[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL:
DEEPENING RIFTS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-155
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana--5/20/14
noon deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
14 deg. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia Massachusetts
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana--5/20/14
noon deg.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D., senior fellow, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies......................................... 6
Mr. Simon Henderson, Baker fellow and director, Gulf and Energy
Policy Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.. 28
The Honorable Stephen A. Seche, senior analyst, Dentons US LLP
(former Ambassador of the United States to Yemen).............. 35
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement................. 8
Mr. Simon Henderson: Prepared statement.......................... 30
The Honorable Stephen A. Seche: Prepared statement............... 37
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 58
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL:
DEEPENING RIFTS AND EMERGING
CHALLENGES
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THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch as soon as
he comes in for 5 minutes each for our opening statements I
will then recognize other members--thank you so much,
gentlemen, for being here--seeking recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection,
gentlemen, the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a
part of the record.
Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions
for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Since the start of the Arab Spring, the dynamics of the
political landscape in the Middle East and North Africa have
undergone dramatic changes. Uprisings in many countries have
led to a change in leadership, shifting the nature of what was
already a fragile political insecurity balance in the region.
Despite similar cultures, political systems and security
concerns, the only real points of concurrence amongst the
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were on the
need to maintain strong security ties with the United States
and on the threat posed by Iran.
This shift in dynamics has also added a strain on the
relationship within the GCC, particularly as the nation's hotly
disputed policy approaches to the conflict in Syria, the
stability of Egypt and the Iranian nuclear issue.
Some of these rifts were made very public earlier this year
as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain all
recalled their ambassadors to Qatar over the Qatari support for
the Muslim Brotherhood.
And while the GCC has reportedly smoothed over this feud,
the fundamental differences are, clearly, too great to overcome
and will certainly boil over in the near future. But the
differences between the GCC member states regarding these
issues haven't just strained relations within the council.
They have greatly impacted our bilateral relations with
each country. The administration's indecision in Syria and its
misguided approach to the Iran nuclear issue have driven a deep
wedge between us and some of our traditional regional allies
and could potentially permanently damage those relationships
which would then pose challenges to our national security
interests.
While some of these nations leave much to be desired in
many aspects, ranging from their human rights records to their
efforts in fighting local terrorist financing and the United
States must continue to press those countries in addressing
those issues, the members of the GCC are for now still key U.S.
allies to many national and mutual security threats.
It would be in the best security interest for the United
States as well as the GCC members to develop and advance an
integrated defense capability so that we can counter any
threats in the region including an Iran that continues to
advance its ballistic missile capabilities and still has the
potential to create a nuclear weapon.
But it is not just the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran that
threatens us and our partners in the region but it is also
Iran's role as the largest state sponsor of terror that must be
defended against.
Iran actively seeks to wage proxy wars and attacks against
the United States, against our ally, the democratic Jewish
state of Israel, and our U.S. national security interest in the
region as well as attacks against several Middle East countries
themselves.
That is why I believe that the GCC countries must refrain
from reaching closer ties with Iran, hold the line against this
terrorist regime and abandon any ambition to deepen economic
alliances with Tehran.
Just this week it was announced that the emir of Kuwait
would be visiting Iran at the end of the month and Saudi Arabia
extended an invitation to the Iranian foreign minister to
visit.
None of us here need to be reminded of the foiled plot by
the Iranians to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.
right here in Washington, DC, to understand the lengths to
which Tehran will go to try to shift the balance of power in
the region in its favor.
If we abandon our partners in the Gulf by continuing to
pursue a bad nuclear deal with Iran that will leave intact its
entire nuclear infrastructure and allow it to continue to
enrich uranium, we will not only lose what little trust we have
with the GCC states but we may open the door to an all-out arms
race in the Middle East.
After all, it was the United States who put pressure on all
of these governments to support our efforts in sanctioning the
Iranian regime and now they perceive the administration's zeal
to reach a deal with Tehran as the U.S. selling them out to the
Iranians, which will force their hands to cut their own deal
with the regime in Iran.
This could up the scales in the region and cause
irreparable harm to U.S. national security interest and may
even make the extremist problem worse if our partners lose
faith in us and stop cooperating with us to counter this
threat.
The administration must do more to work with these partners
to earn their trust back and it must abandon its current
nuclear policy with Iran or run the risk of turning the entire
region against us.
With that, I am so pleased to yield to the ranking member,
my good friend, Mr. Deutch, of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am
pleased that we are holding today's hearing to examine a region
that plays such a critical role in the United States policy and
security more broadly throughout the Middle East.
In recent months, much has been made over the perceived
rift between the GCC states and the United States, notably over
the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, our policy in Syria and events
in Egypt.
I believe the U.S. and the Gulf share the same goals--a
nuclear-free Iran, an end to Syrian conflict that does not
leave Assad or dangerous terrorists in power and a stable
prosperous Egypt.
It should be clear to our Gulf partners that this Congress
and this administration value the strong relationship.
Secretary Kerry and other senior State Department officials
have continued to brief the Gulf States on Iran negotiations.
Secretary Hagel recently convened a meeting of defense
ministers, the first time all six defense ministers have been
together with the Secretary since 2008, and President Obama
himself traveled to Saudi Arabia in March to reaffirm the U.S.
commitment to the region.
But just as our Gulf friends seek assurances from us, so do
we from them. It is understandable that Gulf countries would
have concerns over a potential nuclear deal with Iran. I have
concerns over a potential nuclear deal with Iran and they are
the ones living in Iran's neighborhood.
Iran's penchant for meddling in Gulf States by stirring
unrest in Shi'ite communities by supporting Hezbollah's
activities in the region have exacerbated thousands of years of
religious tensions and regional power struggles.
This has only been compounded in recent years by the
Iranian regime's unwavering support for Bashar al-Assad in
Syria. Now, I recognize that there are those allies who were
perhaps caught off guard by Western engagement with Iran.
But it is just as concerning to the United States that
Tehran and the Gulf seem to be warming relations despite this
perceived anger at the P5+1 for pursuing nuclear negotiations.
The emir of Kuwait will visit Iran May 31st. Reports last
week indicated the Saudi foreign minister has invited his
Iranian counterpart to visit Riyadh. All of this creates the
unfortunate perception that despite our very real and serious
mutual concern over a nuclear-armed Iran, our Gulf friends
simply wish to see the United States solve the problem for
them.
And while we appreciate the tremendous economic support the
Gulf has provided Egypt to help restore economic stability, the
U.S. will still continue to ensure that we support an Egyptian
Government that respects human rights and puts the country on a
path toward real democracy.
Over the past decade, we have increased security
cooperation to unprecedented levels and the United States
continues to balance these individual bilateral relationships
and security needs with our cooperation and engagement with the
GCC as a whole.
We continue to cooperate on vital counter terrorism issues
including preventing Hezbollah from acting in the region. Bold
actions from our Gulf partners like declaring Hezbollah as a
terrorist organization sends an important message to Iran and
to its proxies but we need to see the same cooperation when it
comes to countering all violent extremism, Sunni or Shi'ite.
GCC countries rely heavily on the United States for their
defense needs and we have strategic assets and defense
agreements in every GCC country whether it is the Fifth Fleet
stationed in Bahrain, Al Dhafra Joint Air Base in UAE, the Al
Udeid based in Qatar, the over 13,000 troops in Kuwait.
These strategic relationships are critical to the ability
of the United States--to U.S. security interests and the
ability to safeguard those interests in the region. But as with
any friendship, there will be times when we disagree.
This certainly doesn't mean that the U.S. has abandoned our
interests in the Gulf and any suggestions to that end are
simply false. But the United States must and will continue to
speak out against human rights abuses of all kinds.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the unequal treatment of
women, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities
or foreign workers or violent suppression of dissent no matter
where in the world it occurs and we will continue to speak out
against those elements in or out of government that support any
form of terrorism or extremist elements.
Disagreements among GCC countries have also posed a
challenge to addressing regional crises. It is no secret that
the Gulf has been split over its approach to Syria and to the
rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Concerned over their own stability, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE didn't appreciate Qatari support for the Muslim
Brotherhood. With respect to Syria, our Gulf friends must use
their resources to collectively strengthen and support vetted
moderate opposition groups.
Continuing to fracture the opposition will never result in
a political solution that forces Assad out. I appreciate Kuwait
fulfilling its humanitarian funding pledges and the UAE-built
refugee camp in Jordan.
But I would also urge all of our friends to use all of
their great resources to fund the desperately lacking
humanitarian response to the crisis in Syria. For the time
being, things appear to be on the mend following the agreement
reached in Riyadh last month with Qatar.
However, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE have yet to
return their ambassadors to DOHA. I hope our panelists will
address whether this band-aid can hold. As I stated earlier,
just as our Gulf allies seek assurances from us, we seek
assurances from them.
Our partners should be assured that if an acceptable deal
is ever reached with Iran it won't be a free pass to Iran to
continue its dangerous and destabilizing behavior throughout
the Middle East and throughout the world. And we should be
assured that our friends will not continue to support dangerous
actors throughout the region.
To our witnesses, thank you for being here. I hope your
testimonies will shed light on a couple of key issues. How deep
is the mistrust between the U.S. and GCC over Iran?
Can the GCC overcome its own internal disagreements to act
in a manner that preserves regional security and perhaps, most
broadly and most importantly, does the GCC view its long-term
relationship with the United States as critical to regional
stability as we do?
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Good comments. At this
time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Deutch, for holding today's hearing about this very important
issue and I would like to extend my gratitude to the witnesses
for being with us today and for the testimony they are about to
provide.
For decades the United States has maintained important
strategic relationships with member states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council. These relationships are more vital today
than ever and ensuring peace and stability are very worthy
goals in any part of the world.
But I remind the committee that nearly 20 percent of oil
traded on any given day must pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
GCC leaders have correctly identified Iran as a threat to
stability and peace in the Gulf but a lack of a unified
approach to address this threat is particularly disturbing.
GCC leaders watch the events unfolding in Syria and Egypt
but have all decided on different policies. This is an
important region and it cannot be overstated how vital it is
that we understand the intentions, goals and aspirations of GCC
member states.
So I look forward to hearing our panelists today providing
clarification on how GCC member states work collectively, how
they pursue their individual national interests and how United
States strategic interests are affected by those decisions.
And I thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, sir.
First, I am pleased to welcome Dr. David Weinberg, who is a
senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
where he focuses on the Gulf countries as well as energy,
counter terrorism and human rights issues.
Dr. Weinberg previously served as a professional staff
member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and has done
research for the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom and the State Department's policy planning staff under
the Bush administration.
Perhaps I should note here that one of our colleagues--he
is not here this morning, Mr. Connolly--was also a staffer and
so apparently you got smart and left and he stayed.
So, second, we want to welcome Mr. Simon Henderson, who is
the Baker Fellow and director on the Gulf and Energy Policy
program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
former journalist at the BBC and the Financial Times.
Mr. Henderson has also worked as a consultant advising
corporations and governments in the Arabian Gulf. And last but
certainly not least, we welcome Ambassador Stephen Seche--am I
saying that correctly? Seche--okay, thank you--who is a senior
analyst at Dentons, an international law firm with extensive
ties to the Middle East.
Ambassador Seche spent 35 years as a U.S. Foreign Service
Officer serving as the United States representative to Yemen
from 2007 to 2010. Prior to his current position, he was Deputy
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at
the Department of State.
He has also served as Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy
in Damascus, Syria and as director of the Office for Egypt and
Levant Affairs in Washington, DC.
Gentlemen, welcome, and Dr. Weinberg, we will start with
you.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Weinberg. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you on behalf
of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies for the
opportunity to discuss tensions in America's security
relationship with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
There is a pervasive sense among the GCC that America has
abandoned its regional allies. This concern is primarily vis-a-
vis Iran, their main regional enemy, but it has been
exacerbated by several of the following factors.
In the last few years, the Gulf States have seen America
becoming less dependent upon foreign oil and they wonder if
this might reduce Washington's commitment to their security.
In 2011, the Gulf States witnessed America supporting
popular revolutions in places like Egypt and they wonder if we
might abandon them like we did Mubarak or support the Muslim
Brotherhood against established regimes.
GCC states also blame Washington for letting Syria's Assad
regime slaughter tens of thousands of Sunni civilians. They
read America's decision not to enforce its red line on chemical
weapons as an indication that our resolve may be lacking across
the board.
Although our military maintains approximately 35,000
personnel in this region, these factors have caused the Gulf
States to question the value of U.S. security guarantees
against such threats as Iran.
There is real truth to the claims by regional officials
that they face ongoing acts of terrorism and subversion by
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Officials have intercepted shiploads of sophisticated
weapons evidently headed from the IRGC to radical Shi'ite
militias that threaten Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain.
The Saudis in particular have been targeted in terrorist
attacks by Iran's global network including the 1996 Khobar
Towers bombing and, as Chairman Ros-Lehtinen noted, a 2011 plot
to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington.
Alleged Iranian espionage rings have recently been
disrupted in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and terrorist
cells in Bahrain receiving IRGC training have reportedly built
hundreds of improvised explosive devices.
Like Israel, the GCC will never trust the terms of an
accord over Iran's nuclear program until they see Tehran
stopping its interventions in their neighborhood. In short,
such activities are the prism through which they view Iran's
broader intentions and relatedly America's commitment to come
to their defense.
Thus, if Washington is truly serious about reassuring its
GCC allies, the government should insist on opening a new
negotiation forum alongside the nuclear file for pressuring
Iran to stop its radical regional activities and we should
bring our Gulf allies to this table.
Because there is a significant trust deficit on both sides
of this alliance, the time has also come to appoint a special
envoy who can regain the trust of the GCC's rulers. Meanwhile,
the State Department should release the recent report it
commissioned with taxpayer money documenting incitement in
official Saudi textbooks and revoke the kingdom's indefinite
waiver under the International Religious Freedom Act.
On terrorism finance, U.S. officials should continue to
press Kuwait and Qatar to stop providing a permissive
jurisdiction for al-Qaeda fundraising. If DOHA and Kuwait City
keep turning a blind eye, U.S. designations should possibly be
broadened to include responsible foreign officials.
Washington should encourage Bahrain's dialogue process and
praise the crown prince and king for restarting that process in
January. However, we should condemn abuses and violence when
they take place, insist on security sector accountability and
impose consequences for one or both sides, depending on their
conduct, if negotiations fail to produce a deal before
elections later this year.
The United States should speak out at the highest levels
for women's rights in the region, advocating for them to be
permitted to drive in Saudi Arabia but also raising concerns
about that country's oppressive and infantilising male
guardianship system.
Similarly, Washington should stand up more consistently for
rights defenders under siege who often face long prison
sentences for arbitrary charges such as offending the ruler or
disrupting public order.
Finally, the United States should help our Gulf allies
address their skyrocketing energy consumption while ensuring
our own lasting energy security. This requires the use of
hydraulic fracturing at home when it is economically and
environmentally viable, a national strategy for fuel choice in
the transportation sector and increases in renewable energy to
move away from fossil fuels in the longer term.
Esteemed Members of Congress, I thank you for this
opportunity to address you on the Gulf today and I eagerly look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]
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Mr. Weber. Thank you, Dr. Weinberg.
Mr. Henderson.
STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON HENDERSON, BAKER FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
GULF AND ENERGY POLICY PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Henderson. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today about such a critical and timely
issue.
Despite the prosperity of the GCC member states--Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Oman--I cannot recall a time when disunity in the alliance has
been so obvious, prospects for reconciliation so poor and
implications for the Middle East region and perhaps the rest of
the world so bad.
The GCC states have three features that distinguish them
from most of the Arab world. They are on what they perceive as
the front line of Sunni Islam adhered to by most of the Arab
world against Shi'ite Islam, which has been led since the 1979
Islamic revolution by non-Arab Persian Iran.
They are all also oil-based economies and, although not
democratic, their political systems are paternalistic rather
than dictatorial. The GCC has been a bulwark against
instability since it was established in 1981, less than a year
after the start of the Iran-Iraq War.
While the battles of that war raged, the GCC member states
were collectively able to avoid being dragged into the
conflict. They established themselves as a third power bloc in
the region without having to align themselves too openly with
fellow Arab leader Saddam Hussein against the threat of
destabilization initiated by Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution.
The recent events in the last few years of the so-called
Arab Spring have had an impact on these countries and which
have only been nation states for a few decades. Now their
immediate political future, given an almost nuclear Iran, is
uncertain.
To make matters worse, the trend line of their greatest
asset, their hydrocarbons, is bad. In 10 or, more likely, 20
years an energy glut, comparatively speaking, is predicted for
North America--that is, Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, considered
collectively--which will likely hammer oil and natural gas
prices.
So even if the GCC's member states collectively have more
than 30 percent of the world's oil and more than 20 percent of
the world's natural gas, lower prices would probably spell
disaster for their relatively undiversified economies.
Further to this, there has opened in the last few months a
wide schism essentially between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the
UAE against Qatar, with the other two states of Kuwait and Oman
standing on the sidelines.
Apparently there had been a row about this last year, which
was unreported, but had led to a peace agreement in late
November 2013.
But this year, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE decided
Qatar was not living up to its side of the bargain and
announced the withdrawal of their ambassadors. It is hard for
me to see a situation whereby this can be reconciled
immediately and this is something which it is very important
for the United States to work on particularly because it is not
a one-off from this year and last year.
But the division between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain
on one side and the rest of the GCC on the other mirrors pretty
exactly what happened in 2011 when Saudi Arabian and UAE forces
entered into Bahrain to help provide some calm in the
disturbances there.
An additional danger for the United States is the age of
the rulers, particularly of Saudi Arabia where King Abdullah is
in ill health and there appears to be what might well be a
family feud going on in the house of Saud.
I therefore recommend that the U.S. links with the GCC
states and need to be worked on and a special envoy should be
appointed and the U.S. should seek to engage as an honest
broker in helping to overcome their disagreements.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Henderson follows:]
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Mr. Weber. Ambassador Seche, you are up.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN A. SECHE, SENIOR ANALYST,
DENTONS US LLP (FORMER AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES TO
YEMEN)
Ambassador Seche. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am very pleased to
be able to take part in today's hearing, which offers a timely
opportunity to assess U.S. relations with the Arab Gulf States
and the nature of the relationships these nations maintain with
each other.
As Ranking Member Deutch has already noted, much has been
made in recent months of the rift between Washington and some
of our key Gulf allies over U.S. policies in the region. We
know well what these policies are and each of the speakers this
morning has identified them--in short, Syria, Iran and Egypt.
These developments prompt two questions. Are the
differences on these issues real and are they capable of
inflicting permanent damage to our relationships with key Gulf
partners. The answer to the first question is yes.
Gulf anxiety about U.S. policies in the region is genuine
and needs to be addressed. As for the extent of damage these
differences can inflict, I think the answer has got to be very
little if we tend to our relationships carefully, explain
ourselves clearly and leave no doubt that our commitment to
Gulf security and stability is as strong today as it has been
since FDR met with Abdulaziz Ibn Saud nearly 70 years ago.
If the administration can be faulted, I believe it is
failing to respond promptly to the clear signals of impatience
and concern issued by our GCC partners, particularly the
Saudis, and for too often seeming to think that a public
statement of support delivered by an administration spokesman
standing in a briefing room in Washington will be sufficient to
put Gulf anxieties to rest.
That said, I also believe that the administration has made
up for its slow start by assembling an impressive list of
senior-level visitors to the region including the President
himself and the Secretaries of Commerce, State and Defense.
In fact, as has been noted, Defense Secretary Hagel has
just convened a meeting of Gulf defense chiefs in Jeddah. This
kind of personal diplomacy is essential and must be sustained.
Secretary Hagel's message is that U.S. engagement with the Gulf
States is intended to support and facilitate, not replace,
stronger multilateral ties within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
This, in my judgement, is absolutely the right direction
for the U.S. to take. Our GCC allies expect to be treated like
mature reliable partners. Let them therefore overcome internal
differences and work together to ensure their collective
security.
It should not be construed as America walking away from its
commitments to the security of the Gulf. We will maintain our
forward military presence which includes 35,000 service men and
women, our Navy's Fifth Fleet, advanced fighter aircraft and a
wide array of missile defense capabilities.
Nevertheless, internal divisions and rivalries within the
GCC conspire against the kind of unified planning the
administration has been encouraging. On the one hand, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, generally supported by Kuwait, are the most
concerned about Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian intentions while
Qatar and Oman define their interest somewhat differently and
are less eager to accept Saudi dominance. Washington must be
cognizant of these tensions and acknowledge that they are
genuine and deep rooted while not accepting these differences
as an excuse for the GCC states failing to take meaningful
steps toward a coherent regional defense posture.
With regard to our own policy differences with our Gulf
partners, I would like to briefly address the two that I
consider to be the principal sources of tension--nuclear
negotiations with Iran and our policy toward the civil war in
Syria.
It is clear that the P5+1 negotiations have prompted Gulf
States' fears that at the end of the day Tehran will be
permitted to maintain some enrichment capacity and continue its
destabilizing activities in the region. A couple of points on
this.
First, if a deal can be struck, and I think that is still a
very big if, the outcome will do much more to impede Tehran's
acquisition of a nuclear weapon than the alternative, a limited
military strike with much less potential for negative
consequences around the world.
On the question of Iranian destabilizing behavior in the
region, Secretary Hagel made it very clear that the P5
negotiations will under no circumstances trade away regional
security for concessions on Iran's nuclear program.
Perhaps if the nuclear talks succeed a second expanded
round can be convened immediately on the subject of Iran's
relations with its neighbors, bringing the GCC to the table
with P5+1.
Syria is a more difficult issue and an affront to our
collective conscience and increasingly home to a metastasizing
violent extremist movement. Gulf States are unhappy because
President Obama has declined to join them in supporting the
armed opposition with lethal assistance and for failing to
enforce his own red line when evidence of chemical weapons used
by the Assad regime became clear.
While we certainly have an interest in seeing Hezbollah's
wings clipped in the Levant, I also believe as we address the
situation in Syria we need to be very careful to avoid becoming
a party to a campaign that has as much to do with sectarian
dominance as it does good governance.
My bottom line is this. For all their public displays of
unhappiness with the United States, our Gulf partners know well
that no other nation can or will ensure their security as we
have done for the past 70 years.
Our strategic interest in the Gulf will endure and with
them our continued investment in the region's stability.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Seche follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Ambassador Seche.
I am going to forego my chance to ask questions for just a
minute and I am going to defer to the ranking member here.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I would just like
to focus on Iran. There have been suggestions that there should
be a parallel track dealing with Iran's meddling in the region
and support for terror.
Ambassador, you talked about a follow-up round of
negotiations dealing with Iran's relations with its neighbors.
Is there any ideal resolution to the Iranian nuclear question
that the Gulf States believe can be reached through this
current round of negotiations?
Dr. Weinberg, we will start with you.
Mr. Weinberg. Sure. I think the comparison with Israel is
illustrative to some extent here. I think the Israelis are
primarily concerned about the nuclear issue as an existential
threat when it comes to Iran.
I think with the Gulf States they are also extremely
concerned about the nuclear issue but the ways in which they
view the nuclear issue are in part affected by how they view
Iran's intentions related to regional subversion activities.
And so I think as long as Iran continues to pursue these
sorts of activities and the United States is not making it an
issue on the negotiating track, I think they are going to have
questions about how effectively and committedly the United
States can enforce a nuclear deal with Iran.
So I think having a dialogue with the Gulf States on this
issue--on the nuclear issue is extremely essential to make sure
that there aren't significant surprises on the negotiating
track.
They were very upset, for instance, when they discovered
that the United States had been engaged in conversations with
Oman in this regard. If the United States had perhaps maybe
informed them that private talks were going on without giving a
specific location so it couldn't be leaked and exposed fully
that might have been more productive.
But looking forward to the future, having senior officials
involved in the nuclear file, such as Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, go and brief officials in
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, for instance, is very constructive and
very productive.
But when it comes to trusting the nuclear deal, I cannot
emphasize enough how important the IRGC element of it is for
reassuring the trust that the Gulf States have in us.
Mr. Deutch. Right, which I understand. So when we have
seen, though, as I referred to earlier, you know, with all have
the Gulf States engaging with Iran, are they just following our
lead? Is it about proximity to Iran if the nuclear deal falls
apart--they don't want to be left in a stalemate or a worse
position? What is the calculation?
Ambassador, let me just ask you what is the calculation
between voicing displeasure with U.S. policy but simultaneously
seeming to pursue closer relations with what has been referred
to throughout here as their number-one enemy?
Ambassador Seche. Sir, I think it is important to realize
that each of the GCC countries maintains diplomatic relations
with Iran. They all have Embassies in Tehran. They all deal
with Iran in one level or another.
They will continue to do so for their own self-interest.
They are unhappy with the fact that we have maintained what
appears to be a process that was going to relegitimize Iran and
its ability to influence events in the region.
However, they have also asked us not to negotiate----
Mr. Deutch. I am sorry. They are concerned about our
efforts to relegitimize Iran even as they continue to engage in
diplomatic relations and seemingly have undertaken efforts to
increase those relations with Iran just over the past few
months.
Ambassador Seche. Yes, sir, and there is a contradiction
clearly inherent in this approach of theirs. But on the other
hand, I am not sure the logic enters into an emotional argument
they make which is the fact that unleashed Iranian influence
will, again, become a juggernaut that is going to really
destabilize their interest.
Now, our position in the U.S. Government or the U.S.
Government's position is that, frankly, the best way to ensure
that Iran's behavior is normalized is to bring it to the table,
ensure its reentrance back into the community of international
nations as a legitimate power that has to have relations that
are maintained as other nations do in the region.
Mr. Deutch. All right. Mr. Henderson.
Mr. Henderson. Yes. Thank you. The GCC states realize----
Mr. Deutch. Is your microphone on?
Mr. Henderson. I beg your pardon. The GCC states realize
they live in that neighborhood. The United States doesn't. So
they have to make their compromises all the way through with
the other countries in their neighborhood, including Iran at
this particular point.
Their fear is that the diplomacy on the nuclear issue will
not only recognize Iran as a quasi nuclear state if you allow
it to hold on to enrichment technology, this is a better deal
than the UAE had to negotiate with the United States in going
for nuclear power plants.
And they also fear that such a diplomatic agreement would
anoint Iran as the hegemonic power in the Gulf area. They fear
that this would lead to what I would call the Finlandization of
the Gulf, comparing it with the state of Finland alongside the
Soviet Union during the Cold War when at that time Finland was
what I would--had to adopt a strategy of what I would call
coerced diplomacy.
Unfortunately, in yesterday's Washington Post David
Ignatius also wrote an article about the Finland aspect of
diplomacy in relation to Ukraine and quoting an unspecified
State Department document which actually turned on its--to my
mind, turned on the head--its head the definition of what
Finlandization is all about.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate it and I am out of time. Thanks,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weber. Thank you. And the Chair now recognizes Steve
Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Yes. I was actually not here before the other
gentlemen so I would be happy to----
Mr. Weber. Adam, do you want to jump in?
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, I appreciate it and thank you all. Let
me just first off say thank you to the witnesses for being
here. I very much appreciate the focus on this issue, which I
don't think has gotten enough attention.
Our alliance with the Gulf States has been very
instrumental in us promoting peace and security across the
region and I think, you know, the administration's unfortunate
use of the term pivot has caused us as much damage as
anything--the idea of pivoting away from the Middle East, which
I think is a very epic mistake, and a pivot away from the Gulf
even though in many cases that doesn't seem like the case.
What has actually been shocking to me is as we look at what
is going on in Iraq and Syria, Iran, Egypt and all over, I am
hearing from our allies, you know, where is America--what has
happened to American leadership.
If you look at Europe, you see as America backs away from
interests in Europe something has to fill that void. It is
Russia. You look at Asia--it is China. And you look at the
Middle East and you see two things--chaos, terrorism and Iran
filling the lack of American leadership.
Mr. Henderson, you mentioned the 1-2-3 agreement with the
United Arab Emirates and a similar situation exists in South
Korea. America holds this commitment of a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula even though we know that in North Korea they have
nuclear weapons. But we like to hold the idea that we are
committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
We said that we are committed to a nuclear-free Middle East
region so the UAE very graciously agreed to no enrichment. And
so you find out that our allies get no enrichment and our
enemies potentially get the right to enrich uranium.
So it begs the question to our allies, okay, being close to
the United States gets you what versus being far from the
United States and a thorn in its side gets you what.
And so it is very concerning, and you look at Syria.
There is a hundred and--at least 150,000 people who have
died in Syria. You have a President that put out a red line as
America has held to for generations that the use of chemical
weapons will have no place in a civilized world, and his
backing off and failure to enforce the red line in Syria has
led me in my discussions--I think many members of the committee
here who have talked with diplomats and heads of states of
other countries--to say that was one of the biggest, most
terrible turning points in America's foreign policy. That is
the point at which your enemies no longer feared you and your
allies no longer trust you.
So I have just a few questions. Mr. Henderson, you talked a
little bit about the coercion and you also talked about coerced
neutrality. How could the neutrality of the GCC states hurt our
ability to stop Iran from attaining its nuclear weapon and at
what point do you think our allies would take on this position
and this calculation?
Mr. Henderson. It is an excellent question and what I see
as likely to happen amongst the GCC states, particularly the
cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, is that they will go their
own way and quite what that way is isn't terribly clear but
there are signals on what that way is.
At the end of the last month, Saudi Arabia held a huge
military exercise culminating in a parade at a military base in
the north of the country which had over 130,000 men on parade.
It was the largest exercise and largest parade they have
ever had and the Saudis also took the opportunity to display at
that parade two of the Chinese East Wind missiles, which are
usually referred to in American terms as medium range or long
range.
And the important thing is that they can get from Saudi
Arabia to Tehran and this was a clear signal to Tehran that
Saudi Arabia is unhappy with the situation. It was also or
should have been a clear signal to Washington, DC, that Saudi
Arabia was unhappy with the situation.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, I was just going to say, because my
time is running out and I know many people have questions, if
this was a--this is a very bipartisan committee.
That is one of the reasons I love serving on this
committee. If this was a Republican administration I would be
screaming just as loudly about the decline of American
leadership around the globe.
I had one more question but I don't have time to ask it.
But I do want to make the point again that I made, which is I
think the failure of the United States of America to enforce
the red line in Syria, and today, even when we hear about more
chlorine gas attacks and barrel bomb attacks and everything has
been one of the biggest foreign policy blunders not just of
this administration but probably over the last couple of
decades.
Mr. Chabot, thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger. Now the Chair
recognizes Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to
follow on the questions of my colleague from Illinois.
Mr. Henderson, you used the terminology the GCC states live
in the neighborhood and the United States doesn't and that the
sense that we may be turning away or pivoting from that is
raising levels of concern.
I know you touched a bit on this in your testimonies but
can you be a little more specific of what we can do to
reinforce and demonstrate our commitment to the region, the
fact that we understand it is a crucial strategically important
region and also in the same vein things we might do differently
or stop doing to reinforce the confidence in the region?
Mr. Henderson. Thank you. I am tempted to say to try to
wind the clock back. I recognize I cannot do that. But one of
the significant mistakes to my mind of what the administration
has done has, at least from a GCC point of view, is they--the
GCC thinks Washington, DC, misunderstood the Arab Spring and
thought the so-called Arab Spring was a great thing and this
was the way forward.
The GCC states considered that Iran was the major threat.
They regarded their own political systems, which I have
described as patriarchal rather than dictatorial, as being, in
a sense, post-Arab Spring anyway. They have already got that
improved level of politics.
One can debate that but you can sense what I mean. And they
were furious that U.S. support for President Mubarak in Egypt
flipped from firm support to he must go within 3 weeks, leaving
them thinking, hell, if that happens in Egypt what is going to
happen with us if the pressure mounts on us.
A further anxiety from a GCC perspective, certainly from
Saudi Arabia, probably Bahrain and the Emirates, is that they
saw the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Damascus as
being important not only for its own purposes because he was a
dreadful dictator but also because this would give a strategic
setback to Syria's main ally, Iran.
And the absence of that overthrow and, indeed, the sense
that Bashar is in there for the way ahead has infuriated the
GCC and feels that that strategic setback hasn't been delivered
and in fact it's been a strategic plus for Iran.
So what do they do now or what can we do is we have to give
the GCC a sense that we better understand their position. In
fact, I don't actually believe the Obama administration
recognizes that they are at fault in their understanding.
The logic of their diplomacy on the Iran nuclear issue is
sort of self-fulfilling, and as I have said before I think this
needs to be corrected because you are heading into a situation
whereby there will be a neutralized Gulf but it won't be
neutral in the favor of the United States or, indeed, the West.
Mr. Schneider. Right, and I will share that what you are
saying and the sense from the Gulf States is consistent with
everything I have heard talking to people who have relations in
Chicago, where I am from.
There is that great concern. It is not new and it is not, I
don't feel, being addressed sufficiently to do that. Dr.
Weinberg, it looks like you wanted to say something as well.
Mr. Weinberg. If I could just jump in quickly. I think some
constructive things the United States can do or is doing
include on Secretary Hagel's visit he presented concrete
specific steps for increasing military partnerships in areas
such as maritime security, missile security.
I think that is a constructive measure. I think the extent
to which the United States is willing to contemplate a
partially increased role related to Syria will see the Gulf
States willing to appreciate that but also foot some of the
bill.
As I noted before, the importance of potentially appointing
an envoy to regain trust with the GCC States could be
constructive as well as keeping the focus on the IRGC. But,
additionally, as these Gulf States engage to some extent with
Iran, as Ranking Member Deutch drew particular attention to, I
think it is important for the United States, just as they
insist from us on an eye into what is going on in the nuclear
talks, I think we should insist from them to know what they are
talking about with Iran.
I think this is important to prevent buck passing and
freelancing on the part of some of these Gulf States but also
to ensure that there are no surprises that we are confronted
with.
For instance, after the Khobar bombing that occurred in
Saudi Arabia and has been tied to Iranian intelligence, the
United States felt that we had extreme difficulty getting
access to some of the suspects in this crime in Saudi Arabia
and it seemed as though, in retrospect, that the Saudi
authorities had cut their own separate deal with Iran on some
security issues at the time in a limited tactical way and they
were slow rolling the investigation.
So in order to prevent something like that, I think it is
important for the United States to insist on a clear eye on
what is actually going on in these dialogue talks as some of
the Gulf States tactically engage with Iran. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I see I am over time so thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I wish we could go more into the no deal
better than a bad deal. It is a crucial issue with Iran--the
textbooks. I thank the witnesses for being here and I yield
back.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Can any of you gentlemen think of a time when there was
tranquility in the Gulf? No, I don't--I can't. I have been
thinking about maybe when the Ottoman Empire dominated the
whole region but even then there was Lawrence of Arabia and all
sorts of House of Saud fighting the Turks at that time. Mr.
Henderson, you were going to say that there was a time period?
Mr. Henderson. Well, you are asking a historical question
and history is a matter of personal opinion. But there was a
tranquility in the Gulf in the sense of no war at the time when
the Shah of Iran was the leader of Iran and his demise in the
1979 Islamic revolution is year zero in my calculation.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Of course, you realize the shah did--
became the shah after he--we overthrew a democratically-elected
President--a guy named Mossadegh, I seem to remember his name
was.
Mr. Henderson. Well, actually he was the shah before and
Mossadegh, who was elected, actually tried to undermine the
shah, which is the historical spin on that one.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. We Americans sort of like that idea
of getting the king out of our lives sometimes, you know.
Mr. Henderson. Well, you have got six kings or quasi kings
in the GCC states.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Mr. Henderson. And it is a challenge to have good relations
with GCC states if you take that point of view.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me--let me ask another historical
question. Now, about that time the Ba'athist movement was
basically emerging as a force in that part of the world and at
the same time you had--historically my read back there was that
is about the same time as well as the creation of the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Can we say that there was a competition in that time period
between whether or not that region would go with the Ba'athists
because there were Ba'athist Parties in all of these countries,
I believe, versus radical Islam and radical Islam as one?
Mr. Henderson. Dr. Weinberg has, I think, a degree in--a
Ph.D. in history and so perhaps he would want to come in on
this one. But essentially the events of the 1950s, which was
the rise of the Ba'ath Party, were a struggle between old style
monarchial regimes.
That was the end of Egypt. Jordan's throne was under
threat. Iraq's ruling royal got dragged through the streets.
Mr. Rohrabacher. He was assassinated. Right.
Mr. Henderson. But it was also the time when the Muslim
Brotherhood developed as an underground movement. But the main
struggle at that time was--in the 1950s was between
nationalists, who were essentially secular, and communists.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. I am actually thinking more of the
ideological fight that goes on and in the end I believe
determines what direction history will take. I have just--you
know, we are in for some big changes in the world and one of
the big changes is the United States is going to become oil and
gas independent.
In fact, we will start exporting oil and gas within a
decade. This would tend to eliminate that mandatory tie that we
have had to being involved in the Gulf. I notice now and for
your testimonies today that it has been noted that China is now
becoming a major weapons supplier to the Gulf--rockets and
missiles to various elements.
Do you expect China to emerge now in some sort of
relationship with radical Islam as we see it in Iran as well
as, I might add, Saudi Arabia is governed by what I would
consider a radical Islamic philosophy?
Mr. Henderson. The China role is an interesting question
but it is watch this space--you know, find out what the hell is
going on in Beijing. I wouldn't have thought that China will
head in the direction of identifying itself with the radical
Islam.
It has problems with the Uyghurs, who are Islamists in
western China, and I can't imagine that Beijing thinks that
this is the way forward. China's history in the Gulf area has a
cynical aspect to it.
During the 1980 to '88 Iran-Iraq war, China was supplying
ammunition to both sides, presumably because they made more
money that way, but as much as this notion of increasing
American energy independence becomes an important factor, I
don't think it makes it simple for the United States to
withdraw from the Gulf area because energy is very much a
universal world, particularly related to price.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for giving me a chance to ask questions and I just would end my
part of the--the world is changing at a very fast rate and I
would believe that our situation with oil and gas will have
major repercussions as to how much the American people are
willing to commit to being involved in a arena of turmoil in
the Gulf. I am sorry. I don't have much time--any time left.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, sir. The Chair recognizes Lois
Frankel. I understand that we are probably going to call votes
here just any minute. So the gentlelady from Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, first, I would
like to welcome Edona Krasniqi from Kosovo, whose specialty is
child protection and she is here as a Hope Fellow to learn how
to improve her and advance her advocacy.
So welcome. Thank you for being here. I hope you have a
good stay here in the United States.
Mr. Weber. Could you have her stand up? Is she back over
here?
Ms. Frankel. Yes.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Welcome.
Ms. Frankel. Welcome. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I wanted to ask a couple questions on this nuclear--the
potential of a nuclear Iran. First is if Iran should get a
nuclear weapon would you expect there would be a proliferation
and which of the Gulf countries do you think would be next to
try to obtain a weapon?
Mr. Henderson. Saudi Arabia would go to Pakistan tomorrow
and ask for one and Pakistan would probably give them more than
one.
Ambassador Seche. I would certainly concur with Mr.
Henderson's view that the Saudis are quite inclined to act and
quickly in the event that Iran were to acquire a nuclear
weapon.
I think that is also why Saudi Arabia can understand that
the nuclear P5+1 negotiations are the best alternative to
keeping that from happening.
Ms. Frankel. Apparently, Iran's President Rouhani was
quoted today saying that a deal over Iran's nuclear program is
``very likely by July 20 deadline.''
Do you know or do you have an opinion as to whether his
version of the deal he is talking about would be one that Saudi
Arabia and the GCC can live with?
Mr. Henderson. I fear that President Rouhani's version of a
deal is something which Washington, DC, can live with. I am
almost certain that the GCC cannot live with it and
particularly Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, probably Kuwait as
well.
Ms. Frankel. Right. And could you just expand on that?
Mr. Henderson. Because these countries feel that too many
concessions are being made to Iran and their interests aren't
being taken into account and it will leave Iran with its
nuclear technology and nuclear industry intact, which will give
it a quasi nuclear weapons status of a country which has always
professed that it has no interest in nuclear weapons but most
people have never believed that statement.
Ms. Frankel. So which specific concessions are they opposed
to?
Mr. Henderson. They don't want Iran to have--well, I don't
think they want Iran to have any centrifuges and the idea that
there is a small number of centrifuges which is a reasonable
number--they can't believe it is a reasonable number.
And they fear also that the deal will not require Iran to
come clean on what they have done in the past and which is
called possible military dimensions in the jargon of their
program.
And with--if Iran doesn't come clean on that part it is
naive and essentially allows them to retain the military
nuclear weapons program both in structure and in personnel.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And oh, Madam Chair, you
are back. Good to see you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. It is a delight
to see you.
Ms. Frankel. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And now we are so
pleased to recognize Mr. Chabot and thank you, Mr. Weber, for
doing a wonderful job. Thank you. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Mr. Kinzinger had asked--actually made kind of a--some
statements, most of which I agreed with, and then asked some
questions and so I will leave out most of the statements that I
would make because I agree with him about sort of the power
vacuum around the world, at least the perception of one by the
United States.
And I will just note that when there is a power vacuum when
the U.S. is less engaged around the world bad actors have a
tendency to fill in there and we are seeing that in South China
Sea with China and the Middle East with Iran and now in Europe,
particularly in Ukraine with Russia and Putin acting up.
And my question would be this, first of all, and I got here
a little late so this may have already been--you may have
already talked about this. But Saudi Arabia sort of shocked, I
think, the administration and the world to some degree when
they turned down, you know, membership on the Security Council
of the U.N. and a lot of people thought it was kind of a slap
in the face at the U.S. for not backing the Gulf States up and
our traditional allies in the region. Would anyone like to
comment on that, what they think about that particular issue?
Ambassador Seche. Perhaps I will begin and then turn to my
colleagues. But I do think there was a strong signal sent by
the Saudis last fall of their unhappiness and this was one of
the issues that I think we moved slowly to respond to. We saw
the----
Mr. Chabot. An unhappiness with what in particular?
Ambassador Seche. Well, fundamentally, with our lack of
involvement in Syria and supporting the opposition.
Mr. Chabot. The United States lack of involvement. The
United States lack of involvement.
Ambassador Seche. United States involvement in supporting
the armed opposition. I think P5+1. I also think that our
support for the popular revolt in Egypt.
All of these combined to create a serious sense of unease
and the Saudis were simply demonstrating the extent to which
that unease had captured them and I think that we needed at
that point to send someone immediately to Riyadh and sit down
and have a face to face, and we did not.
And I think, again, we were slow to react but I think we
finally began to understand the depth of this unhappiness and
the fact that it was beginning to tear at the fabric of the
relations that we have and we consider to be so important.
Mr. Chabot. And with respect to--you mentioned Egypt--there
is also a perception in that region of the world, particularly
in Egypt but I think throughout the Gulf States, that not only
is less resolve and less commitment and less involvement and
less engagement from the United States but there is even a
perception that not only did we not support sort of the
government but that we are pro-Muslim Brotherhood.
I mean, I am not saying that is true but I am saying is
that not kind of the perception amongst a lot of folks--public
opinion in that part of the world?
Ambassador Seche. Well, there is a perception but I think
the perception may be somewhat missing the point. The fact of
the matter is the Muslim Brotherhood government came to power
in Egypt by virtue of what everyone agrees was probably the
most open and fair election in Egyptian history.
No one was content with the fact that a Muslim Brotherhood
government started to turn against the very democratic process
that put it in power and I think this demonstrates the
immaturity to some extent of these movements.
They are able to use the democratic process to their
advantage but are still so afraid of it that they begin to
consolidate power in very anti-democratic ways once they have
an opportunity to do so.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Would any of the other--yes, Dr.
Weinberg.
Mr. Weinberg. If I could jump in there. I think with regard
to your first question first, it is also important to note that
the Saudi leadership gave up an opportunity to address the U.N.
General Assembly this fall, which is an extremely unusual
choice.
Related to that decision and the U.N. Security Council seat
decision, the Saudi official line pointed to a whole range of
silly points like oh, well, we are mainly upset about the
Palestinian issue or we are mainly upset about Rohingya Muslims
in Burma--issues on which the Saudi leadership had been doing
basically nothing in the months before that.
I mean, these are not silly issues per se in foreign policy
but they--you know, they weren't a core element of Saudi
initiatives at the time. I think it is worth noting that they
came within mere days of President Obama's telephone call with
President Rouhani in Iran.
So I think Iran was a part of that, I think Syria was a
part of that and I think frustration with the U.N. apparatus
and the international community for not doing more had
something to do with that. But I think also another element is
King Abdullah's temper in Saudi Arabia.
I think we saw this also in the withdrawal of the Saudi
Ambassador from DOHA in Qatar and I think it points again to
the importance of personal relations in this region where power
is so centralized with a few individuals. The fact that
President Obama went to Saudi Arabia in March to look the king
face to face I think was a very positive development.
However, I think the fact that they spent all of about 2
hours together is a sign of how frayed those relationships are,
pointing to the importance of having somebody out there,
perhaps an envoy, to rebuild trust with these leaders.
With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, as you noted, I
think there is deep, deep mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood
from the leaderships in the United Arab Emirates and in Saudi
Arabia.
I actually just came back from Abu Dhabi and Dubai and I
heard people describing their views of the Muslim Brotherhood
compared to the Comintern, Hitler and Mussolini. I think there
is real fear that this organization in the long term could pose
a threat to established regimes there.
But at the same time, Qatar does not in any way seem
prepared to revisit their extensive broad-reaching sponsorship
of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the broader Middle East.
And so I think it is reasonable for the United States to expect
this GCC spat to linger on and I think we need to adapt to
that.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair. A question for all of
you all. Well, I have got all kinds of questions but they will
call voting. Does the GCC endure if through this should the
United States come in and say look, okay, we understand your
view our foreign policy as faltering but we would like to come
back in a very comprehensive way now, strong, come out and say
look, we would like you all to renounce all forms of terrorism
and list the terrorist organizations and then we will kick back
in, and it will take an administration, quite frankly, in my
opinion that would say no more negotiations on Iran getting
nuclear weapons, and we will talk a little bit about that in a
minute, Mr. Ambassador.
But if the United States came in and said we want you all
to become more cohesive, stronger than ever but here is the
steps it is going to take, is that a viable option for us to
put on the table to try to really get them to renounce
terrorism, list the terrorist organizations and to get on the
same page? Or is that just pie in the sky?
Ambassador Seche. Yes. If I may, sir, I think it is going
to be very difficult at this point to see the very disparate
interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE come to terms with
Qatar's behavior. I think there is a sense that Qatar, even
having had agreed to some sense of a modus vivendi with their
neighbors, is probably still not persuaded.
Mr. Weber. So if they were alienated that the rest of them
actually came to that table and Qatar thought they were going
to be left out--pressure on them?
Ambassador Seche. Qatar has enjoyed very much its role as
the maverick in the Gulf and I think it sees itself as now
punching way above its weight and having an opportunity to
exercise influence and it does, certainly through Al Jazeera,
certainly through its enormous wealth that it has and they
demonstrated around the world that it can buy its way into a
lot of countries and societies.
So I am not sure how easily, and I think the Gulf States
may be trying to test a young emir recently empowered to see if
he has the mettle that his father had or if he will cave under
that kind of pressure.
Mr. Weber. Also, let me follow up on that, Ambassador. You
said in earlier comments that Iran needed to be back in the
international neighborhood. But I was curious when you said
that. Is that devoid of any nuclear capability? You didn't
really qualify that, but they needed to be made a player again.
Explain that.
Ambassador Seche. Well, I certainly think the terms for
that would have to be that Iran does give up any opportunity to
develop a nuclear weapon, that there is a success----
Mr. Weber. Including enrichment?
Ambassador Seche. Well, I don't think they will give up
enrichment. I think Iran is absolutely intent upon
maintaining----
Mr. Weber. We are too far down that path is what you are
saying.
Ambassador Seche. Right. And I think there is probably an
inherent unfairness in the fact that this is going to, if it
succeeds, allow Iran to have some enrichment capacity and
others have noted that the UAE, for example, forsake that
option.
But I do believe that this deal--it is not this deal or a
better deal. It is this deal or no deal, and this is the one
moment we have a chance to put something on the table that will
guarantee if it is done properly and if it is airtight and very
verifiable----
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Ambassador Seche [continuing]. That there will not be a
nuclear weapon.
Mr. Weber. Now a question for all three and I have got 2
minutes left. Arab Spring--is that going to reemerge, revive or
are we going to see that in the GCC? What is the likelihood?
Mr. Henderson. Because of the different political systems
and the inbuilt notion of consensus in the albeit quasi
monarchy systems they have, I don't think you are going to see
the Arab Spring in the sense that you saw it in Tunisia where
there was a dictator or Egypt where there was a dictator or
even Yemen.
But what I am watching and what I expect we will see is
that the degree to which the people of the GCC countries, the
citizens of the GCC countries which are essentially over
subsidized and cosseted are accept--continue to accept the
system despite its benefits----
Mr. Weber. Not as unhappy as some of the others.
Mr. Henderson. They are very conscious of the fact they
live in a region where there is--things are happening. When it
is turmoil they don't like it.
But when they want to tweet and they want to do social
networking and all this sort of thing these are things which
the old style governments aren't--don't have built-in
mechanisms to know how to cope with.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Final question, and I think as you,
Ambassador, said, Hagel is going over there negotiating, you
said, maybe an enhanced role for the United States in Syria.
Explain.
Ambassador Seche. Well, I don't know that I said that but I
do believe the United States is reexamining our role in Syria
at the moment and I think that there is enough pressure
building----
Mr. Weber. Maybe it was Dr. Weinberg. An enhanced role in
Syria--Chuck Hagel--military role and what does that look like.
Mr. Weinberg. I don't think that was specifically tied to
Secretary of Defense Hagel's visit to the region, which I think
was mainly focused on defense partnerships in the Gulf region
per se.
But I do think the U.S. administration has acknowledged
that there is some need for a reevaluation of its policy in
Syria. Now, as to whether that involves a fundamental
reevaluation of some of the shortcomings of that policy or
whether it is incremental, I think has yet to be seen.
But there is some reason to believe that the administration
may be increasing its program for training members of the
Syrian opposition that are vetted and moderate and, for
instance, there was a recent David Ignatius column which
suggested that Qatar has been paying the difference for the
increase in this training program.
Mr. Weber. I saw that.
Mr. Weinberg. And that the Saudis are providing U.S.-made
anti-tank TOW missiles to vetted members of the Syrian
opposition. So I think to the extent to which the United States
is willing to explore increasing its support to the right
people in Syria, I think there is hunger in the Gulf States for
that and I think they will support us in that and appreciate it
in our broader relationship.
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. Madam Chair, thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. The U.S. has over 35,000
service men and women in the Gulf nations, giving us a rather
robust military presence, and we have an important intelligence
presence in the region as well, making our relations with these
countries strategically important.
What does the administration need to do in order to repair,
to expand, to strengthen those relationships in order to ensure
our national security interests are being best served and also
to strengthen our relationships with the GCC countries that
want a closer relationship with us in the United States?
Mr. Henderson. I think the United States has to better
explain what it means to have these military forces and in the
Gulf area and because the notion of using force, which is after
all what a military is all about, has--seems to have been
redefined by Washington, DC, in recent years.
It is not as if you have to go to war but you have to at
least give the impression you will actually use the military
and from a GCC perspective they, while grateful for the U.S.
military there, they are uncertain whether the strength of this
military, the deterrence of this military, is recognized any
longer by troublemakers such as Iran.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I know that you want to comment but
let me just give this question out. If the United States and
the P5+1 reach an agreement with Iran that still allows Iran to
enrich its own uranium, what does our relationship with the GCC
countries look like the next day?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, I think several of the members on this
panel have highlighted the potential risk of Saudi Arabia
pursuing a nuclear weapon if they believe that Iran's nuclear
program is not going to be suitably restricted.
I think Mr. Henderson here was a little modest in that he
didn't mention that he is published. He has personally been
told by A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear program
who also was linked to nuclear weapons information sharing and
sales to several rogue countries, has visited Saudi Arabia
dozens of times, so he claims, and I think the linkages between
the Pakistani and Saudi military establishments including in
this arena are extremely close and need to be a cause of
concern.
When it comes to the UAE's perspective, I think there will
be considerable resentment about the fact that they signed an
agreement forgoing the opportunity to enrich when Iran, on the
other side of the Gulf, retains it.
So I think it comes down to the fact that as, I think,
Congressman Schneider noted and I noted in my written
testimony, a bad deal is worse than no deal. Even with the
administration----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Let me just go over here. We
are out of time.
Ambassador Seche. If I may for a moment, ma'am, I don't
believe that a deal--a P5+1 deal with Tehran it allows them to
have minimal enrichment--10,000 to 12,000 centrifuges--a
breakout time of 4 to 6 months is going to send the Saudis to
Pakistan to acquire a nuclear weapon.
I believe they would do that--if Iran gets a nuclear weapon
they would respond in kind. But I also believe they know that
the alternative, which is a limited military strike, is going
to have unintended consequences across the region that are
going to be far more dangerous to the well being of the Gulf
States than a deal which is verifiable and comprehensive with
the Iranians.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, and I know that we
have lots more to say and there is zero time remaining on the
clock for our votes. Thank you, gentlemen, for excellent
testimony. Thank you to all of our members and to the audience.
And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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