[House Hearing, 113 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 113-85] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY __________ HEARING HELD MARCH 12, 2014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 87-617 WASHINGTON : 2014 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Thirteenth Congress HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDRE CARSON, Indiana CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAUL COOK, California JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member Mike Casey, Professional Staff Member Nicholas Rodman, Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2014 Page Hearing: Wednesday, March 12, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Navy... 1 Appendix: Wednesday, March 12, 2014........................................ 51 ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2014 FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1 Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2 WITNESSES Amos, GEN James F. USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.......... 9 Greenert, ADM Jonathan, USN, Chief of Naval Operations........... 6 Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy........................... 4 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Amos, Gen James F............................................ 125 Greenert, ADM Jonathan....................................... 91 Mabus, Hon. Ray.............................................. 60 McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 55 Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 57 Documents Submitted for the Record: Charts from Admiral Greenert................................. 147 Letter to Ms. Speier from Acting Under Secretary of Defense.. 149 Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: Mr. Conaway.................................................. 153 Mr. Jones.................................................... 153 Mr. Scott.................................................... 154 Ms. Speier................................................... 154 Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Ms. Bordallo................................................. 158 Mr. Brooks................................................... 164 Mr. Coffman.................................................. 164 Mr. Conaway.................................................. 161 Mr. Kline.................................................... 160 Mr. Langevin................................................. 158 Mr. McKeon................................................... 157 Mr. Shuster.................................................. 161 Mrs. Walorski................................................ 165 Mr. Wilson................................................... 157 FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2014. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I want to thank you all for joining us here today as we consider the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Department of the Navy. I appreciate our witnesses' testimony and their support of our naval forces. Joining us today are the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations; and General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Our naval forces are the best in the world. They provide our Nation with an incredible ability to project power and strength and strengthen the U.S. presence around the world. Unfortunately, the largest threat to our naval forces is one of our own making. Defense cuts continue to have a debilitating effect on our ability to deploy naval forces in sufficient capacity to meet our Nation's defense strategy and the needs of our military commanders. For the Navy, this budget outcome means decommissioning an aircraft carrier. Just last week Admiral Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, indicated that the Navy cannot meet the global demand for aircraft carriers, yet the budget request includes no funding for refueling and overhaul, forcing the Navy to decommission the USS George Washington which has over 25 years of hull life remaining. The budget outcome also means cutting force structure. Despite the repeated requirement for a minimum 306-ship Navy, the budget request funds a 283-ship Navy. Secretary Mabus, you have characterized our defense strategy as inherently a maritime strategy, yet the administration has also outlined significant reductions in our submarine forces, amphibs [amphibious assault ships], and cruisers. Finally, this budget outcome means cutting end strength. A reduction to 175,000 marines would significantly strain the force and reduce dwell time. It also means that the Marines have to be all in, to deter or defeat aggression in just one region of the world. These drastic nonsensical cuts should stir immense debate. Is this the Navy that the Americans want? This assumes more than just increased risk, as Secretary Hagel stated last week. The security environment and need for naval forces have not abated, yet this is a fundamental piecemeal dismantling of the world's greatest Navy. Now, I am not pointing the fingers at you. We are the ones that voted for these cuts, some of us, and the budget deal that was arrived at by our House Budget Committee, the Senate Budget Committee, voted on and signed by the President in December, actually set a 2-year budget number. So I don't even know why we are going through this actually this year because the number is already set and this I guess just gives us talking points to debate about. But the budget is fixed by law for this year and the appropriators already have their numbers and they are already moving forward and the Senate has said that they are not even going to address a budget issue this year. But it is good to plan and think out ahead and look forward to the future, and I really appreciate you being here today. I think it is important that we have a good debate about this, that the American people understand how much we have cut defense the last couple of years and what the numbers look like going forward for the next several years. I think it is putting us in great jeopardy and I am going to plan on doing everything I can within my power to reverse this dangerous trajectory. I will do that by leaving, probably, get out of the way and let somebody else carry on the fight. As I have told people, I am not planning on leaving the fight, I am just leaving Congress. Anyway, thank you very much for being here with us today. We look forward to your testimonies. [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] The Chairman. Mr. Smith. STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome our witnesses as well. I appreciate your collective service to our country. It has been great working with all of you. I think you do a fabulous job to make sure that the men and women under your command are well served, and I appreciate all of your work in that regard. The good news is we do still have the most powerful, capable Navy and Marine Corps in the world. Your ability to project presence around the world, the size of your force, is unmatched, and, you know, we cannot forget that and the importance of that and the strength and capability that we have. However, the chairman correctly laid out the challenges that the future will bring. Because in the first place, the United States has a lot more obligations globally than any other country in the world. We are, just to give one example, the guarantors of peace for South Korea and Japan. We are a significant deterrent to what North Korea would otherwise do. That doesn't come cheap, and the Navy and Marine Corps are critical, critical piece of that deterrent. If we are going to be able to maintain that capability, we are going to have to make some very, very tough choices going forward. And you know as bad as the fiscal year 2015 budget is for a lot of the cuts that have been proposed, it is going forward beyond that that I think is the real challenge. Now, I will say one thing, Mr. Chairman. Yes, the fiscal year 2015 top number is set, but we have to figure out how we spend that money. The Pentagon, the DOD [Department of Defense] and the President have presented their initial budget request and it is our job to figure out is that the best way to spend that top line number. We will have that debate and undoubtedly make some changes. But going forward, when you look at 2016 and beyond, if sequestration kicks in, I think these two gentlemen before us and their services are an excellent example of just how troublesome that is. You know, the Marine Corps has been shrunk down to 182,000. If we face sequestration, that number is going to have to go even lower than that. In the Navy, you know we are consistently concerned about the fact that we are well under the number of ships that the requirements say we should have. We are currently building 2 Virginia-class submarines a year, 2 destroyers a year, I forget, 2/3 LCSs [littoral combat ships] a year, and we are trying to maintain an 11-aircraft carrier Navy. Virtually none of that is going to be possible if sequestration kicks in 2016. I don't see how we can maintain 11 aircraft carriers at that budget. I don't think we will be able to build the number of ships that we have projected to build, and that significantly reduces our presence and there are enormous challenges if we have to do that. Now, that is not to say that savings cannot be found in the defense budget. Certainly it can; we saw a significant increase in the spending, though as I believe the Navy will point out, a lot of that increase did not go to the Navy during the course of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But we saw those increases and efficiencies can be found, and about 3 years ago, the Department of Defense sat down and looked out at the next 10 years and said what should our strategy build be? And they built that strategy, and they built in some reductions in expected spending. Those reductions were around $500 billion. But now with sequestration and CRs [continuing resolutions], those numbers, the size of those cuts become much, much more significant. But I will close just with two things. Number one, as we go into fiscal year 2015 and we look at some of the cuts that have been proposed, I think most prominent with this group is the proposal to take 11 cruisers out of service to retrofit them for a certain period of time, if we are not going to do those things that are proposed in the 2015 budget because of the reality that the chairman points out, we have a top line number, then it is incumbent upon our committee to say what we would cut instead. It is not enough to just rail against reductions in the Guard or rail against setting aside those 11 cruisers or getting rid of the A-10s and some of the other decisions that we have made. We have to propose alternatives for 2015. But the second, I think more important point, is going forward. The impact on our national security and the impact on our industrial base of sequestration for national defense will be significant. There will be a lot of jobs lost if we don't change it. Well, how do we change it? Really there is some combination of three things we need to do. We need to turn off sequestration which is devastating the discretionary portion of the budget. Defense is over half the discretionary portion of the budget. That is the primary place that we found cuts both in the Budget Control Act and in the budget agreement that was reached in December. So we have to deal with sequestration and/or we have to increase revenues somehow or reduce the amount of money that we spend on mandatory programs. Now, I will grant you that I think everybody here would have some different combination of how they do those three things, but if you refuse to do any of those three things, if we leave sequestration in place, if we don't find more revenue, if we don't find reductions in mandatory spending, then the 2015 budget is going to be looked back on as the high-water mark of what we have accomplished in national security. As much as we are bemoaning the reality of it today, if those changes that I just mentioned don't get made in 2016 and 2017, we are going to look back on this as the good old days. So these are some tough choices that we have to make, and figure out. Like I said, we can disagree about how to do it, how much revenue to raise or not, how much to reduce mandatory spending or not, what to do about sequestration, but if we let current law stand, our national security picture and particularly in the very, very important area of the Navy and the Marine Corps and the forward presence that they bring will be significantly shrunk from what it is today. So we have some tough decisions to make and you gentlemen do as well. I look forward to your testimony, questions, and then trying to figure out the best way to make those difficult decisions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, thank you for your service, for your leadership in these very difficult times. I look forward to your testimony. STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Secretary Mabus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Smith, members of this committee, first I want to thank you for your support of the Department of the Navy, of our sailors, our marines, our civilians, and our families. General Amos, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Admiral Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations and I couldn't be prouder to represent those courageous and faithful sailors, marines, and civilians. These men and women serve their Nation around the world with skill and with dedication no matter what hardships they face, no matter how far from home and family they are. The architects of our Constitution recognized the inherent value of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, and this Article I, Section 8, which is on a plaque in this hearing room, gave Congress the responsibility to ``provide and maintain a Navy,'' because our Founding Fathers knew that the Nation needed a naval force to operate continuously in war and in peace. Over two centuries ago the United States had a crucial role in the world. Today that role is exponentially greater. Whether facing high-end combat or asymmetrical threats or humanitarian needs, America's maritime forces are ready and present on day one of any crisis, for any eventuality. In today's dynamic security environment, naval assets are more critical than ever. In military terms, they provide presence, presence worldwide. They reassure our partners that we are there and remind potential adversaries that we are never far away. This presence provides immediate and capable options for the Commander in Chief when a crisis develops anywhere in the world. In the past year, our naval forces have operated globally from across the Pacific to the continuing combat in Afghanistan and from the Gulf of Guinea to the Arctic Circle. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the newly released QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] are both maritime in focus, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and require presence of naval forces around the world. Four key factors make that global presence and global action possible. These four factors--people, platforms, power, and partnerships--have been my priorities during my tenure as Secretary and they have to continue to receive our focus looking ahead. In our fiscally constrained times we have used these priorities to help balance between the readiness of the force, our capabilities, and our capacity. Our people are our biggest advantage and we must ensure that they continue to get the tools they need to do their jobs. In compensation, we have increased sea pay to make sure those sailors and marines deployed aboard ship are appropriately recognized. However, this budget also seeks to control the growth of military compensation and benefits which threatens to impact all the other parts of our budget. If this isn't addressed, as the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] puts it, the quality of work for our sailors and marines will almost certainly decline. Shipbuilding and our platforms remain key elements of our maritime power and a focus of this committee. The number of ships, submarines, and aircraft in our fleets is what gives us the capacity to provide that global presence. While we have the most advanced platforms in the world, quantity has a quality all its own and I think it is important to understand how we got to our current fleet size. On September 11, 2001, our fleet stood at 316 ships. By 2008, after one of the great military buildups in American history, that number had dropped to 278 ships. In the 4 years before I took office as Secretary, the Navy put 19 ships under contract. Since I took office in May of 2009, we have put 60 ships under contract. And by the end of this decade our plan will return the fleet to 300 ships. We are continuing our initiatives to spend smarter and more efficiently, which are driving down costs through things like competition, multiyear buys, and just driving hard bargains for taxpayer dollars. Power, energy, is a national security issue and central to our naval forces and our ability to provide that presence. Dramatic price increases for fuel threatens to degrade our operations and training and could impact how many platforms we can acquire. Having more varied stably priced American produced sources of energy makes us better warfighters. From sail to coal to oil to nuclear and now to alternative fuels, the Navy has led in energy innovation. Since the end of World War II, U.S. naval forces have protected the global commons to maintain the foundations of the world's economy. In today's complex environment, partnerships with other nations, evidenced by interoperability, by exercises and operations, continue to increase in importance. The Navy and Marine Corps, by their very nature and by that forward presence, are naturally suited to develop these relationships, particularly in the innovative small footprint ways that are required. With the fiscal 2015 budget submission, we are seeking within the fiscal constraints imposed to provide our Navy and Marine Corps with the equipment, the training, and the tools needed to carry out the missions the Nation needs and expects from them. There are never any permanent homecomings for sailors and marines. In peacetime, wartime and all the time, they remain forward deployed, providing presence and providing whatever is needed by our Nation. This has been true for 238 years and it is our task to make sure it remains true now and into the future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral Greenert, there is a quote that is perfect for a Navy hearing. Anyone can hold the helm under smooth seas, but it is a testimony to your leadership the way you have handled the helm in very rocky seas. Thank you. I appreciate what you are doing. I look forward to your testimony. STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN GREENERT, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Admiral Greenert. Thank you, sir. That is very kind when you are talking to a submariner as well, but I will take it aboard. Thank you, sir. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, first, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for 22 years of exceptional support that you have given the men and women of our Navy. Your efforts, sir, have really helped ensure the preeminence of American seapower. You are always thanking us for our service. So, Mr. Chairman, your sailors and Navy salute you and Patricia for your service. And we would all give you a standing ovation but this table, we are all crumpled in here and the table would come over and it would be very disruptive so we will keep decorum up, if that is okay with you. I am honored to represent 633,000 sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, especially the 50,000 sailors deployed and operating forward around the globe today. The dedication and resilience of our people continue to amaze me, and the citizens of this Nation can take great pride in their daily contributions. Those are their sons and their daughters in the places around the world that count. I am pleased to testify this morning beside Secretary Mabus and General Amos. Your Navy-Marine Corps team is united in fulfilling our longstanding mandate to be where it matters, when it matters, and to be ready to respond to crises to ensure the stability that undermines this global economy. General Amos has been a great shipmate. Our respective services' synergy of efforts has never been better and Secretary Mabus has provided Jim and I the vision, the guidance, and the judiciousness that we need to build the finest Navy and Marine Corps that this Nation is willing to afford. Forward presence is our mandate. We operate forward to give the President the options to deal promptly with contingencies. As we conclude over a decade of wars and bring our ground forces home from extended stability operations, your naval forces will remain on watch. This chartlet that I gave each of you in front of you shows today's global distribution of deployed ships as well as our bases and our places that support them. In the block in the lower left it will also tell you how long it will take if we are not there to get from respective ports and areas in the United States. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 147.] Admiral Greenert. Now, our efforts are focused in the Asia- Pacific, I think you can see that and the Arabian Gulf, but we provide presence and we respond as needed in other theaters as well. With this forward presence over the last year we were able to influence and shape the decisions of leaders in the Arabian Gulf, Northeast Asia, and the Levant. We patrolled off the shores of Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan to protect American interests and induce regional leaders to make the right choices. We relieved suffering and provided assistance along with our Marine Corps brothers and sisters and recovery in the Philippines in the wake of a devastating typhoon. Our presence dissuades aggression and it dissuades coercion against our allies and friends in the East and the South China Seas. We kept piracy at bay in the Horn of Africa. And we continued to support operations in Afghanistan while taking the fight to insurgents, terrorists, and their supporting networks across the Middle East and Africa with our expeditionary forces and supporting our special operations forces. The 2014 budget will enable an acceptable forward presence. It is acceptable, but through the remainder of the year we will be able to restore a lot of our fleet training and our maintenance and our operations and we will recover a substantial part of that 2013 backlog that we talked about quite a bit in this room. The President's 2015 budget submission enables us to continue to execute these missions, but we are going to face some high risks in specific missions articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance. Our fiscal guidance through this Future Year Defense Plan is about halfway between the Budget Control Act caps and our Pres-Bud 14 [President's budget for fiscal year 2014] plan. It is a net decrease of still $31 billion when you compare it with Pres-Bud 14. So to prepare our program within these constraints, I set the following priorities and Secretary Mabus supported me. Number one, we have to provide the sea-based strategic deterrent; two, forward presence; three, the capability and the capacity to win decisively; number four, the readiness to support the above; five, that we maintain and bring in asymmetric capabilities and maintain a technological edge; and, number six, to sustain a relevant industrial base. Now using these priorities, we built a balanced portfolio of capabilities within the fiscal guidance that we were provided. We continue to maximize our presence in the Asia- Pacific and the Middle East using innovative combinations of rotational, forward based rotational forces, forward basing and forward stationed forces. We still face shortfalls in support ashore and a backlog in facilities maintenance that erode the ability of our bases to support the fleet. We have slowed modernization in areas that are central to remain ahead of or keep pace with, technologically advanced adversaries. Consequently, we face higher risk if confronted with a high-tech adversary or if we attempt to conduct more than one multiphased major contingency simultaneously. Mr. Chairman, as I testified before you in September, I am troubled by the prospect of reverting to the Budget Control Act revised caps in 2016. That would lead to a Navy that is just too small and it is lacking the advanced capabilities needed to execute the missions that the Nation expects of the Navy. We would be unable to execute at least 4 of the 10 primary missions that are laid out very clearly in the Defense Strategic Guidance in the Quadrennial Defense Review. If you look at the back of the chartlet that I showed you that has got the ships on the front, you will see that our ability to respond to contingencies is dramatically reduced in this future scenario of being retained at budget control caps. It limits our options and it limits the Nation's decision space and we would be compelled to inactivate an aircraft carrier and an air wing. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 148.] Admiral Greenert. Further, our modernization and our recapitalization would be dramatically reduced and that threatens readiness and our industrial base. If we revert to the Budget Control Act caps year by year it will leave our country less prepared to deal with crises, our allies' trust will wane, and our enemies will be less inclined to be dissuaded or to be deterred. So, Mr. Chairman, I am on board with the efforts to get the fiscal house in order. I look forward to working with the committee to find solutions that enable us to sustain readiness while building an affordable but a relevant future force. This force has to be able to address a range of threats, address contingencies and high consequence events that could impact our core interests. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and I thank you and the committee for your continued support and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the Appendix on page 91.] The Chairman. Thank you very much. I got to spend a couple nights on a submarine under the Arctic ice cap. That was a great experience. A lot of times when we travel we get to shake a few hands and say ``hi'' to a few troops and then move on and probably never see them again. But after 2 days, we kind of bonded. You know, we could play games and watch movies and eat together, and it was interesting. And then I went to Virginia a few years ago when we did the--welcomed the USS California into the fleet, and I was able to show my wife this is where we ate, this is where we played cards, this is where I slept. You know, she couldn't believe I slept in a space that small. It was a great, great experience. I want to especially recognize General Amos, the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his last posture hearing before our committee. I made the mistake yesterday when we were talking, saying this is your last hearing. Because he says, oh, you know, let's not be pushing him out before he is done. He has got a lot of work to do before he leaves. But this is his last posture hearing. And, few will ever know the full burden of command, and the general has shouldered it admirably. He has been faced with difficult issues and equally difficult decisions. All the while he has kept our men and women in uniform in the forefront of his decisionmaking and has continued to be a tireless advocate for them. The committee appreciates his honesty, his candor, and his counsel, and I think our Nation is better having had the privilege of his military service. He told me when he got this job that he would not be a part of hollowing out the Marine Corps. And so the way they have handled the cuts is they have kept them a fighting force. They are not going to be spread out and try to have to pull together when they are needed, and I think that has been very, very important. General Amos, I look forward to hearing your testimony. STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS General Amos. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee. Again I am pleased to appear before you to speak on behalf of the Marine Corps. And Chairman, I echo my colleague Jon Greenert's strong comments and appreciation for your leadership. I suspect that every service chief that has sat at this desk, and we have certainly sat with all of them over the last 3 to 4 years, feels that you love their service the most, and that is a unique ability of leadership to get them to believe that, because your Marine Corps feels like you care for us more than you care for anybody else when in fact I know that you care for all of us equally the same. So thank you for your leadership, Chairman, and this committee and Congress and the United States of America will sorely miss you when you retire later this year. Since our founding in 1775, marines have answered the Nation's call, faithfully protecting the American people while maintaining a world-class standard of military excellence. Nothing has changed, we continue to do the same even as we meet here today. Yet we find ourselves at a strategic inflection point in history. After 12 years of war we are drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, resetting our institution, and reawakening the soul of the United States Marine Corps. Today we are challenged by fiscal uncertainty that threatens both our capacity and capabilities, forcing us to sacrifice our long-term health for near-term readiness. As I have testified before this committee many times, despite these challenges I remain committed to fielding the most capable and ready Marine Corps the Nation is willing to pay for. Our greatest asset is the individual marine, the young man and woman who wears my cloth. Our unique role as America's premier crisis response force is grounded in the legendary character and warfighting ethos of our people. As we reset and prepare for future battles, all marines are rededicating themselves to those attributes that carried marines across the wheat fields and into the German machine guns at Belleau Wood in March of 1918. Those attributes that enabled raw combat-inexperienced young marines to courageously succeed against a determined enemy at America's first offensive campaign in the Pacific, the attack at Guadalcanal by the 1st Marine Division in August of 1942, and lastly those timeless strengths of character and gut courage that enabled marines to carry the day in an Iraqi town called Fallujah and against a determined enemy in the Taliban strongholds of Marja and Sangin. Your corps is rededicating itself to the timeless attributes of persistent discipline, faithful obedience to orders and instruction, concerned and engaged leadership, and strict adherence to standards. These ironclad imperatives have defined our corps for 238 years. They will serve us well in the decades to come. As we gather here today some 30,000 marines are forward deployed around the world promoting peace, protecting our Nation's interests, and securing our defense. But we don't do this alone. Our partnership with the Navy provides America an unmatched naval expeditionary capability. Our relationship with the United States Navy is symbiotic. My relationship with Admiral Jon Greenert is unprecedented. This is why I share CNO's concerns about the impacts associated with a marked paucity of shipbuilding funds. America's engagement throughout the future security environment of the next two decades will be undoubtedly naval in character. To be forward engaged and to be present when it matters most means we need capital ships and those ships need to be loaded with United States Marines. Expeditionary naval forces are America's insurance policy. We are a hedge against uncertainty in an unpredictable world. The Navy and Marine Corps team provides power projection from the sea, responding immediately to crises when success is measured in hours, not in days. From super typhoon that tragically struck the Philippines late last year to the rescue of American citizens in South Sudan over Christmas, your forward deployed naval forces were there. We carried the day for the United States of America. As the joint force draws down and we conclude combat operations in Afghanistan, some argue that we are done with conflict. My view is different. The world will remain a dangerous place. There will be no peace dividend for America nor will there be a shortage of work for its United States Marines. Ladies and gentlemen, we will not do less with less, we will do the same with less. In closing, you have my promise that we will only ask for what we need. We will continue to prioritize and make the hard decisions before coming to Congress. And once again I thank the committee and specifically your leadership, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the Appendix on page 125.] The Chairman. Thank you very much. As I stated in my opening remarks, I am concerned about our aircraft carrier force structure. If a nuclear refueling of the George Washington is not supported, our carriers will be reduced from 11 to 10. Last year when Admiral Greenert,PACOM [United States Pacific Command] Commander, testified before the committee, he commented about the problem. There was a flare-up in Korea at the time and he said usually when that happens he sends a carrier out and that has a calming effect. He said he didn't have a carrier to send, he said then I would send a B-2. That also has a calming effect. We didn't have a B-2 to send, he says then I send some F-22s, and we didn't have any F-22s to send. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Admiral Samuel Locklear was the PACOM Commander who testified. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I think I mentioned yesterday, I think the main purpose of our military is to prevent war, to keep from having to go to war, to be a strong deterrent. If that is not possible, and that generally comes when we are weakened or perceived by potential adversaries that we are weakened and they sense an opportunity, then we have to sometimes engage in war and then your responsibility is to win those wars as quickly as possible and return as many of our people home safely as possible. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, last week Admiral Locklear testified again before our committee and he stated that we have insufficient carriers to meet the global demand. He was questioned--I enjoyed the discussion between him and Mr. Smith--about the need for the carriers and the forward presence. Do you concur that the demand signal for aircraft carriers is more than what the Navy can currently fulfill? Secretary Mabus. The demand signal from combat commanders for carriers and for all our types of ships is more than we can currently fulfill and we want to keep the 11th carrier and its associated air wing very much. What we have done in this budget is move that decision to fiscal year 2016 so that there is time to debate it, to take a close look at what would be the realities if we did decommission this. First, there is a law that says we must maintain 11 carriers. But, secondly, CNO, Admiral Locklear have all discussed the impact of only having 10 carriers in the fleet. Your deployments, which are already long and getting longer, would get longer still. The stress would increase on our force. The presence that we need for those carriers would be impacted. The industrial base that builds and maintains our carriers would be very negatively affected. The ability to maintain the carriers that we had because of the increased usage of the ones that remained would also be called into question. So, it would have some very serious consequences, to have to retire this carrier. To keep it over the 5 years starting in fiscal year 2016, is a $7 billion additional bill, and there are very few places that you can find $7 billion in any budget. And so, if we go back to the sequester level, that would be one of the options we would almost certainly have to put on the table because of the large cost and because of the decline in the amount of money that was available. Admiral Greenert. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Locklear has been clear since he took the watch in the Pacific Command what he needs for aircraft carriers, and he said I need two there full- time, and then about 3 months a year to 4 months a year I actually need a third, and he times that based on the events out there. Admiral Locklear, the Department of Defense gives him an assignment, it is called the global employment of the force, and within it, provides aspirations if you will or key principles that each of our combatant commanders have to meet on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and really the Nation. And also he has operational plans, he is responsible for four of the seven treaties that we have out there and the sustainment. So he has been pretty clear on what he needs, and it is I think we call it 2.3. And if you take into account on the back of the sheet for a reminder, for us to meet what the combatant commanders request, we need a Navy of 450 ships, Mr. Chairman. So what we do is we adjudicate the distribution of forces, as the Secretary alluded to, based on the Navy that we have, where we are, and distribute them accordingly. The Asia-Pacific is important and we are rebalancing toward it. If you go from 11 to 10 carriers you exacerbate that, what is already a very difficult problem, to the point where one of our tasks, a primary missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance, is to deter, and defeat if necessary, and the deterrence factor goes down dramatically when you have gaps. And it is a risk that we assume and I worry about. The Chairman. General Amos, the proposed Future Years Defense Program would reduce the Marine Corps to 175,000. What are the consequences of this reduced force structure in meeting your steady state rotational and major contingency operation requirements? General Amos. Chairman, the Marine Corps, just a couple attributes to that 175K [175,000] force. First it is one I would describe as a moderate risk force, moderate risk in that, that force would be made up of 21 Marine infantry battalions which is the centerpiece around which everything else is built in the United States Marine Corps. The numbers of squadrons and everything else are all a function of the number of battalions. The large-scale contingency operation that might be required of our Nation, the pacing of that size operation would require about 20 Marine infantry battalions. So what this means is your Marine Corps would be all in. And we built it so the Marine Corps' readiness would be up, they would be fully manned, fully trained, fully equipped as you talked about in your statement, but we would be all in. And just like World War II and Korea, we would come home when the war is over. So there is risk involved with that because there is other places around the world where things might well be happening and that will require a presence of marines. This is going to require a Presidential recall of our Reserves, 39,600 marines, and they would provide the shock absorber that would provide not only combat replacements for that 175K force, those 20 infantry battalions, but they would also provide the ability to do limited operations elsewhere around the world. So there is a combat power buildup. There is a sense of the units that remain back home will be less ready, even though we are going very hard to keep them ready. So it will be longer for them to get there. And eventually when you start running out of marines in a major theater war, you are going to go from boot camp to battlefield. So there is moderate risk in that force, sir. The Chairman. There has been a lot of talk with this budget that we received from the President about assuming additional risk. I think it is important for the American people to understand what we are talking about in additional risk is lives. And that is a big concern, because as I said earlier, it invites aggression and then we have to go to war, and that has been our history for many, many years now. I would like to see us avoid that. We always draw down after the war, but we are still at war and we are drawing down. So we not only don't have a peace dividend, we are drawing down while we have troops still serving, risking their lives every day. So you have been dealt a very hard hand. I commend you for the job you are doing. I wish it weren't so. Not the job you are doing, I wish you didn't have the hand that you are playing. Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just continuing, first of all I want to recognize General Amos' service as well in his last posture hearing, and it has been great working with you. You and your office have been terrific to me and my office, kept us informed, and you certainly do a great job for the men and women who serve under you. So we appreciate your service and hope you enjoy your retirement when it comes. You mentioned 175,000 marines. What does that look like if we get the full 8 years of sequestration that are currently on the books? How large of a Marine Corps could you maintain in that scenario? General Amos. Congressman, that is 175. When we built that force, we started just before, almost a year ago to today, and we actually looked forward expecting sequestration would be signed in March of this past year. And so that force of 175,000 with 21 infantry battalions and the appropriate rest of the combat support, combat service support, is a fully sequestered force. So that force will maintain itself out into the future. Where we begin to run into trouble, because I moved to maintain near-term readiness now of those deployed units and the ones that are about to deploy, and trying to keep the readiness of the deployable units up, I have reached into other accounts in O&M [Operations and Maintenance] within my authorities and pulled money out, facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization, range modernization. I canceled 17 programs. So I pulled out and pulled that money in to maintain the readiness. I will be able to do that for another probably 2 years, but the 36th Commandant will reach a point probably 2 years from now where he is going to have to take a look at that readiness level and say I am going to have to lower that so that I can get back into these facilities that I can't ignore, my training ranges that I can't ignore, and the modernization that I am going to have to do eventually. Otherwise we will end up with an old Marine Corps that is out of date. Mr. Smith. So the same size force, but it would be less ready, less prepared to fight. General Amos. Sir, it will be less ready in about 2017 and beyond. Mr. Smith. Okay. Admiral Greenert, you mentioned the COCOM [combatant command] requests for ships and if they were all met there would be a 450-ship Navy. Our requirements I think, put the Navy at this point at around 300, I forget what the exact number is for the requirements at this time. Admiral Greenert. 306, sir. Mr. Smith. 306. Admiral Greenert. 306. Mr. Smith. So can you perhaps explain for the committee's benefit the difference between requirements and COCOM requests? I mean, as my 10-year-old son says, it never hurts to ask. So you know, the COCOMs do make a lot of those requests. But obviously there is a difference between that and requirements. Could you explain that difference a little bit? Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. Again, as you alluded, the combatant commanders, first of all they have a tasking given by the Department, it is called a global employment of the force, and it tells them what they are supposed to accomplish in their theater of operations. It is fairly--it is broad enough for them to determine that. They boil that down to presence, theater security cooperation and security, and they deliver to the Department of Defense through the services here is what I need from you. We take those down to the Joint Staff and we work through it, well, here is what we have. Here is the need in the world I live in. Here is the Navy I have. Here is the request. And we reconcile it. We adjudicate it. That adjudication is done at the Joint Staff, signed by the Secretary of Defense. We distribute the forces in a document called the Global Force Management Allocation Plan. We allocate the forces globally. So, simply put, that is the process that we use, and that is my demand signal for the year. Mr. Smith. But how reflective do you think it is that the amount of requests that come in from the combatant commanders, like they are making all these requests and we are not meeting them. How big of a problem is that? How do you sort of balance what is sort of what would be nice to have versus need to have based on a COCOM request? Admiral Greenert. Well, you have to look at what is it for, to your point, I think. What is the Department's priorities? Is this for warfighting? Is this for theater security cooperation? Is it an exercise? What is the deal on that? And that is reconciled. This takes a year, Mr. Smith. And so, we grind through all of that. It is supposed to be a request of capability. So if you say, well, I need this ship, and as Jim Amos and I work on it, you say you need an amphibious ship. Well, I got an idea. How about this support ship that we think can do the same thing? This sort of brokering goes on---- Mr. Smith. Right. Admiral Greenert [continuing]. Through the year. Mr. Smith. Okay. Secretary Mabus, a couple of issues. You mentioned you are building up to get to a 300-ship Navy. Number one, what year would that be projected to happen. Number two, if sequestration kicks in as planned, what does that do to that plan? What number do you wind up with? Secretary Mabus. We would get to a 300-ship Navy by the end of this decade under the current plan and would keep it going forward. The effect of sequestration is on the back of the CNO's chartlet here. We would be unable to procure--well, the carrier would certainly be at issue, three destroyers, one submarine, four support ships and one forward staging base that we are currently planning to build---- Mr. Smith. Okay. Secretary Mabus. We could not build at those levels. Now, one of the perverse things that happens with sequestration is that as we take ships out, things like destroyers or submarines, we are taking them out of multiyear contracts and so we are breaking multiyear contracts which raises the cost of the individual ships so we get fewer and they cost more. Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Vice Chairman Thornberry, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General Amos. It is always a pleasure to see you all and thank you for your service to our country. Gentlemen, I know you have all had the opportunity to visit south Mississippi and see firsthand the world-class warships that are built right in my district. I know we all have a healthy respect for the capabilities these ships bring to our men and women serving in the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps. I believe many of you would agree that the world is not getting safer but is becoming more dangerous and that we need more ships, not less ships. So with that let's jump right in. General Amos, do you support the requirement for a 12th ship of the LPD-17 class and would you please explain the capability that vessel would add to the Marine Corps mission? General Amos. Congressman, the capabilities are significant. That is a wonderful ship. Admiral Greenert and I just commissioned the USS Somerset, LPD-25, just about 2 weeks ago in Philadelphia. So it is a wonderful ship and it is being built with a very high degree of quality. I would love to have the 12th ship. We would love to have the 12th ship. Quite frankly, there is little to no money in the budget to be able to do this, which goes back to my original statement, my opening statement on we need capital ships. The Navy needs that. But there is no money, Congressman, to do this, to buy this 12th ship. The 12th ship, if money was allocated, would allow us some decision space as we look towards just exactly what is going to replace those LSDs [landing ship, dock], those 12 LSD 41-49- class ships that we have which are nearing the ends of their service life. So would we love it? Yes, we absolutely would, but there is no money in the budget to pay for it. Mr. Palazzo. So the Marines clearly want and need a 12th LPD [landing platform/dock] and the LPD maintains the critical industrial base hot for rolling right into procuring the next amphibious ships based on the LPD hull form. And experience in shipbuilding has shown that new programs are always more expensive than desired and always take more time than planned, and I think it is vital that we support maintaining the current program that is building these ships and receiving excellent marks from the operational commanders and delivering a vital capability to our Marine Corps. And so, General Amos, you mentioned the LSD ships and that we are thinking about constructing them based on the existing LPD-17-class hull form. Can you elaborate on that and why that is important? General Amos. Congressman, there is what we call an analysis of alternatives which is underway right now. The CNO Jon Greenert, Admiral Greenert commissioned that some time ago. And they are looking for all the different possibilities. We do this for everything. We do this for vehicles, we do this for airplanes. So we examine what are the art of the possible things that might be out there, some of which may be commercial-off-the-shelf, some of which may be developmental. But so, what is it that is out there that could fit the needs of the requirement, meet the needs. And that is what we are doing right now. So that has not been complete yet. There is seven or eight variables out there that are potential solution sets to the LSD and we are looking at that right now, Congressman. Mr. Palazzo. Admiral Greenert, do you have anything to add to the questions that I have proposed to the general? Admiral Greenert. Well, sir, there is requirement and we have a requirement for 38 amphibious ships for joint forcible entry. I stand behind it. The Marine Corps has established it, we established it together. Thirty-three we say we should endeavor for as an affordable solution, 33 gray hull amphibious ships. But today, in the world that we live in, the world that the Navy and Marine Corps lives in and the future, we probably need 50. If we want to do everything that we are asked to do, and it is not just the COCOMs ask, it is we look out around the world, we could probably use 50 amphibious ships. But we don't have that. So there is a requirement; there is want, I want the ship; and then there is the reality that I have. So if we were to take the shipbuilding plan and do this, sir, I would on balance, what I have with the resources of the Navy. Now, if I may be so bold, in the past we have taken, as Jim said, we are building an amphibious ship to replace the LSD and we want to get that thing going and we want that thing to be affordable. So if there is a feasibility of taking seed money and looking at what can we do to help the industry, to help designers, we have done this with the Virginia class and it got us down--it saved us $200 million per copy we estimate on the Virginia class. If there is a way to do something like that, I think that is feasible. So you didn't ask for that, but thank you, sir. Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, and thank you for your testimony. And General Amos, you are going to be sorely missed. And, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. McIntyre. Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each of you gentlemen for your service to our country. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, we were talking earlier about the desire to reach 300 ships by the end of the decade. Do you think the current mix of ships is correct, especially with the truncation of the LCS program and how that impacts the fleet design? I know on the handout here you actually say in parenthesis ``Mix matters. Insufficient small surface combatants.'' How does this concern about the number of ships affect what you think the mix should be among the ships we do have or will be able to have by the end of the decade? Secretary Mabus. Congressman, you are absolutely correct. It has got to be the right mix of ships and not just sheer numbers. But first I think we need to be very precise on the LCS. What the Secretary of Defense has said is that we need the small surface combatants, that we need to grow the fleet, that we need what has been noted that we need, 52 of the small surface combatants. What he has tasked me and Navy to do is to take a look at the LCS program and at the requirements, what should a ship like this do, how survivable should it be, what sort of armament should it have, this sort of thing, and report back in time for the 2016 budget. And all we have been told to do is to not engage in contract negotiations past 32 ships. We only have 24 under contract now, so we will continue to build the LCS. One of the things that he called out very specifically that we should look at, one is continue to build the LCS; two is build a modified LCS; and three is build a different design ship. He also tasked me as part of that look how much would any of these alternatives cost and how long would it take to get to the fleet because we do need these ships very quickly. And so, this look at the requirements, at what the ship is meant to do, does it meet the requirements, is what we have done on every single type of ship that the Navy has built. We are about to start in fiscal year 2016 the fourth flight of the DDG-51 [guided missile destroyer]. We are going to start fairly soon after that with the fourth flight of the Virginia-class submarine. So requirements change. Technology improves and we change. And so, that is what I have been directed to do, that is what we are doing at Navy on the LCS. So in terms of numbers of ships and in terms of mix of ships, the Secretary of Defense has said that we need to have these small surface combatants, and what we are doing now is what is the best way to meet that need, and continuing to build the LCS or a modified LCS is certainly an option pending the results of this review. Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Admiral, let me ask you this, because my time is running out. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that answer, and that was very helpful. Would you please discuss with us the risk and cost savings associated with any further slippage that might occur in the Ohio-class replacement submarine? I know there is a question about whether the Navy can fulfill STRATCOM's [U.S. Strategic Command] continuous at-sea deterrence requirements in future years. Can that be done at the current schedule, and if these replacement submarines are further delayed, what can you share with us about meeting that concern with STRATCOM---- Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. First of all, thanks for all that you have done for your Navy. I understand you are getting near some of your last hearings as well, sir. Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, sir. Admiral Greenert. It has been great working with you. To the point, your question. The Ohio-class submarine today has already had its life extended. They are on a retirement track that, by the way, we still need to be sure they can technically support the retirement track they are on. So, the Ohio replacement, which we have already moved 2 years to the right, number one, it is aligned with our ally, the U.K., so we are building this thing in commensurate with them building their submarine. The missile compartment is common. But number two, we have to get the first Ohio replacement in construction by 2021, so that it is complete by 2029 and ready to go on patrol. So we have quite a bit of tight schedule there, and so my point would be, there is no slack in here. And the mission is sea-based nuclear--excuse me--strategic deterrence, and for us, that is number one. It is a national mission, and we have to fulfill it, sir. Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and yes, I would be the first to agree that the budgets are critical to a strong military, but I also would like to say that integrity in each of the services is also critical to a strong military. That brings me to this. General Amos, I have become friends with Major James Weirick, United States Marine Corps, who I believe, sincerely believe, is a man of integrity. That brings me to four questions that I do not think you will have time to answer today that I would ask the chairman and ask that these answers be written and submitted back to the committee so that each member of the committee can analyze the responses. The first question would be, who brought to your attention the email Major Weirick sent to Peter Delorier on the 21st of September of 2013? The second question would be, who decided to issue the protective order taken out against Major Weirick? And since you were named in the protective order, did you fear Major Weirick at any point? That would be another question. Your job is to stand up for your marines. That said, was your civilian attorney, Robert Hogue, ever reprimanded for his slanderous comments comparing Major Weirick to the Navy Yard shooter? Mr. Hogue made these comments in the press both before and after Major Weirick had been found by a Navy behavioral health provider as fit for duty and posing no threat. And Mr. Hogue made those comments about an outstanding Marine officer. I want to know, again, in writing, did you reprimand him, because I did not see it in the press. In a February the 17th interview with NPR [National Public Radio], you stated, and I quote, ``I have never ever said that I wanted them crushed and kicked out,'' talking about the marines in the urination case. When speaking about the marines involved with this video, however, General Waldhauser gave sworn testimony that you did in fact say that you wanted them crushed. I am asking you today, and you can put it in the writing, are you saying that General Waldhauser lied under oath? The fourth question that, again, I look forward to your written responses, during the same NPR interview, you stated, certainly, none of them have been crushed or thrown out of the Marine Corps. General Amos, how many of them were not allowed to continue to serve in the corps? My information says that the number is seven out of nine marines. Would you please verify that what you said in the NPR article interview was that none had been crushed. Then, lastly, ``Tarnished Brass,'' a 27 February 2014 article in Foreign Policy Magazine, poses this question. And sir, I would rather not be reading this, but it has been put into print, and it all goes back to Captain James Clement and to Major James Weirick. The article says, and I quote, ``The top Marine Corps general is''--under--``is unpopular with his troops, damaged on Capitol Hill, and under investigation in the Pentagon. Can he really still lead?'' This, again, I would ask you to submit in writing to the committee. Sir, when I look at what has happened both in the James Clement situation and having talked to Major Weirick on numerous occasions over the past 5 months, it is disappointing that the integrity of this marine, and I would include Captain James Clement as well, have had to take the attacks that have come out of the office, whether it is you or people around you, that they have done everything they could to destroy two--the integrity of two marines. And Mr. Chairman, with that--I have got 43 seconds left--I would ask that these questions that I have asked publicly here in the committee today, that with your help, sir, and the ranking member's help, that we get a response back, if possible, within the next 6 weeks to these questions because, in my humble opinion, it is important. I have heard from too many marines, sir, both Active Duty and retired, that they are concerned about the integrity of the United States Marine Corps, so, sir, I ask you please to put in written form answers to these questions. And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, sir. The Chairman. General, do you want to take any time now to respond, or would you prefer to do it in writing? General Amos. I will do it in writing. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 153.] The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ms. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to all of you, thank you so much for being here, for your extraordinary service. And General Amos, best of wishes to you as you move on, not quite yet, but in the future. We had a hearing last week with Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey looking at the QDR but also how trying to face some really tough decisions that you obviously are very aware that we have, whether it is readiness and how we move forward with personnel issues and a host of other ones, and I wonder if you could share was, of the decisions that are coming forward and where you think we are today and the likelihood of the committee pushing back on some of the tough decisions that you have ahead, where do you see that, those key issues that you want to be sure that we take a very hard look at and not necessarily respond in what we think would be the better situation for our constituents, for our communities? Is there an area that you choose to point out that you see as a problem area? Admiral Greenert. Admiral Greenert. Ma'am, I would request we look very closely and weigh all the options and read closely our intentions on compensation reform. It is fairly comprehensive, extensive; it is just not one issue. I don't think it is a one- issue topic. And I think it is our sense that under the circumstances that we are in fiscally, the longstanding good support and good will of this Congress for our military and those members, and in the world I live in, the other things that they need, any money coming from compensation reform to the Navy--and Secretary Mabus supports me in this--is going right back to things that support our sailors: their quality of life and their quality of work, barracks, peers training, manning, all of these things, these are the things that they tell us, they tell myself and my senior enlisted that this is what, the things that bug them that could make their career better, that we do a balance of that and to think through that and not pick the thing apart. It is my opinion that we have an opportunity here to sort of address and do this debate in this sort of node, if you will, or knee in the curb, however you want to look at it, inflection point of our service and of our budget. Thank you, ma'am. Mrs. Davis. Secretary Mabus, I wasn't sure if you wanted to respond. Secretary Mabus. I would echo exactly what the CNO said. But I would also say, to go back to what the unique characteristic that the Navy and Marine Corps give this country, and that is presence, the ability to be forward deployed, the ability to have the right number and the right mix of ships forward, the ability to maintain those ships, the ability to have trained crews on those ships, and so keeping that presence and also taking a little history in mind that the Navy got significantly smaller in the last decade and that we are beginning to come up now to meet this new maritime strategy. So that presence that gives our Nation options, we-- CNO, Commandant, and I--are working very hard to protect that presence, but not just presence but presence with the right kinds of ships, presence with the trained people, sailors and marines, on those ships, to give those options to this country. Mrs. Davis. Yeah. So that is also keeping faith with our promise to our sailors and to their families as well, that that balance is correct, and I think that is going to be the tough decisions, one of them, that we face. I think the other one, certainly for the services, all of them, but I am wondering about the Navy and the Marines in terms of BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] and whether you think there is excess capacity that we can be looking at. I guess one other question I would like to ask is just about how we are dealing with toxic leadership, which I know has been of great concern to all of you, and whether the training, the ability to go back and sort of reassess where we are in that area to keep the integrity of the services also, very clear. Secretary Mabus. I would like to comment very briefly on that. We, uniquely, in terms of leadership, when we relieve somebody, we announce it. We announce why we are doing it, and it is one of the things that we focus on. The Commandant has talked about the reawakening efforts that he is making and a lot of the other efforts that he is making and has made across the Marine Corps. CNO, likewise. I was at the Naval War College in Newport and made a talk to those students and to about 700 of our officers about ethics, but having said all that, no ethics classes in the world, if you don't know it is wrong to steal, if you don't know it is wrong to take a bribe, if you don't know it is wrong to cheat, you missed something from your mother. And what we can do is set up systems to make sure that we catch you, that we hold people accountable, and I think that we have done a pretty good job in that. And again, when we find somebody that has not met those high standards, we are public about it when we relieve them. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Forbes. Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Amos, I wish there was more we could offer you than thank you, but we offer that to you. You have done a great job. You have shown courage, not just on the battlefield but on the political field. You have always fought for your Marine Corps and your marines, and we owe you a debt of gratitude. Thank you so much for that service. Admiral, Mr. Secretary, I have just enormous personal respect for both of you. I know you love your Navy. I know you are fighting for your Navy. I believe that some of the decisions we are arguing about today were not your decisions. I am not going to ask you to comment on that, but I will ask you this, please don't take my criticisms to the two of you. They are to the people who ultimately made these decisions. As we look, we hear a lot about these cuts, and one of the things that we don't talk about is the fact that there was $778 billion of cuts that took place long before sequestration reared its ugly head. I asked last week for Secretary Hagel to present us with a single time that the administration appeared before this committee or communicated to us and said those $778 billion were too much. So far I am holding in my hand all those responses. It is all I expect to get. The second thing is I heard this discussion about our combatant commanders, kind of suggesting that maybe these guys just came in with these wish lists. We have had seven combatant commanders testify before this committee. Their testimony is what we use for our posture hearings, what we use to base this budget on. They are our gold standard. I asked Admiral Locklear, do you fluff these requirements, or are they the requirements we had? He said, I can assure you they are not fluffed; they are what we need. Mr. Secretary, one of the things that frightens me are the facts that in 2007, before this administration came into office, the reality is we met 90 percent of the combatant commanders' requirements. This year, we will only meet 43 percent. And what is our response? Not more ships but paper ships. When we talk about a 30-year shipbuilding plan, one of the things we ignore is this: We will build half the ships today that that 30-year shipbuilding plan had in it 10 years ago. Next year, we will build half the ships that the 30-year plan had in it 10 years ago. And even if we took the shipbuilding plan, there is a $6 billion deficit per year in getting to the number of ships that we need in there, and they are just paper ships. The second thing, Mr. Secretary, I look at is this. You have issued, and you were kind enough to notify us, we are going to change the counting rules of how we count the ships. I don't know if this has gone into effect. I don't know when it goes into effect, but here is the fact: 60 seconds before this new rule goes into effect, the Navy will have officially 283 ships. The moment it goes into effect, 60 seconds later, we will have 293 ships. They are paper ships. Not one of those things in that shipbuilding plan or this change in counting help meet a single one of those requirements for our combatant commanders. And then the chairman asked about the carrier, and there is a huge disconnect between the rhetoric we are hearing and the actions that are being taken. We say we are not going to reduce our carriers down from 11 to 10, but the reality is this: $243 million this committee put in to do the planning for a year to get ready for that refueling; we are taking it out. If you wanted to reduce our carriers from 11 to 10, you would take it out. If you wanted to leave them in and to delay the decision, you would leave the money in. Four hundred fifty million dollars of materials that we need to buy for next year to get ready, that is not even in the President's budget. It is taken out. If you wanted to keep 11 carriers, we would leave it in. If you wanted to take them out, you would take that money out. And then in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], we have removed the carrier from the FYDP. It was in last year's FYDP. It is not in this year's. So, reality, Mr. Secretary, what we are really doing is we have made the decision to go back from 11 to 10. We are just waiting until maybe after November or something to announce it, but you have taken all the steps with the actions to take it out. Here are my two quick questions for you. One is this: Why didn't the President, if he was going to keep 11 carriers, include that in the budget that he submitted, which is $115 billion above the sequestration numbers in the Budget Control Act? And then the second thing is, do you have any historical data that suggests if we make that decision next year and put all that money back in, that you could possibly meet the timelines that would be required after you have lost 2 years to make sure we don't go down from 11 to 10 carriers? Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. The decision that we brought forward on the carrier was to move--was to give us another year's decision space. And one of things we looked at very closely, because we are heel-to-toe in these carriers, is, can we meet the timelines? If the decision is made next year, in fiscal year 2016, we have exactly the amount of time, the correct amount of time, to get the George Washington out and to put the next carrier in with the materials, with the supplies, with everything. So that was one of the things we looked at very carefully before we made the decision to defer this for 1 year. And we have been given guidance to prepare, as we are looking at the fiscal year 2016 budget, to prepare with the carrier in that budget. That is at least the initial guidance. Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen. Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a series of questions first for General Amos on the dwell time question and the numbers in the Marine Corps. As I understand it, your desired number is one 185.5, and the number you are getting is 175. Is that about right? General Amos. Congressman, the number that our Nation needs its Marines Corps to be is 186.8. Mr. Larsen. 186.8. General Amos. And that will be a roughly a 1:3--in fact, it will be a 1:3 dwell. Mr. Larsen. Yeah. So, the question--so, that is about--the 175 is about a 6.2 percent decrease from 186.8, but the dwell time though then drops from 1:3 to 1:2, which is about a 33 percent decrease in dwell time. Can you briefly explain to me that jump? General Amos. Yes, sir. It is capacity. It is simply the numbers of battalions and units we have to do what we call steady state operations, and that is those units that are forward deployed in the Pacific. They are rotating units. Those are those units that are aboard ship on Marine Expeditionary Units, Amphibious Ready Groups. Those are the units that are in Afghanistan. Those are the units--although they will be coming out; that should take care of itself here soon. It is those marines that are in the Special Purpose MAGTF, Marine Air- Ground Task Force, that is in Moron right now. So those steady state requirements drive us at a 175K force to a dwell of 1:2. If we go to combat, it is 1:0. It is, you just go and you come back, so that is what it is. In a 186K force, we have enough elasticity and capacity where we can go on a deployment for 6 months and then come home for 18 months, and then go for 6 months and come home for 18 months. It is just a function of capacity, Congressman. Mr. Larsen. Yeah. I think I understand it better. Thanks. Admiral Greenert, I might have missed it, although I was here, but you mentioned that the sequestration would lead to a high risk to specific missions, and I didn't quite--then you jumped to another part of your testimony. You might have jumped back to what those specific missions were that were going to be subject to high risk. I have a question for Secretary Mabus, so don't take the 3.18 to answer this. Admiral Greenert. Yeah, I understand. Thank you, sir. Deter and defeat aggression, that is the--with the retirement of the carrier, the deterrence force, that means presence. What do I have presence? What do I need to deter? And in defeat, one--conduct one, one MCO [major combat operation], if you will, for that, so that was the first mission. The second one is project power in an anti-access area of denial, and that is keeping--if we don't keep pace with the high-technology capabilities we are bringing in, and we have to face a high-technology adversary--of an advanced adversary, then that risk continues to grow as we go through the FYDP. Mr. Larsen. Those are the two main ones. Yeah. Thanks. And Secretary Mabus, we know that over the last couple of weeks, because the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] mission in the Baltics has shifted to us for this quarter, we have increased the number of airplanes there by four, I think four additional F-16s to do air patrols on the Air Force side. I was curious if over the last several weeks, if the U.S. Navy, as part of its NATO mission or as part of a U.S. mission, has been asked to increase or maintain any presence in the Mediterranean or near the Black Sea to assure allies in the region. Secretary Mabus. One of the things that we endeavor to do is to have that presence there all the time, not just at the right place at the right time, but the right place all the time. And I think that this is one of those examples of where we do have the right presence at the--all the time, whether-- regardless of the region. Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Is there anything specifically that you can point out? Secretary Mabus. We have a DDG in the Black Sea now, a long-planned exercise that we have--that we do every year. The Marines have a force called the Black Sea Rotational Force that we go in, exercise with our allies, with our friends, with our NATO members there, and we are continuing to do that, forward deployed all the time now, as we have in the past. Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you. And then, with the time I have left, I will yield back, but just momentarily just to put in a plug: I appreciate the Navy and Marine Corps' investment in electronic warfare. Obviously, it is close to home, but just while it has fallen upon U.S. Navy to provide the air attack capability for electronic warfare, so that continued investment on the electronic warfare side to go along with platforms is pretty key and it is something we will be exploring with the other services as well. So I appreciate that and yield back. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to thank each of you for being here today, particularly General Amos. We appreciate your association with South Carolina. I am very grateful that I represented Parris Island, and I saw firsthand your success in training young marines and giving opportunity. I am also grateful that my late father-in-law and late brother-in-law were proud marines, so we associate with you and wish you well in the future. And Admiral Greenert, I am very grateful I have a son under your command, so it is personal. We are very proud of his service. And Admiral, what is the status of the Navy contribution to the National Mission Forces, Combat Mission Forces and Cyber Protection Forces of the U.S. Cyber Command, which is to be located at Fort Gordon, Georgia? Admiral Greenert. We were tasked, and it started in fiscal year 2012 actually, to stand up a series of task force. And what these are, these are groups of around 40 cyber warriors who have specific skills to enter networks, if you will, to be able to rummage around to look for the right stuff, and as necessary, I will just say, provide effects, and we are stood up. We are on track. In fact, we are ahead of track to stand up those, I think all told, 16 teams, and we provide those around the world to combatant commanders. Mr. Wilson. And I have visited the facility, and you would be proud to see in the midst of an Army complex, Navy personnel looking very ``strack.'' Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, including civilians. This is very joint and interagency. Mr. Wilson. And so important for the security of our country. Secretary Mabus and General Amos, I am very concerned about the unintended consequences of the decision to raise the minimum wage for Federal contractors. This has an extraordinary potential to destroy jobs, totally unintended, and these--it is quality of life. And as chairman of Military Personnel, it concerns me, and that is that employees of chain restaurants on military installations--it could be Subway, Taco Bell, Burger King--that they could be subject to this regulation, which would make the businesses nonprofitable. They would close. People would lose their jobs. And the services provided for quality of life could be eliminated. I hope that you are looking into this so that this can be avoided. Additionally, we have other services, such as barbershops, that won't be able to provide the services that are necessary. Additionally, another benefit that has been so positive for military families are little kiosks, where you have small tiny businesses where persons operate, and this is perfect for military dependents and spouses. All of these are at risk. And Secretary, are you aware of this, and what is being done? Secretary Mabus. Congressman, the benefits that you have laid out, the quality of life, we are very aware of this, and we are very cognizant that these things remain for marines, for sailors, for their families. However, as you know, there is very conflicting and imperfect evidence as to which way this goes, and so we will continue to watch it, but in terms of making sure that the quality of life for everyone, our sailors, our marines, their families, and the people who work on those bases, we are going to keep an eye on that, and we will make whatever recommendations are appropriate. Mr. Wilson. And to me it is really very clear, and that is, where you have a wage differential on-post/off-post, and then you have to raise prices on-post, I know something about our military and their families; they are very bright. They will shop off-post, and it would be a spiral out of control, closing these businesses, destroying entry-level jobs. Additionally, it would create a circumstance where you would have a wage differential on-post/off-post, and it would be not sustainable. And so the way to address that is to close the on-post facilities, again affecting military families, and I just see this as just--and it couldn't possibly have been an intended consequence. The unintended consequences, really catastrophic to jobs and to quality of life for our military, and I hope you look into this right away. It is--because the contracts are going to be negotiated soon. There have already been some closures and planned closures at strategic locations around the world. Thank you very much. Secretary Mabus. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. I appreciate you all's service. The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Secretary Mabus. And General Greenert, I am always very proud to say our former commander, Naval Forces, Marianas and Guam. And General Amos, I do appreciate all your service and your continued commitment to the realignment of marines and to a robust Navy presence on Guam. And I think this year's budget does show a clear commitment on your part to our rebalance strategy. General Amos, can you comment on the progress that we have made in the last year regarding the realignment of marines from Okinawa to Guam. Can you comment on the significance of the Governor of Okinawa signing the landfill permit and how important is it to remove the restrictions on Government of Japan's funds in this year's defense authorization bill. What impact do those restrictions have on our partnership with Japan? General Amos. Congresswoman, first of all, we remain, as I said last year, bullish on this move to Guam. We are planning on it happening. We need it to happen to aid in our redistribution of the forces in the Pacific. We sit today at about a little over 22,000 marines west of the International Date Line. As you recall, Secretary Panetta's goal was 22.5. Now, they are not all in the right spot, though. We have got more on Okinawa than we need, and we will eventually go down to 11,500 in accordance with an agreement between Japan and us; 4,700 of those will--roughly 5,000 will go to Guam. We are still planning on that. Two construction projects are under way right now, the underground utilities that go out to the North Ramp of Andersen Air Force base, and there is a maintenance facility that is being built there. We have in 2015 a hangar to be built at the North Ramp. So those are all things that are unencumbered by the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] specific language on restrictions. So we are planning on doing this. As you know, the environmental--the supplemental environmental impact statement should be complete, scheduled to be complete towards the end of this year. That means by early 2015, next year, this time by next year, we should have a record of decision, and when that happens then, that then allows the--assuming that it goes the way we hope it goes, that allows then the planning for the construction of the training ranges and the living cantonment and the building cantonment and our headquarters. So, we are actually doing well. There is money in the budget all the way out till 2020 and beyond to do this, but you are absolutely right. The NDAA is pretty strident with regards to not spending money until we have a comprehensive plan for Okinawa, Guam, the realignment in the Pacific and Hawaii, so we are going to need some help to try to break free some of that, those restrictions with Congress, to allow us to spend some of the money that is already in our budget and that is in Japan's budget to be able to build the facilities we need on Guam in an iterative fashion. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. And we will continue to work on that. The next question I have is for Admiral Greenert. At a hearing last week, Admiral Locklear indicated that it was very important for there to be a robust depot-level ship repair capability with a dry dock on Guam. Now, I think we can all agree with that assessment. Admiral, can you elaborate on why that specific capability is important to the Navy and our readiness overall in the Western Pacific. We have spent many, many years building up a specialized workforce on Guam, and I would hate to see that capability decline and for the MSC [Military Sealift Command] ships to be going to foreign countries for repair when we do have the capability on Guam. Admiral Greenert. Ma'am, Guam is very important to me, to Admiral Locklear, to Admiral Harris, our commander of the Pacific Fleet. It is strategic. I agree with Admiral Locklear's assessment. I want to and I will do what I can to move this ship repair contract, get going, get back up to speed. I am with you. We have got to get workers working. I don't want to go back, you know, all the way to the U.S. It is a long way back there to do ship repair, and I agree, we ought to have a dry dock facility there as soon as feasible. We have got to get old Big Blue up and certified or whatever it takes. Ms. Bordallo. Or to be sending these ships to foreign countries, Singapore and other areas. Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Bordallo. I think we should be repairing in a U.S. facility. Admiral Greenert. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen. And I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Conaway. Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentleman, thank you for being here, and I sincerely appreciate each of your long distinguished careers and service to our country. We are a better country for all of your service. Secretary Mabus, I am sincere about that. You and I disagree on something of some import to me anyway, and so don't let that disagreement distract from my appreciation for your service. Two thousand nine, when you and the President launched this greening of the Navy effort, we had dramatically different circumstances than we have right now. In your written testimony, you are still committed to that, so I don't anticipate changing your mind with my eloquence, but I would like to point out that we are different. All three of you talked about how difficult the budget circumstances we find ourselves in, sequestration, cutting spending, top line budgets, numbers have been going down. All of that is different from 2009. On the supply side, the security side, dramatic increases of oil production during that timeframe, unanticipated, quite frankly, 2009, but that is now the reality that our domestic production is going up, and so, from a national security standpoint, pursuing fuels that might fit that gap if couldn't get at anything else might make some sense, but clearly, biofuels are not in that category. In your written testimony, you announced that you signed a contract with four different contractors to provide 160 million gallons per year of bio jet fuel at $4 a gallon, which is at or near the commercial cost. Can you tell us when that will be delivered, and can you tell us, does that amortize all of the investment that the Department of Defense, Ag [Agriculture] Department, and Energy Department have paid, and why do you think that effort will be any more successful than, say, Solyndra or any other efforts that the administration has made at juicing this market? Secretary Mabus. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about this, and you may--we may have more things in common than you think. The reason we are doing this is so that we won't have to cut ships. The reason we are doing this is so we won't have to cut training or steaming or flight hours. And I am really happy that oil and gas production has gone up in the United States, as virtually all Americans are, but even if we produce all the oil or the petroleum that we could possibly use--and the military would go to the front of the line no matter what. Mr. Conaway. Right. Secretary Mabus. Oil is a global commodity, and it is traded globally. We have been presented in Navy with $2 billion in unbudgeted, unanticipated fuel bills in fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2012, the most recent complete numbers that we have. What we are looking for is some competition for petroleum. What we are looking for, to go along--you and I have the same notion. If you replace one thing with another, it has got to be a drop-in fuel, and it has got to be competitively priced. And as you pointed out, that 160 million gallons of both aviation and also marine diesel will come online in 2016. That moneys, those moneys and those gallons coming to the fleet will give us the ability to mitigate some of those price spikes. Mr. Conaway. Okay. Secretary Mabus. Some of that security premium that oil traders talk about. You don't have to look any further than the last couple of weeks when---- Mr. Conaway. Just a second. Let me---- Secretary Mabus [continuing]. Price of oil goes up. Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Cut you off with that, but I do want to get to one other point that we do agree on. You mentioned that for every dollar increase in the price of a gallon--of a barrel of oil, that it costs you $30 million. Would you provide the committee that computation for how that works? Secretary Mabus. Sure. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 153.] Mr. Conaway. And then the remaining time, General Amos, I need to get you on the hook for bragging on the Marine Corps for their audit that they recently got, and also, I would like a head nod from the other gentleman about continued commitment to getting the Department of Defense books in an auditable condition before 2017. And I hope, Secretary, I have your commitment to that as well as Admiral Greenert, but I would like for General Amos to talk about his Marine Corps efforts in that regard. General Amos. Congressman, thank you. It was painful, took longer than we hoped. It was actually a fiscal year 2012 audit that I just reported out, as you are aware, just here late this past fall, but we are the first service that have gone through it, so we were breaking trail, so to speak, on it. I am very proud of it. We are involved right now in the next year's audit, and so we are back into it again, but I am proud of the effort because it was--when you track--can you imagine trying to track every single dollar that goes from operations maintenance, training, ammunition procurement, so thanks, thanks for the kind words. You do have my word that now that we have done it once and we know it is possible, we are going to continue to do it because this actually gives us visibility inside the corps to be able to figure out where the money is going. And we are--and we can track it now. We have mechanisms that we track where our money is going and how it is being spent. So thank you, Congressman. Mr. Conaway. All right. Secretary, real quickly. Secretary Mabus. As a former State auditor, you and I sure agree on this, and number one, the Navy is on track to meet its audit requirements. And you and I can go back and forth in private on some of these technical things, but we are on track to do that. And the Marines, as marines do, are leading, as always. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Courtney. Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. General Amos, I just want to let you know that wounded warrior from Ellington, Connecticut, Corporal Caron, appreciated your good wishes when I saw you at the shipbuilding breakfast. And again, I want to thank you for your interest in his amazing recovery and your great career. And also, as similarly asserted by Mr. Conaway and the auditability reform committee, kudos to the Marines for getting us to that point. I mean, this is something that is a must now, obviously, with all the budget challenges that we are talking about. We have to see how the money is being spent, so congratulations on that great achievement. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, there is strong bipartisan support for getting a 300-ship Navy. Again, I want to just follow up some of the comments earlier that during your tenure, as your testimony points out, you have put 60 ships under contract. I have been around here long enough to know that we were not even close to that pace in the preceding 4 years, and again, I think that is something people have to be mindful of. Your commitment to getting us there is based on real results. It is not a talking point for you. You are getting it done, and I think, you know, people need to remember that as we sort of discuss the challenges that face us. What I would like to spend a minute with you with is a question that came up with Secretary Hagel last week, and you started this discussion by saying that, again, all the reasons why we have to get SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine] online on time is proceeding smartly, but the fact is, is that we are going to hit a point where we have got to start paying for building them, and the impact on that 300-ship Navy is going to be quite dramatic. And as you point out the other day, a national conversation really has to take place here. For 70 percent of the triad, the Navy's budget can't be treated as a one-third commitment in terms of the security requirement. So, again, I was wondering how we get that to the next level so that we sort of move it out of the realm of just sort of pundit talk. Secretary Mabus. Well, first, thank you so much for what you said. We are on track with the Ohio-class replacement, as Admiral Greenert said. We are on track with the engineering, with the R&D [research and development] that is going on now. We are on track to do the advance procurement. We are on track to begin building, and we are on track in terms of the Common Missile Compartment with our British allies, but as you rightly pointed out, when we are building Ohio-class replacement submarines, it will take up at least a third every year of the Navy's normal shipbuilding budget. We are the most survivable part of the nuclear triad, of the nuclear deterrence, and it-- as I said and as you just said, there needs to be a decision, after a full debate and full conversation, on that shouldn't be the trade because it will have a dramatic and not good impact on all of our other shipbuilding programs, including our attack submarine programs, which is one of the places we have a very large technological tactical edge right now and into the future. So, I think that just making people aware of the start numbers of what will happen to the rest of the fleet if this entire shipbuilding for the Ohio-class replacement is taken out of normal Navy shipbuilding, number one, it is a national program, but number two, we also don't replace these things very often at all. They last for decades, and the ships that we are building now, the boats for the Ohio-class replacement, will last into the 2080s, and so we ought to view it through that lens, and we ought to have that conversation. Mr. Courtney. Admiral, did you want to---- Admiral Greenert. Well, sir, the year of reckoning is 2021, it is right around the corner, and that is about a $9 billion to $10 billion--it is the procurement of the first boat. It is high, but they are always high in the first. That does a lot of R&D, as you well know. Two years go by where we don't procure as we build the first, and then we build one, and then it is every year, it is about $6 billion in those years' dollars. As the Secretary said, that is about a half and maybe just a little less than half of the budget. It will clobber the budget, and our priority, of course, is sea-based strategic deterrent, but it is also the undersea domain. That is right behind it. So where do we get the money? Submarines, destroyers, P-8s, they are all contributors to the undersea domain; so sir, we need relief is what we need from this burden. Mr. Courtney. In the defense bill this year, we can start working on some language to start really making this, again, more than just a talking point in the hallway. You know, if we care about a 300-ship Navy, we have got to deal with it. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman. Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, thank you again for joining us today and thank you for your service to our Nation. General Amos, thank you for 44 years of service to our Nation as a marine, and thanks so much for your leadership. You have led our marines through 13 years of conflict, and we appreciate that. Please thank Bonnie, too, for the great job she has done in supporting our marines and their families. Thank you. Thank you. I am going to begin, Admiral Greenert, with you to look at where we are, from a Navy perspective, concerning our L-class ships. And General Amos, I also want you to be part of this discussion. We are looking at the next generation replacing the LSD. General Amos, you spoke very eloquently and passionately about saying that the LPD 17 hull form is the way to go for a variety of reasons, and in answering Mr. Palazzo's question, you laid out a lot of those, but I do want to get your perspective on, from both you gentleman, about why you believe the LPD 17 hull form or that class of ships is the best way going forward to meet the Marine Corps' needs and to make sure, too, that we have a platform that is functional and is in the fleet in a timely manner. Admiral Greenert. Well, I will start, sir. If it is the most cost feasible for the capability, I am very sensitive. Jim Amos is my customer, so I have to understand that. We need to bring the Marines the capability they need. We already have the infrastructure in place to repair it, to maintain it, to train people to it, to buy stuff that goes in it, you know, from air conditioners to diesels, you name it, you know what I am saying, to weapons systems, so that would be very nice if that moved in there very eloquently and we could afford it. So I turn to, as I was kind of talking to Mr. Palazzo earlier, if we could get a transitional piece, you know, a seed money or something--we did this with the Virginia class--hey, that might work, and we have done it before. So, anyway, it is all of those that makes it--and you know what, that is a pretty successful class now. Secretary Mabus. And just to follow up just for 1 second. Mr. Wittman. Sure. Secretary Mabus. LPD 17, the first in that class had--as the first of the class, had some issues. Mr. Wittman. Right. Secretary Mabus. And it got a lot of press, a lot of press. Are we going down the right road? Are we doing the right thing here in the Navy? The last two LPDs, 24 and 25, have had no starred cards, no major defects during their sea trials. Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Secretary Mabus. General Amos. General Amos. Congressman, the hull form issue is simply simplifying the acquisition process and the developmental costs of any kind of platform. It just makes--you know, that is one that makes sense. Mr. Wittman. Sure. General Amos. Developing something brand new costs more money than we think, takes longer than we think, and it is fraught with more danger than we think. Doesn't mean we can't develop, doesn't mean we shouldn't, you know, but that is really the hull form of that class ship, which has been so, so successful at this point to the point of everybody else. And I am going to step a little bit out of my lane here, but I tell you what, the truth of the matter is, everything-- when you start talking United States Navy and capital investments, they cost a lot of money. Mr. Wittman. Yeah. General Amos. This is not like buying a Humvee for $250,000. This is buying a ship for $2.3 billion or buying an Ohio-class replacement submarine that is going to consume his entire--the bulk of his entire shipbuilding plan for when it finally comes in. The truth is, is that my personal opinion, we are out of balance in the budget. Mr. Wittman. Sure. General Amos. Not so much Congress but within our Department of Defense. The Department of the Navy in the Navy shipbuilding program needs more money. This is not a proportional solution set because the ships are expensive, and they are, they are capital investments, and by the way, they will last for 40-plus years. Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this. I want to lead right from your answer to a broader question. Where we are proposing to go with our Navy and as a component of that, our amphibious ships, look at the world we are in today, being more dangerous with more need to be able to project power to respond to humanitarian needs and the overall effort that this Nation needs to place, if we don't have a Navy that has those 11 aircraft carriers, that has the next generation L class ship, that has the SSBN(X), two questions: Will our men and women that we ask to go in harm's way, will they be put at greater risk, i.e., will more of them be killed on the battlefield? And will there be an increased possibility that if we are in a conflict, that we would lose that conflict? And I would like each of you gentleman to answer that, and you can quickly do it yes or no. Admiral Greenert. I will answer the second one first. Yes, we have risk in our ability to take on an advanced adversary, as I spoke to, and I am concerned about that. But in your first question, my job is to make sure that our people that go forward have the finest equipment and they are organized, trained, and equipped, and so, for me, I would always come to Secretary Mabus and say, Boss, our budget has to have the right readiness. I cannot send forward--I will get smaller to be good and to make sure that they are good and that they are safe. Mr. Wittman. Secretary Mabus. Secretary Mabus. I will just echo what the CNO said. We are over time, but we will make sure that people that go in harm's way, and that is what we are trying to do with the budget, have the right equipment but also the right training, the right things they need all the across the board. We should never go into a fair fight. Mr. Wittman. Gotcha. General Amos. Congressman, the few of the ships--fewer numbers of ships, less capable they are, means the longer it takes to build up combat power when it is needed, not if it is needed but when it is needed. The longer it takes to build combat power puts our young men and women at risk. It is a complementary equation. Mr. Wittman. All right, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Peters. Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. I would--I want to talk a little bit about energy as well. Specifically, I have a question about specifically how it affects the rebalance. But the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to energy security and efficiency through goal setting in its program initiatives, that the stated strategy is to--is that energy security is critical to mission success and that energy efficiency minimizes operational risks while saving time, money, and lives, and I want to say I thank you for that. Specifically, at MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station] Miramar, I know that you are doing some methane power generators, solar panels, working on a microgrid, interested to see how the microgrid work comes out when it is completed. And what I want to ask, though, and this is a little bit broader than biofuels, which I have raised in past, is in the context of the rebalance to the Pacific, how does that affect Navy energy security? And you have got that huge expansive region and the geographically fragmented energy infrastructure. Now we want to emphasize our presence there. How does the Navy intend to ensure that it can meet operational energy requirements to carry out its missions and reduce fuelling vulnerabilities in that region? Secretary Mabus. Well, you just gave the best rationale for what we are doing. Number one is energy efficiency so that we don't have to have as much energy, and we are doing stuff ranging from things like voyage planning to hull coatings to stern flaps to changing the light bulbs in ships, all of which save pretty significant amounts of energy on board that ship. We are looking, as you pointed out at Miramar, we are looking at alternative energy. If you look at some of the places across the Pacific, at Guam, at Hawaii, at Japan, at Diego Garcia, where we--all of which, where we have significant infrastructure, very high energy rates there. So if we can move to a renewable energy, a lower cost so that we don't have to have that vulnerability of shipping oil and gas to some of those places, that will also help in that energy security. Mr. Peters. Is that affecting acquisition and procurement? Secretary Mabus. We are well on our way to the 50 percent alternative fuels for Navy, both ashore and afloat. Mr. Peters. Okay. Secretary Mabus. And so, in that sense, yes, it is, but it is, in many ways, the new normal. That is what we are going after and, on the other side of the coin, for far more efficiency in whatever we do. Mr. Peters. Admiral. Admiral Greenert. We are--maybe I can quantify a little bit. The Secretary eloquently laid it all out. In sailor terms, you know, when a Hornet pilot takes off from the carrier, the first thing they do is say, Good, I am in the air. The second one is, Okay, where is the tanker? And in a more efficient Hornet engine, that is less other Hornets--these are strike fighters--that we have to use to be tankers. So, I mean, that is real warfighting eventually, so 5, 6, 7 percent, that is other aircraft that we put back into the flight. The Secretary mentioned stern flap. That will get you 5 days, additional days at sea that you don't have to look for an oiler. That is the unique part of being a sailor, where am I getting food, because you ain't going to fish for it. It is going to run out. And then secondly, we have an engine that will get us 10 days, so it becomes real stuff pretty soon. Mr. Peters. Well, I want to commend the Navy and the Marines for thinking about both insulation and fuel in terms of alternatives and security. It is heartening, and I think it is smart in this budget context, too. Also, Admiral, I did want to thank you on the recent visit to San Diego that you made, and you are welcome back anytime. I think you were the one who coined the term ``solar vortex,'' which we have gotten a lot of mileage out of. I appreciate that. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, you brought up earlier one of my primary concerns, which is that as we cancel multiyear contracts, we pay more per item and get fewer of them, and it is recognizing budget constraints. I am concerned that, you know, some of the decisions we are being forced to make are pennywise and pound foolish, as we would say. And that brings me to the MH-60, and Admiral Greenert, I understand that you are considering reducing the purchase by 29 aircraft, if I am correct with that. And my question is, what is the cost of terminating that procurement versus the cost of actually continuing to purchase the 29 helicopters, and what type of negative impact do you expect with the reduction in the equipment? Admiral Greenert. Well, sir, if we get a good outcome on the aircraft carrier, I need to continue because I need the helicopters for the air wing. We would continue purchasing at least another year on that. So I will just state that up front. But I will have to get you the precise numbers on shutdown. But I am pretty sure it is about the same to shut down and terminate and--those costs as it does--because it struck me when I remember talking to my guys about it. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 154.] Mr. Scott. And that is what we have seen as well, but I would appreciate those numbers. And it just doesn't make sense to me that we would pay the same thing to terminate a contract as we could get the 29 additional aircraft for, even if we--if we didn't have a need for them, certainly we have allies out there that would need them. General Amos, thank you for your service. As you know, I have had the opportunity to do a Wounded Warrior hunt with several marines, and they wanted me to make sure that I spoke up for a couple of things, one being the A-10, and they sure would like to have a .45 instead of a 9-millimeter. But with that said, the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of Robins Air Force Base. We are very proud of them. The Air Force has proposed to recapitalize them, which would give you more information--more accurate information and, hopefully, improve that battle management platform. If you could just speak to the benefit to the Marines of that JSTARS battle management platform, I would appreciate it. General Amos. Congressman, first of all, I would like the .45 instead of a 9-millimeter, too, but that is for another budget at another time. But it has been--it is a combat-proven platform, back to the JSTARS battle management airplane you are talking about. It has done well in combat. It served us well all through the march up to Baghdad, going all the way north and then settling in that area afterwards when we came back in. So it has been a battle-tested platform. It gives us the situational awareness while we are on the ground of what it is seeing in the air, a moving target indicator and a few other things that is very critical to us. So it is a battle-tested program. I can't speak to programmatic decisions being made by the Air Force. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is struggling with the budget exactly the same way we are while we are trying to all figure out how we can pay our bills to provide the best combat readiness our Nation needs. Mr. Scott. Well, thank you. And the beauty of the JSTARS, obviously, is that the radar can see such a large area and it is a big world out there. Gentlemen, Secretary Mabus, thank you for your service. With that, I yield the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kilmer. Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to each of you for being here and for your service. Before I ask a question, I actually just wanted to lob a comment. We are hearing a good amount of interest from folks in my neck of the woods around reauthorization of overtime payments for Navy civilians who are working on the forward deployed carrier in Japan and I was hoping that the Navy would be supportive of that reauthorization. For questions, let me start with Admiral Greenert. Can you talk about how much risk we are assuming by not fully funding the expected amount of depot-level work for our vessels. And, you know, what is the expected amount of savings that will result out of that decision? And is there a reasonable expectation that we can pay for the costs of implementing that decision in the out-years? Admiral Greenert. Well, the definition ``fully fund''-- there is the request, and then we would be our comptroller and--working with NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command] to--there are a number of programs--you are probably aware of many of them--we have in place to improve the efficiency of each of our depots. So we ask them, ``How is your program going? What is your goal for the year?'' We apply that to their budget request and that becomes, if you will, the lesser funding. So we might fund the 97 percent or whatever that number turns out to be. I know the rolled-up number, but each depot is different. If we don't get that right, that is man-days that aren't-- the work that doesn't get done, because we thought it would take 2,500 man-days. It takes 2,650. So there is a little bit of risk in that. And you got to come back around the next budget cycle and fix it, and we have had to do that. But, sir, you know, we have to--we got to be efficient with the taxpayers' dollars and be good stewards. So we--and they have really responded. The depots have responded. They are much more efficient. Mr. Kilmer. Are there specific alternatives that the committee ought to consider to fully fund that depot-level maintenance to protect the investment that we are making in our naval--in our maritime vessels? Admiral Greenert. I wouldn't suggest it. What I mean by that is we--I think you had asked us to sit down and say, ``What have you assumed in those efficiencies, if you will, such that we would like''--I commit to you that what we have presented and Secretary Mabus has approved on my behalf is fairly closely scrubbed, sir. Mr. Kilmer. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, the committee is currently undergoing a multiyear effort to review acquisition systems and I wanted to hear from you about what you see as the biggest challenges to the Department of Navy in terms of shipbuilding and in terms of non-major defense acquisition programs. Are there specific considerations that we should be mindful of when considering the requirements of the Navy and of the Marine Corps? And, I guess, in short, what can Congress do to help? Secretary Mabus. Well, the first part of that question, we have been getting, I think, all our acquisition programs well under control, shipbuilding, the aircraft programs that we control. We have done it by competition. We have done it by multiyears. We have done it by block buys. We have done it by using some pretty basic business strategies. But going forward from that, we are also looking--and I think that, as you take this look--as Congress takes this look--we are looking, for example, at service contracts. We spend about $40 billion a year on service contracts. And what we have undertaken--and we are absolutely confident that we can do it--is we are going to take 10 percent of that, about $4 billion a year, $19 billion over the FYDP, out of service contracting without really having that much of an impact on what we get. And that is just by being able to follow money from the time it is appropriated all the way through to the time it comes out as a good or service that we get. So I would ask you to not just look at the major acquisition programs, not just look at--look at how we and everybody is structured. Look at where the growth has been. Look at what the benefit is that you get from that growth. And, as General Amos, who I have had the pleasure to serve with now for almost 4 years, said, we build very expensive things in the Navy, but they also amortize pretty well. We just retired Enterprise after almost 52 years of service. So if you break it down on that standpoint, you are getting a lot for your money. But it is a big, big upfront cost, and I think you should look at the service that those platforms give you. Mr. Kilmer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Hunter [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Bridenstine is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to ask Admiral Greenert--I have an interest in specifically the Growler. As a Navy pilot, I have been deployed on aircraft carriers. And the EA-6B Prowler would become a national asset as soon as we got into theater. It would depart. We would lose it as an organic asset to the aircraft carrier, to the air wing. And I know right now we are slated to have five Growlers in each squadron on an--or in an air wing. And I was wondering-- there is a concern I also have about not just not having enough assets, but also a concern about the risk that is injected when we take the F-18 off production, given the F-35 has had some risks. My question is this. I saw that you put out a recent unfunded priority for additional Growlers following the release of the budget and I was just wondering if you would talk about that priority and the unfunded piece of it. Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. What we have done is I submitted--in consultation with Secretary Mabus, I submitted, in responding to the chairman's request to the chairman and the Secretary of Defense for their look, an unfunded requirements list. Yes. I put the Growlers on there. The issues became--you articulated some of it--when you look at requirements, we are at minimum requirements, as we know it. However, I look to the future. And, to your point, electronic warfare, electronic attack, is critical. It gets us joint assured access. I see a growing need, number one. Number two, there are a few studies going on looking at a joint requirement. Well, that is us. We are the provider. So my view was, for hedge and for risk reduction, I thought it would be appropriate to describe what I view as a need--a future need and potential requirement. Mr. Bridenstine. Secretary Mabus. Secretary Mabus. We are the prime service now to do electronic attack, as you pointed out. Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, sir. Secretary Mabus. And for that reason and for what the CNO said, we are five planes in a squadron today. Looking out in the future, we don't think electronic attack is going to get any smaller. We are also very mindful of the industrial base. And if we buy the Growlers that we have in the budget, that line will continue through 2016. And I know that we are working on things like foreign military sales, things like that, to keep that line in business. But to the CNO's point, today we have the minimum numbers in each squadron. Looking out to the future and to what electronic attack may or will become, it is an insurance policy. It is a hedge. Mr. Bridenstine. Sure. Admiral Greenert and Secretary Mabus, what is the role of low-cost autonomous surface vessels in the fleet of the future? What steps is the Navy taking now to build autonomous surface vessels? Admiral Greenert. I see them for--you can use them for security, for sure. You know, they would be surveillance if you go in a harbor. We have done that already, by the way. But this summer we will be demonstrating autonomous unmanned surface vehicles for mine warfare where they go out and actually tow a sensor. We have it in the 5th Fleet arena, the Arabian Gulf. And so I see that as a future--a pretty important element. I would like to move ahead to we will develop a swarm concept of operations. We do a lot of counter-swarm. I want to flip this. I want to do some swarm. And we have the technology and the means. Now we have to put our efforts to it. That is my view. Secretary Mabus. We are the only service that does unmanned above the sea, on the sea, and under the sea, and surface unmanned autonomous surface vehicles have to be a part of that future fleet. And the one example that the CNO used, you are seeing that with the--particularly with the littoral combat ship, sending out autonomous surface--unmanned surface vehicles to hunt mines, to keep sailors out of the minefield, and to be way more efficient in hunting mines than we do today. Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral and General, I want to thank you for appearing before us today. And, of course, we appreciate the benefit of your testimony. General, since this is your last posture hearing before the committee, I just want to express especially my appreciation for your service. I have enjoyed getting to know you and working with you in your position as Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I wish you well in the next chapter of your life. Thank you, General. Gentlemen, making predictions is obviously a dangerous business to be in, but I certainly think that one point that we can all agree on is, as we look out into the future, there is going to be an ever-increasing reliance on key enabling technologies. Some are more obvious, like the tactical information networks that make possible many advanced warfighting concepts, including cyber. Others are more nascent, such as the contributions of future aerial platforms, like UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike], or future technologies, such as directed energy or rail guns, advanced hypersonics, persistent unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, as we were just discussing a moment ago, next-generation EW [electronic warfare] and radars and future ships, such as the Zumwalt. Admiral, if I could start with you, I would appreciate your thoughts on what those investments, particularly in directed energy and rail guns, mean to the future of the fleet. And the other question I would like to get to, hopefully, time permitting, is: With the construction rate proposed in the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan, the nuclear attack submarine inventory will slowly decline to 43 SSNs in 2028. Assuming the global COCOM demand remains fairly steady, how will the Navy compensate for the projected shortfall of attack submarines and, in particular, for undersea payload capacity as the SSGNs [guided missile nuclear submarines] age out? Admiral Greenert. The directed energy, we are going to do a demonstration this summer. In fact, we are down to final certification. We will load a directed-energy weapon laser on the Ponce, which is our afloat forward staging base. It is an LPD. It is an amphibious ship. We have sized it. We have looked at it. We have already demonstrated this particular, if you will, laser gun--laser weapon system. What--the value of it is its persistence. It costs under a dollar for one round, if you will, laser round. We have already proven it against a drone and against a small craft. So the deal is I want to get it out there and take a look at it and see how does it perform in that sort of harsh environment, and then we adjust. Imagine you have a laser. You don't have to have as much ammunition on board and all that brings that. So then you want to miniaturize it. You have to have the power system to be able to produce the power repetitively. But I think we can overcome on that. We are on a track for that. And then you raise the energy level that it can deliver, and we are on track to do that. Mr. Langevin. And I applaud the work that the Navy is doing in that respect. I have met many times with Admiral Klunder at ONR [Office of Naval Research] and I am very familiar with that weapon system on the Ponce and will be following that closely. Admiral Greenert. Secondly, I will comment on the rail gun. We have these vessels called joint high-speed vessels. They are catamarans. And we have the ability to put the power system in and put a rail gun mounted on the back. And in the summer of 2016--late summer, probably--we want to take that to sea and demonstrate it and see how can the rail gun perform. The issue with rail gun is the barrel. That high energy that is generated through there can tend to melt the barrel. So we have to get the right barrel and do that right. We are working that and the engineers tell me, ``No. We can do this.'' And, secondly, you have to generate the power for that electromotive force. So those are two right up front there. The future in submarines--we have a few things up our sleeve to help get through what we call this trough that you alluded to. One, we will look at deployment lengths. They are 6 months now. Maybe extend a few, and we would pick and choose those. Two, the maintenance, the time they are off service, can we bring them--you know, can we be more efficient in our maintenance or kind of move that around differently. And then we will look at where are our submarines forward deployed, where are they stationed, put another way. As you know, we are moving one SSN to Guam here in this budget request. So if we continue to do that, we will work on the trough, as you say. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral. With time permitting, we have obviously invested billions of dollars to ensure that our aircraft carriers can project power anywhere on the globe. It is critical that we continue to make the investments to ensure that we are leveraging our carriers' impressive capabilities to the maximum extent possible. How do you envision Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike enhancing the carrier air wing? Admiral Greenert. Well, as a minimum, it will--the very minimum, it will provide a fueling capability, but that is not its primary purpose. That returns, as I was mentioning earlier, Super Hornets-- joint--excuse me--strike fighters right to the air wing. So immediately the air wing is better. They will be an integral part. But they can do refueling, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. So they will go out and surveil. Our requirements are you have to have a payload. So we can mount all kind of surveillance on there. And then it has to bring a weapon with it. Then I am convinced industry will evolve this thing so that its observability will get lower and lower. And then you are talking about going into increasingly denied environments. So, frankly, it will become a platform with payloads, just like the Super Hornet and like the Joint Strike Fighter B, in the--my view, in the carrier of the future--air wing of the future. Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Byrne, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Byrne. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate you being here today. I am sorry you are having to sit so long through this process, but we do appreciate it. It is helpful to us. Mr. Secretary, I would like to talk to you about my favorite topic, the littoral combat ship. I have read the memo that the Secretary of Defense sent you on 24 February in which he tells you, in essence, build it out to 32 ships, pause, and over the next year he would like for you to consider three options and come back to him with your recommendations based upon those options. The options are for the procurement of a capable and lethal small surface combatant, and his three options are a new design, an existing ship design including an LCS, and a modified LCS. I would like to take you through those three options, if I could. Are you aware of an existing ship design that would meet the definition of a capable and lethal small surface combatant other than an LCS? Secretary Mabus. The rest of that requirement is that I have to look at cost--because we have got to get enough of these ships--and I have to look at when they could be delivered to the fleet. So if you add those two requirements to it, I do not know of another design. But that is part of this look, Congressman, is to see if there is another design out there that could meet those requirements. Mr. Byrne. Yes, sir. I understand you have some work to do, but I am just trying to get what you know today. So let's go to the second option, which is designing a new ship. Given your goal to have a 300-ship fleet by 2020, which is 5 fiscal years from now, and the cost, as you mentioned before, what would be the timeline for developing a new ship--a new ship design altogether? And what would the cost be for that? Secretary Mabus. The normal timeline--and the CNO and I have both talked about this--the normal timeline of a blank sheet of paper to introduction in the fleet is about a decade, about 10 years. And I don't have any idea about what the cost would be at this time. Mr. Byrne. Well, we have gotten the cost for the LCSs down to about $350 million a ship now. Is that right? Secretary Mabus. That is correct. Mr. Byrne. Could you produce a new ship for anywhere near $350 million over the time horizon that you are looking at by 2020 for a 300-ship fleet? Secretary Mabus. The LCS is the only ship that we are currently producing anywhere close to that cost, any warship. And, again, that is the purpose of this look, is to see. But I am very proud of how much the cost has been driven down, working with our partners in industry. Because, as you know, the first ships of the LCS, of both versions, cost more than $750 million and now we have gotten that down to $350 million, more or less--and perhaps a little less--going forward. That is very hard to do, and it has been a real effort, but it has been a real partnership between Navy and industry to do that. And so we will certainly, as the Secretary directed, look to see what a cost would be on continuing to build the LCS, on building a variant of the LCS, or a completely new design. And he has explicitly instructed me to look at cost and delivery as well. Mr. Byrne. Well, when I look at the LCS, I am reminded of my favorite boxer of all time, Muhammad Ali. Now, he didn't win his fights by sitting there and just taking punches. He always said that he liked to float like a butterfly and sting like a bee. It seems to me, when I look at the LCS and what it was designed to do, it is a Muhammad Ali. It floats like a butterfly, a very fast butterfly, as you know, and stings like a bee. Isn't that what you are looking for? Secretary Mabus. Well, as you know, both the CNO and I are proponents of the LCS. We believe that we need this ship in the fleet and appreciate very much the fact that we are going to continue to build these through the FYDP to get to 32. And, as you said, the only pause here is a pause in contract negotiations on ships past 32. So that is several years from now. And I think that, very frankly, it is a good idea to take a look at capabilities, to take a look at requirements, to take a look at how ships meet these, because we do that on a very routine basis. We do it--as I have pointed out earlier, on the DDG-51, we are about to start Flight 3, which is actually the fourth flight of this destroyer. We are moving to Flight 4 of the Virginia-class submarine. We tend to--we don't tend to--we actually do look at every different ship type as technology changes, as requirements change, as missions change. And the beauty of the LCS or a ship like the LCS is it is modular so that you don't have to build a new hull, you don't have to build a new ship. As technology improves, as technology changes, as requirements change, you simply change out the modules. Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier, is recognized. Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you to each of our great leaders who are at the witness table. My first question is to General Amos. First of all, congratulations on your clean audit, the first service to have one. That is good news, I think, for all of us. I want to ask you, though, about a letter that--or a request made by Secretary Hagel last May in which he ordered all of the services to look at their positions of trust-- soldiers who are in positions of trust for any previous criminal or unethical behavior. The Army disqualified 588 as sexual assault counselors, recruiters, or drill sergeants after discovering that they had records of either sexual assault, child abuse, or drunk driving. The Marine Corps has disqualified no one, zero, and I find that remarkable, particularly since every other service has had at least a few. I have sent a letter today to the Secretary asking that he ask the services to go back and take a relook because you can't have 588 in one and zero in another of the services, particularly when the Marine Corps has, you know, had some problems in the past. Can you respond to that? General Amos. Congresswoman, I would be happy to. Thanks for the opportunity. The two communities that we call, that you have described as those that we need to pay particular attention to when it comes to dealing with sexual assault and the victims of sexual assault, are our recruiters. That is where it begins for us. And recruiting--I think you know this from seeing them out in California. Our recruiting is a primo job for our marines. And so we go through--in that community, we go through a recruiter screening team. We go through their records. We do a Federal law enforcement screening on every one of them. They are screened by their commanding officers. So the recruiters, that part of that community, is screened more so than, I think, any other--I think I can say this--any other service's recruiting team. Ms. Speier. General, I don't want to interrupt you necessarily, but I have got a very short amount of time and I have another question to ask. So are you going to take another look, is the question I asked, because it just seems a great disparity that there is not one soldier who was in a position of trust that did not meet that review and be recognized as not being appropriately placed. General Amos. Congresswoman, I will do that. You have my word, and I will get back to you on this. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 154.] General Amos. Just a comment on our sexual assault team, I mean, our civilians and our marines. They go through an enormous screening before they even are eligible to even be considered for employment, I mean, background checks and everything. So the fact that we have had none is not necessarily an indication that we haven't looked. We have actually taken---- Mr. Speier. All right. Thank you. I am sorry, but I do want to get one more question in. I have a minute and 45 seconds. All right. Admiral Greenert, thank you for arranging for the opportunity for both Congressman Garamendi and myself to visit the USS Coronado when it was in Cartagena. It was a very edifying experience. I have been critical of the LCS. I still have great concerns. But I must tell you one of my biggest concerns right now is that, you know, in private conversations with some on the ship--and I will say that your commander there did an outstanding job. He was an incredible cheerleader, loves the ship. But in some private conversations I had with others on the ship, the electronics on the ship are not working. And my concern is that, when the warranty is out, General Dynamics is going to start charging us and they have never presented us with a ship that was fully functional to begin with and we should not be paying for that. So that is number one. Number two, one of the criticisms is that you can't see out of the side of the ship. And he said, ``Well, we probably won't be able to get that fixed until it goes into dry dock. That is 2 years away.'' I mean, I think that is a big problem. They left Cartagena, went through the Panama Canal. And what happened? The ship got scraped on the side of the Panama Canal. So we have got a problem here, and I am wondering what you are going to do about those two issues. Admiral Greenert. Well, the first one we are reasonably aware of, the electronics piece. There are a couple of things, number one, how well does it intercept signals, process it, and use it to be functional; number two, the internal electronics. And when we ordered the ship, we wanted to address that after delivery. But it is a valid comment. We will look into it. And I want to make sure I understand specifically, when we say ``electronics,'' what it is. So I got that, and we will take a look at that. The second one, it is a paradigm, to say the least, to ask people not to be able to go out on a bridge, a wing wall. The other folks are doing reasonably well on that. But we are revisiting that aspect of it, you know, the ability to, if you will, see around rather than just saying check out the cameras or rig up rearview mirrors. So what we are going to do about that is we are going to go back in and say what is the basis of this and how do we continue to do it. Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman. My time has expired. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. The gentlelady from Illinois is recognized. Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Amos, I join my colleagues in expressing my admiration for your service. My daddy was a Marine NCO [non- commissioned officer] in World War II for just a few years and was an Army officer for about 16 years. And I think his greatest regret, despite his pride in my service, was that I was not ever a marine. So, hopefully, he is impressed, now that I get to talk to the Commandant. I do have a question that pertains to where we are moving forward, back with the dwell time issues and the reset of marines as you are drawing down the Active Duty force and how that reset is going to go with the Marine Reserves. Specifically, how sustainable is this 1:2 dwell time? I mean, this is a pretty intense pace that you are going to be putting people on. And is that sustainable 5 years? Two years? Are we going to be relooking at this? And are the Reserves doing the same thing? General Amos. The Reserves, Congresswoman, as you know, are a little bit more mature. They have already finished at least one enlistment in the fleet. They already, for the most part, have had one tour as an officer out in the fleet Marine force. So they are a little bit more mature. We are going to maintain them on a 1:5, which is the standard Reserve-Guard ratio of deployment to dwell. So there is no intents in use to change that. We are, though, going to capitalize on their experience and try to draw them in as often as we can. We are making plans--in fact, we just upped--in the 2015 budget, upped the Reserves budget by a significant amount of money just so that we can bring them into our unit deployment. It is good for them. It is good for us. So we are going to continue to use them. We are not going to wear their dwell out. Inside of us, we are a young service. We are the youngest, not age-wise, like 238\1/2\ years, but we are the youngest of all the services. Sixty-two percent of the Marine Corps are on their very first enlistment. You know, I have got almost 20,000 teenagers in the Marine Corps. So when I travel around--and the sergeant major and I, we visit marines in Afghanistan. They are deployed. And the only questions we get is not, ``Hey, sir, I am too tired. This is too hard.'' I get the question, ``Sir, when am I going to get to deploy again? Now that we are coming out of Afghanistan, where are we going to go next?'' So we are a young force. They signed up to deploy. So the pressure on the 1:2 dwell--I mean, I am not naive--will be on what we call the career force, and that is 27 percent of the Marine Corps. The bulk of the Marine Corps comes in and leaves and does not retire, but the career force stays on. That is the captains, the lieutenants, the master sergeants, the gunnery sergeants. And it will be harder on them. The decision to go to 1:2 dwell was simply a function of budget. It is a function of you have a Marine Corps to respond to today's crisis with today's force today, not a month from now, but today. And the only way we can do that is pull money into readiness, keep the units fully manned, fully trained, and fully equipped so that they can deploy and be ready. And to do that, to shrink the force down, it results in a 1:2. I am actually pretty optimistic. I am not getting any--of course, we are not in it yet, but we have been in a 1:2 dwell, actually, for probably the last 6 to 7 years. So I am optimistic that our Marine Corps is going to be able to sustain itself at this. Is it ideal? Absolutely not. America needs a Marine Corps of 186,800, which is a 1:3 dwell. Ms. Duckworth. It is certainly a heavy load that we are asking your marines to shoulder going well into the future, and I just want you to know that there are many of us here who certainly appreciate that burden that you are carrying for our Nation. I want to talk, also, about equipment. You talked about the equipment and, specifically, the return of the vehicles from Afghanistan and looking forward with the JLTVs [Joint Light Tactical Vehicles] and we are going to slow down the procurement of the JLTVs along with the Army slowing down the procurement, but you are going to try to increase the number of up-armored Humvees to make up the difference. And, again, you know, ideally, looking forward, how does that balance come out? And does that also affect the Reserves-- the equipment in the Reserves as well? General Amos. We haven't sorted out yet with the Reserves the JLTV. We are still in the program of record for it. We are the lead service into it in that we get the vehicles first. We are teamed up with the Army. We get 5,500 vehicles. We slid it to the right one year just because of budgetary issues. We are still going to get that. What we have done, though, inside what we call the ground vehicle strategy in the Marine Corps, because of money, we have had to look and ask ourselves the question, ``What is good enough?'' And we had 20-plus-thousand Humvees. A bunch of them are new. They were the ones that we got in 2006-2008. We are going to refurbish those--probably about 13,000 of those. JLTVs will fit in there. We are going to put more MRAPs [mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles] back in the inventory than we had originally planned. So it is a balance right now between modernization, paying our bills, and being able to be a ready force. We are trying to cut Solomon's baby in a variety of different ways, but, hopefully, we are doing it the right way. It is a balance. Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. The chairman recognizes himself for some questions. First, let me say sons out, guns out. That is right. My sleeves are actually rolled right now under my suit. You can't tell. But I think that is the best decision the Marine Corps has made in a long time. Commandant, let me say thanks to you and Bonnie for your time, for your service. It is not always easy to reconcile warfare with, let's say, the political class. It is tough. And you have had to do that, I think, during the last couple of years simply because of the ideology that has been in place. It is hard to reconcile combat and the elite political class. I mean, that is a fine line to walk, and I want to thank you both for doing it and for your--just your time and effort and your love for the Marine Corps and your marines. You love your marines. We can tell that. We can see it. So thank you. And I think this will be the last time that you are sitting down there, and you are probably like, ``Thank God.'' But thank you very much. Thanks for what you have done, for your service, and for your love of the Marine Corps and this country and your marines. So thank you. General Amos. Thank you, sir. You know this better than most sitting in this room. So thank you. Mr. Hunter. And to Bonnie. Is she here right now? General Amos. Sir, she is not. She is afraid to come in here. Mr. Hunter. All right. Same here. Well, thanks to her too. Yes. She has probably gone through a lot more than you have because she doesn't get to come out here and talk about it. So let me say first--I guess the question is: Now that you have taken--the Marine Corps has taken on the role of responding to the Benghazi-like attacks. The Marine Corps stepped up and said, ``Hey, we are going to take this on.'' Right? And you have done that. You have a unit in Spain. You are doing special-purpose MAGTFs [Marine Air-Ground Task Force]. You are responding to that. So you have now stepped up. So I guess the question is: Does your budget request match what you are now responsible for? Because if it happens again, the Marine Corps is on the hook because you have stepped up and said, ``We are going to make sure it doesn't happen again.'' So are we able to make it not happen again, basically? General Amos. Congressman, thank you. We have budgeted for that special-purpose MAGTF we currently have in Moron, Spain, and right now that works out of Africa. You are well aware of its success stories and its relevance. We have also budgeted for a second one in another area of operations. So we actually have two in our budget in the FYDP. We planned for that. So the answer is yes. And that is just in recognition of the future security environment. Ideally, what Admiral Greenert and I would like to do is put those rascals on ships and, when we get ships, we will. But for the time being, we are going to put them in the areas of operations for the combatant commanders so that they can be relevant. Mr. Hunter. So when do you make the transition from land- based to amphibs? Because that is what you just said, basically. Right? ``We want to put them on amphibs and''---- General Amos. Exactly. What I am saying is, ideally, in a perfect world, what we would like to do is put them on--for instance, we are looking on the west coast of Africa right now. It is hard to find a base that will--a country that will allow us to operate out of there. A ship of some kind, afloat forward staging base--some type of ship, an amphib, would be perfect for that area. And Admiral Greenert and the Secretary and I are working on that right now. So that would be an indication or example of transition to that. But we are probably down the road, quite honestly, with the number of amphibs we have. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Commandant. Admiral Greenert, a question about the dual-mode Brimstone missile. We have been talking about swarming boats. That is the Hellfire-ish missile that has radar and IR [infrared]. So I have seen a video where you have a bunch of swarming boats and it takes out a whole bunch of them. And you can launch it off ships. You can launch it off UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. The British have done all the R&D. It is a package deal. And you are very interested in this. I understand that. I just want to know how--how is that going? Are we going to actually do it? Are we going to employ it? Are we going to use it? Admiral Greenert. As I sit here in front of you, I can't tell you, yes, we are. As I sit here in front of you, I will tell you, this summer--earlier I was talking about we are going to do a swarm demonstration, we swarm and, at the same time, look at counter-swarm. During that, next comes the lethality, what kind of guns, what kind of missiles, what kind of sensors are we going to put on these. So I guess I would say stay tuned. We will keep you informed where we want to go with that. I think we need to---- Mr. Hunter. Do you like the missile? Admiral Greenert. Come again, sir? Mr. Hunter. Do you like the missile? Admiral Greenert. I do like the missile. The question is: How do you integrate it? How does it perform? How do I buy it? And if I need to--I don't want to say ``get around''--how do I get it through the system so it isn't another one of these--you know the deal--program of record, long-term thing? We need this thing out there soon, if we need it. Mr. Hunter. So because they have already done the investment, the Brits--they have already done the investment and it is a non-R&D product that is actually packaged and ready to go, Secretary Mabus, is there a fast track for something like this, where the Navy says, ``Hey, it is good to go. There is no R&D. We just want it''? Secretary Mabus. There are fast tracks for urgent needs like this. And whether it is this missile or some alternative, we are already moving to meet the swarming things. We have got some money in this budget to put the Longbow missile in the surface warfare component of the LCS. So, yes. The short answer is yes, there are. But a little bit longer answer is you have got to do what the CNO said first and show that we can integrate it, that we can use it, that it can do the job as advertised. Mr. Hunter. Thank you all. And I just want to say in the end, I mean--you know, the Army is going to knock me for this, but probably in the next 15, 20 years, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are going to be out there front and center. Everybody--the last two or three SecDefs [Secretaries of Defense] have said we are not going to get in a big land war again, it is all going to be pushing out, trying to reach out and touch people. And you all are going to be front and center. I know you have got a lot of planning to do. You have got the F-35s. You have got UCLASS. You have to be able to put everything together. You have got to be able to see it. And it is going to change the way that we fight. With everything networked, it is very complex and very complicated. And I wish you luck. We are here to help, and anything that we can do, let us know, because you have your work cut out for you. And I want to say thanks for your service. General Amos, congratulations, sir, on a beautiful career and congratulations on getting out relatively unscathed. And, with that, I would like to yield to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Shea-Porter--or from New Hampshire. I am sorry. I get those confused. They are both on the coast though. Ms. Shea-Porter. I would say they are both on water. It works. So thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And congratulations to you, General, and thank you for your service. My question here is for the Secretary. You said in your testimony that maintaining undersea dominance is vital to the U.S. Navy, and we continue to fund the Virginia-class subs each year. Now, I have the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in my district, and you know how famous they are for the great work they do. And they meet all of the challenges, including the sequester last year, which had an impact. But they have been on the job and their record is absolutely wonderful. So my question is very simple: In considering a future BRAC--and you know what the Congress had to say about that--but in considering a future BRAC, is the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in that equation at all? I believe their work is essential. And my question is: Do you and does the Navy? Secretary Mabus. I am going to leave out whether--because we haven't been authorized to do a BRAC. And so I don't know what would be looked at. But I will say that all our naval shipyards, including Portsmouth, do incredibly good work. They do the work that we have to have to keep not only our submarines, but all our ships at sea, maintained at the highest state of readiness. They do so under sometimes difficult conditions. And so we value them very, very much. We value the workers. And I think that one of the things--when we were first forced to furlough last year, one of the things that Navy exempted from furlough was the shipyard workers, to make sure that we--or most of the shipyard workers--to make sure that we kept them on the job because we couldn't make up that time if they were not there. And I think that that speaks to the value and the importance that we put on them, not that we value any of our civilians less, but just that their work is so time-sensitive and, if you lose a month or a few days, there is no place to make it up. Ms. Shea-Porter. Right. And, as you know, they almost did go through the full furlough, but that was changed, fortunately. But my concern is that, as we look forward and we recognize there is dangers around the world and that is the reason that we continue to make the Virginia-class subs, we have to also make sure that we have the quality workers and that we have the facilities. And this is a public yard, as you know, that is open 24/7 and has been there, and saltwater runs in the veins New England. So I just wanted to ask that question. I appreciate that you couldn't really answer that at this moment, but I just wanted that for the record. Secretary Mabus. Well, and I will add that, in previous BRACs, the Navy and Marine Corps have taken out a lot of unused capacity. Now, I do think that DOD-wide we should take another look at what we have. But the Navy and Marine Corps, because of previous BRACs-- and I was Governor of Mississippi during a BRAC when one of our bases was targeted. And so I know exactly what you are going through. But I think that the quality of work and the necessity of work of all these shipyards speaks for themselves. Ms. Shea-Porter. Right. Well, we barely survived that round of BRAC, as you know. And when you see the work that they are doing and recognize how essential it is for national security, you know, I hope that will get the full measure of consideration. Thank you very much. And I yield back. The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. And if there are no more questions, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X March 12, 2014 ======================================================================= ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD March 12, 2014 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] ======================================================================= DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD March 12, 2014 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] ====================================================================== WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING March 12, 2014 ======================================================================= RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES General Amos. I recall hearing about Major Weirick's 21 Sept 2013 email briefly from someone on my staff, but I do not remember the full context, nor the circumstances when I first read it. [See page 19.] General Amos. Major Weirick's Battalion Commanding Officer issued a lawful military protective order as a result of the email. Commanders may issue a military protective order to safeguard discipline and good order in his or her unit. [See page 19.] General Amos. No, I do not fear Major Weirick. [See page 19.] General Amos. No. Mr. Hogue has not been reprimanded. [See page 19.] General Amos. Inasmuch as this matter is under review by the DOD Inspector General, I will not comment further. [See page 19.] General Amos. Of the nine Marines held accountable for their actions in this matter, seven enlisted and two officers, only one, a Captain, was separated involuntarily after an administrative board found substandard performance on his behalf. This officer received an honorable discharge. This separation action, taken by the Secretary of the Navy, was determined subsequent to the NPR interview. No others involved were separated involuntarily as a result of performance or misconduct. One other officer accepted non-judicial punishment and remains on active duty. Four of the seven enlisted Marines were medically retired. One of the seven enlisted Marines remains on active duty; another served out his enlistment and separated from the Marine Corps. The last of the seven enlisted Marines died in a later training accident. [See page 19.] General Amos. Editorial criticism is a part of being a service chief and making difficult decisions. During my service as Commandant, the Marine Corps has faced a number of challenges that we have worked diligently to address and to answer in support of our national security. Marines completed our mission in Iraq after 7 hard years of fighting there. We have waged a counter insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, while simultaneously helping train and assist Afghan National Security Forces. While thousands of Marines operated in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps continued to provide the best trained and equipped Marines ready to respond to global uncertainty around the globe. All of this being done during a period of fiscal uncertainty, marked by significantly reduced budgets, a substantial drawdown of force structure, and a civilian workforce furlough . . . all done during a time of war. This is unprecedented. The Marine Corps has faced these challenges head on and has performed well in every effort. [See page 19.] ______ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY Secretary Mabus. On average, the DON uses 30 million barrels (bbls) of oil per year. Therefore, a $1 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil effectively results in a $30 million annual bill to the Department. Department of Defense fuel purchases are made by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy Working Capital Fund. In FY11, the DON budgeted for fuel costs at $127.26/bbl. When the standard price increased on June 1, 2011 to $165.90/bbl, DON actually paid $38.64/bbl more than budgeted for four months of the fiscal year. Thus, the additional DON FY11 fuel costs were just over $500M. Similarly, in FY12, DON budgeted for fuel costs at $131.04/bbl. This price was set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller in November 2010. However, the price of petroleum increased between November 2010 and October 2011, resulting in DLA Energy adjusting the price to $165.90/ bbl to ensure solvency of its Working Capital Fund. The price of fuel was adjusted three more times that year with the total fuel costs exceeding the initial DON budgeted amount by approximately $500M. In recent years, DON has covered its additional fuel costs through reprogramming funding from other defense accounts. From FY11-FY13, the Services received an unfunded bill of $3.2B. If OSD had not reprogrammed $2B in FY12 and FY13, the Services would have seen a $5.2B increase to their fuel costs. Unfunded fuel bills in the year of execution significantly impact training, operations, and ultimately, national security. [See page 29.] ______ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER General Amos. Please see the attached response from OSD. The Marine Corps continues to work in coordination with OSD on this issue. [See page 43.] [The response referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 149.] ______ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT Admiral Greenert. A final decision on maintaining or terminating the MH-60R multi-year procurement (MYP) contract has been deferred to FY16. Our proposed FY15 budget fully funds the MYP in FY15 with advance procurement (AP) for the 29 MH-60R aircraft (and full procurement of 8 MH-60S aircraft). If the Navy returns to BCA levels in FY16, the subsequent fiscal constraints would challenge our ability to procure the 29 aircraft. MH-60R procurement would be aligned to force structure reductions. This scenario may cause MH-60R MYP contract termination which could cause contract termination costs and reduce rotary wing capacity for Navy. We have not determined the exact costs and fees associated with a cancellation. Cancellation fees would be calculated in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. Any cancellation decision and notification would occur after the FY16 budget is approved by Congress. The cost to procure 29 MH-60R aircraft is estimated at $760 million; the exact amount will be based on the FY15 appropriation. Both MYP contracts (MH-60R and MH-60S) require FY15 AP funding in order to maintain multi-year aircraft pricing for FY15. Navy will continue to work with Congress and our industry partners on a resolution for the FY16 budget submission. [See page 35.] ? ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING March 12, 2014 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON Mr. McKeon. We've had many lessons learned from contracting actions during contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. How are you incorporating lessons learned from contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan into the professional military education of your military and civilian personnel? Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. In conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and other Military Services, the Department of the Navy (DON) is actively engaged in efforts to institutionalize Operational Contract Support (OCS) through a variety of initiatives in the areas of education, training, joint exercises, doctrine, and service-level policies; incorporating lessons learned from exercises and current operations. The Navy is an active member of the DOD OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board, which provides oversight for all ongoing and planned OCS related initiatives across the Department. While the DON is in the initial stages of fully developing its OCS capability, funding for OCS initiatives will continue to face resourcing challenges and fiscal risk in light of the Department's overall limited resources. Mr. McKeon. We've had many lessons learned from contracting actions during contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. How are you incorporating lessons learned from contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan into the professional military education of your military and civilian personnel? General Amos. The Marine Corps is actively engaged with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and other Military Services in efforts to institutionalize Operational Contract Support (OCS). The Department of Defense (DOD) FY14-17 OCS Action Plan, currently in staffing, identifies specific actions the Marine Corps is taking to close the remaining OCS capability gaps. The Marine Corps has taken on a bigger role in OCS implementation within DOD, and has been designated as an associate member of the DOD OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB), which provides oversight for all OCS related initiatives across DOD. The Marine Corps is making great progress by incorporating lessons learned from exercises and current operations to institutionalize OCS across the Corps. Through a variety of OCS initiatives in the areas of training and education, organization, doctrine and service level policy, the Marine Corps is defining OCS within its unique warfighting mission. The Marine Corps OCS initiatives include: employment of an OCS cell within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Logistics Staff to support contract planning and contractor integration for Operation Enduring Freedom; developed OCS specific training scenarios to incorporate into Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) for deploying forces; establishing OCS focused billets within our Marine Expeditionary Forces as well as the Marine Corps Service Component Command assigned in support of the Combatant Commanders; drafting policy on OCS responsibilities at the various levels of operation and support within the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is committed to establishing OCS capability to support current and future contingency missions. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON Mr. Wilson. General Amos, as the war in Afghanistan dies down, what is your long-term plan for the wounded warrior regiment? General Amos. Keeping Faith with Marines, Sailors and their families remains one of my top priorities. You have my commitment that, the Marine Corps, through the Wounded Warrior Regiment (WWR), will continue recovery care in times of war and in peacetime. We recognize that recovery care must be enduring in view of issues resulting from the current decade of war, including, catastrophic injures requiring acute care, traumatic brain injury, and complex psychological health problems. These problems are not solved by short-term care and require continuing services. The Marine Corps' post-2014 strategy and our reduced presence in Afghanistan will result in fewer combat casualties; however, currently 50 percent of the WWR's Marines are ill or injured outside of a combat zone. While we will ensure our capabilities remain at 100 percent, the WWR is weighing options to streamline its global presence while preserving flexibility to ramp-up capabilities if requirements emerge. Viable options to right size WWR's global presence may include converting peripheral detachments to liaison teams with Recovery Care Coordinator capacity. The concentration of care would be provided at five ``Recovery Centers of Excellence'': Camp Pendleton, Naval Medical Center San Diego, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Camp Lejeune, and San Antonio Military Medical Center. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN Mr. Langevin. Where have you had to accept risk in your research and development initiatives? Which R&D initiatives have you protected as core to your future needs? Admiral Greenert. Some risk was accepted in PB-15 in programs such as Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), F/A-18 improvements, and Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS). Navy continues to invest in the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP)-- keeping our top priority program on track. Navy has budgeted $1.2 billion in FY 2015 for ORP. FY 2015 research and development will focus on the propulsion plant, missile compartment development, and platform development technologies like the propulsor, electric actuation, maneuvering/ship control, and signatures. In support of longstanding bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom these funds also provide for joint development of missile launch technologies. To meet the cost targets for the program, the Department also continues design for affordability. To protect Navy's future needs, R&D in other programs received modest or no reductions in PB-15 including: Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), Science and Technology (S&T), Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), P-8, and AEGIS Combat System. Several key programs received additional RDT&E funding in PB-15. These include Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW), Railgun, MQ-4 Triton, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO Ms. Bordallo. I would like to understand how the budget supports equipping the Navy to address ISR requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Pacific area is incredibly expansive making it a challenge for military planning. What kind of technologies is the Navy investing in to support the Pacific-focused military strategy? I am especially interested in how unmanned systems like the MQ-4C Triton can help meet the unique challenges of this region. Secretary Mabus. The expansiveness of the Pacific area does present unique challenges in both time and distance. The Navy is developing and investing in technologies and capabilities to deliver scalable, persistent, and networked Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) providing battle space awareness across the full range of maritime missions. The Navy will provide the warfighter with the right sensor, on the right platform, at the right place and time, for the right effects. MQ-4C Triton leverages reach and persistence and when integrated with manned platforms holds potential adversaries at risk earlier and over longer periods of time. In its primary role, MQ- 4C Triton is intended for operational and tactical users such as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, and Surface Action Group by providing intelligence preparation of the environment and a persistent source of information to maintain the Common Operational and Tactical Picture of the maritime battle space. The 360-degree Field of Regard sensor suite on MQ-4C Triton includes: Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) maritime radar which is an AESA radar with search, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) modes; Electro- Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor; Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver; and Electronic Support Measures (ESM). Ms. Bordallo. I understand that there has been an active debate within the Navy regarding the role of the UCLASS program and what missions it will fulfill. It seems some argue that the Navy needs additional ISR assets as soon as possible and basing these on an aircraft carrier could provide a number of benefits. On the other side, are those suggesting that the most effective way to utilize aircraft carriers and project power into the future is by developing a robust, survivable or ``stealthy'' platform that is capable of operating in contested airspace. What do you think and why? Although I appreciate the need for additional ISR, I worry that those requirements could be filled by other means and developing another unmanned system that can't operate in an A2/AD environment is short-sighted. Secretary Mabus. The Navy remains committed to the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program, which will provide a carrier-based UAS to extend the ISR and precision strike reach of the air wing in a contested environment. UCLASS operational requirements were approved by the CNO on 5 April 2013 and have remained constant. They were subsequently validated by the JROC to align with the DOD's comprehensive capability. These requirements delineate the need for CVN based ISR&T to meet today's operational needs and future operations in contested environments. The in-depth and comprehensive discussions you reference centered not on the operational requirement, but on the Government's desire to define to the industry base the need to ensure the system procured today had the required future capability to achieve contested operational requirements. It was less a debate and more of an analysis to understand the balance between cost, schedule, technology, and industrial base manufacturing capability. The resulting UCLASS acquisition strategy leverages industry's ability to deliver within 4-5 years from contract award, a capable and survivable air vehicle within the $150M cost per orbit requirement, while preserving the ability to incrementally increase Air Vehicle (AV) capability in the future to match evolving threats. The in-depth analysis referenced herein will result in a UCLASS system that includes CVN based ISR &T along with precision strike with robust survivability capable of operating in denied environments. Ms. Bordallo. I would like to understand how the budget supports equipping the Navy to address ISR requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Pacific area is incredibly expansive making it a challenge for military planning. What kind of technologies is the Navy investing in to support the Pacific-focused military strategy? I am especially interested in how unmanned systems like the MQ-4C Triton can help meet the unique challenges of this region. Admiral Greenert. The expansiveness of the Pacific area does present unique challenges in both time and distance. The Navy is developing and investing in technologies and capabilities to deliver scalable, persistent, and networked Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) providing battle space awareness across the full range of maritime missions. MQ-4C Triton provides reach and persistence, and when integrated with manned platforms, holds potential adversaries at risk earlier and over longer periods of time. In its primary role, MQ-4C Triton is intended for operational and tactical users such as the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, and Surface Action Group by providing intelligence preparation of the environment and a persistent source of information to maintain the Common Operational and Tactical Picture of the maritime battle space. The 360-degree Field of Regard sensor suite on MQ-4C Triton includes: Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) maritime radar which is an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with search, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) modes; Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensor; Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver; and Electronic Support Measures (ESM). Ms. Bordallo. I understand that there has been an active debate within the Navy regarding the role of the UCLASS program and what missions it will fulfill. It seems some argue that the Navy needs additional ISR assets as soon as possible and basing these on an aircraft carrier could provide a number of benefits. On the other side, are those suggesting that the most effective way to utilize aircraft carriers and project power into the future is by developing a robust, survivable or ``stealthy'' platform that is capable of operating in contested airspace. What do you think and why? Although I appreciate the need for additional ISR, I worry that those requirements could be filled by other means and developing another unmanned system that can't operate in an A2/AD environment is short-sighted. Admiral Greenert. The UCLASS operational requirements that I approved on 5 April 2013 have remained constant and have been validated by the JROC to align with the DOD's comprehensive capability. These requirements delineate the need for CVN based ISR&T to meet today's operational needs and future operations in contested environments. At EOC (within 4-5 years of air vehicle segment contract award), the UCLASS acquisition strategy will deliver a CVN-based ISR&T system within the affordability KPP cost guidelines ($150M per orbit) while allowing for growth capability to match evolving threats. The resultant UCLASS system will include CVN-based ISR &T, precision strike, and robust survivability for operating in denied environments. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE Mr. Kline. What is the plan for upgrading the 36 legacy H-1 engines that are installed in the updated H-1 aircraft, the AH-1Z and UH-1Y? If there is a plan, what avenues are being explored to fund this initiative and how can Congress help complete the upgrade of these aircraft in order to have a fleet of H-1s with the same engine? If there is not a plan, why not? General Amos. The 36 AH-1Z aircraft, equipped with legacy T700-401 engines, are logistically supported and will continue to be as long as the engines remain in our inventory. This issue has been officially considered for funding by Headquarters Marine Corps during the creation of POM-14, POM-15, and POM-16 budgets as well as the Naval Aviation Enterprise Fleet Readiness Initiative for POM-16. Due to competing priorities in this fiscally constrained environment, the engine upgrade has thus far remained unfunded. However, we included this as a candidate for funding on the Marine Corps' Unfunded Requirements (UFR) submission and the President's Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative (OGSI) in the FY15 President's Budget submission. Additional funding associated with the OGSI will be used this year to upgrade these 36 AH-1Z aircraft. In the long term, the Marine Corps plans to buy T700-401C engines to replace these legacy engines. Upgrading these engines--to the T700- 401C--is a priority, and we continue to explore all avenues of funding for this initiative. Mr. Kline. In addition to constraints being imposed on the end- strength of the force, constraints have also been imposed on capabilities; what are your top priorities for capabilities or resources in order to maintain the Marine Corps as the Nation's Expeditionary Force in Readiness? How has this been affected by the recent budgetary constraints? General Amos. In order to continue to execute the missions assigned the Marine Corps in both the Defense Strategic Guidance and execute our Title X responsibilities the Marine Corps must maintain a focus on capabilities that provide readily available scalable forces. We will retain a forward and ready posture that enables immediate crisis response. If required, this initial response force has the ability to composite with other forward forces to provide additional capability as needed to satisfy Geographic Combatant Commander requirements. We must be prepared as individuals and as a force to move rapidly, operate immediately, adapt to conditions and succeed in dispersed and austere environments. The key resources that provide us these capabilities are amphibious ships coupled with programs such as ACV, F35B, and the next generation of connectors. All of these will allow us to execute future amphibious operations from crisis response to forcible entry at the times and places of our choosing. Programs such as JLTV and G/ATOR will replace outdated legacy systems and allow Marines to be successful on the 21st century battlefield. Budgetary pressures continue to cause the Marine Corps to take a careful approach to balancing near term readiness with long term investments in capabilities. Planned reductions in FY16 and beyond would cause equipment modernization and many procurement programs to suffer cuts or elimination to protect the investments in the major acquisition programs detailed above. Mr. Kline. Please explain the tradeoffs made when designing the force and your opinion of how this will affect both the Marine Corps and national security in the short term and long term General Amos. The Marine Corps is designed as a forward-deployed force, immediately available for crisis response. It will be a ready force, involved with theater security activities, reassuring our partners and allies and deterring potential adversaries. In order to prioritize these emerging demands in a fiscally constrained environment, we accepted risk in Major Combat Operations and stability operations. The redesigned Marine Corps made tradeoffs in some high end capabilities, like armor and artillery, in order to concentrate on our role as America's expeditionary force in readiness. In the short term, our focus on readiness ensures that 20 of our 21 battalions will be adequately trained and ready for a major war. However, should major war occur, we will be all in until the war is over. We will have very little left for crises that could occur in other parts of the world. To meet presence demands, our force will maintain a high operational tempo at 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio which will increase risk by stressing training requirements and straining our career force. The long term impacts depend in large part on resourcing levels. A return to sequestration in FY16 with a 175k force would equate to high risk. At this lowered resource level, our units that deploy to combat would not be as well trained, and would be slower arriving. This means that it will take longer to achieve our objectives, and the human cost will be higher. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER Mr. Shuster. As you are well aware, the Army's Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, or CROWS, is under full-materials release, with more than 11,000 systems in service. I am sure you are aware that the CROWS system would allow Marines to engage the enemy from inside the relative safety of an armored vehicle; using a joystick and a computer screen, benefiting from the inherent advantages of a state of the art sensor system that would allow them to engage the enemy in all conditions. General, one would assume that a system such as CROWS, with a proven capacity to protect troops, a combat proven legacy, and a significant fielding investment already made by the Army, would be very attractive to the Marine Corps. Even more so now that the Navy has already adopted this system. General, can you tell this committee about the Marine Corps' current thinking regarding procurement of this system? General Amos. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) assessed the Commonly Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS) Remote Weapons Station (RWS) on a HMMWV in 2010 in Camp Lejeune. While the assessment indicated there were some gains in terms of operator protection, accuracy and nighttime visibility, the Marines using the system reported degradation in their situational awareness and a loss of field of view. MCWL performed technology investigations to address these challenges, however no formal requirements resulted from their efforts. MCWL later transferred the RWS systems to the Office of Naval Research for use on their Gunslinger Packages for Advanced Convoy Security (GunPACS) on our Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs). There have been no further requirements generated by our Marines in the operating forces to procure a remote weapons system, of which CROWS is one example. We have made provisions within future requirements for Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to integrate a remote weapons system. Further, government sponsored technology demonstrations and evaluations have been conducted to better understand RWS performance. Platform specific requirements are currently under review. Future research and development will explore means to mitigate Situational Awareness degradation and effectively integrate RWS technology into our military vehicles. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY Mr. Conaway. Please provide the calculations that support the statement that a $1 increase in the price of a barrel of oil costs the Navy $30,000,000 in increased fuel costs. Secretary Mabus. On average, the DON uses 30 million barrels (bbls) of oil per year. Therefore, a $1 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil effectively results in a $30 million annual bill to the Department. Department of Defense fuel purchases are made by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy Working Capital Fund. In FY11, the DON budgeted for fuel costs at $127.26/bbl. When the standard price increased on June 1, 2011 to $165.90/bbl, DON actually paid $38.64/bbl more than budgeted for four months of the fiscal year. Thus, the additional DON FY11 fuel costs were just over $500M. Similarly, in FY12, DON budgeted for fuel costs at $131.04/bbl. This price was set by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller in November 2010. However, the price of petroleum increased between November 2010 and October 2011, resulting in DLA Energy adjusting the price to $165.90/ bbl to ensure solvency of its Working Capital Fund. The price of fuel was adjusted three more times that year with the total fuel costs exceeding the initial DON budgeted amount by approximately $500M. In recent years, DON has covered its additional fuel costs through reprogramming funding from other defense accounts. From FY11-FY13, the Services received an unfunded bill of $3.2B. If OSD had not reprogrammed $2B in FY12 and FY13, the Services would have seen a $5.2B increase to their fuel costs. Unfunded fuel bills in the year of execution significantly impact training, operations, and ultimately, national security. Mr. Conaway. What is the Navy's total cost for fuel annually? And, how much fuel does the Navy purchase annually? Secretary Mabus. According to our financial records, the Department of the Navy (DON) purchased a total of 30,052,000 barrels of oil for worldwide missions in FY 2012. Further, an additional 8,422,000 barrels were procured for overseas contingency operations (OCO), bringing the total number of barrels of oil purchased that year to 38,474,000. Under normal operations, DON typically uses about 30 million barrels a year. FY 2012 was a particularly volatile year in the oil markets. That year the Services were budgeted a standard price of refined product of $131.04 per barrel. As a result of upward price movements and market volatility, the actual price paid by the Services for refined product was $145.18 per barrel. This left a balance of $14.14 per barrel the Department had to accommodate in FY 2012 and resulted in unfunded bill of more than $500 million in the year of execution. Thus, the total cost for fuel in FY 2012 was $5,585,655,320. Mr. Conaway. Of this total cost, what percentage does foreign oil account for annually? Secretary Mabus. DLA Energy does not track the sources of crude oil, except to ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources (Iran, Sudan, and North Korea). As oil is a fungible product, once it enters the refinery stream and fuel distribution network, there is no meaningful way to know where the refined product came from. Mr. Conaway. Of this percentage, how much foreign oil is purchased when the Navy refuels in foreign ports? Secretary Mabus. DLA Energy does not track the sources of crude oil, except to ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources (Iran, Sudan, and North Korea). As oil is a fungible product, once it enters the refinery stream and fuel distribution network, there is no meaningful way to know where the refined product came from. Mr. Conaway. Won't the Navy be reliant on some percentage of foreign oil by necessity of operating in forward theaters where it must refuel in foreign ports? Secretary Mabus. Yes, refueling in foreign ports is done by fuel provided in that foreign port. And increasingly, more alternative fuels are entering the foreign distribution networks. Moreover, competitively price alternative fuels, foreign or domestic, provide greater flexibility and imply greater cost stability as a result. Mr. Conaway. When the Navy purchases oil in the U.S., how do you know, or distinguish, what oil is from North America and what is foreign imported from overseas? Secretary Mabus. At the point of purchase by DLA Energy, it is unknown whether oil originates from the United States, elsewhere in North America, or from another foreign country. DLA Energy does not track the source of crude oil, except to ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources. Mr. Conaway. When refueling in foreign ports, what percentage of annual foreign oil purchases are conducted with the SEACARD program that secures a predetermined price negotiated and contracted by the Defense Logistics Agency? Secretary Mabus. Of the nearly 1.3 billion gallons of fuel the Navy purchases annually, SEACARD purchases made in calendar year (CY) 2013 amounted to 8.67 million gallons, and were almost entirely for Marine Gas Oil (MGO). MGO is a commercial substitute that is approved for use as an alternative when the Navy's preferred marine fuel, F-76, is not available. The remainder of SEACARD purchases in CY13 were sourced from the bulk fuel programs, which also negotiates and contracts either an annual or three-year fuel procurement. Compared to the bulk fuels purchase program annual requirements for the Western Pacific and Atlantic/European/Mediterranean programs in 2013, the SEACARD purchase amounts represent approximately 2.8% of the total F-76 overseas requirements. Mr. Conaway. Do you anticipate transporting U.S.-produced biofuels to foreign ports in order to reduce our dependence on foreign oil? Secretary Mabus. DLA Energy does not track the sources of crude oil, except to ensure that crude oil does not come from prohibited sources (Iran, Sudan, and North Korea). As oil is a fungible product, once it enters the refinery stream and fuel distribution network, there is no meaningful way to know where the refined product came from. In all likelihood, the majority of fuels acquired in foreign ports come from foreign sources. And increasingly, more alternative fuels are entering the foreign distribution networks. Moreover, competitively price alternative fuels, foreign or domestic, provide greater flexibility and imply greater cost stability as a result. Mr. Conaway. In previous testimony, you mentioned that transporting conventional fuel into Afghanistan has cost lives--if biofuels replace conventional fuels, will the U.S. no longer have to use convoys to transport biofuels to theaters of war? Secretary Mabus. Alternative fuels are intended to be drop-in replacements that function in a manner identical to the petroleum that they displace. Alternative fuels increase the fuel supply base and give our forward deployed troops additional fuel flexibility. Reducing the reliance on fuel convoys to transport fuel into theater, the USMC has introduced a number of renewable energy technologies such as solar- powered battery chargers, tent liners, LED lighting, and renewable power generators that reduce fuel requirements while maintaining or enhancing capabilities. In Afghanistan, these technologies were made available to all battalions operating in theater, resulting in lower fuel consumption and reducing demands to transport fuel into theater. Mr. Conaway. Do you foresee a time where the U.S. and our ally and partner in North America cannot produce oil? Secretary Mabus. In order to serve the national interest the DON must have secured access to reliable sources of energy to train for and execute its missions. Planning for a future where that energy source remains tied to a single commodity and all its attendant risks is not in the best interest of either the DON or the Nation that it serves. Oil is a finite resource. It would be imprudent to rely on that single commodity, riding its price shocks and supply constraints until the very last drop, before seeking alternative sources. Mr. Conaway. Does it make sense to stand up an entirely new industry when we already have one that efficiently and effectively provides for our energy needs right now and according to experts will be able to do so far into the future? Secretary Mabus. While the oil market has been able to supply fuel to the DON, the problem of at what cost still remains. In FY11 and FY12 the DOD saw an unfunded bill in the year of execution of $3 billion due to sharp price movements and volatile markets. In FY13, oil price shocks and volatility would have resulted in an additional $1 billion unfunded bill had it not been for the reprogramming of DOD funds. This unpredictable global commodity has direct and negative impacts on training, readiness, and national security. It is irresponsible and in direct conflict to our national security to not pursue alternative fuels. As major consumers of liquid fuel, the United States as a whole and the DOD in particular would greatly benefit from a competitive, domestic renewable fuels industry capable of broadening the commodity supply base and ultimately helping to ease the impacts of volatility oil markets. Further, oil is a finite resource and to rely solely on this one resource until the day it runs out is once again at direct odds with our Nation's security. Mr. Conaway. In preparation for the Great Green Fleet in 2016, how much money do you expect to spend on biofuels? Secretary Mabus. The DON will only purchase biofuels at a price cost competitive to petroleum-based fuel. The integration of competitively priced drop-in biofuel with petroleum-based fuels marks the start of the ``new normal,'' where drop-in biofuels will be fully incorporated into logistics and operations. One early indicator of the price that DON can expect to pay in 2016 is the average price of the DPA Title III alternative fuel companies. They have committed to provide more than 100 million gallons per year with production starting in 2016 at an average price point of less than $3.36/gallon. For comparison, DLA Energy's standard fuel price is $3.73/gallon. Competitively priced drop-in biofuel is on track to begin entering DOD's distribution system in 2015 and will provide greater flexibility and financial stability to DOD fuel costs. These fuels also provide the ability to offset the $1B fuel cost adjustments that have occurred several times in recent years. Mr. Conaway. How much was the DPA biofuel purchase that you mentioned in your written testimony? Secretary Mabus. To date, no biofuel purchases have been made through the DPA. Beginning in 2016, the DPA companies will be producing biofuel at commercial scale. Based upon their commitments, the DPA companies stand to: produce more than 100 million gallons per year of drop- in, military compatible fuels; at a weighted average price of less than $3.36 per gallon; and with at least 50% lower lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than that of conventional fuel. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN Mr. Coffman. The events at Forward Operating Base Delhi from July 24 to August 10, 2012 and the related referral of Major Jason Brezler to a Board of Inquiry are the subject of criminal investigations by the Justice Department and the military, and civil investigations by the Department of Defense and Marine Corps inspectors general. Is it premature to separate Major Brezler, a current or prospective witness in these investigations, from the Marines at this time? General Amos. Board of Inquiry procedures are designed to provide officers full and fair hearings when there is reason to believe they have not maintained required standards of performance or conduct and may therefore be separated for cause. These administrative separation proceedings are independent of the investigations by the Justice Department and the military and civil investigations by the Department of Defense and Marine Corps Inspectors General. Regardless of whether Major Brezler is ultimately separated from the Marine Corps, he may serve as a witness in these investigations. Mr. Coffman. Were the reported statements of the Marines' Office of Legislative Affairs to the House Armed Services Committee staff circa October 30, 2013 that Major Jason Brezler (1) sent classified information from home, (2) waited six weeks to self-report a possible spillage of classified information, (3) destroyed evidence, (4) had his computer confiscated, (5) had 107 classified documents his computer, all of which were (6) clearly marked as such, accurate based on information available to the Marines at that time? Are they supported by sworn testimony at Major Brezler's December 17-19 Board of Inquiry? General Amos. Yes, the reported statements reflected the most accurate information available to the Marine Corps at the time. Boards of Inquiry receive extensive review of both the legal and the factual sufficiency of the proceedings. Evidence at a Board of Inquiry, which is an administrative proceeding, can include documentary evidence, sworn testimony, sworn and unsworn statements of the respondent, and other forms of evidence. At this stage of review, it is not possible to determine the precise format of the evidence that led the Board of Inquiry to its findings and recommendations. Further, because Major Brezler's Board of Inquiry is still under review, it would be inappropriate to comment on the proceedings at this point. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS Mr. Brooks. I understand that the Navy is considering ending its buy of the highly praised MH-60R helicopter after this year's buy-- which would leave the Navy with 29 aircraft short of its requirement and would break the current H-60 multi-year procurement. What is the termination liability of such a move and what are the effects this will have on the price of the Army UH-60M aircraft for next year if the multi-year is broken? I understand the necessities of your budget crunch, but will this have a negative effect on the Navy's operational capability being short this many aircraft? Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A final decision on maintaining or terminating the MH-60R multi-year procurement (MYP) contract has been deferred to FY16. Our proposed FY15 budget fully funds the MYP in FY15 with advance procurement (AP) for the 29 MH-60R aircraft (and full procurement of 8 MH-60S aircraft). If the Navy returns to BCA levels in FY16, the subsequent fiscal constraints would challenge our ability to procure the 29 aircraft. MH-60R procurement would be aligned to force structure reductions. This scenario may cause MH-60R MYP contract termination which could cause contract termination costs and reduce rotary wing capacity for Navy. We have not determined the exact costs and fees or effects on Army UH-60M associated with a cancellation. Cancellation fees would be calculated in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. Any cancellation decision and notification would occur after the FY16 budget is approved by Congress. The cost to procure 29 MH-60R aircraft is estimated at $760 million; the exact amount will be based on the FY15 appropriation. Both MYP contracts (MH-60R and MH-60S) require FY15 AP funding in order to maintain multi-year aircraft pricing for FY15. Navy will continue to work with Congress and our industry partners on a resolution for the FY16 budget submission. Mr. Brooks. I saw that the President's Budget cut 29 MH-60R helicopters from the planned procurement. I wonder how this will negatively impact the Department, the warfighter, and, ultimately, the taxpayer. Won't the USG, specifically the Department of the Navy, be faced with termination liability? Won't breaking the multi-year cost close to the amount of the deleted 29 helicopters? Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert. A final decision on maintaining or terminating the MH-60R multi-year procurement (MYP) contract has been deferred to FY16. Our proposed FY15 budget fully funds the MYP in FY15 with advance procurement (AP) for the 29 MH-60R aircraft (and full procurement of 8 MH-60S aircraft). If the Navy returns to BCA levels in FY16, the subsequent fiscal constraints would challenge our ability to procure the 29 aircraft. MH-60R procurement would be aligned to force structure reductions. This scenario may cause MH-60R MYP contract termination which could cause contract termination costs and reduce rotary wing capacity for Navy. We have not determined the exact costs and fees associated with a cancellation. Cancellation fees would be calculated in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations. Any cancellation decision and notification would occur after the FY16 budget is approved by Congress. The cost to procure 29 MH-60R aircraft is estimated at $760 million; the exact amount will be based on the FY15 appropriation. Both MYP contracts (MH-60R and MH-60S) require FY15 AP funding in order to maintain multi-year aircraft pricing for FY15. Navy will continue to work with Congress and our industry partners on a resolution for the FY16 budget submission. Mr. Brooks. I understand that the Navy is considering ending its buy of the highly praised MH-60R helicopter after this year's buy-- which would leave the Navy with 29 aircraft short of its requirement and would break the current H-60 multi-year procurement. What is the termination liability of such a move and what are the effects this will have on the price of the Army UH-60M aircraft for next year if the multi-year is broken? I understand the necessities of your budget crunch, but will this have a negative effect on the Navy's operational capability being short this many aircraft? General Amos. The Marine Corps' procurement of aviation assets is planned and programmed in close coordination with the Department of the Navy (DON). The DON allocates a portion of their total obligation authority (TOA) to Marine Aviation, and as such, Marine Corps aircraft are procured with Navy ``Blue'' dollars. The Fiscal Year 2015 budget provides Marine Aviation with the best balance of requirements within the constraints of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. We have a vested interest in Naval Aviation, but the Marine Corps' aviation portfolio does not include MH-60R aircraft. We defer to the Navy, as they continue to evaluate this issue as part of their Program Objective Memorandum for FY16 (POM-16) budget submission. Mr. Brooks. I saw that the President's Budget cut 29 MH-60R helicopters from the planned procurement. I wonder how this will negatively impact the Department, the warfighter, and, ultimately, the taxpayer. Won't the USG, specifically the Department of the Navy, be faced with termination liability? Won't breaking the multi-year cost close to the amount of the deleted 29 helicopters? General Amos. The Marine Corps' procurement of aviation assets is planned and programmed in close coordination with the Department of the Navy (DON). The DON allocates a portion of their total obligation authority (TOA) to Marine Aviation, and as such, Marine Corps aircraft are procured with Navy ``Blue'' dollars. The Fiscal Year 2015 budget provides Marine Aviation with the best balance of requirements within the constraints of the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. We have a vested interest in Naval Aviation, but the Marine Corps' aviation portfolio does not include MH-60R aircraft. We defer to the Navy, as they continue to evaluate this issue as part of their Program Objective Memorandum for FY16 (POM-16) budget submission. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI Mrs. Walorski. In a December 2012 Proceedings article entitled ``Imminent Domain,'' you wrote that, ``Future conflicts will be won in a new arena--that of the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. We must merge, then master those realms.'' Can you give this committee an update on the progress the Navy has made on its goal of improved electromagnetic decision-making across the fleet, given the vast array of threats we face today? Admiral Greenert. We have emphasized electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) decision-making across the Fleet and have continued to invest in EMS- related programs. As I indicated in my article, our focus on the spectrum is underpinned by the convergence of the EMS and Cyberspace. They are inter-dependent components vital to modern warfare and are necessary for the delivery of integrated fires. As information becomes so intertwined with the transmission medium (light in a fiber optic cable, terrestrial radio waves, or satellite links), our ability to leverage the EMS in its entirety and counter the adversary's use of it becomes a critical element of any Navy operation. We continue to integrate elements of cyberspace operations into the Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), preparing deployable units and strike groups to respond to the inherent challenges of operating in a contested electromagnetic and cyber environment. We placed focused effort toward initiatives being employed during fleet exercises with allies to assess, validate, refine, and deploy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that instill resiliency in a Command and Control Denied or Degraded Environment (C2D2E). Navy is focusing on updating and generating EMS-related decision making, doctrine, and operating concepts with a focus on force-level operations in denied environments. In addition to these Fleet initiatives, we continue to make significant progress in capability development. These efforts include investments in Research and Development (R&D), Science and Technology (S&T), and concept development in an effort to rapidly field advanced EMS decision-making technologies into existing programs of record. Focused investments by the Navy in EMS capabilities are also contributing to the Joint fight, including efforts to improve our electromagnetic situational awareness and command and control (C2) tools. Mrs. Walorski. In an era of declining defense budgets, how do we adequately invest for the future so that we are able to stay ahead of the emerging EW threat abroad? Admiral Greenert. I have made it a priority to continue investing in Navy EW programs at or above previous funding levels given the proliferation and sophistication of global EW threats. Science and technology (S&T) initiatives on the part of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and others are critical to the success of our future EW capabilities. ONR is investing in the integration of EW, cyber, and communications systems to address EW threats in an integrated fashion with other systems that operate in and through the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). We are transitioning these S&T efforts to the development of systems and programs with a common architecture, multiple functions, and with cross-platform (ship, aircraft, submarine) applications. New programs are being designed with agility and flexibility across the EMS ``built in.'' EMS agility is critical to both protecting Navy forces from detection and denying potential adversaries' access to the EMS in contested environments. Our investments enhance our spectrum agility by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in potential adversaries' position in and use of the EMS. Given the rate at which global EW threats are growing in sophistication and proliferating, current and future investments in programs and systems that use the EMS will be emphasized in order to maintain the overall efficacy of Navy integrated combat systems. Mrs. Walorski. I am pleased to hear that naval aviation is taking initial steps to analyze the feasibility of integrating the Dual Mode Brimstone (DMB) missile on the F/A-18 Super Hornet. We're aware of the small boat threat and always interested in hearing about ways to save money by leveraging existing technologies like the DMB. The missile reportedly would be helpful in defeating high speed maneuvering targets like swarming small boats and vehicles with its integrated semi-active laser and active radar seeker. I understand that the missile is fully developed and has been used extensively by UK Royal Air Force Tornado fighters in combat operations over Afghanistan and Libya with extraordinary accuracy and low collateral damage because of DMB's high- quality seeker. It is my further understanding that the missile was successfully integrated on an MQ-9 Reaper aircraft and hit target vehicles traveling in excess of 70 miles per hour at the Naval Air Station in China Lake, California in January of this year. According to reports, the missiles are extremely accurate and are available now to help fill naval aviation requirements from both F/A-18 Super Hornets and Helicopters. If the initial integration feasibility assessments are positive, do you see value in expanding those activities in the coming fiscal year(s)? Admiral Greenert. If the initial integration feasibility assessments are positive, the Department of the Navy (DON) will examine DMB specific attributes versus the Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) program. The F/A-18 E/F Hornet roadmap already includes funding for the SDB II weapon system. SDB II is an all-weather, moving target, standoff (40+ nautical mile) glide weapon that prosecutes wheeled, tracked, and maritime moving targets which is also a capability that DMB advertises. SDB II's IOC on the F/A-18 E/F is scheduled for FY19. SDB II's advantages over DMB are: it has a tri-mode seeker; is data-link capable; and a significantly greater maximum range. SDB II is a non-forward firing weapon. Should the Fleet requirement for a new forward firing, air-to-ground weapon on the F/A-18 E/F and the MH-60 change, DMB may compete in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved and validated Joint Air- to-Ground Missile (JAGM) program.