[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A FALSE NARRATIVE ENDANGERS THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 15, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Steve Daines, Montana Eric Swalwell, California
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Vacancy, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
Witnesses
Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Former Senator From the State of
Connecticut:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Hon. Jane Harman, Former Representative From the State of
California:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
General John M. Keane, (Ret. U.S. Army), Chairman of the Board,
Institute for the Study of War:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Seth G. Jones, Associate Director, International Security and
Defense Policy Center, The Rand Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
For the Record
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the
State of South Carolina:
Article........................................................ 49
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for Honorable Joseph I.
Lieberman...................................................... 63
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for Honorable Joseph I.
Lieberman...................................................... 63
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for Honorable Jane Harman. 64
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for Honorable Jane Harman 64
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for John M. Keane......... 64
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for John M. Keane........ 65
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for Seth G. Jones......... 65
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for Seth G. Jones........ 66
A FALSE NARRATIVE ENDANGERS THE HOMELAND
----------
Wednesday, January 15, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, King, Broun, Miller,
Meehan, Duncan, Marino, Barletta, Hudson, Brooks, Perry,
Sanford, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Higgins, Richmond, Payne,
O'Rourke, Horsford, and Swalwell.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to examine the
danger to the homeland from the threat of extremism. I now
recognize myself for an opening statement.
Today the President's rhetoric on the threat of al-Qaeda
and its franchises are in stark contrast to the reality we are
witnessing in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Whether or
not the downplaying of the spread of these Islamic extremist
groups and the real threat they pose, which are metastasizing
from the civil war in Syria, is to further a political agenda
or simply to avoid the conflict altogether, I believe this
false narrative greatly endangers our National security.
Protecting this Nation requires that we correctly identify
the threats against it. It also requires that the United States
lead on the world stage. I am increasingly concerned that we
are doing very little of both. The administration has labeled
the Fort Hood massacre in my home State ``workplace violence,''
explained Benghazi away with a protest to a video as opposed to
an al-Qaeda-driven attack, and removed words like ``violent
Islamist extremism'' from their vernacular. With each attack,
the administration appears to distance itself from who is
behind it.
President Obama repeatedly tells us that al-Qaeda is on its
heels and on the run. In May of last year, the President said
that Osama bin Laden is dead and so are most of his top
lieutenants, there have been no large-scale attacks on the
United States, and our homeland is more secure. Killing bin
Laden was an important accomplishment, but it has not put al-
Qaeda on its heels or secured the homeland. In fact, Peter
Bergen just recently wrote in an article last week that al-
Qaeda appears to control more territory in the Arab world than
it has done at any time in its history.
Foremost in the narrative is the administration's frequent
use of the ``core al-Qaeda concept.'' This is a false construct
in my judgment and misleading for a number of reasons. Today
there is no central al-Qaeda nucleus. References to a ``core
al-Qaeda'' imply that its defeat would dismantle terrorist
efforts around the world and eliminate the terrorist threat to
the homeland. This is simply not the case. Over time the term
``al-Qaeda'' has come to symbolize an ideology of hate towards
the West, with the goal of establishment of a Caliphate ruled
by Sharia law and the pathway there through violent jihad. We
are seeing it spread, play out in the Middle East, in Africa,
and in the Caucasus. And although many terrorist groups
subscribe to this ideology, we must understand that they are
independent organizations planning and conducting operations
without the oversight of an al-Qaeda central command.
The only core is the ideology itself, and the defeat of an
ideology requires more than just drone strikes. The failure to
recognize this truth prevents us from understanding the real
threat from Islamic extremism and clouds our judgment in
fighting against it. Ultimately, you cannot defeat an enemy you
are unwilling to define.
The second part of the false narrative is our increasing
willingness to abdicate our responsibility as a world leader.
In the aftermath of World War II, President Truman said, ``The
peoples of the Earth face the future with grave uncertainty,
composed almost equally of great hopes and great fears. In this
time of doubt they look to the United States as never before
for goodwill, strength, and wise leadership.'' Again today the
people of the world face the future with grave uncertainty and
they look to the United States for stable leadership.
We are witnessing a worldwide rebalancing as we have never
seen before in modern history. This time, however, it is
exacerbated by a Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict that has
consumed the Middle East, caused great unrest across the
region, and is forcing countries around the world to intercede.
Yet our steadfast leadership is notably absent.
Terrorist groups are multiplying. They are spreading like
wildfire, I would submit, like a spider web across Northern
Africa. Foreign fighters are pouring in every day into Syria at
an alarming rate, while Syria itself is being pulled apart by
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Red lines are drawn and crossed,
diminishing our world standing and forcing other countries to
act where we have failed.
Our negotiations with Iran damaged our relationship with
Saudi Arabia and Israel. American forces pulled out of Iraq,
and al-Qaeda now has taken over Fallujah, once the symbol of
the United States' commitment to stability in Iraq. We are
pulling out of Afghanistan, where not so long ago the 9/11
masterminds plotted against the United States. In Egypt, we
have been indecisive with our support while radical elements
are growing.
Our lack of leadership has damaged our standing in the
world and created a power vacuum being filled by terrorists who
are prospering in our absence. President Kennedy told us, ``Our
strength, as well as our convictions, have imposed upon this
Nation the role of leader in freedom's cause.'' I believe that
statement is as true today as it was then. It is through our
stable leadership and clearly identifying our enemies that we
will secure the homeland and protect the American people.
I look forward to this distinguished panel's testimony and
today's discussion. I want to thank all of the witnesses for
being here today.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also welcome our witnesses today.
Ms. Harman, good to see you. As you know, you were an
original Member of this body when it was a select committee,
without any jurisdiction. We still have a little bit around.
Chairman McCaul. We are working on that.
Mr. Thompson. Today's hearing seeks to examine whether U.S.
policy to address unrest in the Middle East, the splintering of
al-Qaeda, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan
and Iraq adversely affect homeland security in the United
States. Such an examination must begin with an authoritative
statement of this administration's policies and actions in each
area.
However, because there is no witness from the
administration for us to question about these policies, it is
unclear how this hearing will aid this committee's
understanding of these critical issues or help inform our
oversight of the policies necessary to impact this Nation's
homeland security.
It appears that this hearing begins with the assumption
that to maintain safety and security within its borders this
Nation must use its military to address every threat outside of
its shores. Given such a perspective, the United States would
be in a position of constantly engaging in military action
abroad. After $1.5 trillion and 6,000 American lives lost,
there are many in this country who want us to consider a viable
exit strategy. There are also many people who believe that the
safety of this Nation can be secured by means that are tailored
to each circumstance based on a realistic assessment of the
threat.
As we consider the threat, we must acknowledge our current
posture. Most experts agree that the death of Osama bin Laden
has substantially weakened al-Qaeda. Its capabilities to mount
large-scale attacks have been reduced. However, al-Qaeda is
more decentralized, more dependent on its affiliates, and has
come to rely on its ability to radicalize and recruit distant
recruits to carry out attacks. The lack of a clear
organizational and leadership structure has severely diminished
the group's ability to develop joint plans and wage large-scale
attacks.
I am not advocating that America return to a pre-September
11 posture. I don't know anyone who would advocate such a
position. However, we must plan based on the facts as they are,
not the facts as they were. As a legislative body, we must ask
serious questions about our homeland security policies and how
our posture should be given the on-going dismantling of al-
Qaeda. The Congressional Research Service has said that some of
the questions we should ask involve the costs associated with
continued U.S. military presence and the challenges of
restoring the readiness of our forces. We must discuss a
strategy that protects U.S. interests, as well as the
integration of efforts across U.S. Government agencies in
support of a broad U.S. political strategy.
As we consider our policies, we need to ask about the
National security apparatus that has developed in this country.
The revelations about the massive collection of information and
the operation of the FISA courts have caused people to question
how these activities have improved our homeland. I understand
that the administration will announce its plans to revamp the
NSA surveillance programs. I look forward to hearing about
those plans. This committee needs to be part of the discussion
about the effects that these metadata collection programs have
on our homeland security.
Mr. Chairman, I agree that we need to take a serious look
at how world events play into our homeland security policies.
This Congress must be willing to legislate and make changes in
the laws that affect the homeland security of this Nation.
However, before we legislate, we need to be willing to discuss
the law and the underlying policies with all the relevant
parties, the Congress and the administration, in the room. I
look forward to having that discussion. I also look forward to
the administration being invited here to testify about how
their overseas policies will affect our homeland security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
We are pleased here today to have four distinguished
witnesses with us to discuss this important topic. First, we
are delighted to have Senator Joseph Lieberman. He represented
the State of Connecticut in the United States Senate from 1989
to 2013. In the months after September 11, Senator Lieberman
led the fight to create the Department of Homeland Security,
which led to the creation of this committee and the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security, which he chaired until his
retirement from Congress last year.
Next, we have our dear friend who served on this
committee--she actually was sort of my boss, if you will. She
was the Chairwoman of the Intelligence Subcommittee as I was
Ranking Member--Congresswoman Jane Harman.
It is great to see you here today.
She represented California's 36th District in the U.S.
House of Representatives from 1993 to 2011, served on multiple
Congressional committees, boards, and commissions, including
this committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Committee on Armed Services. She is
currently the president of the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars and is a member of the Defense Policy Board
and the Homeland Security Advisory Committee, among others.
It is great to see you.
Next, we are pleased to have a very distinguished witness,
General Jack Keane, a retired four-star general who completed
37 years in public service in December 2003, culminating as
acting chief of staff and vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army.
He currently serves as chairman of the board of the Institute
for the Study of War and sits on the board of directors for
MetLife and General Dynamics.
Thank you, sir, for being here.
Next is Dr. Seth Jones, the associate director of the
International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND
Corporation. He served as plans officer and adviser to the
commanding general of the U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan,
as well as representative for commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command to the assistant secretary of defense for
special operations.
The witnesses' full written statements will be included in
the record. The Chairman now recognizes Senator Lieberman for
his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, FORMER SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Mr. Lieberman. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson. It is great to be back before you. Thank you for
convening this hearing. Thanks for inviting me to testify.
Thanks for putting me in the great company of the other
witnesses at the table.
I think it is very important that you are holding this
hearing, and let me briefly explain why. In the aftermath of
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the overwhelming focus of
our Government and of the American people was on the threat of
terrorism. Twelve years later, this is no longer the case. Our
loss of focus is in part a consequence of the success we have
achieved, namely, that we have not had another catastrophic
attack on our homeland since that terrible Tuesday morning in
September 2001.
But pride in this achievement must be tempered by an
awareness of some harsh realities. First, al-Qaeda and its
affiliates remain a ruthless, determined, and adaptive
adversary. Second, the underlying ideology that inspires and
drives al-Qaeda to attack us and our allies, namely, the
ideology of violent Islamist extremism, is neither defeated nor
exhausted. It manifests itself not just in a resurgent al-
Qaeda, but in terrorist organizations that are either
unaffiliated with al-Qaeda or loosely affiliated with it but
have exactly the same goals and capability to use violence
against innocents.
For that reason, our safety as a Nation is ultimately
inseparable from our ability to meet the fullness of the
threat. Our security as a Nation also requires, as you have
said, that we stay engaged in the world beyond our borders.
That is the best way to prevent another terrorist attack
against America like the one that occurred on 9/11.
Yet increasingly we hear voices on both sides of the
political spectrum who say that the threat of terrorism is
receding, that the end of this conflict is here or near, and
therefore that we can withdraw from much of the rest of the
world. That narrative, as the title of this hearing suggests,
is false and really does endanger our homeland.
There is no question that the United States under President
Bush and President Obama has inflicted severe damage to core
al-Qaeda, the senior leadership that reconstituted itself in
the mid-2000s in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan
after they were driven by the courageous American military from
neighboring Afghanistan after 9/11. But to borrow a phrase from
General Petraeus, while the progress we have achieved against
core al-Qaeda is real and significant, it is also fragile and
reversible. For example, and this is a very timely example,
core al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan has been degraded
by the persistent, targeted application of military force
against those individuals and networks.
The precondition for those operations and the intelligence
that enables them has been America's presence in Afghanistan.
If the United States withdraws all our military forces from
Afghanistan at the end of this year, the so-called ``zero
option,'' which some now advocate, you can be sure that al-
Qaeda will regenerate on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan
border. If you doubt that, I urge you to look at what is now
happening in western Iraq, where just a few years ago, during
the U.S.-led surge, al-Qaeda was dealt an even more crippling
blow than core al-Qaeda has suffered in Pakistan. Yet now it is
al-Qaeda that is surging back in Iraq, hoisting its black flag
over cities like Fallujah and Ramadi and murdering hundreds of
innocent Iraqis just in the last year.
To me this leads to an important conclusion, which is that
while space for core al-Qaeda in tribal Pakistan has been
shrunk, thanks to persistent U.S. action and leadership, new
territory where al-Qaeda affiliates can find sanctuary has
grown significantly during the same period, particularly in the
Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Al-Qaeda
and other violent Islamist extremist groups have long exploited
Muslim-majority countries that have been weakened or fragmented
by conflict and neglected by the international community,
including the United States. They take advantage of these
places to recruit, radicalize, and train the next generation of
extremist foot soldiers. They use these places to plot and plan
attacks, including against our homeland.
That is why al-Qaeda and its affiliates first went to
Afghanistan in the 1990s, that is why they later turned to
Yemen and Somalia in the 2000s, and that is why today they are
fighting to build sanctuaries in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. There
is now a clear, present, and increasing threat to America and
our allies from those three countries, but administration
policymakers have signified that any involvement, and I stress
any involvement by the U.S. military there is for all intents
and purposes off the table. That means that the United States
will not be able to assist our local allies in combating the
rise of al-Qaeda in these countries. It also means that we are
failing to help deal with the underlying conditions that are
making al-Qaeda's resurgence possible.
To put it as bluntly as I can, I do not today see a
credible or coherent American strategy for these countries--
Syria, Iraq, and Libya--that most threaten to emerge as al-
Qaeda's newest and most dangerous footholds, places from which
terrorist attacks against our homeland can and will originate.
This failure, it should be added, has consequences for our
National security that extend beyond counterterrorism. Across
the Middle East and beyond, the credibility of American
leadership is being questioned as it has not been for a very
long time. Among friends and enemies alike there are doubts
about our staying power, questions about our reliability as an
ally, and suspicions that at the end of the day America will
hesitate to back up our promises and historic commitments with
the use of force if necessary in a dangerous world. That is the
reality, I believe, of how the United States is seen right now
in too many places in the world.
Some in Washington look at what is happening in Syria,
Iraq, and Libya and downplay their significance for our
security and with it our need to get involved. Yes, al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups are there, these skeptic say, but they are
mostly focused on fighting other Muslims. The situation is
confusing and chaotic, we are told, and after all, these Sunni-
Shia conflicts have gone on forever and will go on forever.
``It is someone else's civil war'' is a familiar refrain we are
hearing often again. That is, again, a very false and dangerous
narrative.
But keep in mind that 20 years ago, during the 1990s, most
people in Washington dismissed what was happening in
Afghanistan as ``someone else's civil war,'' and thus began the
road to 9/11. I fear very much that 20 years from now, or less,
someone else is going to be sitting here testifying before this
committee saying much the same about pulling back from Syria,
Libya, and Iraq today.
In brief, what do I think the United States should be doing
now to protect our people against future 9/11 attacks? First, I
don't advocate sending tens of thousands of troops to these
countries. I don't believe it is within our power or our
responsibility to solve every problem these countries face.
These are the standard, and I think hollow, straw man arguments
against what we can and should do. There is a lot we can and
should do.
In Syria, we can and should much more aggressively provide
militarily-relevant support to non-extremist rebel forces. In
Iraq, we can and should make clear to the government that we
are willing to support Iraqis against al-Qaeda with U.S. air
power, as well as putting a small number of embedded advisers
on the ground while using that increased assistance as leverage
to encourage the Maliki government to politically reconcile,
particularly with Sunnis. In Libya, we can put in place, and
should, a large-scale, well-resourced U.S.-led effort to build
up the new Libyan Army and security forces as quickly as
possible.
In Afghanistan, we can choose not to squander the gains of
the past decade and dishonor the brave Americans who risked and
lost their lives there. Instead, we can keep a sufficient
follow-on military presence to sustain the increasingly-capable
Afghan National Security Forces in our shared fight against al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. That will also safeguard, incidentally,
the gains that have been made in human rights and human
development more broadly, particularly among Afghan women, all
of which will be erased if the Taliban returns.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, none of these possible
actions by the United States represent simple or quick
solutions. There are no easy solutions to this threat. But
there are smart, strong steps we can take that will put us in a
better position to deal with the evolving threats we face here
at home and that will ultimately make us safer as a country.
Mr. Chairman, I would just ask unanimous consent that the
rest of my statement be entered into the record as if read. I
thank you again.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you,
Senator, for your analysis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph I. Lieberman
January 15, 2014
Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished
Members of this committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear
before you to testify today.
Let me begin by commending you for holding this hearing. In the
aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the overwhelming focus
of our Government and of the American people was on the threat of
terrorism. Twelve years later, that is no longer the case. Our loss of
focus is in part a consequence of the success we have achieved--namely,
the fact that we have not had another catastrophic attack on our
homeland since that terrible Tuesday morning in September, 2001.
The absence of such an attack, however, is not because of an
absence of terrorist plots or plans against us. Rather, it has been the
consequence of vigilance, determination, courage, and creativity by
National security professionals and National leaders across two
administrations, as well as the close cooperation and help of America's
allies and partners around the world. It is also due to a series of
sweeping National security reforms and innovations enacted in the
aftermath of 9/11 that have made our Nation safer.
Pride in this achievement, however, must be tempered by an
awareness of several harsh realities. First, al-Qaeda and its
affiliates remain a ruthless, determined, and adaptive adversary.
Second, the underlying ideology that inspires and drives al-Qaeda to
attack us and our allies--the ideology of violent Islamist extremism--
is neither defeated nor exhausted. It manifests itself not just in al-
Qaeda but in terrorist organizations that are either unaffiliated with
al-Qaeda or loosely affiliated with it.
For that reason, our safety as a Nation is ultimately inseparable
from our own ability to adapt to meet this changing threat. It also
requires that we stay engaged in the world beyond our borders. That is
the best way to prevent another terrorist attack against America like
the one that occurred on 9/11.
Yet increasingly we hear voices--on both sides of the political
spectrum--who say that the threat from terrorism is receding, the end
of this conflict is here or near, and therefore that we can withdraw
from much of the rest of the world.
This narrative is badly and dangerously mistaken.
There is no question, the United States--under President Bush and
President Obama--has inflicted severe damage to ``core'' al-Qaeda, the
senior leadership that reconstituted itself in the mid-2000s in the
tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan, after being driven by the
American military from neighboring Afghanistan after
9/11.
To borrow a phrase from General David Petraeus, while the progress
we have achieved against core al-Qaeda is real and significant, it is
also fragile and reversible.
What has degraded core al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan has
been the persistent, targeted application of military force against
these individuals and networks. The precondition for these operations,
and the intelligence that enables them, has been our presence in
Afghanistan. If the United States withdraws all of our military forces
from Afghanistan at the end of this year--the so-called ``zero
option,'' which some now advocate--you can be sure that al-Qaeda will
regenerate, eventually on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.
If you doubt this, I urge you to look at what is now happening in
western Iraq, where just a few years ago, during the U.S.-led surge,
al-Qaeda was dealt an even more crippling blow than core al-Qaeda has
suffered in Pakistan. Yet now it is al-Qaeda that is surging back in
Iraq, hoisting its black flag over cities like Fallujah and Ramadi,
murdering hundreds of innocent Iraqis this year, with violence surging
back to 2008 levels.
This leads to an important conclusion. While space for core al-
Qaeda in tribal Pakistan has been shrunk thanks to persistent U.S.
action in recent years, new territory where al-Qaeda affiliates can
find sanctuary has grown significantly during this same period, in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups have long exploited
Muslim-majority countries that have been weakened or fragmented by
conflict, and neglected by the international community. They take
advantage of these places to recruit, radicalize, and train the next
generation of extremist foot soldiers. They use them to plot and plan
attacks.
That is why al-Qaeda and its affiliates first went to Afghanistan
in the 1990s. That is why they later turned to Yemen and Somalia in the
2000s. And it is why today they are fighting to build sanctuaries in
Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Several factors make the prospect of al-Qaeda sanctuaries in these
three countries especially dangerous for the United States and our
allies. The first is their respective locations. Syria and Iraq are in
the heart of the Arab Middle East, bordering key American allies like
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel. Libya and Syria are
Mediterranean countries--comparatively easy to reach by terrorist
recruits from the West, in contrast to remote Afghanistan and Pakistan.
And Libya is also adjacent to the vast Sahel, with its weak and poorly-
governed states.
In the face of the clear, present, and increasing threat to America
and our allies from these places, American policymakers have signaled
that any involvement by the U.S. military is for all intents and
purposes off the table. This means that the United States is not
effectively able to assist our local allies in combating the rise of
al-Qaeda in these countries. It also means that we are failing to help
deal with the underlying conditions that are making al-Qaeda's
resurgence possible.
Put very bluntly, I do not see a credible or coherent U.S. strategy
right now for exactly those countries--Syria, Iraq, and Libya--that
most threaten to emerge as al-Qaeda's newest and most dangerous
footholds--places, from which terrorist attacks against our homeland
can and will originate.
According to one estimate, there are now more foreign fighters in
Syria than in Iraq and Afghanistan combined over the past 10 years.
This failure, it should be added, has consequences for our National
security that extend far beyond counterterrorism. Across the Middle
East and beyond, the credibility of American leadership is being
questioned as it has not been for a very long time. Among friends and
enemies alike, there are doubts about our staying power; questions
about our reliability as an ally; and suspicions that, at the end of
the day, we will hesitate to back up our promises and historic
commitments with the use of force--if necessary.
This is the reality of how the United States is seen right now in
too much of the rest of the world.
Some in Washington look at what is happening in Syria, Iraq, and
Libya and downplay their significance for our security, and with it,
our need to get involved. Yes, al Qaeda-affiliated groups are there,
these skeptics say, but they are mostly focused on fighting other
Muslims. The situation is confusing and chaotic, we are told, and these
Sunni-Shia conflicts have gone on forever. It is ``someone else's civil
war'' is a familiar refrain we are hearing often again.
But keep in mind that 20 years ago, during the 1990s, most people
in Washington dismissed what was happening in Afghanistan as ``someone
else's civil war.'' And thus began the road to 9/11. I fear very much
that 20 years from now or less, someone else will be sitting here,
testifying before this committee, saying much the same about pulling
back from Syria, Libya, and Iraq today.
What do I believe the United States can and should do now to
protect our people against future 9/11 attacks? First, I do not
advocate sending tens of thousands of troops to these countries. Nor do
I believe it is within our power, or our responsibility, to solve every
problem these countries face. These are hollow straw man arguments
against what we can and should do.
And there is much we can and should be doing today that we are not.
In Syria, we can much more aggressively and creatively provide
militarily-relevant support to non-extremist rebel forces. In Iraq, we
can make clear to the government that we are willing to support Iraqis
against al-Qaeda with U.S. airpower, as well as putting a small number
of embedded advisors on the ground, while using that increased
assistance as leverage to encourage political reconciliation. In Libya,
we can put in place a large-scale, well-resourced, U.S.-led effort to
build up new Libyan army and security forces as quickly as possible--
rather than the balkanized, poorly-resourced, decades-long effort now
in place.
And in Afghanistan, we can choose not to squander the gains of the
past decade and dishonor the brave Americans who lost or risked their
lives there. Instead we can keep a sufficient follow-on military
presence to sustain the increasingly capable and courageous Afghan
National Security Forces in our shared fight against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, that will also safeguard the gains that have been made in
human rights and human development more broadly, particularly among
Afghan women, all of which will be erased if the Taliban returns.
None of these possible actions by the United States represent
simple or quick solutions. There are no easy solutions to the problems
here. But there are smart, measured steps we can take that will put us
in a stronger position to deal with the evolving threats we face and
that will ultimately make us safer as a country here at home.
It is worth noting that, in all of these countries, we have
repeatedly seen that al-Qaeda and its extremist vision for society are
rejected by the overwhelming majority of people living there. In Iraq,
Syria, and Libya, we have seen popular, grassroots movements rise up
against al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. The question is whether we
provide these anti-extremist popular movements with the help and
support they need to succeed, or leave them on their own to fail.
This is especially urgent in Syria right now. In just the past
several days, there has been a grassroots uprising in the northern part
of the country against the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, because al-
Qaeda has alienated the local population with its brutality and
violence. The question is, do we now come to the aid of these rebels
who are in a two-front fight against al-Qaeda and Bashar al Assad--
which is to say, against Iran--and who desperately need our help? If we
fail to do so, and al-Qaeda defeats them, the consequences will be dire
not only for Syria, but for our own National security.
Let me make one final point. The Obama administration has
repeatedly narrowed the rhetorical scope of this conflict from what it
criticized as an amorphous and open-ended ``war on terrorism'' to an
armed conflict against a discrete and identifiable group: al-Qaeda and
its affiliates. Our goal, the President has said, is to disrupt and
ultimately dismantle the entity known as al-Qaeda and those affiliated
with it.
There is an argument for this approach. After all, the enemy we are
fighting is not ``terrorism,'' which is simply a tactic. But an
organization-centric approach to counterterrorism, as the Obama
administration has advocated, is ultimately inadequate because al-Qaeda
as an organization can be eviscerated, but it will regenerate as long
as the ideology that inspires it survives. An organization-centric
approach may also inadvertently cause us to miss the threat posed by
groups that share al-Qaeda's ideology and ambitions to harm us, but
that lack meaningful organizational ties to it. Indeed, it seems
plausible that this is part of what happened in Benghazi in 2012.
The fact is, ultimate success in the struggle we are in depends not
simply on the death of particular terrorist leaders or the destruction
of a particular terrorist group, important though that is. Rather, it
requires the discrediting of violent Islamist extremism as a worldview.
And let me underscore here, the enemy is violent Islamist
extremism--a political ideology that seeks to justify totalitarian
governance by perverting religion. The enemy, we can never stress
enough, is not Islam itself.
Nor, I would add, our enemy is political Islam per se. In fact,
there are political Islamists who are neither violent nor extremist,
and who recognize al-Qaeda to be a mortal threat just as much if not
more than we do. In Tunisia, for instance, we see an Islamist party
that has proven thus far to be respectful of democracy and of political
pluralism.
In fact, such Islamists--operating in a democratic framework--may
ultimately prove to be the most powerful and effective force to
delegitimize and destroy violent Islamist extremism. Conversely,
repressive regimes in Muslim countries are likely in the long run to
radicalize people and push them towards violent extremism. For this
reason, the United States does have a core National interest in the
political development of the Muslim world towards greater freedom.
Mr. Chairman, the progress we have made since 9/11 in securing our
homeland is real. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that
this fight is anywhere near over. Perhaps the best description of where
we find ourselves can be found in the familiar words of a great
statesman of the last century, speaking of a very different struggle
against another totalitarian foe.
In late 1942, after the first British victories in North Africa,
Winston Churchill told the House of Commons: ``Now this is not the end.
It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of
the beginning.''
So, too, perhaps it is for us now ``the end of the beginning'' of
our war against violent Islamist extremism. If so, that should give us
reason to hope--but also grounds to recognize much danger, difficulty,
and hard work lies ahead.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes our former
colleague, Congresswoman Jane Harman, for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to so
many good friends. This feels like a homecoming. As you pointed
out, I spent 8 years on this committee, 4 when it was a select
committee and then 4 when we finally eked out a little
jurisdiction to form a real committee. I worked with most of
you, certainly all of you in the top row. As you pointed out,
Chairman McCaul, you and I were partners on the Subcommittee on
Intelligence. Mr. Thompson, when he chaired the committee and
when he was the Ranking Member, and I traveled the world
looking at garden spots where terror cells are growing.
I feel that the history of bipartisanship of this committee
has set an example for this House, and I hope it will continue
to set an example for this House--and, oh, by the way, that
other body somewhere in the Capitol--because my little
deathless phrase that I have been repeating for years is the
terrorists won't check our party registrations before they blow
us up. We need to focus on this. Sorting ourselves out by party
is not helpful.
Now I am at the Wilson Center, a garden of
nonpartisanship--I have to say that feels very good--but I
continue to focus on these issues. As you pointed out, I am on
the Defense Policy Board, the State Department's Foreign Policy
Board, the DNI board, and recently joined the Homeland Security
Board, where I will hopefully advise Jeh Johnson in his new
role, and I care intensely about the policies here and getting
them right.
So in true bipartisan fashion, let me start with something
not in my testimony, but that is an endorsement of some of the
things you said, Chairman McCaul, and some of the thing you
said, Ranking Member Thompson, in your opening statements,
because I think they are both true, as are many of the things
my dear friend Joe Lieberman just said.
Chairman McCaul, you said that the terror threat is growing
and some are not paying adequate attention to that. The terror
threat has changed from the 9/11 days. The core al-Qaeda, as I
think you said, and I know Senator Lieberman said, has been
substantially destroyed by the efforts of two administrations,
one a Republican and one a Democrat. I think most people would
agree that President Obama not only continued the efforts of
President Bush, but he increased those efforts against core al-
Qaeda, and most of those high-value targets have been removed.
So it is less of a force.
But the terror threat has morphed. It is now a loosely-
affiliated horizontal threat. Many of those groups are called
al-Qaeda, some are, some aren't, but they are opportunistic,
and they come together like cancer cells when necessary. The
new organization, ISIS, the Islamist State in Iraq and Syria,
is called al-Qaeda. It really isn't technically al-Qaeda. It
was the old Zarqawi organization, that Osama bin Laden
disliked, Zarqawi in Iraq was then taken out. But his
successors run this organization, and it has taken advantage of
an unfortunate vacuum in Iraq because, unfortunately, President
Maliki, I think, makes inadequate efforts in some of the Sunni
parts of his country, but also in Syria for obvious reasons.
So the terror threat has changed. But Ranking Member
Thompson is also correct that to defeat this threat we need
more than kinetic force. Playing Whac-A-Mole, which we have
done pretty well and which we should continue to do in some
parts of the world using drones and other activities, will
eliminate individuals, but it won't defeat the threat. We
really in the end have to win the argument.
That is why a whole-of-Government approach is so important.
That approach is embraced by our Defense Department, oh, by the
way, which has done some of this as a Defense Deferment, by our
State Department, by public-private partnerships, by NGOs, and
by many both in this body and around the world. We need, in
addition to applying these strategies, to project an American
narrative, and I think all of us agree on that, that explains
what we are doing, why we are doing it, and persuades some kid
in the boonies of Yemen not to strap on a suicide vest but
rather to hopefully join a productive economy in his country,
go to a school that doesn't teach extremism in the guise of
having people memorize the Koran but teaches reasonable
subjects in a truly dispassionate way. We have to help build
those schools, by the way, and we have to make sure that girls
get to go to them.
So I have a long statement here, but I want to now turn my
focus, because I remember the 5-minute rule and I am about to
exceed it, as did my buddy here, on two things that I think are
the more immediate threats to the homeland, and they relate to
terror, obviously, but I don't want us to lose sight as we are
thinking about foreign terror organizations.
One of them is home-grown terror, something this committee
has focused on extensively. Since 9/11, there have been almost
400 home-grown terrorists indicted on terror-related charges or
killed before they could be indicted in this country. Lone
wolves are a big part of this problem. This committee has
studied--I know this because I was involved in it--how people
who have radical beliefs, which are protected under our
Constitution, then transition to wanting to be engaged in
violent acts which are not protected. We passed legislation a
couple of times, which unfortunately died in the Senate. But it
is a huge issue, and we have to look at it in our country. Then
we have to look at these disaffected Americans being recruited
for attacks abroad by al-Shabaab, by groups in Syria, et
cetera, all of which has been recently in the press.
But the other issue that is a huge imminent problem, and
you and I were just talking about this, Mr. Chairman, is cyber
terror. It is absolutely imperative that Congress pull together
to pass legislation that gives our Government the tools to work
with private industry, which is a huge partner in this, on
solving this problem. Congress has been, alas, extremely
partisan; there have been all kinds of problems why bills
haven't passed. I know that Senator Lieberman and my dear
friend Senator Collins had a bill in the Senate that they
couldn't move. You just told me that there may be some chance
of moving a bill here. I hope so, Godspeed, because we are way
behind the curve in understanding, responding to, adapting to,
and preventing cyber intrusions, especially in the private
sector. Sadly, the leaks by Edward Snowden have given some of
our tool kit to bad guys, our technical tool kit, and I think
this is pernicious.
So in conclusion, the threats today are different. They are
on a smaller scale, but they are very serious and we have to
keep focused on it. We need a narrative and a whole-of-
Government approach as much as or more than we need a kinetic
approach, in my view. But endless partisanship is a huge
obstacle to progress, and I urge this committee, in true
Homeland Security Committee fashion, to pull together and do
the right things about cyber terror, home-grown terror, and
helping us make the wise decisions about a U.S. international
role. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Harman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jane Harman
January 15, 2014
I've always said that terrorists won't stop to check our party
registration before they blow us up. One of the hallmarks of my
relationship with Chairman Michael McCaul was that we worked closely
together to solve problems--we didn't let politics get in the way.
I'd like to make three basic points:
1. I watched closely for many years as al-Qaeda and associated
terror groups changed. While the U.S. Government does not do a perfect
job explaining the evolution, we are addressing new threats and in my
own view making progress. A promising development is the indigenous
push-back against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria--or ISIS--in
Syria. This is reminiscent of the Arab Awakening in Anbar, and might
unify the Syrian opposition.
The problem with the U.S. narrative is not that we are underplaying
the terror threat. We are inadequately explaining our agenda to people
in the United States--and in the region. If we leave a vacuum, the bad
guys fill it with their narrative.
2. Secretary John Kerry's efforts to negotiate peace in the Middle
East and a nuclear deal with Iran are heroic and if successful will
have a major impact on stability and security in the region. They will
also ``reset'' how the United States is viewed.
3. Since 9/11, there have been almost 400 home-grown terrorists
indicted on terror-related charges or killed before they could be
indicted. The biggest threats to the U.S. homeland are home-grown,
lone-wolf terror attacks and cyber-terror attacks.
a. Lone wolves
Radicalization is an individualized process and the
vulnerable come from varied backgrounds. Recent reports
that Syrian extremist groups are recruiting for U.S.
attacks are extremely concerning. (See my LA Times op-ed
dated January 6, 2014).
Reverse recruitment is also happening, like al-Shabaab in
Minnesota.
b. Cyber terror
We are way behind the curve in understanding, responding
to, adapting to, and preventing cyber intrusions--
especially in the private sector. We're just starting to
protect better our physical computer systems. But we've
barely touched security for mobile devices.
Snowden leaks have compromised a lot of our technical
ability. Some, like former Department of Homeland Security
Assistant Secretary for Policy Stewart Baker, suggest that
there are many countries that may have used the leaks to
bolster their own capabilities. That means we lose the
competitive edge.
Most terror groups or lone wolves don't have advanced
technical capability yet. But they learned quickly how to
use the internet to radicalize, recruit, and fundraise; why
wouldn't they learn how to launch attacks that way?
It's not hard to buy exploits and find someone with the
expertise to deploy them.
So we have an opportunity now to harden our critical
infrastructure. The President's Executive Order is a good
start. But legislation is essential to compel industry to
share threat data--not personal information about
individuals--with the Department of Homeland Security and
provide appropriate immunity when it does.
H.R. 624, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection
Act, (Rep. Mike Rogers) has passed the House. H.R. 756, the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, (Rep. Mike McCaul) has
passed the House. The Senate approach is different and
progress is urgently needed.
Spillover from the Snowden leaks has meant that businesses
are even more reluctant to cooperate. We need more brain
cells on this problem because it is the key to preventing a
catastrophic attack.
So, what to do? Just as we've layered security across ports and
transportation systems, we need to do the same in the cyber world. The
SAFE Ports Act, a product of the House Homeland Security Committee
(Lungren/Harman) in 2006, could be a model--leaving the more
controversial pieces for stand-alone legislation.
CONCLUSION
1. Threats today are different and on a smaller scale. Al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula describes this shift in its English-language on-
line magazine Inspire as a ``strategy of a thousand cuts.'' And they
aren't expensive: ``Operation Hemorrhage''--AQAP's printer-cartridge
bombing attempt--cost less than $5,000.
2. We need a narrative and whole-of-Government approach more than
kinetics.
3. But partisanship is a huge obstacle to progress.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Jane Harman. It is great to see
you again.
Let me just say that today actually Congressman Pat Meehan
and Yvette Clarke will be marking up our cybersecurity bill at
the subcommittee level. I have enjoyed a good relationship with
the Ranking Member, as you said, in the spirit of
bipartisanship on this committee. I believe it will be passed,
hopefully unanimously, just as the border security bill was
passed unanimously out of this committee. I think when it comes
to National security, as you say, they don't check our party
affiliation, and we should be working together when it comes to
National security. So thank you for that comment.
Next, the Chairman now recognizes General Keane for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, (RET. U.S. ARMY), CHAIRMAN
OF THE BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
General Keane. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Minority, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you
for inviting me to testify today on an important subject
concerning the security of American people. I am honored to
share this panel with three distinguished colleagues,
particularly two friends, Senator Joe Lieberman and
Congresswoman Jane Harman. Let me just say that they are both
great American patriots, and I want to thank them publicly for
their many years of devoted and selfless service to this great
country.
You have asked to us consider the President's speech in May
at the National Defense University as a basis for our
commentary on the security of the United States and the
American people. It is true that bin Laden is dead, there have
been no major attacks on the homeland, and fewer troops are in
harm's way. But it is not true that our alliances are stronger.
Indeed, they are weaker because our allies are fundamentally
questioning the will of the United States. Many allies believe
the United States will not be there for them in a time of
peril, and sadly some recent polling are indicating that the
United States' standing in the world is at its lowest since
prior to World War II.
How could this happen? Is this because of the protracted
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is it the U.S. backing of Israel
and our inability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute?
Absolutely not, in my judgment. It is because of American
leadership. When American leadership is strong in the world,
the world is a safer place. When American leadership is
inconsistent, indecisive, and we are willing to permit others
to lead who do not have the capacity, or when we are paralyzed
by the fear of adverse consequence, then American leadership is
weak and the world is a more dangerous place. As such, our
adversaries are emboldened, they become more aggressive, they
take more risk. The results are more death, more casualties,
and the security of the American people is threatened.
Tragically, this is where we are today.
Despite our success in denying sanctuary and driving the
al-Qaeda from Afghanistan to Pakistan, defeating the al-Qaeda
in Iraq, while also killing Osama bin Laden and many al-Qaeda
leaders, the harsh reality is that radical Islam, the al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, represent an ambitious political movement
with a committed ideology. It is on the rise, and the evidence
is overwhelming.
The al-Qaeda are quickly taking control of western Iraq,
while they have seized control of northern Syria. The border is
nonexistent, and today there is a bona fide sanctuary from
which operations can be conducted against our allies in the
region, specifically Jordan. The radical Islamists were not the
catalysts for the revolutionary change that swept over the
Middle East 3-plus years ago, but they see geopolitical change
as opportunity to gain influence, and as such control territory
and people. This is happening in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia,
and Mali, while al-Qaeda affiliates are exerting pressure in
Somalia and Kenya.
Because of the failure, in my view, of American leadership,
the term ``radical Islam'' or ``Islam extremism'' is not
mentioned in U.S. policy, which is quite astounding.
Furthermore, 12 years after 9/11 we still have no comprehensive
strategy to defeat radical Islam or al-Qaeda. We do not even
have a military strategy. We use drones to kill al-Qaeda
leadership in Pakistan and Yemen, as we should, but that is not
a military strategy, it is a tactic and an instrument of war.
It has limitations also because leaders are replaced quickly in
an ideological movement and the mission goes on.
Contrast this current reality with our strategy and
policies in the 20th Century when the United States was
involved in another struggle, another ideological struggle,
communism. We fashioned a grand strategy, we organized major
alliances in Europe and Southeast Asia, in NATO and SEATO, to
contain it by agreeing on a common political goal, as well as
sharing intelligence, training, doctrine, equipment, and
tactics. We encouraged some of our best universities to study
the subject--whole departments grew up around the subject as a
matter of fact--and think tanks like my colleague's, RAND and
others, were initiated because of the challenge of communism.
After all, ideas in an ideological struggle truly matter.
To understand our adversaries' ideas, their history of
development, their weaknesses and strengths, and to challenge
our own ideas against them is fundamental to defining and
understanding our enemy. Today there is no such strategy. We
have no formal alliances to partner politically,
intellectually, and militarily against them. This is not about
our troops fighting against the radicals world-wide, but
assisting our allies so their troops can do it only when it is
necessary.
I agree with Congresswoman Harman. This is a whole-of-
Government approach, and it is largely nonkinetic. The radical
Islamists understand us better than we do them. As such, they
fear our ideas, democracy, and capitalism. The advancement of
these ideas in the region is a major threat to radical
Islamists because it makes it all the more difficult to bend
the people's will and force surrender.
This is why the Arab Spring is such a threat to them. No
one was demonstrating in the streets for radical Islam and
jihad to achieve a better life. The people in the streets were
looking at what the United States and the West has to help
change their lives, political and social justice, economic
opportunity. That is, democracy and capitalism. Therefore, the
radicals are all in to influence the outcome that is so
uncertain and unpredictable. On the contrary, ask any of our
friends in the region about U.S. policy in the Middle East and
the two most frequent descriptions are ``disengagement'' and
``retreat.''
No one can say with certainty, depending on open sources,
that any one of these al-Qaeda hot spots that we have mentioned
is a direct threat against the people of the United States. But
this much we can say, that when we permit sanctuary and
uninterrupted recruiting, training, planning, and equipping, as
the al-Qaeda was able to do for almost 10 years prior to 9/11,
then the risk to U.S. interests and the security of the
American people is exponentially higher. After all, what makes
this movement the most threatening we have ever faced is their
stated and unequivocal desire to use WMD against the people of
the United States.
Unchecked, radical Islam, an ambitious political movement,
is in an ideological struggle with the United States and its
allies that will dominate most of the 21st Century. We lost
3,000 Americans on our land and now almost 7,000 troops in
foreign lands as we attempt to defeat it and our people and our
way of life. We desperately need strong American leadership to
define radical Islam for what it is, to fashion a comprehensive
strategy, and to partner effectively with our allies to defeat
it. We have a long way to go.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
Prepared Statement of John M. Keane
January 15, 2014
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority, and distinguished Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on such an
important subject concerning the security of the American people. I am
honored to share this panel with my distinguished colleagues and
friends Senator Joe Lieberman and Congresswoman Jane Harman. They are
both great American patriots and thank you so much for your many years
of devoted and selfless service to the Nation.
You have asked us to consider the President's speech in May at NDU
as a basis for our commentary on the security of the United States and
the American people. It is true, that bin Laden is dead, there have
been no major attacks on the homeland and fewer troops are in harm's
way. But it is not true that our alliances are stronger, indeed, they
are weaker because our allies are fundamentally questioning the
``will'' of the United States; many allies believe the United States
will not be there for them in a time of peril and, sadly, U.S. standing
in the world is at its lowest since prior to WWII. How could this
happen? Is this because of the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the U.S. backing of Israel and our inability to resolve the Israeli/
Palestinian dispute? Absolutely not. This is because of American
leadership. When American leadership is strong in the world, the world
is a safer place. And when American leadership is inconsistent,
indecisive, and we are willing to permit others to lead who do not have
the capacity or when we are paralyzed by the fear of adverse
consequence, then American leadership is weak and the world is a more
dangerous place. As such, our adversaries are emboldened, they become
more aggressive, they take more risks and the results are more death,
more casualties, and the security of the American people is threatened.
Tragically, this is where we are today.
It is undeniable that since 9/11 the United States has been at war
with Radical Islam and, specifically, the al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
This is a very ambitious political movement designed to control
territory and people by first establishing a caliphate in Muslim lands
and eventually seeking world domination. It is an ideology drawing
extremist ideas from radical theologians and philosophers from the 14th
Century on, yet grounded in Islam, which is its belief system. Jihad is
the means to gain control using death and fear to force capitulation.
Despite our success in denying sanctuary and driving the al-Qaeda
from Afghanistan to Pakistan, defeating the al-Qaeda in Iraq (which
they openly admitted), while also killing UBL and many al-Qaeda
leaders, the harsh reality is that Radical Islam and the al-Qaeda
affiliates are on the rise and the evidence is overwhelming.
After the strategic blunder of leaving no residual force in
Iraq (and immunity for U.S. troops was a false issue) equally
damaging, was distancing ourselves from a long-term strategic
partnership between the United States and Iraq, leaving the al-
Qaeda to have re-emerged and the level of violence today is as
high as it was in 2008 and destined to get higher. The al-Qaeda
are quickly taking control of western Iraq while they have
seized control of northern Syria. The border between Syria and
Iraq from a Radical Islamist perspective is non-existent and
today there is a bona fide sanctuary from where operations can
be conducted against our allies in the region, specifically,
Jordan and other U.S. interests in the region.
The radical Islamists were not the catalyst for the
revolutionary change that swept over the Middle East 3-plus
years ago, but they see geo-political change as an opportunity
to gain influence and, as such, control territory and people.
This is happening in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, and Mali,
while al-Qaeda affiliates are exerting pressure in Somalia and
Kenya. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood won an election but
failed their people when they attempted to impose an Islamist
state on a secular nation.
If we make the same mistakes in Afghanistan that we did in
Iraq and pull the plug on support for the Afghans then the
Taliban will truly threaten the regime and the al-Qaeda
leadership will return to their most desirable sanctuary, the
mountains of Afghanistan.
Because of the failure of American leadership the term Radical
Islam or Islamic extremism is not mentioned in U.S. policy which is
quite astounding. The great military strategists, Clausewitz and Sun
Tzu, indicated that a major tenet in defeating an adversary is to
define that enemy and equally important the nature and character of the
kind of war they are waging. Furthermore, after 12 years of war, we
have no comprehensive strategy to defeat Radical Islam or the al-Qaeda.
We do not even have a military strategy other than counter insurgency
in Iraq and Afghanistan. We use drones to kill al-Qaeda leadership in
Pakistan and Yemen, but that is not a military strategy it is a tactic
and an instrument of war. And it has limitations because leaders are
replaced quickly in an ideological movement and the mission goes on.
Contrast this current reality with our strategy and policies in the
20th Century when the United States was involved in another ideological
struggle, Communism. We fashioned a grand strategy, we organized major
alliances in Europe and Southeast Asia in NATO and SEATO to contain it
by agreeing on a common political goal as well as sharing intelligence,
training, doctrine, equipment, and tactics. We encouraged some of our
best universities to study the subject and think tanks like Rand and
others were initiated because of the challenge of Communism. After all,
ideas in an ideological struggle truly matter--to understand our
adversaries' ideas, their history of development, their weaknesses and
strengths and to challenge our own ideas against them is fundamental to
defining and understanding our enemy.
As stated, we have no strategy to defeat Radical Islam, we have no
formal alliances to partner politically and militarily against them.
This is not about our troops fighting against the radicals world-wide
but assisting our allies so their troops can do it effectively, only,
when necessary. I have been speaking on college campuses every year
since 9/11 and I can assure you there are no departments at our great
universities devoted to understanding this ideological struggle with
Radical Islam, quite the contrary, if an academic pursues this line of
scholarship it is often denigrated as not worthy of serious study.
The radical islamists understand us better than we do them. To
illustrate, their initial strategic goal is to dominate and control
Muslim lands. To accomplish this, their stated objective is to drive
the United States out of this land, which is what 9/11 was about. But
the reason is not the obvious one, U.S. military presence, which they
do not fear and know they can harm but cannot defeat. Instead they do
fear our ideas, democracy and capitalism. The advancement of these
ideas in the region is a major threat to the Radical Islamists because
it makes it all the more difficult to bend the people's will and force
surrender. This is why the so called Arab Spring is such a threat to
them. No one was demonstrating in the streets for Radical Islam and
Jihad to help them achieve a better life. The drivers of the
instability in this revolutionary change is political and social
injustice and the lack of economic opportunity. The people in the
streets are looking at what the United States and the West has to
change their lives, democracy and capitalism. Therefore, the radicals
are ``all in'' to influence the outcome that is so uncertain and
unpredictable. On the contrary, ask any of our friends in the region
about U.S. policy in the Middle East and the two most stated
descriptions are ``disengagement'' and ``retreat''. The so-called
``pivot'' to the East with the emergence of China is camouflage for an
unstated policy to disengage from the Middle East and, at all costs, to
avoid the potential of another Middle East war. No one can say with
certainty, depending on open sources, that any one of these al-Qaeda
hot spots in the world is a direct threat against the people of the
United States. But this much we can say, that when we permit sanctuary
and uninterrupted recruiting, training, planning, and equipping as the
al-Qaeda was able to do for almost 10 years prior to 9/11, then the
risk to regional U.S. interests and the security of the American people
is exponentially higher. After all, what makes this movement the most
threatening we have ever faced is their stated objectives to use WMD
against the people of the United States.
Unchecked, Radical Islam is an ideological struggle with the United
States and its allies that will dominate most of the 21st Century. We
lost 3,000 American citizens on our land and almost 7,000 troops in
foreign lands as we attempt to defeat it and protect our people and our
way of life.
We desperately need strong American leadership to define Radical
Islam for what it is, to fashion a comprehensive strategy, and to
partner effectively with our allies to defeat it. We have a long way to
go.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, General.
I certainly agree, it is a war of ideology, that drone
strikes have been effective, but I don't think alone they can
kill an ideology and a movement. That is the great challenge we
have today.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Jones for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, THE RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, Members of the committee.
There are obviously a range of perspectives on al-Qaeda and
the threat to the United States from Islamic extremists. My own
view and those noted both in my written testimony and oral
testimony are informed by on-going work, my own work on this
subject, including a forthcoming report on this, work that I am
overseeing, and then my past service within U.S. Special
Operations, and particularly visits recently, including to
those same units overseas, especially Afghanistan, which I will
come back to.
The argument that I will make here in my oral remarks will
be several-fold. One is, while al-Qaeda and the broader
movement has become decentralized, I think the data is
important. What we have seen in running the numbers is an
increase--an increase, a notable increase--in the number of
what I will call Salafi-jihadist groups over the past several
years, particularly since 2010, and especially in North Africa,
in the Levant, Syria, Lebanon, and I am going to include the
Sinai there.
Second, there has been an increase--again, an increase--in
the number of attacks perpetrated by these organizations, and
as part of that an increase in the casualties and fatalities
that have come out of that. Now, while this trend is troubling
in one sense, it is worth noting that not all of these groups
are plotting attacks against the U.S. homeland and its
interests overseas. So as I will come back to in a moment, I
think it is worth highlighting which of these groups presents
the most serious threat.
But I do want to note on the verge of the Sochi Olympics
that we have multiple groups in the North Caucasus and in
Central Asia that do present a threat to American citizens
traveling to this area, to our athletes traveling to Sochi. So
this threat obviously impacts us not just in our infrastructure
overseas, like embassies, our homeland, but also major events
like the Olympics.
I won't rehash the structure of this organization because
my colleagues here have noted that, but I do want to highlight
the fact that the biggest increase in what some have called the
al-Qaeda movement has been in the organizations that aren't
sworn affiliates, that is, they don't pledge allegiance to
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the emir, but who have a very similar
Salafi-jihadist world view, who would like to establish an
Islamic emirate in areas they control. In particular, we have
seen that increase in groups operating in North Africa and the
Levant.
I will come back to the threat posed by those groups in a
moment, but let me just shift to Afghanistan, where I visited
not that long ago and where I have noted very serious concerns
among U.S. military and intelligence units operating in these
areas, that we have worked for a long time against groups
operating in those areas. There is still a notable presence of
those groups along a very porous border, both Afghanistan and
Pakistan. We have tried for the last several years to kill or
capture the emir of al-Qaeda in northeastern Afghanistan, Faruq
al-Qatari, with limited success--no success, in fact. He has
not been captured or killed.
I would just ask a rhetorical question that as we pull out
our forces, close down our bases, and potentially even exit,
will it be easier or harder to continue to target these
individuals? I don't mean just with forces, but I mean
collecting information, intelligence, on these individuals
operating in this area. The answer is straightforward: It will
be much more difficult.
I would say also that we have a number of groups that have
plotted attacks against the U.S. homeland, this includes al-
Qaeda, the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, this area, the Times
Square bombers, U.S. forces and U.S. Government installations
in the region, and U.S. citizens, to include other groups, like
Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Mumbai attacks, and the Haqqani Network.
Let me come just back briefly to this then what do these
groups, what threat do they pose to the homeland? Again, in my
view in looking at this problem set, the ones that pose the
most significant threat at the moment to the homeland continue
to be the group operating in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, and the inspired networks, like the Tsarnaev
brothers that perpetrated the Boston bombings. But I would note
that this was not just a home-grown plot. Both of the brothers
listened extensively to al-Qaeda leaders, including the now-
deceased Anwar al-Awlaki. They specifically used al-Qaeda
propaganda in their attacks in Boston, including from the
Inspire magazine. So there was a connection, just happened to
be on the internet to what we consider core al-Qaeda.
We have got threats to U.S. embassies overseas from groups
like al-Shabaab targeting plots, from Ansar al-Sharia in
Tunisia, which has planned attacks against U.S. diplomats and
infrastructure. We have got Americans, a growing number that
has gone to Syria, Europeans that have gone to Syria. So again
I would highlight that there is a very serious threat to U.S.
infrastructure, citizens overseas. This is not just about
homeland and this is definitely not just about the core al-
Qaeda.
Let me just say in closing that we need a proactive policy.
In my view, we have been reactive. We have now returned
advisers and trainers into Somalia but we are reluctant to do
that in Iraq. Trainers have been very useful on multiple
levels. I think we did a phenomenal job during the Cold War of
combatting Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. I think we have
been very slow to develop a policy along those lines.
Let me just end by saying, with the NSA debates we cannot
lose our ability to monitor individuals that have linked up
with websites that are radicalizing Americans like the Boston
bombers. So whatever happens with this NSA discussion, we
cannot lose our ability to monitor those websites. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Seth G. Jones \1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-
profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective
solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private
sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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January 15, 2014
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing, ``A
False Narrative Endangers the Homeland.''\2\
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\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT403.html.
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There are a range of perspectives today on the threat to the United
States from Islamic extremists. Some argue that al-Qaeda--especially
core al-Qaeda--has been severely weakened, and there is no longer a
major threat to the United States.\3\ Former CIA operations officer
Marc Sageman concludes that ``al-Qaeda is no longer seen as an
existential threat to the West.''\4\ Some contend that the most acute
threat to the United States comes from home-grown terrorists.\5\ Others
maintain that al-Qaeda is resilient and remains a serious threat to the
United States.\6\ Finally, some claim that while the al-Qaeda
organization established by Osama bin Laden is in decline, ``al-
Qaedism''--a decentralized amalgam of freelance extremist groups--is
far from dead.\7\
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\3\ R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, March 2013). Academic arguments include, for
example, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money:
Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
\4\ Marc Sageman, ``The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism,'' The
Chronicle of Higher Education, April 30, 2013. See the response to
Sageman by John Horgan and Jessica Stern, ``Terrorism Research Has Not
Stagnated,'' The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 8, 2013.
\5\ Sageman, ``The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism''; Sageman,
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
\6\ Bruce Hoffman, ``Al Qaeda's Uncertain Future,'' Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 36, 2013, pp. 635-653; Bruce Riedel, ``Al
Qaeda is Back,'' The Daily Beast, July 26, 2013.
\7\ Andrew Liepman and Philip Mudd, ``Al Qaeda is Down. Al Qaedism
Isn't,'' CNN, January 6, 2014. Accessed on January 12, 2014 at http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/01/06/al-Qa'ida-is-down-al-
qaedism-isnt/.
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Which of these arguments is right? This testimony argues that while
the al-Qaeda movement has become increasingly decentralized, there has
been an increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups and followers
over the past several years, particularly in North Africa and the
Levant. Examples include groups operating in such countries as Tunisia,
Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai), Lebanon, and Syria.
There has also been an increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by
al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist groups. While this trend is
troubling, only some of these groups are currently targeting the U.S.
homeland and its interests overseas like U.S. embassies and its
citizens--a particular worry on the verge of the 2014 Sochi Winter
Olympics. The most concerning are al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
inspired individuals like the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers, though the
growing number of Western fighters traveling to Syria to fight against
the Assad government presents a medium-term threat. These developments
should cause serious concern among U.S. policymakers and, more broadly,
the American population.
The rest of this testimony is divided into four sections. The first
examines the organizational structure and capabilities of al-Qaeda and
other Salafi-jihadist groups. The second section explores reasons for
the resurgence of Salafi-jihadists. The third outlines implications of
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, an important component of this
hearing. And the final section outlines threats to the U.S. homeland
and U.S. interests overseas.
THE ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF SALAFI-JIHADISTS
Al-Qaeda and the broader Salafi-jihadist movement have become more
decentralized over time. The unfortunate tendency among some
journalists and pundits to lump all Islamic terrorists as ``al-Qaeda''
has clouded this debate. Consequently, I will focus on al-Qaeda and
other Salafi-jihadists. Used in this context, Salafi-jihadists refer to
individuals and groups--including al-Qaeda--that meet two criteria.
First, they emphasize the importance of returning to a ``pure'' Islam,
that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. Second, they believe that
violent jihad is ``fard `ayn'' (a personal religious duty).\8\ Salafi-
jihadists consider violent jihad a permanent and individual duty.\9\
Many Salafists are opposed to armed jihad and advocate the da'wa or
``call'' to Islam through proselytizing and preaching Islam. But
Salafi-jihadists like al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri support both
Salafism and armed jihad.\10\
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\8\ See, for example, bin Laden's fatwa published in the London
newspaper ``Al-Quds al-`Arabi'' in February 1998, which noted that ``to
kill Americans is a personal duty for all Muslims.'' The text can be
found at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/jan-june98/
fatwa_1998.html.
\9\ Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the
Pharaoh, translated by John Rothschild (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1993); Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for
a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 41.
\10\ On Salafi-jihadists, for example, Alain Grignard, ``La
litterature politique du GIA, des origines a Djamal Zitoun--Esquisse
d'une analyse,'' in F. Dassetto, ed., Facettes de l'Islam belge
(Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2001). Also see Assaf Moghadam,
``The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,'' CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No.
3 (February 2008), pp. 14-16.
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Today, this movement is increasingly decentralized among four
tiers: (1) Core al-Qaeda in Pakistan, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri; (2) a
half-dozen formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance to core al-
Qaeda (located in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa); (3) a
panoply of Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn allegiance to al-
Qaeda, but are committed to establishing an extremist Islamic emirate;
and (4) inspired individuals and networks.
1. Core al-Qaeda.--This tier includes the organization's leaders,
most of whom are based in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda leaders refer to this
broader area as Khurasan, a historical reference to the territory that
included Persia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and parts of northwestern
Pakistan during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates.\11\ Core al-Qaeda
is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, but there are still a range of Americans
in core al-Qaeda (such as Adam Gadahn) and operatives that have lived
in America (such as Adnan el Shukrijumah). Al-Qaeda's senior leadership
retains some oversight of the affiliates and, when necessary, may
adjudicate disputes among affiliates or provide strategic guidance. But
Zawahiri's challenges with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
highlight core al-Qaeda's limitations in enforcing its judgments.
Around July 2013, Zawahiri took an unprecedented step by appointing
Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as
his deputy, elevating the importance of Yemen for core al-Qaeda.
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\11\ See, for example, letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi and Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, May 2013.
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2. Affiliated Groups.--The next tier includes affiliated groups
that have become formal branches of al-Qaeda. What distinguishes
``affiliates'' from other types of Salafi-jihadist groups is the
decision by their leaders to swear bay'at (allegiance) to al-Qaeda
leaders in Pakistan. These organizations include Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS) based in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) based in Yemen, al-Shabaab based in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria and neighboring countries, and
Jabhat al-Nusrah based in Syria. All of the groups became formal
affiliates within the past decade: ISIS in 2004, initially as al-Qaeda
in Iraq; AQIM in 2006; AQAP in 2009; al-Shabaab in 2012; and Jabhat al-
Nusrah in 2013 after breaking away from ISIS.\12\
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\12\ These dates refer to the year in which the affiliate publicly
announced that their emirs had sworn bay'at to al-Qaeda central
leaders.
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Figure 1 highlights the number of attacks by al-Qaeda core and
affiliates since 1998. The data indicate a substantial rise in the
number of attacks over time. Most of these attacks have occurred in
``near enemy'' countries and against local targets. A further breakdown
of the data shows that violence levels are highest in Yemen (from
AQAP), Somalia (from al-Shabaab), Iraq (from ISIS), and Syria (from
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah). These attacks include a mixture of suicide
attacks, complex attacks using multiple individuals and cells,
assassinations, and various types of improvised explosive devices
against local Government targets and civilians.
Figure 1.--Number of Attacks by al-Qaeda and Affiliates, 1998-2012 \13\
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\13\ Data are from the Global Terrorism Database at the University
of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START). Accessed on January 12, 2014, at
www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
In Yemen, for example, AQAP retains a sanctuary in several
governorates, including in southern Hadramawt, Shabwah, and Abyan along
the Gulf of Aden--as well as around such cities as Rada' (in Al Bayda'
governorate), Sana'a (Sana'a), Wadi Abidah (Ma'rib), and Yatamah (Al
Jawf). The group has demonstrated an ability to mount large-scale,
mass-casualty attacks across Yemen, especially in southern Yemen. AQAP
has also benefited from limited Yemeni government operations. Since
mid-2012, President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has avoided major ground
offensives in favor of airstrikes and small-scale raids against al-
Qaeda sanctuaries, perhaps to minimize government casualties. On
September 30, 2013, for instance, al-Qaeda operatives overran the
military's regional headquarters in Mukallah, Hadramawt governorate,
killing at least 6. On September 20, al-Qaeda conducted a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device and small arms to attack military
facilities in Shabwah Governorate, killing as many as 56 Yemeni
security personnel. On December 5, al-Qaeda operatives launched a
complex attack against the Yemeni Ministry of Defense complex in
Sana'a, killing 40 Yemeni personnel and civilians, and wounding dozens
more. They detonated a suicide vehicle bomb that breached a fence
inside the compound, which allowed 6 or more militants to attack the
military leadership hospital on the compound.\14\ And on January 2,
2014, AQAP operatives were responsible for the assassination of a
senior Yemeni security official in Aden. Most concerning, however, AQAP
continues to plot attacks against the United States and American
targets overseas.
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\14\ Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's media arm, al-Malahim,
released a Twitter statement on @shomokhalislam regarding the December
5, 2013, and other attacks. See also HIS Jane's, Al Qa'ida in the
Arabian Peninsula, December 2013, accessed Jane's World Insurgency and
Terrorism database on December 19, 2013; ``Al Qa'ida Claims
Responsibility Over DOD Attack,'' Yemen Post, December 7, 2013.
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3. Allied Groups.--Next are a series of allied Salafi-jihadist
groups, whose leaders have not sworn bay'at to core al-Qaeda in
Pakistan. This arrangement allows these Salafi-jihadist groups to
remain independent and pursue their own goals, but to work with al-
Qaeda for specific operations or training purposes when their interests
converge. There are a substantial number of allied Salafi-jihadist
groups across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caucasus. Perhaps
most concerning, there has been an increase in the number, size, and
activity of Salafi-jihadist groups in two areas: North Africa and the
Levant. Examples include the Mohammad Jamal Network (Egypt), Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis (Egypt), Mujahideen Shura Council (Egypt), Ansar al-Sharia
Libya (Libya), al-Murabitun (Algeria and other countries), Ansar al-
Sharia Tunisia (Tunisia), Harakat Ansar al-Din (Mali), and Boko Haram
(Nigeria).
4. Inspired Individuals and Networks.--The last tier includes those
with no direct contact to al-Qaeda central, but who are inspired by the
al-Qaeda cause and outraged by perceived oppression of Muslims in
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Palestinian territory, and other countries. They
tend to be motivated by a hatred of the West and its allied regimes in
the Middle East. Without direct support, these networks tend to be
amateurish, though they can occasionally be lethal. Tamerlan Tsarnaev,
the ringleader of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, was motivated by
the extremist preaching of now-deceased al-Qaeda leader Anwar al-
Awlaki, among others. Tsarnaev and his brother also used al-Qaeda
propaganda materials, including an article from Inspire magazine, to
build the bombs.\15\ But many others were rudimentary and their half-
baked plots would have been difficult to execute.
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\15\ ``Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,'' Inspire, Issue 1,
Summer 1431 (2010), pp. 31-40.
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WHY A RESURGENCE?
The rise in Salafi-jihadists groups has likely been caused by two
factors. One is the growing weakness of governments across Africa and
the Middle East, which has created an opportunity for Salafi-jihadist
groups to secure a foothold. The logic is straightforward: Weak
governments have difficulty establishing law and order, which permits
militant groups and other sub-state actors to fill the vacuum.\16\
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\16\ Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community,
Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2005); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin,
``Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,'' American Political Science
Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 75-90. On the importance of
building institutions, see Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace
After Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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Governance, as used here, is defined as the set of institutions by
which authority in a country is exercised.\17\ It includes the ability
to establish law and order, effectively manage resources, and implement
sound policies. A large body of quantitative evidence suggests that
weak and ineffective governance is critical to the onset of sub-state
actors--including insurgent and terrorist groups. One study, for
example, analyzed 161 cases over a 54-year period and found that
financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments
render insurgencies more feasible and attractive due to weak local
policing or inept counterinsurgency practices.\18\ The reverse is also
true: Strong governance decreases the probability of insurgency. In
looking at 151 cases over a 54-year period, one study found that
governance is critical to prevent insurgencies, arguing that success
requires the ``provision of temporary security, the building of new
institutions capable of resolving future conflicts peaceably, and an
economy capable of offering civilian employment to former soldiers and
material progress to future citizens.''\19\ In addition, governmental
capacity is a negative and significant predictor of civil war, and
between 1816 and 1997 ``effective bureaucratic and political systems
reduced the rate of civil war activity.''\20\
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\17\ World Bank, Governance Matters 2006: Worldwide Governance
Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 2.
\18\ Fearon and Laitin, ``Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,''
pp. 75-76.
\19\ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and
Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 5.
\20\ Hironaka, Neverending Wars, p. 45.
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There are good reasons to believe that weak governance has
contributed to the rise of Salafi-jihadist groups. Since 2010, a year
before the Arab uprisings, there has been a significant weakening of
governance across the Middle East and North Africa, according to World
Bank data. Levels of political stability dropped by 17 percent from
2010 to 2012, government effectiveness by 10 percent, rule of law by 6
percent, and control of corruption by 6 percent across the Middle East
and North Africa.\21\ Of particular concern, governance deteriorated in
numerous countries that saw a rise in Salafi-jihadist groups. Take rule
of law, which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, as well as the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as
the likelihood of crime and violence. Between 2010 and 2012, rule of
law dropped by 21 percent in Egypt, 31 percent in Libya, 25 percent in
Mali, 20 percent in Niger, 17 percent in Nigeria, 61 percent in Syria,
and 39 percent in Yemen. To make matters worse, most of the countries
had low levels of rule of law even before this drop.\22\ This decline
appears to be, in part, a consequence of the uprisings.
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\21\ World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators Data Set. Accessed
December 16, 2013.
\22\ World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators Data Set. Accessed
December 16, 2013.
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A second factor is the spread of Salafi-jihadist militant networks
within the Middle East and Africa. The logic is that operatives who
have spent time training at al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist camps or
fighting in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have moved
to new countries in North Africa and the Levant and established Salafi-
jihadist groups.
Individuals that spend time at training camps generally establish
trusted social relationships.\23\ Training camps provide a unique
environment for terrorists to pray together, reinforcing their
ideological views; share meals; train together in classrooms, at
shooting ranges, and through physical conditioning; socialize with each
other during breaks; and, after training is completed, sometimes fight
together. Camps create and reinforce a shared religious identity and
strategic culture dedicated to overthrowing infidel regimes.\24\ For
example, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to blow up an
airplane landing in Detroit on Christmas day 2009, attended an al-Qaeda
training camp in the Shabwah region of Yemen. There were over 2 dozen
fighters who dug trenches, crawled through barbed wire, and practiced
tactical movements such as clearing buildings. The daily routine at the
training camp consisted of rising early, praying, reading the Qur'an,
completing warm-up drills, and conducting tactical training. After
lunch, the students completed additional tactical training drills and
stayed in tents at night.\25\ The social interaction during daily
routines experienced by individuals like Abdulmutallab creates a strong
bond among operatives.
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\23\ Thomas Hegghammer, ``The Recruiter's Dilemma: Signaling and
Rebel Recruitment Tactics,'' Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 50, No. 1
(2012), pp. 3-16; Max Abrahms, ``What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist
Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,'' International Security, Vol.
32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 100-101.
\24\ On identity and strategic culture see, for example, Alexander
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996).
\25\ See, for example, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Comments, Training
Video of Abdulmutallab, Al Malahim Media Foundation (al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula), Released in 2010.
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The syllabi in many of these camps include theoretical and
practical courses on weapons and explosives.\26\ Individuals often
study common religious texts in training camps, in addition to the
Qu'ran and the hadiths.\27\ Testimonies of former fighters suggest the
camps foster a culture obsessed with weaponry.\28\ Participants also
engage in nasheeds, or battle hymns sung a capella during training and
socializing. A similar component is poetry. Arab fighters in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq composed new poems and recited
them in the camps. Veterans are often familiar with this material and
share it during social gatherings. Another aspect of jihad culture is
telling war stories from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his
immediate successors.\29\ In short, the socialization process in camps,
and later on the battlefield, develops and strengthens social bonds.
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\26\ Rohan Gunaratna, ``The Terrorist Training Camps of al Qaida,''
in James JF Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment,
Training and Root Causes (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 172-193.
\27\ See, for example, the study of Sayyid Imam Abd al-Aziz al-
Sharif's works in al-Qaeda camps. Muhammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim,
``Jihad Revisions: Truths and Presuppositions,'' June 11, 2007, posted
on a jihadist website.
\28\ Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2006). Also see the experiences of al-Qaeda
operatives Jose Padilla and Najibullah Zazi. Declaration of Mr. Jeffrey
N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating
Terrorism, submitted for the Court's consideration in the matter of
Jose Padilla v. Commander C.T. Hanft, USN, Commander, Consolidated
Naval Brig, Case Number 04-CV-2221-26AJ; United States of America v.
Najibullah Zazi, United States District Court, Eastern District of New
York, Docket No.: 09 CR 663 (S-1), Transcript of Criminal Cause for
Pleading, February 22, 2010.
\29\ Thomas Hegghammer, ``The Recruiter's Dilemma: Signalling and
Rebel Recruitment Tactics,'' Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 50, No. 1
(2012), pp. 3-16; Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there is limited data on foreign fighter flows, there is some
evidence that individuals from al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist camps
and battle fronts have migrated to the Middle East and North
Africa.\30\ In Syria, for example, Jabhat al-Nusrah leaders, including
Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, were veterans of the Iraq war and members of
al-Qaeda in Iraq. Mohktar Belmokhtar, the emir of Al-Murabitun, split
off from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2012 and had spent time in
al-Qaeda training camps in Africa in the 1990s. In Egypt, Muhammad
Jamal al-Kashif trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s with al-Qaeda,
where he learned to make bombs.\31\ In Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia's
leader, Sayfallah Ben Hassine, spent considerable time at training
camps in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s, where he
apparently met Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ On the transnational movement of terrorists see, for example,
Thomas Hegghammer, ``Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation
in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,''
American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013, pp.
1-15; Hegghammer, ``The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the
Globalization of Jihad,'' International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2011,
pp. 53-94.
\31\ United Nations, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee
Adds Two Entries to Its Sanctions List (New York: United Nations,
October 2013). Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/
sc11154.doc.htm.
\32\ U.S. Department of Defense, JTF-GTMO--CDR, MEMORANDUM FOR
Commander, United States Southern Command, SUBJECT: Recommendation for
Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN
US9TS-000510DP, September 15, 2008; U.S. Department of Defense, JTF-
GTMO-CDR, MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command,
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD)
for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9TS-000502DP, June 22, 2007; Haim Malka
and William Lawrence, Jihadi-Salafism's Next Generation (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2013).
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
The downsizing and potential exit of U.S. forces from Afghanistan--
a focus of this hearing--could increase the terrorism problem from
groups based in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Al-Qaeda's
global leadership is still located along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, though it has been weakened by persistent U.S. strikes. A civil
war or successful Taliban-led insurgency would likely allow al-Qaeda
and other terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan,
Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba to increase their presence in
Afghanistan. Most of these groups have already expanded their presence
in Afghanistan over the past several years and have attempted to
conduct attacks either against the U.S. homeland (such as al-Qaeda and
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), U.S. forces and U.S. Government
installations in Afghanistan (such as the Taliban and Haqqani network),
or U.S. citizens in the region (such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaeda).
Several Central Asian groups--such as the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and Jamaat Ansarullah
(JA)--also could increase their presence in Afghanistan after the U.S.
withdrawal.
Al-Qaeda leaders likely believe the U.S. drawdown will allow them
more freedom of movement in provinces such as Kunar and Nuristan. Al-
Qaeda's paramilitary commander and emir for northeastern Afghanistan,
Faruq al-Qatari, is already attempting to expand al-Qaeda's footprint
in the northeast.\33\ Since al-Qaeda currently lacks the legitimacy and
power to establish a sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan on its own,
it has attempted to leverage the capabilities of local militant
networks like the Haqqani network. This symbiotic arrangement provides
al-Qaeda some operational flexibility to access existing resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Author interview with Western government officials,
Afghanistan, September 2013.
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A burgeoning war could also increase regional instability as India,
Pakistan, Iran, and Russia support a mix of Afghan central government
forces, substate militias, and insurgent groups. Pakistan, in
particular, would likely experience increasing violence and refugee
flows if the war in Afghanistan spills over its border, as it did in
the 1980s and 1990s. Growing conflict and radicalization in Pakistan,
in turn, raises concerns about the security of its nuclear
stockpile.\34\ In short, a U.S. military departure from Afghanistan--if
it were to happen--could foster a perception among some countries and
organizations that the United States is not a reliable ally. Al-Qaeda
and associated movements would likely view a withdrawal of U.S.
military forces as their most important victory since the departure of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and provide inspiration to core
al-Qaeda, affiliated groups, allied groups, and inspired individuals
and networks.
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\34\ Author interviews with Pakistan officials, Washington,
September 2013.
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THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
Not all Salafi-jihadist groups present a direct threat to the U.S.
homeland. In the near term, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula likely
presents the most immediate threat, along with inspired individuals and
networks like the Tsarnaev brothers that perpetrated the April 2013
Boston Marathon bombings. The growth in social media and the terrorist
use of chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other sites has
facilitated radicalization inside the United States. While al-Qaeda
leaders did not organize the Boston attacks, they played a key role by
making available the propaganda material and bomb-making instructions
utilized by the Tsarnaevs.
Other affiliates do not appear to pose an immediate threat to the
U.S. homeland. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is focused on
overthrowing regimes in North Africa, including Algeria. Al-Shabaab's
objectives are largely parochial, and it has conducted attacks in
Somalia and the region. But al-Shabaab possesses a competent external
operations capability to strike targets outside of Somalia. The
Westgate Mall attack was well-planned and well-executed, and involved
sophisticated intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance
of the target. These skills could be used for other types of attacks
directly targeting the United States and its citizens. In addition,
Americans from cities like Phoenix and Minneapolis have traveled to
Somalia over the past several years to fight with al-Shabaab. Between
2007 and 2010, more than 40 Americans joined al-Shabaab, making the
United States a primary exporter of Western fighters to the al-Qaeda-
affiliated group.\35\ And the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, along
with Jahbat al-Nusrah, are primarily interested in establishing Islamic
emirates in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region.
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\35\ Committee on Homeland Security, Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and
Radicalization Within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to
the Homeland, Majority Investigative Report (Washington, DC: U.S. House
of Representatives, July 27, 2011), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Still, several Salafi-jihadist groups pose a threat to the United
States overseas. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, for instance, has planned
attacks against U.S. diplomats and infrastructure in Tunis, including
the U.S. embassy. Operatives from Ansar al-Sharia Libya, the Muhammad
Jamal Network, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were involved in the
2012 attack that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Several
Salafi-jihadist groups pose a threat to the forthcoming Sochi Winter
Olympics, including Imirat Kavkaz based out of the North Caucasus and
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
Other groups, like Jabhat al-Nusrah, could be a long-term threat.
Jabhat al-Nusrah's access to foreign fighters, external network in
Europe and other areas, and bomb-making expertise suggest that it may
already have the capability to plan and support attacks against the
West. There appears to be a growing contingent of foreign fighters--
perhaps several thousand--traveling to Syria to fight in the war. A
substantial portion of these fighters are coming from the region,
including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Some have come from Chechnya.
Others have apparently come from Afghanistan and Pakistan. But a
significant number also appear to be coming from the West, especially
from Belgium, France, and Sweden. Extremists have traveled to Syria
from other European countries. According to Spanish officials, for
example, a network based in Spain and Morocco sent approximately 2
dozen fighters to Jabhat al-Nusrah over the past year. It is unclear
how many of these fighters have returned to the West, but some have
apparently returned to Germany, Denmark, Spain, and Norway among
others. In October 2012, authorities in Kosovo arrested the extremist
Shurki Aliu, who had traveled from Syria to Kosovo and was involved in
recruiting and providing material to Syrian opposition groups. A small
number of Americans--perhaps less than a dozen--have apparently
traveled to Syria to fight with the Syrian opposition.\36\
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\36\ Author interview with government officials from Europe and the
Middle East, April and May 2013.
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It is currently unclear whether most of these fighters will remain
in Syria over the long run, move to other war zones such as North
Africa, or return to the West. And even if some return, it is uncertain
whether they will become involved in terrorist plots, focus on
recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned with terrorism.
Still, foreign fighters have historically been agents of instability.
They can affect the conflicts they join, as they did in post-2003 Iraq
by promoting sectarian violence and indiscriminate tactics. Perhaps
more important, foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, because volunteering for war is the
principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme
forms of militancy. When Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually
do not plot attacks in their home country right away, but travel to a
war zone first. A majority of al-Qaeda operatives began their militant
careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi groups today
are by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations.\37\
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\37\ Thomas Hegghammer, ``The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters:
Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,'' International Security, Vol.
35, No. 3, Winter 2010/11, pp. 53-94.
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Based on these developments, U.S. policymakers should be concerned
about the number, size, and activity of al-Qaeda and other Salafi-
jihadist groups. Some of these groups pose a direct threat to the U.S.
homeland, embassies, and citizens overseas, while others are currently
targeting local regimes. Still, an effective U.S. strategy needs to
begin with an honest assessment of the problem.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Jones.
I agree that, you know, as al-Qaeda does spread--in a
different form, Jane, you are absolutely right, they have
evolved--but as it spreads, as Peter Bergen said, al-Qaeda has
the largest presence now in the Arab world in history. So, too,
does the threat to the homeland. That is my concern as Chairman
of Homeland Security. I would also submit that the Boston,
particularly Tamerlan, was not only inspired over the internet,
but he did travel to Dagestan. He got through some of our
flags, unfortunately. We will be releasing our report later
this month on the Boston bombings, which I think will document
some of these influences he had while he was over there.
General Keane, I would like to ask you my first question.
In his new book, Secretary Gates wrote that under President
Obama, the National security staff was, in his words, filled
primarily by former Hill staffers, academics, and political
operatives with little experience in managing large
organizations, and that the National security staff became
increasingly operational, resulting in micromanagement of
military matters, a combination that has proven disastrous in
the past. We have seen that in history.
This political heavy-handedness and the President's
statements about al-Qaeda being on the run are concerning to
me. Do you believe the administration is downplaying the threat
of al-Qaeda to further their political goal of claiming victory
in the Middle East?
General Keane. Well, in my view, there is no doubt that
they are downplaying it. You know, certainly championing the
success of killing bin Laden and many of its leaders. But the
fact of the matter is, as we have all testified here, it is
clearly on the rise. It clearly is a threat to us here in the
homeland and to our interests in the region.
Listen, this business of al-Qaeda becoming more
decentralized is part of the plan. The al-Qaeda has always
intended to take territory and gain control of people and to
use affiliate groups in those countries as the start place, and
then they bring foreign fighters to that scene. So what is
being played out in front of us is part of their overall
strategy.
Now, we have severed the command and control of that
strategy to a large degree where they do not maintain
operational control over this because of the pressure we have
put on them, and that is a good thing.
Does that answer your question, Mr. Chairman? Okay.
Chairman McCaul. Well, I think so. But again I think the
al-Qaeda is on the run, this war on terror is over, I have
personally experienced with the State Department and other
agencies, traveling overseas, an attempt not to even use these
words, to change the vernacular. Look, Jane, you know I am
about as bipartisan as they come, but it concerns me that this
language is taken out of the vernacular.
General Keane. Well, I agree. Listen, I have had problems
with the Bush administration in not educating the American
people to what this movement is and keeping us posted on what
our progress is against it. I challenged them for not having a
comprehensive strategy to deal with this. It was taking
sanctuary away in Afghanistan initially and then going after
WMD in Iraq. But that is not a comprehensive strategy to defeat
al-Qaeda, believe me.
This administration doesn't have it either. But it is even
worse because it has got its head in the sand about it. One, it
will not call it for what it is, it will not describe what it
is, and it is downplaying the success the movement is having as
it takes advantage of the revolutionary change that is sweeping
through the Middle East.
Chairman McCaul. I think that goes to the point, you can't
defeat an enemy you cannot define. I think the head-in-the-sand
analogy is correct. I think, frankly, they just want to say it
is over and let's move on to something else. I don't know.
I do applaud the President with respect to bin Laden. I
think that was a courageous effort, to go in with military
forces and not just bomb the place, to prove to the world that
bin Laden was killed. But I don't think that has solved the
problem. It is not case closed anymore. This threat is growing
throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East.
Senator Lieberman, just last week the House Armed Services
Committee declassified testimony after months of hearing, and
General Carter Ham, AFRICOM commander during the attack,
testified. He said: To me it started to become pretty clear
quickly that this was certainly a terrorist attack and not just
something sporadic. I believe Leon Panetta was a part of this
as well. The response, though, was not that this was an al-
Qaeda attack, but blamed on some video and the protest over a
video. What do you make of that?
Mr. Lieberman. Well, a couple of things. The first is that
it was obviously a terrorist attack by any generally-held
definition of terrorism, which is the use of violence to
achieve a political end or convey a political message. I mean,
these are people who were attacking the U.S. consulate in
Benghazi, and they obviously weren't there just to have a good
time or because they didn't like that the consulate was there.
They were there to make a statement against America, so it was
classic terrorism.
Why there was hesitancy to do that at the beginning--
frankly, even if it was in some way affected by the video,
which I ended up concluding that if it was, it was only that
the terrorist saw this as a moment of opportunity to strike--
still it was terrorism. It is not as if, if you were affected
by an awful grotesque anti-Muslim video and your response to
that is to attack the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and burn it
down and kill the U.S. ambassador, that is not terrorism.
The other thing I want to say, and this is based on an--
unfortunately quick, because the session was ending--
investigation that Senator Collins and I did of Benghazi in the
last few months of 2012, one of the things we concluded--and I
will say first for myself, I think some of the terrorists
involved were either inspired or loosely connected to al-Qaeda,
but a lot of them were indigenous and separate. Part of the
problem, when you limit the enemy to al-Qaeda and affiliates
and not to the broader category of violent Islamist extremists
and terrorists is that you will miss part of the enemy, and
part of our conclusion, Senator Collins and mine, was that we
don't have adequate intelligence, at least we didn't at that
point, on non-al-Qaeda clearly violent Islamist extremists.
Incidentally, in the last month, Ansar al-Sharia, Benghazi,
was finally put on the foreign terrorist organization list,
bringing about many things, including, I am sure, increased
intelligence oversight of those groups.
Chairman McCaul. I agree with you. I think, you know, the
distinction between core al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda
affiliates, jihadists, I think they are all jihadists, and it
is a movement that--that is a common thread, and the
distinction without a difference, I think we need to be focused
on the movement itself and not distinguish between all these
different groups. They all stand for the same philosophy.
So, I would be remiss if I didn't give my colleague Jane
Harman, who may not agree with me on everything, the last word.
Ms. Harman. Well, thank you, I appreciate that. I do think
there was a terror attack in Benghazi, just to go over that
point, and I do think we were underprepared. I recall that
immediately afterwards Secretary--then-Secretary Hillary
Clinton asked for a report and got 25 or 26 recommendations and
implemented all of them. Hopefully, we will all learn the
lessons of Benghazi, so that is point No. 1.
No. 2, though, I sit on these various boards in this
administration, and they are bipartisan boards. I participate
in discussions about these subjects because I am passionately
interested in this stuff, as you all know, and I don't think we
are being reactive. I think there are a lot of brain cells on
this, both in these boards and in the administration in various
departments.
I just came from 10 hours at the Defense Policy Board, and
your old department, Jack, is all over this subject. Sure,
maybe could be doing even better, but there was a discussion of
South Asia that was pretty bone-chilling and a lot of people
wanting to do a most effective job, but it does come back to
something that General Keane said, which is whole-of-Government
is a better approach to this than kinetics only.
I would just suggest, with respect, Mr. Chairman, that
calling all of these different groups al-Qaeda emboldens al-
Qaeda. That is something we don't want to do. If we can
separate them and have strategies that take some of them out,
which we do, not just with kinetics--I support the limited use
of drones, but I also support other strategies--I think we will
get farther.
Just, finally, you know, the world is extremely dangerous,
but viewing this set of threats as the only threats I don't
think is going to help us get to a place where the United
States can project our power, all of our power, our smart power
in the way that we need to. Looking at failing states and how
we can support them is a high priority. Helping a transition to
democratic with a small ``d'' regimes is another high priority,
and building modern world structures. Some of the structures we
deal with are pretty antiquated. That can project the whole of
the world against, for example, the possibility of a nuclear
action between India and Pakistan--those are Government
decisions probably, although possibly could be loose-nuke-
driven--it seems to me are also priority, so I just want to put
this in a context.
Chairman McCaul. Let me close by saying, I think--and you
will probably disagree with me on this. There has been a bit of
a failure of leadership globally. I think our enemies view us
as weaker, and they test us as a result of that more because
they do view it that way, and our traditional allies, quite
frankly, there is a lot of confusion over, where do we stand?
Are we standing with them or not? Are we going to take out--are
they going to be the next enemy of the United States we take
out and create more instability that we have seen in the Middle
East, particularly after this so-called Arab Spring?
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think anyone on this committee, individually or all
of us, want to do anything other than to keep Americans safe. I
think how we approach keeping us safe is why we hold hearings
like this, and we all have different approaches to keeping us
safe. I think it is safe to assume that the collective of what
I have heard today is really important. The difference of
opinion is important. Somewhere between those differences is
the security that we all are looking for. But a lot of us are
faced, when we go to our districts, with an effort that has
gone on a long time. People are becoming weary, not defeated
but weary, and they say, why don't you do something to bring
this to an end?
If we had a magic wand, we could do that. So, listening to
some of our constituents who talk about the 6,000 people who
died and the enormous cost so far, and I will go--because I
have heard it--what would you suggest as a response to those
constituents going forward as to what Members of Congress or
the House and the Senate should do to bring that to an end?
I will start with you, Senator.
Mr. Lieberman. Thanks, Congressman Thompson.
That is a really important question. I am very glad you
asked it because that is the reality, and I know that is what
you face and probably Members of both parties face when they go
home.
So, here is the point at which--I mean, one first reaction
I have, which won't really convince people, but it is an
important one, and I will tell you that every time I went to a
funeral of a soldier from Connecticut who was killed in Iraq or
Afghanistan, I was amazed and moved by the families saying,
please make sure that our son, daughter, husband, whatever,
didn't die in vain. So, there is that element. I mean, if we
just--we learned some lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, but if
we just walk away, we do risk saying to those families, whose
family members gave their lives, because we ordered them to go
there in our defense, that they did die in vain. I don't think
we ever want that to happen.
The second thing I am going to go back to and in some sense
is I want to make this personal about President Obama. Put it
in this context. President Obama ran for office in 2008 and
again in 2012 with one of the basic themes, in addition to all
the change in dealing with domestic problems, was that, that he
was going to get us out of the wars we were in and not get us
into additional wars around the world. You know, fair enough,
but sometimes, the world doesn't cooperate with a Presidential
narrative, and I think that is where we are in the countries
that I have talked about--Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya--
which if we don't do something more than we are doing now, they
are going to tip over.
So, I say this personally. I am not here just to criticize
what the Obama administration has done. In some sense I am here
to appeal to the Obama administration, which after all, the
President is going to be our President for 3 more years, and a
lot that could be good or bad for our security can happen.
I repeat: What is a lesson learned that is consistent with
the message that the President, the policy that the President
has adopted? We are not going to send tens of thousands of
troops on the ground to any of these countries, but there is
something in between that and just pulling out, and I think
what we have all in different ways tried to argue today, both
militarily and in other ways in terms of aid and support, we
are--if we don't--and this is what I would say to the
constituents--if we don't at least maintain a presence, we
don't help the freedom fighters in Syria, the non-extremists
anti-Assad people, if we don't build up the Lybian military to
maintain order against the militias, if we don't make the kind
of agreement and support the government in Iraq, then we are
going to get attacked again. Same in--from Afghanistan, and
then we are going to go back in there and have to spend even
more and risk even more American lives.
It is not an easy argument, particularly not in tough
economic times, but--so I think, bottom line, we learn from
Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not going to be hundreds of
thousands of troops, but if we just turn away, we are going to
suffer, and therefore, we need your support, Mr. and Mrs.
Constituent, to help us do that.
Ms. Harman. I can think--I can think of five things, some
of which I have already mentioned, but I will tic them off.
One, honor the service of those who followed orders and
went to Iraq and Afghanistan: 6,000 died, they leave behind
families; many came home, tens of thousands grievously wounded;
many came home in decent shape. Honor their service. Make sure
we have in place a welcome mat that includes all the benefits
they are entitled to but also, hopefully, efforts to build good
jobs for them. The unemployment rate among returning vets is
disproportionate to the unemployment rate of others.
Second, engage in a whole-of-Government approach to solve
this problem. We have discussed that at length. I won't go into
it again.
Third, continue the counterterrorism mission in not just
the greater Middle East but around the world. The United States
has interests in other places other than our own country, but
we surely don't want training grounds to develop again in--pick
a place--and we know that some are, and we need to be active
there using all the tools that we have.
Fourth, continue our surveillance system, although I think
some reforms are in order. The President will speak on Friday.
I was quite impressed with the report that was presented to
him. It is not clear exactly what he will adopt, but we need to
have an effective system that can spot bad guys and prevent and
disrupt plots against us.
Finally, enact cybersecurity legislation so that we are
protected against what is a growing threat and could, in the
end, be a more--many predict--a much more severe threat than
some other form of terror threat against the homeland.
Mr. Thompson. General.
General Keane. Yes. I would first say to them that never
before in the history of the country have so few sacrificed so
much for so many and have done it for so long. The fact of the
matter is, the reason why it has been so long is because of the
mistakes that we made, and be honest about it. The fact of the
matter is, our strategy initially in Afghanistan, military
strategy I am talking about here, and our military strategy in
Iraq after we liberated Iraq was flawed, and that led to
protracted wars, and we should have that honest discussion, you
know, with the American people and also with your constituents.
Now, the fact of the matter is, if you know America's
military, and I can say this with some knowledge, that we
normally get off on the wrong foot, and we have throughout most
of our history with some rare exceptions. But because we are
reflections of the American people and American society, we are
intellectually flexible and operationally adaptable, and we
sort of get to the answer faster than other people would when
we are at a much larger war than what we are dealing with here,
and we did figure it out eventually in Iraq, and we have
figured it out in Afghanistan as well, and the sacrifice is
definitely worth it to protect the American people.
I mean, when you talk to the troops that we deployed in the
1990s, and we were all over the world doing things in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, you name the place, there were
problems, and we were there, not necessarily fighting to the
degree that we have done post-9/11, but nonetheless,
deployments and some fighting. From 9/11 on, and we have a 9/11
generation in the military, we have a 9/11 generation in the
Central Intelligence Agency, the fact of the matter is when you
talk to these troops, it is all about the American people.
Before it was about helping others. This was about protecting
the American people, and they get it. That is why they
willingly go back and do four, five, six tours. We have
generals that been away from their family for 8 out of 10
years. I mean, it is quite extraordinary the sacrifice that is
willingly being made. Tell that story. It is extraordinary,
because they are protecting the American people and our way of
life, and they are willing do something that most of the
American people cannot do, and that is, die for that, and that
is really quite extraordinary.
So, I say be honest with them, and then, in terms of this
troublesome area, I know intellectually we like to talk about
we are pivoting to the east because of the emergence of China;
does anybody in this room believe in the anywhere near term, we
are going to war with China? Not that we shouldn't be vigilant
about them. We can't be serious about that. The fact of the
matter is, we have--we have huge problems in the Middle East
that threaten the United States, and we have to stay engaged,
Mr. Congressman. That is a word that we need to use. We partner
with our allies in that region, and we support people who want
to overthrow dictatorial regimes, like in Libya, like in
Tunisia, like in Syria. Libya and Syria, they just want us to
help them. They don't want our troops. In Iraq, where we did
help them, we walked away, and look at the mess we have as a
result. That should inform us of how dangerous this situation
is and how important American commitment is to stay engaged. We
have to do that if we are going to protect the American people.
Mr. Thompson. Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I would say three things that are worth
reminding constituents and all Americans that we talk to. One
is, as much as we would like this war and the struggle to end,
there are organizations committed to fighting Americans and
conducting attacks overseas that will not end. They don't have
a desire to end this, and the struggle on their part will
continue. Therefore, the struggle continues. As much as we want
to end it, the terrorists that we have talked about today are
committed to continuing the struggle.
Second, I would say, as everybody here has noted, the days
of large numbers of American forces targeting terrorists
overseas, particularly conventional forces, are over. I think,
as we have seen over the past several years, they have tended
to radicalize populations rather than facilitate. So what that
does leave us is, I would say, a third point, that there is a
more modest approach. I think we have learned we are talking
about smaller numbers of the forces but lethal ones overseas as
well as civilians. We are talking about a smaller amounts of
American dollars that are being spent. There is a need for
direct action, some direct-action activity. We have stopped
plots targeting the U.S. homeland from overseas with some of
this action.
We also have an interest in building some local partnership
capacity so that we don't have to do all of this, so that we
don't have to do all the fighting and dying and that locals can
do it. This is the direction we have moved on in several
fronts, so I would say there has been a learning process. But
let me just conclude by just, again, reminding constituents and
Americans that from the al-Qaeda, the jihadist perspective, the
war continues, and in that sense, we cannot retreat.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman
Emeritus, Mr. Peter King from New York.
Mr. King. Sounds like I am dead, anyway.
Chairman McCaul. No, you are not dead.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
calling this hearing.
Let me thank all the witnesses for being here today.
I know Senator Lieberman and General Keane and Dr. Jones
have all testified before.
Jane Harman, somehow, I think, she is still part of the
committee. She was such an integral part in the formative years
of this committee and the great work that you did. I also want,
for the record, to point out that General Keane and I are the
only two who do not have an accent.
I agree with virtually everything that was said here today,
especially with the tone and the rational level of debate that
we have had, and I do agree that there is a narrative which is
hurting our country, and I think it comes from both--people in
both parties, people in the media from all sides, really.
For instance, Congresswoman Harman, you mentioned, you
know, the threat from domestic terrorism or home-grown
terrorism. Well, there was no more effective force against, I
believe, than the NYPD, and you have a personal interest in
that since you have family members living in New York. Yet, if
you read the New York Times for the last 3 years, it was
editorial after editorial denouncing the NYPD, accusing them of
profiling and going after innocent people, and yet, they did
more to protect a major urban area than any other element in
the country.
Dr. Jones, you mentioned the NSA and so did Congresswoman
Harman, about the importance of it. We can have an intelligent
debate about whether or not there should be certain reforms or
what to be done and not done. I don't see that. In politics, we
are talking about spying, about snooping. When you look at the,
you know, the lettering during the TV shows, it is ``NSA
Scandal,'' despite the fact that the President's panel or no
one has come up with even one abuse in all the years. So,
rather than have an intelligent conversation, we go off on
these, I think, too often, histrionics. You have people in both
parties, including my own party, who talk about the U.S. being
an imperial power, that somehow we want to be in wars. I think,
as General Keane said, anyone who has been in the military
knows, the last thing you want to do is be in a war, but that
is the way the debate has been framed. There is virtually no
talking about al-Qaeda.
I wish some of the people who rally against the NSA would
spend equal time rallying against al-Qaeda. Sometimes you
forget who the enemy is if you just listen to the media or
listen to people in both parties. So I really want to thank you
for coming here today, and really, I think, injecting a level
of common sense that there is a real threat. In many ways, the
threat is worse than it was before and more dangerous than it
was before, and we have to deal with it in an intelligent way.
Probably no one has done that as much or certainly not more
than Joe Lieberman did during the time that he was in the
Senate.
Congresswoman Harman, what you did in this committee.
General Keane, your service.
Dr. Jones, I am a great consumer of all the materials you
put out, and thank you for the help you have given us.
Let me just talk about one particular area, and that is
Syria, because there have been reports about how dozens of
Americans, if not more, are going to Syria to take part in the
fighting in Syria. They are siding with the al-Qaeda leading
elements in Syria, and there is certainly the threat of them
coming back here, you know, to this country, but even apart
from that, when you are talking about western Iraq and Syria
becoming a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, I would ask each of the four
of you really, do you think it is too late for us to be
providing aid to moderate elements in the Syrian resistance, or
is it too much of a risk of that just enabling al-Qaeda itself
or al-Qaeda affiliates, you know, to use it against us? So, I
will just ask--and that will be my last question, ask each of
the four of you, if you could respond, is what we should be
doing in Syria, is it too late, and how effective can we be?
Thank you very much.
Mr. Lieberman. Thanks, Congressman King, thanks for your
opening statement.
May I say personally, for a Chairman Emeritus, you are
looking very good.
Mr. King. Not as good as you, though.
Mr. Lieberman. So, what was the question?
Oh, Syria. Okay. I got so embraced in how good you look, I
forgot.
Okay. So, look, this is--this has been sort of a--this has
been a story that has gotten more tragic as it is going on, and
from the beginning, it seemed to me that we had--I went over
there early on with Senator McCain. We met with the opposition
figures there. As much as anybody can tell visiting, these were
not extremists. These were genuine Syrian patriots,
nationalists. They just were sick and tired of Assad's
dictatorship, and frankly, just to go to both parts of what
Jack Keane said earlier, democracy, capitalism, they felt that
the Assad gang was stealing the Nation's wealth, and they
didn't have an equal opportunity to build better lives for
their family. We should have supported them from the beginning.
It spun out of control.
But these people are not going to give up. They are still
there. They are the moderate non-extremists sort of Syrian
patriots, and since then, as you have said, Syria has become
probably the front line of the al-Qaeda violent Islamist
extremist war today because they are all pouring in, and they
are linked now with what is happening in Iraq, but it is--the
answer to your question, in my opinion, Chairman King, it is
not too late.
If we sit back, frankly, it can only get worse. There are
two bad results here. One is that Assad wins, which is a win
for Iran incidentally, and the other is that the al-Qaeda
groups win, so we still have a, what I would call, still,
believe it or not, a pro-American element there, a group that
we can work with. They are angry at us, they were disappointed
with us, but they still need our help. You know, if it wasn't
for the Saudis pouring money in there, they would have been--
less moderate group would have been out already, so not too
late. We have a lot on the line. If we don't act, Syria will
become a base for future acts against the American homeland.
Ms. Harman. Congressman King, I have lots of positive
things to say about the NYPD, in addition to the fact that they
keep my kids and grandkids safe, and I think Ray Kelly's
service was impressive. As you know, now, the new chief is Bill
Bratton, who came from New York, but then he went to Los
Angeles, where his skills improved as head of the LAPD, so now
we send him back, the sleeker, better version of Bratton, and
you will love him.
On Syria, it is a humanitarian catastrophe. This could be
worse, in the end, than Rwanda and some of the egregious--
certainly it is a humanitarian catastrophe of the 21st Century,
as John Kerry just said. I think we should have acted years
ago. Joe Lieberman and I agree, we didn't do it.
I do think there still is room to act, but we have to be
quite careful about what we give to home. Wouldn't it be
terrible if MANPADS surfaced and were used against Israelis by
Hezbollah, or something of that nature? Because, again, of the
way that these terror groups morph and unmorph and disperse,
there is that risk, and the Intelligence Committees here and in
the Senate looked at this and were pretty cool to giving them
military weapons.
That said, however, I think the fact that Bashar has
surrendered his chemical weapons should not be a permission
slip for him to continue as head of the country, and I do think
we need, and I think we are doing this through John Kerry, to
focus on Geneva II, to getting the opposition there, including
some of the more scary elements. Al-Nusra is part of the
opposition that is not ISIS, and I think the goal has to be to
provide humanitarian assistance, maybe, in some way, find a way
to build humanitarian corridors so they can--that assistance
can get to people who have been without food for--or any kind
of sustenance for a long time, but then to shore up the
opposition so that it can be the transition to a stable
government without Bashar in it.
General Keane. Yes, we certainly squandered a huge
opportunity to be able to assist them. The fact of the matter
is there was, even in the Central Intelligence Agency, when I
was having discussions with General Petraeus, they were pushing
back early on that the rebels were fragmented, unreliable, and
just too much risk associated with harming them. But then, by
the summer of 2012, actually, the Institute for the Study of
War had some impact on the Central Intelligence Agency, and
because we had some real evidence that the groups could be
vetted properly, and the CIA did that, and as a result of that,
the Central Intelligence Agency, then led by General Petraeus,
gave briefings in Washington, obviously Classified at the time,
that the rebels could be--could be armed and they could vet
them. Secretary Clinton agreed with that, and that briefing
went to the White House in the summer of 2012, and the
President said no.
That, I think, was a strategic blunder on our part. As a
result of that, the rebel organization, the Syrian Free Army,
while still receiving weapons from Saudi Arabia, the fact of
the matter is, they know, as a result of the last initiative
dealing with chemical disarmament, they are probably not going
to get help from the United States, and that group is less
homogenous than what it was. A lot of the moderate Islamists
that were associated with the Syrian Free Army have broken free
of them because they don't think they are going to get the
weapons.
The fact of the matter is, there is still opportunity
there, and it is overstated about weapons falling into the al-
Qaeda's hands. The Saudis have been giving these guys weapons
now for 2-plus years, some of them are anti-aircraft weapons.
To the best of my knowledge, and we stay pretty close on top of
this, none of those weapons have found their way into the al-
Qaeda, and the vetting that the CIA has done and the leaders
they vetted are still there.
So, I do think there is opportunity, but we certainly did
squander a huge opportunity a couple of years ago to truly make
a difference.
Mr. Jones. This is a fundamental question, and you have, in
multiple hearings, Congressman King, been on top of this issue,
so thank you for continuing to bring it up.
In my view, it is not too late. We should have acted
earlier. It is not too late. I would actually argue if we wait,
if we continue waiting on this one, the trends are going to
continue to get worse. So I think there is an incentive to do a
couple of moderate things. I will not, I was in--in Europe, in
Brussels, both to visit our partners, European partner
agencies, intelligence agencies in December on the Syrian
threat, and I have never seen the amounts of concern among the
Europeans, number of Europeans that have gone to Syria to
fight, well over a thousand, with, if they don't get on Watch
Lists, will have Visa waiver access to the United States.
Numbers up into the hundred, around a hundred or so Americans
that have gone to either fight or otherwise participate in
Syria.
The control of the territory that groups like Jabhat al-
Nusra have had, have grown, and I think the more we wait, the
bigger problem we have. What I would argue is--and there are
two, I think, useful trends. One is the--the amount of support
for the jihadist ideology in Syria is very small. As we have
already seen recently with the push back against ISIL or ISIS,
depending on which acronym you use, the al-Qaeda affiliate in
the West, there has been active fighting against them because
they have been involved in brutal killings, they have been
involved in harsh reprimands against the local population, so I
do think there is an opportunity, at the very least, to provide
non-lethal communications equipment, information intelligence,
and information could be actually quite useful for these
organizations in their military and civilian strategies,
blankets. I mean, there are a whole range of things, including
to the refugees, that I think, again, that the longer we wait
to act, the bigger this problem will continue to get.
Mr. King. We thank all of them. I ask the Chairman if I
could just have 10 seconds at the end. You know, in answer to
the question of why these sacrifices were continuing, and every
American death is absolutely tragic and profound, but keep in
mind, on September 11, in less than 2 hours, we lost 3,000
people, and that is important to realize, that we are going to
factor in again why these sacrifices are made, how vital they
are, and what are the consequences if we ever again do let our
guard down--3,000 in less than 2 hours.
I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Chairman. I just have one
quick comment, and that is, with respect to Syria, I am very
concerned this is a culmination of the Sunni-Shia conflict, and
that it is becoming one of the largest training--terrorist
training grounds now globally, and every day, jihadists are
pouring into Syria.
I agree, General, that we squandered an opportunity 2 years
ago when these forces were more moderate. I am concerned about
the growing infiltration of the rebel forces by more extreme
groups and the blow-back that that could present to the
homeland.
With that, I want to say, given the time and the number of
Members left, that the Chairman is going to stick very strictly
now, I think, to the 5-minute rule.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witnesses for their
presentation today at a hearing that I hope, in its conclusion,
will emphasize that there is no partisanship in the issue of
domestic and National security.
I want to thank the witnesses for their thoughtful
presentation, and in particular, to thank Senator Lieberman,
Congresswoman Harman, and General Keane for their service to
the Nation.
I think it is important to note that I hope in the course
of the discussions about the issues of National and domestic
security that we will quickly have before us the newly sworn-in
Secretary of Homeland Security, which is a crucial issue, and
that we will, like my Ranking Member has indicated, pursue the
question of how you balance privacy and security with the
question of the gathering of the mega data.
As a Member of the House Judiciary Committee, under the
business section 215, that was not the intent of Congress, but
I, as a Member of this committee, truly believe there should be
a balance, and my questions will be along those lines of
balancing, and I thank you very much for your presentation.
Let me also say that I am--I know Commissioner Kelly as
well and certainly now Commissioner Bratton. Commissioner Kelly
served in the Homeland Security department and respect his
work. You can have security in New York, and frankly, we know
the challenges it faces. Houston faces challenges because we
are the epicenter of energy, but we can balance challenges with
not having racial profiling. So I wanted to make sure I put
that on the record because that is very important to us.
It is important also to note that President Bush had a
series of Homeland Security security strategies that he offered
in the 2000s. When President Obama came in, he integrated
National security and domestic security, and I, frankly, think
that was a very smart approach because National security is
interwoven, meaning the security beyond the borders, making
sure that this country defends itself from foreign enemies is
the same, I think, of having domestic security, and that kind
of structure is what I think that we should be looking at.
I have never conceded the point that al-Qaeda was dead, and
I use the term rather than decentralizing, as franchising.
Franchising was the shoe bomber. Franchising was the Christmas
day bomber. Certainly in meetings that we have had, we know
that al-Shabaab, although they have a pointed issue, they are
after Kenya, but they are also reckless as it relates to
Americans as well. So what goes on outside of our border
impacts inside of our border, and frankly, this committee has
worked hard, in particular, under HR 1417, a border security
bill that has allowed us to work together.
Let me ask this question to everyone. In the Chairman's
comments, he commented from Peter Bergen about the idea of an
immediate threat at home. Peter states that al-Qaeda controls
much of the Arab world, and therefore, what is its impact here?
My question is: Understanding that adjusting our approach
to fighting terrorism is a broad perspective, can anyone
identify areas of immediate need where the U.S. homeland is
most vulnerable?
Let me start with General Keane, and if I can ask Senator
Lieberman. My other question is: Is there any evidence that
suggests that scaling back U.S. involvement and presence in
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq may reverse the efforts
of the last decade to eliminate terrorist groups?
Might I also say, and I--your answers might also say that
we wanted to pursue and stay in Iraq, but they had to protect
our soldiers, and they refused to do it.
General Keane.
General Keane. Yes. Well, certainly the engagement we have
currently with senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan is
critical to American security. To continue to be successful at
that, two things have to happen. One is we have to continue our
involvement with the Pakistani military and assisting them to
conduct counterinsurgency. In other words, unconventional
operations against that force as well as the thing that they
are most interested in is the Taliban that is threatening their
regime. So our presence in Afghanistan, as previously stated by
my colleagues here, is very important to us to be able to
continue to have the intelligence we need and also the means to
be able to execute operations against them. That is crucial.
Second, in my view, the developing situation in Syria and
Iraq will become the largest al-Qaeda sanctuary, and it will
threaten the region, to be sure, and we have to start now
dealing with the harsh reality of that. The sooner we get on
top of it in terms of intelligence, the better we are going to
be with dealing with this reality.
This is what al-Qaeda wants. They will--they seize
territory, gain control of people so that they can become
predator in nature in that area, and also, they have never
given up on their desire to cause more harm to the United
States. So I think that is a major area.
I disagree with you, Congresswoman, on Iraq. The fact of
the matter is, the immunity issue was not a serious issue. It
was a false issue presented by Maliki as face-saving because
the United States envoy came in. After the military had
recommended 24,000 soldiers to stay in Iraq, the President's
envoy put 10,000 on the table. Maliki knew that was not a
serious proposal. That eventually got down to nothing. The
immunity issue got brought up at the end, and it was more face-
saving for him inside of Iraq than anything else.
But the fact of the matter is, that is a significant
strategic blunder not leaving forces there, much as we did
post-World War II, not for security reasons but for influence,
and we lost this influence over Maliki, and even further than
that. It is more than the troops. We disengaged--disengaged
geopolitically with Iraq and in terms of partnering with them,
which they wanted very much so. They forced the strategic
framework agreement on us. We wanted to have a status of forces
discussion about troops, and they said no. Maliki said we are
not doing that until we agree to have a strategic partnership
that will last for 20 years. That was their idea. We walked
away from that as well, and now we have this debacle on our
hands.
So, that is the second-most--most critical area, I think,
that we have to pay attention to, and without getting into the
details of it, what has taken place in northern and
northeastern Africa also is potentially threatening to us.
In principle, in my judgment, what you deal with, you
cannot let sanctuaries take hold, and we should be using
partnering with other countries to deal with those sanctuaries.
I am not talking about bringing U.S. troops to bear. I am
talking about, in some cases, in helping people with training
assistance so they know how to deal with this problem, and we
may actually help them with equipment and intelligence to deal
with it, to be sure. But we cannot let these sanctuaries take
hold and fester because they will be predator in nature on
their neighbors and then eventually potentially dangerous to
the American people.
Mr. Lieberman. Just briefly, in answer to, Congresswoman,
your very good question, which is, is there any evidence that
our pulling out of countries creates a threat to our homeland--
I am paraphrasing, but I think that is what you asked.
Well, I look back first at Afghanistan during the 1990s
when, as I said earlier, the general feeling in this country
was that was someone else's civil war when the Taliban took
over and al-Qaeda nested there, and of course, that led right
to the 9/11 attacks against us. Iraq today is another example
of that. We pulled out for all the reasons that have been given
here, and now al-Qaeda is back in, and they will--they will use
that as a base against us.
I will summarize it this way. My reading of the last 15
years tells me that the reason that we have--and this--the
reason that we have so diminished and degraded core al-Qaeda in
the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not because
of a whole-of-Government approach, because we used the U.S.
military. I believe in a whole-of-Government approach, but that
has to, in these cases, include the U.S. military because al-
Qaeda is not a social organization. It has an ideological
motivation to it, but it is a brutal military organization. We
are only going to stop it by helping the heroes in each of
these countries, who don't want al-Qaeda or the Taliban to
control their lives and want to fight for something better.
They need our help. They want our help, and if we give it to
them, it will protect our homeland.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say that I respect the
testimony of the very fine witnesses. Many of us would disagree
but agree that we have issues in both of those places, Iraq and
Afghanistan, that I think we now need to collaboratively come
together. I know the American people wanted out of the Iraq
wars; they want out of Afghanistan. But they also want those
countries to remain strong, to collaborate with them, to use
resources, and as well they want us to have a strong National
security policy that protects the homeland as well, and I think
this is a very important hearing.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman of the
Cybersecurity Subcommittee, Mr. Meehan from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Meehan. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
again this very, very distinguished panel, not just for your
presence here today but across the panel, your tremendous work
on these issues on behalf of our Nation in so many different
capacities.
Congresswoman Harman, it is indeed a pleasure to once again
have the capacity to share a moment in this room with you. You
will be pleased to know that--and I thank you for raising the
issue of cybersecurity, because it--it remains a remarkable
focus, and in the aftermath of the incident which just occurred
with Target, and that is one kind of a cyber incident. Criminal
enterprise is likely, wholly separate from the kind of state-
sponsored cyber activity may take place.
So I want you to know we have made great progress, and we
will be marking up this afternoon a cyber bill. But I am
worried as well about the concerns that we may have in this
Nation as we deal with the narrative in this moment that
appropriately reflects in the aftermath of the NSA revelations
and other kinds of things, we have got a better understanding,
but there is a narrative that may be taking place, which is
privacy versus security, and it is so easy for us to move so
quickly away from attention to the security.
So I am going to ask if you would give me your sense of
where we are in the form of the cyber preparation to deal with
this issue of paying attention to protection of privacy but not
surrendering in some kind of a knee-jerk effort our
responsibility to protect Americans in so many different
capacities.
Ms. Harman. Well, thank you, Congressman Meehan. It is very
good to see you, too.
I--as I think about privacy and security, I often say they
are not a zero-sum game. You didn't get more of one and less of
the other. They are re-enforcing values, and things that we
have worked on together in Congress, like the Intelligence
Reform Law of 2004--Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins,
Congressman Huckster, and I were the so-called Big Four on that
one--not only find ways to reorganize our intelligence
community so we leverage the strengths of all the agencies, but
also to set up a privacy and civil liberties board, which was
supposed to be stood up then and, unfortunately, hasn't--just
finally was stood up last year. But at any rate, the point of
that was to have, at the front end of policymaking, a group of
people who worried about the privacy of Americans. We can do
both. This needs to be a positive-sum game. It applies
obviously to cybersecurity, and people are genuinely worried
now that they see that there was a theft of I guess it is 70
million pieces of crucial information on individuals. That is a
large number.
But they also need to be worried, it seems to me, about the
purchase of exploits by bad guys, which are very inexpensive.
These are back doors into our grids, our infrastructure in this
country, and it is--so it is not just personal information. It
is, you know, pick one, something very serious. It could be--
generate, you know, a life-and-death problem for our
communities.
So how to think about this? I think this committee has an
opportunity, and I know you are doing it, to talk to the
private sector, which controls most of the cyber capacity and
persuade them to come on in. A cyber bill, Senator Lieberman
knows this better than I do, has to grant immunity to those who
come to play and has to respect the fact that personal
information about companies is being shared and so on and so
forth and make sure that again it is a win-win, and I think
this is the climate to do it in.
I would just add on surveillance, because that has come up,
too. Same issue. There is not a zero-sum game here. There
should be tweaks, my view, to the laws that we have. I think
the public debate is healthy, and the tweaks should assure an
anxious public that their privacy is protected, but we should
never compromise on the basic parts of the system that lead us
to find bad guys before they attack us.
Mr. Meehan. Well, I thank you to for that, that answer. You
will be pleased to see that I think we have made remarkable
progress in the form of bringing together not just the private
sector but our Governmental entities in the kind of a framework
that would be effective, but the one place we haven't been able
to touch, and you put your finger on it, is the kind of thing
that will incentivize that sharing between the private and
public sector which gives some kind of security really in the
form of liability protection to those entities which are
touched first. No better example than a Target who finds out,
you know, weeks ahead of time that they are being impacted. We
need to encourage that sharing in real time.
I thank you for your focus on this very, very important
issue and look forward to working with the entire panel as we
move through these issues in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you. Let me just commend the
gentleman for your leadership on this issue, your dedication to
get not only the private-sector support of your legislation but
also the privacy groups. It is not an easy task, and it is
not--it is an uphill battle and you were able to accomplish
that, and I just want to thank you for that.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to play a little bit more on this zero-sum game
context. The one thing you know in a zero-sum game is that the
sum will always be zero, but in game theory, there is also a
variable-sum game where there can in fact be multiple winners,
and there can only be multiple winners in a pluralistic society
when the rights of minorities are protected.
There was a debate here last year about--or last couple of
months about military intervention in Syria. We certainly did
not support the Assad regime, the justification for authorizing
the administration to use military force, albeit not troops on
the ground, was that Assad had murdered, through chemical
weapons, 100,000 people in Syria. Well, the rebel fighters were
beheading people, and in that part of the world and in that
conflict, I think the concern is not that you are supporting
Assad, but as a minority, you are afraid that all non-Sunnis
will be murdered.
Marwan Muasher just released a book called, ``The Second
Arab Awakening,'' and in it, he identifies the Middle East as
being a pluralistic society, a pluralistic region of Sunni,
Shia, Kurds, Christians, and a lot of tribes--and a lot of
tribes. He also says that 500,000 American troops in Iraq and a
trillion dollars couldn't implant a lasting pluralism or peace
in Iraq, and therefore, no outsider can.
You know, what is going on in the Middle East today is it
continued--the Chairman has said there was a culmination of
Sunni-Shia conflict. It is really the continuation of it, and
what is going on is Shia and Sunni are continuing to litigate a
conflict that goes back to the Seventh Century as to who the
rightful successor to the prophet Mohammed is. This is not
about peace. This is not about democracy. This is about
control, and so long as you don't have, as Fareed Zakaria would
say, the inner stuffings, in his book, ``The Future of
Freedom,'' in a constitution that protects minority rights, you
are always going to have these conflicts.
In Northern Ireland, George Mitchell was sent over there
for 5 years, the last iteration was 22 months. He didn't think
that peace was possible in Northern Ireland, and he says in his
book ``Making Peace'' that the great intangible of solving
conflict is exhaustion, not only at the negotiating table but
also on the battlefield. The warring factions have to realize
that their commitment to the fight, their commitment to the
culture of violence has not produced any kind of lasting peace,
and therefore, they need to move in a different direction.
So, what are the two sides in Northern Ireland, what were
they required to do, the Catholics and the Protestants, the
extremists? They were required to denounce violence and
actually participate in destruction of their arms so that the
culture of physical force to achieve political ends was over,
but both sides had to give something in order to achieve that.
You know, you may say, you know, how can you compare
Northern Ireland with the Middle East? Well, guess what, when
George Mitchell was finished negotiating the Good Friday
Accord, he was dispatched where? To the Middle East, because
the conflict is very, very similar.
So, I just think that, you know, American Presidents
certainly can do more to keep leaders in those countries from
going to extremes, but there is only so much that we can do.
Our American military has been extraordinary, extraordinary in
tamping down violence in Iraq, tamping down violence in
Afghanistan. To what end? We can't impose a political solution.
We can only provide a context, a breathing space within which
the warring factions can do that. I am afraid that in that part
of the world, there are no good allies of the United States in
that part of the world. Not Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq, not Karzai
in Afghanistan. We have to bribe his brother to help promote a
lasting peace in Afghanistan. We don't have good allies there.
What we can do I think is what we have already done, and I
think we are limited. So, I am sorry I went on a little bit too
long, but I am just interested in your thoughts about that.
Ms. Harman. Congressman Higgins, I don't know if I should
be first, but I just very quickly would offer, too, first, I
think we have some allies in the region, one of which Israel,
which is a pluralist democracy and under threat. I strongly
favor the peace process. I think it is in Israel's interest and
the Palestinian peoples' interest, but that is one.
I also think there is another good news story maybe, and
that is Tunisia, where an Islamist party, the Ennahda party,
won the first election and has now in a peace deal with other
parties surrendered power to a coalition, and just maybe that
can show some success.
So, I think a lot of what you said is very true, but I
think there are ways--and our vigilance and focus will be
necessary--that progress can be made.
Mr. Lieberman. I will just add briefly, thanks for your
statement. So it was a thought-provoking statement.
In my opinion, we do have friends in the countries
throughout the Middle East who essentially share our goals,
that what is happening--and we won't have any friends if we
just pull back. They are not asking, as General Keane said, for
the U.S. Army to be or the military to be on the ground. They
are asking for our help, and what is happening now, after the
so-called Arab Spring, is really a remarkable historic
development in the Arab world, which is an uprising against
dictators, autocrats, by the people. They want freedom and they
want a better opportunity to make some more money for their
families, and in almost every case, these revolutions have been
led by the under- or unemployed children of the middle class,
who are well-educated, who understood how much better things
could be.
What is happening now in some of these countries in the
conflicts that the revolutions have unleashed is not dissimilar
to what has happened before when autocrats or totalitarian
regimes are overthrown. They unleash this kind of conflict. It
happened in Eastern Europe, Central Europe. In some sense, that
is what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if we stand back,
it is only going to get worse.
I will--I know the Sunni-Shia conflict has been going on
for a millennia-plus, but I also know that there is a lot of
mixing between Sunnis and Shias throughout the Middle East, and
this is, as you said, it is not a zero-sum game. We ought to be
able to work out a system, and Tunisia is the hopeful example
where everybody could feel that there is a way for them to win.
Frankly, as we have said earlier over and over, it is in our
interest to see that happen, not only because it reflects our
best National values, but it also reflects what is best for our
security.
Mr. Jones. If I could just very briefly follow up with two
points.
One is I would just, on your Northern Ireland example, I
think one of the useful lessons the United States is now in is
the shift the British had, the mindset shifting from a heavy
military footprint to target the IRA to one that was much
lighter, focused on MI5 and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that
allowed a peace process to even be possible, in part because
the IRA was so weakened by that point.
The other thing I would say, just to reiterate, is we do
have allies. We don't have common interests across the board
with all of them. We do have allies that hate extremism. If you
look at the progress that has been made in Somalia, tossing out
Shabaab from Mogadishu, from Kismayo, tossing out extremists
from other areas, we do have allies. We do have allies, local
populations in Mali that hate extremism. So I think in that
sense we have to gravitate towards those kinds of
organizations.
General Keane. You know, I think it is a thoughtful
question and one that has been asked before. I think it is just
too simplistic to categorize the entire Middle East as a
conflict between Sunnis and Shias, a sectarian conflict. I am
not minimizing the fact that it exists, I think you have to
understand it does exist, but what is happening there is there
are authoritarian regimes, every single one of them, except for
Israel, and the drivers of instability as a result of these
authoritarian regimes are the lack of political and social
justice and the lack of economic opportunity. As a result of
that, the radical Islamists use that and leverage that to gain
support for what they are attempting to do.
So we have to look at the region and see what has taken
place in that region and how this very ambitious political
movement that is trying to drive us out of the region so they
can have their way--and that is what 9/11 was all about, it was
about driving us out of the region, it is one of their major
strategic objectives--and for us to make certain that that
region doesn't explode with this radical Islamic movement,
which would not only threaten the region but the world at
large. They are a world domination objective organization. It
is hard for us to get our head around that intellectually, I
think, but nonetheless that is their idea, not ours.
So the only answer here is to work this, I think,
comprehensively--what are you trying to achieve here, is what I
would love the administration to articulate--and then
individually work with partners in the region to deal with the
realities that they have. Some of these realities are dealing
with our allies, Mr. Congressman, who are authoritarian
regimes, who are repressive in dealing with their people, the
lack of social justice that exists in these regions. Yet we
have harmonious relationships with them that are financially
rewarding. The fact of the matter is we should be leveraging
these regimes to move in a different direction.
That is why I am saying it is not just kinetic. What is our
strategy, what we are trying to do? I am not suggesting we
force democracy on everybody. But I am suggesting that if you
focus on what the drivers of instability are, injustice to
people and lack of economic opportunity, you can start to make
some progress in the region. Certainly staying engaged is the
answer, as opposed to just the sense of futility and
hopelessness that we get. The culture is dramatically different
from the United States, the geography is harsh, everything
about it is hard. It is easy to say, let's just walk away from
it. That would be a tragedy, and it would result in harm to the
American people.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman
of the Oversight Subcommittee, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having this
very insightful hearing today.
First off, I want to add my voice to the thanks to Senator
Lieberman and Congresswoman Harman for your service to our
country.
General, for your service in the 101st Airborne, 10th
Mountain Division, 1st Brigade. The Chairman and I were able to
visit with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team in Afghanistan in
November 2011, and the memories that I have of the men and
women that are serving in harm's way go a long way. I just want
to thank everyone that is serving to fight and counter the
elements that we are talking about today around the globe,
whether it is in the southern Philippines or Afghanistan or
where it may be.
Senator Lieberman, I want to also thank you for some
comments in your opening statement, when you said, let me
underscore here the enemy is violent Islamist extremism, a
political ideology that seeks to justify totalitarian
governance by perverting religion. The enemy, we can never
stress enough, is not Islam itself, it is the Islamist
extremists that use religion for its own use and gain.
So I want to shift gears from some of the topics that we
have talked about today, because talking about a false
narrative that endangers the homeland, and as I sat here and
listened to some of the testimony I thought about the false
narrative with respect to our Nation's borders. That is the use
of the term ``operational control,'' and that we have a secure
Southern Border.
So I want to ask each of you, in your opinion, how does
border security, specifically the Southern Border in this
instance, but we can't limit it just to the Southern Border. We
have a long Northern Border with huge ports of entry. We have
ocean and seaports, airports that are all playing into that
border security element. So how does National border security
play into your thoughts with regard to National security
countering al-Qaeda elements, countering any other threats, but
also the false narrative of an operational control element? So
I will start with Senator Lieberman.
Mr. Lieberman. Thanks, Congressman. Thanks for your kind
words. Let me begin the discussion. I have been out for about a
year, so I don't know the latest. But part of the challenge
post-
9/11 was not just the security-privacy tension, but how do we
maintain security in a country that has historically been as
open as ours, and that includes the geographical fate of
America which has always protected us? We are surrounded by two
oceans, we have historically friendly allies to the north and
south. We have enormous borders. You are never going to really
maintain full security unless you do your best on those
borders.
I think we have come a long way since 9/11 toward achieving
that. We are probably doing better at airport and airline
security than we are at some other places. We have improved, I
think, our ability at points of entry on the north and the
south borders to stop people that want to do us harm from
coming in. The Southern Border is obviously a unique problem
because of the enormous flows of people across that border,
including, obviously, illegal immigrants.
So, bottom line, if you are talking about homeland
security, you have got to in the post 9/11 age protect your
borders, all of them, air, sea, land. We have done a lot
better. But this is one of those journeys that doesn't have an
end point, we are just going to keep having to do better and
better.
Mr. Duncan. Right. Let me just, before I go to
Congresswoman Harman, let me just remind everyone that
Hezbollah has exploited our Southern Border.
Mr. Lieberman. That is correct.
Mr. Duncan. So Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. I think it is an important question.
This committee should take a victory lap for its authorship of
the Safe Ports Act about 5 years ago. It was a bipartisan law
that passed the House and Senate, was signed I think by
President Bush. I think it predates President Obama. But what
we did is push our borders out. We thought about how important
it is to inspect cargo, for example, at the point of
embarkation on ships and then to lock down those ships, and
then of course to have security at the actual ports of entry.
But we called it layered security. That layered security
approach is now the approach that we take at our airports as
well in a variety of ways. So there really should be an
appreciation of that.
On the physical land borders, Canada and the Southern
Border, I would just point out that so far as I know, and again
I may be a little stale, more terrorists have tried to enter
our country through the Canadian border than through the
Southern Border. That doesn't mean the Southern Border doesn't
matter; of course it does. But one of the early bad guys that
an astute I think customs official was able to spot was a guy
named Ahmed Ressam, who was trying to cross the Canadian border
in Washington State with a rental car full of explosives. His
intended target was LAX, then in my Congressional district. So
of course I would remember that and think it was a heroic act
to have stopped the guy.
But, yes, looking at all the borders, as you have
described, should be, should remain a high priority. But let's
not forget that home-grown terrorists who are already here,
many of them legally, are getting radicalized on the internet,
but also by live people in their neighborhoods, and we have to
keep a focus on that.
Mr. Duncan. Absolutely.
General, can you give a military perspective on that real
quickly?
General Keane. Well, from our perspective, I think what our
intelligence agencies have done to thwart terrorism is really
notable since 9/11 and the cooperation that these agencies
have.
I am convinced in my own mind that no amount of fencing in
and of itself is going to stop a determined terrorist from
getting into this country. What we have do is stay focused on
them. We have to be into their phone conversations, we have to
be into their internet, we have to know what their thinking is,
and we have to stop those kind of activities before they start.
So our intelligence services, yes, the National Security
Agency, the extraordinary work that they have been able to do
is really critical to stopping this. Do we need a secure border
in the southern part of the United States, given all the
problems associated with it? Certainly, we do. As Congresswoman
mentioned, the focus we have taken and the layered approach
where it begins overseas is really critical for us. We have had
a lot of success as a result of it. So the resources that are
necessary for that kind of work is something that you are all
doing and I applaud you for it.
Mr. Jones. I think one of the more interesting discussions
on this came from the bin Laden documents from the Abbottabad
compound, where senior al-Qaeda leaders noted two things I
would highlight on the subject. One is frustration at the
closed borders and the progress the United States had made in
making it more difficult for them to get inside, actually
hearing it from senior leaders themselves. But also the
commitment of finding and exploiting ways to get inside of the
homeland, whether it was individuals, as bin Laden had said at
one point, trying to get somebody with a Mexican visa that they
could smuggle through the Southern Border or elsewhere.
Look, we have had people leave the United States and go to
train with militant groups overseas, senior levels of al-
Shabaab, Syrians, other locations, Afghanistan as well, and
Pakistan. We have had people that have come back and been
involved in plots and we had not discovered them. Zazi,
Shahzad, Abdulmutallab were all back in the United States when
they were involved in plots.
Mr. Duncan. The Boston bombers.
Mr. Jones. Exactly. The Boston bombers. So this will remain
a problem.
I think the issue with our border security has got to be
border security is good up until the point that it has useful
intelligence. I think one of the aspects about this then is--
and this is where Syria comes back into the picture--we are
only as good as people whose names we have access to and we can
pass to folks in the border security. One concern I have had in
talking to folks that we have working in and around Syria is we
don't know all the people over there. We know many of them, but
not all of them. If those names don't get on lists, they don't
get back to border security, they can come in or out without
being stopped.
So I would then fuse those two issues of border security
and intelligence as being crucial and potentially vulnerable if
we don't have access to that information.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for your time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to point the committee to an article
in the Weekly Standard by Thomas Joscelyn, ``Know Your Enemy,
al-Qaeda's Grand Strategy.'' I would like to enter this for the
record.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted For the Record by Honorable Jeff Duncan
January 20, 2014
KNOW YOUR ENEMY: AL QAEDA'S GRAND STRATEGY \1\
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\1\ http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/know-your-
enemy_774088.html?nopager=1.
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By THOMAS JOSCELYN
In the summer of 2008, Barack Obama, senator and presidential
candidate, toured the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama had
endeared himself to the antiwar left by denouncing President Bush's
decision to topple Saddam Hussein and repeatedly claiming that the war
in Iraq had diverted resources from defeating al Qaeda and its allies
in South Asia. Obama did not tone down this criticism even as he spoke
with CBS News from Kabul on July 20, shortly before proceeding to
Saddam's former abode. ``We got distracted by Iraq,'' Obama said.
Afghanistan ``has to be the central focus, the central front [in] our
battle against terrorism.''
Some top U.S. military commanders, including General David
Petraeus, then the face of the American war effort, disagreed with
Obama's assessment. And in Iraq, the general and the senator squared
off. The contentious meeting between Petraeus and Obama has been
recorded in The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq,
from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, by New York Times reporter Michael
Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor.
Obama repeated that ``Afghanistan is the central front in the war
on terror,'' and therefore a timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq
was necessary. Petraeus disagreed: ``Actually, Senator, Iraq is what al
Qaeda says is the central front.''
Obama was unpersuaded. ``The Al-Qaeda leadership is not here in
Iraq. They are there,'' Obama said, pointing to Pakistan on a map.
Petraeus, of course, knew this. The general did not need the
senator to point out the obvious. And besides, Petraeus argued, Obama
was missing the point. Whatever one thought of the decision to invade
Saddam's neo-Stalinist state in the first place, al Qaeda had made the
fight for Iraq its main priority.
Obama pressed forward, questioning ``whether Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI]
presented a threat to the United States,'' Gordon and Trainor write.
``If AQI has morphed into a kind of mafia then they are not going to be
blowing up buildings,'' Obama said. Petraeus pointed to a failed
terrorist attack in Scotland in 2007 as an example of why Obama's
thinking was wrong. ``Well, think about the Glasgow airport,'' Petraeus
warned. The general, according to Gordon and Trainor, ``also noted the
potential of AQI to expand its influence to Syria and Lebanon.''
The debate between Obama and Petraeus may seem like ancient history
after more than five years have passed. And Obama went on to ``end''
the war in Iraq, or so he claimed during his reelection campaign and
thereafter, by withdrawing all of America's forces at the end of 2011.
The truth, however, is that the disagreement between Obama and
Petraeus still resonates today. Al Qaeda has come roaring back in Iraq,
capturing significant territory in Fallujah, Ramadi, and elsewhere.
Obama does not believe this is a major concern. And, just as Petraeus
warned, AQI has ``expanded its influence'' in neighboring Syria as a
result of the revolution against Bashar al-Assad. Other al Qaeda
affiliates have joined AQI in the fight for Syria.
But there is something even more fundamental about the Obama-
Petraeus debate. It goes to the heart of how we define al Qaeda itself.
More than a dozen years since the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the United States is still confused about al Qaeda's goals and
even how the group founded by Osama bin Laden is organized. The
intellectual confusion is pervasive--and some of it is deliberate.
Political Revolutionaries
Osama bin Laden will always be remembered for his success in
attacking the United States within its own borders, thereby shattering
Americans' illusion of security. To this day, if you listen to many
commentators, this is al Qaeda's principal reason for existence. It is
widely thought that if al Qaeda is not striking targets in the West,
then the group must be close to defeat. This is simply not true.
Terrorizing the United States and its Western allies was always a
tactic, a step toward achieving al Qaeda's real goal--power for its
leaders and their ideology in the heart of the Islamic world. Al
Qaeda's jihadists are not just terrorists; they are political
revolutionaries. They have sought, since al Qaeda's founding in 1988,
to overturn the existing political order in various Muslim-ruled
countries.
Al Qaeda's ideologues believed that the status quo before the 2011
Arab uprisings was heretical. They believed that Muslim rulers had
abandoned true Islam by neglecting to implement sharia law as defined
by al Qaeda. They also believed, and continue to believe, that an
imaginary Zionist-Crusader conspiracy has prevented the real believers
from achieving success. Therefore, al Qaeda deduced, the conspirators
must be confronted.
By striking America, al Qaeda's most senior leaders believed, they
could cause the U.S. government eventually to withdraw its support for
various Muslim rulers and Israel. According to bin Laden and other al
Qaeda thinkers, American support was the main reason why early jihadist
efforts to overthrow Muslim dictatorships ended in bloody fiascos.
Strike America, al Qaeda argued, and it will crumble just as the
Soviets did after their embarrassing loss to the mujahedeen in
Afghanistan in the 1980s. As America's influence wanes, al Qaeda's
theory of the world continued, the apostate tyrants who rule throughout
the Muslim world will become susceptible to the jihadists' revolution.
Al Qaeda and like-minded jihadists can then replace the dictators with
pure Islamic states based on sharia law. And these states can then link
up to resurrect the Caliphate, a supranational Islamic empire that was
dissolved in 1924 and that has taken on a mythical status in al Qaeda's
thinking.
This is how al Qaeda has long seen the world and why America was
struck on September 11, 2001. It is why U.S. interests were attacked
well before 9/11 and have continued to be targeted ever since. Al
Qaeda's conspiratorial view of Middle Eastern politics, its deep hatred
of the West, and its resentment of Western influence in the Islamic
world made such attacks necessary.
Al Qaeda has repeatedly made this strategy clear. In his 2002
letter to the American people, Osama bin Laden emphasized that ``our
fight against these [Muslim] governments is not separate from our fight
against you.'' Removing ``these governments is an obligation upon us,
and a necessary step to free the Ummah [community of believers], to
make the Shariah the supreme law and to regain Palestine.''
In private correspondence recovered in bin Laden's Abbottabad
compound nine years later, the terror master repeatedly made the same
point. Bin Laden emphasized the necessity of striking American
interests as a step towards building a true Islamic state. Bin Laden
worried that, however much the United States had been weakened since 9/
11, the world's lone superpower retained the ability to destroy an al
Qaeda-style nation should it arise. The ``more we can conduct
operations against America, the closer we get to uniting our efforts to
establish an Islamic State,'' bin Laden or one of his top lieutenants
wrote in 2010. Still, al Qaeda's leaders believed that the ``time to
establish an Islamic state is near, and the jihadist ideology is
spreading abroad.''
Al Qaeda adjusted its tactics in the post-9/11 world, especially
with American troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bin Laden
wrote in another letter that his organization must ``concentrate'' its
``jihad efforts in areas where the conditions are ideal for us to
fight.'' Bin Laden concluded that ``Iraq and Afghanistan are two good
examples.''
The centrality of the Iraq war, from al Qaeda's perspective, was
emphasized in a letter from Ayman al Zawahiri, then bin Laden's top
deputy, to the head of Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2005. Zawahiri wrote: ``I
want to be the first to congratulate you for what God has blessed you
with in terms of fighting in the heart of the Islamic world, which was
formerly the field for major battles in Islam's history, and what is
now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era.''
The very fight that Barack Obama has long seen as tangential to al
Qaeda's operations, and even similar to Mafia-style crime, was viewed
quite differently by al Qaeda's leaders. It was the ``greatest battle
of Islam in this era.''
This was not empty rhetoric. Numerous public and private statements
from al Qaeda emphasized the centrality of Iraq and their desire to
establish an Islamic state in the heart of the Middle East.
Al Qaeda has continued to adjust its operations in the wake of the
2011 Arab uprisings. In Syria, the organization has devoted a
substantial amount of its resources to defeating Bashar al-Assad's
regime and establishing a new Islamic regime. Elsewhere, in countries
ruled by newly installed Islamist governments, such as Tunisia, al
Qaeda initially advised jihadists to refrain from fighting altogether.
In such countries it was best, al Qaeda said, to concentrate on
recruiting and to build a base of popular support for its ideology.
Over time, that strategy has evolved, however, as the Tunisian
government has cracked down on al Qaeda-allied organizations.
But everywhere, the goal is the same: to advance a political
revolution that al Qaeda sparked more than a quarter of a century ago.
Al Qaeda's Global Network
Once you understand al Qaeda's true aspirations, the structure of
its organization begins to make sense. Although much of al Qaeda's
network remains clandestine, a vast amount of information on its
operations is available to the public.
The days when al Qaeda was a small cadre have long since passed.
From its earliest days, al Qaeda devoted a substantial share of its
efforts to insurgencies ranging from Chechnya to North Africa. Before
9/11, most of the recruits who passed through al Qaeda-sponsored
training camps in Afghanistan were tasked with doing something other
than attacking America. ``Some experts even believe that the ratio of
insurgent fighters to terrorists in al Qaeda's camps may be 15 to 1,''
notes the START Database's website, which is sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. This created a deep well from which al
Qaeda could draw manpower. Estimates of the number of jihadists trained
in al Qaeda's camps prior to 9/11 vary, but easily totaled 10,000.
(U.S. intelligence estimates cited by the 9/11 Commission range from
10,000 to 20,000 fighters. Other estimates are much higher.) Only 19 of
these trainees attacked the United States on 9/11.
Going back to his days in Sudan in the early 1990s, bin Laden
believed that his al Qaeda was the vanguard of the global jihadist
movement. According to the 9/11 Commission, bin Laden ``had a vision of
himself as head of an international jihad confederation.'' Bin Laden
established an ``Islamic Army Shura,'' which ``was to serve as the
coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he
was forging alliances.'' The Shura ``was composed of his own al Qaeda
Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist
organizations that were still independent.'' As of the early 1990s, bin
Laden and al Qaeda pursued a ``pattern of expansion through building
alliances'' and thus had laid the ``groundwork for a true global
terrorist network.''
Throughout the 1990s and thereafter, al Qaeda continued to pursue
versions of this original vision. In some cases, other jihadist groups
were outright absorbed into bin Laden's joint venture. In other
instances, al Qaeda remained closely allied with jihadist organizations
that did not formally merge with it. Al Qaeda also deliberately spawned
new groups to expand its influence.
Al Qaeda's policy of aggressive geographic expansion has been
largely successful of late. While the group once relied almost entirely
on a network of secret operatives embedded within countries ruled by
hostile governments, al Qaeda now has formal branches (often called
``affiliates'') operating in Africa, throughout the Middle East, and in
South Asia. Each branch is fighting to create an Islamic state and has
openly declared its loyalty to Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Laden's successor
as the head of al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is headquartered in Yemen
and led by Nasir al Wuhayshi, Osama bin Laden's former protege. In
August 2013, Zawahiri appointed Wuhayshi as the general manager of al
Qaeda's global operations. This gives Wuhayshi great power across the
network. Wuhayshi has been experimenting with al Qaeda-style
governance, even creating a new brand (Ansar al Sharia, or Defenders of
Sharia) for his efforts. Ansar al Sharia in Yemen was the first of
several similarly named jihadist groups to emerge following the Arab
uprisings.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took over much of Mali in
2012 until the French intervened in January 2013. The group continues
to operate throughout West and North Africa. In Somalia, another al
Qaeda branch, Al Shabaab, continues to hold some territory and wage an
insurgency against African forces.
The war in Syria has been a boon for al Qaeda. Jabhat al Nusra and
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the successor to Al Qaeda in Iraq,
have thousands of fighters on the ground in Syria and Iraq. The two
have quarreled over leadership and other matters. But they are still
doing a considerable amount of damage while probably controlling more
territory than al Qaeda has ever held before. There are other al Qaeda-
allied groups operating inside Syria as well.
In addition to these five official branches, there are numerous
jihadist groups that have said they are part of al Qaeda's global
jihad. And in South Asia, al Qaeda continues to operate as part of a
terror ``syndicate,'' owing to its decades-long ties to extremist
organizations that share its ideology. Al Qaeda continues to cooperate
closely with the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and an alphabet soup of
other groups based in Pakistan. They are jointly seeking to re-
establish the Taliban's Islamic state in Afghanistan.
The degree of command and control exercised by al Qaeda's senior
leaders over this global network is hotly debated. But the minimalists
have to ignore a substantial body of evidence showing that Zawahiri and
his lieutenants maintain a significant amount of influence, despite the
management problems that any human organization faces.
The Enemy Gets a Vote
The debate between Obama and Petraeus in 2008 has not been
resolved. If anything, Obama now defines al Qaeda more narrowly than
ever before, even as al Qaeda's many branches have become more
virulent.
To hear the Obama administration explain the current state of the
war, you would never know that al Qaeda seeks to establish Islamic
states, or that the group has made stunning advances toward this end.
Instead, the president and his surrogates consistently draw a hard line
between al Qaeda's ``core'' in South Asia and ``affiliated'' groups
everywhere else. Some are quick to brand virtually any jihadist group,
even if it is openly pro-al Qaeda and has well-known ties to one or
more of al Qaeda's branches, as a ``local'' nuisance that should not be
considered part of al Qaeda's network. Such arguments miss the entire
reason for al Qaeda's existence, which has always been to acquire power
in ``local'' settings. This is why al Qaeda has always devoted most of
its resources to fueling insurgencies.
It would be naive to assume that the Obama administration's
definition of al Qaeda is not directly tied to its preferred policies.
President Obama is dedicated to decreasing the American military's
footprint, even as al Qaeda has increased its own. U.S. troops were
pulled out of Iraq by the end of 2011. And a short-lived surge of
forces in Afghanistan was ended, with the goal of removing most of
America's forces in the near future. While Obama argued in 2008 that
Afghanistan, not Iraq, must be our ``central front,'' it quickly became
apparent that this was political rhetoric, not a real strategy. Drone
strikes, Special Forces raids, and other covert activities are
sufficient, in the Obama administration's view.
This is not to suggest that large-scale American military
deployments are necessary everywhere al Qaeda's branches prosper. But
in the coming months, there simply will be no central front in
America's fight against al Qaeda and its allies.
President Obama's plan for fighting al Qaeda, therefore, rests on a
gamble. As long as al Qaeda's various branches do not successfully
attack the continental United States, then the United States will not
treat them as first-order security threats. In countries where America
has semi-reliable allies, others will take the fight to al Qaeda. In
countries where no allied forces exist, such as Syria, America and the
West will simply hope for the best. Well over 100,000 Syrians have been
killed since the uprising against Assad's regime began; thousands of
them have been killed by al Qaeda's branches. In Obama's estimation, al
Qaeda's victims inside Syria and Iraq are not America's concern.
But there are already indications that Obama's understanding of the
enemy cannot be sustained. Al Qaeda's branches, especially Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and closely allied groups, such as the
Pakistani Taliban, now threaten the U.S. homeland. The threats to
American security from al Qaeda's global network are multiplying, not
receding.
And during a press briefing on October 30, an anonymous senior
White House official explained to reporters that Al Qaeda in Iraq and
Syria is ``really a transnational threat network'' now. ``This is
really a major and increasing threat to Iraq's stability, it's [an]
increasing threat to our regional partners, and it's an increasing
threat to us,'' the official continued.
That is, General Petraeus had a point about Iraq all along.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda strives on towards its real goal. It is a
difficult course, and success is far from certain. But history tells us
that a lot of carnage can be wrought in pursuit of violent fantasies.
In one of the documents recovered in his Abbottabad compound, Osama
bin Laden wrote that ``the jihad war is ongoing, and on several
fronts.'' The strategy is simple: ``Once America is weak, we can build
our Muslim state.''
Chairman McCaul. Chair recognizes my colleague from Texas
to wrap up this hearing, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am certainly no apologist for the administration's
National security strategy, and I have some significant
concerns with it. But a lack of focus or vigor in the
prosecution of the war on terror are not among them. And if you
look at the unprecedented level of both domestic and
international surveillance that have come to light recently--
the drone strikes against terrorist targets who present a
direct threat to this country, and also targets who are the
enemies of our allies that don't present a direct threat to
this country, the surge of forces in Afghanistan in the first
term of this administration, and as has been mentioned before,
the killing of bin Laden--it is hard to see how one could reach
the conclusion that there is a lack of focus or interest or
intent to successfully prosecute the war on terror in this
administration.
To General Keane's point, to use his phrase, that the mess
in Iraq is the result of--again, his word--the bungling of the
administration's negotiators in Iraq, I reach a different
conclusion. I think that, to use that word, the mess we are in
is a result of our invasion of that country in the first place,
the lack of critical questions to the assumptions that we made
prior to that invasion, and the inability to think through the
consequences of that invasion.
So I hear a lot of military solutions to the very complex
terrorism problems and threats that our country faces in the
Middle East. I would love to hear, General Keane, Senator
Lieberman, Congresswoman Harman, Dr. Jones, if there is time,
like to hear you reflect on some of the perhaps unintended
consequences of military action, of invasions, of military
presence in the Middle East, of drone strikes, and what those
activities do to perhaps increase the threat or complicate the
threat that we have over there.
Again to use General Keane's, I think, excellent idea of
what that might mean to a comprehensive strategy beyond a
military presence or a remainder of forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq. I guess I would like to start with Senator Lieberman.
Mr. Lieberman. Thanks. Thanks, Congressman.
So I would say that the positive aspects of the Obama
administration's record in counterterrorism that you stated I
agree with. But what I am saying here, and I will go back to
what I said earlier, is that in many other ways what the
administration is doing is not working. In other words, if we
are not helping the moderates, nonextremists in Syria, if we
are sitting back now as Iraq becomes a sanctuary for al-Qaeda,
if we are doing the same essentially in Libya, if we are going
to let Afghanistan basically go the way that Iraq did and not
have an agreement to leave any troops there by the end of this
year, we are inviting the whirlwind.
So what I am saying is not to criticize the positive things
you have said, but essentially to say, Mr. President, there are
3 more years in which you are going to be our commander-in-
chief. A lot of what you are now doing, in my respectful
opinion, is simply not working to protect our security, and it
is diminishing our credibility in areas of the world way
outside of the Middle East.
I talk to people in Asia. I was just in Asia about a month
ago. The world is small. When they see us pulling back from,
well, countries that think are our close allies in the Middle
East, they read it personally. They think, wow, what is going
to happen if China makes a move on me? Can I rely on the United
States? They think they can't.
So I join you, and, as I said in my opening statement,
appreciating what the Obama administration has done, including
particularly here at home in supporting the Homeland Security
Department and the various elements of National security that
were adopted post-9/11. But I think there are large parts of
the foreign policy approach of the administration that are
simply not working and----
Mr. O'Rourke. Senator Lieberman, excuse me. Respectfully.
Mr. Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. O'Rourke. But I guess to one of the points I was
attempting to make: Do you acknowledge that there is another
side to the more aggressive, robust presence that you and
General Keane have been arguing for, and acknowledging it
doesn't mean that you dispute its total or net value, but that
a presence there also serves al-Qaeda's interests in being able
to recruit additional people, drone strikes help in their
recruiting? Again, not to argue against them, but to say that
it is a much more complex picture and that more aggression or a
greater or more robust presence doesn't necessarily mean that
there aren't complications.
Mr. Lieberman. Yes, of course, there are. I mean, this is
the complication of life in a very dangerous world. But the
bottom line here is, and General Keane was right earlier when
he said this is going to go on for a large part of this
century. We are facing a group of people, violent Islamist
extremists. They represent a distinct minority in the Islamic
world. And yet they are fearless, they are an ideologically-
driven killing machine, killing mostly Muslims. So, yes, a lot
of the things we have done will have a counterreaction. But in
the end, if we do nothing, the result will be worse.
Again I think we have all said it today, none of us are
calling for hundreds of thousands of troops back into Syria,
Iraq, Afghanistan. But, you know, you can overlearn the lessons
of the last war. One of them would be to just pull out because
the consequences of that would be disastrous for our country
and our people.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. I applaud your patience in sitting here for
2\1/2\ hours. We are also patient. We are the witnesses.
Mr. Lieberman. We were all each once the junior member of
our committee.
Ms. Harman. Yeah. Many stories to tell.
Mr. Lieberman. We identify with your pain.
Ms. Harman. I also applaud your question. I don't think
anyone here is saying let's cut and run from the Middle East,
if that is the area we are talking about. There are different
nuances to what each of us is saying. So here is what I am
saying. I am saying we need to continue a robust
counterterrorism presence in the Middle East. But that does not
mean that we have to have troops everywhere. We can have an
over-the-horizon force in some places which we can stage into
areas if we need to, to protect U.S. interests. That is one. I
am saying we need a robust set of laws that allow us to do what
we are all talking about, which is to learn the plans and
intentions of bad guys and prevent and disrupt them from
attacking us. That is another thing that we need to do.
But just take Iraq. President Obama, as everybody knows,
ran on a platform that he would disengage us militarily from
Iraq. Many people in America in both parties support this.
There is a democratically-elected leader of Iraq who is
supposed to represent the whole population, not just the Shia
population, and that is an issue. I think John Kerry is right
in calling on Maliki to represent his entire population and to
provide leadership.
Similarly in Afghanistan, they are not the same country,
not the same set of problems, but there is an elected leader.
There hopefully will be a reasonably fair election. I am not
optimistic because the last one was so unfair. But I think it
is important that the countries themselves exercise leadership
as we try to help them.
My final point is, at least speaking for me, we should
never disengage from that region. The history of every major
religion is there, many of our allies are there. It is
important to keep brain cells on the problem. But it is also
important to continually revise the strategies that we use. I
applaud especially Secretary Kerry for trying to do that.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
General Keane. Well, that is an excellent commentary, and I
welcome the opportunity to respond to it.
When you take a look at Iraq and Afghanistan and you look
at troop presence and what happened there, the fact of the
matter is until we got the right strategy in Iraq--I am not
going to reargue should we or should we not have gone to Iraq.
I have views on that as well. But the fact of the matter is, we
were there, and we finally applied a counterinsurgency strategy
which was designed to protect the people. Once the people saw
that we were willing to die, and die we did, protecting them,
something we had not done up to that point, and the Iraqis did
not have the capability to do it, the war turned to our favor.
Also strangely at the same time the al-Qaeda had fallen in
on Iraq because of our presence. That is a true statement. So
that was a huge negative outcome as a result of the invasion of
Iraq. Al-Qaeda fell in on Iraq because they saw it as a huge
opportunity to render a defeat to the United States. They
feared strategically the United States would possibly turn Iraq
into a country that had democratic principles and economic
opportunity, something that they ideologically are
fundamentally opposed to.
But their message is so harsh and their means are so brutal
that the Sunnis themselves rejected them, even though they were
supporting them for 3 years. We would never have had the
success we had with the surge, with the increase of forces
applied differently, if we did not have the so-called awakening
that took place with the Sunni tribal leaders who were
rejecting the al-Qaeda, the brutality of 7th century Talibanism
that they enforced upon them. So we have to understand that,
that this message that they bring to Muslims is a very harsh,
strident message, and we can leverage against that.
In Afghanistan, and I have been there 15, 20 times, the
people themselves, when you free the people from the harshness
and brutality of the Taliban, we don't have to win their hearts
and minds, all we have to do is kill the bad guy who is
terrorizing them and just driving their life into the gutter.
Once we do that, the people are very supportive of us.
So my point to you is, is this cancer is out there, and we
have the means to deal with some of it. Most of it has to be
dealt with, with those countries. In doing that, I think we can
help them intellectually to deal this, we can help them in
terms of the kinds of government they have, in terms of
improving those governments and the needs for their people. If
you want to be an ally of the United States, then these are
some of the conditions that we want to see.
Also certainly we can go a long way with helping--we have
learned an awful lot, Congressman about how to deal with this
militarily. We forgot the lessons of Vietnam. That is one of
the reasons why we had such a problem with this initially in
Afghanistan and also in Iraq. But now we understand how to do
this. We can truly help our partners in the region when they
have to use military force, this gets you the best results in
using that military force.
So there is so much that we can do. I think it is learning
the lessons that we have learned from the mistakes that we have
made and applying those lessons and partnering and staying
engaged. When we pull back, the enemy moves forward. That is
what has happened right before our eyes. You know, the
government in Libya is a moderate government, friendly to the
United States. You know what they want from us? To provide
assistance to train a proper security force so that they can
disarm the militias and be a counterbalance against the al-
Qaeda radical Islamist threat. That is what they want. That is
small for us, I think, to assist in. The payoff is enormous.
Are we doing that? No. And that is tragic, in my view.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thanks.
Mr. Jones. Very briefly, I think you have put your finger,
Congressman, on an important issue, and we have to think about
the costs and benefits of how we intervene. There are costs.
I would say, big picture, my concern is that the
rebalancing--we heard this from General Keane earlier--the
rebalancing to Asia and, in my view, the underfunded support to
a U.S. Africa Command that has a very big problem on its hand,
do cause some risk. Our decisions on Syria, future decisions on
Afghanistan put us in a position where we may take on, in my
view, risk.
But I do think you are putting your finger on an important
issue, which is, are there costs to how we intervene? I think
the answer is yes. I think we have demonstrated that there are
types and numbers of forces that can radicalize populations. I
think some of the strikes that we have seen overseas when they
have killed civilians, especially excessively, have tended to
be more harmful than helpful. I would not deny that there have
been strikes that have actually been quite helpful and saved
American lives.
But you can also overdo it. You can also assume that a
drone campaign is the solution. It is an instrument. It is not
the solution in and of itself. So I think when you look at this
you have got to also see some of the benefits to intervention.
I think we are at the position really where we are talking
about a much lighter presence overseas, limited, one that
includes not just military, but Treasury, State Department, and
other officials, and one that does increasingly work with
allies in doing this with us, in some cases for us. That is
intervention, in my view, that is worth the cost.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman
from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am sure you are all happy to see me show up. I can assure
I was watching the hearing from the office. I had a couple
other things and got a little bit of a cold here.
I want to start with Dr. Jones. In your opening statement
you kind of alluded to and maybe you need to clarify increased
or continued monitoring or surveillance of all Americans for
the sake of making sure that we catch or keep track of these
al-Qaeda folks. I guess from my viewpoint it seems to me it
would be, in a time of limited resources and in a place where
our Constitution guarantees our liberties, that the best thing
to do is to target specifically individuals, whatever the
matrix is, whatever the metrics are, who travel to these
places, who correspond with these folks, who live in
communities that have a proclivity towards radicalization. I
just want to get your thoughts on that, because to me that
seems like the better approach.
Also, if you could, to clarify maybe your thoughts on why
we are doing the opposite, why we are looking at every single
American for the sake of a few who would be bad actors, and is
it from a standpoint of political correctness? Or why do we
refuse to face this enemy head-on and target our energies and
our resources?
Mr. Jones. Sure. Just to be clear, I did not support
monitoring all Americans, and I don't believe I said that
either. But I did support having a capacity to be able to
monitor extremists.
Here is the challenge, though, and this is why this is not
a black-and-white issue, a zero-sum issue, is because we can't
know and we won't know everybody that has access on the
internet and radicalizes. We won't know everybody that goes
overseas. There are a range of individuals that may radicalize
inside the United States, stay here.
Mr. Perry. But I would say also, as far as I know, we have
no proof of anyone, even a lone wolf, and even under the
Patriot Act provisions which haven't been used regarding a lone
wolf ever, who has ever been radicalized in the United States
solely on their own. In other words, they have had contact with
through one means or another, the internet or what-have-you. If
the NSA has the capability and the ability, and I think they
do, to monitor every single thing we do, that we can and should
know that.
I mean, Nidal Hasan was looking at websites that were
known, corresponding with bad actors that were known, yet we
did absolute nothing. Instead we are spending all this money
watching all of us Americans. I guarantee you the only time I
have traveled to places that are unsavory were not because I
wanted to take my family on a vacation or myself to Afghanistan
or the Middle East where there is a civil war going on. People
that go to those places I think that they probably would not
object to being suspect for their motives. I think that that is
where we should be focusing our efforts.
Mr. Jones. I agree. I would point out that you don't have
to travel overseas anymore to get the kind of expertise we are
talking about.
Mr. Perry. Sure. But do you correspond, somehow or another,
you do correspond with people that are known.
Mr. Jones. You do correspond.
Mr. Perry. To me, that is where we should be focusing our
efforts as opposed to this broad approach to every American. I
guarantee the people on my staff, you know, they have never
traveled to these countries and they don't correspond with
people that are engaged in these kind of things. So spending
resources on them is a waste of time, energy, and resources.
Senator would you like to----
Mr. Lieberman. Yeah. Thanks, Congressman. So let me get
into this because a lot of people ask this question. In my
opinion, part of what you are talking about is the so-called
metadata that the NSA goes after. That is one excellent way in
which we can get to target. In other words, Congress
established a law here, which, incidentally, though it has been
subject to criticism, the Chinese don't have a law like this,
the Russians don't have a law like this. We actually tried to
create a system where there was due process involved.
As you know, I think the metadata, which is looking at
millions and millions of phone calls and emails, it is not the
content, it is the connections. That is the way they get to
target, when they see the connections. Then they have got to go
to court to get a court order. I mean, just think about how
crazy that would seem to somebody in China or Russia or to the
members of al-Qaeda or Iran.
Mr. Perry. While I agree with you, Senator, at the same
time we were doing this, right, and we didn't pick up, we
didn't pick up the Boston bombers, who were corresponding and
making those connections. We didn't pick up Nidal Hasan.
Mr. Lieberman. No system is perfect. But, I will tell you,
the American Government has stopped a lot of terrorist plots
against us because of these methods of surveillance.
I want to say something else, I have been thinking about it
lately. Every time I go on the internet to buy something, I am
giving up more information than the NSA has gotten from those
millions of phone calls and emails that they do metadata
surveillance of. I just read an article somewhere in the last
few days that there is a service now being sold to stores that
sort of tells them where people have been, based on their cell
phones, before they come into those stores. You know and I know
that when I start to Google something or I go on different
internet sites, I am getting advertising that is based on
previous sites I have been at. So, you know, the private sector
knows a lot more about almost every--every American--than the
NSA does unless you have got a hit that raises their suspicion
and then they have got to go to court.
So I think it is really important for the Congress to be
careful--and the President will announce a program tomorrow--
before upsetting this system, which I think has really
protected our security.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add, I deplore what Edward
Snowden did. I don't think he was a whistleblower, and I think
he in many respects compromised very important security
interests. But I applaud the public debate. Where you are
coming from is where a lot of Americans are coming from. I
think you probably understand this better than they do. Again,
metadata is just a list of phone numbers; it is not names, and
it is certainly not content.
But I was here when all these systems came into effect.
Initially, the administration, the Bush administration in its
first term went around Congress and ignored the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which I, when I discovered that,
was very unhappy about. But then Congress amended FISA to reset
the system of checks and balances, and there have not been any
abuses.
The President's Advisory Committee has recommended changing
Section 215 and stopping the storing of this phone metadata by
the Federal Government. One recommendation is to create an
independent agency, a second is to push it out and have the
phone companies store the data. The President, according to
reports, is probably not going to do either because the phone
companies have pushed back, and they don't want to store the
data. But just as one person observing the debate in the
country, it would certainly be acceptable to me if we took that
recommendation and pushed the data into the private sector and
tried to engage, adopt some of the recommendations that will
make the American public more comfortable.
We need a strong surveillance system. But it needs also to
give comfort to Americans that their privacy is being
respected. I think this debate should lead to changes, and I
hope that the President will be forward-leading on Friday when
he proposes changes.
Mr. Perry. I appreciate--my time has long since expired, as
you folks know--I appreciate the Chairman's indulgence. I guess
my point is that I want us, our policy, our security policy to
be targeted on those who would do us harm and do as much as it
can to secure our God-given freedoms and our Constitutional
freedoms as so enumerated. I appreciate your thoughts and
opinions and your testimony today. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the gentleman.
Let me just say just for the record, when I was a Federal
prosecutor we did go to the private phone carriers. It was not
amassed under, you know, giant warehouse under the NSA. I think
that is what gives the American people some pause, quite
frankly. But I do think it has been effective. It is a legal
system.
I just want, and I know it is getting late, but as Chairman
I want to exercise my prerogative to throw one last question,
because we have such great expertise on this panel. I want to
thank you for being here today. It has to do with Afghanistan.
I am very concerned. General Keane, as you mentioned, the
status of forces agreement, we had a failure to negotiate that
in Iraq. Now we are looking at al-Qaeda in Iraq taking over
Fallujah, taking over large portions of the country. We are
faced with that same dilemma now with Afghanistan. I think
Karzai's playing a lot of politics with us. Lack of a better
word, he is jerking our chain a little bit, trying to play to
his local base, if you will, his local politics. There has been
some talk of what is called a zero option, which would result
in a complete, 100 percent withdrawal from the region.
Can you tell me what impact that zero option, if exercised,
would have on our security to the homeland and in our fight
against al-Qaeda?
General Keane. Certainly. Listen, Karzai, as we all know,
is a mercurial figure, and he frustrates the daylights out of
us for the entire time he has been there, at times. The fact of
the matter is, he is going to be gone in the spring. Election
is around April. I think from a policy perspective we should
not react emotionally to him, although I understand why people
would, but look beyond Karzai. There is going to be a new
leader in Afghanistan. If we have to sign this with the new
leader, so be it, because sign it we must. Certainly we need to
keep residual forces there.
Listen, the current situation, just so you get a grasp of
the security situation, the surge forces were applied in the
south, and it is relatively stable there as a result of that.
We did not get all the forces we wanted, we got 75 percent of
them, 30 versus 40, and we had to sequentially apply those
forces in the north.
The problem was the President pulled those forces out
before we could apply them in the north. The original intent
was put them in the east--excuse me--and put them in the south,
simultaneously take the Taliban down at the same time with
surge forces. Only could put them in the south. That situation
is relatively stable, and the Afghans are holding their own.
The problem we have is in the east. We never were able to
generate the combat power there that we have in the south. As a
result of that, we are leaving the Afghans with a bit of a
problem, and we know that. The fact of the matter is we also
conduct an aggressive counterterrorism program out of
Afghanistan bases using the Central Intelligence Agency to do
that. We conduct counterterrorism inside Afghanistan using
special operations forces to do that against high-value
targets. Both of those we need to keep. Both of those would be
at risk seriously if we pulled our forces out. It is hard for
me to imagine those operations, the Central Intelligence Agency
operation being able to, as robust as it is, be conducted there
without any of our security forces and intelligence that we are
providing for them.
So the situation in Afghanistan as residual forces, there
are two other issues. One is we are providing enablers for the
Afghan forces. They are essentially an infantry organization.
We need to continue to provide some enablers for them, not for
10 years, but at least for a few more years after 2014, until
they are able to have that capacity themselves, logistics,
intelligence, some communication. Some of the residual force
would do that.
Then also we need some trainers and assistance at the
headquarters level to help shape the Afghan military's thinking
about how to cope with some of the problems. We are not going
to have trigger-pullers on the ground side-by-side with them,
but just some relatively senior officers and senior NCOs to
help them do that. That is probably about 15,000 to 20,000
troops is what we need to do that. We pull that away, all those
functions go down the tube, the terrorist operation in
Pakistan, which directly relates to the security of the
American people, is at risk, and the gains we have made in
Afghanistan to date would also be tragically at risk by pulling
those forces out.
Chairman McCaul. I couldn't agree with you more.
Senator Lieberman, is the zero option an option?
Mr. Lieberman. I hope not. I mean, to me, the zero option
for Afghanistan is the worst option for the United States of
America. It does dishonor the men and women of the American
military who fought there, were wounded there, and died there.
It also creates all the danger for the United States that
General Keane has talked about.
We have got to have some patience here. I know we set the
deadline for making a decision on this is December 2014. But as
General Keane has said, there is going to be an election coming
up. President Karzai has taken this position. Incidentally,
let's not forget that just a short while ago he summoned a loya
jirga, one of the sort of people's meetings, leaders from
around the country on this subject. What did they do? They
voted to urge him to quickly enter into a security or status of
forces agreement, bilateral, with the United States of America.
The Afghan people know the terrible fate that awaits them if we
pull out.
It will be terrible for us, not only in terms of it
becoming a sanctuary for terrorists who will strike us again,
but that is a critically important part of the world
geostrategically. It will be important for our security and our
prosperity to have an American presence there for some time to
come. So zero option for Afghanistan is the worst option for
America.
Chairman McCaul. Excellent point.
Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. We can't leave a force there without a status
of forces agreement. That would compromise their security. I
think the SOFA will be signed this year, either by Karzai or
his successor, and I think the administration will decide to
leave a force of some size, small force there.
But that doesn't fix the problem of Afghanistan. The
government of Afghanistan has to show more responsibility for
the whole country. The government of Pakistan, some impressive
early start by Nawaz Sharif, has to show responsibility there,
close neighbor of Afghanistan, for doing more to quell the
existence of terror cells, terror organizations inside of
Pakistan. Similarly in Iraq. Maliki has to govern all of Iraq.
Other governments in the Middle East also have to step up.
So my bottom line is we do have a responsibility to project
our values and be helpful in the Middle East. I don't think we
should retreat. I do think our narrative is not where it needs
to be. We also have a responsibility to use all of our
Government power, soft, smart, and hard, against terror cells
there which might have the capability to attack our interests
or attack our homeland.
This committee has done a good job of staying focused on
it. I am very pleased you asked me to participate on the panel.
I would just urge one more time that on a bipartisan basis you
attack these problems and show the rest of the House that
bipartisanship can thrive, especially when the critical
interests of the United States are at stake.
Chairman McCaul. We thank you for being here today as well.
Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I was recently in Afghanistan, so my views are
formed at least in part by that recent visit and my service
there and my time since 2001 there.
I think an exit, the zero option would be extremely
dangerous for the United States. In my most recent trip I
visited several of the countries in the region. Their
leadership, from India, from Russia, even from Pakistan itself,
and from several of the Central Asian governments, the
assessments from those countries is dire if there was an
American withdrawal from Afghanistan. So that view is shared by
all of Afghanistan's neighbors. I think the kinds of
discussions we have had here about a lighter footprint,
training, I think are exactly what we are talking about and
exactly what we need for Afghanistan.
I would just say I have been somewhat impressed by at least
some of the Afghan security services' ability to keep key
provinces like Kandahar. It is the center of gravity for the
Taliban, it is where their inner shura was, that is largely in
the control, at least much of it is, by Afghan and allied
forces. So there has been some positive developments.
This is more than just about security. I think, as
Congresswoman Harman, said this is an Afghan government
responsibility. But we cannot leave. We did that once. We left
the region after the Soviet withdrawal and we paid a major
price for that.
Chairman McCaul. Well, thank you, Dr. Jones.
Let me just end by saying that I do believe we need a
counterterrorism footprint there after we withdraw in 2014.
General Keane, perhaps you are correct, we need to wait until
the next election to achieve that.
But I do believe--and, Jane, as you have mentioned--this is
a bipartisan, I think most people on both sides of the aisle
agree with your assessment on this issue. I know the
administration is working hard towards that end.
So let me just close by saying thank you to all of the
witnesses. This has been very insightful and a very
distinguished panel. As you know, there will be additional
questions in writing from Members. I ask that you respond to
those. The record will be held open for 10 days.
And, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for Honorable Joseph I.
Lieberman
Question 1. The first step of addressing any problem is to honestly
identify it, yet this administration repeatedly refuses to acknowledge
the nature of our threat overseas and at home. From Benghazi to
Falluja, the administration seems more focused on protecting their
political message than confronting the threats still posed by radical
Islamic groups operating under the ideology of al-Qaeda. Do you view
this forced ignorance as a major threat to our security? Do you see any
way the Obama administration will pivot towards a more honest foreign
policy?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Our National defense is one of the few areas the
Federal Government SHOULD be spending money on according to the
Constitution, yet many in the administration would like to preserve
other, questionable spending in favor of cutting our defense. With the
Asia Pivot and growing threats in the Middle East, is that position by
the administration irresponsible?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for Honorable Joseph I.
Lieberman
Question 1a. My subcommittee oversees the Transportation Security
Administration, so I know all too well, from Classified meetings and
briefings, just how real the threats are to our transportation systems.
TSA Administrator John Pistole has stated publicly that terrorists are
developing more sophisticated ways of smuggling explosives onto U.S.-
bound aircraft from overseas through advanced designs and concealment
methods. In 2012, we thwarted an attack by AQAP so to me it's clear the
terrorists are making progress. The question I think we need to ask
ourselves is--are we one step ahead or one step behind?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. In your assessment, are our homeland security efforts
adequately adapting resources, technology, and manpower to counter the
ever-changing threats to transportation security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Does the Obama administration's narrative help or hurt
in this regard?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. What suggestions do you have that will help us stay
flexible and adaptive in our approach to protecting our aviation
systems?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How would you describe the command and control from al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, led by Zawahiri, over al-Qaeda ideologically-aligned
groups such as AQAP, ISIL, al-Shabaab, Ansar al Sharia, etc.
Specifically how are we adapting our procedures, intelligence-gathering
methods, and resources to ensure we're infiltrating and collecting
accurate information on these smaller, decentralized, localized groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. What impact to our homeland do you see from a complete
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Prior to the September 11, 2012 attack on our consulate
in Benghazi, there was a great deal of reporting that al-Qaeda
ideologically-aligned groups were operating in and around Benghazi. Why
do you think that administration did not see those groups as a
significant threat to United States operations in the area?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for Honorable Jane Harman
Question 1. The first step of addressing any problem is to honestly
identify it, yet this administration repeatedly refuses to acknowledge
the nature of our threat overseas and at home. From Benghazi to
Falluja, the administration seems more focused on protecting their
political message than confronting the threats still posed by radical
Islamic groups operating under the ideology of al-Qaeda. Do you view
this forced ignorance as a major threat to our security? Do you see any
way the Obama administration will pivot towards a more honest foreign
policy?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Our National defense is one of the few areas the
Federal Government SHOULD be spending money on according to the
Constitution, yet many in the administration would like to preserve
other, questionable spending in favor of cutting our defense. With the
Asia Pivot and growing threats in the Middle East, is that position by
the administration irresponsible?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for Honorable Jane Harman
Question 1a. My subcommittee oversees the Transportation Security
Administration, so I know all too well, from Classified meetings and
briefings, just how real the threats are to our transportation systems.
TSA Administrator John Pistole has stated publicly that terrorists are
developing more sophisticated ways of smuggling explosives onto U.S.-
bound aircraft from overseas through advanced designs and concealment
methods. In 2012, we thwarted an attack by AQAP so to me it's clear the
terrorists are making progress. The question I think we need to ask
ourselves is--are we one step ahead or one step behind?
In your assessment, are our homeland security efforts adequately
adapting resources, technology, and manpower to counter the ever-
changing threats to transportation security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Does the Obama administration's narrative help or hurt
in this regard?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. What suggestions do you have that will help us stay
flexible and adaptive in our approach to protecting our aviation
systems?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How would you describe the command and control from al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, led by Zawahiri, over al-Qaeda ideologically-aligned
groups such as AQAP, ISIL, al-Shabaab, Ansar al Sharia, etc.
Specifically how are we adapting our procedures, intelligence-gathering
methods, and resources to ensure we're infiltrating and collecting
accurate information on these smaller, decentralized, localized groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. What impact to our homeland do you see from a complete
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Prior to the September 11, 2012 attack on our consulate
in Benghazi, there was a great deal of reporting that al-Qaeda
ideologically-aligned groups were operating in and around Benghazi. Why
do you think that administration did not see those groups as a
significant threat to United States operations in the area?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for John M. Keane
Question 1. The first step of addressing any problem is to honestly
identify it, yet this administration repeatedly refuses to acknowledge
the nature of our threat overseas and at home. From Benghazi to
Falluja, the administration seems more focused on protecting their
political message than confronting the threats still posed by radical
Islamic groups operating under the ideology of al-Qaeda. Do you view
this forced ignorance as a major threat to our security? Do you see any
way the Obama administration will pivot towards a more honest foreign
policy?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Our National defense is one of the few areas the
Federal Government SHOULD be spending money on according to the
Constitution, yet many in the administration would like to preserve
other, questionable spending in favor of cutting our defense. With the
Asia Pivot and growing threats in the Middle East, is that position by
the administration irresponsible?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for John M. Keane
Question 1a. My subcommittee oversees the Transportation Security
Administration, so I know all too well, from Classified meetings and
briefings, just how real the threats are to our transportation systems.
TSA Administrator John Pistole has stated publicly that terrorists are
developing more sophisticated ways of smuggling explosives onto U.S.-
bound aircraft from overseas through advanced designs and concealment
methods. In 2012, we thwarted an attack by AQAP so to me it's clear the
terrorists are making progress. The question I think we need to ask
ourselves is--are we one step ahead or one step behind?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. In your assessment, are our homeland security efforts
adequately adapting resources, technology, and manpower to counter the
ever-changing threats to transportation security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Does the Obama administration's narrative help or hurt
in this regard?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. What suggestions do you have that will help us stay
flexible and adaptive in our approach to protecting our aviation
systems?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How would you describe the command and control from al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, led by Zawahiri, over al-Qaeda ideologically-aligned
groups such as AQAP, ISIL, al-Shabaab, Ansar al Sharia, etc.
Specifically how are we adapting our procedures, intelligence-gathering
methods, and resources to ensure we're infiltrating and collecting
accurate information on these smaller, decentralized, localized groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. What impact to our homeland do you see from a complete
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Prior to the September 11, 2012 attack on our consulate
in Benghazi, there was a great deal of reporting that al-Qaeda
ideologically-aligned groups were operating in and around Benghazi. Why
do you think that administration did not see those groups as a
significant threat to United States operations in the area?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Paul C. Broun for Seth G. Jones
Question 1. The first step of addressing any problem is to honestly
identify it, yet this administration repeatedly refuses to acknowledge
the nature of our threat overseas and at home. From Benghazi to
Falluja, the administration seems more focused on protecting their
political message than confronting the threats still posed by radical
Islamic groups operating under the ideology of al-Qaeda. Do you view
this forced ignorance as a major threat to our security? Do you see any
way the Obama administration will pivot towards a more honest foreign
policy?
Answer. My current research and past counterterrorism experience in
the U.S. Department of Defense indicates that the threat from al-Qaeda
and other Salafi-jihadist groups remains significant. The number of
Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks has increased since 2010.
Most of the attacks are occurring in North Africa and the Middle East
in such countries as Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and Syria. Indeed, the war
in Syria has been the single most important attraction for Salafi-
jihadist fighters. This increase in Salafi-jihadist groups has likely
been caused by weakening governments across North Africa and the Middle
East, as well as the expansion of Salafi-jihadist operatives that have
spent time at terrorist training camps, fought on jihadist
battlefields, or been released or escaped from prison.
The threat posed by this diverse set of Salafi-jihadist groups
varies widely. Some are locally-focused and have shown little interest
in attacking Western targets. Others, like al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, present a substantial threat to the U.S. homeland, along
with inspired individuals like the Tsarnaev brothers that perpetrated
the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. In addition, several Salafi-
jihadist groups pose a medium-level threat because of their desire and
ability to target U.S. citizens and structures overseas, including U.S.
embassies. Examples include Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, al-Shabaab, the
Muhammad Jamal Network, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the
various Ansar al-Sharia groups in Libya. As explained below in response
to the second question, there are significant risks in downplaying the
threat from al-Qaeda and other groups plotting attacks against the U.S.
homeland and U.S. interests abroad (such as embassies).
Question 2. Our National defense is one of the few areas the
Federal Government SHOULD be spending money on according to the
Constitution, yet many in the administration would like to preserve
other, questionable spending in favor of cutting our defense. With the
Asia Pivot and growing threats in the Middle East, is that position by
the administration irresponsible?
Answer. It is vital that the United States retains a defense budget
capable of defeating and deterring terrorist groups plotting attacks
against the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas. The trends noted
above suggest that the United States needs to remain focused on
countering the proliferation of Salafi-jihadist groups, despite the
temptation to shift attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region
and to significantly decrease counterterrorism budgets in an era of
fiscal constraint. The U.S. Department of Defense's 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review, for example, notes that the United States should be
``principally focused on preparing for the future by rebalancing our
defense efforts in a period of increasing fiscal constraint.'' It also
emphasizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific region as ``increasingly
central to global commerce, politics and security.''\1\ Not
surprisingly, much of the U.S. military--including the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps--is shifting its attention to the Asia-Pacific
theater, including such issues as force posture, acquisitions, campaign
planning, and response anti-access area-denial (A2AD) challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), pp. IV, 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rebalance entails risks, particularly if it involves
decreasing attention and resources from countering the resurgence of
al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadists in North Africa and the Middle
East. For the near future, some of the most acute security threats to
the U.S. homeland and its interests overseas will come from terrorist
groups and state sponsors of terror in North Africa and the Middle
East, not countries in the Asia-Pacific. To complicate matters, most
U.S. Government agencies involved in counterterrorism have not
systematically apportioned or adequately synchronized their declining
resources to focus on the most serious terrorism threats.
With the U.S. shift to Asia, it is important that the United States
continue to provide sufficient resources and attention to North Africa
and the Middle East for the use of special operations, intelligence,
diplomatic, and other capabilities to conduct precision targeting of
groups and their financial, logistical, and political support networks.
The United States also needs to continue training, advising, and
assisting local governments in their struggle against terrorism. For
the foreseeable future, the United States will need to orchestrate
covert raids to capture or kill terrorists, seize their supplies, and
target their finances; conduct air strikes from drones, fixed-wing
aircraft, and helicopters; oversee psychological operations to
undermine terrorist support; collect and analyze intelligence about
terrorist groups (their networks, locations, capabilities, and
intentions); and engage with Tribal and other local actors.
Questions From Honorable Richard Hudson for Seth G. Jones
Question 1a. My subcommittee oversees the Transportation Security
Administration, so I know all too well, from Classified meetings and
briefings, just how real the threats are to our transportation systems.
TSA Administrator John Pistole has stated publicly that terrorists are
developing more sophisticated ways of smuggling explosives onto U.S.-
bound aircraft from overseas through advanced designs and concealment
methods. In 2012, we thwarted an attack by AQAP so to me it's clear the
terrorists are making progress. The question I think we need to ask
ourselves is--are we one step ahead or one step behind?
Answer. Whether we are one step ahead or one step behind depends,
in part, on the issue. According to several documents found in Osama
bin Laden's Abbotabad residence, some senior al-Qaeda leaders were
frustrated about the difficulties in smuggling operatives into the
United States because of improvements in U.S. border security,
intelligence collection and analysis, and databases such as the No-Fly
List. However, terrorists--including al-Qaeda and its affiliates--
continue to innovate. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has explored the
possibility of concealing bombs inside consumer electronic items, such
as laptop computers, cameras, and tape recorders. And al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula bomb makers continue their efforts to build
improvised explosive devices using components that may not be detected
by airport screeners.
Perhaps most concerning, al-Qaeda is a different organization than
it was a decade ago--a development that some officials have not fully
appreciated. The broader Salafi-jihadist movement has become more
decentralized among four tiers: (1) Core al-Qaeda in Pakistan, led by
Ayman al-Zawahiri; (2) formal affiliates that have sworn allegiance (or
bayat) to core al-Qaeda (located in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and North
Africa); (3) a panoply of Salafi-jihadist groups that have not sworn
allegiance to al-Qaeda but are committed to establishing an extremist
Islamic emirate; and (4) inspired individuals and networks. Using the
state of core al-Qaeda in Pakistan as a gauge of the group's strengths
(or weaknesses)--as some have done--is increasingly anachronistic.
Overall, I am concerned that the United States is one step behind in
understanding the nature of the threat from a heterogeneous and
decentralized movement.
Question 1b. In your assessment, are our homeland security efforts
adequately adapting resources, technology, and manpower to counter the
ever-changing threats to transportation security?
Answer. I have not done a thorough analysis of whether--and how
much--U.S. homeland security efforts are adequately adapting resources,
technology, and manpower to counter the evolving threats to
transportation security. However, other RAND researchers have examined
various aspects of transportation security.\2\ One of the biggest gaps
in U.S. homeland security efforts is the absence of a veritable
counterterrorism strategy. A strategy refers to a plan to defeat or
degrade terrorist groups. Government officials need to consider how to
use their military, law enforcement, diplomatic, financial, and other
tools against terrorist groups. The British government, for example,
has a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy referred to as CONTEST,
which covers transportation and other types of security. It is based on
four areas of work: Pursue (to stop terrorist attacks); prevent (to
stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism); protect (to
strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack); and prepare (to
mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack). While the United States
does have a National Strategy for Counterterrorism in name, it does not
offer a veritable plan for how to combine resources, technology,
manpower, and other key ingredients to defeat terrorist groups.\3\ This
is a notable gap in countering the ever-changing threats to
transportation and other types of security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See, for example, Andrew R. Morral, et al., Modeling Terrorism
Risk to the Air Transportation System: An Independent Assessment of
TSA's Risk Management Analysis Tool and Associated Methods (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2012); Brian Michael Jenkins, Aviation Security:
After Four Decades, It's Time for a Fundamental Review (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2012); Kevin Jack Riley, Air Travel Since 9/11 (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 011); Brian A. Jackson, Efficient Aviation Security:
Strengthening the Analytic Foundation for Making Air Transportation
Security Decisions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012).
\3\ White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism
(Washington, DC: White House, June 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 1c. Does the Obama administration's narrative help or hurt
in this regard?
Answer. My current research and past counterterrorism experience in
the U.S. Department of Defense indicates that the threat from al-Qaeda
and other Salafi-jihadist groups remains significant. According to my
analysis, the number of Salafi-jihadist groups, fighters, and attacks
has increased since 2010. Approximately 98 percent of the attacks are
occurring against local targets, particularly in North Africa and the
Middle East. Examples include groups operating in Tunisia, Algeria,
Mali, Libya, Egypt (including the Sinai), Lebanon, and Syria. In fact,
the war in Syria has been the single most important attraction for
Salafi-jihadist fighters.
More broadly, the United States lacks a coherent narrative to
combat the narrative of al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadists. In 1999,
the State Department disbanded the U.S. Information Agency, which
played a prominent role in countering Soviet ideology during the Cold
War. Today, no U.S. Government agency has the lead role for countering
the ideology of al-Qaeda and its broader movement. The State Department
has the lead for public diplomacy, including through such organizations
as the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. But the
State Department has not developed--nor has the mandate for--a
comprehensive inter-agency strategy to counter al-Qaeda's ideology. The
CIA is involved in some clandestine activity, but most senior officials
do not view undermining al-Qaeda's ideology as its core mission. The
Department of Defense is also involved in some efforts, but they are
dispersed among U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command,
and other organizations. Ultimately, it is the President and the
National Security Staff's responsibility to appoint a lead agency and
hold it responsible. An effective campaign has to be done carefully,
covertly, and led by credible Muslims in these countries. In the end,
the struggle against the al-Qaeda movement will be long--measured in
decades, not months or years. Much like the Cold War, it is also
predominantly an ideological struggle.
Question 1d. What suggestions do you have that will help us stay
flexible and adaptive in our approach to protecting our aviation
systems?
Answer. The recent tragedy with Malaysia Airlines flight MH370
highlights the need to improve passport security, with two passengers
that boarded the flight using stolen passports. Both of the stolen
passports had been on Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents
(SLTD) database, but the airport and airline staff failed to make the
necessary checks. This is a gaping loophole for terrorist organizations
and poses a threat to Americans traveling overseas. Interpol created
its Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database in 2002, and it now
contains more than 40 million records. The SLTD database is available
to Interpol's 190 member states, but only a few countries
systematically search the database--such as the United States, United
Kingdom, and United Arab Emirates. According to Interpol, passengers
were able to board planes more than a billion times in 2013 without
having had their passports screened.\4\ Additional measures are being
made to enhance passport security such as the installation of chip and
fingerprints in the documents, but it is still a vulnerable system. The
United States should take the lead in encouraging and assisting other
governments in fixing these loopholes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Mike Hills, ``Mystery of Flight MH370 Raises Fears of Passport
Fraud,'' BBC, March 11, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, one of the most important steps to protecting U.S.
aviation systems is to ensure U.S. intelligence agencies are providing
U.S. Government agencies dedicated to protecting U.S. aviation systems
with sufficient information about the types of plots and improvised
explosive devices being developed--or considered--by terrorist groups.
Question 2. How would you describe the command and control from al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, led by Zawahiri, over al-Qaeda ideologically-aligned
groups such as AQAP, ISIL, al-Shabaab, Ansar al Sharia, etc.?
Specifically how are we adapting our procedures, intelligence-gathering
methods, and resources to ensure we're infiltrating and collecting
accurate information on these smaller, decentralized, localized groups?
Answer. Al-Qaeda's command and control is increasingly
decentralized. Core al-Qaeda includes the organization's leaders, most
of which are based in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership retains
some oversight of the affiliates and, when necessary, may attempt to
adjudicate disputes among affiliates or provide strategic guidance. But
Zawahiri's failure to mediate the dispute between Jabhat al-Nusrah and
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham highlights core al-Qaeda's
limitations.\5\ However, the U.S. Government needs to better adapt its
procedures, intelligence-gathering methods, and resources to an
expanding number of Salafi-jihadist groups. Most U.S. Government
agencies involved in counterterrorism have not systematically
apportioned or adequately synchronized their declining resources to
focus on the most serious terrorism threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, for example, Qaedat al-Jihad Organization--General
Command, ``Statement Regarding the Relationship of the Group of Qaedat
al-Jihad with the Group of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham,''
various jihadist forums, February 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 3. What impact to our homeland do you see from a complete
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Answer. A complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could seriously
jeopardize U.S. security interests because of the continuing presence
of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
U.S. forces would have little or no mandate and limited or no
capabilities after 2015 to assist the Afghan government if the Taliban
or other groups associated with al-Qaeda threatened to overrun a major
city or even topple the government. A U.S. withdrawal would also
increase the probability that Afghanistan would be used as a beachhead
for al-Qaeda and other militant groups. Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal
is illustrative: al-Qaeda in Iraq has regrouped since 2011. It conducts
attacks at a high tempo and was instrumental in establishing an
affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusrah, in Syria.
A civil war or successful Taliban-led insurgency would likely allow
al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba to increase their
presence in Afghanistan. Most of these groups have already expanded
their presence in Afghanistan over the past several years and have
conducted attacks either against the U.S. homeland (al-Qaeda and
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), U.S. forces and U.S. Government
installations in Afghanistan (Taliban and Haqqani network), or U.S.
citizens in the region (Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaeda).
In addition, al-Qaeda and associated movements would likely view
the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan as their most
important victory since the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
in 1989.
Question 4. Prior to the September 11, 2012 attack on our consulate
in Benghazi, there was a great deal of reporting that al-Qaeda
ideologically-aligned groups were operating in and around Benghazi. Why
do you think that administration did not see those groups as a
significant threat to United States operations in the area?
Answer. Prior to the September 2012 attack in Benghazi, U.S.
Government agencies had warned of terrorist activity in the area,
including from groups like Ansar al-Sharia Libya, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, and the Muhammad Jamal Network. Going forward, as some
RAND work has concluded, the security plan for the U.S. diplomatic
presence abroad must include well-developed strategies to both detect
and prevent an assault like the one in Libya before it occurs.\8\
Technology, for example, can help. Cameras with pattern-recognition
software positioned around the embassy to monitor the streets can show
what those streets look like on a normal day and what they look like on
a day when there may be protests or an attack. They can capture
protesters mobilizing or attackers prepositioning themselves before an
assault. Similarly, predictive analytics can be applied to social media
collected from Facebook, Twitter, and other accounts to determine when
crowds might form or when an attack is being planned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ William Young, Embassy Security: From the Outside In (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------