[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-99]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM U.S. FORCES KOREA AND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 2, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_______
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Spencer Johnson, Counsel
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 2, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense
Authorization Budget Requests from U.S. Forces Korea and U.S.
Strategic Command.............................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 2, 2014......................................... 35
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. FORCES KOREA AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command...... 5
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Haney, ADM Cecil D........................................... 64
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 39
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M.................................... 43
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 94
Mr. Cooper................................................... 93
Mr. Langevin................................................. 93
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. FORCES KOREA AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 2, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The
committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year
2015 National Defense Authorization budget request from U.S.
Forces Korea and U.S. Strategic Command.
Joining us today are General Curtis Scaparrotti and Admiral
Cecil Haney.
The commander of U.S. European Command, General Breedlove,
was also scheduled to testify today. However, late last week
Secretary Hagel called him back to Brussels to directly deal
with the crisis with Russia. We will look to another date later
this year and try to get the general to appear before the
committee then.
The general's callback is a sobering reminder about how our
military presence in Europe still matters and is still needed.
Yet as we have shifted focus on other threats across the globe,
our readiness and force posture in Europe has declined, and we
have come to find that deterring regional aggression has become
more difficult.
The crisis with Russia is also a reminder that we have to
be prepared for a range of scenarios, whether we think them
likely or not.
Some may think a major conflict on the Korean peninsula is
unlikely and therefore we don't need to size our forces,
especially our land forces, for such a scenario. However, we
can look to every major land conflict we have been involved in
to know that we are usually wrong.
North Korea maintains the world's fourth largest army. It
poses a grave threat to our South Korean allies and to
stability in the region, and increasingly direct threat to the
United States.
Yet I remain concerned that the end strength and force
structure cuts contained in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense
Review] and the budget request create significant risk for a
Korean scenario, and also creates greater vulnerabilities in
other parts of the world.
In a Korean scenario, General Amos has testified that the
Marine Corps would be all in, with 20 of its 21 infantry
battalions committed to the fight. General Odierno testified
that the Army force structure in the QDR will put in doubt our
ability to execute even one prolonged, multi-phased major
contingency operation.
General Scaparrotti, I hope you can discuss the changing
threat on the peninsula, the implications it has both for U.S.
and South Korean forces and capabilities, and the implications
of the QDR and budget request.
Admiral Haney, U.S. Strategic Command has a vast portfolio
to include nuclear forces, missile defense, cyber operations,
and space.
As you know, General Dempsey believes our Nation's top
national security interest is to continue to assure the
survival of the Nation. I agree with that prioritization and I
support the funding in this year's base budget request that
protects the nuclear triad and other nuclear deterrent
capabilities.
It is imperative, Admiral, that you continue to take on
those who would pretend that the United States alone among
nuclear powers can continue to disarm itself.
I am increasingly troubled by the aggressive counter-space
programs of China and Russia, in particular. I trust you will
not hesitate to tell this committee what you need to accomplish
that mission.
At the conclusion of our open session today, we will move
into 2216 for a closed briefing. I would encourage all Members
that can, to attend that session.
Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership, for your service
during this challenging period. And I look forward to your
testimony.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to General
Scaparrotti and Admiral Haney.
I particularly note, General Scaparrotti, welcome. We
enjoyed your time out at Fort Lewis, really appreciated your
leadership there. And I am glad that you are on the job in
Korea. So it is good to see both of you and I thank you very
much for your leadership.
I also want to join the chairman in noting General
Breedlove's absence, given the crisis in the Ukraine and Europe
that his presence is required back there. But the issues that
he is involved in are critical to this committee and ones that
we will continue to exercise oversight on as we deal with the
situation between Russia and the Ukraine.
And in Korea, I also agree with the chairman, that
continues to be one of the more, you know, dangerous parts of
the world for us. North Korea is unpredictable. Another sign of
that yesterday, as they attempted to I guess establish a larger
border by lobbing missiles across the line in the ocean, or
artillery.
And North Korea's unpredictability requires our presence.
We are and have been for some time the guarantor of South
Korea's security. And that is going to continue to be the case
for as far as I can see, given the way North Korea is acting.
And I share the chairman's concerns as we once again look
at sequestration here in the near future and go through budget
cuts, will we have sufficient forces and sufficient presence to
provide that deterrent capability?
Because as bad as what North Korea has been doing for the
last couple of decades, I think we don't want to imagine how
much worse that would be if they thought we were not there to
stop them from further aggression against South Korea.
So I would be curious about your thoughts about how you
manage that declining budget and continue to maintain a
credible deterrent to North Korea.
Also, to learn more about South Korea's growing
capabilities. Obviously, they are a key partner in that
deterrence. They have become more capable in recent years. That
is obviously helpful.
And I am curious to hear how you feel our partnership with
South Korea is going and how that matches up to provide that
deterrent to North Korean aggression.
So thank you. I look forward to that testimony.
Admiral Haney, you have an incredibly important portfolio,
as the chairman mentioned. Space is critical to literally
everything we do. So curious to hear how we can maintain our
leadership in that area, make sure that our assets in space
continue to provide for us what we need throughout our military
operations.
And also I am curious about how the triad is maintained
going forward, or what is your vision for nuclear deterrence as
we face some very difficult budget challenges in all pieces,
all assets of the triad?
Trying to figure out what we are going to do with the
future long-range strategic bomber, how we maintain our
submarine fleet given a shrinking budget, and how we maintain
our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] domestically,
as well. What does the triad look like?
And then, lastly, I would be interested in hearing an
update from you on missile defense, on what you think our
future is, where we would be most wise to spend our money.
Because I believe missile defense continues to be
critically important as adversaries like Iran and North Korea
develop better and better missile technology, and our ability
to defend against that is going to be critical to our national
security.
But I want to make sure that we are spending our money
wisely as we do that to give us the best chance to have the
best possible missile defense system to deter those threats.
I thank you both for being here. I look forward to your
testimony and the questions and answers from the committee. And
I yield back. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti.
STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
FORCES KOREA
General Scaparrotti. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to
testify today as the commander of the United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.
On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors,
and their families who serve our great Nation in Korea, thank
you for your support.
After 6 months in command, I am confident that combined and
joint forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea are
capable and ready to deter, and if necessary, respond to the
North Korean threats and actions.
We know how real the North Korean threat is, as over 4
years ago last week, North Korea fired a torpedo sinking the
South Korean ship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors.
That terrible day is a constant reminder that standing at
freedom's frontier with our Korean ally, we cannot allow
ourselves to become complacent against an unpredictable
totalitarian regime.
The Kim Jong-un regime is dangerous and has capability,
especially with an increasing asymmetric threat to attack South
Korea with little or no warning.
North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world
with over 70 percent of its ground forces deployed near the DMZ
[demilitarized zone].
Its long-range artillery can strike targets in the Seoul
metropolitan area where over 23 million South Koreans and
almost 50,000 Americans live.
In violation of multiple U.N. [United Nations] Security
Council resolutions, North Korea continues to develop nuclear
arms and long-range missiles. Additionally, the regime is
aggressively investing in cyber warfare capabilities.
North Korea brings risk to the world's fastest growing
economic region, which is responsible for 25 percent of the
world's GDP [gross domestic product] and home to our largest
trading partners.
Against this real threat, our Nation is committed to the
security of South Korea and to our national interests.
Our presence and your support of our troops give meaning to
that commitment. We are a key component of the Nation's
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
Together, the alliance's commitment to each other enables
stability and prosperity now and into the future.
In the spirit of this commitment, we are working closely
with the South Korean military to develop its capabilities and
combine C4I [command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence] systems and alliance counter-missile defense
strategy and the procurement of precision-guided munitions,
ballistic missile defense systems, and ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms.
Readiness is my top overarching priority. To ensure we are
focused on the right things at the right time, I have developed
five priorities: first, sustain and strengthen the alliance;
second, maintain the armistice to deter and defeat aggression
and to be ready to fight tonight; third, transform the
alliance; fourth, sustain force and family readiness; and my
fifth priority, enhance the UNC [United Nations Command], CFC
[Combined Forces Command], and USFK [U.S. Forces Korea] team.
An essential part of this is a positive command climate
that focuses on the covenant between the leader and the led and
our mission together.
At the core of mission success is the close relationship we
share with our South Korean partners. We benefit from an
important history forged on many battlefields, shared
sacrifices and democratic principles.
Over the past 60 years, we have built one of the longest
standing alliances in modern history. We will continue to
ensure a strong and effective deterrence posture so that
Pyongyang never misjudges our role, our commitment, or our
capability to respond as an alliance.
I am extremely proud of our joint force and their families
serving in the Republic of Korea. I sincerely appreciate your
continued support for them and for our crucial alliance.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found
in the Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND
Admiral Haney. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking
Member Smith, and distinguished members of this committee, with
your permission, I would like to have my full statement made as
part of the record.
The Chairman. No objection, so ordered.
Admiral Haney. And I am honored to join you here today as
my first appearance as the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
I am also pleased to be here with General Mike Scaparrotti,
commander of U.S. Forces Korea. I would like to express my
appreciation for his vision and leadership.
As you know, U.S. Strategic Command executes a diverse set
of global responsibilities that directly contribute to national
security. And I can say with full confidence that today, U.S.
Strategic Command remains capable and ready to meet all
assigned missions.
We are blessed to have a talented, dedicated, and
professional military and civilian workforce to address the
significant national security challenges facing the United
States of America.
I thank the Congress and this committee for your support
and I look forward to working with you throughout my tour of
duty.
We appreciate the passage of the 2-year Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2013 and the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
This legislation decreases near-term budgetary uncertainty,
but I remain concerned that sequestration will continue to
stress the human element of our capabilities as well as
impacting our capability to meet the threats and challenges of
the 21st century.
The current global security environment is getting more
complex, dynamic, and uncertain than any time in recent history
as ongoing events in Ukraine and North Korea, as mentioned, are
making abundantly clear--advances in state and non-state
military capabilities across the air, sea, land, and space
domains, as well as in cyberspace.
The space domain is becoming ever more congested,
contested, and competitive. Worldwide cyber threats are growing
in scale and sophistication.
Nuclear powers are invested in long-term and wide-ranging
military modernization programs. Proliferation of weapons and
nuclear technologies continues.
Weapons of mass destruction capabilities deliver--
technologies are maturing and becoming more readily available.
No region of the world is immune from potential chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear risks.
Terrorist threats remain a source of significant ambiguity
and the threat of homegrown violent extremists remains a
concern.
Against this dynamic and uncertain backdrop, U.S. Strategic
Command's mission is to partner with other combatant commands
and to deter and detect strategic attack against the United
States of America and our allies, and to defeat those attacks
if deterrence fails.
Our Unified Command Plan assigned missions are strategic in
nature, global in scope, and intertwined with the capabilities
of the joint force, the interagency, and the whole of
government.
These attributes require linkages and synergies at all
levels to bring integrated capabilities to bear through
synchronized planning, simultaneous execution of missions and
coherent strategic communications. And we must secure these
activities by implementing a defensible joint information
environment.
U.S. Strategic Command manages this diverse and challenging
activity by actively executing a tailored deterrence and
assurance campaign plan and by executing my five command
priorities: number one, provide a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent force; two, partner with other combatant
commands to win today; three, address our challenges in space;
four, build cyberspace capability and capacity; and five,
prepare for uncertainty.
In keeping with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, my first
number one priority is to ensure a safe, secure, effective
nuclear deterrent force consisting of a synthesis of dedicated
sensors, assured command and control, the triad of delivery
systems, nuclear weapons and their associated infrastructure,
and trained ready people.
In light of recent personnel integrity concerns associated
with the intercontinental ballistic missile force, I fully
support Secretary Hagel's initiatives to assemble key
Department of Defense stakeholders to fully assess and
understand the implications of recent events and seek long-term
systematic solutions that will maintain the trust and
confidence in our nuclear enterprise.
This has my utmost attention--but let me repeat: America's
nuclear deterrent force remains safe, secure, and effective.
In addition to our critical deterrence and assurance work,
we are engaged on a daily basis in a broader range of
activities across our mission areas of space, cyberspace,
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, combating weapons
of mass destruction, missile defense, joint electronic warfare,
global strike, and analysis and targeting.
While these diverse activities are being synchronized and
integrated by an outstanding team, none of this work I have
described can be accomplished without trained and ready and
motivated people. They remain our most precious resource and
deserve our unwavering support.
My travels to a number of U.S. Strategic Command and
partner locations since I took command last November confirm my
belief that we have an outstanding team in place across all of
our mission areas.
I have the utmost respect for their professionalism, their
dedication to duty, and sustained operational excellence.
In today's uncertain times, I am proud to lead such a
focused and innovative team. We are building our force--our
future on a strong and successful path.
Your continued support, together with the hard work of
outstanding men and women of U.S. Strategic Command, will
ensure we remain ready, agile, and effective in deterring
strategic attack, assuring our allies, and defeating current
and future threats.
Today, I am joined by my sister behind me, Dr. Yvonne
Coates, who has worked as a DC [District of Columbia] public
school teacher for many years.
While I often acknowledge the support of military families,
today I salute the efforts of my sister, who represents our
siblings, who many times are often left to handle family
matters while we in the military service serve our Nation far
away from home. We couldn't do it without their support, too.
I thank you all for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Scaparrotti, while North Korea remains one of the
world's largest conventional forces, your testimony also
discusses its increased emphasis on asymmetric capabilities.
Can you discuss these capabilities in more detail and the
implications they have for U.S. forces and capabilities? And as
you look at the Korean Peninsula scenarios, what are your
concerns with the defense strategy in the fiscal year 2015
budget request to include Army force structure cuts to the
420,000 active and changes in the ISR programs?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you very much.
First of all, as stated, North Korea presents a very large
force--a million--across all of its services. A good portion of
that is conventional, as you know, but in recent years the
North Koreans have invested in their asymmetric capabilities,
as well. And those are predominantly in their missile
capabilities, which have been demonstrated here since the 21st
of February, most recently, a medium-range ballistic missile--
two--that were fired across the peninsula into the East Sea, as
well as development--at least they have displayed intermediate-
range ballistic missile and an intercontinental ballistic
missile, as well. Although not tested, they have displayed
them, and they claim to have this capability.
They are developing, as you know, a nuclear capability, as
well. And then within their navy, they have a--although not a
modern submarine force, a very capable one that presents
challenges in terms of their ability to use torpedoes, mining,
and also for the insertion of soft forces into South Korea.
And then finally, coupled with that is a very large soft
special operations force who train for infiltration techniques
by air, land, and sea, specifically, against targets that we
have seen mockups in South Korea over the last winter training
period.
And then finally, they have continued to develop a long-
range artillery capability. Significant number of tubes of
long-range artillery that can reach Seoul from their positions
on the other side of the DMZ. And they are in hardened
positions, so it makes it very difficult for us to detect, and
then to counter.
The impact of that is, is that they present a large
conventional force with some credible asymmetric capabilities,
both of which they may choose to use for limited objectives,
for instance, in the asymmetric capabilities. And they present
us with a problem where it is very difficult for us to have
indicators and warnings of their use. So, it reduces our time
to detect--our ability to detect and then our time to respond.
And that has created--that has caused us to change our strategy
in terms of defense and our posture on the peninsula across the
alliance, both South Koreans and the United States.
Finally, to your question about the present budget under
consideration--Korea has--the Korean theater has enjoyed being
the highest of priorities, right behind Afghanistan. So, as a
result, Mr. Chairman, I have been resourced to defend the
peninsula and our interests. And my forces are ready to do
that. My concern, however, is in the follow-on forces, which,
if there is a conflict or an escalation of crisis on the
peninsula, I rely on to be there quickly and to be ready.
I am concerned that the follow-on forces, given the fiscal
constraints and their impact on our forces writ large--that
they are at a reduced readiness capability today. And also, the
capability of moving them on the timeline that I might need
them is in jeopardy.
And so, those are my concerns with the present fiscal
constraints. If sequestration were to continue, I think that
would become a greater concern.
With respect to the forces, my concern would be that we
maintain enough depth in all of our services. That we can
respond to the many global challenges that we have and
commitments that we have made, as well as be able to respond to
a crisis, for instance, on the Korean theater, and have enough
depth to deal with that, particularly if it is one that is not
of short duration.
In the Army's case, I think that if we were to reduce our
force size based on the sequestration, we would probably be
challenged in terms of maintaining a long duration conflict, or
one that included stability operations for some time
thereafter.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Haney, can you confirm that it is your position, as
it is the position of the chairman and the vice chairman of the
Joint Chiefs that further reductions in U.S. nuclear forces be
negotiated, bilateral, and verifiable? And that you would
oppose unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions?
Admiral Haney. Chairman, I agree with the statement you
have made there. Any additional reductions in nuclear weapons
require it to be non-unilateral. And it has to be in a
verifiable manner so that we can get the benefits, such as
those we have gotten from the New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction] Treaty, where we have had access and the ability to
be able to verify what Russia has in a very methodical way and
a very open and transparent way.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, when you look at the--I guess it is sort of
like three challenges here. New START--obviously, having to
implement that. And then, you know, updating and maintaining
the existing triad. You know, getting ready to build the new,
you know, Ohio class, you know, submarines. Dealing with, you
know, the aging ICBM fleet, and also the long-range strategic
bomber.
So, as you balance New START, the cost of modernization--so
it is also modernization costs for specific nuclear weapons.
And then the challenge of the budget. What is sort of your
vision for how we maintain, you know, our nuclear deterrent?
Maintaining the full triad, meeting New START, meeting those
modernization requirements in a tight budget environment? I
realize that is not exactly a short answer, but just quickly,
what is your vision for how to meet all those challenges and
make sure we still have the nuclear deterrent that our national
security plan requires?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Smith, I thank you for that
question. First and foremost, I think it is important that we
as a country realize just how important and foundational our
strategic deterrent is today for us and well into the future.
As you have mentioned, there is a need for modernization in
a variety of areas. When you look at the credible strategic
deterrent we have today, that includes everything from the
indications in warning to the command and control and
communication structure that goes all the way from the
President down to the units, and to what frequently we talk
about as the triad involving the intercontinental ballistic
missiles, the submarines, and the bombers, each providing its
unique aspect of deterrent.
And as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review 2010, which is
still enduring, these are capabilities that our country must
have for the foreseeable future, even as we work to meet those
New START Treaty limits that are provided. And we are on a good
course regarding those. As you look at what numbers of our
stockpile was back in the 1970s to where we are today and we
are going, that is a good thing----
Mr. Smith. Yes----
Admiral Haney [continuing]. For the United States of
America.
Mr. Smith. Admiral, if I may, I think the greater challenge
is the budget piece. I mean, what if sequestration kicks in and
we don't have enough money to replace the Ohio class? You know,
or those budget constraints kick in and we can't modernize the
missiles we need to keep our ICBM fleet up to snuff, or can't
build a new long-range bomber?
How deep are you into contemplating what the choices are in
terms of what the smartest cuts to make and still maintain a
credible deterrent would be?
Admiral Haney. Well, Congressman Smith, I would say, number
one, if we continue on a journey of sequestration and have to
make those kind of choices, that will be detrimental to our
national defense structure. And I would make that my point,
first and foremost.
Mr. Smith. Right. That is subtly and artfully put. I think
it would be devastating. I mean, it would--I think it would
require us to fundamentally reexamine our nuclear deterrent
strategy.
And I know many Members are very adamant that we need that
nuclear deterrent strategy, we need that triad. Sequestration
makes that impossible. It would require choices--it would
require us to go in a different direction, and there may be a
way out of it, a logical way.
But I just want to make sure that everyone understands that
sequestration basically blows up that strategy, that nuclear
deterrence strategy based on the triad, given all of the things
that have to happen over the course of the next couple of
decades to fund it.
Am I wrong about that or is that a fair assessment?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Smith, we will have to look at
all things across our national security apparatus in that view.
And there will be, as we have already made and will continue to
have to make, very hard choices going forward in that regard.
When you look, though, historically here, the force we have
today has been really on what I call the decay heap from the
investments made in particular around the 1980 timeframe. And
consequently, that capability has been enduring and has lasted
quite some time, even to this day, where its portion of defense
funding is somewhere in order of 2.5 percent or more.
And even the business of modernizing and improving that,
which again will build things that will last a long time,
requiring some modernization, will still perhaps be in the
doubling of that amount or more over time.
It is an investment, from my opinion, that we as a country
can ill afford not to make, given the modernization that we see
going on in other countries in the strategic environment today.
Mr. Smith. I am sure. Thank you. I do have questions for
General Scaparrotti, but I will save those for the classified
session and let other Members get in. I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you and the ranking member
for holding this hearing.
General, Admiral, thank you for your service to our
country. And Admiral, we are certainly appreciative of the
support your sister and your entire family has given to you as
you have served with the general so ably for this country.
General, we have heard words on North Korea like
unpredictable, dangerous, unstable, one of the world's largest
conventional forces, willingness to use their military force.
Last month, General Dempsey testified to this committee
that he considers anti-personnel landmines to be an important
tool in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the United States.
The chairman also made this committee aware that an assessment
has been conducted by the Pentagon on the issue of landmines
and the impact of signing the Ottawa Treaty.
Have you been able to review that assessment yet?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Forbes. And can you tell us what that assessment is? Or
is that something you would prefer to do when we go into the
classified session?
General Scaparrotti. I would prefer to do it in the
classified session.
Mr. Forbes. Then in this session, can you tell us not based
on that assessment but in your best professional military
judgment, what would your advice be to the chairman and this
committee on the utility of anti-personnel landmines to your
mission on the Korean Peninsula?
And particularly, let me ask you this--what will be the
impact to your mission on the Korean Peninsula if such a treaty
were signed? And how would the United States and the Republic
of Korea provide an effective deterrent to North Korea without
the use of landmines?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have provided my best military
advice on this issue, as well. And it is my assessment that
landmines are a critical element in the defense of the Republic
of Korea and our interest there. And they are a critical
element of our contingency plans, as well.
For any further response, I would ask that we refer that to
the closed session.
Mr. Forbes. And with that, I will look forward to that
response in that closed session.
And Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you gentlemen. Having personally had
opportunities to meet with you in former commands that each of
you had, I greatly appreciate the work and have witnessed it
personally. And I thank you for that dedication and commitment.
General Scaparrotti, particularly your time at Fort Bragg;
and Admiral Haney, your time at the USS North Carolina
commissioning that we had down at our congressional district,
and also the work you did in PACOM [Pacific Command] and over
in Pearl Harbor.
With regard to your testimony, Admiral Haney, on page 10
you say that ``recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent
force is my top modernization priority and I am committed to
working closely with the Navy on this program.''
And then you speak about the Trident ballistic missiles and
the concerns that you have.
And you talk about, with respect to the submarine that
delivers these missiles, and I quote: ``the Ohio-class
submarine has already been extended from 30 to 42 years of
service--no further extension is possible and these submarines
will start leaving service in 2027. As such, the Ohio
Replacement Program must stay on schedule. No further delay is
possible,'' closed quote.
And then you refer to our commitment to working with the
United Kingdom on this. Would you discuss the risk and the cost
savings associated with any further slippage in the schedule
for the Ohio-class replacement submarine?
In other words, will the Navy be able to fulfill STRATCOM's
[Strategic Command's] continuous at-sea deterrence requirements
in future years on the current schedule? And if these
replacement submarines are further delayed?
Admiral Haney. Congressman McIntyre, thank you for your
question.
As you have described here, I am fully committed to the
Ohio replacement program due to what it provides our Nation as
part of the triad. The survivable nature of our sea leg of this
strategic deterrent continues to provide and will in the future
provide credible both deterrence and assurance for our Nation
and our allies.
We have extended the Ohio class, the current class, out to
this 42 years, which is further than we have had any other
submarine class operated before. Only one submarine, USS
Kamehameha, was out to 36 years.
So through proper engineering assessments and what have
you, by refueling that class, we were able to get it out to 42
years. But in doing so, that really puts it at significant risk
of going beyond that and maintaining the presence of strategic
deterrence, its survivable leg at sea, for the future.
As we look at the current plan which has been moved to the
right, we won't have that new Ohio replacement submarine on
patrol until 2031, even with the current program we have right
now.
And as such, that puts our strategic deterrent at risk if
we don't continue to move forward and as we work through our
sequestration journey, that that has to remain a high priority.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Admiral.
General Scaparrotti, in the time I have left, I know the
Army announced a rotational deployment of a combined arms
battalion to Korea. We here get advice and hear consultations
and testimony from other groups. And I want your reaction to
this.
The Center for Strategic International Studies has
recommended that the Department consider replacing U.S. ground
combat units with rotations of trained and ready Army brigades
as one approach to enhancing readiness.
Can you tell us what the benefits and risks of such a
rotational model would be?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. Thank you.
As you know, we are rotating today on the ground force side
of this, an aviation, reconnaissance aviation battalion, and as
you mentioned, a combined arms battalion.
The advantages of that are that those are both additional
forces in Korea. So we were able to add forces with that
rotation to meet needs for posture on the peninsula. So it
allowed us to add a force.
And when we do that, we can provide a force that is
completely trained. It is ready. And it will be ready and in
place for the duration, a 9-month rotation in this case, to
provide the deterrence and, if necessary, the combat forces
that we need in a crisis.
These forces are trained for that. They come into the
theater ready to go. And we don't have the turbulence that we
see in the remainder of our forces that are assigned on the
peninsula.
As you know, we have most of our forces, particularly the
soldiers, there on 1-year tours unaccompanied. And then, if
they have families, which is about 20 percent, it would be a 2-
year or 3-year tour.
So we have an increased rotation of personnel, which
challenges us in terms of readiness.
So overall, I would say that I favor rotational forces, but
we have to have a balance of those between the number that we
rotate and then another grouping that is stable and on the
peninsula to provide that persistence in a long-term
relationship that we need within the alliance, as well. So a
combination works best.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, Admiral,
thank you very much for your service. And I am particularly
grateful to be with you in that I had the opportunity to be on
a very rare delegation to North Korea. And so I have seen North
Korea. I have just completed my third visit to South Korea.
There is no greater contrast on Earth as to the difference
between the failure of socialism in North Korea and the dynamic
success of South Korea. And I give so much of that credit to
American military to make this possible. The security there,
the opportunity for the people of South Korea. And I just saw
it firsthand.
Additionally, I had the opportunity--it was my third visit
to the DMZ. And I thought, General, Admiral, when I was going
there that, gosh, third time. This is going to be boring. No.
Any time you go it is, again, a chilling reminder with victory
in the Cold War, there still is a remnant of the Cold War. And
our military personnel are making such a difference in
preserving by peace through strength in that region. So thank
you for your service.
I am particularly concerned that North Korea is changing
its asymmetric capabilities with deployments and development of
new ballistic missile systems, nuclear tests, cyber threats,
and increased emphasis on specialized light infantry special
operation forces.
With that in mind, are the U.S. forces postured and capable
of defending our allies given North Korea's ability to conduct
limited attacks, as indicated, Admiral, with limited or even no
warning?
General Scaparrotti. Would you like me to take it?
Mr. Wilson. Both. Yes. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti. Sure. As I stated, they are investing
in asymmetric means. We have made adjustments to our posture as
an alliance, both ROK [Republic of Korea] and U.S. as a result
of their changes. We have made changes in our armistice plans
day to day, as well as our contingency plans for either
provocation or crisis.
So we have continued to adapt both the forces we have and
the plans that we rely upon as an alliance to address that. And
we are able to deter today and we can respond, as you saw this
past week. The ROK forces responded to the artillery fires in
the northwest region. Thank you.
Admiral Haney. Congressman Wilson, likewise, our forces
remain postured and ready. And the planning that we do with
USPACOM [United States Pacific Command] is integrated in order
to look at the threats from North Korea.
But as you have stated, their provocation cycle and in
particular their ability here to launch things in space, as
well as parading around their various ballistic missile type
capability and their nuclear test is something that we must
continue to deter and provide assurance to as we go forward.
Mr. Wilson. And I am going to thank both of you because I
believe you are both very convincing. And this has to be
reassuring, as the general indicated, to 23 million people who
live virtually within artillery range in Seoul. And again,
thank you.
Additionally, with the rebalancing of the Asian Pacific,
how is that affecting your ability to provide support in the
region? Can you explain the adjustments that our forces are
making that is different than currently postured? General.
General Scaparrotti. Sure. I can address that. First, it
has been very positive on the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific
at large, as you might imagine. But for me, the additional
rotational forces that we just discussed are a part of the
rebalance.
In terms of the equipment that we have, the equipment
within Korea, the services are--the Army has already completed
the move to give us the most modern equipment in terms of
Apaches, Bradleys, tanks that are available. And that is true
with the other services. They are working along the same lines.
In terms of the rebalance, I have been resourced so that I
can maintain my readiness. My pilots, for instance in the Air
Force, where our funds were increased this year to ensure that
they could keep their skills honed to be able to respond and
fight tonight. So I am pleased with that aspect of it.
If I could, one thing from your last question is that is my
first need given the threat that we face is increased ISR. And
I wanted to make that point because you noted the limited
warning time that we have. And it is an increase in ISR that
will allow me to get indicators and warnings and posture the
force properly and be proactive as opposed to reactive.
Mr. Wilson. Well that is incredible, and I thank you again
for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And want to thank
both the witnesses for being here today. General, your opening
reference to the sinking of the Cheonan, you know, again, I
think is an important reminder about the fact that, you know,
the conflict over there, which again a lot of the press is
focused on sort of, you know, rockets being fired and missiles
being fired, but it also extends under the sea.
And that actually was, again, the most--had the biggest
casualty impact and was really the most outrageous breach of
the rules over there. So thank you for, you know, sort of
highlighting what happened in that incident.
And Admiral, it is good to see you again. Your service at
Squadron Two up in Connecticut, again, was, again, an
outstanding addition to your amazing resume. And it is good to
see you in your new position.
At every hearing since the budget came out, whether it was
Secretary Hagel, Secretary Mabus, Mr. Stackley, recapitalizing
the ballistic submarine force has been sort of a top issue,
number one in terms of the priorities of the country but also
obviously the challenge it presents to shipbuilding.
I wanted to focus for a minute, in terms of CBO
[Congressional Budget Office] sort of laid out some different
scenarios in a recent report that talked about a fleet size of
ballistic subs of 8 versus the planned 12. And again, in a very
sort of strategic neutral fashion. It just sort of did it based
on, you know, the impact in terms of budget numbers.
But I was wondering if you would comment in terms of what
the impact of having a smaller fleet would be if 8 were the
size of the fleet as opposed to the--again, the reduced size of
12 that is now presently being planned.
Admiral Haney. Congressman Courtney, a very important
question, in that through a variety of different jobs,
including this one, as we have rigorously looked at the
requirement, eight will not meet the requirement for the
foreseeable future.
When I first entered this business, we had ``41 for
Freedom'' in terms of the number of SSBNs [ballistic missile
submarines] that were available. Today we have worked hard to
get to what--just what the country needs. And as we look at
this future, the 12 Ohio replacement platforms is the
requirement now and into the future.
Mr. Courtney. And in terms of what eight would mean is
that--you know, sometimes people might think eight would always
be out there deployed at all times, but the fact is is the
reality doesn't allow for that. You need to have boats in for
repair availabilities that take them out of the circulation.
And I mean, isn't that sort of really the rub of a smaller
fleet size?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Courtney, we have worked over
the years to refine our operational concept such that we could
even get down to the 14 ballistic missile submarines we have
today. Those submarines have an operational tempo of 70 percent
and we keep them with the two-crew concept out at sea more so
than our other platforms.
As a result, you couldn't do the same thing with eight
today. That would be a significant reduction from the
requirement that is necessary in order to have that survivable
sea leg capability providing our deterrence day in and day out.
Mr. Courtney. And last year during, again, some of the
budget deliberations, again, there was an attempt again to sort
of reduce the design budget and, again, push the schedule off
to the right, which there was a fairly strong bipartisan vote
rejecting that proposal.
Again, I just wondered if you could sort of talk a little
bit about the impact of another delay if that were ever to be
approved by Congress.
Admiral Haney. Well, first I would like to thank the
Congress for keeping us on course here. Because as I mentioned
both in written testimony and verbally here, it is just so
important that we not delay any further because we will take a
detriment in having that strategic deterrent, that survivable
leg capability that has been providing our deterrence for years
and will continue to be a foundation of our national security
for years to come.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, I want to thank you for your very clear
description of the need for us to take very seriously the
investment in our strategic forces. Your statement of the
investments that were largely being carried on occurred in the
1980s--the need to make certain that we have a credible and
quality valid nuclear deterrent is incredibly important.
Putin has allowed us in his most recent actions to
understand that we have been pursuing a false narrative with
respect to Russia, both with respect to our conventional forces
in Europe and our strategic forces. We now see that there have
been some actions that Russia has been taking, specifically
under the leadership of Putin, that perhaps we have ignored or
that we have diminished in importance.
As we review those issues again, certainly our nuclear
deterrent comes to mind as an issue that needs to be reviewed
in light of Russia's actions and Russia's doctrine. So, my
question to you is twofold with respect to Russia's actions and
doctrine with respect to its nuclear deterrent.
Recently in the Global Security News wire, there was a
statement that this weekend there was a massive nuclear force
exercise in Russia that was under way, that, obviously having a
great concern, if that is accurate, that that occur in context
of the significant conventional mobilization that is happening
of Russia on the border of Ukraine.
So, I wonder if you might speak for a moment about Russia's
nuclear doctrine as we try to look to what narrative we should
see Russia in. Could you tell us about this exercise and about
Russia's nuclear doctrine in general? And also, how does Russia
integrate the use of its nuclear weapons into its conventional
war plans, as we look to, obviously, a Russia that is
mobilizing for war, specifically as we looked at Crimea and the
prospects of Ukraine?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Turner, first and foremost, I
would like to make sure I under--we are clear that I know of no
massive nuclear exercise that is ongoing right now. I will say
in 2013----
Mr. Turner. But let me just read what this says. It says,
``According to the Russian Daily, on Thursday, Russia's
strategic missile forces began a massive 3-day exercise
involving 10,000 soldiers and 1,000 pieces of equipment for
more than 30 units. The major purpose of this drill, according
to the report, which cites multiple senior Russian military
officers, is to ensure Russia's strategic missile forces have
sufficient readiness to conduct offensive operations involving
the massive and simultaneous use of nuclear missiles.''
Now, even if that--if you are not familiar with it, and
even if it is not occurring, it certainly gives us the light of
their concept--which is where my question goes--of the use of
strategic weapons in context of their offensive or conventional
movements.
Admiral Haney. Congressman Turner, Russia has maintained
and continues to modernize their strategic deterrent
capability, and also, periodically, exercises both their
command and control capability through their communications, as
well as as we saw in 2013, quite frankly, Russia put a YouTube
video out on one of their strategic operational nuclear force
exercises, where they demonstrated back in September, October
timeframe every aspect of their capability. It did not make as
much news as you described here today. But on a day-to-day
basis, they exercise and have a readiness posture of their
capability, which we monitor very closely.
Mr. Turner. Could you talk a moment about the issue in
their doctrine about de-escalation? Because we have heard in
front of this committee testimony about their use of nuclear
weapons to de-escalate a conflict, which we would consider to
be an escalation of it.
Admiral Haney. Well, Congressman Turner, I think it would
be much more appropriate to have that kind of conversation in a
closed hearing.
Mr. Turner. Well, my point being, if--whatever you can say
on the record, this certainly requires a public discussion of
what our deterrent may be looking to. What can you tell us
about Russia's view versus our view?
Admiral Haney. Well, Russia has, as I mentioned, been on a
continuous modernization program of their capability. Not just
fixed ICBM--intercontinental ballistic missile sites. For
example, they have mobile ICBM missiles. They have been
developing a new class of SSBN, as well. And they have
exercised their strategic bomber capability frequently over the
years, and continue to do so.
I would be remiss if I was to go deeper into their strategy
and what we think in that regards. But, as noted, through our
various arms control deliberations, and even in his public
statements that have been made by President Putin, he has
always stated the importance of his strategic capabilities for
the country of Russia.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This--all the way
stage right. This question is in follow-up really to Mr.
Wilson's questioning and Mr. Turner's questioning.
We have seen several incidents of the North Koreans
launching short-range and medium-range ballistic missile
testing. We have seen several provocations of artillery firing
on the part of the North Koreans, with some response with South
Koreans.
In light of what we have seen in Ukraine, and especially
Crimea, do you detect any further provocations on the part of
North Korea? I realize that North Korea has had a history of
provocation--de-escalation, provocation, de-escalation. But do
you see any linkages here between the North Koreans' recent
activities and with the Russian actions in Crimea?
General Scaparrotti. Congressman, no, I don't. I have got
to believe that Kim Jong-un and his regime obviously watches
what goes on in--globally and our responses to it. But in terms
of this--the recent missile launches, the live fire event the
other night, this is a common strategy with North Korea, to
come out of a period of calm and to use these types of actions
to message to both the United States, the international
community, and South Korea.
And also to demonstrate capability. And I personally
believe that he is in a period now, particularly coming out of
winter training cycle, and having had the alliance demonstrate
our capabilities and our training period here over the last 2
months, that that is what this is about. It is the normal
pattern of messaging his displeasure with our training.
Messaging their capabilities. And just recently, their rhetoric
has begun to pick up, as well, particularly in the last 2 or 3
days.
So, I think it is something that I expected, particularly
at about the March-April timeframe.
Mr. Enyart. Do you anticipate that this is sending the
message also to China?
General Scaparrotti. I think it could be. You know, China
is--we would hope, have some influence. They certainly have
every opportunity to influence Kim Jong-un and his regime. We
would hope they would continue to put some pressure on him to
abide by international norms and the United Nation's Security
Council Resolutions.
Mr. Enyart. And one final question. What impact has the
execution of his uncle had on the military command and control
structure in North Korea?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir.
That is a difficult question to answer in the sense that,
you know, the regime is closed. They are very good at control
of information, et cetera. And it is difficult for us to have a
real clear picture of impact and intent.
However, I think from what we do know, the fact that Kim
Jong-un executed his uncle--that it was his uncle, that it was
an elder, and in the fashion that he did it--the public nature
of it--and that he announced the reasons for it in the way he
did, obviously, had an impact on the regime, as well. Because
it really changed the rules, if I can put it that way. And I
believe they probably are unsure of what the rules are today.
So we believe it probably did have an impact on the regime.
It probably was unsettling.
From Kim Jong-un's point of view, though, I would say that
he has successfully controlled that situation, has gained power
as a result of that.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank both of you for being here and for your service
to our country.
Admiral Haney, I was listening to your interaction with
Ranking Member Smith and talking about sequestration and its
effects on us. And I know from our conversations and your
reference in his questioning that modernization is a top
priority for you.
And your belief that sequestration is going to have a
seriously detrimental effect on our ability to modernize. But
when you were answering Congressman Turner, you made this
quote, this statement: ``Russia has been under continuous
modernization process.''
Can you tell us more about that continuous modernization
process?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Rogers, as Russia has
articulated their value in having strategic capability, and as
such, each area they have invested in both in terms of nuclear
strategic capability, as well as space capability and
cyberspace capability, in terms of things.
And as a result, we have seen them demonstrate their
capability through a variety of exercises and operations. They
maintain their readiness of that capability on a continuous
fashion. And it is a capability I don't see them backing away
from.
Mr. Rogers. Over how long a period of time would you say
they have been under this continuous process?
Admiral Haney. I would say, as a minimum, as the Russian
capability drew down, the one area that they maintained was
their strategic capability.
Then their modernization has been occurring over the last
decade or so.
Mr. Rogers. And how does it compare to our modernization
effort over that same 10-year period of time? And what you see
going forward?
Are they as vigorous or more vigorous or less vigorous than
we are at modernization?
Admiral Haney. I would say, at this point, over the last
decade, they have put in place new programs, where in our case
we have sustained existing programs. So I want to be careful in
terms of comparing apples to oranges.
It is just as we look to our future, you can only sustain
what we have for so long. For example----
Mr. Rogers. I guess what I am getting at is, would you say
our modernization effort is inadequate?
Admiral Haney. I would say we have plans for our
modernization that we must continue to work through. And if--as
long as we stay on course on those plans, we will be fine.
Mr. Rogers. And will sequestration allow you to stay on
course on those plans?
Admiral Haney. Sequestration, as written today, puts
uncertainty in those plans, in terms of what will be funded
into the future.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Now I want to turn to the B-61 LEP [Life Extension
Program]. Do you think our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] allies should help share the cost of our B-61
Life Extension Program?
Admiral Haney. I believe the B-61 Life Extension Program is
a United States of America program and that is where it should
be in terms of things.
Mr. Rogers. But do they currently shoulder part of those
expenses by sharing the basing of them?
Admiral Haney. The expenses that our NATO partners expend
on is associated with the storage and security of our storage
areas.
Mr. Rogers. So in fact they are sharing a part of the cost
at present.
Admiral Haney. They are sharing that part of the cost.
Mr. Rogers. Which is a part of the cost. If they didn't do
it, we would have to do it, wouldn't we?
Admiral Haney. That is correct.
Mr. Rogers. Do you think that having them share part of
these costs is in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty?
Admiral Haney. The way they are paying for the security and
storage is not in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
And I want to make sure we are clear--you restate your
position on the importance of the B-61 LEP.
Admiral Haney. It is very important as we go forward here
with what we have been calling our ``3+2'' strategy for weapons
modernization that we life-extend the B-61 program. And that
program has started and it provides the capability for our air
leg to continue to be a viable part of our credible strategic--
--
Mr. Rogers. There are those in the Congress who want to--
who are calling for termination. Do you think that would be a
responsible position to take?
Admiral Haney. No. I would urge the Congress to support the
B-61 Life Extension Program.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, Admiral Haney, thank you very much for
your testimony and for your service to our Nation. I
congratulate you and wish you well in your respective
positions. Thank you for all you are doing.
General--actually Admiral, if I could start with you, since
we have discussed New START this morning already a bit. I want
to dive into that just a little more and talk about what
STRATCOM's view is as the best path for meeting New START
levels while maintaining a nuclear deterrent and why.
Admiral Haney. We are, Congressman Langevin, on our journey
in terms of meeting the requirements of the New START Treaty
that goes fully in effect on the 5th of February in 2018.
This involves where we will end up with 1,550 operational
warheads that are also associated with 700 deployed launchers
that are spread around the intercontinental ballistic force,
the sea base, submarines, and the bombers.
We are working our way through that journey and then there
is another number, the 800 total launchers, meaning that you
have about 100 that are non-deployed, meaning that they are not
operationally with a--in the case of an ICBM or a submarine
physically with a missile in the tube in that type of a
configuration. More of a warm status.
We are working our way through that cycle so that we will
be there in 2018.
Mr. Langevin. And the thoughts on the balance in terms of
the missiles that are warm in the silos? Is that going to come
at the expense of what is our most survivable nuclear
deterrent, that is our SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic
missiles] in the tubes?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, the work is ongoing with U.S.
Strategic Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense. And in
terms of looking very--in detail with the attributes that each
of those legs provide as we look at which will be kept in the
warm status and I think the results of that will be coming out
soon.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
General, if I could turn to you, and I thank you both for
identifying the cyber threat as one of our top concerns. And I
have been working on this issue for years. When I first did a
deep dive on this in 2007, I can tell you pretty much nobody
was talking about it. Now it seems that everyone gets how
important and challenged we are in securing our Nation's
cyberspace.
So General, if I could just start with you, what does the
cyber threat landscape look like in your AOR [area of
responsibility]? What trends concern you most? And I will see
if I have time for a follow-up after that.
General Scaparrotti. Congressman, thank you. I was remiss
in not noting cyber as one of the asymmetric threats that North
Korea is developing. And they are developing a cyber threat, as
well.
Theirs is not as advanced as some others, globally
challenges. But they have demonstrated the ability to do denial
of service, as well as disruption of web faces, et cetera. They
had an impact on the South Korean banking and media industry
here in the spring and summer of 2013, for example.
And we know that they are working hard to develop a greater
capability in cyber.
And then also within our area, as you know, China presents
a cyber challenge, as well, in the Pacific region.
Mr. Langevin. And on that point, General, do you assess any
security risk to U.S. forces from Seoul's interest in China's
Huawei communications and networking equipment?
General Scaparrotti. I am sorry, sir, on the last part,
China's----
Mr. Langevin. China's Huawei communications and networking
equipment?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I can't comment on that. I don't
have the knowledge on that particular issue.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. I would like to circle back with you.
As you know, the Intelligence Committee on which I sit, as
well, has done a deep dive on the Huawei issue and it is of
great concern to us to the point that we have blocked Huawei
from doing business here in the United States.
But that is an ongoing and evolving concern that we have.
So, we should talk more about that.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. With that, I will have more questions in the
classified session.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your service to our country.
Admiral Haney, is it true that according to the latest New
START Treaty declaration, we have actually cut our nuclear
warheads by 103 while Russia has increased its deployed
warheads?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, I would put it a different way
in that we are all working toward our strategic deterrent limit
numbers as I described here relative to the 1,550 warheads for
the United States of America, as well as for Russia in this
arms control agreement.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I can't dispute what you are saying. But
to me, it is a remarkable situation that we are decreasing and
they are increasing.
You don't have to comment on that, but let me ask you
this--what is the ratio of imbalance of nuclear forces not
covered by the treaty, like tactical weapons?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Lamborn, as you know, Russia has
a sizable quantity of tactical nuclear weapons.
The agreements we have had thus far have been focused on
the strategic nuclear weapons. And when you look at those
stockpile reductions, we have come down quite significantly as
appropriately, in my opinion.
And at the same time, through agreements ensuring that we
have strategic stability as part of that process--and the
verification piece that provides us that transparency; for
example, 18 inspections on each side is a critical part of that
agreement.
Mr. Lamborn. But is the imbalance roughly 10 to 1 when it
comes to tactical warheads and weapons?
Admiral Haney. I would rather not put a number to it in
this open forum, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Haney, your predecessor testified that B-61 nuclear
weapons stationed in Europe provide the President with
important options and therefore have military value.
Would you agree with that assessment?
Admiral Haney. I would agree with that assessment.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you very much.
And now, for either one of you, how dangerous are North
Korea's KN-08 missiles? Are they different from what we have
seen in the past?
General Scaparrotti. The KN-08 is their developmental
intercontinental ballistic missile. They have not tested it.
They have displayed it.
We believe that they have the technical capabilities and
the skill to produce an ICBM. They claim that they have done
so.
And so, because of that, I think it is dangerous and we
have to assume that they can employ one.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, with that in mind, are we adequately
prepared to defend against North Korean missiles--either the
KN-08 we just discussed or the shorter range weapons that could
hit our forces in the region?
General Scaparrotti. Congressman, I will take the Korean
theater portion of that. We and the Republic of Korea forces
have a missile defense system that is in place which does
provide the fence for the Korean theater and the forces therein
and the populace there.
As noted in my testimony, it is one area, though, that we
do need to continue to focus on. And it is one of the areas for
improvement on both the ROK and U.S. side, in terms of the
alliance. We can be better, is what I am saying.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Admiral Haney. Congressman Lamborn, our missile defense
system which we have developed and continue to work on
improving is designed specifically for a threat such as from
North Korea.
This is an area that we continue to work on investments,
particularly in our sensing capability, discrimination, and
working to improve the kill vehicle aspect of that capability
are our top priorities.
Mr. Lamborn. And lastly, does the North Korean regime
continue to put an emphasis on developing weapons of mass
destruction as well as ballistic missiles?
General Scaparrotti. Congressman, yes they do. They are
working on it steadily.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you both.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would like to address a little bit more about
the Republic of Korea's military's capabilities.
You know, I know that historically, DOD [Department of
Defense] was really looking at varied options to improve their
readiness and also to look at the transfer of wartime
operational controls back to the South Koreans--and that has
been delayed until 2015 for a number of reasons.
So, I would be really interested in hearing about the
current status of those efforts and what some of the biggest
impediments to the transfer might be right now.
There have also been some reports that have expressed
concerns about the South Koreans' abilities to assume control--
whether they have demonstrated capabilities in place, or
especially when they don't have certain capabilities such as
landing crafts.
I am just very concerned about the range of security issues
in the region and would like for you to perhaps comment on the
current combat deficiencies with the ROK--beyond F-35, which
you have already mentioned--that may further delay transferring
operational control.
And could you also identify capabilities that they should
be pursuing that they currently don't have or aren't and if
that is anything that can be addressed with the FMS [Foreign
Military Sales] program?
General Scaparrotti. Congresswoman, thank you for the
question.
We are presently--and I say we--it is the Minister of
Defense and the Secretary of Defense; the Department of Defense
here last October agreed that they would form a working group
to review the OPCON [operational control] transition of control
in wartime of the alliance forces; they would review that
throughout this year with an end date of reporting back at the
next military committee this coming October.
That review is underway. And really, what they are looking
at is, is it appropriate? What is the right timing of the
transition? It is scheduled for December of 2015 at this point.
And then also looking at what are the conditions that have
to be met--because the transfer--Strategic Alliance 2015, as it
is called--is a conditions-based process. It is not set on a
date alone; it is on the condition.
So, those are being reviewed today. What I would say to you
is that the Republic of Korea leadership that I work with daily
has stated that they are not prepared to take control of
alliance forces in crisis at this point, and don't believe they
will be by 2015.
Having said that, and to respond to the areas where I
believe that we need to work--and these are areas that within
the alliance, we need to work, but also ones that the Republic
of Korean forces are focused on--is, first, ISR, the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that
enable us as an alliance to provide indicators and warnings and
to know what happened if there is an instant to determine what
needs to be done next.
Secondly, C4I, which is our computers, communications
systems that allow command and control. An area there that is
sufficient today; but given technology, can be much better--
internally for each of our forces, but specifically for the
alliance and something that I think for transition needs to be
improved.
The third is the ballistic missile defense system. As an
alliance, we prefer an interoperable, layered, integrated
system that works together--it is a much stronger system that
way. There are things that need to be done in order to attain
that objective.
On the part of the Republic of Korea, that is one of their
central priorities within the Ministry of Defense. And they are
working what is known as the Korean Air Missile Defense System,
and they have established a cell on a procedure to get to that
point.
And then finally, munitions. Within the alliance, we don't
have the right stockage of munitions and the numbers that we
need to sustain us for a crisis of 30 days or more, for
example. And we are working closely with the Republic of Korea
to resolve that.
I would finally close by saying that the ROK Government
this year has budgeted within their budget against each of
these areas and they are also focused on the areas that we
believe as an alliance need to improve as we work toward OPCON
transition.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. Are their priorities the same as
yours--you know, the ones that you have addressed?
You talked about the ISR, C4I, the ballistic missile
defense, munitions--would you say that there would be
concurrence on the South Korean defense minister's part, as
well, or do you think he has slightly different priorities?
General Scaparrotti. Well, he may have other priorities as
well, but they agree with these priorities with the alliance.
They have been agreed upon bilaterally. And as I said in the
budget for instance, ISR, they recently budgeted to purchase
Global Hawk, which is very important.
They also put funds against munitions, et cetera. So we are
working now on exactly--for instance munitions, which ones
are--do we agree upon that we need, et cetera.
Ms. Duckworth. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank both of you and those with you. Always
very grateful to those who wear the uniform. I have 5-year-old
twins, and I know that they have a much better chance of
walking in the light of freedom because of the commitment that
you have shown your entire lives, and I am very grateful to
you.
With that, if it is all right General Scaparrotti, I will
start with you. President Obama recently told leaders of Japan
and South Korea that he has succeeded in ``changing the game''
over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
And yet last month, North Korea launched two mid-range
ballistic missiles, and earlier this week they released a
statement saying they would not rule out a new form of nuclear
test for bolstering nuclear deterrence.
And from your perspective, what is our Defense Department
doing or able to do to change the game in our favor, and how
are our missile defenses postured to support and protect our
allies in the region from potential North Korean missile
threats?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, in terms of the Defense
Department strategy, it is really a whole-of-government
approach that includes diplomatic, economic information, as
well as military responses.
In terms of the military, it is our posture. The exercises
that we do for instance are a part of this deterrent strategy
we have in terms of Kim Jong-un's view of his missile and
nuclear capabilities and what capability he may have and what
it may cost him. So we look across the whole of government to
respond to this.
And actually just as with the occurrences that we have had
here since the 21st of February and over the last few days, we
are continually working that and changing our posture in order
to have influence.
Mr. Franks. Thank you. Admiral Haney, STRATCOM mission is
to ``deter and detect strategic attacks and defeat attacks if
deterrence fails.''
And I have to say to you, having the privilege of serving
on the Strategic Forces Committee here, I believe that the
dollars spent under your command are the most important dollars
in our entire military because our diplomacy is always seen in
the shadow of our military capability. And I just can't express
to you how deeply convinced I am that your leadership and the
work that you do is vital to this country.
You have stated that our spending on nuclear forces was
only 2.5 percent of DOD spending in 2013. And I am not sure
that upper echelons of leadership are really giving you the
resources that you need. And I hear now of further reductions
even beyond the New START Treaty levels. And I have to express
to you, the low spending and even the further reductions in our
New START concerns me greatly.
Does it affect your mission to deter, detect, or defeat
while potential adversaries around the world are pursuing
greater capability in light of some of these moves in the
direction of where it would reduce your overall response or
throw-weight capability? Tell me, how is that affecting your
mission?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, first and foremost, you know,
the forces that I lead and have at our country's disposal today
is in fact ensuring we have a credible, secure, and effective
deterrent capability. And it is run and operated by very
capable people day in and day out.
But to your point here, we cannot just assume that that
will continue without proper investments, modernizations,
support for our laboratory infrastructure and what have you
that supports that capability now and into the future. It will
continue to require investment.
Mr. Franks. Well, I know--you know, there is no one that
can tell you about anything about deterrent. You are the--I
think one of the most well-qualified leaders of this particular
part of our military that we have ever had.
But having said that, you know, the deterrent is always in
the mind of the enemy or the potential enemy. And my concern is
that when they see us moving toward reduction and lower
spending, that they may begin to be a little bit more--maybe
question that deterrent more than they should, especially as we
get that umbrella broadened out.
And do you have any thoughts for this committee about what
our future mindset should be toward the deterrence spending?
Admiral Haney. Well, I would hope this committee would
support the modernization programs that support our credible,
secure, and effective deterrent. And that extends all the way
from the indications and warning sensors, the command and
control piece, as well as the modernization of the platforms
that are required, all the way to the weapon, the warhead
itself. And we have to stay on course in that regard.
As mentioned earlier, these modernization programs such
as--from the weapons side, the warhead such as the B-61
program, very important to our Nation going forward. And in its
future, the replacement for the air-launched cruise missile
will be just as critical.
Similarly, as we look at platforms, the Ohio replacement
platform, the long-range strike bomber, support for those
programs are critical to the future of our deterrent. As we do
reduce in numbers to the New START Treaty, you should know that
those numbers support the warfighting capability we need to
have, the deterrence and assurance capability we need to have.
And that has been looked at very, very hard. And having
seen that process before when I was deputy commander and in
other jobs in the Pentagon to seeing where we are now, we are
on the right course. But that really makes every leg of the
triad very important for the future.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Admiral. Thank you both for
your service.
Mr. Scott [presiding]. Gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both,
gentlemen, for being with us this morning. And as my colleagues
have said, thank you for your service and your leadership to
our men and women in uniform.
I want to talk first of all with you, Admiral Haney, about
cyber threats in the United States. I think Secretary Hagel
said it well, that this is in the future in many ways of our
defense posture and we must make sure it is robust.
I believe we have to expand our cyber warfare capabilities
to confront what we know are the evolving and ever-growing
cyber threats against the United States. And as you know,
Admiral, innovations in technology are moving very rapidly. And
there is convergence between various disciplines with network
systems and tactics.
And this convergence of technology I believe calls for a
diverse cyber workforce with capabilities from various
disciplines. As you may know, Admiral, I have an outstanding
garrison, Fort Huachuca, in my district with its electronic
proving grounds, which is I believe an important partner in
this evolving mission of cybersecurity.
Not only does the installation have one of the most
pristine environments in the world for C5ISR [command, control,
communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] testing in the United States,
but also has a training facility right at its back door.
Admiral, could you comment on this?
As cyber warfare increasingly becomes a high priority in
our national defense strategy, how do you see STRATCOM or more
specifically USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] diversifying its
cyber capabilities with existing infrastructures like Fort
Huachuca and the electronic proving grounds?
And do you see the Nation's ranges playing an increasingly
important role in the testing of future cyber and electronic
magnet--electromagnetic technology? Please respond, Admiral.
Admiral Haney. Congressman Barber, I thank you for that
question. Your concerns for cybersecurity and our cyber
capabilities are spot on.
This is an area that is very important to me, and as I get
to have this focus in my command as a priority of building
cyberspace capability and capacity in working with our services
and the joint staff and of course with U.S. Cyber Command in
order to look at the threats of the day and the threats of the
future and ensuring that we man, train, and equip to be able to
address those threats, and also to integrate that capability
into our tool bag for the future.
So there is a lot of work going on. Your discussion of
ranges is also important. And that interface between the
electronic warfare environment and the cyber environment is one
that we are continually working on now and into the future.
Mr. Barber. Well, I definitely commend the installation
at--in Cochise County in my district, Fort Huachuca, and the
range that as I mentioned is right there, the Goldwater Range,
and great capabilities.
Let me have a follow-up question with you on this, Admiral,
too. And that has to do with how the fiscal restraints and the
budget cuts are impacting on this important asset that we must
have going forward.
How does the Department of Defense diversify and build a
cyber workforce during a time of pretty significant personnel
reductions and budget constraints?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Barber, that work is under way
and ongoing, and I am very pleased that the commitment from the
services and through the joint force apparatus--Office of
Secretary of Defense support. In terms of working to build up
that capability, even in this environment of sequestration, we
have been supported to build up a number of teams associated
with our cyber workforce. From a protection standpoint,
national mission teams. And they are working hand in hand at
U.S. Cyber Command--they are--day in and day out, and improving
that capability.
I think as we go forward, we will still need some work
outside of what was already discussed in terms of policies,
authorities, and those to support this workforce that we
continue to train and develop and grow.
Mr. Barber. Let me turn--thank you, Admiral. I will turn to
General. This has to do with South Korea and the protection of
our ally there, the treaty that we have.
The A-10s, as you know, have played an important role in
providing close air support, should we have a conflict with
North Korea. And you never know--tomorrow it could happen. I
mean, I can ask your comment--for you to comment on the A-10's
presence, its importance, and about what might happen if we no
longer have it in the air and flying in protection of our
troops.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir.
As you know, the A-10 is a unique platform that provides
exceptional close air support to our troops. I'm an
infantryman; it has been employed on my behalf in combat. And
the pilots that fly them--it is an exceptional platform.
On the peninsula, I think it is an important part of our
defense there in the sense that you have the kind of terrain
that an airplane like that can be helpful. However, I also know
in this case, the Air Force's difficulties with the physical
constraints that they have, and an aging platform, that they
have got to make some tough decisions. And I believe that if
the A-10 does not remain in the inventory, that we can be
provided support from F-15, F-16, and the other platforms, as
we have done in Afghanistan successfully.
So, within the peninsula, my concern is, is that I have an
aircraft that will replace that A-10 if, in fact, it leaves the
inventory.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, General.
I yield back.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General
Scaparrotti, Admiral Haney, thank you so much for joining us
today. We appreciate your service to our Nation.
General Scaparrotti, in August of 2013, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense denied the Army's request to increase the
overseas housing allowance in support of the Humphreys Housing
Opportunity program, stating that there were some issues there.
And what they did was to direct the Army to look at
alternatives to that housing opportunity program there that
would meet the readiness requirement set forth by U.S. Forces
Korea's commander.
Let me ask this. Do you believe that the readiness
requirements for Camp Humphreys housing is still valid? Are you
reevaluating those requirements? And what are you doing
currently in working with the Army to address the projected
housing deficits there at Camp Humphreys?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, thank you.
As I came into command, one of my first priorities was to
really review very closely our reposture of our forces, and in
particular, our ability to take care of our forces in barracks
and families in quarters. And I have done that in the time that
I have been in command. And, actually, I have established my
requirement at 40 percent of our command sponsorship program
families, which is also General Thurman's prior requirement. I
believe that is accurate.
And I have--the Army is aware of that requirement, as well.
Now, I have worked with the Army since I have been in command
on this issue. In fact, spoke to Ms. Hammack this week. And
then about 10 days ago, the Army held a conference in Korea,
targeted at determining the market off post, and the
availability off post--the availability of building.
So, having said that, it is an Army issue. As a commander,
I do need a solution. As you know, the majority of our forces
are moving in 2016. I am really inside of the window for being
able to provide for the families that will be moving. And so I
look to the Army to find a solution, and it will probably be a
combination of both on- and off-post capability in order to
meet our requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
If you would give me your assessment of U.S. Forces Korea
readiness, and how you look at the other challenges that are
out there that may have an impact on your state of readiness,
and that is, the effect of other COCOMs [combatant commands]
and the other service branches as far as the current readiness
states.
And what are your thoughts and concerns about PACOM's pre-
positioned stocks, including operational stocks? And is there a
challenge there with those stocks being deficient? And if so,
what would you propose be done in relation to your efforts with
PACOM to address that?
General Scaparrotti. Congressman, we are in close working
relationship with PACOM. We have an excellent relationship in
terms of our staffs. I do have concerns about pre-positioned
stocks, primarily with the fiscal constraints, and perhaps some
decisions that Army may make with respect to the available
stocks for us, which we rely upon if we go into crisis.
I also have concerns about munitions. Having the stockage
that I need. I am short right now in some specific categories--
precision munitions and ballistic missile defense, in
particular. And also, the location of those so that they match
my deployment schedule in the places that I need them as I flow
forces.
Mr. Wittman. Give me your perspective on the current state
of readiness there. If you would put that in perspective.
Obviously, we talked about the operational and pre-positioned
stocks, but give me your perspective on where you are from a
readiness standpoint.
General Scaparrotti. I think today, Congressman, I am in
good shape in terms of readiness for deterrence, and for
actions in armistice or provocation. My concern with readiness
has to do with development where provocation escalates to a
crisis. And at that point in time, I will immediately need
follow-on forces.
The initial forces from PACOM, I am confident, given my
discussions with the PACOM commander and his subordinate
commanders that they are focused on my immediate needs, and
they track that daily. But as we get into a greater conflict,
and we begin to flow forces from all the services, you know
today that they are at a reduced readiness rate. And so, I am
concerned that they would be--they would come in a ready state
that I need them for what will be a high-intensity conflict.
Not like Afghanistan or Iraq, but a high-intensity conflict.
And also, that they can be delivered by TRANSCOM
[Transportation Command] in the timeline that I need them. And
I believe today that TRANSCOM could not meet that schedule,
given the fiscal constraints that they have.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
General, you spoke earlier to the ISR on the battle
management platforms and the importance of them. The JSTARS
[Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of
Robins Air Force Base that I represent. And there is a proposal
currently to recapitalize that fleet. I have a tremendous
amount of respect for General Welsh. Agree with him that we
need to move to that next generation platform.
In moving to that platform, we are going to be pulling down
some of the current aircraft that are flying and providing that
intel and that battle management platform.
My question for both of you is, as we draw down those units
when they go in for depot maintenance, to recapitalize the
fleet, my concern is that it leaves us with a gap in that ISR
and battle management platform. Could you discuss the
importance of the JSTARS, the recapitalization, and any
potential gap that may be there as we recapitalize that fleet?
General Scaparrotti. In my case, sir, I--the environment in
Korea--the JSTARS provides me some critical intelligence in
terms of change management, et cetera. And I would prefer not
to go into too much more detail here, but it is very important
to us. And when that transition takes place, for me, it is
important that it is done so that I don't have a loss in
capability as we transition to, and make available, a new
airframe that will provide the same intelligence capabilities.
Mr. Scott. I think that--obviously, our goal is to get you
more intelligence from the JSTAR unit. But we will speak
further about it when we go into the classified meeting. But
thank you for your comments.
And, Admiral, do you have anything to add to the JSTARS?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, I would say at large, in terms
of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and our
assets, they are at high demand and in total.
And the business of being able to have that unblinking eye
is a critical mission area that we are all--work together at.
So, when we get to this point here of JSTARS management,
that is going to require careful management to ensure that we
don't lose capability where we need to have it.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank both of our--General and Admiral, for
your time here today and briefing us.
I had an opportunity to go to South Korea back in 2006
before I got involved in this crazy place. I went there to
visit my son, who was up at Camp Casey, Camp Humphrey--two
garden spots, I would say.
But I was always concerned about our ability to defend
ourselves and the South Korean Peninsula.
And there have been a number of changes in force--he was
heavy armor, then went to Bradleys.
So, I hear some reluctance in your statements, General, in
regards to pre-positioning of our assets. You know, everything
that I have heard and read about North Korea--it doesn't bode
real well for us in the short-term for those forces that we
have there.
Can you give me assurances as a father of three soldiers
that currently serve--two Active Duty, one National Guard--that
we are capable of defending not only South Korea, but our own
men and women that are stationed there?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Congressman, I can. The Republic
of Korean forces, which have the--provide the predominance of
the ground force today and the defense along the DMZ--which has
changed, you know, since 2006. There has been a transition
there within the alliance.
They are a capable, modern force. Their officerships are
well-trained and they are getting stronger every day.
Our posture there, I think, is sufficient now. To your
point, in terms daily, I believe, yes--we can defend the
peninsula.
But what I would say is, is that this is a different
environment than we have--you know, it is a different--the
nature of this conflict will be different.
And it will be high intensity; there will be higher
casualties than we have seen in the recent conflicts that we
have been in because of the, one, the capability of both sides;
but also, the number of forces that are involved here and the
limited warning.
So, there is no doubt that we can defend the peninsula. But
this will be a high-intensity, tough conflict, and it will have
potentially some high casualties, as well--that is, if we go to
a full crisis.
In short, in terms of provocation, I assure you that we can
deal with provocation.
Mr. Nugent. And I know from the intel side of it, very
difficult to judge where Kim Jong-un--his regime is at any
given time, particularly he obviously has no problem in taking
out those that he feels are a threat to him in any way at all.
But changing just a little bit--as it relates to the
National Guard and the Reserve forces, there is a lot of
discussion about, A, keeping them operational. What, if any,
mission do you see with the National Guard or Reserve forces to
supplement the forces--Active Duty forces that are currently in
Republic of South Korea?
General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, in terms of our forces, the
Guard is--you know, over the years, particularly through the
conflict in the last decade, they have served side by side with
us. We have been a total force.
As a commander in Afghanistan, I averaged between 11 and 14
percent Guard and Reserve with every unit that I commanded in
Afghanistan or Iraq.
And in terms of the peninsula, I think they are an integral
part of what we do day to day in armistice and as well as if we
go to conflict.
Mr. Nugent. Are you planning National Guard rotations or
Reserve rotations through the peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I don't necessarily specify the
type of element. I have a requirement as a commander----
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
General Scaparrotti. And then it is the forces'
determination as to who they provide. My requirement is they
provide a force that is capable to do the mission and is ready.
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Haney, our QDR states that, quote: ``We will pursue
further negotiated reductions with Russia''--talking about
nuclear arms reductions.
Given Russia's annexation of Crimea and the mass amount of
troops that they are putting on the border of Ukraine, do you
support negotiated reductions with Russia?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, as I have stated both in a
variety of statements publicly, any further reductions with
Russia requires that it is done in a verifiable manner. It also
has to be negotiated--not unilateral; bilaterally. And it has
to be in full context of their world events, as well as in
context of all of their capability.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, if the QDR, for example, was written
prior to the invasion of Crimea, then that might change the
calculation of whether or not we need to reduce nuclear weapons
with Russia?
Admiral Haney. It has the possibility.
Mr. Bridenstine. It is public knowledge that the State
Department has confronted Russia about its violation of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. And media reports indicate
that the U.S. has known about these likely violations for
years.
Did this factor into these statements in the QDR about new
negotiations for treaties with Russia that you know of?
Admiral Haney. The comment in the QDR associated with
negotiations with Russia has been a comment that has been
reinforced, both from Nuclear Posture Review 2010, the
President's Berlin speech.
This has been a continual goal--the goal of continuing to
reduce nuclear weapons in the world in general. But along with
that goal has been a statement that as long as other nations
have that capability, we will have a safe, secure, and
effective capability, as well.
Mr. Bridenstine. Do you believe Russia should be in
compliance with its existing nuclear arms control treaties
before we negotiate new ones?
Admiral Haney. I believe that treaties are an agreement
that has to be dealt with seriously and that--no different than
our execution of New START Treaty today, that we are able to
carry out what we signed up to do.
Mr. Bridenstine. So, if they would be in violation of old
treaties, maybe we shouldn't enter into new treaties?
Admiral Haney. I would rather not talk about a hypothetical
case. I would rather this issue, which I think is being taken
seriously--it is being looked at by our interagency,
particularly State Department--and I think that piece needs to
come to conclusion as we look forward at further treaties.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you very much, Admiral.
I yield back.
Mr. Scott. Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, what type of strategic adjustments have you had
to make in light of what Mr. Snowden has taken from us as far
as intelligence and how we go about business? How do you
prepare for somewhat the unknown?
I guess we do have some idea of what was taken and what
information may be shared. But how do you prepare for the
downfall of that?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, I think that first and
foremost, the approach has been to take a hard look at what is
all the material that has been potentially leaked--classified
material leaked by Mr. Snowden.
And then looking at that and adjusting based on those--on
the categories and the specificity--the specifics of the
associated material. I couldn't go into more detail than that
in this open forum.
Dr. Wenstrup. But that process is taking place and
analyzing what we may need to change in order to keep up with
what they may now know?
Admiral Haney. It is a process that is ongoing. It has
specific attention, I think, of components to our Department of
Defense and country at large, and that this is an ongoing
assessment and evaluation.
Dr. Wenstrup. Yes, I imagine it is pretty extensive.
Because so much material was taken to figure out what we know
they know. And then how do we adjust? And so, I appreciate your
efforts in that regard. I am encouraged to know that it is
ongoing. And I want to thank you both for your service.
And, General, I don't know if you have anything to add to
that.
General Scaparrotti. Only that just 2 days ago, I sat down
with individuals who are analyzing all of this data to
specifically come back for another time with me in terms of how
it impacts my forces in Korea and what we do. So, they are
constantly working this issue, and we are continuing to
exchange as time goes on to determine what changes we need to
make, what impacts it will have.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you both very much. Appreciate it.
I yield back.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Gentlemen, that concludes the meeting in this room. We will
adjourn to 2216 at this time. If you need a little break--say
12:00 p.m., does that work for you?
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 2, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 2, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 2, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. There are various efforts in the Department, namely
Air Force, Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid low cost launch solutions.
How would this type of launch capability be a benefit to the
warfighter, and in light of China's advances in counterspace, how
important is it that we prioritize these efforts?
Admiral Haney. Rapid low cost launch solutions could enable the
warfighter to add, maintain or replenish capability should the need
arise. Rapid launch may also help supply short-term niche space-based
products and services in support of specific operational needs that may
be beyond the scope or timeline of on-going programs. The current level
of development priority for these capabilities is appropriate. While
rapid launch will likely be a contributor in supporting response
options to threats to our space systems, it is premature to determine
if this path will provide our sole or most significant contribution.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. What would it take to fully implement the nuclear
deterrent modernization plan laid out in FY14? Please provide any
available analysis or charts showing what would be required to fully
execute this plan.
Admiral Haney. The FY2015 Section 1043 Report (10 USC, Sec 495) is
in final development for submission to the President and forwarding to
Congress. The report outlines the plans and resource requirements to
ensure the U.S. continues to meet its strategic deterrence objectives
and extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners. These
resource requirements are reflected in the President's FY2015 Budget
submission. The total estimated budget requirement for Fiscal Years
2015 through 2019 is nearly $125B--$45.6B for the DOE, NNSA; $61.2B for
the DOD nuclear weapons delivery systems capability sustainment; and
$17.9B for the DOD nuclear command and control capability sustainment.
Mr. Cooper. The Defense Science Board in a recent report,
``Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies,''
concluded that monitoring for nuclear proliferation should be a top
national security objective, but one for which ``the nation is not yet
organized or fully equipped to address.'' Do you agree? Why is
verification important for strategic stability?
Admiral Haney. I agree monitoring for nuclear proliferation should
be a top national priority. Monitoring and verification are important
components in our strategy to reduce nuclear threats to United States'
vital interests. As the report points out, today's complex security
environment presents new and evolving challenges in the early
identification of clandestine nuclear weapon programs. New technologies
and approaches are required as part of a comprehensive strategy to
mitigate these threats. Many of these same technologies are also
necessary to enhance verification of compliance of current and future
arms control agreements that seek to reduce nuclear stockpiles as well
as delivery systems.
Mr. Cooper. Why is Russia concerned about U.S. missile defense and
conventional prompt global strike efforts? How is this affecting their
nuclear deterrent force posture and doctrine?
Admiral Haney. Despite the fact the U.S. continues to assure Russia
that European BMD is not sized, positioned, nor capable of offsetting
Russian ICBMs, the Russians continue to publicly oppose U.S. missile
defense in Europe, stating they believe these interceptors to be a
threat to their nuclear strategic deterrent. Publicly, Russia has
expressed concerns about the survivability of its future nuclear
deterrent in the face of U.S. and allied ballistic missile defenses and
conventional strategic arms. Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov
may have best summarized these Russian concerns when he spoke at an
October 2007 NATO-Russia Council Meeting:
``. . . Global missile defense cannot be discussed apart from
strategic offensive weapons. The undeniable link between U.S.
missile defense and its strategic offensive weapons is
axiomatic. Taken together they become a strategic complex
capable of delivering a ``disarming first strike'' . . .
Furthermore, we see a direct link between U.S. plans for global
missile defense and the prompt global strike concept which
means the ability to strike any point on the globe within an
hour of the relevant decision. This concept, when combined with
global missile defense, becomes a means for world domination,
politically and strategically. This is a rather serious factor
which undermines the principles of mutual deterrence and mutual
security and erodes the architecture of strategic stability . .
.''
From our perspective, their concern is unwarranted as the planned
number of interceptors is insignificant compared to the total number of
ballistic missiles they have available.
The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that, ``While the
GMD system would be employed to defend the United States against
limited missile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity
to cope with large scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks, and is not
intended to affect the strategic balance with those countries.'' We
continue to follow this policy in our acquisition and procurement
decisions.
We continue to monitor Russia's upward trajectory to modernize its
nuclear triad by 2021 that interestingly includes its own precision-
guided weapons development program as well as the fielding of missile
defense systems. The last two Russian strategic nuclear forces
exercises have included media coverage of precision guided cruise
missile strikes as well as launches of anti-ballistic missiles in
response to an incoming ICBM strike. Russia's nuclear forces are
undergoing a substantial modernization in the face of this new
generation of missile defense capabilities. During the most recent
Russian nuclear forces exercise (8 May 2014), Russian Defense Minister
Shoygu informed President Putin that new ICBMs and SLBMs were entering
the active force in large numbers. Shoygu also noted that the new Yars
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and the Bulava Sea Launched
Ballistic Missile systems that were being put in service contained,
among other improvements, enhanced capabilities to overcome missile-
defense systems.
Mr. Cooper. What is STRATCOM's advice on avoiding an arms race with
Russia? What is the value of verifiable nuclear weapons reductions?
Admiral Haney. An arms race is not in our mutual interests.
Therefore, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. should
continue talks and cooperation with Russia on strategic stability
issues to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce
mistrust. Verifiable strategic nuclear arms reductions under the New
START Treaty support these goals reducing the potential for
misperception that could lead to unhealthy nuclear competition.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. The United States Government signed agreements with
the Republic of Korea to relocate United States military forces from
Seoul and other bases to Camp Humphreys. While the majority of the
relocation costs are being paid by the Republic of Korea, the
Department of the Army is solely responsible for ensuring that adequate
family housing meeting applicable U.S. standards is available, both on-
post and off-post. I am concerned about the impact that a lack of
adequate housing may have on the relocation effort.
A. Can you please briefly provide an update on the status of the
relocation?
B. In addition, can you please provide an update on your
requirement regarding the percentage and number of military families
that need to be housed on Camp Humphreys and a discussion for when you
need to have family housing available for the relocation to stay on
schedule?
C. Do you see any viable short-term solutions to any assessed lack
of adequate housing?
D. Can you elaborate on the anti-terrorism and force protection
measures that will be implemented to ensure the safety of the large
number of military members and their families stationed in Korea?
General Scaparrotti. A: The Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land
Partnership Plan relocation to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys
remain on schedule to meet U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) objectives. B: USFK
requires an additional 425 family housing units by mid-2016 for 40% of
the command sponsored families at USAG Humphreys. C: The Department of
the Army is working to find housing solutions to meet our operational
requirements in Korea. D: Currently, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) terrorism threat level in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is
``Moderate,'' and the overall criminal threat within the ROK is
``Low.'' USFK military housing offices work closely with local realtors
to provide safe, high quality housing for military members. Although
the Unified Facilities Criteria anti-terrorism standards do not apply
to private off-post housing (in Korea or the United States), our
housing offices provide information sheets on features to look for to
enhance force protection when selecting a rental unit.
Additionally, ROK government agencies have very effective
surveillance and counter-intelligence systems to identify individuals
with possible ties to terrorist organizations or activities and swiftly
take action to prevent incidents. The Command works closely with these
ROK agencies to identify and mitigate any potential threats against
USFK installations and personnel.
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