[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-95]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY, MARINE CORPS,
AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 26, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOHN GARAMENDI, California
PAUL COOK, California RON BARBER, Arizona
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
ROB BISHOP, Utah MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
John Sullivan, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force Combat Aviation Programs......................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 26, 2014........................................ 29
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION
PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 3
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces................... 1
WITNESSES
Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer
for the F-35 Joint Program Office.............................. 4
Grosklags, VADM Paul A., USN, Principal Military Deputy,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and
Acquisition; accompanied by LtGen Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.,
USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, and RADM Michael C.
Manazir, USN, Director, Air Warfare, OPNAV N98................. 17
LaPlante, William A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition; accompanied by Lt Gen Burton M. Field, USAF,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements,
U.S. Air Force................................................. 18
Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C................................. 33
Grosklags, VADM Paul A., joint with LtGen Robert E. Schmidle,
Jr., and RADM Michael C. Manazir........................... 76
LaPlante, William A., joint with Lt Gen Burton M. Field...... 106
Sullivan, Michael J.......................................... 64
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Response to Request for Information on Department of the
Navy's Aviation Procurement Programs....................... 135
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Jones, Walter B.............................................. 167
Smith, Adam.................................................. 167
Turner, Michael.............................................. 157
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 26, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:37 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R.
Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Turner. Call to order the Subcommittee on Tactical Air
and Land Forces.
I want to apologize for being late. I was doing the
important people's work of being on the House floor
congratulating the University of Dayton, which is in my
community, and which I am alumnus, on entering the Sweet 16,
and wishing them well on their game tomorrow night.
But, this committee meets here today to receive testimony
on the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force budget requests for
combat aircraft programs for fiscal year 2015.
Our hearing today will consist of two panels. In the first
panel, we will hear testimony on the F-35 program, and the
second panel will consist of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
acquisition and requirements official, who will provide
testimony on the services' combat aviation programs.
On the first panel, we welcome Lieutenant General
Christopher Bogdan, F-35 Program Executive Officer, and Mr.
Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing,
Government Accountability Office [GAO].
The second panel, our witnesses are: Vice Admiral Paul
Grosklags, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition);
Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle, Deputy Commandant of the
Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Michael Manazir,
Director of the Air Warfare Division for the U.S. Navy; Dr.
William LaPlante, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition; and Lieutenant General Burton Field, Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans, and Requirements.
I thank you all for your service and your testimonies
today.
We have a number of issues to cover today. But my opening
remarks will focus on the F-35 and budget reductions in the
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force budget requests.
The F-35, a fifth-generation fighter, is required to
achieve the effects necessary to win in an integrated anti-
access/area denial [A2/AD] environment. Over the last year,
slow but steady progress was achieved in development,
production, and operations. The F-35 did well in testing last
year, but with about one-half of flight testing completed. Much
testing remains to demonstrate and verify its performance.
This year, as was the case last year, F-35 software
development is still of particular concern. The GAO's primary
concern is that software development may be taking longer than
expected, resulting in a potential delay of initial operational
capability for the three F-35 variants.
The Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces also shares that
concern. And for the fiscal year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Act [NDAA], the subcommittee included a provision
that would require an independent team to review the F-35
software development program and provide recommendations for
improvement. This provision was adopted by the House-Senate
Conference Committee and included in the fiscal year 2014
National Defense Authorization Act. We expect the Department of
Defense to send us that report no later than June of this year.
This is an area the subcommittee continues to watch to
ensure that the final software block of the development phase
is completed on schedule. While the capability of the F-35 is
needed for the future, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
cannot ignore the modernization and life extension upgrades for
their legacy fleets of AV-8Bs, FA-18s, F-15s, and F-16s, and
the sustainment of those fleets.
As most of you know, I didn't support the Budget Control
Act [BCA] of 2011. But now, unfortunately, the effects of this
act and sequestration have become apparent in this budget
request which will reduce both capacity and capability in our
Strike Fighter forces, resulting in higher risk in achieving
military objectives in the future.
Last year, the fiscal year 2015 through 2019, the Navy
anticipated procurement of 69 F-35Cs. This year, the Navy's
budget plans for only 36, a 52 percent reduction. These F-35C
procurement reductions have resulted in an increase in the
Navy's Strike Fighter shortfall, from 18 last year to 35 this
year, in the 2023 timeframe. With fewer F-35Cs, the Navy Strike
Fighter fleet will be less capable.
For the Air Force, budget reductions have required the Air
Force to lower its F-35 procurement in fiscal years 2015 from
30 to 26, a 13 percent reduction. Additionally, the Air Force
proposes retirement of the entire A-10 fleet, and 51 F-15Cs in
the Future Years Defense Program. While the Air Force did not
report a Strike Fighter shortfall last year, this year the Air
Force projects that it will have a shortfall of 175 Strike
Fighter aircraft in fiscal year 2019, 9 percent below its
required inventory of 1900 Strike Fighter aircraft.
The Air Force has also proposed the termination of the F-
16's Combat Avionics Program Extension Suite, or CAPES. CAPES
would equip the block 40, 42, 50, and 52 fleets with new radars
and defense systems that increase survivability against
emerging threats. Without CAPES, the Air Force F-16 fleet will
be less capable.
I look forward to the testimony today of our witnesses, and
I hope that they will be able to expand on the risks associated
with the capacity and capability reductions in our combat
aviation forces.
And, with that, I would like to recognize my good friend
and colleague Loretta Sanchez.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being before us today.
Today's hearing will focus on fiscal year 2015 Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force requests for tactical aircraft
development, modifications, and procurement. And like almost
all the parts of the DOD [Department of Defense] budget, there
are significant reductions and changes being proposed in this
area because of the decline in the overall funding picture.
However, it is important to remember that today the United
States remains the only country that can deploy and maintain
thousands of combat aircraft almost anywhere in the world.
The U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps total tactical aircraft
fleet alone, is larger than almost any other nation's entire
air force. In addition, the United States also remains the
world's leader in tactical aircraft technology, including
stealth, unmanned aircraft, engine performance, electronic
warfare, precision-guided weapons, et cetera, et cetera.
So it seems that the critical question for today's hearing
is how the 2015 budget proposal affects the United States
current dominance in the area of air warfare. And I think that
this--that is one of the subcommittee's most important roles,
is trying to maintain our advantage with respect to that.
Also want to note that complex aircraft programs take a
long time to come to fruition, and so whatever we do today is
going to impact what we look like in the future. And making the
right investments of course may not pay off for a decade or
more.
For example, it was investment decisions by the DOD and
Congress in the 1970s that allows us to have a highly effective
F-16 and F-18 aircraft still in the Air Force and the Navy
today. In the time, there were many critics of that aircraft.
They were said to be too expensive, too complicated,
unaffordable to maintain, and to be sure, in both cases, it
took time to get the aircraft as capable as they are today.
And I want to say that because eventually we fix the
problems and, of course, these are some of our most important
tactical fighters today. And I think it is important to see
that as we look at this F-35 program, which is what this first
panel is going to be about. Because the F-35 also has many
critics, and this program is very complex. And we have earlier
versions flying today that aren't as reliable as we would like
them to be, don't meet all the capability goals that we need.
But we need to figure out whether they are on the right
trajectory to ensure that we have the right product for our men
and women in the military, especially keeping in mind the
history, for example, of the F-16 and the F-18.
So we have to make decisions today on the F-35 that will
impact the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps in the
2020s and the 2030s and maybe beyond, and at the same time we
have to ensure that taxpayer funds are used correctly. And so I
am really looking forward to this presentation today and this
give and take, because this is a highly complex program.
And, of course, the second panel on today's hearing will
focus on all the other tactical and intelligence aircraft
programs beyond the F-35, and there are a lot of pressing
issues there also. One of them is the fate of the A-10
aircraft, for example. The Air Force is proposing to retire all
283 A-10s over the next 5 years. But in most cases, they
propose to replace them with F-16s or F-35s or other aircraft.
And, you know, production line of the F-18 is--which is
scheduled to close in 2016, some in Congress are proposing that
we procure more EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft. But
it comes at a very high price, and the Navy may not need more
of these aircraft if it ends up eliminating an aircraft carrier
and an associated wing, for example.
And, finally, this subcommittee has to consider the whole
arena of unmanned aircraft, the ones we fly today and the ones
we have for the future. You know, we had the Global Hawk on the
cutting block recently and it was kept in, and now the reversal
is taking place. Now we want to retire the U-2 in 2016 and keep
the Global Hawk. So both aircrafts have different advantages to
them. I look forward to hearing from the Air Force, why they
have gone in this direction, for example.
So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is going to be a very
interesting hearing.
Thank you.
Mr. Runyan [presiding]. Thank the ranking member.
And with that, I now recognize General Bogdan for his oral
testimony.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR THE F-35 JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
General Bogdan. Thank you, Congressman.
Congressman and Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
address this committee and discuss the F-35 Lightning II
program today. Over the past few years, we focused on creating
and maintaining a realistic program baseline for DOD's largest
acquisition program. And despite a turbulent past, the program
is making slow but steady progress on all fronts to include
technical improvements and driving costs out of the program. I
believe the F-35 program is headed in the right direction now,
and I am confident in our ability to meet U.S. Marine Corps
initial operating capability and Air Force initial operating
capability in the summers of 2015 and 2016, respectively, with
all the capabilities our warfighters need.
We are now seeing the benefits of a disciplined systems
engineering process that we instituted a few years ago in
response to many of our technical issues, including
improvements in the helmet, the hook, our fuel dump capability,
weapons capability, lightning protection, and night and all-
weather flying. We are closely managing F-35 on-board and off-
board software, and software still remains the number one risk
on the program.
We have also fundamentally changed the way we are
developing the ALIS system, our [Automatic] Logistics
Information System, and are starting to see some incremental
improvements there.
We are also fully committed to making the F-35 more
affordable in both the cost of buying the airplanes and the
cost of operating and sustaining the aircraft.
Finally, I want to thank the Congress and the Department of
Defense for their support during the past 2 years of budget
instability. The program has weathered this storm relatively
intact. We have made no changes to the development program, and
our aircraft quantities were preserved in fiscal year 2013 and
fiscal year 2014, though the Department has reduced quantities
in fiscal year 2015.
I would like to close by saying that my team is focused and
committed to doing the very best we can for the warfighters,
the taxpayers, and our partners to ensure the F-35 meets all of
our needs. To that end, my team is rising to the challenge of
managing this very large and complex program with integrity,
transparency, accountability, and discipline.
I ask that you hold me and my team accountable in the
coming years to ensure that we develop and deliver the
warfighting capability that this country needs and expects.
I look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Bogdan can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, General.
Mr. Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sanchez, members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-
35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter. With
estimated costs near $400 billion today, the F-35 is the
Department's most costly acquisition program. And with its
three variants, it will provide fifth-generation fighter
capabilities for the United States Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps, as well as eight international partners.
As we have reported in the past, the program's acquisition
strategy originally called for high levels of concurrency
between testing and production, and, as a result, it has
encountered significant costs and schedule growth, and has been
restructured three times.
First in 2003 and then again in 2007 and then again in
2012, when the Department increased the program's cost
estimates, extended its testing and delivery schedules, and
deferred the procurement of 410 aircraft into the future. Since
that time, the program has remained stable; costs and schedule
has also remained stable.
My testimony today is based on our March 2014 report, which
was just released Monday, and I believe the committee has a
copy of. And I would like to just make some quick points on the
risk the program still faces concerning software development
and future funding as well as some of the progress they have
made with regard to manufacturing.
Software development challenges continued through 2013 due
largely to delays in getting the software for Block 2B to
flight test, then limited capability once it was delivered, and
the need to fix and retest multiple software versions. So there
is a lot of churn with the software development at this time.
In addition to risking the delivery of less than required
initial operating capabilities for the Marines by 2015, these
delays could increase the already significant concurrency
between testing and procurement and result in additional cost
growth. So there is--I am talking about this in terms of risk
potential, not necessarily things that are happening today.
Finally, without a clear understanding of the initial
capabilities that will be delivered, the services may not be
able to make fully informed resource allocation decisions. To
execute the program as planned, the Department plans to
increase annual funding steeply over the next 5 years. It has a
total of more than $50 billion in its current Future Years
Defense Plan, and after that, it then plans to sustain an
average of about $12.6 billion per year for this aircraft
through 2037.
So annual funding of this magnitude clearly poses long-term
affordability risks, especially given the nature of the current
fiscal environment. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has directed the program
to find ways to reduce unit costs on these aircraft before
full-rate production begins. But meeting those targets will be
challenging, as significant cost reductions are still needed
there.
Sustainment cost estimates also strain affordability
constraints. The Department's most recent estimates for
operating and supporting the F-35 fleet are somewhere between
$850 billion and $1 trillion, which Department officials have
deemed unaffordable. The key driver separating those estimating
assumptions is assumptions about future inflation rates.
On the upside, the aircraft manufacturing continued to
improve in 2013. As the number of aircraft in production has
increased, manufacturing efficiency has increased
significantly, and the contractor has steadily reduced the
overall labor hours needed to manufacture the aircraft.
In 2013, the contractor delivered 35 aircraft to the
government, 5 more than it delivered in 2012 and 26 more than
it delivered in 2011, and it is on track to deliver 39 more
aircraft in 2014. It has now delivered just over 100 aircraft
and has another 75 in process.
To summarize, the Department has made a number of difficult
decisions through the years to put the F-35 on more sound
footing, but more risks lie ahead, and it will be important as
to how these risks are managed. If software delays continue, if
funding falls short of expectations, or if unit cost targets
cannot be met, the Department may have to consider whether to
proceed with production as planned or alter production rates in
the future.
At this point, we believe the most pressing issue is the
effect software delays are likely to have on the initial
capabilities that each military service will receive. To make
informed decisions about weapons system investments and force
structure, the services must have a clear understanding of the
capabilities that the initial operational F-35 will possess.
Thus in our annual report, we recommended that the Department
assess the capabilities that can realistically be delivered to
each of the services by their established ILC [initial launch
capability] dates and share the results of the assessment with
the Congress and the services as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would
be pleased to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the
Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Turner [presiding]. Mr. Sullivan, since you are from
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, it would be
perfectly appropriate to say ``Go Flyers'' at the end of your
testimony.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am also a brand new
grandfather, if I could. Charlie Sullivan was born Monday.
Mr. Turner. Excellent. Congratulations.
Mr. Sullivan. Mother and son are doing well.
Mr. Turner. Excellent.
Mr. Sullivan. Go Flyers.
Mr. Turner. There you go.
You know, obviously, Mr. Sullivan, as I stated in my
opening statement, we are very concerned about the software
delays. And recognizing that the issue is one of both, you
know, operational capability and inventiveness, it is not as if
we are--this is off-the-shelf software completion, this is
where actual advances need to occur.
What is your concerns about what these additional impacts
could be on the program with these delays? This obviously is
one that can cascade, the software being one of the leading
aspects of development.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes. That is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I
think there are two parts to that. The first one is just the
risk that you don't get the software completed, that you don't
get full capability, and I think there still is risk in that
area. Very, very, very complex software development has to go
to get the sensor fusion and all of the communications across
many different platforms that they are going to need on this
aircraft. By the time they complete block 3F, which is the
final software.
So there is still an enormous amount of complexity. This
program had started its software and has developed it in
blocks, from block 0 all the way up to Block 3F. And as they
have delivered the blocks, there has been spillover from one
block to the next block, and so that creates inefficiencies,
more churn, and kind of a more chaotic environment. So there is
all of that the program is working with now is trying to get
the earlier blocks finished up while they are still trying
deliver very complex software. A lot of costs and schedule
strain on that.
And, the other thing that it means to the program, I think,
I mentioned in my statement that concurrency was a huge issue
on this aircraft program. And the longer it takes to complete
that software development, of course, the longer you remain
concurrent between testing and production, and that means that
more changes could take place before you finally get the
aircraft that you want. You might also have to keep software
engineers around longer, you might have to stay in development
longer. All of that stuff creates cost and inefficiency.
Mr. Turner. General, looking at the GAO's report about the
software delays, obviously the concern is the end goal of
delivering warfighting capabilities, the concerns about the
warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps by July 2015.
Could you please describe these impacts, especially since we
are in a period of time where the Air Force is looking at
divesting of other weapons systems, aircraft. Is the gap going
to get bigger?
General Bogdan. Sir, right now, the three increments of
software that I am watching very carefully and, oh, by the way,
when Mr. Sullivan talks about concurrency, we are also a little
bit concurrent when it comes to software development. Because
we are currently finishing up our 2B capability, interim
capability. At the same time, we are in the middle of our 3I
capability, which is the exportable version of the F-35, and
then finally that 3F capability.
So when I make my comments, I will have to talk about each
of those individually. Because, quite frankly, the risk is
different for all three.
For the 2B capability that the U.S. Marine Corps is going
to use to declare IOC [initial operational capability] and
limited warfighting capability, we are tracking 206 individual
capabilities within the software, and those are what the U.S.
Marine Corps needs to declare IOC.
As of today, 80 percent of those have been verified as good
to go. We have 20 percent left. And I have two more increments
of software to go this summer before I finish flight testing
for 2B at the end of the year.
My assessment, and my look at the technical risk and the
flight test program, is that I am within 30 days of completing
2B on time. So fundamentally very, very little risk in
delivering software-wise the capability to the U.S. Marine
Corps.
What I will tell you is more troubling for Marine Corps
IOC, and I will just mention it here, and we can get it later.
Modifying all of the older airplanes to the production-
representative configuration that the Marine Corps needs to go
to war with, is even more of a problem than the software in
2015. So that is 2B. I am pretty confident on the software
capability, a little less confident on the mods
[modifications].
The 3I capability, for U.S. Air Force, also quite
confident. They have an extra year for us to get it right
before they declare IOC, and it has the same capability as 2B.
So, fundamentally, there is some time margin built into that.
And, finally, the last capability, the 3F capability, that
is the one I am most concerned about in terms of schedule
delay. I will tell you today, if we don't do anything else and
we just continue to perform the way we are performing right now
and not getting any better, we are going to be somewhere
between 4 and 6 months late on that software. It is as simple
as that. And that has impact not only on the U.S. Navy's
ability to declare IOC, but some of our partners and their
ability to field what they consider to be a minimum capable
airplane.
That is unmitigated. I haven't done any--there are a lot of
things I can do between now and 2018 to bring that back to a
more reasonable timeframe. But if I had to tell you today, I
would say 4 to 6 months late. And it has mainly to do with the
complexity of the software work we have to do in 2016 and 2017.
It is really, really hard stuff. And I am just projecting that
we are going to have some trouble getting it done.
Mr. Turner. General, my last question, the news articles
that Italy may be delaying its acquisition of 90 F-35s, what is
the status of the foreign acquisition programs with our
partners? It obviously both significantly affects our cost
structure but also the development path.
General Bogdan. Absolutely, sir. The biggest impact our
partners have today when it comes to the quantity of airplanes
they are buying and when they buy them is the unit cost of the
airplane. In fact, the partners have a greater impact on either
reducing the cost of the airplane or actually--I won't say
increasing the cost of the airplane, because it will always
cost cheaper, later. We have made that commitment to the
enterprise. But that cost reduction gets smaller. Even greater
than any movement our services have made at this time. So they
are very, very important to the cost curve as we call it.
Relative to Italy, some of the press reports, at least in
the conversations I have had with the senior leadership with
the Italian Air Force and their Ministry of Defense, and I have
had conversations with them recently, their Prime Minister has
said that future investment in the F-35 is on hold. Okay, so
they have committed to buying a certain number of airplanes in
their FACO [Final Assembly and Check Out], or their fabrication
facility in Cameri, Italy.
And they will buy those airplanes. But their future buy
beyond that, beyond the first 20-some-odd airplanes is on hold
until such time as their Parliament decides what to do. So that
is an instability for us that could affect future prices.
Turkey, the same. They have delayed their buy 2 years. They
were anticipating this year that they would come on board and
fully commit to buying. They have not yet. So we are waiting
there.
And Canada would be the third country where we are waiting
to see how their political process plays out.
If those three partners choose to push airplanes out or
choose to reduce their buy on airplanes, it will have an effect
on the price of all the other partners and the services buying
the airplanes to the tune of about 2-3 percent increase in
price.
Mr. Turner. General, to the extent that our subcommittee
may help in trying to communicate some of the issues of the
advantages of the F-35 and foreign acquisition decisionmaking,
please let us know. We know there is a lot of legislative
discussion among their Parliaments and legislators that perhaps
we can help effect. Please do and include us if there are
issues where we can make a difference.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will just note for those who are on committee who haven't
been following this, as we go out on the timeline, the per-unit
cost of the F-35, supposedly, theoretically, will come down.
And so when our foreign partners are looking, they want to
catch the end part of that in order to have their per-unit
costs come down, rather than catch the front end. So a lot of
them are figuring--so it is not because they don't want them,
it is because they want to find the sweetest spot they possibly
can when it comes to per-unit costs. Am I not correct, General?
General Bogdan. You said that very well, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. Yes.
General Bogdan. However, the other part of that is, as you
know, the other side of that coin is, those people that need
the airplane sooner----
Ms. Sanchez. Right.
General Bogdan [continuing]. Will now pay that price.
Ms. Sanchez. Right. Or those of us--with the U.S., if our
foreign partners move out on that timeline, then the cost per
unit for us, sitting on that timeline of keeping the production
going and bringing down the cost, is higher to us. So it is a
real interesting game we play.
General Bogdan. But there is one thing, and I don't want to
interrupt, our FMS [foreign military sales] customers, who are
different from our partners, they are actually offsetting a lot
of the movement that our partners have made in pushing
airplanes out and the U.S. services. So our FMS customers are
filling the gap, so to speak, over the next few years, and that
is helpful.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. General, you have been quoted many, many
times as saying that there is no more money and no more time,
when it come to the F-35 program. Correct?
General Bogdan. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, just this week, the committee was
briefed by your office and was told that in 2015, our partner
nations on this program have agreed to provide $400 million in
additional funding. While that is good news, in theory, that
our partners are willing to provide the extra money, does that
mean that we have $400 million cost increase in development
that these funds are covering up?
What is happening----
General Bogdan. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. With these $400 million that you
told me----
General Bogdan. Well----
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. That it is enough, remember you
spent it, it is done. You are going to work within that time,
that time and that money allotment. I have heard this over and
over, and now I am getting, oh, by the way, somebody is
throwing in another $400 million into the pot.
General Bogdan. Yes, ma'am. A couple of things. The money
that the partners have generously offered for development work
came from prior savings that they had on the program in terms
of what they had budgeted for and what they are paying for
airplanes and paying for things right now.
So this was not our partners going back and asking the
governments for more money. They didn't do that. What we did
with this--what we are going to do with that money is we are
going to use it in development to offset what the services
would have to pay over the next 5 years. The price of--the end
price of development has not changed. All we have done is moved
that $400 million into the SDD [Strategic Deployment Document]
line so that we could help offset the Navy, the Marine Corps,
and the Air Force's bill for the next 5 years for development.
Ms. Sanchez. So what--I am trying to understand what you
just said to me. But it seems to me that what you said was our
partners have--they had allocated more, they are going to spend
less for what they thought they were going to get. They have
some additional monies they are going to put into the
development phase, and that phase would have been picked up by
the Navy, the Army, and the Marines. And now our Army, and
Navy, and Marines don't have to put that money there. So are
they going to come and give the committee the $400 million to
put somewhere else?
General Bogdan. So, so I will make two points about that. I
will make two points about that.
The first point is, the reason why the partners chose to do
this is because, as you recall, Mr. Sullivan said the program
had been re-baselined three times.
Ms. Sanchez. Uh-huh.
General Bogdan. In re-baselining the program three times,
the Department of Defense put in 13.5 billion more dollars than
it expected to for development, and none of that money came
from the partners. Because they had made the initial investment
in SDD and never contributed anything further.
So as a show of good faith for that $13 and a half billion
that the Department of Defense picked up, that is why they
agreed that this added money could be used.
When we put our POM [program objective memorandum] in our
President's budget each year, I let the services know how much
money I need each year for the development program. In 2015,
where I am going to book that $400 million, I reduced the bill
to the services by that amount. So when they put in their
fiscal year 2015 President's budget, it included $400 million
from our partners, which reduced their bill, and, therefore,
they could use that money for other things.
Ms. Sanchez. So noted. We are going to take it back and
take a look and make sure that that is what happened.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Bogdan, I am glad to see that you grew up in KC-
135s and that was the first operational aircraft you flew. And
I am glad also to see that you worked on the KC-46 program.
And I guess what concerns me is with all of the talk about
the mushrooming costs in the F-35, as you well know, the design
of the 135s is over 60 years old. Most of the airframes the
crews are flying are now older than the crews. And, of course,
the KC-46 modernization program is vital to the entire fleet.
And do you foresee any problems with the funding of the KC-46
Alpha, in light of the increasing costs that we have seen in
the F-35?
General Bogdan. I don't want to get too far out of my lane.
I haven't been on the KC-46 program for a number of years. But
as I do recall the development program for the KC-46 is a
fixed-price development. So the U.S. government's liability is
capped on how much it is going to pay for that development. And
that was a choice Boeing made during the competition, that the
tough competition they had for that program.
So relative to the KC-46 and the Air Force budgets, I will
defer to General Field and Dr. LaPlante.
What I can say is, when I was the program director there,
it was imperative that the Air Force funded each and every year
of the development program because you do not want to underfund
a fixed-development contract because the contractor will then
have recourse to come back and say, You didn't give me all the
money I needed, and, therefore, you slowed me down, therefore,
we will change the terms and conditions later on.
So it is important to keep the funding for the KC-46 on the
development program constant because of that contract type,
sir.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, General.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
testimony, and we appreciate the information you provided to
the committee. We are going to turn to our next panel now.
Ms. Sanchez. Question.
General Bogdan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Sanchez. Before I let you go----
Mr. Turner. Before I excuse you, my ranking member has a
last question.
Ms. Sanchez. I'm sorry, I had one other question that I
felt was very important for our committee to hear.
So the F-35 program figure shows that all three versions
remain far below the planned level of reliability.
Specifically, as of this month, the F-35A was 4 hours between
critical failures as opposed to 13 hours expected. The F-35B
was 3 and a half hours, when it should have been 7 and a half
hours. And the F-35C was only 2.7 hours, however, we
anticipated would be at 9 hours.
If we weren't in such a large-scale production, it might be
one thing. But we are there now. So that means that within a
couple years the service will have hundreds of F-35s on their
hands that won't be able to fly very often unless things get
dramatically better. At this point, it looks like the program
wouldn't even meet a 50-percent reliability goal when the
aircraft are fully operational.
So, I know that these will improve over time, but what are
the specific steps that you are taking to lift that critical
reliability time up?
General Bogdan. I bet that is my question.
You are right, ma'am. All three variants today are below
what we call the reliability growth curve on the airplane. And
``over time'' is not the right answer. Things will get better
over time, but that is not the right answer.
The right answer is, and we have started it now, was a
fully funded, disciplined, reliability and maintainability
[R&M] program that looks at all of the cost drivers, all of the
pieces and parts that are coming off the airplane too often,
the repair times for those parts, the supply chain and spares
posturing. All of those things play into reliability and
maintainability.
And I can tell you, quite frankly, when we first started
flying the airplane, one, we didn't have enough data to know
where we were bad, so to speak, we have got more of that data;
and, two, we didn't have a great focus on it because, quite
frankly, the last few years the program was just trying to hang
on.
We are past that point now. We are at the point now where I
have 58 operational airplanes out there. We have flown 12,000
hours. We know what the cost drivers are, we know what parts
are coming off too frequently, we know what maintenance
procedures take too long. We have just got to go do something
about it. So I started last year a fully funded, fully
dedicated R&M program. I put a program manager in place.
Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney have done the same
corporately on their side, putting folks in place. And we are
systematically attacking that problem.
The problem here is, you are not going to see results in
the next 2 or 3 months. It is going for take months and months
and months of constant effort to start seeing this improve. Our
goal is by 2015 to have the aircraft availability at 60
percent.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a very critical
piece to this program, and that you and I need to sort of keep
an eye, and ensure that this reliability figure continues to go
up rather than stagnant as it is.
Mr. Turner. Excellent. Absolutely.
Mr. Sullivan. If I could, we have looked at the reliability
too, and it is a really big concern now. It is very risky. In
terms of not only getting the unit costs down on the aircraft
but also in terms of the operating and support costs that are--
you know, the estimate right now is deemed unaffordable. That
has all got as much to do with reliability of the aircraft as
anything else. So this is a critical point.
Ms. Sanchez. Yeah, if you are paying for it but you are not
flying it, that is bad news.
Mr. Sullivan. That's right.
I mean, we have many examples from the past. The F-22
program is an example where they are still working on
reliability on that aircraft, and, in fact, have started
additional acquisition programs to get that fixed today.
Mr. Turner. Well, gentlemen, as I was excusing you, before
you almost made an escape, but we have two members who were
able to return to the hearing, both of which who have
questions. We will turn to----
Ms. Sanchez. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. But this is incredibly
important.
Mr. Turner. I am glad that our ranking member held you for
a time----
Ms. Sanchez. I might add that that $61 million program they
are talking about, it is above the amount of money that we have
going on. So----
Mr. Turner. Giving the floor for Ms. Walorski.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And sorry if you have already addressed this. But I just
want to kind of follow up with Mr. Sullivan with what you were
just talking about on this issue of the significant financial
obligation on this--for the Air Force and the Navy being deemed
unaffordable. And I apologize if you talked about this earlier.
But are there specific steps or can you talk about how in the
world this program can--we can drive the operating and
sustainment costs down?
Mr. Sullivan. That is a very good question, and it is--the
last question was kind of dealing with that too.
Mrs. Walorski. Yes.
Mr. Sullivan. Since--and the program and the general here
is dealing with O&S [operating and support] costs now, I know.
They have many initiatives going on, trying to drive that down.
So in order to get O&S costs down, you can do a lot of
things. You can change the availability of the aircraft, you
can have them fly less. You know, less flight hours mean less
maintenance, and things like that. You can look at manning and
try to reduce the number of people that it takes to keep an
aircraft up and running.
You can look at fuel costs, which is very good. That is a
kind of uncontrollable. There is an awful lot about O&S that is
uncontrollable. Fuel costs is one of those things. That is a
big part of it.
Inflation rates are, you know, who can predict inflation?
That is a big part of it. So there are a lot of costs you can't
control.
But reliability is one of the best ways, if you can have a
reliable weapons system, and that means designing in
reliability. And the general talked about a reliability growth
curve. That is really the critical thing that you want to keep
an eye on. In order to get more reliability they drive down the
reliability growth curve established from flight test and
ground testing and things like that.
That is the single, key, real root way to get O&S costs
down more, is to improve reliability of the aircraft. And this
program, with a lot of initiatives under way, but still, as the
Congresswoman said, they are still only halfway there, and they
are not that far away from full-rate production.
Mrs. Walorski. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And before I begin my question, I just want to congratulate
you on being a new grandparent.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Barber. It is awesome. I have five. They are wonderful,
beautiful. Have you ever heard a grandparent say his kids are
not wonderful or beautiful? But I hope you enjoy, because it is
a great experience. I really appreciate it myself.
Mr. Sullivan. Charlie is a gift.
Mr. Barber. I want to thank you both for coming today.
And I want to start off by saying that I am a very strong
supporter of the F-35, and as you probably know, I would love
to see this program, or this fighter flying in southern
Arizona. Hopefully, one day we will be bedded down in Tucson.
A recent survey that was conducted in my community, in fact
it was just published about a week ago, showed overwhelming
community support for Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is in
my district, and the bedding down of the F-35. So I think that
survey, which was done in an objective and scientific way,
should put to rest any notion that our community is not
interested in the F-35 or the future of the air base.
So we have invested a lot in this program, obviously. And
getting your arms around trying to make it more affordable and
prevent future cost overruns. And since we have invested so
much money, we have got to finish the job. I don't think it is
any time to reconsider. But I am concerned, as my colleagues
are, about the delays in the F-35 program, because it means, in
my view, that during a time of fiscal uncertainty we will be
spending more tax dollars while potentially negatively
impacting on our air strategy.
First, the development and procurement costs for this
platform are already significant, as we've stated. And now
delays in developmental flight testing will cost us more money
as we fix recurring problems with emission systems. These
delays could, I believe, prolong the delivery of the first
batch of F-35s by an additional 13 months before it attains
initial operational capability.
The President's budget has called for divestment of an
important air platform, many of them, including the A-10, so
that the Air Force can modernize by acquiring the multi-role F-
35. And I would like to ask you, General, if we won't see the
F-35 fielded until well after the Air Force begins to rid
itself of important capabilities, such as the A-10, don't we
leave our military men and women without the important tools
they need?
And would you agree that it would be prudent to maintain
the A-10 warfighting capability until we can be assured or
reassured that the F-35s will be ready?
I am very concerned about this gap I think the divestment
plan would create for our men and women on the ground.
General Bogdan. Sir, I am going to defer most of that
question to my Air Force brethren for the next panel. But what
I will tell you is that we are intending on delivering an air-
to-ground and close-air-support capability with the F-35 in all
three increments, 2B, 3I, and 3F, with 3F being the final
capability. And I think the airplane from a technical
standpoint and from a national standpoint will have the ability
to conduct that mission safely and effectively for the Air
Force. What they do with the A-10s, again, I will defer that to
the next panel.
Mr. Barber. Nice punt there, General. I understand. We will
talk about it next panel.
I just want to ask a follow-up question, though. Due to the
uncertainty surrounding the delivery of the F-35 software
capabilities, the GAO, as you know, Mr. Sullivan, recommended
that DOD execute an assessment of the specific software
capabilities that could realistically be delivered, and those
that would not likely be delivered. How will the DOD conduct
this assessment? And what software capabilities are most
critical?
And, additionally, if DOD follows the GAO recommendations
and decides to lessen software capabilities, would this have
any impact, in your view, on the proposed mission systems that
would enable the F-35 to conduct adequate close air support,
Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. Sullivan. Okay. So our recommendation is that they
assess where they are with software today in relation to the 2B
software block that they are to deliver to the Marines for the
Marines' IOC date, which is now scheduled for July 2015.
So, what we are saying is, the Marines deserve to know
exactly what they are going to get. So before that date, they
should--there should be an assessment on, realistically, here
is what we have for you.
And I would go back--you mentioned a 13-month delay, and I
know in our report we have a 13--we have something in there
about 13 months' delay in software. But want to clarify that
that is a delay that would only extend the IOC date 6 months.
That 13-month delay would be from May of 2015 to November of
2015. They right now are saying May. They have a 7-month kind
of management reserve in there. The Cost Assessment and
Programming Effectiveness, the CAPE from OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] has looked at that schedule and said that
that they may be as late as 13 months beyond May. Which would
put them to November of 2015. That is--so, all told, that is a
6-month delay that the CAPE is talking about. That is what we
refer to in our report.
So what our recommendation is, is really just to assess
software and let people know what is going to be available to
them on these key dates. July 2015 is one. If the Marines
aren't going to get the full 2B block capability, then they
should know what they are getting. They should have, you know,
the ability to delay if it is going to be a little bit longer
to get full 2B. That is essentially what we are saying.
Mr. Barber. I guess I just close----
Mr. Sullivan. We are not by any means saying that they
should--that the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] should be delivered
without full capability eventually.
Mr. Barber. I just would wonder, though, since we have had
so many delays, so many promises made that have not been kept,
General, how can we be assured that these timelines are real?
General Bogdan. I will give you a two-part answer, sir. The
first answer is rooted in the technical underpinning of the re-
baseline that we did starting in 2010. We added time and margin
into that schedule from 2010 to 2018, and we made it much more
realistic. We planned for discovery that we hadn't foreseen, we
planned for delays in flight testing. We planned for a lot of
things that were more optimistically planned for before that. I
guess that is the best way to say it.
So from that perspective, the dates that I am giving you
are on that baseline plan from 2010, and we are currently
executing to that plan without changing. The other--so that is
the technical answer, sir.
The other answer is, I am not here to advocate for the F-
35, necessarily. I am here to execute the program. And I want
to give you the best information I can, good, bad, or
otherwise.
And so the other part of my answer is, you will--you
somehow, somehow have to trust me, and if I am wrong then you
guys can take it out on me. Because I consider myself
accountable for the outcomes on this program.
Mr. Turner. Well, Mr. Barber, we are going to ask that----
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. I ask that the remainder of your questions be
submitted for the record. We do need to get to the second
panel.
Thank you, gentlemen. We appreciate your testimony.
General Bogdan. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Next, we will go to Vice Admiral Paul
Grosklags; Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle; Michael Manazir,
and--Rear Admiral; and Dr. William LaPlante, Military Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and
General Field, United States Air Force.
I understand the two opening statements will be given by
Admiral Grosklags and Dr. LaPlante.
Turning to Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT
AND ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LTGEN ROBERT E. SCHMIDLE, JR.,
USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AND
RADM MICHAEL C. MANAZIR, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE, OPNAV N98
Admiral Grosklags. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Turner, Representative Sanchez, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to be
here today to talk about our Naval and Marine Corps aviation
programs.
As I think you are aware, we had to make many difficult
decisions as we built our 2015 budget submission. But we
believe what we have submitted for your consideration is a plan
that ensures we have the capacity and the capability to ensure
that we can fight and win when called upon.
But I also have to tell you that this is a plan that
contains increased levels of risk as opposed to our PB 2014
[President's budget for fiscal year 2014] submission. Now, on
our 2015 submission, we are continuing development of fifth-
generation aircraft. We are fully committed to both the F-35B
and the F-35C, and believe the program is on a solid path to
meeting our initial operational requirements for the Marine
Corps in 2015 and the Navy in late 2018 or early 2019.
Our unmanned aircraft systems also maintain a full measure
of our attention. These include already fielded systems at the
unit level, like the Marine Corps' RQ-21 Blackjack, all the way
up to carrier strike group and carrier air wing platforms, like
the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Strike and Surveillance
aircraft, otherwise known as UCLASS. It is a mouthful.
We also continue investment in our critical development
programs, such as the 53K Heavy Lift Helicopter, the MQ-4C
Triton unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, and the
Presidential helicopter program.
And we are recapitalizing in other areas. Maritime patrol,
with the P-8 replacing the P-3, our carrier-based early warning
aircraft with the E-2D, and virtually all of our vertical-lift
and tiltrotor aircraft with the V-22, our H-60s, and the H-1.
And, finally, but not in the least, we have focused
investments being made in our currently fielded aircraft and
systems to ensure that they remain relevant, they remain safe,
and that they are able to counter the threat well into the next
decade.
Now, as I mentioned earlier, the efforts that we are
undertaking I have just described are not without risk. Even
with the spending levels supported by the Bipartisan Budget
Agreement, we have been forced to extend some development
timelines, we have reduced our procurement rates, and we have
reduced the rates at which we have planned to modernize both
capability and capacity.
And, frankly, a transition back to the Budget Control Act
levels of spending will have a significant negative impact on
our readiness, our modernization, and eventually the relevancy
of Naval Aviation. Ultimately, this result is increased risk to
our operating forces forward deployed.
So, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity and look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grosklags, General
Schmidle, and Admiral Manazir can be found in the Appendix on
page 76.]
Mr. Turner. Dr. LaPlante.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LT GEN BURTON M.
FIELD, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you, Chairman Turner.
Thank you, Ranking Member Sanchez, other members of the--
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thanks for having
the hearing. And already we have already had good discussions
and good questions; so, thank you for having the hearing and
for what you do.
I am joined here by Lieutenant General Burt Field, who is
the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Operations,
Requirements and Plans. So we are here to talk about the fiscal
year 2015 budget that we have submitted and the tough choices
that we have already talked about here.
Just like my Navy counterpart, the Air Force, all the
services had to make these tough choices. The choices were
between the things we know, readiness today, if we have to go
to war today, versus building the force that we know we need
for the next 10, 15 years.
We also know as we watch around the world, regardless of
whatever threat assessment you think, that the technologies are
proliferating. Particularly, places where we are used to just
being able to operate at will--space, cyber, air--we can't
assume that in the future.
The technologies to contest that are proliferating, and we
have to plan for that. We also have to plan for being able to
react quickly and globally.
So in this tough environment there was tough choices being
made, and we have talked about some of those hard choices
already.
I would say, if the last time that some of us appeared
before you was back in October, it was a hearing about the
effects of the sequester. And I just want to contrast and thank
you from where we are then from where we are now and, also,
talk about still issues we have problems with.
First of all, back then, what we were telling you was, to
meet the sequester numbers, we were having to make this very
difficult choice between readiness today--flying hours, weapons
systems sustainment, going into depots--and investment in RDT&E
[research, development, test and evaluation] really were the
only two places we could take the money, and it was a very
difficult situation. We asked you also to help us with just
understanding stability so we could do planning.
But with the BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act], you have given
us--and I want to thank you for that--some stability. We now
know what the budget is. We know what to plan for in 2014. We
know what to plan for 2015, in particular. And we have a down
payment to begin to turn back and upturn and working on
readiness. Readiness is not going to be fixed with turning a
switch, as you know, but thank you for the BBA because it is
going to allow us to start working on that again.
The other thing the BBA did a bit--and I want to just
temper what it was able to do for us--we did use a little bit
of it in the Air Force to protect some of our high-priority
programs.
Specifically, we were able to protect the F-35 buy. I think
back in October we said that, had the sequester occurred, we
had four to five airplanes at risk in F-35. That was able to be
mitigated with the BBA in 2014. And the same would have had to
happen in 2015. So that helped us there. And we were able to do
some to help us stay above minimal sustainable rates in
munitions.
But, largely, what the BBA does for us is it gives us
stability and it helps us turn the corner back again, begin to,
in readiness.
But here is what the BBA does not do. If we return to the
sequester numbers in 2016 and beyond, we still have the reality
of a smaller Air Force. We are going to have a smaller Air
Force regardless.
But, as has been said, platforms like the KC-10, the Global
Hawk Block 40, technologies--exciting technologies like the new
engine technology that we are looking at for adaptable
engines--all of those frankly do not survive mathematically if
you look at it in a sequester budget beyond 2016.
And so that longer-term situation remains unchanged, and we
are having to plan for that, but the near-term situation is
significantly different than when at least I appeared before
you back in October.
So that is a summary of what I wanted to say, and I look
forward to answering your questions. And I also, again, enjoyed
the discussion on F-35 and would be happy to talk more about
that. Thanks.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. LaPlante and General
Field can be found in the Appendix on page 106.]
Mr. Turner. Dr. LaPlante, your statement is an excellent
transition to my questions for General Field and Admiral
Manazir and General Schmidle.
I opposed sequestration because I thought it would be
irresponsible and devastating to our military. Sometimes
pessimists are right. I am not optimistic about what we are
facing for 2016 and on.
I believe that part of the reason why sequestration was put
into effect is because the picture of what would occur if
sequestration was implemented was not told, in part, because
DOD was constrained from planning for sequestration until it
was upon us and then, when they were implementing it, they
didn't have the time to be able to look up from their desks and
explain what was to happen.
So my question to each of you is: If you are forced to
accept sequestration-level budgets between 2016 and 2023, how
will that affect capability, capacity of each of your branches,
Air Force, Marines, and Navy? And how does that affect your
ability to meet the requirements of the National Defense
Strategy?
General Schmidle, we will begin with you.
General Schmidle. Okay. Thank you, Chairman, and Ranking
Member Sanchez.
So, to begin with, the sequestration, as you know,
Chairman--there is two things that affect us, two big bins. One
of them is readiness and the other one is in our investment
portfolios. And we--the example that we used--oh. Sorry. Better
now? Okay.
The example that we talked about last year was the number
of F-18s that we had that were in reporting status as opposed
to the number that were out of reporting status.
Just a couple of snapshots of where we are today. About 50
percent of the airplanes that--the Marine Corps F-18s that we
own are not on our flight lines.
They are going through depot maintenance, and they are in
various places where they are getting modified so that we can
continue to fly them until we get enough F-35s to be able to
move into the fleet to make up for those to replace those
airplanes.
So that is an effect that we have noticed right away from
sequestration because of the workforce that was being paid, if
you will, to work in the depots to do that.
The other place that we would notice it is in all the
aircraft procurement programs. As you know, sequestration comes
in and it just takes a bite out of a--a percentage, if you
will, out of each of the program element lines.
And we don't have a lot of choice in that. We have to pay
the bills somehow. So you are going to have--our ability to buy
more to modernize our airplanes is going to be affected as
well.
And the third piece of this--or the second big piece, if
you will, is readiness. Sequestration would have an effect on
readiness, which would equate to about 10 percent, if you will,
of the flying hours that we fly every year.
And if you just do the problem mathematically, right now,
today, as of right now, we have a little over 70 percent, 73
percent of all the airplanes in Marine aviation, all of them,
are at--the readiness level for all of our squadrons, rather,
is at what we would refer to as C2, which is ready to go to
war. That was in 2013.
In 2014, as where we are today, we are at 65 percent, and
that is--and it would be lower except for the money that we got
back in the BBA.
If we continue on that rate, by the time we get to 2017, if
we are fully sequestered, we will be down to--around 50 percent
of our forces will actually be at the level of readiness that
we would want them to be at in order to push them out the door,
and by 2021 we estimate that we could be as low as 27 to 30
percent.
So that is over time what happens to us when we take the
flight hours out, we don't have the hours to fly, we don't have
the airplanes to use to train the pilots, and the readiness
continues to go down.
So that is probably the best example that I can give you
between the investment accounts and the readiness of how that
is going to affect us.
Mr. Turner. Admiral.
Admiral Manazir. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.
I share the concerns that General Schmidle laid out
because, as you know, Naval Aviation is Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft. I will start far term, then midterm, then near term.
Far term is procurement of aircraft. As we continue to buy
our P-8 out to the end of the FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program], as we continue to buy the unmanned systems with N-26
sponsorship and N-98 sponsorship to the end of the FYDP year,
as we continue to look to buy JSF and we continue to look at
the numbers of the EA-18G Growlers that are coming this way in
the execution year and then potentially in fiscal year 2016,
you will see those numbers go down because that is where the
flexibility comes from.
In the midterm, our modernization is to keep our forces
relevant. So in Naval Aviation, as we increment the P-8 to
greater capability, as we increment the air plan or flight plan
for the F-18E and F Super Hornet and make those more relevant,
those capabilities will be pushed out 1 year and 2 years to the
right. The initial operational capabilities of those advanced
Super Hornets, advanced aircraft, advanced P-8s, will be pushed
to the right.
And then near term is readiness. As the general laid out,
we normally like to push our forces out with C2 readiness to be
able to accomplish any mission across the spectrum of
warfighting. We would have to lower that down to a lower level,
but what we would do is we would push those deployed forces out
with a C2. It is the search forces behind them that would take
the greatest impact.
I will give you an example, sir. Last year, a year ago, I
was the strike group commander for the Eisenhower Strike Group.
Because of sequestration, we were told to come home, do flight
deck maintenance, and in 2 months took the entire strike group
back out again to the Gulf.
So we turned around in two deployments, 10\1/2\ months
deployed in 12 months, and we took the surface forces with us
to do that. That was a direct impact of the sequestration
levels of readiness that we had to take our previously trained
strike group and turn around twice. So that surge force was not
available to back up what we have out on the line.
You will see very, very capable forces on the line, Navy
and Marine Corps. What you will find is the surge forces behind
them are going to start to hollow out. As the sequestration
levels go down to what they were during the BCA, you will see
no surge forces behind them. With the current BBA, you will see
a surge force of one to two behind what you have currently got
deployed.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Turner. General.
General Field. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This will sound remarkably similar to my colleagues. You
will have a smaller, less capable, less ready, less viable Air
Force that will not be able to execute the Defense Strategic
Guidance. That is the bottom line.
And similar to what the Marines and the Navy just said,
what happens is we are in an--at risk will be some of our
highest priority programs, the F-35, the long-range strike
bomber, and the KC-46, although those are the three that we are
going to try to protect the most.
What will also be on the table will be the KC-10, the RQ-4
Global Hawk, other ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] assets. Virtually every modernization program
that has not already been cut will be on the floor, and that is
what will lead to that smaller and less capable and less viable
force.
Like the Marines and the Navy, our readiness suffered. As
we told you last year, our readiness levels were remarkably low
prior to sequester, and we were looking at a 3- to 6-month
effort just to recover to that already too low level.
In some of our squadrons of the 31 we stood down, we have
recovered that readiness. In other squadrons, we are still
working to recover back to those levels that were already too
low.
We will have to probably attack that readiness problem
again, and we will probably have more squadrons stood down for
periods of time that will inhibit any recovery of the readiness
for the future.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to put down for the record--because I heard
General--our Marine General here say a comment. He said we have
to pay the bills somehow.
So we got into sequestration because we had to pay our
bills somehow, and that was the fight that was going on at the
time. So it seems like nobody would want to vote in a
sequester.
But the problem was there were some that were holding up
our ability to pay the bills that we, as a Congress, had
already agreed to pay. So that is how we ended up where we are.
To the Admiral, the Navy has stated that the production of
the F-18 will end in 2016 or 2017 unless additional foreign
military serials occur and that, as a result, the U.S. will be
left with only one production line for manned tactical fighter
aircraft. Some have proposed providing the Navy with additional
EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft in order to keep the
production line going.
So my questions are: Does the Navy have a validated
requirement for more of these aircraft? If we, the Congress,
would provide the additional aircraft, what would the Navy do
with them if Congress doesn't provide additional people and
operations, funding facilities, et cetera? Would you still use
the extra aircraft? And if the production line is shut down,
does that necessarily mean we wouldn't be able to start one up,
for example, for a sixth-generation aircraft intended to
replace something like the F-18, that the F-35 would not be in
that space?
Admiral Manazir. Thank you, Member Sanchez. Thank you for
the multifaceted question. I will address the last part first.
I will tell you, in the Naval Aviation, we don't know what
``sixth generation'' means because we don't know what
capability that brings us later on.
To be fair, we are required to look--when any type model
series goes out of service, at the end of its service life,
like in the F-18E and F series, which is going to go out in
2035, we will look at the range of gaps in capability that that
Super Hornet delivers right now to the Nation and we will
determine what the solution could be. It could be more F-35s.
It could be an unmanned system. It could be a family of
systems. We will look at capabilities across the board, not
necessarily a one-for-one replacement out into the future.
To the F-18E/F and the G, we have 563 Super Hornets, Es and
Fs, that are currently being delivered, and the last bunch is
going to be delivered to us in 2015, and that will complete the
buy. And that is our requirement, 563 Es and Fs that provisions
31 strike fighter squadrons on our carrier decks, including the
attrition and reserve airplanes.
The EA-18G Growler, we currently have 138 in our program of
record. That 138 airplanes is 10 squadrons that are in our
carrier air wings, the 10 carrier air wings that support our 11
carriers that are currently in the budget, and then there are 5
expeditionary squadrons. The last 2 squadrons of the EA-18G
Growlers are being built to take the place of the Marine EA-6B
Prowlers that are going to go out of service in 2019.
If we were to get additional Growlers, what they would
service is the joint mission. The 18G Growler, with the ALQ-99
pod now and the next-generation pod in the future, services a
large part of the electromagnetic spectrum. And as the CNO
[Chief of Naval Operations] has testified multiple times, it is
the domination of the electromagnetic spectrum that is going to
ensure that we can get into anti-access environments.
Having that high-end airplane with those high-end
capabilities to address the electromagnetic threat allows us to
be able to bring a family of systems. For instance, the F-35 is
very, very capable in an electronic attack, but it has a narrow
part of the spectrum. So the EA-18G supports in a complementary
capability the F-35Bs and Cs when you put them forward.
Families of systems called stand-in jammers that would get
inside of those threat envelopes need to get standoff jamming
support first before you get in there to allow us to have
assured access.
So what we are looking at now, ma'am, is a series of
studies that look at the validated requirements above 138 EA-
18Gs to determine whether the joint fight, the interoperable
fight, with the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Air Force, and our
coalition partners requires additional EA-18Gs.
I will tell you that the CNO has testified that there are
22 Growlers on an unfunded requirements list. Of those 22
Growlers--and thanks for the omnibus that gave us $75 million
in AP [advanced procurement]; so, we have a little bit of a
discount there from Congress--congressional action earlier--we
would take those 22 Growlers and increase the PMAA [Primary
Mission Aircraft Authorization] of the squadrons on the flight
decks from 5 to 7.
We have determined in our campaign analysis that, when you
increase from 5 towards 8 aircraft, that actually gives us a
knee in the curve to reduce the time of the campaign and
increase the effectiveness of electromagnetic maneuver warfare.
Ma'am, I hope that answered all of your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, we will have to digest everything you
just told us and then probably come back with some more
questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
Doctor, I have a question for you. And I do appreciate the
Air Force having a continued effort with engine propulsion
technology and developing that further. I think it is important
not only for our capabilities and efficiency, but it--like
anything else, it is important to our industrial base here.
And I saw that the Secretary in the budget--2015 budget
allocated $1 billion for next-generation jet technology
development.
And so my question is: Can you give me some detail on how
this funding will be used and when it would be used?
Dr. LaPlante. Yeah. We are still working through the
details of it; so, I can tell you just broadly what we are
thinking.
So the program and the research area that has been
ongoing--and it has been some excellent work sponsored, in
part--began with DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency], but then moved over to AFRL [Air Force Research
Laboratory], is what we call adaptive engine technology.
What the $1 billion allows us to do is--without that, we
were going to basically end with some technology development--
piece part technology development about 2017, and we just did
not have the money to take it further, which, of course, for
all the reasons you said, you know, it is just--you know, we
didn't want to stop it, but we had no choice with the budget.
With the billion dollars in there, we are going to be able
to continue that and at least take it, I believe, potentially
to an engineering development model. I am hoping--and there--
depending on how mature the technology is, that we could
further that even through the end of 2019 or so. Again, we are
working through the details of it, of exactly how far it is
going to take us.
I think, also, it is going to depend upon our assessment
how mature the technology is as to how quickly we can go into
an EDM [electric discharge machining]-type situation, but it is
going to allow us basically--it doesn't completely get us to
transition. You know, we all talk about the transition and the
``valley of death.'' But it is a bridge that starts to bridge
the ``valley of death.''
So it was a good thing that we are doing that and we are
continuing it. And I hope we can. As a technologist, I think it
is great work.
Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I appreciate that. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Admiral, you mentioned in your testimony that meeting the
Marine Corps F-35B IOC will require modification of aircraft to
bring them up to the required hardware configuration and that
the schedule to do so is tight.
What steps is the Navy taking to mitigate the risk that all
required modifications will be done on time? We are aware that,
previously, General Bogdan has indicated that it is not
necessarily--some of these delays are not necessarily software
development, they are actually completion of modifications. Do
you have a comment?
Admiral Grosklags. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I will address that
for you.
This is not a technical issue for us. This is purely a
management issue. We understand the technical changes that need
to be made to the aircraft. The simple fact is we have
competing priorities.
We have aircraft required for test. We have aircraft
required for training our pilots to make sure that the pilots
are trained and ready for initial operational capability. And
we need to use those same--or take those same aircraft and turn
them around and modify them to the appropriate IOC
configuration. So it is a management issue. It is not a
technical issue. So I just want to be clear on that.
What we are doing, quite honestly, is prioritizing. We are
trying to ensure that, with the depot stand--the recent depot
standup at Cherry Point last year, that gives us the facility
to do the deep modernization work that needs to be done.
We have also established a small footprint at Yuma at the
operational site so we can do limited modifications there.
Part of our approach is to try and bundle, if you will, the
modifications that need to be done. So we are taking a close
look at the scope of the modernization so we don't have to
reach in to various parts of the aircraft more than one time.
So, in a nutshell, that is it. General Schmidle may have
more insight to specific things the Marine Corps is doing, but
it is really a management issue for us.
General Schmidle. Again, if you like, just to pile on very
briefly, in terms of the schedule for the modifications, we
are, in fact, taking a very, very close look.
As General Bogdan said, this is actually--he mentioned it
was his concern going to IOC. It is, we believe, the long pole
in the tent right now, and we have got all kinds of focus on
this, to include down to the squadron, to the individual
airplane level, how many airplanes they need on the line to be
able to fly, the sorties the pilots need to be able to get
ready to IOC the jets so that we can declare IOC in the summer
of 2015.
It clearly is a challenge, but we are absolutely laser-
focused on it right now.
Mr. Turner. My last question, Dr. LaPlante. You mentioned
in your testimony that the Air Force has concern about the
aerospace industrial base that supports engineering, design,
and development of tactical fighter aircraft. You note that,
when production of the F/A-18 and F-15 ends, there will be only
one prime contractor producing tactical aircraft.
What steps is the Air Force taking in the FY 2015 and the
future years to address this concern? And when you say we are
accepting risk that some elements of the current aerospace
industry capacity may atrophy, what specific skills are likely
to atrophy and what would be the impact on the Nation's
aerospace programs? And how do the Air Force long-range strike
aircraft program and the Navy's Unmanned Carrier Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike programs affect the industrial
base necessary to develop and produce tactical fighter
aircraft?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. I appreciate the question.
There are key skill sets that, of course, are needed to
build advanced tactical aircraft, some of which are common to
the bomber. It is not completely a one-to-one correlation, but
we can't talk much publicly about the bomber because of
security classification.
But I think it has been--as we have been saying, it is
identified to be going after mature technologies such to lower
risk, something that is at high TRL [technology readiness
levels], as they call it.
What the Air Force is doing consciously in that program is
beginning to set up a feeder line, if you will, so when the
first versions of the bomber start getting delivered, they have
in there, for lack of a better word, the hooks and the blocks
to put in future upgrades, that there is, frankly, a technology
line and a technology demonstration line that can feed those
future blocks.
I will tell you--I mean, I can't go into the details here
because of the classification. I would say it is in the
following type of areas: It is in materials. It is how we
integrate and keep low observable technology with electronic
attack. It is with advanced controls. Those are the kind of
areas that we are very conscious of keeping the industrial base
alive, and those are--could be common between advanced tactical
and the bomber.
Do I think that that is by itself enough? I don't,
actually. And I don't pretend to have all the answers here. But
I will tell you what some of us are thinking is that exactly at
this time is probably when--if you look back in history when,
in the past, we have done, for lack of a better word,
experimentation, whether it was in the 1990s or in the 1970s,
where we kept prototyping, we kept ideas, we kept innovation
going, we kept design teams going even for things that we
didn't know if we were just going to put on the shelf, but that
we were trying. And we were trying them between the technology
community and the warfighter. We believe--there is many of us
that believe we are in the era now where we need to be doing
that.
Now, that is not a panacea for all of the industrial base.
That will not deal with, for example, a production line being
shut down. We have to think differently about that.
But I believe that we need to do some type of comprehensive
experimentation program to feed not just the future bomber,
which we already have some of that going on, which I can't go
into because it is classified, but to feed whatever we end up
with beyond F-35 and even F-35 itself.
In my experience, we often set up the mainstream program to
have the hooks and the blocks, and then we kind of just assume
industry will innovate and provide us the technology. Well, we
also have to fund it. IRAD [independent research and
development] can only go so far. So I believe we need to, as a
Department--this isn't just in Air Force--set up such an
experimentation program.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Yes. I wanted to ask specifically about the
retiring of the 283 A-10s. Now, when those A-10s are retired,
all those planes are going to be replaced with F-16s and F-35
at many of those bases. Isn't that correct?
General Field. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Veasey. Okay.
General Field. Except for one. One of the units is a Guard
unit from Idaho, and they are going to become an active
associate--or a classic associate, which means they are going
to work with the Mountain Home F-15Es and fly those airplanes.
Mr. Veasey. And the A-10--the role of the A-10 is
basically--it is pretty much a single mission. It is just
basically to provide ground support. Is that----
General Field. Sir, its primary mission is to provide close
air support for troops on the ground that are fighting. It does
some other things in terms of personnel recovery and some other
air-to-ground missions as well, but that is its primary role,
is in close air support. That is correct.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. So when you land those things--because I
know that the Air Force has also looked at retiring some B-1
bombers and even looked at retiring F-16s and F-15s.
And so I just wanted to know if you could expand just a
little bit more on retiring some of those planes versus the A-
10s.
General Field. Yeah. Sir, I think that was a
misinterpretation of some previous discussions with folks.
When we talked about the A-10 decision, we went through a
series of analysis to look at the effect that would have, and
we compared that with what the Air Force brings to the table to
the joint community.
Because, at the end of the day, we fight as a joint force
and we need to be able to provide the capabilities to our
brothers and sisters in the other services and our coalition
partners.
So we looked through mobility. We looked through ISR. We
looked through air superiority. We looked at command and
control. And we looked at, you know, precision attack. And
there are all kinds of facets to every one of those.
We also did a study with our--in the Air Force and we did
some analysis and lessons learned with the Army on how we would
perform the CAS mission, the close air support mission, if the
A-10 did go away.
And when we looked across the spectrum of conflict that we
might be having, when we looked into some of the higher-end
issues that we might be facing in the future, it looked like
the A-10 was the best of all bad options to take off the table.
There isn't a single airman in the Air Force that thinks
this is a good idea. This is basically a budget-driven
decision. So we came to the conclusion that we had to remove
the A-10 because, if we took the whole fleet out, we could take
a lot of the support structure and gain billions of dollars in
savings, not millions of dollars in savings.
And so some of the examples that you referenced here are
some of the things we looked at just to explain the comparison.
So if we take the A-10 fleet out, we will save about $4.3
billion over the FYDP.
To get that kind of savings, if we took out F-16s, we would
have to take--retire 350 F-16s, which affects about 14
squadrons. We would have to take out the entire B-1 fleet, 62
aircraft.
So why don't we want to take out the B-1 fleet? The B-1
provides most of our--you know, 38 percent of our long-range
strike and is the only aircraft in the Air Force inventory that
is going to use--be able to employ the JASSM [Joint Air to
Surface Standoff Missile], which is a long-range cruise
missile, between now and fiscal year 2019 and 2020. It is
enormously capable and can do missions from CAS to deep strike
and beyond.
The 350 F-16s--the amount of capability was just more so
than the A-10 in terms of not just the CAS environment, but in
other missions beyond that. We looked at ways that we could
reduce readiness, and we have already--we are already down at
what I would term a critical level in the readiness status of
our combat air forces. And we would go even lower to the fact
that we would take off--two to three squadrons would just not
fly ever at a time for the near future.
So when we looked through that, we looked at the studies,
we discussed it with our service partners, we decided that the
A-10 was the best decision to make, even though nobody likes
the result of that decision.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, thank you. We are going to conclude.
They have called votes on the House floor. We appreciate all of
your comments. And thank you for your service. We will be
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 26, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 26, 2014
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 26, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 26, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. GAO's most recent report points out that software
delays may impact software deliveries and could hinder the delivery of
expected warfighting capabilities--first to the Marine Corps and then
possibly to the Air Force and Navy as well. Please describe the mission
system software difficulties that the program has experienced, and
explain what the program is planning to do/or is in the process of
doing to mitigate the impacts of those difficulties. What are the
impacts, if the program is not able to deliver all of the expected
warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps by July 2015?
General Bogdan. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) does not fully
agree with all of the conclusions made by the GAO in their recent
report, ``Problems Completing Software Testing May Hinder Delivery of
Expected Warfighting Capabilities.'' The program is making steady
progress and is fundamentally on the 2011 baseline plan, with moderate
confidence in the Block 2B/3i software delivery schedules. There is
additional risk with 3F as it is dependent upon the successful and
timely completion of blocks 2B/3i.
Software continues to be the program's number one technical risk;
however, the program has a track record of overcoming difficulties
related to software development. These difficulties include technical
challenges implementing multi-level security in Block 1B, delays in
maturing and integrating Block 2A software, and burning down
outstanding technical debt from earlier software blocks. Over the past
two years, the program has implemented significant changes in how
system software is developed, lab tested, flight tested, measured, and
controlled. The program is starting to see the positive effects of
these changes. As part of these process changes, the program has:
Created a Capability Block Plan that provides an
integrated roadmap to define when individual capabilities are
integrated into each software block.
Instituted a Block Review Board, led by the government,
to track all configuration, capability, and schedule changes to
software development.
Directed a more robust Systems Engineering/Technical
Review process for all development work to provide greater knowledge
and defined decision gates to determine when configurations are mature
enough to proceed to the next phase. This includes assessing the impact
and corrective actions for issues identified against the defined Block
Capabilities and missions.
Developed tools to define the relationship of each
planned software capability to the overall mission sets, providing
insight into the impact to mission effectiveness resulting from any
potential shortfalls in capability maturity.
In addition to implementing process changes, the program has made
considerable strides in maturing the on-board software as a whole and
retiring risks from earlier software blocks to establish a healthy
foundation going forward. Specifically, the technical debt from
previous software blocks will essentially be negated as we enter into
Block 3 development and integration. The program has also recovered
from software delays in fielding Block 2A LRIP 5 software and has
executed the Block 2B plan largely to the baseline. Lastly, the program
has successfully demonstrated the rehosting of Block 2A and early Block
2B capability on the TR-2 hardware required for Block 3i LRIP 6
aircraft.
It is the JPO's plan to deliver all Block capabilities at the
required maturity levels to meet the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates. Anomalies that may have an
impact to planned IOC mission sets are either being corrected or
assessed with the stakeholders for acceptability. It is my assessment
that delivery of Block 2B-capable aircraft for USMC IOC is tracking to
a July 2015 date and software is not expected to be the limiting
factor.
Mr. Turner. GAO and others have identified affordability as a
significant challenge for the F-35. The total financial commitment
needed for the program's operation and support costs are still
estimated at around $1 trillion, and GAO notes that acquisition costs
over the coming decades will average $12.6 billion a year. What is the
program doing to ensure that this program is affordable in the long-
term?
General Bogdan. Affordability continues to be one of my top
priorities. Over the years, my team and I have been successful at
shifting the cost risk from being fully absorbed by the government to a
more equitable split between the government and the contractors. This
has incentivized the contractors to become participants in driving down
costs, without compromising capability or quality. We have been
successful in ensuring that lot over lot, the cost of the aircraft
continues to come down, and I expect this trend to continue. Although
the cost is coming down, it has not come down as quickly as I would
like, and I am taking strategic steps with my team to deliver an F-35A
in Fiscal Year 2019 between $80-85 million in FY19 dollars. Operation
and Sustainment (O&S) is one of the main cost drivers over the
lifecycle of the program and it is imperative that we get it right.
Some of the initiatives to address O&S affordability include:
Established an F-35 Cost War Room, which includes
representatives from prime contractors, with the objective of
identifying program-wide initiatives to drive down overall program
costs. They are currently examining 48 opportunities to drive down or
remove costs from the program.
Executing a Level of Repair Analysis study to define the
most cost effective repair enterprise for the U.S. and International
Partners. The outcome of this study will help us determine the optimum
repair structure. We expect the study to be available for review by the
U.S. Services in the third quarter of this year.
Completed a second Business Case Analysis in April 2014
to help inform the most cost effective Regional sustainment construct.
This analysis will determine the best-value sustainment solution across
a range of alternatives using a consistent set of baseline requirements
and ground rules. We expect to have the analysis confirmed and
finalized within the third quarter of this year.
Established an actively-managed and funded Reliability
and Maintainability (R&M) Improvement Program with the objective of
redesigning components to improve R&M from both a hardware and software
perspective. The intended outcome will be increased component
reliability and decreased maintenance burdens.
We continue to press forward with continuous improvement/
producibility efforts in order to reduce the labor hours associated
with aircraft production. We are examining methods of addressing
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources to introduce competition in the
supply chain. We are taking a systematic approach to reduce aircraft
prices below the normal production learning curves and are addressing
supply chain arrangements to reduce material costs. The procurement
quantity from year to year is a significant factor in achieving lower
procurement costs. In the last two years, our International Partners
and the U.S. Services have delayed purchases to future years, delaying
the timeline for realizing unit cost targets. Over the next few years,
I expect Foreign Military Sales customers to increase their quantities,
which will make up for some of the delayed purchases by the U.S.
Services and our International Partners, but if we continue to see the
current trend then it will further delay how quickly we are able to
reduce the procurement cost of the aircraft.
Mr. Turner. GAO notes that the F-35 program office estimate for
operation and support costs is around $200 billon lower than the $1
trillion estimated by OSD. They also note that the major driver in the
difference between the two estimates is the use of different inflation
assumptions. Please explain how the program came to its most recent
estimate. To what extent do you believe that the program's estimate is
more reliable than the OSD estimate?
General Bogdan. In the 2012 System Acquisition Report (SAR), the
OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and F-35 Joint
Program Office (JPO) estimate for Operational and Support (O&S) costs
differed in excess of $200 billion. There were two significant factors
that led to this difference. First, the CAPE did not update the O&S
cost estimate for SAR-12 but instead used the estimate from SAR-11,
whereas, the F-35 JPO did update the O&S cost estimate for SAR-12
utilizing the latest data available. Secondly, the F-35 JPO and the
CAPE used different inflationary assumptions which accounts for the
large difference in SAR-12 Then Year Dollar (TY$) estimates. For SAR-
13, the CAPE did update their O&S estimates and reductions were seen in
both the Base Year Dollar (BY$) and TY$ estimates.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O&S Estimates SAR 12 BY12$ SAR 12 TY$B SAR 13 BY12$ SAR 13 TY$B
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAPE O&S $617.0 $1113.3 $597.8 $1016.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JPO O&S $549.2 $856.7 $541.1 $916.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difference $129.5 $256.6 $56.7 $99.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In SAR-13, the TY$ difference between the CAPE and JPO's O&S
estimates was reduced from $256.6 billion to $99.7 billion. The F-35
JPO O&S estimate differs from the CAPE O&S cost estimate primarily in 4
areas--reliability, depot overall, government/contractor manpower and
F-35A fuel consumption:
1. Reliability: The CAPE used the Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation's (DOT&E) estimate for Reliability and Maintainability (R&M)
based on 8,500 fleet hours. The F-35 JPO used the most current R&M
forecasts of steady state reliability, informed by approximately 12,000
fleet hours, for their estimate. The CAPE position for this element is
4% higher than the JPO position.
2. Depot Overhaul: the CAPE used historical data from AV-8B and F/
A-18C aircraft and assumed each depot event was a discreet action and
summed these actions for a total cost estimate. The F-35 JPO used
historical data from F-15, F-16, and F-22 aircraft and bundled certain
depot events, modeled after the strategy within the F-18 aircraft
community. The CAPE position for this element is 71% higher than the
JPO position.
3. Government/Contractor Manpower: The CAPE used the 2011 manpower
estimate which was based on high level manpower requirements allocated
at a 20/80 government/contractor split for most elements. The F-35 JPO
used the Fiscal Year 2013 latest manpower estimates as represented in
the current sustainment strategy based on a discrete assessment of
government and contractor requirements for future sustainment work. The
CAPE position for this element is 17% higher than the JPO estimate.
4. Fuel Consumption: The CAPE used a revalidated Air Force fuel
burn rate that did not change from SAR-12. The F-35 JPO used a lower
burn rate that was initially validated in the Air Force Weapon System
Planning Document. Future SARs will ensure that the CAPE and F-35 JPO
will use the same fuel burn rates. The CAPE estimate for this element
is 5% higher than the JPO.
I am confident in the F-35 JPO estimate for O&S costs.
Incorporating the same technical baseline for these 4 areas would have
resulted in less than 2% difference between the CAPE and F-35 JPO O&S
cost estimates.
Mr. Turner. GAO notes that the program will be challenged to meet
its unit cost affordability targets by 2019, as required by OSD. How
does the program plan to meet its unit cost targets, if at all, and
what steps are being taken to achieve those targets? If the targets are
not met not, what is the impact and what action(s) does the program
plan to take?
General Bogdan. Based on the program's current production and
procurement profile, I am moderately confident that we will meet the
Department of Defense's (DOD) unit price target of $83.4M in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2019. Under the current procurement profile, we will deliver
an F-35A in FY19 between $80-85 million in FY19 dollars. For the F-35B
and F-35C, I am moderately confident that we will meet the unit cost
targets or be within a few percentage points of the target.
Affordability continues to be one of my top priorities and my team
and I continue to strive to not only meet the DOD unit price targets
but to realize unit costs below the target. Over the years, my team and
I have been successful at shifting the cost risk from being fully
absorbed by the government to a more equitable split between the
government and the contractors. This has incentivized the contractors
to become participants in driving down costs, without compromising
capability or quality. We have been successful in ensuring that lot
over lot, the cost of the aircraft continues to come down, and I expect
this trend to continue. Although the cost is coming down, it has not
come down as quickly as I would like and I am currently pursuing
several initiatives to make the F-35 weapon system more affordable and
bring down the unit cost of the aircraft.
Operation and Sustainment (O&S) is one of the main cost drivers
over the lifecycle of the program and it is imperative that we get it
right. Some of the initiatives to address O&S affordability include:
Established an F-35 Cost War Room, which includes
representatives from prime contractors, with the objective of
identifying program-wide initiatives to drive down overall program
costs. They are currently examining 48 opportunities to drive down or
remove costs from the program.
Executing a Level of Repair Analysis study to define the
most cost effective repair enterprise for the U.S. and International
Partners. The outcome of this study will help us determine the optimum
repair structure. We expect the study to be available for review by the
U.S. Services in the third quarter of this year.
Completed a second Business Case Analysis in April 2014
to help inform the most cost effective Regional sustainment construct.
This analysis will determine the best-value sustainment solution across
a range of alternatives using a consistent set of baseline requirements
and ground rules. We expect to have the analysis confirmed and
finalized within the third quarter of this year.
Established an actively-managed and funded Reliability
and Maintainability (R&M) Improvement Program with the objective of
redesigning components to improve R&M from both a hardware and software
perspective. The intended outcome will be increased component
reliability and decreased maintenance burdens.
We continue to press forward with continuous improvement/
producibility efforts in order to reduce the labor hours associated
with aircraft production. We are examining methods of addressing
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources to introduce competition in the
supply chain. We are taking a systematic approach to reduce aircraft
prices below the normal production learning curves and are addressing
supply chain arrangements to reduce material costs.
The procurement quantity from year to year is a significant factor
in achieving lower procurement costs. In the last two years, our
International Partners and the U.S. Services have delayed purchases to
future years, delaying the timeline for realizing unit cost targets.
Over the next few years, I expect Foreign Military Sales customers to
increase their quantities, which will make up for some of the delayed
purchases by the U.S. Services and our International Partners, but if
we continue to see the current trend then it will further delay how
quickly we are able to reduce the procurement cost of the aircraft.
Mr. Turner. Your recent report emphasizes the risks posed by
continuing delays in mission systems software testing, and notes that
those delays could limit the capabilities the Marine Corps receives at
the time it plans to declare its initial operational capability. If the
program continues to experience software related delays, what
additional impacts do you believe this could have on the program?
Mr. Sullivan. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Turner. In addition to software, GAO's most recent report
identifies a number of other ``technical'' risks that the program has
faced during development. What progress have you seen the program
making in these technical risk areas; and which areas, if any, do you
believe still pose risks?
Mr. Sullivan. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Turner. F-35 operation and support costs--which are still
estimated at around $1 trillion over the life of the fleet--represent a
potentially significant financial obligation for the Air Force and
Navy, and have been deemed ``unaffordable'' by the Department. What
steps do you think the program can take to drive operating and
sustainment costs down?
Mr. Sullivan. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Turner. You mentioned in your written testimony that F-35
sustainment costs remain a concern. What actions are the F-35 Joint
Program Office and the Department of the Navy taking to reduce F-35
life-cycle costs?
Admiral Grosklags. The Department of the Navy and the F-35 Program
Executive Office (PEO) are continuing to reduce the Operations and
Support (O&S) costs. As a result of our efforts to date and as reported
in the 2013 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the CAPE O&S estimate
from SAR 2012 to SAR 2013 reduced by approximately three percent (in
BY2012 dollars). The Department and PEO have several initiatives
underway that have substantial O&S cost savings potential:
1. The Services are reviewing basing assumptions, squadron size,
and training requirements. As an example, the training mission profile
has been refined resulting in reduced estimates for F-35C fuel usage.
2. The Services and PEO are conducting a level of repair analysis
that fully explores all three levels of maintenance to improve
readiness and reduce repair and turnaround costs. The study is expected
to conclude in May.
3. The PEO has established a sustainment cost war room with active
participation from Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney. The team is
focused on life-cycle affordability. Some of the initiatives include
aligning periodic maintenance and planned modification, aligning engine
data to maintenance planning, pursuing Red Air alternatives in training
squadrons, reusing support equipment from legacy programs, optimizing
the number of pilot fit facilities and warehousing, and optimizing low-
observable maintenance practices.
4. The PEO has a focused effort on reliability and maintainability
improvements. The top reliability degraders have been identified and
the PEO is conducting business case analysis for each to determine the
best investment opportunities for improved reliability and/or reduced
cost.
5. The PEO is conducting a business case analysis to evaluate
alternative lifecycle sustainment strategies comparing the baseline
full contractor logistics support construct to a spectrum of fully
organic or a hybrid mix of contractor and organic support. Initial
results have identified several cost drivers in both labor (organic
rates are lower than contractor rates) and material (original equipment
manufacturer mark-up). The study will also consider investment costs
such as data rights, additional manning resources, training, and spares
inventory.
Mr. Turner. The budget request postpones the MQ-4C Triton low-rate
initial production from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2016. What
steps is the Navy taking to mitigate the effects of this delay on the
Navy's requirement for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance?
Admiral Grosklags. Postponement of MQ-4C Triton low-rate initial
production from Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 to FY 2016 resulted in a one-year
fielding delay for MQ-4C Triton Multi-INT (signals intelligence
capability) to FY 2020. In accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2011 and the Navy's Maritime Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (MISR&T) Transition Plan, a
delay in fielding MQ-4C Triton Multi-INT required a corresponding
sustainment of legacy MISR&T platforms. The Navy's Special Projects
Aircraft (SPA) squadron will operate through FY 2019 and the Navy's
Fleet Air Reconnaissance (VQ) squadron will operate through FY 2020.
These one-year extensions to planned retirement dates will ensure
adequate MISR&T assets exist to meet Global Force Management
requirements until MQ-4C Triton Multi-INT is fielded in sufficient
numbers.
Mr. Turner. You mention in your testimony that meeting the Marine
Corps F-35B IOC will require modification of aircraft to bring them up
to the required hardware configuration and that the schedule to do so
is tight. What steps is the Navy taking to mitigate the risk that all
required modifications to the F-35B fleet will be done on time?
Admiral Grosklags. The Marine Corps and the F-35 Program Executive
Officer (PEO) are working together to meet aircraft modification
requirements in support of F-35B Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
The technical issues are understood; it is a management issue that is
receiving the appropriate attention. The Marine Corps and PEO are
building and constantly refining an integrated modification schedule to
incorporate several air vehicle and propulsion modifications that will
be performed at various locations. Most significant is the planned
increase in aircraft throughput capacity at the Fleet Replacement
Center-East in Cherry Point, NC. We may also look to increase
throughput capacity and/or work at Yuma, AZ, as well as other locations
to ensure requirements for F-35B IOC are met. The current planned
timelines for throughput capacity increase and modification completion
are executable, but leave a small margin before impacting F-35B IOC.
Mr. Turner. Your written testimony notes that the Marine Corps
strike fighter shortfall is 20 aircraft in 2023. Do you believe that
the Marine Corps may experience an elevated operational risk in the
2020's if the predicted strike fighter shortfall comes to fruition?
Please describe why you believe the Marine Corps faces this elevated
operational risk and what the Department of the Navy is doing to
mitigate those risks.
General Schmidle. The Marine Corps does not believe it will
experience an elevated operational risk in the 2020's.
With the pending certification of the Naval Synchronization Tool
Set and ongoing use of the Continuous Process Improvement Program (CPI
Blackbelt projects), Marine Aviation is able to proactively plan
aircraft utilization, and efficiently manage the service life of its
remaining AV-8B and F/A-18A-D aircraft. In addition, Marine Corps
Aviation is implementing force management and scheduling strategies
targeted at greatly reducing risk throughout the transition to the F-
35.
The Department of the Navy (DoN) continues to manage aircraft
service life of each aircraft at the operational level in order to
achieve the maximum allowable service life limits prior to its sundown.
The continued engineering and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) kit
development over the FYDP will ensure there is sufficient TACAIR
inventory to meet DoN requirements through the transition to the F-35.
Mr. Turner. We understand that Marine aviation is on a path toward
a distributed Airborne Electronic Attack system of systems including
both unmanned and manned assets. Please describe the number and types
of unmanned and manned assets that will be part of this system.
General Schmidle. The Marine Corps anticipates a future operating
environment comprised of advanced Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
Warfare and digital threats. The Marine Corps will address these
threats with the Marine Air Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare (MAGTF
EW) concept. This approach will leverage all available transmitters and
sensors across the MAGTF on both manned and unmanned platforms. A
coordination cell comprised of EMS, Cyber, Operations, Intelligence,
and Communications subject matter experts (SME) will collectively
integrate collections and effects-delivery efforts in real-time. The
Marine Corps will no longer depend on a large single-purpose platform,
since the low-density, platform-centric approach has proven
insufficient for meeting capacity requirements. MAGTF EW systems will
be capable of networking with Marine and Joint assets spanning the air,
ground, space, and cyber domains.
Any current or future airframe employed in support of MAGTF
operations will maintain the ability to host advanced EMS payloads in
support of integrated Spectrum and Cyber Operations. The Intrepid Tiger
II Electronic Warfare pod, currently deployed aboard Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEUs), is one such payload example. The types and
numbers of these platforms and systems will be based on Service
capacity and future mission requirements. These platforms specifically
include future Group 4/5 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), RQ-21A, F-
35B, AV-8B, F/A-18A++/C/D, AH-1W/Z, though any aircraft in the
inventory will be capable of serving as a host platform in the
distributed capability network. As the future linchpin of Marine Corps
Tactical Aviation, the F-35B will contribute by reducing counter-
integrated air defense systems (C-IADS) requirements due to its
inherent Spectrum survivability, and adding decisive networked attack
and exploitation capabilities in EMS regions of significance.
While the Marine Corps is currently achieving combat success with
EMS payloads on manned platforms in theater and adding such capability
to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units, the application of airborne
Spectrum Warfare will increasingly gravitate towards UAS platforms.
Marine Corps Aviation is actively exploring options to expand its UAS
fleet with more capable platforms to provide the requisite size,
weight, and power to perform a combination of standoff and penetrating
Spectrum Attack operations. Coupling new UAS employment concepts with
emerging EW payloads offers the Marine Corps a unique opportunity to
counter a complex IADS. This approach will enable deliberate growth in
the Spectrum Warfare portfolio and will include communications-based
targets, RADAR-based targets, directed-energy (DE) and LASER targets.
Additionally, the Marine Corps is exploring the viability and readiness
of advanced (medium-high Technology Readiness Level) Spectrum Attack
technologies to augment baseline Intrepid Tiger 2 capability for future
incorporation.
Mr. Turner. If the Department of Defense is forced to accept
sequestration-level budgets between fiscal year 2016 and 2023, what
affect will that have on the capability and capacity of Navy and Marine
Corps' strike fighter fleets to achieve the requirements of the
National Defense Strategy?
General Schmidle. The DoN is focused on maintaining a strike
fighter fleet which possesses the capability and capacity to win
decisively. Sequestration-level budgets will force the DoN to balance
future capabilities and capacity within the limits of the Budget
Control Act, challenging the ability of our strike fighter fleets to
maintain an advantage against possible future threats and increasing
risk in meeting National Defense Strategy requirements.
Sequestration will reduce current modernization funding levels and
severely limit further F/A-18A-F capability upgrades. Sequestration
will also increase the risk to achieving initial operating capability
goals, and ultimately, full fielding of the Joint Strike Fighter
program of record. Initial operational capability of the F-35B in FY15
will not be affected but may increase risk to follow-on software
development. Additionally, any reduction to Service Life Management
funding levels will negatively impact Marine Corps F/A-18A-D capacity
throughout the F-35 transition. Lastly, sequestration will adversely
impact strike fighter readiness across all of Naval aviation.
Mr. Turner. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require
inventories of precision air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please
describe which inventories and short of requirements and provide the
committee a list of those munitions and amounts above the budget
request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015.
General Schmidle. Navy supports the Fiscal Year 2015 President's
Budget (PB15) as submitted.
If additional funds were made available, the following precision
air-to-air and air-to-ground Naval munitions, listed in alphabetical
order, are short of their inventory requirement. The amount of funding
above the PB15 budget request that could be executed in fiscal year
2015 and the respective quantities to be procured with that funding is
as follows:
AARGM: $24.3M of WPN for an additional 46 missiles.
AMRAAM 120-D: $62M of WPN for an additional 83 missiles.
GP Bombs: $93.7M of PANMC for the additional components below:
--JDAM tail kits 500 lbs ($15.3M, QTY 625)
--JDAM tail kits 2,000 lbs ($38.0, QTY 27,576)
--GBU-10 ($3.6M, QTY 201)
--BLU-109 Bomb Body ($21.7M, QTY 678)
--FMU-143 fuze ($27.5M, QTY 7624)
Rockets: $100M of PANMC for the additional components below:
--LAU-61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.256M, QTY 4)
--MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 57,460)
--WGU-59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section ($74.3M, QTY
2,552)
--WTU-1/B Inert Warhead ($1.14M, QTY 15,985)
Mr. Turner. If the Department of Defense is forced to accept
sequestration-level budgets between fiscal year 2016 and 2023, what
affect will that have on the capability and capacity of Navy and Marine
Corps' strike fighter fleets to achieve the requirements of the
National Defense Strategy?
Admiral Manazir. The DoN is focused on maintaining a strike fighter
fleet which possesses the capability and capacity to win decisively.
Sequestration-level budgets will force the DoN to balance future
capabilities and capacity within the limits of the Budget Control Act,
challenging the ability of our strike fighter fleets to maintain an
advantage against possible future threats and increasing risk in
meeting National Defense Strategy requirements.
Sequestration will reduce current modernization funding levels and
severely limit further F/A-18A-F capability upgrades. Sequestration
will also increase the risk to achieving initial operating capability
goals, and ultimately, full fielding of the Joint Strike Fighter
program of record. Additionally, any reduction to Service Life
Management funding levels will negatively impact Marine Corps F/A-18A-D
capacity throughout the F-35 transition. Lastly, sequestration will
adversely impact strike fighter readiness across all of Naval aviation.
Mr. Turner. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require
inventories of precision air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please
describe which inventories and short of requirements and provide the
committee a list of those munitions and amounts above the budget
request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015.
Admiral Manazir. Navy supports the Fiscal Year 2015 President's
Budget (PB15) as submitted.
If additional funds were made available the following precision
air-to-air and air-to-ground Naval munitions, listed in alphabetical
order, would be augmented in numbers. The amount of funding above the
PB15 budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015 and the
respective quantities to be procured with that funding is as follows:
NAVY 2015 Unfunded Priority List:
AMRAAM 120-D: $96.3M of WPN for an additional 83 missiles.
Munitions above budget request that could be executed in fiscal
year 2015:
AARGM: $24.3M of WPN for an additional 46 missiles.
GP Bombs: $102.7M of PANMC for the additional components below:
--JDAM tailkits 500 lbs ($15.3M, QTY 625)
--JDAM tailkits 2,000 lbs ($38.0M, QTY 1,378)
--Laser Guided Bomb tailkits ($3.6M, QTY 201)
--BLU-109 Bomb Body ($21.7M, QTY 678)
--FMU-139 Fuze ($24.1M, QTY 7624)
Rockets: $100M of PANMC for the additional components below:
--LAU-61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.256M, QTY 4)
--MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 57,460)
--WGU-59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section ($74.3M, QTY
2,552)
--WTU-1/B Inert Warhead ($1.14M, QTY 15,985)
Mr. Turner. You mention in your testimony that the Navy does not
have a requirement for additional F/A-18E/F aircraft. Does the Navy
have a requirement for additional EA-18G aircraft?
Admiral Manazir. On-going study indicates the likelihood of
increasing threat capability, and additional Growlers on the flight
deck will provide a significant advantage in a high end conflict. The
Growler will soon be the only DOD tactical AEA aircraft in the joint
force inventory and is required to support both 4th and 5th generation
strike fighter aircraft. With legacy jamming pods or Next Generation
Jammers the EA-18G provides precise control of a broad range of the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to create sanctuaries for the Joint
force, denying enemy access to portions of the EMS.
The current total procurement of 138 aircraft can source the Navy
mission. The addition of 22 EA-18Gs listed on the Navy's Unfunded
Requirements List will be used to augment existing Navy squadrons in
the execution of the joint AEA missions allowing carrier squadrons to
deploy with seven aircraft vice their current complement of five
aircraft per squadron. The additional aircraft will reduce risk in
meeting operational demand for multi-ship tactics and the potential
increased need for AEA. As nations expand their use of the EMS, the
ability to perform the AEA mission will become more critical and buying
additional EA-18Gs in FY15 reduces risk in our ability to meet future
AEA demand.
Mr. Turner. You mention in your testimony an Air Force concern
about the aerospace industrial base that supports the engineering
design and development of tactical fighter aircraft. You note that when
production of the F/A-18 and F-15 ends, there will be only one prime
contractor producing tactical aircraft. What steps is the Air Force
taking in the FY 2015 and in the future years defense program to
address this concern? When you say, ``we are accepting risk that some
elements of the current aerospace industrial capacity may atrophy,''
what specific skills are likely to atrophy and what would be the impact
on the Nation's aerospace programs? How do the Air Force long range
strike aircraft program and the Navy's unmanned carrier-launched
airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) programs affect the
industrial base necessary to develop and produce tactical fighter
aircraft?
Dr. LaPlante. The current fiscal environment has forced the Air
Force to make some very tough choices. In broad terms, the Air Force
has chosen capability over capacity. The ripples from these decisions
extend from the immediate force structure through our base
infrastructure to the aerospace industrial base. Just as the Air Force
lacks both the budget availability and flexibility to maintain the size
and structure of current forces while we modernize, we lack the
immediate mission requirements and resources to sustain the defense
sector of the aerospace industrial base as configured. Elements of the
aerospace industrial base have already taken some steps in terms of
reorganizations and workforce adjustments to better position themselves
in this new fiscal arena. The lack of demand from the Air Force will
contribute to a reduced capacity, affecting all skills, from
engineering through production.
The fact that there will be only one tactical aircraft, the F-35,
in production for the foreseeable future is a reality the Air Force has
neither the operational requirements nor the financial resources to
alter. However, the Air Force is able to use other elements of the
budget to sustain and develop some industrial base capabilities at a
reduced capacity. For example, Air Force research and development
investments in advancing the state of the art in turbine engine
technology contribute to the support of engineering and design teams of
two contractors. Other aircraft programs, whether manned or not, also
serve to sustain engineering design, integration, and production
capabilities. Moreover, the Air Force has continuing needs for our
current aircraft. As we maintain and modernize these legacy aircraft,
we place demands on the industrial base for engineering design and
production to sustain our operational capabilities.
The defense sector of tomorrow's aerospace industrial base will be
similar to tomorrow's Air Force--it will be capable but no longer have
today's capacity.
Mr. Turner. Last year the Air Force mentioned that depot delays
would require the grounding of some of the affected aircraft, and that
sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will impact every one of
the Air Force's investment programs, creating inefficiencies, raising
unit costs, and delaying delivery of valued capabilities to warfighters
in the field. The Air Force also noted that the Fiscal Year 2014 budget
request would not enable full recovery of warfighting capability,
capacity and readiness and that additional resources would be required.
As we are into execution of the FY 2014 budget this year, what
steps has the Air Force taken to mitigate these affects? Did you get
the additional resources required in fiscal year 2014 to make the
fighter fleets whole again?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force did not develop its Fiscal Year 2013
weapon system sustainment (WSS) program factoring in sequestration, so
when ``sequestered'' impacts were added to the WSS Fiscal Year 2013
President's Budget funding position, unfunded requirements (a bow wave)
resulted for aircraft and engine programmed depot maintenance.
Initially, the impact was assessed to be approximately 24 aircraft and
84 engines. The impacts were mitigated by: Military Augmentation, House
Resolution 933, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act of 2013, buybacks, reduction in the number planned furlough days,
and relief from overtime limitation. Fiscal Year 2013 ended with an
unfunded bow wave of 13 aircraft and 19 engines.
The Fiscal Year 2014 Bi-Partisan Budget Act impact, including a
$500 million buyback, eliminated the sequestration bow wave with depot
production back on track with minor impacts to due dates and flow days
for aircraft and engine. Exchangeable production was diminished during
the furlough period but is recovering. Impacts were offset by shelf
shock with full recovery expected in Fiscal Year 2014. All Fiscal Year
2013 deferred aircraft and engines including the fighters were
mitigated in Fiscal Year 2014, eliminating the sequestration bow wave.
Mr. Turner. You mentioned in your written testimony that all three
mission areas in the air-to-surface munitions inventory are short of
inventory objectives. Those missions are stand-off, direct attack, and
penetrator munitions.
Please provide the subcommittee a list of those muntions and
amounts that could be increased to the budget request and, if
authorized and appropriated, could be executed in fiscal year 2015.
Dr. LaPlante. If additional funds were made available, the
following Air Force air-to-surface munition procurements could be
executed in FY15 up to the quantities indicated. Quantities above the
planned FY15 procurement will allow the Air Force to meet inventory
objectives sooner.
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
To bring production to the contracted maximum capacity of 15,000
tail kits per year, an additional 5,000 JDAM units could be purchased
for $147.5M.
Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
The FY15 production contract is currently being negotiated with
Lockheed Martin. If additional FY15 funds were made available,
quantities of Baseline and Extended Range (ER) missiles would be
adjusted to maximize ER production while maintaining the most
economical unit price within the bounds set by the Request for Proposal
(RFP). An additional 16 missiles could be purchased for an additional
$19.5M resulting in 100 JASSM-Baseline missiles and 140 JASSM-ER
missiles. The planned FY16 procurement brings production to the maximum
capacity of 360 missiles per year.
Hellfire
Up to an additional 3,953 Hellfire missiles could be purchased for
$411M to bring production to its maximum steady-state capacity of 6,000
missiles per year.
WRM--Ammunition
This mission area includes hundreds of items in several categories.
Up to an additional 9,500 bombs (includes 2,000 pound penetrators and
2,000 pound general purpose bombs) could be purchased for $275M; up to
7,500 additional fuzes could be purchased for $15M; and up to 300,000
additional cartridges could be purchased for $15M.
Training Munitions Items
This mission area includes dozens of items in several categories.
Approximately 8,000 additional practice bombs could be purchased for
$25M in FY15.
Mr. Turner. We noted that the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH)
program is currently scheduled for initial operational capability in FY
2021. Will the Air Force be taking risk in its combat rescue mission
until the CRH becomes operational?
Dr. LaPlante. Given current aircraft attrition projections, a fully
funded Ops Loss Replacement (OLR) program will recap the current HH-60G
fleet to a program of record of 112 aircraft by Fiscal Year 2018. This
will mitigate further risk to the combat rescue mission until the CRH
program reaches initial operational capability in Fiscal Year 2021.
Mr. Turner. If the Department of Defense is forced to accept
sequestration-level budgets between fiscal year 2016 and 2023, what
affect will that have on the capability and capacity of Air Force
strike fighter fleet to achieve the requirements of the National
Defense Strategy?
General Field. The fiscal constraints imposed by sequestration have
forced the Air Force to make difficult choices. All budget decisions,
not only in the strike fighter fleet, but also across all Air Force
capabilities, are evaluated against planning scenarios directed by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense that support the President's Defense
Strategic Guidance. Ultimately any decisions the Air Force makes
regarding potential aircraft divestment will be based on aligning the
Air Force's contribution to fulfilling the Defense Strategic Guidance,
while complying with the fiscal constraints imposed by sequestration.
The Air Force is very concerned with recent budget reductions and
continues to monitor how these cuts will affect risk. The Air Forces'
fighter fleet is approaching 30 years old--the oldest in our history.
The Air Force is pursuing modernization programs to extend the service
life of our strike fighter inventory. Without service life extensions
and capability upgrades, it will be increasingly difficult to meet the
defense strategy. Therefore, it is absolutely critical selected fourth
generation sustainment and modernization efforts continue as outlined
in the FY15 budget request. Additionally, we must procure the F-35 at a
rate that ensures we have the capabilities and capacity to ensure
success against emerging threats.
Further, Air Force mission success is dependent on our fighter
force manning. The Air Force is currently 200 fighter pilots short of
the total manning requirement. Our projections indicate this deficit
growing to approximately 500 by 2022, excluding any additional
sequestration driven impacts on flying training. The shortfall resulted
from a series of force reductions and it will take the Air Force many
years to reverse this trend and recover. A return to sequestration
level funding only exacerbates this problem and extends the number of
years required to recover from the fighter pilot shortage.
At the levels requested in the President's budget, the Air Force
protects the capabilities required to prevail in the more demanding
operational environment in years to come. At sequestration funding
levels, it is not possible to budget for an Air Force capable of
simultaneously performing all of the missions our Nation expects. We
would end up with a force that is less ready, less capable, less
viable, and unable to fully execute the defense strategy.
Mr. Turner. You noted in your written testimony that fiscal
constraints have driven force structure divestments of 334 fighters
that require the Air Force to ``accept near-term risk today to be ready
and viable tomorrow.'' What scenarios are at greatest risk with the
reduction of 334 fighters?
General Field. To support the National Defense Strategy and meet
future threats, the Air Force must continue investments in new
capability programs and upgrades to gain and maintain full-spectrum
readiness. Budget constraints have forced difficult decisions that
reduced fighter force capacity in an effort to rebuild a more ready
force and bridge the gap to future force requirements. Reduced fighter
force capacity elevates risk in all scenarios. However, these
deliberate capacity cuts that focused on single mission part of the
fourth generation fleet leave the Air Force with the ability to manage
near-term risk in supporting the National Defense Strategy, although
significant challenges still exist. Ultimately, the strategy underlying
the Presdient's Budget allows the Air Force to balance capability and
capacity to win today's fight while acquiring critical capabilities to
address future threats.
Mr. Turner. You mention in your written testimony that the Air
Force fighter fleet is approaching 30 years old--the oldest in Air
Force history--and that ``without service life extensions and
capability upgrades, it will not be possible to manage risk.'' The FY
2015 budget request includes the termination of the F-16 combat
avionics programmed extension suite, or ``CAPES.'' How does the
termination of CAPES affect risk, and what scenarios are most affected
by an F-16 fleet that would not have the CAPES upgrade?
General Field. The termination of CAPES increases risk and
decreases operational effectiveness in several scenarios, but to remain
within fiscal guidance constraints, we had to make difficult trades
between force structure investment, readiness, and modernization. We
chose to terminate F-16 CAPES because the impact on operational risk
was judged to be less than the impact of other higher priority
capability upgrades. This budget driven decision likely increases
operational risk in the Homeland Defense and highly contested
environment scenarios as the F-16 may not be as effective due to the
loss of the Airborne Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and an
upgraded electronic warfare suite. We recognize this elevated
operational risk; however, these decisions remain consistent with our
approach to take near-term risk in modernization of legacy systems to
ensure future force structure recapitalization.
Mr. Turner. In your statement you note that when the U-2 is
retired, you will not meet the overall demand for high altitude
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). What percentage of
high altitude ISR demands are met now, and how much less of that
requirement will be met with retirement of the U-2?
General Field. The requirement for high altitude ISR capability is
defined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council; per the classified
definition of conventional wartime high altitude ISR needs, either the
U-2 or RQ-4 can meet 100 percent of the force structure requirement for
Combat Air Patrols, with a narrow classified exception for the RQ-4.
However, retirement of the U-2 results in the loss of approximately
50 percent of overall high-altitude ISR collection capacity. Combatant
Commanders do not specify platforms when submitting annual ISR needs;
however, the U-2 historically provides at least half of all high-
altitude imagery and signals intelligence products.
Mr. Turner. What is the status of the Air Force's air-to-air
weapons inventory? Are there shortages in the AIM-120 or AIM-9
inventories? If so, please provide additional amounts that could be
executed in fiscal year 2015 to address those shortages.
General Field. Currently, both the AIM 120 and AIM 9 inventories
lag Air Force requirements. Actual inventory requirements are
classified and available under separate cover. At this time, the Air
Force is not requesting any additional amounts for AIM-120D or AIM-9X
procurement above what is presented in the FY15PB. The FY15PB addresses
the inventory shortages with an overall increase to Air Force AIM 120D
procurement by 103 missiles and AIM 9X Block II procurement by 333
missiles across the FYDP over FY14PB levels. The FY15PB also includes
Air Force procurement of an additional 388 AIM 120D and 201 AIM 9X
missiles in FY19 and the production lines for both missiles are
expected to remain open well into the 2020s.
In the FY15 Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative, OSD
included a request for $62M in WPN to procure approximately 62 AIM-120D
missiles for the Navy in addition to the Air Force's FY15PB request for
200 missiles. The FY15PB already outlines an aggressive Air Force and
Navy AIM-120D production profile across the FYDP that balances the
inventory shortage with the program's aggressive Diminishing
Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) efforts. Any
increase in FY15 quantities beyond 262 missiles is limited by a
depleting stock of missile components impacted by DMSMS issues.
Production line introduction of components redesigned to address DMSMS
are planned in FY16 and FY18 that will allow production quantities to
increase as shown in the FY15PB.
For AIM 9X, the total Air Force and Navy procurement quantities
could be increased by a maximum of 168 missiles with an approximate
total cost of $67M in FY15.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. When do you propose to standardize your fleet?
General Schmidle. Many different funding sources have been pursued
over the past three years to retrofit the first 36 AH-1Z aircraft that
are still equipped with the legacy T700-401 engines. Due to competing
priorities in this fiscally constrained environment, the engine upgrade
has thus far remained unfunded. Marine Aviation continues to explore
all avenues of funding for this initiative.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES
Mr. Jones. It is my understanding that when the Marines started the
AH1Z and UH1Y program, that the first 36 AH1Zs were built utilizing old
engines which were really built for the AH1W and that using those
engines have resulted in aircraft that cannot carry a full payload on a
hot day and that it also complicates logistical support and results in
pilots having to learn two different sets of aircraft limitations. Is
this true?
General Schmidle. The first 36 AH-1Zs built were ``remanufactured''
AH-1Ws that still have the old T700-401 engines installed. These 36
aircraft will have dissimilar engines from the other 313 AH-1Z and UH-
1Y aircraft in the Marine Corps' inventory unless retrofitted with new
the T700-401C engines. The first 36 AH-1Zs with the 401 engines have
110 less shaft horsepower in each of their two engines. In same
environmental conditions (6000 feet and 95 degrees F), the newer 401C
configured AH-1Z can carry four additional Hellfire missiles and 100
extra rounds of 20mm while increasing speed by 10%. Single engine
performance is even more disparate. In hot temperature, high altitude
conditions with heavy payloads, the decreased power of the old 401
engine increases risk during a single engine failure situation.
These 36 aircraft also complicate logistical support across the
fleet by requiring separate spare parts, maintenance training and
technical publications. Marine pilots do not need to learn two
different sets of engine limitations. The temperature limits are the
same for the old 401 engines and the new 401C engines. However, the
power reduction does pose a pilot awareness issue during standard
flight operations at high altitudes, in hot temperatures, and at full
payloads, as pilots will need to be aware of the performance reductions
of the 36 specific AH-1Z aircraft with 401 engines mixed within the
entire AH-1Z fleet including 401C engines.
Mr. Jones. If this is true how much would it cost to upgrade these
36 aircraft and standardize your fleet?
General Schmidle. It will cost $62.7 million to upgrade all 36 AH-
1Z aircraft with 72 T700-401C engines in order to standardize the AH-1Z
and UH-1Y fleet.