[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERTURNING 30 YEARS OF PRECEDENT:
IS THE ADMINISTRATION IGNORING THE
DANGERS OF TRAINING LIBYAN PILOTS
AND NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND BORDER SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-72
(Committee on the Judiciary)
__________
Serial No. 113-96
(Committee on Oversight and Government Reform)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://judiciary.house.gov http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
Wisconsin JERROLD NADLER, New York
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT,
LAMAR SMITH, Texas Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ZOE LOFGREN, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
DARRELL E. ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
STEVE KING, Iowa Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JUDY CHU, California
JIM JORDAN, Ohio TED DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina SUZAN DelBENE, Washington
RAUL LABRADOR, Idaho JOE GARCIA, Florida
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
JASON T. SMITH, Missouri
[Vacant]
Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel
Perry Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman
TED POE, Texas, Vice-Chairman
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
STEVE KING, Iowa SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
JIM JORDAN, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
RAUL LABRADOR, Idaho JOE GARCIA, Florida
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico
[Vacant]
George Fishman, Chief Counsel
David Shahoulian, Minority Counsel
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania JACKIE SPEIER, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
DOC HASTINGS, Washington ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
ROB WOODALL, Georgia TONY CARDENAS, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Vacancy
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Stephen Castor, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts,
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee Ranking Minority Member
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming PETER WELCH, Vermont
ROB WOODALL, Georgia MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan
C O N T E N T S
----------
APRIL 3, 2014
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable Trey Gowdy, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration and Border Security, Committee on the Judiciary.... 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Immigration and Border Security, Committee on the Judiciary.... 3
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Utah, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform......... 32
The Honorable John F. Tierney, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 33
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 37
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 38
WITNESSES
Alan D. Bersin, Assistant Secretary of International Affairs and
Chief Diplomatic Officer, Office of International Affairs, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
Janice L. Kephart, Founder and CEO, Secure Identity and
Biometrics Association (SIBA), former Counsel, 9/11 Commission
Oral Testimony................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 53
James M. Chaparro, Executive Vice President, Strategic Enterprise
Solutions
Oral Testimony................................................. 67
Prepared Statement............................................. 69
Frederic Wehrey, Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
Oral Testimony................................................. 76
Prepared Statement............................................. 78
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Material submitted by the Honorable Trey Gowdy, a Representative
in Congress from the State of South Carolina, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 6
Prepared Statement of the Honorable John F. Tierney, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts, and
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform................................ 35
Additional Material submitted by the Honorable Trey Gowdy, a
Representative in Congress from the State of South Carolina,
and Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security,
Commitee on the Judiciary...................................... 102
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Trey Gowdy, a Representative
in Congress from the State of South Carolina, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 107
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 108
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary........................... 109
OVERTURNING 30 YEARS OF PRECEDENT:
IS THE ADMINISTRATION IGNORING THE
DANGERS OF TRAINING LIBYAN PILOTS
AND NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS?
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2014
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security
of the
Committee on the Judiciary
and the
Subcommittee on National Security
of the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:37 p.m., in
room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Trey
Gowdy (Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border
Security, Committee on the Judiciary) presiding.
Present from the Committee on the Judiciary:
Representatives Gowdy, Goodlatte, King, Lofgren, Conyers,
Jackson Lee, and Garcia.
Present from the Committee on Government Reform:
Representatives Chaffetz, Bentivolio, Tierney, Kelly, and Lujan
Grisham.
Staff Present from the Committee on the Judiciary:
(Majority) Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel;
Dimple Shah, Counsel; Graham Owens, Clerk; and (Minority) David
Shahoulian, Minority Counsel.
Staff Present from the Committee on Government Reform:
(Majority) Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian & Deputy General
Counsel; Mitch Kominsky, Counsel; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Sang
Yi, Professional Staff Member; Sharon Casey, Clerk; (Minority)
Jaron Bourke, Director of Administration; Peter Kenny, Counsel;
Chris Knauer, Senior Investigator; Adam Koshkin, Research
Assistant; Julia Krieger, New Media Press Secretary; and Juan
McCullum, Clerk.
Mr. Gowdy. The Subcommittee on Immigration and Border
Security and the Subcommittee on National Security will come to
order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Committee at any time. We welcome our witnesses
today. I will recognize myself first for an opening statement,
and we will have a series of opening statements, given the fact
that this is a joint hearing.
The Administration is moving to lift the longstanding
prohibition against Libyans entering the United States to work
in aviation, maintenance, flight operations or to study or
train in nuclear-related fields. Despite concerns expressed
last November by Representative Jason Chaffetz and Chairman Bob
Goodlatte, DHS moved forward with this change and sent the
draft final regulation to OMB.
Under the terms of the regulation, the removal of the
prohibition will go into effect without prior notice and
comment. We would have to trust the Libyan Government and the
Administration to appropriately vet which Libyans would be
allowed to learn to fly planes and study nuclear technology.
The current prohibition was put into place in the early
1980's after a series of terrorist incidents involving Libyan
nationals. On December 2, 1979, a mob attacked and burned the
U.S. Embassy in Tripoli; and on December 29, 1979, the United
States designated Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism.
In order to protect Americans, on March 11, 1983, the
Reagan Administration implemented this rule to prohibit Libyan
nationals or other foreign nationals acting on behalf of the
Libyan entity from obtaining certain immigration benefits for
the purpose of engaging and/or seeking to obtain aviation
maintenance, flight operations or nuclear-related studies or
training.
While we have hope for a democratic Libya, the question we
must consider today is, has enough changed to lift this
longstanding ban? Why now is post-revolutionary Libya secure
enough to justify and warrant the change? And let's consider
some recent events, if we will. The National Transitional
Council has struggled to govern Libya effectively since the
fall of Qadhafi. The majority of territory outside of Tripoli
has fallen under control of armed militias that have refused to
disarm.
Just 3 weeks ago, on March 12, 2014, the Libyan prime
minister fled after parliament voted him out of office.
Militias based in Western Libya, notorious for their violence
and independence, have launched an offensive against the
Eastern rebels and what can be the opening shots in a civil war
between Western and Eastern Libya. Without a central
government, without any real power, Libya may be falling apart.
Only 2 weeks ago, Libya acknowledged for the first time that
terrorist groups were behind dozens of attacks against security
services.
The government issued a statement on March 19 saying,
``Benghazi and other cities are facing a terrorist war waged by
Libyan and foreign elements who have hostile, evil agendas.''
On March 20, Libya's Government called for international help
to fight terrorism that is threatening internal stability in
the country. On the same day, a missile was launched at the
Tripoli Airport runway, shutting down the airport.
And finally, the head of Libya's military police was
assassinated in Benghazi in October while Libya's first post-
Qadhafi prosecutor general was shot dead on February 8, 2013.
Unfortunately, these new reports indicate that the militias are
getting stronger and not weaker, so why is the Administration
proposing to lift a 30-year ban on Libyans coming to the U.S.
to train as nuclear scientists now?
The Administration's draft regulation justifies the change
because the U.S. Relationship with Libya has been normalized.
In November, my colleagues, Representatives Chaffetz and
Goodlatte, wrote to acting Homeland Security Secretary Beers
about this rule change and spelled out specifically the violent
threats and actions against American antiterrorism operations
in the country.
And we cannot talk about the Libyan-American relationship
without acknowledging the attack against the diplomatic post in
Benghazi resulting in the murder of four Americans. How is this
relationship normalized when our Ambassador was murdered in
Benghazi 18 months ago and not one single solitary person has
been arrested, prosecuted or brought to justice? It seems,
therefore, unjustifiable to rescind a 30-year rule at this
time.
Why are we willing to risk, no matter the likelihood,
chancing Libyan extremists for terrorists to come here to
essentially learn the skills to commit acts of terror? So why
in general, and why now specifically? What has changed? And the
burden of advocating for change, in my judgment, in the status
quo lies with the Administration.
With that, I will recognize the Ranking Member Ms. Lofgren
from California.
Ms. Lofgren. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on the letters that the majority has sent to the
Department of Homeland Security as well as the opening
statement, I believe the concerns can be summarized as follows:
The Libyan Government is fragile. There are extremist elements
in the region that would do us harm. So we can't lift the visa
restriction because these people might somehow harm us.
This argument, however, is illogical.
First, as the Department of Defense, which initiated the
request to rescind the visa restriction in the first place,
makes clear, the whole point of lifting the visa restriction is
to help the Libyan government defeat those very extremists.
Members on both sides of the aisle, including Republican
Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Saxby Chambliss, have
recognized the critical importance of helping the new
democratically elected Libyan Government secure itself against
militant extremism in the region.
But the visa restrictions actually stand in the way.
Because the restriction affects all Libyans, it means we can't
even train the pro-Western forces within the Libyan Air Force
on the aircraft they need to secure their own country against
extremist forces. The Libyan Government's ability to fight such
forces depends on being able to move troops and equipment
throughout the country, and the country currently uses Lockheed
C-130 military transport planes and Boeing CH-47 cargo
helicopters to do that.
But according to the Defense Department, the fleet is aging
and needs repair and replacement, and many more pilots and
flight crew need to be trained. There are proposals to buy
additional aircraft and parts from U.S. companies and to
provide training to pilots and flight crews, but the visa
restrictions stand in the way of those arrangements.
Members on the other side of the aisle may raise the
unfortunate attacks on Benghazi at this hearing today, but that
event actually underscores why we should lift the visa
restriction. On the night of the attack, it was one of those
very same Lockheed C-130 transport planes that the Libyan
Government used to rescue and evacuate their surviving consular
personnel at the U.S. compound in Benghazi. Rather than used
against us, that plane helped Americans survive.
Now, when my colleagues on the other side of the aisle
nevertheless raise the Benghazi attack, as well as other
terrorist incidents within Libya, as grounds for keeping the
visa restriction in place, we must keep in mind that there is a
difference between the extremist forces behind these incidents
and the pro-Western Libyan military that is trying to defeat
them.
And that is the point of lifting the visa restriction. The
visa restriction simply does not differentiate between the
Libyan forces we are trying to help and the forces we are
trying to defeat. It bars friend and foe alike, and that just
isn't smart policy.
That gets us to the second big reason why we should rescind
the visa restriction: It simply isn't needed to keep America
safe from harm. We must bear in mind that the 30-year-old
Libyan visa restriction is the only such country-specific visa
ban of its kind. It is an anachronistic relic of a bygone era.
If a ban were necessary with respect to Libya, which is not
designated a state sponsor of terrorism since the Bush
Administration removed them from the list in 2006, wouldn't it
be even more necessary with respect to countries that are
actually designated as state sponsors of terrorism? Well, those
bans don't exist. There are no country-specific bans for Iran,
Syria, Sudan, Cuba, the countries currently listed as state
sponsors of terrorism, nor is there a ban for rogue nations
like North Korea. And that is because our immigration laws
provide plenty of authority to prevent the travel of
individuals who pose a danger to the U.S. and its interests.
Our immigration laws already require the denial of visas to
persons with suspected ties to terrorism as well as anyone who
is otherwise suspected of posing a threat to national security.
Our immigration laws also require consular officials to deny
visas for an individual whose travel raises significant foreign
policy concerns. The same is true for any individual suspected
of potentially violating the terms of their visa or admission
to the United States.
Over the years, including after the attacks of September
11, 2001, this country has not seen fit to erect more country-
specific restrictions like the Libyan visa ban. Instead, the
U.S. moved in a very different direction, erecting bans that
actually focused on whether the admission of a particular
individual was helpful or harmful to U.S. interests.
In other words, we adopted policies that allowed us to let
in our friends and to keep out our enemies, rather than barring
them all. Doesn't that make more sense? But, unfortunately,
sense is rarely what congressional hearings are about these
days, and I am afraid we will see potentially some scare
tactics and political attacks on the Administration. I hope
not. I hope that my fear is not grounded.
I do thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. Gowdy. Before we go vote and come back, I would ask
unanimous consent to put a couple things in the record.
Number one, the Libya final regulation, final action notice
from the Secretary of DHS, Janet Napolitano, former Secretary
of DHS; February 1, 2010 letter to Assistant Secretary Heyman,
from Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman; May 31, 2012, letter
to Assistant Secretary Heyman from Assistant Secretary Jeffrey
Feltman; February 12, 2013, action memo from Mr. Bersin to DHS;
April 1, 2014, letter to Mr. Bersin from the Assistant
Secretary of Defense Amanda Dory; March 21, 2014, letter to
Chairman Goodlatte and myself from Brian de Vallance, Acting
Secretary for Legislative Affairs of DHS; and finally,
information from OMB showing the date the regulation was sent
to them and that the review was extended.
Because the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act
include explicit exemptions for disclosure to Congress Members
and staff of the House are not restricted in their use of the
information provided by DHS. As is typical, the speech and
debate clause also applies in this context.
With that, I want to apologize to our witnesses--I am
asking unanimous consent. Is there an objection from the
gentleman from Utah?
Mr. Chaffetz. No.
Mr. Gowdy. Okay. So admitted.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Gowdy. I will apologize to the four witnesses. We will
vote as quickly as we can, and then we will come back and
recognize the remainder of our colleagues for their opening
statements and then you for yours.
And with that, we are temporarily recessed.
[Recess.]
Mr. Gowdy. The Subcommittee will come to order and the
Chair will now recognize the Subcommittee Chair from Oversight,
the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz for his opening
statement.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the Chairman.
I thank you all for being here today on this topic.
I simply don't understand. Who in the Federal Government
wakes up in the morning and says, You know, what is in the best
interest of the United States, what would improve the national
security posture of the United States is to make sure the
Libyan nationals can come to the United States and learn about
nuclear sciences, that we have got to teach them about
aviation?
Like who actually wakes up in this country and says, this
will be in the best interest of the United States of America;
let's teach the Libyan nationals about nuclear sciences? That
makes no sense to me. None.
Now, I am sure there are a lot of good and decent people
there that are going through a lot of difficult things, but it
does not mean that we should be actively pursuing the bringing
of Libyan nationals to the United States to train them on
nuclear sciences.
We have got enough Americans that can do this. And as it
relates to aviation security and aviation, we can teach them
overseas. We don't need to bring them to the United States of
America to do this, where we don't monitor them once they are
here.
I was very surprised to read the Department's draft final
regulation, Billing Code 9111-28, that stated, ``DHS has
determined that maintaining this regulation would no longer
reflect current U.S. Government policy toward Libya.'' I am
curious to hear what exactly the Administration's current
government policy toward Libya entails. Of all the things in
the world we have got to do and work on, this is what the
Administration is working on, how to loosen up the visa
requirements for Libyan nationals to come to the United States?
Equally troubling to me was reading Mr. Bersin's memorandum
addressed to then DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano on February
12, 2013. In his memo, Mr. Bersin recommended that the
Secretary take regulatory action to rescind Section 214.5 of
Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations. What is most
surprising is that the memo postdates the tragic day in
Benghazi when our country lost four Americans during a
terrorist attack.
We couldn't even send our FBI into Eastern Libya for 18
days because it was so dangerous. We couldn't get the
intelligence that we needed. We couldn't even get the FBI to go
into that part of the country. And yet, we want to give those
same people a visa to come to the United States to learn about
nuclear sciences? Wow!
However, not one mention of the chaos and violence in Libya
is made in the memo. There appears to be zero consideration of
any geopolitical concern in rescinding this 31-year-old rule
that prohibits certain Libyan nationals from engaging in
aviation or nuclear-related training in the United States.
Meanwhile, just last month, it was reported that the Libyan
former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan fled after parliament voted
him out of office.
A North Korean oil tanker illegally picked up a cargo of
crude from rebels in Eastern Libya, despite a Libyan
government's threat to detain the vessel. In Western Libya,
militias launched attacks against Eastern Libya rebels, which
could provoke a civil war. These events do not indicate a
nation where things have been, ``normalized,'' rather they seem
to be ingredients of a failed state in the making.
Another reason why the Department's rescission of this
prohibition in the CFR is so troubling is the lack of any prior
notice or comment period. That is a deep concern. I have read
the testimonies of the witnesses, and it seems that we are all
in agreement: Libya is a very dangerous place, challenged by
instability. And when looking at corruption indexes, Libya
ranks 172 out of 177, making it the sixth most corrupt country
in the world, if you are going to believe that index.
I was in Libya in September 2012. I was in Libya again in
November of 2013. I heard firsthand the security challenges of
the country. I met with the deputy prime minister, who noted
that the security situation in Libya is tumultuous at best. He
referred to his government as an accidental government. It was
the byproduct of removing an existing government, and he
claimed one of the main obstacles to their progress was a
police force, was the lack of a reliable ministry of interior,
intelligence and internal affairs apparatus to help the police
force.
When we go to give somebody a visa, we rely on the host
nation to help us identify that person and understand their
background. That does not happen in Libya. Let's be realistic.
Muammar Qadhafi was ruling there for 40-plus years. They don't
have the infrastructure and the ability to deal with this.
Now, there was some assertions early on in the testimony
that, well, we need to train them on aviation. Well, then do it
overseas. That is how we have done it in the past. There is
this assertion that there is no prohibition against getting
visas from state sponsors of terrorism and other countries. I
want to sponsor that bill. It is a good idea.
I want to sponsor a bill that says if you are coming from
trying to get a visa from a state sponsor of terrorists, then
you shouldn't be able to get a visa here in the United States.
And there are multiple restrictions on Cuba, Mongolia,
North Korea, Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, for all
sorts of different visas. We have these type of visa--
restrictions in Iran for people trying to come from Iran. So
there is precedent.
I don't see, Mr. Chairman, the reason why we have to deal
with this now, and I am glad to have this hearing.
Yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Utah.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for being here today, as well. I am
going to ask unanimous consent to enter my opening statement in
its entirety into the official record and make just a couple of
brief remarks.
Mr. Gowdy. Without objection.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. We are having a review of the
attempt to define the bilateral relationship between our
country and Libya. And both before and after the fall of Mr.
Qadhafi, the Department of Defense espoused the need to lift
the restrictions that we are discussing.
In view of Libya's challenges in building and stabilizing
democratic institutions it seems advisable that we review
whether or not the success of that country in transitioning has
impacted its ability to meet national security requirements in
a manner that strengthens or weakens the development of its
armed forces and political process.
Everybody agrees that there is greater political
uncertainty now than there was perhaps in 2012, but if the
Department of Defense security experts feel that military
cooperation is a good idea, if they think it would help
stabilize the government, then it would seem to make sense to
me that we have the Department of Defense and their defense
experts here to discuss whether or not the current political
infrastructure is secure enough and reliable enough to warrant
a cooperation that is being recommended.
And I just think that is one of the faults of today's
hearing, is we don't seem to have a full panoply of people that
are making the recommendation, which I think would make
ultimate sense, and therefore, the Committee Members are not
going to get a full discussion of this matter, and I regret
that.
With that, I will rely on the rest of my statement that has
been entered upon the record and thank the Chairman.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tierney follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Gowdy. The Chair would now recognize the gentleman from
Michigan, Past Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman. And we welcome Mr.
Tierney to our ranks.
I would like to make this observation, if I may. Namely,
that the Department of Defense had asked the State Department
and the Department of Homeland Security to rescind a dated 30-
year-old regulation that is currently hindering U.S. interests
in Libya. That regulation, which prevents Libyan nationals and
certain other individuals from coming to the United States to
study flight operations, aircraft maintenance and nuclear
science, was put in place in 1983 when Libya had training camps
and supported terrorism around the world.
Such a prohibition on visas for Libyan nationals may have
made sense in 1983, but it does not make sense over 30 years
later. If country-specific travel bans were necessary to keep
us safe, we would have instituted them for other countries,
like designated state sponsors of terrorism--Iran, Cuba, Syria
or Sudan--and other countries, like North Korea. But we
haven't. That is because our immigration laws provide broad
authority to restrict travel to individuals who may do us harm.
The government already denies admission to anyone suspected
of having ties to terrorism, anyone suspected of otherwise
posing a threat to national security, anyone whose travel
raises significant foreign policy concerns, and even anyone
suspected of potentially violating the terms of their visa or
admission to the United States. This kind of system basically
allows us to keep in the good guys and keep out the bad guys.
It is far superior to a system like the Libyan regulation that
keeps out friend and foe alike.
Libya, and our relationship with Libya, has changed
dramatically since the regulation was promulgated in 1983. In
the late 1990's, Libya became an ally in the war against
terrorism. In the years following, Libya condemned the 9/11
attacks against the United States, paid compensation for
attacks it had been responsible for in the past, destroyed and
surrendered its weapons of mass destruction, signed
international treaties and protocols on nonproliferation and
otherwise sought to return to the good graces of the
international community.
For these actions, the administration of former President
George W. Bush ended sanctions against Libya in 2004. In 2006,
President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice removed
Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Secretary
Rice even said that the United States was resuming, ``normal
diplomatic relations,'' with Libya. Based on those improving
relations, the Department of Defense, not known for being soft
on terrorism, requested that the Libyan regulation be
rescinded.
Libya's ability to fight off extremist forces in the
region, as well as the Arab spring and the Libyan civil war,
put efforts to lift the Libyan regulation on hold. But once
Libya established a new democratically-elected government, one
that sought closer cooperation with the United States, the
Defense Department renewed its request to lift the visa
restriction.
The principle reason for lifting the restriction is to help
the Libyan Government fight a common enemy, extremist militants
in the region. Ladies and gentlemen, this is critical. A few
months ago, Senator John McCain went to Libya and explained the
critical importance of training the Libyan armed forces. He
said, and I quote, ``I have met with the military here, and we
are confident that we have plans now for training and equipment
for the Libyan military.''
Senator McCain noted that this support was critical for
helping the Libyan armed forces carry out their security and
border management tasks, tasks critical to beating the
extremist forces in the region. But the current visa
restriction prevents us from providing a great deal of this
training and equipment, thus making it more likely that the
extremists may win.
I doubt that this is the outcome anyone here wants, and I
thank the witnesses for joining us here today for this
discussion, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, gentleman from Michigan.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia,
the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you and Chairman Chaffetz for holding
this hearing.
On February 1, 2010, then Assistant Secretary of State for
the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman requested
ending the longstanding prohibition against Libyans entering
the United States to work in aviation maintenance flight
operations or to study or train in nuclear-related fields.
Shortly thereafter, widespread unrest in Libya precluded the
U.S. Government from engagement with Libya.
The post-Arab Spring civil war in Libya led to the fall of
the Qadhafi regime in August 2011, and Qadhafi was captured and
then killed by rebel forces in October 2011. Following the
revolution, the Obama administration once again began the
process of ``normalizing'' relations with that country.
Yet, on September 11, 2012, U.S. Ambassador John
Christopher Stevens and three other State Department officials
were killed when terrorists stormed the U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi, Libya, and set it ablaze. A statement by U.S. State
Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the United States
condemned the attack ``in the strongest terms,'' and was
working with Libyan security forces to secure the compound.
President Obama called the attack in Benghazi outrageous
and shocking and vowed its perpetrators will face justice. ``I
have also directed my Administration to increase our security
at diplomatic posts around the world,'' Obama said. ``And make
no mistake, we will work with the Libyan Government to bring to
justice the killers who attacked our people.''
To date, no one has been brought to justice for these
attacks. Instead and despite these attacks, on May 31, 2012,
Feltman, along with Joseph McMillan, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs, again asked DHS
to end the provision stating the ``outdated regulation does not
reflect current U.S. Government policy towards Libya.''
Unbelievably, the letter makes no mention of the attacks,
acting as if they had never occurred.
Rather, as outlined in a February 12, 2013, memo from Alan
Bersin, signed by Secretary Napolitano, ``According to the U.S.
Embassy in Tripoli, there is a robust plan in place to
encourage engagement and educational exchanges in coming years
with the Libyan Government. The Department of Defense is
attempting to initiate a program of aircraft sales, pilot
training and ground crew training early this year worth $2
billion, the contracts for which would go to other countries if
training could not be conducted in the United States. The
Departments of Defense and State have made it clear that,
absent its rescission, the regulation will significantly hamper
these efforts.''
On April 1, 2014, just 2 days before this hearing, the
Department of Defense reiterated its desire to see the
regulation lifted to Mr. Bersin. The memo from Mr. Bersin also
fails to mention the attack in Benghazi, the first time an
ambassador for the United States had been killed since 1979.
The longstanding prohibition on Libyans was put in place to
protect the homeland against serious threats from terrorists
from a particularly unstable and dangerous country.
The Obama administration argues that it is no longer
needed. However, many of the characteristics regarding Libya
that caused the regulation be put in place persist today.
Regardless of any progress that may have been made following
the removal of Muammar Qadhafi from power, many extremist and
terrorist groups operate unfettered in Libya.
Two weeks ago Libya acknowledged for the first time that
terrorist groups were behind dozens of attacks against security
forces. And on March 20, Libya's Government called for
international help to fight terrorism that is threatening
internal stability in that country. That same day, a missile
was launched at the Tripoli Airport.
Four 9/11 hijacker pilots obtained their expertise in
aviation primarily at U.S. flight schools. Do we want to risk
Libyan terrorists learning how to fly airplanes in the United
States? Given the desire of radical regimes and terrorists to
obtain or build nuclear weapons or dirty bombs, do we want to
possibly train Libyan terrorists in nuclear engineering?
If the prohibition is lifted, not only can Libyan
supposedly vetted by the Administration receive this training,
but any Libyan can seek to do so.
Ultimately, it does not appear that national security has
been adequately considered in the effort to end the
prohibition. It is uncertain whether our immigration system has
sufficient integrity to ferret out applicant's long-term
motivations for receiving an education in sensitive topics from
the United States.
As a final note, we have long been seeking information from
the Department of Homeland Security regarding the status of the
rescission of the regulation and the role of the White House.
We only received answers to some of the questions we asked
after this hearing was announced. It is troubling that it takes
such actions by the Committees to receive information from DHS
that is vital for us to fulfill our legitimate oversight role.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the Chairman.
We have a distinguished panel of witnesses.
I am going to do my best to summarize and capture your
backgrounds. If I leave something out, it is not because it is
not important; it is because I am trying to get you out of here
at a reasonable hour. We have your opening statements and then
questions.
I am going to introduce you en bloc, and then I will
recognize you individually for your opening statements and hope
that you do a better job than I did at staying within the 5-
minute time period. The lights mean what they normally mean:
Green means go; yellow means speed up; and red means stop.
First, Mr. Alan Bersin currently serves as assistant
secretary of international affairs and chief diplomatic officer
for Department of Homeland Security, a position he has held
since January of 2012. He oversees the Department's
international engagement and serves as the principal adviser to
Secretary Jeh Johnson on all international affairs. Previously,
he was the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. He has graduated from Harvard, Oxford and Yale,
where he got a law degree.
Ms. Janice Kephart--if I mispronounce your name, forgive
me--currently serves as CEO of Secure Identity and Biometrics
Association, a firm that works to create awareness and promote
the value of secure identity technologies and biometric
solutions. She also recently returned from the special counsel
position with the Senate Judiciary Committee. Prior to that,
she was counsel with the 9/11 Commission and was the author of
``9/11 and Terrorist Travel.'' She holds degrees from Duke and
Villanova School of Law.
Mr. James Chaparro is executive vice president for strategy
at Strategic Enterprise Solutions, an information technologies
services and management consulting company that delivers
cybersecurity technology and program management capabilities to
better enable the government to accomplish their mission. Prior
to that, he had a distinguished 26-year long career in Federal
law enforcement in the national intelligence community. He has
a bachelor of arts degree in political science from California
State, University of Long Beach, and a graduate of the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.
Dr. Frederick Wehrey is a senior associate in the Middle
East Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His
research focuses on political reform and security issues in
Arab Gulf states, Libya and U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Prior to that, he was senior policy analyst at RAND
Corporation. He was also a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air
Force Reserve, completed tours in Turkey, Uganda, Libya,
Nigeria and Iraq, where you earned the Bronze Star in 2003. We
thank you for your service.
He holds an M.A. In Near Eastern studies from Princeton and
a Ph.D. In international relations from Oxford.
With that, we would recognize Mr. Bersin for his 5-minute
opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF ALAN D. BERSIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CHIEF DIPLOMATIC OFFICER, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bersin. Chairmen Goodlatte, Gowdy, Chaffetz, Ranking
Members Conyers, Lofgren and Tierney. I want to assure you that
we have not approached the subject of today's hearing without
careful consideration.
Secretary Napolitano considered it carefully as is
Secretary Johnson, who is taking great care to review this
important issue.
I share your commitment to the safety and security of our
nation, and I would never undertake any measure that would
place this country in jeopardy. I have never awakened on any
morning with the intent to do so. My entire public career and
public life is to the contrary.
Ladies and gentlemen, we have good reasons and prudent ones
for changing this regulation, and I want to ensure you are
comfortable with our thinking or that at least you understand
the basis for the recommendation. I am also available to
discuss this issue with you individually.
Today, I would like to discuss why this is a sound policy
from the standpoint of ensuring that we are issuing visas
appropriately and safely admitting those who we allow to enter
the country in accordance with congressional mandates that have
been established after 9/11.
In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security under then
Secretary Napolitano agreed to formal request by the
Departments of State and Defense to begin the process to amend
the provision from 1983, barring Libyan nationals seeking to
study aviation maintenance, flight operations or nuclear-
related fields in the United States.
It is important to note, as have the Ranking Members, that
8 CFR Section 214.5 applies only to Libyan nationals or other
foreign nationals acting on behalf of a Libyan entity. There
are no other DHS regulations similarly restricting nationals of
other countries, including those that today remain state
sponsors of terrorism.
Much has changed since 1983. The most important change is
that we suffered the attack of 9/11, and after that trauma,
Congress legislated a whole series of security requirements in
response. Notably, Congress did not adopt the technique
embodied in 214.5 of banning nationals of this country or that
country. Instead, Congress adopted a case-by-case approach to
be filtered through multiple layers and checks which is what we
have proceeded to accomplish over the last 13 years.
As a result, distinguished Members, the U.S. Government has
exponentially expanded procedures for vetting immigrants,
refugees and visa applicants. Today, our vetting process
considers a far broader range of information than it ever has
and certainly did in 1983 or in the years before 9/11.
In the absence of 8 CFR 214.5, Libyan visa applicants
seeking admission to the United States for any purpose, to
include aviation, nuclear-related training, would be subject to
the array of visa security measures currently in place to
protect U.S. borders from terrorist-related or other elicit
travel. Each year, 365 people cross our borders to visit this
country for one purpose or another. Every one of them is
subject to the restrictions and the layers of security that I
look forward to discussing with you this afternoon.
Interagency stakeholders, to include DHS, the Department of
State, FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center and other
intelligence community partners have constructed a visa-vetting
processes that leverages state-of-the-art technology, expensive
information sharing, highly skilled and trained officers and
comprehensive interagency cooperation, all to facilitate
legitimate trade and travel without compromising our Nation's
security.
The Security Advisory Opinion mechanism is an interagency
secondary screening process available to consular officers to
provide supplemental advice and background information to
adjudicate cases of visa applicants with possible terrorism or
other security-related ineligibilities. Specific to the
nuclear-related provision of 214.5, Libyan visa applicants
would be subject to a specific type of security advisory
opinion known as Visas Mantis. The purpose of Visas Mantis is
to ensure comprehensive interagency vetting to guard against
improper technology transfers.
Initially, in 2010 and then in 2012, the Departments of
State and Defense formally requested that DHS rescind 214.5 to
allow for comprehensive bilateral security with the Libyan
government. I want to discuss with you today, and I look
forward to doing so, why we at DHS felt that that would not
jeopardize the security of this Nation or the safety of the
American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bersin follows:]
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__________
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Bersin.
Ms. Kephart.
TESTIMONY OF JANICE L. KEPHART, FOUNDER AND CEO, SECURE
IDENTITY AND BIOMETRICS ASSOCIATION (SIBA), FORMER COUNSEL, 9/
11 COMMISSION
Ms. Kephart. Good afternoon, Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman
Chaffetz, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Conyers, Ranking
Member Lofgren, Ranking Member Tierney and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittees.
To be clear, I am not representing the views of the Secure
Identity and Biometrics Association today, an organization I
founded in February.
I understand that DOD, DOE and DOS all have strategic
reasons for wanting the Libyan visa ban on aviation and nuclear
studies lifted and that military and diplomatic agreements are
the usual course of business for the United States. However,
when the immigration system is affected in such a contract,
such situations must be treated with careful consideration. The
immigration system is more than a token and a contract but a
gateway to our great benefits and a core strategic partner in
security.
As such, I deeply appreciate Mr. Bersin's testimony. He has
illuminated much in major improvements to visa processing that
support what we learned on the 9/11 Commission and since that
time.
Unfortunately, there is more than just process at stake in
rescinding this rule. Remember, there is absolutely nothing in
place legally when this rule is rescinded: no processing
requirements, no caveats, no limits on only DOD-endorsed
individuals having access to these visas, for example.
Visas Mantis for high science visas like nuclear studies is
discretionary. Flight school vetting for DOD-endorsed
individuals will be waived, and we know the security concerns
here are widely understood because of the 9/11 hijacker pilots,
who obtained their expertise in aviation primarily at U.S.
flight schools.
Kingfisher counterterrorism automated vetting is not
clearly required.
PATRIOT vetting by ICE officers is not fully in place yet,
and we don't even know if it would apply to Libya. Any Libyan
in any militia that is threatening the Libyan Government right
now, Al-Qaeda or numerous dangerous elements in Libya, could
apply that, but our intelligence simply can't pick up where
there are so many degrees of anti-U.S. sentiment.
While I personally don't think it is the right time for
rescission, the foreign policy questions are for this body and
Administration to jointly decide. What I want to do with the
remainder of my time is pose some areas that deserve further
consideration.
Let me begin with the sensitive and dual-use technologies.
Current law requires that nations actively sending their
citizens to study nuclear and other sciences will not use that
knowledge to increase a region's instability, for one; or two,
develop and transfer arms or sensitive technologies to
terrorists.
In Libya, we have both issues of concern. The region and
the government are highly unstable and the Libyan Government
could end up transferring sensitive technologies to terrorists
under a lot of different scenarios. The 1983 rule under
consideration today requires that no detrimental security
situation be implicated, but rescission will repeal that
standard, too.
Also, why does Libya want these students in the U.S.
really? With a $2 billion military contract at stake, will
these state-sponsored students have to work for the Libyan
Government and in what capacity? Historically, for example,
Iraq's strategy was to send students specifically to study
nuclear-related subjects in order to develop Iraq's
nonconventional weapons programs. One of these students
received his doctorate in nuclear engineering from Michigan
State University, then returned to Iraq to head its nuclear
weapons program.
Similarly, at least three Iranian officials suspected of
developing Tehran's nuclear program also reportedly studied in
the United States.
Libya reportedly sent students to develop Tripoli's weapons
programs prior to Qadhafi's fall.
In 2012, we banned Iranians from obtaining nuclear and
energy-related visas. The precedent set in 2012 represents not
creating a detrimental security situation, which could be very
well preserved in the current rule.
And what do we really know about the individual Libyan
applicants in a nation being torn by internal terrorist
activity? For both nuclear and aviation applicants, it is
unclear whether the Administration's self-created Interview
Waiver Pilot Program could apply to applicants under this rule.
You may recall that the visa interview played a major role
in our 9/11 Commission recommendations and findings. The
Interview Pilot Program enables the waiver of interviews deemed
in the national interest, and there is the possibility that the
national interest exception could apply to some of these
Libyans. The result could be no robust security vetting, nor
interviews for certain Libyans.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that this rule could
detrimentally provide access for Libyans to highly desired
nuclear and aviation visas. However, if there is a decision to
do so, I highly recommend limiting access of these visas to the
original DOD request in the contract, mandating interviews,
mandating Secure Advisory Opinion and Alien Flight School
Program vetting, which is not mandated, using the student
tracking to its utmost potential, and enforcing immigration law
where appropriate.
Thank you so much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kephart follows:]
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__________
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Chaparro.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES M. CHAPARRO, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
STRATEGIC ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS
Mr. Chaparro. Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman Gowdy, Chairman
Chaffetz and Ranking Members Lofgren, Tierney and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
discuss DHS' proposed decision of 8 CFR 214.5. I have spent
over two and a half decades of my professional career
strengthening national security in a number of key positions.
I have served as a frontline special agent with the
Immigration of Naturalization Service; the director of
antismuggling at INS; special agent in charge with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the director of the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center; executive associate director
for Enforcement of Removal Operations at ICE; deputy
undersecretary for intelligence at DHS, INA; and executive vice
president at SE Solutions.
My experience provides me with a deep understanding of
threats and vulnerabilities impacting Homeland Security. I
understand how our legitimate travel systems are continually
exploited by those seeking to circumvent our security efforts,
and I also understand the strengths and weaknesses of our IT
systems that vet visitors as well as our enforcement
capabilities' strengths and weaknesses.
I am extremely proud of the men and women who labor around
the clock and around the globe to help protect us. I understand
their challenges firsthand, and I feel a burning sense of
urgency to help them.
Once a state sponsor of terrorism with an aggressive WMD
program, Libya is working hard to evolve to accepted norms of
international conduct and governance.
Despite the best efforts of Libya's weak and unstable
government, Libya remains a very dangerous place. Radical
extremists within Libya, including factions of Al-Qaeda,
continue to present genuine threats to Libyan security and to
our own. Libya's ineffective border controls cannot stand the
illicit flow of people and weapons across its borders. In fact,
the U.N. Security Council issued a statement last December
urging the Libyan Government to gain control of the vast
amounts of unsecured weapons in Libya, citing the risks of
having those weapons fall into the hands of extremist groups.
I commend the Subcommittees for holding this hearing. While
it is clearly in America's interest to strengthen relations
with Libya, it is also in our interest to protect our own
citizens at home. Rescinding 214.5 begs several questions: Does
Libya have sufficient passport issuance controls, including
effective anticorruption measures? Can Libya control its own
borders to stem the flow of terrorists and weapons? Does Libya
have the capability to conduct comprehensive background and
security checks before it issues passports? Are the breeder
documents used to issue Libyan passports secure?
And then looking at our own mechanisms, how effective are
our own border security screening tools? We have made progress,
but we have gaps. How effective are we at monitoring the
compliance of foreign students in the U.S.? Have we provided
sufficient resources to maintain acceptable levels of
compliance, and have we implemented effective deterrence for
those who failed to comply? How effective are our IT systems at
pushing that necessary information to our frontline officers
and agents?
The GAO has found considerable room for improvement in many
of our border security programs, including SEVP which is
designed to monitor compliance of foreign students. DHS, as Mr.
Bersin noted, has made tremendous advancements in screening
foreign nationals coming into the U.S. including the collection
and analysis of biometrics information, federated search tools,
targeting algorithms and increased information sharing.
But these tools are not a panacea. The tools have improved,
but funds have been cut in operational programs, such as
Homeland Security investigations and enforcement and removal
operations, who are our boots on the ground actually enforcing
the law and pursuing the leads that these tools generate.
For example, when I was running intelligence at ICE,
Department of Defense was bringing in Afghan nationals to
United States for military training to support the Afghan
military. And about once a week, one of them would abscond,
which causes great concern because many had training in
explosives or training in weapons and tactics. And so my point
is that these are very resource-intensive operations.
My two and a half decades of training and experience has
taught me that when it comes to the safety and security of the
American people, we should err on the side of caution. I would
rather explain to the Libyan Government why we want a little
more time to deliberate this important policy matter rather
than sit before this Committee at some point in the future
explaining something that went horribly wrong. I wouldn't feel
comfortable lifting the ban until we were satisfied with our
answers to these questions, and I know and recognize it is a
complex issue.
I thank you for inviting me to testify and I am happy to
answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chaparro follows:]
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__________
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you very much.
Dr. Wehrey.
TESTIMONY OF FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Wehrey. Chairmen Gowdy and Chaffetz, Ranking Member
Lofgren and Tierney and distinguished Committee Members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you today about
Libya's security crisis and why a repeal of CFR 214.5 is
necessary to give the United States the flexibility to assist
the Libyan Government in its difficult transition.
I visited Libya four times since the fall of Qadhafi in
2011, traveling to this country's main cities, including
Benghazi. I have spoken with a range of government officials,
military officers, Islamists and militia leaders about the lack
of security and what to do about it. Now, prior to this, as an
officer in the Air Force Reserve, I served as a military
attache at the Defense Attache Office in Tripoli in 2009 and
again in 2011 before the revolution.
Based on this service and my visits, I will offer some
observations about why U.S. assistance to Libya's military,
especially in the aviation field, is so important for the
country's security.
Now, much of Libya's hope in bringing about a durable peace
to its citizens lies in national reconciliation, a
constitution, a functioning parliament and a government that
can deliver services to its citizens. These are challenges
where outsiders can assist by offering advice and modest
assistance, but the ultimate burden must be carried by Libya's
leaders and its civil society.
The security field is an area where Libya's Government has
sought outside help and where the U.S. is well positioned to
assist. Libya desperately needs a capable military and a police
to assert control of vast expanses of its territory and
confront extremists bent on destabilizing the country and its
neighbors.
During my last trip to Benghazi in November, I was struck
by the poor state of Libyan military units in that city, ill-
equipped and lacking even basic body armor and secure
communications. They are often indistinguishable from local
Islamist militias.
Aviation is an especially important part of the effort to
bolster security across the country. But the Libyan air force
is currently unable to perform even basic missions. Long
neglected by Qadhafi, its aircraft are poorly maintained;
flight training is inadequate; and crashes are common. The
Libyan air force lacks the critical capacity to ferry equipment
and personnel from one part of the country to another.
Now, in response to a request by the Libyan Government, the
U.S. has committed to train and equip a new Libyan national
army, denoted in military terms as a ``general purpose force.''
Equipping Libya's military with new lift and mobility aircraft,
such as the C-130 and CH-47, is an essential element in the
U.S. plan to help Libya secure its territory and confront
extremism.
So, too, is training a new generation of Libyan pilots in a
secure U.S. location with adequate facilities and simulators.
Training in Libya is unfeasible due to security conditions and
the lack of facilities. CFR 214.5 stands in the way of this
assistance.
Now, certainly, the effort to build Libya's military faces
challenges and difficulties. U.S. support to the Libyan
military must be undertaken in a way that does not further
polarize or destabilize the country. The U.S. must ensure that
it trains a force that is respectful of human rights and
subordinate to a democratically elected government. But to meet
these challenges, the Department of Defense has to have the
flexibility to meet Libya's security assistance needs.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a few words about
Islamic extremism and the influence of Al Qaeda in Libya.
Some observers have charged that the Libyan government has
grown hostile to the United States and is under the sway of
hardline Islamists. Much of this commentary is unfortunately
based on a superficial reading of Libya's complex politics.
Certainly, there are pockets of Libyan territory that are rife
for exploitation by local jihadists working with transnational
Al Qaeda elements, but I want to emphasize that these actors
remain on the fringes of Libya's politics and its security
institutions. Overwhelmingly, the country's Islamists reject
violence for political means. Like most other Libyans they
remain committed to moving the current forward on a democratic
path, and they welcome cooperation with the United States,
provided it is done in a way that is respectful of Libyan
sovereignty and built on a foundation of mutual trust.
Mr. Chairman, the repeal of CFR 214.5 will help build that
trust. It will pave the way for the U.S. to provide vital
aviation assistance to Libya's military. It is a small but
important step in enabling the country's elected government to
protect its citizens and territory, combat violent extremism,
and advance the hard-won gains of its revolution.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wehrey follows:]
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__________
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, sir.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia,
the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Goodlatte, for his
questions.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bersin, can you give us some more details about the $2
billion contract that you believe is at stake here?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, the $2 billion figure that you
quoted in the--from the memorandum was the information that,
best information we had received from the State Department, the
Defense Department in--at the time that the memorandum was
composed. As you have seen from the letter filed in connection
with this hearing, that number has been reduced based on the
assessment of what assistance could be available to Libya.
Mr. Goodlatte. And where was this assistance coming from?
Mr. Bersin. From the United States.
Mr. Goodlatte. So we would be paying the Libyans to come
here and be trained, not generating additional work from
outside the country, additional resources to pay people in the
United States to provide these services?
Mr. Bersin. I believe the reference in the letter dated
April 1st related to hardware. Now I am not familiar with the
budget lines that would separate between hardware that would be
purchased and supplied and services that might be involved. I
am simply not able to do that, although I am certain the
Pentagon could.
Mr. Goodlatte. You issued a memo to Secretary Napolitano
advocating for rescission of the rule that bars Libyan
nationals from entering the United States. The memo you sent to
Napolitano fails to discuss the attacks on the U.S. compound in
Benghazi, does not discuss recent terror threats coming out of
Libya or the instability of the current Libyan Government. Do
you think that any event would change the Administration's mind
about rescinding the rule when the death of a U.S. Ambassador
did not and very heavy terrorist activity inside Libya right
now does not seem to change that?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, and respectfully, the attachments
to the memorandum that was submitted with my memorandum to
Secretary Napolitano did mention the tragic, horrible and
unspeakably indefensible attack on our compound in Benghazi.
Mr. Goodlatte. The attachment, but not the memo itself. So
in the memo, you did not address those concerns? Why would that
be?
Mr. Bersin. Because the issue that we were addressing was
the request of the Defense Department and the State Department
made to engage with those elements of Libya, the Libyan
Government, with whom we could do business and who would be
able to take actions in the--that would be in the interest of
the United States. The focus of our request, because that is a
policy judgment that was recommended by State and Defense, and
we did not take issue with it, but the focus of our concern was
on how we would issue visas and what protections existed to be
able to assure that we could do so securely and safely.
Mr. Goodlatte. But isn't it true that if the regulation was
lifted, there would be nothing in place to prevent any Libyan
from seeking access to the United States for purposes of flight
training or to study nuclear science?
Mr. Bersin. They could, as is the case from, with the
exception of Iran, from other citizens of sponsors of state
terrorism in which there is no specific or overall ban, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. I don't want to get into other countries
that we might want to add to that list, but I certainly don't
have a problem associating what is going on in Libya today with
the same kind of concerns we have with what is going on in Iran
today. And why would we want to reduce that list in a country
that is having the kind of problems. It is disturbing to me.
Mr. Bersin. The ability to enlist and recruit those people
who are known to our military and to our diplomats and to be
able to distinguish between them and terrorists I think is a
fundamental assumption here that is a good assumption.
Mr. Goodlatte. Why didn't you modify the regulation to
provide that only Libyans vetted by the U.S. military could
seek to do these things? Why do you repeal the entire
regulation?
Mr. Bersin. Because of the system of vetting and the layers
of security that exist, Mr. Chairman, we have confidence that
we do this every day and that we could do this in this case.
And with respect to the specific areas of flight maintenance
and operations and nuclear-related fields, there are extra
layers of security and vetting through which everyone who would
be invited into the country would go through.
Mr. Goodlatte. My time is running out. Let me turn to Ms.
Kephart and ask her what she thinks about this. Do you agree
with me that there is nothing that would prevent any Libyan
from seeking access to the United States for purposes of flight
training or studying nuclear science?
Ms. Kephart. That is correct.
Mr. Goodlatte. The State Department recently updated their
security vetting procedures to include a new system called
Kingfisher. The system was up and running for nonimmigrant
visas as of June 15, 2013, and functions for immigrant visas as
of the first week of September of last year. The notice to
rescind the regulation makes no mention whatsoever of
Kingfisher, though the rescission notice was sent to OMB on
January 1, 2014. Isn't it crucial to ensure that Kingfisher
processing is required for all Libyans seeking to study
aviation or nuclear science?
Ms. Kephart. I agree, and I would also add that right now,
under the draft language supporting the final rule rescission,
everything, all the other security vetting is discretionary as
well. There is mention of Visa Mantis for nuclear science, but
it is not required. There is mention of the flight, the Alien
Flight Student Program, but that is waived for DOD applicants,
so, you know, you have got some loopholes in there that are
pretty big, and I think, and PATRIOT also is not mentioned,
either, the visa security vetting as well. So I think these are
all really great measures that if they are in place would help
a lot with this particular rule, but it is not even mentioned,
and having it discretionary leaves too many loopholes, in my
view.
Mr. Goodlatte. My time has expired.
Thank you, Ms. Kephart.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair will now recognize the gentlelady from
California, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Ms.
Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is the Department of Defense that is really driving this
proposal as best I can figure, and the letter that has been put
into the record makes it clear that the Defense Department
believes it is important to actually get this changed so they
can strengthen the Western forces in the Libyan Government.
Now, I asked my staff to check with the Defense Department
to understand why in the Department's view it is important to
train Libyan officials in the United States, and if we assume
that it is important, and I think everyone does, that we
strengthen Western forces--I don't think anybody is against
doing that--why would we have to do it here? Now, what we were
told is that the training that would normally be done, let's
talk about the pilots, has to be done under secure conditions,
and that the simulators and training facilities that meet those
security requirements are really only here, and that if the
travel ban continues, the Defense Department would have to
establish secure training facilities someplace else, which they
haven't done, and they don't have the budget to do and/or the
material to do. Is that your understanding? I guess I should
ask you, Dr. Wehrey, is that your understanding of what the
crux of the problem is here?
Mr. Wehrey. Yes, ma'am. There is--I mean, there is really
no facilities to do it. Obviously, in Libya, they are in
disrepair, security conditions. So it would have to be done in
the United States or at a third country. I mean, I visited some
of these air bases, and there is just no place. There is no
infrastructure and then, of course, the security issue.
Ms. Lofgren. Now, Secretary Bersin, obviously, all of us
want to have a safe country. We don't want anybody who would do
harm to the United States to be admitted to the United States.
There is no disagreement on that point, I don't think, among
any Member of the Committee. The concerns that have been raised
about our ability to adequately vet prospective Libyan trainees
I think needs to be addressed directly. Do you think that the
State Department, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security can adequately screen who we want to receive
the training in the United States? Are we up to that task, do
you think?
Mr. Bersin. Ms. Lofgren, yes. In addition to that, there is
the combined resources of the intelligence community, the
National Counterterrorism Center, and the FBI and the
Department of Justice.
Ms. Lofgren. Now, how--can you explain the process that DHS
would use to screen out potential bad actors from Libya who
might want to come and receive training here but really aren't,
they are not our side? How would you address that?
Mr. Bersin. In two specific ways. First is the standard
visa vetting process that takes place with regard to all
foreigners who enter the United States, and that involves being
checked against massive databases that are maintained by the
United States Government. These include the Automated Biometric
Identification System, containing 160 million fingerprints; the
FBI Next Generation Identification System, which contains 76
million criminal records; the consolidated, consular
consolidated database maintained by the State Department that
has 109 million photos of visa applicants; the Consular Lookout
and Support System that contains 27 million records of people
who have applied for and been rejected for visas.
In addition, Ranking Member Lofgren, there is the Terrorist
Screening Center activities, in which we are constantly
screening visa applicants against to rule out people of high
risk. That is just at the front end.
With regard to specific people who would be applying to
flight maintenance schools or flight operations schools, there
is a special Transportation Security Administration security
check that would both validate the schools to which they
applied, as well as an additional security check, based on
biometric and biographic information.
With regard to those who would be seeking to participate in
nuclear-related fields, there is a special program called the
Visas Mantis program----
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
Mr. Bersin [continuing]. Which would involve very specific
vetting and a security advisory opinion that is geared
specifically to that. After people would come to the United
States, there would be a monitoring of their activities through
the SEVIS program----
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
Mr. Bersin. The Student and Exchange Visitor Program.
Ms. Lofgren. That is pretty effective, yeah?.
Mr. Bersin. And there are other layers of security I would
be happy to go into.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I think--I see my time has expired. I
will just mention something I mentioned to the Chairman that
years ago, when I was a practitioner, before this ban was in
place, I had occasion to meet someone from Libya who had a
post-doctoral degree in nuclear physics, and he was getting
offers from all over the world, I mean, for his own lab to go
develop nuclear programs for other countries, and the Defense
Department was quite interested that he not go to those other
countries, and we ended up getting a national interest waiver
so that that Libyan could not leave the country and eventually
did become an American and became an employee of the Department
of Defense. So it is important that we have our friends here.
And blanket decisions will not allow us to make those kind of
fine decisions. I mean, for example, the idea of doing a
blanket prohibition on visas to Syria, I mean, we have got
Christians who are fleeing Syria and who are seeking refuge in
the United States. Surely we don't want to turn those people
away. So I think it is important to use our decisionmaking in a
way that serves American interests.
Mr. Bersin. Ms. Lofgren, if I might, the Congress itself
made that decision in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
when restrictions on issuance of visas to nonimmigrants from
countries that are state sponsors of international terrorism
did not go to the ban as a technique but rather insisted that
there be judgments made case by case, visa by visa before
entering. And so this a--this has defined the way in which we
approach this matter.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from California.
And the Chair would now recognize the gentleman from Utah,
the Chairman of the OGR Subcommittee, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Bersin, what is the driving need to have a Libyan
national trained on nuclear sciences?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, there are two policy judgments
that are basically involved here. One had to do with the
desirability of the engagement and the need to engage with
those elements of the Libyan Government with whom our Defense
Department and State----
Mr. Chaffetz. But they don't have any nuclear power plants
there.
Mr. Bersin. That is a decision that was made, a policy
decision that was made, and I can't--I can point you to the
letters on which I relied and the points that were made in
those letters, but for reasons that are not clear to me,
representatives of the Defense Department and the State
Department are not here to respond.
Mr. Chaffetz. So you are going to provide to both the
Judiciary and the Oversight Committee all the letters
articulating the need for Libyan nationals to be trained on
nuclear sciences as well as aviation?
Mr. Bersin. The ones that I have seen, yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. And when will you provide those?
Mr. Bersin. You have the two letters plus the third that
was filed this week that made reference to that request.
Mr. Chaffetz. I still don't understand for this Committee
why the driving need to train Libyan nationals on the nuclear
sciences.
Let me also ask you, Mr. Bersin, why not issue a public
notice and allow for a comment period?
Mr. Bersin. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the letter from
Assistant Secretary de Vallance to this Committee, the decision
on whether or not to apply the foreign policy exception which
would preclude the need for a hearing is a decision that is
still under consideration, and no decision has been made, and
the matter will be determined in due course.
Mr. Chaffetz. I know it is not required in the regulation.
Why not do it?
Mr. Bersin. The matter is being considered, and Secretary--
--
Mr. Chaffetz. But you listed out all the different agencies
that are allowing comment period. Why not allow the American
people? Why not allow the United States Congress? Why exclude
them?
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Chaffetz. What is the harm?
Mr. Bersin. I have no official authority to make the
decision. I hear you, and I don't disagree personally, but my
personal view is unimportant.
Mr. Chaffetz. Who makes that decision?
Mr. Bersin. The Secretary would make it in consultation
with----
Mr. Chaffetz. What sort of consultation have you been in
with the White House?
Mr. Bersin. The National Security Council is aware of the
request that was made by the Defense Department, the State
Department, and is also aware that DHS has decided that given
that policy direction, we can adequately and will adequately
protect the American people.
Mr. Chaffetz. What is your viewpoint of the status, what is
it like in Libya right now?
Mr. Bersin. Libya is, as Dr. Wehrey described it, an
unstable, dangerous, and insecure place. There is no question
about that. That does not mean, from the standpoint of the
Defense Department and the State Department, that we should
stand back and not work with those people within the government
that we can work with. Normalization does not mean secure nor
does it mean peaceful nor does it mean halcyon; it means that
we will engage.
Mr. Chaffetz. So when we are doing these visa applications,
you listed out a number of things that we look at in order to
assess somebody's viability, and you talked about the big
databases we have. How many Libyan criminal records do we have
in our database?
Mr. Bersin. Inside our databases, the FBI would not
maintain criminal records unless it was collected as part of a
previous case.
Mr. Chaffetz. So the answer is zero. How many of----
Mr. Bersin. It is not zero. Respectfully, sir, it is not
zero. We would have to find out.
Mr. Chaffetz. When will you give me that number?
Mr. Bersin. We will make inquiry because I could tell you
as a former Federal prosecutor, if there were Libyan criminal
cases, we would have those records in our database.
Mr. Chaffetz. I am just wondering when you are going to
give those to the Committee. You said you have those, you can
get those.
Mr. Bersin. I will make inquiry. I don't have them
available now.
Mr. Chaffetz. How many fingerprints, photos, terrorist
screening centers? I mean, part of the issue here is the fact
that you don't have a fully functional host nation government.
We have to deal with the fact that after a 40-year regime there
under Muammar Qadhafi, they are not a functioning country at
this point. You can't get to--have you ever been to Libya?
Mr. Bersin. I have not, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. As a Member of Congress I have been there
twice. I couldn't even go to the eastern part of the country.
And so if we are trying to assess an individual who comes from
Darnah or pick anyplace, how are we going to assess that? We
can't even get there, let alone be able to work with the host
nation government. There is no host nation government to work
with.
Mr. Bersin. I understand that, sir, and I understand that
many of our diplomats and particularly our soldiers go to
places that are very dangerous. You could add to the example of
Libya what is going on in Egypt today on occasions, what is
going on in Yemen, what is going on as our soldiers are under
attack in Afghanistan.
Mr. Chaffetz. It doesn't excuse or explain the idea that
Libya is a very unique case. I see no urgency to try to get
this through, particularly as it relates to the nuclear
sciences. I wish the Administration would work with Congress. I
think we could probably figure something out. But what the
Administration has done is worked with a whole host of
agencies, except Congress. We send you a letter. Chairman
Goodlatte sends you a letter. No response. And then we get some
partial information back, didn't answer all of the questions,
and we have got to yank you up here for a hearing.
Mr. Bersin. May I say, in response to that, while we may
disagree on many matters this afternoon, we do not disagree on
the inexcusability of that late response. And I want to
reiterate the apology that was contained in Secretary de
Vallance's letter, and I know because it was included, and you
have been informed that Secretary Jeh Johnson, now in his 100th
day, together with his chief of staff has put into place
procedures that would not lead to that result. I, again,
apologize for that.
Mr. Chaffetz. I appreciate your sincerity. I am 0 for 2
with him so far, but I do appreciate his leadership. I am glad
he is in that role, look forward to working with him.
Yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Utah.
And the Chair would now recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. I basically think Ms. Lofgren covered most of
the ground on this perspective, but Secretary Bersin let me
just ask you, with respect to a review from an individual
coming from Afghanistan to the United States, would their
security check be the same as, less than, or more intensive
than one for proposed process for Libyans?
Mr. Bersin. It would be the same unless there were special
condition, and then it would be the additional security checks
and layers that would be applied.
Mr. Tierney. How about Yemen?
Mr. Bersin. Same, same answer.
Mr. Tierney. How about Somalia?
Mr. Bersin. Same answer.
Mr. Tierney. Sudan?
Mr. Bersin. Same answer.
Mr. Tierney. Djibouti?
Mr. Bersin. Same.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The
Chair would now recognize himself.
Mr. Bersin, I want to start by thanking you for your
service as a Federal prosecutor and tell you what you have
probably already picked up on, which is that I am a
simpleminded guy, and I find myself in some instances having to
piggyback on the equally simpleminded questions of Mr.
Chaffetz.
It strikes me that the prohibition would not have been put
in place except for a desire to be punitive whenever the Reagan
administration put it in place, right? It was designed and
calculated to be punitive. So the lifting of it would be a
reward. Is that fair?
Mr. Bersin. Well, I would never refer to the Chairman as
simpleminded.
Mr. Gowdy. Everybody else does, it is okay.
Mr. Bersin. But the decision, sir, respectfully, was
because circumstances have changed and because after 9/11, we
have a completely different approach to the way in which we
look at how we vet people coming into this country.
Mr. Gowdy. I get that, but your position would be
buttressed if this move were made more contemporaneous with 9/
11. It has been quite some time since 9/11, and the move has
not yet been made.
Mr. Bersin. Well, Mr. Chairman, the fact is that the
engagement with Libya began in the Bush administration; 2003
and 2004 is when Libya renounced terrorism and renounced its
use of weapons. President Bush sent an ambassador to Tripoli.
In 2006, it was the Bush administration that removed Libya from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Mr. Gowdy. I am with you. And Mr. Chaffetz said that part
of his frustration was that there had not been a lot of
consultation with Congress, which is not your fault, but
nonetheless that is his perception. I want to tell you what my
perception is because you seem like somebody I would be very
pleased to have a conversation with about this. It strikes me
that when you talk about normalization or what kind of
countries, to use your quote, Libyan Government with whom we
could do business, that was a quote that you used in response
to another answer--question. And it strikes me that a
government with whom I would be interested in doing business
would be a government that has some semblance of a civil or
criminal justice system. So I understand that some of my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle don't want to go back
to Benghazi, but it is tough. It would be tough in my district
to explain to people why a government that can't help us make a
single solitary arrest in 18 months or a prosecution would be a
government that we would trust to vet applicants to come to
this country. How is that analysis flawed?
Mr. Bersin. Chairman, we don't trust the Libyans nor do we
trust any other country to do the vetting that we are required
to do under the law, and we do that. When we can, through the
intelligence community or otherwise, receive information on
people because of inquiries that are made, we take it, but this
is a responsibility of our government to do this.
With regard to the state, I admit and concur with you that
Libya is in a very unstable place. Dr. Wehrey, I think,
outlined the considerations quite directly. But I can tell you
as a vice president of INTERPOL, the international criminal
police organization, that in fact there are many countries
around the world, not only the ones that Mr. Tierney mentioned,
but many countries that don't have the rule of law established.
We do everything we can to help build the capacity for that,
but it is a fact of life so that when we invite someone to
enter this country, it has got to be based on capacity and
knowledge and data that we have.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, I am not disagreeing with you there, but I
do believe that having a normalized, whatever that definition
may be, I am not a diplomat, but whatever that definition is, a
normalized relationship between our country and another country
is a reward or a benefit to that country.
It may also be a reward and a benefit to our country, but I
would imagine that there are countries that want to have a
better relationship with ours, and I don't think it is asking
too much that we tell that country, this is what we would like
to see. And Benghazi leaps to mind. There was a schoolteacher
that was murdered in Benghazi. It didn't get nearly the
attention that our diplomats and our Stevens and Smith and
Doherty and Woods got, but a teacher named Ronnie Smith was
murdered in Benghazi. There have been no arrests. I have heard
nothing about it. If you are going to seek a reward from this
government, which is how I view this, then I would expect to
see something on your behalf, and a stable criminal justice
system, which results in arrest and prosecutions, would be
something I would be interested in.
Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would also
welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you in the
aftermath of the hearing. With regard to the suggestion you
just made, I urge you to take that up with the State Department
in a similar kind of discussion.
Mr. Gowdy. Oh, excuse me. The Chair would now recognize Ms.
Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Doctor, I am glad you are here today because it would
appear that you have firsthand knowledge of the situation in
Libya and have knowledge from a military perspective training,
why training Libyans may further security goals. What is your
military expertise, and how did that lead you to your
understanding of U.S.-Libya military relationships?
Mr. Wehrey. Nineteen years in the Air Force, 9 years active
duty, 10 years in the Reserves. I am what is called a foreign
area officer. I speak Arabic. I served for 2 and a half months
in Libya as the acting chief of security cooperation, where I
was assisting the active duty defense attache, essentially
spearheading this nascent training effort in 2009 that included
English language training to the Libyan military, C-130
maintenance, so it gave me a sense of the Libyan military,
their structure, their weaknesses, their shortcomings.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. You seem to be arguing that in order to
maintain security within Libya, the central government needs a
strong airlift capability, and currently, the Libyans have
minimal capability in that regard with both aging equipment and
aging pilots. Is that correct?
Mr. Wehrey. That is correct. We are talking about systems
that have fallen into real disrepair throughout the sanctions
era. They are legacy U.S. systems. The pilots are aging. They
need these systems really to project the government's authority
over a very expansive country, to include border control, an
issue that the international community cares about, to include
securing oil facilities in the far south of the country. The
roads are in disrepair. So we are really talking about giving
the government, the military, an essential military capability.
And I should also add that the air force of Libya's
institutions or of its military services is among the most
coherent and most pro-Western elements in the country. I mean,
Air Force officers defected en masse during the revolution,
entire air bases went over to the rebel side. These are
Western-oriented officers. They could not have gotten to where
they are in Libya's military if they were extremists or
Islamists. Qadhafi made sure of that, so----
Ms. Kelly. So the airlift capabilities would help in
maintaining security?
Mr. Wehrey. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Kelly. And also you seem to be saying that in order to
have a strong security force with airlift capabilities, DOD
needs to be able to provide training to the Libyans. The
current regulation CFR 214.5 is hampering that training. Is
that accurate?
Mr. Wehrey. That is accurate, yes.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. And can the Department of Defense
sufficiently train Libyans in Libya do you think?
Mr. Wehrey. I believe they can. I mean, obviously, this is
an international effort as well. We have to remember that many
of our allies have also committed to helping Libya's military,
the Turks, the British, the Italians, the U.N. is heavily
involved, so it is really an international effort, and the
Libyans I think welcome U.S. expertise, and they want this
training.
Ms. Kelly. So do you feel like they need to come to the
U.S. for training or not necessarily, or there are practical
limitations of training Libyans in Libya?
Mr. Wehrey. Well, again, I think that is a question for the
Department of Defense. My understanding, as was mentioned, that
there are a number of cost issues and practicalities to having
this training at a third country outside of Libya. Certainly it
would be easier and more efficient to have it in the United
States.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from Illinois.
The Chair would now recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr.
King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
hearing and the testimony of the witnesses here today.
And I would turn first to Dr. Wehrey and just inquire, your
last trip into Libya was November 2013, and you talked about
the presence of militia there. Hard to distinguish whether they
were Islamic extremists or whether they were from other
entities. Does the government of Libya have a full military and
security presence in Benghazi?
Mr. Wehrey. They have a marginal presence. They have a
special forces unit there. They have infantry. They do have
regular Army units. I mean, I visited the base of a Libyan
military unit there in Benghazi. The problem is they are ill-
equipped. They lack training. They lack essential
communications. So they are competing with these other
militias, so the way they control the city is by, in some
sense, cooperating with these militias, and they can't push too
hard against them.
Mr. King. Okay. Somewhat like Beirut then, would that be
similar? Have you traveled there?
Mr. Wehrey. It is a very, I think, rough and I think,
frankly, crude analogy. I mean, you do have----
Mr. King. With Hezbollah standing on the streets in Beirut
along with--okay, I will just skip away from that, and we will
focus on Benghazi for a moment. Do government security
personnel, are they, do they openly patrol the streets?
Mr. Wehrey. In places like Tripoli, yes.
Mr. King. Benghazi.
Mr. Wehrey. Yes, and in Benghazi, they do. When I went to
Benghazi, there were government military personnel at every
checkpoint. They were out in force.
Mr. King. Where?
Mr. Wehrey. The government has made an effort with what it
has to patrol the streets, and I visited the country four times
since the revolution, and in each visit, I have seen more and
more uniformed police and military on the streets and less and
less informal militias, technicals.
Mr. King. Tell me about your security detail there in
Benghazi.
Mr. Wehrey. I am sorry?
Mr. King. Your security detail in Benghazi, did you wear a
bulletproof vest or helmet?
Mr. Wehrey. I did not have a security detail.
Mr. King. You walked down the streets----
Mr. Wehrey. Yes.
Mr. King. And you were anonymous enough that you didn't
fear for your life?
Mr. Wehrey. Yes.
Mr. King. Okay. What about the operation of militia or,
say, Islamic extremism in places like Tripoli that might come
from places like Benghazi, can you tell us about the
instability in Tripoli?
Mr. Wehrey. It is not really an issue in Tripoli. Again,
the Islamist presence is primarily or the radical Islamist
presence is primarily in the east, in Darnah.
Mr. King. Didn't they once circle the parliament and shut
down the parliament in Tripoli, and didn't that force come from
Benghazi and not----
Mr. Wehrey. Part of it came from Benghazi. Part of it was
from Misrata. It was actually a diverse coalition of interests.
There were people from the south, people from the west. I spoke
to many of these individuals about what they wanted. I actually
talked to them about what they wanted, and they were not doing
it out of an Islamic cause. They were pressing the government
for certain infrastructural requirements. They believed they
needed to use force. It was not an Islamic takeover of the
parliament.
Mr. King. Just I appreciate you willing to take this risk,
not the risk of testifying before Congress, that is relatively
safe, but walking the streets of Benghazi is not. And I would
reflect upon after hearing the testimony here that this is a
difficult question. We want to help stand up a security force
and detail in Libya that will be our friend and our ally that
can project force into all of Libya and perhaps beyond if
called upon to do that. I hear the testimony that if we are
going to have a Libyan Air Force, we need to have personnel
that are trained to take care of the maintenance on that and to
get that Air Force in the air, but it is not practical to train
them in Libya, and I don't know who has got the best answer to
that question, but I would turn perhaps to Mr. Bersin on that.
Why is it not practical? Who testified to that? Was that
you, Doctor? Who testified that it is not practical to train
them in Libya?
Mr. Wehrey. I did, sir.
Mr. King. Okay. Then I would direct the question to you,
Doctor, please.
Mr. Wehrey. Well, again, I would defer the ultimate answer
to that to the Department of Defense. I mean, they do the
assessments, but my understanding is there is very--I mean, the
actual air bases are in a state of disrepair. There are certain
air bases and certain facilities that are, in fact, under the
control of militias, they have not been turned over. So have
the armories. Something I didn't mention was the fact that if
you put U.S. personnel, boots on the ground, contractors, you
introduce a dynamic I think that could undermine a lot of the
goodwill that Libyans feel toward the United States right now.
Mr. King. Okay. Ms. Kephart, could you respond to that same
question, please? I watch my clock ticking down here.
Ms. Kephart. Could--the last part of your question was the
practicalities of training the Libyans here in the United
States? Yes?
Mr. King. Versus that in Libya, yes.
Ms. Kephart. Right. I think the biggest problem you have is
you have got an incredibly--you have got no infrastructure
really with the government right now that can provide border
security in Libya, so you really don't know who your applicants
are going to be. I think the infusion of a lack of intelligence
about who you are actually dealing with is the big problem
here. I think there is a concern about DOD and DOD being able
to do its business, but the problem with this rule rescission
is it is so broad that it could apply to anybody, and the
militias that have been testified about here today all have
access to those visas as well, so bringing them here creates
the enforcement issues with immigration, as well as all the
other security and counterterrorism issues that you all have
heard about multiple times.
Mr. King. I hear your testimony on that, and I appreciate
it. I know the light is red, but I would ask unanimous consent
to yield to the gentleman from Utah for 1 minute or to the
Chairman at their choice. They are talking.
Mr. Gowdy. Will this be in lieu of a second round would be
my question to the gentleman from Utah?
Mr. Chaffetz. I would like to simply make a point if my
colleagues are okay with that.
I think they are overstating the security situation in
Benghazi and Libya. I just wanted to inject in here as you are
talking about what it is like in Benghazi, let's remember that
Libya's first post-Qadhafi prosecutor was shot and killed,
let's also understand that the head of Libya's military police
was assassinated in Benghazi in October, let's remember that
our U.S. SEALs had to board a ship that had gone into the port
there in eastern Libya. I mean, we are having to deploy SEALs
to go over and take care of business over there, and for us to
suggest that, hey, it is just getting better, we see a few more
police out there--can anybody here name who is the prime
minister of Libya? You can't because he had to flee. This place
is falling apart. The military, the militias have over 8,000
people in prisons. You have got another town in Libya where
they had 40,000 people had to leave. You had an Indian doctor
who was assassinated. Consequently, according to press reports,
1,600 doctors have left the country. This place is falling
apart, and we are over here trying to figure out how to get
more Libyans into the United States to be trained on nuclear
sciences. It doesn't add up.
Yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Iowa and the
gentleman from Utah.
And the Chair would now recognize the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
First of all, let me thank both Committees for joining
together on an important question, and I believe that we do
ourselves a disservice to come to a hearing like this with a
closed mind.
We recognize that part of the engine behind the decision,
Mr. Bersin, is a reality of the small world in which we live,
and the question is, do we turn our backs and utilize the
turtle theory, or do we answer questions from Members of
Congress, legitimate questions, about breach of security that
would result in a terrorist act on our soil? I think that is
what my friend from Utah is suggesting, that we would allow
individuals into the United States unchecked and that they
would perpetrate horrors because, one, they would not be
tracked. So let me say to you that I think the premise of this
repeal of this particular regulation has value, but I do think,
as someone who has been in the region, is on Homeland Security,
I think we have just seen each other recently, I recognize that
our ultimate responsibility, I just got through interviewing on
the question of Fort Hood and the issue of whether we can
protect our soldiers on domestic soil. Our soldiers are not
supposed to be armed. We are a civilian government. But whether
or not we can protect against this potential of happening.
So let me ask this question to you: The title of the
hearing is provocative. It says that we are going to be
training nuclear scientists, and that raises an ugly head that
we are going to be training people who will use nuclear bombs
to implode. Why don't you tell us what you think the impact of
such a regulation will be? Is it your goal to bring over
nuclear scientists? Can you kind of describe what kind of
training and the level that individuals will be at, and then I
would like to ask Mr. Wehrey--am I pronouncing your name right,
sir?
Mr. Wehrey. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. You were on the ground, and I
want you, in fact both of you to answer the question that I
think has been asked is, what will be our checks and balances?
What will be our screening process? And I ask Mr. Bersin a
larger question of the types of individuals that will come
over. Let me yield at this point.
Mr. Bersin. Ms. Jackson Lee, the people that would be
selected would not be a casual process. The Defense Department
would select and vet those people who they would recommend
apply for visas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The Defense Department?
Mr. Bersin. That is correct. At that point, the whole
panoply of screening mechanisms that I described in my
testimony would apply to these particular individuals. So this
would be a very carefully monitored and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would this be a crowd of thousands?
Mr. Bersin. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And so let's just say if we framed it in
that way, you would expect what? Because we have done training
in Egypt, remember that was a longstanding relationship that we
had with the Egyptian military, of course, over the period of
time, and certain other countries in the Mideast, we have the
Saudis trained over here. So what level of size are we talking
about?
Mr. Bersin. I am unable to give you a specific number, but
you are talking about a manageable group, not numbering in the
hundreds or the thousands, that would be presumably affected by
this.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And what would be the focus of tracking or
maintaining the whereabouts of these individuals?
Mr. Bersin. There are, in addition to the security measures
that would be applied and the vetting procedures that would be
applied before they would be permitted entry, there is a
process called the SEVIS, which is the Student Exchange Visitor
Information System, that would actually require that a school
continually update the status of that particular element. In
addition, there would be the so-called Visas Mantis program
that would be an especially rigorous security advisory opinion
applied to those individuals.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just say this, and I
appreciate that. Being on Homeland Security, I know some of the
fractures in that system. I would want the Department of
Defense to commit to a collaboration with Homeland Security for
a definitive way of respecting the dignity of these
individuals, but even beyond the SEVIS process, because you are
leaving it to colleges, and I think it would be very important.
I think the process is important.
Let me just ask this, are you specifically training people
to be nuclear scientists? Are you calling them over and saying,
I want you to be a nuclear scientist, to be a bomb thrower?
Mr. Bersin. I am unable to identify any particular case and
tell you what that particular person is, so----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it is not--the headline of the hearing
says ``nuclear scientists.'' That is not the whole label of
what you are doing?
Mr. Bersin. We are certainly not bringing over someone who
doesn't know anything about atomic or nuclear physics, I think
that is a fair assumption.
Mr. Chaffetz. Will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would be happy to yield if I could get--
if I have the Chairman's unanimous consent to allow me to have
Mr. Wehrey answer my question and Mr. Bersin to just answer the
question, I would be happy to yield, ask unanimous consent.
Mr. Gowdy. Without objection.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Bersin, before I yield to the gentleman from Utah, what
I was saying, Mr. Bersin, are you saying that you don't know if
they are going to be that or you don't know the types of
training or individuals, is that what you are saying?
Mr. Bersin. I am not familiar with any specific application
of people who have applied or who would apply or who the
Defense Department may have identified as wanting to
participate.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. So it is no glaring announcement
that it has just these nuclear scientists. That is what I
wanted to make sure. Thank you.
Mr. Wehrey, and then I will yield to the gentleman. My
question was on the idea--you have been on the ground, and the
idea of the value of having Libyan, I will put the word
students, but also the value of having them having some system
of knowing who they are and where they are.
Mr. Gowdy. You may answer as quickly as you can.
Mr. Wehrey. That is absolutely essential, and I would defer
to the Defense Department on that. I mean, they have to do the
vetting. They have to do the screening. There are programs in
place. My sense, again, I want to emphasize that this is about
a partnership with a specific Libyan institution, the air
force, that overwhelmingly has been pro-Western and supportive
of U.S. objectives in that country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you would support the importance of
that?
Mr. Wehrey. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield to the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. Chaffetz. We are fine, thank you. I think we are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Oh, you are getting your own time?
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes, thanks.
Mr. Gowdy. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, let me just thank you very much and indicate
in conclusion that we must be careful, but what we are trying
to do is reestablish government in Libya. That is of concern to
the United States homeland security, national security. And I
think we have to be tough, but I think the door has to be
opened carefully, cautiously, but we have to be responsible or
responsive to trying to reconstruct a government. If that
helps, we should do so.
I yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from Texas.
The Chair will now recognize himself and the gentlelady
from California for 5 minutes for closing remarks. I will go
briefly and then yield to the gentleman from Utah.
Dr. Wehrey, I want to thank you for your service to our
military. I want to thank you, Mr. Chaparro, and you, Ms.
Kephart, for your service to law enforcement. I know yours, I
believe, was active, and you were with the 9/11 Commission, and
I want to thank you for your service as a Federal prosecutor,
which is very near and dear to my heart, and for your
collegiality and expertise and comity, with a T, among
yourselves and with the Members of the Committee.
And Mr. Bersin, I would like to take you up on your
opportunity to meet privately at your convenience because if
there is a leverage point by which we can impress upon the
folks in Libya the importance of the civil and criminal justice
system and bringing those to bear, not just in Benghazi but
also the teacher, I would love to talk to you about that.
And with that, I would yield to the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank you, I thank all the panelists here,
but to address what the gentlewoman from Texas brought up, the
reason it is bringing nuclear scientists into the title of this
hearing is the fact that based on what--during the Reagan
administration did in 1983, the Department of Homeland Security
is looking to rescind a prohibition of bringing Libyan
nationals who are engaged in or seeking to obtain studies or
training in aviation maintenance, flight operations, or nuclear
related fields. That is what they are trying to rescind. The
prohibition is there right now, and what is very telling about
the answer is you know of no person, there is not one person
that you are aware of that is trying to come here to get
trained on nuclear sciences. Yet we are spending all this time
and energy, all this effort to try to rescind it, and again, it
begs the question that it sounds like it is best answered by
the Department of Defense and the Department of State as to the
need, the driving need to bring a Libyan national to the United
States to train on nuclear sciences. That is what is mystifying
to me.
I would hope that you would carry back to the senior
management, including the White House, but certainly within
Homeland Security, I think it would be prudent to allow public
comment and to allow the public notice, and then public comment
and to better inform Congress of what you are trying to do. If
there is a driving need, then I want to hear it, but we have
gone through this entire hearing, and I don't think anybody has
adequately explained in this hearing on why we need to train
Libyan nationals on nuclear sciences. It just mystifies me.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you yield just for a moment?
Mr. Chaffetz. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is just a moment. You have just said
what all of us are saying, which is the State Department I
believe is doing well and I think the Defense is doing well, is
that they will generate answers to these questions that you
have, and we should allow those answers, and finally you are
reading a 30-year commentary by, under President Reagan. The
gentleman from the State Department indicated that he has no
known knowledge of the level of individuals that will come. I
think we are really recognizing that we have to do something to
rebuild that government, and the United States is very much a
player in that. I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. Reclaiming my time. I don't think bringing
people in to train them on nuclear sciences when they have no
nuclear power plants is where we would start. We need some
basic rule of law. The gentleman is from the Department of
Homeland Security, not from the Department of State. I would
also ask--and part of the reason we are having this hearing
here today is that Chairman Goodlatte and I did issue a letter
asking for a response and explanation, of which we didn't get
an answer, and I appreciate the gentleman's apology to that
effect.
I would like to ask Mr. Bersin, under Executive Order
12866, the Department of Homeland Security is required to
provide the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
numerous assessments regarding needs, costs, and benefits among
other items in writing regarding to this rescission. Have you
done that?
Mr. Bersin. I would have to confirm that. I have seen OMB,
Office of Management and Budget, documents to that effect, so I
believe so, but I would have to confirm that.
Mr. Chaffetz. Would you commit to providing those to this
Committee, these Committees?
Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. And when would we--what is a reasonable----
Mr. Bersin. I should say, because I am, I was a fair lawyer
at one point, subject to whatever privileges.
Mr. Chaffetz. Fair and lawyer are not very often used in
the same sentence, but I get what you are saying.
I remind the Chairman from South Carolina that I am not an
attorney.
Mr. Gowdy. Quit apologizing.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thought I was bragging. But we would
certainly appreciate it if you would provide those to these
Committees, and I do appreciate your perspectives on this. We
obviously care about this and would like more information.
Thank you.
Yield back.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Utah.
I now recognize the gentlelady from California.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I do think that we have managed to surface some useful
information here today. You know, I think key to this issue is
whether we are going to use the tools available to us to
benefit our country or whether we are just going to use a blunt
instrument that could do harm to our country. That is really
the question before us. And when I think about, you know,
normalized relations doesn't mean that you have a relationship
with a country that is normal. You think about the countries
that we maintain some kind of connection with when it is
advantageous to us, you know. In Colombia, they assassinated
the supreme court. You know, the drug cartels tried to take
over the entire country, but we did not say no one from
Colombia can ever come to the U.S., even though they were, I
mean, a basket case at the time because, you know, there were
things that we needed to do, and in fact, we have helped
Colombia turn the corner and defeat the drug cartels. And part
of that was training their people, and you know, it is a
success story that is not over with yet. But I mean, they are
in much better shape than they were, and I think this,
hopefully, could be a similar situation.
I do think that it is a legitimate question of why would we
have study in the nuclear field. I think it is worth pointing
out that Libya as a nuclear, a former nuclear power, has
weapons scientists there. They have nuclear weapons scientists
in the country, or they did at one time. Historically, we have
sought to take weapons scientists from potential enemies and
teach them something useful to do, other than weapons
scientists, because if that is all you know how to do, that
skill is for sale in the world, and if you have something
useful to do with that level of information, it is much safer
for the United States.
I would note also that we are not asking to repeal the
deemed export rule, and for those of you who are not aware of
this, the deemed export rule means that if you have got
sensitive information and you have got a foreign national, they
can't actually study that because it is deemed that you are
exporting that sensitive information to a nation, hence the
name deemed export rule. So this would seem to preclude, I
think, bringing in new scientists to learn how to make new
weapons. But you know, I think we would like to follow up with
the Department kind of what the intentions are and if it really
matches what I have described here, which I think so far as I
have been able to learn, it does.
And Mr. Bersin, let me----
Mr. Bersin. Ranking Member Lofgren, I want to point out
that after we have been talking about the Department of State
and the Department of Defense, but actually, the Department of
Energy actually also weighed in for precisely the reason you
suggest.
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
Mr. Bersin. After, and I would have to get you the date
when this began, but they started a Libyan scientific,
scientist engagement program precisely on this notion that
there are nuclear scientists in Libya as a result of the
Qadhafi years, and it is in our interest to see that they get
gainful employment that is not hostile to us.
Ms. Lofgren. Right.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I would yield
back my time and go meet the people who are amassing in my
office for a meeting.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from California.
Before we adjourn, I would move, I would ask unanimous
consent to move two things in the record. One is the statement
from our colleague, Mr. Bentivolio, and the other is an article
by Patrick Cockburn entitled, ``Three Years After Gaddafi,
Libya is Imploding Into Chaos and Violence.''
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Gowdy. With that, this concludes today's hearing.
Thanks to all the witnesses for attending.
Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days
to submit additional questions for the record for the witnesses
or additional materials for the record.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Trey Gowdy, a Representative in
Congress from the State of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Immigration and Border Security, Committee on the Judiciary
The Administration is moving to lift the longstanding prohibition
against Libyans entering the United States to work in aviation
maintenance, flight operations, or to study or train in nuclear-related
fields.
Despite concerns expressed last November by Rep. Chaffetz and
Chairman Goodlatte, DHS moved forward with this change and sent the
draft final regulation to OMB. Under the terms of the regulation, the
removal of the prohibition will go into effect without prior notice and
comment. We would have to trust the Libyan Government and
Administration to appropriately vet which Libyans would be allowed to
learn to fly planes and study nuclear technology.
The current prohibition was put into place in the early 1980s after
a series of terrorist incidents involving Libyan nationals. On December
2, 1979, a mob attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, and on
December 29, 1979, the United States designated Libya as a state
sponsor of terrorism.
In order to protect Americans, on March 11, 1983, the Reagan
administration implemented this rule to prohibit Libyan nationals, or
other foreign nationals acting on behalf of a Libyan entity, from
obtaining certain immigration benefits for the purpose of engaging in
or seeking to obtain aviation maintenance, flight operations, or
nuclear-related studies or training.
While we have hope for a democratic Libya, the question we must
consider today is: has enough changed to lift this longstanding ban?
Why now? Is post-Revolutionary Libya secure enough to justify the
change?
Let's consider some recent events:
The National Transitional Council has struggled to govern Libya
effectively since the fall of Qaddafi.
The majority of territory outside Tripoli has fallen under the
control of armed militias that have refused to disarm.
Just three weeks ago, on March 12, 2014, the Libyan Prime Minister
fled after parliament voted him out of office.
Militias based in western Libya, notorious for their violence and
independence, have launched an offensive against the eastern rebels in
what could be the opening shots in a civil war between western and
eastern Libya. Without a central government with any real power, Libya
may be falling apart.
Only two weeks ago, Libya acknowledged for the first time that
``terrorist groups'' were behind dozens of attacks against security
services. The government issued a statement on March 19 saying:
``Benghazi and other cities are facing a terrorist war waged by Libyan
and foreign elements who have hostile, evil agendas.''
On March 20, Libya's government called for international help to
fight terrorism that is threatening internal stability in the country.
On the same day, a missile was launched at the Tripoli Airport runway
shutting down the airport.
And finally, the head of Libya's military police was assassinated
in Benghazi in October while Libya's first post-Gaddafi prosecutor
general was shot dead on February 8, 2013.
Unfortunately, these new reports indicate that the militias are
getting stronger, not weaker. Why is the Administration proposing to
lift a 30-year ban on Libyans coming to the US to train as nuclear
scientists now?
The administration's draft regulation justifies the change because
the US relationship with Libya has been ``normalized.''
In November my colleagues Rep Chaffetz and Chairman Goodlatte wrote
to Acting Homeland Security Secretary Beers about this rule change, and
spelled out specifically the violent threats and actions against
American anti-terrorism operations in the country.
And we cannot talk about the Libyan-American relationship without
acknowledging the attack against the diplomatic post in Benghazi
resulting in the murder of four Americans. How is this relationship
``normalized'' when our Ambassador was murdered in Benghazi 18 months
ago? And not one single person has been arrested, prosecuted or brought
to justice.
It seems unjustifiable then, to rescind a 30 year rule at this
time. Why are we willing to risk, no matter the likelihood, chancing
Libyan extremists and terrorists to come here to essentially learn the
skills to commit acts of terror? Why? Why now? What has changed? And
the burden of advocating for a change in the status quo lies with the
administration.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Immigration and Border Security, Committee on the Judiciary
Based on the letters that the Majority has sent to DHS, as well as
their opening statements today, I believe their concerns can be
summarized as follows: the Libyan government is fragile and there are
extremist elements in the region that would do us harm, so we can't
lift the visa restriction because people might somehow harm us.
This argument, however, is entirely illogical.
First, as the Department of Defense--which initiated the request to
rescind the visa restriction in the first place--makes clear, the whole
point of lifting the visa restriction is to help the Libyan government
defeat those very extremists. Members on both sides of the aisle--
including Republican Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Saxby
Chambliss--have recognized the critical importance of helping the new
democratically elected Libyan government secure itself against militant
extremism in the region.
But the visa restriction stands in the way. Because the restriction
affects all Libyans, it means we can't even train the pro-Western
forces within the Libyan Air Force on the aircraft they need to secure
their own country against extremist forces. The Libyan government's
ability to fight such forces depends on being able to move troops and
equipment throughout the country. And the country currently uses
Lockheed C-130 military transport planes and Boeing CH-47 cargo
helicopters to do so.
But according to the Defense Department, that fleet is aging and
needs repair and replacement, and many more pilots and flight crew need
to be trained. There are proposals to buy additional aircraft and parts
from U.S. companies and provide training to pilots and flight crew, but
the visa restriction stands in the way of those deals.
The Members on the other side of the aisle will likely raise the
unfortunate attacks in Benghazi repeatedly at this hearing today. But
that event actually underscores why we should lift the visa
restriction.
On the night of the attack, it was one of those very same Lockheed
C-130 transport planes that the Libyan government used to rescue and
evacuate the surviving consular personnel at the U.S. compound in
Benghazi. Rather than used against us, that plane helped Americans
survive.
Will my colleagues on the other side of the aisle nevertheless
raise the Benghazi attack, as well as other terrorist incidents within
Libya, as grounds for keeping the visa restriction in place? We must
keep in mind that there is a difference between the extremist forces
behind these incidents and the pro-Western Libyan military that is
trying to defeat them.
And that's the point of lifting the visa restriction. Like my
Majority colleagues, it simply does not differentiate between the
Libyan forces we are trying to help and the forces we are trying to
defeat. It bars friend and foe alike, and that just isn't smart policy.
This gets us to the second big reason we should rescind the visa
restriction. It simply isn't needed to keep America safe from harm.
We must bear in mind that the 30-year-old Libyan visa restriction
is the only such country-specific visa ban of its kind. It is an
anachronistic relic of a by-gone era.
If a ban were necessary with respect to Libya--which is not a
designated state sponsor of terrorism since the Bush Administration
removed them from the list in 2006--wouldn't it be even more necessary
with respect to countries that are actually designated as state
sponsors of terrorism?
But such bans don't exist. There are no country-specific bans for
Iran, Syria, Sudan or Cuba--the countries currently listed as state
sponsors of terrorism. Nor is there a ban for rogue nations like North
Korea.
That's because our immigration laws provide plenty of authority to
prevent the travel of individuals who pose a danger to the U.S. and its
interests.
Our immigration laws already require the denial of visas to persons
with suspected ties to terrorism, as well as anyone who is otherwise
suspected of posing a threat to national security.
Our immigration laws also require consular officials to deny visas
for an individual whose travel raises significant foreign policy
concerns. The same is true for any individual suspected of potentially
violating the terms of their visa or admission to the United States.
Over the years, including after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
this country has not seen fit to erect more country-specific
restrictions like the Libyan visa ban. Instead, the U.S. moved in a
different direction--erecting bans that actually focused on whether
admission of a particular individual was helpful or harmful to U.S.
interests.
In other words, we adopted policies that allowed us to let in or
friends and keep out our enemies, rather than barring them all.
Doesn't that just make more sense?
But sense is rarely what congressional hearings are about these
days. I'm afraid all we will see today are scare tactics and political
attacks to try and hurt the administration.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary
On February 1, 2010, then-Assistant Secretary of State for the
Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, requested ending the
longstanding prohibition against Libyans entering the United States to
work in aviation maintenance, flight operations, or to study or train
in nuclear-related fields.
Shortly thereafter, widespread unrest in Libya precluded the U.S.
Government from engagement with Libya. The post-Arab Spring civil war
in Libya led to the fall of the Qadhafi regime in August 2011, and
Qadhafi was captured and then killed by rebel forces in October 2011.
Following the revolution, the Obama Administration once again began the
process of ``normalizing'' relations with that country.
Yet, on September 11, 2012, U.S. Ambassador John Christopher
Stevens and three other State Department officials were killed when
terrorists stormed the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya and set it
ablaze.
A statement by U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland
said the United States condemned the attack ``in the strongest terms''
and was working with Libyan security forces to secure the compound.
President Obama called the attack in Benghazi ``outrageous and
shocking,'' and vowed its perpetrators will face justice. ``I've also
directed my administration to increase our security at diplomatic posts
around the world,'' Obama said. ``And make no mistake--we will work
with the Libyan government to bring to justice the killers who attacked
our people.'' To date no one has been brought to justice for these
attacks.
Instead and despite these attacks, on May 31, 2012, Feltman, along
with Joseph McMillan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, again asked DHS to end the prohibition,
stating the ``outdated regulation does not reflect current U.S.
Government policy towards Libya''. Unbelievably, the letter makes no
mention of the attacks, acting as if they had never occurred.
Rather, as outlined in a February 12, 2013 memo from Alan Bersin
signed by Secretary Napolitano: ``According to the U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli, there is a robust plan in place to encourage engagement and
educational exchanges in coming years with the Libyan government. DOD
is attempting to initiate a program of aircraft sales, pilot training,
and ground crew training early this year worth $2 billion, the
contracts for which would go to other countries if training could not
be conducted in the United States. The Departments of Defense and State
have made it clear that absent its rescission, the [regulation] will
significantly hamper these efforts.'' On April 1, 2014, just two days
before this hearing, DOD reiterated its desire to see the regulation
lifted to Mr. Bersin.
The memo from Mr. Bersin also fails to mention the attack in
Benghazi--the first time an ambassador for the United States had been
killed since 1979. The long-standing prohibition on Libyans was put in
place to protect the homeland against serious threats from terrorists
from a particularly unstable and dangerous country. The Obama
Administration argues that it is no longer needed.
However, many of the characteristics regarding Libya that caused
the regulation to be put in place persist today. Regardless of any
progress that may have been made following the removal of Muammar
Qadhafi from power, many extremist and terrorist groups operate
unfettered in Libya.
Two weeks ago, Libya acknowledged for the first time that
``terrorist groups'' were behind dozens of attacks against security
services. And on March 20th, Libya's government called for
international help to fight terrorism that is threatening internal
stability in the country. That same day, a missile was launched at the
Tripoli Airport.
Four 9/11 hijacker pilots obtained their expertise in aviation
primarily at U.S. flight schools. Do we want to risk Libyan terrorists
learning how to fly airplanes in the U.S.? Given the desire of radical
regimes and terrorists to obtain or build nuclear weapons or dirty
bombs, do we want to possibly train Libyan terrorists in nuclear
engineering? If the prohibition is lifted, not only can Libyans
supposedly vetted by the administration receive this training, but any
Libyan can seek to do so.
Ultimately, it does not appear that national security has been
adequately considered in the effort to end the prohibition. It is
uncertain whether our immigration system has sufficient integrity to
ferret out applicants' long term motivations for receiving an education
in sensitive topics from the United States.
As a final note, we have long been seeking information from DHS
regarding the status of the rescission of the regulation and the role
of the White House. We only received answers to some of the questions
we asked after this hearing was announced. It is troubling that it
takes such actions by the Committees to receive information from DHS
that is vital for us to fulfill our legitimate oversight role.
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