[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING ISSUES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REAUTHORIZATION
=======================================================================
(113-63)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/
committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation
----------
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia
Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California
JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
JEFF DENHAM, California, Chairman
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CORRINE BROWN, Florida
JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
GARY G. MILLER, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
BOB GIBBS, Ohio JANICE HAHN, California
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York, Vice ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
Chair PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas (Ex Officio)
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)
VACANCY
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
TESTIMONY
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration................................ 8
William F. Downey, executive vice president for corporate affairs
and chief security officer, The Kenan Advantage Group, Inc., on
behalf of the American Trucking Associations................... 8
Thomas E. Schick, senior director of distribution, Regulatory and
Technical Affairs, American Chemistry Council.................. 8
Stephen Pelkey, chairman, Transportation Committee, American
Pyrotechnics Association....................................... 8
Elizabeth M. Harman, assistant to the general president for
hazardous materials, weapons of mass destruction training, and
grants administration, International Association of Fire
Fighters....................................................... 8
PREPARED STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
BY WITNESSES
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman:
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Answers to questions for the record from the following
Representatives:
Hon. Jeff Denham, of California.......................... 47
Hon. Janice Hahn, of California.......................... 50
William F. Downey, prepared statement............................ 53
Thomas E. Schick:
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Janice Hahn, of
California................................................. 62
Stephen Pelkey:
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Answers to questions for the record from the following
Representatives:
Hon. Jeff Denham, of California.......................... 71
Hon. Janice Hahn, of California.......................... 76
Elizabeth M. Harman, prepared statement.......................... 77
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Hon. Corrine Brown, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, request to submit a list of issues surrounding the
movement of hazardous materials compiled by the following rail
organizations: ATDA, BLET, BMWED, BRS, IAM, IBEW, TCU and TCU
Carmen, IBT Teamsters, TWU, and SMART--Transportation Division. 4
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, responses to requests for
information from the following Representatives:
Hon. Grace F. Napolitano, of California, regarding the safety
and security of toxic gas shipments........................ 23
Hon. Corrine Brown, of Florida, regarding testing information
that PHMSA has requested of the American Petroleum
Institute.................................................. 33
Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, of Maryland, regarding PHMSA's
assessment of penalties over the past decade............... 38
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Air Line Pilots Association, International, written testimony.... 84
John P. Tolman, vice president and national legislative
representative, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
Trainmen, written testimony.................................... 93
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, written testimony............ 97
Cynthia Hilton, executive vice president, Institute of Makers of
Explosives, written testimony.................................. 100
LaMont Byrd, director, Safety and Health Department,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, written testimony...... 107
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
EXAMINING ISSUES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REAUTHORIZATION
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Denham
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Denham. The subcommittee will come to order. Before we
begin, I have an administrative item to cover. I would like to
ask unanimous consent that former chairman, Don Young, and
Representative Rick Larsen be permitted to join the
subcommittee for today's hearing, and ask questions.
[No response.]
Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. Well, good
afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. Our hearing today will
focus on reauthorizing of the Hazardous Materials Safety
Program of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, PHMSA. The current authorization was part of
MAP-21, which expires October 1, 2014.
Our goal is to continue the advances made by MAP-21 in
reducing regulatory burdens while ensuring hazardous materials
are transported in a safe and efficient manner. We have a
distinguished panel of witnesses today, and it is my pleasure
to welcome back once again Ms. Cynthia Quarterman,
Administrator of PHMSA, as well as--as you know, the
Transportation Committee is working on a reauthorization of
MAP-21, and I am proud that Chairman Shuster's leadership on
the committee is looking at addressing a wide variety of
transportation needs, including the reauthorization of the
Hazardous Materials Safety Program. So, I look forward to the
testimony and discussion today, as we move forward in that
process.
The movement of hazardous materials in commerce is integral
to our Nation's health and economy. Hazmats include common,
everyday products like paints, fuels, fertilizers, fireworks,
explosive, alcohols, and batteries, that are essential to such
industries as farming, medicine, manufacturing, mining, water
purification, and entertainment industries.
PHMSA is the agency within DOT entrusted with that mission,
and determines what materials are hazardous, and promulgates
and enforces, among others, the regulations that set forth the
packaging, marking, labeling, placarding, and other
requirements for the movement of these goods.
Unlike other modal administrations within the DOT, PHMSA is
unique in that its regulations apply across the modes, reaching
to every form of commercial goods transportation. Our role is
to ensure that these goods are moved in a safe, reliable manner
that helps drive our continued economic growth.
MAP-21 made several reforms and established new
requirements for the transportation of hazmats. And I am
looking forward to hearing about their ongoing implementation.
A number of these requirements were important to developing new
technologies and standards for hazmat transportation, improving
the data collection analysis, and reporting of the agencies,
and improving training for first responders and hazmat
employees.
MAP-21 also set new requirements and reviews of programs
and processes to create more regulatory certainty, establish
greater transparency, and cut red tape. In addition, the act
enhanced enforcement power to ensure an already safe industry
was made safer.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, including
PHMSA Administrator Quarterman; Mr. Downey, on behalf of the
American Trucking Associations; Mr. Schick, of the American
Chemistry Council; Mr. Pelkey, of the American Pyrotechnics
Association; and Ms. Harman, with the International Association
of Fire Fighters, regarding these issues concerning hazmat
transportation.
I would now like to recognize the ranking member, Corrine
Brown from Florida, for 5 minutes for any opening statement she
may have.
Ms. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subcommittee is
meeting today to hear testimony on reauthorization of the
Department of Transportation hazmat program, which was last
reauthorized in MAP-21. This hearing is very timely, because
the purpose of this program is to protect people and the
environment from the risks of hazardous material
transportation.
In just a few weeks, on April the 28th, we will observe
Workers Memorial Day to remember those who have suffered and
died on the job, and to renew efforts to safeguard our Nation's
workers. Just 44 years ago, Congress passed the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, promising every worker the right to a
safe job. Since that time, many in Congress have fought hard to
make this promise a reality. But our work is far from done.
Many jobs--hazards still exist, particularly in hazardous
material transportation. Since I was first elected to Congress,
one issue comes up every time we authorize the hazmat program:
the authorizing of OSHA and DOT to protect hazmat workers. Let
me be clear. The role these two agencies play in protecting
hazmat workers is crucial. Yet some in the industry have
proposed to eliminate OSHA jurisdiction, claiming that there
are overlaps and confusing regulation. This is not the case.
DOT has regulations on packaging and on safety procedures
for loading and unloading materials. On the other hand, OSHA
has regulations that provide for worker safety, including noise
and air quality control, emergency preparation, personal
protection equipment, and hazard communications. These
regulations are not new. DOT and OSHA have shared this
responsibility for decades, and these regulations are critical
to maintaining the highest level of safety for hazmat workers.
The fact is that 12 workers die every day in our country
from work-related injuries. In 2013 alone, more than 4,300
workers were killed at work. I am committed to maintaining a
safe and healthy workplace for all American workers, including
those in this critical industry. And I will work to defeat any
proposal that would eliminate OSHA protection for hazmat
workers.
In my home State of Florida, we recently had several
dangerous explosions involving hazmat material. In July of last
year, eight workers were in critical condition following an
explosion at a Blue Rhino plant that was--forced an evacuation
of area residents and shook houses 10 miles away. In July of
2007, a devastating explosion at the T2 chemical plant located
close to my home in Jacksonville, Florida, killed 4 people and
injured 32.
Not only must we ensure the safety of hazmat workers, but
we also need to focus on the safety of those responding to
hazmat accidents, like our Nation's firefighters. I want to
give a special welcome to the Democratic witness from the
International Association of Fire Fighters, Elizabeth Harman.
With her help last Congress, we were able to enact strong
training standards in MAP-21 for firefighters and other
emergency responders, and ensure continuing funding for
important firefighters training program. According to DOT, more
than 2 million emergency responders received training through
their program.
With that, I welcome the witnesses and look forward to
hearing your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to include in today's
hearing record a written statement from the Transportation
Trades Department of AFL-CIO and 10 labor unions.
Mr. Denham. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Denham. I would like to again welcome our witnesses
here today. I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' full
statements be included in the record.
[No response.]
Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. Since your
written testimony has been made part of the record, the
subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony
to 5 minutes.
Ms. Quarterman, you may proceed. Thank you for joining us.
TESTIMONY OF HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM
F. DOWNEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR CORPORATE AFFAIRS AND
CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC., ON
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS; THOMAS E. SCHICK,
SENIOR DIRECTOR OF DISTRIBUTION, REGULATORY AND TECHNICAL
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL; STEPHEN PELKEY, CHAIRMAN,
TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, AMERICAN PYROTECHNICS ASSOCIATION;
AND ELIZABETH M. HARMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE GENERAL PRESIDENT FOR
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TRAINING, AND
GRANTS ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE
FIGHTERS
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you for having me. Good afternoon,
Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify
on PHMSA's progress in implementing Title III of the Moving
Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, also known as MAP-
21.
Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, the
Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and all of its employees.
All of us at DOT appreciate your dedication and leadership in
advancing hazardous materials transportation safety. For a
relatively small agency with limited resources, the staff at
PHMSA works diligently to protect the American people and the
environment from hazardous materials transportation incidents,
and have made great strides in implementing the provisions
included in MAP-21.
Since MAP-21's enactment in 2012, PHMSA has met or will
meet more than 90 percent of the established timelines for the
32 separate provisions assigned to the agency. This is very
significant, especially given the many challenges and emerging
issues that PHMSA has faced over the same time period,
including efforts to enhance the safe transportation of crude
by rail, and continuing to consistently reduce the number of
major hazardous materials incidents, as we have done over the
past 25 years.
A significant contributor to PHMSA's success has been the
strategy and action plan we developed and implemented to
bolster compliance with hazardous materials regulations. As the
transportation sector continues to evolve and become more
interconnected with the international community, PHMSA has
attempted to adopt smarter strategies to adapt to the
challenges.
As part of our enforcement strategy, and through the
authority of MAP-21, PHMSA raised its maximum civil penalty
amount for violations resulting in death, illnesses, and
injuries. In addition, PHMSA is moving forward with advancing
efforts in hazardous materials research and development. Our
hazardous materials technical assessment research and
development and analysis program is allowing us to work
cooperatively with stakeholders to identify and mitigate
hazardous materials risks, and to promote innovative approaches
to support a safe, multimodal hazardous materials
transportation system.
We are also working to develop uniform performance
standards for training our hazardous materials inspectors and
investigators to ensure field staff continue to accurately
identify instances of noncompliance and take appropriate
enforcement actions.
In addition to the nonregulatory efforts to improve safety
I just described, PHMSA is continuing to fulfill our commitment
to streamline hazardous materials regulations and processes.
Since 2011, PHMSA has been reviewing and analyzing special
permits to determine which ones can be converted into the
hazardous materials regulations. We are currently working on a
rulemaking effort that will address the conversion of active
special permits into regulations that we expect to be published
by October of this year.
These are just a few of the many actions PHMSA has
undertaken to address and implement the mandates included in
MAP-21. As I have stated earlier, PHMSA is committed to
improving transportation safety, and I believe our approach is
working. Our safety mission is guided by our vision that no
harm results from hazardous materials transportation, and I
truly believe our efforts will continue to prevent and mitigate
accidents and move us closer to our goal of zero deaths and
incidents.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak today. We look
forward to continuing to work with Congress to safeguard
people, property, and the environment from hazardous materials
transportation risks. I would be pleased to answer any
questions the committee may have.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
Mr. Downey?
Mr. Downey. Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today about reauthorizing the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act.
My name is William Downey, and I am the executive vice
president and chief security officer for The Kenan Advantage
Group, which is located in North Canton, Ohio. We are North
America's largest tank truck transporter and logistics provider
to the petroleum, specialty products, and merchant gas
industries. We employ approximately 9,000 people, and we are
the only fuels delivery carrier with a nationwide presence. I
am testifying today on behalf of the American Trucking
Associations and the National Tank Truck Carriers. ATA and NTTC
are members of the Interested Parties group, and endorse their
comprehensive recommendations for hazmat reauthorization.
Of the roughly 800,000 shipments of hazmat on a daily
basis, in terms of product value, tonnage, and number of
shipments, trucks move more hazmat than all other
transportation modes, combined. Today I propose three
commonsense solutions to improve the safe, secure, and
efficient transport of hazmat. First, the present background
screening process for hazmat endorsement on a commercial
driver's license can be reformed. Second, the proposed wet
lines rule can be halted. And, finally, the State hazmat
permitting process can be improved.
On background screening, presently a TSA-administered
fingerprint-based background check is required for all hazmat
CDL endorsements. This costs $86.50 in States that use TSA's
contractor, but as much as $150 in States that perform the
checks themselves. This security check is required for
transporting all hazmat, including paint, nail polish, or
alcohol-based products like perfume. None of those products
pose a weaponized threat.
Congress should limit fingerprint background checks to
drivers transporting weaponized hazmat, also called ``security
sensitive hazmat.'' All hazmat drivers would still be required
to pass the relevant safety tests, as well as the name-based
background checks. Drivers transporting security-sensitive
hazmat would also be required to undergo a fingerprint-based
background check before acquiring another card demonstrating
the driver poses no terrorist threat. This proposal passed the
House in 2009 with bipartisan support as part of the SAFE
Truckers Act.
To my second recommendation, wet lines are fuel-loading
pipes used to fill and drain cargo tanks. MAP-21 banned PHMSA
from issuing any final wet line regulation until GAO studied
the rule. PHMSA's proposed regulation had very few benefits and
high cost. Because of this, and the fact that better
alternatives are available, GAO recommended withdrawing the
rule. But, PHMSA has not done so. Instead, PHMSA has indicated
their intent to promulgate a rule, anyway. Given GAO's finding,
and PHMSA's refusal to withdraw the rule, a legislative ban is
both appropriate and necessary.
Finally, hazmat regulations forbid States from enacting any
regulation or permit requirements that are not substantively
the same as Federal regulations. However, States may require
motor carriers to apply for permits to transport hazmat in
their States. State permits are, unsurprisingly, substantively
the same as Federal requirements. Carriers compliant with
Federal requirements will, by definition, also be compliant
with State requirements.
Five States--Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia--are currently members of the Alliance for Uniform
Hazmat Transportation Procedures. The alliance States have
amalgamated their application process online. A carrier can
visit the site once, provide all the necessary information
through a single interface, select the States in which the
carrier transports hazmat, and pay a single composite fee.
States that wish to require hazmat permits should be compelled
to join the alliance. States already participate in similar
programs for administering fuel taxes and processing motor
carrier registrations.
ATA and its members, along with The Kenan Advantage Group,
support safe and secure transportation of hazmat. Hazmat
regulations can be improved by reforming hazmat endorsement
background check, forbidding PHMSA from issuing a final warning
on the wet line rule, and compelling all States to join the
alliance for issuing hazmat permits. All three, I believe, are
very commonsense approaches.
On behalf of The Kenan Advantage Group and ATA, I would
like to thank you for this opportunity, and I would welcome any
questions from the Members.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Downey.
Mr. Schick, you may proceed.
Mr. Schick. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member
Brown, members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom Schick, I am
here on behalf of the American Chemistry Council. We appreciate
this opportunity to testify on reauthorization of the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act.
ACC represents the leading companies engaged in the
business of chemistry. Our members apply the science of
chemistry to make innovative products and services that make
people's lives better, healthier, and safer. I would like to
underscore the important role that the products manufactured
and shipped by our members serve in virtually every aspect of
our lives. The Nation depends on our industry to produce the
chemicals that are necessary for safe drinking water, life-
saving medications, medical devices, safe and plentiful food
supply, energy-saving solar panels, and much more.
Our members rely on all transportation modes to deliver
products wherever they are needed to get the job done, from
water treatment, to farms, to factories. Because a number of
the shipments involve hazardous materials, we work constantly
with our transportation partners to find ways to build upon an
already impressive safety record. Through ACC's Responsible
Care initiative, our member and partner companies are committed
to continuous safety improvement in every aspect of
transportation. Collectively, we have invested billions of
dollars in training, technology, and equipment, and will
continue to do so.
We have also worked to establish a strong and successful
partnership with emergency responders. For example, our
members, working with other stakeholders, developed
transportation community awareness and emergency response,
known as the TRANSCAER program. This is a voluntary training
effort to help communities prepare for possible hazmat
incidents.
Emergency responders also have access to a wide range of
experts through ACC's CHEMTREC Center. When an incident does
take place, the center provides the information on the best way
to handle all types of hazmat. CHEMTREC provides this service
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at no cost to emergency
responders, other callers, Government, or taxpayers. We invite
the members of the subcommittee and the staff to tour our
CHEMTREC Center in northern Virginia, or attend a TRANSCAER
event.
Turning to HMTA reauthorization, we believe the Federal
Government must continue to play the central role in ensuring
safe transportation of hazmat. Congress has wisely established
a comprehensive national regulatory system that is administered
by DOT. HMTA has worked well in making the transportation of
chemicals and other hazardous materials safe for the public,
for workers, and emergency responders.
As you consider legislation to reauthorize HMTA, we
strongly support the uniform national regulatory program that
assures that all aspects of hazmat transportation are
consistent across this country. We also support DOT's excellent
work in harmonizing, to the maximum extent possible, U.S.
hazmat regulations with international standards. This
harmonization not only facilitates commerce in these important
products, but also promotes safety through consistent hazard
communication requirements, and consistent procedures and
equipment.
We are concerned, however, about two aspects. One is the
loading and unloading of hazardous materials. Several years
ago, DOT withdrew from the regulation of loading and unloading
in certain circumstances. Yet DOT, as well as others, are
critically aware of the importance of loading and unloading in
safety. We think that loading and unloading are fundamental to
safe transportation, and that Federal regulation is the way to
provide that uniformity to enhance the training of hazmat
employees and the preparedness of emergency responders. So we
would like to see DOT re-establish its full regulatory position
on loading and unloading.
Turning to special permits, these allow safety-based
variations from the existing rules. Applicants for special
permits come forward voluntarily with proposals, and these can
only be approved if DOT finds there is at least an equivalent
level of safety to what the regulations require. Special
permits are a win-win process. The applicants gain operational
flexibility at no loss of safety. Other parties can learn from
and even use the same special permits, if they are approved by
DOT to do so. And the Department learns about new procedures
and technologies that can later be incorporated into the
regulations. In fact, MAP-21, as mentioned earlier, has DOT
doing that.
There has been some talk about user fees for special
permits. We oppose that at ACC. Special permits are an inherent
and beneficial part of the regulatory process that governs
hazmat transportation. We think it is appropriate to maintain
that function without imposing user fees that could interfere
with the development and implementation of new safety
enhancements.
In conclusion, the country depends on HMTA and the safe and
reliable system to move hazmat. Where improvements are deemed
appropriate, we can all work together to continuously improve
it. We look forward to cooperating with you in this, and I
would be glad to answer any questions.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Schick.
Mr. Pelkey, you may proceed.
Mr. Pelkey. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member
Brown, other members of the subcommittee. I sincerely
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon
to discuss issues regarding hazardous materials
reauthorization, an issue of vital importance to the U.S.
fireworks industry. I am Stephen Pelkey, president and CEO of
Atlas Advanced Pyrotechnics, headquartered in Jaffrey, New
Hampshire. I also currently serve on the board of directors of
the American Pyrotechnics Association, and as the chairman of
the APA's Transportation Committee.
Atlas was founded in 1950 and is a prominent professional
fireworks display company, producing award-winning displays
throughout New England the world. Atlas employs 24 full-time
workers. During our busy Fourth of July season, our employment
rolls swell to 750 employees.
I am here today on behalf of the APA. APA participates in
the Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials Transportation
coalition, commonly referred to as the IPs. I have been tasked
to address the IPs and APA's number-one priority, which
concerns the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's
Hazardous Material Safety Permit Program, and the ongoing
delays in reforming this vital program.
The HMSP program has been seriously flawed since inception,
and I have detailed those flaws in my written submission. At
the present time, to retain an HMSP, a carrier must maintain
out-of-service inspection rates for vehicle, driver, and hazmat
violations below a set percentile. HMSP holders are judged
against all other carriers under the vehicle and driver rates.
However, they are judged against themselves when determining
the hazmat out-of-service rate, which is based on violations
that, for the most part, are not crash-causal. And this is the
most troubling and difficult area in which to maintain
compliance.
Unlike large, long-haul freight of all-kind transporters
that operate year-round and are inspected frequently, display
fireworks transporters operate primarily on a seasonal and
periodic peak-time basis, typically driving much shorter
distances and many fewer miles. Thus, we have far fewer
inspection opportunities to offset any potential violation.
In order to stay above the designated hazmat threshold, a
carrier must have 14 clean inspections to overcome the effects
of just 1 bad inspection. Atlas has firsthand experience with
this extremely flawed program, as we unfortunately lost our
permit in 2011 as a result of receiving several erroneous out-
of-service citations that put our company above the hazmat
disqualification threshold. Without a permit, in order for us
to stay in business, we were forced to ship products in
separate trucks, each legally transporting the less than 55
pounds of fireworks, the threshold which triggers the
application of the HMSP.
For the better part of a year, we put 8 to 10 trucks,
separate trucks, on the road, legally moving less than the 55
pounds in each vehicle to each of our contracted display sites,
as we aged out of the 12-month period to renew our permit.
Needless to say, this placed an undue burden on our company,
and one has to question whether public safety was enhanced by
having multiple vehicles on the road, rather than transporting
these products in just one vehicle.
We appealed the erroneous paperwork-related citations to
Federal Motor Carriers' DataQs. However, the State authority
issuing the citation incorrectly entered the citation as ``no
shipping papers offered.'' As Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration chose to side with the State authority, rather
than provide us with an opportunity and appropriately appeal
the citation directly to Federal Motor Carrier.
While we understand limited agency resources necessitate
the delegation of enforcement to the States, we believe it is
not appropriate that the agency has delegated its ultimate
authority to determine whether a hazmat safety permit should be
renewed or denied. The APA, along with several other IPs has
been advocating for the need of an administrative process that
would also allow Federal Motor Carrier to intervene outside of
the DataQs. We will call this an additional level of safety
review to determine a carrier's fitness prior to the denial of
a permit.
In 2011, Federal Motor Carrier agreed that the HMSP program
was flawed, and accepted our petition for rulemaking. However,
we are disappointed that the agency has not made reform of this
program a priority. While the agency's recently released
assessment report to Congress recognized the need to provide a
means for corrective actions and/or second level of review for
carriers, the agency does not establish a timeframe to address
this ongoing problem.
I am pleased to see a number of recommendations outlined in
the assessment. Several of the recommendations, however, will
require rulemaking, which is a lengthy process. In short,
hazardous material safety permit holders will have no prospect
of immediate relief. Providing HMSP holders an opportunity for
an additional level of safety review before their permit is
denied must be a priority.
We are grateful to members of this subcommittee who have
joined in efforts to reform this program. Atlas is committed to
ensuring safety in the handling, transportation, and execution
of our fireworks displays. Atlas and members of the APA will
continue to provide safe and spectacular fireworks displays and
delight and thrill American families across our great Nation.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Pelkey.
Mr. Pelkey. And I thank you for this opportunity to
testify.
Mr. Denham. Thank you for your testimony.
Ms. Harman?
Ms. Harman. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member
Brown, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Elizabeth
Harman, I serve as the assistant to the general president for
hazmat, WMD training, and grants administration for the
International Association of Fire Fighters. I am pleased to
appear before you today on behalf of IFF General President
Harold Schaitberger and the 300,000 firefighters and emergency
medical personnel who comprise our organization.
Fire departments in the United States receive over 350,000
calls related to hazmat response each year. When an incident
involving hazmat does occur, the individuals tasked with
responding to the incident are most--almost, without fail,
firefighters. Unfortunately, despite the potential for such an
incident in every community in America, too many firefighters
are insufficiently trained to ensure a safe and effective
response.
The reasons for the lack of properly trained firefighters
vary, although, for the most part, it is simply a lack of
funding. Nationwide, fire departments' funds are stretched
thin, a situation which has been exasperated by the recent
recession. In tight budgetary environments, training is often
among the first items to be cut. Unfortunately, the lack of
adequately trained personnel in the fire service means there
are significant portions of the country where first responders
are not prepared for an incident. This is an untenable
situation which must be rectified.
We must ensure that firefighters receive the type of
training that is most appropriate for emergency response.
Unfortunately, of the training that is being provided to
firefighters, much is provided at an insufficient level. OSHA
regulations identify special competencies for employees who are
engaged in emergency response. Awareness level training is
intended for individuals who are likely to witness or discover
hazardous substance release, and notify the proper authorities,
which, in most cases, would be a fire department.
Operations level training is intended for workers who
respond to releases or potential releases of hazardous
substances. Their function is to contain the release from a
safe distance, keep it from spreading, and prevent exposures.
These regulations clearly indicate operations level training is
the minimum level intended for firefighters. This is also
supported by national consensus standards, such as NFPA 472.
Providing awareness level training to firefighters is not
sufficient. There is little point in training firefighters to
learn how and when to call the fire department.
Unfortunately, the number of firefighters receiving
awareness level training, rather than operations level
training, is growing. Congress has begun to address the
inadequacies of hazardous materials training among
firefighters. In MAP-21 Congress required that all training
delivered to firefighters via PHMSA's hazardous material
emergency preparedness grant program must be at the operations
level or greater. While a positive step in the right direction,
training provided via HMEP represents only a tiny fraction of
the training received by firefighters nationwide.
Congress should explore ways to encourage States and
localities to provide all firefighters with operations level
training, regardless of the funding source. We must also ensure
that training is provided in a manner that must be customized
and incorporate real-world events. Under the HMEP grant
program, the IFF has received an annual grant to train
instructors to deliver hazardous materials training to
emergency responders nationwide in communities of all sizes. We
have also recently, due to amendments in MAP-21, begun direct
delivery of training, in addition to administering our train-
the-trainer program.
We believe our training provides the best model for
training firefighters to respond safely and effectively to
real-world hazmat incidents. We provide training to both
professional and volunteer fire departments at no cost to them.
The grant has enabled the IFF to sufficiently increase training
rates in the first responder community. The IFF's unique
training model provides responders with real-world training in
hazmat response that few institutions can match. Instructors
train through the IFF's program deliver training directly to
responders in their own communities, allowing them to tailor
their presentations to address unique concerns or challenges
facing a particular community, such as a specific hazmat
shipping route.
The IFF model also utilizes highly experienced firefighter
instructors to each its courses in a peer-to-peer setting.
Independent evaluations of this training have found the
programs to be cost effective, and evaluations have found the
instruction to be highly effective. Simply put, the IFF
provides exemplary hazmat training at a time when first
responders need highly effective, appropriate training more
than ever. We encourage the subcommittee to continue funding
this valuable program, and use it as a model when considering
expanding training opportunities for firefighters.
PHMSA also has an important role to play in making it
easier for responders to identify hazardous materials. The
paperless hazardous communications pilot program established by
MAP-21 represents a significant step forward in the development
and advancement of identification tools. Providing first
responders with access to updating e-shipping papers will help
responders identify hazardous substances during a hazmat
incident without putting personnel at risk.
As PHMSA continues to develop HM-ACCESS, the program's
success will depend upon meeting certain key criteria. First,
responders must have access to e-shipping information. HM-
ACCESS must conduct pilot tests in all forms of transportation.
And PHMSA should consult with first responders, including rank-
and-file users, at every step of the system's development.
This concludes my testimony, and thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Harman. I will now recognize
each Member for 5 minutes' worth of questioning. Mr. Young, you
are recognized.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the
courtesy.
Administrator Quarterman, in the wake of the recent train
derailments involving crude oil, the Department of
Transportation issued a safety alert announcing that Bakken
crude oil could be more volatile than conventional crude oil,
and may need to be handled differently. Instead of focusing on
the cause of the derailment, your agency seems to be
preoccupied with the characteristics of crude oil. When crude
oil is transported by railcar, it is labeled as group one, two,
and three. And which of these packing group, Mr.-- Madam
Administrator, is the most dangerous?
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you for your question. The
Administration is not just focused on identifying the
characteristics of the crude oil. In fact, we have a three-part
approach, which includes, as the very first step, prevention of
incidents. The second is mitigation of incidents, should they
occur. And the third is making response available to incidents.
In terms of the packing group that is the most dangerous,
packing group one, sir.
Mr. Young. And Bakken oil is number two, if I am not
mistaken. Bakken oil is two.
Ms. Quarterman. Bakken oil may be one or two. We have seen
from our testing----
Mr. Young. It is two. It is two. One is the most volatile.
Bakken oil is two.
At the last safety hearing you said that cars are not a
silver bullet, and we should be focused on preventing
derailments. Yet yesterday, you publicly complained that the
oil industry has not shared Bakken crude characteristics with
your agency. What is the number one cause for rail--tankers to
be derailed?
Ms. Quarterman. I think we have been clear from the
beginning, sir, that it is a multi--it is a very complicated
problem which requires a comprehensive approach. Included among
that approach are determining the characteristics of the crude.
And, as I said at the beginning, prevention is the very first
leg of the three-legged stool that we think will prevent this
from occurring, and we have been working very hard----
Mr. Young. In all due respects, madam----
Ms. Quarterman. Sure.
Mr. Young. In all due respects, where is the problem of any
rail going off because of what you are carrying?
Ms. Quarterman. [No response.]
Mr. Young. There is none. It is at the rail. It is not the
liquid which you are carrying in the container. This is not a
new process.
Ms. Quarterman. Everything has to be----
Mr. Young. This has been going on for years and years and--
--
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Considered, sir.
Mr. Young [continuing]. Years and years, and I--my interest
in this, we have--we transport volatile fuel in tank cars, as
they are made today, the same cars that are used in the Bakken
field, and yet there seems to be some interest in your agency
to say that it is the car's fault. It is the rail's fault.
Ms. Quarterman. I am not here to ascribe blame to anyone. I
am here to tell you that, as a multiple--it requires multiple
responses. It is a comprehensive approach which includes
prevention. Yes, you are correct, we need to ensure that train
cars stay on the track, absolutely true. But we also need to
ensure that the package itself is appropriate, and that the
materials that are in the package are appropriately packaged,
and that the materials are appropriate to be shipped.
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, my interest in this is this is
another agency that doesn't understand what in the world they
are doing. A multiple facet, and you are going to package
something different that has been packaged all these years, and
you say we have to have a new way, area, time of packaging
crude oil that--makes no difference what we have been doing all
these years. Happens to be more volume. There is probably rails
that have been misused, and that is where we should be
concentrating.
And, by the way, how many of the oil companies have shared
their data with you on Bakken oil?
Ms. Quarterman. I believe we have received information from
three companies so far.
Mr. Young. It is four, but that is OK. I just--because they
have communicated with you. And have they ever said anything
about the cars?
Ms. Quarterman. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Young. Have they ever said anything about the cars?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, as I said, I believe that there were
three companies that provided information to us. And in terms
of the cars, I don't understand your question.
Mr. Young. No. What I am saying--have they ever said
anything about the cars being inadequate to carry the fuel?
Ms. Quarterman. Have the companies----
Mr. Young. Yes.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Said that the cars were--I
have no idea.
Mr. Young. No? OK. Mr. Chairman, again, what I don't want
to see is an agency, ``OK, we are going to have a silver
bullet, we are going to produce new cars, double hull,'' da,
da, da--has nothing to do with these derailments. As ex-
chairman of this committee, that is what we should be
concentrating on, not the other stuff. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Young. Ms. Brown?
Ms. Brown. I think we need to follow up on this discussion,
because the last meeting we had AAR said the cause was
inadequate, and they are beginning to develop additional cars.
But in addition to that, it really doesn't matter if your city
explodes, whether the car was at fault or whether what they was
carrying is at fault. We need to make sure that we do the
multiplicity of things, including prevention. That is the first
thing.
But the question that I have here is that we asked the last
time, and seeing your testimony, that the Petroleum Institute
said that they were cooperating. I need to know. Have they
provided you with the information that you need for the
testing? And, if not, what is it that we need to do to make
sure that you are getting what you need, whether it is this
crude, the oil crude, or this new crude we using? If it kills
you, then it is the same.
Ms. Quarterman. Well, let me just say that we are working
hard with all the stakeholders involved in this, and asking
them to come to the table and cooperate with us, in terms of
providing information, whether they be a rail industry or a
petroleum industry.
We have, as I mentioned, a few companies who have come
forward, and we applaud----
Ms. Brown. How many companies are we talking about?
Ms. Quarterman. We have had three companies provide us
detailed information. We have had conversations with several
companies who have provided more anecdotal information. My
statement went more to the American Petroleum Institute, who
has not provided any individual information on that. They have,
however, come forward to put together a working group to look
at classification piece, and try to come forward with the
standard, and we appreciate that assistance.
Other organizations have also stepped forward: the American
Petroleum--wait, fuel--the Association of Fuel and Petroleum
Manufacturers have indicated that they are going to put
together some information for us. My statement really went to
the American Petroleum Institute, who has not supplied any data
with respect to the characteristics of the crude. And one would
think that they would know.
Ms. Brown. Two questions. What, as far as the material is
concerned, the firefighters, when we train them--and this is
for you also, Ms. Harman--how can we make sure that they have
the adequate equipment and training so that they can protect
themselves when we have an explosion? We have had two in
Florida where people were killed. And we have got to make sure
that that does not happen.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. That is an excellent
point, and I appreciate your comments in your opening comments.
And you may not be aware, we do have some of our instructors
from Jacksonville, Florida, who are part of our instructor
cadre that teach all over the United States, as well as Canada,
with other funding sources.
And training, for us, is key. Training for urban areas,
rural, and suburban, is key. And there are times when our
instructors will arrive at locations. They know they need the
training, they have requested the training. And I can tell you
when our instructors arrive there, they don't necessarily have
the proper equipment to do what they need to do. And that is
where our training model that comes into play brings those
outside experiences, folks that have dealt with experiences--
unfortunately, like you have in Florida--to bring that to those
smaller, rural areas, to say, ``You know what? You need this
equipment, you need that equipment.''
Then, the next question is, ``Where is the funding that
comes from that?'' They are small departments working off a--
rural volunteer fire departments working off budgets of $89,000
a year. There are large metropolitan areas that are working on
much larger budgets. But the key to this equipment is true
operations-based training, which, at times, is your basic
firefighting equipment and a whole lot of water. Sometimes foam
is at play in some of this, but if it is a running liquid that
is going, foam is not going to eventually help that. So, our
instructors will help guide those departments where they need
to go.
Ms. Brown. Ms. Quarterman, you mentioned in your testimony,
or the last time, there are grants available. How do you let
the community know that these grants are available for
training, and to educate the community?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, there are grants available: the HMEP
grants, which were referred to earlier. And when those grants
come out we have a--obviously, we send out a press release, we
tweet it around the country, we talk to individual members to
let them know that this is available to their States and
localities. And in this past instance, we have included a
special provision related to crude oil.
Let me just add to what Ms. Harman said on the firefighter
front. We have put together a working group to talk about the
Bakken crude in responding to those incidents. As was mentioned
earlier, we sent out a safety alert, which was focused, in many
ways, to the emergency response community, so that they would
know that when they see these trainloads of crude going across
the country, it is not crude that they may be accustomed to
responding to. It is really a much lighter, more volatile
crude. Thank you.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Brown.
Ms. Brown. Thank----
Mr. Denham. Mr. Hanna?
Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Chairman. Administrator Quarterman,
can you answer a quick question for me? Are more hazardous
materials--meaning oil, gas, et cetera, natural gas, propane--
carried underground than over ground?
Ms. Quarterman. I think the answer is yes.
Mr. Hanna. So that the XL pipeline might not be a bad idea?
Ms. Quarterman. That is not under my authority----
Mr. Hanna. No, I realize that. I just couldn't resist.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hanna. The--Mr. Pelkey--thank you. You said that you
need 14 positive inspections to offset 1. Is that regardless of
the size or number of trips that your particular business is
making?
Mr. Pelkey. Yes. There is a certain threshold that you have
to maintain under for any hazmat type of----
Mr. Hanna. So that--the conclusion would be that if you are
not a big company, you may never get back to a point where you
are making--you have made enough inspections. You may be--find
yourself in a position where you are begging to be inspected,
because you need to get past that 14 threshold.
Mr. Pelkey. Correct.
Mr. Hanna. So, shouldn't it be more flexible for somebody
who is small, as opposed to big? I mean, does 14 fit every
company?
And, let's--conversely, if you are a huge company, you may
get inspected 14 times in a day, which lets them--you know,
they would actually be able to have an error a day, because
they are off the hook the next day. Am I getting that----
Mr. Pelkey. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great
question. It is further exacerbated because most display
companies across the country normally would perform their
duties and their work over this July 2nd, 3rd, 4th of July, New
Year's Eve or Labor Day. And in most cases, there aren't any
enforcement teams that are out there that are inspecting on
those particular----
Mr. Hanna. So you----
Mr. Pelkey [continuing]. Nights and weekends, and you are
lucky to see one. If you did receive one--and sometimes you
do--often times you wouldn't even have a hazardous material
authorized person to inspect. Therefore, you would be going
through the inspection process----
Mr. Hanna. So you can't get a ticket if you beg for one on
the wrong day.
Mr. Pelkey. We have gone through, and several of our
members of the American Pyrotechnics Association have gone
through a stop, a weigh point, and begged for an inspection,
for a hazmat inspection, and there just isn't a certified
inspector there.
Mr. Hanna. Mr. Schick, did you want to say something?
Mr. Schick. I am not going to--we don't operate motor
carriers, for the most part----
Mr. Hanna. Right, right.
Mr. Schick [continuing]. I am not going to join into that
one.
Mr. Hanna. Well, thank you very much. Chairman?
Mr. Denham. Mr. Hanna yields back. Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would--he is not
here, but I would respectfully disagree with the former
chairman. We need to know what materials are being carried, and
both obviously deal with operational issues, which is FRA, and
they are not before us today, and deal with, you know, the
actual containment of those materials. And it does make a
difference, in terms of the containment. It certainly makes a
difference to the first responders, in terms of the knowledge
of--the training and the materials to deal with that. So I
would have some disagreement there.
But on--Madam Administrator, on February 26th we held a
hearing. And, as you might remember, we had some discussion. I
was trying to find out about a potential date for rulemaking
for the new tank cars. I am wondering what the current status
is. Have you completed your work? Is it at the Secretary's
office? Is it down there with the trolls at OMB? Where is it?
Ms. Quarterman. We have made great progress since we--I
last testified before you. We have a--shall we say a draft in
circulation? So we are working very hard, and hoping to move
that rule out very soon.
Mr. DeFazio. Can we just go back to what ``very soon''
might mean? Not to belabor my point from the last hearing, but
I would like--here is the issue--we have one major rail company
looking at making a huge investment. Whether or not they will
have a safe harbor if they go ahead with their improved tank
car, whether or not other people will buy the AAR version, or
whether or not people will try and make the 111's safer,
depends upon both the rule you put forward, what it proposes,
and what conditions it puts on the existing cars.
Ms. Quarterman. No, I agree with that, and we have been
having ongoing conversations with those folks, as well. So we
know that commitments are being considered, and that is why we
are working as fast as we possibly can to get a rule out.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So I am not going to get much further with
that.
So, there is another issue, which I actually was surprised
by. I have been on the Aviation Subcommittee for a very long
time, and I had no idea that the lithium batteries are
nominally the jurisdiction of PHMSA, but have been delegated to
FAA. And I would note that I think we are 8 years or so into a
rulemaking, which I hope doesn't happen with tank cars. Can you
give me any idea about what DOT is doing to harmonize our
standards with those of ICAO, which would seem to be reasonable
to me?
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. Yes, it is actually our
rulemaking, and we are responsible for hazmat, no matter how it
moves, as well as operational issues related to hazmat in
different modes. We have a rule that we are hoping to get out
very soon to complete our harmonization with ICAO on the
lithium battery, as well.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. And is that rule somewhere other than in
your agency?
Ms. Quarterman. It is.
Mr. DeFazio. Would it be down at OMB?
Ms. Quarterman. I think it is all public, where it is. It
is----
Mr. DeFazio. Is it there? I mean you can tell me yes or no?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, it is.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes. I can find it, yes.
Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. I once had a colleague, Al Swift, from
Washington State. And he described to me the people at OMB. He
says, ``DeFazio, they are the trolls with the green eyeshades
that hide under the bridges, and they come out and gnaw on your
leg every once in a while.''
I know OMB is concerned about cost effectiveness, but when
it comes to saving lives or keeping an airplane in the air, I
think they need to move more promptly. So now I know where to
direct my concerns. Although, in terms of the tank car, I think
they are still to you; in terms of lithium batteries, it is to
OMB.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Ms. Quarterman, the GAO report on the safety of
wet lines raised significant concerns with the accuracy of the
data, and found that the costs and benefits were not accurately
presented in the proposed rule. Yet PHMSA refuses to withdraw
proposed wet lines rule. Do you plan on withdrawing the
proposed rule? And why, or why not?
Ms. Quarterman. Let me just say for my friends at OMB who
work really hard on our issues, that, you know, that they are
supportive, I think, of safety, as well.
On your question on wet lines, we are in the process of
reviewing the results from the GAO study to determine--I mean
they were critical of our regulatory evaluation, determining
the costs and benefits associated with the wet lines rule. So
we are still in the process of reviewing that, looking at the
data that we have associated with that, looking at the
recommendations that they gave to us about how we might improve
that data.
And then, we will determine whether we withdraw the rule or
move forward with it. Whether we do either, we will certainly
want to improve the safety of wet lines, whether it is through
a rulemaking or something else. My colleague, Mr. Downey,
mentioned that there are other options available. I welcome him
to come talk to our staff about ways that we might improve wet
lines in the future.
Mr. Denham. So, just to be clear, you do not disagree with
the GAO report.
Ms. Quarterman. They drew some conclusions about our
analysis, our cost benefit analysis. We are going back to look
at their recommendations, and try to improve that, and then we
will make a determination on how to proceed.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. And what is your timeline on that?
Ms. Quarterman. We don't have a timeline, that I am aware
of, at the moment. You know, the next few months we will be
looking at that.
Mr. Denham. This is something you intend on either--making
a recommendation one way or another within the next couple of
months?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes. We have been a little busy recently.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. Mr. Downey, you expressed concern
about the wet lines rulemaking. How would you propose that
PHMSA use its resources in order to withdraw its proposed
rulemaking?
Mr. Downey. With the GAO report, but also the independent
evaluation that was done. Our position is that we can take the
dollars that would be required to retrofit our trailers, or buy
new trailers with some type of device that would evacuate the
wet lines, and put those dollars to training or other types of
technologies that would prevent accidents, such as anti-
rollover stability equipment.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. Mr. Schick, you are supportive of
PHMSA's regulating loading and unloading of hazardous
materials. What are the benefits PHMSA's--what are the benefits
of PHMSA's doing so? And, specifically, will it help the
preparedness of emergency responders?
Mr. Schick. Mr. Chairman, we are totally supportive of
that. As I said in the written testimony, they had somewhat
withdrawn the application of their authority, which they pretty
clearly have. We think that that is primarily for operational
safety and operational efficiency of the shippers and the
consignees who do the loading and unloading and are present
when that happens. It is important for safety for everyone that
the same kind of activity, say the same unloading conducted
with the same equipment from the same, let's say, cargo tank,
be under PHMSA's jurisdiction, so they have oversight over
everything. It should not matter whether the person doing the
unloading happens to be the employee of the trucking company or
happens to be the employee of the consignee.
I think since that happens mostly on site, it is primarily
for those kind of operations, rather than emergency responders.
But more fundamentally, the loading and unloading are known to
be potential causes of accidents. So, if you are looking to
prevent accidents, obviously you want your loading and
unloading to be done in a safe manner. And we believe that if
it is done in a consistent manner under Federal oversight, as
opposed to possibly disparate ways under different State and
local jurisdictions, that will enhance safety.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. And can you also explain the
concerns you have with imposing further costs on special
permits and approvals of applicants?
Mr. Schick. Yes, I can, sir. As I said in testimony, the
special permit applications actually come from parties--it
could be shippers or carriers, it could be Government agencies
who are in the role of a shipper, for example--that have come
up with a new way to do something. But they know, full well, it
does not fit under the current written PHMSA regulations. So
they come forward, they acknowledge that, they make a
presentation to the agency, and the agency evaluates it. It
cannot proceed to grant a special permit unless it is shown to
be at least as protective as what the rules apply.
If it passes that test, and it can be put into place by the
applicant who gets a special permit, other parties who do the
same thing can also use that, and the agency, in effect, gets
research and development. They get new ideas brought to them,
and they get to look at them. And then, over time, they can
move those into the regulations. So everyone benefits.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. Ms. Napolitano?
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, sir. Ms. Quarterman, what steps
are being taken to ensure the safe, secure shipment of chlorine
and other toxic gases? The railroad companies recently
partnered with DOT and TSA to put in place the procedures to
further improve the safety and secure shipment of the gas.
Could you share some of those procedures, quickly?
Ms. Quarterman. I will have to get back to you for--on the
record on that.
Mrs. Napolitano. Would you report that back, please?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, absolutely.
[The information follows:]
Working closely with FRA and TSA, PHMSA established several
critical requirements to ensure safety and security of toxic
gas shipments. Key requirements and procedures include:
Security Plans (49 CFR Sec. 172.800)--Each person
who offers for transportation in commerce or transports in
commerce a PIH material must develop and adhere to a
transportation security plan. The security plan must be based
on an assessment of the possible transportation security risks
for materials transported, stored, or unloaded incidental to
movement. Key components of the security plan include:
Measures to address assessed risks regarding
personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route
security;
Identification by job title of the senior
management official responsible for development and
implementation of the plan;
Security duties for each position or department
responsible for implementing the plan; and
Training for hazmat employees.
Rail Routing (49 CFR Sec. 172.820)--Rail carriers
must assess available routes using, at a minimum, the 27
factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to
determine the safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive
hazardous materials. These factors address safety and security
issues, such as the condition of the track and supporting
infrastructure; the presence or absence of signals; past
incidents; population density along the route; environmentally
sensitive or significant areas; venues along the route
(stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response
capability along the route; measures and countermeasures
already in place to address apparent safety and security risks;
and proximity to iconic targets. The regulations require rail
carriers to make conscientious efforts to develop logical and
defendable routing decisions using these factors.
Speed Restriction by Rail (49 CFR Sec. 174.86)--For
trains transporting any loaded, placarded tank cars containing
a material poisonous by inhalation, the maximum allowable
operating speed is 50 mph.
Enhanced Tank Car Design (49 CFR Sec. Sec. 179.100
and 179.102-3)--Increased tank car design standards for head
and shell puncture resistance, nozzles, and top fittings
protection.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. Mr. Schick, you were talking
about the training of loading and unloading. That is a real
serious issue with me. I have one of the largest corridors of
rail transportation and truck transportation in my area. And I
visited some of the places where they build the double wall for
chemicals.
My concern is that we are providing training at one of the
local university colleges for firefighting in hazmats. But are
we training them in the proper procedures of loading and
unloading?
Mr. Schick. I don't believe, ma'am, that the firefighters
would be doing the loading and unloading. I am talking about
the loading that happens at the production site, and the
unloading at the receiver's site.
Mrs. Napolitano. Right, but----
Mr. Schick. Rather than what might happen----
Mrs. Napolitano [continuing]. If there is a spill, the
firefighters have to come in and help clean up. Do they not?
Mr. Schick. If it is on--if it is outside of
transportation, there--certainly could be called in certain
circumstances. If it happens during transportation, obviously,
it is out in the public space, and it is a different issue, I
think, in that sense.
But, again, I think the loading and unloading itself is not
done by the emergency responders. The National Transportation
Safety Board a number of years ago--took a very close look at
this back in 2001--this was at the time when PHMSA was in the
process of drawing back its regulatory authority. And the NTSB
said in no uncertain terms that they are not convinced that if
RSPA--it was then called RSPA, Research and Special Programs
Administration; it is PHMSA today--relinquished its regulatory
authority over hazardous materials loading/unloading
operations, other Federal, State agencies would be able--they
are concerned whether they would be able to exercise the
necessary safety oversight of these very specific areas of
transportation. That is why we at ACC support--and I believe
the large Interested Parties community generally supports--the
re-establishment of loading and unloading as primary functions
under DOT's jurisdiction, and not to leave it to disparate
points of view.
Another aspect from industry is if someone is involved in
that at a plant site, if they are going to be transferred and
have a job opportunity elsewhere within their corporation, it
would also be helpful--it is not a safety issue, but it would
be helpful, not only for the company, but for the personnel, to
be able to go somewhere else and have the same rules apply.
Mrs. Napolitano. But are the chemical companies required to
report on-site accidents of loading and unloading?
Mr. Schick. I would--I think I will ask Ms. Quarterman, who
is here. I think that when the carrier is present, the carrier
files a 5800 report, which is the report for the unintended
release of hazardous materials. I think what happens without
the carrier being present--even, as I said, with exactly the
same process and equipment, I think you may be having PHMSA
deprive itself of exactly that kind of knowledge.
Mrs. Napolitano. Ms. Quarterman?
Ms. Quarterman. If there is a loading and unloading
incident that is associated with transportation, then, yes, it
would be reported on the 5800 report.
Mrs. Napolitano. OK, thank you. And, Ms. Harman, how much
placarding information should be displayed on the railcars
carrying material? And is this important to the local folks to
be able to know what is being transported?
Ms. Harman. Thank you for your question. Yes, it is
absolutely critical that we understand what is being placarded.
Your first responders that arrive to a scene of an incident
like that, their job is defensive operations, not just to
recognize, but also to prevent any further damage to the
community, whether they have to dam and dike. They have got to
notify the community, they have got to look up that particular
item in the ERG book, and figure out if there needs to be some
sort of evacuation, how far that needs to be. So, yes, it is
absolutely critical that we are able to know what is in that
container.
Mrs. Napolitano. Where should be the best place for
displaying of such material that is being transported?
Ms. Harman. Right in the public view, of where those are
located now. In addition, if there is an incident, and that is
an obstructed view, the shipping papers are critical for us, as
well.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, that question has come up in the
past, because there have been some instances in my area in
years past, and there was no way of getting to the cab, to the
front of the locomotive. And so there was a question about what
was inherently being carried.
Ms. Harman. Right.
Mrs. Napolitano. Because the placarding was not sufficient.
Ms. Harman. Right. And the key for us--you know, worst case
scenario--I mean, obviously, the placarding needs to be there
for us. The shipping papers need to be there for us. Even if--
when we move into an e-shipping, electronic world, you know,
that shouldn't replace the paper shipping papers for us. There
is always a way for us to go back to the basics. It is critical
for firefighters.
But if we cannot view those, it is going to be treated as
any other flammable liquid until additional resources arrive.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hanna [presiding]. Ms. Esty?
Ms. Esty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really glad we are
having this hearing today. Just last year, we had one of these
chemical spills in Fulton Park, in one of my cities in
Waterbury, Connecticut.
And, again, the issues Ms. Harman has raised about the
preparedness of those who arrive at the scene and often do not
know what they are encountering, and have to make life-and-
death decisions immediately for a community. So I want to drill
down a little bit more into some of those issues.
So, Administrator Quarterman, does PHMSA currently have a
system that can collect and analyze hazardous material incident
data collected by emergency responders?
Ms. Quarterman. We do not have the data that is collected
by emergency responders. We do require reporting by anyone who
has an incident, and we have that data, which we correlate. We
have had conversations. My deputy is actually a former fire
chief, and he has had conversation with several different
firefighting organizations about what data they do collect, and
the extent to which we might get some of that data and
integrate it with ours, because we actually collect data not
just for us, but for all the modes who have involvement in
hazmat.
Ms. Esty. So is there a reason we don't have a system that,
as a regular course of business, collects this data?
Ms. Quarterman. I--it is an ongoing conversation. Part of
it has to be attributed to resources.
Ms. Esty. All right. And following up on that, Ms. Harman
had expressed concern about--that whatever systems are
developed, that they need to be accessible 24 hours a day, and
whether there is paperwork there or not. What provisions, if
any, is--you know, is the agency looking at?
And, in PHMSA, what is in place now to ensure that
electronic communications are accessible in these dramatic
incidents? It might be 2 a.m., chaos is reigning, somebody is
trying to look at a sheet of paper and determine what these
substances are, and what they should do.
Ms. Quarterman. Currently, paper is the only thing that is
available. We are in the process of putting together a pilot to
do electronic reporting for movement of hazardous materials. We
actually had a session last year including, most importantly,
emergency responders, because we viewed their opinions as, you
know, paramount, in terms of how do we move from paper to
electronic. To what extent do we need paper? So that is an
ongoing conversation.
Obviously, when we have a pilot, hopefully this year, that
will be a part of what we want to learn, a big part of what we
want to learn, and make sure that things move smoothly.
Ms. Esty. For Ms. Harman, I know that the National Fire
Protection Agency estimates that 65 percent of departments that
are responsible for responding for hazmat do not have formal
training. What can we do in Congress? What can we do to address
that? And, obviously, as we are seeing--as you can tell by the
questioning about Bakken crude, we expect there are going to be
more transportation within our borders on these issues.
What do you recommend that we in Congress ought to be
looking at? It is resources, obviously, some of that. But if it
is just up to grants, I have got to tell you I represent 41
cities and towns. Some of these towns are 4,000 people. And if
we are leaving it up to the volunteer firefighters in Goshen,
Connecticut, to know that there is funding available someplace,
and a grant application maybe, that their 100 volunteers will
get life-sustaining training, I don't think that is acceptable.
I don't think that is acceptable for our communities, and it is
not acceptable for our volunteers, who put their lives on the
line. So, what should we be doing on the congressional level?
Ms. Harman. Well, not the answer you want to hear, but
continued funding is key for us. I mean training is key. The
training is out there. There are multiple modes of training
deliveries. There are fixed facility training. We are proud of
the portable delivery training model that we bring. We have a
strong demand for training right now. There is a wait list for
classes that we can't even get to.
The train-the-trainer model is important for us,
particularly for those smaller communities. We don't see as
many requests for train-the-trainer coming in, particularly
now, and particularly from the smaller volunteer communities,
because you have got folks in this economy not only trying to
volunteer, but working multiple jobs, finding it difficult to
do training. They take a train-the-trainer, now they have got
to prepare themselves as an instructor to teach the rest of
their community, and they may not have some of those larger
scale incidents like you have had there in Waterbury to bring
that experience into their facility.
So, it is important, I think, for Congress to continue to,
number one, enforce that operations level training. It should
be the minimum level of training for all firefighters,
regardless if they are career or volunteer, and encourage them
to reach out to organizations. They have got to take a
proactive approach. We are certainly there to provide training
throughout career or volunteer. There is other funding sources
that are there. There is online training modules that we offer.
The resources are there, but it takes a level of effort to also
get that.
Ms. Esty. Also, if you could, quickly, give us your advice
on gear, what sort of gear they ought to be looking at having.
Ms. Harman. Gear is critical. I mean your traditional
turnout gear for firefighters, which is your firefighting
ensemble, a self-contained breathing apparatus, is key. A lot
of water, a lot of hose. There has been a lot of discussion
about foam, and foam caches set up. You know, a large-scale
incident, I don't think any large jurisdiction is going to have
enough foam to put out any of these. So it is really the
traditional firefighter that you see now, if you were to call
911 and showed up here, is the same firefighter that is
initially going to show up on a scene like that in their
regular turnout gear.
Mr. Denham [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Michaud.
Mr. Michaud. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank the panelists, as well, for testifying today. This
question is for Ms. Harman.
As you are aware, last summer, when the train wreck in Lac-
Megantic--the severity of that wreck. And, since then, several
of my colleagues and I have advocated for multiple-person crews
on freight trains, particularly those carrying hazardous
materials or meeting trains carrying hazardous materials. We
believe that this is a public safety issue, and the FRA
actually believes it is a safety issue, as well. And if you
look at past rail accidents, there are many incidents of
multiple-person crews being able to mitigate the damage by
separating the train from the burning cars, and being able to
work with first responders.
My question to you is, could you share with us your
thoughts on how having multiple crewmembers on hazmat trains
could improve safety and interaction with the first responders?
Ms. Harman. Sure. We believe in multiple crews--are crucial
for us to get the response done appropriately and efficiently.
You know, the original driver of that train can easily be
injured in the crash themselves. Having multiple people,
particularly multiple people who are trained, who are trained
to work collaboratively with the first responders so they don't
meet for the first time at the scene of that incident, that is
critical for us.
Mr. Michaud. Thank you. The second question is for you, as
well. I recently met with a mayor who is a head of the Maine
Municipal Association and learned that many local fire
departments only carry enough foam to extinguish a car fire.
That would be incapable of responding to a major rail or truck
disaster calling for additional foam from surrounding areas.
I recognize that we probably can't ensure that every fire
department in the country has the resources to respond to every
kind of major disaster, but I do think that local fire
departments should have the information to quickly locate and
call for those additional resources in the case of an
emergency. Is there something that we should do at the
congressional level to facilitate this type of information
sharing? Or do you have any ideas of what we can do, as far as
foam, as it relates to major train wreck?
Ms. Harman. No, that is an excellent question. We get a lot
of questions on foam. How much is enough? How much is not
enough? The true underlying resolve to a lot of this is pre-
planning. It is knowing who your partners are, knowing what is
coming through your community, knowing what you need to be
prepared for, and potentially how much.
As I said earlier, I don't think enough foam is going to
cover any major incident. And it has to do with the pre-
planning. And at times, really, if you are in a rural area and
there is not an immediate threat to life or significant
property, there is going to be a time where you are just going
to let it burn off.
So, you know, we are supportive of free planning, of
collaborative training, and bringing folks together so that
they truly--they are not meeting for the first time at the
scene of that incident.
Mr. Michaud. Thank you. Does anyone else on the panel want
to address the issue about adequacy of foam, particularly if
you are in a rural area with a major train wreck?
Ms. Quarterman. I will just comment on the end comment from
Ms. Harman, in that my deputy has said the same thing. It is
not intuitive for me, not being a firefighter, but he has said,
you know, in an instance like that, you try to get the people
out, and you probably just let the fire burn out. So----
Mr. Michaud. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. Ms. Hahn?
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, I had an
incident that just happened in my district in Wilmington,
California, where 40 barrels of crude oil from a crack in an
idle oil pipeline spewed into a residential neighborhood in
Wilmington, California. Obviously, this spill endangered the
health and safety of hundreds of my constituents, as well as
caused untold amounts in property damage and cost to the local
economy.
And while the spill is still under investigation,
information that we have learned so far suggests that the spill
was caused by an internal corrosion of an idle pipeline that,
unfortunately, still contained a lot of oil. The current owner
of the pipeline believed that the idle pipeline was empty when
it was received 15 years ago from the previous owner. And no
inspection of the inside of the pipeline apparently is required
under PHMSA or State guidelines.
So, while there is a clear process for shutting down
pipelines that are not intended to be used any more through the
process of abandonment, and there is clear inspection and
monitoring process for active pipelines, it seems to me there
is no process for ensuring that idle, out-of-service pipelines
that are believed to be empty, but are intended to be used
again, are actually empty of hazardous material.
I just feel like if at any point during this 15 years, if
the current owner of the pipeline had verified that it was
empty, or State officials would have verified it was empty, or
the Federal Government would have verified it was empty, this
spill would have never occurred. And I think it is this lack of
verification that led to a hazardous pipeline spill and
seriously, you know, endangered my constituents, who are
already kind of the--on the short end of the stick, living next
to the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which is--any
manner of hazardous event could happen on a daily basis. Also,
this community probably sits on more pipelines than any other
community, I believe, in southern California.
So, am I not understanding it properly? Is there a process
for any kind of verification of an out-of-service, idle
pipeline, versus an active or abandoned pipeline? And, if not,
why not? And is this a loophole that we should try to close?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, as you know, the--this current
situation is under investigation, so we can't really talk about
the details of that situation. But you are right, that my
understanding is that the pipeline was idle, as opposed to
abandoned. Whether a pipeline is idle for 15 years, I think, is
an open question. Certainly, if it is an abandoned pipeline, it
should have been----
Ms. Hahn. It has to be capped and----
Ms. Quarterman. It has to be capped and cleaned. So that is
something that we will follow up with you on as we go through
the investigation----
Ms. Hahn. Are you aware--is PHMSA aware of this kind of a
loophole in----
Ms. Quarterman. It is the first time I have heard anything
about this before, so----
Ms. Hahn. Right. I just think it is--might need to look at
how we verify. It is all simple verification of a pipeline that
has been deemed idle or out of service. Particularly when they
acquire it from another company. Nobody--there was no third-
party verification that, in fact, it was empty. And while it
may not be a lot of crude oil to the oil company, they seemed
to scoff when I was like, ``Forty barrels before you capped
it?'' And they were sort of like, ``That is not that much.''
But, obviously, in a residential neighborhood, that is an
extreme problem and hazard and smell and----
Ms. Quarterman. Well, it is a lot----
Ms. Hahn. The equipment that has to come in to try to cap
it, it was a big mess. But I feel like it might be something we
should work together to solve.
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
Ms. Hahn. My second question is about strengthening
pipeline inspections. And right now, California has 5
inspectors inspecting over 750 pipelines in the ground.
Additionally, in accordance with PHMSA guidelines, companies,
and not the actual inspectors themselves, are in charge of
conducting inspections of pipeline. Inspectors are in charge of
conducting audits of the companies' inspections. Is this the
best process we have, going forward? And can you give me some
assurance that we are--all pipelines are inspected in a timely
manner?
And how do we strengthen this current system so there is
more accountability for the companies who have failed to
adequately inspect their pipelines?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, you will see in the Department's
fiscal year 2015 budget, we have a large request for the
pipeline safety program. Included in that is additional grant
money for States to improve--and our inspection, I mean, the
biggest part of that goes to our inspection force, adding many,
many new people. So, the President's budget supports that right
now.
In terms of inspection--and in some ways it is a misnomer.
I mean our staff does go out and review the documents of
companies, but they also go out during construction, and doing
some maintenance, so they do inspect to that.
I think what you are referring to is an internal inspection
of a pipeline, which is something that--the Government doesn't
own these pipelines, so we have no way to put any equipment in
them to verify that. So that is really reviewing the
inspections, or the assessments that companies have performed.
Absolutely, we need more resources.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Denham. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
Ms. Hahn. I yield back.
Mr. Denham. Mr. Larsen?
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First off, I want to
dispel a notion that PHMSA believes in a silver bullet
approach. Ms. Quarterman was in my office 2\1/2\ months ago.
And I think I am quoting you when you said, ``There is no
silver bullet to resolving this issue.''
But classification is part of it. Railcar safety is part of
it. Training for first responders is part of it. There is
probably other parts I am missing.
But I want to understand the classification issue, because
API was here with us last hearing and said in 6 months--not a
2-year timeline they usually take, but a 6-month timeline they
usually take to establish a new classification standard for
Bakken. That is what they said. But the reports the last couple
days seems to come across, from PHMSA's perspective, they
expected information sooner than that.
Am I conflating two issues, or am I--or are you--do you
have a faster timeline than API has?
Ms. Quarterman. There are actually two different issues.
One, the work that API is doing is on an industry standard for
classification, which is what they do quite frequently on
different issues. And we have a staff person who is on that
committee, working towards assisting in that classification
standard. Should it be something that we agree at the end of
the day is worthwhile, we could adopt it and put it in our
regulations. That is one thing.
The other thing is actual data about the attributes of the
crude, itself. What is its initial boiling point? What is its
flash point? What is its vapor pressure?
Mr. Larsen. Yes, right.
Ms. Quarterman. Those kinds of details, which Mr. Young may
know, because he suggested this was a class II----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Crude, whereas we have some
information of our own which doesn't necessarily support that.
Mr. Larsen. OK.
Ms. Quarterman. It could be class I or class II.
Mr. Larsen. So you said that three companies--it could be
four companies--have provided information. How many other
companies have you requested information from and have not
received information from?
Ms. Quarterman. We went out, initially, to API and asked
that they bring in some of their members. After that, we sort
of expanded our reach, and we had a series of crude oil
meetings where we invited not just API, we invited AFPM, who I
mentioned is coming forward with some information. We also
individually reached out to some of the biggest shippers. I
forgot how many, I don't know if it was----
Mr. Larsen. OK.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. The top 10 or top 20, but we
invited them all to come in and talk to us. And those who
couldn't come, we sent a letter and said, ``If you can't come,
we will set up a separate meeting for you, or we will call you,
whatever we can to get as much information as possible.''
Mr. Larsen. OK. And then, so that is where you are right
now on trying to establish these basic data points about the
Bakken crude. And those are--that is the basic data that you
are trying to uncover currently.
Ms. Quarterman. Yes. But let me just add that, you know, we
can't wait for data from other companies or from any industry
organization. We have been on the ground in an unprecedented
effort, with our sister agencies, drawing crude oil from
trains, from trucks, from pipelines, and sending it to labs and
having it tested ourselves. So we are getting information on
the attributes of that crude from the ground up.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. And just--you know, as you know, in my
district alone we have four refineries. We are moving from
about zero gallons a day maybe last year, late last--or early
last year, to about 12 million gallons a day of Bakken crude
moving through the district on rail when all four facilities
have their offload facilities built. So this has really become
an issue quickly in our district. And part of it, part of the
answer, has to do with firefighters.
And, by the way, before I go further, not just the
firefighters, all first responders, but certainly firefighters,
Arlington Fire District and Darrington Fire District and folks
from Clark County, Nevada; Boone County, Missouri; Colorado,
all converging on Highway 530 to deal with the mudslide and be
part of FEMA's incident command teams. And they are all doing a
great job, and this last weekend they have been able to turn
over and get some new people in, to give people some rest. And
we appreciate what firefighters and other first responders are
doing. I want to pass that on to you.
And then, Mr. Schick, I want to take up your--you don't
need to turn on the mic for this--I just want to take up your
invitation to visit the facility, so long as you include a
briefing on the--not just the CHEMTREC, but the----
Mr. Schick. TRANSCAER, as well?
Mr. Larsen. TRANSCAER as part of that. Can you do that?
Mr. Schick. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you so much. Yield back.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Mr. Lipinski?
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
and Ranking Member Brown for holding this hearing today.
Certainly the public safety in the transport of hazardous
materials is a very important responsibility of this
subcommittee, so I am glad we are here to look at PHMSA's
progress since the authorization of MAP-21.
One area that I know we all have a great interest and
concern about is the transport of hazardous material by rail. I
know Mr. DeFazio had covered some of the issues already. What I
want to focus on is the paperless manifest for trains that
carry hazardous materials. I know it is very important, it is
an issue that has been raised in some of the accidents that
have occurred is the need for first responders to know what is
on the trains in case there is an accident, and find out what
the risk is from any material on the trains.
So, I was happy that MAP-21, I know, had a requirement for
PHMSA to evaluate a paperless system. And I know that right now
the railroads themselves are working on electronic systems. As
I raised before on this committee to the AAR, that I think more
should be done in order to make sure that this information is
available to first responders.
So, I wanted to ask Administrator Quarterman. Can you tell
me where PHMSA is right now on this requirement that was put in
in MAP-21? And I want to know if you are working with the
railroads at all on what they are working on doing with these
paperless manifests.
Ms. Quarterman. We are working with all constituents. I
mentioned earlier we had a workshop in July of last year, and
included the emergency responders and all of the modes to talk
about use of this electronic format. Right now there is a
requirement in our rule for--on rail that the train consist
must show where the hazardous materials are on the train, and
it must be updated if it gets moved around, so that emergency
responders will have that knowledge, or should have that
knowledge if they go to fight a fire at--because of hazardous
materials.
Mr. Lipinski. And do you anticipate PHMSA issuing any
further regulations in the space--in rail, or any other----
Ms. Quarterman. We are at the pilot project phase. We are
not at the regulation phase. I mean we really need to go and do
a few pilots, see how it works before we talk about issuing any
regs. So we are early on.
Mr. Lipinski. OK. Well, I just wanted to make sure that we
continue to work on this, and as we go down the road, and make
sure that we do have the best system in place, so that first
responders can have adequate information.
And, with that, I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. Ms. Brown?
Ms. Brown. Thank you. Ms. Quarterman, this is a yes or no
question. Yesterday we received your statement that the
American Petroleum Institute and its members have not been
cooperative with your agency, and have refused to provide
testing information with your safety experts. Is that yes or
no?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
Ms. Brown. OK. Could you give us in writing what questions
that you have asked them and they have not responded to,
please?
Ms. Quarterman. I would be happy to.
[The information follows:]
PHMSA posed the following questions to API and crude oil
shippers prior to meetings in early February.
What tests or methods do you use to determine the
properties of the crude oil to include its vapor pressure,
flammable gas content, flash point, boiling point, hydrogen
sulfide content and corrosive properties prior to offering
it in transportation?
Who performs these tests and how frequently are
they completed?
When you find high levels of gases in crude, what
actions do you require of your oilfield personnel before
loading into a transport vehicle? What information about
the crude oil properties, if any, is provided by the
producers to you prior to transportation? How is this
information communicated?
What information do you share with truck and rail
carriers about the crude oil properties?
Are there any prescribed limits involving vapor
pressure, flammable gas concentration or hydrogen sulfide
content above which the crude oil is not placed into
transportation? If so, what are these limits and how are
they determined?
To date, PHMSA has received some testing information from
individual crude oil companies but thus far the data has been
limited. As part of ongoing efforts, PHMSA has supported the
American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to
develop industry standards for proper sampling techniques,
testing criteria and frequency for crude oil. PHMSA is actively
participating in the discussions during working group sessions
and plans to continue up through expected completion in July.
Ms. Brown. OK. Now, my next question, Mr. Downey, I was
very involved with the wet lines issue. And, in fact, I went
over to Baltimore to test it, you know. And I know that we are
on tight budgets. And so, in your testimony, you said it would
be better if you all use that money for anti-rollover
technology, which is really the problem in the industry, and
not the wet lines. Can you expound upon that, please?
Mr. Downey. That is a very good point, Ranking Member
Brown. In fact, I was in Baltimore at that hearing, as well.
And if you look----
Ms. Brown. And I went around----
Mr. Downey. I know you did.
Ms. Brown [continuing]. Before we went to the hearing.
Mr. Downey. Yes, and one of our folks was there.
Ms. Brown. I recommend the chairman do the same.
Mr. Downey. I guess our point is that, looking at the cost
benefit analysis that was done in the surveys, looking at the
dangers of retrofitting some of the trailers--and I know that
when you----
Ms. Brown. I don't think your mic is on.
Mr. Downey. It is. I believe it is----
Ms. Brown. Well, pull it up, pull it up.
Mr. Downey. Is that better?
Ms. Brown. Yes, sir.
Mr. Downey. OK, thank you. But looking at the risks to
retrofitting the trailers--and when you were in Baltimore, I
believe that they discussed that with you--we could take those
dollars and minimize risk and put it into technology that would
make the traveling public safer, keep our tractors and trailers
on the road, with the anti-roll stability. That is our
position. Does that answer your question?
Ms. Brown. Yes, sir. And I would be interested in making
sure that we get some directions to the agency in that vein,
because, basically, in--from what I can gather, the information
that we have gotten, that is where the problem is, and not with
the wet lines.
Mr. Downey. Yes. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Brown. OK. My last question, pertaining to making sure
that we protect the firefighters and the first responders,
and--do the firefighters have the gear to respond to the hazmat
incidents? And I am particularly concerned about the crude oil,
ethanol, and the lithium batteries. And those batteries, I
understand, could play a major part when it comes to airplane
crashes and other things.
Ms. Harman. The traditional gear for--that firefighters are
going to be wearing, donning and doffing as they show up to
these scenes here, is your traditional turnout gear. That is
your initial response. Your typical firefighter that is coming
in here in their bunker jacket, their bunker boots, and their
pants with their suspenders and their self-contained breathing
apparatus, gloves, a lot of hose, a lot of fire--not fire--a
lot of water. Your second set that is coming in are definitely
going to be going more into the hot zone. Those are your
technicians, those are your specialists. So that gear that is
out there we believe right now is sufficient that is out there.
There is new technologies coming out every day. We stay abreast
of that, and there is a cost that comes to that. So we are
always watching that to see, you know, how is this going to be
afforded, how are these skill sets going to be acquired.
But the gear that is there now, so long as the fire
departments have the minimum level of what they need, and the
training that they need to respond in an operational capacity,
they should be pretty well set to go.
Ms. Brown. Ms. Quarterman?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes? You want me to answer the same
question about gear?
Ms. Brown. Yes.
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we agree that it is important. We
would have to look at our grant language to ensure that it is
something that we could fund through our existing HMEP grant
program, the extent to which we can fund it.
Ms. Brown. Is it possible to let the Members know when the
grant applications are available?
Ms. Quarterman. We would love to.
Ms. Brown. So that we could make sure our communities know
about it?
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. If you don't know, we will make
sure you know.
Ms. Brown. Because are you saying that you put it in the
Federal Register?
Ms. Quarterman. We put it in the Federal Register, but we
realize that not everybody reads that, so we have been tweeting
it----
Ms. Brown. And some small communities don't have a person
that is looking for that all the time.
Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we try to do a press release, as well.
But we will absolutely let the Members know.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Brown. Ms. Hahn?
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, one of
the other issues I have been dealing with for a long time, even
before I came to Congress, is that I have a facility, LPG
tanks, which are located in San Pedro. I think they were built
in 1976, aging facilities, they can hold up to 25 million
gallons of LPG. I have been trying to get them moved or shut
down for as long as I can remember. They are on private
property, so I am struggling with what to do. But the threat of
leakage and vaporizing and igniting and--it sits next to a
soccer field, an elementary school, residential neighborhood.
So, just have two things on that. One, in 1986, I guess,
Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act, EPCRA. And after 9/11, DHS came in and many of these
highly volatile facilities now are being classified as a
possible homeland security threat. You know, attack on one of
them, obviously, could produce the same effect as a natural
disaster.
So now, that has superseded EPCRA. So now I believe a
member of the community has to go downtown to their fire
department, look at documents in secret, not allowed to take
out copies of those documents, so it really has undermined, in
my opinion, a community's right to know the kinds of hazardous
materials and threat to their livelihood that exists in their
community.
Is this something that you feel like we should do a better
job of balancing? Is this something maybe you and Jay Johnson
could have a conversation about? Because I really do think--I
mean I am all about homeland security, but I am also about a
community's right to know what kind of hazardous material is in
their neighborhood, and what they need to do to prepare
themselves against disaster.
Ms. Quarterman. I agree with you, and we have a similar
effect on the pipeline side, where, as we had created, I
think--or the agency had created very detailed maps of the
pipeline system, and put it on the web, and almost immediately
had to pull it down because of 9/11, I think it is worthwhile
to have that conversation.
I have heard that some of those things are no longer as
covered as they used to be. There are less concerns. But I
agree with you, the public has a right to know where these
facilities are, and to be prepared to respond. And certainly
emergency responders need to be prepared to respond in those
instances. So I will take you up on that, and have a
conversation----
Ms. Hahn. Great. And maybe even there is a compromise in
how they--you know, besides going downtown to a fire department
and looking at documents in secret, is there a compromise
there?
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
Ms. Hahn. Yes. And the other thing, what can I tell my
constituents in San Pedro, California, that PHMSA is doing to
protect them from a possible leak, vapor cloud, ignite? I mean,
the threat of something happening with 25 million gallons of
propane and butane is just a daily concern. And we can't figure
out which agency could help us, you know, protect the community
against a disaster.
Ms. Quarterman. I am not sure that we have oversight of
that particular facility. Our oversight is to pipelines and
things that are moving in transportation. But I would say to
your constituency that, you know, PHMSA is a small agency with
a huge mission, and you will see the number of incidents going
down, down, down over time.
Our folks are dedicated to ensuring that nothing happens,
and we really are moving towards zero incidents. So you walk
around every day----
Ms. Hahn. And this facility actually has a rail line now.
Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
Ms. Hahn. And so this product is being----
Ms. Quarterman. Is moving in and out.
Ms. Hahn. Is moving by rail. So----
Ms. Quarterman. Most of the time nothing happens. We are
all surrounded by pipelines, by trucks moving hazardous
materials, by trains every moment of the day. So we are talking
about an infinitesimal possibility of something going wrong. I
mean, really, considering the amount of----
Ms. Hahn. If it makes them sleep better at night.
Ms. Quarterman. I know.
Ms. Hahn. Well, if you would take a look into this facility
and the railcars for me, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Hahn. Mr. Cummings?
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Ms. Quarterman, in 2009
this committee conducted an investigation of DOT's hazmat
program, and were made aware of an internal DOT analysis which
showed that 60 to 90 percent of all accidents were unreported,
and that little had been done to address it.
The audit also found that there were several invisible
risks where DOT had little to no data, such as LNG facility
incidents, hazmat incidents in the maritime mode, loading and
unloading of rail tank cars, and environmental effects of
hazmat spills.
Four years later, in September 2013, the GAO reported that
DOT's incident data is still significantly flawed, raising
concerns for what should be a data-driven agency. What is DOT
doing to improve its hazmat data, particularly data on
accidents and incidents?
Ms. Quarterman. We have had, since the September of 2009,
we have had teams working on data quality, especially with
respect to unreported incidents. We now do our own intelligence
gathering, if you will, for incidents that are not reported to
us on the 5800 report. And we include those within our
database. So we are trying to get data from as many different
sources as possible, and include it within our system. And then
we go out, we follow up with anybody who has not reported that
incident.
So I think our data quality has improved a great deal. I am
not familiar with the GAO report that you are referring to----
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. In 2013.
Mr. Cummings. Well, do you think we are missing--still
missing some of these incidents and accidents?
Ms. Quarterman. I am certain we are missing some of these.
I mean if they are not reported any place that we are looking,
then we are not getting that.
You know, the--we have very recently completed a data
report about how we might do even more to clean up our data and
make it better. But it is a resource-intensive exercise, and we
need more resources to be able to continue to make our data
better.
We put in place an IT modernization program as part of the
response to that 2009. We have had only small pieces of that
funded. So it is an uphill battle, but I think we are doing a
good job at cleaning up the data.
Mr. Cummings. Well, in your testimony you indicated that,
pursuant to MAP-21 legislation, PHMSA adopted a new rule on
April 17, 2013, to remove the maximum penalty for a violation
of hazardous materials rules, and to raise from $75,000 to
$175,000 the maximum penalty for a knowing violation, and a
violation resulting in death, serious illness, or severe injury
to any person, or substantial destruction of property.
How many times over the past decade has PHMSA assessed the
maximum penalty for either a willful violation, a violation
that resulted in death, or injury, or substantial destruction
of property, and how--have any such penalties been assessed
since the enactment of the new rule?
Ms. Quarterman. I would have to go and get that data for
you. I can tell you that our penalty authority has gone up. And
for the first time, I think, in many, many years, we also
revised our penalty guidelines, which sort of circumscribe how
much the penalties are. In my view, the penalties are still
extremely low. But I will provide that record for you----
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. That answer for you for the
record.
Mr. Cummings. How soon can you get that to me?
Ms. Quarterman. We should be able to do it in a week or so.
[The information follows:]
Question: How many times over the past decade has PHMSA
assessed the maximum penalty for either a willful violation, a
violation that resulted in death, or injury, or substantial
destruction of property?
Answer: Seven (three at $50,000 and four at $55,000).
Question: Have any such penalties been assessed since the
enactment of the new rule?
Answer: Zero.
Mr. Cummings. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I want to thank each
of our witnesses for their testimony today. If there are no
further questions, I would ask unanimous consent that the
record of today's hearing remain open until such time as our
witnesses have provided answers to any questions that have been
submitted to them in writing, and unanimous consent that the
record remain open 15 days for any additional comments and
information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in
the record of today's hearing.
[No response.]
Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. I would like to
thank our witnesses again for their testimony.
If no other Members have anything to add, this subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]