[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-75]
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S
COUNTERSPACE PROGRAM AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 28, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
86-965 WASHINGTON : 2014
____________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected].
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, January 28, 2014, People's Republic of China's
Counterspace Program and the Implications for U.S. National
Security....................................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, January 28, 2014........................................ 19
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2014
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COUNTERSPACE PROGRAM AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Butterworth, Dr. Robert L., President, Aries Analytics, Inc...... 3
Krepon, Michael, Cofounder and Senior Associate, The Stimson
Center......................................................... 5
Tellis, Dr. Ashley J., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace............................................ 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Butterworth, Dr. Robert L.................................... 41
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 23
Krepon, Michael.............................................. 48
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces..................................................... 26
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 25
Tellis, Dr. Ashley J......................................... 28
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Carson................................................... 64
Mr. Forbes................................................... 59
Mr. Rogers................................................... 61
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COUNTERSPACE PROGRAM AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Meeting Jointly with the Subcommittee on
Seapower and Projection Forces, Washington, DC,
Tuesday, January 28, 2014.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. We want to welcome our witnesses and everyone
to this joint hearing on the People's Republic of China's
counterspace program and the implications for U.S. national
security.
Unfortunately, we have some votes that are coming up, so we
have got a little bit of a time squeeze. Chairman Rogers and
Ranking Member McIntyre both agreed that we will all waive our
opening statements. Anyone who has an opening statement, feel
free to submit it for the record. It will be entered into the
record.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes, Mr. Rogers, and Mr.
McIntyre can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 23.]
Mr. Forbes. The other thing is we are going to, unless
there is an objection, reduce the time for our questions to 3
minutes each, because we want every Member to be able to get
their questions in. Because, unfortunately, tonight, with the
State of Union and all, we don't have a lot of back time after
we get these votes called.
We are delighted today to have with us three very
distinguished witnesses who are experts in this area. We
appreciate so much your willingness to be here with us.
The first witness we have is Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, and Dr.
Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Dr. Tellis, thank you so much for being with us.
We also have Dr. Robert L. Butterworth, who is the
president of Aries Analytics, Inc. Do not shake his hand; he
says he has a cold. And we are going to say ``cold,'' but we
have something, you know, that is there. But he has been very
thoughtful in not giving that to us.
And Dr. Michael Krepon, the cofounder of the Stimson
Center.
And to each of you three gentlemen, we thank you for being
here. On behalf of Chairman Rogers, myself, Mr. McIntyre, Mr.
Cooper, we thank you for giving us your time and expertise.
And now we would like to ask you if you could take 3 to 5
minutes to give us whatever statements you have. Your written
statements, of course, will be part of the record, and we have
read those already.
And, Dr. Tellis, are we going to start with you, or have
you predetermined that?
Dr. Tellis. Yes.
Mr. Forbes. Then, Dr. Tellis, we would love to have you
start off for us.
STATEMENT OF DR. ASHLEY J. TELLIS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Dr. Tellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rogers, Chairman Forbes, the distinguished ranking
members, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to present today on China's counterspace programs.
In the interest of time, I am going to keep my comments
extremely brief. I want to make five basic points for your
consideration.
The first point is that the current and the evolving
counterspace threat posed by China to U.S. military operations
in the Asia-Pacific theater and outside is extremely serious.
And the threat ranks on par with the dangers posed by Chinese
offensive cyber operations to the United States more generally.
That is the first point.
The second point is that the diversity and the complexity
of China's counterspace programs make them particularly
problematic, because they span the gamut all the way from
direct-ascent and co-orbital ASAT [anti-satellite] programs,
which receive enormous attention, to equally challenging
threats like electronic warfare intended to paralyze U.S.
satellite communications, which actually get very little
attention, to more recondite dangers, such as directed-energy
weapons and radiofrequency weapons and computer network attack
capabilities, which are rather hard to understand. So it is the
complexity and the diversity of these threats that magnify the
challenges faced by the United States.
The third point I want to make is that these dangers are
acute because the U.S. space systems which are the targets of
China's activities are simultaneously extraordinarily
vulnerable and extraordinarily valuable at the same time.
The fourth point is that the incentives that drive China to
pursue its counterspace programs are strong and will only
intensify over time for the simple reason that China views
itself as being in a geopolitical competition with the United
States and believes that it must prepare itself for a possible
conflict with a superior U.S. military. Given this perception,
Chinese military planners are deeply focused on neutralizing
American space capabilities because of their belief that such
neutralization is essential to whittle down the information
dominance on which the United States military depends on for
its success.
The fifth and last point is a more controversial one, but I
think I should make it. Given China's incentives and the
reasons why it is pursuing a counterspace program, I do not
believe Beijing can be dissuaded from moving in a different
direction through arms-control agreements.
The only way to persuade China that its counterspace
programs will not deliver the returns that it seeks, if there
is any way at all, is for the United States to ensure that its
military forces can operate successfully despite China's
investments in counterspace. This will require, at the very
least, diverse new kinds of investments, which are essential
for the United States to protect its success in power
projection operations that will be necessary in the years to
come.
Let me end on that note, and thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis can be found in the
Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you so much, Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Butterworth.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. BUTTERWORTH, PRESIDENT, ARIES
ANALYTICS, INC.
Dr. Butterworth. Chairman Forbes, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member McIntyre, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members
of the committees, thank you very much for convening this
hearing.
The topic is terribly important, the facts of the matter at
hand are debated, and the consequences of the approaches open
to us are neither clear nor guaranteed. We need a lot more
attention to this problem to help shape our judgments about the
way ahead.
China is a large, growing, militarily and economically
strong assertive power. It has gone to war to expand its
control over contiguous regions at least four times since the
Korean war. It might well have done so again in its recent
disputes with Vietnam, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and
Taiwan except that its demands now involve a region of national
security interest to the United States and U.S. allies. China
is not yet ready for a military confrontation with the United
States.
If things go well, that confrontation may never occur, but
China does seem determined to prepare for one as it seeks to
exert unilateral authority over an ever-expanding neighborhood.
A bellwether here is China's experimentation with
counterspace operations. If China can deprive the United States
of reliable and timely space support, our force movements will
be slower and less coordinated, our longer-range weapons less
responsive and less accurate, our tactical operations in
general less focused and more costly, and our global awareness
more myopic and less timely.
China's most notorious counterspace experiment involved a
direct-ascent hit-to-kill technology--that was in January of
2007--but it is surely looking at other approaches, too, as Dr.
Tellis just mentioned, including other kinetic-energy weapons,
lasers, jammers, cyber tools to attack data and command and
control systems. For the near term, at least, I think it will
probably favor systems to achieve mission kill by attacking
U.S. satellites directly, either from orbit or from the ground.
China will also want to know what U.S. satellites to kill
in order to achieve the desired degradation in U.S. military
capabilities. I expect that targeting is a problem, and
possibly the problem, that will be addressed using the sort of
capabilities for precision orbital and proximity operations
that China demonstrated starting a few months ago.
Such operations could help China characterize the U.S.
space architecture and perhaps place sensors close to U.S.
satellites that could provide clues about the how, what, and
when of the satellites being used for military operations. If
true, then we should expect to see more extensive examination
and operational probes in the future.
So China still has some distance to go before it can be
confident in a confrontation, but so does the United States.
There are things we can do to protect some satellites against
some threats: We can try to complicate China's targeting
problems by exploiting deficiencies in its ability to detect
and track potential targets. We can further harden satellite
subsystems to resist thermal and electronic attacks. And we
might find ways to engage and defeat an attacker's weapons
before they engage our satellites.
But China's counterspace activities presents a broader
challenge. To meet it, we need to know how to integrate space
control into plans and preparations for the joint fight more
broadly. Changes in our space order of battle, whether they
come about through defensive movements on our part or attacks
by an enemy or random mishap, can immediately alter the
effectiveness of our terrestrial forces.
We need to make sure that command and control is unified
and timely. We need experiments, demonstrations, and exercises
that more realistically test our forces' abilities to detect,
attribute, and respond to attacks on our space systems. We need
to develop, execute, and repeatedly test plans for operations,
particularly for power projection, when space is contested.
We need to better coordinate the planning and developing of
space defenses. We need to assess the cost-effectiveness of
selected alternatives to space support. And I hope that we can
further integrate space into the joint fight by coupling space
programs more closely with other force-development activities.
The perspective offered here, what I am talking about, is
that the United States and China are in a long-term military
competition which includes significant effort in space. This
competition is not a policy of momentary advantage or a
transient appeal, and it creates a core issue of national
security between China and the United States. It is about and
will require real capabilities. Finding ways to negate the U.S.
military space advantage is a compelling strategic requirement
for China. It won't be moderated by proselytizing space norms
or deterrence by demarche or a code of conduct for good guys in
space.
None of this is meant to suggest that war with China is
inevitable. It does suggest that a good way to help China join
and strengthen the international order is to be prepared to
maintain American principles militarily, including in space.
Thanks for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Butterworth can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Dr. Butterworth.
Mr. Krepon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, COFOUNDER AND SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
THE STIMSON CENTER
Mr. Krepon. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Krepon, you might need to pull that
microphone as close as you can. It doesn't pick up very well.
Mr. Krepon. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Minority Members McIntyre, Cooper, members of this committee, I
have a huge sense of deja vu sitting here, because I was a
staffer for a member of this committee when the leadership was
Mr. Hebert, Mr. Rivers, and Mr. Price, who are looking down on
us now.
And back then, the issue was the Soviet space challenge,
and it was very severe. And a lot of the capabilities that
China is testing, evaluating, improving aren't new. Those
capabilities existed back then, as well. And we had, as you
well know, an intense nuclear competition with Moscow, an
intense space race with Moscow. We had crises. We competed for
ideological and geopolitical advantage. It was a fierce
competition.
And yet the worst fears of warfare in space were not
realized; warfare, terrestrial and on the seas, were not
realized. How did we succeed back then in deterring a
determined and highly capable adversary, and are there any
takeaways for us now?
I think there are several reasons why we avoided warfare in
space back then. One was that we couldn't firewall it away from
warfare in other domains. The prospect of uncontrolled
escalation was in front of us and in front of Moscow. Number
two, the capabilities in space were so vulnerable that if
somebody wanted to start shooting up there, we could both be
extremely harmed. And, also, military capabilities that we had
invested in and the Soviets invested in for other purposes
could be repurposed for use in space warfare.
Now, all of these conditions are true today also, but we
can't depend on them to prevent China from doing things that
are extremely harmful to us. So we can't rely on these existing
conditions to defend ourselves. We need a strategy to deal with
very real threats to assets that are very meaningful to our
Armed Forces and to our economic security.
So what do we do? One thing we can do is to increase the
resilience of our space assets. We can do this to help deter or
foil some kinds of attacks, even though our satellites will
remain vulnerable to a determined attacker willing to suffer
the consequences.
What else can we do? We can deter or dissuade through
disaggregation, to the extent that we have the resources to do
so. Deterrence of attack is increased by complicating the plans
of the attacker.
What else can we do? Space situational awareness. The
extent to which we can deter depends on how much we know ahead
of time. And if the committee underfunds space situational
awareness, then our deterrence capabilities can be diminished
even if we are doing the other things right.
What else can we do? We can retain the capability to
respond in ways of our choosing if somebody messes with our
space assets or the infrastructure for our space assets. We
have these capabilities today. They are actually greater today
than they were during the cold war.
Now, do we need specific types of weapons that are
dedicated to the mission of destroying, damaging, disrupting
satellites? Do we need dedicated, online, ready-to-respond-
quickly types of capability, like we do in the nuclear arena?
In my view, there is so much latent capability to do this now,
we don't need dedicated--certain types of dedicated capability.
I don't think we need the capability that messes space up
for us as well as for the other guy. So capability that creates
mutating debris fields, which are indiscriminate and long-
lasting in their effects, it doesn't matter if it is your
satellite, my satellite, somebody else's satellite, I don't
think we need that. But we have the capability if we need to.
Diplomacy. You know, I think one of the lessons a lot of
people learned during the cold war was that deterrence is
stronger when it is backed up by diplomacy. Now, we can't do
treaties in space, but we can do, I think, a code of conduct
that makes rules and establishes rules of responsible, as
opposed to irresponsible, behavior. Without rules, there are no
rule-breakers. I think norms can serve our interests.
So I am suggesting to you, Mr. Chairman, or Mr. Chairmen, a
multilayered approach to deal with a very serious problem.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Krepon.
Just to let you know and the people in this room, one of
the interesting things about the Armed Services Committee, we
are probably the most bipartisan subcommittee in Congress. The
two ranking members and both Mr. Rogers and I have enormous
respect for each other. And our Members here are all looking to
find a solution, as opposed to just driving things politically.
I appreciate you coming here today and outlining what you
think we should do. And in my 3 minutes, I just want to
basically suggest--I think there are three questions we have to
ask: One, what exactly is the vulnerabilities that we have?
Number two, what is the magnitude of that problem? And, number
three, what can we do to fix it? Because part of what we do
with these hearings is try to take a message to our other
Members to let them understand exactly what we are looking at.
Dr. Tellis, you gave us an excellent five-point
presentation. Your first one is very concerning to me because
you indicated that you view the problem as extremely serious
and on par with the cyber problems. And most of us have some
feel for how serious the cyber threat is from China today.
The question I would ask to all three of you is, assume
this happens. Give us your picture of the vulnerabilities that
we have and then what exactly it would do to us from a
capability point of view. And, if you can, give us what
specificity you can give us, as opposed to just globally, you
know, hitting in there.
Dr. Tellis, do you mind starting off with that? And then I
would love to have each one of you weigh in.
Dr. Tellis. I think there are two capabilities that the
Chinese have invested in which pose specific kinds of threats.
The kinetic kill capabilities obviously have a specific
effect on low-Earth-orbit satellites. And, obviously, the key
satellites there that matter are electro-optical surveillance
satellites, which are most at risk because you can interfere
with their operations not simply through kinetic kill but
through laser dazzling and so on and so forth. So even if you
don't get hard kills that contribute to the debris that Mr.
Krepon has correctly identified is a serious challenge, you can
interfere with their operation through directed-energy devices,
which China has been pursuing for the last several years.
The second issue which I think bears on the magnitude-of-
vulnerability question, which I am concerned about, has to do
with U.S. communications satellites, because China has made
enormous investments in jamming. And there are a class of U.S.
communication satellites which are protected, which are going
to be more impervious to the Chinese capabilities that are
coming on line, but much of our warfighting efficiency depends
on being able to use commercial satellites and other kinds of
military satellites which are unprotected.
And I think if we lose the capacity embodied in those
unprotected assets, then, of necessity, the burdens that would
shift to our protected communications would be extremely high.
And I haven't done the operations research to prove this, but
my suspicion is that if we lose unprotected communications, the
protected satellites that we have do not have the throughput to
be able to sustain the kind of data requirements that would be
necessary for success in conventional operations.
So those would be at least two areas that I would focus on
right away when one thinks about the vulnerability of our
systems.
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Butterworth, if you could briefly tell us
what you think the assessment would be of how it would impact
our capabilities.
Dr. Butterworth. If I can figure out the button. There, I
think that did it. Good. Thanks so much.
Mr. Chairman, it is a bit difficult to answer. It is easy
enough to point to specific vulnerabilities and to try to
identify the consequences of the loss of particular satellites
or satellite functions. But I think my view on this is that we
need to have a broader perspective and try to understand how
space support is integrated into the joint fight. We haven't
done a very good job of that.
We have tended to assume that there would be things from
the space that would simply be available. I remember when I was
running a project for General Cartwright years ago on foreign
counterspace and so on, we would look at the annexes in PACOM
[Pacific Command], for example, and the annex for space for
their war plans was, ``We assume space works.'' Now, it is not
that way anyway; there is a much, much bigger annex these days.
But that is the kind of approach that I think still exists
throughout our work on this problem. So I would urge that we
try to understand the integrated effect of fighting and not
having the space systems and also alternative ways to get
around it.
Second, just very briefly, we need to know an awful lot
more not just about what is up there but what happens to our
stuff. That can take a very long time. And I assume you will be
digging into that in a subsequent hearing.
And then, finally, we need to integrate all the different
command and control communications functions that Ashley, among
others, was just talking about.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Krepon. Mr. Chairman, in my view, the greatest current
vulnerability is a debris vulnerability.
So, in 1985, the United States carried out a kinetic-energy
ASAT test. Fourteen years later, a piece of debris from that
test came within 1 mile of the newly launched International
Space Station.
The debris problem has been magnified by some very, very
large number, particularly after the Chinese ASAT test, but not
just that ASAT test. There have been breakups of rocket bodies;
there have been collisions. The debris problem is enormous. And
we move the Space Station, on average, once a year to try and
get out of the way of a piece of debris.
So the more a nation depends on space, the more vulnerable
it becomes, just because of the debris problem--not even
talking about Chinese counterspace capabilities.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Warning satellites do a great job of helping us to keep an
eye on enemies for not only our national security but our
allies'. I wondered, though, do you believe--is it your opinion
that we have been clear to our adversaries on the risk they
would incur by interfering with those satellites?
And I would start with you, Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Tellis. I think we have tried to address the problem
through indirection.
Mr. Rogers. We haven't been direct enough?
Dr. Tellis. I believe that is the case.
Mr. Rogers. How about you, Dr. Butterworth?
Dr. Butterworth. Well, we have--as you well understand,
Chairman, we have a problem that we don't want to be----
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Butterworth, hit that little button again.
I know it is----
Dr. Butterworth. Thank you very much. I need to be trained
frequently.
It is a difficult problem, as I know you gentlemen
understand, that we don't want to be pointing out specific
targets and specific vulnerabilities. So I agree that, yes, we
have been sort of general in saying, ``Right, space is an
important part of our military capabilities,'' without being
terribly precise.
Mr. Rogers. But do you think that we have explained to them
there are consequences for messing with our satellites?
Dr. Butterworth. Sir, there is no doubt in my mind that
they understand that very well----
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Dr. Butterworth [continuing]. That if they do something to
our satellites, that means war. And I can't imagine why they
would do something to a satellite if they weren't----
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Krepon. Mr. Chairman, both President George W. Bush and
President Obama have the same declaratory policy with respect
to attacks on our space assets. I think declaratory policy--if
you mess with our satellites, you are messing with our vital
national security interests--that is an important piece. We
have got that piece.
Mr. Rogers. Do you think we have been clear on that?
Mr. Krepon. I think declaratory policy can't be a one-off.
It needs to be repeated.
Mr. Rogers. Well, let me ask this: Do you all believe that
if our satellites were interfered with, that we have the
capability to rapidly discern that and attribute who is
disturbing the satellites?
Mr. Krepon. Proper retribution depends on attribution. And
there are issues with respect to attribution.
Mr. Rogers. Explain.
Mr. Krepon. Inferences could be drawn, but one of the
reasons why I mentioned funding for space situational awareness
to you is that that will help with attribution.
There are two kinds of challengers to us in space: One are
actually little guys, and one are major powers. And, actually,
most of the interference so far has been from the little guys,
and the interference that they are most interested in is
interfering with broadcast satellites.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Krepon. So our planning and strategies to respond, I
think, depends on the category of adversary. But it all begins
with attribution.
Mr. Rogers. All right.
Dr. Butterworth or Dr. Tellis, do either of you think that
we are short in our ability to attribute interference? Or do
you think we are covered on that?
Dr. Butterworth. Sir, I think we are not just short, I
think we are absent. Even if you are just talking about
interference with communications satellites or something, it
can take weeks and weeks and weeks to try to find out where
that is coming from and then to try to find out who is actually
doing it.
I urge the committee in different sessions to ask people,
you know, how long would it take us to know that something had
happened to one of our satellites.
Dr. Tellis. I would make two points on that.
It depends on the kind of interference, and it depends on
the context. There is some kind of interference that is
palpable and manifest which is easier to attribute, and there
are other kinds of interference, particularly electronic
interference, that are harder to nail down. So that is point
number one.
Point number two is, if the interference occurs in
peacetime, where everything else is as is, it might be easier
to attribute. But if it occurs in the context of a crisis or in
war, when other systems are stressed greatly, I think the point
that Dr. Butterworth made about the difficulties of attribution
will only get magnified.
And, unfortunately, that is when attribution matters most.
It is when other systems are stressed and it has a direct
impact on your capability to prosecute military operations that
we might pay the highest costs in our inability to attribute
quickly.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much.
Dr. Tellis, on page 2 of your testimony, you say that one
of the concerns is China has steadily expanded its capability
to mount discrete physical attacks on installations integral to
the space-ground segment.
What is an example of that, how you could have a discrete
physical attack on a ground segment?
Dr. Tellis. By ``discrete,'' I meant individual attacks as
opposed to all-out attacks. And a specific example would be
China's increasingly precise ballistic missile force that
allows them to actually target sites as small as individual
buildings at great distance without using the total force to
achieve those effects.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. Thank you. Thank you for clarifying
that.
Dr. Butterworth, the last several years, we have seen China
develop the ability to shoot down a satellite, perform new
types of satellite maneuvers, and get closer to launching a new
heavy-lift rocket.
When you look at this, what do you believe are the risks,
when we talk about layering, as has been explained by Mr.
Krepon, if we continue to rely on our legacy systems? Because I
think the problem we have got here is our budget issues and
knowing what to do, and unfortunately we know that too often
military space programs are targeted for cuts.
And so the question is, how much can we rely on legacy
programs and how much is new development that we need to do in
order to provide the kind of multilayered protection that we
would need?
Dr. Butterworth. Sir, I don't know any happy answer to
that. It is going to take just a hell of a lot of money. We are
going to have to start considering space as part of the joint
fight, as part of the theater of operations, and that is going
to require new systems.
I can't think of another way out of it. There is no silver
bullet, there is no one thing that we can do, there is no
specially orbiting laser, X-ray, nuclear pump device that will
provide the defenses that we need. We are going to have to take
it from design as part of the joint operating forces.
Is that responsive to your question?
Mr. McIntyre. That helps.
I don't know, since you used the term ``multilayered
defense,'' Mr. Krepon, if you would like to respond to that.
Mr. Krepon. The Stimson Center, where I work, put out a
publication on how to tackle this problem of vulnerability and
deterrence. And we had people writing from different points of
view; we don't agree on some things. But every single one of
these multilayered pieces we all agreed on.
Now, the diplomacy piece is the most contentious, and I
know that many of you have your doubts. But I disagree with Bob
about whether China is clear about the consequences of messing
with our satellites.
We came to this understanding with Moscow during the cold
war, but there was a whole lot more conversation between
Washington and Moscow on strategic issues and space and nuclear
than there is today between Washington and Beijing. So I am in
favor of the diplomacy piece, too.
Mr. McIntyre. What do you believe is the nearest-term
challenge with regard to our counterdefensive capability?
Mr. Krepon. You know, there are some vulnerabilities that
we just can't escape, Mr. McIntyre. We can compensate for
vulnerability as best we can, as budgets allow, but the
vulnerability will continue to be there in space, and we can't
talk ourselves out of that reality.
Satellites are immensely important, but they can be found,
and major powers have the capability to mess with them. We
certainly do have the capability to mess with the satellites of
adversaries. They have it for us.
So how do we manage vulnerability as best we can? That is
my view. That is the question.
Mr. McIntyre. Yeah. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Krepon, I think it bears repeating that you said pretty
directly that we had more communication during the cold war
between America and the Soviet Union than we have today between
America and China regarding space issues. That is a pretty
startling realization. And that doesn't necessarily mean
diplomacy, but communication, because there are many ways that
information can be given back and forth.
So that would seem to be a startling risk factor in terms
of both nations trying to behave in a rational fashion. Because
the theory of mutually assured deterrence and the theory of
most deterrence is that both actors understand each other's
motivations. So I would think that would be an area for
clarification.
Mr. Krepon. One of the problems we had with the Soviet
Union early on was that the military had an outsized stake on
national security issues. And I remember--I am showing my age,
but when the strategic arms limitation talks began and our
diplomats started talking about Soviet strategic forces, the
military pulled our diplomats aside and said, you know, our
diplomats are not cleared to hear this. Well, we got through
that.
I think there is also dysfunction in China between the
political leadership and the military. I don't see them meshing
as well as I would like, particularly with respect to space.
So I think one of the potential gains in having more
conversations is having military and civil leaders in China
sitting down with our folks to talk about what our red lines
are.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Krepon, from a historical perspective, it
is kind of amazing that--you know, Sputnik was such a long time
ago; it is almost amazing that these other nations have taken
so long to even begin to catch up. Because it has been many
decades.
And these are high-class problems in the military sense, in
the sense that you are not talking about civilian casualties,
necessarily, here if a space asset is hit by debris or--you
know, these are replaceable gizmos.
And, also, our military budget is completely within our
discretion. And we represent a country with a per capita income
of, what, $48,000 a person versus China with a per capita
income of, what, $1,000 a person. And we are worried about
maintaining our technological edge? You know, there shouldn't
be that much of a concern if we want to do it. It is a question
of will, not of means.
Mr. Krepon. Mr. Cooper, our capabilities to mess with
somebody else's satellites have never been greater. And, unlike
nuclear deterrence, we don't really need to be in your face
about it. So we don't test new devices, we don't flight-test
ASAT missiles, we don't deploy at high levels of readiness the
way we do, or did, on the nuclear.
So the deterrence in space is largely inferred; it is not
demonstrated in the same way. I think we still are able to get
our points across with this latent or inferred capability: If
you mess with us, the consequences could be immense, and they
are of our choosing.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 3
minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming.
Mr. Krepon, you piqued my interest when you talked about,
we need rules for space. Most rule-based systems--and I am a
CPA [certified public accountant] by profession--are only as
good as the enforcement process. Who would enforce those rules
against the Chinese?
Mr. Krepon. Sir, we have rules of the road with respect to
our navies, air forces, and ground forces operating in close
proximity with Russia. These agreements exist. They do not have
enforcement mechanisms. The nuclear arms reduction treaties
that we have do not have enforcement mechanisms. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty comes closest through concerted efforts at
sanctions.
But we are talking not only about a rules-based system but
a self-interested-based system, a national-interested-based
system. So we----
Mr. Conaway. But don't we wind up just--I hear that and
understand it. But some would argue that we have deluded
ourselves in a lot of areas thinking bad guys or folks on the
other side are as honest as we are, or we try to be. And so I
hear that.
All three of you talked about hardening our existing fleet
of satellites. What timeframe is that? How many years are you
talking about, actually getting that accomplished?
Mr. Krepon. Sir, if you are talking about weight, weight
gain for satellites, that is a very hard thing. So we tend to--
--
Mr. Conaway. Or protecting whatever you are trying to do to
put self-defense mechanisms on them. You can't do those in
space. This is a replace-the-entire-fleet issue, right?
Mr. Krepon. I think, given the sunk costs, we are thinking
about, or I think about incremental----
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Mr. Krepon [continuing]. Gains over time.
Mr. Conaway. Which orbits are most at risk? Every satellite
up there, or just the ones in low Earth orbit?
Dr. Butterworth. Sir, I think the Chinese have recently
demonstrated a high-altitude, direct-ascent ASAT capable of
reaching GEO [geostationary orbit]. And they have certainly
demonstrated the ability to be able to launch and deploy small
items of considerable interest that are very difficult to
track, and they can do that at a variety of altitudes, as well.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Thank you all. I appreciate your comments this afternoon.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I
appreciate your testimony. I think it is a very important
discussion.
Obviously, ensuring information dominance provided by our
satellites is a difficult but absolutely critical topic. And I
certainly, again, appreciate the committee's focus on this
issue.
So I would like to--I would note that, given the
proliferation of certain capabilities, this conversation
certainly has relevance far beyond China. But I would like to
focus on, for a minute, nonkinetic weapons, particularly high-
energy lasers. Obviously, such weapons come with a variety of
effects on a platform as complex as a satellite.
And what I want to know is, do we currently have the
breadth of knowledge to characterize the full range of those
effects across the spectrum of possible power levels and beam
qualities?
Dr. Butterworth. I do not believe that we do have that
information at present, sir.
We did some very small experiments a while ago, in the
nineties, with the MSTI 5 satellite, and we cooked it as it
came over New Mexico, I think it was, out of the Albuquerque
range and were able to see how some of those effects were
measured and what they might be.
But in terms of being able to really characterize the
impact on us, I don't think so. I think we are still at the
stage of putting warnings on the satellites that they are being
lased, but I am not quite sure that we see clearly the effects.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Anybody else care to comment?
Okay. Well, given the well-known vulnerabilities of
satellites, the number of technologies that are able to
threaten these platforms, is there an understood tiering of
importance? For example, is there a particular importance
attached to jamming or dazzling particular satellites?
Dr. Tellis. There seems to be a trend, at least in the
Chinese literature after 2007, after the 2007 test, that China
ought to look at means other than simply kinetic attacks.
Because I think one of the things that both shocked and
surprised them was the international revulsion about the debris
problem that was magnified as a result of that test.
And so certainly in recent years there has been a clear, I
don't want to say a ``shift,'' but there has been an increase
in the emphasis that China has placed essentially on soft kills
or mission kills. Because it allows them to achieve their
operational aims without contributing to destruction, physical
destruction, of satellites, which obviously magnifies the
debris problem, which affects them, as well.
Mr. Langevin. And before my time runs out, how dependent is
China's military and economically on U.S. systems such as GPS?
And how long can we expect that dependence to persist, given
current levels of investment in systems such as Beidou, if I am
pronouncing that right?
Dr. Butterworth. I think Beidou is just about to finish up.
Isn't that right, Dr. Tellis?
Yeah. So it should be just complete.
What I suspect the Chinese are going to find, however, is
that its performance is not up to that of the GPS system. And
so they will very likely like to depend on the GPS system as
long as possible, as well as using Beidou and trying to sell
its appeal.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you.
I have one question, really following up on Mr. Cooper's
question. And I am new, so this may be something that is so
elementary that you are going to have to answer a very
elementary question.
But you hear about the wealth or the productivity of China
being so much less than the United States per capita and that
they are spending so much less than we are on national defense.
How in the world are they matching us in space in this sort of
technology? Are they focusing a disproportionate share of their
resources on that? Are we not focusing enough of our resources
on it? How could a country like that come close to the United
States of America?
Mr. Krepon. For an elementary question, it is a very
difficult one.
It drives me nuts to read the trade literature about how
much we put into space. And I think we are shortchanging space
across the board, in my view.
Bear in mind that it has taken China four decades to catch
up with us in terms of--and they haven't caught up with us
yet--in terms of space exploration. They are still behind us,
in my judgment, across the board.
But they are working hard, and they are taking shortcuts.
So is this worrisome? In my view, it is. And resources can't
solve the problem, but I don't think you can begin to solve the
problem without more resources on our end.
Mr. Byrne. I know I have just a little bit of time. I just
want to make sure I get down to this. What should we be doing
that we are not doing to stay significantly ahead of the
Chinese?
Mr. Krepon. Here I am going to provoke Ashley and Bob.
I think that on the counterspace side, I think we are doing
a fair amount. The thing that sticks in my craw has to do more
with the exploration piece. And, you know, it would be--we are
having trouble building satellites on time and on budget. We
are getting a little bit better, but we are handicapping
ourselves so much by the way we do things, our procurement
policies. We are just not on time, on budget.
Dr. Tellis. Could I take a crack at answering that in a
direct way?
I think we have two weaknesses. Our space systems are too
concentrated in their capability and they are too few, which
means that any loss of even a single system has a
disproportionate effect on our capacity.
We have done this for both technological and economic
reasons. If you move to an alternative architecture of smaller
satellites, more flexible, more distributed capabilities, it is
going to be more costly, but the upside is that we will have
greater resilience and greater ability to compensate for
losses.
The second weakness that we have is that we have a very
poor reconstitution capacity. If we lose some of these space
systems in a war, it is going to take a long time before we can
get replacements up there. And that is everything from a lack
of spares, in terms of the space systems themselves, all the
way to a long timeline with respect to launch.
So we have simply not configured our capacities on the
principle that these assets are at risk. And that is the point
I think that Dr. Butterworth was making, that we have simply
been content to assume that we will have these capabilities no
matter what.
If we begin to shift that premise and think about these
capabilities as essentially nonavailable in some circumstances,
I think we would begin to think of our investments in space in
a very different way.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired.
And we saved the clean-up spot for the distinguished
gentleman from the great State of Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Space situational awareness is an issue that influences
every space asset beyond those of national security space. The
animation showing the creation of debris from the 2007 China
ASAT test or the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision are dramatic
depictions of the consequence of the laws of motion in our
space environment.
I suspect most people in the room today are familiar with
the recent hit movie ``Gravity.'' I think the movie did
everyone here a service by bringing to light the reality of the
precarious situation of space operations in our orbitable
environment. It is obvious that the consequences of a conflict
in space could be devastating to nearly all space-faring
nations.
So, with that, I would like to get the witnesses' thoughts
on the priority of space situational awareness [SSA] for U.S.
space security. And, also, is the United States Air Force Space
Command the proper entity into which we should expand a greater
SSA responsibility? And if not the Space Command, then who?
And we will start with Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Tellis. I think space situational awareness is the
foundation for any kind of defensive counterspace that the U.S.
has to invest in.
I accept the point that Mr. Krepon made in principle, that
we don't need to overinvest in offensive counterspace because
we have latent capabilities to do that if required under
conditions of extremis.
But if we have to do serious defensive counterspace, the
challenge of being able to attribute where the threats are
coming from, what the nature of the threat is all takes on an
entirely different coloration. And we certainly have to put
resources first and foremost into space situational awareness,
because nothing else with respect to defensive counterspace is
going to work if you don't have adequate situational awareness.
So that is point number one.
Point number two, I think my view is that Air Force Space
Command is the logical place in which this should reside
because the Air Force maintains the largest catalogue of space
objects out there. It has the resources, both terrestrial and
space-borne, to maintain this capability. And I think starting
from scratch or moving it to a different organization at this
point would involve probably more trouble than it is worth.
Mr. Palazzo. Dr. Butterworth.
Dr. Butterworth. Yes, sir, I would concur with what Dr.
Tellis was saying, with a couple of qualifications.
One is that I think we should emphasize space situational
awareness from orbit. And some of those orbits should be very
high so that we are looking down. There may be an effort to try
to make things difficult to detect. Nothing is equally
difficult to detect from all angles. We should have all angles
from which we could survey what is out there in space.
Secondly, with regard to the Air Force's capabilities, I
would note that the record of the JMS [JSpOC Mission System]
out there, or the JSpOC [Joint Space Operations Center], is not
overwhelmingly impressive. And so I hope we can do a lot better
with that soon.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you.
Mr. Krepon. Sir, I would like to put a bug in your ear
about space traffic management, because situational awareness
goes hand-in-hand with traffic management. One of the reasons
why we want situational awareness is to get early warning, but
it is also to avoid collisions with debris or, heck, another
satellite.
So we haven't really thought hard about space traffic
management. How do we do that? Who does it? How does it work?
Capabilities are so disproportionate. We are the best. But how
do we convey messages? How do we develop patterns of safe
traffic in space? We are behind the eight ball on this one.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. And, gentlemen, we once again thank you for
being here.
I thank my good friend, Mike Rogers, for allowing us to
join and have this joint hearing.
As I told you earlier today, we want to give you 60 seconds
or so for any wrap-up that you have of something that you think
you need to clarify or that we left out. Because it is not just
important, this hearing, but it is important, the record we are
building of this hearing, to be used later.
Dr. Tellis, if you don't mind, we will start back with you
because you had the first opening remarks.
Dr. Tellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to make one point, which Mr. Krepon referred
to, because I think it is important.
I am not as sanguine about the idea that we will have a
collaborative solution or even an equilibrium solution with
respect to counterspace where China is concerned in a way that
we had with the Soviet Union during the cold war. And there is
a very important reason for that, and it goes beyond diplomacy.
There was no asymmetric dependence on space at the height
of the cold war. Both the Soviets and the United States,
certainly in the latter half of the cold war, came to depend on
space almost equally for the success of their military
operations. And, therefore, Soviet incentives to engage in
counterspace activities of the kind that the Chinese are
contemplating were much smaller.
China's dependence on space is not as significant as the
U.S. dependence on space. And it is that delta independence
that gives China much greater freedom of action than we
recognize. It is something to keep in mind.
There is a second point. During the old cold war days, the
Soviets had the conventional advantage. And, therefore, if
conflict broke out, they could have been content prosecuting
their operational aims through the use of conventional forces
alone because that was their strong suit.
The Chinese see themselves as not having that kind of a
conventional advantage. And, therefore, the incentives they
have to attack us asymmetrically, to attack our space assets,
to attack our information architecture, and so on and so forth
is much greater.
And so I think we need to be sensitive to the differences
that exist in the U.S.-China case compared to the U.S.-Soviet
case, which makes the burden on the objective of protecting our
space assets even more.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Dr. Tellis.
Dr. Butterworth.
Dr. Butterworth. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you again
for having this excellent hearing.
I will endorse almost everything that my colleague to my
right here said, except for the part about the Soviet Union.
Even they didn't use space in the way that we have. Nobody does
it like we do. We showed the world first in Desert Storm the
integration of space assets into tactical operations, and we
have gone way beyond what we could do then in the ensuing 25
years, or almost 25 years.
Nobody else has tried to do that. They may use it for
strategic reconnaissance, they may use it for selected
communications, and so on, but not integrated into warfare the
way that we have.
And so, to try to understand the relationship with China in
terms of parallelism or symmetry--that is, you know, that we
can shoot their satellites and they can shoot ours--misses the
point that they don't use space in the way that we do, nor, as
I mentioned, did the Soviet Union.
And so when I talk about trying to take into account the
joint fight perspective, that is the most important part of it,
is to understand that they are looking at space with very
different eyes, just as Dr. Tellis was just suggesting.
Thank you again.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Dr. Butterworth.
Dr. Krepon.
Mr. Krepon. Mr. Chairman, China's vulnerability in space is
growing every year--every year. And the question that you are
exploring here, for which I thank you, is, how do we leverage
this to influence Beijing's national calculus? And I don't feel
comfortable that we understand Beijing's national calculus
enough. So I would like more conversations, U.S.-China, on
this.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Gentlemen, thank you all.
Thank all of our Members for being here.
Mr. Rogers, thank you.
And, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
January 28, 2014
=======================================================================
?
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
January 28, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6965.033
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
January 28, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. has changed its attitudes to the Space Code of
Conduct over the last several years: from opposition or benign neglect
to a stated willingness to engage in conversations. Has the space
environment changed for the better that U.S. participation is
warranted? Will the Space Code of Conduct deliver on what is our
principal objective: a space environment free of threats to our U.S.
national security?
Dr. Tellis. The Space Code of Conduct cannot--and will not--deliver
on the principal U.S. objective of preserving a space environment free
of threats to U.S. space systems. The U.S. attitude to the Code of
Conduct has indeed varied over the years, but that is more because of
differences in attitudes between different administrations in
Washington and not because the Code itself has become more effective in
protecting American interests. The Code must be understood for what it
is: it is a confidence-building measure at best. It will not prevent
states from developing counterspace programs nor can it prevent any
state from mounting counterspace operations against the United States
during a crisis or in war. The Code, therefore, cannot eliminate the
most serious dangers to U.S. space systems. If successful, the best the
Code can do is to restrain states from engaging in kinetic anti-
satellite tests that are debris-generating in peacetime: while this
would be an important achievement, it is more likely that any such
restraint--if it materializes--would ensue because it advances the
national interests of the various spacefaring powers rather than
because of their formal adherence to the Code per se. In any event, the
issue of whether the United States should be an adherent to the Code
must be assessed on whether the Code in its totality advances U.S.
space interests. Even the most current version of the Code does not
unambiguously advance that objective yet. Consequently, the United
States should stay involved in the discussions on the Code, but not
commit to adhering to it just yet.
Mr. Forbes. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace
technology that would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space?
What insight do we have into their intent for developing such
technology? What motivates them, and what would de-motivate them in
this pursuit?
Dr. Tellis. China today has the most aggressive counterspace
program of any state in the international system. The principal target
of this counterspace program is, first and foremost, the United States.
The motivations animating the Chinese counterspace program are simple:
China views the possibility of a conflict with the United States as
serious, and is preparing a variety of military capabilities to deal
with that contingency. It has a healthy appreciation of U.S. military
superiority and seeks ways to mitigate America's operational advantages
across the board. China's counterspace program is part and parcel of
this effort. Given China's larger geopolitical interests, there is no
way to induce Beijing to forego its counterspace investments.
Consequently, the United States must ensure that no matter what China's
counterspace capabilities may be, U.S. military operations can
nonetheless be successfully prosecuted in every scenario of relevance
to American interests.
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. has changed its attitudes to the Space Code of
Conduct over the last several years: from opposition or benign neglect
to a stated willingness to engage in conversations. Has the space
environment changed for the better that U.S. participation is
warranted? Will the Space Code of Conduct deliver on what is our
principal objective: a space environment free of threats to our U.S.
national security?
Dr. Butterworth. The space environment has not changed for the
better, and the Code will not help reduce space threats to our national
security. Chinese military space R&D and deployments are particularly
vigorous and clearly aimed at degrading the effectiveness of U.S.
national security systems.
The most effective measures toward keeping space safe and secure
for the benefit of all continue to be led by the United States, working
through United Nations committees, alliances, and bilateral agreements,
and providing conjunction analysis and collision warnings pro bono to
government and commercial space operators around the world.
The Space Code of Conduct offers no practical support for the
United States' efforts and could prove diplomatically troublesome. The
Code is silent about important definitions and any procedures for
monitoring, verification, and sanctions; it calls for sharing
information about national security strategies and programs; it calls
for complying with and promoting a treaty the U.S. Senate refused to
ratify; and as an excuse for the dangerous deficiencies in its
drafting, it declares that it is not legally binding.
And in any event, the Code would address less than half of the
world's orbital launch activity. Three of the countries on record as
opposing the Code (Russia, China, and India) accounted for 48 of the 78
successful space launches to orbit in 2013.
Mr. Forbes. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace
technology that would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space?
What insight do we have into their intent for developing such
technology? What motivates them, and what would de-motivate them in
this pursuit?
Dr. Butterworth. China's counterspace programs are energetic and
diverse because they are critical to China's hopes for being able to
challenge U.S. interests militarily. China clearly appreciates the
significance of space systems to U.S. military power projection and so
is driven to develop effective counterspace capabilities. Most recently
in the South and East China Seas, China has been using implied military
threats to assert unilateral prerogatives in areas of concern to the
U.S. and its allies and partners. China cannot be de-motivated in this
pursuit so long as it continues to use military threats to change
international norms, practices, and procedures.
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. has changed its attitudes to the Space Code of
Conduct over the last several years: from opposition or benign neglect
to a stated willingness to engage in conversations. Has the space
environment changed for the better that U.S. participation is
warranted? Will the Space Code of Conduct deliver on what is our
principal objective: a space environment free of threats to our U.S.
national security?
Mr. Krepon. The George W. Bush was not enthusiastic about an
international code of conduct for space-faring nations. It placed a
high priority on freedom of action and wished to avoid any diplomatic
undertakings in this domain. This view became harder to sustain after
the PLA's 2007 ``hit-to-kill'' ASAT test, which produced the worst man-
made debris consequences since the Space Age began. After this test,
some rethinking appeared warranted about rules of the road to set norms
of responsible behavior in space--especially regarding ASAT tests that
produce mutating, long-lasting debris fields.
Presidential candidate Barack Obama held a positive view about a
properly crafted code of conduct for space-faring nations, but his
administration moved very deliberately on this initiative. Other issues
had a higher priority, and the executive branch and the Pentagon
undertook lengthy reviews on how a properly crafted code of conduct
might affect U.S. national and economic security. After these reviews
were completed, the administration announced that it could support a
properly crafted code of conduct. The administration has been very
involved in the drafting process led by the European Union. But this
process is also going slowly. Progress has been made, but three key
hold-outs remain: China, Russia, and India.
In my view, the space environment will become more hostile to
spacecraft and human spaceflight as long as the potential for debris
proliferation is greater than the potential for debris mitigation.
Debris is lethal and does not respect the nationality of spacecraft or
manned spaceflight. We face the real potential that some heavily
trafficked orbits could become dead zones as a result on debris hits
with pin-ball effects, just as some locations at sea are dead fishery
zones. A code of conduct for space could help prevent this outcome by
establishing a norm against ``hit-to-kill'' ASAT tests.
Backers of a space code of conduct can't promise ``a space
environment free of threats to our U.S. national security.'' Even with
a well-designed code, U.S. satellites will continue to be vulnerable
requiring, as I testified, multi-layered deterrence whether or not this
diplomatic initiative succeeds.
Mr. Forbes. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace
technology that would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space?
What insight do we have into their intent for developing such
technology? What motivates them, and what would de-motivate them in
this pursuit?
Mr. Krepon. According to published reports, the PLA is testing
capabilities and practicing techniques that could be applied against
satellites. These capabilities are not unique to China; all major
space-faring nations, including the United States, can be expected to
possess them. When any country tests such capabilities, others might
infer hostile intent, or preparations to be ready to employ these
techniques in the event of authorization to engage in warfare. Or they
might serve deterrent purposes. Or these practices might suggest, in
China's case, a perceived need to play catch-up ball. I am not a China
scholar, so I am not well versed enough to hazard a guess about which
of these possible motivations, or which combination of motivations,
applies.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. How does the U.S. deter China from entering a conflict
in space?
Dr. Tellis. The best way for the United States to deter China from
expanding a conflict to space would be to invest in maintaining all the
necessary warfighting capabilities that (i) promise to inflict greater
pain on China than would be suffered by the United States in any space
war; and (ii) permit the U.S. military to secure its operational
objectives terrestrially despite any counterspace operations that may
be mounted by China. In other words, the best deterrence strategy is
one where the United States clearly demonstrates that it has both the
capability and the willingness to run any space-relevant offence-
defense arms race provoked by China--and win.
Mr. Rogers. What are the national security implications if our
military lost access to space capabilities in a conflict with the
People's Republic of China? Beyond national security, if a system such
as Global Positioning System (GPS) was threatened, what would be the
potential economic and civil impact on the United States?
Dr. Tellis. I think it would be safe to say--as a first cut--that
the loss of U.S. space capabilities to China in a conflict would be
simply catastrophic to the United States. There is no other national
military that relies on space for its operational effectiveness as much
as the U.S. military. Nor is there any other society that relies on
space for its economic wellbeing as much as the United States. The loss
of U.S. access to space for both military and civilian endeavors would,
therefore, be calamitous. Given this fact, it is unfortunate that we
still do not have a comprehensive understanding of what exactly would
entail operationally if the U.S. military were to lose access to space
in a conflict with China. I believe that assessments of this kind are
just beginning and it will probably be a while before they are
complete.
Mr. Rogers. What steps is China taking to increase their Space
Situational Awareness (SSA)? What are the risks of this, and what role
will their SSA ability play in their counterspace systems?
Dr. Tellis. China is beginning to build the foundations for a
comprehensive Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability. In recent
years, Beijing has embarked on a variety of technical investments to
detect and track orbital bodies passing over China through the use of
specialized optical telescopes and theodolites, laser satellite-
tracking devices such as rangefinders, large phased-array radars,
various ground- and space-based signals intelligence systems, and
radars associated with surface-to-air missile systems, all of which are
capable of searching, acquiring, tracking and classifying objects of
interest to Chinese strategic planners. China has also sought to
collaborate with various international research organizations,
particularly in Europe and Asia, to identify U.S. space systems that
are not identified in the open space catalogs maintained by NASA and
the U.S. Air Force Space Command.
The objectives of these activities, in the first instance, consist
of denying the United States the targeting data that would enable it to
interdict China's land-based strategic nuclear platforms and key
elements of its conventional forces. Accurate information about U.S.
and third-party space reconnaissance assets and over-flight patterns is
sought in order to permit Chinese commanders to issue the appropriate
notifications to their field components in regard to movement and
dispersal operations, which are timed to occur outside the window of
observation. The Chinese quest for more accurate SSA, however, is
equally driven in the final instance by their desire to nullify
American space systems, either kinetically or through soft kills or
through informational denial operations: all these objectives require
Beijing to first know the capabilities of the U.S. space platforms it
seeks to defeat, their orbital parameters and their spatial
relationship to other orbiting bodies. The ultimate aim of China's SSA
investments, therefore, is to underwrite its larger counterspace
ambitions.
Mr. Rogers. Over the past several years, there has been much
discussion on an international agreement for a Space Code of Conduct,
to establish ``norms and confidence-building-measures'' according to
its advocates. Do you think the Chinese will sign up to this sort of
agreement? And if they do, do you think they will stop their
counterspace program because of the agreement?
Dr. Tellis. It is not clear right now whether China will sign on to
any Space Code of Conduct, although Beijing has agreed recently--after
many years of opposition--to join in discussions of a Code. Even if
China were to adhere to any future Code of Conduct, it will not
terminate its counterspace programs, which are driven by strategic
necessities that transcend the requirements of public diplomacy.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the leadership of the Chinese space
program, and the relationship between the military and civilian
elements. What are the risks of U.S. cooperation with China's civil
space program? Please describe the extent of efforts by the Chinese to
illegally acquire U.S. technology.
Dr. Tellis. It must be remembered that China's space program is a
remarkably integrated effort. Unlike the United States, for example,
where a significant divide exists between civilian and military space
activities, and where diversity, heterogeneity, and atomistic
competition are the norm in both realms, civilian and military space
programs in China are not only centrally directed but are also mutually
reinforcing by design. Although specific activities in the Chinese
space program may be biased towards civilian or defense applications,
the entire enterprise, strictly speaking, is a strategic program with
no firewalls whatsoever between the civilian and the military. This
``unity-in-difference,'' centered on the primacy of military
considerations which suffuse even the scientific, domestic, and
commercial elements of the space effort, is protected at the
programmatic level by the organizational structure of the Chinese
system. China's State Council oversees the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, the State Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission, and the Ministry of Science and Technology,
which through different lines of control oversee the research academies
and the defense industry groupings that produce the various
technologies for either the People's Liberation Army (through the
General Armaments Department (GAD)) or the various ministries that use
space products and services. The links between military and civilian
space are, therefore, far more robust than often appear in
organizational charts.
In this context, the China National Space Administration, which is
sometimes depicted as China's National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), is essentially a civilian front for
international cooperation and a liaison between the military and
Chinese defense industry. The military interests of the Chinese state
in the space program are thus affirmatively protected, even though
Chinese policymakers rarely, if ever, own up to the military dimensions
of their space endeavors. As Kevin Pollpeter summarized it succinctly,
``China's space program is inherently military in nature . . . Indeed,
China's space program is a military-civilian joint venture in which the
military develops and operates its satellites and runs its
infrastructure, including China's launch sites and satellite operations
center.'' The policy consequence of this fact, from an American
perspective, is that any collaboration with China's ``civilian'' space
program inevitably ends up aiding its military.
Mr. Rogers. How does the U.S. deter China from entering a conflict
in space?
Dr. Butterworth. For China, conflict with the U.S. in space is
about military advantage on earth. Space systems are plainly an
integral and crucial element of American military power, especially
projection power, which is why China is working hard at counterspace
capabilities. But for the same reason, the U.S. response to an attack
on its space systems would not be limited to counterattacks in space
but would reasonably include targeting facilities that housed, enabled,
or facilitated the counterspace attacks. That is, the importance of
space support to U.S. military operations is both why China would
attack in space and why the conflict could not be confined to space.
Consequently, to deter China from a conflict in space is to deter
China from a terrestrial conflict with the U.S., a calculation that
includes assessments of American projection power, regional military
balances, alliances, partnerships, and other ``whole of government''
considerations. The United States wants to help China become a
constructive partner in the community of nations, but doing so
apparently will first require denying China any benefits from bullying
its neighbors.
Mr. Rogers. What are the national security implications if our
military lost access to space capabilities in a conflict with the
People's Republic of China? Beyond national security, if a system such
as Global Positioning System (GPS) was threatened, what would be the
potential economic and civil impact on the United States?
Dr. Butterworth. Bluntly, if we lose space we do not play. Space
provides the warp and weft of the highly integrated forces we bring to
the joint fight. Without space, the battle team unravels, and the
separate threads more easily broken.
The economic and civil effects of a loss of GPS on the U.S. are
also incalculable, primarily because of the widespread dependence on
the timing signal. Navigation is important but probably accounts for
about one-seventh of the usage of GPS. Broader losses would come from
the loss of timing for the internet, for commercial transactions, for
digital communications, and many other elements of our infrastructure.
Mr. Rogers. What steps is China taking to increase their Space
Situational Awareness (SSA)? What are the risks of this, and what role
will their SSA ability play in their counterspace systems?
Dr. Butterworth. China is developing and conducting on-orbit
demonstrations of satellites and satellite control techniques that can
be used for an intelligence preparation of the space battlefield. China
evidently hopes to gain substantial insight into the U.S. ``space order
of battle'' by using sensors to detect and track satellites from
various positions in orbit, and by using close proximity operations to
refine estimates of the function and purpose of satellites in orbit.
The results could provide China a guide to which U.S. satellites to
attack, when, and in what fashion to best complicate different phases
of U.S. terrestrial operations.
Mr. Rogers. Over the past several years, there has been much
discussion on an international agreement for a Space Code of Conduct,
to establish ``norms and confidence-building-measures'' according to
its advocates. Do you think the Chinese will sign up to this sort of
agreement? And if they do, do you think they will stop their
counterspace program because of the agreement?
Dr. Butterworth. China has repeatedly said that it is opposed to
the European/Space Code of Conduct because China wants an international
agreement about weapons in space, while the Code focuses on debris (for
which adequate international fora have been in operation for several
years).
China has proposed negotiating an agreement that would prohibit
placing weapons in space but has insisted that such an agreement would
not prohibit ground-based anti-satellite weapons.
China's counterspace program is rooted in China's determination to
achieve sufficient military power to be able to win a regional military
confrontation with the United States. China will not stop its
counterspace program unless it turns to established diplomatic
procedures for resolving disputes peacefully and abandons its military
bullying.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the leadership of the Chinese space
program, and the relationship between the military and civilian
elements. What are the risks of U.S. cooperation with China's civil
space program? Please describe the extent of efforts by the Chinese to
illegally acquire U.S. technology.
Dr. Butterworth. Detailed insights into leadership of the Chinese
space program and the relationship between the military and civilian
elements can be provided by China experts such as Dean Cheng, and they
can certainly help the U.S. understand some of the background of
Chinese actions. But regardless of whether an event resulted from
military arrogance or civilian impotence, the Chinese government must
be held responsible for its actions.
Chinese efforts to acquire U.S. technology illegally include the
traditional panoply of technical means together with extensive contacts
with Americans in various meetings and circumstances. One area of worry
for space operations is ensuring the integrity and security of
components and subsystems, including computer chips.
Mr. Rogers. How does the U.S. deter China from entering a conflict
in space?
Mr. Krepon. As noted in my testimony, by a multilayered approach
that includes the ability to cause significant harm to a potential
attacker, whether in space or elsewhere; by having space situational
awareness so as to learn as quickly as possible about potential attacks
and to determine the perpetrator; by disaggregating and diversifying
our capabilities in space; and by increasing protective measures for
satellites when they are cost-effective at the margin.
Mr. Rogers. What are the national security implications if our
military lost access to space capabilities in a conflict with the
People's Republic of China? Beyond national security, if a system such
as Global Positioning System (GPS) was threatened, what would be the
potential economic and civil impact on the United States?
Mr. Krepon. This scenario--what some have characterized as a
``space Pearl Harbor''--would place the United States at a profound
disadvantage, unless the United States retained the ability and will to
retaliate in ways that also placed China at a similar or worse
disadvantage. I would expect this to be the case.
Mr. Rogers. What steps is China taking to increase their Space
Situational Awareness (SSA)? What are the risks of this, and what role
will their SSA ability play in their counterspace systems?
Mr. Krepon. China's space situational awareness lags well behind
that of the United States. Indeed, I believe that the United States has
provided conjunction warnings to China when one of its satellites or
space missions might be imperiled by debris that we can track better
than they--including debris generated by the PLA's 2007 ASAT test. The
asymmetry of SSA capabilities would place China at a disadvantage in
the event of warfare in space, and would pose the question to China's
leadership of whether limited or all-out counter-space attacks would be
worth the risk. Improved U.S. space situational awareness would
reinforce deterrence against surprise attacks.
Mr. Rogers. Over the past several years, there has been much
discussion on an international agreement for a Space Code of Conduct,
to establish ``norms and confidence-building-measures'' according to
its advocates. Do you think the Chinese will sign up to this sort of
agreement? And if they do, do you think they will stop their
counterspace program because of the agreement?
Mr. Krepon. The Chinese leadership's position is evolving.
Initially, Beijing and Moscow rejected a code of conduct, insisting on
an unverifiable and ambitious treaty to ban some kinds of space
warfare, but not the counter-space capabilities they are developing.
Last fall, Beijing and Moscow endorsed in principle the notion of a
code of conduct, but not the draft code developed by the European
Union. Beijing and Moscow have agreed that some types of transparency
and confidence-building measures could have utility, and they have
enumerated a number of useful measures that could be incorporated into
an international code of conduct They have also stated that a code of
conduct should be an interim step to an ambitious treaty that, in my
view, is unlikely to be negotiated.
The realization of a properly crafted space code of conduct will
depend on several conditions, including the acceptance by China and
Russia of pragmatic and useful ``rules of the road'' for space--
including consultative measures and the end of ASAT testing that causes
long-lived space debris.
A code of conduct would not stop the development of counter-space
capabilities, because such capabilities reside in technologies that
could have peaceful as well as malign purposes. Consequently, whether
or not an international space code of conduct is finalized, I do not
foresee the United States getting out of the counter-space business.
Nor would it be wise to do so.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the leadership of the Chinese space
program, and the relationship between the military and civilian
elements. What are the risks of U.S. cooperation with China's civil
space program? Please describe the extent of efforts by the Chinese to
illegally acquire U.S. technology.
Mr. Krepon. A subsidiary reason why I support negotiations on an
international space code of conduct is to learn more about civil-
military relations in China as they apply to space. I know very little
about how well Chinese leaders have familiarized themselves with the
PLA's plans or understand the consequences of their military's
doctrine, test practices and exercises. I presume that the PLA briefed
the Party leadership about its counter-space programs prior to the 2007
ASAT test that endangered over 200 satellites and manned space
programs--including their own. But I don't know whether the Party
leadership received a detailed preview of the 2007 test, and whether
they knew enough to ask about the debris consequences of this test. I
do know that the Foreign Ministry remained silent for two weeks after
this ASAT test.
The advent of an international code of conduct for responsible
space-faring nations could prompt more internal and international
consultations on these matters.
As for civil space cooperation with China, the risks of possible
technology loss have to weighed against potential gains from
cooperation. I recall that there was considerable anxiety to the Nixon
administration's 1972 agreement with the Soviet Union to a docking
mission for the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft. In retrospect, these
anxieties proved to be unwarranted. Cooperation between Washington and
Moscow in space continues on a daily basis on the International Space
Station--despite many other difficulties the United States faces with
Russia.
I am a supporter of exploring ways for the United States to
cooperate with China in space, without compromising sensitive
technologies. I believe that the Congressional prohibition of bilateral
engagements between NASA and its Chinese counterpart is unwise.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON
Mr. Carson. How quickly are we able to reconstitute capabilities
like GPS or communications networks if one or more of our satellites
was destroyed or otherwise taken offline? In your opinion, are
additional investments necessary to increase this pace? If so, which
investments?
Dr. Tellis. In general, the U.S. capability to reconstitute its
space-based communications satellites and the GPS system is a function
of their orbital altitudes, the character of an adversary attack, and
the availability of ready spares and rapid launch capabilities in the
United States. A more careful modeling of these factors is essential
before your question can be answered satisfactorily. In general,
however, I would say the following: One, the United States must move
with alacrity to develop a rapid launch capability, which we still
don't have. There are several new private sector solutions that are
innovative and possible cheaper, which ought to be investigated. Two,
we need to reassess the need and the number of satellites spares for
high priority operations, and to provide the budgetary support for
maintaining the requisite spares inventory. Three, the most likely
threats to our space systems will be less kinetic destruction and more
suppression of links that transmit their data; dealing with this
challenge is more complicated because its requires multiple and
distributed solutions.
Mr. Carson. Can you describe how increased transparency into
counterspace capabilities has impacted the perception of hosting
military payloads among commercial satellite operators? What steps can
we take to reassure concerned commercial operators of the safety of
their satellites? Additionally, what can we do to expand hosted payload
opportunities?
Dr. Tellis. As far as I can tell, most commercial satellite
operators still operate on the presumption that space will continue to
remain a protected sanctuary, at least as far as commercial systems are
concerned. They are more concerned about congestion, debris, and
peacetime management of space assets than military interference per se.
Obviously, this will change over time, particularly if countries like
China and Russia demonstrate a willingness to interfere with commercial
systems. The dangers to commercial systems, however, pose new
challenges to space deterrence. One approach to these dangers would be
for the United States to adopt a clear declaratory policy that treats
threats to space systems owned and operated by U.S. commercial entities
similarly to those facing U.S. military systems. Another important
complement will require expanding U.S. space situational awareness
capabilities to encompass critical U.S.-owned and operated commercial
satellites as well. Solutions of this sort will be essential as
commercial space systems increasingly support U.S. defense operations.
Mr. Carson. How quickly are we able to reconstitute capabilities
like GPS or communications networks if one or more of our satellites
was destroyed or otherwise taken offline? In your opinion, are
additional investments necessary to increase this pace? If so, which
investments?
Dr. Butterworth. The GPS constellation includes some satellites
that can be used as on-orbit spares, and so reconstitution can be quick
if not too many satellites are taken offline. In my opinion, it would
be prudent to invest in a backup terrestrial system (e-loran) to ensure
continuity of the timing signal, vital to so many operations in our
infrastructure.
Communications networks can be reorganized fairly quickly in most
cases of military need, but doing so would be done based on priority
and the overall capacity of the network would be reduced if one of our
satellites were destroyed or taken offline. The U.S. military has
always needed more communications capacity for its operations. One idea
to provide surge communications for regional military operations
involves launching perhaps six small satellites with UHF payloads into
an appropriately angled molniya orbits. Additional options will become
available as the national security community moves further toward data-
centric approaches to communicating information.
Mr. Carson. Can you describe how increased transparency into
counterspace capabilities has impacted the perception of hosting
military payloads among commercial satellite operators? What steps can
we take to reassure concerned commercial operators of the safety of
their satellites? Additionally, what can we do to expand hosted payload
opportunities?
Dr. Butterworth. While hosting military payloads might draw hostile
attention to a commercial satellite, I have not seen serious concern by
commercial operators about becoming a target for counterspace threats.
For now, at least, the industry seems eager to offer hosting services
for military communications systems that might be involved in
``disaggregation.''
The primary difficulty with attracting more hosts for military
payloads is the incompatibility between the government's acquisition
process and the commercial operator's business-driven schedule. The
opportunities for hosted payloads will expand, I think, if the Defense
Department can provide its payloads to the commercial operator with the
agreed technical interfaces and within the commercial operators'
production-to-launch schedule (say, 30 months).
Mr. Carson. How quickly are we able to reconstitute capabilities
like GPS or communications networks if one or more of our satellites
was destroyed or otherwise taken offline? In your opinion, are
additional investments necessary to increase this pace? If so, which
investments?
Mr. Krepon. U.S. launch capabilities are diversifying, which is a
very positive development. However, certain satellites are harder to
replace than others, and my sense is that the United States cannot
depend on prompt reconstitution in some, if not most cases. I suspect
these conditions also apply elsewhere. I think that everyone on our
panel of witnesses has reached the conclusion that, because essential
satellites are also vulnerable, resilient, disaggregated capabilities
make more sense than relying on very few, highly capable satellites. If
disaggregation results in some loss of high-end capability, I would
still advocate disaggregation.
Mr. Carson. Can you describe how increased transparency into
counterspace capabilities has impacted the perception of hosting
military payloads among commercial satellite operators? What steps can
we take to reassure concerned commercial operators of the safety of
their satellites? Additionally, what can we do to expand hosted payload
opportunities?
Mr. Krepon. I am inclined to support hosted payloads because they
would result in disaggregation, thereby helping to offset counter-space
capabilities. I view this as a cost-effective step that can complicate
the plans of a potential attacker, thereby reinforcing deterrence. That
said, hosted payloads could still be vulnerable payloads.