[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF DOE'S STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 31, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-77
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
JOE BARTON, Texas Ranking Member
Chairman Emeritus JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania ANNA G. ESHOO, California
GREG WALDEN, Oregon ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
LEE TERRY, Nebraska GENE GREEN, Texas
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania LOIS CAPPS, California
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
Vice Chairman JIM MATHESON, Utah
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana JOHN BARROW, Georgia
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio DORIS O. MATSUI, California
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi Islands
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky JERRY McNERNEY, California
PETE OLSON, Texas BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia PETER WELCH, Vermont
CORY GARDNER, Colorado BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas PAUL TONKO, New York
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
BILLY LONG, Missouri
RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina
_____
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
Chairman
PHIL GINGREY, Georgia PAUL TONKO, New York
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
RALPH M. HALL, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky GENE GREEN, Texas
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania LOIS CAPPS, California
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio JERRY McNERNEY, California
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia JOHN BARROW, Georgia
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida DORIS O. MATSUI, California
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California (ex
JOE BARTON, Texas officio)
FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Hon. Paul Tonko, a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York, opening statement.................................... 28
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 31
Witnesses
Ernest J. Moniz, Secretary, Department of Energy................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Answers to submitted questions............................... 95
Submitted Material
Letter of June 28, 2013, from Mr. Shimkus to Mr. Moniz, submitted
by Mr. Shimkus................................................. 3
Letter of July 22, 2013, from Peter B. Lyons, Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy, to Mr. Shimkus,
submitted by Mr. Shimkus....................................... 5
Report, ``The Report to the President and the Congress by the
Secretary of Energy on the Need for a Second Repository,''
December 2008, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,
Department of Energy, submitted by Mr. Johnson................. 62
OVERSIGHT OF DOE'S STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in
room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John
Shimkus (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Shimkus, Hall, Whitfield,
Murphy, Latta, Harper, McKinley, Bilirakis, Johnson, Barton,
Upton (ex officio), Tonko, Green, Capps, McNerney, Dingell,
Barrow, Matsui, and Waxman (ex officio).
Staff present: Nick Abraham, Legislative Clerk; Gary
Andres, Staff Director; Charlotte Baker, Press Secretary; David
Bell, Staff Assistant; Sean Bonyun, Communications Director;
Allison Busbee, Policy Coordinator, Energy and Power; Annie
Caputo, Professional Staff Member; David McCarthy, Chief
Counsel, Environment and the Economy; Brandon Mooney,
Professional Staff Member; Chris Sarley, Policy Coordinator,
Environment and the Economy; Peter Spencer, Professional Staff
Member, Oversight; Tom Wilbur, Digital Media Advisor; Jeff
Baran, Democratic Senior Counsel; Alison Cassady, Democratic
Senior Professional Staff Member; and Caitlin Haberman,
Democratic Policy Analyst.
Mr. Shimkus. I would like to call this hearing to order. I
want to thank the Secretary for coming. I would like to
recognize myself for the 5-minute opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Today, we review the ``Department of Energy's Strategy for
the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-level
Radioactive Waste.'' We are pleased to have Secretary Moniz
with us, looking forward to hearing his testimony.
In 2008, after decades of research, DOE filed an 8,700-page
license application at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for
permission to construct a repository at Yucca Mountain. In
2009, the administration unilaterally decided to cancel the
Yucca Mountain program and sought to withdraw the license
application. The NRC, which is mandated under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act to review the license, denied DOE's request but not
before the then-NRC chairman directed the staff to cease its
review, an affair this committee investigated at length. The
matter of whether the NRC should resume its review, of course,
has now been pending for quite some time before the DC Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Three weeks ago, 335 Members of the House, including more
than half the Democrats, voted to preserve funding for the
NRC's Yucca Mountain license review in the Energy and Water
appropriations bill. This vote showed a remarkable bipartisan
agreement that the NRC should continue its work as an
independent safety regulator and issue a decision on whether or
not Yucca Mountain would be a safe repository. After over 30
years and $15 billion, the American people deserve to know the
NRC's independent, objective conclusion.
And, Mr. Secretary, I would also just add that regardless
of what the results are, this scientific research at the
conclusion would be helpful for any reason, any future
repository. The research developed on Yucca Mountain and
finalizing the scientific research would be helpful as we move
in other directions if we were to do that. So it is very
important to finish the scientific report.
In light of all this, DOE's new waste strategy very much
represents the administration's effort to start from scratch as
if the Nuclear Waste Policy Act doesn't exist or at least as if
most of it doesn't exist.
At the end of June, I sent a letter to the agency asking
basic questions about the legal authority and funding for the
actions DOE is currently undertaking. At this time, I would
like to ask that my letter, together with DOE's response and
attachment, be included in the hearing record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. DOE's response cited a few convenient sections
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as providing the authority for
the Department to conduct certain work. But, and I want to
underscore this, the agency did not cite Section 302(d)
regarding the use of the Nuclear Waste Fund, which states: ``No
amount may be expended by the Secretary under this subtitle for
the construction or expansion of any facility unless such
construction or expansion is expressly authorized by this or
subsequent legislation. The Secretary hereby is authorized to
construct one repository and one test and evaluation
facility,'' which, of course, with the law is Yucca Mountain.
DOE estimates the cost of starting over to be $5.6 billion
for just the first 10 years. At the end of those 10 years, DOE
projects to have only a pilot facility operating with a
repository not expected to be operational until 2048. Ladies
and gentlemen, that is 65 years after Congress first passed the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and after the reactors we have
operating today have most likely closed.
DOE's Strategy would require legislation but Secretary
Moniz indicated in our hearing last month that the
administration does not intend to propose legislation. DOE is
in this situation because the White House decided not to follow
the law that Congress has already passed. With this Strategy,
DOE expects to simply write off $15 billion in favor of a pilot
facility that might or may not get sited after this
administration ends. I firmly believe the public deserves to
know the truth about Yucca Mountain. We all need to know about
all the money that has been spent and the science behind it not
just for ourselves but for our children and our grandchildren.
We deserve a permanent solution, not just the hope of a
temporary fix.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Shimkus
Today we review the Department of Energy's Strategy for the
Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-level
Radioactive Waste. We are pleased to have Secretary Moniz with
us and look forward to hearing his testimony.
In 2008, after decades of research, DOE filed an 8,700-page
license application at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for
permission to construct a repository at Yucca Mountain. In
2009, the administration unilaterally decided to cancel the
Yucca Mountain program and sought to withdraw the license
application. The NRC, which is mandated under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act to review the license, denied DOE's request but not
before the then-NRC Chairman directed the staff to cease its
review--an affair this committee investigated at length. The
matter of whether the NRC should resume its review, of course,
has now been pending for quite some time before the DC Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Three weeks ago, 335 House members--including more than
half our Democrats--voted to preserve funding for the NRC's
Yucca Mountain license review in the energy and water
appropriations bill. This vote showed a remarkable bi-partisan
agreement that the NRC should continue its work as the
independent safety regulator and issue a decision on whether or
not Yucca Mountain would be a safe repository. After over 30
years and $15 billion, the American people deserve to know the
NRC's independent, objective conclusion.
In light of all this work, DOE's new waste strategy very
much represents the administration's effort to start from
scratch as if the Nuclear Waste Policy Act doesn't exist or at
least as if most of it doesn't exist.
At the end of June, I sent a letter to the agency asking
basic questions about the legal authority and funding for the
actions DOE is currently undertaking. At this time, I'd like to
ask that my letter together with DOE's response and attachment
be included in the hearing record. DOE's response cited a few
convenient sections of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act as
providing the authority for the Department to conduct certain
work.
But the agency did not cite Section 302(d) regarding the
use of the Nuclear Waste Fund, which states:
``No amount may be expended by the Secretary under this
subtitle for the construction or expansion of any facility
unless such construction or expansion is expressly authorized
by this or subsequent legislation. The Secretary hereby is
authorized to construct one repository and one test and
evaluation facility.''
Which is, of course, Yucca Mountain.
DOE estimates the cost of starting over to be $5.6 billion
for just the first 10 years. At the end of those 10 years, DOE
projects to have only a pilot facility operating with a
repository not expected to be operational until 2048--ladies
and gentlemen, that's 65 years after Congress first passed the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act and after the reactors we have
operating today have likely closed.
DOE's Strategy would require legislation but Secretary
Moniz indicated in our hearing last month that the
administration does not intend to propose legislation. DOE is
in this situation because the White House decided NOT to follow
the law that Congress has already passed.
With this Strategy, DOE expects to simply write-off $15
billion in favor of a pilot facility that might, or might not,
get sited after this administration ends. I firmly believe the
public deserves to know the truth about Yucca Mountain, and our
children and grandchildren deserve a permanent solution not
just the hope of a temporary fix.
Mr. Shimkus. And with this, I would like to yield now to my
colleague, Mr. Tonko, the ranking member of the subcommittee,
for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL TONKO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And welcome, Secretary
Moniz. Thank you for appearing before this subcommittee on a
very important topic this afternoon.
For decades, nuclear power plants have provided electricity
through the fleet of reactors located across our country. Over
the same period, we have generated substantial amounts of waste
that have yet to be secured in a long-term storage facility. We
have debated this issue. We have funded research and
development. We have passed laws designating a storage facility
and have held numerous oversight hearings over the years. There
have been reports by the National Academy of Sciences, the
Government Accountability Office, industry and nongovernmental
groups, and then most recently, as we all know, the President's
Blue Ribbon Commission. But we still have not solved the
nuclear waste problem.
We have a long-term storage facility and yet we do not. We
do not have interim storage facilities or a policy of
establishing them, and yet we do. I don't know what else you
would call the storage facilities at each power plant site
around the country. They are now de facto interim storage
facilities. If nuclear power is going to continue to play a
significant role in delivering baseload electrical power, we
need a resolution to this situation. It will not be easy and it
will be most likely expensive. But the alternative is also
expensive and provides less safety, less security than a
functioning, ordered process for dealing with spent fuel.
I realize that many people feel this resolution is to
complete the process to open Yucca Mountain. Well, the Yucca
Mountain facility is not open at this time and it does not
appear it will be open in the near future. In the meantime,
spent fuel continues to accumulate and penalty fees continue to
accrue. It appears to me that it is worth examining
alternatives to current law and the current situation. Partisan
bickering will not solve this situation and strictly adhering
to past or current positions will not solve this problem
either. The administration's strategy, based on the work done
by the Blue Ribbon Commission in 2012, also has its challenges
and its unknowns.
If we are to pursue a system that includes both interim and
long-term storage of waste, how do we proceed? How many interim
sites will be needed? How much waste can or should be stored
there? And what time period qualifies as interim? Where will
they be located? How do we ensure the transportation to these
sites is done and done safely? Are there States and localities
willing to host repositories, either interim or permanent? What
are the costs and can we access the necessary funds in the fund
established to deal with this problem?
I do not expect to hear definitive answers to all of these
questions here this afternoon. Today's hearing does, however,
give us an opportunity to examine all options for moving
forward. In any case, it appears congressional action is
needed, and I am willing to work with my colleagues to address
this issue. I do not see much future for nuclear power if we do
not find a way to deal with this issue.
Again, Mr. Secretary, I thank you for being here this
afternoon and I thank you, Chairman Shimkus, for holding this
very important hearing.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.
The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Upton, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and certainly for your leadership on the issue. And,
Secretary Moniz, we certainly appreciate you being here as well
this afternoon.
During your tenure as Secretary, you and I will work
together on a wide array of issues, and I certainly appreciate
the time that we have spent since you have been Secretary and
look forward down the road as well. I appreciate that dialogue
on a number of issues. But certainly the nuclear waste disposal
is a great concern for me and one that I sank my teeth into
early on when I came onto this committee and myself and Mr.
Towns, with Mr. Dingell's help, we were able to broker a pretty
good deal back in the '90s.
You know, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is the law on the
subject, and as Chairman Shimkus stated, that means Yucca
Mountain. Shutting down the repository program, the
administration did not elaborate on a technical or safety
concern, merely that it was ``unworkable.'' This was followed
by the former Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman, who
unilaterally ceased the staff's review of the license
application one month--one month--before a key safety
evaluation report was to be publicly released with the agency's
conclusion about the safety of Yucca.
Electricity consumers pay for the disposal of civilian
spent nuclear fuel and taxpayers pay for disposal of nuclear
waste from the Atomic Energy Defense program. In Michigan, our
consumers alone have paid nearly $600 million into the fund.
Fifteen billion was invested in this repository program and got
us within just a month of knowing whether we have a
scientifically safe and sound location. And after spending that
15 billion, the public certainly should have the right to know
what the NRC concluded. Instead, the strategy unfortunately
abandoned that investment, expecting consumers and taxpayers to
foot the bill for another 5.6 billion for the first 10 years to
start really back at square one.
By the end of this fiscal year, DOE will have spent nearly
$80 million in support of that strategy. And I realize that is
is the result of an omnibus appropriation for fiscal year 2012
and a continuing resolution for '13 and I strongly support the
efforts of the House Appropriations Committee to correct this
situation.
The House Energy and Water appropriation bill did clarify
that the Nuclear Waste Fund is only to be used for its intended
purpose: Yucca Mountain. The bill also eliminated the burden
currently shouldered by the taxpayer for the administration's
decision to start over.
So questions also have arisen about whether the Nuclear
Waste Fund would be adequate under DOE's new approach. GAO
doesn't believe it is. Previous cost estimates indicated the
fund would be adequate to finish building and operating Yucca,
but GAO questions whether the fund would be adequate to cover
the costs of pursuing an alternate repository, in addition to
two interim storage facilities and multiple transportation
campaigns.
The administration touts its strategy as saving taxpayer
money by mitigating DOE liability for failure to accept and
dispose of spent fuel, and we have asked the GAO to analyze
that. Last August, a year ago, GAO said that Yucca could be
completed faster than a new effort to build interim storage,
thus making Yucca the best option for mitigating taxpayer
liability.
I certainly remain committed to ensuring that consumers get
the repository that they have paid for and that the costs to
the taxpayers are minimized. And right now, it seems as though
Yucca does remain the clear answer to both of those problems.
And it is the law.
So, Mr. Secretary, I look forward to our continued dialogue
in the weeks and months ahead to solve a long-term nuclear
waste disposal issue.
I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Fred Upton
Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, for holding this hearing and
for your leadership on this issue. Secretary Moniz, thank you
for being here.
During your tenure as Secretary, you and I will work
together on a wide array of issues. I also appreciate the
opportunity for an ongoing dialogue on the issue of nuclear
waste disposal, which is an issue of great concern to me, and
one for which I do have concerns with the department's
strategy.
First, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is the law on this
subject. As Chairman Shimkus stated, that means Yucca Mountain.
In shutting down the repository program, the administration did
not elaborate on a technical or safety concern, merely that it
was ``unworkable.'' This was followed by the former Nuclear
Regulatory Commission chairman unilaterally ceasing the staff's
review of the license application one month--one month before a
key safety evaluation report was to be publicly released with
the agency's conclusions about the safety of Yucca Mountain.
Electricity consumers pay for the disposal of civilian
spent nuclear fuel and taxpayers pay for disposal of nuclear
waste from the atomic energy defense program. Michigan
consumers alone have paid nearly $600 million into the fund.
$15 billion was invested in the repository program and got us
within one month of knowing whether we have a scientifically
safe and sound location. After spending $15 billion, the public
should have a right to know what the NRC concluded. Instead,
DOE's strategy unfortunately abandons that investment,
expecting consumers and taxpayers to foot the bill for another
$5.6 billion for the first 10 years to start over from square
one.
By the end of this fiscal year, DOE will have spent nearly
80 million taxpayer dollars in support of the strategy. I
realize this is the result of omnibus appropriations for FY
2012 and a continuing resolution for FY 2013. I strongly
support the efforts of the House Appropriations committee to
correct this situation. The House Energy and Water
Appropriations bill clarifies that the Nuclear Waste Fund is
only to be used for its intended purpose: Yucca Mountain. The
bill also eliminates the burden currently shouldered by the
taxpayer for the administration's decision to start over.
Questions also have arisen about whether the Nuclear Waste
Fund would be adequate under DOE's new approach. GAO doesn't
believe it is. Previous cost estimates indicated the fund would
be adequate to finish building and operating Yucca Mountain,
but GAO questions whether the fund would be adequate to cover
the costs of pursuing an alternate repository, in addition to
two interim storage facilities and multiple transportation
campaigns.
The administration touts its strategy as saving taxpayer
money by mitigating DOE liability for failure to accept and
dispose of spent fuel. We've asked GAO to analyze this. Last
August GAO said that Yucca Mountain could be completed faster
than a new effort to build interim storage, thus making Yucca
Mountain the best option for mitigating taxpayer liability.
I remain committed to ensuring that consumers get the
repository that they have paid for and that the costs to the
taxpayers are minimized. Right now, Yucca Mountain remains the
clear answer to both of those problems. And it's the law.
Mr. Secretary, I look forward to our continued dialogue in
the weeks and months ahead in the effort to solve our long-term
nuclear waste disposal.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. The chair
now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr.
Waxman, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, in 1982 Congress passed the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The Act sought to establish a fair
and science-based process for selecting two repository sites
for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Under
this approach, no one State or locality would bear the entire
burden of the Nation's nuclear waste. In the years that
followed, the Department of Energy began evaluating a number of
potential repository sites.
Then, just 5 years later, in 1987, Congress made the
decision to designate Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the sole site
to be considered for a permanent geologic repository. There was
no plan B. This decision was widely viewed as political and
provoked strong opposition in Nevada. Ever since Congress
decided to short-circuit the site selection process, the State
of Nevada and a majority of its citizens have opposed the Yucca
Mountain project.
In 2002, President Bush recommended the Yucca Mountain site
to Congress. Using the State veto procedures set forth in the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Nevada then filed an official Notice
of Disapproval of the site. Congress proceeded to override
Nevada's veto by enacting a resolution that was reported by
this committee.
Twenty-five years after the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, it is clear that this Washington-knows-best
approach has not worked. The Department of Energy has
terminated its Yucca Mountain activities.
President Obama wisely sought a new approach. He directed
Secretary Chu to charter a Blue Ribbon Commission to perform a
comprehensive review of U.S. policies for managing nuclear
waste and to recommend a new strategy.
Last year, we heard testimony from the co-chairs of the
Blue Ribbon Commission on the recommendations that resulted
from their 2-year effort. Since then, the Department of Energy
has released a strategy for implementing many of those
recommendations.
The Commission recommendations and the DOE's strategy
deserve our serious consideration. They raise a number of
important policy questions such as whether a new organization
should be established to address the nuclear waste problem, how
nuclear waste fees should be used, and whether one or more
centralized storage facilities should be developed in addition
to one or more geologic repositories.
These are policy questions that require a legislative
response. Answering these questions requires an open mind and a
willingness to move past a narrow obsession with Yucca
Mountain. The Senate appears to be moving forward. Four
Senators recently introduced bipartisan nuclear waste
legislation. The bill may not have the final answer to every
question, but it represents a genuine effort to get past
ideology and begin grappling with these tough issues. We should
seek a similar constructive approach in the House. If we pound
the same old drumbeat on Yucca Mountain, all we will get is
more gridlock, which serves no one well.
Secretary Moniz, you do us a great service by appearing
today before this subcommittee. It is unusual to have a
Department Secretary testify before this subcommittee. We have
had Cabinet officials who testify before the full committee. It
is a testament to your commitment on this issue.
You were on that Blue Ribbon Commission and are a true
expert on nuclear waste disposal. We should all listen very
carefully to what you have to tell us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to the testimony
of the Secretary.
Mr. Shimkus. And I thank my colleague. The gentleman yields
back his time.
And I just want to reiterate I agree with the ranking
member that we do appreciate you coming here. We know it is
extraordinary for a Secretary to come to a lowly subcommittee,
but we are pleased to have you.
And with that, I would like to recognize you for 5 minutes
for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Moniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I will start by
disputing your characterization as lowly. I think and actually
I would say, as you both have said, it may be a bit unusual but
I really appreciate the chance to come here and to start a
dialogue on this important issue. As you know, I have been
working on this issue, thinking about this issue for a long
time, and I come here in a sense of hopefully we can
pragmatically find a path forward.
So, Chairman Shimkus and Upton and Ranking Members Tonko
and Waxman, members of the committee, thank you again for
inviting me here to discuss nuclear waste issues and the
activities at the administration is ongoing to meet the
challenge of managing and disposing of used nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste.
As was stated in January of this year, the administration,
Department of Energy released its strategy for the management
and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste based on the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on which, again, I did have the pleasure of serving
under the leadership of Lee Hamilton and Brent Scowcroft.
The administration clearly embraces the principles of the
Commission's core recommendations, supports the goal of
establishing a new, workable, long-term solution for nuclear
waste management. I would also like to observe, as was noted,
that a bipartisan group of Senators has introduced a bill
adopting the principles of the Blue Ribbon Commission. I
testified before that Senate Energy Committee yesterday and was
encouraged by the progress they had made towards addressing the
most complex of issues. And I appear today before this
committee to reinforce that the administration is ready and
willing to engage with both Chambers of Congress to move
forward.
Any workable solution for the final disposition of used
fuel and nuclear waste must be based not only on sound science
but also on achieving public acceptance at the local, State,
and tribal levels. When this administration took office, the
timeline for opening Yucca Mountain had already been pushed
back by 2 decades, stalled by public protest and legal
opposition with no end in sight. It was clear the stalemate
couldn't continue indefinitely.
Rather than continuing to spend billions of dollars more on
a project that faces such strong opposition, the administration
believes a pathway similar to that the Blue Ribbon Commission
laid out, a consent-based solution for the long-term management
of our used fuel and nuclear waste is one that meets the
country's national energy security needs, has the potential to
gain the necessary public acceptance, and can scale to
accommodate the increased needs for future that includes
expanding nuclear power and deployment.
The strategy lays out plans to implement with the
appropriate authorizations from Congress--and we do need those
authorizations--a long-term program that begins operations of a
pilot interim storage facility, advances toward the siting and
licensing of a larger interim storage facility, and makes
demonstrable progress of the siting and characterization of
repository sites to facilitate the availability of one or more
geological repositories.
Certainly, consolidated storage is a critical component of
an overall used fuel and waste management system and offers a
number of benefits such as offering an opportunity to remove
fuel from shutdown reactors, meeting waste acceptance
obligations of the Federal Government sooner, and reducing the
Government's liabilities caused by delayed waste acceptance.
No matter how many facilities or what specific form they
take, we believe a consent-based approach to siting is critical
to success. The administration supports working with Congress
to develop a consent-based process that is transparent,
adaptive, and technically sound, as recommended by the
Commission. The Commission emphasized that flexibility,
patience, responsiveness, and a heavy emphasis on consultation
and cooperation will all be necessary in the siting process and
in all aspects of implementation.
The strategy also highlights the need for a new waste
management and disposal organization to provide the stability,
focus, and credibility to build public trust and confidence.
Again, there are multiple models that exist along a continuum
from a Government program to Federal corporations. But whatever
form the new entity takes, organizational stability and
appropriate level of autonomy, leadership continuity, oversight
and accountability, and public credibility are all critical
attributes for future success.
Finally, the Department has also initiated the Blue Ribbon
Commission recommended revisiting of the decision to co-mingle
commercial used fuel and defense waste.
So we are facing a unique opportunity to address the needs
of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle by setting it on a
sustainable path and providing the flexibility needed to engage
potential host communities and anticipated advancements in
technology. We need to move forward with tangible progress
toward used fuel acceptance initially from closed reactor sites
and providing more certainty for the nuclear industry. This
process is critical to assure the benefits of nuclear power are
available to current and future generations.
And I will be happy to answer any questions that you have,
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moniz follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now, I would like to
recognize myself for 5 minutes for the first round of
questions.
Mr. Secretary, DOE's strategy is built on the premise that
States will volunteer to host interim storage or a repository
facility. Your testimony mentions reports that ``a number of
communities are exploring the possibility of hosting a
consolidated storage facility.'' So the question is what States
have indicated interest in hosting a facility?
Mr. Moniz. First, I want to clarify, Mr. Chairman, that of
course at this stage we are not engaging in any kind of
negotiations or anything of that type. However, there have been
a number of public reports, and in fact, one county has in fact
passed a resolution expressing interest. Based also upon the
experiences in Europe, we believe there are reasons for
optimism that that can happen.
Mr. Shimkus. So we don't have States that are showing
interest right now nor do we have Governors or U.S. Senators
who are making a pitch for their State to be considered?
Mr. Moniz. Well, it is certainly premature for any so-
called pitch because right now we don't even have the
authorities to move forward.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, no, it is not unlikely with the Blue
Ribbon Commission and with the statements by this
administration for States to have come forward and tried to
organize their own political support with the Governor's office
and their sitting Senators to be making this pitch that we
would consider it. I mean there is nothing in law that says
they can't start trying to mobilize public support in their
State for following up on this proposal, is there?
Mr. Moniz. Well, no. And again, as I have said, there have
been certainly reports in the media----
Mr. Shimkus. But you can't tell us of any States which have
done that initial work other than this one county in some
State?
Mr. Moniz. Well, one county that is in Texas, I mean, it
was in public. A public resolution was passed. Recently, there
were media reports which I have not attempted in any way to
confirm, but there were statements made in Mississippi. There
have been a number of statements made. But again, until we have
the authorities, can put out a request for proposals, then I
think frankly our position to provide some technical support
for developing the information for potential communities I
think would be premature frankly.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, it seems to me that a majority of these
siting efforts and up with local community supporting a
facility, maybe this county, and State-level officials opposing
it. In fact, if I remember, the history of Yucca Mountain was
the State General Assembly passed a resolution in support of
the initial siting of Yucca Mountain.
We also have, you know, Nye County v. Nevada, Private Fuel
Storage v. Utah, and your written testimony mentions consent-
based areas that might be successful, i.e., Sweden and Finland,
but you fail to mention England, a consent-based approach that
the Commission touted, and what happened to that consent-based
approach?
Mr. Moniz. These are tortuous paths so----
Mr. Shimkus. So it was not successful as an----
Mr. Moniz. Yes, we will----
Mr. Shimkus. So, I mean, my point is, what makes you
believe that another consent-based approach somewhere in this
country is not going to end up 30 years later and $15 billion
in the hole just like we have right now at Yucca Mountain?
Mr. Moniz. Well, look, we all know all of these issues
around nuclear waste take time. One example that, you know, it
is not a high-level waste repository but----
Mr. Shimkus. Which is a lot different than what we are
talking about.
Mr. Moniz. But in WIPP with the transuranic facility we did
have a similar situation with the State and now we have a very
successful----
Mr. Shimkus. But I have personal knowledge of a U.S.
Senator who fought against that as the Attorney General who is
now a sitting U.S. Senator from that State. So----
Mr. Moniz. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus [continuing]. We better be careful. I think
this illusion that this consent-based approach is going to be
panacea I am not sure is supported by the facts.
Another thing that the Blue Ribbon Commission that you are
also promoting is that incentives are a key to success. And the
estimated cost of this effort from the beginning is 5.6 billion
over 10 years. Why not offer this money to Nevada?
Mr. Moniz. Again, the recommendation is around a consent-
based approach. Any State and community can come forward.
Mr. Shimkus. Part of the problem with the State of Nevada
is they say show me the money. We don't believe you will follow
through and there are not going to be any additional benefits.
Wouldn't $5.6 billion to a State that has a struggling economy,
they could rebuild its roads, bring in rail lines, and probably
continue to do what we have and the Department of Energy has
done with UNLV, continue to support their advanced nuclear
energy technology, don't you think that would be a good lure?
Mr. Moniz. Again, we are advocating a consent-based
approach. Any State can come forward, and we do believe that
research, materials testing, characterization facilities are an
important part of the storage program and it presumably would
be part of a possible ``incentive'' program.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I yield to Mr.
Tonko for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
For the last few decades, the nuclear waste problem has
been intractable. I think the Blue Ribbon Commission
recommendations and the Department of Energy strategy document
are helping to strike up conversation about where we go from
here. Congress has an important role to play in finding
solutions along with the Departments and the Commission.
Secretary Moniz, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a
consent-based siting process for one or more centralized
interim storage facilities and one or more permanent
repositories. My understanding is that under current law the
only repository site that can legally be considered is Yucca
Mountain, and interim centralized storage is not an option in
the absence of Yucca. Is that correct?
Mr. Moniz. I believe that is a correct reading of the----
Mr. Tonko. So legislation would be necessary to establish a
new siting process that ensures a project has the consent of
the State and local governments?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, sir. In fact, the Blue Ribbon Commission
noted that almost all of the major steps required new statutory
authorities.
Mr. Tonko. OK. Thank you. The Blue Ribbon Commission
recommended that a new organization be created to manage and
dispose of the Nation's nuclear waste. That is contemplated in
the DOE's strategy, too. Would congressional action be needed
to establish an independent agency and transfer the necessary
functions and resources to that agency?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, sir. It would be.
Mr. Tonko. There are also tricky funding and appropriations
issues that need to be addressed to make sure that the funds
put aside for constructing a repository or storage facility can
actually be used for that purpose. Congress would need to
address those issues through legislation, I believe. Is that
correct?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, sir. And again, if I may comment, we
emphasized in the Commission and it is also true in the
administration's strategy, that is what is most important is
that whatever form the organization takes, it has the proper
authorities. Key among those is a proper access to the funds.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And it sounds to me like DOE has
taken an important step in developing a strategy, but you can't
solve this problem alone, can you?
Mr. Moniz. Correct, sir.
Mr. Tonko. So there is a bipartisan effort in the Senate to
develop legislation to begin addressing these very tough
issues. We haven't seen any effort on the House side, though.
House Republicans seem unwilling to move past their fixation on
Yucca Mountain. So my question would be while the Republicans
seem to be waiting for a resolution to a pending lawsuit
seeking to require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
continue its work on its withdrawn DOE license application for
Yucca, but a court opinion can't fix the funding problems or
establish a new organization to handle the waste or and the
staunch opposition to Yucca in Nevada, can it?
Mr. Moniz. That is correct. And I would just add that,
again, our view is that quite independent of the court
decision, we should have these parallel tracks, the storage and
repository development, and for that we will need the new
authorities.
Mr. Tonko. Mr. Secretary, what message would you share with
members of the subcommittee and the broader committee who
remain focused exclusively on Yucca Mountain?
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, our view is that we have obviously
been having this stalemate over Yucca Mountain. There is a very
good chance this may continue for some time. There are many
steps needed. Even if the court were to rule for the NRC to
proceed, there are still other actions of Congress, many
actions in the State, et cetera. And again, our main message is
that it will work out one way or the other but let's move
together on taking some practical steps that require new
authorities that will move the ball forward, provide more
confidence to industry, and start getting the Government
accepting waste in the earliest possible time.
Mr. Tonko. What is the perceived timeline here if we are to
move forward and with the ultimate goal of having a new
repository available? Is there a certain given timeline that
you can imagine would be required at a minimum?
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, the administration strategy noted
that we feel that we can certainly move if we have authority,
let's say, this year, then we can move on the first interim
storage site within a decade. That would allow us, for example,
to move fuel away from the closed reactor sites, which would
be, I think, an important step, but that a repository is likely
to take decades to actually get functioning.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And, Mr.
Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague. I would just remind him
of the vote on the floor, 335 voting for Yucca, 118 Democrat,
so it is just not a Republican fixation.
Now, I would like to yield to the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Upton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I really appreciate, Mr. Secretary, you being
here and sharing your comments. This is such an important issue
for the country and you are right, we don't want gridlock on
this. I would note it has been bipartisan in terms of trying to
move a path forward for a couple of decades actually. And
certainly your willingness to engage and to move the ball
forward is very much appreciated.
And as Mr. Shimkus just said, and the votes we have had the
last couple of years, not only this year but last year, the
votes--326 to 81, 335 to 81, 337 to 87--is a pretty clear
indication that the House at least has a very strong bipartisan
majority towards trying to get this issue resolved. I would
note that Mr. Dingell and myself wrote an op-ed piece about a
month ago or so again urging the court to try and help resolve
this and allow the NRC to move forward.
But let me go back. When you testified before our committee
in June, Chairman Shimkus asked if you were aware of any
technical or scientific issues that would prevent Yucca from
being a safe repository, and you responded at that time, ``this
is an NRC decision ultimately to be taken.'' And I certainly
agree. And the public debate would clearly benefit from the NRC
completing the independent assessment of Yucca.
Fortunately, we know that both the NRC and DOE do have the
funds to support the completion of the NRC's safety evaluation
report. However, we are all waiting for that DC Circuit Court
of Appeals--maybe it will be coming this afternoon; who knows--
which seems to be taking an inordinate amount of time compared
to a number of other cases that they have had.
One of the issues that concerns me is what the ultimate
cost of DOE's new strategy would be to the consumers and the
taxpayers. We know that in '09, the Fee Adequacy Assessment
showed that the fee was adequate to fund Yucca Mountain.
However, I am going to quote from DOE's Secretarial
Determination of the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund fees in
January of this year before you are there. It said, ``the
consent-based approach to facility siting set forth in the
strategy makes it impossible to assign meaningful probabilities
to any geologic medium, and by extension, any cost estimate.''
Those were their words. So do you know whether the Nuclear
Waste Fund today will be adequate to pay for all the facilities
contained in the DOE strategy?
Mr. Moniz. Mr. Chairman, certainly my understanding of the
revised analysis that was done in response to the court, it
looked at--I may get this not quite--I think it was something
like 42 different scenarios into the future and found that with
continuation of the one-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee, that kind
of rested kind of in the middle of the various scenarios. And
so the argument was that at this stage the one-mill-per-
kilowatt-hour fee would seem to be an appropriate place to go
but there is considerable uncertainty of the lifetime costs
depending upon which of those scenarios ends up being followed.
Mr. Upton. Do you know whether the Nuclear Waste Fund could
absorb the $9 billion write-off for abandoning Yucca?
Mr. Moniz. Well, if one looks at the ensemble of the
scenarios in that Fee Adequacy Reassessment, the uncertainties
of the spread was much, much larger than the amount that you
have said. So that would again be in the uncertainties that we
have today to be realized only over decades.
Mr. Upton. Yes. So for us in Michigan, that 1/10-of-a-mill
fee has meant $600 million in essence collected from Michigan
ratepayers. And so if you know Michigan at all, we have got one
plant no longer operating, the Big Rock plant. I have two in my
district, two facilities that are currently operating, and they
have both run out of room so they are doing dry storage. I know
Mr. Dingell has got a facility in his district as well.
So ultimately, we really do need this to be resolved and
get on a glide path that can assure that there will be one safe
place, at least one safe place for the high-level nuclear
waste. And I appreciate your willingness to work with us and
with our committee to ultimately get this thing done.
Mr. Moniz. If I may comment, I think the situations that
you have described are exactly what motivated the Blue Ribbon
Commission discussions that we feel, and the administration has
agreed with this, that moving to an initial kind of fast track
pilot interim storage facility could handle the fuel from those
shutdown reactors, and that would allow, you know, restoration
of that site to other activities.
And of course we know that a substantial fraction of plants
are running out of space and that is where the consolidated
storage site--the issue is fuel acceptance. I mean that is the
key issue for the plants. And this would allow us to start to
move the fuel and both alleviate the issues at the plants and
lower the liabilities for the Government by beginning to move
the fuel. So that is why I mean, again, we think that a
parallel track of the storage and repository or repositories
will give us the flexibility and the adaptability to start
moving and except fuel in the next decade.
Mr. Upton. I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The chairman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Waxman,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Moniz, I thank you again for being here today to
discuss the administration's strategy for managing the
country's nuclear waste.
Over the last 2 years, this not lowly but very important
subcommittee has heard testimony from a number of witnesses on
the nuclear waste issue, including testimony from the State of
Nevada about why many Nevadans oppose Yucca Mountain nuclear
waste depository. Martin Malsch, testifying on behalf of the
State of Nevada, told the committee ``opposition to the Yucca
Mountain project in Nevada was not always a given.'' But
Congress and Federal agencies took several actions that
destroyed the State's trust in the process and locked in
opposition.
I would like to ask you a few questions about how to move
beyond the Yucca Mountain stalemate and learn from our mistakes
in Nevada. In your testimony you say, ``any workable solution
for the final disposition of used fuel and nuclear waste must
be based not only on sound science and also on achieving public
acceptance at the local, State, and tribal levels.'' Let's
start with sound science you say is necessary. What are the key
scientific questions that need to be answered to satisfy
concerns about the safety of nuclear waste disposal?
Mr. Moniz. Well, there are a number of scientific
questions. Ultimately, it comes down to understanding the form
of the waste package, its interaction with the host
environment, and the potential for having some elements go into
the environment and propagate over long periods of time. That
is what is a very detailed analysis looking at both geology,
hydrology, and the materials issues around integrity of the
package.
Mr. Waxman. The State of Nevada and Clark County raised
particular concerns about how EPA and other Federal agencies
set safety standards for Yucca Mountain alleging that these
standards were tailored to make sure Yucca met them. The State
of Nevada told our committee that these changes ``utterly
destroy the credibility of the program.'' How should EPA and
other Federal agencies approach the regulatory process to
ensure that any safety standards are both sufficient and
credible with concerned stakeholders?
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, if I go back to the Blue Ribbon
Commission recommendations, the Commission emphasized that what
really needs to be set first are kind of generic safety
standards before one starts tailoring to an individual site. So
again, we think that the way that the Yucca Mountain decision
was made, A) raises this problem, as you have referred to many
times, in terms of it was not a consent-based process and that
in itself created conditions. It also had the effects of highly
restricting what the Department could do over many years in
terms of exploring different geologies and it basically did not
have this approach, as I mentioned, where one such generic
safety standards that one then applies to various characterized
local sites.
Mr. Waxman. So it could apply to a number of multiple
sites?
Mr. Moniz. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. Having updated generic standards will also
support the efficient consideration as you look at----
Mr. Moniz. Yes. And then that would inform the regulatory
process. And as we have all said, particularly when you look
also, you know, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also had a cap of
70,000 tons and we know very well that even if there were no
nuclear reactors built, we would be way, way past that amount.
We have to look at the questions of other repositories,
certainly be prepared for that possibility.
Mr. Waxman. Now, no project will ever enjoy universal
support so how do you envision defining consent? In the case of
Nevada, the Yucca Mountain project enjoys some local support
but faces strong opposition from the State and key counties.
What can the Federal Government do to win support of a whole
State that is wary of hosting a repository or interim storage
facility even if the facility enjoys local support?
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, we believe or at least I should say
I believe that ultimately it is a very iterative process based
upon, as I said in my testimony, continuous open cooperation
and consultation at all levels. As we said earlier, and I think
it is an example again--I will concede to the chairman's point
that clearly the WIPP facility in New Mexico is a transuranic
waste facility, not high-level waste, but the fact is that was
a case where it took many, many years. There was litigation
involved to win the confidence and trust all along the chain of
responsibility. And now, as a result, well, I think we are into
now our second decade of a highly successful operation there.
Mr. Waxman. So for the Congress, the take-home message
should be that we can tackle this problem by ensuring the
Federal agencies, or any new organization, has the authority it
needs to implement a consent-based process that is transparent
and rooted in science. With that----
Mr. Moniz. That ultimately is the overarching, most
important recommendation of the Commission.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus, Mr. Barton,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know we are having another hearing on high-level
nuclear waste when members of the audience are already asleep.
Mr. Shimkus. Wake up.
Mr. Barton. I am not going to name names, but his initials
are D.G.
But, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. And when I
was a young man, some members of the audience have heard me
tell the story, but it was my job to brief the then-Secretary
of Energy on a proposed piece of legislation at the Department
of Energy that came to be known as the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982. And they felt that if an Aggie engineer could explain
a bill to an oral surgeon, that we ought to be able to get it
through the Congress. And we did, and who would have dreamed
that in 2013 we would have the current Secretary of Energy
debating yet again another way to find a path forward on the
storage of high-level nuclear waste?
My good friend from Illinois, the subcommittee chairman,
asked you a question about what States might compete if we
adopted your consent-based approach or the Department's
consent-based approach? I would postulate that my State of
Texas might actually offer to compete. The county in West
Texas, Loving County, has already passed a resolution at the
county level and has been engaged in Austin with the Governor
and the Texas legislature. While it is never a given, certainly
I think the State of Texas might adopt an approach where, on a
local option basis, a county or an entity could compete for an
interim storage facility.
I also know that at Yucca Mountain, we have spent $15
billion and I think the subcommittee and the full committee
chairman are absolutely correct in trying to get value for the
taxpayer dollars and the ratepayer dollars that have been spent
on that facility.
Again, I would ask as a question if we were to adopt
through legislation, as you have at least suggested we might, a
dual-track approach of an interim storage facility while we are
waiting to license a permanent repository, that would not
preclude Yucca Mountain being chosen as either the interim
facility and/or possibly the permanent repository. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, I would agree. We view these as two linked
but independent pathways.
Mr. Barton. OK. And I believe I am correct, too, that under
current law Yucca Mountain has been legally empowered to be an
interim facility for storage. Is that not correct?
Mr. Moniz. I would have to clarify that, Mr. Chairman
Emeritus.
Mr. Barton. Well, I think I am correct.
Mr. Moniz. OK. Well, I will take, you know----
Mr. Barton. I think lots of things, not all of them are
correct, so maybe I am wrong on that. But I believe----
Mr. Moniz. When you were a practicing engineer and I was a
practicing scientist, we were always correct.
Mr. Barton. Yes. You have talked in your testimony about a
pending court case, and I think it is fair to say that the
majority of the committee is very frustrated that the court
should have ruled, has yet to rule. Do you have any indication
of when we might get a ruling on the legality of what the Obama
administration did in shutting down the Yucca facility?
Mr. Moniz. No, sir. I have no insight whatsoever to as when
a ruling would come, but I assure the committee, and as the
administration has spoken, that whatever the ruling is, we will
act appropriately and help to carry it out.
Mr. Barton. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to say in closing
that I am a strong supporter of Yucca. In your absence, I went
to the floor a week before last and opposed several amendments
against Yucca. So I am pro-Yucca. But I don't want to have to
serve as long as John Dingell has already served to finally
find an answer to the high-level waste issue. And if we can
adopt some sort of a dual approach were we push forward on
licensing Yucca as a final repository while also letting States
compete on an interim storage basis, I for one on the majority
side would be supportive of that approach with the appropriate
safeguard and caveats about the money and the effort that has
already been spent at Yucca Mountain.
So I thank the Secretary and his department for their
efforts, and I hope that since we, this morning, passed an SGR
fix that nobody thought could happen, this could be two in a
row if we can pass a high-level waste bill out of this
committee. That would be a tremendous accomplishment on your
watch and Mr. Upton's watch and Mr. Tonko's and Mr. Waxman's
watch. And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.
And I can assure my colleague that as long as Yucca
Mountain is still in the mix, we can move forward. But I have
no indication that the administration wants to move forward on
Yucca Mountain.
So now, I recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Dingell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy, and
I commend you for having this hearing.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary, to the committee. I note here in
2006 you wrote an article supporting Yucca Mountain. In 2011
you wrote another article saying there needs to be an
alternative. So to assist the committee with our judgments
here, you now believe that Yucca Mountain is no longer an
option as a permanent repository? Please answer yes or no.
Mr. Moniz. Congressman Dingell, with all due respect, it is
a little bit more than yes or no. I would note that the article
you referred to actually it is an op-ed, I think, in 2006, did
say that DOE had to take a fresh look at assessing the
suitability of Yucca Mountain, and it was not a complete----
Mr. Dingell. What does that mean, Mr. Secretary? That you
think it is still a viable thing----
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, we----
Mr. Dingell [continuing]. Or that it is not?
Mr. Moniz. The view is that it needs both science and
public acceptance. The latter is not there and we are not
seeing an end to the stalemate.
Mr. Dingell. With all respect, Mr. Secretary, you have
taken both sides of this issue. We have shot about $12 billion
as near as I can figure, maybe 13 now, and the hole is still
there and people are digging and doing things but nothing is
happening. And we don't have any idea of when we are going to
complete this problem or anything else.
Now, Mr. Secretary, would you please provide additional
information for the record regarding the viability of Yucca
Mountain as a permanent repository? And I will let you come up
with whatever it is you feel you should like to say on that
particular matter.
Mr. Moniz. Yes, sir. We will.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Secretary, do you have any plans to
reinitiate DOE's license application to the NRC for review and
final decision on Yucca Mountain? Yes or no?
Mr. Moniz. No, but again if the court reinstates the NRC
licensing process, then we will support it as needed, assuming
we have the funds to do so.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Secretary, the Blue Ribbon Commission
of which you were a member was not allowed to examine Yucca
Mountain is a part of its study. Do you believe that doing a
similar study again but including Yucca Mountain would be
useful to the administration is a determinant of a path forward
regarding nuclear waste storage? Please answer yes or no.
Mr. Moniz. No, sir, I don't think that would be useful at
this time. A commission like the Blue Ribbon Commission was
very important to address the generic, nonsite-specific issues,
as we discussed. For example, one of the problems is the need
to get generic safety criteria before one starts moving into
the consent----
Mr. Dingell. So is the answer, Mr. Secretary, yes or no?
Mr. Moniz. It was no. It was no, yes.
Mr. Dingell. Yes or no?
Mr. Moniz. It was a no, yes.
Mr. Dingell. OK. Now, Mr. Secretary, most of BRC's
recommendation is a consent-based approach where localities
across the country could volunteer to be the site of a new
repository. Under the best case scenario where all the units of
government from local to State to Federal agree that there is a
site that meets the needs of a repository of this kind, how
long approximately would it take to create such a repository
and how much would it cost?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think the estimate based upon the Fee
Adequacy Assessment were approximately $3 billion for
preselection, site evaluation for a repository, and
approximately 8 to 9 for site characterization and licensing.
So altogether in the 10 billion, $11 billion range.
Mr. Dingell. Would you submit for the record your further
comments on both of those two matters----
Mr. Moniz. Yes, we would be pleased----
Mr. Dingell [continuing]. How long and how much?
Mr. Moniz. We would be pleased to.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Secretary, the BRC report recommends,
``access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are providing
for the purpose of nuclear waste management,'' and you propose
nonlegislative as well as legislative changes to achieve this
goal. Can access to the funds be gained through nonlegislative
means? Yes or no?
Mr. Moniz. I would say yes and no. We strongly feel that
legislation really is the appropriate way to go. I think the
principle administration's proposal and really the Commission's
is somehow we need to have the funds and the expenditures
either mandatory or discretionary but in a way that does not
have these funds competing with the other Government
priorities.
Mr. Dingell. Would you submit further comments for the
record?
Now, Mr. Secretary, would nonlegislative proposals
recommend ways in which we could protect funds being deposited
into the Nuclear Waste Fund? As you know, we have dissipated
large sums of money. Can you answer yes or no to that, please?
Mr. Moniz. Again, we feel legislation is the appropriate
route.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's----
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Secretary, in the 2011 article I mentioned
earlier, you note that you were a strong supporter of nuclear
energy developing new nuclear technologies and investing in
other energy technologies. Based on recent appropriations and
the recently passed Energy and Water appropriations from the
House, do you believe that your department now has the
resources to invest in these new technologies to prevent, as
you put it, ``America being less competitive in the global
technology market?'' Please answer yes or no.
Mr. Moniz. Well, if the President's request is respected,
then the Nuclear Energy Office has a very good plan in place to
both support advanced reactor technology and the technology
development for waste disposal. I would add to that, of course,
beyond the appropriated amounts, the Department has made the
conditional loan guarantee of $8 billion roughly to build
``first-mover'' new nuclear plants, which is a critical issue
for the future of nuclear power in this country.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chair, I am over my time and I thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Hall, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, I thank you for being here. Sometimes
it is not good to have been here before like you have, the
questions that you get put to you, but I will remember you on
my Section 999. You were very knowledgeable on that. That is
still up and you remember it was when you had energy at a
certain level but we couldn't get it to the top of the water
and we traded for technology from universities and others and
paid them with the energy that we did get to the top of the
water. So we didn't get it if they didn't get it to the top.
They got it to the top and it is working and they are still
trying to kill 999. I hope you will remember your position on
that.
Mr. Moniz. I remember your efforts very, very well leading
that charge and I would say that as a fact I think the result
has been some excellent, excellent research.
Mr. Hall. It is still working.
Mr. Moniz. Especially on the environmental footprint of
unconventional oil and gas production.
Mr. Hall. Yes, and thank you. And it is a pleasure to see
you. I have a copy of a DOE presentation here from late June
that indicates the size for the ``larger interim storage
facility,'' the one slated to be open in 2025 and the DOE
strategy is 70,000 metric tons. Is that right? That is your----
Mr. Moniz. Yes, sir. And that would be preceded by the
pilot plant.
Mr. Hall. That is the entire inventory of what the nuclear
industry is currently storing and the statutory size of Yucca
Mountain, right?
Mr. Moniz. Um-hum.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Secretary, how hard is the administration
going to answer or how are they going to make people believe
when you say that that facility is going to be temporary?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think this is, again, the so-called
linkage issue and we think it is very important----
Mr. Hall. Right.
Mr. Moniz [continuing]. That the action on the storage side
is accompanied in parallel by adequate expenditures to
establish one or more repositories.
Mr. Hall. How will DOE overcome concerns that a lot of
people are going to have on the part of communities that an
interim site could become a de facto permanent site if no other
community could be found to host a permanent disposal facility
area?
Mr. Moniz. You know, again, as I have said, I think this is
going to be a long discussion, and we also noted that there
should be flexibility into the system so that the individual
communities and States who are stepping forward as potential
hosts can negotiate the linkages that they feel are appropriate
to lend them confidence.
Mr. Hall. Well, the presentation--I don't know where it is
there but I think we have seen it somewhere--estimates
transporting the spent fuel to this larger interim storage
facility at a rate of 3,000 tons a year, and that means that it
would take over 23 years just to transport the spent fuel to
the site. By the time the 70,000 tons was all transported, it
would be 2048. That is a hard figure for me to think about
being here and being sure that it happens just that way.
Mr. Moniz. Yes, well, it is a major logistical challenge
and I think no matter what repository, what storage sites one
has, it is a major transportation campaign. I also served on a
National Academy committee several years ago looking at
transportation and a couple of things of note perhaps. One is
that we felt that for the large campaign, a heavy reliance on
trains would be a good thing. That is a big planning project.
Secondly, we also noted that the number of used fuel movements
in Europe already is approximately equal to all the movements
we would need for 70,000 tons, and that has been handled in a
pretty safe way.
Mr. Hall. But 2048 is the projected date for opening a
repository under DOE's strategy.
Mr. Moniz. It is approximate.
Mr. Hall. OK. Well, let me ask you, does that really make
sense?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think, you know----
Mr. Hall. I think you have been around a long time and you
are very knowledgeable.
Mr. Moniz. To be honest, the Department has had an issue of
perhaps too often providing optimistic dates for big projects
and maybe to be a little more conservative is a good idea.
Mr. Hall. It is going to be hard to explain how they are
going to spend 23 years transporting just to turn around and
ship it all again. Is that going to cause some problems?
Mr. Moniz. Well, of course, we are in no way precluding the
possibility of----
Mr. Hall. DOE estimated----
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Hall. DOE estimated the transportation costs for 70,000
metric tons to go to Yucca at 19 billion. I am anxious to watch
what the analyzation is going to be on that. And my time really
is up.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. I would
remind him that if everything would have gone upon plan, Yucca
would have been open in 1998. Had the administration not pulled
the plug when it did, we would be under construction right now.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
hearing. I want to thank Secretary Moniz for joining us.
The subcommittee examined the issue of nuclear waste
storage in numerous hearings for the past several years. In
2011 as ranking member of the subcommittee, I had the
opportunity to visit Yucca Mountain with Chairman Shimkus, and
I supported the use of Yucca Mountain in the past and still
believe it is a terrible waste of taxpayer dollars to have this
$12 billion facility sitting unused in the desert, although in
all honesty, we are not going to sell that desert land for
condos. And so I assume it will stay in our Federal land
inventory. So maybe someday we have this hole underground, it
can be used for long-term nuclear storage.
The termination of the project, though, has postponed our
Nation's efforts and delayed efforts to permanently dispose of
used nuclear fuel. It is now envisioned it will be storing
these materials and dry casks for decades, not much longer than
the original intended purpose. What is DOE doing to support the
long-term storage of used nuclear fuel in these dry cask
storage systems? And I will go forward after that. Is there any
program at DOE to be able to deal with the amount of nuclear
waste we are seeing?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, sir. There is work going on and also
historically we have seen collaboration with EPRI in terms of
looking at the dry cask storage longevity and a particular
focus right now is on the materials issues and really whether
we can confidently expect century-scale storage.
Mr. Green. Between the 1980s and 2010 when Yucca Mountain
was terminated, the Nation had invested billions of dollars in
a scientific study at that site. The scope of this work spanned
our entire national lab complex and many of our leading
universities, a number of other respected institutions. What is
the understanding and result of this study and what did we
learn? How can we best apply the results of this work before
going forward so that our investment is not wasted? You know,
we know that at least politically in the foreseeable future,
Yucca Mountain is not available, but we still need to plan for
long-term storage, and I think that is what the Blue Ribbon
Commission said.
Mr. Moniz. Well, may I answer? Oh, yes. So, for example, I
would pick out a couple of areas. One, it would be that I think
the methodology was developed for developing large-scale
reservoir and, if you like, a water basin modeling technique
that one will need in any geology to go forward.
Another, I would say, is understanding how the form of
waste package interacts with the environment. So I think the
methodology for how one does characterization and waste package
geochemistry interactions has been advanced.
Mr. Green. So we have learned something from the effort.
And, as you know, and you served on it--and thank you for your
service--the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a consent-based
approach to repository siting. With respect to Yucca Mountain
project, there appears to be a division of the opinion. And
having been out there, and I think we met with about every
county official from around that area who very much supported
it. Obviously, the State of Nevada and Clark County doesn't.
And that may have been different back years ago when it was
selected.
How can we keep from having something, because these things
take so long, getting permission? And there may be consent but
a decade later all of a sudden the political will is not there.
And, you know, I know there is a proposal for Pecos of Texas
and New Mexico. There may be other locations but, you know, if
we make a decision and the political will then changes, which
is what seemed to happen out in Yucca Mountain, how did the
Blue Ribbon Commission address that issue if we are going to
look for consent now and expect that contract to last for
decades?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think the Commission recognized that--
well, first of all, again let me repeat that in the case,
again, of a transuranic repository in New Mexico, little bit
different animal, but that case where again it took an
evolution of the community/State interaction. Secondly, the
Commission recognized that each of these negotiations will be
somewhat different, but in a generic sense, recommended a
process that would have various steps and commitments to
continue, which kind of ratcheted up at each step of the
negotiation.
Mr. Green. I know I am almost out of time and I won't have
time for all my questions, Mr. Chairman. I know of no country
in the world that has long-term storage but our country is
producing a lot of it and I would think it would be redundant
to create a separate agency. I think we might need to fix the
one we have so we don't add that bureaucratic delay in to
getting forward with it.
But I thank you for the time.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Harper, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Harper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking your time to come
visit with us on what is a very important and long-going issue.
In 1980, Congress passed the Low-Level Waste Policy Act
providing a framework for States to voluntarily join compacts
and then work within the compact to site a low-level waste
disposal facility. While this merely addressed low-level waste,
it provides relevant experience about a consent-based process
for nuclear waste disposal. After the Act was passed in 1980,
it wasn't until 1985 that Congress approved the compacts and
then it was 1990 before a disposal facility opened in Utah but
only for Class A waste, the lowest class of low-level waste.
Congress didn't approve the Texas/Vermont compact until
1988, 18 years after the Act passed, and the disposal facility
in Texas didn't open until 2011 after a 7-year licensing
process. To date, 33 years after Congress passed the 1980 Act,
34 States still remain without access to low-level waste
Classes B and C disposal.
So my question is in light of the limited success and
lengthy process for consent-based siting for low-level waste,
what gives you confidence that DOE will find an interim storage
site for used nuclear fuel and have them operating 8 years from
now?
Mr. Moniz. Well, first, I would note that, first of all,
there is some success, and again I go back to the WIPP example
in New Mexico which is for transuranic waste. And again, it
took a long time. This goes back to Mr. Hall's question. We
prefer to be conservative and set 2048 because these things
take time. And I think we just have to start on that path. I
personally remain optimistic that we will have communities
coming forward and then provide technical assistance so that
they can be certain that they have the technology base to move
forward.
Mr. Harper. Well, given your role on the Blue Ribbon
Commission, are you familiar with the private fuel storage
project in Utah which is the only interim storage facility ever
licensed?
Mr. Moniz. Am I familiar with it?
Mr. Harper. Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Moniz. Yes. Yes. Um-hum.
Mr. Harper. Do you know how long the NRC took to issue that
license?
Mr. Moniz. No, I do not, sir.
Mr. Harper. OK. If I told you 8 years, would that surprise
you?
Mr. Moniz. No.
Mr. Harper. OK. All right. Do you know the status of that
license now?
Mr. Moniz. No, I do not.
Mr. Harper. OK. It is my understanding the consortium asked
to the NRC to terminate the license late last year.
Mr. Moniz. I see. Um-hum.
Mr. Harper. So I think PFS is an example of how a local
community, in this case the Goshute Indians, initially
supported a project but State officials opposed it, just like
the situation with Yucca Mountain. It is also an example of how
licensing such a project is not as expedient as sometimes the
DOE strategy suggests.
So, you know, what we have here is a very serious issue. It
is something that we have dealt with for now decades. I don't
believe that the formation of a new Federal agency to oversee
management of nuclear waste is the answer. I believe that that
would just create additional delays. So I would hope that we
could continue to work on this issue and I certainly want to
thank you for your time today to come share this with us.
And with that, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. If the gentleman would yield.
Mr. Harper. Yes, I will yield to the chair.
Mr. Shimkus. And I would just highlight we did this when
the Blue Ribbon Commission testified before us, and there is a
map of Nevada. We talk about local interests. Two points of
this is that all of the counties minus Clark have resolutions
on record supporting Yucca Mountain. And then we talk about
local issues and you use even in your testimony Finland and
Sweden. A land base of that siting proposal which you would
call local, do you know what would be local for Yucca Mountain?
Who would be considered the local landowners? It would be the
Federal Government. That is how far away and expansive the
Federal property as Yucca. Who is local would be us. We are the
local interest of concern, and if we are not, the local
communities that all have gone on resolutions in support of
Yucca, they are on record.
So, you know, I am kind of getting tired of this bashing of
Nevadans that they are all one side when there is a strong
vocal group of Nevadans who want this, hence going back to the
$5.6 billion that I think you should put on the table to help
convince maybe the other folks from Nevada.
So with that, I would like to recognize my colleague from
California, Mrs. Capps, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for it and thank you,
Secretary, for being here today and participating.
And, as you know, like it or not, nuclear waste is a
reality. Part of that reality is that nuclear waste is going to
be around for a long, long time, far beyond the lifetimes of
our children and our grandchildren. But as the creators of this
waste, I believe that we have a responsibility to put in place
a long-term plan to store it safely. And in the absence of such
a plan, however, spent nuclear fuel will continue to be stored
for the foreseeable future onsite right at nuclear power plants
like Diablo Canyon, which is in my Congressional District.
I have been pleased to see more spent fuel being moved out
of high density pools and into dry cask storage at Diablo
Canyon and also across the country. These casks are more stable
and safer, but they are not a permanent solution for spent fuel
storage in my opinion. Do you agree?
Mr. Moniz. Yes. As I said----
Mrs. Capps. They are not a permanent solution----
Mr. Moniz [continuing]. Century-scale looks to be the kind
of scale.
Mrs. Capps. Pardon?
Mr. Moniz. We think the dry cask storage for the order of
one century----
Mrs. Capps. One century they will work but not a permanent
solution--I mean we can't----
Mr. Moniz. Not a millennium.
Mrs. Capps. Not a millennium?
Mr. Moniz. Right.
Mrs. Capps. As we all know, implementing a permanent
storage solution has proven to be quite difficult. I commend
the administration for moving the ball forward with the Blue
Ribbon Commission report and the strategy released earlier this
year, but given the serious challenges that still lie ahead, my
constituents and I remain concerned that Diablo Canyon could
become a de facto long-term storage site. It has already been
over 30 years since Congress first directed the Department of
Energy to remove and store spent nuclear fuel from power
plants. So, Mr. Secretary, what happens if it takes another 30
years or even longer to implement a permanent storage plan?
Does DOE have a contingency plan to handle long-term onsite
storage of spent nuclear fuel?
Mr. Moniz. Well, first, I think the general technical
judgment is that continued onsite storage moving in from pools
to dry casks is a reasonably safe approach but it is not a
system that we want at all. And that is exactly why we feel
that the strategy put out following the Commission's
recommendations to aggressively pursue the parallel paths of
consolidated storage and repositories is the right one and it
gives flexibility, adaptability, and it won't be immediate. We
think we have a chance to start moving some fuel in about 10
years but only if we start now.
Mrs. Capps. Right. So I will just move ahead. One of the
most important elements of the Blue Ribbon Commission report
and the DOE strategy is the consent-based approach for locating
the permanent storage facility. Engaging local communities in
this process is critical, especially for the consolidated
facility, but it is also crucial to engage with the communities
where the fuel is currently being stored and could be traveling
through. I am very concerned about the transportation. Once a
permanent site is found, how do we move this spent fuel safely?
This is a top priority for my constituents in San Luis Obispo.
They have serious concerns about the risks involved in moving
the spent fuel safely through their communities, and they want
their voices heard in this process. So to what extent is DOE
engaging with communities where there is this storage now
occurring and so many concerned constituents who are worried
about how that transporting is going to happen through their
communities?
Mr. Moniz. So the Department has recently done a number of
transportation studies, and again, I refer to the National
Academy report of--6 or 7 years ago I was a member of that
group as well. Again, I think two points, maybe one to
reiterate is that the amount of fuel movement called for for
all of the fuel we have today is very comparable to what Europe
has already done with a very, very good safety record. However,
clearly, we have to A) do it very well, but B) the report
emphasized strongly the same thing as you have emphasized, the
need to early on work with the communities along transit
pathways, instruct in emergency response kinds of activities,
communicate, know what is happening. That is very, very
important.
So I think as soon as we understand that we are moving
towards a system to begin moving that fuel, we need to get very
aggressive in that community outreach.
Mrs. Capps. Well, I appreciate knowing that. I share your
concerns about it and I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentlelady's time is expired. And on her
point, though, that I think in testimony yesterday the
Secretary said Plan B is to leave on site. That was testimony
yesterday. Is the Plan B right now----
Mr. Moniz. Well, as I----
Mr. Shimkus [continuing]. If all else fails----
Mr. Moniz. When I said it, it is the ground truth. If we
can't move it----
Mr. Shimkus. Well, I am just trying to lay out the facts as
was testified yesterday that Plan B would be to keep onsite.
Mrs. Capps. Is it permanent? Are you----
Mr. Shimkus. That is their Plan B.
Mr. Moniz. If I may clarify, what I said again the ground
truth is if we can't move it, it stays where it is. It is a
totality. That is why we have to have the ability to move it.
Mr. Shimkus. Just trying to get some transparency here, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Moniz. For that, we need the authorities from Congress.
Mr. Shimkus. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary,
it is good to talk with you again. Thank you for being here
with us today.
Most of DOE's current nuclear waste management activities
rely on taxpayer funding appropriated in 2012 and under the
Continuing Resolution for 2013. This means that the taxpayer is
currently funding the costs of DOE's effort to start over,
breaking the historic principle that the beneficiaries of the
electricity, the consumers, pay the costs of disposal. For how
long and for what cost does the administration support
continuing the policy of having the taxpayer foot the bill?
Mr. Moniz. Well, sir, I think, first of all, let me refer
to the letter to Mr. Shimkus that he had read into the record
looking at all of the activities and the authorities, et
cetera. This, by the way, has been reviewed by our general
counsel and by the Department of Justice to make sure all the
authorities were proper in terms of what was used for
appropriated funds and what was used by waste fund.
But I think, as you referred it, to the 2012 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, there was explicit language to look at fuel
management and disposal activities. In my view, those are very
generic activities. Frankly, those are some of the activities
that the Department was proscribed from doing by the 1987
action, and my view, to be honest, very mistakenly, that this
research on the back end of the fuel cycle was always important
and it is very important that we continue to do it now.
Mr. Johnson. OK. Changing subjects a little bit, there have
been inaccurate statements how Yucca Mountain can only hold
70,000 metric tons, so even if we build Yucca, we will still
need more than one repository. I would like to clarify for the
record that is a statutory not a scientific limit.
Mr. Moniz. Um-hum.
Mr. Johnson. In the Yucca Mountain EIS, DOE analyzed, ``the
total projected inventory of commercial spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste plus the inventories of commercial
greater than Class C waste and DOE special performance
assessment required waste.'' In DOE's 2008 report to Congress
on the need for a second repository, DOE referenced studies of
repository designs three times the area of the design used to
accommodate the 70,000 metric tons and an independent study
that concluded Yucca Mountain could accommodate from 4 to 9
times the statutory limit. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert
DOE's 2008 report to the hearing record.
Mr. Shimkus. Is there objection? Hearing none, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, DOE's July 22 response to
Chairman Shimkus, I think, as you indicated, indicates that
ongoing transportation activities are authorized under Section
180 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and eligible to be paid for
from the Nuclear Waste Fund. However, Section 302 of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act regarding use of the Nuclear Waste
Fund stipulates ``no amount may be expended by the Secretary
under this subtitle for the construction or expansion of any
facility unless such construction or expansion is expressly
authorized by this or subsequent legislation. The Secretary is
hereby authorized to construct one repository and one test-and-
evaluation facility.'' Which, of course, as we know, is Yucca
Mountain. So my question is how does the Department justify
Nuclear Waste Fund expenditures on transportation for
destinations other than Yucca Mountain?
Mr. Moniz. Well, sir, first of all, I am not a lawyer and I
think I may have to get back to you for the recommendation.
Mr. Johnson. Neither am I so----
Mr. Moniz. OK. We talk the same language.
Mr. Johnson. We do.
Mr. Moniz. But I think again all of the entries in those
three tables that was sent were reviewed by general counsel at
DOE. Secondly, I would note that it was my understanding those
transportation studies were very generic. They would be
applicable anywhere, and they certainly are not applied to the
construction or expansion of any facility. So I can check on
that with the lawyers but that would be my first reaction.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, I would ask you to go back and check, Mr.
Secretary----
Mr. Moniz. OK.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Because as I understand Section
302, it seems pretty emphatic and pretty specific what the
shalls and the shall nots pertain to.
Mr. Moniz. OK.
Mr. Johnson. OK. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back the time.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
McNerney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, first, I want to thank you for bringing your
technical expertise and your human communication skills to this
difficult problem.
My first question would be do you believe in your opinion
that the technology exists for safe transportation and long-
term storage of high-level nuclear waste?
Mr. Moniz. In the National Academy study that I referred to
earlier certainly concluded that one has to execute but, yes,
that it could be safe.
Mr. McNerney. So what you have said is that we need both
the science and we need the public acceptance for a local--so
clearly, in Yucca Mountain, the public acceptance part of this
has failed. Would you be a critic and tell me what you think
went wrong in that process in getting that project to be
acceptable in Nevada at Yucca Mountain?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I am neither a lawyer nor a psychologist
but I think, as was said earlier, I think the very prescriptive
nature and frankly the change of process that led to the
singling out of Yucca Mountain I think just inherently raised
some opposition.
Mr. McNerney. Do you think that that can be repaired, the
damage that was done?
Mr. Moniz. Well, we feel that consent-based process has a
very good chance of being successful with the time taken to
communicate, cooperate, and assistant technical analysis.
Mr. McNerney. But at the very least, the Department has
learned from that experience and probably won't make those same
mistakes again?
Mr. Moniz. I think we have all learned a hard lesson, yes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I have another question. Do you
believe that high-level waste has enough potential future value
to design repositories that the waste could be retrieved in the
future if appropriate?
Mr. Moniz. Well, if I may just kind of make sure we have
our definitions in the same line, we are using high-level waste
generally to apply to things like the defense waste where the
things like plutonium have already been removed so they do not
have energy value. But in the spent fuel or used fuel, as it is
sometimes called from the commercial power reactors, they still
contain plutonium, which certainly could be used for power
production here and that is what is done in France, for
example. I want to make very clear I am not advocating that,
but technically, that is correct.
Retrievability, however, independent of that, is probably
something that will be important for public acceptance, at
least over some time period.
Mr. McNerney. Well, if you look at what is happening at the
NIF program in Livermore, in order to use the NIF as a gateway
to hybrid fusion reaction or commercial reactor, they would use
spent fuel and use neutrons created in little fusion explosions
to accelerate a heat-driven process. Do you know what I am
talking about?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, there are many----
Mr. McNerney. There are values in this material.
Mr. Moniz. Yes, there are many alternatives. You are
referring to a process called spallation typically----
Mr. McNerney. I didn't know the word.
Mr. Moniz [continuing]. To make--well, to make neutrons and
that you then do something else with. There is fusion, there is
conventional fusion, there is inertial-confined fusion. These
are all, shall we say, well into the future as possible energy
sources but they are being researched.
Another thing I just maybe mention is that there is a
concept that is interesting potentially which one uses fusion
for the purpose of making neutrons that then makes more nuclear
fuel----
Mr. McNerney. Right.
Mr. Moniz [continuing]. Using depleted fuel, and I think
that is the thing that you are probably referring to.
Mr. McNerney. So the other question I have has to do with
the concern about comingling of military versus civilian
nuclear waste. What is the issue there? I don't understand why
that is a concern or an issue.
Mr. Moniz. Oh, well, in the 1980s that decision was made to
combine them. That wasn't made in the context of the 1998 date,
and so it was viewed that the defense programs could then be
relieved of the need to independently develop a repository.
Well, now, it is a different world. 1998 is past as far as I
can recall. Also, since then, we have developed specific
agreements with States like Idaho, for example, in terms of
removal of not only spent fuel but of high-level waste.
And so the Blue Ribbon Commission was not saying that
technically one could not combine them but it does note that
there are very different issues, different agreements. Also,
the high-level waste for the defense waste so-called, as I said
earlier, does not have energy value. Number two, it has
different packaging. Number three, it typically was very low
burn-up fuel. So it is typically much cooler than commercial
waste and so, there is no judgment made, but we are going to
reopen that, relook at the decision, and see if it would make
more sense to keep them separate or keep them on the same
track.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. I would ask
him to talk to me about Hanford on background. We can talk
about it.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Latta, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr.
Secretary, again thank you very much for being with us this
afternoon.
And if I could go back to Chairman Shimkus' June 28 letter
that he had written to the Department of Energy, the chairman
raised questions about the legal authority under which DOE is
conducting the various nuclear waste activities. It looks to me
that DOE is picking and choosing which laws are convenient to
follow. In the nuclear fuel storage and transportation section
of DOE's response, I noticed that DOE sites the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act Monitored Retrieval Storage, the MRS, provisions as
the authority for pursuing interim storage activities. However,
DOE's 2008 report to Congress on the demonstration of the
interim storage of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned
nuclear power reactor sites state, ``in Section 141 of the NWPA
authorized the Department to site, construct, and operate a
Monitored Retrievable Storage, MRS, facility but restricted the
ability of the Department to pursue this option by linking any
activity under the section to milestones tied to progress in
the development of the Yucca Mountain repository.''
I guess the question I have is, given that the DOE has shut
down the Yucca mountain program, how can DOE justify its
activities on interim storage under the MRS provision? It is
kind of a long question.
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, sir, ultimately I am relying on the
judgment of our general counsel in the Department of Justice
and the spelling out the authorities that were in there. And I
am also happy to respond more fully upon further research
there. But again, in my view, the issues of researching for the
whole back end of the fuel cycle, no matter what we pursue in
terms of storage and repository program, we need to do that
work that frankly was suspended for so long because of the 1987
decision. But I will get a response----
Mr. Latta. If I could ask if you could respond to the
committee in writing on that, I would greatly appreciate it----
Mr. Moniz. Yes.
Mr. Latta [continuing]. Because I think it is very
important point out there that needs to be----
Mr. Moniz. I would be happy to.
Mr. Latta [continuing]. Considered and responded to.
Now, if I could follow up on another point in regard to the
chairman's letter, DOE also indicated that the used fuel
research and development activities are authorized under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. And it is clear, however, that in
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and amendments enacted into the
1987 law, Congress directed DOE not to conduct further
repository research on sites other than Yucca Mountain.
In its decision in the United States v. Estate of Romani,
the United States Supreme Court stated, ``a specific policy
embodied in a later statute should control our construction of
the earlier statute even though it has not been expressly
amended.'' And then the question I have then, Mr. Secretary, is
how do you and the DOE justify ignoring the sections of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act while claiming to follow the others
and then falling back to the Atomic Energy Act which so clearly
has been superseded by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act?
Mr. Moniz. Again, sir, I will include that in the detailed
response because I am just not the person----
Mr. Latta. Well, and again, you know, in reading your
testimony, you know, I think it is very important because
especially as we have known that we are looking at about $15
billion have been spent at Yucca and, you know, I think if I
remember right in your testimony, we are talking that it is
looking like maybe another $19 billion is going to have to be
expended because of having to find other places to deposit the
nuclear waste. So if I am reading that correctly, is that 15
billion and then another 19 billion on top of that?
Mr. Moniz. Certainly north of 10, that is for sure.
Mr. Latta. So we are talking $34 billion out there that is
going to be expended when we already had a site Yucca, is that
correct?
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, going back to the waste fee
adequacy analysis, it is consistent that a mill per kilowatt
hour would cover all of these costs. So it is essentially
nuclear power, you know, pay-as-you-go. And I think the exact
cost will become sharper only as the future trajectory becomes
more clear. But the one mill per kilowatt hour in the revised
assessment is certainly consistent with covering the costs.
Mr. Latta. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask for indulgence to
ask one more question?
Mr. Shimkus. It depends on how long.
Mr. Latta. Short.
Mr. Shimkus. I have got colleagues who would like to ask--
--
Mr. Latta. When you say when it becomes sharper in looking
at that, could I just ask what your definition of sharper when
it comes to--you said when those numbers become sharper?
Mr. Moniz. First of all, the trajectory of nuclear power,
which clearly is an unknown today, will it grow substantially?
Will it not? Are we going to have multiple repositories? Are
going to have multiple storage sites and repositories at the
same time? I think those are all the issues that that will have
to be resolved to get the full lifecycle cost understood.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair now
recognizes----
Mr. Latta. I yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shimkus [continuing]. The gentleman from Georgia. Your
time is expired, no time to yield back.
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Barrow, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Barrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us today. And I can't
help but feel like you have been put in an incredibly difficult
position. You didn't really get us here but it is good to have
a friend in nuclear in your position even though you have got
an impossible set of circumstances to deal with. I just want to
ask you, explain it so an old county commissioner can
understand it. What is it going to take, what is going to have
to happen, and who is going to have to do what before we decide
whether to go forward with Yucca or not?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think the initial issue will be the
results of the current litigation with the NRC.
Mr. Barrow. That has got to be decided.
Mr. Moniz. That has to be decided and, as we have said, we
will----
Mr. Barrow. And you need some legislative authority to do
anything different than what is being litigated in the lawsuit
right now.
Mr. Moniz. Again, we feel we should be pursuing these dual
tracks in any event and that will require new authorities.
Should the licensing go forward, the evaluation go forward at
the NRC, again, a caution that there are still many, many other
steps that need to be taken by the Congress and the State to
move that project forward.
Mr. Barrow. So what should those steps look like to mark
what should we be doing?
Mr. Moniz. Well, the first thing that I am really asking
for and the administration asks for us to have the authorities
to move forward on this parallel track.
Mr. Barrow. Here is a concern I have got with that because
I am representing a whole lot of taxpayers who gave their
consent to this overall structure when they have been paying
their utility bills and paying into a fund that was supposed to
get them something. I remember it was the generators who gave
their consent to this process when they gave their political
assent to the laws that impose this burden on them and they
also entered into these contracts. When they turn all this
ratepayer money over to you all, they were supposed to get
something in return.
Now, my point is you talk about this is a pay-as-you-go
system. We have been going pretty far down the road and we
haven't gotten anywhere yet. So one question I would ask along
those lines what do we do to reimburse those folks who paid a
sum if we decide to abandon Yucca? What do we do to the
ratepayers and the generators that extracted the money for that
solution? What is going to happen to those ratepayers? How are
they going to be made whole if we decide to go in another
direction?
Mr. Moniz. The one mill per kilowatt hour is to remove fuel
from those sites, put it into Federal control where then the
Federal Government has the responsibility----
Mr. Barrow. That is for money that hasn't been collected
yet.
Mr. Moniz. But I am saying----
Mr. Barrow. What about the money that has already been
collected?
Mr. Moniz. And, yes, sure, but the----
Mr. Barrow. You say sure, but. It is----
Mr. Moniz. Each kilowatt hour will ultimately bear a cost
which is currently best estimate of a mill to manage disposal.
There is no backing away from the Federal commitment to manage
that process.
Mr. Barrow. My question: What about the stranded asset of
the investment that ratepayers have paid for years now if it is
determined that that asset is going to be upended? How about
covering their loss?
Mr. Moniz. The Federal Government, the administration
remains committed to moving that fuel as soon as possible. That
is why we believe that this dual track strategy is the fastest
way----
Mr. Barrow. But if you move it to someplace other than what
has been bought and paid for, you are going to add the cost of
this other repository system, either this intermediate and
permanent or this new permanent. My point is how do we
compensate the folks who have paid for the facility that we are
going to be walking away from if that is what we decide to do?
Mr. Moniz. The estimate remains that the one mill per
kilowatt hour is a very credible expectation for the cost of
getting that fuel accepted and moved.
Mr. Barrow. That is future revenues for future projects. I
am talking about what you want to do about the issue----
Mr. Moniz. All the way from the beginning, the current
waste fund with its nearly $30 billion sitting in there----
Mr. Barrow. How about money that has been collected that
hasn't been spent yet? What are we going to do about that?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I mean currently it is collecting interest
and it is sitting there to be deployed. In fact, then the
request for legislation would be to determine how a new waste
organization has access to whatever combination of
discretionary and mandatory funds required. But that $30
billion or almost $30 billion is there for this purpose.
Mr. Barrow. Well, I can speak for every county commissioner
and city councilman who has got any zoning authority anywhere
in the country that there is a problem here that I recognize a
mile away, and again, you didn't invent this problem, but if
you have got to zone a socially necessary use into an area that
has got some controversy or some undesirable effects, you are
going to have some problems with folks who don't want it in
their back yard.
And the problem with a consent-based basis that we are
talking about here, one challenge that I see just as an old
county commissioner is you have got folks who have got
different ideas about what their back yard is. You might have a
local government, the local community that is just dying to get
the jobs and the infrastructure and the opportunities. You have
got a State government that doesn't want it in their back yard.
Or you might have a State government that wants it but a local
government that doesn't want it in their back yard. Or you
might have the State and local government on the same page and
you have got some interest group somewhere that says it regards
the whole country is their back yard or the planet as their
back yard.
So I don't want us to be looking to something that has
never been found and it won't be found. I don't want to be
looking for a unicorn in this picture. Thank you for your----
Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague from Georgia and I would
like to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Murphy, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Secretary, great to see you again, and
thanks for coming to Pittsburgh this week.
Mr. Moniz. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy. One of the comments that was made in that
roundtable you had was an energy company leader said it was
important to have regulations that were science-based and
enforced consistently so that they could predict our future. I
worry about a consent-based approach because I am not always
sure that it is based in science. I believe that pure science
is best done without politics, and unfortunately, politics is
often done without science.
And we had some hearings prior to today where we learned
the story of what happened when a new director of NRC came in,
basically shut down the facility, got rid of employees,
disposed of records, and sent us back in time. And it concerns
me that that was politically driven and not scientifically
driven.
Now, help us, as I appreciate your commitment to wanting to
move forward in this, but in March, Nye County, California,
last year they notified DOE of their consent to have repository
Yucca Mountain. DOE responded saying that Nevada doesn't
consent. And, Mr. Secretary, your testimony refers to reports
that a number of communities are exploring the possibility of
hosting a consolidated storage facility and NRC staff has
indicated four industries have expressed some level of
interest. Has DOE or the representatives met with these
entities? Can you give me a yes or no on that?
Mr. Moniz. No, we are not and we don't have the authorities
to begin any kind of a negotiation with these communities.
Mr. Murphy. So isn't it fair that DOE meet with
representatives from Nye County, Pennsylvania, or somewhere
else if you are going to use a consent-based approach?
Mr. Moniz. Oh, I am sorry. I believe some other officials
have met with people from Nye County----
Mr. Murphy. But people within DOE are not?
Mr. Moniz. I am sorry?
Mr. Murphy. But people from DOE are not meeting with folks
in these other communities?
Mr. Moniz. No, no, again, it is my understanding--I can
clarify this later. It is my understanding that certainly some
members of the Nuclear Energy Office have had discussions but
nothing that I would call certainly a negotiation. We have no
authorities to do that.
Mr. Murphy. Well, regarding the interested entities, these
four that were mentioned, have the Senators and Governors in
the States where they are located endorsed hosting a
consolidated interim storage facility?
Mr. Moniz. No, sir, as far as my knowledge goes. But
earlier, as Mr. Barton said, there is an example where a county
in Texas has a public resolution----
Mr. Murphy. Sure.
Mr. Moniz [continuing]. Of interest and he said are engaged
in discussions with the Governor and the State legislature. So
that is an example where it is beginning and that is all--I
think until we have a process in place----
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me ask about this process. Have you
done any analysis on the adequacy of the Nuclear Waste Fund to
pay for both interim storage and final disposal facilities
assuming the fund could be used for both purposes?
Mr. Moniz. Again, the waste adequacy assessment looks at
multiple scenarios and finds that there is a very, very wide
range of lifecycle costs. The one mill per kilowatt hour----
Mr. Murphy. But my point is, are you using the Nuclear
Waste Fund to pay for interim and final disposal facilities?
Mr. Moniz. That is again something that will have to be
decided in Congress.
Mr. Murphy. But is that something you would support?
Mr. Moniz. The Blue Ribbon Commission supported it.
Mr. Murphy. OK. And most of DOE's current nuclear waste
management activities rely on taxpayer-funded appropriations in
2012 and under the Continuing Resolution 2013. This means that
taxpayers are currently funding the costs of DOE's efforts to
start over, breaking the historic principle that the
beneficiaries of electricity, the consumers, pay the cost of
disposal. So for how long and for what cost does the
administration support continuing the policy of having the
taxpayers foot the bill? Is that part of your discussion?
Mr. Moniz. Again, that is a very important part of
Congress' discussion in terms of how it has chosen to do
appropriations, discretionary appropriations or waste fund
allocations.
Mr. Murphy. Sure. Well, in that context, though, our
concern is we have already spent 15 billion that we
appropriated and then someone, for consent reasons or political
reasons, decided to pull the plug on that. So our concern is if
we put more money into this, we want to know there is a
commitment from you and the Department of Energy to move
forward.
I was impressed with the article you wrote in Foreign
Affairs 2011 where you talk about the importance of nuclear
power and you also acknowledge the sensitivity you have to the
Government paying billions of dollars in damages to energy
companies and that the uncertainty of cost is a big problem
with building more nuclear power plants. So in this context,
you see the uncertainty of cost remains if we are ambiguous of
where we are moving forward. So your commitment to move forward
is so important.
You mentioned the Blue Ribbon Commission with regard to
moving forward, and you also said that we are in a stalemate
and we have to be moving the ball forward. You said that today.
So help this committee understand or build confidence in DOE's
commitment to move forward on using Yucca Mountain as a
permanent storage facility or, and what you have also talked
about, a temporary one made for the next 100 years. There is
land out there to do that as well. Are you committed to
continue to move forward personally on this? Is the Department?
Or are we going to see more holdups in this process?
Mr. Moniz. Certainly I am committed. In fact, that is why I
am here today. The administration is committed. The Department
is committed. Of course, there is this recommendation about a
new organization to be formed, and if that is done, then
presumably a lot of those responsibilities would move to this
new organization. But I think the point is the administration
and the Government must be committed to executing this
responsibility.
Mr. Murphy. Well, we have been committed to a plan so far
and it is frustrating to have the rug pulled out from under us.
Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Matsui, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Matsui. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding a hearing on this important issue. And thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for joining us once again. I commend your work with
the Blue Ribbon Commission and I appreciate the Department of
Energy's continued work on this matter.
The administration's strategy for the management and
disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste
makes significant contributions to this debate and I look
forward to continuing this open dialogue with you on how best
to address the safe deposit of our country's nuclear waste.
My district of Sacramento, the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District, otherwise known as SMUD, owns the decommissioned
Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, so I have had an interest in
issues with spent fuel management posed by permanently shutdown
reactors for some time. I was heartened to see that the
administration's strategy includes a pilot interim storage
facility with an initial focus on moving fuel from shutdown
reactors. Shutdown reactors represent a unique component in
overall nuclear waste policy. As is the case with SMUD, removal
of the spent fuel is many times the last major hurdle in the
way of putting the land to a more beneficial use.
The Blue Ribbon Commission and the administration both
advocate that it should be a priority to move spent fuel from
sites with permanently shutdown reactors and without an
operating nuclear generating station. Do you agree that spent
fuel from these sites should be prioritized?
Mr. Moniz. That is certainly the administration's
strategy's position.
Ms. Matsui. I strongly support a pilot interim storage
facility that removes all spent fuel from permanently shutdown
sites. It seems to me that a successful pilot project could
help repair public confidence in the Government's ability to
manage the Nation's public waste.
Mr. Moniz. Yes.
Ms. Matsui. And what other benefits would a pilot project
achieve?
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, first and foremost, it would of
course remove the fuel from those sites. I think it would have,
as you have indicated, an enormous impact on saying that there
is this commitment to accepting fuel by the Federal Government.
We are accepting fuel. We are moving fuel. We are moving it
safely and I think that would really add a big jolt of
confidence to getting this whole program moving, not talking
about it, but moving, moving fuel. That is the issue.
Ms. Matsui. Now, in your testimony, you mentioned that DOE
would conduct an analysis of initial used fuel shipments from
shutdown reactors sites. Can you elaborate on what specific
aspects this analysis will consider?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think the analysis at this stage, it has
to be quite generic because of course what the geography would
be of such a pilot facility will determine specific travel
routes, et cetera, but I would say--and this is now my own
personal speculation if you would like--I think for a first
pilot facility in terms of modal issues, we probably will be
talking, you know, trucking of casks on the highway. As the
Academy report many years ago suggested, once we get into a
very, very large-scale transportation of thousands of tons per
year, then using trains as a major mode will be important.
Ms. Matsui. So it is my understanding that the Federal
Government has been transporting this nuclear waste and spent
nuclear fuel in this country for some time now?
Mr. Moniz. Um-hum.
Ms. Matsui. That is right?
Mr. Moniz. Yes, we have had thousands of shipments.
Ms. Matsui. Yes. So can you tell us about that record and
whether you are satisfied with the level of safety that has
been achieved?
Mr. Moniz. Certainly my understanding is that there has
been a very, very safe record, and as I said, the similar
record in Europe where more than 10 times as many movements
have occurred has also been very good, at least that was the
case a few years ago when I was on that Academy committee. To
be honest, I haven't looked personally in the last 5 or 6
years.
Ms. Matsui. OK. Well, I believe moving spent nuclear fuel
from decommissioned sites first should be a priority and that a
pilot interim storage facility is a necessary step in the right
direction in the overall management of our Nation's nuclear
waste. And I do look forward to working with you, Mr.
Secretary, and my colleagues on this committee to make real
progress in this area. And I thank you very much----
Mr. Shimkus. Can I have your last 35 seconds?
Ms. Matsui. Yes, you may.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Secretary, what is a crystalline
formation, cutting the rock?
Mr. Moniz. Granite, for example.
Mr. Shimkus. And wasn't that exempted under the '87
amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act?
Mr. Moniz. As I recall, I believe that----
Mr. Shimkus. And there are 25 States that have this
formation?
Mr. Moniz. I don't----
Mr. Shimkus. So if we go to obviously a second repository,
those sites, based upon your testimony, or those States would
still be then open and accessible for granite formations during
high-level nuclear waste? Wouldn't that be correct?
Mr. Moniz. Well, I think again that would be----
Mr. Shimkus. States like Washington, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia all could be considered----
Mr. Moniz. I mean, again, as has been demonstrated
internationally, there is a wide range of geologies that can be
suitable for a repository.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I now recognize the gentleman from West Virginia, Mr.
McKinley, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary,
thank you for going to Morgantown to visit the----
Mr. Moniz. It was fun.
Mr. McKinley [continuing]. National Energy Technology
Laboratory.
I wasn't here in Congress in '08 or '09. I didn't come
until '11 so I am trying to get up to speed with all of this
debate that is taking place, but I do have a fact finding from
the Nuclear Energy Institute that indicates that in 2008 there
were some 3,000 scientists across five laboratories and various
major universities were involved in filing this application
with the DOE for the permit. And then within a year's time,
that permit was reversed. The application was reversed. Mr.
Secretary, other than an election being taken place during that
period of time, what happened? Was there a change in science or
technology that DOE hadn't taken into consideration or was this
decision to cancel the application merely political?
Mr. Moniz. Well, in a similar vein, of course I was not
here as well. However, I would note that, as we have stressed,
that there are two essential conditions in our view. I mean one
is good science and number two is consent.
Mr. McKinley. Well, Mr. Secretary, what I am saying is what
science changed between '08 and '09?
Mr. Moniz. And there are two issues, science and consent,
and the administration felt that on the consent basis this was
simply not a workable project.
Mr. McKinley. Was consent part of the law in '08?
Mr. Moniz. It is a question of the ground truth, and the
reality is the project moving forward? Does the project have
the ability to capture all of the permits that it needs, which
includes State permits? And so the project was deemed and
declared not workable.
Mr. McKinley. Engineers or contractors, it feels political.
It doesn't feel like it has anything to do with science or
technology. So the question you were asked several times now,
the gentleman from Georgia was asking it; I heard Chairman
Upton from Michigan raise the same question and using his
numbers because I don't know what they are for West Virginia,
but when he said Michigan again has taken away from the
taxpayers and businesses, everyone using the power, they have
extracted $600 million from the residents of Michigan to pay
for this facility. What have they gotten for that $600 million?
Mr. Moniz. Well, first of all, the question----
Mr. McKinley. And I heard your answer, well, the amount
that is being extracted is fair. It will pay for the facility,
but that is not the question they we are asking. What did we
get for it? If we wind up ultimately abandoning the facility,
what did they get for $600 million in Michigan?
Mr. Moniz. The one mill per kilowatt hour has been paid in
the rate base for all nuclear utilities for the Federal
Government commitment to accept the fuel and move it from those
sites. That commitment remains.
Mr. McKinley. But they have spent 600 million and it hasn't
happened yet, so what happens with the amount of money that has
already been expended? Are we going to refund it to the
individuals if we abandon and go to a different site?
Mr. Moniz. As I think----
Mr. McKinley. Because I believe you are trying to answer--
if I can put words into your mouth--that whenever the site is
determined, that mill per kilowatt hour will be adequate to be
able to facilitate this, but that is not the question. The
question is what happens to the $600 million in Michigan that
has already been expended? They don't have anything. There is
nothing to show for it.
Mr. Moniz. Again, the one mill per kilowatt hour is not to
buy a facility. It is to buy a service. The service, as far as
the utility concerned, is spent fuel removal. The failure to
begin removing that fuel on February 1, 1998, has led to the
payment of damages. Those damages are currently projected to go
north of $20 billion back to the utilities because the service
is not being provided. The service will be provided. That
remains the commitment. And the funds in the meantime are, as I
said earlier, accruing interest. In fact, I think in the
current waste fund--I maybe not quite right on this--but I
think something like $6 billion of it is interest that has
accrued over the time. So it is a service being purchased.
There was a decision a long time ago by this Congress in terms
of how nuclear waste disposal would be paid for. The commitment
remains. It is no different.
Mr. McKinley. In closing, I know my time is almost up. Are
you telling me that if this decision goes in our favor or it
goes in the favor of Yucca Mountain, all of the investment we
have made, will the President uphold that or is this going to
be another DOMA, Immigration, and the Employer Mandate? Will he
enforce this or would he waive this----
Mr. Moniz. We have made very clear we follow the law. If
the court directs----
Mr. McKinley. He hasn't followed the law. That is the
problem. He hasn't followed the law in other----
Mr. Moniz. The law will be determined by this court
decision that we are all awaiting, and if it directs the NRC to
pick up the license, we will do our job to support that, given
appropriations. It will be up to the funds to be supplied from
discretionary or mandatory by this body and there will be many
other conditions that have to be met, including by the
Government, land withdrawals, there will be State permits,
many, many issues. And again the judgment remains. When we put
all of this together, it doesn't seem very workable.
Mr. McKinley. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for running over.
Mr. Shimkus. No, you did fine. Thank you. The gentleman
yields back his time.
And, Secretary, you have been great. We have got one more
member here who is actually the chairman of the Energy and Air
Quality Committee, so he does have part of the big nuclear
portfolio up here and I am glad that he stayed around. And I
would like to recognize him for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moniz. I am aware of his portfolio.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, thank you, Chairman Shimkus.
Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your being with us today and I
just have to say honestly that I don't envy you trying to
defend the administration on this issue.
I was reading the testimony and it said ``the
administration supports working with Congress to develop the
consent-based process that is transparent, adaptive, and
technically sound.'' And it is my argument that we already have
the law on the books, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 1982, 1987.
Democrats and Republicans made the decision to do it. And now
this administration in 2009 made the decision to pull the plug
after the Department of Energy had submitted its application in
2008 at the NRC.
And then Mr. Jaczko, who--so in my view, Harry Reid,
President Barack Obama, and the chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission basically made the decision they don't
care what the Congress thinks, they don't care what the
American people think, they are not going to abide by the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act. And, as a result, we have spent--I
have heard different figures--Mr. Barton said around 15
billion, 13 billion, 14 billion for Yucca Mountain and no one
talked about the judgments against the Federal Government as a
result of the lawsuits because the Federal Government had
breached its contract because it didn't have the ability to
take possession of the waste, so that is another 12 or $13
billion. And then the President decides, well, OK, we are going
to pull the plug but we will establish a Blue Ribbon
Commission, and now you all are asking for 1.3 billion and pay-
as-you-go another 5.6 billion over 10 years.
And, you know, maybe I am biased but when I go to the
Rotary Club and I talk about this kind of waste, it is really
upsetting to people when you talk about a $16 trillion Federal
debt that is growing every day and this judgment is growing
every day. And so you really do wonder what is the President
thinking about? We have a Federal law that has not been
invalidated. The only reason we are now waiting for a decision
of the courts is because the administration didn't act, so a
lawsuit was filed. And so here we are. And I mean I have great
admiration for you and your intellectual ability and your
understanding of the issue, but I tell you, I think that Barack
Obama is flat wrong on this issue and that the American people
are going to suffer.
Now, maybe that is my opening statement and I would be
happy to give you an opportunity to respond if you want to. I
am certainly not frustrated in any way but if you would like to
respond, fine. If you----
Mr. Moniz. Well, again, it would just be repetitive that
Secretary Chu felt that the project would be unworkable and
that is again based on the issue of public acceptance, which we
consider to be equally important as the scientific criteria.
So, again, as I said earlier, when the judgment is made in the
litigation with the NRC, I think we will have a path forward
there, whichever it is. But, again, I think I have come here
today especially to try to, you know, present my perspective.
It is the one of the Blue Ribbon Commission that we need to
pursue these two tracks in any event. It will be our fastest
approach to move fuel, to accept fuel, and we believe that is
needed no matter what the repository pathway is. And I hope
that we can work together to move the ball.
Mr. Whitfield. And I would just say that, I mean, the
President is out there every day talking about all-of-the-
above, and the nuclear energy is really being stagnant right
now because of this waste issue. And if he is genuinely
concerned about carbon emission, he should get off the dime and
take some action to expedite this waste issue, taking care of
this waste issue or we are going to have a pretty stagnant
nuclear energy in the U.S., in my view.
Mr. Moniz. If I may respond to that, I think the
administration's actions are very consistent on nuclear power
with the all-of-the-above strategy. The fact is after many
years of talk, this administration moved out with the
conditional $8 billion loan guarantee for first-mover nuclear
plant construction in Georgia, AP 1000s. This administration
launched the program and already decided on one license for a
new small modular reactor to be constructed, and the
administration feels that it is putting forward in fact the
proposal for the most effective way to address waste management
in a consent-based approach. So I think the ground truth, the
ground facts speak for themselves.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, Mr. Secretary, I may make one final
comment. Every day the President, when he talks about energy,
he talks about all-of-the-above and yet America is the only
country in the world where you cannot build a new coal-power
plant. So I don't see how he can say all-of-the-above.
Mr. Moniz. Well, I would like to respond to that as well in
a similar vein. I think, first of all, of course, the President
has stated and I have stated and thousands and thousands of
scientists have stated that it would be imprudent not to start
addressing the greenhouse gas emission issue. So that is kind
of a given in the administration's position. Now, given that,
what does all-of-the-above mean? What it means in this case
is--and I am going to go back and say there was a lot of
talking the talk for many years. This administration put $6
billion on the table for clean coal projects, eight major
sequestration projects, one has started, two will start next
year, five are in construction. ARPA-E has invested in more
than 20 projects for novel capture technologies. So if we are
going to establish carbon capture utilization--and I might add
six of those eight projects have enhanced oil recovery as part
of it. If we are going to establish the competitiveness of all
of our resources in a low-carbon world, this is exactly what we
need to do and the President moved out on these programs.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, if I may make one final comment, I do
hope that you ought to consider things other than just carbon
capture and sequestration because there are a lot of other
technologies out there that can be just as beneficial.
Mr. Moniz. Well, in fact, if I may add--I am sorry, Mr.
Chairman, one last thing----
Mr. Shimkus. You have been very kind on all this time we
have given, so of course you can continue.
Mr. Moniz. So another example of this case was a week after
the President's climate plan announcement in Georgetown, our
department put out a draft solicitation for an $8 billion loan
guarantee program for advanced fossil technologies across the
board. We are waiting for input in September but we said, as
examples, it could be dry fracking. It could be new carbon
utilization technologies. It could be advanced fossil combined
heat and power. So we are putting out the programs to establish
fossil fuels as part of the low-carbon future.
Mr. Shimkus. And reclaiming my time. And I want to thank
the Secretary for your time. And it was good for some of my
nuclear friends to hear some fossil fuel stuff, so that is why
I definitely am all-of-the-above in my Congressional District,
so it was probably good for them to hear some of that.
In conclusion, again, I would like to thank you. You spent
a wonderful amount of time in a subcommittee setting, which it
is fairly unique in this process. I want to thank my Members on
both sides who participated in today's hearing, and I want to
remind Members that they have 10 business days to submit
questions for the record, and I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to
respond to those as promptly as you can.
Mr. Moniz. Yes.
Mr. Shimkus. And with that, the hearing is now adjourned.
Mr. Moniz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Tonko.
[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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