[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-78]
UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 11, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
86-968 WASHINGTON : 2014
___________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer
Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or
866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MO BROOKS, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
PAUL COOK, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alexander Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, February 11, 2014, United States Security Policy and
Defense Posture in the Middle East............................. 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, February 11, 2014....................................... 37
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2014
UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Pandolfe, VADM Frank C., USN, Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy (J-5), Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense.......... 8
Patterson, Ambassador Anne W., Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State................. 3
Slotkin, Elissa, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense. 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 41
Pandolfe, VADM Frank C....................................... 65
Patterson, Ambassador Anne W................................. 44
Slotkin, Elissa.............................................. 57
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 42
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 73
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. McKeon................................................... 77
UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 11, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen. We appreciate all of you being
here today. The committee meets to receive testimony on United
States security policy and defense posture in the Middle East.
And I just want to point out before we begin that there
will be no disruptions at the hearing. We appreciate you all
cooperating for that to make sure that everything goes well.
Our witnesses today include Ambassador Anne Patterson; Ms.
Elissa--Elissa, I have got a granddaughter, Elissa--Slotkin;
and Vice Admiral Frank Pandolfe.
Thank you all for joining us here today.
The committee has conducted several classified briefings
and open hearings with outside experts on this topic area.
However, today is an opportunity to build upon that knowledge
in an open forum with senior policy and military leaders in our
government. The Middle East is in the midst of a particularly
tumultuous period, from the Arab Awakening to the evolution of
Al Qaeda, to the deadly conflict in Syria, to Iran's continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons. We are witnessing a level of
volatility in the Middle East that poses a serious threat to
U.S. security and to our interests in the region.
While our allies and partners seek strong U.S. leadership
and engagement in the region, they instead see signs of
disengagement. Our withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the
administration's rebalance to other regions and its dealmaking
with Iran help shape this view. There is widespread uncertainty
about U.S. commitment in the Middle East.
As noted by former U.N. [United Nations] Ambassador to Iraq
James Jeffrey in a recent op-ed, and I quote, ``As often
happens in this region, the administration is sounding an
uncertain tone. The result has been an extraordinary collapse
of U.S. credibility in the region, despite many commendable
administration steps,'' end quote. These comments illustrate a
lack of certainty about U.S. policy in the region.
Equally important is our military posture in the region,
how we combat evolving threats, deter Iran, degrade Al Qaeda,
and assure our allies and partners. We also must ensure our
military posture and its associated capabilities are not traded
for interim deals with regimes that have a history of
noncompliance.
We look forward to your testimony on the administration's
policy and posture in the Middle East and how they
comprehensively support U.S. national security interests.
Now I will turn to Ranking Member Smith for his statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to our exceptionally well qualified group of
witnesses. Look forward to your testimony and discussion on
this important region.
It is a complex and difficult region, perhaps as complex as
it has ever been for us with the Arab Awakening; our, you know,
presence in Iraq and then withdrawal from Iraq and now the
difficulties that are there; Syrian civil war; transition
governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and a whole lot of other places;
and an ongoing effort, once again, to try to reach and resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. I cannot imagine a more
difficult set of challenges.
And I think our commitment to the region is clear. I will
disagree with the chairman on that. I mean, our efforts to
negotiate with Iran are an effort to resolve what is an
incredibly difficult tension. We do not want Iran to have a
nuclear weapon. And if we are going to prevent them from doing
that, we need to actively engage, which I believe that we are.
I also, you know, very much support Secretary Kerry's
efforts to, once again, try to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
crisis, which is a major source of tension in the region and
significant uncertainty for Israeli allies.
I think we are committed and engaged in the region. The
problem is it is a very difficult region. And the thing I am
most interested in is how do we work in that region,
understanding that we cannot control it? And I think that is
the problem with some of the analysis out there as if the U.S.
simply woke up one day and decided to be more engaged, everyone
would listen to us and, you know, solve all of their problems.
You know, one of our problems and challenges in the region is
understandably that region wants to be autonomous. They do not
want to think that the U.S. is the one that is going to show up
and solve their problems.
And also to be perfectly honest, we have some credibility
issues in that region. You know, people, you know, you saw in
Egypt, you know, both sides were claiming that the reason that
Egyptians should support them is because the U.S. was
supporting the other side. You know, that lack of credibility
undermines our ability to simply show up, have a presence, and
fix problems. It creates a very complex diplomatic set of
circumstances.
So I am very interested to hear from our witnesses how we
manage that, how we do stay involved, because I think it is
critical that we do, but stay involved in a way that is
positive and helpful and understanding the limitations on our
ability to simply show up and solve these problems in a region
that ultimately is going to have to solve its own problems. How
do we balance those challenges?
You know, I think the administration is having a clear
message, and it is trying to do that, but it is a difficult,
complicated region. So I look forward to your testimony
explaining how we can navigate those very, very challenging set
of circumstances that exist in the Middle East. And I thank you
for being here, and I look forward to your testimony and the
questions that follow.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 42.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Patterson.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member----
The Chairman. Ambassador, you are going to have to just
pretend like you are----
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. A rock star and swallow that
microphone.
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you.
The Chairman. It really only picks it up if you are right--
--
Ambassador Patterson. Close to it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of
the committee. I am honored to appear before you today with my
colleagues from the Defense Department. Together with the
Intelligence Community, we work to protect our country from
terrorist attacks and to promote American national security
objectives.
The Middle East today is undergoing historic changes.
Across the region, we are seeing unprecedented political
ferment and in some cases upheaval as people demand change.
There are deep demographic and economic forces that add urgency
to this situation, but it is clear that the forces of change
are knocking down some of the longstanding pillars that have
supported regional stability. Regrettably, there are no easy
solutions.
The rapid pace of events in the region also threatens to
open long dormant divisions within societies, among class,
sect, religion, and ethnicity. These developments feed
revolutionary sentiment and set the conditions for extremism
that is rejected by the vast majority of people across the
region and poses a threat to the United States.
The United States is and will remain firmly engaged in the
Middle East. Our relationships in the region make the United
States an essential player in the search for diplomatic
solutions. The region's people want effective governments that
respect universal rights, presenting us with opportunities to
show the way. Our position in the global economy can help both
ourselves and the region through broader trade and investment.
Secretary of State Kerry has undertaken extraordinary efforts
to address the region's pressing and interrelated challenges
and leading efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon, to end the civil war in Syria, and to help reach a
final status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians.
Mr. Chairman, I know this committee shares our deep concern
about Iran's nuclear program. The United States is firmly
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Talks on a comprehensive solution will begin in Vienna next
week. Meanwhile, we can continue to enforce vigorously the
existing sanctions put in place by the United States and many
in the international community.
We are also well aware that Iran continues to promote
regional instability through both Iranian and proxy fighters.
Iran's support for Hezbollah has done much to destabilize
Lebanon, promote tensions along Israel's northern border, and
help keep the Assad regime in power. Iran is also working to
undermine Yemen's peaceful transition and Bahrain's stability.
Our negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue will not stop
us from taking decisive steps with our partners in the Gulf, in
Europe, and elsewhere, to end these and other dangerous
activities.
In Iraq, Mr. Chairman, Iraq has been experiencing
escalating levels of violence. The two-way flow of extremists
between Iraq and Syria has allowed high-profile attacks in
Iraq, mostly led by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant, ISIL, formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Taking
advantage of Iraq's fragility and government weakness, ISIL
began shifting resources from Syria to Iraq last year,
consistent with its broader ambitions. By last summer, they
were launching between 30 and 40 suicide bombings monthly. In
January, ISIL attacked and occupied Ramadi and Fallujah.
Working with local leaders, the government has largely freed
Ramadi of ISIL and its plans to clear Fallujah--and it plans to
clear Fallujah using mostly tribal forces.
I would like to thank the Congress for supporting the much
needed military equipment we have been able to provide to Iraq.
The government needs a professional and well-equipped army to
engage extremist groups before they enter the cities.
The growing violence has had a devastating effect on Iraq's
people. To repair the damage, Iraq's political leaders must
work together urgently across religious and ethnic divides on
essential political reforms in advance of April 30th national
elections.
Mr. Chairman, 3 years ago in Syria, a series of peaceful
protests against the Assad regime were met with violence and
repression. The ensuing civil war has caused enormous
destruction and terrible hardships for the Syrian people. It
has also had serious consequences for Syria's neighbors,
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as Iraq.
The United States has responded to this crisis by providing
more than $1.7 billion in a humanitarian assistance, the
largest of any nation, for people affected by the conflict
inside Syria and across the region. The Assad regime has
responded with obstruction and delay, preventing aid from
reaching more than 250,000 civilians. Although there has been
modest progress in Homs, civilians remain trapped in the cities
of East Ghouta and Mouadamiya. The conflict has become a magnet
for extremists from around the world trying to hijack the
Syrians' aspirations. We assess there are nearly 26,000
extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 foreign
fighters from up to 50 countries. Many are affiliated with
designated terrorist groups, such as the Al-Nusra Front and
ISIL, openly competing with the moderate Syrian opposition and
the regime.
The United States has worked to build an international
consensus for ending this conflict. Although the Geneva II
process has begun, supported by over 40 nations and
international organizations, it initiates a process that can
only end with the Assad regime's departure. Our team is in
Geneva today seeking progress on discussions toward a
transition process and steps to ensure humanitarian access to
the civilians trapped by the conflict.
We are working closely with international partners to
support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons [OPCW] to meet the ambitious June 30th target date for
the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program. The OPCW
has destroyed all of Syria's chemical weapons production and
mixing equipment, and the U.S. and others are working with them
to destroy remaining chemical weapons and precursors. We are
concerned about the Syrian government's slow pace and are
working with the international community to press them to
fulfill their international obligations.
Mr. Chairman, the United States will remain engaged in
resolving some of the region's major international political
crises. We will use our influence to press for political
reforms and democratic governments that respects universal
rights, enabling societies to change and adapt, and we will
press for economic reforms and seek to expand trade and
investment to provide jobs, opportunities and hope that will
benefit people in the region and the United States. Progress in
these three areas can help turn the extraordinary creativity
and energy of people in this region toward the building of a
better future. It will take years of work, but our national
security depends upon it. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson can be
found in the Appendix on page 44.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin.
STATEMENT OF ELISSA SLOTKIN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you very much. Can you hear me? Does
this work? Yeah.
The Chairman. Right into it.
Ms. Slotkin. Right into it. Okay.
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and other
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to speak to you on both our multilateral and
bilateral defense relationships in the Middle East and how
these partnerships fit into our broader regional policy.
In broad terms, our strategy involves cooperating with
regional partners and the international community in order to
help foster a Middle East that is stable, peaceful, and
prosperous and that, over time, succeeds in fulfilling the
aspirations of its own people. The people in the region want a
greater say in national affairs. They want broadening of human
opportunity, and they want recognition of the rights and
dignity of every individual.
The continuing ripples of the Arab Spring and the political
transitions taking place in the Middle East offer the United
States both opportunities and challenges as we work to address
our core interests. Those interests are combating Al Qaeda and
affiliated movements; confronting external aggression directed
at our allies and partners; ensuring the free flow of energy to
the rest of the world; and preventing the development,
proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.
Given the intersection of these four core interests, the
greater Middle East remains a region of vital strategic
importance to the United States. This is a point the
administration has made repeatedly, including in the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance, which affirms that, quote, ``The
United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and
allied military presence in and support of partner nations in
and around the region,'' end quote.
At the core of this commitment are four critical tools that
the Defense Department uses to achieve U.S. goals in the
region: our force posture, our bilateral relationships, our
growing multilateral relationships, and our military exercises
across the region. I will briefly talk about each of these in
turn.
First, our force posture: The most tangible sign of U.S.
commitment that we can make to the security of the region is
the physical presence of the men and women in uniform as well
as the presence of advanced military equipment. Anyone, friend
or foe, who looks at our presence in the Middle East will come
to only one conclusion: our commitment to the Middle East is in
no way eroding. We have ground, air, and naval presence of more
than 35,000 U.S. forces in and around the immediate vicinity of
the Gulf. We routinely maintain a naval presence of more than
40 ships, including a carrier strike group, and conduct a range
of freedom of navigation operations. These operations have
included approximately 50 transits of the Strait of Hormuz over
the past 6 months. Taken together, the U.S. has the ability to
project power in the region, deter our adversaries, and
reassure our allies and partners.
Another critical tool, and one I cannot overstate, are
bilateral relationships in the region. The Middle East is home
to some of the most important bilateral security relationships
we have anywhere in the world, and that starts, of course, with
Israel. The U.S.-Israeli defense relationship remains stronger
than ever. In addition to the State-led and DOD-executed
[Department of Defense] Foreign Military Finance Program, DOD
contributes to Israeli security by maintaining Israel's
qualitative military edge and authorizing the sale of advanced
technology to Israel. The U.S. is providing $3.1 billion in
foreign military financing to Israel this year as part of a 10-
year, $30 billion commitment to Israel. We are in near daily
contact with our Israeli counterparts.
Another bilateral security relationship that is important
to achieving U.S. goals in the region is our relationship with
Egypt. The U.S.-Egypt relationship is one of our most
significant and enduring defense relationships in the region.
For more than 30 years, it has served to further our countries'
joint security interests. Our bilateral partnership facilitates
cooperation on counterterrorism, eases U.S. military access and
critical overflight privileges, helps improve the security of
Israel, and contributes to the security of our embassy and
consulate. As we recalibrate the relationship in the wake of
the Arab Spring, it by no means diminishes the importance that
Egypt plays in the region.
Another important bilateral relationship that we continue
to work on is with the government of Iraq. Since 2011, we have
normalized our security cooperation with Iraq by forming the
Office of Security Cooperation under the U.S. embassy and
reducing its size from more than 700 uniformed military
personnel to 108 personnel today.
We have been tracking the uptick in violence and the
situation in Anbar, obviously, very closely. We, along with our
State Department colleagues and others in the U.S. Government,
have been urging the government of Iraq that the only long-term
way to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL,
is through robust cooperation with Sunni leaders, and we
continue to encourage Prime Minister Maliki to address Sunni
grievances. Iraq will only be secure when all Iraqis are
included in the political, economic, and social life of the
country.
Our bilateral relationships are critical, but our policy in
the Middle East also depends on our growing multilateral ties.
Our recent multilateral initiative was the President's
determination to make the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC,
eligible to be furnished with U.S. defense articles and
services as a single entity, a designation similar to NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or the African Union. This
designation will help us work with our Gulf Cooperation Council
member states to enhance critical capabilities, including items
for ballistic missile defense, maritime security, and
counterterrorism.
Of course, multilateral relationships are especially
important in contexts where our national security depends on
very broad diplomatic support. The United States continues to
support the U.N.-Arab League Joint Special Representative
Brahimi and the opposition in their efforts to find a
negotiated political solution to the Syrian crisis and the
creation of a transitional governing body within the framework
of the Geneva communique.
We will also continue to closely watch the multilateral
effort to ensure the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons
arsenal. The Department of Defense has dispatched the naval
vessel, Cape Ray, to receive Syrian chemicals and ultimately
dispose of them ahead of the June deadline.
Another difficult regional situation that we have sought to
address through multilateral engagement is the often
destabilizing behavior of the government of Iran. Let me once
again reiterate what this administration has said repeatedly:
We will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. Our
strategy of pressure and engagement, a strategy made possible
by strong multilateral sanctions, has created a window for
diplomacy, and the Joint Plan of Action was an important first
step. We are now focused on testing the prospects for our
comprehensive nuclear deal, based on verifiable actions that
convince us and the international community that Iran is not
trying to obtain a nuclear bomb. The Department fully supports
these diplomatic efforts while continuing to focus intently on
ensuring that the President has all options available should
negotiations falter or Iran not abide by its commitments.
Finally, the Department's military exercises help us
advance security relationships in the Middle East, both
bilateral and multilateral. I will allow my colleague, Vice
Admiral Pandolfe, to provide more detail, but let me assure
you, we are exercising with our partners in the air, on the
ground, and at sea, improving experience in interoperability
and working together on common security challenges.
Thank you, members of the committee, for this opportunity
to discuss the primary tools we are using to advance our
security priorities in the region. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Slotkin can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF VADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR FOR
STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5), JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Admiral Pandolfe. Good morning, Chairman McKeon, Ranking
Member Smith, and distinguished committee members. Thank you
for this opportunity to update you regarding how our military
forces are supporting U.S. policy objectives in the Middle
East. Our vital interests in that unsettled part of the world
are significant, and we are committed to working with the
states of the region to strengthen security, enhance
deterrence, and prevent war.
The U.S. seeks to increase regional stability, decrease
violent extremism, and counter the proliferation and the use of
weapons of mass destruction against our Nation, our allies, and
our partners. We cannot do these things alone. Rather, to
accomplish these goals, we work together every day with other
agencies of our government, with forward station State
Department professionals, and with partner countries in the
region.
All of these missions require us to maintain significant
combat power forward and to continually interact with our
partners by way of operations, training, and investing in
military-to-military relationships. Let me share a few
examples.
Regarding operations, our forces in the Middle East operate
continuously on the land, in the air, and on the sea, routinely
conducting freedom of navigation operations, forward
deployments, and port visits. They enhance stability and
safeguard access to the global commons. U.S. military forces in
the area are significant, with thousands of personnel deployed
throughout the region, especially in and around the Arabian
Gulf and in Afghanistan. Included in these numbers are U.S.
soldiers and marines with armor, artillery, and attack
helicopters; highly trained special operations forces; our most
advanced aircraft; advanced surveillance assets; a wide array
of missile defense capabilities, including ballistic missile
defense ships and Patriot batteries; and a large naval
presence, including a carrier strike group, mine-sweeping
capabilities, and an afloat forward staging base.
Additionally, as mentioned, we conduct numerous exercises
to increase the proficiency and the interoperability of our
partners across all mission areas, including war fighting,
counterterrorism, maritime security, and peacekeeping. U.S.
CENTCOM's [Central Command] extensive exercise program
includes, on average, 35 significant exercises each quarter. In
2013, our training efforts included Exercise Eagle Resolve,
which was hosted by Qatar and included forces from 12 nations.
Exercise Eager Lion in Jordan involved 8,000 personnel from 19
nations, and the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise in
Bahrain included 40 nations and 35 ships. These are just a few
of the hundreds of engagements conducted by all services with
foreign partners each year.
In conjunction with the Department of State, our military
also maintains an aggressive schedule of leader interactions to
strengthen relationships. These help us better understand
regional perspectives on common security issues while fostering
cooperation. For example, Chairman Dempsey participated in the
Middle East Chiefs of Defense Conference in Jordan last August.
Also CENTCOM Commander, General Austin, and his service
component commanders continuously engage their regional
counterparts, such as at the Regional Air Defense Chiefs
Conference in November 2013. Engagements such as these allow us
to listen to partner nation concerns, assure them of support,
and demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region.
We complement operations, exercises, and key leader
engagement with efforts aimed at strengthening partner
capacity. A key aspect of these initiatives are foreign
military sales and foreign military financing programs,
including more than $75 billion in U.S. arms sales to Gulf
Cooperation Council states since 2007. We are also co-
developing advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities with
Israel. Additionally, International Military Education and
Training is a key investment we are making to build enduring
relationships with partner nations, civilian and military
leaders. We have trained over 3,000 officers through this
program from this region over the last 13 years.
Finally, we are working with partners throughout the region
to help them better defend critical assets, including in the
physical sense and in the cyber world, including military sites
and key infrastructure.
Ladies and gentlemen, your military's men and women are
forward deployed every day in the Middle East in support of our
national defense. We are proud of their efforts and their
sacrifice.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak to your committee
this morning, and please accept my gratitude for all you have
done for us.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Pandolfe can be found in
the Appendix on page 65.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, there is a
tremendous level of volatility in the Middle East. Last week,
we received testimony that Al Qaeda is a growing threat,
particularly in Iraq and Syria, and you have referred to that.
Given the failure to achieve a status of forces agreement
[SOFA] with Iraq, which could have provided for residual U.S.
presence in the region, the rise of Al Qaeda and the associated
instability in that region, what lessons can we learn from the
experience and how we should transition in Afghanistan?
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. Well, obviously, we watch the events
going on in Iraq right now very closely. Anyone like myself who
served there feels--the only reaction is to feel emotionally
when you see what is going on in Anbar.
I do think that the idea that if we had negotiated a
follow-on settlement with the Iraqis and had a SOFA and a
remaining force, the idea that that force would be able to
prevent what is going on is--I am not sure that that would be
possible. You know, at the height of the American presence in
Iraq, the height of the surge, 170,000 troops, we had levels of
violence that we are seeing right now in Anbar, so I am not
sure that a remaining force of 10,000 would have been able to
prevent this.
More importantly, I do think that our overall goals in the
region are to support partners and allies as they manage their
own threats, manage threats within their borders. That is our
goal in many states in the region, and Iraq being one of them.
That is why some of the accelerated weapons transfers that you
have been seeing have been going on. We have been pushing very
hard to get the Iraqis what they need to take on those threats,
learn the lessons that they need to learn to manage those
issues within their own territory.
In terms of what it teaches us for Afghanistan, I am not
sure the situation is analogous. Back when we were negotiating
the original SOFA in 2008, it barely passed the Iraqi
parliament on the very last day of the session with a slim
margin, and whereas in Afghanistan, you have real support for
an enduring presence in the country, both from the loya jirga
members, from the members of their parliament, from the average
person on the street.
When it came to negotiating a follow-on agreement in 2011
with the Iraqis, the President, our President and Prime
Minister Maliki had conversations as two sovereigns, and the
prime minister did not believe that he could get a follow-on
agreement through his parliament. We respected that decision.
And if we couldn't get the protections and immunities that we
needed, we weren't going to stay. So I don't think there are
direct lessons we can learn for Afghanistan from the Iraq
experience, particularly because of the public support in
Afghanistan for an enduring presence.
The Chairman. To what extent is the Department of Defense
consulted prior to the United States entering into the interim
agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program?
Ms. Slotkin. I am sorry. I misunderstood. The Department of
Defense was consulted and involved in the conversations before
the agreement was publicized. We were involved in a robust
series of interagency conversations.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think one of the challenges of the Middle East is
balancing our various interests there in terms of, you know, we
certainly want stability, and we want to build relationships
and have friends. At the same time, we are promoting democracy,
we are--this is going into conflict in a number of places, in
Egypt most notably, and I think, you know, part of the problem
is we set this expectation that we are going to only support
democratic and free governments, but it is really not possible.
So when you look at Egypt, when you look at Saudi Arabia, when
you look at Bahrain and you have some of those challenges
where, you know, supporting a government that is not as free
and open as we would like them to be is in our best interests
in terms of maintaining relationship and stability, I think
part of the problem with the credibility of our message is
people don't see how we balance those two. We seem to
constantly be moving back and forth between the two interests
in a way that is confusing for the region.
Now, it is very difficult to balance, but I am just curious
how you would say we should go about messaging that and
working. And you can get specific in terms of how we should
handle Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, any of those.
Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Smith, this is always a very
difficult balancing effort, as you outline. Let me talk for a
minute about Egypt. Egypt is a country of 80 million people of
enormous strategic importance to the United States and to
Israel. We have a longstanding defense relationship with Egypt.
We are very concerned about the upsurge in terrorism and
insurgency in the Sinai, which is increasingly becoming an
ungoverned space, but that said, we are also very concerned
about the direction of the government, the arrest of
journalists, the crackdown on secular activists. So we do have
to balance these interests, and our hope is that we can balance
them in an intelligent and effective way by encouraging the
government to move toward the democratic process. They seem to
be--they had a referendum. They are going to have elections
soon, but we have to preserve our national security interests,
and we have to preserve our relationship with the Egyptian
military, because that is the bulwark of Camp David and in many
respects the bulwark of regional peace, so we try to balance
these as best we can.
In Bahrain, as you know, there have been a number of
discussions, certainly concerns about the human rights
situation. We have had many discussions with the government
about that, but it is also the home of the 5th Fleet and the
center of a very important national security interest in the
region. We balance them as best we can. And----
Mr. Smith. Could we, on that--if I may. Sorry to interrupt.
I think part of the problem with the messaging is when we come
out, you know, in favor of, you know, a democratic government
or opposed to a government because it is not democratic, our
language is very strong that this is a core U.S. principle that
we will not veer from, and yet everyone in the region knows
that we veer from it with great frequency. And I am not saying
that is wrong. I mean, you have to make choices; I mean, we
cannot imagine perfect governments all around the world. But do
you think we sometimes overstate the fact that, you know, come
hell or high water, we are going to support democratic
governments and then there are just so many obvious examples
when we haven't, and is there a way to better balance that
message in terms of how people in the region hear it and
perceive it?
Ambassador Patterson. Certainly, Mr. Smith, after my
experience in Egypt, I think our messaging needs work. I would
be hard-pressed to say, though, that we should not emphasize
our long-term interest in a democratic transition, because that
is critically important.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely.
Ambassador Patterson. I mean, they are absolutely--the only
way these countries can become stable and prosperous is to move
down the democratic path, but, yes, sometimes our messaging is
a little in-adroit in all these circumstances.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. On Syria, in particular, first of
all, can you give us your latest assessment of the situation on
ground in terms of the extremist groups, Al-Nusra and ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. You know, they seemed to be
ascendant for quite some time; slight setbacks a couple weeks
ago. How much--where are they at in terms of how dominant they
are in the insurgency at this point?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, Mr. Smith, they are
increasingly important on the battlefield. As I mentioned,
there are 7,000 foreign fighters from a large number of
countries, including from a large number of Western countries,
which means they have Western passports and potentially access
to Western countries, but I certainly would not want to rule
out the potential for the moderate opposition. Those people are
out there fighting and dying every day, but certainly it is of
great concern to us that ISIL, Al-Nusra Front and others are--
have a seemingly more active role in the battlefield.
There are Islamic groups that we would not call extremists
that are being funded by some of our allies. They, too, have a
prominent role in the fighting, but yes, it is of great concern
to us.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Anybody else?
Thank you very much. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Patterson, I want to get back to this subject of
credibility that the chairman raised a little bit earlier. And
part of what really bothers me is Ms. Slotkin's answer to the
chairman's first question. She said essentially that, Well,
we--there was a lot of violence in Anbar when--before the surge
and so there is really no lesson to be learned there, because
our troops wouldn't have made any difference anyway. But what--
well, first, of course, there was a tremendous amount of
sacrifice that was--of our folks as well as Iraqis required to
change the situation in Anbar.
Secondly, the hope was that some sort of continued
engagement and advisory would increase their capability and
keep them focused on the real enemy, the terrorists, not
devolve into sectarian sorts of struggles. And so I want to
get--and the fact that we are not there, I kind of wonder does
that not affect the--the way the other countries see us as
whether we are a reliable partner or not.
Now, that is just kind of preliminary. You, obviously,
served next door to Afghanistan. That is something that you
have a lot of knowledge and experience about. I would like to
hear your view about lessons from Iraq that may apply to
Afghanistan and the larger question of U.S. credibility in the
Middle East, whether we are a reliable partner or not.
Ambassador Patterson. I do think--let me say I do think we
are a reliable partner, and I think that our presence is very
extensive. Let me just take, for instance, the example of Iraq
and what we have done recently. We have made an extraordinary
effort with the help of this committee and other committees in
the Congress to give them the weaponry and the, frankly, the
intelligence support that they need to meet this renewed threat
from ISIL. And it was critically important that we provided
Hellfire missiles, because they had attempted to go after these
camps in the desert with thin-skinned helicopters and with--by
ground, and had been unable to do so, so our armament came in
at a critical point to enable them to go after some of these
terrorists.
We also have tried to step up training, we are planning to
step up training. We have an enormous foreign military sales
and foreign military financing program with Iraq. So I think it
is very difficult to say that we have abandoned the Iraqis,
because I think we are very intensely engaged there.
And as to your broader question, sir, yes, I think we are
going to need to be involved in these countries, whether it is
Afghanistan or Pakistan or Iraq or Egypt, for decades to come,
and not just in the military sense. The key element in all
these countries is going to be job creation for the enormous
number of young men that are coming into the labor force and
basically have no prospects are a built-in element of
instability. So, yes, generally speaking, whether it is by
troops or through assistance or through our investment programs
or any number of other mechanisms, we are going to have to be
in these countries in force for decades to come.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I would just say I hope that the
situation in Afghanistan does not have to get as bad and
deteriorate as much as it had--as it did in Iraq before we re-
engaged. It got--well, secondly, I hear what you are saying and
you all are all, you know, stating your opinion about our
credibility, but I will just say what I hear from a variety of
countries and U.S. people who visit those countries is they
have real doubts about the U.S. position, whether we are a
reliable ally; part of it is the negotiations with Iran, part
of it is the pivot to Asia, part of it is our unclear policy
with Egypt and Syria. And my fear is that doubts about our
credibility increase the dangers in that region, and nothing
would cause that to be in greater doubt than for us to abandon
Afghanistan in the same way we did in Iraq.
So thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being with us today.
Admiral, if I could just start with you for a second,
because I--we talked about the Pacific pivot certainly in this
committee, and I am wondering--you also spoke certainly about a
number of exercises in the region and I appreciate that, but I
wonder how you assess our security goals, how they would be
affected if our Navy was reduced in the total number of ships,
including an aircraft carrier, of course, and also some of the
LCS [littoral combat ship] fleet. Is that--where does that fit
into the discussion?
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, when the service chiefs come up,
they attest to the requirements of their services, as derived
from analytical analysis, which includes contingency planning,
and the Chief of Naval Operations has testified to the size of
the Navy that he feels is most appropriate and asked for
funding for that fleet. We are concerned with the size of the
Navy today, and we ask for your support to try to meet the
Chief of Naval Operations' requirements.
Mrs. Davis. Do you pick up from our partners in the region
that the discussion of the Pacific shift, pivot, is of concern
to them?
Admiral Pandolfe. I don't think it is of tremendous
concern. I think we have to--we have to explain the context,
which is that in a rising Asia economically, it is important
that we stay engaged in that theater, and that much of the
rebalance we are talking about is the flow of forces that had
been surged into Iraq and Afghanistan now returning to their
normal bases in Hawaii and Washington State and Okinawa.
It is by no means a disengagement from the Middle East. We
have made that very, very clear. We retain extraordinary forces
in the Middle East, not just quantitatively, but qualitatively,
and we are fully prepared to meet our security commitments.
As mentioned in my statements and others, our leadership
continually passes this message personally to the leadership in
that area, and I think they understand that and they do believe
that we will be there for a long time to come in the numbers
and the capabilities needed.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Madam Ambassador and Ms. Slotkin, actually, it remains a
big deal, I think, to all of us that you are here testifying
together. There was a long time before sometimes that occurred,
and I wonder if you could share with us, in the midst of so
many issues, crises, obviously, in the Middle East, how your
Departments are prioritizing, synchronizing means to achieve a
unity of effort. What can you point to that is really
different? And I wonder in that discussion if you could also
focus on the actual threats to the United States. We know that
there are continual crises within the region, but focus on the
threats to the United States particularly.
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you. We have, in answer to your
first question, extremely close collaboration with DOD.
Frankly, it is as close as I have seen it in many respects in
my 40-year career. For instance, when General Austin went out
to the Gulf a few weeks ago, essentially to reassure our
allies, Brett McGurk, who is very knowledgeable about Iraq,
went with him. We have many such joint efforts and many
meetings and collaboration on issues like our military
assistance to Egypt and every other country. There is an
extraordinary degree of collaboration, if I might say so, a
very amiable relationship, which also wasn't always the case,
but is certainly the case now.
And on threats to the United States, I think when General
Clapper testified last week, I think there is, of course,
growing concern about the global reach of some of the groups
that are operating in Syria right now, and the movement of some
of the more hardened terrorists from the tribal areas of
Pakistan into Syria who might potentially pose a threat to the
United States.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin, would you----
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. I couldn't agree more. Certainly, as
someone who worked on the Middle East, in terms of the
cooperation among the interagency, I would characterize my
experience in the previous administration as pretty
adversarial. Now, maybe between agencies, maybe that was
because I was working on Iraq, and it was particularly
political, but it is the tone of the conversation I think has
fundamentally changed, and while we meet with our interagency
colleagues on a daily basis, it is the tone to me that is the
most important change, not just the frequency of meetings. We
work on everything together, so I think that that is a positive
thing.
In terms of the threats, obviously, we look at the threats
coming out of Syria, Al-Nusra Front and the terrorists and
extremist groups that are powerful there. And I think one of
the positive examples of interagency collaboration has been our
approach to dealing with containment of that threat in
particular, so we have, in the past, I would say, year really
upped our game with Jordan, what we are doing in Jordan. So in
addition to the Patriots and the F-16s we have there, we have a
military presence that supports increased border activity,
helping the Jordanians train to manage threats to their
borders. The same thing with Lebanon. We have a robust program
with the Lebanese armed forces, but recently with the help,
frankly, of the Congress, have moved ahead on some border
security, additional border security programs dealing with----
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Slotkin [continuing]. The Lebanese----
The Chairman. The lady's time has expired.
Ms. Slotkin. Pardon.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here. I would like to
continue this question that the chairman began and Mr.
Thornberry had about credibility.
And, Ms. Slotkin, it seems like I heard you say that--if I
didn't misunderstand, that we will not allow Iran to get a
nuclear weapon, and you said that without any qualification at
all. Is that correct?
Ms. Slotkin. Correct. That is our current policy, yes.
Mr. Forbes. Let me ask you this, then, because we do have
some credibility problems. In fact, when you just made the
mention of the previous administration was more adversarial, to
some of us, we feel like maybe the Department of Defense was
standing up a little bit more to State, and sometimes you are
not adversarial if you are just saying, Okay, we will go along
with what you want to do.
But I look, and this administration could not stop a single
employee of a nongovernment contractor from stealing and
distributing to the world some of the most vital military
secrets of this Nation, secrets that many members of this
committee wouldn't have even had security clearance to look at.
And yet you sit there and tell us, without qualification, that
we will not allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Isn't it true
that we may not even know when they are close to having a
nuclear weapon?
Ms. Slotkin. So what I would say is the President has
stated over and over again----
Mr. Forbes. I understand what the President has stated.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. So, to your issue first of credibility,
so this strategy is----
Mr. Forbes. No, no. If you don't mind, you have stated
there unequivocally that we will not allow them to get a
nuclear weapon, and yet you have heard and we have seen what
has happened, even within the protection of our own
information. How can you guarantee this committee that you are
even going to know when Iran is close to having a nuclear
weapon?
Ms. Slotkin. Sir, particularly in an unclassified forum,
the most I will say is General Clapper was up on the Hill
talking about the Intelligence Community assessment, and we
believe that should Iran make the decision to pursue a nuclear
weapon, that we--it would take at least a year for them to do
that. We can talk additionally in a classified forum, but for
this forum, you know, the DNI [Director of National
Intelligence] has said this clearly. Obviously the Department
of Defense supports that assessment. That is our best
estimation based on the intelligence we have.
Mr. Forbes. And I don't have a problem saying it is our
best guess, best estimation. It is when you come in here and
say that the tack you are taking, unequivocally we are going to
keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, I think that puts in
jeopardy your credibility for being able to say that, because
if we guess wrong, if the President guesses wrong in the
direction he is going, we may not even know that until it is
too late.
But, Admiral, let me shift, if I can, to you. One of the
things that I would like to ask you, Admiral, what regional
initiatives both unilaterally and multilaterally are being
undertaken to deal with growing Iranian anti-access/area denial
[A2/AD] capabilities? How can the U.S. stiffen Gulf State
resolve to resist Iranian belligerence in the event of a
conflict to maintain U.S. access to forward bases, and what
lessons or synergies can be gleaned from our attempts to
preserve American power projection in the Asia-Pacific to
assist our efforts in the Persian Gulf area?
Admiral Pandolfe. So there are a number of initiatives to
address the A2/AD threat that Iran poses in the Gulf and to its
neighbors. So----
The Chairman. Admiral, could you pull that mike up, sir?
Admiral Pandolfe. I am sorry.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Pandolfe. There are a number of initiatives that we
are working to help counter the Iranian A2/AD threat. Among
them are working with the Israelis on ballistic missile defense
programs, including their suite of weapons, which are coming
along very well, and integrating the Gulf States into a more
comprehensive air and missile defense architecture. This was
discussed by Secretary Hagel recently in his overseas speech in
Manama. We are working to train forces in a number of countries
for border security and for counterterrorism to get at the--in
the terrorist threat sponsored by the Iranian threat network.
So when you look at the array of capabilities from
conventional ballistic missile all the way down to sea denial
and then into the--in the asymmetric or terrorist world, we are
sponsoring programs to strengthen our friends and partners, as
mentioned by Ms. Slotkin, both bilaterally and increasingly
multilaterally, to put down a clear marker that these nations
are united in their concern about and their intention to push
back against Iranian attempts at intimidation.
For our own Nation, we are----
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral, my time is up.
Admiral Pandolfe. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Forbes. But maybe I can chat with you a little bit more
at a later time, but thank you so much for that information.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
Let me--I have several questions that I would like to get to.
Let me start with one with respect to ISIL.
Last week, we saw an unprecedented move from Al Qaeda's
leadership to disassociate themselves from ISIL. What does this
latest move mean for the strategy of core Al Qaeda going
forward and specifically for their influence and abilities
within the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East? And has
this announcement affected our approach to fighting Al Qaeda?
Ms. Slotkin. Obviously, we watched Zawahiri's announcement
with great interest in the government since it was the first
time we have seen an affiliate actually have a break with Al
Qaeda central. I think we are still trying to assess exactly
what it means in terms of your question on impact on sort of
regional policy, and I think one of the fundamental questions
we have is, is this a sign of strength or a sign of weakness
for Al Qaeda core?
Certainly, I think our early initial--our early assessments
indicate that it means that Al Qaeda core is very interested in
what happens in Syria. Right? So ISIL had been accused by Al
Qaeda core of insubordination, and ISIL has obviously become
very powerful in Iraq in addition to Syria.
One possibility that we are still exploring is that the Al
Qaeda core is more interested in Syria than anything else in
the region and has put their emphasis on Al-Nusra Front because
of the importance of Syria. We are still trying to assess what
it means for our policies, and we watch it very, very closely.
Mr. Langevin. And with respect to the ISIL demonstrating
insubordination, as Zawahiri called it, what was the center of
that insubordination? What is it that they are referring to?
Ms. Slotkin. I think, again, in an unclassified forum, they
had good old-fashioned command and control problems----
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Ms. Slotkin [continuing]. Listening to the boss.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, thanks.
Turning to Egypt, what are the United States policy
objectives with regards to Egypt over the short and the long
term, and let's start with that.
Ambassador Patterson. Thank you.
The policy objectives are to promote a democratic
transition, and Egypt has had a referendum. Again, it was not
problem-free, but there are elections, and then to promote our
national security interests which involve our longstanding
relationship with the Egyptian military which goes back many
decades and to do everything possible we can to help the
Egyptians reduce some of the terrorists and insurgency in the
Sinai.
We are working with the Egyptian military. We have
continued counterterrorism cooperation, we have continued
sustainment, we have continued training to help them meet these
new threats. So we have really multifaceted objectives in
Egypt.
Mr. Langevin. And right now, how do you assess how stable
the Egyptian economy is and are their foreign currency reserves
and the external assistance they receive, are they adequate to
meet their needs?
Ambassador Patterson. Almost certainly not, Congressman.
They have gotten an influx of foreign exchange from the Gulf
countries to the tune of somewhere around $10 billion and that
has shored them up, but Egypt has been very hard hit by the
decline in tourism and the freezing essentially of investment
flows, and it is essential that Egypt undertake some economic
reforms and get some political stability so it can realize
really the enormous economic future that it has before them.
But the situation is rather dire at the moment.
Mr. Langevin. And worst case, what could we reasonably
expect with regards to the governance situation in the country
if the Egyptian economy collapses?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, certainly in my view their
economic problems were key in these periodic upheavals, and
again the huge unemployment, particularly among young men. If
they don't solve their economic problems and they don't find
jobs for all these people coming into the labor force, we are
going to continue to see political instability and street
demonstration and threats to the governments that are unable to
meet the goals of their people.
Mr. Langevin. And what is at stake right now with respect
to the next round of Egyptian elections and are there any
possible outcomes likely to lead to the denigration in the
security situation?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, the security situation has
deteriorated recently with the increase in activity of a Ansar
Beit al-Maqdis. It is a group that has only been active in the
Sinai. So there has been some considerable deterioration. We
are hopeful that the referendum, the presidential elections,
and now the parliamentary elections will bring some political
stability to Egypt that will then allow the economy to get back
on its feet.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman's time expired.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
witnesses for being here and your long service to our country.
Ms. Slotkin, I too was struck by the declarative statement
that you made that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. This
administration has at least from a domestic standpoint, has got
some pretty famous declarative statements out there that
haven't really worked all that well. You had nothing to do with
that and I got that. So if they snuck up on us and got one,
would you also interpret that to say we would not let them keep
it?
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. So I think the President has been very
clear on this that----
Mr. Conaway. His credibility is not real good with us; what
is your thinking on this?
Ms. Slotkin. So I think what is frankly underwriting the
current work on diplomacy on this issue is the Department of
Defense's strong posture in the region and our ability to act
from that posture against----
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Ms. Slotkin [continuing]. All contingencies, and, frankly,
our----
Mr. Conaway. Okay. But your recommendation is that we would
not let them keep a weapon. If you are committed to them not
getting one, and I assume you are, you made the statement----
Ms. Slotkin. Of course.
Mr. Conaway. Your recommendation is we would not let them
keep it either, right?
Ms. Slotkin. All options are on the table.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Ms. Slotkin. The President has said that and the Department
of Defense is----
Mr. Conaway. All right, let me pivot to Russia and the
influence they are having in Egypt, Syria, and other places.
Madam Ambassador, what are your thoughts. Are they being
helpful in the region, hurtful, and what do you think Putin is
trying to do?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, Congressman, it is a mix. I
mean they have been helpful in the P5+1 [U.N. Security Council
permanent members plus Germany] negotiations with Iran, they
have been helpful in the quartet, they have been helpful in the
removal of Syria's chemical weapons, and my own view is, for
instance, their so-called inroads into Egypt are much
exaggerated. I mean we have a very robust and longstanding
relationship with Egypt on the military side. There is some
residual Russian equipment and there were some trips there by
Russian officials, but again, I don't think it they can begin
to compete with our relationship with the Egyptian military.
Mr. Conaway. And your assessment that keeping Assad in
power in Syria is in Russia's best interest?
Ambassador Patterson. That is a difficult question,
Congressman. I think the Russians are conflicted and, well, I
think they are very concerned about the terrorist--the growth
in terrorism in Syria which threatens their own country. There
are a number of Chechens there. And this is a subject of
constant interaction with the Secretary and other officials
with the Russian government. We are trying to work very closely
with them. We have managed to do so on chemical weapons, and we
are trying to work very closely with them on humanitarian
access and on the broader picture.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Madam Ambassador, I was also piqued
by your comment that the United States would have some role in
creating jobs in these countries. Again, the administration
that serves us right now has got a very poor track record of
creating jobs here in America for our youth and young men and
women trying to come into this workforce. Do you really see
us--as that being one of our core roles, is to create jobs in
these countries?
Ambassador Patterson. Actually I do. You know, we can act
as catalyst on job creation. It is not the U.S. Government that
creates jobs, it is American companies and foreign investors
that create jobs and the local people that create jobs. But we
can do things like promote programs on entrepreneurship, like
promote innovation, like promote high schools in technology and
science. There are things we can do through our assistance
programs that can facilitate that.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, I do think we have a role.
Mr. Conaway. So, could we morph some of the domestic
policies this administration has been unsuccessful with over
the last 5 years to use as the guideposts in your part of the
world?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, I just mentioned, Congressman,
a few of the projects I think we can do and have done
successfully in this part of the world to facilitate
investment. It is the private sector and it needs to play a
greater role.
Mr. Conaway. Okay, well, I appreciate that clarification.
It is the private sector. Madam Ambassador, I was whacking at
you a little bit. I honor your service. You have been in the
worst parts of the world for a long time, so, please don't--I
am trying not to be disrespectful, but you have got a bad hand
to play. But you have been in a bad part of the world for a
long part of your career and I really respect that immensely.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think if we listen to the comments of my brothers and
some sisters on the other side of the aisle we will come to the
conclusion that the Obama administration is responsible for
every problem that America has, both domestically and
internationally, and it is a shame I think that we have now
come to politicization of our foreign policy partisanship on
that issue.
The issues that we deal with on this committee are much too
complex and serious than to devolve into partisanship on this
committee, and I think our history as a nation has brought us
to this point, and that has not been a partisan issue, and it
is going to take all of us to work towards a more peaceful and
prosperous world. I don't think there is anybody out here that
doesn't want peace and prosperity, and that is what we should
be fighting for, that is what we should be employing our hard
power to produce when it is necessary, and we should also be
focusing so much on our soft power that can actually produce
the peaceful result.
And I think that there has been a lot of success that this
administration can claim in terms of peaceful progress, and I
won't go over all of them, from reaching an agreement with Iran
for a 6-month period to navigating an agreement to prevent them
from becoming a nuclear weapons power, to the removal of--or
the march towards the removal of chemical weapons from Syria,
the extraction of our forces from the unfortunate war in Iraq,
and unfortunately for them and for us, they did not enable us
to sign a status of forces agreement over there so we had to
come on out, and the same thing will happen in Afghanistan if
they don't agree to the very reasonable terms of a status of
forces agreement.
So I would like to ask though about Egypt and the fact that
there are at least 23 journalists who have been arrested and
charged with terrorism or support of terrorism due to the fact
that they have been reporting on the Muslim Brotherhood. I
would like for you to speak on, Ambassador Patterson, our
efforts, if any, to produce the freedom for those journalists.
Indeed, if Egypt is to become a nation with democratic ideals,
it should certainly start with freedom of the press which is
closely linked to freedom of association and freedom of speech.
Can you give us, Ambassador Patterson, some idea on
America's way forward in ensuring that those journalists can be
freed?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, thank you, Congressman.
We entirely agree with your assessment that freedom of the
press is absolutely key because it surfaces all the other
issues. Let me assure you, Congressman, that the administration
has pressed hard on this issue.
It has been the subject of Secretary Kerry's conversations
with Egyptian leaders, it has been the subject of Secretary
Hagel's conversation was his counterparts in Egypt, and we will
continue to press on these issues and urge that these
journalists be released. A number of them are non-Egyptian.
Some of them are very distinguished in their field. It is hard
to believe they were reporting unfairly, and even if they had
been that is most certainly not a grounds for their arrest.
But it is a very high priority for us, as is encouraging
the Egyptian government to enable freedom of association, and
they have some recent laws which have curtailed that as well.
These are worrisome trends, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for either for Secretary Slotkin or Ambassador
Patterson. I am concerned that in Iran we have not known
everything that was going on until sometimes years after the
fact--years after the fact. The secret facility at Qom, for
instance, we didn't know about that for years.
So Secretary Slotkin, when you say it would be a year from
when they would try to start breaking out and develop a nuclear
weapon from their current status, and yet I know that we have
allies and others like our Israeli allies and others who think
it would be as little as 2 months, but whatever it is, whether
it is closer to 2 months or closer to 12 months, is the U.S.
military prepared to act in that limited window and use force
if that is what it would take to keep Iran from actually
deploying a nuclear weapon?
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. So just starting from the top, first on
the interim deal, first of all the joint plan of action allows
for the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to verify
Iran's compliance with the deal. I understand you are talking
about there if there are things that are not on the table, but
certainly the IAEA has a role until verifying compliance now.
Any comprehensive agreement that we ever negotiate will
emphasize verifiable means, right? We will have to have solid
proof, we will not rely on just trusting the Iranians. And
then, importantly, we remain confident that we could tell if
Iran was making a dash towards a weapon and we believe should
that decision be made, it would take at least a year.
I stand by that, and I think in an unclassified forum that
is as far as I will go. If for some reason negotiations broke
down, if we didn't get a comprehensive deal, the President said
all options are on the table, and the Department of Defense is
prepared to take any action that the President deems----
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, let me follow up on that for either you
or the Ambassador, and this has already been alluded to by Mr.
Thornberry and Mr. Forbes and others. But the credibility
issue, I see that the lack of action in Syria, whether or not
it would have been right for the U.S. to step in and use force
to punish the use of chemical weapons upon his own people by
Bashar Assad, the fact is that the Iranians are viewing that as
a lack of credibility and a sign of weakness.
What indications do we have that the Iranians are really
taking seriously the threat that the U.S. would act militarily?
I think that the credibility gap has widened considerably and
is a very troubling thing.
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman, I think one issue that
we sort of overlooked here is their economy is in shreds. The
sanctions have been extraordinarily effective in reducing their
access to international financial institutions and reducing
their petroleum production. So that has clearly gotten their
attention and brought them to the table to negotiate.
Mr. Lamborn. But has that been undone now to a large
extent? I hear there is what is called a gold rush of European
countries and the private sector going into Iran and now saying
that they are open for business.
Ambassador Patterson. Congressman, let me stress that Iran
is not open for business and the American government will do
everything it possibly can to enforce these sanctions on any
company that would be so unwise as to engage in business with
Iran right now. Yes, they are going, and I hope they are giving
the message to Iran that if we were able to do business with
you, there would be advantages. That is putting more pressure
on them.
But please rest assured that the sanctions have been
effective, gotten them to the table. I don't think the
credibility issue, again it seems that economically Iran is in
a very weak position right now. So I think the issue of
credibility, I do think, yes, some people would complain about
that, but I think we are engaged militarily, we have gotten
Iran to the table, we have an enormously robust presence in the
Gulf and elsewhere in the region, so it is hard for me to see
that our credibility has eroded.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral, let me ask one really fast question
of you.
We have sold arms, advanced arms, to some of the countries
in the region outside of Israel. Are we able to make sure that
they comply with the restrictions on the use of those advanced
weaponry and arms?
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes. First of all, before we agree to
those arms sales, it goes through a very thorough vetting
process to make sure that the qualitative military edge
considerations are fully acknowledged and accepted in terms of
ensuring there is a strategic balance that is properly
maintained. Then we do have end-user agreement specifics in the
agreements which allow us to make sure that the weapons are
being employed to the role and mission that they were intended.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, you testified about the Eagle Resolve as well as
Eager Lion and there is a reference to 12 and 19 countries
respectively that have participated in that. Can you give me an
idea of who these countries are?
Admiral Pandolfe. I would have to go back to CENTCOM to get
the specific list, ma'am. I will be happy to forward them to
you. Generally, I am most familiar actually with the third
example which is the International Mine Countermeasure
exercise. And that involved a lot of nations from the region,
it also involved NATO allies, and I believe there was even some
nations from the Far East. But I can get you the specific lists
of which nations participated in each exercise.
Ms. Hanabusa. Well, do you know off the top of your head
which countries from the Middle East participated in these
exercises?
Admiral Pandolfe. Generally they are the Gulf States, and I
would have to check whether Saudi Arabia participated or not.
Ms. Hanabusa. So if you could forward that to me, to the
committee and the committee will forward it, I would really
appreciate it.
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 73.]
Ms. Hanabusa. Madam Ambassador, in reading your testimony,
of course that is where we have the reference to ISIL as well
as there is also the ``L'' is Levant or however you may
pronounce it. And I also see that reference in terms of Syria,
and I understand it is some kind of a geographical reference.
But why is it now appearing in like ISIL and the reference to
Syria. Is there any significance in the use of that word?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, yes, because I think they have
changed or rather expanded their focus to include Syria and--to
include Syria. So it is not just Iraq anymore.
Ms. Hanabusa. But doesn't it also geographically include
Israel and other countries?
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Hanabusa. So what is the significance of now referring
to the context, like Iraq, for example, to have itself referred
to with Levant at the end?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, I think it refers to their
aspirations to expand throughout the region. And let me say
that is one reason we are working very intensely with Syria's
neighbors, Jordan and Lebanon, in particular, the King is here
this week and I am sure he will be talking to members of the
committee, to shore up their counterterrorism capabilities and
to improve the control of their borders.
Ms. Hanabusa. So is it a correct statement to say that by
the inclusion of this word that they are sort of asserting a
different jurisdiction? Because my understanding is that it
includes Cyprus, Palestine territories, the Palestinian
territories, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, for example,
that that is traditionally what it was. So are they somehow by
calling themselves ISIL, Syria and Levant, saying this is
really the region that we control or should control?
Ambassador Patterson. I think that would be right,
Congresswoman, that they have a vision of greater expansion.
Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. So how does that play in with Israel being
part of that, that area that they perceive to be within their
territorial expansion?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, let me stress that as far as I
am aware, we have not seen any activity by this group in
Israel, although Israel, of course, is the subject of security
threats from elsewhere in the region. But I certainly--so let
me just say that I would go back to what Ms. Slotkin said, that
Israel's security is one of our highest national priorities and
we will do everything possible we can to work with the Israelis
to shore up their defenses and to share intelligence, I wanted
to go back to that, to share intelligence on the broad range of
threats in the region.
Ms. Hanabusa. So do we as a country, when we agree to refer
to Iraq, for example, ISIL, or we allow them to continue or we
defer or we give them the credibility of using it in terms of
their description of who they are now, are we somehow
encouraging it or conceding just simply by the fact that, for
example, it is found in your testimony, it is found in other
references; are we giving some ground by doing that versus
saying no, you are not going to refer to yourself that way?
Ambassador Patterson. I wouldn't think so, Congresswoman. I
would think we were just sort of recognizing the facts of the
matter on that. They are a more expansive organization than
they have been in the past and I think we are merely
recognizing that fact.
Ms. Hanabusa. But it is not an organization that everyone
who is a member of is conceding that their membership within
that group?
Ambassador Patterson. No, certainly the countries involved.
But the organization itself has a more aspirational--it is
spreading, I think, to be blunt about it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Patterson, you made the statement that we are
going to be in these countries in force for decades to come a
little while ago. Can you tell me specifically which countries
you are talking about and what type of force you are talking
about in that statement?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, Congressman, I think it is not
just military force, it is also economic force. I mean, we took
down our flag in Afghanistan in 1989 and literally moved out.
There was a lot going on elsewhere in the world, but it is not
just our military force that matters, it is our investors, it
is our educators, it is our assistance programs, and we are
going to require very robust engagement by all elements of U.S.
national power in these countries to stabilize them.
Mr. Scott. Which countries specifically are you talking
about?
Ambassador Patterson. We can speak about almost any one of
them, but let me take Egypt because I recently left Egypt. We
are going to require--we are going to have to have American
investment there, we are going to have to have a robust trade
relationship, we are going to have to increase educational
exchanges. There are only 3,000 Egyptian students in the United
States. I think that is an embarrassment. So we want more
educational activity, just for an example.
So there are many ways we can engage with these countries
that go beyond our military presence and in the long run are
frankly just as important.
Mr. Scott. I guess when we talk about these other
countries, it is not that I question your abilities or the
Secretary, or our abilities as a country to help things as much
as I question our capacity and the capacity of the United
States economy. If every dollar that we spend in interest on
the national debt is a dollar that is going to come out of
discretionary spending.
And so I guess my next question would be for Secretary
Slotkin. The DOD, we are involved in a lot of countries and a
lot of conflicts, you are taking a lot of cuts in the
Department of Defense. Do you think that you have the capacity
based on the budget that you have today to carry out the
mission for decades to come?
Ms. Slotkin. I do. I mean, I would say to the Ambassador's
point that the bilateral relationships that we have are the
cornerstones of our approach in the region, and frankly the
investment we make up in front in training their military,
their security forces, and military education and civ-mil
relations pays big dividends for us later on in preventing
conflict, preventing spill-out of extremist groups, you name
it.
So I feel like the relatively small amount of money frankly
that we spend on some of the programs the Ambassador is talking
about that we do in non-conflict situations prevents the
significantly more expensive operations, combat situations that
we are still dealing with.
So I do think that we are positioning. Frankly, you know,
it won't be long enough until we have released our QDR
[Quadrennial Defense Review] and you will see an enhanced focus
on the importance of partnership and training ahead of a
problem, building partner capacity ahead of a problem.
Mr. Scott. Admiral, if I am correct in reading the
Treasury's reports and where our money is going, we are
spending more money in interest on the national debt than we
are in military pay for our men and women in uniform. The
projections are that those interest payments are going to
continue to escalate at a fairly rapid pace. Any dollar that is
paid in interest comes out of discretionary spending. Obviously
the DOD gets about 50 percent of that.
Again, do you have the equipment, the men, and the men that
you need to protect this Nation?
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir. Today absolutely we do, and, as
mentioned, particularly in this area, in the Asia-Pacific we
are focusing our best resources. As we move forward we are
going to have to be very careful to ensure that we maintain the
capabilities and capacity that we need by making wise choices
with investments.
Mr. Scott. I would respectfully submit that the lack of
investment right now in equipment and technology and the things
that we are going to need to fight the battles that we are
going to be in going forward, that maybe we should concentrate
more on the United States than some of these countries.
And quite honestly, Ambassador, if a country doesn't
respect a person's religious freedom, if the leadership of a
country doesn't trust their own people with religious freedom,
then I don't see why we should think that we can trust the
leadership of that country.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing and the witnesses for being here this
morning.
We have heard, you know, a lot of talk in the back and
forth about lessons learned and whether or not in particularly
the case of Iraq and as far as our credibility whether or not
Iraq was abandoned. I think that was one of the statements that
was made here.
You know, one of the lessons that I certainly think we
should reflect on was the statement by Secretary Gates, who is
hardly an apologist for this administration as we have seen in
recent weeks, that any Secretary of Defense who advises a U.S.
President to get involved in a ground war in the Middle East
ought to have their head examined.
And so, you know, Ms. Slotkin, when the questions were
posed to you earlier about Iraq and whether or not our
credibility has somehow been damaged because of events that
flowed since 2011, I mean you were intimately involved based on
your resume with the transition that took place.
And again, just to reiterate the point, because we had a
number of hearings in this committee about the status of forces
agreement negotiations. Again, the reason why the final outcome
occurred was because of this issue of immunity of prosecution
for our troops staying there.
So, in other words, if a soldier from Norwich, Connecticut,
without an immunity provision, you know, got picked up by the
Iraqi military police or even civilian police, basically they
were completely exposed to the criminal justice system or the
military justice system of that country, which was unacceptable
to both the Bush administrations and the Obama administration.
I mean is that a correct accounting of the back and forth
that took place?
Ms. Slotkin. I think it is correct to say that regardless
of administration, there are certain basic SOFA provisions, and
trying our own people in our own courts is a basic tenet of any
SOFA negotiation around the world.
The Bush administration wasn't going to let our soldiers be
exposed to the Iraqi courts and neither was the Obama
administration. I don't believe that was the only issue. We
certainly had a very complicated recent past with Iraqis, but
that certainly was one issue.
Mr. Courtney. Certainly in this committee, and I recall
those hearings well, I mean that was a very bright line as far
as any agreement moving forward.
Ms. Slotkin. It was the single most difficult part of the
original SOFA to negotiate. I was on the original team and it
came down to the last couple of months and it was the single
most controversial issue of the original SOFA signed back in
2008.
Mr. Courtney. And, again, as far as the other side of that
negotiation, again it was a pretty adamant provision of the
Iraqi negotiators, that they insisted on it, and in fact I
believe there was even a vote in the Iraqi parliament that took
place again sort of reiterating that position. I may not have
that totally correct. But the bottom line is that it is
important for people to remember that this didn't happen in a
vacuum. That kind of comes with the territory when you are
doing bilateral negotiations and you are fostering democracy
and some of these things. Their position, you know, affects the
outcome of negotiations.
And Ambassador, you I know have a history in Afghanistan. I
mean this issue of immunity from prosecution actually is not a
stumbling block right now. I mean that is something that at
least press reports suggest, the two sides have actually agreed
on that. There is other issues that are hindering a completion
of the agreement. But, again, just as an example, it is sort of
a contrast, I mean how important that is.
Well, again, maybe, Ms. Slotkin, you can----
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. I mean this is a fundamental difference
between where we were with Iraq in 2011 and where we are now
with Afghanistan is that the people of Afghanistan, the
parliamentarians of Afghanistan, the members of the loya jirga,
they support an enduring presence.
And we just didn't have the same facts on the ground in
2011 in Iraq for a whole variety of reasons. And I think that
you are right, we largely have the contours of an agreement, we
just need the political will to get it signed, and we urge
President Karzai to sign it as soon as possible.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
Ambassador, you have mentioned the efforts in Syria to
remove the chemical weapons and again there has been some
progress with the production facilities. You know, there was an
interesting report that we had about the U.S. Navy's
participation in this process that they have actually got a
container ship ready to go, the USS Ray.
And again, I was wondering if you could just sort of talk
about the fact that, again, we have to get the pace moving, but
the fact is, is that our military is doing an outstanding job
in terms of getting this, in my opinion, great accomplishment
completed.
Ambassador Patterson. Yes, Congressman. This is really an
important advance. It was the biggest threat to the most number
of Syrians, and, importantly, it was the biggest threat to
Syria's neighbors as well. So it was very important to address
this issue.
The removal has stalled and we are doing everything we can
to push the Syrians to remove the weapons as soon as possible.
It has been a great example of international cooperation. But
it is important to realize too that the machines which actually
make the materials, mix the materials, have already been
removed, so Syria's capacity to actually deploy a chemical
weapon is very, very greatly reduced.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have got a number of questions so I might cut off the
speakers and I will apologize in advance.
Admiral, first of all, real quick on MRAPs [Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected vehicles] and the situation in Fallujah, Anbar
Province, and everything else, that it is not just the
helicopters, it is also the fact that IEDs [improvised
explosive devices] are a big problem. We had a committee
hearing that said they are going to chop up a number of them
that are coming out of Afghanistan. I wonder if this might be
one of the carrots that we could use with the Maliki
government. I don't trust his government, particularly the
relations with Iran. If you could briefly comment on that.
Admiral Pandolfe. My understanding is that we are not
cutting up the MRAPs as was previously discussed.
Mr. Cook. That policy has changed?
The Chairman. Admiral.
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, I will go back and check on that,
but my understanding is that has changed.
Mr. Cook. Because we----
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes.
Mr. Cook [continuing]. Were briefed, and it wasn't that
long ago----
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cook [continuing]. And I am there as, you know, a dumb
grunt----
Admiral Pandolfe. Right.
Mr. Cook [continuing]. That always took his equipment out
saying, what in God's--we spent all this money and everything
like that and okay----
Admiral Pandolfe. I believe we have revisited that, and let
me go back and double-check that for you.
Mr. Cook. Okay.
Admiral Pandolfe. Regarding the Iraqis, we are responding
to the lists of capabilities that they have given us. They have
told us what they think they need to recapture the areas that
are contested.
Mr. Cook. Particularly Fallujah?
Admiral Pandolfe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cook. And when they have tried, they have really gotten
whacked pretty bad, haven't they?
Admiral Pandolfe. I don't want to comment on what their----
Mr. Cook. Okay.
Admiral Pandolfe [continuing]. Operational plans are. But
they have given us a list of the capabilities they feel they
need and we are moving swiftly to provide those.
Mr. Cook. Okay, could I switch to the Ambassadors real
quick, on the Kurds. We haven't heard much about the Kurds. I
know they have the pipeline, things are looking better,
obviously tremendous in regards to their economy. But I am
afraid that they might get thrown under the bus again as they
have in the past.
What is the policy towards the Kurds and the fact that
oftentimes they get left in the dust real quickly?
Ms. Slotkin. Well, again, I think the Kurds now more than
ever are integrated into the State of Iraq. And while I think
given their history there will always be concerns about them
being quote ``left in the dust'' as you say, they are a part of
the senior leadership of the government. They have come to some
important agreements with the central government.
Mr. Cook. Okay. And their relationship with Turkey has
obviously improved since we had the terrorists----
Ms. Slotkin. Significantly. I mean, if you would have told
me as an Iraq expert a decade ago that they would have had the
relations that they have with Turkey, I would have frankly
laughed. I mean it is pretty----
Mr. Cook. I agree 100 percent.
Moving on real quick, a couple of Gulf States that I have
real problems with and I won't mention, in terms of money going
to Al Qaeda, and it is kind of wink-wink, nod-nod, or there has
been reports of that, and these states are in our military--you
know, it is as if they get a free ride on that. Is that true?
And I am talking about one in particular and you might----
Ambassador Patterson. Well, no, sir, it is not true. There
have been huge efforts over the years by our Treasury
Department and others----
Mr. Cook. Maybe with the government, but they allow certain
elements--I have got to move quickly, I am sorry.
Ambassador Patterson. Let me be quick. They don't allow it.
They do try to shut it down. We try and shut it down.
Mr. Cook. But are there are citizens in that country that
do funnel money to Al Qaeda?
Ambassador Patterson. They manage to fund these groups in
places like Pakistan and Syria, of course. They are trying to
restrain it, but, of course, it hasn't been 100 percent.
Mr. Cook. Okay. Going back to--I just want to make a real
quick comment in regards to Iran. I am sorry, and I appreciate
your service and everything and the Intel Community. Hey, I am
a grunt, infantry. You know, you never, ever, ever, trust the
intel because it is the grunts, my Marines that had to go in
there and get the job done. And what happens? You get killed.
And the best example going back was the Marine barracks in
Lebanon.
And remember that group, Hezbollah, and who were they
associated with? Iran. You talk to most of the military, at
least the ones, the one country that keeps them awake at night
is Iran, Iran, Iran. And to say we got a year, I don't believe
it.
So, at least from one Congressman, I don't share that
optimism. I have been to Israel. They are scared to death of
what is happening there and it will be too late. And you are
right, I don't think we can stop it unless we do have a good
line in the sand that we are going to enforce.
I yield back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. If I could follow up, this has been explored a
great deal. I just want to follow up on a couple points about
Iran and what we do about them. I mean, if our position is we
just can't know, no matter what we do, we can't know, you know
I guess isn't the only policy choice at that point to just
declare war and get it over with? I mean, I am just not
understanding where it is that the folks on this side of the
aisle think that we ought to go with this.
Now, I will for a brief moment explain where it is that we
are going with this that makes sense, and that is the sanctions
were brought about to force Iran to the conclusion that
building a nuclear weapon was not in their best interests.
In fact, you make a pretty powerful argument that the worst
thing that Iran has done over the course of the last decade is
pursue a nuclear weapon, because they were up to all manner of
different malfeasance short of nuclear weapon, but some of that
was tough to establish, it was tough to get our allies on
board. But when they started pursuing a nuclear weapon our
allies understood, gosh, even Russia understood, this was not a
very good thing, so we were able to put crippling and crushing
sanctions on them in a bipartisan way that brought Iran to the
conclusion that they better talk.
And all of our intel shows us that they have not made the
decision to build a nuclear weapon. In fact, someone said to
me, well there is no evidence that that is true. I said I first
heard that Iran was 6 months from getting a nuclear weapon in
2005. So what evidence is there that they have not decided to
build one? They don't have one, all right? They were 6 months
from it in 2005. If they wanted it, they would have it. They
have not decided to build that weapon because they are not sure
it is in their best interest to do so. So our policy is to keep
the crippling sanctions on them.
And one of the things that was said that just really
disturbed me was the notion that Iran is open for business as a
result of this 6-month deal. Pay some attention to what is
actually in the deal. All that is in there in terms of
sanctions relief is to release a small amount of Iranian money
that we have been holding. We are holding well over $100
billion, and I believe we are releasing somewhere between 4 and
6 billion. All of the other sanctions on their oil industry, on
their financial services industry, all of those other sanctions
are kept in place and are not going to be removed until we get
a final agreement.
So if our position is, oh, goodness gracious, we can't
possibly know, they might build it we can't trust them, then
have the guts to say not just that we should have the option on
the table, but that you are in favor of us bombing Iran right
now today because we can't know.
I think that is wrong. I think it is a crazy policy, it is
the wrong way to go, because we do know a great deal about what
they are up to. The sanctions policy is our best hope to
prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon. So these questions
are pushing us in a direction that makes no logical sense. That
is more of a statement than a question, obviously.
But help me out here, Ms. Slotkin. Is that not fairly
accurate? And also it is clear, our policy is if everything
else fails, we will use military force, but given the
consequences of that we would dearly love to stop everything
else from failing. So lay that out a little bit more clearly
for us, because I think there is a clear policy here this
committee is missing.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, sir. I think that is accurate. That
is certainly the way we see it. I mean I think it is not crazy
to have questions of trust with the Iranians.
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Ms. Slotkin. That is a natural normal reaction to events
that happened, God, for the past 30 years, with today being the
anniversary, frankly.
Mr. Smith. I think, if I may, our policy reflects that lack
of trust.
Ms. Slotkin. Exactly. And I think that is why the interim
agreement that is on the table right now is not about trust and
just taking them at their word, it is about verification.
And my only point is if we were able to do it with the
Soviet Union, right, if we were able to negotiate with others
in our past who had every reason not to trust, with the right
verification standards in place, I think we are able to make
progress and we need to allow diplomacy a chance to succeed.
Certainly from the Defense Department's perspective, I would
always rather have diplomacy be the order of the day than be
forced to take military action.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
The Chairman. I don't know that I would use Russia as an
example of negotiating because we know that they have broken
treaties.
And I think probably one of the things that leads us to the
lack of trust is why do they have to do this work under a
mountain? Why don't they just open it up? If they are just
doing nuclear energy for energy, why do they have to bury it
where it is away from sight? Where is the transparency?
Mr. Smith. Again, Mr. Chairman----
Ms. Slotkin. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. We know that there are over 10 nations that
use nuclear power but don't do the enriching that they are
doing. So you know, there are some very solid reasons for
distrusting them.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, as I said, the cornerstone of our
policy is we don't trust them, okay? We are not arguing--nobody
is arguing in terms of how we negotiate this deal that we ought
to just close our eyes and trust them. That is why we have the
sanctions. That is why we have the back and forth.
Yes, absolutely Iran has been underhanded in this. What
they want, they want to be able to build a bomb without having
international repercussions. That is what they want. And they
have been sort of dancing around for a decade trying to figure
out how to do that, and it has been our job and the
international community's job to say you can't. You know, if
you go down this road the price you will pay will be steep. So,
no, we don't trust them at all and we shouldn't.
The Chairman. And I think where we recently with this
interim deal where we have the problem is the things I
mentioned, and the thing that we put the sanctions on that
brought them to the table, if we had kept those sanctions a
little bit longer we may have gotten them to give up the
enrichment, if that was what we really wanted.
Mr. Smith. We haven't given up the sanctions. That is the
whole point. What do you mean if we kept them a little longer?
We have not given them up.
The Chairman. Yes, we did. You just said we gave them up $4
billion to $6 billion. In other words----
Mr. Smith. And a whole raft of other sanctions are very
firmly in place that are continuing to cripple their economy.
Let's ask Ms. Slotkin for her opinion. Is their economy any
less crippled because we released a small amount of money?
Ambassador Patterson. No. Let me try--Mr. Chairman, one
element that I think, it is not just our intelligence we are
depending on, although I think it is pretty good in this
instance. It is also the enhanced inspections by the IAEA that
were a critical element of this interim agreement. They are
going to be in some of these facilities every single day and
others on a much more regular basis.
The Chairman. Okay. You know, this is already done and we
are not going to undo it. We have had the same briefings and we
just look at it a little bit differently, and I don't think it
is because, Democrat or Republican.
Ms. Slotkin. Can I just add one--I am sorry, sir.
The Chairman. No.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay.
The Chairman. Let me get to the members who have been
sitting here very patiently to ask their questions.
Dr. Wenstrup.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all
being here today. If I can, we will go back to Iraq for a
second.
You know, I think obviously the people of Fallujah and
Anbar Province are not happy to see Al Qaeda back in Iraq, and
you made some mention, Ms. Slotkin, that Al Qaeda probably
would have resurged there in some way with or without our
presence.
Ms. Slotkin. My point was Al Qaeda frankly was at its
strongest right as we had the largest single number of troops
in the country at a time, so 170,000 troops back in you know
2007 and we have got the highest rate of attack that we saw
from Al Qaeda during the course of the war.
Dr. Wenstrup. And I can appreciate that. I was there 2005
to 2006 you know leading up to that buildup and understand the
effort that that takes. But I am just concerned that you may
feel, and correct me if I am wrong, that a U.S. presence would
have no deterrence.
Ms. Slotkin. I think the presence we were always talking
about would be a train-advise presence, largely based out of
Baghdad, right. The numbers we were talking about at the time
were something around 10,000. So that is obviously not going to
be able to have a geographic spread the way 170,000 troops had
at the height of the surge. So I think while we would have been
able to advise and assist in probably a more robust way, we had
already turned over lead to the operations to the Iraqis a year
and a half, 2 years before then.
So I don't think that we--our presence would have been the
deterrent. I think we would have been able to provide more
expertise and more training than we are currently doing.
Dr. Wenstrup. You know, I tend to think our presence can be
a deterrent. When I traveled to the Kurdish area, for example,
they were pretty pleased there has been an American presence in
their area since 1991, and I think that they probably, correct
me if I am wrong, I don't know what kind of say they had at the
table during the discussions on the SOFA, but I think they
would have been more than happy to have an American presence in
the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Did they have a say at the table during this conversation?
I agree with what Mr. Courtney was bringing up about, you know,
concern for our troops and protection for our troops. I
understand that part completely. But I find it hard to believe
that they would not have wanted our presence there.
Ms. Slotkin. Certainly different groups, and Iraq is made
up of a large number of different groups, had different views
on whether there should be a presence, a follow-on presence
after 2011. There were Kurdish members of the original SOFA
negotiating party. There were Kurdish members of parliament
that voted on the SOFA when it passed back in 2008. And I think
largely the Kurdish population tends to be pretty pro-American
and would have supported us staying.
I don't think that speaks for everyone in the Kurdish
territories, but I think there are also plenty of groups around
the country, Shia, Sunni, and others who were supportive. They
voted to keep us there. So the Kurds certainly weren't the only
ones at the time who supported it.
Dr. Wenstrup. With what is going on now, do you think they
have any regrets?
Ms. Slotkin. I think you know, as we were talking about, if
you go to Erbil, I am not sure where you were in the Kurdish
areas, if go there, there are just cranes everywhere. They
are----
Dr. Wenstrup. I was at Sulaymaniyah.
Ms. Slotkin. Okay. So construction boomed, their economy is
doing exceptionally well, they are signing important deals with
their neighbors. They still have a senior role in the
government. So I think that the Kurdish areas are doing
particularly well and I think that is without us signing a
follow-on agreement in 2011.
Dr. Wenstrup. Admiral, I have a question. Strategically,
what benefit do you think it would have had if we had a
stronger presence in Iraq at this time? For the entire region,
not just for Iraq?
Admiral Pandolfe. Well, I don't want to speculate on what
might have happened in Iraq. What I would like to focus on is
Afghanistan and that we have, as Ms. Slotkin has underlined and
Ambassador Patterson, we believe that the signing of a BSA
[bilateral security agreement] there which reflects the will of
their people and the international community, quite frankly,
will allow us to maintain the presence, when I say ``we'' I
mean the NATO presence, to help that nation continue toward a
better future.
So looking forward it is our hope that Afghanistan, the
president of Afghanistan does sign the BSA to allow the
international community to remain in that country, both for
defense purposes and to Ambassador Patterson's point for
developmental purposes, because the international community
presence will facilitate the flow of funds for both defense and
for development.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
this panel for being here.
I also really did enjoy the conversation between our
ranking member and the chairman. I kind of liked that free-
flowing dialogue. It is good.
You know I hear a lot about obviously trust as it relates
to Iran. I was in Iraq in 2011 and had two sons in combat in
Iraq in 2011 as they were transitioning out and I do remember
that one night I was there an IRAM [improvised rocket-assisted
missile] attack took place and killed a number of our troops.
For those who don't know what an IRAM is, that is an Iranian
warhead. The only place you can get an Iranian warhead is from
Iran. And I worry about where we are in Afghanistan now just
because Iran likes to play everywhere, and we see that across
the board.
I think what a lot of folks are worried about, and
particularly with Iran, you hear all kinds of estimates, so I
get all the briefings, I sit on the IETC [Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities], is the fact
that once if they are successful in obtaining a nuclear weapon,
we are going to be in the same position that we are today with
North Korea. There are a whole lot of reasons how they got it,
and we are going to be facing the same dilemma that we have
today in North Korea but you know with a different state actor.
And I guess that is why a number of us are concerned that we
are going to make the same mistakes in this particular issue
with Iran and particularly with our good friend and ally, with
Israel, that could face the brunt of it.
I just don't know. We hear about sanctions. I heard the
ranking member talk about sanctions. You know the Senate was
just talking about increasing sanctions on Iran and I think
they have paused that because of a lot of lobbying by the
President in regards to not doing that. But why do you think
that they were so, on both sides of the aisle in a bipartisan
way, why do you think that they wanted to increase sanctions on
Iran if they think that this is the right direction where we
are going today with Iran in regards to them saying that they
really don't want a nuclear weapon? Why do you think the Senate
was taking that position? Do you have any idea? I am sure it is
not just to block or, you know, cause problems for the
President, because it was the Democrats who were pushing that.
Ambassador Patterson. Well, no, sir. I mean, I think as we
have said, there is an enormous suspicion based on years of
empirical data about Iran's intention. But let me stress that
this nuclear--that Iran's ability to acquire a nuclear weapon
is an existential threat to us and it is an existential threat
to critically Iran's neighbors. So that has got to be our first
priority.
And these sanctions, these crippling sanctions, the
reduction of their capacity, their currency totally tanked, has
enabled us to get to the table and try to negotiate this and to
cap and to freeze their paths to a nuclear weapon while these
negotiations are underway.
Mr. Nugent. I mean, they are in control of this. I mean
they could easily reverse this in regards to sanctions if they
did what? What could they do today to reverse that? Is there
something they could do today to reverse those sanctions?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, yes, because they could
negotiate an agreement. There is an interim agreement and we
have begun to negotiate. They could--there is, yes, a whole----
Mr. Nugent. Couldn't they just walk away from what they are
doing and still do the development they wanted to from a
peaceful side, but could they not reverse this very simply if
they wanted to, if they really didn't have a goal of creating a
nuclear weapon?
Ambassador Patterson. Well, if they walked away from the
negotiations? I am not quite sure I follow you, sir.
Mr. Nugent. No, what I am saying could they not get the
international partners and the United States to reverse their
decision on those crippling sanctions if they did one thing,
and clearly did the things that would be required to walk away
from a nuclear weapon? Because that is really the name, is the
reason we have these sanctions.
Ambassador Patterson. Well, sure they can lift the
sanctions if they move in that direction, and that is what this
negotiation is all about. It is an international negotiation
with a number of countries, and there is a lot of U.N. Security
Council resolutions that are at play too. So yes, as the
negotiations go on, of course we hope that they will walk away
from it.
Mr. Nugent. And I will be honest with you, I am the last
one that would want to see military action because I happen to
have three sons that currently serve, and they are the brunt
of--when we sit here and talk about military action, there is
really a human face behind that and I want to make sure that
before we do something that we, you know, allow the sanctions
to work, but also allow diplomacy to work.
But at the end of the day, the Iranians have control. They
control their fate in regards to what they do and the course of
action that they have taken and are taking. And so while I
appreciate everything that you do, I think that until they
decide that they want to get out from underneath these
sanctions, it is going to continue, because they have
underlying reasons to do that.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I appreciate
your time.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. No other
questions, this hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you very
much for your presence here.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
February 11, 2014
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 11, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 11, 2014
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
Admiral Pandolfe. Eagle Resolve Participating Countries: Bahrain,
France, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Eager Lion Participating Countries: Bahrain, Canada, Czech
Republic, Egypt, France, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Poland,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,
United States, and Yemen. [See page 23.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 11, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. Does it remain U.S. policy that all options, including
military force, remain on the table to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon?
Ambassador Patterson. This Administration views the prospect of a
nuclear-armed Iran as unacceptable and is committed to preventing Iran
from developing a nuclear weapon. The President has been consistent:
the United States is committed to using all the necessary elements of
American power to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Although we continue to believe that there is time and space for a
diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear program, as the President has
said, all options remain on the table.
Mr. McKeon. What are we doing to demonstrate to Iran that we are
ready and willing to use force if necessary?
Ambassador Patterson. This Administration has made non-
proliferation one of its top priorities. We view the prospect of a
nuclear-armed Iran as unacceptable and are committed to preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We have implemented the strongest,
most comprehensive sanctions regime to date against the Iranian
government.
The United States is committed to using all the necessary elements
of American power to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Although we continue to believe that there is time and space for a
diplomatic solution, as the President has said, all options remain on
the table.
Mr. McKeon. Iran is in a position where it could break out and
produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than two
months. Is the U.S. military prepared to act in such a narrow timeframe
to respond to an Iranian breakout attempt?
Ambassador Patterson. I am not going to speculate about military
action or discuss military planning. President Obama has pledged
repeatedly that all options remain on the table.
Mr. McKeon. What impact did the lack of U.S. military action in
Syria have on Iran's view of the credibility of the U.S. threat of
force to stop its nuclear quest?
Ambassador Patterson. When the President stated his willingness to
order a limited strike against the Asad regime in response to the
brazen use of chemical weapons, he did not do so lightly. The purpose
of such a strike, as the President said, would have been to deter and
degrade the regime's ability to use chemical weapons.
The threat of force in Syria remains credible because it is in the
security interest of the United States and the world to meaningfully
enforce the international prohibition against use of chemical weapons.
The President has made it clear that all options remain on the table.
However, as the President said, he preferred a diplomatic resolution to
this issue and we are implementing the agreement reached in Geneva in
September. This diplomatic resolution will meet our objectives by
ensuring that the regime can never again deploy these terrible weapons.
Likewise, the Administration seeks a diplomatic resolution to the
concerns of Iran's nuclear program. The Administration is committed to
the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and views the
prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as unacceptable and remains committed
to preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
The United States is committed to using all the necessary elements
of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
Although we continue to believe that there is time and space for a
diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear program, as the President has
said, all options remain on the table.
Mr. McKeon. What steps are the United States taking to mitigate the
impact of unfolding Middle East events on Israel's QME?
Ambassador Patterson. The United States is committed to helping
Israel maintain its QME, defined as Israel's ability to counter and
defeat credible military threats from any individual state, coalition
of states or non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage or
casualties. This policy was written into law in 2008, but it has long
been a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy and a cornerstone of the U.S.-
Israel security relationship.
The Administration is regularly assessing the capabilities of the
region's militaries and non-state actors to ensure Israel maintains its
qualitative military edge (QME). We are also taking full advantage of
the consultative and political mechanisms currently in place to respond
to and act on Israel's concerns.
In addition to fulfilling the requirements of the Naval Vessel
Transfer Act of 2008, the United States protects Israel's QME in a
number of important ways. 1) Israel is the leading recipient of Foreign
Military Financing (FMF). In FY 2013, which marked the fifth year of a
10-year, $30 billion MOU, Israel received $2.94 billion in FMF,
slightly less than the $3.1 billion request level due to sequestration.
We requested the full $3.1 billion in FY 2014; 2) Israel is the only
country authorized to use one-quarter of its FMF funding for domestic
defense procurement, which provides significant flexibility in meeting
immediate procurement needs and supporting the Israeli defense
industry; 3) Israel has privileged access to advanced U.S. military
equipment, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and, more recently,
the MV-22 Osprey; 4) the United States is cooperating with Israel,
using DOD appropriated funding, to develop a comprehensive air and
missile defense system that protects Israel against ballistic and
cruise missile threats; and 5) the United States has provided
additional funding outside of State's annual FMF request to support the
expansion and acceleration of the Israeli-developed Iron Dome short-
range rocket defense system. In FY 2011, Congress provided an
additional $205 million for the procurement of additional Iron Dome
systems. We provided an additional $70 million in FY2012 for Iron Dome
systems and another $195 million in FY 2013 and $220M in FY 2014. The
Administration has requested $175.9M for FY 2015.
Mr. McKeon. How is the United States ensuring that arms sales to
the region do not undermine Israel's QME?
Ambassador Patterson. The Administration has sought to enhance
security cooperation with and between U.S. partners in the Middle East.
The United States is engaged in extensive efforts to ensure its
partners have credible military capabilities to respond to potential
regional threats. An essential part of this approach is providing our
partners access, when appropriate, to military technologies critical to
their national defense. These sales will also allow U.S. security
partners to bear a greater share of the burden for regional security.
Enhancing the capabilities of our Arab partners does not come at
the expense of Israel's security. This administration is committed to
strengthening security cooperation with Israel and safeguarding its
qualitative military edge (QME). We do not proceed with the release of
U.S. defense articles or services that could pose a risk to our allies
and partners or compromise regional security in the Middle East.
Israel remains, by a significant margin, the leading recipient of
foreign military financing and the Israel Defense Forces enjoy
privileged access to the most advanced U.S. military equipment, such as
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the V-22 Osprey.
Mr. McKeon. Do you share Director Clapper's concern about the
threat foreign fighters in Syria pose to the United States or our
allies like Israel? How are we addressing this potential threat?
Ambassador Patterson. The U.S. government is extremely concerned by
the threat posed by foreign fighter travel to Syria and potential
implications for broader regional stability as a result. Furthermore,
we are worried about the potential for these fighters, some of whom
have connections with al-Qa'ida elements, to plan for and conduct
attacks outside Syria, particularly against U.S. and other Western
interests.
We have been in close consultation with our partners in Europe and
the Middle East on this matter. Effective coordination and
collaboration with these partners is crucial in mitigating foreign
fighter flows. Our discussions with partners are focusing on enhancing
information sharing, border security measures to deny departure or
entry of known or suspected extremist travelers, effective
watchlisting, law enforcement cooperation, and measures to counter
violent extremist messages and recruitment. We plan to intensify this
engagement over the coming months.
Mr. McKeon. What is the United States doing to stop the flow of
foreign fighters to Syria?
Ambassador Patterson. We have been in close consultation on this
matter with our partners in Europe and the Middle East, particularly
over the past year. Effective coordination and collaboration with these
partners is crucial in mitigating foreign fighter flows. To that end,
the State Department has been leading U.S. interagency outreach with
key partners in Europe and the Middle East. Our discussions are
focusing on enhancing information sharing, border security, and law
enforcement cooperation, in addition to efforts to counter violent
extremist messages and recruitment.
Mr. McKeon. What challenges do you foresee in Lebanon given the
increasing incidents of violence across the country? How can the United
States minimize the threat of violence aimed at Israel from its
northern border?
Ambassador Patterson. U.S. policy in Lebanon is focused on
bolstering Lebanon's stability and sovereignty and countering extremist
influences, both foreign and domestic. Lebanon has faced a rising tempo
of terrorist attacks in the last six months that have killed and
wounded hundreds of civilians across the country. These attacks are
directly related to the spillover of the Syria crisis into Lebanon.
Another challenge is that Lebanon currently hosts almost a million
refugees from Syria, and more enter Lebanon every day. These refugees,
who live in communities across the country, strain the basic
infrastructure of the nation as well as tax local municipalities'
abilities to scale up services to meet rising needs.
Increasing sectarian violence and a steady influx of refugees from
Syria threatens Lebanon's stability. It is imperative that we continue
our assistance to and partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and Internal Security Forces (ISF); our long-standing, community-based
USAID programming; our strong support for moderate leaders, such as
President Michel Sleiman; our continuous engagement with mainstream
political actors, including March 14 leaders; and our whole-of-
government approach to countering Hizballah activity around the world.
Our security assistance to the LAF and ISF is intended to develop
functioning, non-sectarian state institutions that gain respect from
all Lebanese citizens in order to show the Lebanese people that they do
not need militias for protection or to advance their political aims.
Sustained U.S. support, particularly in the face of increasing domestic
and regional tensions, has maintained and improved the LAF's
capabilities as a national security force. A stronger LAF would
contribute to stability on Lebanon's border with Israel, help mitigate
the spillover effects of the violence in Syria, and serve as an
increasingly effective counterweight to Hizballah.
Working closely with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), the LAF's performance in southern Lebanon has added to
stability along the Blue Line with Israel. UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 calls upon Lebanon to disarm Lebanon's militias--a goal
we support through our training and equipping of the LAF and the ISF as
the sole legitimate defense forces in Lebanon. Part of UNIFIL's mission
is to keep the Blue Line secure, and it also trains with the LAF to
increase its capability to monitor the border and provide security. The
LAF is not yet fully able to provide security throughout the entire
area under UNIFIL's mandate, but with our assistance, further UNIFIL
training, and other international support, the LAF's capabilities are
improving.
Mr. McKeon. Does it remain U.S. policy that all options, including
military force, remain on the table to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon?
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. Although diplomacy remains the preferred means to
resolve international concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program, all
options--including military option--remain on the table to prevent Iran
from developing a nuclear weapon.
Mr. McKeon. What are we doing to demonstrate to Iran that we are
ready and willing to use force if necessary?
Ms. Slotkin. Iran is well aware of our force presence and the
significant capabilities of the U.S. military in the region. We have
about 35,000 forces deployed in and immediately around the Gulf region.
We have over 40 ships in the broader Middle East region, to include a
carrier strike group. We also have deployed an array of missile defense
capabilities, advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
assets, as well as some of our most sophisticated aircraft. Our assets
conducted approximately 50 transits through the Strait of Hormuz just
during the last six months of 2013. Finally, our forces and personnel
conducted and participated in over 50 multilateral and bilateral
training exercises in the broader Middle East region last year. All of
these serve as a constant reminder that the United States is ready and
willing to use force to advance its core interests.
Mr. McKeon. Iran is in a position where it could break out and
produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than two
months. Is the U.S. military prepared to act in such a narrow timeframe
to respond to an Iranian breakout attempt?
Ms. Slotkin. Given this is an open forum, let me say simply that I
am confident the U.S. military is ready and able to respond quickly and
decisively to a variety of contingencies around the world, including
one involving Iran, if necessary.
Mr. McKeon. What impact did the lack of U.S. military action in
Syria have on Iran's view of the credibility of the U.S. threat of
force to stop its nuclear quest?
Ms. Slotkin. The Intelligence Community is best positioned to
answer this question. However, it was the credible threat of military
force that helped bring about the diplomatic resolution on chemical
weapons elimination in Syria. Our preference is to resolve issues
through diplomacy, but the United States is prepared to execute
military action should it become necessary.
Mr. McKeon. What steps are the United States taking to mitigate the
impact of unfolding Middle East events on Israel's QME?
Ms. Slotkin. As Secretary Hagel has said, ``Our commitment to
Israel's security is ironclad and unyielding.'' In the midst of the
uncertainty and instability that has plagued the Middle East in recent
years, the Department of Defense has worked diligently to ensure that
Israel's qualitative military edge is maintained. In addition to
providing $3.1 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) each year--
the most FMF provided to any country in history--the United States has
made sure that Israel has access to the most advanced military
capabilities possible, including the F-35 and the V-22 Osprey. Access
to these types of advanced capabilities, combined with an unprecedented
level of FMF to purchase them, will ensure that Israel's qualitative
military edge is maintained for the next generation.
Mr. McKeon. How is the United States ensuring that arms sales to
the region do not undermine Israel's QME?
Ms. Slotkin. The cornerstone of the U.S. security assurance to
Israel is the United States' support to Israel's qualitative military
edge (QME). Israel must have the ability to defeat any adversary--
anytime, anywhere. As you know, the importance of ensuring Israel's QME
is not just based on shared values and interests, but is also based on
U.S. law. This law provides that any proposed sale or export of defense
articles or services to the Middle East will include a determination
that the sale or export will not adversely affect Israel's QME. Working
with the Department of State, the Department of Defense will continue
to ensure that, in accordance with this law, arms sales to the Middle
East will not undermine Israel's QME.
Mr. McKeon. Do you share Director Clapper's concern about the
threat foreign fighters in Syria pose to the United States or our
allies like Israel? How are we addressing this potential threat?
Ms. Slotkin. I agree this issue is of concern, both to the United
States and our partners in the region, including Israel. We are
monitoring this issue closely and working with partners in the Middle
East to address this threat. We are providing assistance to Lebanon and
Jordan to strengthen their ability to secure their borders, including,
for example, by providing equipment and training to supplement the
Jordan Border Security Program. We are also working with Turkey and
Iraq to determine how to stem the flow of foreign fighters into the
region.
In addition, DOD will continue to support the efforts of other U.S.
departments and agencies to strengthen elements of the moderate Syrian
opposition so they can better degrade terrorists' ability to attack the
homeland and U.S. interests abroad.
Mr. McKeon. What is the United States doing to stop the flow of
foreign fighters to Syria?
Ms. Slotkin. We are working with our partners in the region and our
European allies, many of whom share our concerns on this issue, to
develop the most effective options to stem the flow of fighters into
and out of Syria.
To that end, we are supporting Syria's neighbors in enhancing their
border security, and have provided assistance to both Lebanon and
Jordan; we are working with Turkey and Iraq to determine how we can
more effectively help those nations deal with foreign fighters crossing
their borders. We are also closely coordinating with Israel to make
sure Israel can defend itself against violent extremist threats in
Syria.
The Department is working with our interagency and international
partners to organize our efforts to monitor the activities and
movements of extremists in the region, and enable U.S. and
international efforts to disrupt foreign fighter flows and potential
extremist attacks. The whole of the U.S. government is coordinating
closely on measures we can take to support this top priority as well as
Ambassador Brafke, who was recently named as State's Senior Advisor for
Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters.
Mr. McKeon. What challenges do you foresee in Lebanon given the
increasing incidents of violence across the country? How can the United
States minimize the threat of violence aimed at Israel from its
northern border?
Ms. Slotkin. Unfortunately, as long as the violence in Syria
continues, we expect that Lebanon will continue to suffer from
spillover violence and humanitarian-related pressures. Terrorist
attacks in Lebanon are on the rise. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
have taken a variety of measures to maintain stability in Lebanon and
to counter the destabilizing effects of the Syrian conflict on
Lebanon's security. The Lebanese Armed Forces' willingness to exercise
its role in Lebanon has made it a target as well.
Our continued engagement with and assistance to the LAF are
extremely important at this time of increased challenges to Lebanon's
stability. We remain concerned with Iran's destabilizing activities in
Lebanon and its partnership with Hizballah. We view the Lebanese Armed
Forces' emergence as the sole legitimate defense force as a critical
component of Lebanon's long-term stability and development. The
Lebanese Armed Forces has proved to be a reliable partner in Lebanon,
and continuing to make it a stronger, more effective institution will
help to ensure that Lebanon remains stable and capable of protecting
its borders, thereby reducing the risk of attacks on Israel from
terrorist elements that may seek to use Lebanon as a launching pad for
violence.
Mr. McKeon. Iran is in a position where it could break out and
produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than two
months. Is the U.S. military prepared to act in such a narrow timeframe
to respond to an Iranian breakout attempt?
Admiral Pandolfe. DNI assesses that Iran will need up to one year
or longer to produce a testable nuclear weapon from the point of
decision to do so. Thus, as discussed in the hearing, we continue to
maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region.
Mr. McKeon. What impact did the lack of U.S. military action in
Syria have on Iran's view of the credibility of the U.S. threat of
force to stop its nuclear quest?
Admiral Pandolfe. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has
assessed that Iran is trying to balance the conflicting objectives of
improving its nuclear capabilities with avoiding severe repercussions,
such as a military strike or sanctions. The DNI does not know if Iran
will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.
Mr. McKeon. What steps are the United States taking to mitigate the
impact of unfolding Middle East events on Israel's QME [qualitative
military edge]?
Admiral Pandolfe. DOD is able to mitigate the impact of unfolding
Middle East events on Israel's QME through the sale of advanced
technology to Israel, participation in combined training and exercises,
and support for active missile defense efforts in Israel.
Annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants of $3.1 billion
support Israel's QME. FMF, along with national funds and U.S. missile
defense appropriations to Israel, represent over $18 billion in Foreign
Military Sales and Direct Commercial Contract purchases. To maintain
QME, the U.S. delivered the C-130J to replace Israel's aging C-130E
fleet and has agreed to provide advanced systems such as the F-35 and
V-22 along with attack helicopters, Patriot Air Defense Systems, and
advanced fighter aircraft radar systems. In addition, Israel benefits
from the $1.4 billion War Reserve Stock Allies-Israel program that
includes Patriot missiles, bombs, and other weapons in country for use
in a contingency.
Many exercises offer DOD the opportunity to work with Israeli
counterparts. These include Juniper Cobra, Austere Challenge, Reliant
Mermaid, Noble Dina, Noble Shirley, Blue Flag and other BMD and command
and control exercises. These exercises address emerging challenges and
increase our combined capabilities, interoperability, and readiness.
DOD also supports Israel's multi-layered missile and rocket
defense. By the end of FY 2014, the United States will have provided
over $700 million for production of Iron Dome batteries in addition to
the $3.1 billion Israel receives in FMF. In FY 2015, DOD plans to
provide an additional $176 million for Iron Dome.
Mr. McKeon. Do you share Director Clapper's concern about the
threat foreign fighters in Syria pose to the United States or our
allies like Israel? How are we addressing this potential threat?
Admiral Pandolfe. I share Director Clapper's concern over the
foreign fighter threat in Syria. Some foreign fighters are joining
units with known links to terrorist organizations. DOD continues to
pursue a strategy of capacity-building, security assistance, and
intelligence-sharing with our international partners to aid in
combating violent extremist threats emanating from Syria.
Mr. McKeon. What is the United States doing to stop the flow of
foreign fighters to Syria?
Admiral Pandolfe. The DOD pursues a strategy of capacity building,
security assistance, and intelligence sharing with international
partners to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters to Syria. Example
capacity building programs include the Jordan Border Security Project
to improve ground surveillance and communication and utilization of
Section 1206 Global Train and Equip funding to improve Lebanon border
security.
Security assistance comes in the form of Foreign Military Financing
to Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon that totaled $826 million in FY 2013. In
January, DOD expedited a $203 million Government of Iraq request to
purchase arms and ammunition to facilitate response to extremist
attacks throughout the country.
Expanded intelligence sharing with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey also
aids DOD's strategy to address the foreign fighter flow to Syria. This
approach involves coordination across the interagency.
[all]