[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-82]
SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REBALANCE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 27, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_____
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86-972 WASHINGTON : 2014
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, February 27, 2014, Seapower and Projection Forces
Capabilities to Support the Asia-Pacific Rebalance............. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, February 27, 2014...................................... 35
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2014
SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REBALANCE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 2
WITNESSES
Berteau, David J., Senior Vice President and Director, National
Security Program on Industry and Resources, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 7
Mahnken, Thomas G., Professor of Strategy, Jerome Levy Chair of
Economic Geography and National Security, U.S. Naval War
College........................................................ 5
Ratner, Ely, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-
Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security... 9
Walsh, ADM Patrick, USN (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Tower Center,
Southern Methodist University.................................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Berteau, David J............................................. 59
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 39
Mahnken, Thomas G............................................ 49
Ratner, Ely.................................................. 69
Walsh, ADM Patrick........................................... 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Statement of Jose Andres, CEO, Makai Ocean Engineering, Inc.. 85
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 91
Mr. Langevin................................................. 95
SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REBALANCE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 27, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome all of our Members and our
distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing focused on
the military capabilities that will be necessary to support our
enduring interest in the Asia-Pacific.
I want to apologize to our witnesses for us being a little
bit late. We had votes, and that is why we are here. So we
appreciate your patience with us.
Today we have testifying before us Admiral Patrick Walsh,
U.S. Navy retired, and he was the former commander of the
Pacific Fleet.
Admiral, thank you for your service and for being here.
Dr. Thomas Mahnken, professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval
War College.
And we certainly appreciate your expertise and your taking
the time to help us on the committee.
Dr. David J. Berteau, senior vice president and director of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]
National Security Program on Industry and Resources.
Thank you so much for taking your time to be with us.
And Dr. Ely Ratner, senior fellow and deputy director of
the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security.
And we welcome all of you. Thank you for sharing your
unique perspectives on this important topic.
With the support of my colleague, the ranking member, Mr.
McIntyre, and the tireless efforts of Ms. Hanabusa and many
other Members of Congress, we spent the last 4 months
conducting a bipartisan Asia-Pacific security series to better
understand our security posture in this critical area.
Today's hearing will conclude this formal effort, but I
hope this process will only be the start of a surge in the
committee's focus and oversight of the shifting security
dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region and what they will mean for
our interest.
To this point we have heard classified and unclassified
testimony from U.S. Government witnesses on our military
posture in the region. Today we thought it would be valuable to
hear a variety of alternative independent perspectives on how
the United States should fashion its regional military posture
for the decade ahead.
While we have maintained a regional military presence in
Asia over the last 70 years that has successfully limited the
escalation of conflict, I believe we will need to carefully
reassess our posture in the years ahead to ensure we can
continue to achieve our objective of sustaining a peaceful,
prosperous, and rules-based Asia-Pacific order.
I believe the military modernization of the People's
Republic of China [PRC] over these last two decades now stands
to challenge our traditional regional objectives.
More specifically, the PRC's investment in ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, mines, submarines, fast attack
ships, antisatellite capabilities, and cyber warfare, among
others, all appear focused on developing a counterintervention
strategy that can limit our military's power projection forces.
I worry that, absent a calculated adjustment by the
Department of Defense, this modernization effort could
undermine the military balance and call into question our
alliance commitments.
The Pentagon had it right when it called for a
geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and
politically sustainable military presence across the Asia-
Pacific region.
I am now curious what range of options we have and what
tradeoffs we should be considering for implementing this
approach. Should we invest more in long-range strike systems
and less in short-range weapons? Are we too reliant on a small
number of large bases instead of moving towards a more
distributed presence? Are we investing in the right type of
munitions? How do our operational concepts, doctrines, and
capabilities align with those of our allies? Do we have the
right mix of capabilities for both maintaining the peace and
warfighting? And, finally, how will research and development
investments drive the competition in the next decade?
I look forward to discussing this important topic with our
expert panel of witnesses. And, with that, I turn to my good
friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee,
Mike McIntyre.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks again to our witnesses for being here and for
your patience.
Because of the voting schedule, I will be briefer than I
had thought I would be. I may save some for questions.
But as we focus on the rebalance or pivot toward the Asia-
Pacific, having just been there last week myself, I realize we
are really looking at an arc that is the Indo-Pacific concerns
as we look through at is occurring throughout the entire area.
And when we look at the economic usage through the Straits
of Malacca and the 1.7-mile-wide stretch and we look at not
only the economic trading, but, also, the energy trading and
investment and what passes through that area, we realize how
strategic it is and how important it is and we do have our
concern about China's action in the South and East China Seas
and the ramification that has for several of our allies in the
region.
Australia, I know, is our closest and strongest ally that
has been with us in every war that we have fought since they
have become a nation, going back to 1901. And with the United
States presence in that area--more than 80 ships, 300 aircraft,
2 Marine Expeditionary Forces and non-Army brigades stationed
in the Pacific Command area--this presence certainly is serious
and demands our attention.
So I want to thank you all for coming today. We look
forward to hearing what your ideas are and your options are you
see for enhancing our military posture in this region and make
sure that we are effectively working with our allies to make
sure that there is not a nation trying to dominate that region
that does not have our interest at heart.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mike, thank you.
And one of the things, as you begin, to tell you, we want
to have that dialogue. So feel free to not have to say
everything in your written statement. We are going to put that
as part of the record.
Second thing: Despite the reputation this city has, this
committee and especially this subcommittee is probably one of
the most bipartisan subcommittees out here. We all have
tremendous respect for each other. We work very well together.
So you may find us asking some questions maybe out of turn
just to make sure we are elaborating on that, if that were to
happen. But we want you to have plenty of time to give us your
answers.
And with that, Dr. Walsh, we look forward to your
presentation and ask you, if you can, on your opening remarks,
to stick as close as you can to around 5 minutes so that we can
get to those questions.
Mr. Walsh.
STATEMENT OF ADM PATRICK WALSH, USN (RET.), SENIOR FELLOW,
TOWER CENTER, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
Admiral Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. Thank you as
well for the invitation to be here today.
In my written statement, I had attempted to present a
maritime perspective that offered context. By the very nature
of it, it is integrative. It looks at not just the military
order of battle, which I think, through a single lens, would
take us down a path that lead to conclusions that are often
erroneous. So you have to put this in its proper context.
When you walk into the area of responsibility that we call
the Pacific, an area that is as vast as any that we have ever
operated as a military, we are talking 100 million square miles
and 15 time zones. So we have the challenge of the vastness of
the geography in a world that is very interconnected. It is
steeped in history.
Consider what the community of nations looked like in 1946
as we came out of World War II, 51 countries compared to 194
today. It is a statement that suggests that we don't really
understand the role of nationalism, sovereignty, cultural
identity and how that underpins so much of the tectonic plates
that move in Asia-Pacific.
So the area that we are talking about is very vast. And I
think, when you--when you try and look at the future of
seapower in a naval strategy, in particular, that represents
national interests, then it begs for a strategy that looks for,
``Where can I place resources that can have the potential for
the most consequence, the most impact?''
Throughout history, there have been continental strategists
who have tried to describe where that critical node is on land,
meaning that, no matter which way you looked on a cardinal
heading--north, south, east, or west--or which perspective that
you adopted, whether it is political, economic, military, or
diplomatic, you could have the greatest impact and influence
from that region. That was known as the Great Game in Central
Asia.
You can pull some of Mackinder's writing and thinking to
help establish a framework for what matters today. I would
offer to you that is the South China Sea. Whether it is $5
trillion of economic activity or 70,000 container ships that
come through the Straits of Malacca each year, any disruption
to the security and stability in that region can have potential
impact in the daily lives, in the quality of lives, of those
all around us.
Trying to narrowly define national interest in traditional
terms will take us down an alley, I think, that will be not
very--not very revealing or satisfying. The problem that we
have with--today is that we no longer manufacture end-to-end
products at home. It is done through a distributed network all
around the world.
So that makes it increasingly difficult to define one
nation's singular national interest inside the South China Sea.
We all have interests there. So any disruption to that security
and that stability and that sea line of communication can have
impact for all of us.
When we think about some of the complexities of operating
in that environment, in an area that continues to develop, we
are seeing the underpinnings of nationalism and the drive for
resources or resource nationalism. That is the complexity of
the environment that we are in.
So whether it is the fight for fish or it is the drive for
hydrocarbons in the South China Sea, we are seeing the dilemma
paradigm play out in the economic exclusion zones.
So my counterparts are faced with the dilemma of whether or
not they surveil and then enforce their economic exclusion
zones or run the risk of a direct confrontation by doing so
with a nation like China. That is the risk that they are
taking.
I know of no country in the region that is downsizing its
Navy. I know of no country in the region that is taking
reductions in its maritime forces. If anything, for reasons
that are sometimes a little difficult to understand, more
nations are acquiring more maritime capability, even maritime
capability where they have no history of undersea warfare.
So as six Kilo-class submarines arrive in Vietnam, it begs
a number of questions in terms of how they are going to manage
water space, how they are going to deploy those ships, and how
they are going to use them. What historical concept of
operations are they going to employ?
It is just an indicator that the region continues to now
develop maritime capability. And because we have so much
history in the region and because we have expended so much
national treasure generation after generation, it is important
to understand what is at risk.
What our forefathers did for us is set up a framework that
has given us a very prosperous economy that has tentacles that
reach around the world. With that, in the phrase that you
described as a rules-based system, is a set of standards and
understanding and a language of how we operate among nations.
When you fly to Beijing, you don't require a fighter
escort. That is because the International Civil Aeronautics
Organization Chicago treaty of the 1940s gave us a taxonomy, a
language, a rule system, for how we would operate.
When you look at the sea, there is a lot of confusion in
terms of how we look at the Law of the Sea, what role it plays,
and now you are seeing, most recently, local interpretations
from China in terms of how to manage and how to look at the
South China Sea. In a word, they claim the South China Sea.
I look forward to your questions and the opportunity to
respond.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Walsh can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you.
Professor Mahnken.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, PROFESSOR OF STRATEGY, JEROME
LEVY CHAIR OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, U.S.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Dr. Mahnken. Thank you.
Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, thanks for the
opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. You have my written
testimony. What I would like to do in the time allotted really
is to just highlight several things.
In order to talk about strategy and force posture, I think
we first need to talk about interests. And I believe the United
States has a set of enduring interests in the Asia-Pacific
region, interests that date back, in some cases, a half
century, in other cases, much longer than that.
And those interests are really four: First, protecting
American lives and territory, the most solemn responsibility of
any government; second, helping to defend our allies in the
region, our treaty allies in particular, treaties which bear
the force of law in the United States; third, as Admiral Walsh
has already alluded to, ensuring the free passage of goods and
services across the global commons, something that has
benefited America tremendously, but also benefited the world;
and then, finally, ensuring a favorable balance of power on the
Eurasian continent, something that we don't talk much about,
but I think has been crucially important to us in the past.
So we need forces that are sufficient to preserve those
interests across the spectrum of conflict. We need to
demonstrate U.S. presence, shape the region. And in peacetime,
we need to dissuade potential competitors, deter potential
aggressors, reassure our allies, and, should it come to it, be
able to fight and win.
Now, it is true that we have strengthened our position in
the Asia-Pacific region. And that is a process that has gone
on--been going on for more or less a decade, and it is a
process that is--long-term process that has enjoyed bipartisan
support.
So today we have more forces in the region--more modern
forces in the region. But this is occurring in a situation
where not just we are changing, but other actors as well, and
the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region is changing.
Chinese military modernization has already been referred
to. More generally, the modernization of Asian militaries is a
fact of life. And the net result is that we face greater risk
to our forces today than we did in the past. There are greater
questions about our ability to support our allies, and,
ultimately, there could be threats to our credibility within--
within the region.
As I see it, there are really three alternatives that I
will put forward as alternative force postures that we could
think about.
The first is sort of a continuation of the status quo, to
continue doing what we are doing, focused on relatively short-
range assets concentrated in a relatively small number of
bases, devoting a larger percentage of our--of our capabilities
to the region, to be sure, but a larger slice of a shrinking
pie.
My concern there is that we will face a growing gap between
our interests and our capability to defend them. Our forces
will face greater risk, greater vulnerability to our forces,
and then, ultimately, I think we will face greater strategic
risk, risk to our credibility, our ability to support our
interests and pursue our interests.
A second alternative is to trim our commitments. It is the
type of thing that is attractive in the abstract, but truly
easier said than done. And I welcome a discussion on that. One
variety of this approach would be to pull back, trade
operational risk, trade the risk to our forces, trade space for
time.
My concern with pulling back and focusing more on long-
range platforms, for example, is that we would trade
operational risk ultimately for strategic risk, that we would
undermine our alliances and undermine stability in the region.
So the third alternative would be to try to close the gap
between our commitments and our ability to meet them. And I
think there are a number of things that we can do, particularly
a number of things that we can do in conjunction with our
allies in the region.
Greater focus on undersea warfare and greater cooperation
with our allies in undersea warfare is one. Greater
collaboration with allies and partners on intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, particularly in disputed
waters such as the South China Sea and the East China Sea. And
then, third, to diversify and harden our basing structure, to
make it more resilient, more credible, and diversify both on
sovereign U.S. territory, but, also, on allied territory.
These are just a few of my ideas, and I certainly welcome
the discussion to follow. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mahnken can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Mahnken, thank you for that insight.
And now, Mr. Berteau, we look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. BERTEAU, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM ON INDUSTRY AND RESOURCES,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Berteau. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am reminded every time I sit in one of these that I am
still a little bit of a troglodyte when it comes to electronic
communications.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McIntyre, members of the
subcommittee.
I am David Berteau from the Center of Strategic and
International Studies. I should note that we are a bipartisan
institution that does not take positions on issues and,
therefore, that the views in my statement and that I am going
to comment on today are entirely my own, although they are
formed by our research and our experience and my interactions
with our colleagues.
My written statement has a wealth of material, and I won't
go through it all. I just want to highlight about three things,
if you will, for our consideration this afternoon.
First is to go back to the Defense Strategic Guidance,
January 5th, 2012. That is the basis of both the rebalance to
Asia that we are talking about today and the broader focus of
the strategy underlying the reductions under the Budget Control
Act.
It essentially said with respect to the rebalance to Asia-
Pacific, number one, its direction to DOD [Department of
Defense] and to the military, rebalance towards the region,
emphasize our existing alliances, and expand our networks of
cooperation with emerging partners, if you will.
That is the guidance to the Defense Department. And if you
listen to what Secretary Hagel said earlier this week in laying
out his summary of what is going to be in the budget next week,
it appears that that guidance still pertains today. So I think
it is a very important starting point for our discussions.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege a year and a
half ago with Dr. Michael Green of CSIS to do this report on
the--an independent assessment of force posture strategy for
the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, and we made four
recommendations there that I think are still relevant today.
One is to focus on forward presence, including a better
aligned engagement strategy. The second is to strengthen our
alliances. The third is to add additional capabilities to U.S.
forces in the Asia-Pacific region. And the fourth is to examine
possible force posture and basing efficiencies, including--and
both of my preceding members of this panel mentioned this--
greater reliance on host nation capability on bases and forces
and on rotations of U.S. forces. And I think that report and
its recommendations, in my view, are still viable and relevant
today as well.
The third thing I would like to raise during this opening
comment is: What do you look for next week when you get the
budget detail? What does this subcommittee focus its attention
on between now and markup?
And I think there are two key questions. One, is DOD
properly planning and resourcing and preparing to carry out the
rebalance to the extent it can under the authorized and
appropriated funding? And the second is: Are we maintaining the
industrial base that we need to support that over the long
haul? Because it is not just the force posture. It is the
capability that the industrial base provides us as part of
that.
We are going to need to look at the report from the 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review that will come out pretty much
simultaneous with the budget, we understand, and presumably the
soon-to-be-forthcoming National Security Strategy as well. And
one thing I would particularly look for there is the role of
our allies and partners as envisioned in those strategy
documents. How much of this is go it alone? How much of this do
we want to rely on the region?
So what would you look for in the fiscal year 2015 budget
and in the out-years of the Future Year Defense Program, or the
FYDP? I think there are a couple of things that are going to be
hard to find in the budget.
One of the most important, from my view, is the low-end
shaping and engagement activities in the 30 countries
throughout the region because, ultimately, it is about those
countries, the U.S. engagement with them in the context of an
emerging and growing China, but not necessarily in a bilateral,
more in a multilateral kind of a framework.
A lot of those activities aren't budget line items. You are
going to have to probe to get the information. But I would urge
you to support that.
The second is the gaps between the strategy and what is
funded both in the base budget and in this $26 billion
Opportunity, Growth, and Security fund that we have heard about
this week. It already could be acronymized as the OGS, but I
don't know if that is quite yet appropriate. And I think those
gaps are an important focus for the subcommittee, if you will.
The third is support for combined exercises. We have had
good protection for the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] level, but
I think you also need to look at the component level, the
PACFLT [U.S. Pacific Fleet], the PACAF [U.S. Pacific Air
Forces], and the component-level exercises, if you will. That
is where a lot of that shaping and engagement goes underway. A
lot of that, again, is not line items in the budget. You will
have to get some requests in to the Department to get that.
I think it is critical for this subcommittee to support the
need for forward presence. I think, with the drawdown in
Afghanistan, there is a tendency to think we don't need anybody
overseas. I would agree we don't need new bases overseas, but
we do need to support and fund expanded overseas engagement and
deployment, and we need to be explaining that to the American
people and, frankly, to the rest of the Congress.
And you mentioned already the need to support investments
in R&D [research and development] and in critical procurement
programs like the Virginia-class submarine, et cetera.
These, I think, are some of the issues that you need to
look for. And I will be happy to expand on those in the
questions.
Mr. Chairman, members of this subcommittee, Mr. McIntyre, I
am grateful for the opportunity to be here today. I thank you,
and I await your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berteau can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Berteau.
And now Dr. Ratner.
STATEMENT OF ELY RATNER, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY
Dr. Ratner. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre, and
other distinguished members of the committee, I will thank you
as well for inviting me here today to discuss the U.S.
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region.
As I am sure you agree, this is a critically important
issue for America's economic and security future, and you and
your subcommittee should be applauded for taking a leadership
role in helping to clarify and refine U.S. policy in the
region.
Our topic today is ``Capabilities to Support the Asia-
Pacific Rebalance,'' and the underlying question here, as I see
it, is: How can the United States most effectively develop and
leverage its military power to advance U.S. interests and
maintain peace and security in Asia?
The first-order requirement, as the other witnesses
remarked, of course, is to ensure that the United States
maintains a robust and geographically distributed military
presence in Asia while investing in the capabilities necessary
to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The United States
can also amplify its military capability by deepening its
treaty alliances and other security partnerships.
Today, however, I want to address an additional means
through which the United States can support its military and
security interests in Asia, namely, the construction of an open
and inclusive regional security order undergirded by widely
accepted rules and institutions.
In my view, any strategy to enhance U.S. military
capabilities in Asia must include efforts to shape a rules-
based regional order that strengthens multilateral security
cooperation while preventing and managing military competition
and crises.
And with the balance of my time, let me highlight three of
the eight recommendations that I put forward in my written
testimony, and I think these are all areas where the United
States can act immediately and where Congress can play a
central role.
First, Congress should reinstate trade promotion authority
in support of the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP] trade
agreement. Although it may seem counterintuitive to begin a
list of national security priorities with a multilateral trade
deal, the successful completion of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership both among the negotiators and on Capitol Hill is
now the single most important policy issue currently affecting
U.S. power and leadership in Asia.
Economics and security are inextricably linked in the
region, and the United States cannot cement a long-term role in
Asia through military muscle alone. TPP is a strategic-level
issue and must be treated as such by the U.S. Congress.
Second, in the context of continued engagement with
Beijing, the United States needs a more coherent and proactive
strategy to deter Chinese revisionism in the East and South
China Seas. Over the past several years, China has engaged in
economic, diplomatic, and military coercion to revise the
administrative status quo in East Asia.
These are deeply destabilizing actions that, if permitted
to continue, will increase the likelihood of serious conflict
down the road. Given this pattern of behavior, the White House
should lead an interagency effort to develop a comprehensive
response that includes actions to impose costs on China if it
continues engaging in acts of revisionism.
As part of this effort, the United States should build an
international consensus on the legitimacy of international
arbitration for maritime and sovereignty disputes and be
unequivocal in rhetoric and action that it does not accept
China's illegal seizure and occupation of Scarborough Reef in
the South China Sea.
The goal here is not to contain China, Mr. Chairman, but,
rather, to ensure that political disputes are managed through
peaceful diplomatic means rather than through coercion and the
use of force.
Third, despite the U.S. declaratory policy of rebalancing
to Asia, there continue to be lingering concerns in the region
about the long-term commitment of the United States, and
intensification of these perceptions will undermine the
development of a rules-based order by causing allies and
partners to question the utility of working more closely with
the United States while also diminishing U.S. influence in
regional institutions and potentially encouraging countries to
engage in acts of aggression or provocation that they otherwise
would not.
The U.S. Government should therefore make a concerted
effort to counter the misperception that the rebalancing to
Asia is wavering or hollow. This can begin with statements by
President Obama about the importance of the Asia-Pacific region
as well as a clear articulation from the Administration about
the intent, achievements, and future of the rebalancing
strategy.
The Administration and Congress can also more clearly
articulate how defense cuts will and will not affect U.S.
military posture and presence in Asia, which will be
particularly important in the wake of the release of the
Quadrennial Defense Review.
Mr. Chairman, as the United States thinks about the
capabilities it needs to maintain peace and security in Asia,
they must prioritize not just boosting the warfighting
capability of the United States, its allies, and partners, but,
also, building a stronger rules-based regional security order.
Thank you again for this committee's commitment to U.S.
policy toward Asia, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner can be found in the
Appendix on page 69.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Dr. Ratner.
What a great opportunity. We have such an expert panel. We
have a subcommittee that has an incredible amount of expertise
on it.
I am going to defer my questions until the end because I
want some of our Members to be able to express their thoughts
and be able to explore their questions.
So I would like to recognize our ranking member right now,
Mike McIntyre, for any questions he might have.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And as I mentioned earlier about--and several of you have
talked about ways to save cost, but, also, to make sure that we
do have a forward presence and work with our allies more
closely.
Mr. Berteau, I believe, if I pronounced your name
correctly--``Berteau''--page 2 of your testimony--and you
referred to this orally--the fourth item, four key elements,
you say, ``Examine possible force structure and basing
efficiencies, including greater reliance on host-nation bases
and forces and rotation of U.S. forces,'' and then over on page
5, you talk about the forward presence and it says it does not
mean the United States should build new bases overseas, but it
does mean the U.S. Government needs to support and fund
expanded overseas deployments.
In that regard, I know, for instance, as I mentioned in my
opening comments about Australia, that the blue-water port we
have that we work with in Australia--that we work with
Australia's port on the western coast, Perth, Stirling, that
base.
Also, I have visited Techport, which is in South Australia,
which is already built--as they say, built, operating, and
ready. We have national security clearance of workers already
there and they are out of range of ballistic missiles from
North Korea and China.
Those two ports, for example, I think about in Australia,
with a very, very strong ally--and then, of course, we have our
Marines up in Darwin--to me, would seem to be examples of how
we have someone already there, already an ally, already willing
to work with us, and they are not coming to us asking for money
and handouts and, ``Will you come build us bases?'', but,
rather, they are in place.
I wonder if you agree with that assessment of our close
ally, Australia, but also how you see us doing this similarly
in other countries in the region when you talk about we don't
need to go build bases, but let's find ways to work with our
allies who we know have opportunities already in place for us
to work with and that can save us money, yet strengthen our
refocus or balance as we look toward the Indo-Pacific region.
Mr. Berteau. Thank you, sir.
I do agree with--I do agree with the supposition that we
have a tremendous opportunity with Australia. As the chairman
mentioned, they have been our partners and allies for more than
a century.
I think it is also instructive to watch the way this has
been unfolding, the movement of Marines into Darwin and the
other options that come into place both with airfields at the
northern side of the country and with ----
Mr. McIntyre. Yes. I meant to mention the airfields, also.
Yes, sir. Go ahead.
Mr. Berteau. And they are moving at sort of a measured
pace, if you will, not too rushed, not making too big of a step
at a time.
I think that both solidifies the relationship with
Australia, but it also responds to the second part of your
question.
It gives a signal and a symbol, if you will, that we are
not trying to create a huge American presence where it is not
wanted. We want to move at a measured pace, engage one step at
a time, and move through that.
And I think that is particularly key for many of the other
countries in the regions with whom we don't have, for instance,
treaty alliances that are already committed to us there.
The challenge is, in fact, if you are moving at a measured
pace, not to lose momentum because you really need to maintain
that momentum. And I think we focus a lot on the individual
steps, but, also, the collective movement that is going
forward.
I think, finally, the Australians offer us an opportunity
in a multilateral or trilateral engagement in the region where
it won't necessarily be the U.S. in the lead, but perhaps the
Australians in the lead in a relationship with a third or
fourth country, if you will.
So they offer us all three of those opportunities. We need
to continue to take full advantage of that.
Mr. McIntyre. And do you see any other country similarly
that we can look--when you say about working with our allies or
other nations that we have a positive relationship with, do you
see any other countries that we have a relationship with that
we can move forward that would save us money, yet give us a
strong presence?
Mr. Berteau. I think it is fair to say that there is nobody
else like Australia, and that is a unique relationship in the
region that we will maintain for a long time.
But I think there are probably six or eight other countries
that we are already having discussions and engagements with,
ranging from our treaty partners, like the Philippines and
Thailand, to some of the lesser-known opportunities, if you
will, including--and I would have never thought I would be
saying this--Vietnam.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. Yeah. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thanks, Mike.
As you know, Congressman Wittman is the chairman of our
Readiness Subcommittee. And we now recognize him for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our panelists for joining us today.
Thank you so much. It is a great perspective that you are
providing.
Admiral Walsh, I would like to begin with you and to get
your perspective on where the United States is in building
those relationships with our partners in the Asia-Pacific.
Having visited there and talked to the governing officials
as well as military leaders in those nations, they are, in all
cases, anxious to develop those relationships. They are doing
that in the context of a China that continues to be more
aggressive in the region and pursuing what I call a testing and
response type of behavior, like the bully on the playground.
You know, they go up to somebody, kick them in the ankle,
see what the response is, and then later shove them a little
bit and see what the response is, and then later shove them to
the ground and then see what the response is. Our partners
there become more and more concerned about this aggressive
behavior with China.
In that context, tell me, what should we be doing to grow
our relationships there? How should we be interacting to make
sure that we provide a strengthened relationship with those
countries, but, also, one that sends a clear signal to China as
a deterrent to that particular type of behavior? I wanted to
get your perspective on that.
Admiral Walsh. Thank you.
I think first is an assessment of the laydown current U.S.
posture in the Pacific. It is a legacy laydown from World War
II in terms of brick and mortar and operating patterns.
And I think, for the Department of Defense, when both the
President and the Secretary of State make in very clear terms
the strategic value and importance of this body of water that
we are talking about specifically in the South China Sea, I
would look for the Department to now adjust its operating
patterns accordingly.
So you would look for some sort of operational consequence
as a result of new guidance that is being issued both at the
national level and the DOD level.
For us in particular, what we did is we looked at ASEAN
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in a different way.
So, for example--and to be a little more granular--this year we
will have a Rim of the Pacific Exercise [RIMPAC] that occurs
every 2 years in Hawaii. It is an opportunity to bring ASEAN
into this as an invited member in ways that we probably have
never thought about before.
In my view, sir, there are more doors open to us in this
line of questioning that you are suggesting than we have ever
had before. And so how to leverage or capitalize or move
forward in view of a door that is opened and do we recognize
it, I think is the key sort of question.
In my view, we can do something that China cannot do and we
need to highlight that, and that is lead, lead a multinational
effort, lead a multinational coalition.
And in my view again, when China looks at our weapons, they
can always reverse-engineer that. They can always then
duplicate it and get their own.
But when it comes to the relationships with partners, that
is the strategic power--relative power that we have in the area
that they do not have.
And so, to the point raised, yes, in fact, the neighbors in
the region are getting very concerned. And we are starting to
push up against constitutional issues inside the Self-Defense
Force in Japan, for example, because they are not sure exactly
how they are going to react and respond to these moves that
China is making.
It is in our interest to provide the reassurances that we
can to all of our treaty partners, especially Japan, who is
going through, I think, a very difficult period trying to
understand how to react within their existing constitutional
framework, and do it in a way that is responsive to the
interests of Japan as well.
There is opportunities in ways that I think this is an area
that requires much more development, and I think we can move
much further forward than we already have.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this in our relationship with
China.
How do you see the mil-to-mil relationship with China?
Where should it go? And what is your view of the manning and
training and equipping of the PLA [People's Liberation Army]
Navy?
Admiral Walsh. To begin with, it took me 2\1/2\ years to
have a meeting with my Chinese counterpart, Admiral Wu Shengli.
And, finally, when I had an opportunity to speak with him,
which was at a regional forum held in Singapore, I mentioned to
him, ``You know, you need to do more of this.''
Because I think one of the challenges that the Chinese
leadership has is understanding how the international
community, not just the regional community, reacts and responds
to the rhetoric that comes from PLA leadership.
From my own point of view, I saw developments taking place
inside the PLA that put a lot of the Chinese national economy
at risk in ways that I am not completely sure that the Chinese
population was aware.
The idea that we would be ready for a confrontation over
rocks, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea and jeopardize
all this economic framework and prosperity that has existed for
so many decades seemed to be counterintuitive to me, but it
underscored a reminder that the Chinese are acting in ways that
represent a civilization and we tend to look at them as a
nation-state and we get confused and we often talk past each
other.
The dialogue, the importance of having them participate in
a RIMPAC-like exercise, to me, the value of that comes from
being able to see us in action with our partners in the region.
That, to me, is a source of real strength, power, and optimism
for the future.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Rob.
Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses for your outstanding
testimony.
Admiral, you mentioned the sort of proliferation in Vietnam
of the Kilos that were purchased, and they are not alone in
that region in terms of spending money in that area.
And I guess the question is: Is that sort of a symptom of
people's insecurity about whether or not, you know, the U.S.
is, you know, sufficiently invested in the pivot, in the--sort
of an insurance policy, or is it just general high anxiety? And
just--and how do these sort of unilateral decisions in terms of
people's, you know, military budgets fit in with your notion of
U.S. leadership for the region in terms of our allies?
Admiral Walsh. Sir, I know you are familiar with the town
hall setting. I attended the town hall meeting in Hanoi with
the Diplomatic Academy.
And to a person in the room--and there were close to 100--
they wanted to know what we were going to do about China, which
I found fascinating to take that kind of question. It is the
latter of the two proposals.
I think there is a general anxiety about the emergence of
China because it is--it has stepped away from its script. For
many, many years, generations, China was going to hide its
capability and bide its time.
In the 2008-2009 timeframe, they got off script. It has a
lot to do, I think, with the success of the Olympics, the
success of the Chinese economic model while the world went
downhill in terms of global economy, and the anniversary of the
PLA.
They became very enamored with their own sort of name
legacy and were ready to change the deck, so to speak, and what
it did is it put the Chinese in a position where they lost a
tremendous amount of goodwill at the international level
because people went from concerned about China to being afraid.
And then, when the confrontations take place, whether it is
with Malaysian forces or Philippine forces or Vietnamese
fishermen, now the region is getting very concerned.
So to the point about Vietnamese acquisition of the Kilo
class, they simply don't want to be left behind, and the same
is true for Indonesia or Singapore or Malaysia when it comes to
the acquisition of maritime capability.
How they will use it and how they will employ it and does
this mean we are on the brink of an arms race, I don't know
that I would go that far because I simply don't know.
I get very concerned that there is no other outlet. There
is no other way to frame this issue, and now we are going to
resort to arms. And, to me, that is a formula where we have had
miscalculation in the past.
And if anyone understands it, it is our country. In 1964,
when we were conducting DESOTO [DEHAVEN Special Operations off
TsingtaO] patrols off of Vietnam, I think the last thing we
thought we were about to do is start a war or be involved in
something that would start a war.
It just goes to the ambiguity that exists for commanders at
sea trying to understand how far ships are away from land, how
close ships are to each other, their geometry, the
interpretation of what their actions are.
The idea of trying to evaluate intent now becomes something
that is done at the commander level, and all it takes is a
fire-control radar to go off or an inadvertent sort of action
by one captain against another and you have something that
quickly becomes far from local. It becomes state on state.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
I would now like to recognize my colleague and partner in
this Asia-Pacific series, Ms. Hanabusa, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanubusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I have a written testimony from one of my
constituents, Jose Andres, from Makai Ocean Engineering, Inc.,
and I would like your permission to have it made part of the
record.
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, it will be so admitted.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
Ms. Hanubusa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Walsh, I am quite sure that you have now read the
statement of Secretary of Defense Hagel and what he views as--
how he is going to effect this upcoming budget.
And one of things that, of course, I found very interesting
was the fact that he is talking about reducing acquisition
costs, maximizing resources, and buy and build new ships, but
it is sort of within just the Navy and Marine Corps budget.
One of the things that I have always been interested in as
we look at the pivot to Asia-Pacific is: What is the
acquisition posture going to look like? Like what is the fleet
going to look like?
We all--we have had great numbers. Three hundred six. We
have had 346 and 347 between Former Secretary Lehman and
Admiral Roughead. I mean, everyone has these numbers, and no
one knows how it then breaks down.
You seem to be testifying that you believe that the
concentration and the pivot to Asia-Pacific should be towards
the South China Sea.
Are you then saying that one of the things that you foresee
for us to do--as you know, in Singapore, we are looking at the
LCS [littoral combat ship], but then Secretary of Defense Hagel
says we are only going to built 32 and that is it.
So do you take issue with that or do you have any
positions, since you were PACFLT? What should that fleet look
like?
Admiral Walsh. If I may.
Ms. Hanubusa. Yes.
Admiral Walsh. This will take just a minute.
If you were to look at the force that we had in Desert
Storm across the range of military operations, we used a label
for that force called ``general purpose forces.''
In the range of military operations, we would expect to see
very utilization--a very small utilization of that force in
counterinsurgency and very small utilization in thermonuclear
war.
So it looked like a parabolic graph that said: You know
what? We could use this one box of Armed Forces and we could
swing it from one contingency to the next. The language we used
was ``lesser contingencies.''
And 9/11 changed that. What 9/11 taught us was that, in
this area of counterinsurgency, we are going to need to spend
some time and resources, because the solution--the resource
solution, the budgetary solution, to solve the
counterinsurgency problem doesn't exist with the general
purpose force because we will expend every resource possible
and we will find dissatisfying results. And as a result, after
9/11, what this committee and others invested in was more
investment in counterinsurgency.
What that programmatic solution looked like was that we
needed pattern-of-life analysis. We needed to understand the
impact that individuals were having at the strategic level. We
needed to find, fix, and finish them, which required the fusion
of intel and the ability to operate on that intel. That brought
us LCS. That made sense because LCS fit into the battle force
or mix of ships.
So what we are hearing today and what we are seeing today
with China is the rise of the state actor. And as you try and
think through the logical sort of outcome, to answer your
question--because I don't have analysis to give an exact
number--what you have to keep in mind is the LCS, which was
designed for one spectrum of warfare, which made sense for
shallow water in and out of the Philippines, Indonesia, working
with coalition partners in order to be able to have an impact
on counterinsurgency and the leaders of it, now we are putting
that up against a state actor.
And what the country is just not prepared for is now
another level of investment for antisubmarine warfare, undersea
warfare, integrated air and missile defense. I mean, that is
substantial.
And, yet, we cannot allow that legacy force to just
atrophy, because what happens over time is we lose the ability
to deter. We are in a world that proliferates this kind of
capability. So whether it comes out of China, shipped to Iran,
and then modified by Hezbollah, as it was in 2006, we are going
to have to deal with it.
And my preference is just deal with the technology rather
than the flag because the flag complicates it. The technology
is very real. And if we don't take steps in order to address
that, then we lose in more ways than we realize.
So the answer to your question is, when you look at the LCS
decision and the Secretary's most recent statement associated
with it, the way I would approach it is: What is the force mix?
We agreed to LCS when we had cruisers. If we are laying up
cruisers, now, what is going to be in the Pacific? What is the
right sort of ratio here with heavy combatants and the ability
to engage forces in shallow water that LCS brings us?
I hope that answers your question.
Ms. Hanubusa. It does. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today for your very
insightful testimony.
And before I begin, I also want to especially recognize and
welcome Professor Mahnken from the Naval War College in Rhode
Island. I appreciate the work that you are doing, Professor. It
is good to have you with us this afternoon.
If I could--and, Professor Mahnken, if I understood what
you said correctly--and I agree in your testimony that there
very likely will be--might--very likely will be a growing gap
between our interests and our ability to defend them as time
goes on in the Asia-Pacific.
And on that point, as we do look to future scenarios in the
Asia-Pacific region, it is clear that any military action will
be highly dependent on enabling technology, such as undersea
strike, directed energy, rail guns, cyber and electronic
warfare, and spectrum dominance.
In your views--and each of you can certainly comment on
this--are we adequately resourcing the research and development
needed to realize necessary technological advances in these
fields?
Dr. Mahnken. Thank you, Congressman Langevin, for that
question.
Look, I think, historically, advanced technology and
research development has provided the United States an
asymmetric edge and, historically, the U.S. Armed Forces, you
know, have looked to that asymmetric edge.
Periodically, that edge comes into question. That certainly
happened a number of--a number of times in the post-World War
II era and I think, you know, it is--we are in another era
where people are looking at the bottom line. They are looking
at expenditures, and, you know, research and development is an
easy--is an easy area to trim.
I personally believe that, you know, in an era like this
where we are experiencing rapid change in the military balance,
that we really do need to be investing in advanced
capabilities. You named a number of them. In a way, we can't
overinvest in those.
I think the big challenge will be then taking those--the
R&D investments and then deciding when and how to weaponize
them, when and how to bring them into the force posture.
But unless we are accumulating that deep bench of
capabilities, we are going to be hard-pressed in the future
when we need to call upon them to move forward and move them
out into the fleet. So, in my view, you can't overinvest in
those.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Admiral, you want to make any comment?
Admiral Walsh. One of the challenges that we have in this
area is the ability to talk about it. So there is a number of
investments going on in research and development that actually
would help the U.S. narrative in the Pacific today, but because
of the classification levels associated with that funding and
those specific efforts, it is very difficult to weave that in.
It is needed. We need to be able to talk about this. We
need to be able to say, ``You know, I recognize and respect
that new system that has just come up, but we have a plan for
that.'' And, yet, we are not able to do it.
It would be very helpful, very useful, if we could find a
way to weave that into our story because, as already mentioned,
the investment that we have already made in areas has been a
tremendous hedge, and we definitely do not want to lose that.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Anyone else care to add anything? Okay.
Let me ask this: Are the investments that we are making
appropriately tied to an overarching strategic vision and
nimble enough to respond to emerging threats?
Dr. Mahnken. I think that is an excellent question. And I
think my answer would be that it is very difficult--it is very
difficult to know. And here I will put my historian's hat on.
I mean, if you look at--if you look at the weapons systems,
you look at the technologies that have proven decisive, say,
for the United States or, more broadly, throughout our history,
oftentimes they were developed for different purposes and under
different circumstances than those in which they were
ultimately employed. And so that goes back to my previous
statement of why it is difficult to overinvest in R&D.
What you are doing is, hopefully, you are placing a whole
series of bets, some of which will pay out because the
technology matures, some of which will pay out because of the
threats we face, but you really are trying to build a portfolio
of capabilities. And I worry that we are, yeah, that we are not
building a robust enough portfolio.
One final comment, if I could--and it was actually brought
on by Admiral Walsh's comment--which is I think a key
consideration for us as a country, for the Defense Department,
as we are developing these advanced technologies is when to
show them and when to hide them.
We hide technologies to preserve an operational edge. We
hide them for various reasons. But we show them, we demonstrate
them, to send messages and to deter.
And I think we need a--you know, as we think about R&D and
we think about new capabilities, we need to have an intelligent
discussion about when to demonstrate those capabilities and
when to keep them secret.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. You know, that is a very good point. And, in
fact, it calls to mind, during both the Iraq war and even
Afghanistan, obviously, we revealed many of our capabilities,
and that certainly was an eye-opener, I know, to many of our
adversaries and they have subsequently adjusted accordingly and
refocused their R&D and procurement as well. So point well
taken.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Peters is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to Admiral Walsh to Ms. Hanabusa's
question because I may be--I may just be slow, but I think that
you explained the basis for an answer, but didn't really get to
the answer of what the force should look like and particularly
the naval force in the Pacific.
So you explained kind of the LCS issue. But how would it--
what would it look like on a map and in terms of numbers of
ships, if it played out?
Admiral Walsh. If I had another dollar, it would go to the
South China Sea. If I had another ship, I would be very focused
on the South China Sea in terms of security and stability
operations.
Can you do that with an LCS? Yes, to a degree. I mean, you
can have engagement with Indonesia and Singapore and Malaysia
and partners in ASEAN.
But the mixed question is really what I am getting at. You
can't have LCS at the expense of losing cruisers. You have got
to have both.
And the reason I couldn't give her a direct answer on the
number is because I just don't have the analysis to put that on
the table. I would be simply guessing.
But the mixed question is critically important because what
the cruisers offer to you is representations of real hard
power. And that message is clear and understood in the region.
Mr. Peters. Okay, I understand now.
So--but, geographically, you are talking about the South
China Sea and that would be the resources deployed?
Admiral Walsh. Yes. So when you consider where we are--
predominantly on the South Korean Peninsula and in Japan, with
now growing presence in Australia--to me, the area that is open
for question and discussion is the operating pattern for
forward deployed forces that are in and around the South China
Sea, East China Sea.
Mr. Peters. Okay. And that is a question that is raised,
but not answered, by the proposed budget?
Admiral Walsh. I don't know. I am not familiar enough with
the budget. Sorry.
Mr. Peters. Okay. Well, I appreciate that clarification.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Peters.
Mr. Mahnken, you teach strategy. One of the things we have
heard over and over again from our allies is that they don't
know what our current strategy is.
We have had experts, similar quality to each of you, who
have sat exactly where you sit and we have asked them the
question: Could you tell us today what our national defense
strategy is? Could you articulate it? Could you articulate it
to our allies? Can you make procurement decisions from it? Each
of the ones we had said ``no.''
In your opinion, can you help us with that? Do we have a
national defense strategy? How does what we have now differ
from what we have had in the past?
Dr. Mahnken. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
I would say--yeah. I am--I am a professor. I am also a
recovering policymaker. So I have great sympathy for those
whose job it is to develop strategy. I have been part of this
sausage-making, and it looks better from a distance, of course.
Look, I think it is very difficult to develop--for the
United States to develop a strategy--for the U.S. Government to
develop a strategy for this region for several reasons.
One is I think we face across the government very different
incentives even if we just focus on China for a minute, not
even the full diversity of the region. Let's just focus on
China.
Different parts of the U.S. Government face different
incentives, have different stakes in our relationship with
China, some parts much more towards cooperation, other parts
much more towards competition.
So trying to--trying to forge a consensus across the U.S.
Government, even within an administration, is exceedingly--is
exceedingly difficult.
Second, we are--you know, we are in an era now where
strategy documents are public documents. They are meant not
only to guide action within the U.S. Government, but they are
public documents that the U.S. public and foreign publics and
foreign governments consume. Perhaps even foreign publics and
governments consume them more than do domestic audiences. And
all of that makes it very difficult to formulate a very clear--
clearly articulated strategy.
Mr. Forbes. But isn't that exactly what we want to be able
to do for an industrial base and for our allies, that we have
clearly defined that strategy so they know where to make their
investments and where to do procurement positions?
Dr. Mahnken. Absolutely right. I mean, I agree with you on
the desirability of it. And it is highly desirable, but I have
also--you know, I have seen and I have lived through the
difficulty of actually doing it.
The four--you know, the four enduring interests that I
listed in my written testimony and my oral remarks came not
from any strategy document. They came from, you know, a reading
of U.S. strategic history.
And I think they are fairly uncontroversial aims, but you
won't find them in a strategy document, because it is so
difficult to state very plainly what our aims are and what our
strategy is.
Mr. Forbes. Let me ask you this question. And I like all
four of you. I respect all four of you. I read what you say.
You know, I am listening to you.
My question, though, is this. You teach it.
Dr. Mahnken. Uh-huh.
Mr. Forbes. Could you teach the strategy? Do you know--I
understand it is difficult, but do we have it?
Dr. Mahnken. I would say that we have a consistent
historical pattern of behavior in the Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. Forbes. Is that a strategy?
Dr. Mahnken. I think--well, I think it certainly falls
short--you know, for me, you know, I think--when I think back
to the gold standard of sort of a national strategy, actually,
I go back to the Reagan administration national security
strategy and its strategy against the Soviet Union.
And I go back to that because it was coherent, laid out
ends, it laid out ways and it laid out means. It also had the
virtue of being a classified document, which meant that
people--a small group of people could debate it, work it
through and then get it signed. It is very difficult for the
reasons I said to do that today.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Berteau and Dr. Ratner, can the two of
you--I know you are experts and have spent a lot of time doing
this.
In terms of our holistic policy and our strategies for our
agencies, would it be useful for us to have kind of a top-down
review of the strategies that our agencies would be using in
the Asia-Pacific area? And does that exist now? Have we done
that? For both of you, whichever one of you wants to start, can
you give us your feeling on that.
Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
question.
I think the first thing that I would say, I think the--you
know, the Asia team in this Administration I think is quite
capable, I think is quite sophisticated, and I think they do
have--in many senses, they do have a series of policies that
they have knitted together that one would consider a strategy.
So I think--and there are one--if you look at speeches and
articles, you could probably knit together a relatively
consistent story that tells--thinking about the complexities of
the region, the degree it is changing and putting forward a
comprehensive multilateral approach to that.
But I think you are right absolutely that there has not
been a top-level official description of that. And one of the
problems of that, you know, as you have described, our allies
and partners are not always exactly sure what we are trying to
do.
Our own bureaucracies, as you state very clearly, are not
always sure what they are supposed to do. And there have been
good reports by the Congressional Research Service and others
looking at the way civilian agencies in the U.S. Government
have or have not rebalanced to Asia in the way that one could
argue the Defense Department is very proactively.
So I very much agree with you not only that it is important
for our own bureaucracies and allies, but for the broader
narrative in the region about what the rebalancing is about.
And without an official U.S. statement, there are lots of
descriptions of it from our own partners and potential
adversaries in ways that it is counterproductive to our
interests.
So I think what we do need to see is not just a Defense
Department policy or strategy or a State Department strategy,
but something that either--either a comprehensive statement by
the President himself in the form of a speech that everyone can
point to and say that is the President's policy or an official
White House document out of the National Security Council or
elsewhere that is an interagency document and not just a
singular document out of one of the bureaucracies.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Chairman, my own background leads me to
conclude that, left to its own, resources tends to drive
strategy far more than strategy drives resources. And if you
really want to know what the priorities are, look at where the
money is being spent. That is a generic proposition, if you
will.
I think, if you go back to that Defense Strategic Guidance
that was laid out, which was not just the rebalance to Asia,
but all of the broad elements of counterterrorism and Middle
East defense and so on, what the Pentagon and the White House
said at that time is you won't see a whole lot of it in the
fiscal 2013 budget, which was the budget that was submitted as
that document was being developed. You really see it in its
fullness in the fiscal year 2014 budget and the associated
FYDP.
Of course, something came along and got in the way of that,
and that was cuts from the Budget Control Act and the
implemented sequester for 2013, et cetera. So we have never
seen the actual laydown of what that document would look like
translated into resource priorities.
Ultimately, to me, as a resource and management guy, the
value of that strategy is in setting priorities and enabling
the framework for making the tradeoff so that, when you come
down to that next dollar, as Admiral Walsh said, you know where
you want to put it.
And this has been one of the strengths of DOD over the
decade, is it knows where it needs to put its next dollar,
should that dollar become available. And I think the ultimate
test here is not the document itself, but the connection of
that document to the priorities and the tradeoffs inside there.
And that--we will see within a week what that looks like for
the fiscal year 2015 and beyond.
But, as you know, we are not out of the woods yet. I mean,
we have about a $140 billion gap between what the Defense
Department thinks it needs over the next 5 years and what the
Budget Control Act says they are going to get.
Admiral Walsh. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just to give you
the net-net.
Mr. Forbes. Yes.
Admiral Walsh. So in view of the comments you have just
heard, it is hard to imagine anything that would come out of
the Administration that would try and change the status quo. I
think the effort is to try and improve the status quo.
And in 1986, we needed to change the game. In 2014, we are
trying to hold on to the framework that we laid down. And what
you are sensing out of the Department is a reaction to some of
the big movements that are taking place associated with the
PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy].
And, as a result, we are very reactionary. We continue to
go through the budget bill process without any change of
strategic direction because we are trying to get to the same
end state, but we are starting to have difficulty in order to
maintain that same status quo.
So it is not a very attractive end state to continue to try
and promote the status quo, but at the same time it is very
much in jeopardy when you consider the operating pattern of the
current forces.
So, for example, with the 189 ships or so that were in
Pacific Fleet, a force that was designed for rotation is really
based on one-third of the force, one-third underway, one-third
training, one-third in maintenance.
We were looking at percentages much closer to the mid-40s
in terms of the total force underway at a given period of time.
That becomes much more difficult to sustain, whether it is the
status quo or something more than the status quo.
I think the effort for whole-of-government approach in
terms of economic agreements and trade agreements in the region
is terrific, but what we have learned over time is that certain
parts of the government have a very clear direct relationship
with their Chinese counterparts. The Department of Defense does
not.
And, as a result, our trade can go up and down, our
business community can go up and down in terms of their
relationship with their counterparts in China, and not really
feel like the whole relationship is threatened. DOD is not
there yet with their counterparts in the PLA.
Hope that helps.
Mr. Forbes. It does.
Admiral, you also mentioned that China is acting like a
civilization as opposed to a nation-state, if I understood you.
Can you just elaborate on that for us just a little bit as
to what you mean by that.
Admiral Walsh. Sure.
If you look at the role that the Chinese Government plays
inside the lives of individual Chinese citizens, it is
promoting and advancing the interests of a civilization.
We tend to look at China as a nation-state and wonder why
China is acting in the way it is. It does not seem rational to
us. We come up with our own language of how we want to
influence China, how we want to shape China.
China is the only country inside the international system
where, rhetorically, we were asked the question, ``Who lost
China?'' If you were to go back to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearings in the 1970s where we brought back the China
hands from 1948 and 1949, we said, ``What happened?'' We
thought we understood China. We don't. We didn't.
The last time we had a chance to seriously influence China
was after World War I. China had participated. China had
helped. China wanted something out of Versailles. And what they
got out of Versailles was that Shandong Province--instead of
going from Germany back to China, it went to Japan. And so the
Chinese community shortly after that gives birth to the
Communist Party, and ever since then we have been confused in
terms of Chinese motivation and interests.
China has longstanding interests in China as a
civilization. China is going to act in a way that advances the
interest of its civilization. We are playing by one set of
rules. They are playing by another set of rules.
We shouldn't be surprised by that, nor should we be
surprised that, when we react and respond and try and say
``no,'' that we are going to feel pressure. We shouldn't walk
away from that and we shouldn't blink.
Mr. Forbes. Last question I would like to ask to each of
you, and it is two questions.
As you know, sometimes we think of the larger conflict that
could happen in the Asia-Pacific area. In reality, we are
looking at the potential for these gray zones that I think the
Japanese call it.
The question I would ask to you is: What can we do best to
respond to those types of actions by the Chinese, one?
And the second thing we are always worried about here, that
we get mired down so much in today that we sometimes miss the
game-changers that could be out there that we should be worried
about.
What would you tell us that we should be worried about as
far as the game-changer that could happen that this committee
should not miss?
So two things: How we respond to these smaller conflicts
that are there and, number two, what is it we should be looking
at that could be that game-changer that we are missing?
We will start with you, Admiral, and each one have a
response.
Admiral Walsh. Sir, I think the answer to the second part
of the question first is you have got to have surface-to-
surface capability.
I would be most concerned about the surface fleet. I would
be most concerned that the investments that we are making with
regard to the surface fleet--read missiles--and the ability to
defend ourselves against that type of environment. That, to me,
is what has changed most dramatically in the last several
years.
We built airplanes with attrition in mind. We don't build
ships that way. So the seaworthiness and the combat-worthiness
of our vessels in this type of environment, to me, is the
primary concern and where we could do the most good in terms of
game-changers because that helps change the narrative.
And to the point raised earlier about research and
development, I think there is work that is being done in this
area that would help assure allies in the region that, yes, in
fact, we have a common interest, we have a common concern, we
respect the technology that is coming on board, and we have a
series of actions and investments that we are making in order
to counter that, we are not just standing idly by.
Because what that allows us to do is to take the first
question that you answered and to be very clear and very
concise and very, very consistent with it, which is that we
stand by our allies and friends in the region.
And so even though we don't want to get drawn into a
situation where we are trying to arbitrate individual actions,
we also want our allies and friends to know that we are going
to be next to them if they start to feel the pressure and the
coercion that comes from a big neighbor.
The Philippines have just submitted their concerns to the
Law of the Sea Commission. In my mind, it would be worthy of
the committee to take another look at this treaty. This is
opportunity lost. We are in concert with Iran and Syria in
terms of how we look at the treaty today. We are on the
sidelines watching others assert their national interests and
we are not in the game.
To me, this is the most consistent complaint that I hear
from those in the region, which is that we helped write the
language, that we helped write the language in 1982, that we
modified--we, the international community, modified the
language in 1982 when we objected to the redistribution of
wealth that was going to come out of the seabed.
In 1994, they brought it forward looking for us to
participate and to ratify. In 2004, it came out of the Foreign
Relations Committee unanimous, and we have never been able to
get an up or down vote on it.
Hope that answers your question.
Mr. Forbes. It does.
Dr. Mahnken.
Dr. Mahnken. Thank you.
I think you put your finger on a very important issue in
highlighting these gray-zone challenges, again, as the Japanese
term it in their national security strategy, and I think there
are several things that we can do to react.
One is we already have a very powerful instrument, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and I think the Coast Guard provides a very good
channel for conversations with China and with other regional
states on these issues. And building up Coast Guards within the
Asia-Pacific region I think is an important lever for dealing
with these types of challenges.
Related to that, you know, the term ``building partner
capacity'' has had a lot of resonance in the Defense Department
in recent years, both in the former Administration and the
current one.
When we have thought about building partner capacity,
though, we have tended to think about at the low levels. It has
tended to be associated with counterinsurgency. I think we need
to give a lot more thought to building partner capacity against
higher-end threats.
And when you start to look at that, you know, what could we
export to, say, the states in Southeast Asia that would help
them defend their sovereignty and harden themselves to
coercion, the answer is there is not--we don't produce as much
as we might.
Things like smaller patrol craft, land-based anti-ship
missiles, they are not in our tool kit. And we might want to
think about some opportunities to do that, to build the
capacity of regional states so that, you know, in the future
maybe Vietnam doesn't go to Russia for Kilos, but maybe there
are some options from us.
In terms of game-changers, certainly at the tactical level,
perhaps developments in directed energy, the rail gun, as
Congressman Langevin mentioned earlier. If they pay off, I
think those could be very powerful and could change naval
warfare.
Certainly a number of developments in undersea warfare I
think could prove to be game-changers both in terms of unmanned
undersea vehicles, but also, submarines and submarine payloads.
And then, from a tactical all the way up to a political
military level, I think there are all sorts of opportunities
now for sharing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
data--imagery from unmanned aerial vehicles, for example--
broadly sharing that and knitting together our allies and our
friends and us in some relationships to share data,
particularly when it comes to these contested areas.
At one level, I think it is very tactical, but it could be
a game-changer in terms of building and maintaining a consensus
in favor of the status quo and against revisionism.
So those are my thoughts.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Chairman, I would like to actually
associate myself with the remarks of both Admiral Walsh and Dr.
Mahnken. I think those are excellent observations, if you will.
I think, in terms of your first question, one of the
critical elements that comes into play is not just the U.S.
bilateral relation with each of the nations there, but the way
in which we can get them to engage with one another. One way to
do that, as Tom mentioned, is, in fact, through our own foreign
military sales.
I think one of the manifestations of the comments you made
earlier about what is the strategy and our allies and partners
asking that, drill that question down one layer. If they come
to us and say, ``Okay. We have only got so much money. What do
we need to spend it on?'', we need to be able to have an answer
to that question.
And the way in which we do these kinds of things today tend
to be individual deals of individual systems rather than
anything that is looked at in a more comprehensive manner, if
you will.
And if we did that in such a way that it builds up the
federated capability across the region rather than just a U.S.-
only or a one-nation-only kind of a capability, I think that
would add a lot of value.
The things that I worry about from a game-changer point of
view--and, actually, yesterday my panel followed you and
Congressman Smith over at that event across town and I was
asked this very question, ``What do you wake up at 3 o'clock in
the morning worried about in this business?''
One of the vulnerabilities at the low end, and that is
cybersecurity. I mean, it actually has high-end vulnerability
as well in an electronic warfare sense, but the real
vulnerability from across the region is at the low end. The
other is space, and that is the vulnerability at the high end.
These are both much harder for us to get our arms around.
In one case, in the case of cyber, the military alone can't
defend America or the world. It is going to take the
cooperation and collaboration of the private sector, the
nongovernment sector, across the board.
And for the life of me, I don't understand why the business
community in America can't see its own vulnerability here and
get on board with the legislation that would help open and move
in that direction, but that is obviously beyond the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee.
The second at the space end suffers from the difficulties
that Admiral Walsh was talking about of our general R&D, which
is it is hard to talk about it; so, it is very hard to fix this
stuff.
Ultimately, I think, though, we need to recognize that
China tends to look at an awful lot of these things in a
Metternichian kind of way. You are either on my side or you are
on their side. And for many of the nations in this region, they
don't want to have to choose. They want to be able to play both
sides.
It is in our interest to help them do that in such a way
that strengthens the overall capacity and capability rather
than forcing people to line up on one side or another. That is
hard.
Mr. Forbes. Good comments.
Dr. Ratner.
Dr. Ratner. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this issue of gray zones is probably the toughest
and most important strategic question in U.S. strategy in Asia
right now. So I think a lot of people are struggling with this.
I think, if you read Danny Russell's recent testimony
carefully, clearly the Administration, I think, has come around
to understanding the importance of some of China's assertive
actions and the gray-zone contestations that we are seeing.
I guess, in terms of response, I mean, clearly
understanding the implications of this and the broader picture
of China's rise and U.S. leadership in the region as opposed to
thinking about--you know, people say, ``Well, these are just
rocks and islands.'' I think they are much more important than
just that in their overall strategic significance.
So I laid out a number of things in my written testimony
that I won't go into detail here. But I would echo Admiral
Walsh's remarks about needing to support international
arbitration.
Even if the Senate--even if we are not going to ratify
UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], I
think supporting the current Philippines international
arbitration in the South China Sea is critically important in
the process, not necessarily the Philippines' claims.
I think we need to think about improving confidence-
building measures in other ways to prevent and manage crises.
Considering the code of conduct in the South China Sea, it is
unlikely to be completed anytime soon. We should think about
how we can take some of those mechanisms and advance them
without the full agreement.
And I would echo Dr. Mahnken's suggestion about a common
operating picture in the South China Sea. I think,
fundamentally, it could be extremely helpful in terms of
helping countries modify their own behavior as well as setting
norms that others would be more likely to abide by.
But I think, at the end of the day, the underlying question
here is about the willingness of the United States to impose
costs on China, as I said in my statement.
And this is not about containment. It is not about a
fundamental change in U.S.-China policy. It is about looking at
our decades-long hedging strategy of engagement, on the one
hand, and balancing, on the other, and deciding whether or not
we have that mix right.
And the argument that I have been making and others is that
we may need to beef up the balancing part of that mix of the
policy so as not to create a permissive environment for Chinese
assertiveness in these gray zones. And there are a lot of ways
we can do that.
One, we can augment our military presence in the region.
Senior White House officials raised that possibility in the
context of ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone] in the South
China Sea. We can think about expanding or more clearly
defining our security commitments in the region, which are
sometimes intentionally ambiguous. We can think about
broadening the type of capabilities we are willing to transfer
to certain partners.
We can think about--and this would be incredibly
sensitive--but, in certain contexts, revisiting our neutrality
on certain sovereignty issues. We can think about offering
legal assistance to countries who are interested in
international arbitration.
And as a final suggestion, I think one idea that we should
consider--and it would have to be legal--we have to get into
sort of legal and operational aspects of this--but I think the
United States needs to think about, in cooperation with allies
and partners, treating Chinese maritime vessels--
nongovernmental maritime vessels and paramilitary vessels as
naval combatants if they are engaging in acts of aggression and
physical coercion.
China is clearly using Coast Guard-like vessels for
essentially military coercion, and I think, as long as we draw
a red line and say that is nonmilitary action, they are likely
to do so and keep the U.S. response below the military
threshold. And I think that only works to China's strategic
advantage and against the interests of peace and stability.
Mr. Forbes. Good. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa, do you have a final question you would like
to pose to the panel?
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Admiral Walsh, when we were discussing it earlier, my other
question to you would have been--as you know, the Congress,
primarily the House, has taken a very strong position against
the retiring of the cruisers.
So I was very interested in what you were saying because
the cruisers are scheduled to be retired and, as you know, we
are going to lose at least possibly two or three at Pearl
[Harbor].
And so, from what you are saying--and that is what I
expected you to say, that we need a mix, and the mix will be
determined by where we are. So the South China Sea, I
understand you.
You seem to be saying that, for the general picture of the
whole of PACOM AOR [area of responsibility], we are going to
need more than just that. That is for that particular area. But
if the player that we are all looking at is China, then we need
the subs, we need the carriers, we need everything else.
Am I understanding you correctly?
Admiral Walsh. Yes. What I am suggesting to you is a line
of questioning as the budget is revealed in terms of how to
approach it.
And if the going-in concern is battle force mix, then it
prompts now the conversation of, ``Okay. How many? And what is
the analysis of how many LCS and how many cruisers? And the
decision associated with retiring or laying up cruisers, is
that based on budget or is that based on changing scenarios in
the Pacific that, in my mind, are playing out?''
We have to make adjustments with the budgetary plan because
of changes that are taking place in the political and military
environment in the Pacific.
So it was more of just sort of helping with the playbook
when it comes down to trying to understand what the exact
answer is.
And I have no agenda in this discussion, other than I am
reacting to a concern that we are going to become LCS-dominant
in the Pacific, and that was never part of the plan. That was
not something we agreed to.
We were always going to have the cruiser capability, the
carrier, the submarine capability. And when you put all of that
together, now you can optimally place LCS where it belongs and
where it fits into the overarching strategy.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question?
Mr. Berteau--am I saying that correctly?--you know, one of
the things CSIS has always been in the forefront with has been
the--and this is, of course, with Michael Green--has been in
the discussion of what does it mean to have the pivot to Asia-
Pacific.
We have heard various people tell us that there seems to be
a lack of clear strategy of what does it mean when we say--when
the United States says we are pivoting to Asia-Pacific or
rebalancing. I have even heard recalibration. Whichever word
you want you can use.
The question is: Do you see a clear strategy or is it
something that you feel that we are sort of, you know, kind of
finding our way around, which doesn't help us as the people who
are finally going to make the decision as to where the money
goes and what is going to be there? What is the strategy, if
you feel that we have one, or if we don't have one, why do you
think we don't have one?
Mr. Berteau. Such an easy question to ask.
Ms. Hanabusa. And my last question. It is all yours.
Mr. Berteau. I think that there are some sound elements of
the current strategy that have been articulated and followed
and, in particular--and I think Dr. Ratner mentioned this in
his testimony--there is much more going on here than just
military presence.
We tend to focus on the military presence side and on the
elements of this that fall under the purview of the Defense
Department, and it is clearly substantially more than that.
I won't pretend that I am tracking what is going on in the
trade arena and the diplomatic arena, et cetera. It is a bit
outside of my area. So I look at it from within the Defense
Department's point of view.
I think there has been a consistent articulation of what
constitutes a strategy that guides the theater campaign plan
that the Pacific Command has in place that allows the
development of courses of action inside there, and I think
there is plenty of work that has been done on that.
What I think remains to be articulated in a public way that
you and I can read and understand--not a classified document,
but a public document--is something that allows us to say, if
you can only do so much of these actions in this campaign plan,
which ones are the most important and which ones come first.
That articulation I think still remains to be laid out there.
As to why it hasn't been put in place, I will tell you, I
think a big part of the problem is just the fundamental
budgetary and programmatic uncertainty that pervades the
defense establishment today and makes it very difficult to
think beyond where we are right now.
I mean, you look at this. We are on the eve of the 1st of
March. We have 7 months left in this fiscal year. For the first
time, actually, in 3 years, the Defense Department knows what
it is going to have to spend in that 7 months, but they don't
know what they are going to have to spend starting on October
1. Well, we sort of do. We are going to have a continuing
resolution. But we don't know much beyond October 1, if you
will.
That level of uncertainty, even though it is not strategic
at all, I think permeates the environment in which any kind of
a strategic thinking comes into play. That is the best
explanation that I can put forward, I think, that looks there.
But I think there is one overriding important point that
has changed dramatically, and Admiral Walsh alluded to this, I
think, in his response to the very first question or the second
question, perhaps, that was asked here.
We inherited a laydown of U.S. forces at the end of World
War II that essentially was the basis of our Pacific posture,
or at least after the Korean War, if you will.
One of the things that Dr. Green and I did when we
undertook our study 2 years ago was said, ``What if we were
starting from a clean sheet of paper, I mean, literally, we had
no basing structure in the Asia-Pacific region? Where would we
want to be?''
Well, guess what. We would want to be in Korea because of
the dynamic there. We would want to be in Japan because of the
importance of the alliance. We would want to have a good
physical presence in the first island chain, which we do in
Okinawa. We would want to have a sound physical presence in the
second island chain, which we do in Guam.
The big gap is everything south of there, Southeast Asia on
around into the Indian Ocean. That is where the gaps were, if
you will. And I think one of the things that time has precluded
is we are not going to go build big bases there. We don't have
the money for it. They don't have the appetite for it. But we
do have to have the engagement that is coming into play.
This is both a strategic framework, but a very set of
tactical decisions day to day at the very small unit level. And
I think a lot of what I am seeing going on at the Marine Corps
level, at the Pacific augmentation team level, small groups,
country by country, location by location, engaging in dispersal
opportunities at air bases around the region, all fits into
this pattern. But it is very hard to describe in a strategic
sense.
So I am seeing a lot of positive activities, if you will,
but it is going to take time before we can see how they play
out in a strategic sense.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
As we mentioned at the beginning, the importance of this
hearing is not just for the hearing itself, but for the
transcript and the record we are making.
And we promised each of you we would give you just a few
moments, if you needed it, at the end for anything that perhaps
you wanted to wrap up with or anything that we left out in
terms of our questioning.
So, Dr. Ratner, let's start with you. And we'll work our
way back. Any closing thoughts that you have that we failed to
ask or that we mischaracterized?
Dr. Ratner. Sure. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for
these hearings. I think this is a real service to U.S.-Asia
policy. So congratulations. I think it has been a success
already, and I hope to see more up here on the Hill.
Let me address the issue of how we should go about building
our alliance and partnerships, because I guess I would somewhat
disagree with how--some of the characterizations earlier that
we're talking about. ``Well, this just should be geared at the
China threat. These countries are feeling more threatened; and,
therefore, we should work with them to deal with that threat.''
I think it is true that countries in the region are feeling
increasingly insecure because of China's rise, but it is also
true that they have deep political and economic
interdependences with China and, whereas U.S. policy can blow
hot and cold, China is a geographic reality for them that is
not going away and, as a fundamental rule in the region, with a
couple exceptions, countries really do not want to have to
choose between the United States and China.
So when we think about engaging with allies and partners,
yes, it should be about enhancing U.S. capability and
deterrence, interoperability for warfighting. But more
fundamentally, it has to be about building partnerships and
having a more politically sustainable relationship, as we have
said--as you said in your opening and as we have said, as
official U.S. policy.
So we should think about how our partnerships can be
integrated in regional institutions, for instance, how they can
address non-traditional security threats or other threats that
are locally important to our partners outside of major power
war.
We should think about how to include engagements with
China, whether it is in multilateral agreements or through our
relationship with Australia, for instance, the fact we need to
have a good relationship with China or at least a stable
relationship with China to deepen our security partnerships
with countries in the region who, again, don't benefit from a
highly adversarial relationship between the United States and
China.
And, finally, we need an economic component to these
engagements such that security is not the overriding core or
pillar of our relationships with these countries.
It makes it very difficult for a number of countries in the
region, even allies like Australia and the Philippines and
Japan, to go to their domestic publics and say, ``Well, our
relationship with the United States is all about security and,
in some cases, all about deterring China.'' That is not what
their publics are looking for out of their relationship with
the United States or with China.
So I think we really do need to think about political
sustainability and think about shaping a regional order rather
than thinking about it in the terms of building some type of
anti-China coalition or whatever you would call it that,
really, most countries in the region will not sign up for.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Berteau.
Mr. Berteau. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa's last question actually gave me the
opportunity to say an awful lot of what I already put in my
notes. To wrap up here, I would just add two final points.
One really piggybacks on Admiral Walsh's comment about
China doesn't behave necessarily in ways that we interpret.
They are playing by one set of understandings and we are
playing by another.
I would note that that is not just true of the United
States understanding of China. It is true, I believe, of the
understanding of many other countries in the region of China.
And they all look at it through a prism, and we need to keep
that in mind as we go forward.
We are on an adventure here that there is no cookbook that
tells us what to do. You know, to behave in such a way that it
changes the evolution and development of a major power is
something that is very rare in history that has been done in a
coherent and peaceful way, if you will.
And I think the challenges that we have are enormous in
this regard and it requires this kind of constant discussion
and dialogue in the open that you have promulgated here that I
think will be of enormous benefit as we go forward. So I thank
you for all these hearings.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Dr. Mahnken.
Dr. Mahnken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to the committee for this important work that
you are embarked upon.
Yeah. Let me just conclude by emphasizing my belief that,
you know, the United States does need a long-term strategy to
guide our investments and to help us compete in an increasingly
challenging environment.
We need that strategy, first, to be a smart competitor. We
are not going to, you know, spend ourselves to good strategy.
We need to be a smart competitor.
We also need to be able to explain our commitment to the
Asia-Pacific region to the American people.
And then, third, we need such a strategy so that we can
work with our allies and with our friends in the region.
I think we are blessed with some very powerful allies in
the region, and I think there are tremendous opportunities
before us, very exciting opportunities before us, to work with
our allies in ways that benefit us, benefit our allies, but
then together disproportionately benefit us as alliances. So we
need to be alive to those opportunities.
Now, if we lack a strategy currently, well, partially that
is because of us, and I talked about that. But, also, it is
because of our--you know, the other members of the--the other
states in the region and our competitors.
We have been talking about China and how best to understand
China. I think we need to invest in capabilities to help better
understand China and China as a competitor, because I think it
is manifestly clear that we don't fully understand what is
driving the party leadership and the PLA and Chinese actions.
So we need that as a foundation to develop a long-term
strategy to guide our investments, guide our actions, explain
to the American people and work with our allies.
So thank you again.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Admiral, we will give you cleanup.
Admiral Walsh. Thank you. An observation and then a
suggestion.
While I was the Pacific Fleet commander, I traveled with
Kirk Campbell and a representative of the U.S. Agency for
International Development and we hopscotched across the Pacific
to 10 different stops. And in the course of that, we found the
power of what we were doing as in the representation of a
whole-of-government sort of approach, at least in the minds of
the audience.
We have an opportunity coming up in Hawaii not long from
now with the Rim of the Pacific Exercise that, if we really do
think that these are matters of important concern, that I could
envision a RIMPAC dialogue where you do have Department of
State representation, where you do have academia that comes out
of Singapore or out of Malaysia, to engage in a forum where
there is an honest, open discussion about some of the maritime
concerns that you have seen play out over the recent few years.
And I could see China having an opportunity to present itself
and participate in ways that I think would be very friendly and
very encouraging.
It is just a suggestion. But it tells me that the
traditional sort of approach that is DOD-centric has its
limitations. And until we invite others under the tent with us
here and engage in that kind of dialogue, then I don't think we
are really going to be able to move much beyond where we are
today.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you so much for all your work
in these areas. They are vitally important to our future.
We thank you for taking time to be with us today and for
your help with this committee, and we look forward to
continuing to be able to utilize your expertise in the future.
So thank you.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 27, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 27, 2014
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 27, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 27, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. What flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region are of most
concern, and how does the rebalance address them?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Provide your assessment of the rebalance to date. What
are the most significant challenges and your concerns with respect to
its implementation?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What is your assessment of U.S. basing in the region?
Is the U.S. military effectively positioned to respond to contingencies
in the region? How can its positioning be improved?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How is the force structure in each of the services
being affected by the rebalance (e.g., end strength, training and
readiness, investment and modernization)?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How critical is forward presence to the rebalance as
well as readiness of the commands in the theater? In what areas is
PACOM lacking required forward presence?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Does the Defense Strategic Guidance and refocus on the
Asia-Pacific necessitate a change in our preposition strategy,
including operational stocks?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Discuss the importance of accessibility in the Asia-
Pacific region, our current accessibility challenges, and how the
rebalance addresses them?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What capabilities, research and development (R&D)
areas, and resources will be required to meet rebalance needs? What are
our most significant gaps and shortfalls? How is the Department
prioritizing those, and how have they changed to align with the
rebalance?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What are the implications of China's military
modernization, specifically its power projection, anti-access/area-
denial, counter-space and cyber capabilities? What is being done to
address these threats?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What should be the role of the U.S. military in the
event of a contingency in the East China Sea or the South China Sea?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region are of most
concern, and how does the rebalance address them?
Dr. Mahnken. I believe that the following flashpoints should be of
greatest concern in the Asia-Pacific region: (1) the Taiwan Strait, (2)
the East China Sea, (3) the South China Sea, and (4) the Korean
peninsula. (1) I am concerned that despite the rebalance, the military
balance across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift away from Taiwan
and toward the PRC. Taiwan's armed forces are increasingly overmatched
by Chinese military modernization. (2,3) In the East and South China
seas, China has utilized a number of instruments of statecraft short of
the use of force to establish a new status quo and coerce Japan into
recognizing Chinese territorial claims. The United States and its
allies need to develop a better understanding of these so-called ``grey
area'' challenges and develop countermeasures to them. (4) The Kim
regime continues to threaten stability on the Korean peninsula. I
believe that that threat will remain as long as the Kim regime remains
in power in P'yongyang, regardless of the rebalance.
Mr. Forbes. Provide your assessment of the rebalance to date. What
are the most significant challenges and your concerns with respect to
its implementation?
Dr. Mahnken. I believe the rebalance has provided needed attention
to the growing strategic weight of the Asia-Pacific region. I also feel
that the commitment to deploy an increasing portion of the U.S. armed
forces in the region is wise, both given the United States' enduring
interests in the region as well as the eroding military balance. My
main concerns are two. First, U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region
represent an increasing slice of a shrinking pie. As a result, unless
the United States adopts innovative approaches to force posture and
force structure, it will continue to face a worsening military balance.
Second, I am concerned that the United States is not exercising
leadership among its allies in the region. Absent that leadership, U.S.
allies are becoming increasingly concerned. In abdicating its
leadership role, the United States is also sacrificing the opportunity
for deeper collaboration with allies.
Mr. Forbes. What is your assessment of U.S. basing in the region?
Is the U.S. military effectively positioned to respond to contingencies
in the region? How can its positioning be improved?
Dr. Mahnken. I believe that the United States should harden and
diversify its bases in the region and augment them with contingency
operating locations. These should be balanced between bases on
sovereign U.S. territory, such as Hawaii and Guam, and those on allied
territory, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Bases on
U.S. territory guarantee access, whereas those on allied territory
provide extended deterrence and reassurance.
Mr. Forbes. How is the force structure in each of the services
being affected by the rebalance (e.g., end strength, training and
readiness, investment and modernization)?
Dr. Mahnken. I do not believe that the rebalance has yet
significantly affected the force structure of the each of the Services.
A force structure that fully implemented the rebalance would feature a
greater emphasis on naval and air capabilities; investment in new
capabilities of particular importance to the theater, including
unmanned strike, undersea warfare, guided munitions, and electric and
directed energy weapons; the development of innovative operational
concepts for projecting power in the face of anti-access/area denial
threats; training focused on the unique features of the theater; and
deeper collaboration with U.S. allies. Although the Services are
undertaking a number of initiatives along these lines, I do not believe
that they have progressed far enough to affect force structure.
Mr. Forbes. How critical is forward presence to the rebalance as
well as readiness of the commands in the theater? In what areas is
PACOM lacking required forward presence?
Dr. Mahnken. I believe that U.S. forward presence plays a critical
role in dissuading aggressors, deterring aggression, and reassuring
allies and friends. However, presence rests upon a foundation of
credible warfighting capability. Although the United States maintains
presence throughout the PACOM area of responsibility, I am concerned
that as the size of the U.S. armed forces shrink, the credibility of
U.S. combat power will be called into question. In particular, I am
concerned that the decreasing size and increasing age of Navy and Air
Force platforms will undermine deterrence and reassurance.
Mr. Forbes. Does the Defense Strategic Guidance and refocus on the
Asia-Pacific necessitate a change in our preposition strategy,
including operational stocks?
Dr. Mahnken. I believe that the growth and modernization of Asia-
Pacific militaries means that wars in the region are likely to involve
increasing expenditure of munitions and other expendables. I also
believe that the growth and spread of precision-strike systems,
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, is ushering in an era of
longer, costlier wars. As a result, I believe that the United States
needs to rethink its strategy for acquiring and positioning operational
stocks.
As part of this, I believe that the United States should enter into
discussions with its close allies in the region on how to pool
operational stocks, to include the acquisition of common munitions and
shared contingency manufacturing.
Mr. Forbes. Discuss the importance of accessibility in the Asia-
Pacific region, our current accessibility challenges, and how the
rebalance addresses them?
Dr. Mahnken. Forward-based forces play an important role in U.S.
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Access to the region is thus
crucial to U.S. credibility. Forward basing on U.S. and foreign
territory play complementary roles. Bases on sovereign U.S. territory,
such as Hawaii and Guam provide assured access. By contrast, those on
allied territory, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines
provide extended deterrence and reassurance. Although the rebalance has
seen increased access to allied and friendly territory in the region,
including Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore, I believe that
more can and should be done. In particular, I believe there are
opportunities for enhanced access to naval and air facilities in
Australia and the Philippines.
Mr. Forbes. What capabilities, research and development (R&D)
areas, and resources will be required to meet rebalance needs? What are
our most significant gaps and shortfalls? How is the Department
prioritizing those, and how have they changed to align with the
rebalance?
Dr. Mahnken. I believe the United States faces shortfalls in the
following areas. Unmanned Strike Systems: The United States requires
greater investment in stealthy unmanned strike systems that can be
launched well outside the growing range of increasingly precise long-
range missiles and other so-called anti-access, area-denial (A2AD)
systems. Undersea Warfare: The United States has built and maintained a
comparative advantage in undersea warfare over the course of decades. I
am concerned, however, that the United States is not adequately
resourcing U.S. undersea capabilities I believe that the United States
should commit itself to purchasing 2 Virginia-class SSNs per year,
funding and procuring the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) and exploring
the Towed Payload Module (TPM). The United States should also place
additional emphasis on developing unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs)
that can complement current U.S. attack submarines. Guided Munitions:
Current U.S. anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile designs date to
the 1970s; the U.S. military urgently requires a new long-range anti-
ship cruise missile to replace the Harpoon and a new land attack cruise
missile to replace the Tomahawk. The United States should also increase
its investment in research into autonomous systems, which offer the
ability to operate in the face of enemy attempts to interfere with
sensors and communication links. Electric & Directed Energy Weapons:
U.S. forces are increasingly at risk from large salvos of guided
rockets, artillery, missiles and mortars. Electric weapons, such as
electromagnetic rail guns and high energy lasers, have the potential to
possess both high rates of fire and very low cost per shot, making them
probable game-changers for U.S. defense strategy if successfully
developed and fielded. These systems deserve greater funding.
Mr. Forbes. What are the implications of China's military
modernization, specifically its power projection, anti-access/area-
denial, counter-space and cyber capabilities? What is being done to
address these threats?
Dr. Mahnken. Chinese military modernization threatens not only to
deny the United States access to areas of vital national interest, but
also to erode the alliances that have served as the foundation of
regional stability for over half a century. Three aspects are of
particular concern: (1) Its growing ability to destroy fixed targets in
the region (including on our allies' home territory) could weaken
deterrence and reassurance. (2) Its growing ability to target U.S.
power projection forces, including U.S. carrier strike groups, could
not only deter the United States from intervening in a crisis or
conflict in the region, but also degrade U.S. warfighting capabilities.
(3) Its nuclear modernization, including the deployment of increasing
numbers of nuclear ballistic missiles, could potentially decouple
allies from the American extended nuclear deterrent by reducing the
credibility of U.S. nuclear retaliatory threats. I believe that more
needs to be done to address these threats. This includes investment in
new capabilities, including unmanned strike, undersea warfare, guided
munitions, and electric and directed energy weapons; the development of
innovative operational concepts for the use of U.S. forces; deeper
collaboration with U.S. allies; and measures to bolster nuclear
deterrence.
Mr. Forbes. What should be the role of the U.S. military in the
event of a contingency in the East China Sea or the South China Sea?
Dr. Mahnken. Much would obviously depend upon the circumstances.
However, it is worth remembering that the United States has, for the
better part of a century, served as a guarantor of stability and order
in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, in the event of a contingency
in the East China Sea or the South China Sea, I believe that the United
States should act to safeguard that order.
Mr. Forbes. What flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region are of most
concern, and how does the rebalance address them?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Provide your assessment of the rebalance to date. What
are the most significant challenges and your concerns with respect to
its implementation?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What is your assessment of U.S. basing in the region?
Is the U.S. military effectively positioned to respond to contingencies
in the region? How can its positioning be improved?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How is the force structure in each of the services
being affected by the rebalance (e.g., end strength, training and
readiness, investment and modernization)?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. How critical is forward presence to the rebalance as
well as readiness of the commands in the theater? In what areas is
PACOM lacking required forward presence?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Does the Defense Strategic Guidance and refocus on the
Asia-Pacific necessitate a change in our preposition strategy,
including operational stocks?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Discuss the importance of accessibility in the Asia-
Pacific region, our current accessibility challenges, and how the
rebalance addresses them?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What capabilities, research and development (R&D)
areas, and resources will be required to meet rebalance needs? What are
our most significant gaps and shortfalls? How is the Department
prioritizing those, and how have they changed to align with the
rebalance?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What are the implications of China's military
modernization, specifically its power projection, anti-access/area-
denial, counter-space and cyber capabilities? What is being done to
address these threats?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What should be the role of the U.S. military in the
event of a contingency in the East China Sea or the South China Sea?
Mr. Berteau. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. What flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region are of most
concern, and how does the rebalance address them?
Dr. Ratner. The most concerning flashpoints in the Asia Pacific are
the Korean Peninsula, maritime/territorial disputes in the East and
South China Sea, and the broader military competition with China. The
rebalance to Asia seeks to address all of these issues through its
multifaceted approach that includes:
-- Strengthening traditional alliances;
-- Building closer ties with emerging partners;
-- Deepening political and institutional relations with China;
-- Engaging the region's multilateral institutions;
-- Diversifying the U.S. military presence in Asia; and
-- Reinforcing U.S. economic leadership in the region.
Mr. Forbes. Provide your assessment of the rebalance to date. What
are the most significant challenges and your concerns with respect to
its implementation?
Dr. Ratner. The rebalancing policy has made considerable
achievements over the last five years. In nearly every dimension of the
policy, the United States has made significant and tangible advances.
There is little evidence to support skeptics who argue that the policy
is not real or is all rhetoric.
Sustaining and deepening the rebalancing will require continued
political and financial commitment from the White House and Congress.
Part of the task ahead is for U.S. political leaders to make the case
to the American people about the importance of Asia's future for U.S.
economic and security interests. The administration and Congress will
also have to keep ensuring that the non-military elements of the policy
receive sufficient attention, including for diplomacy, economic
assistance, and trade.
Mr. Forbes. What is your assessment of U.S. basing in the region?
Is the U.S. military effectively positioned to respond to contingencies
in the region? How can its positioning be improved?
Dr. Ratner. The United States should continue seeking a more
geographically distributed, operationally resilient and political
sustainable military presence in the region. Presence and access
agreements in Australia, Singapore and the Philippines are extremely
important in this regard in terms of demonstrating U.S. commitment to
the region, providing new operational and strategic advantages, and
creating greater opportunities for building partner capacity and
responding to regional crises.
Mr. Forbes. How is the force structure in each of the services
being affected by the rebalance (e.g., end strength, training and
readiness, investment and modernization)?
Dr. Ratner. The question is beyond the witness' scope of
experience.
Mr. Forbes. How critical is forward presence to the rebalance as
well as readiness of the commands in the theater? In what areas is
PACOM lacking required forward presence?
Dr. Ratner. Forward presence and access agreements are extremely
important in terms of demonstrating U.S. commitment to the region,
providing new operational and strategic advantages, and creating
greater opportunities for building partner capacity and responding to
regional crises.
Mr. Forbes. Does the Defense Strategic Guidance and refocus on the
Asia-Pacific necessitate a change in our preposition strategy,
including operational stocks?
Dr. Ratner. The question is beyond the witness' scope of
experience.
Mr. Forbes. Discuss the importance of accessibility in the Asia-
Pacific region, our current accessibility challenges, and how the
rebalance addresses them?
Dr. Ratner. See answers above.
Mr. Forbes. What capabilities, research and development (R&D)
areas, and resources will be required to meet rebalance needs? What are
our most significant gaps and shortfalls? How is the Department
prioritizing those, and how have they changed to align with the
rebalance?
Dr. Ratner. The question is beyond the witness' scope of
experience.
Mr. Forbes. What are the implications of China's military
modernization, specifically its power projection, anti-access/area-
denial, counter-space and cyber capabilities? What is being done to
address these threats?
Dr. Ratner. The question is beyond the witness' scope of
experience.
Mr. Forbes. What should be the role of the U.S. military in the
event of a contingency in the East China Sea or the South China Sea?
Dr. Ratner. The precise role of the United States military will, of
course, depend on the nature of the contingency. Nevertheless, the
United States could have a key role to play in terminating any
conflict, either through the use of force or deterrent threats.
Depending on the circumstances, failure to play that role could have
significant negative effects on U.S. credibility, leadership and
interests in Asia.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Looking at the probability that future environments
in the Asia-Pacific will be denied, are we making the right investments
to ensure the adequacy and resiliency of our ISR capabilities?
Admiral Walsh. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. In your views, have we placed appropriate strategic
emphasis on matters other than high-end warfare in the Asia-Pacific, in
particular on contesting the persistent low-level competition that
seems endemic to the region?
Dr. Mahnken. The United States faces a number of challenges in the
Asia-Pacific region. Of these, the most consequential would be a great-
power conflict. It is not, however, the only contingency of interest.
In particular, I am concerned about China's so-called ``gray-area''
challenges to the status quo in the region. China has utilized a number
of instruments of statecraft short of the use of force to establish a
new status quo and coerce regional states into recognizing Chinese
territorial claims. The United States and its allies need to develop a
better understanding of this strategy and develop countermeasures to
it.
[all]