[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-101]
AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES
AVIATION PROGRAMS AND
CAPABILITIES RELATED TO THE
2015 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 2, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 2, 2014, Air Force Projection Forces Aviation
Programs and Capabilities Related to the 2015 President's
Budget Request................................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 2, 2014......................................... 27
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014
AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES AVIATION PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES RELATED
TO THE 2015 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 2
WITNESSES
Jones, Maj Gen James J., USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, Plans and Requirements, United States Air Force 5
LaPlante, Dr. William A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force; accompanied by
Maj Gen John F. Thompson, USAF, Program Executive Officer for
Tankers, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, United States
Air Force...................................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
LaPlante, Dr. William A., joint with Maj Gen John F. Thompson
and Maj Gen James J. Jones................................. 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Noem.................................................... 53
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 57
Mr. Langevin................................................. 58
AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES AVIATION PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES RELATED
TO THE 2015 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 2, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Today the subcommittee convenes to receive
testimony on the fiscal year 2015 Air Force budget request
regarding airlift, tanker, and bomber acquisition programs. Our
distinguished panel of Air Force leaders testifying before us
are Dr. Bill LaPlante, the newly confirmed Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition.
Thank you for being here, and congratulations to you.
Major General John Thompson, Program Executive Officer for
Tankers at the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center.
And, General, thank you for your service to our country and
for being here today.
And Major General Jim Jones, Air Force Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements.
And, General, also, we thank you for your service and for
being here with us today.
As we assess the Air Force 2015 budget, it is apparent that
sequestration has had the predictable and devastating impact
that many of us in Congress have warned about over the past
several years. And as troublesome as the outcome of this budget
appears to many right now, this budget does not even reflect
funding at sequestration budget caps, which means the picture
will only get worse.
The Air Force states that this budget sacrifices capacity
to meet minimum capability requirements. But I challenge that
assessment. Last year, we were told by the service chiefs and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that if one more dollar were to be
taken from defense beyond Budget Control Act levels, the
Department would no longer be able to meet the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance. And yet here we are just a year later, with
a budget that is in fact below Budget Control Act levels, and
we are being told that the Department can still meet the 2012
strategy.
At some point soon, the Department has to stop with the
rhetoric and fancy gimmicks that conceal true sequestration
impacts if we are to have any hope of maintaining the world's
finest military beyond the near term. This budget request is
detrimental to the Air Force because they are already starting
from a point of disadvantage, with current readiness at 38
percent, and the abysmal pace of recapitalization over the
years to replace our aging fleet of 38-year-old bombers and 49-
year-old tankers. And those are just averages. The B-52 bomber
fleet is over 50 years old, and the KC-135 tanker fleet is over
60 years old.
This budget request preserves the Air Force top three
modernization programs, two of which fall within the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee, the new KC-46 tanker and the
new Long Range Strike Bomber. These are extremely vital
programs that will be key enablers in giving the joint force
access and freedom of maneuver in highly contested warfighting
environments. It is important that we keep these programs on
track, and thus far it appears the Air Force is making stride
in efforts to do just that.
It is also important that we continue to modernize and
upgrade our existing fleet of tactical airlift to keep those
aircraft relevant, capable, and accessible. One of these
upgrade efforts that became a victim of budget cuts in fiscal
year 2013 was the legacy C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.
After investing more than $1.5 billion to develop and test this
program, it was disheartening to see it shelved by the Air
Force just as it was going into low-rate production. While we
agree that hard choices have to be made, we disagree on this
outcome, and look forward to working with you to see how we can
affordably restore this critical legacy C-130 modernization
effort, supporting mostly the Air Force Reserve and Air
National Guard.
I again thank you for being here to testify, and look
forward to your testimony. And with that, I turn to my good
friend and ranking member, the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. McIntyre.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today, and for
your commitment and your service. In welcoming Dr. LaPlante,
Major General Thompson, and Major General Jones, we greatly
appreciate your service to our country. And it is always a
privilege to have you come before us.
Today's hearing, we know, covers the major acquisition
programs in the Air Force: bomber aircraft, airlift aircraft,
and tanker aircraft. And while the Air Force did make some
adjustments to these programs, there appears in the fiscal year
2015 budget to be adequate funding, which I want to make sure
that we define that term appropriately, to maintain our current
aircraft fleet in those areas, and allowing some for
modernization, but at a slower pace.
For example, the new budget appears to show that it is not
going to retire any bomber aircraft, includes significant
funding upgrades to the B-1, B-2, and B-52 bomber fleets, and
also keeps on track the new Air Force bomber, the Long Range
Strike program. Also concerns we have about C-130J Hercules and
the modernization of the C-5 Galaxy, the budget continues the
production of the C-130J and modernization of the C-5.
And finally, in the area of tanker aircraft, the KC-46
program appears to be on schedule and will enter low-rate
production in 2015, assuming that the test program proceeds as
expected. Production of the KC-46 will allow the Air Force to
finally begin replacing the 40-year-old KC-135 aircraft fleet,
which I know we have had concern with the tankers at Seymour
Johnson Air Force Base, which borders my district in North
Carolina. We know these old aircraft can over time become very
difficult to maintain, and we hope that we can keep the KC-46
on track to reduce some of the risk we have seen recently with
KC-135 in a recent crash that occurred in May of 2013.
So while the overall budget request for these programs
appears to continue as we would want, there are still areas of
concern. For example, the Air Force has stated that, unless it
gets relief from the sequestration in 2016, it will propose to
retire the entire KC-10 tanker aircraft fleet. We know our
current tanker fleet is in demand, it is constantly in demand,
and rightly so needs to be available to support our other
aircraft platforms. The prospect of losing these aircraft is
very troubling.
Also have concerns about sequestration, as my good friend
Chairman Forbes knows, and I share the concerns that he has
expressed with regard to how our Air Force can continue to do
the fine job that we know you all are committed to doing given
certain budget issues and restraints. We look forward to your
testimony and addressing these and other issues that you may
wish to raise before us.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mike.
And as each of you gentlemen know, this is probably one of
the most bipartisan committees that we have in Congress, a very
bipartisan subcommittee. We have a lot of respect for each
other. So we may have some questions that kind of come in
different directions here. But it will all be to get to the
conclusions that we feel we need to get to, to do our markup.
Dr. LaPlante, thank you again for being here. It is my
understanding you are going to start us off. And your written
testimony will be made a part of the record, without any
objection. And we would love to hear your comments now.
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE;
ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ GEN JOHN F. THOMPSON, USAF, PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR TANKERS, AIR FORCE LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT
CENTER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you, Chairman Forbes. I will make a few
comments, and then also ask General Jones to make some
comments, too. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking
Member McIntyre, thanks to the other members of the
distinguished subpanel. Thanks for what you do and the
importance of the questions you are asking us, and the interest
that you have. I think we all are on the same side on the tough
stuff we have in front of us.
I am joined here next to me by General J.T. Thompson.
General Thompson is of course the Program Executive Officer for
Tanker for the Air Force. And next to him is General Jones, the
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for
Operations, Maintenance, and Requirements.
We are here to talk about the 2015 budget. The 2015 budget,
as both of you already said in your introduction, had those
very tough tradeoffs that were essentially between the
readiness today, are we ready to go to war today globally with
a force that can fight and win, with the investment for the
future, and how does one take risk in both places. Because it
is all about risk. And those are very, very difficult decisions
to make. And that is really what we have here and what we are
talking about here in the 2015 budget, and probably even more
importantly than what happens beyond 2015 and 2016 and beyond.
So I would say, going back to the fall, I want to just
perhaps start on some good news and some thank you. Last fall,
I had the privilege of testifying in front of the HASC [House
Armed Services Committee] when we were still in the midst of
sequestration. This was October of 2013. And as we all remember
from those times, the services were in a very difficult spot
having to find the dollars for sequester just now, both in 2013
and 2014, and we were almost living on a month-to-month basis
on what the rules were. It was a very difficult situation, as
you all remember, and we were having to choose between two
things you don't want to choose between, which is operations
and sustainment, essentially readiness today, flying hours,
weapon system sustainment, the depots, turns out the furloughs
of our civilians was out of that account, versus the
modernization, the RDT&E [research, development, test and
evaluation] and procurement, our future.
Those are two choices nobody wants to make. But the fact is
that is what we were having do. Almost as bad as the dollars
was the issue of the instability and not knowing how to plan.
As you all well know, part of our business for the taxpayer and
the warfighter is doing things like multiyear contracts,
putting together performance-based logistics contracts that are
more than 6 months. Knowing what systems we are going to
sustain versus divest helps us make the right decisions for the
taxpayer. All of that was the situation in October.
The BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013] changed a lot of
that. I am going to talk about what it changed, but also about
what it didn't change. The BBA, thank you for the BBA, probably
more than anything else it helped us with that stability. It
has allowed us to know what our budget is this year in 2014,
and it allowed what we can plan for in 2015.
It also primarily helped us begin to turn the corner--it is
not going to happen overnight--to put a downpayment back on
fixing readiness. Mr. Chairman, you talked in your opening
remarks about the situation with readiness. If the BBA did one
thing beyond the stability, is it is going to help us start to
attack that again. And as all of you know, that is not going to
be done overnight, but at least we can try to turn the corner
on that.
In the case of the Air Force, the BBA was able to help us a
little bit on one of those three high priority programs the
chairman talked about. We were at risk of losing about four to
five F-35s under the sequester number in 2014 as well as 2015.
The BBA allowed us to at least mitigate having to lose those
airplanes.
But mostly what the BBA does, again, is bring us the
stability and allows us to make the downpayment on the
readiness. So again, thank you and thanks to the Congress for
doing that. I can't tell you how much of a difference it makes
just in the atmosphere or the planning and the planners at the
Pentagon knowing we have something to plan for, even in the
year we are in.
But here is what the BBA does not do: It does not
fundamentally change the situation in the long term in terms of
force structure that the Air Force has to plan for. As has been
said by the Chief and the Secretary, we are going to be a
smaller Air Force, that is true BBA, no BBA, and if we return
to the sequester level numbers in 2016 and beyond, as we have
very specific force structure and technology issues that will
not likely make it in the budget.
An example that has already been mentioned by the chairman
is the KC-10. Another example is, I think there are as many as
four to five tankers that we have, if we get the President's
budget in the outyears of the FYDP, that we would not be able
to afford if we were to go back to the sequester number. We
also will not be able to invest in some exciting engine
technology that is both cost savings and efficient. And then
some Global Hawk upgrades. So there are a series of things that
will not happen if we do go back to that sequester number. It
is still real and that has not changed, that has not changed
with the BBA.
So, again, thank you for holding the hearing. I hope we can
answer all of your questions, we can give you what went into
the decisions, what the difficulties are with the decisions,
and we can have a dialogue and work on this hard problem
together. So, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
the rest of the committee.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. LaPlante, General
Thompson, and General Jones can be found in the Appendix on
page 31.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Doctor.
And, General Thompson, it is my understanding that you do
not have any opening remarks. I don't want you to think we are
skipping over you sitting there.
General Thompson. No, sir, I am not offended in the least.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
And, General Jones, we would love to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES J. JONES, USAF, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
General Jones. Thank you, sir. And, Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member McIntyre, and the other distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I also want to thank you for the opportunity
to come speak with you, to express our concerns, and to address
questions that you may have as we work together on the
difficult days ahead of us.
As you have heard both our Secretary and our Chief of State
previously, when we were building the fiscal year 2015 budget
there were no easy choices, as you have already heard Dr.
LaPlante allude to. So in this fiscal environment we have been
forced to divest fleets and cut manpowers that we would have
preferred to be able to retain. This fiscal year 2015 PB
[President's budget] total force decision that we put forward
resulted in increased near-term risk, but we did that in order
to fund the most critical recapitalization and modernization
programs and place our Air Force on a course towards a more
capable force in 2023 and the uncertain years ahead.
Now, of all the undesirable options that we evaluated, our
analysis shows that the choices this budget proposes represents
the least overall increased risk to the Air Force's ability to
accomplish our full range of missions. And if we are forced to
reverse force structure divestment decisions without any
additional long-term increases in funding, then we are likely
going to have to reverse some of the things that Dr. LaPlante
talked about in terms of our efforts to increase readiness and
some of the modernization programs that we have in place to pay
those bills for the larger force. And that will likely leave us
less ready and less viable in meeting national defense
requirements both now and in the future.
So while the BBA did offer welcome relief in our ability to
protect our near-term readiness, the fiscal constraints we
still face force us to look for areas to decrease capability or
capacity with the least increase in risk towards accomplishing
that broad range of missions I mentioned earlier that we may be
called upon to perform.
Within the tanker, the airlift, and the bomber fleets, some
of these include reductions in crew ratios across various
platforms, taking some of our combat-coded aircraft and putting
them into a BAI [backup aircraft inventory] or backup status,
reducing or delaying some of the modernization efforts, and
divesting aircraft where we have excess capacity. We looked at
our air refueling fleets, and we initially considered divesting
the KC-10 with our proposal, largely driven by the fact that
the KC-10 ownership costs are expected to increase dramatically
as commercial carriers around the world divest the DC-10, which
results in increased costs to us to maintain the commercial
equivalents.
If we do return to the BCA [Budget Control Act] level
funding, we will likely be forced to revisit that KC-10
decision in order to garner savings of about $2.6 billion in
the outyears. It is $2.3 billion in the FYDP [Future Years
Defense Program] and $2.6 billion in the outyears.
So as we look to some of these difficult choices, to give
you a comparison of savings in terms of other mobility
aircraft, if we turn there, to achieve that same level of
savings for divesting the KC-10 fleet, it would take an
equivalent of divesting about 152 of our KC-135s. So that is
about 34 percent of our tanker fleet. If we didn't want to do
that because of the criticality that we have mentioned before
in terms of the tankers, it would take our entire C-5M fleet,
all 52 of those, to meet the equivalency, or we could take
about 80 of our C-17s to meet that, which is about 37 percent
of our airlift capacity.
So, again, none of those are good choices, and they all
come in significant increased risks to our ability to do our
tasks. So the KC-10 divestiture, if we have to go there, we
think would incur the least amount of additional risk. And that
is just one example of the things that we have tried to work
our way through as we balance the portfolios.
Additional funds, as Dr. LaPlante said, provided by the BBA
do allow us to retain that KC-10 fleet with our PB, but the KC-
46 acquisition still remains critical to maintain our
affordable and effective air refueling capability. So in order
to begin recapitalizing that aging fleet, we do remain
committed to bring the KC-46 fleet online. And the KC-46
remains essential to our overall strategy and remains our
number one mobility acquisition program. And as we bring that
aircraft online, in turn we will begin to retire the KC-135s on
a one-to-one basis in the outyears as we build up to our
requirement of 479 total tankers.
In our strategic airlift fleet, we assume some risk in our
airlift capacity by placing portions of our C-5 and our C-17
fleet in backup inventory status. As we do that, we believe we
are still capable of meeting national security requirements,
but our margin of error continues to decrease. One area where
we know we can save money as we look at these while incurring
minimal risk is in our C-130 portfolio. Our mobility
capabilities assessment study determined that there is no
scenario associated with the current defense strategy that
requires the current fleet of 358 C-130s. And as such, we
propose to retire 47 aircraft in this budget submission, which
is consistent with DOD [Department of Defense] guidance to
divest excess capacity.
In the fiscal year 2015 budget we also focus on
recapitalizing and modernizing our mobility fleet where we can.
Where possible, we sought to do both, but when compelled by the
fiscal limitations we chose to recapitalize in order to be
ready for the future. Along with the KC-46 procurement, we will
continue to procure C-130J aircraft, as well as key
modernization programs for the C-130s, 135s, C-17s, and C-5s,
in order to meet the required FAA airspace access requirements.
These programs are important for us to continue to ensure that
we can provide rapid global mobility anywhere in the world.
So our Air Force continues to strategically invest in our
long-range bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s. This budget
funds a fleetwide upgrade of all of our 76 B-52s with the
Combat Network Communications Technology, or CONECT system,
which provides secure line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight
communications, key situational awareness upgrades, and
machine-to-machine conventional retargeting capabilities that
we believe are critical to operations in the Pacific theater.
In addition to the B-52 upgrades, we are going to look at
the 1760 data bus for the Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade, which
enables the carriage of our J-series, or smart preferred
munitions, such as JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition], JASSM
[Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile], and the Internal
Weapons Bay, and enables carriage of the critical JASSM-
Extended Range [JASSM-ER] that we intend to field in 2017.
The fiscal year 2015 PB also invests in modernizing the B-
1B with increased capability via new electronics and the
Integrated Battle Station program, which combines three
different modification programs into a single installation
line. By doing this, it enables us to provide the B-1 with a
completely upgraded cockpit, modernized communications, and
minimizes impact to the B-1 fleet during that upgrade timeline.
The budget also makes key investments in preferred long-range
munitions such as the JASSM-ER that I mentioned, which will be
carried in large numbers on the B-1 bomber.
The fiscal year 2015 PB continues to fund the B-2's
Defensive Management System [DMS] Modernization. However, with
budget constraints we were forced to defer that completion by
about 24 months. When fielded, DMS will enable the B-2 to
continue to penetrate dense threat environments via improved
threat location and identification capabilities, allow real-
time rerouting, and improve survivability against enemy
advanced integrated air defenses.
Our budget proposal also continues to support the Common
Very-Low-Frequency Receiver program for the B-2, which adds
survivable communications capability to the B-2. And finally,
the Flexible Strike program on the B-2 rehosts weapons software
into the new integrated processor units, which provides a
foundation for future weapons capability upgrades, and also
includes future carriage of the B-61 Mod 12 nuclear weapon.
So, again, the Air Force's fiscal year 2015 budget
prioritizes readiness, recapitalization over modernization of
legacy systems to build a bridge to a more ready, capable force
for 2023 and beyond. A return to the sequester level funding
will result in an Air Force that is unable to fully execute our
defense strategy. In order to continue to support national
strategy and defeat the advancing threats, we must continue
investments in our top recapitalization and key modernization
programs, while gaining and maintaining full-spectrum
readiness.
So, again, I thank you for your support that you
continuously provide to our Air Force, and your support to our
airmen and our families, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Jones, Dr.
LaPlante, and General Thompson can be found in the Appendix on
page 31.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you for your comments. I have
about three questions I need to get for the record, but I am
going to defer my questions until the end, make sure our
members get all their questions in. So at this time I would
like to recognize my good friend Mike McIntyre for any
questions he may have.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
Briefly, and thank you for running through your testimony
Major General Jones, I want to just clarify, so the President's
budget shows a considerable increase to the $913 billion in the
funding commitment to the Long Range Strike Bomber program. Can
you clarify for us or elaborate on what this increase in
funding signals for the program's schedule as far as staying on
schedule or keeping within what we need to have accomplished in
the time period required?
General Jones. Yes, sir. So we do have that in 2015 and
about $11.7 billion across the FYDP, and our intent is to still
field the long-range strike variant in the mid-2020s as
scheduled.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. And the Air Force has a stated
goal of a cost of about $550 million per aircraft for the new
Air Force bomber. Some have questioned the feasibility of that
very low target cost. How confident are you in that cost
target? Dr. LaPlante, you may be able to answer that.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. Well, I would say right now, which is it
is easy to be confident now with the following caveat: That we
are so early in the program, that so far so good, but it is
very early in the program.
The $550 million number, what is important about that is
that, as we say with the LRS [Long Range Strike Bomber], with
the bomber, we are being very disciplined in the requirements
on what that bomber will do, will need to do, and any change to
the requirements. And it has been very disciplined since the
program was started in 2010. Including in that discipline is we
are being ruthless on focusing on the costs per airplane now
while they are beginning the design. So in other words, if one
is designing to a number versus designing to something else and
then a number is thrown on of how much it should cost later, it
is a very different approach.
So the $550 million, which refers to--being a physicist, I
always have to give reference points; if it is decibels I have
to tell you what it is referring to--550 is fiscal year 2010
dollars, and that is the average price per unit, and that
assumes we have 80 to 100 bombers that we ultimately will
build.
So what we have done is we put that marker in the sand, and
we said design to that. Design to that. And that is driving, if
you will, the fixed requirements side of this bomber. And so
that is the way it is being done, and so far we are optimistic.
But I would--I would be very cautious to say if I wasn't
optimistic this early in the program, we would have a problem.
So it is so far, so good.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you.
Were you going to comment? Was there another comment?
General Thompson. No.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mike.
Now we recognize Mr. Runyan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Chairman.
And, gentlemen, I know you probably know where I am going.
Obviously, I represent Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, so the
KC-10 is something that is there. I had the opportunity this
morning to be in the presence and have a meeting with General
Stough talking a little bit about moving forward.
And, Chairman, putting that out there, it is something that
I am going to continue to fight for in my short time here. But
I want to remind the Members of Congress and bring up, and I
believe Secretary Gates said it, one of the biggest national
security threats is our debt. And the fact that we still have
the sequester hanging over us is Congress' inability to deal
with our debt.
Now, again, now if you want to move it to the KC-10 issue,
creating a readiness force structure issue further down the
road. So we have compounded one and made it a bigger problem,
and we still haven't addressed the original one.
And going to that and talking about this process, General
Jones, you said in your view doing the vertical cut of the KC-
10 has the least amount of risk to it. Well, I ask this
question to both General Thompson and General Jones: To your
knowledge, how many airframes in the history of aviation have
come out on time?
General Jones. Sir, I am not aware.
Mr. Runyan. I have heard not many.
General Thompson. Sir, I don't know either, but I would
characterize your statement as being pretty close to accurate.
Mr. Runyan. And it is scary when we see, you know, the
sequester thing has been thrown out there, obviously, I don't
know, for lack of a better term, the incompetence of Congress
to be able to address that issue is going to create a massive
issue, I want to be able to say, in readiness down the road,
because obviously you are going to have to make a decision.
Now, you know, if the 46 isn't ready to go, where are we at
there? I know it is a hypothetical question, but it is of
serious concern. And I have seen this happen so many times. We
put a lot of these ideas out there and actually scare the
living daylights out of people that, you know, you are going to
eliminate whole wings and all that kind of stuff. It is
frustrating. And I know there are no answers to any of the
questions I just put out there, but I just wanted to put them
out there to really say that this is a serious, serious issue.
And this is one near and dear to me, but I think it is a pretty
big chunk out of what, you know, the capabilities, especially
that Air Mobility Command can bring to the table. And it has
detrimental effects down the road.
General Jones. Sir, if I might comment. Sir, I share your
concern. The reason I said that it is the least risk is that
our plan right now is we maintain the KC-10, is to divest the
135 on a one-for-one as the KC-46 comes up. If in fact that we
go back to sequester and we have to start looking at the KC-10
fleet, we intend to do the same type of methodology, which
would be to divest the KC-10 at a rate based on the KC-46
coming online. We do incur some increased risk by doing that
just due to the capabilities that you are well aware of, of the
KC-10's ability to self-deploy. And that is the key thing in
the Pacific, that we see that increased risk. But, sir, we
would manage that divestment of the fleet based on the KC-46
coming online.
Mr. Runyan. I thank you for that, because I have actually
tried to get that answer out of a few people in the past year
and haven't been able to. So I appreciate it.
And I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman.
And, General Jones, could you just elaborate a little bit
on what Mr. Runyan said about the risk that you see that we are
running in doing that? Because that is something we have not
done a very good job of painting pictures.
General Jones. Yes, sir. And as you both are well aware,
our air refueling fleet is critical not only to the Air Force,
but to all of our joint partners, the Marines and the Navy, as
well as our coalition partners. And so we do understand the
requirement to do that.
Sir, we see our requirement to be about 479 tankers. That
is to meet the Defense Planning Guidance with an acceptable
level of risk is doing that. Sir, when I talk about increased
risk, the challenge that we face, if in fact we have to divest
the KC-10 and we go that route, will be managing the ramp of
the KC-46, coming up with the divestiture of the KC-10.
If they both were to stay on a projected, the area that we
think that we would probably see some increased risk is about a
2-year period, sir, and that is just as the KC-10 drops below a
certain level, which we can give you in a classified
environment. But it really is that transition point and making
sure that as the KC-10 gets below a certain level if the 46
hasn't matched that level, there is about a 2-year period, sir,
where we see some increased risk.
And, again, our biggest risk for the KC-10 fleet, it has
the ability, while there are certainly advantages and the
ability of fuel at range, because of the capacity that it
carries, the largest advantage in a Pacific scenario is going
to be our ability to rapidly deploy and start turning air
power. The KC-10, because it can deploy, it can self-deploy,
carry everything that it needs to turn and go, is where we
would see that increased risk happening.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
Mr. Kilmer is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought I would start with you, Dr. LaPlante. I am
interested in acquisition reform. And I would appreciate your
thoughts about what Congress can do to help you and the Air
Force maximize the dollars that are authorized and appropriated
to support your mission. I am particularly interested in
understanding your thoughts on the increased use of multiyear
contracts with prime vendors and whether or not it makes sense
for prime vendors to control subcontract sourcing so long as
they can demonstrate effective competition.
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you for the question, because we could
spend many hearings talking about acquisition, acquisition
reform. I will start by going to where you ended, on the
specific question on multiyears. I think that done correctly,
meaning with proper transparency and the like, multiyears to
primes can be a very good thing for the government.
What I would caveat that to be, or to add to it would be
the following. I would say, first, I think that the ability of
the government to have transparency into what the prime, let's
say, negotiates with their sub is more than people in the
government realize. In other words, maybe too often in the past
I think we have accepted not being part of understanding what
the supply chain is, what the negotiated rates even are, when
in fact we can be part of that, we can understand what those
rates are.
And we have been doing more of this under Mr. Kendall's
``should cost,'' where the government has been with the primes
understanding what they are paying for their subs. Again, not
trying to do anything other than be transparent and get the
best deal for everybody. So I think that any time, in my view,
the Congress hears a good case for multiyear, a good case that
we have a good acquisition strategy, anything the Congress can
do to help with that regard is very good.
I think the other thing I would ask, and this is perhaps a
little bit general, so I would have to think about how to make
it specific and actionable, but I think tracing accountability,
responsibility, and authority in acquisition, and always asking
ourselves the question, do we have clarity to it? Have we made
it clearer with what we are doing or have we actually made it
harder with what we are doing is something that would be very
wise. And what I mean by that is, I have a lot of good
colleagues, good friends of mine who are around the Department
of Defense who will be involved in acquisition programs, and
they will rightfully say, I have to be involved in it because I
am held accountable, or I think I am held accountable for this
piece of software engineering, or this piece of that. And they
are absolutely right and they are absolutely sincere.
But the aggregate is a program manager has a lot of people
trying to, quote, ``help them'' that feel that they are also--
they think they are kind of accountable, but really at the end
of the day it is the program manager and the PEO [program
executive officer] that is accountable and the SAE [service
acquisition executive]. So I think that that balance and that
discussion is really important to have. And some of the things
that we do, while well intentioned, if they are not clear as to
who is actually going to be accountable, they actually can
hurt.
So what I say when people ask me in acquisition do we hold
people accountable, and if I don't think we do, but I think
what is foundational underneath that is we sometimes are not
clear as to who is actually accountable, and it is because we
have a lot of stakeholders. So things that the Congress can do
to help us clarify those roles and responsibilities, to say,
you know, this organization can help here, this can advise
here, but the accountability of the outcome is this chain would
be helpful.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Major General Thompson, it is our understanding that the
Boeing company is actively marketing the KC-46 to our
international allies. It stands to reason that it is mutually
beneficial to both U.S. security strategy and to our coalition
partners' success that the KC-46 be integrated in as many of
our allies' air forces as possible. To what extent are the DOD
and Air Force leveraging this successful program and helping
increase our foreign military sales?
General Thompson. Thanks for your question, Congressman. I
can't overemphasize how important it is to have that
interoperability around the world with our allies, not just in
tankers, but across our various fleets of aircraft.
The United States Air Force is doing what it can to assist
the Boeing company in their marketing for both foreign military
sales and direct commercial sales of KC-46 around the world. We
do that in several different ways. When allies have questions
about what the capabilities are with the program, or
capabilities are with the jet, or what the status of the
program is, we answer them to the best of our ability. In
addition, we ensure that senior leadership of the Air Force
that exists in the AORs [areas of responsibility] where allies
are considering KC-46s for purchase are as up to speed on the
program as possible.
And then, for instance, just as an example, here I believe
it is next week a significant number of the air attaches from
here in Washington, DC, at foreign embassies are coming to
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to visit the Air Force Security
and Assistance and Cooperation folks. What we have arranged to
do during that time is have Boeing bring their KC-46 simulator
and aerial refueling operator station simulator to Wright-
Patterson so that these air attaches can see what the
capabilities of the aircraft are and to hear a status of the
program.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. LaPlante, Major General Thompson, Major General Jones,
thank you so much for joining us today, and thanks for your
service to our Nation. We deeply appreciate that.
Major General Jones, I want to ask some questions about our
B-1 fleet. You know, the Air Force is required by law to
maintain a B-1 combat-coded inventory of 36 aircraft, which the
Air Force is doing. However, the subcommittee understands that
for 3 of those 36 aircraft they don't have the same crew ratio
or flying hours programmed against them as the other 33 B-1
combat-coded aircraft do. Can you explain the reason for this
difference? And what risks do we incur in meeting combat
commander requirements if all 36 combat-coded B-1 aircraft are
required to meet presence and operational requirements?
General Jones. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
So my understanding, sir, is that several years ago we did,
as we put our Air Force budget forward, there was a proposal to
reduce down to 33. As you are likely aware, the decision was
made to hold at 36. Sir, my understanding is that we have not
yet, as you said, fully funded those remaining three.
Now, they are being maintained, all the modernization of
those aircraft are still viable. But, sir, I will be the first
to tell you that our bomber fleet and the requirements that we
have to do around the globe, we don't have enough. And so there
is increased risk as a part of that, which is why we need to,
and are going to, look at in our fiscal year 2016 budget what
it would take to be able to restore that funding.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. I think that is absolutely critical
as we look at the challenges around the world and what those
requirements are and where we are with our current bomber
fleet.
Let me go back to the tanker question. I find it
interesting, the USTRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]
requirement for a tanker fleet is at 567 aerial tankers to meet
steady state and current contingency surge requirements. The
Air Force requirement, as you just stated, was 479, yet our
fleet only has 454 tankers in it. Can you tell me then
presently where are we as far as the risk that we look at based
on present fleet, present Air Force requirements, TRANSCOM
requirements today? How does that risk become exacerbated then
in the future if we aren't able to close either of those two
gaps?
General Jones. Yes, sir. So you are exactly right. So with
455 that we have now, as we continue to bring the KC-46 on, as
I alluded to earlier, as we hit 479 we will start divesting
some of our legacy.
Sir, the higher number that you heard from TRANSCOM, we do
have a number of different studies that are out there. That
number that you referred to is from one of our older studies,
the Mobility Capability Requirement Study 2016. And that number
is actually at the, again, while avoiding specific discussions,
if I had to characterize it, I would say it was very low risk.
So it was almost an unconstrained requirement.
Sir, our 479 analysis that we have done is what I would say
is probably right in the middle of the risk spectrum. And so
any number that we have, so your question as to where we are
right now, we still believe we can do that, but as we deviate
one side or the other, it either increases or decreases that
risk. In today's environment, we do not have enough money to
buy every fleet to the lowest amount of risk. And so that 479,
we believe, is in the heart of the envelope.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this then. At the 479 number, in a
rough percentage, how far short will you fall of combatant
commanders' requests and service branches' requests? Obviously,
you refuel other aircraft in the air. Tell me approximately
where you would fall short in those requests.
General Jones. Sir, it is difficult to give you a specific
answer, because it largely depends on a number of things. So
depending on where we are going to have to use those tankers in
a fight, the key challenge is going to be the basing
requirement, and then the proximity to the fight, because the
distance requires, that is how much off-load there is to be
able to give that range. So it is difficult to give you a
specific number.
But, sir, what I stand by is the fact that our analysis
shows that in the Defense Planning Guidance, and I know you are
familiar with what those requirements are, we believe that we
can meet those. But, again, as we sway either way on numbers,
it will affect the level of risk that we face.
Mr. Wittman. In managing this tanker fleet, you talked
about the options there with the KC-10 and retiring the KC-10.
Give me a scenario if Congress tells, says, no, you are not
going to require the KC-10, tell me what your options are to be
able to manage the resources you have within that context.
General Jones. Yes, sir, absolutely. So if we do it within
the mobility construct, I alluded earlier that you could take
an equivalent of 152 KC-135s, sir, I don't think we can do
that. That is too much of the boom availability that is out
there. Again, we could look within the STRAT [strategic]
portfolio and look at the C-5s. Each one of those within the
mobility portfolio that we are addressing here today is a
significantly higher number of risk.
So, sir, what we really have to do, if we did that, would
be, as all of the dust settled and all of the programs were
settled, we would have to go back and look at the remaining
programs that are out there and start trying to see what we
would be able to do. It is $2.3 billion, and, again, another
$2.6 billion in the outyears. So we would have to figure out
which program we could do that.
But my main message to you, sir, is that we believe in our
best judgment that this portfolio as presented right now is the
least amount of risk incurred. And so anything that we would do
would likely increase that risk.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from California, Mr. Cook, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I hope some of
the questions I ask today don't reflect my age or the old
corps, the old Air Force, or things like that. But we had this
brief this morning, and we talked about Korea, and of course
the shift now of course to the Pacific. And I am very, very
concerned about the distances involved. I think the end of the
Cold War, when we used to have the air alert battalions, and
whether you had C-130s or 141s, or what have you, everything
has changed.
I am really worried about the lift capability that we have
in case something goes south, literally, in Korea, you know,
whether we can transport those, I am thinking the 82nd
Airborne, Army forces, 1st Marine Division, maybe even the 2nd
Marine Division. These are long distances. When I was younger,
it was fun to be a platoon commander, company commander, and
then they made me a logistics officer. Air Force is great, but
when you would start getting the manifests and all the gear
that has got to go, I just don't feel good about the fact that
over the years we are not going to have that time for a
buildup. It is going to go very, very quickly.
And if you could address that, make me feel better about
the emphasis on the Pacific and the fact that the combat
windows, when we have to react, are going to be much shorter,
and the impact on the craft, the civilian and Reserve air
fleet, and whether we can meet those commitments.
General Jones. Yes, sir. Thanks very much.
So, again, I will keep alluding back to our analysis. As
you know, we have 301 of our aircraft right now that are
strategic lift. And we believe that we can go down 275 and
still meet the Defense Planning Guidance.
Sir, I share your concern over the amount of lift that we
are going to have to do. And as we take some of our strategic
airlift and we put it over into BAI--so, for example, we are
taking 16 of our C-17s and we are putting them into an
attrition reserve status, a BAI status, we are taking 8 of our
C-5s and doing that--sir, that will decrease about 10 percent
of our required million ton miles, the main metric that we use.
That is not insignificant.
However, when we look at all of the things that we are
going to have to do, so, you know, we are divesting fighter
squadrons, we have taken cuts in all of our portfolios, and so
as we try to balance the risk across what our Air Force is
going to have to be able to do, that reduction that we are
looking at in both strategic lift and in the tactical lift for
the C-130s we believe is the right--or is compared to the broad
risk across is----
Mr. Cook. Okay. Let me ask you. I haven't looked at an op
[operation] plan for Korea for years. Do you think the op plans
are current now with the threat assessment that has changed in
terms of time that we can meet those commitments? Obviously,
the sequester, readiness, all those things there. But the op
plans probably haven't changed since then. And that is what you
use as the bible when you break it out, you go in the top
secret vault, you know what I am talking about. So are we up to
speed on that?
General Jones. You know, Congressman, you bring up a great
point. So I want to make sure that I go on the record as saying
as we talk about risk in the Defense Planning Guidance, those
are not the O [operation] plans that you are referring to.
Those are commonly agreed upon scenarios that all of the
services use. And they are different from the O plans.
Sir, your question of the O plans, are they current? Again,
you know, I was on a COCOM [combatant command] staff, but I am
not now. But every one of those O plans stay in revision, and
they are all in different levels of that. And so what I would
tell you is that the COCOM commanders will continue to upgrade
those O plans as the threat environment changes.
Mr. Cook. And because of what happened with the Snowden
affair and everything like that, I am sure they have to be
changed just because of that. That takes time.
General Jones. Sir, it does. And we are still sorting
through a lot of it.
Mr. Cook. Okay. Thank you.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from South Dakota is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Noem. Thank you.
I wanted to just do a little follow-up with Dr. LaPlante on
the question that Mr. McIntyre brought up about the cost of the
Next-Generation Bomber. And you were talking about the
discipline that has happened in the spending on what that cost
would be, around $550 million per aircraft, but your principal
military deputy for acquisition was at a press conference last
week and stated that of course it would cost more than that.
So how far off are we talking about? And just explain that
statement that he made at that press conference to us so we can
have some context as to what we are looking at as a plan for
this bomber as it develops.
Dr. LaPlante. Right. So the headline and the bottom line is
what I said earlier, and if he was here he would say the same
thing. To try to explain what he was saying, I would put it
this way. He was in the midst of a discussion and trying to get
at people who were focusing on the particular number, and when
the number would happen, and all of that, and he was trying to
get people to say, look, you know, whether it is 550, don't
focus on that number itself.
And so what it really is about is we are trying to remind
people, look, this is 2014, this is a target we put in the
sand. We use 2010 dollars, fiscal year 2010 dollars, we put
this number of 550, and they are designing to that, and as our
best estimates are they are on track to do that, period, end of
story.
In history, how often have 30 years later have people
nailed it within 1 percent? You know, it is the same as the
history of, like, when is the last time we did this or did
that. That is kind of not the point. And I think that is what
he was trying to get people at.
And so for me as an acquisition kind of technology guy,
what is clear is, and it is surprising that we don't do this
enough, is we don't sit the engineers and the concept people
and the requirements people down at the very beginning of the
program and say, oh, by the way, it can't cost more than this
much money. So if you come up with a design that costs more
than that, it is not going to work. And that is different that
we are doing for this. And that is the key point.
Mrs. Noem. Okay.
Dr. LaPlante. So there is nothing that has changed, nothing
at all.
Mrs. Noem. Okay. I appreciate that clarification.
And then, Major General Jones, I shared the same concerns
that Mr. Wittman did as well with the B-1s. And I was just
wondering if you knew and had ballparked the cost to get those
3 aircraft back up to fully manned levels like the other 33 B-
1s, what would that approximate cost be? I know that you are
not anticipating doing that until fiscal year 2016, but what
are we looking at as a need financially to make that happen?
General Jones. Ma'am, I would like to make sure I get that
number right, so if you don't mind, I will take for the record
and get back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 53.]
Mrs. Noem. Okay. That would be wonderful. You were very
clear in the statement that we faced risks around the world,
and we could use those bombers in the air when necessary. And
so that cost would be very helpful to know what that would
take.
And also, I just wanted to also talk to you about the New
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty. And it requires
a reduced number of deployed nuclear weapons, which would
require the Air Force to decertify a certain number of B-52
aircraft. And so what is the projected number of B-52s that you
would decertify in order to meet these New START treaty
requirements?
General Jones. Yes, ma'am. And so as you allude to, we are
required to come under the 700 of deployed systems. What we
would like to do is not go below 60. But ma'am, we really won't
know until the whole, across the whole triad, that number has
to be resolved. And so until all those deliberations are made,
we don't know yet as to what the final number would be.
Mrs. Noem. When do you think that would be?
General Jones. Ma'am, I am unprepared to tell you what that
timeline is, but again, I can get back with you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 53.]
Mrs. Noem. Okay. Perfect.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for your questions.
Gentlemen, I have just a couple of questions and then we
will have one more question.
Approximately $200 million is included in this year's
budget request for continued development of the air-launched
LRASM [Long Range Anti-Ship Missile] Increment 1 missile that
will be fielded onto the B-1 bomber in 2018 to fulfill an
urgent operational need of the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command]
commander. Can you provide us an update of the program's
progress and explain how Increment 1 will fill the PACOM
commander's capability gap that currently exists?
Dr. LaPlante. Yeah, I can talk a bit, and then maybe turn
it over to General Jones.
So I know that that is in, as you said, the B-1 is the
initial target platform for that weapon, and that it has
primarily been worked on the Navy side starting with DARPA
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]. I have familiarity
with that program only because of some of my history in working
on it. And it has been something that has been a dire need in
the Pacific for years, frankly. And so as far as I know, it is
on track to meet that
B-1 as the target platform.
I will turn it over to General Jones.
General Jones. No, sir. As you allude to, sir, it will be
critical to PACOM, just due to the environment that is there.
And so we are watching it being developed closely. And, sir, I
have no other details than Dr. LaPlante said, other than the
fact that it will be an objective for the B-1.
Dr. LaPlante. If I could add one other thing. I do think
that we should be looking at--and LRASM is a good example of
increased capability, whether it is range and the like and
precision, but also how many--it gets to similar with the
bomber--how many of these can we actually produce? Which means
we have to keep the costs down. Because we are being challenged
not just by geography, as the Congressman said, but we are
being challenged by, frankly, numbers. And so for weapons like
LRASM, which are great weapons, we also have to think, how can
we make sure we have sufficient numbers of these?
Thanks.
Mr. Forbes. In the press 2 weeks ago it was reported that
your estimate for Boeing at completion of development of the
KC-46 tanker is approximately $1.1 billion above the original
program estimate and above the ceiling limit of the contract.
Can you provide us your reasoning for the cost growth? And will
this cost growth impact the program's execution?
General Thompson. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question.
And by the way, that is a great question.
There is always some risk in acquisition programs, but
based upon what we know today, the KC-46 program is executing
as well as any acquisition program that I have ever been
involved in, in 27 years. We are about 50 percent done with the
development program. We have had excellent funding stability
from here on the Hill and from within the Department. We have
had excellent requirements stability from our warfighting
brethren. We have not made any engineering changes to the
design in the first 3 years since contract award.
But there is always risk. That EAC [estimate at completion]
that was reported in the press here several weeks ago is
basically our estimate that reflects that an increase in
resources that the contractor may need to complete the work on
the contract, but doesn't necessarily mean that there will be
any schedule slip to the program.
From our standpoint, the United States Air Force has lived
up to its obligations under the contract. We have paid all our
bills on time, we have kept the requirements stable with no
ECPs [engineering change proposals] in 3 years, and we have
lived up to our other support aspects of the contract. So I
think it is fair and reasonable to assume that the contractor
will live up to their commitments on the program and deliver on
time. Regardless, the government's liability, as you correctly
stated, remains capped at $4.9 billion. So we have insulated
the taxpayer from any additional cost overruns relative to
development.
I guess I would just conclude by saying we are 50 percent
done. I have been at this business a long time. And you have
been overseeing programs like this for a long time, Mr.
Chairman. We have a lot of work to go. Our design is set. Our
critical design review was accomplished approximately a month
ahead of schedule last year. But we are getting ready to get
into flight test later this summer. We are potting our long-
term sustainment strategy over the next year.
So things can happen. And I will just say in conclusion
that the program office and all of the stakeholders across the
Department of Air Force and the Department of Defense will
flight follow this very, very closely, making sure that we
deliver on time with a weapon system that is ready for war on
day one.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. I have just one last question. It is
a little bit lengthier. But on March 12, we had a hearing with
retired Admiral Natter and Dr. Rebecca Grant to discuss their
assessment of the 2015 budget request. And during Dr. Grant's
testimony she brought up three specific areas regarding the new
bomber that we should consider. One, overclassification of the
LRS-B [Long Range Strike Bomber] program may restrict the
technical work and cross-flow that the prime contractors must
go through to produce an adequate system. And she also
suggested that the program should come out of the black. Number
two, is the technology scope right for this bomber to
accommodate its lifecycle capability growth to keep pace with
future threats? And number three, is the current quantity of 80
to 100 bombers sufficient to meet future needs as legacy
bombers begin to retire?
And if I could add to Dr. Grant's observation on total
quantity, the decision to procure 80 to 100 bombers was made
before the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance implemented a
refocus on global anti-access/area-denial environments, and the
Department's pivot to the Asia-Pacific. Given the time and
tyranny of distance associated with long-range strike and the
number of targets that combatant commanders would likely rely
upon the new bomber to engage, is 80 to 100 still the right
number? And could you provide us with an unclassified
assessment of Dr. Grant's observations and whether or not we
need to address these in the development of our 2015 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act]?
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you for the question. I will take the
first two and maybe the third I will defer.
Mr. Forbes. Sorry to layer those on.
Dr. LaPlante. Oh, that is fine. That is fine. Thank you.
The security question is an interesting one. Had I been in
front of this committee 4 years ago I might have agreed that,
you know, we tend to overclassify and sometimes that hurts
innovation. I have completely changed my view, and I will just
say it was influenced by my time on the Defense Science Board.
Some of you may be familiar with the Defense Science Board
study on cyber and the resilient cyber-threat that was out last
year. I was on that study. I am convinced as a result of 2
years of looking at cyber we are not overclassifying. We are
not overclassifying. We have to protect and have to understand.
What I am worried about is all our unclassified designs that
are out there.
So, no, the fact that we have our crown jewels protected,
thank goodness. And, again, I would not have said that 4 years
ago, and that comes from 2 years of studying cyber.
On the second question, which is about the technology, the
design of the acq [acquisition] strategy, as we have already
discussed, is this idea of what people have called the Block A
approach, where you go for the 80 percent in the first version
that you deliver, the 80 percent airplane, and you keep this
focus on requirements that we have talked about, including the
550 number as the baseline.
What goes along with that, though, is we have to build the
runway and the ramps to put in upgrades. We have also said,
rightfully so, to get to this 80 percent we are not going to
repeat mistakes made in other programs by requiring the first
version to be so advanced in technology that it gets pushed to
the right and there is never a second version because people
don't believe there will be another block.
So we are holding firm to that. But that means that we also
have to hold firm to building, if you will, the next generation
of technologies that hooks into the bombers, hooks into either
an open architecture with new sensors, hardened spots on the
wings, things where we don't know what the world is going to be
and what the threat is going to be and we don't know what
technology is going to be there, but we have to build it such
that, and have the technology ramp, if you will, that can
inject these technologies.
One of the things that I have been looking into since my
short time on the job is do we have that sufficient technology
ramp to feed next-generation versions, blocks of that bomber. I
think in some areas we do and some areas we don't. I would
rather not, and we can't talk about it more here.
But that is how I would answer that question on the
technology. I think it is a good question, because the good
side is that we are fielding highly mature technologies and
fixed requirements. But we have to finish the deal by funding
the advancements in the next versions of the block. So that is
the answer to the second question.
The third, General Jones.
General Jones. Sir, when we talk about capabilities and
quantities--and, again, in the follow-on session we will be
able to get into more detail--so, sir, the question about 80 to
100, we absolutely believe that we need this penetrating strike
capability, a long-range penetrating precision strike
capability, just like we also need penetrating ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. We need to
get after this anti-access/area-denial [A2/AD] threat that we
continue to face and proliferates. As Dr. LaPlante said,
technology is proliferating at a rate, and so where we used to
have a significant technology advantage, I believe we are
losing that. So we have to look at not only the capabilities
and the capacities.
But, sir, what I would offer to you is it is not just that
one platform. You brought up the LRASM piece and I appreciate
the opportunity to come back to that. It is a combination and
we need to look at things as a family of systems. And so we
need to continue to invest in the ability to not only have an
airplane that can penetrate through, but to also take our
legacy platforms, modernize them, and make them more
survivable, plus give them the ability to do the preferred
standoff munitions that will increase the tempo of kinetic
effects as we also try to honor that A2/AD environment.
So what we continue to look at is not only each system, but
the family of systems, which is why it is critically important
that not only we keep this program on track and we continue to
assess the numbers and capabilities, but we also look across
our portfolio to include preferred munitions, that as we take
penetrating airplanes, perhaps open a corridor, it starts to
increase the viability of our legacy platforms. And the
modernization efforts that we are taking with our B-1s and our
B-52s will make that aircraft viable to 2040, longer for the B-
2, and so we will continue to leverage those modernization
efforts.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. And I would like to welcome the
gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, and ask unanimous
consent that he be allowed to participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Bridenstine will be
recognized at the appropriate time after all subcommittee
members have had a chance to ask their opening questions.
It is my understanding, Mr. Johnson, that you have no
questions to ask at this time.
And Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. No questions.
Mr. Forbes. So with that, Mr. Bridenstine, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Chairman Forbes. I appreciate
you letting me sit in on this hearing. And, of course, I thank
the distinguished panel for being here and answering our
questions.
General Jones, I had a question for you. You are a pilot,
an Air Force pilot. I just wanted to ask what kind of aircraft
you flew?
General Jones. Sir, the majority of my time is in F-16s,
but then I also flew tankers, AWACS [Airborne Warning and
Control System], and JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System].
Mr. Bridenstine. When you flew the F-16, did you have a
heads-up display?
General Jones. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Bridenstine. And did you have terrain awareness and
collision avoidance equipment inside the F-16?
General Jones. Yes, sir, you had a line in the sky you
could set for awareness.
Mr. Bridenstine. And then how about when you talk about
your heads-up display, you probably had some navigation
equipment, VOR [Very high frequency Omni Directional Radio
Range], TACAN [tactical air navigation], ILS [instrument
landing system] equipment integrated with the heads-up display?
General Jones. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Bridenstine. Were these systems beneficial for the
safety of your aircraft and for you personally?
General Jones. Yes, sir, particularly in a single-seat
aircraft.
Mr. Bridenstine. Absolutely.
See, the thing that I have seen here in Congress, we have
authorized funding for the Avionics Modernization Program [AMP]
for C-130H. We have not only authorized the funding, we have
appropriated the funding. We did that for fiscal year 2012,
authorized, appropriated, went to the Pentagon, and the money
never got obligated. We did it in 2013, authorized,
appropriated, went to the Pentagon, never got obligated. 2014,
we explicitly passed in the NDAA a prohibition on the
cancellation of C-130M.
This is personal for me. I am a Navy pilot myself. I have
flown aircraft that have modern cockpits and I have flown
aircraft that have not so modern cockpits. And I have seen that
within the Department of Defense as a whole we have, it seems,
airplanes that have propellers don't get the fancy cockpits,
but airplanes that have jets do get the fancy cockpits. In the
Reserves and the National Guard they don't get the fancy
cockpits, but in the Active Component they do get the fancy
cockpits.
This seems to be a trend not just in the Navy, but also in
the Air Force, and this is a challenge that I am going to take
very personally, because the safety of our aircrew goes across
all branches and it goes throughout the different components of
the branches. And I want to hear what your commitment is to
obligate the funds to make sure that AMP actually becomes a
program that gets implemented in the cockpits.
And I would also say that the airplanes that I have flown,
you get into different airplanes and you have all different
configurations of avionics, different software within the
multifunction displays, and we need standardization across the
fleet. What AMP does is it standardizes C-130 cockpits for the
National Guard and for the Reserve, and I would just like to
hear your commitment to that.
General Jones. Sir, so a couple of things I would like to
address. First of all, I want to express my appreciation for
your commitment to ensure the safety of our airmen, and I thank
you for your service previously as well, and that is something
that we all remain very concerned about.
So, sir, as you may be aware, the AMP program has a number
of elements to that. One of it is to make sure that we maintain
viable in national airspace and international airspace for our
AO [area of operations]. And then there are some avionics,
glass cockpit, and, sir, I know you are well aware of all
those.
So the first thing that we need to do, sir, I know you are
aware of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study and we
are waiting for the results of the GAO [Government
Accountability Office] study, and once we get that study that
will enable us to move out on whichever program, whichever path
we take.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, hold on real quick. Because if the
funds are authorized and explicitly appropriated for this
specific purpose and it goes to the Pentagon and then you don't
obligate the funds, do you really need to do a study?
General Jones. So, sir, what we are trying to do is figure
out the best way to meet the Air Force total requirements for
our Nation.
Mr. Bridenstine. And you realize that by studying the best
way you are intentionally going around the will of Congress?
General Jones. Sir, what we are trying to do is maximize
the capability for our Nation. So if I could have just one
second, sir. So as I mentioned before, the HUD [head-up
display] is critical, I thought, as a single-seat pilot, but
for the $2.63 billion, as we look in this fiscally constrained
environment, and particularly as we go back to the law of the
land and go back to that hard BCA [Budget Control Act] level,
sir, I have also flown airplanes that don't have a HUD, the
[RC-135] Rivet Joint, the AWACS, the tanker, and in a crew
environment there is the ability to cross-check, and, sir, I
know you are well aware of that.
And so in the hard choices that we are all faced to make in
this fiscal environment as we go across the entire spectrum
that we have to go through, would we like to do it? Sir, there
are a number of programs that we would like to do. But we are
forced in this environment to figure out what are the hard
choices that----
Mr. Bridenstine. But real quick, there are no choices here.
The money has been appropriated specifically for that purpose.
There is no real choice in this matter.
I yield back. I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. But the gentleman's question is a good one. One
of the things that we are experiencing with all of the services
is almost a separation of power situation. But when Congress
does, as the gentleman mentioned, not only authorize but
appropriate something, and then we hear the services come back
and we are finding out whether we want to use it or not, that
doesn't bode well. And so we will be looking at stronger
language this time for this and other issues the same way to
make sure that we don't lose that process.
I am not faulting you guys, but maybe you can take that
message back over to the big house.
And Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones, the New START treaty requires a reduced
number of deployed nuclear weapons, which in turn will require
the Air Force to decertify a certain number of B-52 aircraft.
What is the projected number of B-52 aircraft that you will
decertify in order to meet New START requirements?
General Jones. Sir, that exact number will be dependent on
the final resolution of the submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and what we have for our ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] fleet. And so as we get that number, then we
will be able to adjust the bomber fleet number. The New START
treaty says that we could go up to 60. We would prefer not to
go below that, but our final number is still yet to be
determined pending the resolution across the triad.
Mr. Johnson. All right. General Jones, USTRANSCOM has
stated a requirement for 567 aerial tankers to meet its steady
state and contingency surge requirements, yet the Air Force
only has an inventory of 454 tankers. What risk is the Air
Force incurring by not having the sufficient number of tankers
in the inventory to meet USTRANSCOM's requirement?
General Jones. Sir, our most recent mobilities capability
assessment, 18, shows that we can meet our requirements with
479 tankers. The number that you referred to earlier from
TRANSCOM was from a previous study, and if I was to
characterize risk it is at the far, you know, the lowest
portion of risk.
We believe that 479 number, without getting into specific
details in this classification level, is in the heart of the
envelope of risk. And so as we bring the KC-46 on board we will
continue to build from 455 up to 479, and then as we reach that
number we will start to divest some of our legacy fleet to
maintain that 479 number.
Mr. Johnson. All right.
Dr. LaPlante, your principal military deputy for
acquisition, Lieutenant General Davis, was quoted in the press
a few weeks ago stating that, quote, ``Of course, the new
bomber will cost more than $550 million per aircraft,'' end
quote. Can you explain to the subcommittee why you have a $550
million cost target and what assumptions are not included in
that cost figure?
Dr. LaPlante. Yeah. Thank you for the question. So the $550
million number is what is called an APUC or an average price
per unit cost. That number is referenced to fiscal year 2010
adjusted for inflation year dollars and assumes a quantity of
80 to 100 bombers being built over the time period that we are
planning to build them.
As we have talked a little bit about in this hearing, the
idea that we are holding to very firmly is to give the
designers and the teams essentially a marker in the sand saying
the unit cost, you know, and you have to give them the
assumptions on what year you are talking about and what
quantity, which we do, will not exceed this number, and 550 is
the number.
So it is being used, and it is being used well, in my view,
as a way to force the designers for the concepts to do the
right trades so that we don't end up what we have done too
often in the past where we let the requirements go where they
go and let them change and then later on we come back and say,
oh, we don't want it to cost more than this much money and the
design has already been done.
So this is something where it is a deliberate, premeditated
way at the beginning of the program to set the requirement and
the unit cost firm and being disciplined in keeping to that.
And in my view, we should be doing this on many other programs.
I hope we would do it on munitions, for example. So that is the
idea behind it.
And then my understanding of General Davis was in his
discussion was trying to make that point and trying to make
sure that people understood what the 550 was, which was this
reference number to fiscal year 2010, and not to get people to
be focused on whether the 550 itself, we were going to be above
it or below it in any one year. It is the target--so far we are
so good, it is very early, though--that is being used to design
the airplane, and there is nothing has changed. Nothing has
changed.
Mr. Johnson. General Jones, the Air Force is required by
law to maintain a B-1 combat-coded inventory of 36 aircraft,
for which the Air Force is complying with. However, the
subcommittee understands that for 3 of those 36 aircraft they
do not have the same crew ratio or flying hours programmed
against them as the other 33 B-1 combat-coded aircraft.
Can you explain to the committee the reason for this
difference and what risks do you incur in meeting combatant
commander requirements if all 36 combat-coded B-1 aircraft were
required to meet presence and operational requirements?
General Jones. Yes, sir, absolutely. Our bomber fleet is
one of the most stressed weapon systems that we have in terms
of meeting our combatant commander requirements. For the 36, as
you said, the tails are fully funded for modernization. We keep
the tails in a combat-coded status and will continue to
modernize them.
In a previous budget deliberation we had proposed going
from 36 to 33. However, in follow-on deliberations the
requirement was set at 36. We do need to go back in the next
budget to take a look at the dollars that it would cost to
return the crew ratios and the appropriate flying hours, and
that is one of the programs that we are going to look at and
need to look at in 2016.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman.
I would like to remind the members that as soon as we
adjourn we will reconvene in 2337 for our next briefing.
And, gentleman, if there are any additional comments that
any of you would like to make, as we indicated at the outset,
we want to make sure this is your transcript and give you that
opportunity to do it.
Dr. LaPlante, thank you for being here, and we will let you
go first.
Dr. LaPlante. Well, I will just say thank you to the
committee and thank you, Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member
McIntyre and all the members. I appreciate your questions. I
think they are the right questions about the tough issues we
have. And as you can see, it is all about risk, and risk is
hard to assess, and that is what we are really talking about
here, is where to take those risks.
But thank you again, and I look forward to working with the
committee.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General Thompson.
General Thompson. Mr. Chairman, thanks so much for having
us over here today to talk about things that we feel very
strongly about. You know, there are thousands of tanker crew
and maintainers around the world right now flying KC-135s and
KC-10s. In fact, last year they conducted over 40,000 sorties,
they refueled over 90,000 different aircraft, and they
transferred nearly 160 million gallons of fuel to warfighters,
humanitarian airlift missions, whatever, all around the world.
They need a new weapon system, and the KC-46 is that new weapon
system.
I am over here on a quarterly basis to update the
professional staffers of this committee on the status of that
program, and with your permission I will continue to do so and
stop in to see you from time to time as well.
Mr. Forbes. That door is always open, General. Thank you.
And, General Jones.
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the
members of the committee for giving us the opportunity to come
by and talk to you. I think it is critically important that we
have these dialogues with you to at least explain the logic
behind what we have done, and I know that there are
deliberations yet to come as to what is right for our Nation.
Sir, I thank you and I thank the committee for your passion
and for your dedication towards our military services and doing
what is right for us all. We all face difficult times ahead and
there will continue to be tough challenges that we will have to
work our way through.
But, sir, your invitation for us to come and be able to
explain where we are, explain our concerns, is critical, I
think, as we try to move forward in the right way. So I thank
you and the committee for the support that you give all of our
military members. But from a member in blue, thank you for what
you do for our airmen and for our families.
Mr. Forbes. To all of you, thank you so much. We look
forward to meeting with you further in 2337. With that, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 2, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 2, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 2, 2014
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. NOEM
General Jones. The cost to fully fund three combat coded B-1s will
be approximately $58 million per year. Of those costs, over $26 million
will be required for active duty officer and enlisted personnel, while
$32 million will be needed to increase the B-1 flying hour program to
required levels. [See page 17.]
General Jones. Based on the New START Treaty-compliant force
structure, announced on April 8, 2014, the Department of Defense will
retain 46 of the 76 operational B-52Hs as nuclear-certified heavy
bombers, and will convert 30 B-52H bombers to a conventional-only role,
thereby removing them from treaty accountability. In addition, all 20
B-2s will remain nuclear capable, resulting in 66 nuclear capable
bombers, with no more than 60 of those in deployed status from a New
START Treaty perspective. [See page 17.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 2, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Knowing that the KC-46 tanker contract is fixed-price,
how important is it to maintain funding stability for the program and
what are the risks to the program if funding gets interrupted?
Dr. LaPlante. Maintaining funding stability to meet incremental
funding requirements is paramount for the KC-46 program. Interrupting
or significantly altering required funding introduces the risk of
impacting the aircraft and training system contracts or other
government costs which cover critical efforts like the flight test
program. If the aircraft contract requires renegotiation due to funding
or schedule changes, these negotiations would be conducted in a sole
source environment. This could negate the near $3B savings from the
original contract negotiation, and would not be prudent from a
taxpayers' perspective. Schedule delays also impact Air Mobility
Command plans to introduce new operational capability and retire aging
legacy tankers.
Mr. Forbes. In lieu of C-130 AMP program, the Air Force wants to
develop a lesser avionics modernization capability that will not
provide the required capability and reliability throughout the service-
life of the C-130 aircraft to meet FAA and International airspace
flight restrictions. What is the cost to develop a lesser avionics
modernization program that will satisfy airspace flight restrictions to
keep the C-130H aircraft relevant and capable through year 2040, its
projected service life?
Dr. LaPlante. The January 2020 Federal Aviation Administration's
(FAA) mandate for ADS-B Out is the only current airspace restriction.
The fiscal year 2015 (FY15) President Budget (PB) includes funding for
the C-130 CNS/ATM program which allows the C-130H aircraft to meet the
FAA's January 2020 mandate. The total FY15 PB fiscal year defense plan
(FYDP) funding for the program is $178M; the program is planned to
complete in FY23.
The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) September 2013 C-130
Avionics Modernization Analysis estimates the FY15 PB C-130 CNS/ATM
program total cost at $620M for 192 aircraft.
Mr. Forbes. Due to budgetary constraints, the Air Force deferred
upgrading B-2 aircraft with a more enhanced mission planning and
execution Defensive Management System. By deferring this capability,
how does this affect the B-2's ability to fly in contested and anti-
access/area-denial environments?
General Jones. As enemy air defenses begin to modernize and
proliferate, the B-2 must also continue to modernize. The B-2 Defensive
Management System modernization program will keep the aircraft viable
against these future threats. Delays to the program may cause delays to
the IOC which would put the B-2 and its aircrew in an increased risk
environment without the best tools to mitigate the risk. More specific
details can be discussed at a higher classification level.
Mr. Forbes. The Air Force plans to decrease its C-130H force
structure by approximately 40 aircraft beginning in FY15 and maintain a
total C-130 inventory of 318 aircraft in the near term, and 328
aircraft in the long term after the last production C-130J is
delivered. Can you tell us how you arrived at the 318 and 328 numbers
taking into account Army direct-support airlift requirements and their
associated force structure reduction, as well as, the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review's requirement to maintain a combat-coded inventory of
300 C-130 aircraft?
General Jones. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review's reference to
300 C-130 aircraft is part of the ``Planned U.S. Force Structure'' and
doesn't in and of itself establish a C-130 requirement. This planned C-
130 fleet size reflects the Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19) 328 Total Aircraft
Inventory (TAI) number, which includes 300 Primary Mission Aircraft
Inventory (PMAI), 26 Primary Training Aircraft Inventory (PTAI), and 2
Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) aircraft.
Decisions regarding C-130 force structure were driven by the fact
that the Air Force has excess tactical airlift capacity. The FY13
National Defense Authorization Act directed the Air Force to retain
additional intra-theater airlift aircraft above the Total Force
Proposal submitted to Congress in November 2012. This established a
``floor'' of 358 aircraft, well above the assessed requirement of 316
during the building of the FY13 President's Budget (PB). The Air Force
extended the ``floor'' through FY14 to create space and time for
dialogue with Congress.
The Mobility Capabilities Assessment-18, published on May 1, 2013,
determined ``there is no surge scenario associated with the current
defense strategy--even one in which a significant [Homeland Defense]
event occurs concurrently with two warfights--that requires a fleet of
358 C-130s. This includes accounting for C-130s that would be dedicated
to the Army's direct support mission.'' In fact, the report finds that
the Air Force requires no more than 320 C-130s, and as few as 248. For
the Army direct support mission, these calculations utilize conclusions
from a 2012 RAND study that suggests four intra-theater cargo aircraft
are needed for each Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)/General Support
Aviation Battalion (GSAB) employed in a conflict. Accordingly, the Air
Force has proposed to retire 47 aircraft in the FY15 PB, consistent
with Department of Defense guidance to divest excess capacity. As we
move forward in FY16, we will continue to evaluate options to ``right-
size and recapitalize'' the C-130 fleet beyond the proposed reductions.
Mr. Forbes. Knowing that the KC-46 tanker contract is fixed-price,
how important is it to maintain funding stability for the program and
what are the risks to the program if funding gets interrupted?
General Thompson. Maintaining funding stability to meet incremental
funding requirements is paramount for the KC-46 program. Interrupting
or significantly altering required funding introduces the risk of
impacting the aircraft and training system contracts or other
government costs which cover critical efforts like the flight test
program. If the aircraft contract requires renegotiation due to funding
or schedule changes, these negotiations would be conducted in a sole
source environment. This could negate the near $3B savings from the
original contract negotiation, and would not be prudent from a
taxpayers' perspective. Schedule delays also impact Air Mobility
Command plans to introduce new operational capability and retire aging
legacy tankers.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Your Principal Military Deputy for Acquisition,
Lieutenant General Davis, was quoted in the press a few weeks ago
stating that ``of course the new bomber will cost more than $550
million per aircraft.'' Can you explain to the subcommittee why you
have a $550 million dollar cost target and what assumptions are not
included in that cost figure?
Dr. LaPlante. That requirement is $550M in base year 2010 (BY10)
dollars for the production of 100 aircraft. We have made informed
trades to meet the average procurement unit cost (APUC) requirement.
The APUC number does not include development cost and does not include
the impact of inflation. The number has been very important in
establishing an affordable design
Mr. Langevin. New START treaty requires a reduced number of
deployed nuclear weapons, which in turn, will require the Air Force to
decertify a certain number of B-52 aircraft. What is the projected
number of B-52 aircraft that you will decertify in order to meet New
START requirements? What might cause that number to shift?
General Jones. The Air Force will convert 30 B-52H bombers to a
conventional only role, thereby decertifying those aircraft from the
nuclear mission and removing them from accountability under the New
START Treaty. The Air Force does not anticipate shifting the number of
B-52 conversions and plans to implement the conversions in accordance
with Section 1042 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012
Mr. Langevin. If the Air Force is required to execute fiscal
resources at Budget Control Act sequestration levels, what operational
risk do you incur by having to divest the entire KC-10 tanker aircraft
fleet? What other programmatic options would you have to execute if
Congress prohibited the retirement of KC-10 aircraft?
General Jones. If Budget Control Act (BCA) level caps are
maintained into Fiscal Year 2016 and the Air Force is forced to divest
the KC-10 before sufficient numbers of KC-46s are fielded, we would
have less flexibility in meeting air refueling demands across a broad
spectrum of operations, resulting in fewer ready forces to support
current strategic guidance. The resulting tanker force will be smaller,
but still required to meet pre-divestiture air refueling demand levels.
Higher tanker readiness and availability levels are required to meet
the strategy.
If Congress prohibits the Air Force from retiring the KC-10 fleet,
the Air Force's ability to meet the strategy will be at greater risk
and we would be forced to shift critical funds from our readiness and
recapitalization/modernization accounts, as well as consider reductions
in other parts of our force. These may include deferring KC-46A
procurement and reducing the KC-135 and the C-5 fleets. BCA-imposed
cuts to our readiness and recapitalization/modernization accounts mean
a less capable, smaller force that's even less ready for tomorrow's
fight.