[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-72]
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
[Serial No. 113-137]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 14, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
______
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86-962 WASHINGTON : 2014
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Douglas Bush, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
LUKE MESSER, Indiana WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, January 14, 2014, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and
South China Seas............................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, January 14, 2014........................................ 33
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2014
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bera, Hon. Ami, a Representative from California, Acting Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific................... 6
Chabot, Hon. Steve, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific........................... 1
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 3
Johnson, Hon. Henry C. ``Hank,'' Jr., a Representative from
Georgia, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces........ 9
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 4
Rohrabacher, Hon. Dana, a Representative from California,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific........................... 7
Salmon, Hon. Matt, a Representative from Arizona, Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific........................................... 8
Sherman, Hon. Brad, a Representative from California,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific........................... 7
WITNESSES
Dutton, Peter A., Strategic Researcher, China Maritime Studies
Institute, U.S. Naval War College.............................. 10
Glaser, Bonnie S., Senior Advisor for Asia, Freeman Chair in
China Studies and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 12
Smith, Jeff M., Director of South Asia Programs, Kraemer Strategy
Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council........................ 14
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Chabot, Hon. Steve........................................... 37
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative from Virginia,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific....................... 42
Dutton, Peter A.............................................. 44
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 40
Glaser, Bonnie S............................................. 56
Smith, Jeff M................................................ 70
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Statement of Hon. Ami Bera, ``Setting and Enforcing
International Norms for Airspace,'' December 19, 2013...... 87
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 91
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, Meeting Jointly with
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, Tuesday,
January 14, 2014.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE CHABOT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Mr. Chabot. Good afternoon and welcome to this joint
subcommittee hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific and the Armed Service Subcommittee on
Seapower and Projection Forces. I want to thank Chairman Forbes
for joining us this afternoon and collaborating with the Asia
Pacific Subcommittee on the critically important topic of
today's hearing, which is the issue of maritime security in the
South and East China Seas. I also want to thank Mr. Ami Bera
for serving as the Acting Ranking Member for Asia and Pacific
Subcommittee and Ranking Member McIntyre for also joining us
this afternoon. We look forward to an excellent hearing.
Today's hearing could not come at a more critical time, as
we have seen over the last few months a growing level of
tension in the Asia-Pacific region as a result of unilateral
actions taken by China to exert its control over disputed
maritime territories. We are witnessing a dangerously
aggressive China trying to assert greater control over these
territories to change the regional status quo in a way that
violates core principles of international law. The implications
of these actions for the United States are substantial since we
have strategic and economic interests that are increasingly
threatened by the growing tension and confrontational incidents
in these waters.
An American presence in Asia is built on maintaining peace
and stability that is upheld through respect for international
law, freedom of navigation, and unhindered, lawful commerce in
the maritime regions. This is pursued through our alliances
with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the
Philippines, in addition to our steadfast relationships with
Taiwan and Singapore, and evolving relationships with Vietnam
and Indonesia.
In recognition of the region's growing importance, the U.S.
policy rebalance toward Asia largely served as an
acknowledgment of our long-term goal of ensuring we remain
firmly engaged in this region. This so-called ``pivot'' came at
a crucial time, no doubt long overdue, because our regional
friends and allies needed assurance of sustained U.S.
commitment. While I may take issue with the lack of depth of
the Administration's rebalance strategy, one thing is certain,
we do have a grounded diplomatic, economic, and military
commitment to the region.
There is no other issue right now in the Asia-Pacific
region more worrisome than the rise in tensions we are seeing
as a result of China's efforts to coercively change and
destabilize the regional status quo. While I am disappointed by
China's behavior, I am also not terribly surprised that it is
failing to behave as a responsible global actor. Among the most
prevalent reasons why China is motivated to fight for its
claims, which include oil and gas reserves, fishing rights,
control of fishing lanes, and establishment of security buffer
zones, its view that its maritime territorial claims have deep
historical roots is the most problematic.
There are a number of instances in history where
nationalism was used to further international political goals
with damaging consequences. Take, for instance, the incident
when back in 1983 Soviet jet fighters intercepted a Korean
Airlines passenger flight allegedly flying in Russian airspace
and with heat-seeking missiles, shot it down in the Sea of
Japan, killing all 268 passengers and crewmembers, including a
U.S. Congressman. President Reagan called the incident a
massacre and tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union
dramatically increased.
Similar motivations were behind the April 2001 Hainan
Island incident when a People's Liberation Army Navy jet
recklessly or intentionally collided with the U.S. EP-3
aircraft flying within China's exclusive economic zone. And now
China's unilateral decision to establish an Air Defense
Identification Zone in the East China Sea is its latest move to
act upon historically contentious maritime territorial disputes
with Japan. This move was further intensified this month when
China established a new Hainan administrative zone and ordered
all foreign fishing vessels to obtain approval before fishing
in or surveying two-thirds of the South China Sea. Both these
actions have only further inflamed what former Australian Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd called an Asian ``tinderbox on water.''
While China's actions over the past few years, in
piecemeal, may seem small, as a whole they depict a fundamental
change in China's foreign policy and strategy. It is no longer
following the policy of peaceful resolution or taking actions
that align with international law, if it ever did in the first
place. China's attempting to take the disputed territories by
gradual force under the guise and misguided hope that Japan,
Southeast Asian nations, and the U.S. will just grudgingly
accept it. This ``provocative'' behavior, as the Obama
administration has called it, unnecessarily raises tensions,
threatening the security and stability of the region, targeting
key U.S. allies and challenging the U.S. presence as a Pacific
power.
As we have seen, players in the region are responding.
Japan is taking steps to reshape its own national security
apparatus to better respond to the rise of Chinese threats, a
policy I support. The Philippines has also been vocal about its
disagreements with China's territorial claims, requesting
arbitration against China under the U.N. [United Nations]
Convention on the Law of the Sea last year. Reports this
weekend indicate the Philippines is building its military
presence in the Zhongye Island and China is now insisting that
it plans to attack Philippine forces on the island to recover
territory that Philippines allegedly ``stole.''
This all follows the Administration's decision to send B-52
bombers out of Guam to fly through the new defense zone in the
East China Sea, and its plans to give nearly $32 million to
Vietnam to strengthen maritime security, with a promise to
provide the Philippines with $40 million to do the same. While
these actions should send a strong message to China to be wary
of taking further provocative actions, we cannot be sure. As we
saw when the USS Cowpens narrowly avoided collision with a
Chinese warship in December, heightened tensions between the
U.S., China and also our allies are only increasing the risk of
miscalculation in the region.
I believe steps taken by the U.S. and Japan to revise our
alliance's bilateral defense guidelines to better deal with new
contingencies is a good step, as is the consideration to locate
U.S. troops in the Philippines on a rotational basis, as we
have done in Australia. At the same time, I believe the
Administration needs to do a better job at understanding and
predicting China's strategic goals and clearly conveying that
the U.S. is committed and prepared to work with and support our
regional allies.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this afternoon
regarding their views on how the U.S. can better manage
obligations to our friends and allies to limit conflict with
China in the coming months. I want to again thank Chairman
Forbes and his subcommittee for collaborating on today's
hearing, and I would now like to recognize Chairman Forbes for
the purpose of making an opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chabot can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. And I would like to thank Chairman
Chabot for offering to work with our subcommittee on this
important topic.
There are many areas of interest that overlap between our
two subcommittees and create natural areas for cooperation, and
I hope this joint hearing will be the first of many to come in
the future.
With the continued escalation of tensions in the East and
South China Seas, or what China calls its Near Seas, I think it
is essential for Congress to closely monitor this issue and
affirmatively state our reservations with its present course.
My greatest fear is that China's coercive methods of
dealing with territorial disputes could manifest into increased
tensions that could ultimately lead to miscalculation.
This heightened use of coercive actions by Chinese naval
vessels now spans the East and South China Seas from Japan's
Senkaku Islands, the Scarborough Shoals, the Spratly Islands
and, indeed, the entire South China Sea.
It is difficult for me to understand why China is pursuing
the more aggressive actions it has over the past years given
how much it has benefited from the rules-based order the U.S.
and its allies have sustained in the Asia-Pacific region for
the last 65 years.
This order has made the region more prosperous, more
transparent and, above all, more peaceful. However, it is clear
that as China has expanded its military forces and
capabilities, their government has chosen a more strident path
in the pursuit of its regional goals and ambitions, including
the territorial claims we are here to discuss today.
I believe we must be 100 percent intolerant of China's
territorial claims and its continued resort to forms of
military coercion to alter the status quo in the region.
This requires not just maintaining a robust military and
strong diplomatic posture, but also working closely with our
friends and allies to understand their concerns and find ways
to strengthen our common cause to preserve free access to the
global commons.
As Congress shifts its attention more closely to the Asia-
Pacific region, I am pleased to see bipartisan support for our
Nation continuing to play a strong leadership role in the
region.
Before I conclude, I also want to recognize Mr. Mike
McIntyre for his dedicated support to the men and women in
uniform, the 7th District of North Carolina, and to the greater
United States.
Mike, you have been a good friend and a consummate
statesman, and our Nation will be at a loss when you depart the
House of Representatives at the conclusion of this session. I
will clearly miss your friendship and your expertise.
Today I also want to thank our experts for being here. We
look forward to your testimony, and we greatly appreciate you
taking time to be here to share your knowledge and expertise
with our two committees.
Again, I want to thank Chairman Chabot for holding this
joint hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman.
I would now like to turn to the Ranking Member from North
Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to our witnesses today and to those who are here.
And thank you to my subcommittee chairman and my good
friend, Randy Forbes, for your very kind words--and unexpected
at this time; thank you, that really means a lot personally and
professionally. And thank you for your leadership.
The Chinese government's recent behavior regarding maritime
and airspace boundaries is of growing concern to the U.S. and
to our allies in the region. And it is important for Congress
to keep a close watch on this situation.
I am especially pleased we are doing this hearing jointly
today with the Foreign Affairs Committee because we know in
many situations, there is not always a military solution.
We have to always be ready, militarily, but we realize that
it is critical that we have diplomatic and political aspects to
be considered and obviously they are always the first recourse
and the first choice when trying to resolve concerns.
We want to make sure that we have that perspective. We have
a full range of tools at our disposal to consider when we look
at various crises that may arise in this region.
Not every problem we know has a military solution. It is
likely to mean that we should be in a position to look at how
best we can resolve maritime disputes with China and that we
can have a more robust diplomacy engaged in this region rather
than seeking a military standoff.
We know that Japan has a strong military; however, some of
our other allies in the region do not. And they are being
intimidated, especially in the South China Sea.
So, without the naval and maritime air capabilities to
patrol and protect this territory, many nations in the region
are at a major disadvantage when they do feel threatened
militarily.
So, over time, we have to address these imbalances between
China and the regional--the countries in that region that could
have a significant impact on China's actions but also have a
significant impact on these countries and their security and
safety.
The U.S. does have a major role to play in working with
China with regard to international standards of conduct, and we
should support our regional allies in every way we can to make
sure that our allies are considered equal partners with us.
And we have had other briefings where the military has laid
out its ambitions to engage with and in some--sometimes train
our regional allies. Those military efforts are absolutely
important, but we realize those military efforts cannot stand
as the sole response.
We must have a concerted diplomatic effort. And right now,
we do not quite seem to have reached that goal of having that
concerted diplomatic effort.
We must be able to make sure that we are not always
reacting, but also being proactive in making sure that we have
the best possible diplomatic solutions, as well as the best
possible military preparation to make sure that we are in a
situation where we can resolve differences and be able to avoid
conflict.
We are very thankful for those who serve in our military,
and are always ready and on standby. We want them to always be
in a position to be prepared. We also now must make sure that
we are always prepared to handle matters diplomatically, and do
what we can to help resolve conflict.
We look forward to hearing from today's panel of experts,
and thank you for your time with us. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and Mr. Ranking.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman for his opening
statement. The Ranking Member of the Asia and Pacific
Subcommittee is unable to be here, Mr. Faleomavaega. So the
acting Ranking Member is Mr. Bera from California, I would like
to recognize him for making an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMI BERA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA,
ACTING RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Dr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. Thank you,
Chairman Forbes, for what is an incredibly important, crucial,
and timely hearing on maritime sovereignty in the South and
East China Seas.
I believe it is important for us, as a Congress, to really
begin exploring what actions we should take to maintain these
key maritime and airspace routes, and keep them open. I also am
deeply concerned about the actions China took, particularly the
rapidity of the announcement on unilaterally establishing a new
East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, an ADIZ.
China's dramatic ADIZ expansion really extends over the
East China Sea territories that historically have been under
the hands of administrative control, and certainly overlaps
with ADIZs of Japan and the Republic of Korea, two important
allies of the United States.
China is also now requiring that foreign aircraft file
flight plans if they intend to fly in Chinese airspace, and has
threatened that their armed forces would respond in cases of
non-compliance. Furthermore, China continues to exhibit a
disturbing trend in their foreign policy.
We have seen this before, if we look at the example of the
South China Sea, you know, as they extended. And if you look at
the nine-dash line area, it creates conflict, it creates
tension and uncertainty. And, you know, if we don't respond
immediately, you know, over time, it becomes much more complex
and much more difficult for us to address.
The nine-dash line affects island groups and reefs that are
also claimed by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan,
Vietnam, all important trading partners of the United States,
and all at a crucial time when we are demonstrating this pivot
to Asia. And the United States has a role in mediating and, you
know, lowering the volume here a bit.
China is also requiring that all foreign fishing vessels
obtain permission from China to navigate these contested
waters. Unacceptable. China--China--Chinese authorities are
showing vigor, and pushing maritime power as a fundamental
national goal, and one that they are willing to challenge
anyone on.
We have got to send, as a body, in a bipartisan manner, a
strong message to China that these threatening and provocative
moves to assert their maritime territorial claims are
unacceptable. These steps clearly undermine the peace and
stability of the Asia-Pacific. If China is left unchallenged,
China's claims over the region will solidify, thus altering the
status quo.
The time for a provocative and strategic engagement with
our allies is now, before China's next move, like more ADIZ
expansions for the South China Sea or the Yellow Sea. We have
got to do this immediately. China and the other nations in the
region must address any outstanding territorial and
jurisdictional issues by engaging in diplomatic dialogue, and
not through coercion, threats, or force.
International laws and norms must be upheld in order to de-
escalate tensions and mitigate any risk of an accidental
military clash. And that is dangerous. Given the importance of
trade and transport in this region, the U.S. must navigate and
enforce the right to freely navigate in these contested areas.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important
hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the
witnesses and working together as a body. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman for his statement, and
the chair would be pleased to extend an opportunity for members
to make a 1-minute opening statement if they would like to do
so. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANA ROHRABACHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. The alarm bells may
finally be ringing, what some of us have been warning about for
years. The fact that we have been treating China, the world's
worst human-rights abuser, as if it was a democratic ally, we
have been giving trade and economic benefits to the Chinese
government, which as I say, the world's worst human-rights
abuser, a vicious dictatorship.
We have been giving better rights than we do to some of our
own friends and some of our democratic allies. They have had
most-favored-nation status now for almost 20 years. Some of our
other allies haven't had that.
And now they have built up their economic might, and
surprise, surprise, they are using their new capabilities to
build a very powerful military machine that threatens the peace
and stability not only of that region, but of the world.
Well, I would call on this Administration and my
colleagues, and all of us who want peace, and want and believe
in democracy. It is time for us to back up 100 percent our
allies who are front line, confronting this new threat, whether
it is Australia, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, or the Philippines. We
need to get behind them in a big way, and send that message to
Beijing.
There is no faltering on our part, supporting these
countries, these democratic countries, against this
dictatorship's claims and its military buildup in the region.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. The
gentleman from Connecticut? The gentleman from California, Mr.
Sherman, is recognized for the purpose of making a 1-minute
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Mr. Sherman. Our national policy establishment has embraced
the new phrase, ``pivot toward Asia,'' which sounds like more
trade delegations to Tokyo and more Chinese language courses in
our university, but actually means that the fight against
Islamic extremism is either over or it is inconvenient, and we
are directing our national security efforts toward confronting
China as the new enemy.
Already, the Pentagon is shifting its design of its
research, and ultimately forces toward taking on the Chinese
navy. We are told that we need to pivot to Asia to protect tiny
specks that may be of some economic value to countries that
spend far less of their GDP [gross domestic product] than we
do, protecting their own little--little island specks.
The fact is that a confrontation with China may give our
national security establishment a--the kind of glorious enemy
that they would like to have, rather than the frustrations of
dealing with asymmetric conflict against an enemy that doesn't
wear uniforms.
But the fact is, these are tiny specks. Those nations that
claim them are willing to fight to get--as long as we spend
trillions of dollars to protect what might be billions of
dollars of assets. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
Gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Salmon, is recognized for a minute.
STATEMENT OF HON. MATT SALMON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I would like to thank my chairman,
Steve Chabot, and Chairman Forbes for holding this joint
hearing on this critical national security and foreign-policy
issue.
Over the last several years, we have seen increased
aggressions in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and
more recently, the East China Sea. As China has sought to
expand their control of the region, U.S. allies are struggling
to ensure their sovereignty is maintained and navigational
rights to the South and East China Sea is protected.
Military and commercial access to the navigable waters of
the South and East China Seas are critical to the security and
economic viability of every country in the region. Strong U.S.
allies, including Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines, Vietnam,
South Korea, have come under increasing pressure from China to
cede or temper these inalienable sovereign rights to the
Chinese will.
There must be a peaceful pass forward to protect the U.S.
regional allies that ensures U.S. national security interests
and avoids unnecessary conflict and aggressions.
President Ma of Taiwan has proposed the East China Sea
Peace Initiative as a means to resolving disputes peacefully by
exercising restraint, refraining from taking antagonistic
actions, following international law, and continuing dialogue.
I hope the Chinese and the other regional powers will embrace
this as a solution going forward.
China has indicated a desire to settle disputes peacefully,
but has been unwilling to open dialogue and negotiations in a
multilateral way. This is disappointing. We have got to
continue to align with our allies in assuring their sovereign
rights to open commercial and military access to the waters of
the South and East China Seas.
Hopefully, the Chinese will work with their neighbors and
implement a peaceful, multilateral dispute resolution system
that will protect all countries' sovereign rights going
forward. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from
Georgia. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, JR., A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM GEORGIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I will. I will take the opportunity to
say that, you know, we face some very serious issues throughout
the world. Sequestration and budget numbers in that area don't
help us out a whole lot when it comes to confronting these
challenges, both in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific.
But I will say, I am happy to share this--this room today
with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, because if we
have ever--if ever there has been a time for diplomacy, it is
now. And so with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. Would
other members like to make opening statements on either side?
If you could indicate you do, I would be happy to recognize
others. If not, we will go ahead and proceed to the
introduction of the witness panel.
We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses here this
afternoon. We will begin with Mr. Peter Dutton, who is a
professor of strategic studies, and the Director of the China
Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College.
Professor Dutton's current research focuses on American and
Chinese views of sovereignty and international law of the sea,
and the strategic implications to the United States and the
United States Navy of Chinese international law and policy
choices. Professor Dutton is widely published, and has
previously testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He also researches and lectures on topics related to
international law of the sea, issues in the East and South
China Seas, East and Southeast Asia and the Arctic, in addition
to the Proliferation Security Initiative and Maritime Strategy.
He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a Juris
Doctor from The College of William and Mary, my alma mater, a
Masters with Distinction from the Naval War College, and a
Bachelor of Science cum laude from Boston University.
We welcome you, Mr. Dutton.
I would like to also introduce the other panel members.
We have Bonnie S. Glaser, who is a senior advisor for Asia
and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] where she works on
issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is
concurrently a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a
consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia. Ms. Glaser
previously served as senior associate in the CSIS International
Security Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a
consultant for various U.S. government offices including the
Departments of Defense and State. Ms. Glaser has written
extensively on Chinese threat perceptions and U.S.-China
strategy. She received her B.A. in Political Science from
Boston University and her M.A. with concentrations in
international economics and Chinese studies from the John
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
And we welcome you here this afternoon, Ms. Glaser.
Our final witness will be Jeff M. Smith, who is the Kraemer
Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC)
and the author of a forthcoming book on China-India relations
in the 21st century. He also serves as the managing editor of
the World Almanac of Islamism and the editor of AFPC's South
Asia Security Monitor. He has provided briefings and
consultations for the Pentagon, State Department, and
intelligence community. Mr. Smith's writings have appeared in
the Wall Street Journal of Asia, U.S. News and World Report,
among others. Additionally, he has been a commentator for many
world news organizations such as BCC and others.
Mr. Smith has an MPIA [Master of Public and International
Affairs] from the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of
Public and International Affairs and studied abroad at Oxford
University in 2005. He has lectured at the graduate and
undergraduate level.
We welcome all three of you this afternoon. I apologize for
my voice which is not up to the standards it ought to be, but
not much I can do about it.
I am sure that the panel is familiar with the 5-minute
rule. You will each have 5 minutes to testify. We have a
lighting system. The yellow light will come on when you have 1
minute to wrap up. We would appreciate it if you wrapped up as
closely to when the red light comes on as possible.
And, Professor Dutton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PETER A. DUTTON, STRATEGIC RESEARCHER, CHINA
MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Mr. Dutton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairmen, Ranking
Members, and distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank
you very much for the opportunity to testify before you today.
The first question I was asked to address has to do with
what it is that China's extension of power over the Near Seas
gains for China, and the extension of China's strategic power
over its Near Seas through expanding military capabilities,
growing law enforcement capacity, sweeping legal frameworks,
augmented by orchestrated civilian activities and political and
economic arm-twisting, has deep strategic roots.
And the roots are grounded, in China's view, that prior to
1840--and this goes back in history, but prior to 1840 when
China dominated the East Asian system, it was a continental
system, all of the strategic events occurred on the continent
and China could dominate the maritime periphery and the
maritime periphery could not dominate China.
After 1840, that reversed. It is the maritime periphery
where the strategic actions in Asia have been evolving, and it
is in the American interest for it to remain that way.
So, first and foremost, it is the failure of previous
Chinese leaders to close the maritime gap in China's arc of
security and the invasions from the sea that resulted that
motivates China's current leaders to extend strategic power
over the Near Seas and which provides them internal domestic
legitimacy. I think that is important to note.
Second, as China advances, the aim of China's regional
maritime strategy as it advances is to expand its interior
control over the Near Seas to cover the maritime demand under
an umbrella of continental control for the purpose of enhancing
that perceived security that China gains from this.
So the two attributes that China gets are security and
leadership legitimacy from extending its control over the
region.
Second, what does this have to do with the Senkakus?
Chinese activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have,
since December 2008, been designed to create a circumstance
that puts Japanese control over the islands in doubt.
The manner in which Chinese activities are conducted is
carefully calibrated to achieve the objective without provoking
outright conflict with the United States.
China's strategy can best be described, in my view, as non-
militarized coercion. Non-militarized coercion involves the
direct and indirect application of a broad range of national
capabilities to favorably alter the situation at sea in China's
favor.
That does not mean that the military has no role to play.
The military's role, however, is indirect as part of the
escalation control mechanism that China uses not to provoke
conflict with the United States as it pursues its objectives.
The integrated process of power and law accurately
describes the events around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and also
with the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, over which
China wrestled full control from the Philippines over a year
ago.
There are many other examples in various stages of
development around China's periphery, including China's claim
to the East China Sea continental shelf and China's advancing
claims to administer the waters within the nine-dash or U-
shaped line in the South China Sea.
The third question is what does the Air Defense
Identification Zone have to do with this? Well, China's
strategy to control water and airspace is similar to its power
and approach to controlling the islands in the East and South
China Sea.
The purpose of China's force structure component is
obviously to develop the power to dominate events in the Near
Seas according to will--China's will. The purpose of the legal
component of China's strategy is to articulate a legitimizing
narrative for the development and employment of this power.
So China's ADIZ is part of a coordinated legal campaign to
extend maximal security jurisdiction over the East China Sea
and the international airspace above it, beyond the authorities
currently allowed by international law, in support of its
objectives related to security, resource control, and regional
order.
And so what are the policy implications for the United
States? Well, there are many, but I would like to point out
just a few.
The first is the Chinese have been talking this great
power--``new-type great power relationship'' with the United
States. I think we need to come back with expectations that
China will become a responsible leading power.
Leading in the sense of leadership over the existing global
system of institutionalized economic and security mechanisms
designed to foster regional and global stability and economic
progress.
Responsible as a supporter and defender of that system and
all its attributes, the institutions, the laws, the rules, the
principles and norms, and refraining from self-interested
actions that conflict with them.
And, power, in recognition that China is one of only a few
states with global economic, political, and security interests
and some capacity to exercise global leadership.
I have a number of recommendations we can talk about during
testimony if you would like. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dutton can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman for your testimony.
We will turn to Ms. Glaser. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
If you could turn the mic on please. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF BONNIE S. GLASER, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ASIA, FREEMAN
CHAIR IN CHINA STUDIES AND SENIOR ASSOCIATE, PACIFIC FORUM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Glaser. Mr. Chairmen, Mr. Ranking Members,
distinguished members of the subcommittees, for this
opportunity to offer my thoughts on China's maritime disputes.
As you all said, disputes in the waters and airspace off
China's eastern coastline have fueled increased tensions in
recent years, both between China and its neighbors as well as
between China and the United States.
How Beijing manages these disputes is widely seen as a
litmus test of China's broader strategic intentions, and how
the United States responds to China's growing propensity to use
coercion, bullying, and ``salami-slicing'' tactics to secure
its territorial and maritime interests is increasingly viewed
as the key measure of success of the U.S. rebalance to Asia.
The risk of a clash with the attendant potential for
escalation is highest today, I think, between China and Japan
in the East China Sea. And the United States could become
entangled in such a Sino-Japanese conflict as a result of its
obligations under the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty.
China's recent declaration of an ADIZ that overlaps
substantially with Japan's ADIZ and covers the disputed islands
significantly increases that risk of accident and
miscalculation.
China's ``salami-slicing'' tactics have been evident in
both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Through a
steady progression of small steps, none of which by itself is a
casus belli, China seeks to gradually change the status quo in
its favor, and it is scoring some victories without adequate
consequences.
Chinese efforts to restrict free use of the maritime
commons is also worrying. We saw the recent example on December
5th in which the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy vessel
engaged in dangerous maneuvers to stop the USS Cowpens from
observing drills conducted by China's aircraft carrier.
And as U.S. and Chinese vessels operate in increasingly
close proximity, I think such incidents are likely to increase.
Regional concerns about territorial and maritime disputes
in the Asia-Pacific are very much on the rise. East Asian
governments increasingly view closer ties with the United
States as a useful hedge against potential domineering behavior
by China.
Virtually every country in Northeast Asia and Southeast
Asia has been publicly or privately supportive of the U.S.
rebalance to Asia. They hope the U.S. will sustain its role as
balancer and counterweight to growing Chinese power.
But I must emphasize that doubts persist about the
credibility and the constancy of U.S. power.
The U.S. has multiple interests at stake in these maritime
disputes. We all know the U.S. supports--we have at stake the
maintenance of freedom of navigation, the encouragement of a
rules-based international system, the maintenance of U.S.
credibility and influence in the region, certainly the peaceful
resolution of disputes.
We also have an interest in the development of a
cooperative relationship with a rising China. In the coming
decade, the U.S. role I think will be pivotal in shaping the
strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region.
We must continue to be engaged economically,
diplomatically, and militarily to influence the future balance
of power in the region and ensure it remains favorable to the
interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners.
Congress can play a vital role in this process and my
recommendations for Congress going forward are as follows:
First, Congress should require the executive branch to
produce a strategy paper on the rebalance to Asia. The paper
should establish explicit objectives and benchmarks for
evaluating progress.
And it should include incentives to China to abide by
international law and practices, as well as consequences for
violating them.
Second, Congress should encourage other governments and
legislatures in the Asia-Pacific to back the Philippines' right
to use available international arbitration mechanisms to
address its territorial dispute with China.
If this tribunal rules in Manila's favor, and China does
not comply, this will have profoundly negative impact on peace
and stability in the region. This is a way to tether China to a
rules-based order. It is an opportunity.
Third, the United States Senate, I believe, should ratify
UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], to
increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to pursue a rules-
based approach to managing and resolving disputes over maritime
jurisdiction.
And fourth, Congress should enact trade promotion authority
legislation so that the Administration can persuade the other
countries negotiating the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] that
the U.S. will be able not just to sign, but also ratify a high-
standard TPP agreement.
Maintaining American economic leadership in the Asia-
Pacific is imperative to enhancing the U.S. ability to achieve
its other interests, including the promotion of a rules-based
system and the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr.
Smith, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JEFF M. SMITH, DIRECTOR OF SOUTH ASIA PROGRAMS,
KRAEMER STRATEGY FELLOW, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL
Mr. Smith. I would like to thank the chairmen and the
ranking members for the opportunity----
Mr. Chabot. If you could turn the mic--thank you.
Mr. Smith. I would like to thank the chairmen and the
ranking members for the opportunity to appear before you today.
In recent months, the world attention has been focused on
China's provocative behavior towards the Senkaku and Diaoyu
Island dispute, and for good reason. That dispute demands our
utmost attention, and poses a tangible risk for interstate
conflict in the years to come.
However, the issue of maritime sovereignty in the East and
South China Seas encompasses more than simply China's
territorial disputes with its neighbors. I want to focus my
remarks on a disagreement between the U.S. and China over the
type of sovereignty China is claiming in its 200 nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, and specifically, the right of
the U.S. military to conduct surveillance operations there.
Our dispute derives from differing interpretations of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, a treaty the
U.S. has not signed, but whose maritime boundary distinctions
we observe and practice. Under Beijing's interpretation, China
enjoys expansive sovereign rights in its EEZ, including the
right to deny U.S. military access to conduct surveillance
operations.
China is not alone in this interpretation. At least 16
other countries share Beijing's position. But China is the only
country that has operationally challenged U.S. forces, leading
to more than half a dozen dangerous confrontations at sea over
the past decade, which are documented in the appendix to my
testimony.
The U.S. and most countries of the world reject this
interpretation of UNCLOS, arguing that China cannot treat the
EEZ as if it were a sovereign territorial sea. My testimony
shows how U.S. scholars have thoroughly debunked Beijing's
reading of the treaty, and that UNCLOS does not require home-
state consent to conduct surveillance operations in an EEZ.
Yet the confrontations continue. And if the U.S. and China
don't come to a modus vivendi on a code of maritime conduct in
Western Pacific, the possibility for escalation and
confrontation is very real.
Further aggravating the situation is the poor military-to-
military [mil-mil] relationship between our two countries.
Though we have taken some small steps forward in engaging the
PLA in recent years, mil-mil remains the most underdeveloped
and concerning aspect of bilateral relations.
While the political and professional Chinese elite are
experiencing an unprecedented level of exposure to the outside
world, this encouraging trend has not yet reached the People's
Liberation Army, which tightly restricts contacts with the
U.S., particularly for junior officers.
By design, the PLA ranks remain conspiracy-minded, hawkish,
and insulated from the Western world, and even to some liberal
influences within China. This is worrying, because many Chinese
nationalists inside and outside the PLA see the U.S. as engaged
in a containment strategy designed to prevent China's rise and
undermine its security.
Firebrand nationalists are taking to the airwaves and Web
pages to denounce a U.S. foreign policy they believe is
aggravating China's territorial disputes with Japan, the
Philippines, and Vietnam. And China's leaders are increasingly
pandering to these nationalists, escalating their own hawkish
rhetoric, and in the process, restricting their freedom to
maneuver in the future.
The trend is worrying enough that last year, the vice
president of the PLA's Academy of Military Science warned
publically that PLA commentators were ``inciting public
sentiment and causing interference with our high-level policy
decision-making and deployments.''
Testing boundaries and establishing new status quos
favorable to China has been a defining feature of its regional
policy in recent years. When the U.S. and other countries have
faltered in the face of this policy, as was the case with the
Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal, China has advanced its
goals and established new status quo.
However, where the U.S. has held firm in its position and
demonstrated resolve, Beijing has backed down. The same result
must be committed to surveillance activities in China's EEZ.
America's position on this issue is not only within the
U.S. national interest, it is fully supported by domestic and
international law. Were we to accept China's interpretation of
UNCLOS, U.S. military vessels could be barred from operating in
large swaths of the world's oceans, an outcome that is clearly
unacceptable to Washington and one never envisioned by the
drafters of UNCLOS.
The U.S. has in the past attempted to create a code of
conduct with China on these matters. However, talks have been
stalled on Chinese demands that the U.S. end arm sales to
Taiwan, put an end to surveillance activities, and repeal
provisions of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act.
The U.S. should do everything at its disposal to ensure
future incidents do not escalate, but it must reaffirm that
U.S. policy will not be subject to fear, intimidation,
coercion, or reckless behavior from Chinese naval forces.
Furthermore, Washington must do a better job drawing clear
red lines around unacceptable behavior in the maritime arena
and enforce those red lines when they are crossed. To that end,
the U.S. should continue an active schedule of surveillance
activities, patrolling, and freedom of navigation operations.
America carries a special burden on this issue. While
Beijing views its neighbors as subservient regional powers, the
Chinese leadership acknowledges and respects American power,
even as they increasingly resent that power.
As perhaps the only country capable of drawing and
enforcing red lines, America's allies in the region are
depending on the U.S. to be a firewall against Chinese
aggression in the Western Pacific. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much for your testimony. I now
recognize each of the Members for 5 minutes to ask questions.
And I will recognize myself at this time.
Ms. Glaser, let me start with you first, if I can. In your
testimony, you recommended that Congress urge the executive
branch to impose consequences on China when they violate
international laws and norms. How do you propose the
Administration penalize China, or punish China, or whatever the
proper verb would be, for violating international laws such as
its decision to unilaterally impose an Air Defense
Identification Zone, for example?
Ms. Glaser. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
very important question. I think that the Administration took
one very important step, and that was flying our B-52s through
that zone, not recognizing the zone.
I think we should be doing more. The United States and
Japan, for example, could conduct joint flights through that
zone.
In other words, the message is that China's behavior
threatens the security of its neighbors, and therefore, there
is a stepped-up military response. So there should be, I think,
greater cooperation.
I would also like to see the United States continue to
encourage greater military cooperation among Japan, and South
Korea, and the United States, which is ongoing, and I think has
been somewhat complicated by some of the political decisions
recently made in Japan by Prime Minister Abe in his visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine. But I think that ultimately, these are
very, very important.
In other cases, I think that the United States can adopt
targeted sanctions or responses to Chinese behavior. For
example, in the cyber area, it has been widely discussed how
the United States might adopt some very targeted sanctions that
are aimed at responding to China's use of cyber to steal
intellectual property, commercial proprietary information.
So those are some of the examples that I would give. Thank
you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Professor Dutton, let me
turn to you next, if I can. You mention a couple of things that
I wanted to touch on.
In your testimony, you said that unless current trends in
the region change, there is no reason to believe that China's
campaign will stop short of achieving its aims, which are
gaining the upper hand on regional security, redeveloping
regional order, and gaining control of maritime resources. You
also said that the U.S. should seek to develop a new type of
great-power relationship with China. What does such a
relationship look like? Also in terms of this trend China is
creating, I believe it is in our interest to slow that trend
down, and in fact, to stop it. How do you also suggest that we
accomplish that?
Mr. Dutton. Yes, thank you very much for the question.
First, I would like to say that U.S. and regional strategies
have largely been reactive. In other words, China has had and
maintained the initiative.
I think we need to restore the initiative in this process
by thinking about rather than what I will call ``negative
objectives,'' in other words, prevent bad things from
happening, let's have a positive objective, which is to create
a region that is fully integrated into the global system and
stable at the same time.
So part of what I was articulating since I submitted the
testimony, I thought more about your question. And actually, in
my oral comments, made the point that we need to expect China
to be a responsible leading power, not just a, frankly, self-
interested regional leading power, right. We need to expect
them to do more for the system and to support the system,
because of the benefits that they receive from it.
What that means is, in terms of the consequences that my
colleague, Ms. Glaser, is talking about, we need to think about
consequences that broaden the horizon of options. In other
words, if we just respond in kind--if China provokes, we
respond with a similar kind of action--then we are still being
reactive.
So we need to think more broadly about the type of
responses. So if China does something in the security field,
well, maybe we need an economic or political reaction to it,
not just a security reaction, in ways that imposes a cost on
China, that China would prefer not to have to pay.
For instance, China was invited to join the Arctic Council
recently. That is a benefit that China has received. There are
other similar kinds of things that China would like to receive.
Well, we need to impose costs when China fails to act in
ways that benefit and support the system. We are inviting them
to share responsible leadership into the system; now we need to
expect them to maintain proper leadership over the system's
rules, norms, principles, and laws.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
organizing this hearing and the witnesses for their outstanding
testimony.
Mr. Dutton, in your sort of policy recommendations starting
on page nine, again, deterrence was certainly one of the
recommendations you set forth.
And in particular, you said, ``In terms of naval power, I
am especially concerned that the U.S. continue to invest in
maintaining its advantage in undersea warfare.''
I mean, given the fact that some of these bodies of water
are described as relatively shallow, maybe you could just sort
of explain your thoughts on that.
Mr. Dutton. First I would--certainly, sir. Thank you for
the question. I--first of all, the ability to impose maritime
actions in East Asia requires our ability to access the water
space.
And although, yes, in some parts of the East China Sea, in
particular, the water space is relatively shallow and submarine
operations in that particular location may or may not be
appropriate--I am not a submariner, I don't know.
But the truth of the matter is the submarine component of
American naval power is one in which we enjoy an advantage, and
that advantage is one that we need to maintain in order to
maintain our access for all forces within the region. That is
the point I am trying to make.
Mr. Courtney. Okay, thank you. And your second
recommendation, again, talked about sort of coordinating with
our allies in the region in terms of, you know, making sure
that not everybody is, you know, kind of duplicating, I guess,
resources.
The New York Times the other day had an editorial, ``The
Submarine Race in Asia,'' which talked about how, you know, the
Vietnamese navy and the Malaysian navy and--I mean, everybody's
navy is sort of rushing to, you know, buy or build submarines.
Your recommendation seems to be that some of these allies
should be more focused on sort of Whitehall Coast Guard-like
capability and sort of--I guess I am sort of--well, maybe you
can tell me.
Are you sort of suggesting that the sort of military side
should be sort of the U.S. Navy's realm? Am I reading that
right?
Mr. Dutton. Well, it is sort of--we certainly welcome
support. I think the United States Navy has been very open and
clear about that.
I don't mean to speak for the Navy. What I mean to say is
that the Navy has been very open in terms of support for naval
activities in the region.
But what we don't want to see is a negative spiral--
negative security spiral. What we want to see is a more
positive direction for maritime power in the region.
And one of the things--countries will make their own
decisions about what force structures they need to have--but
one of the things that is important that all countries in the
region be able to do is to enforce their own maritime interests
in terms of their exclusive economic zone and the fisheries
issues that they have rather than simply allowing China to
continue to build its law enforcement capacity without any
regional response.
So, I am not suggesting that the regional states should not
make their own decisions about their force structure, but I do
hate to see a negative regional spiral in which countries are
starting to get into arms races that could be very
destabilizing.
Mr. Courtney. Great, thank you.
Ms. Glaser, you know, sort of--there has been a little bit
of what came first, the chicken or the egg. Is it the Asia
pivot that stimulated the claim of territorial space or is the
pivot in reaction to the claims of territorial space?
And I just wondered if you could sort of give your thoughts
in terms of, you know, the Asia pivot, in terms of whether it
was justified or whether it is provoking a negative reaction.
Ms. Glaser. Well, thank you very much for that question. I
think that is actually a narrative that is quite common in
China.
And I think when the Obama administration came to power,
they had the idea that--this is particularly in 2009--that
China was going to be a partner on a range of issues that were
very important for the United States.
We heard officials talk about how no global problem could
be solved without Chinese cooperation. So, global warming,
proliferation, the global financial crisis--these were all
things that the United States was going to work with China on.
And this was really borne out of the same time that the
pivot really came into being, even though it wasn't really
announced until later. Very early on, as we heard from former
National Security Advisor Tom Donilon in a speech that he gave
at CSIS, Administration advisors even before the President was
inaugurated, I understand, talked about where we were
overinvested in the region, where we were underinvested.
It was so clear that the economic dynamism in the Asia-
Pacific was so important to the rejuvenation of the American
economy and the institutions that were being formed in the
Asia-Pacific region like the East Asia Summit--we needed to be
a part of; and that decision was made really very, very early
on.
So, I think that the rebalance to Asia from the beginning
was about including China, and it is China's more coercive
behavior that we saw really take full form, I think, in 2010
and then thereafter, that has caused it to have a sharper edge
in dealing with China--in large part because of the magnetic
demand pull from the region which has been calling on the
United States to be more involved diplomatically, economically,
and militarily--to give them some backing so that they, too,
can stand up for their interests.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
Chairman Forbes is recognized.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for being here. You know, to each of
you three witnesses, I appreciate your work. I have enormous
respect for what you have done--your expertise.
Undoubtedly, that is shared by both of our subcommittees
and the staffs or else they wouldn't have invited you here.
So, in that collective expertise, Ms. Glaser, I want to
start with you, but I want both of our other witnesses to weigh
in on this.
You mention this concept of strategy. We have been groping
around in the night to try to find it.
And as I think all of us recognize, we agreed with the
concept of a pivot or rebalance to the Asia-Pacific area, but
we also believe very strongly we needed to have a strategy that
we could get our hands around.
In July of last year, I wrote a letter to Susan Rice
requesting that the Administration do an interagency review of
their strategy so that we could articulate that and note what
it was.
I got a very prompt response back 3 months later that said
that they had done that. They called it a vision, first of all,
and then they came back and said, ``We are continuing to
implement our comprehensive strategy.''
But I have yet to find anybody that can really articulate
that strategy or any of the agencies that say, ``Yes, we have
sat down and done this.''
In the new omnibus bill that is coming up there is good
language in here because we require within 90 days after the
enactment of that provision that the Secretary of State do just
that--develop that strategy and give an integrated, multi-year
planning and budget strategy for rebalancing of United States
policy in Asia back to the respective committees.
In your expertise and knowledge, do you believe that
strategy exists today? Do we have any such interagency strategy
that we have developed or do you think that is something that
yet needs to be designed and developed?
Ms. Glaser. That is, indeed, a very important question. I
think that there are pieces of the strategy. I don't think they
are necessarily well-coordinated.
I think that the Defense Department [DOD] is working very
effectively within the constraints of budget cuts and potential
future sequestration cuts and I think that they are very
focused on the problem----
Mr. Forbes. I don't want to interrupt you--I want to just
add this, too. We are being told by so many people that weigh
in on this that this needs to be a more holistic approach,
though; it can't be just----
Ms. Glaser. Yes.
Mr. Forbes. DOD. Do you agree with----
Ms. Glaser. And that is exactly the point that I was going
to make. We really do need more of a whole-of-government
approach. You can't just have the diplomatic piece working at--
by itself and independently--and the economic piece and the
military piece.
I think it is very helpful when there is a central document
that is generated in the Administration that assigns various
responsibilities to certain agencies and then they all see how
the means and the ends come together to--in the pursuit of very
specific objectives.
I don't think that the Administration has done that yet.
There have been some very good speeches that have been given by
senior Administration officials, but they are not seen by the
region as sufficient enough to ease their concerns about U.S.
staying power.
There is growing concern in the region that the United
States is being distracted--that the priorities of some of the
officials in government are elsewhere. And the United States is
a global power--we have priorities in many places in the world.
And just because we happen to be doing something in the Middle
East today doesn't mean that we can't also address our interest
and the interests of the wider countries in the region at the
same time.
And a document like this, I think, will go a long way
towards easing that concern and actually generating a more
coherent strategy within the Administration. So, I am very much
in support of this effort.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Dutton? Mr. Smith? How do you feel about?
Mr. Dutton. I do agree, actually. And one of the problems
we are confronting is that there is really a certain--I am
going to call it strategic ambivalence here--in that on the one
hand, the Administration seems to want to achieve a stable
relationship with China. On the other hand, it wants to
reassure friends, allies, and partners in the region.
And that--those have become an increasingly difficult goals
to reconcile because of the friction between the two in the
region. So, we do, I think, need to, rather than simply say we
want to deter, prevent, and maintain stability, we need to
articulate a positive regional end state.
In other words, what would a region in the--what would a
positive regional system in Asia look like and how could we,
then, begin to move closer toward it over time, rather than
simply saying--rather we don't want anything bad or
destabilizing or negative to occur in the region. How do we
make it a positive region?
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I want to associate myself with Bonnie and
Peter's remarks and also say that I do think there is a great
deal of room for us to further flesh out this pivot strategy.
I get frequently asked, not only by Chinese guests but also
by visiting fellows from other Asian countries, what does the
pivot mean? Is it sustainable? What exactly are you trying to
accomplish with it?
And we are not always able to provide them good answers.
There is a great deal of uncertainty that remains in the
region.
One trend I do think that is positive is that we have been
emphasizing more of an economic and diplomatic component to it,
rather than a purely military component. And I think that has
helped the image of the pivot in the region, and I think we
should continue to emphasize that.
But I also don't think we should be ashamed of admitting
our concerns. I think we should be candid with China, and we
should note that some aspects of the pivot are our reaction to
increasingly provocative behavior. And while we are not putting
ourselves in a position to contain China, we are putting
ourselves in a position to respond if China's behavior grows
more provocative.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
I believe the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Hanabusa, is
recognized for 5 minutes at this time.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In reading the testimony--I am going to begin with Mr.
Dutton--you had an interesting statement in your conclusion,
that, basically, you said, ``first and foremost, the United
States must develop and deploy the naval, air, space, and cyber
technologies required to ensure East Asia remains a maritime
system.''
I am curious about how you anticipate or envision that it
remains a maritime system, versus what other kind of system.
Mr. Dutton. Yes. Thank you very much for the question.
So, I started to introduce the idea in my opening comments
that prior to 1840 and the introduction of British maritime
power in the region, that Asia was a continental system that--
in other words, China, on the continent, could dominate the
region, because there were no threats that could impose
challenges--strategic challenges for China from the sea. And
this is really what China is trying to change in developing its
force structure and in jurisdictionalizing the region.
The problem with that is that there is the possibility of
it becoming over time a closed system. In other words, limiting
the economic and political freedom of action of other regional
states, unless China acknowledges or accepts what they are
doing as being appropriate for China's interests.
That limitation is also a problem for the United States,
because our political, our economic, and our security access
requires an open system, as well.
Technology is the basis of maritime--an open maritime
system. Ships, aircraft, supported by space and cyber power,
are the way in which strategic power is generated in the
region. And so, I don't have specific force structure
recommendations, but I do know that we need to develop and
maintain the kind of force structure, the technology in the
region, that enables us to ensure that the maritime domain
remains open, remains--freedom of navigation remains, not just
for commercial purposes, but for security purposes, as well, in
order to keep this system vibrant and open and connected to the
global system.
Ms. Hanabusa. So, am I hearing you correctly then? When you
talked about it--I mean, maintaining or remaining a maritime
system, that you are really saying that the United States must
maintain its dominance in Asia-Pacific as a maritime power? Is
that what you are saying? And that somehow, that maritime power
base will then keep China in check, and keep our commercial
lines open, trade flowing? Is that what you are alluding to
with this statement?
Mr. Dutton. In short, the answer is yes. But it--what I
mean, too, to say is exactly how much power and how much force
structure is required--that is a very difficult assessment that
I am not qualified to make, frankly. And so, one thing that is
important, though, is that there is a scale between dominant
sea supremacy and sea denial on the other end, where you can't
go. And somewhere in between there is where the United States
needs to be sure that we can act. We don't need sea supremacy
or total control. We need to recognize that China has
legitimate security interests, right?
But we do need to, also at the same time, recognize that we
have legitimate security interests in the same space. And so,
we need to ensure our access to that space to preserve our
security interests.
Ms. Hanabusa. And one of the recommendations, of course,
that you made that was pointed out earlier was our undersea
dominance, which is really submarine capacity, correct?
Mr. Dutton. Yes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Now--but still, what you are alluding to,
though you said you don't know what the force structure will
look like--what you are alluding to is that it is really not a
balanced system that you want out there. You want something
that will keep China in check. So, therefore, it would only
make logical sense if the United States and its allies must
somehow dominate, or have an advantage to keep China in check.
That seems to be--though you don't know what it means yet, that
seems to be where you are headed with that statement.
Mr. Dutton. Well, I would say sufficient power to ensure
our access. That is a little----
Ms. Hanabusa. In other words, and so----
Mr. Dutton [continuing]. Different. That is----
Ms. Hanabusa [continuing]. And so, we don't have to worry
about what we would call the A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial],
area access and access denial. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Dutton. It is our ability to overcome any kind of A2/
AD, or counter-intervention capability, as China often, I
think, refers to it.
It is our ability to ensure that we cannot be excluded at
China's will. It is not the same thing as ensuring that we keep
China in check. It is a balance in between the two.
Ms. Hanabusa. I understand what you are saying, but it
still has to come down to some measure of something. In other
words, we, as policymakers, as we sit here, we are going to
have to put numbers to what you are saying. And there has got
to be something that measures that for us. And what you are
saying is, you don't have the answer. It is just that it has
got to be measured somehow. Is that correct?
Mr. Dutton. That is fair enough. Yes, sir, I think I
would--or, ma'am, I would defer to the Navy staff for that.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
From what I am understanding from the testimony so far is
that there is no strategy in place right now in terms of
American strategy in the far Pacific Asian region. Anybody
disagree with that?
Okay.
Let me suggest then that what I have heard suggests to me
that the pivot was a slogan. A slogan signifying that we are
changing emphasis, but it is not based on some thought-out
strategy. Is that--would that be inaccurate? Correct, or
correct?
But please feel free to comment, disagree, whatever.
Ms. Glaser. Okay, I am happy to--Mr. Congressman, I think
that your critique perhaps, from my perspective, is a bit
harsh. There was no initial strategy document that was guiding
the pivot. I think that it evolved piecemeal over a period of
time. I think we have seen some important diplomatic, economic,
and military aspects of it, but they haven't yet come together,
from my perspective, in a coherent strategy----
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right, so there is no strategy? It is
not a strategy.
Ms. Glaser. Okay.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is something--it is piecemeal. It is
going by time.
Let me--to let you know, I flew over the Spratly Islands
about 10 years ago, after being kept from doing this. As a
member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, our government,
meaning our State Department, felt compelled to prevent me from
seeing what was going on in the Spratly Islands. And I
eventually had to commandeer a plane from the Philippine air
force to fly me over the Spratly Islands, all right?
At that time, the Spratlys were--there were some Chinese
naval vessels there, clearly warships. Have the Spratly Islands
been fortified since those days when I flew over there? So, for
the last 10 years, as piecemeal policy is being developed here
in Washington, or a response, that they have been fortifying
Spratly Islands? Am I inaccurate in that suggestion?
Yeah, they are fortifying the Spratly Islands. So, the
piecemeal message we have been giving them as to our strategy
is that we are cowards and we are weak. Just don't confront us
and you can get away with what you want. And now, we see China
challenging us in a way that threatens our security and
threatens the peace of the world, by putting Japan and our
other allies on the spot. Surprise, surprise.
Well, I would hope that the pivot becomes more than just a
slogan, and that we really take advantage of maybe whatever
time we have got left to work with our allies. Luckily, we have
a new sign of strength in Japan. And we should all be grateful
and praise President Abe, and give him all the backing we can,
coupled with one thing: we are weaker than we were 10 years
ago. We are weaker than when we walked into Iraq and wasted a
trillion dollars and thousands of our lives, and demoralized
the American people so we are not able to make those kind of
foreign commitments again.
So, you know what we have to do? We have to make sure
Australia, we have to make sure Japan, Korea, and our other
allies in that area know that we will support them in their
efforts to confront this aggression. And that is the--that
should be the strategy and the formula. Maybe you would like to
comment on that strategy.
Anybody?
I guess what I am saying is, maybe we should agree with Abe
that he should expand his military forces, and thus, we don't
necessarily have to send another two aircraft carrier battle
groups there at a cost of, what, $50 billion to the American
people, to offset this expansion of China into that region.
Does that make sense?
Ms. Glaser. I--we are----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Go right ahead.
Ms. Glaser. We are undertaking a project at CSIS. We are
looking at--it is our president, John Hamre's idea--to look
into how we could pursue more what he calls ``federated
defense.'' Which is, encouraging greater collaboration among
our allies----
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Ms. Glaser [continuing]. Not only in the area of
deployments, but also in exercises and procurement----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Ms. Glaser [continuing]. So we can try and limit
duplication----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I have got 20 seconds left.
Ms. Glaser [continuing]. Get force multipliers----
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is a great idea what you said. How
about the idea of creating an OSCE [Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe], that is now focused on Europe, of
course--but an OSCE that would be Asia-focused, and having just
an organization of democratic states like that for Asia? Would
that help give China a message that we are united behind
democratic countries?
Ms. Glaser. In principle, it is a good idea, but in a short
answer, what I would say is, there is no country in the region
that wants to be compelled to choose between the United States
and China. And being part of that kind of organization would
appeal to some countries, but for some that are geographically
very close to China, very dependent on China economically,
would not want to be put in that position.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let's just make sure that Mr. Abe
and our Korean friends and our friends down in Australia, and
our other close friends who do want to be with us know that we
are encouraging them to stand up to this challenge, because
they will be the ones who have to stand up. Our government
seems to be pivoting around the world, and trying to take in
the information and develop some strategy for the future.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr.
Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. And, Mr. Chairman, I have
an opening statement I would ask to be entered into the record.
[The statement of Mr. Connolly can be found in the Appendix
on page 42.]
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair, and I thank the panel for
being here.
And I am always--I always enjoy the thoughts of my friend
from California. And I have so many reactions to so much of
what he had to say.
I would note, as a student of history, there are others in
Asia who have made the miscalculation of mistaking American
resolve, and with tragic consequences for them and for us.
But I would hope that others in the region today would not
make a similar miscalculation, because some think we are weak.
Weakness is in the eye of the beholder. I certainly share my
colleague's views about the folly of Iraq, and the terrible
price the United States has paid, and the diversion it
represents.
I am not sure, maybe my friend would be happier if we had a
white paper on the pivot, and then we could call it a strategy.
I happen to think the pivot is an enlightened decision by the
United States, and is going to involve lots of elements.
We are seeing one of them as we speak, the TPP, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, which is going to be a very important
economic anchor and political anchor. And it is very much in
the face of China.
My friend lionizes the prime minister, now president of
Japan, Mr. Abe. It might be useful if Mr. Abe wishes to really
exercise moral, as well as political, leadership in the region,
if he were to acknowledge the sins of Japan, especially with
respect to Korea, from the recent unpleasantness known as World
War II. That might be a useful start if Mr. Abe wishes to
exercise regional leadership.
Let me ask you about the situation. I mean, China seems to
have gone out of its way to provoke the Philippines, South
Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and the United States, the
Spratly Islands, as Mr. Rohrabacher talks about, the Senkaku or
Diaoyu Islands.
What is in the thinking of Japan--I mean, of China? Is it
deliberately being provocative, or is it unmindful or uncaring
of the consequences of such provocation? Your sense, Mr.
Dutton. And we can go down the panel.
Mr. Dutton. Thank you very much. Yes, I believe it is
deliberate provocation for the purpose of achieving at least
two sets of objectives. One set of objectives is domestic, it
is internal.
This type of friction, I think, is managed friction. It is
creating it, but managing it, avoiding escalation, in order to
ensure domestic stability in the sense that the Chinese
Communist Party remains the center of governance within the----
Mr. Connolly. You think it is more internal than anything
else?
Mr. Dutton. It is tough to assess. But it is a very
important part.
Mr. Connolly. I am going to come back and ask you about
miscalculation. But I want to give Ms. Glaser and Mr. Smith a
quick chance to comment.
Ms. Glaser. Very quickly, I think there is an inextricable
linkage between the domestic situation and the external
situation for China. I think that the Communist Party is
seeking to rejuvenate itself. Its legitimacy is very much
wrapped up with not making any concessions on territorial and
sovereignty in these maritime disputes.
So I think that the Chinese are going to continue to adhere
to this. They don't want to make concessions on these. They
also want good relations with their neighbors. Up until now,
they haven't been compelled to make a choice.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. I would like to add India to that long list of
countries that China has been provoking in recent years. In
fact, India may have been one of the first.
I think this behavior really began in 2009. And actually,
in doing some research for a book on China-India relations, one
of the things that frequently came up was in assessing China's
behavior in recent years, don't underestimate the effect that
the global financial crisis had on the thinking of their
leadership; that really, America's--this was the beginning of
America's decline, and the time had come for China's rise.
They had weathered the storm much better than we had, or in
fact, anyone else around the world. And if the time to assert
China's--reassert China's authority in Asia, it was now.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Final point, though, what worries me
about, as a student of history, is miscalculation. Okay. So
that is your thinking, and that is what you are doing. And it
has a lot of internal domestic pressure, which, not unique to
China, not unique at this moment in history.
But what can happen is a miscalculation. Because the fact
externally is this is a provocative set of behavior that could
provoke something, not planned, not intended, nonetheless real.
Mr. Dutton, Ms. Glaser, Mr. Smith, do you want to quickly
comment?
Mr. Dutton. Yes, it is absolutely----
Mr. Connolly. The chair will allow them to finish
answering. My questions are over.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Dutton. It is absolutely the case that it is a
dangerous game. And what we can see clearly is that it has
provoked American attention and American concern, and the same
thing throughout the region. And I think it has achieved what
China sought to prevent, which is balancing behavior against
China directly. It is unfortunate, but I think that is what it
has achieved.
Ms. Glaser. I would just say that the Chinese are
insufficiently worried about miscalculation and accident, and
quite confident, frankly, that they could control escalation.
If they were worried about this, they would not have
announced that new ADIZ, which the potential for their aircraft
flying over these disputed islands in the East China Sea, then
being intercepted by Japanese fighters, and responded to by
Chinese fighters scrambling.
This carries, I think, great inherent danger. And I don't
think the Chinese appreciate this significantly.
Mr. Smith. I would agree, and I understand why China's
policy in the region seems so counterintuitive, because I think
it has done their image great harm. And on the flipside of
that, we must never forget sort of the silver lining, which is
that countries in the region who maybe 10 years ago were tiring
of American power and authority, or looking for alternatives,
are now welcoming the U.S. back with, you know, great
enthusiasm.
So as we confront this challenge, we must also look at it
as an opportunity.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. First, I am just trying to
understand the law of the sea, and the conventional law of the
sea. It is my understanding that if there is a tiny speck just
barely above water, the smallest possible island, that whoever
owns that island controls 125,000 nautical miles, 200 miles in
every direction, of that speck, with regard to economic
exploitations. Is that true?
Mr. Dutton. I am sorry, sir. No, it is not true. A small
island that is uninhabitable, or that can produce no economic
activity of its own, gets no more than 12 nautical miles around
it. And that is only if it is above water at high tide.
Mr. Sherman. Does an artificial island get anything?
Mr. Dutton. It does not.
Mr. Sherman. And if there is like one family that lives on
the island, does it then get the 200 miles?
Mr. Dutton. Well, we are hoping that the Philippine
arbitration can help us understand what the law says about
these questions. It is one of the most important aspects of
China's--or of the Philippines, a desire to get an
international law perspective on these questions.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. And if the--if it is inhabited, I assume
that an island that was previously uninhabited, that gains
habitation, counts as a habitable island. Is that accurate?
Mr. Dutton. Well, it is a little difficult to know, and
here is why: Because what does habitation mean, has so far not
been answered. And if you have--you just put soldiers down on
an island, but you have to truck in water, or fly in water, is
that habitation? No, probably not.
So the answer is not yet definitive in international law,
but it is pretty clear that it has to be self-sustaining
habitation. And that was meant, was a permanent----
Mr. Sherman. Well, of course, a vacation--there are many
vacation islands with thriving economies that exist only
because tourists spend money to be there.
Mr. Dutton. Well, if they are self-sustaining, and from
what the resources of the island can produce, then they
probably would get----
Mr. Sherman. You put a rich family on an island, you have a
tourist resort.
Now--but there is no--even the smallest inhabited island
does get the 125,000 square miles, nautical miles, it can be a
small island with--as long as it is inhabited; is that correct?
Mr. Dutton. As long as it is inhabited, it gets 200-mile
exclusive economic zone. Yes, I haven't done the math.
Mr. Sherman. Wow. Now, Japan would certainly--so the
islands that are in dispute, for the most part, are viewed as
uninhabited, and control only 12 miles?
Mr. Dutton. Yes. In the Spratlys, there are about 45
islands that are the major groups that are the larger of the
islands, 45 of which are inhabited, technically inhabited.
Whether they are legally inhabited is a different question, we
don't know----
Mr. Sherman. Got you.
Mr. Dutton. Technically inhabited by----
Mr. Sherman. So we have to both determine the ownership of
the islands and whether they are inhabited.
Mr. Dutton. That is right.
Mr. Sherman. And these islands have been of scant economic
value up until now. We are told that we should be spending
trillions of dollars reorienting our entire military
establishment to defend the economic rights of countries that
spend, in the case of Japan, only 1 percent of its GDP.
This is a kind of rhetorical question, but if there is oil
on any of these islands, the American taxpayer doesn't get any
of it, right?
Mr. Dutton. Sir, the answer to that question is there are
three problems. We are only being asked to deal with one of
them; not the sovereignty question, not even the jurisdictional
question over how do you draw resource boundaries, but control.
Whether the coastal state has, China, has the right to
limit freedom of navigation for military purposes or not, that
is the key American interest.
Mr. Sherman. I understand. Well, the reason they are trying
to do it, presumably is the resources. And of course, Japan
also has the same kind of notification zone that China has been
criticized for creating. My time is almost expired. I will ask
any witness with--Ms. Glaser, do you have----
Ms. Glaser. With all due respect, sir, I do think that your
perspective is a narrow interpretation of American interest.
No, we may not get directly all the fish, or the oil----
Mr. Sherman. We have a tremendous interest in everything in
the world. And we could have a $5 trillion military, and it
wouldn't be sufficient to deal with every occasion where people
have sat in front of me and said, ``We have vital interests.
And the interests of our allies are at stake. And we must take
action.''
Ms. Glaser. I believe that our interest----
Mr. Sherman. Sure. If--you know, if we could just phone
this one in, fine. But our entire military is looking at this
as a chance to face a noble foe, a chance to be in the kind of
conflict that is far less frustrating than fighting
insurgencies and fighting asymmetrical warfare, all for some
islands where our interests may be just as vital as they are in
every other square inch of this planet. And there is no
shortage of interests.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time is expired.
Unless one of the witnesses wants to respond briefly. Ms.
Glaser.
Ms. Glaser. I would just like to briefly comment. There may
be some individuals in the military that hold those views.
Those that I speak with and people who are in higher levels in
this Administration and even prior Administrations I think
would argue differently. That our goal is not to encourage
China to be an enemy or to organize our military against China.
That we very much want to see China emerge peacefully and
become part of this rules-based system.
I don't think about our presence in the Asia-Pacific is
simply about protecting tiny specks of rocks or other things in
the waters. I think it goes way beyond that. It is freedom of
navigation. It is maintaining the access and freedom to
maneuver within the area, without which we will have no
credibility as a presence and a provider of a balancing force
in the region to help protect not only our own interests, but
those of our allies and partners.
Mr. Chabot. Mr. Dutton.
Mr. Dutton. Yes, quite briefly, I would like to say the
pivotal rebalance is not about looking for a glorious enemy or
some noble foe. It is about a return to America's fundamental
security and strategic interests.
Mr. Sherman. I would simply say that a nation with our
economic problems has fundamental interests at home. And that
the fundamental interests that you are talking about are no
more significant than those in the eastern Mediterranean, those
in the Caribbean, hundreds of other conflicts most of them not
in the headlines today.
And if--again, could we limit our military to merely a $5
trillion budget if we dealt with every set of witnesses that
told us of a critical national security vital interest
position, critical to our standing in the world. I would say
that Japan, the real beneficiary of some of the actions you
suggest, limits its military to 1 percent of GDP.
I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair would ask unanimous consent that all Members have
5 days to supplement any statements or submit any questions. I
would like to recognize Chairman Forbes, for the purpose of
making a statement and recognize the panel.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for
allowing us to do this.
And to each of you, we recognize the time that you spent to
prepare to be here today. This is a very important hearing, but
equally it is a very important record for us to create. So, our
subcommittee always likes to give our witnesses an opportunity,
if you need to, to either complete or make sure your responses
were complete and accurate. If there is anything that you feel
briefly you need to put on the record, to supplement or clarify
anything that you have said, we would like to give you that
opportunity now.
And if you don't do it now, please feel free to submit it
to us later. We will start in the order that you spoke. Mr.
Dutton, anything else that you have for us for the record that
you would like to offer?
Mr. Dutton. Yes, sir. I have four points. I will be as
quick as I can. The first is I think it is important to note
that China has not been as dangerously, quote, ``aggressive''
as (A) they could be, or (B) they have been at different times
in the past. China has been through--the current, the People's
Republic of China, has been through four phases in their
approaches to the island disputes and the water disputes in
East Asia. The first phase from 1949 to 1974 was they ignored
them, essentially. From 1974 to 1988 or so, they did in fact
use military power to change the circumstances on the ground a
number of times during that timeframe.
From roughly 1990 to the mid-2000s, China went on a charm
offensive trying to buy the goodwill of the regional states
regarding these disputes. And then finally, most recently, this
nonmilitarized coercion that we are seeing now. And the problem
with--that we are having with is that we have too few tools to
grapple with this particular strategy. We could manage the
previous ones. We have too few tools to manage this one.
The second point that I would like to make is in talking
about whether China will be weaker or stronger in the future,
it is almost the wrong question. We have 1.3 billion globally
connected, economically connected people now that a generation
ago were not. That economic connectivity has a gravitational
pull of its own, which means that China's economy will be a
powerful force of some kind in the future.
Whatever the GDP futures look like, I don't know. My
crystal ball is cloudy. But I will say that China will have
substantial economic and political power--substantial enough to
choose to make military power in the future if that is where
they choose to balance how to spend their money. Whether it is
on social spending or military spending, we don't know. But
they will have plenty of spending when you have 1.3 billion
globally connected, economically connected people.
The third point I want to make is to reiterate that freedom
of navigation and the essence of American security around the
world is based on American ability to navigate around the world
through--in and through the commons, and that requires us to
support the laws and norms of freedom of navigation and to
exercise leadership over those norms. I believe we need to
accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The world is crying out for American leadership of some kind.
And in order for us to exercise that leadership, getting inside
the system and running the system from inside, rather than
standing outside it is how we are going to best get the support
and the coalescence of power that we need in order to confront
what China is pushing at us with--on this point.
And then the last point I wanted to make, it is also
related to freedom of navigation. It is also related to the
fundamental strategic roots of American security. And that is
our ability to ensure our security presence in Europe and the
Middle East and in Asia. Those three regions are--and our
ability to access them for security purposes is the foundation
of American security. It is possible for America to re-
articulate a fundamentally different security strategy and that
may be something we would want to do in the future. But it is a
world in which our options and our opportunities become
significantly constrained.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Ms. Glaser, very briefly, any other comments that you----
Ms. Glaser. Yes, thank you very much. I will just make two
points.
One is that there are these ongoing worries and concerns
about U.S. staying power in the region. This is not going to be
attainable, this reassurance, probably over any period of time.
It is just an effort that the United States has to keep up at
every day, every week, every month, every year.
We have to give these countries in the region confidence
that the United States is going to continue to be there. It is
not enough just to say we are a resident power. But we really
have to be involved in the life of the region.
And countries are so welcoming of the United States. So it
is a great opportunity, but we really have to continue to do
this. If we are not sufficiently providing this reassurance, I
really do think that there is a risk that some of the smaller
countries in the region are going to feel that they have to
accommodate to terms that are being dictated to them, in part
and mostly by China, but that they prefer not to accede to.
The second point that I would like to make is that one of
the fundamental sources of instability in the region and
particularly in the South China Sea is the nine-dash line and
the ambiguity of the nine-dash line.
So, it originated 1947. It was an 11-dash line. You know,
we all know this. But today, what does it mean? The Chinese
themselves have these internal debates about what it means.
And we all need to compel China to tell us and the world,
and particularly its neighbors, what does it mean? Is it
China's EEZ? Is it a national boundary? Does China simply claim
the land features and then the waters that those legally
generate under UNCLOS?
Clarification of this by China I think would go a long way
towards beginning to create the kind of circumstances in which
countries can begin to collaborate, maybe join economic
exploitation, fisheries agreements, and things of that nature
that might diffuse some of the tensions.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
And Mr. Smith, last brief word on your account?
Mr. Smith. Yes, just a brief remark for Congressman Sherman
who I think in an era of budget constraints, this type of
skepticism is actually very healthy. This is an issue where we
all seem to be on the same page. So, having some critical
thinking and really prodding us to think through this is most
welcome.
And I think--I am sure everyone who comes before you says
that their issue and their region of the world is of utmost
importance and is, you know, vital national security interest.
I think in this case, you really can make a valid and
rational case that China is unique--that it is the one country
that is capable of posing a genuine conventional threat to the
U.S. military in the 21st century.
And in addition to that, is the one country that is really
doing--is engaging in a lot of provocative behavior with its
neighbors.
And it is not just a territorial dispute issue with its
neighbors--it is also attempting to restrict our freedom to
operate in the Western Pacific. It is something that impinges
directly on our national security interests and is not merely
an issue for our allies.
But thank you for voicing this concern.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
I would like to thank the chair and the ranking members
that were here earlier for their cooperation in making this
very important hearing possible, and I want to especially thank
our distinguished panel this afternoon for their very helpful
testimony.
If there is no further business to come before the
committees, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
January 14, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. It was reported that a Chinese naval vessel nearly
collided with the USS Cowpens after the Chinese vessel moved to block
passage of the USS Cowpens. I understand that the USS Cowpens was
operating in international waters. There have been other incursions by
the Chinese military to impede U.S. military operations in other areas
including the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the interdiction of an EP-3
aircraft in 2001. How effective is China in coordinating actions of
local military commanders? In your estimation, are these incidents
coordinated by the central government or are they actions by rogue
military agents?
Mr. Dutton. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. As to the establishment of the Air Defense
Identification Zone by the Chinese in the East China Sea, it appears
that our response was not well coordinated with our partners. I
understand that FAA included a Notice to Airman to our commercial
airline industry that required them to abide by the Chinese notice. I
also understand that the Japanese and the South Korean initially
blocked implementation of this notice and the Japanese remain opposed
to using the notice. While I applaud the PACOM's decision to send a B-
52 flight without notice into the Air Defense Identification Zone
thereby establishing our intent to follow international law, I am
concerned that the executive branch did not effectively coordinate an
international response with our partners and allies for our commercial
sector. From your perspective, can you elaborate what you believe would
have been an appropriate response to this incursion and did the U.S.
effectively coordinate a response with our partners and allies?
Mr. Dutton. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces had
a hearing in December to discuss Chinese trends and potential impacts
of a reduction in GDP growth. I was surprised at the near unanimity in
thought among those witnesses as to their anticipated growth
assessments for China. If China GDP continues to decline, can you
project how their economy will impact Chinese military decisions? Would
you anticipate a reduction in GDP could possibly embolden Chinese
military activities to more vigorously exert territorial claims in the
near to mid-term?
Mr. Dutton. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. It was reported that a Chinese naval vessel nearly
collided with the USS Cowpens after the Chinese vessel moved to block
passage of the USS Cowpens. I understand that the USS Cowpens was
operating in international waters. There have been other incursions by
the Chinese military to impede U.S. military operations in other areas
including the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the interdiction of an EP-3
aircraft in 2001. How effective is China in coordinating actions of
local military commanders? In your estimation, are these incidents
coordinated by the central government or are they actions by rogue
military agents?
Ms. Glaser. Regarding the Cowpens incident specifically, the PLAN
undoubtedly anticipated that U.S. surveillance vessels would be
monitoring this exercise, which was the first major exercise conducted
by the Liaoning carrier escorted by destroyers and frigates. It is
likely that the naval ships involved in the exercise were instructed as
to the rules of engagement with U.S. surveillance vessels. They may not
have anticipated that the Cowpens would sail as close to the carrier as
it apparently did. In a January 23 News briefing, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III stated that the Chinese believed
that their carrier operations were properly notified, but the Cowpens
was not aware of any notification. It is my understanding that China's
Maritime Safety Administration issued on December 6 three no-sail ban
warnings for the areas where PLAN training was taking place from
December 3, 2013 to January 3, 2014. The incident with the Cowpens
occurred on December 5, so it seems that the late issuance of the no-
sail warning played an important role in this incident.
To your larger question, coordination between Chinese civilian and
military actors, and between law enforcement ships and navy ships
(white hulls and grey hulls), has improved. Xi Jiping was put in charge
of a task force to manage maritime issues even before he became general
secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and he has taken steps to
strengthen coordination. Nevertheless, it is plausible that there could
be instances in which individual ship commanders or even pilots behave
more aggressively than the central government has authorized. The PLA
is not a rogue actor, however; it is very much under the control of the
CCP.
Mr. Forbes. As to the establishment of the Air Defense
Identification Zone by the Chinese in the East China Sea, it appears
that our response was not well coordinated with our partners. I
understand that FAA included a Notice to Airman to our commercial
airline industry that required them to abide by the Chinese notice. I
also understand that the Japanese and the South Korean initially
blocked implementation of this notice and the Japanese remain opposed
to using the notice. While I applaud the PACOM's decision to send a B-
52 flight without notice into the Air Defense Identification Zone
thereby establishing our intent to follow international law, I am
concerned that the executive branch did not effectively coordinate an
international response with our partners and allies for our commercial
sector. From your perspective, can you elaborate what you believe would
have been an appropriate response to this incursion and did the U.S.
effectively coordinate a response with our partners and allies?
Ms. Glaser. It is my understanding that the FAA reiterated
longstanding practice and policy that, for the safety and security of
passengers, U.S. civilian aircraft flying internationally operate in
accordance with NOTAMs issued by foreign countries. I do not believe
that there was an instruction issued to specifically abide by China's
notice. However, since this reiteration by the FAA of U.S. policy was
made after China issued its new ADIZ regulations, it appears that the
FAA was telling U.S. airlines to follow Chinese regulations. The
Japanese opposed complying with China's notice.
Perhaps even of greater significance, there was a gap between Japan
and the U.S. in their official responses to Beijing after the
announcement of the ADIZ. Tokyo insisted that China rescind the ADIZ;
the U.S. only demanded that China not implement it and said it would
not recognize the ADIZ. It is clear from both these instances that the
U.S. and Japan did not adequately coordinate their responses. Given the
fact that there were ample signals in the Chinese media and from other
sources that Beijing was planning to announce an ADIZ, this is
disappointing and inexcusable.
I believe that ensuring the safety of American citizens flying
abroad should be the number one priority of the U.S. government, so I
do not oppose the U.S. decision to not instruct U.S. airlines to ignore
China's ADIZ regulations. I do think, however, that the U.S. should
have coordinated more effectively with Japan and minimized the gap
between the allies, which works to China's advantage. Tokyo and
Washington should work harder to anticipate Chinese actions and
coordinate responses. I understand that there are plans to conduct a
series of US-Japan tabletop exercises to enhance preparedness for such
contingencies and I applaud this effort.
Mr. Forbes. The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces had
a hearing in December to discuss Chinese trends and potential impacts
of a reduction in GDP growth. I was surprised at the near unanimity in
thought among those witnesses as to their anticipated growth
assessments for China. If China GDP continues to decline, can you
project how their economy will impact Chinese military decisions? Would
you anticipate a reduction in GDP could possibly embolden Chinese
military activities to more vigorously exert territorial claims in the
near to mid-term?
Ms. Glaser. China has entered an era of slower growth after three
decades of double-digit annual economic expansion. Mainstream
economists predict that China's annual growth will slow to between 6
and 7 per cent over the next decade. If this forecast is accurate,
China will continue to be a formidable economic power and its economic
influence on the region, indeed on the world, will be enormous. China's
military expenditures will likely remain substantial, and will continue
to exceed the military budgets of most of China's neighbors.
Today, China is the number one trading partner of 124 countries in
the world. These include Japan, Korea, Australia and every ASEAN
country with the exception of the Philippines. Beijing will therefore
be able to use economic tools to influence the political decisions of
its neighbors. China is likely to rely on diplomacy and economic tools,
rather than military means to enforce its claims. The Chinese know that
any use of force to secure their claims would be counterproductive in
that it would make the regional states more wary of Chinese intentions
and push them into closer alignment with the United States. In the past
few years, there has been a pattern of Chinese coercion and
assertiveness, but not Chinese aggression. I do not expect that in the
near to mid-term the Chinese will shift to the blatant employment of
military force to exert control over their claims.
China's GDP is only one of several variables that will affect
Chinese decision making regarding maritime disputes. Chinese
assessments of U.S. economic strength and commitment to the Asia-
Pacifica region will also be important factors. If the U.S. is strong
and deeply involved in the region, there is a reduced potential for
miscalculation by China.
Mr. Forbes. It was reported that a Chinese naval vessel nearly
collided with the USS Cowpens after the Chinese vessel moved to block
passage of the USS Cowpens. I understand that the USS Cowpens was
operating in international waters. There have been other incursions by
the Chinese military to impede U.S. military operations in other areas
including the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the interdiction of an EP-3
aircraft in 2001. How effective is China in coordinating actions of
local military commanders? In your estimation, are these incidents
coordinated by the central government or are they actions by rogue
military agents?
Mr. Smith. This question has been the subject of fierce speculation
outside of China--to what degree are provocative actions by Chinese
forces the result of initiatives taken by local commanders, and to what
degree are they orchestrated by China's senior political leadership? I
frequently encountered this question when conducting research for my
book on China-India relations, as it related to border incursions
across the Line of Actual Control by Chinese border patrols. In this
case, and in the case of our multiple maritime incidences at sea, a
convincing body of circumstantial evidence suggests the behavior is
encouraged and condoned by the senior leadership. Were these limited to
a handful of incidents the possibility of rogue behavior by a local
commander would be more credible. Unfortunately, U.S. Navy ships have
been harassed on nearly one dozen occasions, as documented in my
testimony, and in the case of Chinese incursions across the China-India
border, happen several hundred times a year. We are unaware of local
commanders facing any consequences for this provocative behavior. The
most insightful China watchers I am in contact with are in fairly
uniform agreement that the behavior is encouraged and condoned by the
senior leadership.
Mr. Forbes. As to the establishment of the Air Defense
Identification Zone by the Chinese in the East China Sea, it appears
that our response was not well coordinated with our partners. I
understand that FAA included a Notice to Airman to our commercial
airline industry that required them to abide by the Chinese notice. I
also understand that the Japanese and the South Korean initially
blocked implementation of this notice and the Japanese remain opposed
to using the notice. While I applaud the PACOM's decision to send a B-
52 flight without notice into the Air Defense Identification Zone
thereby establishing our intent to follow international law, I am
concerned that the executive branch did not effectively coordinate an
international response with our partners and allies for our commercial
sector. From your perspective, can you elaborate what you believe would
have been an appropriate response to this incursion and did the U.S.
effectively coordinate a response with our partners and allies?
Mr. Smith. As you rightly point out, our policy regarding the
protocols for civilian airliners operating in China's ADIZ was both
ambiguous and poorly coordinated with U.S. allies like Japan. In many
respects, the episode boiled down to a question of semantics. The Obama
administration was able to claim that, like Japan, it did not
``require'' civilian carriers to comply with China's ADIZ regulations.
Instead, it merely ``advised'' them to do so. According to the State
Department: ``The U.S. government generally expects that U.S. carriers
operating internationally will operate consistent with NOTAMs (Notices
to Airmen) issued by foreign countries.'' An FAA spokesman also said
they were ``advising for safety reasons that [U.S. civilian carriers]
comply with notices to airmen, which FAA always advises.'' While
technically not a demand, in practice the policy was perceived as very
much at odds with Japan's. This created the impression of distance
between the two treaty allies and caused Tokyo a great deal of
discomfort in the process. Our poor coordination with the Japanese
government was evident in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's response
to the announcement: ``We have confirmed through diplomatic channels
that the U.S. government didn't request commercial carriers to submit
flight plans.'' This confirms the suspicion that Washington only
consulted with Japan after the fact.
Mr. Forbes. The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces had
a hearing in December to discuss Chinese trends and potential impacts
of a reduction in GDP growth. I was surprised at the near unanimity in
thought among those witnesses as to their anticipated growth
assessments for China. If China GDP continues to decline, can you
project how their economy will impact Chinese military decisions? Would
you anticipate a reduction in GDP could possibly embolden Chinese
military activities to more vigorously exert territorial claims in the
near to mid-term?
Mr. Smith. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]