[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS: UKRAINE AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-150
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Ms. Anita E. Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear and Strategic Policy, Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State......... 7
Mr. Brent Hartley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State................. 17
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ms. Anita E. Friedt: Prepared statement.......................... 10
Mr. Brent Hartley: Prepared statement............................ 20
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 38
Hearing minutes.................................................. 39
Written responses from Ms. Anita E. Friedt to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 40
U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS: UKRAINE AND BEYOND
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
and
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. Subcommittees will come to order and without
objection all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record and subject
to the length of limitation in the rules.
In a matter of weeks, Putin and his commandos stole Crimea.
Now he is on to Eastern Ukraine. I and other Members of
Congress were in Ukraine last week and the people were
rightfully concerned about Putin's next move into their nation.
According to press reports this morning, Secretary Kerry
said that we now have intelligence revealing that operatives in
Ukraine are taking orders directly from Moscow. Secretary Kerry
also said that some of the same Russian operatives from Crimea
and Georgia have shown up in Eastern Ukraine.
When I went to Eastern Ukraine one of the officials gave me
a wanted poster for what he called Russian saboteurs. It is in
Ukrainian and he--it is on the screen, I hope it is up--this is
a copy of the wanted poster and he was willing to pay out of
his own money for Russian equipment that had been--it was
confiscated by Ukrainians, everything from machine guns,
rifles. To anybody that is occupying one of the Ukrainian
buildings without permission he is willing to offer rewards for
that.
So I thought that was quite interesting that they are
concerned about the insurrection or insurgence in his own part
of the state.
I believe these actions should--we should understand that
we have to reevaluate our agreements with the Russians because
of their failure to abide by international law in that they
have entered Crimea, Ukraine and even other Baltic states are
concerned and so reflected that in conversations with them.
In my opinion, the Russians are not our allies. They are
not our friends and we certainly can't take them for their
word. Exhibit A is the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, the INF, and this treaty between the United States and
Russia places limits on ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
The United States has held up our agreement in the treaty.
It appears the Russians have not. According to press reports,
it appears the Russians have tested a ground-launched cruise
missile from an operational launcher. The Russians have
responded this is a sea-based missile, which does not fall
under the treaty.
There is no way to know if it is a sea-based missile until
it is actually deployed. But even so, if it was a sea-based
missile and the Russians tested it on land using an operational
launcher it is violation of the treaty.
Either way, the Russians are violating this treaty.
According to press reports, the administration knew about the
violation back in 2008. Six years later, the State Department
says the violation is still under review and has not officially
classified it as a violation or not. Time for the State
Department to pick a horse and ride it. Either it is a
violation or it is not a violation.
I have introduced H. Con. Res. 94 with Representative
Rogers and Joe Heck, calling the Russians out for their
violation and the administration for its refusal to tell it
like it is.
We had hoped that a formal determination would be in this
year's arms control compliance report but the report itself due
in April is already late.
Apparently, the State Department needs more time to figure
out what the rest of us already believe. The Russians do not
have to worry about violations as much as the New START treaty.
During negotiations, they gutted the verifications that were in
the old START treaty.
The most significant changes were the elimination of
verification measures for some ICBMs and reduction of total
number of inspections. When the Senate was debating approval in
2010, critics argued the treaty was nonsensical because the
Russians were already at or below the required levels in key
categories while we had delivery vehicles and warheads that
were way above these new levels.
Just like the critics warned, the Russians have since
undergone the most extensive nuclear modernization since the
end of the Cold War, all without violating the New START
treaty. We had a reason to be distrustful of the Russians when
the New START went into effect in 2010 and we have more reasons
today.
The fact is Russia is willing to treat these treaties as
less than binding when it suits them. That is not how treaties
are supposed to work. Despite this, the administration has
pledged to seek deeper cuts in nuclear arms.
In June 2013, the President called for the reduction of our
deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. My
personal opinion is this would be dangerous and is misguided,
based on the information that we have about the Russians.
Fortunately, Putin may have saved us from ourselves. The
Russians have ``no apparent interest in further arms reductions
before 2017,'' according to numerous arms control experts.
The United States should not continue to seek agreements
with the Russians when they either cheat or show no interest in
those agreements. I don't think--it is not now the time to be
kowtowing to Putin, and I will now turn to the ranking member
from California for his opening statement, Mr. Sherman, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sherman. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. I thank Mr. Sherman for allowing me to attend
a meeting where my presence is required for a quorum and I
thank Chairman Poe and Chairman Rohrabacher for convening this
important hearing.
I would like to begin thanking Ms. Friedt and Mr. Hartley
for appearing today. Both witnesses have extensive experience
on Russia and on European security interests. I am looking
forward to hearing their assessment of the long-term strategic
implication of Russia's illegal invasion of Crimea, its
subsequent efforts to destabilize Ukraine's interim government
and other matters.
Despite its April 17th pledge to help de-escalate the
crisis in Ukraine, Russia has done exactly the opposite. The
role that Russian special forces have played in destabilizing
Eastern Ukraine is indisputable in supporting so-called
separatist-coordinated armed attacks on government buildings
and on orchestrating kidnaps and violence against local
politicians, reporters and even OSCE monitors.
Russian disinformation campaigns have only made matters
worse. Russian forces use the masked warfare and other covert
tactics seen to signal a strategic shift in its approach to the
region and to European security.
It is essential that the United States and NATO allies
respond. I welcome the administration's decision yesterday to
impose a third round of sanctions on individuals and entities
closely linked to the Russian leadership's inner circle.
I also welcome the decision to impose export restrictions
on 13 Russian companies and the additional restrictive measures
on defense exports.
The goal of these targeted sanctions is to send a clear
signal that Russian aggression against Ukraine comes at a
price. I share the President's hope that these measures will
persuade President Putin to reverse course.
Unfortunately, I am not optimistic that the steps taken to
date will be sufficient. I therefore fully support the
administration's readiness to impose additional penalties if
Russia continues to press forward including targeted sanctions
against specific sectors of the Russian economy.
As the United States moves forward, it is imperative that
we do so in a coordinated effort with our European allies. I
applaud today's announcement of further EU sanctions on Russia.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Hartley about the status
of the administration's ongoing discussions with the EU as well
as plans within NATO to counter Russian aggression and reassure
our Central European and Baltic allies.
I also look forward to hearing from Ms. Friedt about the
status of existing arms and existing control agreements between
the United States and Russia.
While further arms control reductions seem unlikely in the
current environment, I am relieved that the United States and
Russia have continued to implement the New START agreement
included by exchanging notifications and conducting on-site
inspections.
These exchanges provide much needed stability and
predictability at a time of increasing mistrust and
uncertainty. I also support the administration's efforts to
work through INF treaties' compliance review mechanisms to
address concerns that Russian activities may be inconsistent
with its treaties obligations.
I strongly supported the administration's decision to cut
off defense cooperation with Russia. I have consistently called
on our European allies to follow suit and to exercise similar
scrutiny with respect to defense exports to Russia. However,
when it comes to nuclear security, the stakes are much too high
to break off communication.
Continued implementation of our arms control agreements
with Russia is essential, especially given the unprecedented
and unpredictable nature of the crisis in Ukraine. The last
thing we need is another nuclear arms race in Europe. With
that, I thank you and yield back.
Mr. Poe. Gentleman yields back his time. I now will turn to
the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
Subcommittee, Mr. Dana Rohrabacher, from California for 5
minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, for
calling this hearing is jointly being held between your
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and the
subcommittee which I chair of Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging
Threats.
During the 1980s, I had the honor of working with and for
President Ronald Reagan. Through his leadership and strength,
the United States brought about the collapse of the Evil
Empire--the Soviet Union.
I would add that there are many people who I worked with
during that time period who can't seem to get over that the
Cold War is over and are still treating the Soviet--the current
Russian Government as if it was the Soviet Government.
We are thankful, however, that the world no longer lives in
fear of annihilation and no longer lives with a Soviet Union
that is controlled by a diabolical philosophy of Marxism,
Leninism which motivated people to attempt to put on the world
a Marxist, an atheistic dictatorship in the name of perfecting
humankind.
We are thankful that that world has been changed and that
reality no longer is present and that we no longer live in fear
of annihilation between--of a nuclear exchange between those
who are motivated by this evil theory--Marxism, Leninism,
communism--and the people of the free world.
One of Reagan's greatest accomplishments was negotiating
and signing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which
banned two entire categories of horrific weapons.
I look forward to this hearing today from witnesses about
the current efforts to maintain and verify the provisions of
that agreement.
I look forward in the future to be discussing with my
colleagues some of the fundamental information that they have
gleaned from their visits to Ukraine and other places and to
have a broader discussion of the nature of the government in
Russia today and the threat that it poses or does not pose to
the free world as compared to what it was like when I worked
for Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.
I also want to speak about another power when we are
discussing this issue Mr. Chairman. We should not lose sight
that we are not just talking about Russia and the United
States.
We are talking about other nuclear weapons in other
countries in relationship to what we are doing with the
Russians and that is, what is Communist China doing and what
are we doing with Russia and other countries that relate to
this very issue of strategic weapons with Communist China?
I fear that by continuing to focus our arms control efforts
only on Russia while excluding China we are making a grave
miscalculation. Our negotiations with Russia dictate our
nuclear posture and define our military capabilities.
It should be a major concern that China is not included in
these limits including caps set by the New Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty signed in 2010.
Over the past two decades the People's Liberation Army, the
armed wing of the Communist Party of China, I might add, has
engaged in a massive arms build-up.
Their capability has increased in every area. It is
illogical to believe that China's strategic forces and their
nuclear stockpile have not also, likewise, been expanded and
improved. The United States-China Economic Security Review
Commission stated in 2012 the PLA continues to modernize and
expand its nuclear stockpile.
China is now on the cusp of obtaining a credible nuclear
triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-dropped nuclear
bombs.
We also know, thanks to the research by Dr. Phillip Karber
of Georgetown University, that China has built some 3,000 miles
of underground tunnels to store and to transport their nuclear
missiles and warheads.
This secret effort by the Chinese military is so massive
that it is known as the Underground Great Wall. Beyond this
incredible infrastructure, China is also researching hypersonic
missiles, ICBMs with maneuvering warheads which then can
outmaneuver our defensive systems.
Communist China, in short--and in closing, I would say--
Communist China must be included in any discussion of arms
control and if we focus only on Russia we are doing a great
disservice to the security of our country.
Addressing concerns and priorities with Russia does remain
important and the things that are being said today need to be
taken into consideration.
Ignoring China's strategic weapons is not an option and
will lead us to a much more dangerous world. They must be part
of this discussion today and hopefully in the weeks ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the ranking member from the
Terrorism Subcommittee, Mr. Sherman from California, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sherman. If you watch American television you would
think foreign policy is as simple as a cheap Western. Some
people are in white hats. Some cowboys are in black hats. If
you watch Russian television, you come to the same conclusion
only the hat colors have been changed.
If you review what has happened you see that this is far
more complicated. A pro-Russian President was elected in
legitimate elections in the Ukraine. That legitimately elected
President broke his promises, turned his policy on a
fundamental issue.
Democratic-elected Presidents have been known to do that.
He was swept from power by an insurrection. Those in the
insurrection occupied Maidan and it is considered a criminal
act to use armed forces--organized government armed forces to
dislodge them. Now the government that has taken over in Kiev
is using armed government forces to dislodge Eastern Ukrainian
occupiers not of Maidan but of various government buildings.
Throughout foreign policy we are faced with the tension
between territorial integrity and self-determination. Those
were the two greatest wars fought on our own territory--our
fight for self-determination from the British and our fight for
our territorial integrity and against the self-determination
objectives of the confederate states. We look at Crimea as a
effort at the self-determination of the Russian-speaking
majority there as an illegal act.
We used our Air Force to achieve the independence of
Kosovo, which, like the Crimea, was a autonomous region within
a republic, which was a relatively newly independent republic,
having seceded from a federation--one seceding from the
Yugoslav federation, the other seceding from the Soviet Union.
So we have been on both sides of territorial integrity and
self-determination both on our own territory in the first 150
years of our existence and in Eastern Europe more recently.
The Russians are interfering in the Eastern Ukraine. Our
friends in Kiev are not without fault. They have adopted a
change in law that would strip the Russian language of its
official status in its southern and eastern provinces.
Fortunately, that law was vetoed. But, clearly, a
Parliament, and I should point out a Parliament in which many
of the Eastern Ukrainian members felt unsafe and did not
attend, would be allowed to pass such a law shows that this is
not a government dedicated to reaching out to all of its
citizens.
So we have the simplicity of Westerns. We have the reality
of foreign policy in Eastern Europe. It is overly simplistic to
say that one side is entirely right and one side is entirely
wrong just as it is even more simplistic to say that everything
would go our way if only we had a President with a different
personality.
We had a President with a radically different personality
just a decade ago when Georgia lost not one but two of its
autonomous regions to Russia, Georgia being smaller, the
regions being smaller, the issues being smaller. But you can
say what you like about our last two Presidents. The one thing
everybody agrees on is they had different personalities.
As to arms control agreements, we have got to trust but
verify. Ronald Reagan entered into agreements with a Soviet
Union that, clearly, was less trustworthy than Putin is today.
Those who enter into these agreements and rely on trust are
fooling themselves.
The allegations are twofold. One, that the--that a Russian
missile that they call long range was tested at an intermediate
range. It seems clear that it is a long range missile.
The other is that a mid-range missile that the Russians say
was for sea-based purposes was tested on ground, which is
allowed, but tested on ground with what appears to be a
operational useable ground-based launcher perhaps one, and I
would like to hear from our witnesses, that was mobile. And so
it appears as if they were developing a ground-based capacity
for this intermediate missile.
Finally, I will point out that four countries have given up
their nuclear weapons or their nuclear programs--South Africa,
where it worked out well--Saddam, Gaddafi and the Ukraine.
Two of them lost their lives. One of them lost the Crimea.
It may be more difficult in the future for us to convince
dictators to give up nuclear weapons. It doesn't always work
out well. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, all of the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made part of the record and I ask that each
witness keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes.
We are in the middle of votes. We will see how far we can
go before we recess for votes and we will resume immediately
after the votes. I will introduce both of the witnesses at this
time.
Ms. Anita Friedt is the principal deputy assistant
secretary for nuclear and strategic policy for the Bureau of
Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the U.S.
Department of State.
Ms. Friedt has earned numerous awards including seven
superior honor awards for her work on U.S.-Russian European----
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, are other members allowed to
give short opening statements?
Mr. Poe. All members may have 5 days to submit statements
due to the fact that we have votes and we also have two
subcommittees. So they can make their comments during their
questioning if they wish.
Mr. Brent Hartley is the deputy assistant secretary for the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. State
Department. Mr. Hartley has extensive experience in European
security issues and has served in various roles related to arms
control, counter terrorism in NATO and more.
Ms. Friedt, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. ANITA E. FRIEDT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY, BUREAU OF ARMS
CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Friedt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Poe, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Members Sherman
and Keating and members of this committee, I am grateful for
the opportunity to speak to you today about the
administration's arms control policy toward Russia.
Today, I want to speak to you about three things. One, why
arms control agreements with Russia continue to be an important
tool to enhance the security of the United States, our allies
and partners; two, how we have used arms control tools since
the crisis in Ukraine began to increase transparency and
stability in support of our broader regional efforts; and
three, the seriousness with which the administration takes
compliance and arms control treaties.
First, as it has been recognized for over four decades,
arms control is a tool that can be used to enhance the security
of the United States, our allies and our partners.
The Obama administration has continued the longstanding
bipartisan approach to arms control with Russia that had its
origins in the days of the Cold War. The administrations of
Presidents Ronald Reagan, George W.--and George H.W. Bush were
the architects of many of our most successful and enduring arms
control efforts.
Let me affirm that the United States is committed to
maintaining strategic stability between the United States and
Russia and to encouraging mutual steps to foster a more stable,
resilient, predictable and transparent security relationship.
That said, Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine have
undermined trust. While diplomacy between the United States and
Russia continues, no one can ignore that Russia's actions in
Ukraine have violated the very principles upon which
cooperation is built.
Further, as we consider arms control priorities this year
or in any year, we will continue to consult closely with our
allies and partners every step of the way. Our security and
defense as well as that of our allies and partners is non-
negotiable.
We will only pursue arms control agreements that advance
our national interest. During the Cold War, Washington and
Moscow found it in our mutual interest to work together to tap
and then to begin reducing the number of nuclear weapons in
service in reversing the nuclear arms race and improving mutual
security instability.
We judged that the New START treaty was in the United
States' national security interest for the same reasons and
that is why we continue to implement the New START treaty with
Russia today.
We are now in the fourth year of implementation, and
despite the crisis in Ukraine we in Russia continue to
implement the treaty in a business-like manner. Since entering
into force in 2011 the United States has inspected with boots
on the ground Russian nuclear weapons facilities 58 times.
These inspections are as a part of New START's treaty
verification regime which is a vital tool in ensuring
transparency and predictability between the world's largest
nuclear powers.
In the realm of conventional arms control, the United
States and our allies have been using arms control mechanisms
in an effort to promote stability in Europe, provide
transparency in Russia's provocative actions and assure our
allies and partners.
I want to underscore that our NATO allies and other
partners in Europe strongly support arms control in Europe as
well as our active participation and leadership in those
efforts.
Since the Ukraine crisis began, the United States and our
treaty partners have used the Open Skies treaty to fly 11
missions over Ukraine and western Russia, yielding imagery of
thousands of square miles of territory. These flights have
resulted in valuable data and insights not only for the United
States but our partners and allies as well.
We also have confidence-building measures in the Vienna
Document to conduct inspections of use and confidence-building
measures in Ukraine.
Let me now turn to the issue of compliance. First and
foremost, the administration takes compliance with all arms
control agreements extremely seriously. For this reason, this
administration worked hard to produce a compliance report in
2010, the first compliance report delivered to the Congress
since 2005, and we have produced one every year since.
We endeavor every year to produce a compliance report by
April 15th. This is admittedly challenging, given the volume of
information, the multiple agencies that must comment on it and
the seriousness with which the administration conducts its
annual compliance review.
Despite this, we plan to have the report fully coordinated
and available later in the spring. As we have previously
stated, we have concerns about Russian compliance with the INF
treaty.
We have raised them--raised these concerns with Russia and
are pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve these
concerns because of the importance of the INF treaty to Euro-
Atlantic security.
We have briefed our NATO allies on our concerns and will
continue to coordinate with them on this and other matters that
affect our common security.
We have kept Congress informed on this matter through
briefings with relevant congressional committees and will
continue to do so. We will continue to work with Russia to
resolve our concerns and to encourage mutual steps to help
foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security
relationship. We are not going to drop the issue until our
concerns have been addressed.
Let me conclude by reiterating our strong belief that arms
control treaties and agreements continue to be an important
tool that can enhance the security of the United States and our
friends and allies.
The successful implementation of the New START treaty and
the important contributions that Open Skies treaty and the
Vienna Document have played recently in Ukraine demonstrate the
continued relevance of arms control for our national security.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Friedt follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ms. Friedt.
Mr. Hartley, we just have a few minutes left in the voting
process so we will do your testimony as soon as we come back.
We have two votes. After the second vote is concluded we
will start immediately after that and we will hear what you
have to say. Committee is in recess.
[Recess.]
STATEMENT OF MR. BRENT HARTLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Hartley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the committees. I appreciate very much your inviting me to
testify here today on our efforts to reassure allies and
partners and to bolster security in Ukraine and the region, and
I would like to thank the members of both subcommittees or both
committees for your engagement on European security in light of
the Ukraine crisis.
It is important to remember how we got to this point.
Russia's illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea and its
continued campaign to undermine and intimidate the Government
of Ukraine have up-ended the post-Cold War security
architecture that Russia had in fact helped to create.
Russia is maintaining a 40,000--a contingent of 40,000
troops on Ukraine's eastern border and conducting military
activities that raise deep concerns. There is strong evidence
demonstrating that the actions of recent weeks--the roadblocks,
building seizures, hostage takings and other violent acts in
Eastern Ukraine, primarily in the Donetsk Oblast--have not been
a spontaneous set of events but rather a well orchestrated
campaign led by Russian special services.
We strongly condemn the abduction last Friday of the
German-led Vienna Document inspection team and their Ukrainian
escorts in Slovyansk by pro-Russian separatists.
We are deeply disappointed that senior officials in Moscow
have not condemned the abduction of the team nor have they
demanded the team's immediate release.
Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine are in violation of
international law and do not uphold the letter or the spirit of
the April 17th Geneva statement.
Yesterday, the United States acted, imposing new sanctions
on seven Russian Government officials including two members of
President Putin's inner circle and 17 companies linked to
Putin's inner circle.
These steps demonstrate that the United States is committed
to increase the costs on Russia as it persists in its efforts
to destabilize Ukraine and that we will hold Russia accountable
for its provocative actions.
Russia's actions have also forced the United States and
NATO allies to fundamentally reexamine our strategic engagement
in Europe. My testimony today will focus on three areas of this
effort.
First, I will talk about efforts to reassure NATO's front
line allies and to bolster our other partners in the region.
Second, I will discuss the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's important role in monitoring the
security situation and facilitating dialogue in Ukraine. Third,
I will address U.S. bilateral security assistance to Ukraine.
First, we are pursuing measures through NATO and
bilaterally to reassure our allies and partners in the region
and in particular to demonstrate our solemn commitment to our
collective defense responsibilities to our NATO allies. We have
deployed six additional F-15s to the Baltic air policing
mission.
We have deployed 12 F-16s and other aircraft and personnel
for exercises--joint U.S.-Polish exercises coordinated by the
U.S. aviation training detachment in Lask, Poland.
NATO has deployed AWACS to provide aerial surveillance over
Poland and Romania as well as a mine counter measure naval
group into the Baltic Sea. The United States deployed--has
deployed ships into the Black Sea for exercises with Romania
and Bulgaria.
On April 16th, NATO allies agreed on additional measures to
provide reassurance and demonstrate NATO's resolve and
solidarity. U.S. Army in Europe has deployed over the last week
company-sized contingents of paratroopers to Poland, Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia for exercises with those host
governments' troops.
These will be the first in a series of expanded land-force
training exercises in the region that will take place at least
through the end of the year. As we prepare for the NATO summit
in Wales, it will be an opportunity to reassess the alliance's
long-term priorities in the wake of Russia's aggressive actions
in Ukraine--that, along with NATO-Ukraine relations questions
related to the open-door NATO enlargement, Afghanistan
capabilities and enhancing NATO partnerships.
Beyond NATO's borders, we are engaged with other front line
states like Georgia and Moldova and I would be happy to get
into more detail on that in my--in the question and answer
period.
Second, we see a vital role for the OSCE in this crisis.
Along with our allies in Europe we are committed to maintaining
a large presence of international monitors as part of the OSCE
special monitoring mission.
This mission is positioned to objectively assess the
security situation and investigate claims of human rights
abuses as well as to assist in de-escalating tensions in
Eastern Ukraine.
But for this mission to be properly implemented in
accordance with the Geneva statement, Russia must take active
and concrete steps immediately to de-escalate the crisis
including public and private messages to pro-Russian elements
engaged in illegal activities in Ukraine as well as active
support for the monitoring missions role.
OSCE is also involved in election observation for the May
25th election. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, or ODIHR, is laying the groundwork for the largest
observation mission in its history--in its 40-year history,
planning to deploy approximately 1,000 observers in the run-up
to the election.
Third, we are working with the Ukrainian Government to
provide security assistance. As Vice President Biden announced
last week, we are providing $8 million in assistance to allow
the Ukrainian armed forces and border guard service to fulfill
core security missions.
This is in addition to the $3 million of meals ready to
eat, $3.5 million of health and welfare assistance to the armed
forces and $3 million in other security assistance to Ukraine's
state border guard service.
Looking forward, the United States will continue to
reaffirm the security and stability of the region across
multiple fronts using multiple tools at our disposal.
In this effort, we appreciate Congress' bipartisan
attention and support for Ukraine and for stability across the
region and will continue to work in close coordination with you
on all three of these areas.
Chair, thank you very much and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hartley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thanks for yielding back time. The Chair will now
recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats--Mr. Rohrabacher--for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The
focus of this hearing, we originally thought would be our
nuclear weapons and the relationship between the United States
and Russia in terms of cooperating on reducing and restricting
the number of nuclear weapons that threaten human kind.
We have gone beyond that and we, of course--however, I
believe the purpose of that is to put in perspective the
decisions we must make in terms of weapons control after the
events that have happened in Ukraine.
Let me just note that from my perspective, there has been
too gleeful a response by so many of my former colleagues, and
I am not talking about members of the House. I am talking about
people who have worked with me over the years in various
administrations and various anti-Communist causes.
There seems to be a gleeful response to what has happened
in Ukraine because it then gives them yet a purpose in going
back and beating up the old enemy. And, frankly, the Soviet
Union was our enemy because it was directed by people with an
ideology that it was trying to supplant in the rest of the
world and doing so in a big way as well as building up their
own military. Russia is a powerful force in the world, which we
need to deal with as a major country--a major nation.
Major countries have their interests. I do not see what is
going on in Ukraine as a--as a outcome of the Communist
ideology but instead you have a very important international
power there, Russia, that is governed by someone who is looking
out for its national interests and who that leadership of that
country, obviously, believes that what was going on in Ukraine
was contrary to their national interests and that they were not
being treated fairly in a way in which a pro-Russian leader was
removed from office by street violence rather than by
elections, which was going to result in their losing the--what
they had was access to the Crimea and a port for their fleet.
That said, I would like to go back to the original purpose
that we came here today was to talk about arms control and how
that will be impacted by this new shift in our relations with
Russia, and I say that no matter what I just said the bottom
line is it is in recognition that we are now not in as a
positive relationship or a neutral relationship that we were in
2 years ago with Russia.
We are in fact in a--things have--our relationship with
Russia has deteriorated. Whose fault that is and does the
Russian Government--does Putin and--we share--have all the
blame or do we share some of it or was there a power grab by
the EU? That is something that would take long to discuss. But
the fact is we know that relationship has deteriorated.
What I would like to ask the panel is does this mean that
what we negotiated with--and I am very proud of what Ronald
Reagan accomplished in eliminating a whole classification of
nuclear weapons and brought down the number of nuclear weapons
that threaten the world--does that mean that we can no longer
work with Russia in this area?
Should we postpone our efforts or pull back from
cooperation with the current Russian Government on those
issues? Should we then also pull back from economic
cooperation?
Should we declare the space program that we are in partners
with Russia now to be not something that we believe we can
count on and thus we should go the opposite direction? What
about that?
What are the implications for arms control? What are the
implications for cooperating in other areas with Russia on this
whole Ukrainian situation?
Ms. Friedt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to
answer that question.
First of all, I would say that this administration has made
it very clear that it is important to continue to cooperate
with Russia where we can, where our national security interests
coincide. But then when we disagree we disagree and we make our
disagreement very clear.
So there is no question that it is in our national security
interest to continue to work with Russia and international
partners in multilateral efforts that are key to global
security.
Such efforts as elimination of Syria chemical weapons, for
example, our work together on Iran and, I would add, also our
work together in the arms control field, and that means a
continued implementation of arms control----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we are not advocating--so the
administration and what you are suggesting today--good policy
would be not to punish Russia in those areas for what they are
doing in Ukraine?
Ms. Friedt. I would not say punish. We have a very clear
position on the events in Ukraine and----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we should not let cooperation be a tool
then. Mr. Hartley, could you answer that and then I will--I
have already taken too much time. I am sorry.
Mr. Hartley. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. Well,
as Anita said we--there are areas where both we and the
Russians perceive our national interest to coincide and Anita
outlined a number of them. One area where we now have a very
profound difference is over what the post-Cold War European
security environment should be--what the ground rules are.
Coming out of the Cold War, we had--we thought some very
clear rules based on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other
agreements that European borders would not be changed by force.
The Russians have undertaken to do that with regard to
Crimea. We believe that they are actively involved using their
special forces and other agents to destabilize Eastern Ukraine
and it is for that reason because of this behavior contrary----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. Thank you very much. And Mr.
Chairman, again, as we discuss this China is still in the world
and in the picture and I hope that as we look and we work these
problems out that we keep in mind that China has to be part of
the equation or the world will be less secure.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. I will--the Chair will
recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee from
California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. This has become to some extent a Ukraine
hearing and we are honored by the presence of the deputy
assistant secretary from the relevant bureau.
Mr. Hartley, has the Ukrainian Government been successful
in disarming anti-Russia militias?
Mr. Hartley. Thank you, sir, for that question. My
expertise falls more on the NATO, the OSCE and the bilateral
security assistance side. It is my impression that they have
made some progress there but I would be happy to take that
question for a more authoritative response.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. While you take that question, the other
question is what are we doing to urge the government in Kiev to
honor and even make less subject to alteration statutes adopted
in the past to assure the Russian language would be an official
language in the south and east of Ukraine?
What are we doing to say yes, there may be forces--
political forces in Kiev that say let us impose the Ukrainian
language on everyone and there may be forces on the other side?
I for one understand America is spending its treasure and
taking risks for the territorial integrity of the Ukraine. I am
an agnostic as to what language should be spoken in the East
and I would hate to think that we find ourselves exposed to
risk and cost because the noncompromising elements prevail in
Kiev on these language issues.
Ms. Friedt, what--does Russia put forward any arguments
that we are in violation of any of the arms control agreements
that we have entered into with Russia or with its predecessor
government?
Ms. Friedt. Thank you for that question, sir. Yes, as a
matter of fact Russia, when we issue our annual compliance
report every year, at least this administration, the Russians
regularly come back with some--their own----
Mr. Sherman. So they have an annual compliance report which
may even be issued on time. Sorry about that. Sorry. Go ahead.
And what do you think is their strongest complaint?
Ms. Friedt. Strongest complaint, the one I would say--I
can't give you all of their complaints right now because I
haven't looked at them recently but certainly our missile
defense is what they focus on.
Mr. Sherman. And which treaty do they believe the missile
defense efforts are in violation of?
Ms. Friedt. Well, it would be more than likely the INF
treaty is one.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Now, as--I am trying to understand what
is the legal obligation of Russia with regard to intermediate
missiles that they claim will be used only in naval warfare.
As I understand it, they are allowed to test these missiles
from a ground-based launcher but not if that ground-based
launcher would be the effective launcher to use in case
hostilities broke out. What are they allowed to do on land in
order to test weapons that they say are exclusively for naval
use?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, quite frankly, thank you for your
question. I am not prepared right now to go into technical
details. The focus here is----
Mr. Sherman. I am asking you what the treaty provides. I am
asking for you to just inform us what the treaty provides. What
is the United States allowed to do? What is the--and I am not
asking for a secret here.
Ms. Friedt. No, no. Not at all a secret. But let me just
briefly state that what, as I mentioned before, that we have
very serious concerns and as you have stated that Russia is
developing a ground-launched cruise missile that is
inconsistent with the INF treaty and we have made those
concerns very clear to the Russians.
Mr. Sherman. I am hoping you would make them clear to us.
Is the mere testing of--and Mr. Hartley, I don't know if you
have a comment on this--the mere testing of this missile a
violation if they can claim that it is--that they only plan to
deploy it on ships?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, that would go into the specific range and
such that it is tested. So it----
Mr. Sherman. It is being tested for--you know, it is an
intermediate range missile. The question is is it a naval
intermediate range missile or are they creating a ground-based
intermediate missile?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, I can't get into details here, I am
afraid, on that topic because of the--I would be happy to talk
about it in closed----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. The details I want are what are the
provisions of the treaty but my time has more than expired. I
thank you for your time.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Friedt, it has taken 5
years for the State Department to reach a verdict on this
treaty, in my opinion.
So my question is are the Russians, in our point of view,
in violation of the treaty? And I see only one of three
answers--yes, no, you don't know. So which one of those is the
answer?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, we are in the process of finalizing the
annual compliance report and we will have a finding so shortly.
Mr. Poe. So you can't tell me whether you--it is yes or no
or you don't know?
Ms. Friedt. I can't at this point because, as I mentioned,
it is----
Mr. Poe. When are you going to have this report ready? It
is--like the ranking member said, it is overdue.
Ms. Friedt. Sir----
Mr. Poe. It is 5 years taken to get a report here. Either
they are in compliance or they are not in compliance. We've got
to make foreign policy decisions and we don't know if the
Russians are cheating or not? So how long is it going--when are
we going to get a verdict on the report?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, we report on this issue every year on the
INF treaty and at this point the annual compliance report is in
the process of being finalized.
Mr. Poe. So when will it be finalized?
Ms. Friedt. Later this spring.
Mr. Poe. You don't know. Okay. Each of you have said that
the actions by Putin are illegal. You have seen that there is
some disagreement here as to whether Russia can do what they
are doing internationally or not.
Why is the action of Russia going into Crimea and then now
Eastern Europe--Ukraine--illegal in the United States' point of
view? You both said it was illegal. So why is it illegal?
Mr. Hartley. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. The--
undertaking the actions they did the Russians have violated
their commitments under the U.N. charter. That is from a legal
standpoint.
From a political standpoint, they have violated--well, they
have broken commitments made under the 1994 Budapest memorandum
and as well as the commitments under the Helsinki Final Act,
among others.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Friedt, do you have any other comments other
than what Mr. Hartley has already said on why the action is
illegal?
Ms. Friedt. No, sir. I think Mr. Hartley has answered the
question.
Mr. Poe. When I was in Ukraine and in recent weeks have
talked to other heads of state in the area they are not the
only country that is concerned about their territorial
integrity--Moldova, other former Soviet republics not yet in
NATO and some that are in NATO. Are there concerns warranted?
Mr. Hartley.
Mr. Hartley. Yes, sir, if I may. The--of course, they----
Mr. Poe. And I am talking about concerns of Russia coming
in and taking over some of their territory. That is my
question.
Mr. Hartley. Yes, sir. The actions that the Russians have
undertaken with regard to Crimea and what they are doing in
Eastern Ukraine gives deep cause for concern on the part of
those nations.
Any country that has a Russian minority or a Russian-
speaking minority, at least according to Mr. Putin in his
March--April 18th speech, according to Mr. Putin's public
statements is--would seem at risk of being--be at risk of
Russian intervention.
Mr. Poe. The Ukrainian Government, on the issue of interest
of Russians in the east, there is no definition as to what a
Russian is.
Is it a Russian that was born in Russia? Is it a Russian
that has moved to Eastern Ukraine? Is it a Russian who wants to
be Russian? There is no definition as to what a Russian is.
Do we have a definition of what a Russian is in the eastern
part of the Ukraine?
Mr. Hartley. I don't know that we do, sir.
Mr. Poe. It means different things to different people?
Mr. Hartley. That is true, and the way Mr. Putin seems to
define it is an ethnic Russian or a Russian speaker.
Mr. Poe. The elections in Ukraine are coming up May 26th, I
believe. I think it is important for stability in Ukraine that
they have these elections, that they are fair, that people
vote.
Do you see--I am asking you just to kind of look 26 days in
the future--do you see that the Russians may cause a
disturbance, a crisis, to try to postpone these elections? It
seems like to me they cause a crisis, then they want to solve
the crisis by moving in their troops. So are we expecting a
possible crisis to try to get these elections postponed?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, thank you for that. Well, I would be
hesitant to speculate too far into the future. The conditions
are such that that is a legitimate concern.
In the negotiation of the Geneva statement, the U.S, the EU
and the Ukrainians all urged the inclusion of a sentence that
referred to the May 25th elections and the need that they be
carried out in an orderly and transparent way.
The Russians refuse to include that in the text of the
statement. The disruptions are already taking place in Eastern
Ukraine that are bound to complicate the election efforts and
we believe that those--that the instability there is being
fomented by the Russians.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Hartley, Ms. Friedt. We will--chair
will yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me--you know, there
was a beginning where we thought that we would be entering a
new world where we would be able to have as we did with the New
START treaty, for example, we are not abolishing nuclear
weapons altogether. There was a--we were moving in the right
direction.
Senate ratified it--the treaty, and the Russian Federation
then right after ratified the treaty, and there was a lot of
things going on because it seems to me when we are dealing with
Crimea and dealing with the east Ukraine we have got to balance
a number of issues also--our NATO allies.
I believe that sanctions work but only when they are
multilateral sanctions. If we do sanctions individually they
are not as strong as they would be multilaterally.
Yet a number of our NATO allies have concerns and we have
got to make sure that they are part of whatever we do. We can't
separate ourselves, in my viewpoint, from them and that is why
our NATO allies are tremendously important.
Some of them are more dependent upon Russia than others and
some arms experts--control experts continue to report that
Russia could potentially withdraw from treaties such as the INF
and that they may further--any further expansion of arms
control efforts will likely make no headway for the foreseeable
future.
So and some of my colleagues, and I hear some of the
pundits, et cetera, saying give weapons and some saying more
sanctions. Very few people are talking about diplomatic
solutions.
So my first question is do--either one of you do you still
see--you know, I always try to believe that there is hope, that
we all--we should talk and have conversations with nations that
we don't disagree with.
Is diplomacy an option here? Do you see diplomacy having a
chance here or have we--you know, or it has no chance? What
role do you think diplomacy has in this?
Mr. Hartley. Thank you, sir. We believe that diplomacy is a
critical aspect of this. That is why Secretary Kerry has had, I
forget, six, eight, 10 conversations with Mr. Lavrov, the
Russian foreign minister, over the last couple of weeks.
That is why he went to Geneva to negotiate the terms of the
Geneva statement that laid out a pathway for de-escalation and
so we very much believe that the--that that is the--that
diplomacy is the way to resolve this to find a political
solution.
The sanctions that we are imposing have been imposed only
after those efforts have so far proven fruitless. But our
sanctions are scalable. They are flexible. If the Russians make
the decision that they want to de-escalate the situation and
return to behavior consistent with international norms then we
can reverse the sanctions.
But we--even as we go forward, taking a harder line on
those, we want to keep the door open for a diplomatic solution.
Mr. Meeks. And that being the case try to prevent a
scenario that we currently have and I do see some of the other
regions, whether it is in the Caucuses, the Baltic or the
Eastern Europe or Central Asia, you know, we have got to focus
on some of those countries now.
I have got a lot of friends in those countries that think
Mr. Chairman Poe may have said something. What do we say to
them now? What should we do.
I mean, when you look at Ukraine its economy was in the
tank and some say Crimea is going to be a big burden on Russia,
as it seems right now. But we have got to firm up the rest of
the Ukraine economically.
What do you see that we can do? Mr. Hartley, you talked
about that there is huge concerns right now about Russia, you
know, at least some of these countries about Russia coming in.
What can we do now before there is any possibility of Russia
invading?
What can we do to help those countries now so that we can
make them--assure them that we are there, that NATO is there?
What do think we can do right now, prospective?
Mr. Hartley. Thank you, sir. Well, with regard to NATO
allies, particular those on--we have now come to call front
line states, the three Baltic countries--Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria--we have already deployed U.S. forces--land, sea and
air--and NATO allies are deploying at this point, principally
sea and air assets in a measured way to underscore that the
Article 5 commitment to collective defense is credible and has
teeth. So we are in constant consultation with our NATO allies
at NATO headquarters.
Mr. Meeks. Let me just ask--and we are out of time--I just
want to ask this one last question. Do you think Russia is
backing down from its arms agreements with the United States
and preparing to have a continued military escalation?
You know, that is what some are saying--that in other
words, people are saying that Russia is building up and they
are strong and kind of daring the United States to have a
military escalation on NATO to come up and make them militarily
see that that is part and parcel of what is going on here?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, thank you for that question. That is
precisely why the New START treaty is so important. The fact
that we have--and the fact that it has been successfully
implemented since it was signed and inspections began in 2011.
Russians are implementing the New START treaty and it does
set the limits on their ability to build up nuclear forces.
Mr. Meeks. And you don't see them violating that right now?
Ms. Friedt. No, sir. No, sir.
Mr. Meeks. Okay. So there is still cooperation in that
regards.
Ms. Friedt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meeks. And there are a number of other things that they
are still cooperating with us on?
Ms. Friedt. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Hartley. May I add to that, sir, or do you want to move
on?
Mr. Poe. If you can make it brief.
Mr. Hartley. Okay. On the conventional side, the Russians
have been modernizing but--and it has been a source of some
concern. But we feel as though the assets available to the NATO
alliance are sufficient to deter any incursions on NATO
territory.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Hartley. The Chair will recognize
the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen,
appreciate your time. Ms. Friedt, the State Department is aware
that Russia may have been in violation of the 1987 Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty while negotiating the New START
treaty.
The first question is when, as far as you understand it,
did the administration first learn of the possible violation of
the INF treaty by the Russians? Was it in 2008?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, the New START treaty--ratification of the
New START treaty did not--I mean, at that time the--Russia was
implementing the INF treaty successfully. At this point, I
would go into--prefer to go into closed sessions to deal with
the circumstances, the specific dates on the specific questions
you asked.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Then let me ask you this. When the
President was overheard talking to Medvedev at the time he said
that after the election he could be more flexible, and this is
in the context of Members of Congress being concerned about our
national security posture and our ability to secure our nation
in light of adversaries and enemies, if you want to call some
folks that. What did he mean by that? What do you think he
meant by that?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, what I can say here is that the United
States and this administration will only pursue arms control
agreements that are in the United States national security
interest and that is something that this administration and the
President believes.
Mr. Perry. But if we know or if we suspect with some
credibility that our partner in negotiation is cheating at the
time we are negotiating a reduction in our capability, how is
that--and we don't take that into account and we continue to
march forward with our reduction, how--can you explain to me
how that is in our best interest?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, as I mentioned in my statement, this
administration takes compliance with arms control treaties very
seriously. During the negotiation of the New START treaty, we
took compliance with arms control treaties into consideration.
Mr. Perry. But we knew or we suspected? We suspected while
we were negotiating the treaty that they were cheating and we
continued forward, and it is fine to continue forward with the
negotiation. We, as far as you know, and as far as Russia is
concerned, based on your testimony have upheld our end of the
bargain.
We still don't know--according to your testimony, we won't
know until later this spring, and by the way, spring is almost
over--to the extent of their cheating and I recognize and
acknowledge the sensitivity of the date.
So I will be happy to talk to you in closed session about
that. But my concern is that we are unilaterally disarming
America while we know or we suspect with some certainty that
Russia is cheating on their end of the deal and I still don't
understand how that is in our best interest.
Ms. Friedt. Thank you for that question, sir. The United
States--arms control is in the United States' national security
interest.
Mr. Perry. It is in our interest when we are controlling
theirs or they are controlling theirs within the paradigm as
well as ours. But it is not in our interest when we are
controlling ours and they are not controlling theirs to our
satisfaction in accordance with the previous agreement. Would
you agree?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, we take compliance--this administration
takes compliance with arms control very seriously. I am happy
to discuss the specifics in closed session.
Let me say with respect to the START treaty that was a very
carefully negotiated agreement based on the nuclear posture
review. That was a document that received interagency--a very
close study by then Secretary Gates and by then chairman of
the----
Mr. Perry. But does it--but did they have the knowledge at
that time? Because we didn't--and again, maybe you want to wait
to a closed session but it is my understanding that we didn't
report our suspicion or our knowledge of their breach of the
previous treaty while the negotiation was happening to our NATO
allies.
Did our negotiators--did Secretary Gates--did he know at
that time while he was in agreement with this accord that we
had a very strong suspicion that they were cheating on the
previous agreement?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, I would like to take you up on your offer
to do this in closed session.
Mr. Perry. All right. Then moving on, based on--based on
recent actions in Crimea, can--how do you--do you think the
American people should trust the Russians to adhere to a
bilateral and multilateral arms control agreement, and if so,
why?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, this administration believes in trust but
verify. So verification and compliance with arms control
treaties is very important.
Mr. Perry. Let me ask you one final question, with due
indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
So if we find out and if we prove and in the spring time if
it is determined and you report that they had indeed cheated,
for lack of a better phrase, on the previous treaty, the
previous agreement, what will be the ramifications?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, I am not prepared to discuss this at this
point. When the report is finalized we will discuss it.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Poe. Gentleman yields back his time. The Chair will
recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate it--
your testimony today.
Why do you think Russia has become so emboldened here,
going back to August 2010, as far as invading other countries?
I thought it was a simple question. I am sorry.
Mr. Hartley. Thank you, sir. If only there were simple
questions in this life. The--it is, of course, difficult to
know precisely why the Russians and Mr. Putin have taken the
actions they have.
There are factors related to history, factors related to
concern about the influence that a successful democracy and
market economy on its border by a land--a country that used to
be part of Russia might have on the--or part of the Russian
empire might have on the rest of the population in Russia.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Let me--let me go in a different direction
here. As you said, there are the simple questions but the
answers aren't often simple. Do you see the 2010 START treaty
with us reducing our weapons to 1,550 and with President Obama
and the administration willingness to reduce further unilateral
cuts to 1,000 do you think that has emboldened the Russians--
Mr. Putin and the Russians?
Ms. Friedt. Thank you for that question, sir. No, I do not.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Do you see Russia viewing us as weak,
undecisive, not willing? Our credibility has been damaged. If
you go back over the course of the last 2 or 3 years--you know,
red lines, no red lines, regimes must change, we never said
regimes must change, not fulfilling the missile defense system
in Poland and, you know, putting a stop to that? Do you think
they see us as just kind being weak and not with strong
resolve?
Ms. Friedt. Sir, I do not see U.S. foreign policy as weak.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. How about you, Mr. Hartley?
Mr. Hartley. No, sir. I agree with Anita.
Mr. Yoho. All right. So with what is going on in Venezuela
in our own back yard, with what China is doing drawing an
arbitrary no-fly zone with Syria and Iran and Iran is closer to
a nuclear weapon--in fact, the last--just here a couple of
months ago we were told that Iran would have enough material to
develop five to six nuclear bombs within 4 to 5 months, I see--
what I am seeing from where I am sitting and what I read is the
lone superpower that Bill Clinton talked about that America
could no longer afford to be becoming weaker, everybody else is
becoming emboldened and I see people flexing their muscles
because of our weakness and that lack of resolve that we have.
Where do you think this will lead? Where do you think
Russia will end up? Are they going to go into Transnistria? Do
you see them going into there? Because that is a large Russian-
speaking population. Do either one of you see that?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, we see that there is a risk and the
Russians have influence in Transnistria. But it is our policy
to exact a cost from the Russians for their behavior that is in
violation of international norms.
Mr. Yoho. All right. And do you feel the sanctions that we
are talking about that we have done do you think they will have
any compact on Russia's aggression?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, the purpose of the sanctions is to try to
influence Russian behavior, to bring it back within
international norms.
Mr. Yoho. How is it working so far, Ms. Friedt?
Ms. Friedt. Actually, that's Mr.--Brent, go ahead.
Mr. Hartley. If I may, sir.
Mr. Yoho. Yes.
Mr. Hartley. This could be a long process, sir.
Mr. Yoho. All right. But, again, do we have compliance with
other nations? Are they putting strong sanctions in place too
or is it just us doing this unilaterally?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, yesterday as we announced our third round
of sanctions we were joined by the G-7, which includes Japan,
Canada and four of the major EU members. But the entire EU also
joined.
You could--we could--the Norwegians, who are not part of
the EU, also adhere to EU sanctions. So we have a broad
international coalition that is focused on bringing Russia back
into compliance with international norms.
Mr. Yoho. Let me ask you one other question. Do we have
troops on the ground in Ukraine right now?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, we do not have combat troops. I mean, it
depends on how you define it. We have a defense attache. We
have officials from the Pentagon that visit. But I think the
simple answer is no.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back. A couple more questions
from the Chair and then I will give the ranking member time if
he wishes.
Are the Russians going to give Crimea back, Mr. Hartley?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, we are doing everything we can to
encourage that.
Mr. Poe. Okay. I know we are doing that but are they going
to give it back, at the end of the day? Is it going to be part
of Ukraine or is it going to be part of Russia?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, it is our policy that it remains a part
of Ukraine and should be returned to Ukrainian control.
Mr. Poe. So you don't know. How about you, Ms. Friedt?
Ms. Friedt. I agree with Mr. Hartley.
Mr. Poe. Okay. We don't know. The 20 kidnapped election
watchers--who kidnapped them?
Mr. Hartley. Sir, there were--it was a Vienna Document
inspection team. They weren't election observers. It was--the
team originally--it was composed of eight Europeans led by the
Germans and they had five Ukrainian escorts with them. They
were kidnapped by pro-Russia individuals or a pro-Russia group
in Eastern Ukraine.
Mr. Poe. Okay. What were they doing in Eastern Ukraine? You
say they were inspectors of what?
Mr. Hartley. They were there under the Vienna Document,
sir. All 57 nations that are participating states in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to include
Russia have agreed to a set of measures that are intended to
build confidence among the partners--among the participants.
Part one mechanism of that is our inspections that each
participating state is obliged to receive a certain number of
inspections every year. But they can also offer voluntary
inspections.
Mr. Poe. So they went over there for inspections of what?
Mr. Hartley. They were there to inspect Ukrainian military
installations and deployments but also to----
Mr. Poe. And they were kidnapped by Russian sympathizers?
Mr. Hartley. Correct, sir.
Mr. Poe. All right. Last question. Is Europe slow walking
sanctions because they are concerned about the fact that many
of them are totally dependent on Russia for their energy and
that Russia may then just retaliate? Is that one of their
concerns about sanctions?
Mr. Meeks asked about the Europeans and their not being too
supportive, as we would hope in this. Is that part of the
reason or do you know, Mr. Hartley?
Mr. Hartley. Both we and the Europeans are looking for ways
for sanctions that will maximize the impact on the Russians
while minimizing the impact on our own economies and
businesses. So it is fair to say that that is a consideration
of the Europeans, sir.
Mr. Poe. All right. Thank you.
I will yield to the ranking member if he has any more
questions.
All right. I want to thank both of our witnesses for their
participation and any other questions that any members of the
panel have will be put in writing and we would expect a
response from you.
Thank you very much for being here. The subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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