vote call, but we still have
15 minutes before we have to be on the House floor. Quick
follow-up question, how long does it take, generally speaking,
for the orbital debris to have its orbit decay to the point
where it goes back to Earth, and it is no longer an issue?
General Raymond. Mr. Chairman, there is a lot--there is
lots of factors that go--that are involved in that.
Chairman Brooks. Is there some kind of average number of
years, or decades, or a range?
General Raymond. Sir, I would--I don't have that at my
fingertip, and I don't think there really is--it--there are so
many factors that are involved. It is altitude, size, shape,
speed, velocity. There are a whole bunch of things. We do
predict re-entries, and we track those re-entries. We know--we
track those, we warn against them, when they are going to re-
enter. But I can't tell you, you know, I can't give you a time
for how many years. But when it gets close, we can characterize
that re-entry, and we warn against that as well.
Chairman Brooks. Mr. Nelson, you wanted to add something?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. It is, you know, the General actually hit
on the issues. It is basically the altitude, the shape of the
object, the mass of the object, and it can range quite--there
is a very, very large range, from, you know, tomorrow to, you
know, maybe a million years from now. So--depending on where
that particular object is. So that brings up the issue of
basically taking it out of the orbit.
Chairman Brooks. Mr. Weeden?
Mr. Weeden. Just to give you some ballpark numbers, at the
altitude of the International Space Station, I would say a
rough estimate, on the order of months to maybe a very short
number of years. When you move up higher, let us say around 800
kilometers, where most of the remote sensing satellites are,
and the greatest congestion of debris is, and the collision
was, and the Chinese anti-satellite was, at that altitude, you
are talking decades or longer. And once you get beyond 1,000
kilometers, for all intents and purposes, it is up there pretty
much, as far as we are concerned, forever.
Chairman Brooks. All right. Thank you. General Raymond, as
a follow up to my earlier question to you, FAA requested, in
their written testimony, for the authority to require operators
to move positions if a possible collision is detected. How
would your process change, if at all, if that authority is
granted to the FAA?
General Raymond. Sir, the FAA would still rely on the data
that we get from our sensors. We would be providing that data.
Today we--again, we warn of those conjunctions. We do not have
the authority to make some--make a satellite operator move. And
I can for DoD satellites, but I can't make commercial
satellites, because I don't have that authority, but they would
take our data that we have and use that data in their new role.
Chairman Brooks. Thank you. Any other follow up on that?
Yes, Mr. Zamka?
Mr. Zamka. Yes, sir. Regarding the request to have the
ability to require an operator to move, that can be done in a
number of ways. Earlier is better. Earlier interaction,
perhaps, agreement with the operator as part of the licensing
process as to what the criteria would be for which they would
move. Probably best of all would be an industry based consensus
on what is the agreeable time to effect a move because
probabilities are involved, and a lot of expense for the
operator, frankly.
Chairman Brooks. All right. I thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony, and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the Committee may have additional questions for you,
and you--we will ask you to respond to those in writing. The
record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments
and written questions from the Members. The witnesses are
excused, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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