[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING CHALLENGES AND WASTED TAXPAYER DOLLARS IN MODERNIZING BORDER
SECURITY IT SYSTEMS
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Steve Daines, Montana Eric Swalwell, California
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Vacancy, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Ron Barber, Arizona
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steve Daines, Montana, Vice Chair Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Ryan Consaul, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the
State of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Management Efficiency:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Charles R. Armstrong, Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Information and Technology, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Thomas P. Michelli, Chief Information Officer, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for David A. Powner.......... 43
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Charles R. Armstrong..... 43
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Thomas P. Michelli....... 44
EXAMINING CHALLENGES AND WASTED TAXPAYER DOLLARS IN MODERNIZING BORDER
SECURITY IT SYSTEMS
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Thursday, February 6, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management
Efficiency,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Duncan, Barber, and O'Rourke.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Duncan. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come
to order.
I will say that the Ranking Member is on his way. Attending
the prayer breakfast this morning, and he is running a few
minutes behind. So hopefully he will get here before I finish
my opening statement. If not, we may pause and allow him to
have an opening statement as we go because I think that is so
important.
But the purpose of this hearing is to examine DHS's attempt
to modernize key information technology systems in use by the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, specifically the TECS Modernization
program.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
During the first half of this Congress, our subcommittee
has had a laser focus on how the Department of Homeland
Security spends tax dollars and how efficient and effective the
Department's programs are during a time when the Nation faces
unparalleled debt and fiscal challenges. As Chairman, I believe
DHS must not only protect the homeland but do so in a fiscally
responsible way.
Yet, time and again, hearing after hearing, we have
examined findings from Congressional watchdogs that show a
Department with little interest in safeguarding taxpayer
dollars. From duplicative programs, broken trust by airport
screener misconduct, and ill-disciplined acquisition practices,
effective management of DHS has consistently taken a backseat.
Unfortunately, today's hearing is no different: Another
program in the ditch, desperately needing a tow. Today we will
examine DHS's efforts to modernize key information technology,
or IT systems, used by the Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, specifically to TECS
Modernization program.
Having visited the border agents along the Southwest Border
and actually in Mr. Barber's district, I know first-hand how
important it is for CBP officers and ICE agents to have all the
tools that they need to secure the border. I know Ranking
Member Barber shares that view.
For the CBP officer on the border, TECS is an integral tool
to secure the homeland. The system helps officers determine the
admissibility of over 900,000 visitors and approximately
465,000 vehicles into the country daily, share critical
information with other Federal law enforcement agencies, and
alert officers to possible threats entering the United States.
That is important. Nine hundred thousand visitors, 465,000
vehicles--that is an immense challenge. I get that.
For the ICE agent, TECS is the primary investigative tool
used to document and build cases for prosecution. A legacy
system in operation since 1987, TECS has become increasingly
difficult and expensive to maintain due to the system's
antiquated technology and its inability to support the
requirements needed by CBP and ICE personnel in the field.
Despite TECS' critical importance to our security, CBP and
ICE have failed to manage the modernization program
effectively. As the Government Accountability Office, or GAO,
recently reported, the result has been wasted taxpayer dollars,
missed deadlines, and delays in fielding enhancements to CBP
officers and ICE agents.
For instance, despite some success deploying functional
capabilities to secondary inspection locations, GAO reported
that CBP has revised its schedule and cost estimates because
they were unachievable. CBP expects to complete the project by
2016 for a total cost of about $700 million.
GAO further found that CBP did not develop a master
schedule that links work activities to the overall project
schedule, despite the fact that numerous projects are being
deployed concurrently. While CBP contends the remainder of its
concurrent program upgrades will be operational by the
beginning of 2016, I am concerned that, minus a sound master
schedule, the project could be further delayed and over-budget,
which could snowball into CBP officers not having the tools
that they need to do their job.
Of even more concern are ICE's failures. Due to unmet
requirements, ICE is starting over on redeveloping its
requirements after spending some $60 million and failing to
produce any deliverables. After about 4 years and $60 million,
ICE has little to show for its efforts, doesn't yet know the
revised total cost or what the program will achieve. The stakes
are high because of a looming 2015 deadline that, if not met,
will force DHS to spend more taxpayer dollars to maintain the
system currently in use.
In addition, I am concerned that, despite numerous
management layers, DHS headquarters still let the program
proceed. The DHS chief information officer has increased
oversight and governance of information technology by reviewing
DHS component programs and acquisitions over the years. Yet the
Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, two
executive steering committees, and the Office of Chief
Information Officer's Enterprise Business Management Office all
failed to adequately address escalating problems associated
with the TECS Modernization effort.
Further, the lack of complete, timely, and accurate data
from the components to DHS chief information officer, as
reported by the GAO, negatively affected the Department's
ability to make informed and timely decisions on the program.
Even the best governance framework won't improve outcomes
if the senior DHS leaders don't have the discipline to enforce
it. DHS must hold programs accountable, and if they fail, then
we will hold DHS accountable.
With the speed with which technology advances today, it
shouldn't take DHS 8 years to complete an IT project. Private-
sector CEOs likely wouldn't tolerate such poor performance and
management; neither should DHS. It is an affront to the
American taxpayer, and it is time for DHS to do better.
[The statement of Chairman Duncan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Jeff Duncan
February 6, 2014
During the first half of this Congress, our subcommittee has had a
laser focus on how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spends
taxpayer dollars and how efficient and effective the Department's
programs are during a time when the Nation faces unparalleled debt and
fiscal challenges. As Chairman, I believe DHS must not only protect the
homeland but do so in a fiscally responsible way. Yet time and again,
hearing after hearing, we've examined findings from Congressional
watchdogs that show a Department with little interest in safeguarding
taxpayer dollars. From duplicative programs, broken trust by airport
screener misconduct, and ill-disciplined acquisition practices,
effective management of DHS has consistently taken a back seat.
Unfortunately, today's hearing is no different . . . another program in
the ditch desperately needing a tow.
Today, we will examine DHS's efforts to modernize key information
technology (IT) systems used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), specifically the TECS
modernization program. Having visited with border agents along the
Southwest Border, I know first-hand how important it is for CBP
officers and ICE agents to have the tools they need to secure the
border. I know Ranking Member Barber shares that view.
For the CBP officer on the border, TECS is an integral tool to
secure the homeland. The system helps officers determine the
admissibility of over 900,000 visitors and approximately 465,000
vehicles into the country daily, share critical information with other
Federal law enforcement agencies, and alert officers to possible
threats entering the United States. For the ICE agent, TECS is a
primary investigative tool used to document and build cases for
prosecution. A legacy system in operation since 1987, TECS has become
increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain due to the system's
antiquated technology and its inability to support the requirements
needed by CBP and ICE personnel in the field.
Despite TECS's critical importance to our security, CBP and ICE
have failed to manage the modernization program effectively. As the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported, the result
has been wasted taxpayer dollars, missed deadlines, and delays in
fielding enhancements to CBP officers and ICE agents.
For instance, despite some success deploying functional
capabilities to secondary inspection locations, GAO reported that CBP
has revised its schedule and cost estimates because they were
unachievable. CBP expects to complete the project by 2016 for a total
cost of about $700 million. GAO further found that CBP did not develop
a master schedule that links work activities to the overall project
schedule, despite the fact that numerous projects are being developed
concurrently. And while CBP contends the remainder of its concurrent
program upgrades will be operational by the beginning of 2016, I am
concerned that minus a sound master schedule, the project could be
further delayed and over budget which could snowball into CBP officers
not having the tools they need to do their job.
Of even more concern are ICE's failures. Due to unmet requirements,
ICE is starting over on redeveloping its requirements after spending
some $60 million and failing to produce any deliverables. After about 4
years and $60 million, ICE has little to show for, doesn't yet know the
revised total cost, or what the program will achieve. The stakes are
high because of a looming 2015 deadline that if not met will force DHS
to spend more taxpayer dollars to maintain the system currently in use.
In addition, I am concerned that despite numerous management
layers, DHS headquarters still let the program proceed. The DHS chief
information officer has increased oversight and governance of
information technology by reviewing DHS component programs and
acquisitions over the years. Yet the Office of Program Accountability
and Risk Management; two Executive Steering Committees; and the Office
of the Chief Information Officer's Enterprise Business Management
Office all failed to adequately address escalating problems associated
with the TECS modernization effort.
Further, the lack of complete, timely, and accurate data from the
components to the DHS chief information officer as reported by the GAO
negatively affected the Department's ability to make informed and
timely decisions on the program. Even the best governance framework
won't improve outcomes if senior DHS leaders don't have the discipline
to enforce it. DHS must hold programs accountable. If they fail, then
we will hold DHS accountable.
With the speed with which technology advances today, it shouldn't
take DHS 8 years to complete an IT project. Private-sector CEOs likely
wouldn't tolerate such poor performance and management. Neither should
DHS. It's an affront to the American taxpayer and it's time DHS do
better.
Mr. Duncan. So I will recognize the Ranking Member when he
comes in. While we are waiting on him, let me just go ahead and
remind Members of the subcommittee that opening statements may
be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
February 6, 2014
Thank you, Chairman Duncan, for convening this hearing.
I also thank the witnesses for appearing today and look forward to
hearing their testimony.
When the Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002, there
was a merger of not only agencies and the people employed by those
agencies, but also technology and the systems used by legacy agencies
to keep our country safe and secure.
One such technology was TECS. As the largest law enforcement tool
used throughout the United States, TECS is a vital component to our
homeland security efforts.
It is used at the border to ensure that legitimate travelers and
trade are welcomed into our country and terrorists, drugs, and weapons
are prevented from entering the United States. It is also used away
from the border by more than 20 Federal agencies to create and access
terrorist ``lookouts,'' track financial crimes, and disseminate
intelligence reports.
Unfortunately, given the age of this system and the way that it is
structured, it has become outdated, and, in some ways obsolete. Its
inefficiency has at times hindered our border security efforts by
increasing wait times and producing false positives that create further
delay.
Like many legacy systems now in use at DHS, TECS is currently
undergoing a modernization effort that by some calculations is expected
to cost more than $1.5 billion. By all accounts, an improved TECS is
well overdue; however, the Department's implementation is cause for
serious concern.
For example, rather than having one program office, established at
the Headquarters level, this major acquisition is being carried out by
two separate components--Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--simultaneously.
As a result, we have two separate program offices, two separate
program managers, two separate funding streams and the need for a
limited acquisition workforce to conduct oversight over two separate
major investments.
Under this structure, I am concerned that duplication, redundancy,
and the inability for one hand to know what the other hand is doing.
Furthermore, both components continue to face challenges that
further reduce my confidence in the management of this billion-dollar-
plus acquisition.
CBP continues to be challenged by scheduling delays, and although
it insists that the portions of TECS Modernization that have not been
delivered will be ready by 2015, the program is still running without a
master schedule and a clearly-defined time line for what will happen
when.
ICE has made the disconcerting decision to halt its efforts after
operating for years without established requirements, resulting in
testing failures and the expenditure of $20 million developing a system
that was ultimately of no use.
That is $20 million of scarce homeland security funds that can
never be recovered that has simply ``gone down the drain.''
These issues and others have caused the Government Accountability
Office in a recently-released report to state that: ``After spending
millions of dollars and over 4 years on TECS modernization, it is
unclear when it will be delivered and at what cost.''
Hopefully, today's witnesses can shed some light on how this effort
can be put on a better track and inform this subcommittee on how much
TECS modernization is expected to cost, when it will be delivered, and
when Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials can stop
relying on a 30-year-old, obsolete system while our security hangs in
the balance.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Duncan. We are pleased to have a very distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statement will appear in the record. I will go ahead and
introduce each of you first and then recognize you for your
testimony.
Our first panelist is Mr. David Powner. He is the director
of IT management issues at the U.S. Government Accountability
Office. Mr. Powner is responsible for a large segment of GAO's
information technology work, including systems development, IT
investment management, health IT, and cyber critical
infrastructure protection reviews. At GAO, Mr. Powner has led
teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts at Cheyenne
Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service, the
Federal Aviation Administration, and the IRS.
Our second panelist is Mr. Charles Armstrong. He is the
assistant commissioner for the Office of Information and
Technology at U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Mr.
Armstrong's responsibilities include software development,
infrastructure services and support, tactical communications,
research and development functions, and IT modernization
initiatives. Mr. Armstrong has led the office since June 2008.
He manages a budget of $184 million and a workforce of about
6,000 Federal employees and contractors.
Prior to serving as assistant commissioner, Mr. Armstrong
was DHS's deputy CIO, where he worked on the Department's IT
initiatives for improving the agency's secure information-
sharing capabilities. Mr. Armstrong has over 30 years of
technology experience in the operations and management of IT.
Our third panelist is Mr. Thomas Michelli.
Did I pronounce that right?
He is the chief information officer for U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, where he is the agency's top
technology administrator and responsible for critical IT
initiatives, modernizing IT systems, and providing IT solutions
throughout ICE.
Prior to joining the Department, Mr. Michelli served as
executive director of enterprise solutions for the Defense
Logistics Agency. In the private sector, Mr. Michelli served as
director of international IT operations and chief information
officer for the real estate firm Cushman & Wakefield. He also
served as chief technology officer at General Dynamics
Information Technology.
Folks, thank you for being here.
I will now go ahead and recognize Mr. Powner to testify.
Keep in mind that if Mr. Barber comes in between testimonies, I
will let you finish, but then we will recognize him for a
statement.
So Mr. Powner can testify.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Chairman Duncan, we appreciate the opportunity
to testify this morning on DHS's efforts to improve its ability
to secure our borders, prevent terrorism, and enhance our
intelligence functions.
The primary system used for admitting persons to the United
States and one of our Nation's most important law enforcement
systems, known as TECS, provides CBP officers and ICE agents
with critical information. This system has over 70,000 users,
is accessed by 10 departments, interfaces with over 80 systems,
including terrorist watch lists, and screens nearly 1 million
visitors and 500,000 vehicles daily.
This system is in need of a major overhaul because it is
expensive to maintain, does not quickly support mission
requirements, and needs major functional improvements like
enhanced searches and better algorithms to match names.
In 2008, CBP and ICE each pursued separate acquisitions to
address these shortfalls. Collectively, these two acquisitions
were to cost over $1.5 billion to build and operate. Mr.
Chairman, we issued a report at your request last month on
those acquisitions, which I will briefly summarize, starting
with CBP.
CBP planned to deploy functionality in five separate
increments and, to their credit, deployed the first increment
related to enhanced secondary inspections at all air and sea
ports in 2011 and land ports in 2013. The remaining four
increments were to be deployed concurrently in 2015, but the
program is being rebaselined for the second time in the past
year, meaning that what will be delivered when and at what cost
is changing.
When we issued our report, DHS was working on new cost and
schedule estimates. We understand that DHS has a new
requirements document, cost estimate, and program baseline that
shows them achieving full operating capability now in 2016, and
the life-cycle cost has dropped slightly to just below $700
million. CBP has spent over $225 million to date on this
effort.
Turning to ICE, ICE planned to deploy an initial release in
December 2013 and annual releases after that but in 2010 began
experiencing technical problems that led to them deferring
3,000 of the 4,300 requirements for the first release. That is
70 percent of the first release being deferred. This led to a
review that determined the system was not technically viable in
June 2013, and the program decided to start over.
We understand there has been an independent technical
assessment of the program and that a new cost estimate and
baseline is expected in the April-May time frame. ICE reported
only having spent about $20 million on their program when we
conducted our review, but today's testimony discloses that $64
million have been spent to date.
So what went wrong with the two acquisitions? Our report
highlights two major areas: No. 1, poor fundamental program
management; and, No. 2, ineffective governance. Both
acquisitions put in place robust requirements management
processes too late, and that was definitely more evident with
the ICE program. In addition, both programs did not effectively
escalate program risks in a timely or aggressive fashion. We
thought CBP should have been addressing scheduling and
contractor risks and ICE should have been identifying the
requirements backlog and technical solution risks much better.
Regarding governance, multiple groups are in place to
oversee these acquisitions: CBP and ICE each have an executive
steering committee, the CIO performs monthly ratings on these
acquisitions, and the under secretary for management oversees
major acquisitions.
These governance bodies clearly were not getting complete
information to assess programs risks, and their assessments
were way too rosy. The under secretary's assessment for both
acquisitions were deemed low-risk in July 2013. The latest CIO
assessments were better, but not much, calling the CBP
acquisition moderately low-risk and the ICE program medium-
risk. It was quite clear during our review that the ICE program
was high-risk at that time.
Moving forward, Mr. Chairman, both programs need to
establish solid baselines so that Congress clearly knows what
we are spending and what exactly is being delivered when to
better support our CBP officers and ICE agents. Once these
decisions are made and approved, DHS needs to tighten program
management processes and executive-level governance practices
to deliver needed improvements and to keep these acquisitions
within their cost and schedule estimates.
This subcommittee's oversight will play a critical role in
ensuring that the new approaches are focused on what is most
needed, cost-justified, and delivered as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Barber, thank you for your
leadership on these critical acquisitions, and I would be
pleased to respond to questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
February 6, 2014
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-14-3M42T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Management Efficiency, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's border enforcement system, known as TECS, is the primary
system for determining admissibility of persons to the United States.
It is used to prevent terrorism, and provide border security and law
enforcement, case management, and intelligence functions for multiple
Federal, State, and local agencies. It has become increasingly
difficult and expensive to maintain and is unable to support new
mission requirements. In 2008, DHS began an effort to modernize the
system. It is being managed as two separate programs by CBP and ICE.
In December 2013, GAO reported that DHS needed to strengthen its
efforts to modernize these key enforcement systems. This statement
summarizes that report. Specifically, it covers: (1) The scope and
status of the two TECS Mod programs, (2) selected program management
practices for TECS Mod, (3) the extent to which DHS is executing
effective oversight and governance of the two TECS Mod programs, and
(4) the importance of addressing our recommendations for improving
DHS's development efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. In its
December 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS improve its efforts to
manage requirements and risk, as well as its governance of the TECS Mod
programs. DHS agreed with all but one of GAO's eight recommendations,
disagreeing with the recommendation about improving CBP's master
schedule. GAO continues to believe improvements are necessary to
validate schedule commitments and monitor progress.
border security.--dhs needs to strengthen its efforts to modernize key
enforcement systems
What GAO Found
The schedule and cost for the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) border enforcement system modernization program known as TECS Mod
that is managed by Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) continue to
change; while the part managed in parallel by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is undergoing major revisions to its scope, schedule,
and cost after discovering that its initial solution is not technically
viable. CBP's $724 million program intends to modernize the
functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move
it to DHS's data centers by 2016. To date, CBP has deployed
functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air and
sea ports of entry and, more recently, to land ports of entry in 2013.
However, CBP is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for
the second time in under a year. Further, CBP has not developed its
master schedule sufficiently to reliably manage work activities or
monitor program progress. These factors raise questions about the
certainty of CBP's remaining schedule commitments. Regarding ICE's $818
million TECS Mod program, it is redesigning and replanning its program,
having determined in June 2013 that its initial solution was not viable
and could not support ICE's needs. As a result, ICE largely halted
development and is now assessing design alternatives and is revising
its schedule and cost estimates. Program officials stated the revisions
will be complete in spring 2014. Until ICE completes the replanning
effort, it is unclear what functionality it will deliver, when it will
deliver it, or what it will cost to do so, thus putting it in jeopardy
of not completing the modernization by its 2015 deadline.
CBP and ICE have managed many risks in accordance with some leading
practices, but they have had mixed results in managing requirements for
their programs. In particular, neither program identified all known
risks, nor escalated them for timely management review. Further, CBP's
guidance reflects most leading practices for effectively managing
requirements, but important requirements development activities were
underway before such guidance was established. ICE, meanwhile, operated
without requirements management guidance for years, and its
requirements activities were mismanaged, resulting in testing failures
and delays. ICE issued requirements guidance in March 2013 that is
consistent with leading practices, but it has not yet been implemented.
DHS's governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS
Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices.
Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and
have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and tracked.
However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have affected
the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and timely
decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. Until these governance
bodies base their performance reviews on timely, complete, and accurate
data, they will be constrained in their ability to effectively provide
oversight.
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) border enforcement system, known as
TECS.\1\ TECS has been used since the 1980's for preventing terrorism,
providing border security and law enforcement, and sharing information
about people who are inadmissible or may pose a threat to the security
of the United States, and today still provides traveler processing and
screening, investigations, case management, and intelligence functions
for multiple Federal, State, and local agencies. Over time, however; it
has become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain because of
technology obsolescence and its inability to support new mission
requirements. DHS estimates that TECS's licensing and maintenance costs
are expected to be $40 million to $60 million per year in 2015.
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\1\ TECS was created as a system of the Customs Service, which was
then a component within the Department of the Treasury. The term TECS
initially was the abbreviation for the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System. When the Customs Service became part of DHS
under the Homeland Security Act, TECS became a DHS system, and
thereafter has simply been known as TECS.
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In 2008 the Department initiated TECS Modernization (TECS Mod) to
modernize existing system functionality, address known capability gaps,
and move the program's infrastructure to DHS's new data centers. TECS
Mod is managed as two separate programs working in parallel: U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) are each modernizing existing functionality specific
to their respective roles and missions within the Department. Both
programs had planned to be fully operational by September 2015.
In December 2013, we reported that DHS needed to strengthen its
efforts to modernize these key border enforcement systems.\2\ In that
report, we issued multiple recommendations aimed at improving DHS's
efforts to develop and implement its TECS Mod programs. My testimony
today will summarize the results of that report. Specifically, I will
cover: (1) The scope and status of the two TECS Mod programs, (2)
selected CBP and ICE program management practices for TECS Mod, (3) the
extent to which DHS is executing effective executive oversight and
governance of the two TECS Mod programs, and (4) the importance of
addressing our recommendations for improving DHS's development efforts.
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\2\ GAO, Border Security: DHS's Efforts to Modernize Key
Enforcement Systems Could be Strengthened, GAO-14-62 (Washington, DC:
Dec. 5, 2013).
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The work on which my testimony is based was conducted from December
2012 to December 2013. Further details on the scope and methodology for
the previously-issued report are available within that published
product. In addition, we analyzed recently-received documentation from
DHS on the status of the two TECS Mod programs. All work on which this
testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
TECS is an information technology (IT) and data management system
that supports DHS's core border enforcement mission. According to CBP,
it is one of the largest, most important law enforcement systems
currently in use, and is the primary system available to CBP officers
and agents from other departments for use in determining the
admissibility of persons wishing to enter the country. In addition, it
provides an investigative case management function for activities
carried out by ICE agents, including money-laundering tracking and
reporting; telephone data analysis; and intelligence reporting and
dissemination.
Over time, TECS has evolved into a multi-faceted computing platform
that CBP describes as a system of systems. This mainframe-based system
dates back to the 1980s and interfaces with over 80 other systems from
within DHS, other Federal departments and their component agencies, as
well as State, local, and foreign governments. It contains over 350
database tables, queries, and reports (e.g., querying law enforcement
records to determine if a traveler appears on a terrorist watch list),
and multiple applications (e.g., ICE's existing investigative case
management system). CBP agents and other users access TECS via
dedicated terminals. The system is managed by CBP's Office of Passenger
Systems Program Office and is currently hosted at CBP's data center.
On a daily basis, the system is used by over 70,000 users and
handles more than 2 million transactions--including the screening of
over 900,000 visitors and approximately 465,000 vehicles every day. In
addition, Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement
entities use TECS to create and disseminate alerts and other law
enforcement information about ``persons of interest.'' Ten Federal
departments and their numerous component agencies access the system to
perform a part of their missions.
The current TECS system uses obsolete technology, which combined
with expanding mission requirements, have posed operational challenges
for CBP and others. For example, users may need to access and navigate
among several different systems to investigate, resolve, and document
an encounter with a passenger. In addition, CBP identified that TECS's
search algorithms do not adequately match names from foreign alphabets.
TECS's obsolescence also makes it difficult and expensive to maintain
and support. Specifically, DHS estimates that TECS's licensing and
maintenance costs are expected to be $40 million to $60 million per
year in 2015.
In 2008, DHS initiated efforts to modernize TECS by replacing the
mainframe technology, developing new applications, and enhancing
existing applications to address expanding traveler screening mission
needs, improving data integration to provide enhanced search and case
management capabilities, and improving user interface and data access.
DHS's plan was to migrate away from the existing TECS mainframe by
September 2015 to avoid significantly escalating support costs. The
modernization effort is managed by two program offices--one at CBP and
the other at ICE--working in parallel, with each having assumed
responsibility for modernizing the parts of the system aligned with
their respective missions.
CBP expects that its modernization efforts will yield certain
improvements over the existing system, including the following.
Enhancements to TECS's search algorithms to better match
names from foreign alphabets; address gaps in current processes
that could result in missing a person of interest. This
includes an improved ability for inspectors to update
information on travelers at air and sea borders at the time of
encounter.
Improvements in the flow and integration of data between CBP
and its partner agencies and organizations. This is intended to
aid the agency's inspectors by providing timely, complete, and
accurate information about a traveler during the secondary
inspection process.
CBP planned to develop, deploy, and implement these capabilities
incrementally across five projects from 2008 to 2015.
Secondary Inspection.--This project is to support processing
of travelers referred from primary inspection for either
enforcement or administrative reasons. According to CBP, this
project's functionality was fully deployed to all air and sea
ports of entry in 2011, and was fully deployed to all land
ports of entry in 2013.
High Performance Primary Query and Manifest Processing.--
This project is intended to improve TECS data search results in
order to expedite the processing of manifests from individuals
traveling to the United States on commercial or private
aircraft, and commercial vessels. It is to be fully operational
by March 2015.
Travel Document and Encounter Data.--This project is
intended to improve CBP's ability to query and validate travel
documentation for both passengers and their means of
conveyance. It is to be fully operational by March 2015.
Lookout Record Data and Services.--This project is intended
to improve the efficiency of existing data screening and
analyses capabilities. It is to be fully operational by March
2015.
Primary Inspection Processes.--This project is intended to
modernize the overall inspection process and provide support
for additional or random screening and communication functions.
It is to be fully operational by March 2015.
As part of each of these projects, CBP is also developing an on-
line access portal, called TECS Portal, for authorized users to access
information remotely using a modern web browser, along with security
and infrastructure improvements, and the migration of data from the
current system to databases in the new environment at the DHS data
center. Ultimately, TECS Mod functionality is to be deployed to over
340 ports of entry across the United States.
ICE's TECS Mod effort is to focus on specific law enforcement and
criminal justice functions; tools to support ICE officers' collection
of information, data analysis, and management operations; enhanced
capabilities to access and create data linkages with information
resources from elsewhere in DHS and other law enforcement agencies; and
capabilities to better enable investigative and intelligence
operations, corresponding management activities, and information
sharing. Similar to CBP, ICE intended to deliver functionality in
multiple phases:
Phase 1: Core Case Management.--This phase was to encompass
all case management functions currently residing in the
existing TECS system. ICE planned to develop and deploy these
functions in three releases beginning in 2009, and was
scheduled to deploy Release 1 by December 2013, with additional
releases following about every 12 months, in order to achieve
independence from the existing TECS platform by September 2015.
Specific capabilities that were to be provided include:
Basic electronic case management functions, including
opening cases, performing supervisory review of cases, and
closing cases within the system;
Development of reports for use as evidentiary material in
court proceedings arising from ICE agents' investigations;
Maintenance of records relating to the subjects of ICE
investigations; and,
Audit capabilities to monitor system usage.
Phase 2: Comprehensive Case Management.--This phase was to
expand on the features delivered as part of Phase 1 and to be
delivered in four increments starting in 2016, with an
estimated completion date in fiscal year 2017.
DHS Oversight of Major IT Programs
DHS's Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Office
of the Under Secretary for Management are to play key roles in
overseeing major acquisition programs like TECS Mod. For example, the
CIO's responsibilities include setting Departmental IT policies,
processes, and standards; and ensuring that IT acquisitions comply with
DHS IT management processes, technical requirements, and approved
enterprise architecture, among other things. Within the Office of the
CIO, the Enterprise Business Management Office has been given primary
responsibility for ensuring that the Department's IT investments align
with its missions and objectives. As part of its responsibilities, this
office periodically assesses IT investments like TECS Mod to gauge how
well they are performing through a review of program risk, human
capital, cost and schedule, and requirements.
In October 2011, DHS's under secretary for management established
the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management. This office
is to ensure the effectiveness of the overall program execution
governance process and has the responsibility for developing and
maintaining DHS's Acquisition Management Directive.\3\ It is also
responsible for periodically providing independent assessments of major
investment programs--called Quarterly Program Accountability Reports--
as well as identifying emerging risks and issues that DHS needs to
address.
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\3\ The Acquisition Management Directive provides the overall
policy and structure for acquisition management within the Department
and is used in planning and executing acquisitions.
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In December 2011, DHS introduced a new initiative to improve and
streamline the Department's IT program governance. This initiative
established a tiered governance structure for program execution. Among
other things, this new structure includes a series of governance
bodies, each chartered with specific decision-making responsibilities
for each major investment. Among these are executive steering
committees, which serve as the primary decision-making authorities for
DHS's major acquisition programs. ICE chartered its steering committee
in September 2011 and it has been meeting since December of that year.
CBP established its steering committee in early 2013 and it held its
first meeting in February.
schedule and cost of both tecs modernization programs are unclear
CBP has begun delivering functionality to its users; however, its
schedule and cost commitments continue to change and are still being
revised. Specifically, CBP intends to modernize the functionality,
data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS's data
centers. CBP plans call for developing, deploying, and implementing
these capabilities in five distinct projects that are to be delivered
by 2015. To date, CBP has completed one of these five projects, having
completed its deployment of functionality to improve its secondary
inspection processes to air, sea, and land ports of entry in 2013. CBP
is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for the second time
in under a year, making it unclear when the program ultimately intends
to deliver needed functionality.
Exacerbating this situation is the fact that CBP has not developed
its master schedule sufficiently to effectively manage work activities
or monitor the program's progress.\4\ Specifically, the program has not
linked all the work activities in the individual project schedules, nor
has it defined dependencies that exist between projects in the master
schedule: Approximately 65 percent of CBP's remaining work activities
were not linked with other associated work activities. Thus, any delays
early in the schedule do not ``ripple'' (i.e., transmit delays) to
activities later in the schedule, meaning that management will be
challenged to determine how a slip in the completion date of a
particular task may affect the overall schedule. In our report, we also
noted that CBP had not yet developed a detailed schedule for
significant portions of the program. CBP reported in January 2014 that
it has now completed that work.
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\4\ Our research has identified, among other things, that a key
element associated with a complete and useful schedule or roadmap for
executing a program such as TECS Mod is to logically sequence all work
activities so that start and finish dates of future activities, as well
as key events based on the status of completed and in-progress
activities, can be reliably forecasted. See GAO, GAO Schedule
Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, Exposure Draft,
GAO-12-120G (Washington, DC: May 2012).
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Program officials stated these deficiencies existed because the
program has only two staff members with skills needed to properly
develop and maintain the schedules, and that fully documenting all the
dependencies would be time-consuming, and in their view, not
sufficiently important to warrant the additional resources necessary to
complete them. However, without a complete and integrated master
schedule that includes all program work activities and associated
dependencies, CBP is not in a position to accurately determine the
amount of time required to complete its TECS modernization effort and
develop realistic milestones.
The program's cost estimates have also changed as a result of
rebaselining and are also being revised. The program's baselined life-
cycle cost estimate \5\ was approximately $724 million, including $31
million for planning management, $212 million for development, and $481
million for operations and maintenance. As of August 2013, the program
reported that it had expended about $226 million. However, as
previously stated, the program is in the process of revising its
estimate, and thus, it is unclear how much it will cost to complete the
program. In January 2014, CBP reported that its revised estimates
should be approved internally and submitted to DHS for its approval by
the end of January 2014.
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\5\ This estimate is in the program's November 2012 acquisition
program baseline.
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Meanwhile, ICE is replanning its $818 million TECS Mod program,
having determined in June 2013 that the system under development was
not technically viable and could not support ICE's needs--this coming
after having already reduced the scope of its initial program
installment by about 70 percent due to protracted technical
difficulties and schedule delays. Specifically, ICE determined that,
after spending approximately $19 million, the system under development
could not be fielded as part of ICE's eventual solution due to on-going
technical difficulties with the user interface, access controls, and
case-related data management. Instead of continuing with the existing
technical solution, the program manager explained that ICE would scrap
a significant portion of the work done to date and start over. As a
result, ICE halted most development work in June 2013 and has since
been assessing different design and technical alternatives. In January
2014, ICE reported that it had rebaselined its program requirements and
that it anticipates having its revised cost and schedule estimates
finalized this coming spring. Nevertheless, given the time lost in
developing the current technical solution, as well as the already-
reduced program scope, ICE cannot say what specific features it will
release to users, when this functionality will be delivered, or how
much such efforts will cost. As such, ICE is at significant risk of not
achieving independence from the existing system by 2015.
tecs modernization's risk management is generally consistent with
leading practices, but requirements management has had mixed results
Both CBP and ICE implemented risk management practices that are
generally--though not fully--consistent with leading practices, and
both had mixed results in managing program requirements. Of four
leading practices associated with effective risk management, CBP and
ICE each fully implemented two (establishing documented risk management
processes and assigning roles and responsibilities for managing risks)
and partially implemented the other two (capturing all known risks and
managing risk mitigation efforts through to completion). Specifically,
neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated them for
timely review by senior management.
Further, of four leading practices for managing program
requirements, CBP fully implemented three (establishing a requirements
management process, assigning roles and responsibilities for
requirements development and management activities, and defining a
change control process) while partially implementing the one other
(eliciting user needs). However, CBP began executing key requirements
activities before such practices were established, and as a result, CBP
officials reported that some TECS Mod requirements were not as
consistently well-formed or detailed because their process during that
time lacked rigor. In ICE's case, management weaknesses and the lack of
appropriate guidance for the program's requirements management process
led to technical issues, testing failures, and ultimately, the deferral
and/or deletion of about 70 percent of the program's original
requirements. ICE issued new requirements guidance for the program in
March 2013 that is consistent with leading practices, but has yet to
demonstrate that these have been fully implemented.
dhs's governance bodies have taken actions aligned with leading
practices, but incomplete and inaccurate data have limited their
effectiveness
DHS's governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS
Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices.
Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and
have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and tracked.
However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have affected
the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and timely
decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. For example:
Steering committees.--In an April 2013 meeting, the CBP
program manager briefed the steering committee on its target
milestone dates; even though the agency told us a month later
that it had not fully defined its schedule, raising questions
about the completeness and accuracy of the proposed milestone
dates upon which the committee based its oversight decisions.
The Office of the CIO.--In its most recent program health
assessments, the Enterprise Business Management Office
partially based its rating of moderately low-risk on CBP's use
of earned value management; however, the program manager stated
to us that the CBP program is not utilizing earned value
management because neither it nor its development contractor
had the capability to do so. Similarly, even though ICE had not
reported recent cost or schedule data for its program--an issue
that may signal a significant problem--the Office of the CIO
rated ICE's program as medium-risk. The reliance on incomplete
and inaccurate data raises questions about the validity of the
risk ratings.
Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management.--In
the July 2013 Quarterly Program Accountability Report, DHS's
Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management rated both
TECS Mod programs as high-value with low risk. However, CBP's
low-risk rating was based in part on the quality of the
program's master schedule and acquisition program baseline;
however, as we stated earlier, problems with the agency's
schedule raise questions about the validity and quality of
those milestones. Further, the low-risk rating it issued for
ICE was based, in part, on its assessment of ICE's performance
between April and September 2012, which rated the program's
cost performance with the lowest possible risk score. Yet,
during that same time period, program documents show that ICE
TECS Mod's cost and schedule performance was declining and
varied significantly from its baseline. For example, program
documents show that, as of June 2012, ICE TECS Mod had
variances of 20 percent from its cost baseline and 13 percent
from its schedule baseline.
Moreover, the Quarterly Program Accountability Report is not issued
in a timely basis, and as such, is not an effective tool for
decision-makers. For example, the most recent report was
published on July 7, 2013, over 9 months after the reporting
period ended and therefore did not reflect that, since then,
ICE has experienced the issues with its technical solution
described earlier in this report. As discussed, these issues
have caused the program to halt development and replan its
entire acquisition. Consequently, the newly-issued report is
not reflective of ICE's current status, and thus is not an
effective tool for management's use in providing oversight.
Until these governance bodies base their reviews of performance on
timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be limited in their
ability to effectively provide oversight and to make timely decisions.
implementation of recommendations could improve dhs's efforts to
develop and implement its tecs mod programs
In our report, we made several recommendations to improve DHS's
efforts to develop and implement its TECS Mod programs. Specifically,
we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP
commissioner to: (1) Develop an integrated master schedule that
accurately reflects all of the program's work activities, as well as
the timing, sequencing, and dependencies between them; (2) ensure that
all significant risks associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are
documented in the program's risk and issue inventory--including
acquisition risks mentioned in our report--and are briefed to senior
management, as appropriate; (3) revise and implement the TECS Mod
program's risk management strategy and guidance to include clear
thresholds for when to escalate risks to senior management, and
implement as appropriate; and (4) revise and implement the TECS Mod
program's requirements management guidance to include the validation of
requirements to ensure that each is unique, unambiguous, and testable.
In January 2014, CBP provided documentation that it had taken steps to
begin addressing the second, third, and fourth recommendations.
We further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Acting Director of ICE to: (1) Ensure that all significant
risks associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are documented in the
program's risk and issue inventory--including the acquisition risks
mentioned in our report--and briefed to senior management, as
appropriate; (2) revise and implement the TECS Mod program's risk
management strategy and guidance to include clear thresholds for when
to escalate risks to senior management, and implement as appropriate;
and (3) ensure that the newly-developed requirements management
guidance and recently revised guidance for controlling changes to
requirements are fully implemented.
We also recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the under secretary for management and acting chief information officer
to ensure that data used by the Department's governance and oversight
bodies to assess the progress and performance of major IT acquisition
programs are complete, timely, and accurate.
DHS concurred with all but one of our recommendations, disagreeing
with the recommendation regarding the weaknesses in CBP's schedule. In
response, DHS stated that CBP's scheduling efforts for TECS Mod were
sound. However, given the weaknesses in CBP's master schedule, we
continue to believe that management will be unable to determine how a
slip in the completion date of a particular task may affect the overall
project or program schedule, and thus, absent any changes, continuing
to use it as a tool to track progress will remain ineffective.
In conclusion, after spending nearly a quarter billion dollars and
over 4 years on its two TECS Mod programs, it remains unclear when DHS
will deliver them and at what cost. While CBP's program has delivered
one of the five major projects that comprise the program, its
commitments are being revised again and the master schedule used by the
program to manage its work and monitor progress has not been fully
developed. Moreover, ICE's program has made little progress in
deploying its system, and is now completely overhauling its original
design and program commitments, placing the program in serious jeopardy
of not meeting the 2015 deadline and delaying system's deployment. The
importance of having updated cost and schedule estimates for both the
CBP and ICE programs cannot be understated, as this important
management information will provide Congress and DHS with visibility
into the performance of these vital border security investments.
Further, while both agencies have defined key practices for managing
risks and requirements, it is important that the programs fully
implement these critical practices to help ensure that they deliver the
functionally needed to meet mission requirements and minimize the
potential for additional costly rework. Finally, until DHS's governance
bodies are regularly provided complete and accurate data for use in
their performance monitoring and oversight duties, their decisions may
be flawed or of limited effectiveness.
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions at this time.
Mr. Duncan. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Powner.
We are going to pause, and I am going to recognize the
gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Barber, the Ranking Member, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Barber. Well, good morning. I apologize for being late.
All the streets get closed down, you know, when the President
is moving around. So I just came from the National Prayer
Breakfast and ran a little bit late, so I appreciate your
indulgence on that.
I want to thank the Chairman for convening this hearing on
a very important topic. We frequently talk here about the many
systems that are part of the infrastructure at DHS, and today
we are going to be talking about one that is critical and on
which myself and the Chairman wrote a letter last month
expressing our concerns about where we are.
Technology, infrastructure, and personnel are obviously
three key elements in securing our borders and ensuring the
safe and legal entry of people and goods into the United
States.
I can tell you, from my perspective as 1 of the 9 Members
from a Southwest Border district, that we have significant
problems in processing, expediting people coming into the
country, particularly at our ports of entry in Nogales, which
is a neighboring district, in my own district at the Douglas
port of entry, partly due to the lack of numbers of Customs
agents, but, also, I believe, due to the cumbersome nature of
the technology that is used by our personnel in DHS to process
people into the country.
Employees from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and ICE
utilize, as you know, many different types of technology to
carry out their mission. One of the largest IT systems
currently in use is TECS, which is the primary border
enforcement system supporting the screening of travelers
entering the United States.
As you also know, the use of TECS goes well beyond CBP and
ICE. It is currently used by over 20 Federal agencies,
resulting in over 70,000 users conducting more than 2,000
transactions each and every day.
According to the CBP, which maintains TECS, it is the
largest and most important law enforcement system currently in
use by the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agents. It
supports law enforcement lookouts, border screening, reporting
for CBP primary and secondary inspection processes, money-
laundering tracking, and reporting telephone and data analysis
and intelligence reporting and dissemination. In sum, TECS is a
vital asset to homeland security.
However, TECS is a legacy system that has been plagued with
problems based upon both the age of the system and the outdated
and, I would say, obsolete technology. As a result, the
Department of Homeland Security is in the process of
modernizing this 34-year-old border security tool through a
multi-billion-dollar project known as TECS Mod. Given the
importance of TECS and its widespread use throughout the law
enforcement community at every level, I support the
modernization and look forward to the day when it can actually
be used with speed, efficiency, and reduced likelihood of false
positives, which are also frequent.
Unfortunately, 4 years after beginning the TECS Mod, ICE is
not much closer to developing a solution than it was on Day 1.
Not only that, but CBP is still unable to determine its costs
or schedule with sufficient detail. Furthermore, DHS's
management of this project and the lack of stated requirements
have led to the waste of millions of dollars of scarce Homeland
Security funds--not very good stewardship of the taxpayers'
money.
This concerns me because, as Ranking Member of this
subcommittee, it is my responsibility, as it is all of our
responsibilities, to ensure that the Department is spending
taxpayer dollars efficiently and that its programs are actually
doing what they are supposed to do and are keeping southern
Arizonans and all Americans safe. Ultimately, the Department of
Homeland Security is at risk of spending an additional $45
million to $60 million per year to maintain the aging system
due to its outdated technology and exorbitant maintenance
costs.
CBP is the Nation's largest law enforcement entity, and its
thousands of law enforcement officials or agents across the
United States rely on this system. Yet they rely on it in order
to get their jobs done and keep us safe from harm, and it just
doesn't work very well.
Our Border Patrol agents and Customs officers and other
border security officials in the field are doing their part
every single day to keep our country safe and secure, and we
owe it to these front-line personnel to provide them with the
technological tools they need to carry out their mission.
At present, TECS Mod is being managed under the direction
of two separate program offices within DHS: ICE and CBP.
Although we have been advised that these offices coordinate--
and the initial decision may have made sense on paper, to
divide the mission--I am very concerned that this decision has
and will result in duplication, unnecessary costs, and uneven
results, which ultimately affect the end-user.
When you put two separate components in charge of the same
program, it is difficult to determine who should be held
accountable. When more than one person is in charge, then
essentially no one is in charge. This could lead to
jurisdiction conflict or, worse, the inability to track
accountability.
According to the GAO, the schedule and costs of both
programs are still unclear, making it much more difficult for
those who rely on TECS to do their jobs. CBP states that the
project will be completed in 2015, but the GAO report casts
doubt on that as a possibility. ICE cannot determine the date
because it has halted all work on TECS until an independent
contractor can determine the life-cycle costs and the necessary
requirements. As a result, the 2015 completion date is in
serious doubt.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the Department has work to do to turn
this effort around and put it on the right track. I look
forward to hearing both from CBP and ICE on how they plan to
move TECS Mod forward effectively and efficiently, including
how they will define key requirements and identify and manage
risks and accurately estimate the completion date for full
modernization. This is essential to our Nation and to the
mission of the Department.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Ron Barber
February 6, 2014
Technology, infrastructure, and personnel are three key elements to
securing our borders and ensuring the safe and legal entry of people
and goods into the United States.
Employees from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) utilize many different types
of technology to carry out their mission. One of the largest IT systems
currently in use is TECS, which is the primary border enforcement
system supporting the screening of travelers entering the United
States.
The use of TECS goes well beyond CBP and ICE. TECS is currently
accessed by over 20 Federal agencies; resulting in over 70,000 users
conducting more than 2,000 transactions each and every day. According
to CBP, which maintains TECS, it is the largest, most important law
enforcement system currently in use by Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agents.
It supports law enforcement ``lookouts,'' border screening,
reporting for CBP's primary and secondary inspection processes, money-
laundering tracking and reporting, telephone and data analysis, and
intelligence reporting and dissemination.
In sum, TECS is a vital asset to homeland security. However, TECS
is a legacy system that has been plagued with problems based on the age
of the system and its outdated technology.
As a result, the Department of Homeland Security is in the process
of modernizing this 34-year-old border security tool, through a multi-
billion dollar project known as TECS Mod.
Given the importance of TECS and its widespread use throughout the
law enforcement community at every level, I support its modernization
and look forward to the day when it can be used with speed, efficiency,
and a reduced likelihood of false positives.
Unfortunately, 4 years after the beginning of TECS Mod, ICE is not
much closer to developing a solution than it was on Day 1. Not only
that, but CBP is still unable to determine its costs or schedule with
sufficient detail.
Furthermore, DHS's management of this project and the lack of
stated requirements have led to the waste of millions of scarce
homeland security funds.
This concerns me because, as Ranking Member of this subcommittee,
it is my responsibility to ensure that the Department is spending
taxpayer dollars efficiently and that its programs are actually doing
what they were intended to do and are keeping Southern Arizonans safe.
Ultimately, the Department of Homeland Security is at risk of
spending an additional $45 to $60 million per year to maintain the
aging system due to its outdated technology and exorbitant maintenance
costs.
CBP, the Nation's largest law enforcement entity and its thousands
of law enforcement agents across the United States rely on this system.
They rely on it in order to do their jobs and keep us safe from harm.
Our Border Patrol agents and Customs officers and other border
security officials in the field are doing their part to keep our
country secure. We owe it to these front-line personnel to provide them
the technological tools they need to carry out their mission.
At present, TECS Mod is being managed under the direction of two
separate program offices--one at ICE and the other at CBP.
Although we have been advised that these offices coordinate and the
initial decision may have made sense ``on paper,'' I am concerned that
this decision will result in duplication, unnecessary costs, and uneven
results, which will ultimately affect the end-user.
When you put two separate components in charge of the same program,
it is difficult to determine who should be held accountable for its
results.
This could lead to jurisdiction conflict or worse, the inability to
track accountability.
According to GAO, the schedule and cost for both programs are
unclear, making it more difficult for those who rely on TECS to do
their jobs. CBP states that the project will be complete in 2015, but
GAO doubts that is possible.
ICE cannot determine a date because it has halted all work on TECS
until an independent contractor can determine the life-cycle costs and
the necessary requirements. As a result, the 2015 is in doubt.
In sum, the Department has work to do to turn this effort around
and put it on the right track. I look forward to hearing from both CBP
and ICE on how they plan to move TECS Mod forward, including how they
will define key requirements, identify and manage risks, and accurately
estimate a completion date for full modernization.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the Ranking Member.
We will go ahead and get back on track. I will recognize
Mr. Armstrong for his testimony for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. ARMSTRONG, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY, CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Armstrong. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking
Member Barber, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's efforts to modernize our
aging information technology systems. I appreciate the
subcommittee's leadership and your continued efforts to support
the security of the American people.
Today I will discuss efforts we are making at CBP to
continue effective delivery, within budget, of our TECS
Modernization program.
TECS is a vital border security system supporting the
vetting of travelers entering the United States who may be
inadmissible or may pose a threat. TECS provides for the
creation and query of lookout records and has more than 70,000
users from over 20 Federal agencies. Approximately 1 million
travelers a day are vetted through TECS when entering the
United States.
TECS is over 25 years old and uses data technology that is
difficult to enhance and expensive to maintain. As part of an
overarching strategy, TECS is migrating to a new enterprise
architecture that will provide a solid foundation for the
future, enhance capabilities, maintain high performance and
availability, and align with other DHS modernization
activities.
CBP began its TECS Mod effort in fiscal year 2008. TECS Mod
functionality is concurrently and incrementally developed and
deployed through five projects that focus on major functional
areas.
CBP's TECS Mod effort is led by a program management office
that has successfully delivered other high-profile border
security systems. I chair the CBP TECS Modernization Executive
Steering Committee, which provides program oversight and
monitors cost, schedule, performance, and risk-management
activities. The committee includes representation from CBP,
ICE, and DHS offices.
I also hold monthly program management reviews and regular
meetings with Mr. Michelli to provide additional oversight and
coordination of the TECS Modernization activities. CBP and ICE
program staffs meet frequently for detailed collaboration on
the program.
CBP TECS Modernization has delivered functionality in four
of the five projects. Secondary inspection has been fully
deployed to all ports of entry. Officers have better
information available to determine admissibility, spent less
time navigating multiple screens and more time focusing their
attention on the traveler.
CBP has also deployed a modernized query engine for Advance
Passenger Information and for primary at air and sea ports. The
modernized query provides a fast response to lookout record
queries, informing officers if a traveler is of interest to CBP
or other Federal agencies. TECS portal enhanced queries of
lookout records, cross-data, and travel documents.
Because of the budget uncertainty during fiscal year 2013,
the final TECS Modernization project primary inspection
process, PIP, was paused. As a result, the TECS Modernization
schedule was revised to restart the PIP in late second quarter
of 2014 and move the program completion date from the end of
fiscal year 2015 to mid-fiscal year 2016.
GAO's recent report contained four recommendations for CBP.
CBP concurred with and has already implemented three of the
recommendations concerning risk and requirements management.
CBP did not concur with GAO's recommendation on our schedule
process. I believe our established process has proven effective
and aligns with our continuing effort to move to agile
development.
The CBP TECS Modernization program has stayed within budget
since it began in 2008 and has made significant progress,
achieved many milestones, and the program is in good overall
health. Mr. Michelli and I are committed to the successful
delivery of the program.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles R. Armstrong
February 6, 2014
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
on behalf of the dedicated men and women of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) to discuss our efforts to modernize aging information
technology systems in support of our border security mission. We
appreciate the subcommittee's leadership and your continued efforts to
ensure the security of the American people.
As the unified border security agency of the United States, CBP is
responsible for securing our Nation's borders while facilitating the
flow of legitimate international travel and trade that is so vital to
our Nation's economy. Within this broad responsibility, our priority
mission remains to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States. Today, I will discuss efforts we are making
at CBP to continue effective delivery, within budget, of TECS
Modernization, one of our key border security systems to support the
missions of CBP, DHS, and other Federal law enforcement agencies.
background
TECS (no longer an acronym) is a key border enforcement system
supporting the vetting of travelers entering the United States and the
requirements of other Federal agencies used for law enforcement and
immigration benefit purposes. TECS supports the sharing of information
about people who are inadmissible or may pose a threat to the security
of the United States through the creation and query of ``lookout
records.'' TECS is used by more than 70,000 users, including users from
more than 20 Federal agencies that use TECS in furtherance of their
missions. TECS receives and processes traveler manifests from carriers
and supports primary and secondary inspections for almost a million
travelers and almost half a million vehicles at United States ports of
entry (POEs) each day. TECS not only collects and creates border
security information, but also shares that data with other systems and
agencies. TECS also provides access to National Criminal Information
Center (NCIC) and the International Justice and Public Safety Network
(Nlets), as appropriate. TECS provides security and privacy controls to
ensure users can only run transactions and access data to which they
are authorized. TECS also includes extensive auditing of user actions
for internal control purposes.
A typical ``TECS Check'' regarding a particular individual provides
authorized users information on:
Lookout records;
Entries into and exits from the United States;
Previous secondary inspections; and
NCIC wants and warrants.
Because TECS is over 25 years old and uses dated architecture and
technology that are difficult to enhance and expensive to maintain,
TECS is migrating to a new enterprise architecture that will provide a
solid foundation for the future, enable enhanced capabilities, maintain
high performance and availability, and align with other DHS
modernization activities. The program provides for highly-scalable
functionality that meets constantly-emerging user requirements.
The modernization of the legacy TECS system is being accomplished
through two separate but coordinated programs, one within CBP and the
other within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Each is
funded and being executed separately in support of each agency's
mission requirements. While both modernization programs remain focused
on continued support of each agency's unique mission, both programs
coordinate closely on common interests regarding planning, development,
and data migration efforts.
cbp's tecs mod program
CBP began its 8-year TECS Modernization or ``TECS Mod'' efforts in
fiscal year 2008. A specific challenge to CBP's modernization effort is
that modifications cannot interrupt existing TECS functionality or
availability. CBP's TECS system must be available to support border
crossing operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The need for high
availability requires redundant hardware and failover processes to
allow system maintenance with little or no interruption to end users of
the system.
CBP's TECS Mod program is transitioning functionality incrementally
with five projects, focusing on major functional areas to decrease risk
and to continue providing existing capabilities to the end-user until
modernization is complete. In addition to the five functional area
projects, CBP TECS Mod also includes two overarching efforts to address
infrastructure and security. The program includes migration of data
from the legacy source system to the target databases, developing
services for interfaces, and deploying a modernized web-based user
interface (portal) to support TECS on-line users, ensuring compliance
with security and privacy policies. The five functional area projects
are:
Secondary Inspection (SI).--This project supports processing
of travelers referred from primary inspection and creates a
modernized graphical user interface.
High Performance Primary Query and Manifest Processing
(HPPQ).--This project focuses on modernizing services and
functionalities essential for primary inspection (person/
vehicle) query functions. HPPQ also modernizes Advance
Passenger Information System (APIS) receipt and processing of
arriving and departing international traveler manifests.
Travel Document and Encounter Data (TDED).--This project
manages travel document data from the Department of State, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and State, Provincial,
and Tribal governments. TDED also modernizes the way encounter
data, which include person and vehicle crossing (entry/exit)
data, I-94 arrival/departure data, and Currency and Monetary
Instrument Report data, are made available for TECS on-line
users and primary and secondary inspections.
Lookout Record Data and Screening Services (LRDS).--This
project will modernize the creation, maintenance, and query of
lookout records for on-line users and interfaces with other
systems. LRDS will also provide TECS data query capabilities
and services to the law enforcement community via system-to-
system interfaces or services. Additionally, the LRDS project
will support current query capabilities for DHS component users
with authorization to access NCIC, Nlets, and criminal history
information.
Primary Inspection Processes (PIP).--This project will
modernize primary inspections (Air, Sea, and Land) user
interfaces, services and processes. PIP will also modernize
current Alternate Inspection (AI) processing which includes any
inspection that is not conducted at an air, sea, vehicle, or
pedestrian primary booth.
Program Governance and Oversight
The CBP TECS Modernization Executive Steering Committee (ESC)
provides oversight of the TECS modernization effort. As CBP's chief
information officer and Office of Information and Technology (OIT)
assistant commissioner, I chair the ESC, which includes members from
CBP offices; DHS's under secretary for science and technology, chief
information officer, and chief financial officer; representatives from
stakeholder groups; and ICE's TECS Mod program manager. The ESC, which
meets every 2 months, monitors the program's cost, schedule, and
performance, reviews risk management mitigation activities, and ensures
corrective actions are identified.
Additional oversight and governance of CBP's TECS Mod program is
provided by existing policies and guidance from DHS's Office of the
Chief Information Officer (OCIO), Office of the Under Secretary for
Management, and the director of operational test and evaluation. All
three offices play key roles in overseeing DHS's major acquisition
programs and are very involved with CBP TECS Mod. Further, DHS's Office
of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) works to ensure
the effectiveness of the overall program execution governance process
by providing independent assessments of major investment programs, and
by identifying emerging risks and issues that DHS and its components
need to address. I hold a monthly Program Management Review (PMR),
attended by OCIO and PARM representatives, which covers schedule, cost,
risks/issues, and other topics. In addition to these formal meetings,
Mr. Thomas Michelli, ICE's chief information officer, and I hold
regular meetings to coordinate TECS Mod activities, and our program
staffs meet frequently for detailed collaboration.
Program Management
CBP's TECS Mod effort is led by the TECS Mod Program Management
Office (PMO) within OIT's Passenger Systems Program Directorate (PSPD).
PSPD manages applications which support CBP's traveler vetting and
processing systems at U.S. ports of entry. It has successfully
delivered several high-profile border security systems, including
Trusted Traveler, Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA),
and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI).
Vital aspects of CBP TECS Mod's strong program governance and
program management are the risk and requirements management processes.
CBP TECS Mod's risk management processes include a strategy outlining
techniques and procedures for identifying sources of risks, and how to
categorize, analyze, and prioritize identified risks. Additionally,
each of CBP's five TECS Mod projects have a Government Project Manager
whose responsibilities include identifying, verifying, analyzing,
documenting, and tracking project risks, as well as communicating risk
issues to the TECS Mod Program Risk Manager.
CBP's TECS Mod requirements management process was revised and
improved in 2012, resulting in better organization, tracking, analysis,
and communication of program requirements. These practices include a
standardized plan to identify requirement types, such as operational,
functional, or technical, and to attribute mandatory and optional
traits for each requirement, such as source, date certified, and
status. Requirements are elicited at user sessions, supported by key
users identified by the CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) and
additional user communities within CBP, DHS, and/or partnering
Government agencies (PGAs). Once functionality is developed, it
undergoes rigorous developmental and user acceptance testing, followed
by independent operational testing to ensure that the functionality is
consistent with the approved requirements and satisfies user needs.
Program Schedule and Cost
The TECS Mod Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), the program's
guiding document, provides the program milestones for key schedule
events, including objective dates and threshold dates. The APB also
specifies program cost objectives and thresholds to ensure the program
stays within budget. The CBP TECS Mod program has stayed within budget
since it began in fiscal year 2008. The PMO collaborated with the DHS
Cost Center of Excellence in March 2012 to refine the Life Cycle Cost
Estimate (LCCE) to ensure risk sensitivity was addressed and to
validate the accuracy and approach of the LCCE. The LCCE has recently
been updated to reflect actual costs for fiscal year 2012 and fiscal
year 2013 as well as the impact of the pause of the PIP project. The
current LCCE is $692.557 million (threshold level) covering planning,
development, and maintenance costs from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal
year 2021.
The TECS Mod master schedule provides visibility into program and
project activities aligning with the APB. The schedule is reviewed and
maintained by the TECS Mod Project Schedule Manager. CBP TECS Mod is
continually improving and refining information in the schedule as a
result of project and program maturity. The detailed schedule is
reviewed biweekly and progress of major milestones is tracked. Despite
challenges such as the size, detail, and complexity of a schedule with
over 20,000 tasks, the current process allows the Program Manager to
monitor the APB milestones, decision gates, and major deliverables and
to ensure successful project management and delivery within planned
dates.
The CBP TECS Mod scheduling process has helped the program deliver
timely incremental functionality and stay on track for completion of
the total program. Because of fiscal year 2013 budget uncertainty and
sequestration, the CBP ESC decided to pause PIP, the last project under
TECS Mod. As a result, the CBP TECS Mod schedule was recently revised
to restart PIP late in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014 and to
move the program completion date from the end of fiscal year 2015 to
mid-fiscal year 2016. The APB has been updated with the revised
schedule and is currently going through the approval process within CBP
and DHS.
Program Performance
Some CBP TECS Mod functionalities have already been delivered, such
as the modernized Secondary Inspection application, which is being used
successfully at air, land, and sea ports of entry. The modernized High
Performance Primary Query Service was made operational in 2012 and is
now being used by the Advance Passenger Information System. In fiscal
year 2013, TECS Mod delivered additional functionality such as
implementing TECS portal, a web-based interface which will replace the
current terminal-only access, for the TDED and LRDS projects. The first
phase of this user-facing functionality includes lookout and travel
document queries. In fiscal year 2014, TECS Mod will deliver new
functionality such as enhancements to query and lookout applications.
CBP has made significant progress with our TECS Mod Program to
date, and we anticipate completion of program development and Full
Operational Capability (FOC) in mid-fiscal year 2016. While 6
milestones were not met early in the program, by incorporating
additional operational capabilities and adjusting to address technology
implementation challenges, we have met all other major milestones and
have been delivering modernized functionality incrementally as planned.
Program planning and execution can always be improved; however, CBP
TECS Mod has strong schedule, risk, and requirements management
practices in place, which have facilitated delivery of required
functionality on schedule and within budget. The PMO has grown in staff
and matured its management processes since the program began in 2008.
The CBP TECS Mod program has made significant progress, reached
many milestones, and the program is in good overall health. GAO report
GAO-14-62, DHS's Efforts to Modernize Key Enforcement Systems Could be
Strengthened, published December 5, 2013, contained four
recommendations for CBP's TECS Mod program. DHS and CBP concurred with
three of the recommendations and is in the process of resolving and
implementing these recommendations. Although CBP did not concur with
GAO's recommended changes to our schedule process based on the fact
that our established process has proven to be effective and efficient,
we will continue to refine and improve upon our current model.
conclusion
CBP is working hard to continue incrementally delivering TECS Mod
functionality and completing the program within budget by mid-fiscal
year 2016. We are continuing to improve the management of all our
programs by ensuring effective oversight, and by harnessing best
practices in how we run those diverse programs. These efforts enhance
CBP's multi-layered approach to vetting and identifying potential
travelers to the United States who may pose a threat to the homeland.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Michelli, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. MICHELLI, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Michelli. Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber,
Congressman O'Rourke, I thank you for the opportunity to
discuss ICE's efforts to improve TECS and the findings of GAO's
recently-released report.
We appreciate GAO's work conducting the review of TECS
Modernization, and we look forward to working with Mr. Powner
and GAO on this important program.
Today I would like to provide some background on ICE TECS
Mod and to outline the actions we have taken to manage our
program, as well as respond to GAO's findings and
recommendations.
As you have mentioned, TECS supports ICE's investigative
case management, including documenting subjects of criminal
investigation in the form of records and reports, which is the
basis for criminal prosecution. TECS Mod is a coordinated
initiative by ICE and CBP to replace the portions of legacy
TECS that align with our respective core missions.
ICE's goal is to relocate the system from an expensive
mainframe by the end of September 2015 by developing a
modernized and comprehensive investigative case management
system that will support the investigative mission of ICE's
Homeland Security investigations.
Subsequent to a full and open competition in 2011, ICE
awarded a best-value, cost-plus contract for a custom-developed
investigative case management system. Much work progressed
well, including programmatic management improvements,
requirements refinement, development and delivery of data
synchronization with the legacy system, interfaces to required
systems, and robust development in test environments.
What did not progress well was core case management design
and development. Many of the issues we identified causing this
lack of progress were subsequently included within the findings
in the GAO report. Our Government and contractor team worked
diligently to remedy these issues before, during, and following
the GAO study.
As we work to improve program performance, we apprise and
receive direction from the appropriate executive steering
committees, which included DHS, ICE, and CBP senior leadership.
We made program decisions based on business analysis of trade-
offs of cost, schedule, and performance consistent with our
overall goal to be off the legacy TECS mainframe by September
2015.
In June 2013, after a diligent effort to bring the core
case management development back on track, ICE concluded, in
collaboration with the vendor, that the core technical
architecture was insufficient. In an effort to independently
validate our concerns, ICE commissioned a brief independent
verification and validation analysis of the system's status and
viability, which confirmed that the existing technical
architecture was not viable.
Once ICE confirmed nonviability of the technical solution,
we acted immediately to change the direction of the program.
Based on the recommendation from the IV&V, a subsequent market
research assessment, as well as the conclusions reached in
conjunction with our governing bodies, ICE is pursuing
procurement of a commercial off-the-shelf, or COTS, -based
solution for investigative case management.
All indications based on recent market research are that we
will be able to procure, deploy, and successfully be off the
mainframe by September 2015, while also achieving lower life-
cycle costs.
GAO's findings related to ICE focused on two key
deficiencies: Risk management and requirements management. We
concur with all three recommendations offered by GAO to aid in
overcoming these deficiencies and have completed the
appropriate documentation and implemented processes and
procedures to fulfill these recommendations.
ICE initiated new status reporting methods based on leading
practices, providing management with a more immediate picture
of program progress. The program has overhauled its reporting
structure and established integrated project teams that report
status and coordinate dependencies weekly. We now track all
known risks, not just those considered significant. We have
revised our risk threshold to ensure risks are identified and
are properly raised to leadership in a timelier manner.
The program has also implemented a method to mitigate each
elevated risk over a period of time. Both the revised risk
threshold escalation and the method to mitigate risk have been
incorporated into Government oversight process and will be in
the scope of work for the new contracts for a future ICE TECS
Mod solution.
The ICE TECS Mod program has completed a detailed
evaluation and comprehensive analysis of our system
requirements. The program identified and eliminated overly
prescriptive, technically outdated, and redundant requirements.
This refinement resulted in a reduction in excess of 75 percent
of system requirements without compromising capability.
We have validated our new requirements baseline and
confirmed that they are in line with other Federal law
enforcement investigative case management programs. ICE has
established new guidelines related to requirement management
and established strict change control processes, which is
consistent with GAO's recommendation.
ICE remains committed to working in a coordinated effort
with DHS and CBP to remedy any issues that have arisen during
our modernization effort. We will continue to coordinate with
stakeholders as we move forward to rebaseline the program and
restart development work.
In closing, both Mr. Armstrong and I are committed to the
success of this program. Thank you again for the opportunity to
appear before you today, and I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Michelli follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas P. Michelli
February 6, 2014
introduction
Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Johnson and Acting Director
Sandweg, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
discuss efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to
improve TECS and the findings of a report released in December 2013 by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled ``DHS's Efforts to
Modernize Key Enforcement Systems Could Be Strengthened.''
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE appreciate
GAO's work conducting the review of TECS Modernization and issuing this
report, and I am grateful for the opportunity to provide background on
ICE TECS Modernization (ICE TECS MOD) and outline the actions we have
taken relating to GAO's findings and our continued collaboration with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to address the recommendations
offered by GAO.
history of tecs and modernization efforts
TECS is a mainframe system that is the primary system of both ICE
and CBP, initially developed in the 1980s. TECS was previously known as
the Treasury Enforcement Communications System when it was managed by
the former U.S. Customs Service (which previously encompassed portions
of both CBP and ICE functions). The system, which is currently managed
by CBP, supports primary and secondary inspection processes for CBP and
Federal agencies vetting for law enforcement and immigration benefits
purposes. TECS also supports ICE's investigative case management
including documenting subjects of criminal investigation in the form of
records and reports, forming the basis for criminal prosecutions. The
TECS modernization effort (TECS MOD) is a coordinated initiative by ICE
and CBP to replace our respective portions of legacy TECS.
Currently, our agencies are engaged in efforts to modernize the
system into products that fit both specific and mutual needs and to
migrate the legacy TECS system from the outdated CBP mainframe computer
system (ICE TECS MOD and CBP TECS MOD programs, respectively). ICE's
initial goal was to relocate the system from the prohibitively
expensive mainframe by September 30, 2015 by developing a comprehensive
law enforcement investigative case management system that will support
the investigative mission of ICE's Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) and its shared mission with CBP to protect the homeland.
Subsequent to the award of a best-value, cost-plus contract, ICE
concluded, in collaboration with the vendor, that the core technical
architecture was technically insufficient in June 2013. In an effort to
independently validate our concerns, ICE commissioned a brief
Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) analysis. ICE used the
IV&V to conduct an assessment of the system's status and viability.
Following an abbreviated examination, the IV&V confirmed that the
utilization of existing architecture would not be technically viable to
support system needs. The IV&V also indicated that there were
significant technical and management process deficiencies that would
make meeting the September 30, 2015 deadline highly improbable.
In consideration of the collective conclusions of ICE, the vendor,
and the IV&V, it was determined that the ICE TECS MOD program required
restructuring in order to ensure accountability and the ability to
address deficiencies in technical oversight and requirements
management. Accordingly, ICE restructured the program by increasing
executive oversight, establishing integrated project teams and
Government personnel accountability, identifying alternative technical
options, and began the process of identifying a new prime contractor.
prior and future funding
The ICE TECS Modernization Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) was
finalized on September 6, 2011, at $818 million for all acquisition and
sustainment costs, assuming a life cycle for the program extending to
2024. Prior to the award of the Design/Development contract in
September 2011, the program received $55.4 million in automation
modernization funding and expended $22 million in support of
requirements analysis, data migration, and acquisition activities.
Between fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, the program received
$36.9 million in automation modernization funding, expending $21.2
million on the Design/Development effort that was curtailed in July
2013, and expending $17.8 million on ancillary contracts including data
migration, training, and communications and program support. In fiscal
year 2014, the program's automation modernization budget is $23
million. In total, ICE TECS Modernization has received $115.3 million
in funding, and we have expended $63.9 million to date.
The program is in the process of revising its LCCE to be in line
with its future plans for the program, and anticipates the full LCCE to
be less than the original $818 million due in large part to an
increased use of commercial, off-the-shelf products (COTS) that will
require less custom development and on-going support. Once the revised
LCCE is complete, the program will be able to adjust future automation
modernization funding requests, and account for both funds received but
not expended, as well as lower anticipated costs.
gao's findings and ice's response and actions
According to GAO, its objective during its review was to determine
the scope and status of CBP's and ICE's TECS MOD programs, assess
selected program management practices for TECS MOD, and assess the
extent to which DHS is executing effective executive oversight and
governance of the two TECS MOD programs. In order to accomplish these
objectives, GAO reviewed requirement documents, as well as cost and
schedule estimates to determine the current scope, completion dates,
and life-cycle expenditures. In addition, GAO reviewed risk management
and requirement management plans, as well as the meeting minutes of the
governance bodies.
The report highlights that ICE's initial efforts were determined to
be ineffective, resulting in the need for the program to restart. It is
pivotal to note that ICE made the determination itself based on
identified risks, schedule slips, and poor quality of interim
deliverables, which ultimately led to the final determination that the
current technical solution would not be able to support the mission
needs of ICE. Based on this determination, ICE took steps to verify
this conclusion through an independent third party, as well as improve
management oversight. Once ICE confirmed non-viability of the technical
solution, we acted immediately to change the direction of the program.
Our action included an external evaluation, which predated the GAO
report. Upon receipt of this independent evaluation, ICE undertook
major course corrections that are in line with those ultimately
recommended by GAO.
GAO's findings highlighted the status of ICE's efforts to modernize
our portion of legacy TECS, focusing on two key deficiencies: Risk
management and requirements management. We concur with the three
recommendations offered by GAO for executive action directly linked to
ICE.
The following are highlights of ICE's responses and actions taken:
risk management
GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
acting ICE director to ensure that all significant risks associated
with the TECS MOD acquisition are documented in the program's risk and
issue inventory--including acquisition risks--and briefed to senior
management, as appropriate.
ICE initiated new status reporting methods based on leading
practices, providing management with a more immediate picture of
program progress. The program has overhauled its reporting structure
and established Integrated Project Teams that report status and
coordinate dependencies weekly.
In addition to the other programmatic risk changes, we also concur
and have adopted the GAO's recommendation to add and track all known
risks. For example, the ICE TECS MOD program has documented in the risk
inventory a new acquisition risk that accounts for the aggressive time
lines associated with the revised program strategy. This risk, as with
all identified risks, has been reviewed by the program's Risk Advisory
Board and elevated to ICE and DHS senior leadership.
GAO also recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the acting ICE director to ensure that the appropriate individuals
revise and implement the TECS MOD program's risk management strategy
and guidance to include clear thresholds for when to escalate risks to
senior management.
The ICE TECS MOD program currently has a set of conditions that
must be met for a risk to be elevated. We are revising our risk
threshold to ensure risks are identified and appropriately raised to
leadership in a timelier manner. The program is also identifying
detailed activities that will help to mitigate each elevated risk over
a period of time. Both the revised risk threshold escalation and the
method to mitigate risk are being incorporated into the Government
oversight process and will be in the scope of work for new contracts
for the future ICE TECS MOD solution.
requirements management
In addition, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the acting ICE director to ensure that the newly-
developed requirements management guidance and recently revised
guidance for controlling changes to requirements are fully implemented.
The ICE TECS MOD program has completed a detailed evaluation and a
comprehensive analysis of our functional requirements. The program
identified and eliminated overly prescriptive, technically outdated,
and redundant requirements. This refinement resulted in a reduction in
excess of 75 percent of functional requirements without compromising
capability. Additionally, the program has validated its new
requirements baseline against other Federal law enforcement
investigative case management programs. ICE has established new
guidelines related to requirement management and strict change control
processes, which is consistent with GAO's recommendation.
coordination with key stakeholders
Throughout this effort, we have been committed to open and
consistent communication with the DHS Office of the Under Secretary for
Management. As it became apparent that the technical solution under
development would not support the objectives of the program, ICE
increased the frequency of its meetings with DHS to provide more
regular and timely reporting of program issues and proposed
resolutions. Additionally, ICE notified DHS after learning the program
would not meet the revised baseline date of December 2013. The program
is currently working with DHS's Office of Program Accountability and
Risk Management to establish a new revised program baseline. This
baseline will be formally reviewed and approved by DHS per the
Acquisition Decision-102 guidance, before the program can restart
development.
In a similar manner, we have maintained on-going collaboration and
coordination with CBP, our key mission partner. CBP serves as a voting
member on the ICE Executive Steering Committee (ESC), which is
responsible for oversight of the ICE TECS Modernization effort, and ICE
serves as a voting member on the corresponding CBP ESC. In addition,
both ICE and CBP participate as partners through the coordination of
delivery schedules, technical solutions, and risk/issue resolution. We
recognize that close coordination is vital to the joint success of both
programs, and will continue to take the steps necessary to maintain
that coordination going forward.
conclusion
ICE remains committed to working in a coordinated effort with DHS
and CBP to remedy any issues that have arisen during our modernization
efforts. The ICE TECS MOD effort has taken a variety of steps to ensure
that the program not only stays on track, but that there is careful
oversight of the acquisition and development process while utilizing
independent authorities to assist with validation of our collective
efforts. ICE will continue to coordinate with stakeholders as we move
forward with efforts to re-baseline the program and restart development
work to become independent of the costly legacy system as soon as a
viable modernized system can be deployed.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission. I
would be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, gentlemen, for your opening
statements.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
Let me just say, I will reiterate what I said earlier. I
understand the immense challenge of the number of vehicles and
persons entering the country every day. I probably don't
understand it as much as the gentlemen from El Paso or Arizona
do, but I do comprehend that we need to facilitate the flow of
commerce and activity across the border in these border
communities like El Paso. I will leave those comments for my
friend from Texas.
But when I think about it from a private-sector standpoint
and I look at the fact that we just spent $60 million in
taxpayer funds--taxpayer dollars, taken from hardworking
Americans that work hard to earn that money, taken from them
through taxation--and we spent that over a 4-year period of
time, and I don't know that we are far enough down the road to
where we need to be.
I am not going to say that 100 percent of that $60 million
was wasted, because you learned from those efforts, you
actually built a platform that you can take the next step from,
so I am not saying that at all. But I am concerned, because I
know in the private sector there are not many firms, if any,
that could invest that kind of money for very little result. I
don't know many private-sector firms that actually would. They
would hold someone accountable in year 1, year 2, and probably
a lot quicker.
So it seems that the requirements process broke down within
both CBP and ICE regarding the TECS program. Given the
requirements process has been a problem in past DHS failures,
and I point specifically to SBInet, explain to me why CBP and
ICE weren't able to get this right this time. You know, what
were some of the obstacles that, after spending $6 million, you
say, you know, we are going to have to start over?
I will address that first off to Mr. Armstrong, and then I
will come back to the GAO. I want to hear your take on it.
Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Armstrong. Well, first off, I mean----
Mr. Duncan. Microphone. There you go.
Mr. Armstrong. First off, you know, I don't believe we had
any complete failures in our requirements process. Our
requirements process did have some challenges that could have
been better, but I will say that one of the lessons learned,
you know, since you asked, I mean, one of the lessons learned
we have picked up from other programs is we are trying to move
to more of an iterative process where we are prototyping
functionality and not doing a big, monolithic build of
functionality before we deploy something.
So our officers and agents actually get to see the
functionality early on before we spend a lot of money to go
then build it. Then, after we build it, then we go out to some
test ports, and then we prototype that in the actual live
environment. That gives the officers and agents an opportunity
to work with the system and gives our program office an
opportunity to make sure that we have the requirements right
before we fully deploy the system.
So we iterate back through that; we roll that back into
sub-releases. Then, once that is in a, kind-of, final stage, it
goes through a control gate, where then the user signs off on
it and we start to deploy that out to more locations.
So I think that those are the big lessons learned that we
got out of other programs. I feel like we are on track.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that.
Before I come to the GAO, it just hit me that, you know, in
the private sector, there is a finite amount of money that a
company has to spend. Sometimes that is money that they have
saved over the course of business practices for a number of
years, anticipating the need for further investment, regardless
of whether it is IT or capital improvements or whatnot, or they
borrow money, or they raise money through stock initiatives,
but it is still a finite amount.
But it seems to me, when we see where we are with this kind
of money being spent, that elements within the Government don't
believe there is a finite amount, they believe that there is an
unlimited supply. You know, we are $17.5 trillion in debt
because we have had that mentality in this Nation that we can
just continue spending without the kind of accountability that
you would see in the private sector.
So, Mr. Powner, the GAO has looked at this. That is your
responsibility. How can we be better stewards of taxpayer
dollars, and how can we ensure that these agencies actually
don't wait till 4 years out, that they actually have more
checks and balances going forward?
Mr. Barber mentioned the two different groups' almost
duplicative efforts and how you have accountability with that.
So I would love for you to speak to that, if you will.
Mr. Powner. So, a couple points, starting with
requirements.
I think from a requirements perspective, both programs, I
would say they have fairly solid requirements management
processes in place now. Those were put in place late. I think
it was most evident in the ICE program. I mean, Mr. Michelli's
comments about the requirements resulting in a 75 percent
reduction in requirements, that is a big change. I am glad that
we are getting it together now, but a lot of this is coming too
late.
The other thing that I would like to mention in addition to
the program management on requirements and the risk that we
need to do a better job at, not just here at DHS but in a the
lot of pockets of the Federal Government, is executive
leadership. These executive steering committees that were put
in place, chaired by both these individuals, are now in place,
and I think they are working more effectively now. But it sure
would have been nice to have those in place sooner.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
My staff just reminded me, you know, I am talking about $60
million, but CBP has spent a quarter of a billion dollars since
2008, and the only project fully completed is secondary
inspection. You have a long ways to go. That is a heck of a lot
of taxpayer dollars that were spent--a quarter of a billion
dollars.
I am going to stop because I need to let my blood pressure
calm down a little bit as we move forward, and I am going to
recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Barber. The Chairman is passing his blood pressure
problem along to me. Very good. I appreciate it.
I, too, am worried and concerned, as the Chairman is.
Let me start, Mr. Armstrong, by asking you this question.
Last month, on January 10 to be precise, the Chairman and I
wrote a letter to the under secretary for management, Mr.
Borras, expressing our concern over CBP's decision to take
corrective action on the procurement efforts for the TECS Mod
and asking for an update on when the final request for
proposals will be complete.
The contract, as you may know, is currently operating on a
series of 3-month extensions. Such short-term contracting, I
think without question, has created uncertainty among those
individuals who are responsible for the TECS Mod update.
To my knowledge, my office--and perhaps the Chairman has,
but I don't know that he has, because I think we would both
receive the response at the same time--we have not yet received
a response from the Department. It has been almost 30 days.
So, two questions: No. 1, when can we expect the office to
respond to our inquiry? How is DHS providing direction and
clarity to stakeholders throughout the TECS Mod process,
including any decision to recompete the TECS Mod contract?
Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Armstrong. First of all, I don't control the
Departmental clearance process. So, I mean, we are prepared to
give them--I mean, we have the information that they would need
to respond to you. That would need to be cleared by the
Department.
We would be more than happy to come up and do a, kind-of,
closed-door briefing on the acquisition. But since a lot of
that is procurement-sensitive, I really don't feel comfortable,
kind-of, commenting on all that here today. But more than happy
to come back with our contracting officers and go through,
kind-of, where we are on the acquisition for you.
Mr. Barber. Certainly. Contact my office as soon as you
can, and we will arrange for that meeting.
Could you, within the Department, ask of the people you
have to deal with on the clearance process when we might expect
an answer to the questions that we phrased?
Let me next move to some questions for Mr. Powner.
You know, I have only been on this committee for a year-
and-a-half, and one of the things that I think troubles me a
lot is how many GAO reports we get regarding DHS. Perhaps other
agencies get as many, but I have a feeling we are a little bit
on the high end here.
So, as you know, Mr. Powner, TECS is used by CBP and ICE,
of course, and it is also used by over 20 other Federal
agencies, as I have mentioned in my opening remarks, including
FBI; Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and the Terrorist
Screening Center; as well as Departments of State and Treasury.
These are accessing TECS on a daily basis.
When you looked at the TECS Mod process, Mr. Powner, did it
reveal to you the level of consultation that DHS had or the
interactions it had with other users of the TECS from other
Federal agencies to get their feedback on suggested
requirements?
I mean, critical, I think, in any development of any
system, new system or revised system, that the end-user have
some input on the process and what they expect to get out of
the end product. Could you tell us what you found in your
inquiries, if you looked at this?
Mr. Powner. Well, when you look at the requirements-setting
process, I mean, clearly, you know, when they put a system in
place, the primary user is DHS, but that process does touch
with the other stakeholders in the program and the other
departments and agencies. I mentioned in my opening statement
10 departments use this system.
So that is part of the process. It is important as part of
the process going forward that when we validate these new
requirements, as these programs are being rebaselined, that we
continue to get feedback from those stakeholders. I assume--
like Mr. Michelli talked about, discover the requirements--I
assume there was a process to vet that with some external
stakeholders.
Mr. Barber. Well, perhaps, Mr. Michelli, you could comment
on that in terms of consultation with other departments. Can
you tell us to what extent that was done as you are moving
forward?
Mr. Michelli. Congressman, I don't know for sure what the
extent was, and I can get back to you on that. I do know that
we have an entity within ICE that conducts information-sharing
requirements generation with other entities, and I will find
out what they have done.
Mr. Barber. I am running out of time, but, Mr. Chairman, if
you can indulge me a few more seconds here. Just two quick
questions for Mr. Armstrong.
Basically the same question that I just asked of Mr.
Michelli and Mr. Powner, but in a different context. Again,
when the end-user is consulted in any IT project, you get a
better outcome. Unfortunately, all too often, they are not
considered.
So can you tell us, were CBP officers and agents involved
in the development and setting of requirements for TECS Mod?
Mr. Armstrong. Sir, they were absolutely involved. We have
a requirements board that worked with our officers and agents
and worked with other stakeholders throughout the Federal
Government. I can tell you that even in our first deliveries of
secondary processing, we got feedback from other agencies
complimenting us on the efficiency by which the system worked.
So, absolutely. We have been doing this for a long time
with other agencies. We have a lot of experience in doing
requirements management with other agencies. So we believe that
it is working efficiently.
Mr. Barber. My last question to you, Mr. Armstrong, has to
do with something I mentioned earlier, and that is the delays
that people have coming into our country for legal commerce,
tourism, produce, products from Mexico and all the rest. The
lines that are waiting at the ports of entry, particularly in
my district and the adjoining district, sometimes can be 2,
2\1/2\ hours. This directly speaks to the economic issue that
my State and the country faces; when we could expedite trade,
we get economic development and growth.
I want to ask you if you can comment on to what extent you
think the TECS system, which is cumbersome and obsolete, has
impacted on these delays. I know we have a problem with the
number of agents we need, but is TECS a part of the problem, do
you think?
Mr. Armstrong. Well, I would say the biggest issue in terms
of TECS and wait times at the border has been the stability of
the old system. So the new system is going to allow for a lot
more redundancy within the system, and it will reduce the
amount of outages we have to take for maintenance.
So I think, coupled together, the availability is going to
go up. That is certainly the platform that we put together. It
will also reduce those outages, those planned outages that we
normally take at least once a month. So I believe it will
improve things.
Then, also, kind-of parallel to this, you know that we have
been moving to other technologies at the ports that will help
expedite especially the pedestrian traffic, so things like
ready lanes and allowing more self-service in those areas. The
new system, I believe, will allow us to avail ourselves of some
of these technologies as they become available much quicker
than the old mainframe system.
So, as our officers continue to work on process
improvement, looking at throughput in the ports not just from
the physical standpoint but also from the time it takes to get
people through primary and/or through secondary, I believe the
new system will definitely expedite that processing downstream.
Mr. Barber. Well, thank you, Mr. Armstrong.
Mr. Chairman, before I yield, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, who is a Member
of the full committee and Ranking Member of the Border
Subcommittee, be allowed to join the panel and ask questions
when time is allowed.
Mr. Duncan. Without objection, so ordered.
The Chairman will now recognize Mr. O'Rourke for 5 minutes.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend you for your focus on issues of
accountability, especially when it comes to purchasing and
contracting within DHS. I feel that, when it comes to
technology solutions, we can become enamored of quick fixes,
blinded by the difficulty of understanding the specifics
involved. When we have the kind of blunders that it seems that
the GAO has uncovered here, the boondoggles like SBInet that
you pointed to, as a whole, as a body, Congress, I think,
oftentimes turns a blind eye. So I really appreciate the focus,
the attention, and the drive for accountability.
I also want to refer to the numbers that you gave us: A
quarter of a billion dollars for CBP's five-step program, only
one of which, one of those steps, has been achieved. You
mentioned $60 million earlier; $20 million on the Raytheon
mistake with the TECS Mod where we are cutting 75 percent--or
70 percent of the requirements, had delays of nearly a year,
and are having to redesign from the beginning the whole
process.
You compare those numbers to $140,000, which is what it
costs to fully train, hire, and move a CBP officer to where he
will be employed. That officer will contribute nearly $2
million to the economy, will help create 22 additional jobs in
the U.S. economy throughout every State in the Union.
So, while I certainly understand, as Mr. Armstrong said,
the time savings that we might be able to see if we can
successfully implement some of these technology initiatives,
and I certainly want us to do that, I also think that we have
some much lower-hanging fruit, including spending and deploying
those assets much more wisely.
I would start with our human assets, those CBP officers,
who have some of the most dangerous, difficult, and most
critically important jobs when it comes to our economy, the
safety and security of our country. I would urge CBP and DHS to
focus more attention on that.
To Mr. Powner, you mentioned SBInet, which really seemed
like a contractors-gone-wild episode, where Boeing is designing
the scope of the project, they are responsible for defining the
milestones and the measurements, and we saw, you know, hundreds
of millions of dollars later, that we had a system that we
could not use, that was a waste of taxpayer money, and that we
had to scrap completely.
We looked at the Raytheon TECS Mod project, begun in
September 2011: A delay of 7 months, 70 percent of the
requirements were removed from the project, and $20 million
later, it sounds like we are starting over again.
Do we have--and you mentioned a deficiency in your opening
statement of core case management and development. Is there
some kind of brain drain within the Federal Government that
does not allow us to properly manage these projects? Should we
be doing more of this in-house and not allowing the Boeings and
the Raytheons of the world to design these projects, and should
we be doing more of that work in-house? Then, when it comes to
actually implementing, programming, testing, holding to account
those who are working on this, should we be doing more of that
in-house, as well?
Mr. Powner. Well, there are very few pockets in the Federal
Government that can do a lot of this, in terms of the
development. There are limited pockets. I will give you IRS as
one example; they have pockets where they do their own
development. But we contract this out.
I think the key is, there are responsibilities that the
Government has and responsibilities that the contractors have.
In the requirements-setting process, let's start with that,
that is the responsibility of the Federal Government to define
what we want. Too often with a lot of these programs, you are
absolutely right, Representative O'Rourke, that we have
contractors get involved in defining how we are going to do
things, so that we need a real clear line of delineation there.
I think these two gentlemen are getting--that is actually
improving with both these programs. That is very important.
Then, once we get those contracts in place, the contractor
oversight that needs to occur needs to be rigorous. We need to
know what is being delivered in terms of productivity and
quality. A lot of these programs, when you go in and you ask,
is the contractor delivering, how is the quality and
productivity, we don't get the right answers from the
Government when we look at it. That is why I would say these
executive steering committees are very important in ensuring
that we have the appropriate contractor oversight and we are
holding contractors' feet to the fire.
I would say, on both these programs, in addition to our
recommendations, one very important thing is we are in the
process of putting contractors in place on both programs. I
believe the ICE program has an award date for this summer, and
I believe that is the same with CBP. It is very important that
we get those contractors in place, the right contractors, as
soon as we possibly can so that we can make progress.
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Michelli have done a
good job of walking us and taking us through process
improvements, oversight committees, means by which we are
sharing information across silos. But given SBInet, given what
we have just described from the Members of the committee and
what we read in the GAO report, what is going to give me
confidence in terms of the human resources that we have within
DHS, that we are not going to have a repeat of these problems
going forward?
In other words, do we have the right structure, the right
line of accountability within DHS to ensure that we don't have
this again, either within ICE or CBP or some other aspect of
DHS?
I am out of time, so I will ask Mr. Armstrong and Mr.
Michelli to just very quickly address that question.
Mr. Armstrong. Well, you know, I would say, at the current
staffing level, I feel confident that we can provide the
correct oversight on the program.
I think what concerns me and part of why I am still here in
the Government is, you know, the budget issues that are going
on today across the Government and the desire to, kind-of,
start to downsize some of these mission support areas in order
to save money. So what I can't speak to is what is going to
happen in the following years, in terms of staffing and our
ability to replace people as they retire and go on to other
things in their life.
I will tell you that a large part of my staff, more than I
would like, is retirement-eligible. They stick around because
they enjoy the work that they do and they feel like the value
they deliver to those front-line officers is very important to
them. But that is going to soon come to an end because they
can't stay around forever.
So our ability to attract and bring new talent into the
Government to be able to pick up with the new technologies
greatly concerns me.
Mr. O'Rourke. You know, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence,
point well-taken that, when we have the sequester, when we have
Government shutdowns, we are not allocating resources wisely.
It affects you and your ability to retain the best and
brightest within your organizations.
But I will also note that, since 1986, we have seen a 1,400
percent increase in spending on border security solutions. So
when we look at SBInet, when we look at TECS Mod, when we look
at a potential biometric exit system, I understand that we need
to resource appropriately from the Congressional level, but, at
the same time, you have unparalleled, unprecedented resources
at your disposal today.
Maybe what we are both saying is that more of that could be
spent on our human resources, on the talent that we have there,
recruiting and retaining, and less on flashy new ideas like
SBInet, like a biometric exit system, when our greatest single
asset is the people who protect our borders, serve the trade
and the crossers coming across, and potentially design and
oversee these systems that we are talking about.
Mr. Michelli, any thoughts on that?
Mr. Michelli. Yes. In ICE, after day-to-day mission,
cybersecurity, and public officer safety, ICE TECS Mod is the
No. 1 priority. We are putting our best and brightest on TECS
Mod.
When we did the requirements refinement in our ESC, which
has an HSI, Homeland Security Investigator chair, realized that
we could use additional help, he has put his best and brightest
on the project, as well.
I do have concerns as we progress into a commercial off-
the-shelf program that we have the right technical skills for
oversight for that. So, as part of the contract action, we have
gone out with an FFRDC to get that expertise in-house so we
will have that technical oversight.
So I believe we are staged to have the right human skills,
both on the technical side and on the mission side, to have
success.
Mr. O'Rourke. I hope so. We need to make sure that that is
the case.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. Great questioning.
Before I recognize the gentlelady from Texas, I had looked
up some comparison numbers of a system known as Iron Dome
deployed by Israel, very effectively I may add, a system that
was developed from drawing board to combat-readiness in less
than 4 years, a system that is effective at shooting down an
airborne rocket traveling at a very high rate of speed, for the
cost of $210 million. Rafael corporation did that.
So, you know, the reason I say that is, we have put this in
context, with the amount of money we are spending and what we
are spending the money on--it is not hardware; to some degree,
it is a software and hardware blend, I understand that--but
what one group of people were able to do in less than 4 years
for a lot less money than the numbers we are talking about
today.
So, with that, I will recognize the gentlelady from Texas,
Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman, Mr. Duncan, and
Mr. Barber, the Ranking Member, for their courtesies for
allowing me, as a Member of the full committee, to sit on this
committee.
Let me thank the witnesses very much for their service.
Allow me just to make two points before I offer some
questions that I think we all are concerned about--the
operations of a very, very, very important agency.
I first want to say that I am very grateful for the
breakthrough that we have heard over the last couple of weeks,
or last week, regarding our Republican friends in the United
States Congress on the idea of comprehensive immigration reform
and their own principles that have been enunciated, and to
thank them for that.
One of the key elements, which I want to put on record,
where there is not a divide is the idea of border security.
This hearing obviously plays a very large role, I believe, in
the moving forward of comprehensive immigration reform.
We truly believe here on the Homeland Security that we have
crafted a thoughtful legislative framework in H.R. 1417 that
may avoid prospectively some of the defaults of this TECS Mod
program. H.R. 1417 thoughtfully lays out a roadmap, seeks the
input of the Department of Homeland Security ahead of the
strategies being articulated, and soundly commits to the
security of the Northern Border, which I always want to
mention, and the Southern Border.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, I think the oversight
work that you are doing complements where we need to be if we
move forward as Republicans and Democrats on what I hope will
be not listening to the naysayers who are countering my
optimism that we will reach a point where we have an effective
construct. With that in mind, we will need the kind of
technological forceful structure that works because that is
part of the compliment of H.R. 1417.
The last statement I want to make is that I hope that we
can work out CBP--this is on the record--the issues with how
CBP officers are dealing with overtime. We recognize that there
are some unfortunate incidences that have occurred, but I
support them. I would like to see their overtime reinstated or
a process reinstated for them to be fairly compensated for both
their work and their sacrifice, along with ICE and others.
I want to quickly move to Mr. Powner and indicate if I
could what can you give us, give the committee an effective,
efficient, and modernized tech system, what if you could just
concisely throw out what it would be? I know you gave us a
number of suggestions, and unfortunately, it looks as if they
were not followed. Then would you also suggest how it would be
managed? Can it effectively be managed with multiple partners
or multiple leaders? I will just pose that question to you. I
will quickly go to Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Michelli, if you can
be prepared to tell me what you actually got out of the $60
million in 4 years program that was halted.
Mr. Powner, can you answer what would be an efficient tech
system?
Mr. Powner. So, first, when you look at the process for
delivering the tech system, I think the requirements are
getting laid out in increments. I will reiterate the importance
of having strong program management, risk and requirements and
having the executive-level governance. I will add this. When we
look at successful IT acquisitions, they go small increments.
When we try to go big, we have failures time and time again. We
always have these failures, and what happens to fix it? We go
with smaller increments, so I think the more we can go with
small increments and even smaller increments going forward,
that is what will be very successful going forward.
Ms. Jackson Lee. When you say ``executive,'' what do you
mean by that?
Mr. Powner. Having the right executive-level oversight.
What I mean by that is when something fails, we typically point
at the poor program manager and blame the program manager when,
in fact, it needs to be executives who own the project.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How far up do you go when you say
executive? Secretary of Homeland Security?
Mr. Powner. Well, clearly, these guys run the executive
steering committee, so they're key players. But then it ought
to go up the CIO of the Department, and it ought to go up to
the under secretary for management, clearly, if this is an
important project for the Department.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think these are important instructions.
Can I quickly ask you to ask us, just you, did we gain anything
from the present system that we had?
Mr. Powner. We sure did. I mean, if you look at what CBP,
with the secondary inspections, clearly there was value in--
delivered with that. We had $225 million spent on that piece,
so there was some value derived there.
To Chairman Duncan's comment about $64 million spent, you
are right; we did learn a little bit, but there was some money
wasted there, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. To the two gentlemen who, agents or groups
who were the co-managers, I guess, of this, what did your boots
on the ground, what did you think your particular entity, CBP
and ICE, gain from the present program that was halted, and how
can you learn going forward?
Mr. Armstrong. Well, certainly, as Mr. Powner said, our
officers have gained greatly from the secondary inspection
consolidation because that allowed us to reduce the number of
lookups and screens they had to go to and gave them more
opportunity to focus on the person in front of them and less
time toggling through screens.
It also, and certainly in an airport environment, where
there may be different parts of secondary located physically
separate, it allowed for kind-of a consolidated view from the
different officers within secondary so they would all know
exactly what the status was of that particular traveler and
anything that they may be bringing in with them.
Also, I do want to point out that we have delivery in our
high-performance primary query that was not completed at the
time of this report, but that is now up and running. That
brings together a lot of our queries, and we're running that in
parallel with our old system. The big advantage there is once
we get that fully deployed, that gets what we call rapid
response out to all of our officers. Rapid response does a lot
more criminal history checks than what the old tech system did.
So just to highlight, we have gotten significant value so far.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me, I
would ask Mr. Michelli to give me the same answer. If he might
just respond, what is the name of that the system, Mr.
Armstrong, that you just spoke of, what is that operating under
right now?
Mr. Armstrong. It is one of the five projects that was
delivered as part of TECS Modernization, and it is our high-
performance primary query.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That one is operating?
Mr. Armstrong. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And is still under funding; is that what
you are telling me? It is still being funded?
Mr. Armstrong. Yes. It is part of the $240 million.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Michelli.
Mr. Michelli. Congresswoman, we have programmatic
management improvements, requirements refinement, development
and delivery of data synchronization with the legacy system, in
other words a new database, interfaces to required systems. We
have our development and test environments. This may not seem
like a lot, but it actually is. This is equivalent to if you
are building a skyscraper, the foundation. It is something that
most people don't see, but it is very fundamental for any new
system. We have that in hand. What we don't have is the first
floor.
So, of the $60 million that we spent, about $20 million was
for co-development. We made the decision, after receiving at
least one, that it was not a sustainable solution, and we had
to look at other alternatives.
So what we did learn from that is when we went out to do
the market research, that the market has changed and that there
are commercial off-the-shelf programs that we can now use. Our
HSI agents are excited at what they see. In fact, by using from
the custom code development to a commercial off-the-shelf
solution, early estimates, very early estimates in the market
research is we could save money over the life-cycle cost
estimate of the system.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
If I might just say to the committee, it is very obvious
that hardware of the 1970s or 1980s is so different from what
we have now. Technology changes so rapidly, and as this
committee does its very able work, I think some of the
questions that we need to hear answered is a whole new
construct as to how acquisition is done, what kind of
thoughtfulness is put into it. I think what Mr. Powner said
strikes me so strongly is, be measured and small. When you try
to get into the ocean and just grab everything, you may have
serious issues of those elements working together. I am hoping
the whole committee can look at your work and maybe work,
looking at a whole, I would say a whole new approach.
We have been doing acquisition issues and issues dealing
with purchases by this Department for as long as I have been on
this committee.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank I the gentlelady for that. We
are working on an acquisition bill, and it is a bipartisan with
Ranking Member Thompson and Ranking Member Barber and others on
your side of the aisle. Hopefully, we will be bringing that
forward soon. I would love to have you look at it, Ms. Jackson
Lee, and love to have your support because it does a lot of the
things that we are talking about today and the great comment
about the ocean and thinking, you know, small steps and small
parameters so we scan have measurable activities, and we can
actually measure it on a very timely basis. So I look forward
to that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me then thank you and Mr. Barber
for allowing me to be on and to listen to the proposal. I look
forward to looking at the legislation. Let me thank the
witnesses.
I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for your interest.
In the essence of time, because they are going to call
votes in 15 minutes, and much to the chagrin of my staff, I am
going to yield some time to the gentleman from the Southwest
for the remaining time we have here because this is an issue
that is closer to home to you guys. I have got all kinds of
questions I could ask, but I want to make sure that we ask the
right questions if you all bring some personal local experience
to the table.
So, with that, I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Barber,
for a question.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses. I know that we have
asked some tough questions of you today, and I just wanted to
express that it is frustration on a broader level. As I said, I
have been on this committee now for, on the subcommittee, for a
year and a month and on the full committee for a little longer.
But it is really frustrating for me to go home to the people I
represent and to tell them once again we have another issue
with expenditures with apparent waste of taxpayer dollars. We
are not making much progress.
I absolutely recognize and appreciate that bringing
together 22 legacy agencies is no small task. In fact, I have
said before that I think actually, given the scope of this job
and the importance of this job to the safety of our country,
this Department is probably one of the, if not the top in
priority department in the Federal Government, and certainly
the job of Secretary is enormous.
I met recently--he came to my district with the new
Secretary, and I am hopeful that he can bring some greater
efficiency and effectiveness to some of these matters.
Let me just pose a question, a similar question, to both
Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Michelli.
Mr. Armstrong, as you know, the GAO states that CBP's
Office of Information Technology lacks a sufficiently-detailed
master program schedule to complete major portions of the TECS
Mod project and that 65 percent of its work activities
apparently remain unconnected. This has led to delays and cost
overruns. This obviously creates uncertainty for users of the
system in the Department and for those involved in
modifications of the program itself. To date, only the
secondary inspection, as you mentioned, project to process
travelers has actually been deployed to all air, sea, and land
ports of entry.
So I would like to ask you, Mr. Armstrong, if you could
outline for the committee how and when the Department plans to
complete a sufficiently-detailed master program schedule for
the modernization.
A similar question if I might to Mr. Michelli. You know,
there apparently is no clear designed framework estimate of how
much the project is going to cost, why it costs the amount it
does and why it is in the interest of the Government to pay the
amount requested. Then also, of course, with ICE TECS Mod's
component, these are vital determinations that cannot be made
because ICE cannot state with any specificity what it will
deliver and how much what it will deliver will cost.
So, to both gentlemen, could you please respond to these
questions? When are we going to see this level of detail which
we can use as a road map to see where we are going and when we
are going to get there and what it is going to cost?
Mr. Armstrong. Sir, I think that, from our perspective,
there is kind of a misunderstanding in terms of what actually
lays out a master schedule. We have a 20,000-line master
schedule in place today. The issue that GAO brought up is that
we don't have all of our predecessor tasks tied together at a
low level. You know, in concert with an agile development
process, we wouldn't have this tied together. We would deal
with those more from the iterative process that we go through.
This program meets weekly to go through essentially immigration
and risk issues within the program. As we move more and more to
an agile environment, that process will become almost daily.
So the idea is that we are not going to be building out
schedules for 3 years from now when we don't know exactly what
all those tasks are going to be. We are going to build them out
to that degree and scope when we are actually getting ready to
do the work.
I think to the point earlier about some of these big
programs that have failed, they have spent a lot of time and
money building out schedules for years and then found that when
they get to that point, the schedules aren't valid, and they
have to go back and rework all those schedules.
So we did have some schedule issues early on in the
program. Some of those were the result of some technical
problems that we had, not within the scheduling, but getting
technology to work. So, therefore, it took us a little bit
longer to get some of our technology that allows us to keep
both the old system and the new system in sync because we are
building a plane and flying it at the same time. So the
commercial off-the-shelf software that was out there at the
point in time we started the program could not keep up with the
rapid pace of which we needed to be able to process people
through the border. So we had to work very closely with the
vendors to get that software tuned and get it working right. So
that did cause us a little bit of schedule issues.
We have now learned some lessons from that. That is part of
our iterative development process to talk about those much more
rapidly and get those escalated quicker. So I feel like we have
got a schedule and a schedule process that works, and I think
that, from my perspective and from the direction from the
Department, we need to focus more on this iteration through the
requirements and getting stuff deployed in smaller chunks
quicker.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Michelli.
Mr. Michelli. Congressman, yes.
We have a very broad schedule now because at week-end we
are going out to a new procurement. We met our first goal
yesterday when we went out with a solicitation or an RFI for a
commercial off-the-shelf solution. Our next target date is
June, when we hope to make an award at that time because we
don't want to tell the winning vendor how to do their business.
We want to work with them collaboratively to ensure that we are
off the mainframe by September 2015. We will work with them to
get the more refined schedule out.
As far as to cost, preliminary market research shows that
with a commercial off-the-shelf solution, we anticipate a 10 to
20 percent lower cost in the total life-cycle of the solution.
Mr. Barber. I want to thank the Chairman again for
convening the hearing, the witnesses for coming. I just hope
that we can get these processes moving faster, more
efficiently, and be better stewards--I think we all need to
be--of the taxpayers' money.
I know you are working hard at this, but we need to
succeed, and we need to do it soon and in a very cost-effective
way. I wish you the best of luck, and thank you for coming here
today.
Mr. Duncan. Thank the Ranking Member, and I will recognize
for the last questions, because they are calling votes as we
speak, for 5 minutes, and then we will wrap it up.
The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. I want to get to the issue of
accountability and, again, always view issues through the
perspective of being a resident of the border and through the
eyes of my constituents, one of the poorest communities in this
country, a community that has 22 million crossings across our
border every year. Those crossings are fundamental to economic
opportunity and job creation that have in El Paso and paramount
to a quality of life that we want to maintain there. So I
appreciate the efforts to improve that through faster crossing
times, implementing technologies that will allow for that. But
it is also hard to go back to those folks in El Paso who are
really struggling to get by, who are waiting in these long
border lines, and tell them that we have spent $240 million so
far to achieve it now turns out two of the five steps that we
need to achieve, that we have wasted money without much
accountability to it.
So a couple of questions. First, to Mr. Armstrong, $240
million has bought us secondary inspection and high-performance
primary query. When it comes to these modifications to the TECS
system, how much will it cost us to deliver the three remaining
parts of that 5-step process?
Mr. Armstrong. So we have spent $240 million to date, and
let me point out that it is not just on those two pieces of
functionality. I talk about those in terms of the results that
we have achieved. We have actually done work in all five areas.
Even in the PIP process, we have done requirements development,
but we did not go on to start building things because there was
budget uncertainty. So each one of the five projects, there has
been work going on concurrently.
Mr. O'Rourke. Understood, but just in the essence of time,
how much will it cost us when we are done?
Mr. Armstrong. So the current life-cycle cost estimate,
which was just completed, is $693 million.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. What are the--to Mr. Armstrong, to
Mr. Michelli, if we have time, I would love to hear from the
representative from the GAO--what are the consequences when we
miss our budget targets, when we spend more than we committed
to spending? What are the consequences to the contractors? What
are the consequences to you and the people who work for you?
What is the accountability that we have in DHS for these
mistakes that have been made so far? I will ask Mr. Armstrong
first and then turn to Mr. Michelli.
Mr. Armstrong. Well, you know, all of these objectives are
laid out in the performance plans for my program managers. So
both my program manager over this program, my executive
director that oversees all of our passenger processing, myself,
my deputy, we all have performance milestones within our
performance plans with respect to the delivery of this program.
Part of the re-compete of the contract is the old contract
didn't have a whole lot of avenues for accountability in it. I
am hopeful that the new one will and that we can hold the
vendor more accountable for delivery. To the point that you
asked me earlier, we have a lot more Government staff on-board
now than we did, say, 10 years ago; so the mix of Government-
to-contract employees overseeing this program is much greater
than it was in the past. So I am confident that we are going to
deliver within our budget and there hasn't been more than a $7
million swing in any of our life-cycle cost estimates by the
middle of fiscal year 2016.
Mr. O'Rourke. For Mr. Michelli, and I believe I am quoting
from the GAO report. In September 2011, ICE entered into a
contract with Raytheon to serve as a prime contractor for TECS
Mod. In 2012, the program began to experience technical issues,
which resulted in a delay of approximately 7 months and the
decision to defer or remove approximately 70 percent of the
requirements Raytheon was hired to complete. What are the
consequences to Raytheon?
Mr. Michelli. So, for any vendor, we provide a CPARS, which
is a rating on the performance, so we would rate them
appropriately. They also in their contract have an award fee,
and we would adjust that award fee appropriately based on the
requirements of the----
Mr. O'Rourke. Can you tell us how we have adjusted downward
the award fee to Raytheon due to their performance?
Mr. Michelli. I would be happy to get back to you once I
consult with the contracting office. I am not sure what the
sensitivity of that is.
Mr. O'Rourke. Okay. For the last word, I have got 10
seconds, Mr. Powner. Anything on that theme that you would like
to comment on?
Mr. Powner. Yeah, I think you are spot-on. I think there
needs to be more accountability, not only within the Department
of Homeland Security, but with those contractors. I think a
best practice up-front is you sit down with the contractor and
demand a meeting at a very high level and talk about what a
priority this is for the Department of Homeland Security with
folks probably even above these two individuals' levels,
because you get the A team men if you are the squeaky wheel.
They are going to be competing with a lot of programs in
the Federal Government. Those contractors have a lot of other
Federal contracts. The program that is the squeaky wheel, that
you get a very high-level individual saying that I am on top of
this, and I am going to watch the performance of this contract
and how things are going, that would help.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the witnesses, Mr. Powner, Mr.
Armstrong, Mr. Michelli, for your valuable testimony today. I
apologize that the hearing is going to be cut short due to
votes.
There are a lot of other questions that we have as we
pursue how we proceed from here and make sure that we are good
stewards.
You know, these hearings aren't the grooviest topics. They
are not the Benghazis or the IRS targeting or all of that, but
I think it is important, as you have seen today, on both sides
of the aisle, we are very concerned about how taxpayer dollars
are being spent, to make sure that we are getting the most bang
for the buck and that we don't go so far down the road, have to
stop, retrace our steps and start over.
So I want to thank the Members of the subcommittee for
their questions and participation. The Members of the
subcommittee may have additional questions for you guys, and we
will ask those witnesses if they will respond to those
questions in writing.
So, without objection, the subcommittee will stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for David A. Powner
Question 1. The DHS chief information officer rated the TECS Mod
program for ICE as medium-risk and CBP as moderately low-risk. In
addition, the Program Accountability and Risk Management Office rated
the program as high-value, low-risk.
Do you believe the Department needs to reevaluate the criteria by
which it considers these large-scale IT projects high-risk and in need
of a TechStat review or health assessment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. One of the subcommittee's biggest concerns with the
review process for an IT project of the size of TECS is that the
appropriate risks were never identified, whether it is with identifying
the appropriate requirements needed or that smaller problems snowballed
and were never identified until the whole program was put on hold.
How would you recommend these risks be corrected so that we don't
end up in this situation again in the future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. What grade (A,B,C,D,F) would you give CBP and ICE in
their development and implementation of major IT programs based on
their ability to meet mission needs, cost, and schedule? How would you
rate DHS's performance in delivering IT systems against other Federal
agencies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Charles R. Armstrong
Question 1. If DHS had conducted a TechStat review of the TECS
modernization effort, could that have helped to identify performance
lapses and recommend corrective actions to get the modernization effort
back on track? What steps have you taken to ensure that high-risk,
high-value IT programs like TECS Mod will be identified as such in the
future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. According to a copy of the Acquisition Program
Baseline CBP recently submitted to DHS that was provided to the
subcommittee, TECS Mod's costs have decreased by about $30 million,
while the end-date for the program has been pushed out to the middle of
2016.
Can you explain how the program will cost less but take longer to
complete? Do CBP's revised plans for TECS Mod envision a reduction in
functionality--and if so, what does the reduction consist of?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. In that same revised APB, CBP altered, or in some
cases removed key TECS Mod performance parameters. In practical terms,
please explain what these changes will mean for the overall performance
of the system, especially for the CBP officer at a port of entry.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The current request for proposal has been protested by
three of the four competitors and, it is my understanding, that the CBP
withdrew the award before the GAO could rule. After more than a year,
it is my understanding that the CBP is going to simply recomplete the
contract based on the same RFP.
To what extent has CBP considered extending the current contract?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. According to the GAO report, the TECS modernization
effort should result in the ability to better match names from foreign
alphabets and improve the flow and integration of data between CBP and
its partner agencies.
Looking back at the tragic Boston marathon bombings, are there
capabilities that may help prevent similar events from occurring in the
future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. If TECS had been modernized fully last year, could
TECS have increased the alert and awareness on Tamerlan Tsarnaev?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Thomas P. Michelli
Question 1a. Did anyone within your office at ICE reach out to the
DHS CIO to initiate a TechStat review of your TECS Mod efforts in order
to identify performance lapses and recommend corrective actions to get
the modernization effort back on track?
Question 1b. What steps have you taken to ensure that high-risk,
high-value IT programs like TECS Mod will be identified as such in the
future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The cost of the ICE TECS Mod program before the
rebaseline was $800 million. What will the new life-cycle cost be?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. ICE recently commissioned a technical assessment by
MITRE to identify potential commercial-off-the-shelf solutions for its
TECS Mod program. Please describe the results of this study and how ICE
intends to incorporate those results in its planning moving forward?
Will you please provide the results of this assessment to the
subcommittee?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Do you believe you are using the DHS OCIO's risk
management processes effectively? Do you think problems with your
portion of TECS Mod could have been escalated earlier on to address
them?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5a. According to your statement, ICE ``anticipates the
full life-cycle cost to be less than the original $818 million due in
large part to an increased use of commercial off-the-shelf products
that will require less custom development and on-going support.''
Whether it is SBINet or high-cost IT programs, the committee has
heard that COTS products alone will reduce costs but this seems rarely
the case because there's usually more work needed to adapt the
technologies to operational needs. What assurance does the taxpayer
have that use of COTS in this case will reduce costs? What concrete
evidence do you have to show that COTS in this type of IT environment
will result in cost savings?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5b. Will a single COTS product satisfy all of ICE's
requirements? If not, what additional functionality will be required
and how will that functionality be delivered?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. You mentioned during the hearing that ICE's
``preliminary market research shows that with a commercial off-the-
shelf solution, [ICE] anticipate[s] a 10 to 20 percent lower cost in
the total life cycle of the solution.'' Can you explain where these
savings are coming from and why these savings were not identified in
the original APB?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]