[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-100]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 2, 2014
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOHN GARAMENDI, California
PAUL COOK, California RON BARBER, Arizona
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
ROB BISHOP, Utah MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 2, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Ground Force
Modernization Programs......................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 2, 2014......................................... 21
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 2
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces................... 1
WITNESSES
Barclay LTG James O., III, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Army, G-8; accompanied by MG Michael E. Williamson, USA,
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)........................ 4
Dee, Tom, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary
Programs and Logistics Management.............................. 6
Walters, LtGen Glenn M., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and
Resources...................................................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Barclay LTG James O., III, joint with MG Michael E.
Williamson................................................. 25
Walters, LtGen Glenn M., joint with Tom Dee.................. 38
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 57
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Enyart................................................... 64
Mr. Turner................................................... 61
FISCAL YEAR 2015 GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 2, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R.
Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Turner. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air
and Land Forces will come to order on ground and rotorcraft
force modernization programs.
The subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the Army and
Marine Corps modernization requests for fiscal year 2015.
I want to welcome our witnesses: Lieutenant General James
Barclay, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-8; Major General
Michael Williamson, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology); Mr. Tom
Dee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary
Programs and Logistic Management; and Lieutenant General Glenn
Walters, United States Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for
Programs and Resources.
General Barclay, it is nice to see you again.
General Williamson, congratulations on your new position. I
understand you will be pinning on your third star in just a
couple of days.
Thank you all for your service, and we look forward to your
testimony.
Today, we will cover a broad portfolio of modernization
programs, to include ground combat systems, tactical vehicles,
rotorcraft, and individual gear such as body armor.
Based on this current fiscal environment, the military
services are having to accept greater risk in modernization
programs in the near term. That is the new fiscal reality.
Programs that were top priorities a year ago are now being
terminated or delayed, and modernization portfolios are being
significantly restructured.
This hearing will provide an opportunity for our witnesses
to inform us of the many challenges they are facing in
acquisition and industrial base management.
We all know that when the military goes into harm's way
that they fight in a joint environment. In other words, the
full power of all the services come together in order to
accomplish our national security objectives.
What is less understood, especially outside the
jurisdictions of the defense committees, is how the services
depend on each other from an industrial base perspective,
especially for ground, rotorcraft, and individual equipment
platforms such as body armor.
For example, decisions that the Army makes about Abrams
tanks or Stryker combat vehicles could affect the Marine Corps
ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] program. Decisions the Navy
makes about Black Hawk helicopters could affect how the Army is
procuring helicopters. All the military services are dependent
upon the same body-armor and tactical-wheeled-vehicle
industrial bases.
The point I am making is that certainly Congress takes
criticism for the perceived parochial support of one platform
over another, but the reality is, although we certainly support
American jobs in our districts, the bigger picture of concern
and oversight isn't about the survival of one platform versus
another; it is about, what capabilities does an Army Brigade
Combat Team or Marine Expeditionary Brigade need in order to
meet the needs of our commandant commanders so that they can
meet our national security requirements?
It is within that context, once we understand the threats
and required capabilities, that we then must understand what
industrial base capability is needed now and in the future in
order to provide the right capability to our military at the
right time.
I want to highlight this point about our defense industrial
base because I believe there is a general misunderstanding
outside of those who serve our defense committees. This
industrial base cannot be turned on and off like a light
switch. And it is the purview of this committee and our
subcommittee's responsibilities to look into the industrial
base and find ways that we need to preserve the industrial base
for the service of all of our service branches.
We all understand that sequestration is still the law, but
my concern is that if we don't like what is reflected in this
year's budget request, we are certainly going to be facing even
more difficulty in the upcoming year. This is part of our
challenge and part of our discussion today and the questions
that we will be having of this panel.
I want to thank each of you for being here and for your
expertise as we look to the issues of not only what do each of
the service branches need, what is the industrial base that
supports them, and what is the interconnectivity of that
industrial base and how it needs to be preserved.
With that, I turn to Ms. Sanchez for her remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, everybody, for being here today.
Today's hearing, of course, will cover our Army and Marine
Corps ground system modernization programs. And this is a broad
range of topics, covering everything from individual equipment
such as body armor, Abrams tanks, Stryker vehicles.
However, in looking at the fiscal year 2015 budget, I do
see some general trends, many of them which are troubling to
me.
First, it is clear that the modernization of the Army and
the Marine Corps ground equipment is under serious budget
pressure. And it looks to me as if these accounts are becoming
the bill payer for both services' overall budget shortfalls.
With only a few exceptions, almost every major program in
this area has been scaled back, delayed, or terminated, in
large part, I believe, because of a lack of funding. For
example, the Army is terminating the Ground Combat Vehicle
program, delaying its high-priority tactical network programs,
dramatically scaling back wheeled vehicle upgrades, and slowing
down production of Apache attack helicopters.
The Marines: Purchases of new Joint Light Tactical Vehicles
[JLTV] are delayed. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle program is
being scaled back. And I don't see a lot of new investment in
most areas.
And the second trend that I see is both services' ability
to actually field new systems through the normal acquisition
process. In the area of large-scale acquisition, Category I
programs, we continue to start things with a big fanfare, and
then we end up terminating because of cost growth, because of
changing priorities, because of shifting service requirements.
And, in addition, constantly changing senior service
leadership priorities appear to be making it very difficult for
the respective service acquisition officials to keep programs
funded in the budget long enough to actually see these new
capabilities in the field. As a result, both the Army and the
Marine Corps keep funding new programs but don't seem to get
those programs across the finish line.
And you know the examples. In the Army, the termination of
the Ground Combat Vehicle was the most recent example, where we
spent more than a billion dollars and we have nothing to show
for it. The Marine Corps has spent more than $3 billion over 20
years trying to field a vehicle to replace the current
Amphibious Assault Vehicle, but we still haven't gotten
anything new for our Marines.
The third trend I see which is disturbing is the needless
duplication between the Army and Marine Corps equipment. To
name a few, both the Marine Corps and the Army are working on
separate multi-mission radar systems, separate precision mortar
rounds, and separate 120-millimeter tank ammunition.
The Army and the Marine Corps also don't use the same
helicopters, despite obvious similarities between the missions
that they conduct with these helicopter fleets. One example is
the fact that the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy all use UH-
60 Black Hawk helicopters of various models, but the Marine
Corps continues to request hundreds of millions for upgrades to
its aging fleet of
H-1 helicopters.
And, in some cases, I am sure that duplication or
differences in equipment are appropriate and necessary, but I
think that there may be a way in which, if we are really
looking for moneys, we should work more closely together on
that.
I don't want to end on a sour note, because I am certainly
a pretty big optimist, so I will just say that there are some
areas where I have seen success.
Body armor, as you know, has been a big priority in looking
at and being on this committee. So in the area of body armor
and protective equipment, both the Army and the Marine Corps
now have well-established research and development efforts and
a healthy inventory of high-quality equipment. But I remain
concerned of the ability for the services to maintain those
investments in protective equipment.
Both services have also done a good job while keeping the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program on track. It is a model of
how competition and stable requirements and thorough testing
can lead to successful acquisition programs.
So, you know, I know I am going to have some questions
because these trends, for me, are a little alarming, but I look
forward to today's hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
We will turn to General Barclay, who will then be followed
by Mr. Dee and General Walters.
General Barclay.
STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES O. BARCLAY III, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-8; ACCOMPANIED BY MG MICHAEL E.
WILLIAMSON, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY)
General Barclay. Sir, Chairman Turner, Congresswoman
Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I would
like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Army's
fiscal year 2015 President's budget request as it pertains to
the Army modernization program.
On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, and
our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, Major General
Williamson and myself look forward to discussing the Army's
fiscal year 2015 modernization budget.
Over the past 3 years, the Army has absorbed several
budgetary reductions in the midst of conducting operations
overseas and rebalancing the force for a wider array of
missions called for by the President's defense strategy. And
during this period of fiscal and strategic uncertainty, our
goal has been to maintain the proper balance between end
strength, readiness, and modernization across the Total Army.
We are reducing our end strength as rapidly and as
responsibly as possible, while at the same time doing our best
to meet our operational requirements. Additionally, we need to
concentrate funds on rebuilding readiness at the same time.
However, to do this, we must accept greater risk in our
modernization programs in the near term.
As a result of this, the research, development, and
acquisition investments have declined 37 percent since the
fiscal year 2012 budget planning cycle. Historically, the
Army's RDA [Research, Development and Acquisition] account has
averaged about 22 percent of its obligation authority, and for
fiscal year 2015, the RDA account is at 17 percent, or about
$20 billion of obligation authority.
And regardless of the austere fiscal conditions, it remains
the Army's responsibility to ensure every soldier deployed is
equipped to achieve decisive overmatch. And to do this, the
Army has developed several initiatives that guide equipment
modernization.
We are using incremental improvements to modernize our
critical systems, and we will build new systems only by
exception. We are divesting older systems and niche
capabilities to decrease the sustainment cost and generate
additional resources that we can invest in our modernization
and readiness posture.
We are also procuring smaller quantities, because the Army
cannot afford to equip and sustain the entire force with the
most advanced equipment. And we are focusing our science and
technology investments where we are technology makers and
reducing the S&T where we are the technology takers.
These guiding principles ensure the Army will maximize
every dollar towards putting the best equipment in the hands of
our soldiers.
First and foremost, the soldier and the squad is the
centerpiece of Army equipment modernization, from which we
build outward by enabling them with the network and key
equipment. And within this year's budget request, we seek to
empower and unburden the soldier through funding for enhanced
weapon capabilities, next-generation optics and night-vision
devices, and advanced body armor and individual protection
equipment.
We will modernize the network to improve soldier
decisionmaking with information and connectivity down to the
lowest tactical level. Our priorities include the Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical [WIN-T] systems, the family of
network radios, and the Joint Battle Command-Platform.
Investments in the network, however, are not untouched by
resource constraints. And, as a result, we will delay a portion
of our WIN-T Increment 3 and reduce investments in the tactical
radio systems.
We are committed to developing and fielding the Armored
Multipurpose Vehicle to replace our obsolete M113 family of
vehicles and augmenting our wheeled fleet through the Joint
Light Tactical family of vehicles, the JLTV.
We also have the Paladin Integrated Management remaining a
significant priority. And we will continue funding a third
brigade set of double-V hull Strykers while supporting
incremental upgrades to existing double-V hull power and
mobility.
A new infantry fighting vehicle remains a key requirement
for the Army. However, due to significant fiscal constraints,
the Department will conclude the Ground Combat Vehicle program
upon completion of the technology demonstration phase, expected
in June of 2014.
Instead, the Army will now focus its efforts on refining
concepts, requirements, and key technologies in support of a
future infantry fighting vehicle. This will include investment
in vehicle components, subsystem prototypes, and technology
demonstrators. In the distant future, we anticipate initiating
a new combat vehicle program informed by these efforts as
resources become available.
The Army will also restructure aviation formations to
achieve a leaner, more efficient and capable force that
balances operational capability and flexibility across the
Total Army.
The Army National Guard will transfer all AH-64 Apache
helicopters to the Active Army, where they will be teamed with
unmanned systems for armed reconnaissance and continued
traditional attack role.
The Active Army will transfer 111 UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters to the Army National Guard, which will
significantly improve its capabilities for support of civil
authorities, homeland defense, and disaster response.
The UH-72 Lakota will replace the TH-67 training helicopter
fleet. We will divest almost 900 legacy helicopters, including
the entire Kiowa Warrior and TH-67 training helicopter fleets.
The Active Army's overall helicopter fleet will decline by
23 percent, almost 700 helicopters, while the Army National
Guard's fleet will decline by 8 percent. The resulting Active
and Reserve Component force mix will result in better and more
capable formations which are able to respond to contingencies
at home and abroad.
And, in closing, we are adjusting to those resources that
have been cut, which means we must accept greater risk in our
Army modernization. The Army's ability to modernize equipment
relies on sufficient, consistent funding. While the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2013 provided greater budget certainty for fiscal
year 2014 and 2015, reductions in the modernization accounts
continue to challenge the Army.
And the forecast in the future beyond 2015 is questionable.
Without Congress' intervention, sequestration-level budget caps
will return in fiscal year 2016 and impose greater risk on Army
equipment modernization, leaving our soldiers less prepared in
an unpredictable world.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, again, thank you
for your steadfast and generous support of our outstanding men
and women in the United States Army and the Army civilians and
their families, and we look forward to your questions today.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of General Barclay and
General Williamson can be found in the Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Turner. General, thank you for your very clear
statement. Those are very particular words that I think charge
us.
We are going to go to Mr. Dee and then come back to General
Walters.
STATEMENT OF TOM DEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
EXPEDITIONARY PROGRAMS AND LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
Mr. Dee. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to address the Marine
Corps ground force modernization and the acquisition programs
that support the future capabilities of our Marines.
Lieutenant General Walters and I have submitted a joint
statement for the record, so, with your permission, I will be
very brief in my opening remarks.
As you have pointed out, the fiscal environment resulting
from the BCA [Budget Control Act], although mitigated somewhat
in the near term by the Bipartisan Budget Act, has presented us
with challenges as we plan for and execute the modernization of
our ground force.
Given the Marine Corps role as America's expeditionary
force in readiness, we necessarily place a priority on current
readiness and crisis response. Nevertheless, our capability-
development community and our programmers, led by General
Walters, diligently strive to appropriately balance the varied
Marine Corps capability portfolios within the available
resources provided to them.
Similarly, the Marine Corps acquisition community
diligently endeavors to squeeze every dime out of every dollar
and deliver the very best warfighting capabilities for the
least cost. In the service with the smallest investment
account, there is no alternative.
And we are proud of what our acquisition Marines have
accomplished this past year.
Under program leadership of the Army, the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle team was recognized by USD(AT&L) [Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics]
with the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award for its
success at reducing both development and procurement costs
while also reducing schedule. JLTV is on schedule to begin
production in 2015.
Our G/ATOR, Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar, program
successfully completed its developmental testing and is
preparing for its first LRIP [low-rate initial production]
contract award with an IOC [initial operating capability] in
fiscal year 2017.
We went into full production and began fleet delivery of
the Enhanced Combat Helmet, which delivers the best-performing
protective capability per ounce of any helmet ever fielded.
We completed intensive and very deep technical and cost
analysis of our ACV program, providing Marine Corps leadership
with the detailed and objective information that they needed to
decide the future shape of the Marine Corps' top ground program
priority.
And in partnership with the Navy, our CH-53 Kilo is on
schedule to record its first flight this year. And when it
achieves IOC in fiscal year 2019, it will triple the external
lift capacity of the legacy CH-53 Echo.
So, although just a few examples of the efforts of the Navy
and the Marine Corps acquisition force, often in partnership
with the Army, they are representative of the diligence with
which the acquisition force strives to achieve the very most
with every dollar that the American taxpayer, as represented by
this committee, entrusts to us.
So thank you for this opportunity to appear today, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Dee and General
Walters can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Walters.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
General Walters. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
distinguished members, it is my pleasure to speak to you today
regarding the Marine Corps' modernization efforts.
Throughout our 238-year history, the Marine Corp has
answered our Nation's call to be the most ready when the Nation
is least ready. Today, we operate freely throughout the world,
responding to the wide spectrum of threats, doing so from the
sea, oftentimes in austere environments.
Our ability to deploy at a moment's notice is supported by
our investment in modernization--modernized equipment. We see
this not just as buying new equipment but as an investment in
our Marines, our most important resource. When our Marines have
the best, most modern equipment, they can meet every mission we
give to them. Through the generosity of Congress, much of what
the Marines deploy with today is the best and most modern
equipment.
Over the past decade of combat, the cost to equip a Marine
has increased by almost six times, but we are providing Marines
with better equipment and more of it. In 2000, the basic set of
equipment we sent Marines who deployed included 14 items
totaling about $2,400 in today's dollars. Today, Marines deploy
with 45 items that cost about $13,700.
We have given the Marines more capability to operate, a
radio set, an upgraded first aid kid, improved body armor,
cold-weather gear, and the list goes on and on.
We also recognize the importance of mobility through better
performance and lighter weight for individual equipment. As we
better equipped our Marines over the past decade, we have
become mindful to find the right balance between performance,
weight, and affordability. We have worked hand-in-hand with the
Army to find the best solution, leveraging each other's
research and development efforts on individual protective
equipment.
We are currently working to field the Enhanced Combat
Helmet, the Modular Scalable Protective System, and Improved
Modular Tactical Vests.
Even with a significantly modernized individual equipment
set, many of our ground vehicles have been worn from over a
decade of sustained conflict and have either been reset or will
be reset over the next few years. Reset will provide a bridge
until our major acquisition efforts begin to deliver
significant quantities.
As described in my prepared statement, our ground tactical
vehicle portfolio will replace several aging platforms. Working
with the Army, we continue to develop the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle, replacing the Humvee. We are also replacing our 40-
year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicles [AAVs] with the Amphibious
Combat Vehicle, or ACV, the Marine Corps' top ground
modernization priority.
The program has been refined to reflect a family-of-systems
approach that will permit amphibious operations rapidly from
further offshore while enhancing protective mobility for the
mission on land. We will do this in a phased approach in
concert with a revision of our concept of operations for
littoral maneuver.
The first phase will leverage work done on the earlier
Marine Personnel Carrier program. We examined nondevelopmental
wheeled combat vehicles that can provide several capabilities
we desire: maneuverability, protection, and limited water
mobility.
In parallel with the development of the first phase, we
will mitigate near-term risk in the high-end amphibious
operations by fully funding survivability upgrades in a limited
number of our AAVs.
This will allow the AAV to serve as an effective bridge
until it is replaced by the second phase of ACV. The effort
will continue research and development to explore capabilities
that will better enable us to conduct extended-range littoral
maneuver from ship to shore.
As we have modified our ACV program, our necessity for lift
by sea or by air for our ground vehicle portfolio remains
constant. For our aviation programs, that means following
through on our multiyear procurement of the MV-22 and
continuing research and development of the CH-53K Heavy Lift
Replacement program.
For fiscal year 2015, we are requesting $1.53 billion to
procure 19 MV-22s. For the entire multiyear procurement
program, we will be purchasing 93 and saving approximately $1
billion when compared to single-year procurements.
For the CH-53K, we are requesting $573 million. That will
continue EMD, engineering and manufacturing development. The
dollars will be used to continue development test flights,
deliver the final engineering development model aircraft, and
start assembly of four systems demonstration test articles.
All of these investments are critical to the Marine Corps'
ability to maintain near-term readiness. However, full
implementation of sequester-level caps outlined in the Budget
Control Act will force us into a less ready force while also
imposing severe restrictions on our modernization efforts. We
are proud of our reputation of frugality and remain one of the
best values for the defense dollar, but we will sacrifice our
modernization in order to be the most ready Marine Corps for
the Nation.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Walters and Mr.
Dee can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
General Williamson, again, congratulations on your upcoming
third star.
I have a relatively long question, but it is just one. And
I will limit myself to one, because there is a relatively long
statement in setting up the question.
But before I do, I would certainly want to acknowledge and
thank again General Barclay for your comments on the budgetary
challenges, your statement of ``during this period of fiscal
and strategic uncertainty.''
The fiscal uncertainty is obviously something that we
should be tackling. Strategic uncertainty, we will never be
able to determine what those who might threaten us do, but the
issue of fiscal uncertainty is something that we are imposing
upon ourselves--not just lower numbers, but the issue of
uncertainty.
And I appreciate your calling on Congress to give you that
certainty and address the issue of sequestration in 2016. You
should not be facing either a cliff coming after 2015, making
you cut a glide path through 2015, nor should you be facing the
threat of what everyone has testified before this entire
committee and subcommittee as being unacceptable levels of
funding in which our military would not be able to function and
would significantly damage readiness.
General Williamson, the question of uncertainty also falls
upon our industrial base. Because, as your posture is
uncertain, then it falls upon the industrial base for
uncertainty. And that affects investment, that affects
employees, people in even their personal plans.
But I would like to take a moment to elaborate just a
little more on one of the industrial base concerns that I have
and that I raised during my opening statement.
As you know, Congress has leaned forward on many critical
national security issues that have included providing
additional funding beyond what the Department of Defense [DOD]
has requested for current operations. We have done so in body
armor; up-armored Humvees; Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected
Vehicles, or MRAPs; and critical ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities. All these come
to mind in areas where Congress has leaned in and increased the
funding above what the Department of Defense has requested that
all came out to be critical capabilities.
In many cases, the requirement process hadn't caught up and
validated the need for this funding, but ultimately these
congressional actions proved to be invaluable in addressing the
needs of the warfighter. It is in this context that the
committee views previous initiatives directed at the industrial
base for the Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and
Stryker Combat Vehicles, as well as others.
Take the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center, JSMC, at Lima
as an example. Now, this is not in my congressional district,
but it is in Ohio and I do have familiarity with it.
Last year, the Army testified that it was not their intent
to close this facility. The Army indicated that the real issue
was based on constrained resources, and they were going to rely
on foreign military sales [FMS] alone to keep the facility
viable until the next major Abrams tank upgrade came along in
2019.
Because of the uncertainty in foreign military sales,
Congress took the position that foreign military sales alone
was an unacceptable level of risk. So the Army and Congress
were agreeing that the facility should not close, but Congress
and the Army were in disagreement as to whether or not the
foreign military sales alone would be sufficient to keep the
facility open.
To be fair, the Army has taken considerable strides in
addressing some of the committee's concerns. For example, with
this budget request, the Army has moved the next major series
of upgrades to some of their major weapons systems, called
engineering change proposals, or ECPs, from 2019 to 2017,
which, by the way, is something that this committee recommended
last year.
I am still concerned about the timing of when some of the
foreign military sales funding will be available, and we are
taking a close look at that. But I am glad to see that the Army
is now taking positive actions in better managing its
industrial base. Again, the industrial base cannot be flipped
on and off like a switch. And if we disagree as to the
certainty or uncertainty of foreign military sales, then the
outcome could be incredibly detrimental to our industrial base.
However, I am still wondering if there aren't things that
we can do or things that you could do with our help that are
acquisition-reform-related, as opposed to just looking at the
issue of is your number right or is our number right.
For example, it is my understanding that when a foreign
government wants to buy Abrams tanks using FMS funding that
they are required to pay a usage fee, which is sent directly to
the U.S. Treasury.
Now, I asked why these funds can't be kept at the facility,
with the production base support funding line versus facility
maintenance, which then could be used for such things as
critical safety and environmental deficiencies requirements. My
understanding is that the Department's position is the
government may not retain proceeds, either in the form of
credits or cash, from the rental of government property. To
allow the Army, in this case, to retain the process would be an
improper augmentation of its funds and a violation of Title 31
U.S. Code, Section 3302(b), which I am certain you are more
familiar with than I am, which is also called the
``miscellaneous receipts'' statute.
I am still in the process of gaining more information about
this subject and how it crosses the committee's jurisdiction,
but it seems to me interesting that if we are going to look to
foreign military sales to support our industrial base, that it
is odd that we should also look to foreign military sales as a
revenue source that supports other areas of the government than
our defense posture.
So my question gets to this: During this limited resource
environment, how can we find more efficient ways to utilize the
commercial sector, the depots, and government-owned,
contractor-operated facilities such as the Joint Systems
Manufacturing Center so we can try to avoid these spikes and
peaks? And they will continue to put these critical facilities
at risk. And do you have thoughts as to what should we be doing
in acquisition reform so that we can get beyond the lever of on
and off or the lever between your number and our number?
General.
General Williamson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
question.
And so there are a couple parts to the answer, but I want
to start with one of the comments that you made, and that is
this notion of risk.
So when you start to have a conversation about the
industrial base, you have to understand really where the risks
lie. And what has to happen at this point is that we can't
offer a solution that just relies on FMS, as you have stated,
but I believe there has to be a three-pronged attack on this.
One, FMS provides us a lot of capability, and it is
important in terms of adding that capacity, that work into our
industrial base. So it is an answer. And I would be the first
to tell you, having dealt with FMS, foreign military sales,
directly for the last year, that not all FMS cases come
through. And so I acknowledge that. And so that can't be the
only plan.
The second part, though, I would offer is, there are some
efficiencies that we probably need to look at. So when I talked
about risk earlier, the thing that we have to identify is,
where is the risk? Is that in the skill sets, critical skill
sets? Is that in the tooling and the special machinery that is
used in these facilities? Is it a combination of the two? And
so what do we have to do, what is the minimum level that we
have to have operating at any of these facilities?
And then, in terms of acquisition reform, one of the things
we have to look at is, is there enough or is there too much
specific statute, rules, police forces, where money can and
cannot go, that adds to the overhead costs associated with
running these facilities? But the good news, sir, is that this
committee has asked us to look at acquisition reform, and so we
are doing some research in that area.
And so when you take a look at not only the research that
has been done by the Department of Defense in their sector-by-
sector, tier-by-tier study, what we had a third party do in the
early A.T. Kearney results that help us to understand the
industrial base, and then a third aspect where the AMC
Commander, the Army Materiel Commander, General Via, and my
boss, Ms. Shyu, have started to go to each facility to start to
get detailed understanding of what are the cost drivers, what
is causing the overhead costs, and where are there
opportunities.
I think as we work along all three of those fronts--
leveraging FMS when it is available; we have done some things,
as you have indicated, by ECPs where we have been able to
smooth those peaks and valleys so that we can assure some level
of work and some capacity throughout these facilities; and
then, third, find opportunities where changes in some of our
acquisition rules policy may allow us to reduce the overhead
costs--I think these three things will help us in looking at
not only the efficiency piece but also the effectivity.
And so the combination of those things are what I believe
will allow us to maintain these national assets.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I look forward to continuing this
discussion, because I think both your insight and the financial
circumstance we are in just require that we pursue these and
actually find solutions that we can implement. So thank you for
your expertise.
General Williamson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. I will turn to my ranking member, Loretta
Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chairman Turner.
And, again, thank you, gentlemen.
This question is about body armor and the industrial base,
because last year we tasked the Army with a review of the
current body armor and soldier protection equipment and the
industrial base and the outlook for future development and
procurement--production and procurement.
And the committee asked for this analysis based on the end
of a large-scale--two wars, land wars, outfitting everybody, et
cetera. And now we are looking at bringing back some of the end
strength--bringing down some of the end strength, et cetera,
and body armor and what it is going to look like and how we are
going to procure it.
The briefing that was provided to Congress painted a mixed
picture. On one hand, it showed that the Army has a solid plan
to invest about $178 million in research and development over
the next 5 years and that it is also starting a new program,
the Soldier Protection System, to integrate new protective
equipment. However, the briefing also pointed out that there is
probably not enough funding in the budget for procurement of
the new body armor to keep the two current domestic producers
or vendors that we have producing this.
So my question is, how much additional funding would we
need, in your opinion, in this fiscal year 2015 to keep both of
these vendors in production? And, in your opinion, is it good
to have that competition going or have these two vendors going?
And if we went down to just one vendor, will that make it more
difficult in the future if we have to ramp up in the way that
we needed to do for Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Williamson. Ma'am, so I would like to start by
saying, the answer for me is that competition is always better.
And so, maintaining an industrial base that provides us with
choice is obviously going to help us to get a better price.
The challenge that I have in this case is really tied to
the item. And so you have to look at this, kind of, from two
lenses. The first lens is from an RDT&E [research, development,
test and evaluation] look. So our drive is, how do you improve
the protection level of that equipment and, at the same time,
how do we drive the cost down and the weight down?
So if you look from 2007 to 2014, there has been a
significant drop in weight and increase in protection. And what
has allowed us to do that is the investment in the research and
development and the ability for people, organizations,
companies, vendors to manufacture. And so we have to have both
of those capabilities.
But the first question that I ask to the folks who do the
work here is, I don't understand--tell me what happens when you
store, for instance, that body armor. And so, how quickly do
you see deterioration? How fast do we have to recycle and
replace? So, obviously, there are those things that are
damaged, lost, that you have to do replacement, but is there
some life expectancy for this material that affects its
protection capability?
And so, understanding all of those pieces of the set that
we have today, the set that we are going to need in the future
and the ability for industry to manufacture that, helps us to
shape our engagement with the vendor community. And so I think
my short answer is that, obviously, I would like to maintain
that competition. The challenge, as you indicated, though, is
the funding level associated with the procurement of additional
sets and our ability to use those.
We have asked the PO [Program Office] to conduct that
study. They are starting to get some of the feedback from that.
And I would be happy to bring that information in to you as we
get smarter on what the industrial base looks like and the
capacity that is required as we deal with the risk that we know
today and expected risk.
Ms. Sanchez. General, before we worked on this body-armor
issue here on the committee, we had the body-armor issue of
just our regular law enforcement folks; you know, our police
departments and sheriffs, et cetera. And one of the things, you
know, with respect to body armor, of course, is what kind of
wear and tear does it take. In that case, we knew that, after 5
years, because of sweat and conditions and everything--you
know, in fact, we passed a grant program that gave Federal
funds to the police departments to actually procure body armor
for their officers.
So I think there is a lot of--and what they had is what we
kind of started with in the military, but we have evolved so
much, as you know, over the last 10 years, with wraparound and
lighter. And so I think it is definitely something that we need
to continue to work.
And in the time that I have been on this committee looking
at this issue, I certainly have seen several companies go out
of business and drop off because they could not really compete
with respect to the weight and the deterrent factor and the
wraparound and everything.
So I think we have at least two really, really good
companies now, who I think will continue to try to outperform
each other, and I do believe that that is better for us. But
how we keep them alive during this time where we really don't
know if we will procure or not.
So I go back to that question of, how much do you think in
this budget that we are talking about would we need to take a
look at or put in to ensure that at least these two companies
stay on their feet to duke it out for a while? Do you have any
estimate at all? And how long will that study that you are
anticipating take before we will know?
General Williamson. Ma'am, at this point, I don't have a
good number in terms of what it would take for the industrial
base to keep two companies going. And so what I would ask is
that I be given the opportunity to come back and give you some
details on what we are finding.
And, if I could, I would also just add that your comment
about the police force and other organizations that use vests.
The other aspect that we have to include is how do we
capitalize that we are not the only organization that is
procuring these? So, in addition to the other services, when
you start to look at police forces and security forces, is
there a way to leverage them in terms of us using the industry
to help us drive down cost and, in addition, keep the
industrial base going.
And, if possible, I would like to come back and provide
that information.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Ms. Sanchez. I will look forward to your ideas on that.
Thank you----
General Williamson. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. General.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Army's artillery schoolhouse is in my State at Fort
Sill. And I was wondering if you could comment, General Barclay
and General Williamson, if you could comment on the Army's
commitment to the Paladin Integrated Management [PIM] System
and, of course, modernization, in general, of artillery systems
in the Army.
General Barclay. Sir, I will take the first part, and then
I will let Michael finish up with it.
But I will tell you that the PIM--and, as you noticed, it
was in my opening statement, and it is also in my written
statement, about the importance of that program to----
Mr. Bridenstine. I did notice. Thank you.
General Barclay. That ought to tell you that that is one of
our critical programs, along with the JLTV, that we know that
we have to continue moving ahead on that. It is very critical
to the operational impact but, also, as we look down the road
of how we integrate across the different components of the
Army.
So from an operational perspective in equipment
modernization, the PIM is one of our critical programs that we
are continuing to push in the future.
General Williamson. So, sir, I have to start by saying, as
an air defense artillery officer, I also know that the school
has moved up to Oklahoma.
And here is where I would start. And that is, the PIM
program is critically important for us. As you can see in the
budget, we have invested substantial dollars in not only
supporting that program from an RDT&E position, but what you
really see in there is that we are starting to produce those
PIMs, and you will see 66 of those coming off the line.
And so I am impressed with the program. It is one of the
programs that I would admit had a rocky start, but I would tell
you now that it is performing very well.
Mr. Bridenstine. General, do you think it would be
appropriate to do multiyear procurement of PIM for the purposes
of getting it to the field sooner and at a lesser cost per
unit?
General Barclay. Sir, again, I think both of us will
comment. I mean--but from a programming perspective, we have
had great success in multiyear programs. And your support from
Congress in allowing us to do that has allowed us to save a
great bit of dollars.
So far, most of those programs, as you know, have been in
the aviation arena, on the multiyear. But in this era we are
in, with fiscal uncertainty and reduced dollars, anything we
can do. And if the multiyears allow us to continue
modernization at the levels we know we need to, then I would
say we will look at that every opportunity we get.
General Williamson. Sir, the only thing I would add is,
purely as an acquisition view, is that multiyear gives me a lot
of leverage in a negotiation. And so, as you know, there are
some rules that are applied, that we don't do multiyears unless
it returns a significant savings. And so the opportunities to
use those we fully support.
But, again, what I would offer is that the challenge we
have is understanding the funding that would be available and
to be able to steady-state that. But just like the question on
competition, so multiple vendors are a good thing; multiyear in
the right negotiation is also a very good thing.
Mr. Bridenstine. Roger that, gentlemen.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Williamson, again, congratulations on your third
star.
I want to talk to you a little bit about the procurement
process, especially through the use of NGREA [National Guard
and Reserve Equipment Account] funding. Can you tell me whether
or not there has been a review of the validity of the plan that
General Barclay put forward to transition--to move equipment
such as the LUH-72s and the Apaches from the Guard to the
Active Duty when those systems are either upgraded with NGREA
funds or purchased, as in 2008 for the 72s, with NGREA funds?
General Barclay. Ma'am, I will address, and then I will let
Michael do it.
But, first of all, we are taking or moving no LUHs out of
the National Guard. Under this Aviation Restructure Initiative,
all of the LUHs, 72s, that the National Guard has remain in the
National Guard. So all those special mission aircraft that they
have added some special mission equipment using NGREA-type
funds to do that will remain within the Guard.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay.
General Barclay. So all the LUHs that are going to move
into the training are coming out of the Active Component, and
then we are going to procure some more LUHs to finish out,
round out that number that is needed for that. So we are not
moving any of that.
And on the Apaches, as you know, there are no NGREA funds
that go. Those are all straight Army funds as we program those
systems.
Ms. Duckworth. As you move the--I have neither Apaches nor
LUHs in my State, so no dogs in that hunt for me. But as you
move the Apaches out of the combat aviation brigades, you are
fundamentally changing the nature of those brigades so that
they are no longer similar to Active Duty ones, which then
means that you have now taken the attack--part of the attack
capacity away from the National Guard's divisions. So now you
have fundamentally affected the composition of what a division
is in the National Guard.
Can you talk a little bit about the decision to go that
route? And is that something that obviously is acceptable?
Because now it is not just about the Apaches, it is about the
composition of an entire division.
General Barclay. Yes, ma'am. We looked very hard at that in
doing our analysis. And there will be active Apaches on line
with the National Guard divisions and those combat aviation
brigades. You and I, as Black Hawk pilots, will tell you that
Apaches are not the only combat aircraft. Most----
Ms. Duckworth. Yeah, I have seen videos of them hanging
the--hanging the missiles on Black Hawks and had my fantasies,
too, General.
General Barclay. No, it is not just hanging missiles on
them. It is the combat mission roles they do and those assaults
and stuff, so----
Ms. Duckworth. Right.
General Barclay. So by moving those Apaches out, you know,
it doesn't mean that we will not keep them on line. And there
will be, again, a multi-mission combat, but, again, it will be
active Apaches aligned to the National Guard divisions.
And we are not changing the name; those brigades in the
Guard continue to be combat aviation brigades. Because they
have Chinooks that do combat missions, Black Hawks that do
combat missions, they have Medevac, and we all know that
Medevac go into some of the most, you know, strenuous missions
that we have on the battlefield.
But, yes, we did look at that. But again, it is based on
the fiscal constraints we had to meet the overall operational
demands of the Total Army, to best-case where we could turn to
meet those demands. And so, with the design that we have
presented, we think we have met that.
Ms. Duckworth. But, I mean, ultimately, you are still
taking the attack capacity away from those combat--from those
aviation brigades. I mean, it is--air assault pilots, we like
to think we are as bad--that we are as big a stud and as bad as
the Apache guys. They may disagree with us. But when you take
the Apaches out, you have taken away the guns, that capacity.
So it does fundamentally change, and I think we need to be
clear that that is what is happening.
I am going to, with my remaining time, talk to General
Walters, just very briefly, if you could.
General Amos was up here a couple weeks ago and spoke about
the Marine Corps' ground vehicle strategy, and he gave a very
nuanced description that I thought was well thought out. And,
you know, my understanding is that it is a mix of acquiring the
JLTV and maintaining and recapitalizing of the MRAPs and the
up-armed Humvees until full acquisition of the JLTV is
completed, at which point the Humvees, I think, will be phased
out.
You know, I know that the JLTVs, they are a long-term
solution, and obviously you are trying to bridge that gap with
the up-armored--with the Humvees and MRAPs in the meantime. But
I am concerned about a potential capabilities gap, especially
with a legacy system like the Humvees.
Could you update us on the Humvee sustainment and
modernization efforts? And is it being sufficiently resourced
in order to fill that gap in the meantime?
You know, I am just basically concerned that you are trying
to balance a number of different programs simultaneously as you
are trying to work towards the JLTV.
General Walters. No, ma'am. Thanks for the question. And
you are right, we are trying to balance three different legs on
the same stool.
We are partnering with the Army on the JLTV. That is not
going to deliver for a while. We have about 24,000 Humvees in
our inventory right now in varying conditions. As we draw down
and as we reduce our force, we have done the analysis to date
that says we are going to need about--in light vehicles, we
need about 17,000. I know these numbers don't wow the Army, but
they are big for us. We need about 17,000 of these things.
So we are in for about 5,500 JLTV. We are in for a Humvee
SMI [Sustainment Modernization Initiative] to put back the
capability on the up-armored Humvee that it used to have when
it wasn't armored. We have about 6,800 of those. You add those
two together, and that is about 12,000, if you will accept my
Marine math for a moment. That is about 12,000, so we need
about another 5,000 vehicles to get that 17,000. And those are
going to be the legacy, you know, platforms that we will hold
around, and those will be the first ones that roll off.
All of this is colored by our requirement to come in in
September of this year with a new Ground Combat Vehicle
strategy. So that is the analysis that is going on right now.
The numbers I just gave you are our current position.
So as we go through this and we see that there could be
decisions made, and what I think you are alluding to is, should
we be buying more JLTVs and less of these or more, absolutely,
that will be an option. And then the requirements folks will
come in, we will get the strategy done, and then we will see if
we can fiscally afford it.
Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Barclay, I had the opportunity in December to
travel to Fort Rucker, Alabama, with Congresswoman Roby. And we
certainly recognize you as the senior aviator in the Army, and
we know you are very familiar with the Army's aviations needs
and Fort Rucker and, of course, the restructuring initiative.
So, for the record, let me just go down part of what you
had said in your opening statement about the Aviation
Restructure Initiative. It includes divestiture of the OH-58D
Kiowa Warrior helicopters and TH-67 helicopters, consolidation
of all AH-64 Apache helicopters in the Active Component, as Ms.
Duckworth was saying, as well as providing additional UH-60
Black Hawks to the National Guard and additional LUH-72 Lakotas
for the Active Component.
The Army's and Office of the Secretary of Defense
assessment is that by reducing from seven types of rotorcraft
to three and divesting the oldest platforms while preserving
the most capable, survivable, and modern aircraft, the Army can
retain its ability to meet warfighting demands and any Title 32
domestic or emergency response requirements from State
governments.
As currently proposed, as you indicated in your statement,
the ARI reduces the Active Component rotary-wing by 32 percent
and the National Guard fleet by 8 percent. So, General, my
question to you is, is this eliminating excess capacity or
actual capability?
General Barclay. Well, sir, I will tell you that we really
didn't have excess capacity, but what we could not afford was
to sustain seven different models.
We had an aging training fleet. We had an aging Kiowa
Warrior fleet for the armed reconnaissance mission that we had
tried to replace that did not produce any vendors that could
meet those requirements. So, based on the fiscal constraints we
were under, the only thing we could do was to consolidate and
then take this initiative to streamline, take out older
airframes, and get us down to those that we can afford within
the fiscal constraints that we are under and still meet the
mission set.
So I think, as we looked across the board and did the
analysis, both with Fort Rucker and we also had the National
Guard in as we were doing analysis to look at the numbers, the
options that we came up with, this was the best case that we
could do within the dollar amount that we were given.
Mr. Turner. Thank you for the clarity of that.
General Walters, could you give us an answer with respect
to the Marine Corps and what decisions they are making in their
rotorcraft programs that we might need to have highlighted?
General Walters. Yes, sir. Thanks.
I mentioned the V-22 multiyear; it is very, very hot on our
mind that we need to maintain that. I worry about that, because
if we get sequestered, you know, the mechanical nature of that
busts that, and then instead of--for example, we are asking for
19 in fiscal year 2015, part of a multiyear. If we were
sequestered in 2015--I know we are facing that in 2016, but if
we were sequestered in 2015, you know, we----
Mr. Turner. Hopefully you are not facing that in 2016.
General Walters. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. It is currently on the books, but hopefully you
are not facing that.
General Walters. There is an old axiom in the military,
sir, that you plan for the worst and hope for the best. But I
think it is an exemplar of what worries us about our rotary-
wing aircraft programs.
We asked for 19. If we somehow got sequestered--thank God,
we didn't. Thank you very much for doing that in 2015. But if
we did get sequestered in 2015, then I wouldn't have enough--we
would bust the multiyear one. And instead of the dollars we are
putting in there buying 19 of those aircraft, we had to go to
single-year procurement. And for the same number of dollars, I
would have to--I could only probably buy 17, so I am losing 2.
You do that across the 5 years, so I have lost two squadrons'
worth of aircraft over a 5-year period.
We are very concerned--or we are not very concerned--we are
watching very closely our 53-Kilo program. That is the key to
our future. That thing is going to lift everything we need to
off the ships. And we are trying to keep our H-1 program on
track.
So those are our three biggies: V-22, 53-K, and the H-1.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Williamson, the Army continues to declare that
fielding of the network is your highest priority when it comes
to modernization. Yet the fiscal year 2015 request for two
major network programs is lower than prior years. These
programs are WIN-T and HMS [Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form
Fit] radios. And it would seem to me that lower funding means
less systems being fielded to the warfighters.
Can you please elaborate on this? And how long would it
take the Army to field this network across the country?
General.
General Williamson. So both of those programs, obviously,
are critical to the Army. And the challenge that we have is,
when you start to look at that, the cost associated with both,
it is an area where we have taken some risk, but not, I think,
excessive risk.
So the intent is, with those lower numbers that will go
out, we will hit the most critical units as quickly as
possible. We have reduced some of the capability. So, as
General Barclay indicated, some of the things that we would
have done in WIN-T Increment 3, which enhanced not only some of
the bandwidth capability but the levels and the mobility
associated with that, we have accepted some of that risk and
combined some of that capability into the current increment.
On the HMS Manpack--on the HMS programs, whether it is the
vehicle radios or the manned portable radios, it will affect
the density, if you will, of how many of those we get out to
units.
And so I am not going to sit here and tell you that it
doesn't come with some risk, but we do believe that the
approach that we have taken gets the capability out to the
Army, if not the entire Army, faster.
General Barclay.
General Barclay. Well, sir, I think, you know, in our
opening statements, we are still committed to the network, but
the lack of funding has caused us to delay these out.
And so, if you look at the forehand, I guess if you look at
the HMS radio or handheld radio, I mean, we are looking at,
probably it is going to be out to 2026. I mean, so that has
pushed that way out. So all of those, as you said in your
opening statement, all--everything is being moved, you know, to
the right, and it is because of the fiscal constraints we are
under.
But we are not backing away from our commitment to the
network and its overall importance. As the Chief and the
Secretary have testified, the soldier and the squad are the
centerpiece of all of our modernization. And the network around
them is what will make them powerful and be able to meet those
mission sets. So that is why we are committed to it. It is just
the timeline based on funding.
Mr. Turner. That is the end of our questions. I do want to
ask if anyone has any closing remarks or any additional remarks
that they would like to make for the record.
Seeing none, then this hearing will be closed.
Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 2, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 2, 2014
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 2, 2014
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
General Williamson. The Army is committed to maintaining
competition for combat helmets and body armor such as hard armor
ceramic plates and ballistic vests. The Army uses a combination of
modernization and sustainment funds to incentivize competition and
maintain the industrial base capacity. The Army's current requirement
for body armor and helmets has been satisfied. Further, the Army is
experiencing a reduction in demand due to the drawdown of combat forces
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and an associated reduction in
Overseas Contingency Operations funding. In order to maintain
competition and industrial base capacity, the Army must balance this
reduction in demand, while maintaining production at the Minimum
Sustaining Rates from multiple vendors. Due to competing priorities,
the Army is not currently funded to maintain a minimum of two competing
vendors for hard armor plates. This is an assumed risk, and it will
take additional time to ramp up the industrial base to the previous
levels of production during the height of the Operation Iraqi Freedom
and OEF conflicts if that is needed. We are exploring various stockage
levels to mitigate that risk.
The Army is supporting a Secretary of Defense led study in
accordance with Section 146 of the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Act, which in part will evaluate the U.S. personal
protective equipment industrial base and its ability to sustain
competition and innovation. We look forward to seeing how we can use
the result of that study to help shape our near term strategies.
Regarding the existing stockpile of personal protective equipment,
the Army is conducting limited surveillance testing on body armor and
helmets to attempt to broadly determine their lifespan. This is a
complex issue because no single piece of body armor is subjected to the
exact same wear and tear, and environmental conditions. We will not be
able to establish service life from this limited testing, but the
analysis may enable us to establish a shelf life for future body armor
requirements. [See page 14.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 2, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. Please elaborate on your enduring requirements for MRAP
vehicles and what the long-term strategy is for incorporating these
vehicles into the fleet.
General Barclay. The Army has an enduring requirement for 11,133
MRAP Family of Vehicles which includes 2,548 route clearance vehicles
and 8,585 protected mobility vehicles. The Army also has current
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) requests for 4,000 MRAPs, and an
additional 5,000 vehicles are being made available to other U.S.
Government agencies, offered through new FMS requests or under the
Excess Defense Articles program. The 2,548 route clearance vehicles
include the Buffalo, Husky, Medium Mine Protected Vehicle Type I
(Panther/RG33L+) and MMPV Type II (RG31). These vehicles will be
employed within formations designed to execute Route Clearance (RC) and
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) missions and will be managed as a
separate Family of Vehicles (FoV)
The 8,585 protected mobility vehicles include the MRAP All Terrain
Vehicle (MATV), the MaxxPro Dash and MaxxPro ambulance. These variants
will be employed as Key Leader Vehicles across the force, in Mission
Dependent Augmentation Sets (MDAS) stored in Army Preposition Sets for
use in future contingencies, in select table of organization (TOE)
units and within the training base.
The Army carefully considered current and future requirements and
its ability to man, equip, train and sustain MRAPs to determine which
vehicles should be retained as the Army's enduring capability of
protected mobility, route clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) platforms. Beginning in 2009 and culminating in 2013, the Army
conducted a series of three studies to determine its requirements for
MRAP combat vehicles.
The requirements were derived from comprehensive reviews of
battlefield performance, Soldier and leader feedback and careful
analysis of mission flexibility and sustainment costs. The Army
selected the best performing and most technologically advanced
vehicles, while divesting those that are not ``best fit'' for enduring
requirements.
Mr. Turner. It has been reported that the Army fielded a Modular
Catastrophic Recovery System (MCRS) in Afghanistan. I understand this
is a modified HEMTT recovery system. I understand that as part of the
MRAP vehicle program, a recovery wrecker variant has been developed and
produced. Why can't the MRAP wrecker variant be used for the MCRS
requirement? Was there an Analysis of Alternatives that included an
upgraded MRAP recovery vehicle?
General Barclay. The MaxxPro Recovery Vehicle (MRV) has significant
capability gaps in mobility and combat towing that impact its ability
to conduct recovery operations in cross-country terrain. These gaps are
identified in the Army Testing and Evaluation Command's Limited User
Test Memorandum, dated June 15, 2011. The MRV is incapable of
recovering a Stryker. Although the Original Equipment Manufacturer has
developed solutions to these gaps, those solutions will cost
approximately $230,000 per MRV to install; therefore the Army will
divest MRVs following Operation Enduring Freedom. The MRV was not
included in an Analysis of Alternatives. MRVs currently in service in
Afghanistan will continue to support vehicle recovery and other
missions consistent within its proven capabilities.
The Modular Catastrophic Recovery System (MCRS), consisting of the
M983A4 Light Equipment Transporter (LET) as the prime mover, along with
the fifth wheel towing recovery device (FWTRD) and the tilt deck
recovery trailer (TDRT), provides more recovery capability than the
MRV. This is a lift-tow recovery system which couples with a companion
trailer tilt-deck cargo bed permitting swift extraction and evacuation
of catastrophically damaged vehicles by winching onto TDRT. The LET can
de-couple from its trailer to permit FWTRD lift of blown-off sub-
assemblies for loading onto TDRT. As a combined system, the MCRS is
capable of evacuating up to 35 tons of catastrophically damaged
vehicles from the battlefield. The LET is a four-axle eight-wheel
tactical truck that is designed to haul trailers using the fifth wheel
coupling. It is equipped with a recovery winch with a rated capacity of
45 tons. The FWTRD coupled to the LET provides a lift tow capability of
70 tons. The MCRS provides the capability for flat tow, lift tow,
winching, overturning and up righting and evacuation scenarios for all
tactical wheeled vehicles to include the Stryker Family of Vehicles.
Currently, 97 MCRSs have been fielded to support operations in
Afghanistan under an Urgent Material Release to meet urgent operational
requirements. The MCRS became a program of record on January 12, 2014.
The Army is developing the Full Material Release (FMR) package now. An
FMR signifies that the Army has rigorously tested and evaluated the
item and determined it is completely safe, operationally suitable and
logistically supportable for use by Soldiers. The target date for FMR
is second quarter, fiscal year 2015.
Mr. Turner. It was two years ago that the Army evaluated
replacements for the Kiowa Warrior Scout Helicopter and decided to
extend the lives of the existing fleet instead. Were the results of
that evaluation considered when selecting the Apache as the new armed
scout helicopter? Was a formal analysis of alternatives conducted?
General Barclay. The Analysis of Alternatives conducted following
the cancellation of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program
determined that the best solution for armed reconnaissance was a team
of AH-64E Apache helicopters and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The
AH-64 and UAS Manned-Unmanned-Teaming solution was not employed at the
time because it was unaffordable to buy and sustain additional AH-64s.
The reduction in Aviation Force structure now allows the Army to employ
AH-64s and Shadow UAS that the Army already owns and sustains to meet
the Armed Aerial Scout requirement. The AH-64 with its Modernized
Target Acquisition and Designation System teamed with unmanned
platforms is already being employed with tremendous success across
Afghanistan.
Mr. Turner. What is the future of the Armed Aerial Scout mission?
Does the Army still intend to develop a new helicopter specific to that
role? If so, when?
General Barclay. The Army maintains a valid requirement for the
Armed Aerial Scout; however we currently do not have the fiscal
resources to pursue a new procurement program at this time. The Army
will examine the success of Manned-Unmanned Teaming between attack
helicopters and unmanned systems and may reconsider the development of
an aircraft in the future.
Mr. Turner. I have concerns about the viability of the tactical
wheeled vehicle industrial base. I'm focusing here on the medium and
heavy truck fleet. To use the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles as an
example, I understand the Army has planned a two year production break
for FMTVs. There are no funds for new production in fiscal year 2015
and 2016, but you do have funds programmed for fiscal years 2017 and
2018. Can you explain the reasons behind this strategy?
General Williamson. There are no funds programmed for new
production Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles in fiscal years 2015 and
2016 (FY15-16). However, Overseas Contingency Operations funds have
been requested for both fiscal years to replace vehicles destroyed by
battle or vehicles that are beyond repair due to battle damage. The
funds programmed for FY17-18 are procurements for Data Interchange and
Force modernization.
Mr. Turner. It has been reported that the Army fielded a Modular
Catastrophic Recovery System (MCRS) in Afghanistan. I understand this
is a modified HEMTT recovery system. I understand that as part of the
MRAP vehicle program, a recovery wrecker variant has been developed and
produced. Why can't the MRAP wrecker variant be used for the MCRS
requirement? Was there an Analysis of Alternatives that included an
upgraded MRAP recovery vehicle?
General Williamson. The MaxxPro Recovery Vehicle (MRV) has
significant capability gaps in mobility and combat towing that impact
its ability to conduct recovery operations in cross-country terrain.
These gaps are identified in the Army Testing and Evaluation Command's
Limited User Test Memorandum, dated June 15, 2011. The MRV is incapable
of recovering a Stryker. Although the Original Equipment Manufacturer
has developed solutions to these gaps, those solutions will cost
approximately $230,000 per MRV to install; therefore the Army will
divest MRVs following Operation Enduring Freedom. The MRV was not
included in an Analysis of Alternatives. MRVs currently in service in
Afghanistan will continue to support vehicle recovery and other
missions consistent within its proven capabilities.
The Modular Catastrophic Recovery System (MCRS), consisting of the
M983A4 Light Equipment Transporter (LET) as the prime mover, along with
the fifth wheel towing recovery device (FWTRD) and the tilt deck
recovery trailer (TDRT), provides more recovery capability than the
MRV. This is a lift-tow recovery system which couples with a companion
trailer tilt-deck cargo bed permitting swift extraction and evacuation
of catastrophically damaged vehicles by winching onto TDRT. The LET can
de-couple from its trailer to permit FWTRD lift of blown-off sub-
assemblies for loading onto TDRT. As a combined system, the MCRS is
capable of evacuating up to 35 tons of catastrophically damaged
vehicles from the battlefield. The LET is a four-axle eight-wheel
tactical truck that is designed to haul trailers using the fifth wheel
coupling. It is equipped with a recovery winch with a rated capacity of
45 tons. The FWTRD coupled to the LET provides a lift tow capability of
70 tons. The MCRS provides the capability for flat tow, lift tow,
winching, overturning and up righting and evacuation scenarios for all
tactical wheeled vehicles to include the Stryker Family of Vehicles.
Currently, 97 MCRSs have been fielded to support operations in
Afghanistan under an Urgent Material Release to meet urgent operational
requirements. The MCRS became a program of record on January 12, 2014.
The Army is developing the Full Material Release (FMR) package now. An
FMR signifies that the Army has rigorously tested and evaluated the
item and determined it is completely safe, operationally suitable and
logistically supportable for use by Soldiers. The target date for FMR
is second quarter, fiscal year 2015.
Mr. Turner. Years of protracted conflict have taken their toll on
the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) fleet. Thousands of TWVs returning
from multiple theaters will require some level of recapitalization or
replacement. When does the Army plan to complete and release an updated
TWV acquisition strategy document?
General Williamson. The Army's TWV Strategy will be release in the
First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2015.
Mr. Turner. Congress has previously urged the Defense Department to
consider requesting multiyear contracting authority as a means to
generate potential cost savings and sustain an efficient and cost
effective TWV industrial base. Most recently, the Fiscal Year 2014
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the Defense
Department to conduct a business case analysis (BCA) of a multiyear,
multivehicle TWV contract to determine any potential increases in cost,
savings, or risks that may derive from such a contract in comparison to
standard contracting methods. If the required BCA supports a multiyear,
multivehicle contract for TWVs, would the Army pursue such a contract
as a means to increase cost savings while continuing to modernize its
TWV fleet?
General Williamson. The report you mentioned is in staffing, and we
look forward to submitting it by the end of May 2014. If the BCA
indicates useful savings over the lifespan of already planned
purchases, we absolutely expect to consider multiyear procurements as
an option for future purchases. It is likely that the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle will provide significant cost efficiencies by
implementing a multiyear procurement approach. That program's strategy
has Full Rate Production beginning in Fiscal Year 2018. We would make a
final determination on a multiyear approach at that time.
Mr. Turner. What are the Army plans for female specific equipment
(to include clothing, individual equipment, and body armor)
development? To what degree do these plans depend on sustainment
funding and/or new program funding?
General Williamson. The Army has numerous individual equipment and
clothing items that have been developed or are currently in development
to better fit female Soldiers. The development of these items relies on
Research and Development appropriations. Various improvements to date
include the female specific jacket and pants of the new Army Physical
Fitness Uniform, new female sized Protective Undergarments (which are
worn in conjunction with the Protective Outer Garment), the Army Combat
Uniform Alternate, the Army Aircrew Uniform Alternate and Women's Flame
Resistant Undergarments (to be worn by female aviators with the Army
Aircrew Uniform).
The Army has also developed and fielded body armor that provides
female Soldiers with a better fit, allowing them to perform their
missions more effectively. The Generation III Female Improved Outer
Tactical Vest (FIOTV) continues to provide the same unsurpassed
ballistic protection of existing Army body armor, while providing eight
additional sizes in conjunction with other modifications designed to
provide a better fit. These efforts provide female Soldiers critical
protection and the improved ability to conduct missions in combat
environments. Another program known as the Family of Concealable Body
Armor consists of two vests for military law enforcement and
corrections officers and they will have a female specific sizing chart
and female variant vests (both types). Finally, the Army will continue
to address female sizing and fit issues as it develops the new Soldier
Protection System. The data used to develop the female variant vests
(FIOTV) has been shared with our industry partners and is being
incorporated into the Army's Soldier Protection System. The Soldier
Protection System entered Engineering and Manufacturing Development in
fiscal year 2013 (FY13), and is scheduled to enter into Production in
the 3rd quarter FY15.
Mr. Turner. I understand the Army has decided to pure fleet the
force with M4A1 carbines. Does the Army plan to revisit the Individual
Carbine program?
General Williamson. The Army does not plan to revisit the
Individual Carbine program at this time.
Mr. Turner. Please elaborate on your enduring requirements for MRAP
vehicles and what the long-term strategy is for incorporating these
vehicles into the fleet.
General Walters. The Marine Corps' enduring requirement for MRAP
vehicles is approximately 2,500. This number of MRAPs provides the
required capabilities and adequate capacity to meet the operational
demands of post-OEF roles and missions. As the Marine Corps transitions
out of Afghanistan and reconfigures and refits to meet the future
security environment, we are conducting a detailed review of our entire
ground combat and tactical vehicle portfolio and strategy to ensure
that our requirements value lethality and sustainability and align with
the protected mobility requirements of the future force.
Mr. Turner. Years of protracted conflict have taken their toll on
the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) fleet. Thousands of TWVs returning
from multiple theaters will require some level of recapitalization or
replacement. When does the Army plan to complete and release an updated
TWV acquisition strategy document?
General Walters. The Marine Corps' Ground Combat and Tactical
Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) provides the basis for planning, programming,
and budgeting to provide balanced maneuver and mobility capabilities to
the Marine Corps' Operating Forces. We remain committed to the process
and continually assess the requirements of the force as we refine the
platforms that will be available. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense requested the Marine Corps update the GCTVS by September 2014.
Mr. Turner. What are the Marine Corps plans for female specific
equipment (to include clothing, individual equipment, and body armor)
development?
General Walters. The Marine Corps fields, researches and develops
the most capable and functional individual combat and personal
protective equipment for all Marines, regardless of sex or stature.
However, our future body armor system, the Modular Scalable Vest (MSV)
has incorporated female anthropomorphic data from its initiation and
will offer sizes that fit the full range of female body types. In
addition, the Load Distribution System (LDS) that has been incorporated
into MSV better allows female Marines to distribute the weight across
their hips and shoulders instead of just their shoulders like the
current vests.
Current hard armor technology does not exist to allow ballistic
plates to be formed in a shape that accommodates the female form and
still retain current ballistic capabilities without greatly increasing
weight. Several Marine Corps units have procured the Army's Female
Urinary Diversion Device (FUDD) for use by forward deployed female
Marines in Afghanistan, but the capability is not registered as a
formal requirement or program. The Marine Corps will work with the Army
to review the use of the FUDD in both services and determine the
feasibility and advisability of making it a programmed capability for
Female Marines.
Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) recently conducted surveys to
better understand the sizing, fit and comfort concerns of current
individual ballistic protection systems including torso, armor, pelvic
protection and helmets. The survey identified some concerns regarding
the fit, function and comfort of the currently issued Improved Modular
Tactical Vest (IMTV) and Plate Carrier (PC). Data from the surveys is
being referenced to enhance the sizing, fit, function and comfort of
the IMTV and PC.
MCSC plans additional surveys targeting female and smaller stature
male Marines to gain greater insights on the functionality of
individual combat and personal protective equipment to inform ongoing
research and development efforts of current and future individual
combat and personal protective systems.
Mr. Turner. To what degree do these plans depend on sustainment
funding and/or new program funding?'
General Walters. The Marine Corps has not developed or fielded
female specific PPE; accordingly, sustainment funding is not required.
All future requirements would depend entirely on new program funding.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART
Mr. Enyart. Is it still the Army's philosophy that you train as you
fight?
General Barclay and General Williamson. Yes, ``train as you will
fight'' remains a guiding principle of unit training. ``Train as you
will fight'' means training under an expected operational environment,
or establishing in training what the unit can expect during operations
to include the culture of an operational environment. The purpose of
unit training is to build and maintain ready units to conduct unified
land operations for combatant commanders. Units build flexibility,
integration, adaptability, depth and synchronization through the
mastery of individual and collective tasks under the conditions of the
anticipated operational environment.
The Army trains to provide ready forces to combatant commanders
worldwide. Collective training provides the full range of experiences
needed to produce agile, adaptive leaders and Soldiers and versatile
units. Training must be relevant, rigorous, realistic, challenging and
properly resourced. Collective task proficiency results from developing
tactical and technical skills through instruction, experience and
repetitive practice.
Mr. Enyart. What cost savings are derived from transferring the
Apaches from the Reserve to the Active Component? What other rationale
other than cost savings does the Army have for transferring the
Apaches?
General Barclay and General Williamson. The transfer of AH-64s from
the Army National Guard (ARNG) to the Active component (AC) is one
aspect of the Secretary of Defense-approved comprehensive Aviation
Restructuring Initiative (ARI), which is designed to achieve a leaner,
more efficient and capable force that balances operational capability
and capacity across the Total Army. The low-density, high-demand AH-64
Apaches transferring out of the ARNG will be repurposed to replace AC
OH-58D Kiowa Warriors that are being divested. The transfer will enable
the teaming of Apaches with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for armed
reconnaissance, filling a critical capability need for an Armed Aerial
Scout created by the elimination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
program. In addition, consolidation of Apache airframes in the AC will
enable the Army to better meet the operational demands of our Combatant
Commanders due to the increased operational availability that it will
provide due to the reduced dwell times that are required in the AC.
Necessary savings are generated by divesting three entire fleets of
aircraft--the OH-58A/C Kiowas; the TH-67 training helicopters and the
OH-58D Kiowa Warriors--an overall reduction of 798 aircraft. The Fiscal
Year 2015 President's Budget incorporated this reduction. The net
effect of the reduction is a 23 percent decrease in aircraft to the
Active component with only an 8 percent reduction to the ARNG. In
addition to procurement and modernization cost savings, the Army would
also avoid the significant operations and sustainment costs of
retaining these aging aircraft fleets. ARI avoids approximately $12
billion in imminent costs. If the Army were to not execute ARI, we
would be forced to retain many of our oldest and least capable aircraft
while divesting several hundred modernized airframes. Upgrades to the
Kiowa Warrior would cost over $10 billion. Replacing the legacy TH-67
training helicopter would cost another $1.5 billion. In addition, lower
procurement rates of modernized aircraft would cost the Army
approximately $15 billion. These costs would be unbearable for the Army
under the current budget constraints and would risk creating a hollow
force, with less overall capability and less investment in
modernization.
[all]