[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-97]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL
YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR
SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 26, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year
2015 Budget Request for Seapower and Projection Forces......... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 26, 2014........................................ 33
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 3
WITNESSES
Glueck, LtGen Kenneth J., Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration, and Commanding General, Marine
Corps Combat Development Command............................... 8
Mulloy, VADM Joseph P., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Integration of Capabilities and Resources...................... 7
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of the Navy.. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 37
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Joseph P. Mulloy and
LtGen Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr................................ 40
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 75
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 83
Mr. Forbes................................................... 79
Mr. Hunter................................................... 83
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 26, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome all of our members and the
distinguished panel of Navy and Marine Corps leaders for
today's hearing. We have testifying before us on the fiscal
year 2015 budget request the Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition; Vice Admiral Joe Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources; and
Lieutenant General Kenneth Glueck, Jr., Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development, Integration and Commanding General of the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here, for your service
to our country. We look forward to your thoughts and your
insights on these important issues. First of all, I want to
commend the Department on their continued emphasis on the
undersea warfare domain. I believe that the United States has a
clear asymmetric advantage in this area, and it is critical to
continue procurement of two Virginia-class submarines a year. I
also appreciate the continued emphasis on the Virginia payload
module and support the eventual inclusion of this capability in
the fiscal year 2019 Block 4 procurement.
As to the aircraft carrier force structure, I am dismayed
at the intent of this administration to reduce our aircraft
carrier fleet. The equivocation and vacillation on this issue
is, frankly, disappointing. It is a fact that the
administration has requested appropriations in fiscal year 2015
only for inactivating the USS George Washington. It is a fact
that the law requires 11 aircraft carriers. It is a fact that
the USS George Washington refueling and complex overhaul is not
included in the Future Year Defense Plan. It is a fact that the
hull of the USS George Washington has another 25 years of
service life remaining. The administration's rhetoric that they
are not removing an aircraft carrier of the fleet simply does
not match their actions. I think our decision on this issue is
clear. I look forward to fully restoring the requisite funding
to ensure we retain the USS George Washington for another 25
years.
There are a multitude of other procurement shortfalls in
the Navy and Marine Corps budget regarding ships, aircraft, and
weapons. Our subcommittee is going to take a hard look at the
entirety of combatant commander requirements and relate those
to what is requested in the budget to ensure our maritime
forces are best funded with the right capabilities.
I look forward to discussing several of these issues today,
and specifically I want to have an in-depth discussion on the
Navy's cruiser retention plan. If the Navy believes it must
pursue this plan because of budget constraints, then we look
forward to understanding the details of how you all plan to
execute this endeavor in the decade ahead and eventually
restore all 11 cruisers to the fleet in a timely fashion.
We also want to understand the risk if 22 cruisers are
required to meet global force management requirements today,
why is it now acceptable risk to reduce by half the quantity
when world events obviously indicate otherwise?
And finally, the Navy has cultivated tremendous uncertainty
related to developing and maintaining offensive surface warfare
missile capabilities. Despite being well below missile
inventory requirements, the Navy has cut in half planned
production of Tomahawk missiles in 2015 and terminated that
line in 2016. And further concerning, replacement missile
capabilities are in the infancy stages of concept development
and years off from operational fielding. We need to again
understand why this is acceptable risk, and what is your
surface attack missile road map going forward.
As to the Marine Corps, I believe that the amphibious ship
construction industrial base is fragile. A significant gap
exists between current and new ship construction plans that
will lead to destabilizing the industrial base. We need to move
with firm and deliberate steps to ensure that we retain an
appropriate and unquestionable force structure to support our
maritime presence and warfighting requirements.
As to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program, I understand
the Marine Corps plans to pursue a two-tiered approach that
would procure a wheeled armored personnel carrier in the short
term and continue the development to achieve capabilities in
the long term associated with high water speed technology
efforts from previous amphibious vehicle programs. While this
approach seems reasonable, I look forward to gaining a better
understanding of the Marine Corps' plans. We need to be assured
we are providing our Marines with essential capabilities at the
right time.
I look forward to discussing these important topics with
our expert panel of judges. I want to also point out that we
understand the great service you provide to our country. We
also understand that you three are the messengers, and we
appreciate that a lot of these decisions are not your
decisions, but we thank you for sharing your insight with us on
them, and with that, I return--I turn to my good friend and
colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Congressman
Mike McIntyre.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to each of you for your continued service and
commitment to our Navy, our Marine Corps, and to our great
country's armed services. Welcome to each of you today. I know
earlier this month, the full committee in this room heard from
Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert and General Amos about the
big picture budget request, of course, for the Navy and Marine
Corps, and today we do want to dive down deep into the details
as we consider underwater warfare and other concerns pertaining
to submarine building, weapons programs, some of our Marine
Corps programs as well as, of course, shipbuilding.
While the Navy is facing many challenges, we are pleased
that in the proposed budget that the Navy-Marine Corps is being
funded strongly in some areas that it will need to be funded in
with our shift to the Pacific and our focus in pivoting to the
Pacific region.
When we talk about the positive parts, the continued strong
support for building two Virginia-class submarines a year,
knowing that the U.S. dominates undersea warfare; in that
environment, we know the Virginia class will continue to help
us maintain that important edge. Another encouraging area in
the budget is the Arleigh Burke-class DDG [guided missile
destroyer] program, now in its fourth decade, still making sure
that we have superb ships year after year in that class. And
with the plan now to start a Flight III set of ships with even
better air defense capability, we are encouraged by that.
However, we realize that both services, the Navy and Marine
Corps, face significant challenges in this year's budget, and
that is what we want to hear about in this hearing.
First, as our good chairman, my good friend Mr. Forbes
mentioned, the potential loss of an aircraft carrier and an air
wing is a major concern. Aircraft carriers, we know, allow the
United States to project power almost anywhere in the world on
very short notice and is a strong statement of our being a
force for democracy. No nation can match that, and I am
concerned that letting another aircraft carrier go, we are
opening the door to an even steeper decline in American naval
power and presence.
However, if we do keep the carrier and air wing, the
question is and we would welcome your recommendations at what
is being given up if more funding isn't provided to the Navy?
I also want to hear about the concern about the Navy, how
it can afford to replace the Ohio-class ballistic submarine,
given the many other shipbuilding needs. We want to know what
our options are for dealing with this issue, including the
potential of setting up an account, perhaps similar to the
National Defense Sealift Fund Congress established in the 1990s
to help the Navy build more sealift capability. So we would
like to hear about a possibility that way in order to make sure
that we can replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.
With such an account, the Navy would be able to spread the
burden of replacing this very expensive capability without
gutting the rest of our shipbuilding budget, which is so
important.
We also want to hear about the proposed layup, as it is
called, of some of our cruisers and amphibious ships. I am
encouraged that the Navy is taking serious this subcommittee's
concerns about the declining size of the fleet, but we need
more detail about how this plan would work and what the risks
might be. What we don't want to see happen is these ships go
into layup status and then not be properly funded and
eventually decommissioned as a result. If that happens, we will
have wasted more money than if they were retired. So we want to
understand exactly what this proposal includes when the term
laying up these ships is talked about. Particularly with layups
this basketball season being so prevalent during March Madness,
we want to make sure we are planning properly in March so we
don't have madness in our budget with something as important as
United States Navy.
So we thank you for the seriousness that you take these
topics, and we look forward to asking these serious questions
and getting these serious answers as we plan ahead to continue
America's best defense that we have to offer, and we thank you
for being at the forefront of that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, as you know, without me having to
say it, our subcommittee is incredibly bipartisan. We have
enormous respect for each other. I am going to defer my
questions until the end when we get there because we may have
votes probably at about 3:15, something like that--4:15, I am
sorry.
So if you could, we have your joint statements that will be
made a part of the record, and if each of you would try to
limit your remarks to maybe 5 minutes or so if possible so we
could move on from there.
And with that, Mr. Secretary, we will let you start off for
us.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF
THE NAVY
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Chairman, Ranking Member
McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for
the opportunity to appear before you today to address
Department of the Navy acquisition programs.
Joining me today are the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Capabilities and Resources, Vice Admiral Joe Mulloy, and
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration,
Lieutenant General Ken Glueck. With permission of the
subcommittee, I propose to provide a brief opening remarks and
submit a separate formal statement for the record.
Mr. Forbes. It will be admitted.
Secretary Stackley. Two years ago, in testimony before this
subcommittee, the Navy described how we had reshaped our
shipbuilding, aviation, and tactical vehicle plans to reflect
the priorities of the new defense strategy, and Congress
strongly supported that year's 2013 budget request. In fact,
funding was increased for additional ships and aircraft.
However, sequestration more than offset those gains, and the
Department of the Navy ended up about $11 billion out of
balance across the operations, maintenance, and investment.
Last year, we again submitted a budget sized and shaped to
provide the capability, capacity, and readiness required by the
defense strategy, and while this committee was particularly
supportive of our request, at the end of the day at the bottom
line the Bipartisan Budget Act [BBA] reduced the Navy-Marine
Corps budget by $6 billion in 2014 and another $15 billion in
2015.
So this year's budget submission is anchored by the BBA in
2015, and though we exceed the Budget Control Act caps across
the Future Years Defense Plan, the Navy and Marine Corps
request falls $38 billion below the level planned just 1 year
ago. So to minimize the impact of this reduced top line, we
have leveraged every tool available to drive down cost. We have
tightened requirements, maximized competition, and capitalized
on multiyear procurements for major weapons systems, and we
have attacked our cost of doing business from headquarters
billets to service contracts so that more of our resources can
be dedicated to warfighting capability. And in balancing
resources and requirements, we have placed priority on forward
presence, near-term readiness, stability in our shipbuilding
program, and investment in those future capabilities critical
to our long-term technical superiority.
Major milestones this past year highlight some of those
capabilities. The Marine Corps took the Joint Strike Fighter to
sea, conducting extensive testing on board USS Wasp. The Navy
conducted first flight of its high endurance unmanned maritime
surveillance aircraft, the Triton, followed shortly by the
first trap and catapult on and off an aircraft carrier of the
unmanned combat air system.
The Navy's game-changing maritime patrol aircraft, the P-8A
Poseidon, is today ranging the Western Pacific on her first
deployment and contributing to the search for Malaysian Airline
Flight 370. In the first demonstration of the Navy's integrated
fire control capability, an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye passed track
data to an Aegis cruiser firing the Navy's newest missile, the
SM-6, to knock out a target well over the horizon without ever
tracking it on the ship's radar. And in a series of firsts, USS
John Paul Jones demonstrated the power of Aegis modernization
by simultaneously engaging inbound cruise and ballistic missile
targets. USS Lake Erie knocked out a ballistic missile target
by firing on the remote track of a distant satellite. A few
months later, she would take out a complex separating ballistic
missile target and, in a third test, set the mark for the
highest altitude intercept to date. Meanwhile, the DDG 1000
advanced gun system went nine for nine, firing 155[mm] rounds
at ranges greater than 60 nautical miles with a strike pattern
unlike anything ever seen from the barrel of a gun. And the
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile conducted its first air launch
demonstration, striking a maritime target from a distance far
beyond the reach of the weapons in our arsenal today.
With particular regard to Navy shipbuilding, we kept on
track our objective for a 300-ship Navy. Seven first-of-class
ships met major milestones. Gerald Ford, the first new design
aircraft carrier since Nimitz, and Zumwalt, the first new
designed destroyer since Arleigh Burke, launched just 1 week
apart, each at extremely high levels of completion. The
amphibious assault ship America successfully completed sea
trials. The joint high speed vessel Spearhead and the mobile
landing platform Montford Point delivered to the fleet. The
littoral combat ship Freedom successfully completed her 10-
month maiden overseas deployment. And finally we laid the keel
for the first afloat forward staging base, the Chesty Puller.
In total, 43 ships are under construction in shipyards and
weapons factories stretching across the country, yet this
critical industrial base is fragile, and we will need to work
with industry and Congress to keep it whole as we navigate the
budget beyond the BBA.
Meanwhile, the third leg of our balanced naval air-ground
task force, the Marine Corps tactical vehicles, is at the front
end of much needed recapitalization. In 2015, we commenced
procurement of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to replace the
HUMVEE [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], and
separately, we are moving forward with acquiring a highly
capable, highly survivable wheeled vehicle in a first phase of
the Amphibious Combat Vehicle [ACV] program. The ACV is, as the
Commandant stated in testimony, a top Marine Corps priority.
And the strategy for procuring this vessel is striking a
necessary balance between requirements and affordability.
I would like to briefly discuss two critical issues posed
by our budget request. First, the refueling complex overhaul of
George Washington CVN-73. The Navy has a hard requirement for
11 aircraft carriers, and title 10 requires the Navy to retain
11 aircraft carriers. However, the cost to refuel CVN-73 plus
maintain its air wing, manpower, and support would require an
additional $7 billion across the 2015-2019 period, and the
Secretary of Defense has stated if we return to BCA [Budget
Control Act] funding levels in 2016, we will likely be
compelled to inactivate the CVN and its air wing. Therefore, in
this budget submission, we have effectively taken a pause,
maintaining the option to include refueling CVN-73 in our 2016
budget as we await determination of that budget's top line.
Second, cruiser and LSD [landing ship, dock] modernization.
The oldest 11 cruisers, CG-52 through 62, have been modernized
and will deploy with carrier battle groups until their end of
service which commences in 2019. The Navy plans to modernize
and extend the service life of the remaining 11 cruisers, CG-63
through 73, through an extended phased modernization program.
The elements of the program are that we will commence in 2015
with planning and material procurement for repair and
modernization of hull, mechanical, and electrical [HM&E]
systems for all 11 cruisers. The depot work will be scheduled
to ensure efficient execution and, to the extent practical, to
provide stability to the industrial base, and once complete
that HM&E phase, these cruisers will be maintained in the
modernization program until completion of their subsequent
combat systems modernization, which will be aligned with
retirement of the first 11 cruisers.
A similar yet simpler approach is planned for three of the
LSD-41 class ships. This Navy plan is made affordable by
drawing down ship manpower and operating costs during the
extended modernization period, a cost avoidance in excess of $6
billion. It ensures we are able to sustain the 12-ship LSD-41/
49 class for its full service life and the critical air defense
commander capabilities of the cruiser force beyond its current
service life into the 2040s. It also retains flexibility, if
needed, to accelerate completion of the modernization pending
availability of added funding and training of additional crews.
In total, in managing the cumulative impact of the
sequestration in 2013, the BBA level funding in 2014 and 2015,
the reductions across 2015 through 2019, the Department has
been judicious in controlling costs, reducing procurements,
stretching developments, and delaying modernization. However,
these actions necessarily add costs to our programs, add risk
to our industrial base, and add risk to our ability to meet the
Defense Strategic Guidance. If we are forced to execute at BCA
levels in fiscal year 2016 and beyond, these cuts will go
deeper and will fundamentally change our Navy and Marine Corps
and the industrial base we rely upon.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. We look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley,
Admiral Mulloy, and General Glueck can be found in the Appendix
on page 40.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VADM JOSEPH P. MULLOY, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES
Admiral Mulloy. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre,
other distinguished members of the committee, I am Admiral Joe
Mulloy, and I am very honored to be here with you today, and I
look forward to your questions.
I just want to indicate that I support Mr. Stackley's
statement, but for the last 4 and a half years, I have served
as the Department of Navy budget officer, and many of your
staff members know who I am. I have seen the highs and lows of
the Navy budget. I had the peak budget and over $170 billion in
fiscal year 2011. I have also saw the pain of sequester and
what it took to the Navy to try to operate with what started as
an 8.6 and became a $4 billion reduction.
We certainly appreciate the BBA law that was passed by the
Congress, that it gave some stability, but as Mr. Stackley
pointed out, it also came at a cost of a significant amount of
money. We are forced to come up with a balanced position minus
$38 billion over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and
looming over our head is fiscal year 2016, again with either a
sequester or not, and another over $30 billion cut through the
FYDP. I look forward to your questions. I think this provides a
balanced budget trying to maintain all facets of the Navy
because before I was budget officer, I was the N5N8 [Deputy
Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Requirements, U.S.
Pacific Fleet], doing all pol-mil [political-military] planning
and operations for the Pacific Fleet and all infrastructure and
resources for out there, so I have seen our fleet used, I have
seen our forces prepared, and did all that planning for over 3
years, so I have been on both ends of this in the Pentagon and
out at the fleet, and I think we tried to find balance in here,
but I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Mulloy, Secretary
Stackley, and General Glueck can be found in the Appendix on
page 40.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you. You certainly bring a
unique experienced background to our committee, and we
appreciate your willingness to help us.
General.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN KENNETH J. GLUECK, JR., USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, AND
COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
General Glueck. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today. The Marine Corps' ability to serve as
our Nation's premier crisis response force is due in large part
to this subcommittee's strong support, and on behalf of all
Marines, I say thank you.
History demonstrates when fiscal austerity reduces the size
of available forces, the Nation must rely on the persistent
presence and power projection capabilities of the Navy-Marine
Corps team. The Marine Corps remains first and foremost a naval
service, operating in close partnership with the Navy. Today
the two naval services leverage the seas not only to ensure
global peace and stability but also, when necessary, to project
our national power and influence ashore. A forward-deployed
Marine Corps provides our combatant commanders a universal tool
that they can immediately employ. This force can serve as a
leading edge of a larger joint force or deploy and sustain
itself in even the most austere environments. This ability to
rapidly respond to developing crises not only ensures the
combatant commander has the right force in the right place at
the right time but also provides our national leaders with
valuable decision space.
Flexible and scaleable by organizational design and
instinctively adaptive by culture, the Marine Corps is guided
by our expeditionary ethos and bias for action. These
characteristics are the hallmark of our corps' capstone
concept, Expeditionary Force 21. Expeditionary Force 21 blends
our time-tested concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea,
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, Seabasing, with the strategic
agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility that
forward-stationed and forward-deployed expeditionary units
provide.
Crucial to these capabilities and persistent presence are
our amphibious warships. They are versatile, interoperable
warfighting platforms capable of going into harm's way and
serve as a cornerstone of America's ability to project power
and respond to the full range of crises. With embark Marines,
amphibious ships are the Swiss Army knife of the fleet,
providing diverse capabilities unlike any other naval platform.
They are critical to both our combatant commanders' theater
engagement strategy and crisis response options, significantly
contributing to both regional stability and security. From
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to forcible entry
operations, it is the amphibious fleet that answers the call.
When the Nation requires a forcible entry capability, these
warships can launch the assault echelons in two Marine
expeditionary brigades. However, an inventory fewer of 38 ships
creates a significant risk in maintaining continuous presence
and undermines the ability to generate the necessary
capabilities to respond to crisis or conduct forceful entry.
While our goal remains to--an increase of sea-based and
forward-deployed forces, we are examining alternatives that
will still ensure persistent presence.
Future security environment requires a robust capability to
operate from the sea and maneuver ashore to positions of
advantage. The core capability of technology--excuse me. Core
capability of expeditionary forces is the ability to project
forces ashore from amphibious platforms and to maneuver once
ashore. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle program provides us that
capability. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle has been refined to
reflect the family assistance approach to a military problem.
It will integrate at sea with amphibious as well as maritime
sealift ships and connectors and enable amphibious operations
rapidly from further offshore. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle
leverages experience gained in the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle program, the Marine Personnel Carrier program, current
threat analysis, and commercial technology to provide a
superior armor protection and mobility. The Amphibious Combat
Vehicle is the Marine Corps' number one ground modernization
priority. It will replace our aging 40-year-old Amphibious
Assault Vehicle. It will be procured on a phased approach, thus
complementing the existing capabilities to maximize both
surface power projection and littoral maneuver. The benefits of
this phased effort are aimed at producing an amphibious
capability that deploys from greater distances and speed, thus
ensuring greater standoff distances for our forces. Given
continuing advancements in applicable technology, the Marine
Corps believes that further investment in these technologies
will lead to the envisioned high water speed capability.
Additionally, as part of the systems approach, the Navy and
Marine Corps team will continue its investment in the next
generation of future connectors. These connectors, with
enhanced speed and range, both aviation and surface, will
provide future expeditionary force commanders with the
flexibility to operate in contested environments. The type of
transformational technology the MV-22 Osprey has already
demonstrated needs to be brought to our surface connector
fleet.
Clearly there are challenges to today's new normal security
environment as well as the challenges of constrained and
uncertain budgets, but rest assured that our forward-stationed,
forward-deployed Marines are poised to remain the Nation's
premier expeditionary force in readiness. In partnership with
the Navy, the Marine Corps looks forward to working with you to
address these issues. Thank you for the opportunity to be here,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Glueck, Secretary
Stackley, and Admiral Mulloy can be found in the Appendix on
page 40.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you.
And with that, I would like to now recognize the ranking
member, Mike McIntyre, who since his Tarheels have now exited
the tournament is supporting the Virginia Wahoos I know as they
go in there, and now recognize him for any questions he may
have.
Mr. McIntyre. Absolutely, I want to uphold the ACC
[Atlantic Coast Conference] tradition. Congratulations to
Virginia.
Mr. Stackley, I want to ask you one question. I know our
time is going to be compressed, and I want to have other
members, give them a chance to ask questions since we have
votes coming up. The subcommittee has heard numerous times from
the Navy that the Ohio replacement program could consume most
of the normal shipbuilding budget for 10 years or more. I
referred to some to this in my opening remarks today.
What are the alternatives? Could one of them be the
establishment by Congress of a fund similar to the National
Defense Sealift Fund so that funding for procurement of the
Ohio-class submarine is funded across the Department of
Defense? Would you address that, please?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, thanks for the question.
First and foremost, to be real clear, the Ohio replacement
program, as repeatedly stated by the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations], is our top priority in this budget. It will remain
a top priority in the next budget. We are doing everything we
have to to protect the funding stream to ensure that the boat
is designed on schedule, built on schedule, and deploys on
schedule in 2031.
Now, what that means is if you look at what the cost of the
program is in current dollars, it is about a $17 billion
research and development funding stream, most of which will be
obligated and expended leading up to that first ship's
procurement, and in today's dollars, we are looking at a $6.3
billion cost for the lead boat and targeting $4.9 billion for
subsequent boats 2 through 12. The first boat is procured in
2021; the last boat in 2035, so there is a 15-year period where
it will be the largest part of our shipbuilding program and, as
has been pointed out, puts extraordinary pressure under our
shipbuilding--on our shipbuilding program.
So the notion of a National Defense Sealift Fund [NDSF]
type of funding mechanism, that won't change the bottom line
cost for the Ohio replacement program, clearly. What it would
do, as it had done for the NDSF fleet, is provide a mechanism
that is extremely flexible to deal with the year-to-year
challenges associated with executing the funding associated
with concurrent building the lead boat, completing the R&D
[research and development] effort that would be done in
parallel with the lead boat, and then ramping up procurement of
follow boats. Ultimately, though, when we are building one boat
per year in the 2026 through 2035 timeframe, then that is going
to be a steady requirement by the Department of the Navy for
what is today about $5 billion per year, and out in that
timeframe, when you add inflation and other considerations,
will measure up to a significant part of our shipbuilding
budget. So creating an NDSF, the flexibility that NDSF provided
to us, aided our efficiency in building the NDSF fleet. Pulling
that budget out of our SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy],
our shipbuilding top line, if we are able to sustain our
shipbuilding top line, that does great--you know, that gives us
the ability to continue to procure the balance of our force,
but in the end, the bottom line for building out the Ohio
replacement program will be about the same. So the source of
the funding ultimately becomes the challenge greater than the
mechanism for the funding.
Mr. McIntyre. All right, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Any other response?
Admiral Mulloy. Sir, having served as budget officer, I
completely support Mr. Stackley's position is that ultimately
as we looked at this, this is 45 percent over 15 years of the
entire SCN account. The first two boats are scheduled over 5
years, but it is half of our budget all those years, so the
NDSF account like does provide tremendous flexibility for
solving problems, but as Mr. Stackley pointed out, it ends up
being the total amount of money that we are talking about is
right now as the DON [Department of the Navy] is planning on
doing that, but it would--it essentially crushes the other
shipbuilding part of the budget is that I have half the budget
on one ship, I have to build an aircraft carrier, spread it
over 4 years, and then I end up looking at is the DDG and
amphibious submarine, and do I build one, two or three, but I
can't build all three in every one year. So it comes back to
being, even if we then look at all our other accounts, you
know, do I shave down aviation? I have a lot of things I need
to buy out there. We now are stuck into OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] and will be talking to the Hill. So an
NDSF fund that has some other way of adding money to it would
be more flexible there for us as opposed to it is just moving
Navy dollars there, it doesn't provide any flex--it provides
flexibility but not source dollars.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay, thank you. Were both you gentlemen
classmates in the Naval Academy? You both graduated in 1979,
right?
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, sir.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. It is amazing that these years
later, you serve us together at this table on this day, and God
bless you and thank you.
And thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mike.
The gentlelady from South Dakota is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Noem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To Admiral Mulloy, what is the average lifespan of an
aircraft carrier?
Admiral Mulloy. Ma'am, the average lifespan of a Nimitz-
class aircraft carrier is about 50 years. The USS Enterprise
just completed a little over 51 years.
Mrs. Noem. Okay, thank you.
Secretary Stackley, as we all know, the Tomahawk has been
and will continue to be hopefully the Nation's long-range
precision strike weapon of choice. Although you did reference a
new long-range missile that you have been under development. I
know the Navy decreased the procurement of the Tomahawk Block 4
cruise missiles by 800 and plans to cease the production of the
Tomahawk beginning in fiscal year 2016. So can you describe
some of the thinking and the analysis on that and maybe a
little bit more detail on your future weapon that you have just
tested?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am, thanks for the question.
First, the budget does not--the budget cuts our quantity for
Tomahawk in half from prior years, so we had been sustaining a
200 Tomahawk per year rate. In 2015, we have dropped down to
100, and in 2016 and out, I guarantee you we will revisit the
question of whether the time is right to cease production of
Tomahawks, but what we have procured to date meets our
inventory requirements for Tomahawks, so we have about 4,000 in
our arsenal. We have satisfied our inventory requirement. What
we have got to get to is that next-generation weapon. That
next-generation weapon could be an upgraded Tomahawk, could be
another weapon that would show up at the competition. So we are
moving forward with development of what has been referred to as
next-generation land-attack weapon, and the key elements of
that weapon will be its increased lethality, survivability
beyond what Tomahawk brings today.
So the future of Tomahawk 100 in the 2015 budget request,
we will certainly revisit that as we build the 2016 budget. We
are going to press forward with advances to our cruise missile
line. We are today demonstrating and testing what I refer to as
the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, that is an air-launched
version. A future increment which will be competed will be a
surface ship-launched version, which will require development
from whoever shows up from industry, and then downstream, there
is modification of the Tomahawks that we have in our inventory
and ultimately a recertification of those Tomahawks that we
have in our inventory. So we are trying to keep it all in
balance. We are keeping a close eye on our inventory numbers,
and equally important, we are going forward in terms of
advancing the capability of those cruise missiles.
Mrs. Noem. Well, recertification is to begin in fiscal year
2019. Is that correct? Do you see--because in fiscal year 2016
is when you basically have it zeroed out as far as new
Tomahawks, correct?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Noem. Because you believe that your inventory is
sufficient enough to bridge the gap until we get past
recertification and into a new weapon that could be developed?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am, our inventory is very
healthy.
Mrs. Noem. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. But we are keeping a close eye on the
recertification timeline. We cannot delay that, so we have to
get into recertification in the 2019 timeframe. There is that
potential gap between 2016 and 2019 as far as Tomahawk
production. Recertification is different from all-around
production, and we are working with Raytheon in terms of the
risks that this potential gap would pose on their factory.
Mrs. Noem. But you do have some plans for modernization in
fiscal year 2020, correct? Is that--could that not be
streamlined a little bit better with recertification so that
the modernization could happen at the same time these weapons
are brought in and recertified----
Secretary Stackley. Absolutely.
Mrs. Noem [continuing]. So that it is a bit more
streamlined.
Secretary Stackley. Absolutely, and that is the part of the
discussion that we are having with Raytheon. In fact, there is
a fairly healthy R&D stream going towards Tomahawk for the
modifications that we need for the missile.
Mrs. Noem. Okay.
Admiral Mulloy, did you have something to add?
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, ma'am, I appreciate the question also.
Clearly, as you pointed out, with the inventory we have is a
very large number of these weapons, which we are continuing to
modernize. There have been four steps. The most important one
is a brand new digital radio----
Mrs. Noem. Right.
Admiral Mulloy [continuing]. Which we are installing which
allows the combatant commanders, you know, carrying out
national command authority missions to retarget the aircraft
and have much more reliable communications, no matter where
they are from satellites. That install is going forward. There
are a number of other ones that we need to do, and those are
also in the plan, but as we talked about, we are down in the
Navy $31 billion. What we had to look at was, what do I have to
do with a weapon that I have overcapacity on but I need to
modernize and I need to certify? Part of the line, in fact
actually your staff will find this, we have bought spares in
2015 and 2016 such that when the line starts back up to do the
certification, we have the appropriate amount from the vendors
to keep going, but that period of time is we, on average, have
shot 100 weapons a year. We have, as we looked at all the plans
and met the requirements of the combatant commanders, in the
areas that we have to take some risk in tough years, we have to
have a path to reach ahead. And so this is one of the ones we
looked at was we will analyze a shutdown. We want to fund the
R&D to get the next weapon. We want to fund the R&D to make the
current weapon work and take a much smaller view as compared to
other parts of this budget, a smaller risk, and, you know,
having looked at detail about what these weapons require and
having personally been at sea with these, Tomahawks are amazing
things. But they were also built when I was a junior officer,
and we have modernized them, but we need to keep thinking about
the future.
Mrs. Noem. Well, that would be my hope, that as we
recertify, that we would also look at modernization at the same
time so it is streamlined and there could be some savings
then----
Admiral Mulloy. Yes.
Mrs. Noem [continuing]. Rather than bringing those weapons
back in to modernize just after they have been through the
recertification process.
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, ma'am, and we are looking at what
could be done at that time because, as we say, this is on Block
4, we can talk with a radio.
Mrs. Noem. Right.
Admiral Mulloy. The early ones I qualified with didn't have
any of this. They were all just merely, not even GPS [Global
Positioning System] capable, but we never looked totally down.
We have never eliminated the ability to do camera and TERCOM
[Terrain Contour Matching] guidance because in a GPS-enabled or
a world that has electromagnetic deviations, you want to have a
weapon that can still find a path, so we have never eliminated
some of the stuff that made it work. The idea is to keep
working to make it better.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Recognize the gentleman from Connecticut for 5 minutes.
After his questions, we are going to recess for about an hour,
unfortunately. We will be back at 5:00 if you could stay with
us until that time.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In light of the press of time, I won't talk about how the
UConn Huskies are, men and women, are both in the Sweet 16.
Mr. Forbes. And we hope they come in second. We will be
supporting them strongly.
Mr. Courtney. The women I don't think I would put much
money on that.
But anyway, Mr. Stackley, again, you laid out sort of the
scenario with the CVN-73 in terms of, you know, the fact that
it is sort of a pending question right now that sort of turns
on whether or not we check, we, again, fix the BCA levels, as
you put it, in your remarks, and again just for clarification,
when you say BCA levels, you are talking about sequester? Is
that correct?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Because, I mean, obviously, the
BCA has a different level also built into it, which is
nonsequester, and I guess so, you know, everybody is sort of
crystal clear, two questions: Number one, if the sequester
levels go into effect in 2016 and years beyond, I mean, really
it is not just aircraft carriers that are going to be impacted
if that were to happen, and maybe you can just talk a little
about that in terms of the spread of damage that would occur.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, and well, let's start with
the fact that the budget that we submitted, the 5-year Future
Years Defense Plan budget is about $38 billion for the
Department of the Navy above that BCA adjusted cap level, and
that is in 2016 through 2019. If we have to, if we have to
budget to that BCA level or, alternatively, if we submit the
budget at the current top line and it gets sequestered----
Mr. Courtney. Right.
Secretary Stackley [continuing]. We have already discussed
the impact in terms of CVN-73 RCOH [refueling and complex
overhaul], but you look across the rest of the board and you
just take an average of $8 billion to $9 billion that is going
to come out of the Department of the Navy budget and you try
assess where it is going to come, and we have very limited
alternatives in terms of where we are going to pull it. So it
is going to clearly impact our procurements, but it is also
going to impact the size of the force and the way we operate
it, and that is going to directly impinge on our ability to
meet our requirements in terms of the Defense Strategic
Guidance.
So whether it is a shipbuilding program, an aviation
program, whether it is the depot maintenance schedule, whether
it is the number of ships and aircraft that not necessarily
that we are able to deploy, but we are able to surge in the
event of crisis, those numbers are all going to come down. And
there is--we have done everything we can inside of our lines to
wring out our costs of doing business. We have done everything
we can in terms to try to drive down the cost of our major
weapons systems, the cost of our operations, and we have been
starting to cut our quantities, so, at this point forward,
deeper cuts into that top line are going to go directly at the
tip of the spear, and we are going to be looking at, in the
2016 budget build, at that, at that extreme case.
Mr. Courtney. So, for example, DDGs, submarines, you know,
littoral combat ships, I mean, what does that mean?
Secretary Stackley. Well, the CNO has already stated in
testimony that we could be looking at three fewer DDG-51s in
the next budget cycle, or if we are at BCA levels, a Virginia-
class submarine, that is at risk, the CVN-73 which we have
already talked to at length. Each program is going to be
revisited in terms of we have to maintain a balanced force. We
have to look at our near-term requirements in terms of
combatant commander demands. We are going to end up taking risk
in terms of future readiness because our investments are going
to end up bearing a very tough brunt of further reductions.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. I mean, I think, you know,
my friend Mr. McIntyre raised the issue of the ORP [Ohio
Replacement Program] funding which I have asked Secretary Hagel
and Secretary Mabus about, and I mean that is definitely a
long-term, relatively long-term, you know, fiscal challenge
that we have to fix or deal with, but obviously, right now, we
have got to not lose sight of the fact that sequester didn't
evaporate with the passage of the budget last December and the
spending bill. And I think, you know, laying out the damage, as
you just did, I think is a pretty powerful warning to people
who care about a 300-ship Navy and our national defense, that
this is right now, you know, in front of us, and we have just
got to, you know, figure out ways to turn off that sequester.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. The effort of Congress last
year to give us the Bipartisan Budget Act gave us 2 years of
breathing room and gave us a funding level above those BCA
capped levels. That is greatness. However, if we allow this
time to lapse and we don't address the longer-term issue, then
we will be sitting here next year talking about the devastation
associated with BCA, and we will be having the same
conversations we had last year regarding sequestration and what
the impacts are to our ability to meet our requirements for
national security.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will recess until right after the votes, and reconvene
immediately upon the votes.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your patience.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. I know these votes interfered with your
schedules. But that is what we are here to do.
So, at this particular point in time, I would like to
recognize Congressman Wittman, who chairs the Readiness
Subcommittee, for any questions that he might have for 5
minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Admiral Mulloy, Mr. Stackley, Lieutenant General
Glueck, thank you so much for joining us today. We really
appreciate your perspective in this challenging time to figure
out how we put the pieces of these things together.
Lieutenant General Glueck, I want to begin with you and go
from the perspective of the Commandant in his words about LPD-
17 and that the LPD-17 hull form should be what we use as the
replacement for LSD. Can you elaborate a little bit on why that
LPD [landing platform/dock] hull form is the preferred platform
for replacement of the LSD? What are its capabilities? How does
it meet the Marine Corps' needs? And if you can put that in
perspective about how the Marine Corps sees its structure going
in the future and why that is so important for capability
within the Marines.
General Glueck. Thank you, sir, for that question. And also
thank you for your support to our Wounded Warriors. It is
greatly appreciated.
I think when you look at the LPD-17, it has been a success
story for the Navy-Marine Corps team. And we are working
through a lot of the bugs in that right now. So we view it as a
proven performer. As you look at what I believe are the
requirements for the new normal that exists out there today,
you know, it is going to be independent deployers, as, you
know, Admiral Locklear has talked about that his requirement
out there as a combatant commander is in the neighborhood of,
you know, 50, 54 ships to maintain that engagement.
And we see that ability to be an independent deployer that
the LPD-17 hull and form brings in terms of their ability to do
C2 [command and control], the aviation capability, the medical
capability, and the surface capability are all the type of
capability that you want in a future ship to be able to do the
things that our Nation requires them to do for stability.
Mr. Wittman. Secretary Stackley, in that realm of the
perspective of the Marine Corps and also the Navy about the LPD
hull form, its capability, its need to be put into service as a
replacement for the LSD, understanding, too, that we have a
requirement for 38 amphibs; we are at 28 currently.
From your perspective, and hearing that the Marine Corps
looks at that as being able to meet their need, if the funding
was available, in your opinion, does Navy and Marine Corps need
another LPD?
Secretary Stackley. Let me answer that a couple ways.
First, you go back to the basic requirement, which CNO and
Commandant have agreed to in terms of the lift capability that
our Navy and Marine Corps team needs in total in terms of both
major combat operations, but more prevalent is just the routine
operations that are being conducted globally today.
So you have a balanced amphib [amphibious] force of 38
ships that are required to meet that requirement. And that is a
mixture of big-deck amphibs, the LPD-17 hull form, and today
the LSD-41. That gives you the total lift package.
Now, we don't have a plan to get to 38 ships. We have a
plan to get to 33 ships, which introduces some risk in terms of
being able to provide the total lift for a major combat
operation. But Navy and Marine Corps have agreed that that is
acceptable risk.
Now inside of that, when you take a look at the LSD-41/49
class and you say, well, should we continue with the LPD 17
hull form as replacement for LSD-41/49 class, the answer is
that is a lot more capability than the LSD-41/49 have today.
But the other thing that the Marine Corps is wrestling with
is their vehicles, their equipment that they deploy with is a
lot more than they had when the LSD-41/49 class was being
built.
So I think General Glueck and his team have worked--worked
hard in terms of trying to determine what the future lift
requirements are. And, you know, under those parameters, the
LPD-17 hull form is a better fit for the Marine Corps
requirement, independent of that 38, 33, total number of ship
requirement.
Now, the other thing we have to balance that with is
affordability. And that has been one of the challenges. So,
right now, we are completing the analysis of alternatives [AOA]
for the LSD-41 replacement, referred to as LXR, and the LPD-17
is prominent in that analysis of alternatives. And what we have
to wrestle with is, how do we get to a hull form that does
provide the degree of lift and capability that the LPD-17 does
but within an affordable top line.
And then the last, the last thing that we are wrestling
with, which doesn't show up in the AOA, it doesn't show up in
terms of Marine Corps requirements, is the industrial base
considerations. Now, when we look at shipbuilding, the area
where we are most fragile is in our amphib ship construction.
And it is just the nature of the beast. LPD-17 production, you
know, we have built out--we are building out our last of the
LPD-17s. We don't require construction of the LXR to start
until about the 2020 timeframe. And so this gap cannot be
filled simply with big-deck amphibs. So we are wrestling with
how to best mitigate the gap in production, how to deal with
the affordability issue that this budget stresses, and then how
to meet the Marine Corps' requirement in terms of lift
capability that an LP-17 would bring to the fight.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And aloha, Vice Admiral. Good to see you again.
Mr. Stackley, one of the things that has always plagued us
is really the question, what is the number? What is the number
that we need? You know, we have heard 306. We have--we are at
283. We had former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman here, who
was the famous almost 600. He corrected us and said he wasn't
quite at 600. And of course, Admiral Roughead was here, too,
and they were, like, 346, 348 or vice versa.
But then when the question then rises, okay, what comprises
that number? Then everyone sort of says, well, it depends on
what we need it for.
But we have got to acquire, as you know, and the build out
is going to be determined, I call it policy by acquisition,
because whatever we buy and we acquire kind of sets it for the
future.
So what is the number? What is the number that we need? We
have got to pivot to Asia-Pacific that Admiral Locklear has
made very clear that he doesn't feel like he has got enough
ships to do that. So what is it? Where are we going to go?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am. Let me start with just the
documented requirement. The Navy has a document referred to as
the Force Structure Assessment. It was last completed in 2012,
delivered to the Hill last year, signed out by the CNO, and
that is for a balanced force of 306 ships: 11 aircraft
carriers, 33 amphibious ships, 88 large surface combatants, 52
small service combatants, 48 attack boats, et cetera.
So 306 is the balanced force structure. But clearly, it
factors in affordability. So in his--in one of his hearings
earlier this year, the CNO, when answering this question,
described that, well, to meet the combatant commanders, the
full range of combatant commanders' demands or requirements, it
would take a 450-ship Navy. And nobody is contemplating a 450-
ship Navy today.
So what we are struggling with is what can we afford and
ensure that it is a balanced force. And then how do we take
that 306-ship Navy that is in the Force Structure Assessment
and meet to the best of our ability the combatant commanders'
demands. And that has going towards things like forward-
deploying ships, so you get greater operational availability,
greater presence. Take the LCS [littoral combat ship] class and
look at 52-ship class and having 26 of them deployed at any one
time, and just getting more mileage out of the ships that are
in the force, recognizing that we are going to be limited in
terms of the force structure that we can build with the budgets
that we have.
Ms. Hanabusa. The Army has said that they have more ships
than the Navy. Is that true?
Secretary Stackley. Well, first, I would describe that the
ships that the Army is referring to are predominantly lift
ships, prepositioning ships. But, otherwise, beyond those
larger ships, what the Army would call a ship wouldn't meet the
Navy's definition of a ship. And I will just stop right there.
Ms. Hanabusa. But the question is, for those that might
meet the definition of a ship, how many are we talking about?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy--the maritime, which includes
Military Sealift Command, the Navy, we have a portion of our
fleet, which is referred to as maritime prepositioning ship.
And so we have a number of ships that are prepositioned with
equipment loaded out in the event of a need for immediate
response to a crisis.
Beyond that, we have a Ready Reserve Fleet that are ships
that could be called up in the event that the Nation determined
that we wanted to activate these Ready Reserve ships. Total
number of those, I would have to get back to you with an exact
number. It is pretty well accounted for. But you are in the
double digits. A few years ago, it was about 50-plus Ready
Reserve ships and 19-odd pre-pos [prepositioning] ships.
Ms. Hanabusa. Before we broke, the statement you made that,
of course, I find troubling--I represent Hawaii--is the fact
that you said that even the Virginia-class subs would be at
risk, the two Virginia-class subs, at the sequester, if we
don't do anything with the sequester in 2016. So when you say
that, what do you mean? That we are not going to be able to
build the two? Or the two are not high enough in terms of
priority that they will be continue to be considered what we
need?
Secretary Stackley. Let me start with the requirement. So
we have a requirement for 48 attack submarines inside of that
Force Structure Assessment. Today we are at 54. So today it
looks like we have a surplus to the requirement, but the
reality is that during the period of the 1990s, we fell short
in terms of building out submarines. And so we need to sustain
a two-boat-per-year pace to minimize the shortfall that we are
going to be staring at in the 2020s.
So in the latter portion of the 2020s, 2029 timeframe, we
are going to--our projection right now is we will have 41
attack submarines against a 48-boat requirement. So that is a
screaming need.
So within the budget that we have submitted, we do, in
fact, sustain two boats per year. And our intent is to sustain
two boats per year except for those years in which we will be
procuring the Ohio replacement program submarines. So there
will be years when we are procuring one Virginia per year.
When I discussed what happens at the BCA levels, again,
these are the deliberations that we are going through right now
as we build the 2016 budget and we take a look at the choices
that we would have to make if we are down to the BCA levels. A
Virginia is under discussion in terms of whether or not it
would fit within our top line, along with the three DDG-51s,
along with the CVN-73 RCOH, along with a number of other ships
and aircraft in our program.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
I have exceeded my time. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General, you have been saying that you need a track
replacement for the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle fleet as
your number one priority for a long time. Now you have shifted
plans to buy a wheeled vehicle. Can you explain to the
committee, for the record, what has changed and where your
priorities are now?
General Glueck. Thank you for that question.
Our requirement has all been based on the requirement to
replace the AAV, which is a track vehicle that is coming up on
over 40 years of age.
Back 25 years ago, we developed a concept called Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver. And three elements of that were the MV-22,
the LCAC [Landing Craft Air Cushion] and then an AAAV [Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle], which was a high-speed vehicle,
track vehicle.
After a quarter of a century of research, and we looked at
this in many different ways, and actually a program name
changed to the EFV, you know, it was canceled. And it was
unaffordable.
We kept up an ACV directorate at that time, an advanced
combat vehicle directorate, that was focused on doing the
research on high speed technology to see if it was actually
realistic to achieve that goal in an affordable way, would give
us the operational capability that we wanted.
After 2 years of research, we found that a track vehicle
was able to get up on the plane and it could give us the 25
knots. However, there were very many tradeoffs to be able to do
that. And those tradeoffs were considered to be unacceptable in
performance potential to actually assure where 90 percent of
the vehicle would have its life ashore. So it was optimized for
10 percent of its mission and not optimized for 90 percent of
its mission.
So we went out to the Nevada test facility out in Carson
City, Nevada. And they have all the vehicles out there, all the
track vehicles we own, as well as all the wheeled vehicles that
we have in the inventory today and included the MPC, which is a
program that we had earlier that we were working on, Marine
Personnel Carrier. And we got a chance, took the Commandant out
there. We drove in every one of the vehicles. Went over their
course. And, you know, we saw that the difference between the
wheel technology and track technology. And, quite frankly, over
the past 20 years, the advancement in wheel technology has far
exceeded that of track technology because of the commercial
demand.
And so we found that because of the great leverage that we
have gotten from the commercial industry, that the capability
of the wheeled vehicle far exceeds that of a track vehicle. So
that is where we set up the program now to go ahead and pursue
the ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] as a wheeled vehicle.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
Can any of you explain to us what the GEF, the Global
Employment of the Force?
Admiral Mulloy. Sir, that is a classified portion of--it
falls out of from a planning guidance that basically says, when
I have so many assets, how do I break down what I would send
for where? So it is created by the Joint Staff working with the
Secretary of Defense and then the services as a classified
annex of how you would use the force. But it also then drives
to you later the states you have to set up. So we could
certainly provide something in writing back in terms of more
about what that is. But it is less in the resourcing area. It
is definitely in the planning area. But ultimately it does
drive us for a long-term view about what you have to have.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, do the combatant commanders have any
role in that, in creating that?
Admiral Mulloy. I know they are involved with when it gets
reviewed and developed. I believe it is developed by OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy and the Joint
Staff. It is staffed out for them to look at it. But I would--I
have to get back to you with the exact specifics of their role.
But almost everything we do under the reorganization, going all
the way back to Gramm-Rudman, is the combatant commanders have
a direct input to the Secretary of Defense on a wide variety of
items. So they do look at that.
Mr. Forbes. The question I would ask each of you, if you
would, for the record for this committee, if you would provide
a time when this committee could review that in a classified
setting, and we are happy to do it in a classified setting. We
have made those requests, and so far just haven't been able to
look at that. But we would like to do that. I think most of our
members would.
The second thing that I would like to ask, Mr. Secretary,
and I know this is no surprise to you, is aircraft carriers. We
talked about earlier where you said there is a statutory
requirement for 11 carriers. And I know that you appreciate
that. Secondly, we know that Congress had allocated and
appropriated money for at least the planning phases of that
carrier for this cycle, which I think was about $243 million.
Am I off a little bit on that?
Secretary Stackley. 245.
Mr. Forbes. 245. It is my understanding now, correct me if
I am wrong, that the Navy has basically said, we are not going
to utilize that, those planning dollars now. Is that correct?
Secretary Stackley. Partially. So, of the $245 million for
planning, a portion of that was associated with defueling the
aircraft carrier, a portion of it was associated with
modernizing the aircraft carrier, and a portion of it is
associated with the refueling piece. And so we are moving out
on the defueling piece because it is applicable to either path,
whether we inactivate or do the complex refueling overhaul for
CVN-73. So that is moving out. That is about $63 million. That
leaves $182 million that we have unobligated today that is
pending a determination of which path are we on, inactivate or
refuel.
Mr. Forbes. Now, help me with this, if you would. And,
again, please don't think I am talking about any one of three
of you because I know this is not necessarily your decisions.
But I remember when we looked at sequestration for a long
period of time and the President's budget continually ignored
sequestration. And we would ask, how come your budgets aren't
reflecting sequestration? And the answer we got from the
Pentagon was consistently, oh, this is so horrible, we can't
possibly look at it because it would be too impactful, so we
are just assuming it is going to go away.
And then we hear now as we look at the President's budget,
I think your statement was, and the nomenclature doesn't
matter, but we are going to take a pause because we are going
to see what happens to sequestration.
And when I am looking at the President's budget, why didn't
the President include enough money to bump up to do that
carrier in his budget? Because if it was the law, if it is, as
everyone says, so strategically important for us as a Nation,
the President didn't limit himself to what sequestration called
for, he bumped up those numbers. Why wasn't the carrier dollars
included in that budget that the President sent over?
Secretary Stackley. I am going to start this response and
then I am going to have Admiral Mulloy join in here.
My simplest description for this is last year, I think we
built six different budgets. And whereas normally we would
build a budget and refine it over time, last year we were
literally building a half a dozen different budgets. And this
is and around things like government shutdowns and furloughs
and everything else that was taking place.
And so we did not have clarity in terms of what budget was
going over to the Hill because we had not, one, received the
BBA had not been enacted yet, so we weren't sure which
direction Congress was heading in with 2014 and 2015. So there
was a lot of uncertainty very late in the day in terms of our
budget build process.
And when the determination--when the BBA became clear, and
the determination was we are going to retain that carrier if we
can retain this top line, frankly, at that stage of the budget
process, it was too difficult to move 7 billion into--inside of
that top line. And that is my simplest, clearest explanation of
where we are and how we got there.
And Admiral Mulloy can probably improve upon that.
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, sir. I would say it all comes down to
the timing. They were developing the plan to--when 2014 and
2015 locked in, as the Secretary pointed out, 2015 was a
dramatic cut, but we were able to balance and work with OSD to
be able to--and also appreciate the fully funding of the 2014
submarine that was done by the Hill. And so items came up that
freed some money, but not to the level we needed to have.
As OSD went down and looked at how do they lock all these--
the DOD [Department of Defense] budgets, the Navy point was,
here is money, we are going to fix some parts of shipbuilding.
But the carrier became a key component at the end. We have been
directed to continue to develop as work in POM-16 [Program
Objective Memorandum-16], given the DOD budget, across the FYDP
of that, what they call the green dash line, is that DOD will
work for resources to solve problems. The Marine Corps end
strength was one small component. The Navy, which is the
clearest and largest component that starts in 2016.
And so I think they are looking for what happens in the
2015 going to 2016 from the Hill. What does that look like. And
then economically. But we are going to develop a plan that has
the carrier in there as part of the Department of Defense
budget.
Mr. Forbes. I guess I still scratch my head a little bit on
if this carrier was a priority and if it was necessary to meet
the strategic guidance for 2012, which I assume it is, because
we have constantly been told it was, I don't--I am still
grasping with why the President didn't include it in his budget
when it came over here.
Admiral Mulloy. Sir, all I can say is, again, as Mr.
Stackley pointed out, we had six different budgets. If you
remember, last summer, DOD could not believe that we could not
cut two or three carriers. The Navy, through a tremendous
effort led by Mr. Stackley in the area of what it called good
stewardship. And of all the areas we tried to tighten, myself
as budget officer with execution and where can we make money,
we freed up money out of the Navy budget to be able to reduce
that number down. And it really came down to being as you are
spinning a lot of plates at the end as you lock this in
January, I believe that it was the Navy is saying is, you know,
this really isn't there yet, this is our budget. And everyone
said, we really want it in. We will go back and do it again.
Because it is--2015 was tight with the BBA. And we had the
room, as we showed you before, was, we can slide the carrier
because the Stennis comes later. We can make a decision in 2016
to start the ship and just still get it done. Basically it
will--we can still get down out of the dry dock in Newport News
before the Stennis comes in. It is pending upon economic
requirements. And that is really all I can tell you right now,
sir, on my understanding of my money as I lock that budget.
Mr. Forbes. And we appreciate all that you guys have done
and the terrible situation you have been in with budgets.
It is just as we look at the carrier and we hear the
rhetoric kind of coming out of the White House of why we
haven't made a decision, but we see you taking the appropriated
dollars that we had for the planning, for the refueling, not
utilizing those, we see no money in for the request to do the
acquisitions that would need to be done this year, and we don't
see it in the FYDP, but we saw it in before, it is kind of like
that old adage, if it walks likes a duck and quacks like a
duck, it is probably a duck. It looks like to us the decision
has been made to take the carrier out. But you are saying,
``but we could put it back in,'' as opposed to saying, ``we
have delayed the decision.''
And I hope that is wrong. And I hope Congress perhaps can
send a message that we need to correct that. But we certainly
don't fault any one of the three of you for that.
Secretary Stackley. Sir, the only thing I would add to what
you just described was the statement was actually a little bit
more clear in terms of we could put it back in. The statement
was we would put it back in if we can hold on to the budget
levels that we submitted with this budget.
Mr. Forbes. Last two questions. And then I want to get Mr.
Langevin's questions in.
Cruisers, you know, that is a big question. None of us so
far with the plans we have got have a comfort level that we
can--will ever see those cruisers come back out, at least on
the plan that we have now.
You know, and some of us are concerned that really what we
see is an elaborate way to bring about early retirement of
these cruisers after Congress has twice rejected this idea.
What comfort level can you give to this subcommittee that
these cruisers are going to come out?
Because everything we see is you telling us, as you just
said with the carrier, we will put it back if we get more
money. We know destroyers are next on the chopping block
perhaps to put some in, you know, next time. Give us that
comfort level that this committee would have that these
cruisers will see life again.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with a few key
points. One, today, we have $2.2 billion inside of the Ship
Modernization Overhaul and Sustainment Fund that Congress
established. In the last 2 years, when the Navy was struggling
with what our budget levels would be and our ability to retain
those cruisers, that fund was not in a working condition where
we could actually put it to work. What you all did with last
year's budget in terms of giving it life out to 2021 gives us
the ability now with certainty to put that money to work.
So a key part of the cruiser modernization plan, which,
one, gives you the ability to hold us accountable but, equally
important, gets us going, is we need to--our proposal is that
we take those 11 cruisers and we commence effectively
immediately CG-64 goes into her modernization at the end of
this year, and we would bring the other 10 cruisers into the
first phase of the phased plan, which starts with the hull,
mechanical, and electrical systems. And we would not wait a
number of years, but we would go into the 10 ships, baseline
their material conditions, get the material on order, and then,
working across the industrial base, phase and schedule those
ships to when they can most efficiently be modernized for the
hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. That is the front end
of the program; $2.2 billion won't get us all the way there. We
have some additional funding in the FYDP. And, frankly, we need
to work with you all to come up with a mechanism to replenish
the fund that has been established.
But in the near term, what we would be executing is a
modernization program for the cruisers that will bring their
material condition up to the level that it needs to be to get
them their extended service life. And then when you look
downstream in the 5-year period from now when they are
completing their HM&E modernization, then the Nation has
choices.
What we are proposing is we would complete the combat
systems portion of the modernization so that we can lockstep
replace retiring cruisers, the first 11, one for one, with the
fully modernized cruiser from the last 11 and then be able to
keep 11 cruisers tied to our battle groups out into the 2040s.
So, in terms of confidence and commitment, I think what we
propose to do is work with you on the details, detailed on the
front end. On the back end, what we would be dealing with is,
okay, the funding stream that would go with that plan--and,
frankly, we are relying on our ability to draw down the
manpower associated with the cruisers and the operating and
support costs during this period to help finance the combat
systems modernization on the back end. So we are committed to
giving you the level of detail that you need to give you
confidence that we are going to execute.
I think we can do this in a stepwise fashion so each step
of the process Congress has a clear eye on the condition of
those cruisers and our ability to complete the phases and so we
do not lose momentum as we go through the entire process.
Mr. Forbes. And we will look forward to kind of walking
through that plan. We trust each one of the three of you, but
we don't necessarily trust everybody else that might be
dictating that. And we don't trust all of our colleagues in
what they may do in budget discussions. That is why we want to
make sure that we have a plan that is going to be workable.
Last question I have is, has DOD performed a new analysis
of mission needs to identify what capability gaps the Navy
might need to address through a new shipbuilding program to
replace the littoral combat ship? If not, then how can DOD know
that it needs a new ship generally consistent with the
capabilities of a frigate? Where is the properly validated
requirements for this new program?
Secretary Stackley. I am going to start, and Admiral Mulloy
finish.
The requirements for the LCS program are well documented.
And right now we are moving smartly through the execution of
that program in terms of the basic hull and then the mission
packages.
What the Secretary of Defense described in his guidance to
us and then his subsequent announcement was that the Department
is looking to increase the lethality of the LCS and something
similar to a frigate. So we do have a requirements team taking
a hard look at exactly what would that mean. What missions,
what roles, what is the concept of operations, looking forward
beyond first 32, to those next 20 small surface combatants.
What is that concept of operations and the additional lethality
that it would require, similar to a frigate.
I don't want to predetermine the outcome of that review.
The team, frankly, is locked up in a war room that we have set
aside. What I would welcome and invite is your staff to visit,
to join, to take a look at the process, take a look at their
findings, interim findings along the way. And this then will be
used as we put together our 2016 budget and look at either
modifying the LCS or, if need be, a new ship class.
In either case, when it comes to modifying an LCS, we have
always contemplated future flights of LCS. So this could be a
very simple, straightforward, in-stride modification, just like
we do with other ship classes.
If it equates to a new ship class, that is a very different
picture. And so, again, just like every other discussion we
have had today, a piece of this requirements definition is
going to include affordability. So we have to strike the right
balance between what is that degree of added lethality, added
capability to an LCS that we need for the CONOPS [concept of
operations] in which you will be operating, which includes with
the rest of the battle force. And then what does that mean in
terms of cost? And what does that mean in terms of schedule,
when we would be able to introduce that capability for the
small service combatant.
Mr. Forbes. We are caught between two very powerful
currents that both want to go in different directions. I don't
know where the subcommittee ends up coming out. But we have got
to make sure they have the right analysis so we can make that
decision.
Admiral, if you want.
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, sir. What I would say is that the
requirements paperwork almost has to come after. But as the
Secretary pointed out, we do a lot of changes in other classes
of ships. I mean, as you look at the North Dakota, the first of
Flight IV, or the flight--I mean, the flight we are doing now
with the South Dakota, is, there have been changes. I mean, the
North Dakota is being built with vertical launch tubes in the
bow and a wraparound array. Nothing to do with the original
MNS/ORD [mission needs statement/operational requirement
document] when the Virginia was designed had that in it. Yet
the combat power and the design of that ship is fundamentally
changing. Flight III Burkes are not having a whole new set, but
they are fundamentally very different than Flight I when the
Burke was built.
So the Navy has a pattern of making changes to improve
ships. So we really have to get the tiger team, with which I
have some of my people on the staff, Admiral Aucoin does, Mr.
Stackley is leader, is this key component. And then is it a
change to the ship? Is a whole new ship? Either way, we can
write some paperwork faster than we have to.
I have a copy of the Nautilus, initial paperwork design
written by--in the 1950s. It is 6 pages long to build naval
nuclear power. It is not the document you would see that had
for Virginia class.
So I am not sure we have to go back to 6 pages. But I know
we can work faster on that once we define what we have. And I
think some of your staff coming to see this team or meet some
of the people would be outstanding. Because the Secretary has
taken it very seriously that we need to figure out what those
next 20 are. But we need small surface combatants, going back
to the FSA design, is small surface combatants fill a range of
needs. They are not all at the high end, but they magnify and
amplify phase 1 convoys, ASW [anti-submarine warfare]. They
also support phase zero operations around the world in
engagement. And that is what we need to go back to, what does
the ship have to bring? And what does it have to have for the
little higher end capability but mesh it into the whole class?
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin, recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. And we
appreciate the benefit of your testimony. And grateful for your
service. So thank you all.
Mr. Secretary, let me start with you. In your testimony,
you referenced the coupling of the Ohio replacement and the
U.K. [United Kingdom] Successor programs and the need to
maintain the current schedule and funding profile. Could you
outline for us your progress in driving costs out of this
system as well as some of the serious risks that would occur if
there was any further slippage to the program?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me first describe that
today we are on schedule in terms of both the Ohio replacement
program schedule and supporting the Successor. We have
effectively prosecuted the design of the common missile
compartment, which is the major portion of the design between
us and the U.K., ahead of when it would normally have been
designed, developed and designed, if we were just doing it for
the Ohio replacement. But that was done to support their
schedule, but it also helps us in terms of retiring some of our
risk ahead of the Ohio replacement.
In terms of progress regarding cost, we are going after two
pieces of the cost. We are going after the development costs,
and we are going after the unit costs for the submarine itself.
And we have a, what is referred to as a design for
affordability program in place between the Navy, Electric Boat,
and Newport News all participating, just taking a fundamental
look at, how is this new boat going to be designed? Where are
there opportunities to reduce its cost, either in terms of the
way we build or the way we buy?
But most fundamentally, the key portion in terms of keeping
cost and schedule under control is reusing technology to the
extent possible. So we are porting over as much of the Virginia
systems as we can that will apply to the Ohio replacement as
well as and equally important the strategic programs associated
with missile launch.
So key components that drive both cost and risk are being
tackled through mature designs and reuse. And then what that
leaves is the balance of the boat and new development that is
associated with improving survivability of the Ohio replacement
to last well into this century. That development has very
dedicated efforts to retire the risk. And that is where a lot
of our current research and development is focused.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you for that answer, Mr. Secretary.
On another program, as we watched the deployment of the
updated laser weapon system onboard the USS Ponce this year, I
know that the Navy is also working on other solid state laser
technical maturity program technologies to put a higher power
integrated weapons system to sea in 2016, as I understand it.
I particularly applaud the inclusion of a dedicated funding
stream in the budget for integration of these capabilities onto
existing platforms. I think that is a very positive
development, positive move in the right direction.
Could you offer an update from your perspective on the
status and the promise of these directed energy capabilities at
sea as well as other high energy weapons systems, such as
railguns.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. In terms of directed energy,
lasers and rail--electromagnetic railguns are the two principal
weapon systems that we are focused on right now. They both have
great promise matched by great challenges. So in terms of laser
development--in fact, we have gone down several paths trying to
get to a laser weapon system that would be appropriate for
shipboard weapons system.
The solid state laser broke through in terms of the
greatest potential. And what we are literally doing on Ponce is
we are not going to wait for the normal, natural development
timeline. CNO has basically said, let's get it out there. Let's
get it out there. Let's get it into the sailors' hands, let's
start to figure out what it means to operate in a marine
environment onboard ship a laser weapon system.
So we are going to run into all sorts of challenges that we
didn't fully anticipate. But the learning that is going to come
with putting that smaller scale laser weapon system on the
Ponce is going to accelerate the longer-term potential and
promise that lasers bring.
Not 2016, sir. We have got a ways to go in terms of
maturing the technology for the broader shipboard application.
But it is also on our priority list because of the potential it
provides.
Railguns are a bit different. Railgun is an extremely
unique technology. You are probably well aware we have
demonstrated its capability down at Dahlgren, the Naval Surface
Warfare Center. But we have several areas that we have got to
tackle in order to weaponize that potential. One is something
as simple as the barrel of the gun. We are dealing with large
electrical power. And so the barrel of the gun has got to be
able to handle, frankly, the megajoules that we are looking at
there.
A second is the projectile itself. You know, we are going
to be firing a projectile Mach 7. We need to ensure that--there
is a lot of testing that goes to developing a Mach 7 projectile
coming from the barrel of a gun. And a third part of the kill
chain is simply the fire control system.
So we have got a gun right now that on land, we can point,
we can fire a slug at Mach 7. What we have got to do is get to
a fire control system associated with this gun that can spot
the target and put the round on the target.
So those are three of the key technologies that we are
continuing to work while we demonstrate the basic technology.
We are going to, just like the laser weapon system, we are
going to get a smaller scale railgun and outfit onboard one of
our joint high speed vessels again to get it into the fleet's
hands, to demonstrate, and to create more momentum behind that
development.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, I am a strong supporter of
these type of technologies. I think are they are game changing,
and they are going to help the fleet be much more effective
as--and that goes across the services once these technologies
are further developed and ready for deployment.
Last question I have is we have invested billions of
dollars to ensure that our aircraft carriers project--can
project power anywhere on the globe. And it is critical that we
continue to make the investments to ensure that we are
leveraging our carriers' capabilities to the maximum extent
possible.
How do you envision Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance
and Strike enhancing the carrier wing?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, I will start this response, and I
will have Admiral Mulloy cap it off.
So, today, we have this demonstrator called UCAS, the
Unmanned Combat Air System, that has basically demonstrated the
ability to operate unmanned fixed wing on and off of an
aircraft carrier.
The next big thing we have got to figure out is how to
integrate it in the air wing. So it, in fact, does bring to
bear its capabilities in increasing the overall air wings'
capabilities.
In the near term, you described the Unmanned Carrier
Launched Aerial Strike and Surveillance system which we simply
call UCLASS. We are working on the request for proposal to go
out and compete the development of UCLASS so that we can deploy
nominally a half a dozen of these aircraft on a carrier late in
this decade to, in fact, not just integrate it in the air wing
but start to exploit some of the capabilities that it will
bring.
Clearly, its high endurance is going to give the Navy the
ability to provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance] capabilities for the carrier 24/7. It is going
to give us the ability to provide orbits, 6 to 1,200 miles away
from the carrier, 24/7, in the case of the 600-mile type of a
range. But beyond that, we are going to give it a strike
capability and then have the ability to start going after
targets of opportunity.
Beyond that, what I would propose is that we offer you a
classified brief so you can see where, in fact, we are looking
to go with this capability in the future.
Mr. Langevin. I would certainly welcome that.
And, Admiral, did you have something to add?
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, sir. I would like to further emphasize
that in the two parts of Mr. Stackley talked about risk
reduction. Right now, we are working with the UCAS, and we have
decided to extend that program, so we are working above
threshold program to come to the Hill in 2014, and you will see
in 2015 an added item to continue to fund for $50 million until
we actually get the UCLASS vehicles from this RFP [request for
proposal] to start coming. Because it comes in three sections,
sir. There is the air vehicle itself, which we are expecting
RFP. There is the carrier segment, which is onboard handling of
the vessel. And there is a communication and command and
control. Do you operate in the area? Does the CAG [carrier air
group] operate it? Does it turn over to a combatant commander
for the use, if we get extended range on it? So all three
sections have to come together. And the UCAS allows us to work
those. Some of it will be on an aircraft carrier. Some of it
will be actually flying at Pax River [Naval Air Station
Patuxent River]. Some may go to Fallon to work into the air
wing. So we are asking for the support.
So we are asking for the support for the ATR [above-
threshold reprogramming] and for this budget item for UCAS.
They all directly lead into the UCLASS program to retire the
risk of all these segments. We really are excited that we
acknowledged as a requirement in I think it was last year's NDA
they said get six vehicles first, and that is where we are
going on that was to get out there and get that on a carrier
and operate and see where it can go. But on those, what are
called key performance parameters, there are six and six key
supported parameters, there is the key system attributes that
all relate to the lethality, connectivity, modularity of that
and the ability that it can operate on a ship, that it has to
be able to operate at sea state 3 and be able to get to sea
state 5. It has to carry weight, it has to fly long enough that
it doesn't interfere with the air wing. You ideally want to
make sure this goes off early and can either stay out of one
full cycle or go out long enough that it doesn't interfere with
the flight deck, that it supports the CAG and the air wing by
being up all the time and not exhausting the crew. So you have
to marinize it, it is different than a land-based item. It has
to fit into what I call the flow of life in the battle group,
that it enhances the battle group, and therefore, it enhances
the combatant commander's needs, and that is what we are
working through with the RFP directly ties to those parameters,
sir.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, thank you for that answer, and I
applaud the Navy's work in this area and being so forward
thinking and working so aggressively to integrate this
capability into the carrier wing so it can enhance our
capabilities exponentially.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you for your patience.
As you know, one of the most important things of this
hearing is the transcript we create, not just your testimony.
We have submitted your written transcript or your written
testimony, but I would like to give you any time you need now
if there was something that we did not discuss that you think
is important that we get in that transcript for you to be able
to elaborate on now or something that perhaps was confusing
that you want to correct.
The other request I would make, not that you have to
respond to this now, but if you would respond back to the
committee, perhaps in writing, of those six budgets you
described, which of the budgets did not include CVN-73 in the
planning? Was it just the sequestration budget? And then if you
can, give us a little written explanation. We are still kind of
fumbling around to understand why we had time to plan for the
$115 billion and the $26 billion, almost $141 billion extra,
but we didn't have time to plan for the carrier.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 75.]
Mr. Forbes. And so, with that, General, would you like to
start off with any comments that you think that the Marine
Corps needs to make sure we get in this transcript that wasn't
in your testimony?
General Glueck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would say that we request your support in a couple areas.
One is the funding flexibility in the ACV way ahead. As you
know, the program has been evolving, and we have some money in
the budget, and what we would like to do is to be able to move
some of that money around to be more effective and efficient
with the funds that do exist, not asking for anything more.
Secondly, we would like to get your support on the funding
of the development of our high speed connector technology as we
move forward. Since we walked away from the high speed vehicle,
we now continue to pursue the high speed connector technology.
And lastly, support of increased amphibious ship investment
as well as the maintenance and inventories. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Mulloy. Yes, sir, I appreciate the chance to be
here. This is my first hearing, so I was very excited to be
over here, but I will say even better than I thought, I look
forward to talking to my family when I get home.
I would say the areas to expand, not so much directly
related to the cruiser but talking about ballistic missile
defense, is the Navy's path ahead is the DDG program. We are
building DDGs. Every one we are building now from the bottom up
is BMD [ballistic missile defense] compliant, and we are
looking forward to in fiscal year 2016 the very first of the
Flight III, which will have the advanced, the AMDR [Air and
Missile Defense Radar] radar and even greater capability to
provide that. And so the path ahead for us is to have the ships
converted, which is the Flight IIAs, we start the first one in
2016. You will see in this budget is funding for three sets. We
have to do the 2 years ahead of OPN [Other Procurement, Navy],
and then we want to start a path. So we acknowledge converting
the BMD Flight I and II ships, but we need to start doing the
IIAs because they are not any BMD capable. Flight Is and IIs
have some capability. The total need for the combatant
commander is to raise the number of capabilities, and it is
really not a cruiser issue; they are AAW [anti-aircraft
warfare] ships. It is a DDG issue, and that is our path to fund
that.
The other one is linking up with our Marine Corps is, we
support the tremendous efforts last year of the committees to
allow us to move the second AFSB [Afloat Forward Staging Base],
to fund it for SOF [special operations forces], other
modifications, and to finish that design, which will also
support our Marine Corps team. We are now looking at the
capability of integrating AFSBs and MLPs [Mobile Landing
Platforms] into more than just being a MPSRON [Maritime
Prepositioning Ship squadron] or the maritime squadron offload.
These will be able to go out and do exercises and advancements,
and we are very excited about this connectivity of an AFSB,
afloat staging base, would be a place for a Marine Corps
Special Purpose MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] to operate
as well as our special forces. So the CNO and SECNAV [Secretary
of the Navy] are very excited about, where can we take this
kind of technology of those ships to support our national
force, whether it is a national mission force or our Marine
Corps team to react to problems around the world that then
frees up the amphibs to remain tied to the amphibious group? So
I think you will see more on that as we go, and you will see in
the budget, we have added a third one in 2017 because we see a
need for three of these around--Ponce has been there; she is a
great ship. I was on her as a third-class midshipman, and she
is still out there working, but we need to have a solution that
solves problems. AFSBs are part of that. So, other than that,
sir, I thank you very much for your time.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you and thanks for being here
for the hearing, and you did a great job. And, you know, our
hearings are always fun and exciting, so they are always
enjoyable.
So, Mr. Secretary, we will let you finish up.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, I am probably just going to
run through a list here just to cap off a few topics.
Admiral Mulloy discussed the DDG mod program to get us up
through the Flight IIs, IIAs. We are on track for that. This
comes back a little bit, though, to the cruiser modernization
discussion as well. So when we come back to you with more
details on cruiser mod, what I would like to do is put that
side by side with destroyer mod so you can see a few things.
One, you will see how we are following through on that
commitment on the destroyers. I discussed the John Paul Jones,
you know, tracking and knocking out a ballistic missile target,
at the same time working a cruise missile target. That is
breakthrough capability. That came out of the destroyer
modernization program. That is the Aegis Baseline 9 that she
was, she was the first one to go through. So we are moving
through that smartly. When you overlay a cruiser mod on top of
that, a couple things will emerge. One is going to be capacity.
So when we talk about scheduling cruiser mod, both the HM&E and
the combat systems piece, what you need to take a hard look at
is the capacity and when do we have the time to do that, when
is it best to do cruisers versus destroyers, and that is going
to be part of our calculus as opposed to dealing with one in
isolation from the other.
Second is we talk about upgrading through the Flight IIA.
Flight III. Flight III is a great news story. We have awarded
the AMDR missile--I am sorry, the AMDR radar development
contract, and we are on track for the preliminary design review
for that radar later at the end of this calendar year, early in
fiscal year 2015. Similarly, we are doing the preliminary
design review [PDR] for the ship to take a look at the ship
impacts, and all of the concerns that had been previously
raised regarding shipboard margins for power cooling,
stability, and weight, those are all being clearly addressed,
and so we see the ship PDR coming along very well. We see the
development on the radar coming along very well, and we look
forward to coming back next year in our 2016 budget request,
where we will include the Flight III. Between now and then, we
will continue to work with your staff to demonstrate the
maturity of that design as it comes along.
General Glueck discussed the amphibs, we discussed the
amphibs. That is--when we look at all the industrial base
issues that we have in shipbuilding, that is one that is most
pressing, and it does not have a simple solution for all the
reasons that we have discussed, but we do look forward to
continuing to work with your subcommittee on this issue because
it is so important to us.
We have talked the CVN-73 at length, and I know we will
continue to talk it, discuss the issues surrounding that as we
go through the budget cycle, and you all deliberate on the 2015
bill that you ultimately pass.
Thank you for the discussion on LCS, I do hope that your
staff or yourself get the opportunity to come over, visit our
war room for those discussions.
The last two things I want to wrap up on, one is our
acquisition workforce. We are engineering-centric, rightfully
so. Last year was tough, tough, tough on our workforce. All the
pressures of the budget, all that churning of the budget, all
the uncertainty, the layoffs, the furloughs put our workforce
under great strain, but they hung in there. They hung in there,
and they are back at it this year unfazed, very dedicated. What
we have to do, and I look for you to keep a watchful eye on us,
is to preserve our investment in that workforce as we go
forward.
Congress put in place the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund that has been very instrumental for us to be
able to build up that skill set and get our engineering force
and our contracts officers, program management team up to the
level needed to succeed in the development of these difficult
programs. What we have to ensure is, as we face these budget
pressures, that we don't go back to where we started and see
the same type of fallout in terms of our shortfalls in program
management and development that we had seen about a decade ago.
Last is our development, our research and development. A
lot of this discussion today was on major programs, building--
sustaining the current fleet and building the next fleet, but
what we have to likewise keep an eye on is the fleet after
next, our R&D investments. Those capabilities that we are
looking at today, that we have to get across the long haul to
deal with the threat which, frankly, is investing heavily right
now. The threat is investing heavily right now in dealing with
our vulnerabilities. We have got to ensure that as the budget
pressures mount, we don't look at the R&D, we don't look at
cutting that R&D stream and forgoing the capabilities that we
have got to put in the hands of future sailors and Marines so
that they can enjoy the same degree of superiority that we
enjoy today.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, our country is very fortunate to
have the three of you serving in the capacities in which you
are serving. Thank you for giving us your time today, and with
that we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 26, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 26, 2014
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 26, 2014
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. The Department of the Navy
(DON) wants to retain CVN 73 if funding allows, as she remains critical
to maintaining presence, surge capacity, the condition and service life
of our other carriers, and the industrial base. The President's budget
(PB) request for 2015 maintains the option to refuel or inactivate CVN
73. The Department noted a decision regarding inactivation or
conducting a refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) is deferred to PB 2016.
As the Navy begins development of PB 2016 estimates, alternatives
regarding plans to commence RCOH planning are under consideration,
influenced by Congressional action in FY 2015. The Navy has proceeded
with ``next steps'' associated with the CVN 73 RCOH; specifically, the
allocation of 2014 funding to expand planning efforts in support of the
RCOH.
In developing PB 2015, the fiscal uncertainty challenged and
continues to challenge our ability to plan and budget over the long
term. As we developed the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for the FY
2015-2019 Future Years Defense Program during calendar year 2013, the
DON was faced with FY 2013 sequestration, civilian furloughs, a
government shutdown, and continuing resolutions. The Secretary of
Defense directed a Strategic Choices and Management Review to produce
options and identify choices necessary to comply with the revised
discretionary caps of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). Until the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA) was passed in December 2013, the
DON was preparing for sequestration in FY 2014 and beyond.
Due to this uncertainty, the DON was directed to produce several
POM 2015 budget options, including one at the PB 2014 level (the higher
caps of the BCA), one at the lower caps of the BCA (referred to as
Alternative POM), and one at the PB 2015 level. The PB 2014 level
provides the resources necessary to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG) and included the refueling of CVN 73. Under sequestration, we
would not be able to meet the DSG and were compelled to inactivate CVN
73 in the Alternative POM scenario.
While the BBA provides some relief from sequestration in FY 2014
and FY 2015, the funding level is lower than our PB 2014 request and
sequestration remains the law in FY 2016 and beyond. Because of the
time necessary to plan and execute such a significant force structure
reduction while preserving capability in the process, the Secretary of
Defense made the strategic decision to program for sequestration levels
in the later years of our PB 2015 submission for large force cuts,
including carrier strike groups. Past drawdowns have reduced force
structure too fast with too little planning. The resulting problems
required significant amounts of time and money to fix. [See page 30.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 26, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The budget request included funding to support the
inactivation of the USS George Washington but did not include funding
request to support the complex overhaul or the investment requirements
for the associated aviation wing. If the House of Representatives moves
to restore funds associated with the proposal, will the Navy initiate
the requisite contracts to obligate funds previously appropriated for
the USS George Washington's complex overhaul? What is the tipping point
for Navy to begin investment in this critical resource? What is the
damage in terms of cost and schedule in delaying the award of the USS
George Washington complex overhaul?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. The President's budget (PB)
request for 2015 maintains the option to refuel or inactivate CVN 73.
The Department noted a decision regarding inactivation or conducting a
refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) is deferred to PB 2016. As the Navy
begins development of PB 2016 estimates, alternatives regarding plans
to commence RCOH planning are under consideration, influenced by
Congressional action in FY 2015. As discussed in recent testimony
regarding the 2015 Budget request, the Navy has proceeded with ``next
steps'' associated with the CVN 72 RCOH; specifically, the allocation
of 2014 funding to expand planning efforts in support of the RCOH.
Mr. Forbes. The Chief of Naval Operations approved a program of
record decrease to the total aircraft procurement quantity for only 109
P-8 aircraft, despite the validated steady-state rotational and
warfighting contingency requirement for 117 P-8 aircraft. Please
describe the risk incurred by this decision, and how does the Navy plan
to mitigate the increased risk by procuring less P-8 aircraft than the
validated requirement?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. The Navy was compelled by
fiscal constraints to lower the final P-8A inventory objective from 117
to 109 aircraft. This change in the Program of Record does not alter
the P-3C-to-P-8A transition. With 109 P-8A aircraft, the Navy can meet
warfighting contingency requirements for major combat operations and
assumes acceptable risk in maritime homeland defense. To mitigate this
risk, the Navy will maintain an appropriate capacity of non-deployed
aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and other
aircraft for homeland defense missions. Further, this decision is
clearly ``reversible'' as P-8A production continues through this
decade. If the calculus associated with this decision changes due to
either a change to security requirements or a change to the budget
outlook, then the Navy has many opportunities to appropriately revise
the P-8A inventory objective.
Mr. Forbes. There has been much debate over the past several
months, primarily within the Department of Defense, to characterize and
codify what the air vehicle attributes of the UCLASS system
requirements should be as an unmanned, fixed-wing, carrier-based
aircraft. Can you describe for us some of the primary Key Performance
Parameters of the UCLASS air vehicle and how you expect some of those
KPP's to mature over time after source-selection and after the aircraft
is fielded?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. All UCLASS requirements have
been fully vetted and stable since the Capabilities Development
Document was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in April 2013.
The Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs),
as reviewed and concurred with by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (VCJCS), address endurance, sensor payload, weapons payload
(including mandatory future growth capability), survivability
(including mandatory future growth capability), aerial refueling (give
& receive), affordability, and schedule. The Navy and industry have
conducted extensive trade studies based on the latest and evolving
threat intelligence to ensure the threshold to objective growth in
those KPPs and KSAs are obtainable with the current fiscal constraints.
The resulting UCLASS acquisition strategy leverages industry's ability
to deliver, within 4-5 years from contract award, a capable and
survivable air vehicle while achieving the $150M cost per orbit KPP and
preserves the ability to incrementally increase future Air Vehicle (AV)
capability to match evolving threats. The in-depth technical
interchange that has been ongoing between the Navy and industry has
been instrumental in developing a comprehensive draft Request for
Proposal (RFP) presently under review. Once early operational
deployments are conducted and fleet inputs have been obtained on the
UCLASS concept of operations, the KPPs and KSAs in the Capabilities
Development Document will be updated to support the next acquisition
Milestone Decision.
Mr. Forbes. The committee understands that the Navy is embarking on
two separate analysis of alternative assessments to potentially develop
a Next-Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), and to develop a surface-
launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) weapon. Can you
describe for us why two separate analyses are being performed to
essentially fulfill what appears to be similar requirements, and what
risk is there involved in terminating Tomahawk Block IV production
after fiscal year 2015 while the analyses is on-going?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. The Department has two
separate mission areas that require assessment: 1. The follow-on to the
Tomahawk Weapon System (land-attack) and 2. Long-term OASuW (anti-
surface warfare). The Navy has commenced study efforts that will lead
to a material development decision (MDD) in Fiscal Year 2015 to
determine whether the Department will enter the Material Solution
Analysis Phase for two separate weapon systems (one land-attack weapon
and one anti-surface warfare weapon) or one weapon that performs both
missions. The analyses in progress take into account multiple factors,
to include launch platforms, target sets, warfighting scenarios,
CONOPS, kill-chains, technology maturity, and cost. These analytical
efforts place the Department on a path to address both mission areas.
Separately, the Navy has programmed for continued modernization of
the current inventory of Tomahawk weapons to improve their
effectiveness against the challenges posed by the increasingly capable
A2/AD threat environment. Ultimately however, although our Tomahawk
inventory is more than sufficient to address worst case operational
planning scenarios, the limits to our ability to modernize Tomahawk
dictate that we develop and deliver the next generation at sufficient
rate to replace the current Tomahawk inventory before it proves
obsolete.
Mr. Forbes. The Navy decided to procure 7 less E-2D aircraft in the
5-year multi-year procurement authorized in the FY14 National Defense
Authorization Act. Why did the Navy make this decision and what is the
impact of procuring 7 less aircraft during the 5-year multi-year
contract?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. The Navy's budget across the
Future Years' Defense Plan (FYDP) was reduced by $38 billion compared
to the FYDP submitted to the Congress when the higher levels of E-2D
procurement were planned within the multiyear procurement (MYP). This
budget reduction drove reduced procurement quantities across virtually
every program and resulted in the decision to delay the purchase of
seven E-2D aircraft into years outside of the current MYP contract (FY
2014-2018). The impact of delaying the procurement of these aircraft--a
cost increase per MYP aircraft of $7.4M due to reduction of economies
of scale and delay to Full Operational Capability from FY 2023 to FY
2025--is poignant example of the negative impact and inefficiencies
caused by the Budget Control Act reductions.
Mr. Forbes. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for the
Secretary of Defense has recently been critical of the P-8's initial
operational capability as only being equivalent to what the P-3
provides the Navy today. Will the P-8's capability remain at P-3 levels
during its service-life, or does the Navy have plans to increase its
capability above what the P-3 currently provides? If so, what
capability increases will occur as compared to the P-3 today?
Secretary Stackley. The P-8A Poseidon program is structured as an
evolutionary acquisition program delivering capability in three
separate increments. The overarching purpose of Increment 1, as defined
in the program's requirements documentation, is to replace the aging P-
3 airframe with a mission system that is at least equivalent to its P-3
predecessor. The Increment 1 configuration successfully completed
Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) in 2013 and has
subsequently deployed operationally. Though Increment 1 relied
primarily upon NDI sensor technology and evolutionary upgrades to
existing P-3 systems in order to minimize cost, schedule and technical
risk, the Increment 1 baseline still delivers significantly greater
mission capability than the P-3 in several important regards. First,
the basic airframe's significantly greater speed, range, and endurance
relative to the P-3 are of great operational benefit especially across
the broad areas encompassed by the Pacific Fleet's Area of
Responsibility. Second, both the basic airframe and the installed
mission systems are substantially more reliable than their predecessor
systems, especially in the case of the acoustic ASW subsystem. Finally,
several key mission systems improve on the performance of their
predecessors as a consequence of the continuous advancement of basic
mission computing and sensor technologies. Consequently, though only
required to equal the capability of the P-3's acoustic system, the P-
8's acoustic system can monitor twice the number of sonobuoys as the P-
3, and can display acoustic data using twice the available display
area, to a larger number of operators, and with far better integration
to the aircraft's other sensors. These P-8A Increment 1 improvements to
the P-3 baseline result in larger search areas while improving the
operator's ability to recognize ASW contacts when they are detected.
Similar Increment 1 improvements vs. the P-3 baseline exist for the P-
8's ESM and Self Protection systems. Collectively, these integrated
Increment 1 systems provide an excellent foundation upon which the P-8
Increment 2 and Increment 3 efforts will build.
P-8A Increment 2 begins a series of pre-planned upgrades that
deliver new capability to the Fleet on a recurring periodic cycle. The
first of these capability upgrades are on-track to deliver in 2015,
when the broad area Multi-static Active Coherent (MAC) acoustic ASW
capability is fielded as part of the first of three planned Increment 2
software deliveries. Following this delivery, Increment 2 will deliver
a high-altitude ASW search capability, an integrated Automatic
Identification System (AIS) to interrogate shipboard transponders,
enhanced MAC processing techniques to further increase the detection
performance of the baseline MAC system, a portfolio of other acoustic
signal processing upgrades vetted through the Maritime Patrol and
Reconnaissance community's Rapid Capability Insertion (RCI) process,
and a High Altitude ASW Weapon Capability (HAAWC). The air-to-air
refueling capability already resident in the basic airframe will also
be tested and certified for fleet use during this period. All of these
capabilities, which exceed the capabilities of the P-3 baseline, will
be fielded prior to the end of 2017.
Finally, Increment 3 is a critical piece of the P-8A evolutionary
strategy which will continue following the final Increment 2 software
release and which is designed to introduce the most extensive of all
currently planned P-8A capability upgrades. Elements of Increment 3
include the integration of Higher-Than-Secret (HTS) data processing
architectures, a fully Net Enabled ASuW Weapon, and extensive upgrades
to the following sensors and communications systems: Radar, Acoustics,
Link-16, Common Data Link, and SATCOM. Increment 3 also provides
extensive Net Centric capabilities through an Applications Based
Architecture (ABA) that is optimized to promote participation and
competition by 3rd party vendors and small businesses. Increment 3 is
currently conducting pre-EMD activities with a scheduled IOC for this
complete capability package of 2021.
Mr. Forbes. The fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act
limited to six the number of air vehicles the UCLASS program could
acquire prior to Milestone B to limit the cost and risk exposure of the
taxpayer until the Navy could determine how it was going to use the
UCLASS aircraft system. Do you anticipate any challenges associated
with limiting the UCLASS aircraft to six prior to achieving Milestone B
in the program?
Secretary Stackley. The 2014 NDAA language associated with limiting
the quantity to six prior to Milestone B does present challenges to the
UCLASS program's ability to meet schedule and Early Operational
Capability (EOC). The Department intends to develop a UCLASS system and
associated CONOPS to achieve the JROC (JROCM 196-12) directed
capability of sustaining two unrefueled orbits (defined as 24/7
constant coverage) at 600nm radius per CVN. Under the current plan, the
Department will use these developed CONOPS to refine the system
requirements to ensure affordability and continue to limit taxpayer
exposure during procurement.
Based upon information obtained during Preliminary Design Reviews,
the Department estimates that six air vehicles per CVN will be
necessary to achieve the unrefueled orbit requirement. At least two
dedicated test air vehicles (non-deployable) are needed to complete the
required UCLASS test and certification events to fully verify the
flight, weapons release, and sensor performance envelopes of the UCLASS
system. The limit of six air vehicles prior to Milestone B will leave
only four air vehicles for the EOC deployments, which will be
insufficient to fully evaluate the system's intended capability and
develop the associated CONOPS.
Based on the need to support the EOC deployments with a full UCLASS
system while simultaneously conducting post-EOC testing, the Department
recommends that the number of air vehicles that may be procured prior
to Milestone B be increased to eight. We will continue to work with the
respective Committee staffs to address all concerns associated with
requirements, technical maturity, and acquisition strategy with the
intent of gaining concurrence on the substantive issues in order to
successfully deliver this needed capability.
Mr. Forbes. I understand the Marine Corps has restructured the ACV
program, to include a wheeled armored personnel carrier, and that this
vehicle will be fielded before the high water speed amphibious assault
vehicle variant. Will the wheeled vehicle that will be procured prior
to the high water speed solution be a commercial-off-the shelf
solution? How many of these wheeled vehicles do you plan to procure?
Secretary Stackley. No, the wheeled armored personnel carrier will
not be a commercial-off-the-shelf solution. Given the maturity of this
type of vehicle in the combat market and because of the engineering and
requirements work we have done with the industry over the last 8 years,
we believe that a solution that meets our essential operational
requirements will be available without significant research and
development costs that have to be borne by the taxpayer . We intend to
field this vehicle in phases, ultimately outfitting at least six of our
ten Assault Amphibian companies. This will require approximately 700
vehicles. We will refine the requirement for future phases as we
determine the capacity of each individual vehicle.
Mr. Forbes. CBO has estimated that an average of $19.3 billion per
year over the next 30 years is required to meet the 306-ship goal. Is
your sense that 306 ships is a realistic goal? With the programming
average of $16.8 billion over the next 5 years, has the Navy invested
sufficient resources to meet the 306-ship goal?
Admiral Mulloy. The 306 ship battle force is not a goal but rather
a requirement. The 2012 Force Structure Assessment (FSA), a
comprehensive and rigorous analytical assessment, determined a post-
2020 requirement for 306 ships in the battle force and emphasized
forward presence while re-examining resourcing requirements for
operational plans and defense planning scenarios.
Yes, the FY2015 President's Budget invests sufficient resources to
meet the FSA requirement as the battle force will increase to 309 ships
by the end of FY2019.
While we can meet today's resourcing needs, the impact of funding
the Ohio Replacement SSBN, which is what drives the CBO average so
high, will be dramatic. Moving the Navy SCN funding to an average of
$19.3B per year for the next 30 years, without shorting Navy account of
readiness, manpower, and modernization funding, is not possible without
outside support.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Locklear provided testimony earlier this month
to the House Armed Services Committee and provided the following
information with regards to the potential reduction of an aircraft
carrier, ``You have about 10 [aircraft carriers] now. We can't support
the global demand.'' He went on and said ``One thing for sure, in my
experience is that--that part of the U.S. global leadership is maritime
dominance, where we choose to have it. And at the front of that
maritime dominance, which starts to become very important, particularly
in the world we're in today, are the capabilities that aircraft
carriers bring.'' What is your assessment about a potential reduction
in aircraft carrier force structure and the impact to the supporting
combatant commander requirements?
Admiral Mulloy. With an 11-carrier force the Navy has met, on
average, 50% of Combatant Commander (COCOM) demand for aircraft
carriers since FY13. A permanent force structure reduction to 10
aircraft carriers would further impact Navy's ability to meet COCOM
presence requirements. The impact of not meeting the COCOM demand and
presence requirements resides primarily in managing risk. That risk is
defined by uncertainty in Navy's ability to meet some portion of
security objectives and prompt response to a crisis with forces already
in theater. As mitigation, the Department of Defense would continue to
employ the Global Force Management process to most effectively allocate
Naval forces to the highest priority COCOM requirements.
Mr. Forbes. I understand the Marine Corps has restructured the ACV
program, to include a wheeled armored personnel carrier, and that this
vehicle will be fielded before the high water speed amphibious assault
vehicle variant. Will the wheeled vehicle that will be procured prior
to the high water speed solution be a commercial-off-the shelf
solution? How many of these wheeled vehicles do you plan to procure?
General Glueck. It will not be a commercial-off-the-shelf solution.
However, given the maturity of this type of variant in the combat
vehicle market and in light of the engineering and requirements work we
have done with the industry over the last eight years, we believe that
a wheeled solution that meets our essential operational requirements
will be available without significant development. We intend to procure
approximately 700 of these vehicles in phases. We will refine the
requirement for future phases as we determine the capacity and
capabilities of each individual variant.
Mr. Forbes. Will the wheeled vehicle that will be procured prior to
a high water speed solution use ACV funding lines?
General Glueck. Yes. We intend to test and procure these vehicles
in phases. It is our desire to use ACV funding lines for necessary
RDT&E now and for procurement to provide an initial operational
capability in the early 2020s.
Mr. Forbes. Based on this new ACV acquisition strategy, does this
mean the Marine Corps will plan to look more at ship-to-shore connector
solutions for high water speed requirements?
General Glueck. Yes. Due to Expeditionary Force 21, our new
capstone concept, as well as threat capabilities, our operating forces,
in coordination with the Navy, must be prepared to operate from a sea
base established at distances greater than 50 nautical miles from the
shore. For high speed, we will be dependent upon multiple and flexible
ship-to-shore connector solutions to support closing that gap as
rapidly as possible. As a result connectors such as the LCAC and LCU,
their planned replacements, and their complementary effects with the
ACV become required critical capabilities to support maneuvering combat
and combat support forces and equipment ashore at relatively high
speeds.
Mr. Forbes. How is the wheeled vehicle that will be procured as
part of the ACV program different from that of current Marine Corps
Light Armored Vehicles? Why not modified those existing vehicles to
meet the phase 1 requirements?
General Glueck. The Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV-25) is
a reconnaissance vehicle designed to support the Light Armored
Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion Mission and is designed to be employed
by a 3-Marine crew and carries a 4-Marine reconnaissance scout section.
The LAV-25 has been in the Marine Corps inventory since 1983 and has
reached the end of its growth margin due to several modifications made
over its lifespan. We intend to continue to employ our LAVs in LAR
Battalions well into the 2030s until we can replace them. The ACV is
required to equip the Marine Assault Amphibian Battalions who have the
mission to provide amphibious and armored mobility to Marine Corps
infantry and selected other elements of the Marine Air Ground Task
Force. The ACV will have the basic requirement to carry at least 10
infantrymen in addition to a three Marine crew and multiple days'
supply of food, water, munitions, etc. In addition to this expanded
carry requirement, it must be highly mobile on land under load and with
significant ballistic and underbelly IED protection. It will also need
a robust swim capability to operate effectively in the littorals, with
a shore-to-shore capability, to permit seamless maneuver through
rivers, lakes, and in the ocean with the capability of safely
negotiating surf zones. The LAV is not capable of these requirements.
The ACV will provide a balanced protection, payload and performance
capability to embarked infantry with improved armor-protected mobility
to the objective.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. Given the current state of combatant ship numbers, how
significant is the ``risk'' to mission for maintaining security for
freedom of navigation and commerce? What is the breaking point for not
being able to fulfill this capability?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. Freedom of Navigation (FoN)
operations involve naval units transiting disputed areas to avoid
setting the precedent that the international community has accepted
these unlawful claims. Since these FoN operations typically involve
only a few ships, as long as the Navy continues routine overseas
deployments, our ability to provide forces for this mission is not at
risk with our current force structure.
Freedom of commerce is similarly assured by our ships on routine
deployments, through both normal presence and periodic transit of
strategic chokepoints and high threat areas (such as areas subject to
threat of piracy).
Current Navy force structure provides assurance to our allies of
our resolve to support freedom of navigation including transit of
disputed or high-threat areas, and signals to potential adversaries
that the U.S. is committed to maintaining freedom of navigation and the
unimpeded flow of maritime commerce.
Mr. Conaway. In the frame of capacity building with regional
partners in combination with a lowered U.S. naval capacity to provide
sustained forward presence, how will the U.S. dependence increase for
partner-nations for providing regional maritime security and ensure
safe sea lanes for U.S. commerce?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Mulloy. Navy's adoption of the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP) and increased use of forward
deployed Navy assets has stabilized Navy's ability to continue
providing forward presence at approximately the same level as in recent
years. By 2020, ship presence in the Asia-Pacific region will increase
to about 67 ships, up from about 50 on average today. Presence in the
Middle East will increase from about 30 ships on average today to about
41. Efforts to partner in maritime security missions are desired and
encouraged as they build confidence and interoperability between
nations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. Please address the benefits that timely AP funding can
have especially in successful shipbuilding programs like the ongoing
Mobile Landing Platform/Afloat Forward Staging Base shipbuilding
program?
Secretary Stackley. Advanced Procurement (AP) funding for advanced
planning efforts and procurement of long lead time material (LLTM) has
been successfully employed on a number of shipbuilding programs to meet
ship construction schedules. Further, such funding provides critical
stability across the shipbuilding industrial base--from key vendors
manufacturing unique equipment and components to our shipbuilders--by
enabling workload stability and level loading, thus avoiding
debilitating production breaks that threaten layoffs, loss of skilled
labor, and cost growth. In addition, some shipbuilding programs have
employed economic order quantities (EOQ) associated with multiyear
procurement contracts to achieve increased savings.
With respect to the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) program, advanced
planning and the procurement of LLTM components occurred on MLP 3 AFSB.
The Navy requested AP funds for detail design efforts for MLP 4 AFSB in
the FY 2013 President's Budget Submission. However, no AP funds were
appropriated, and the ship was fully funded in FY 2014.
Mr. Hunter. Since a determination was made that having a third
Afloat Forward Staging Base ship is required, and since funds were
sought, authorized and appropriated in FY14 to procure the second
Afloat Forward Staging Base ship, wouldn't it make sense to work to
allocate some meaningful level of AP funding this coming fiscal year,
FY15, or certainly no later than next fiscal year, FY16, in order to
support the cost-efficient and timely production of this required ship
with the specialized supplier base and shipbuilder?
Secretary Stackley. Advanced Procurement (AP) funding is budgeted
on a lead-time basis for material and design efforts necessary to meet
ship construction schedules. FY 2015 AP is not required for the FY 2017
ship. The Department will take the matter of FY 2016 AP for the FY 2017
ship into consideration during development of the FY 2016 budget
submission. However, past efforts to budget for AP for the purpose of
efficiencies and to avoid production gaps have not historically been
supported by the Appropriations Committee and are therefore considered
high risk by the Department.
Mr. Hunter. Given that your recent testimony and PB15 budget
exhibits confirm that there would be a 3-year interval between start-
of-construction of the FY14 funded AFSB ship and start-of-construction
of the budgeted FY17 AFSB ship, what actions could the Navy and
Congress take--including but not limited to the allocation of timely AP
funding--to minimize a production gap between these two urgently
required ships?
Secretary Stackley. Upon its award, the fourth Mobile Landing
Platform (MLP 4) will provide new construction workload for the
shipyard through 2017. A production gap would exist between the
completion of MLP 4 and start of construction of MLP 5 (if awarded in
FY 2017). While FY 2016 Advanced Procurement (AP) funding could
possibly help to mitigate the gap, FY 2015 AP is not required for the
FY 2017 ship. The Navy will take the matter into consideration during
development of the FY 2016 budget submission. However, despite the
benefits provided by Advanced Procurement in terms of cost efficiency
and production stability, the historical lack of support for AP by the
Appropriations Committee is a significant factor in the Department's
determination of whether or not to request such funds in our budget
submission.
Mr. Hunter. Additionally in relation to the TAO(X) fleet oiler
recapitalization program, wouldn't it make sense to work to allocate
some AP funding in the FY17 timeframe for the second TAO(X) fleet oiler
slated for FY18 procurement in order to help achieve desired
programmatic and acquisition objectives and in the industrial base?
Secretary Stackley. Advanced Procurement (AP) funding for advanced
planning and procurement of long lead time material (LLTM) may be
appropriate in FY 2017 to support the timely and efficient production
of the second T-AO(X) ship in FY 2018. On more complex war ship
designs, the Navy typically includes a ``gap'' year following award of
the lead ship to properly allow the design to reach sufficient
maturity, and to avoid ``two'' lead ships. T-AO(X) is planned as a
commercial-oriented, non-developmental design, and would likely benefit
from AP funding in FY 2017 and the resulting improvement in production
efficiency. The Navy will take AP into consideration during the
development of the FY 2017 budget. However, despite the benefits
provided by Advanced Procurement in terms of cost efficiency and
production stability, the historical lack of support for AP by the
Appropriations Committee is a significant factor in the Department's
determination of whether or not to request such funds in our budget
submission.