[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, CHEMICAL SPILL
=======================================================================
(113-53)
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2014 (Charleston, West Virginia)
__________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia
Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California
JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
VACANCY
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv
TESTIMONY
Panel 1
Hon. Joe Manchin III, a U.S. Senator from the State of West
Virginia....................................................... 6
Panel 2
Rafael Moure-Eraso, Chairperson, U.S Chemical Safety Board....... 9
Mike Dorsey, chief, Homeland Security and Emergency Response,
West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection........... 9
James A. Gianato, director, West Virginia Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management.............................. 9
Letitia E. Tierney, M.D., J.D., commissioner, Bureau for Public
Health, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,
and State health officer....................................... 9
Gordon Merry, director, Cabell County Office of Emergency
Services....................................................... 9
Dale A. Petry, director, Kanawha County Department of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management.............................. 9
Jeffrey L. McIntyre, president, West Virginia American Water..... 9
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, a U.S. Senator from the State of
West Virginia.................................................. 47
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Hon. Joe Manchin III............................................. \1\
Rafael Moure-Eraso............................................... 50
Mike Dorsey...................................................... 55
James A. Gianato................................................. 58
Letitia E. Tierney, M.D., J.D.................................... 63
Gordon Merry..................................................... 66
Dale A. Petry.................................................... 69
Jeffrey L. McIntyre.............................................. 75
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Hon. Shelley Moore Capito, a Representative in Congress from the
State of West Virginia, request to submit ``Recommendations to
Incorporate Public Health Components to Senate Bill 373,'' by
Rahul Gupta, M.D., M.P.H., F.A.C.P., executive director/health
officer, Kanawha-Charleston Health Department, February 3, 2014 23
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
D. Michael Langford, national president, Utility Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, comments for the record...................... 83
Maya Nye, spokesperson, People Concerned About Chemical Safety,
comments for the record........................................ 92
----------
\1\ Hon. Joe Manchin III, a U.S. Senator from the State of West
Virginia, did not submit a written statement for the record.
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THE CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, CHEMICAL SPILL
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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:07 a.m., in
Ceremonial Courtroom 4, Kanawha County Courthouse, Charleston,
West Virginia, Hon. Bill Shuster (Chairman of the committee)
presiding.
Mr. Shuster. The committee will come to order.
I want to welcome everybody here today to Charleston, West
Virginia. Thanks for all coming out, especially our panel of
witnesses today.
Our first order of business is, I would like to ask
unanimous consent that Senator Manchin be allowed to sit in the
hearing today and participate in the questioning.
Without objection, so ordered.
Senator, welcome to the Committee on Transportation.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
Mr. Shuster. We are pleased to welcome our distinguished
witnesses today, starting with Rafael Moure-Eraso. I started
off telling him I apologize, in case I butchered that. He is
Chairperson of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.
Welcome.
Mr. Michael Dorsey, chief of the Homeland Security and
Emergency Response for West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection; Jimmy Gianato, director of West
Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management; Dr. Letitia Tierney, who is the commissioner of the
Bureau of Public Health, West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources, and State health officer; Gordon Merry, who is
director from Cabell County--which I guess, Nick, that is in
your district--Office of Emergency Services; Dale Petry, who is
the director of the Kanawha County Department of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management; and Jeff McIntyre, the
president of West Virginia American Water.
I want to thank, also, Mrs. Capito for requesting an
important hearing and hosting the committee here in her
hometown of Charleston.
I also want to thank Ranking Member Rahall for working with
us on this hearing and ensuring that we understand how
important this issue is to him and his constituents as well.
And, again, I welcome Senator Manchin for being here today
and participating.
And also to Congressman Daniel Webster, a native of West
Virginia, now representing a district in Orlando, Florida.
Welcome home, Daniel.
It is critically important for this committee to be here
today to hear from the folks who have been on the ground since
the spill occurred, and to gain an understanding of what has
happened in this incident.
I can only imagine how difficult it has been for the
residents of this region over the last month. The uncertainty,
the unanswered questions, must be overwhelming at times.
As Americans, we all should feel safe to drink the water
that comes out of our faucets. We should be able to take a
shower without worrying about what is in the water. And we
should have confidence that our Government leaders are doing
everything in their power to ensure the safety of the water
supply. And that is why we are here today.
The past 4 weeks have, no doubt, been a roller coaster ride
for everyone here in this region. I know that people are
concerned, frustrated, and looking for answers.
Representatives Capito and Rahall and Senator Manchin have
made it very clear how important it is for us to be here on the
ground to see and hear firsthand, to truly understand what is
happening here.
We are here to get firsthand accounts of what has happened,
what went wrong, when went right, what needs to be improved. We
need to focus our attention and work to find solutions for the
future, to hear directly from those who were at the spill site
when it first became clear what was happening, and to hear from
those who have been working day and night since then to help
clean up and protect those who live here.
Again, I want to thank everyone who has taken their
precious time to be here today. I want to, again, thank our
witnesses for joining us.
Before I go, as I had to explain to Senator Manchin, who is
in the Senate, in the House, we have different rules. I pointed
out in the House, we have a 5-minute rule, so I would ask for
witnesses to keep your opening statements to 5 minutes. I am
quick on the gavel. You will hear me tap first when you get
over. But, again, to move things along, and to make sure
everybody is heard, we want to make sure that we get through,
so 5 minutes on the opening statements.
Your full statements will be in the record. I know you have
some lengthy pieces of information, which will be in the
record.
And again, to my colleagues, if they keep their opening
statements to 5 minutes and then we will go into questioning.
The questioning rounds will be 5 minutes. If we need more, we
will certainly do more.
With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member,
Mr. Rahall, for a statement.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join with my colleagues on this dais in welcoming you to
West Virginia and thank you for taking the time to be with us
today so that we can be on the ground in the area where it is
especially important that we hear from the families whose lives
and livelihoods have been disrupted.
Yesterday marked 1 month since the chemicals leaked from a
storage tank at Freedom Industries into the Elk River. One
solid month since the spill, yet still--and rightly so--there
is a lingering worry among the people of this area. There is a
lingering mistrust of what they hear.
Some of that clearly stems from a lack of accurate
information at the start, most of which can be traced directly
to a financially troubled business with deteriorating
facilities and critically lax safety standards.
When State DEP officials arrived at the Freedom Industries
site following a trail of strong licorice scent, workers there
didn't even know they had a leak. When workers were shown the
pooling chemical and told to report the leak, they resisted.
When they finally did report the leak, they claimed the
chemical was not spilling into the river. Wrong.
First responders, the water company, public health
officials, all thought they were dealing with one chemical
based on information obtained from the company--information
that was wrong.
Mr. Chairman, there were distressing blind spots and errors
long before this spill. But on January 9, confronted with this
disaster, a lot of people tried to do the right thing. A lot of
people are still trying to do the right thing. Some of them are
here with us today, and we will hear their testimony.
They have been the target of criticism and anger. And, yet,
they came here today to answer and re-answer and re-answer
questions and take their lumps.
I think it speaks volumes that the one entity that is not
here today--is not here--the one empty seat we will have at
that witness table, if there was room for that empty seat,
belongs to the one entity at the epicenter of all of this, the
one who totally blew it and then gave the bad information on
which every effort to respond to the spill was built.
Mr. Chairman, there is an odor emanating from Freedom
Industries, and it is not licorice. We cannot legislate
morality into the billionaire corporate boardrooms where shell
game playing abounds.
I share the worry and frustration that I see in the faces
all around this room. I understand the shaken confidence.
Were there mistakes made? Yes. Are there loopholes in the
law that must be closed? Yes.
As you have stated, Mr. Chairman, we are here to listen and
learn and do all that we can to help prevent this type of
crisis from recurring.
I have chosen not to endorse legislative proposals yet,
until after this hearing and hearing first directly from those
at this hearing to ensure that our efforts in Congress are as
thorough as possible, and that the Federal Government will not
place demands from on high, but work with our State and local
governments to ensure that any new laws work together to
eliminate loopholes.
A cloud of suspicion and fear may be hanging over this
region for some time. But, speaking as a West Virginian, I hope
we can channel these energies into positive change for our
State.
Above all, the communities, businesses, and families
deserve definite answers. People have a basic right to know,
and Government has a fundamental obligation to inform the
public whether or not their water supplies are safe.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, in a Congress that is so often
divided, you have not let party differences stand between us
and working to address the needs of the people we serve. I
thank you, again, for your interest in the families in this
area and for taking the time to be with us today.
And I believe you have already done this, but if not, I
would ask unanimous consent that the record be open for 30 days
to allow people who want to submit their testimony to us will
be made part of the record.
Mr. Shuster. Without objection, so ordered.
I now recognize Mrs. Capito.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
bringing the committee to my home county of Kanawha, and
Charleston. I am pleased to be here with my colleagues.
The chemical spill occurred just a few miles from where we
sit, and it had a devastating effect on 300,000 people in a 9-
county region.
Small businesses were forced to close. A lot of folks went
without paychecks. And residents went without potable water.
Our community is angry, anxious, and we need answers to how
the spill occurred, the health effects, and how we can help
prevent it from happening again. That is what we are here today
for.
Last week, 14 schools in Kanawha County reported smelling
the odor. Three of those the schools were closed as a result,
and several illnesses were reported. Those events demonstrate
that, a month after the spill, the effects still continue.
I live in Charleston, and I use the water myself. Like
everyone in this room and everyone in this community, we just
want to have the confidence that the water coming out of our
faucets is safe, and our families are safe as well.
Many West Virginians lack that confidence today. I think
``confidence'' is going to be the word we are going to be
hearing quite a bit.
Unfortunately, we won't be able to answer questions, as my
fellow Member from West Virginia talked about, from one of the
relevant parties today. The president of Freedom Industries was
invited to appear before the committee. We gave them the
opportunity to answer this committee's questions, questions
that residents across this community have also been asking, and
to explain its many failures that have hurt so many families
and businesses.
Unfortunately, he chose not to be here today to answer for
what his company has done. I find that extremely telling.
If he were here today and had the courage to come, I would
have asked him this: When did you learn that a chemical was
leaking from a tank at your facility? Why did it take so long
to report that spill? How did you not know for 12 days, or
report, that a second chemical was a part of the mixture? And
do you accept any responsibility for the catastrophic harm you
have caused our community?
Their decision not to testify today compounds its gross
misconduct, and it is an absolute affront to every person
impacted by the spill.
With that, I want to thank all the witnesses that are here
today, not only for what they are doing today, but for what
they have done over the past month. This will help us gain a
better understanding on what happened on January 9.
We need to learn from West Virginia and American Water when
it learned of Freedom's spill, how it made the decision to keep
the water flowing, and why the company did not know in advance
of the spill what types of chemicals were stored in tanks just
upriver from the water intake.
We need to learn from the local responders, and they did a
wonderful job--and thank you so much--how they mobilized and
what we can do to improve their situation.
From the Division of Homeland Security, we need to know the
current status of water testing in public facilities across the
impacted area, and the State's plan for targeted--I noticed
this is a discussion of late--in-home testing around the
region.
Many citizens are concerned about the flushing protocols,
and we need to know the successes and failures in cleaning up
the water system.
From the DEP, and we need to learn about the initial
response to Freedom Industries' site, the agency's plan to
inspect similar facilities, and the implementation of both
State and Federal environmental laws.
And from the Department of Health, we need to learn how
testing protocols and safety standards were established, and
make sure that people are provided with accurate and timely
information.
One of the scariest parts of this incident, I think,
occurred on Thursday, when the CDC advised that pregnant women
may wish to avoid the water until all traces of MCHM were
removed after first announcing that a universally applicable
safe standard had been reached.
Senator Manchin and I wrote to the CDC asking for testing
protocols and about the agency's confidence in the health
impact study, but their letter was severely lacking in the
details that we needed.
We invited the CDC to come here today. They declined that
invitation, but they are working in an advisory role in
assisting the State of West Virginia. We can learn from
participation of State officials in settling the no-health-
impact standards.
Finally, from the Chemical Safety Board, we need to gain
perspective on how this occurred, and how we can prevent it
from happening again.
To spur development of State programs, the State has done a
great job, but I will be introducing the Ensuring Access to
Clean Water Act when I return to Washington this evening. This
bill requires the inspection of aboveground storage tanks like
the one that leaked at Freedom Industries; creates standards
for the oversight of chemical storage facilities; and ensures
that water utilities are given information about chemicals
stored upstream, together with a plan on how to address
emergency situations.
The West Virginia Legislature is considering legislation to
address this issue, and Senator Manchin has proposed
legislation that is similar to the bill I will introduce
tonight.
I want to thank everyone for coming, and I look forward to
your testimony, and also the opportunity to ask those questions
that I mentioned.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
And now with that, Senator Manchin is recognized for 5
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOE MANCHIN III, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, and Ranking
Member Rahall, Congresswoman Capito, and Congressman Webster
for holding this hearing today to give it the national
attention it deserves.
I do understand the rules of the House, and I will more
than abide by them. And I appreciate you having me as part of
this. Bipartisan, bicameral--we need more of this. We really
need do. And it sets a good example for all of us, so thank
you.
On January 9, as has been said, a month ago yesterday,
thousands of gallons of crude MCHM leaked from a storage tank
into the Elk River contaminating the drinking water of 300,000
West Virginians. In the immediate aftermath and the days since,
I have been in continual contact with the CDC and the EPA,
trying to assist and help the State. I know the State has been
in contact with them also, and I appreciate that. We will be
hearing your testimonies on that today also.
The CDC has determined that the water is appropriate--and I
say the word ``appropriate''--to drink. I am not sure of the
definition of ``appropriate,'' but I am trying to get into that
more, and I am sure you will be able to clear that up today
also.
They say levels are below the 1 ppm--and I know we have
questions about that--benchmark. And then the nondetect level
is supposed to be 10 ppb, which is 100 times more stringent
than 1 ppm.
I am using, I am personally using, we have a little
townhouse here, I am personally using the water as I normally
would use it. But I know a lot of don't people feel that way.
And I believe that the people, and I believe the State will
accommodate them having the ability to have it tested. I
believe that will all happen. I really do.
And with that being said, in our State, we have always done
hard work. We have worked hard. And we continue to work hard.
We are hardworking people to produce the energy and chemicals
that power this country. But that cannot come at the cost of
access to safe and clean drinking water or to the safety and
confidence of the people of West Virginia.
We have always said, if you can't do it right, don't do it.
If it is not safe, don't do it.
But with that, we think there is a balance between the
environment and the economy that can be found, if we all have a
desire to do that.
The spill should have never have happened. There is no
excuse for it. It really shouldn't have happened. And as
Congress, it is our responsibility to do everything we can to
keep it from happening again, not just in West Virginia, but
anywhere in the United States of America.
This is a wakeup call for this country. We were on the
front end of this, but it is a wakeup call for the country.
That is why I work with Senator Boxer, who is the chairman
of the Environmental and Public Works Committee, to develop the
Chemical Safety and Drinking Water Protection Act. It basically
does things that we thought were already being done. We thought
that all aboveground storage probably was being tested and
checked, not knowing that there was no laws on the book--if it
was not a hazmat material, that it didn't have to be.
And really, the EPA or the DEP didn't have any authority or
power to go into these areas and do the testing. And I talked
to Speaker Boehner about that. He is committed to helping and
working with us. And our colleagues on both sides of the aisle
are committed to fixing this. So I am very appreciative of
that.
This bill sets minimum Federal standards that chemical
facilities must meet, including construction and leak detection
requirements, fail-safe containment standards, and the
development of emergency response plans. Our bill also requires
that companies meet financial responsibility requirements.
Taxpayers should not be forced to pay for the monetary damages
incurred from this incident or any other chemical spill.
Additionally, companies must inform the State, the EPA, and
local water systems of the chemicals they store. However, that
information is helpful only if we have adequate health and
safety data on these chemicals.
That is why I am also cosponsoring and totally committed to
the Chemical Safety Improvement Act, which would, for the first
time in 42 years--think about this; 1976 is the last time we
ever tried to find out what chemicals we are using and how it
affects humans.
There are 84,000 chemicals used by Americans every day in
every form, and the extremely outdated Toxic Substance Control
Act is 1976. It is unbelievable.
Under the Chemical Safety Improvement Act, States should
request and could request that EPA prioritize the testing of
specific chemicals, including those held near waterways. Even
if they are not a hazmat or determined to be a hazmat material,
everybody in every State is responsible for identifying any
possibility and also having the CDC and the EPA test at the
highest levels as if they were toxic.
And for the chemicals like MCHM, the overwhelming lack of
health and safety data is one of the criteria for designating a
chemical as high priority.
The bottom line is that no West Virginian or American
should have to worry about the contamination of their water
supply from a chemical spill, and I will do everything, working
with my colleagues, to enact legislation to protect safe
drinking water.
These two bills would go a long way in ensuring that every
American has access to safe drinking water, and that if, God
forbid, an incident like this occurs again, we have the tools
to respond as quickly and as effectively as possible. It is
unconscionable to think that we did not know sooner than we
did.
And today I am asking all West Virginians, the EPA, the
CDC, and West Virginia DEP, and all of us who are involved and
could be involved and should be involved, to join me and my
colleagues in pledging to make sure that we come out of this
bigger and better. The water in West Virginia should be the
cleanest and safest in America.
I want to thank you, and that should be our goal today.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Senator.
And with that, I recognize Mr. Webster for an opening
statement.
Mr. Webster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
hosting this forum. I think it is very, very important for this
area.
I am from Orlando, Florida, now, but I am a fifth
generation West Virginian. I was born here in Kanawha County
close by, at St. Francis Hospital. I have a lot of relatives
here. I ate dinner with five of them last night, two get their
water from St. Albans and had no problem. Three did not, and
they are concerned. They are still drinking bottled water, even
though it is supposedly OK to not do that. They are just
afraid.
And I would imagine there are a lot of citizens out there
who are afraid, so I appreciate this opportunity.
My dad's family was from Winfield. They moved there in
1862. My mom was from a place in Roane County called Rush Fork
and Green Creek. I have no idea where that is, but it is
somewhere. And both were longtime farmers. Both depended on the
water here.
It is an important commodity. It is the lifeblood of our
community. And so I appreciate just the opportunity to be here
and to have an opportunity to participate in this.
This also, certainly, has nationwide implications, and
there are some things here I hope we will learn to prevent this
from happening in other places in the country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Webster.
Before I get to the witnesses, I might add that I am from
Pennsylvania. My district is western Pennsylvania, parts of
Greene County and Fayette County, which border West Virginia.
And growing up in Bedford County, very close to the West
Virginia border. So as I like to tell my colleagues, Mr. Rahall
and Mrs. Capito, we are kissing cousins in western Pennsylvania
to West Virginia. And good, hardy, hardworking people in
western Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
So again, I just wanted folks to know that I'm not from the
other part of Pennsylvania--Philadelphia, as we call it.
So with that, again, I encourage the witnesses to keep to 5
minutes, because I think the really important part of this is
the questioning. Hopefully, we can have a couple rounds of
that.
And we will start to my left with Dr. Moure-Eraso.
Before it is all over, I will get it down.
Go ahead, Doctor. You are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF RAFAEL MOURE-ERASO, CHAIRPERSON, U.S CHEMICAL
SAFETY BOARD; MIKE DORSEY, CHIEF, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION; JAMES A. GIANATO, DIRECTOR, WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION
OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT; LETITIA E.
TIERNEY, M.D., J.D., COMMISSIONER, BUREAU FOR PUBLIC HEALTH,
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, AND
STATE HEALTH OFFICER; GORDON MERRY, DIRECTOR, CABELL COUNTY
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES; DALE A. PETRY, DIRECTOR, KANAWHA
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT; AND JEFFREY L. MCINTYRE, PRESIDENT, WEST VIRGINIA
AMERICAN WATER
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, and Ranking
Member Rahall, also Congressman Webster and Congresswoman
Capito, and Senator Manchin. I am honored to be here.
I am Rafael Moure-Eraso. I am the Chairperson of the U.S.
Chemical Safety Board, or the CSB, from Washington, DC.
There are a few things that people here in West Virginia
will never take for granted again, common acts, such as using
tap water to prepare dinner for your family or drawing a bath
for your child, and everyday activities that quickly became
impossible for approximately 300,000 people on January 9, 2014.
It is clear to me, as Chairman of an independent Federal
agency charged with investigating industrial chemical
accidents, that urgent steps are required to significantly
improve the safety of facilities that handle hazardous
chemicals. The chemical sector is vital for our economy, yet
potentially hazardous to those who live near the thousands of
facilities that process or store these hazardous chemicals.
The CSB has 41 employees, half of whom are professional
accident investigators with highly technical skills. Currently,
the CSB has a four-member team in the field investigating this
particular accident.
Heading the team and with me is the supervisory
investigator, Johnnie Banks. And also with me today is Hillary
Cohen, our communications director back there.
First, I think, it is important to discuss the history that
the CSB has had investigating accidents in the Kanawha Valley.
This is our third deployment to a major chemical accident in
the valley.
In 2008, two workers were fatally injured at the Bayer
CropScience chemical plant in Institute when a waste tank
containing the highly toxic pesticide methomyl violently
exploded.
Then in 2010, three incidents occurred in a 33-hour period
at the DuPont Belle facility. There was a release of highly
toxic phosgene, exposing a veteran operator and resulting in
his death 1 day later.
Following the CSB's investigation into these two places,
Bayer and DuPont, the board recommended that the county,
working with the State, establish a hazardous chemical release
prevention program to enhance safety and optimize emergency
response.
The CSB recommended that the Health Department establish an
industrial safety authority, paid for using fees assessed on
the companies processing or handling potentially dangerous
chemicals.
As an example, we cited the successful program in
California's Contra Costa County, which has an equally dense
industrial chemical base.
Although no regulatory program is 100 percent effective, in
Contra Costa, the program has reported a dramatic decrease in
serious incidents over the years without any adverse impact on
employment or the business community.
State and local authorities in West Virginia tell us that
they considered our recommendation but due to a number of
reasons, including funding, it has not been adopted.
The CSB's previous recommendations aim at empowering a
Government agency to determine just what poses a high hazard.
Perhaps qualified inspectors would have considered aging
chemical storage tanks located just upstream from a public
drinking water treatment plant to be potentially ``highly
hazardous'' and worthy of a closer look.
I am very encouraged by the recent efforts mentioned here
of legislators, including Representative Capito and Senator
Rockefeller and State Delegate Skinner, who are all seeking to
have the CSB recommendations implemented to protect West
Virginia residents and business.
I thank you all, and let's work together to get this done.
All of us here today are all too aware of the recent events
that occurred at Freedom Industries. A significant amount of
the chemical that we are discussing, MCHM, containing also the
propylene glycol phenyl ether as part of it, was released in
the Elk River, and eventually reached the Kanawha River.
Today, I am here to discuss some preliminary findings into
the CSB's ongoing investigation.
In October 2013, at the request of the company, tank
engineering and management consultants performed a review of
the tank terminals located in Charleston and Nitro. The
evaluation was conducted and approved by an American Petroleum
Institute 653 and 570 certified inspector, who also has
credentials as a National Association of Corrosion Engineer.
That review notes that the substances stored in tank 396
consisted of nonhazardous materials. And as we said before,
this is a qualification. It is a legal statement. It doesn't
reflect the problem that we are seeing here in the ground.
Mr. Shuster. Doctor, I am going to ask you wrap up.
Mr. Moure-Eraso. OK, yes.
The CSB has determined that the secondary containment wall,
which was composed of cinder blocks and surrounded tank 396,
provided very little protection from a possible release.
Moving forward, the CSB will closely examine tank 396. We
plan to complete a thorough internal inspection of the tank to
determine the tank thickness, and we will examine design,
materials of construction, inspection practices, and State and
Federal oversight.
The team will also examine the response to the leak once it
was discovered. And we will have information readily available
for the public as the issue is developed. And we would like
also to make recommendations about improvements to the Toxic
Substances Control Act.
I would like to conclude by strongly commending Senator
Manchin, Senator Rockefeller, and Senator Boxer for promptly
introducing legislation aimed at safeguarding water supplies
from chemical leaks.
We are making recommendations of inherently safe----
Mr. Shuster. Doctor, we will include that all in the----
Mr. Moure-Eraso. We will continue coming to this community
to keep you informed of the progress of our investigation.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. Your full statement will be
included in the record. And we will all have that.
Mr. Dorsey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dorsey. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, members of the
committee, Senator Manchin.
As one of the first State responders onsite, and as someone
who is still involved in remediation of the site, I appreciate
this opportunity to offer my perspective on the event, and
offer a few thoughts on related issues.
After the release was discovered by investigators from the
Department of Environmental Protection's Division of Air
Quality, I was contacted by a supervisor and arrived at the
site with a chemist from my staff at approximately----
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Dorsey, could you pull your mic closer to
you?
Mr. Dorsey. Certainly.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Mr. Dorsey. At this time, it was apparent that the MCHM,
and as we later learned, propylene glycol phenyl ether, or PPH,
was leaving the facility through a drain pipe that runs below
the tank farm and leaking through a retaining wall that was
part of the facility's secondary containment.
The drain pipe was leaking through a rusted bottom into an
erosion ditch about 5 to 10 feet below the containment wall,
and the material that was exiting through the wall was draining
directly into a rubble-filled swale that is located where an
old fire suppression intake had been located.
Company officials had, by this time, placed an absorbent
boom at the point where material was leaking through the wall.
As we investigated the spill scene, we could see that the
MCHM was entering the river from both on top of and below an
ice shelf that extended approximately 10 feet from the shore
into the river.
After reviewing the Material Safety Data Sheet for the
MCHM, a water company official stated that he thought the
problem could be addressed by adding additional activated
carbon to the water plant filters.
I handed the investigation over to our enforcement group
and left the scene at about 2:45 p.m.
It was not until about 4:20 p.m. that I started receiving
calls detailing the larger water contamination problem. Since
that time, remediation efforts have continued at the site.
Remediation activities at the site have included the
installation of collection sumps in the tank area; interceptor
trenches; and the aggressive management of offsite water,
rainwater, and snowmelt. While these remediation efforts are
ongoing and successful, a number of investigations are also
taking place by State, Federal, and private parties: The U.S
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, the Federal
prosecutor's office, the Office of the West Virginia Attorney
General, the bankruptcy plaintiffs, and others. These
investigations are, by and large, necessary, but they also slow
remediation efforts in the vicinity of the tank that spilled
the material. It is hoped that within a week all of the
investigations will have reached a point so the tank area will
be possible.
An interesting issue with MCHM and PPH is their relative
lack of toxicity. The problems that the release caused are very
real, and there is no doubt that the ``do not use'' order was
the right thing to do. But there is relatively little data,
because of the lack of toxicity, on the chemicals.
In a world where deadly chemicals such as methyl
isocyanate, dioxins, and others grab all the headlines, little
thought is given to those less toxic, but ubiquitous, chemicals
that can wreak havoc with our lives like these chemicals have.
Neither of these chemicals is even considered to be
hazardous materials by State or Federal laws.
The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 is a Federal law
that was designed to serve as a safety net for chemicals that
were not regulated by other programs. Due to lack of support,
it has never fulfilled its responsibilities. Potentially
harmful chemicals are not receiving the review and study they
were meant to have.
Today, a bipartisan bill, the Chemical Safety Improvement
Act, is struggling in the U.S. Congress. It is designed to
address the shortcomings of TSCA and provide that safety net
that is supposed to be provided by that law. The bill is not
perfect. But it can be fixed, and it deserves to be fixed.
Of more immediate interest are bills currently moving
through Congress and the West Virginia Legislature that will
provide for the regulation of aboveground storage tanks, much
as underground storage tanks are regulated. I see this as a
complementary effort to the bill mentioned above.
Ensuring that aboveground storage tanks are structurally
sound and have adequate secondary containment seems like simple
common sense today. But before the Freedom Industries release,
the general thought process was that if the material in a given
tank wasn't regulated by any of the multitude of State or
Federal programs, it was probably harmless to both public
health and the environment. The fallacy of that type of
assumption is clear now.
A positive note in this unfortunate episode has been the
working relationships between various State and Federal
agencies. In particular, the relationship between DEP and the
Environmental Protection Agency has been one of mutual respect
and cooperation. Decisions have been made cooperatively,
allowing the State and Federal Governments to speak with one
voice to the public, as well as the responsible party.
The Freedom Industries release caused approximately 300,000
people to be without water. People became ill. Pregnant women
were advised not to drink the water. But it could have been
much worse. There are far more toxic and equally unregulated
chemicals in tanks throughout the country.
Let this incident be a wakeup call for the entire Nation.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Dorsey.
And with that, Mr. Gianato is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gianato. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Rahall, Congresswoman Capito, Congressman Webster, and Senator
Manchin. Thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning
to speak with you.
At approximately 4:50 p.m. on January 9, I received a call
from the West Virginia Department Health and Human Resources
Bureau of Threat Preparedness, advising that in 10 minutes
there would be a call to discuss an imminent announcement by
West Virginia American Water that they were going to issue a
``do not use'' order due to chemical contamination of their
water treatment facility and system.
As a result of our prior planning, we immediately knew that
the loss of the water facility would impact a large number of
hospitals, schools, nursing homes, residences, and businesses.
The West Virginia American Water treatment facility and
distribution system serves commercial and residential customers
in a nine-county region.
The interdependencies associated with this loss include
hotels, restaurants, dairies, as well as farming facilities and
many other industries that depend on potable water to operate
safely.
Governor Tomblin immediately declared a state of emergency
for the nine counties impacted, and the State Emergency
Operations Center was fully activated.
Based on media and law enforcement reports, after the order
was broadcast, citizens were rushing to stores to purchase
water, and the stock was quickly being depleted.
Governor Tomblin requested an emergency declaration from
FEMA that was granted seeking support from the Federal
Government.
Over the next days and weeks, FEMA would provide over 456
trailers of water, which is equivalent to over 8.6 million
liters, and over 100,000 boxed meals, which were essential to
supplement water purchased by the State and received from the
numerous donors.
The division requested the activation of the West Virginia
National Guard 35th Civil Support Team. This team, which is a
key resource to the State, is a full-time federally funded
State asset specializing in weapons of mass destruction and
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosive response.
The men and women of this unit have been deployed for this
incident since the initial hours, and they continue to serve.
Over the course of the event, six additional civil support
teams from neighboring States have assisted.
Initial testing was performed to screen to a Center for
Disease Control threshold of 1 ppm of MCHM in drinking water.
All areas of the system have been tested and cleared to that
level.
Twelve days into this event, Freedom advised DEP that an
additional product, PPH, had been mixed with the MCHM and had
leaked into the river as well. Little was known about PPH, and
we immediately began conducting research to identify the
manufacturer and make contact with them to obtain the most
current information on this product to share with the CDC and
the interagency team that was involved in water sampling.
Upon learning that the second chemical PPH was in the MCHM
that leaked, testing was done to check for PPH as well as MCHM
in the water samples. In order to help us build on the 1 ppm
testing that was done, and to create a higher level of
confidence in the safety of the water, systematic testing was
done to clear all zones at a laboratory nondetectable level of
10 ppb.
The water distribution throughout this event has been a
collective effort of multiple agencies at the Federal, State,
and local levels. Local agencies and volunteer groups have
distributed water to individual citizens who could not travel
to distribution sites.
As we continue to move forward, we must learn from this
event. What happened in Charleston, West Virginia, could happen
in any town or city in the United States that has a similar
water system located in a similar geographic footprint. We must
capture the many lessons learned, using them as a catalyst to
continue to strengthen our infrastructure security and
resiliency posture.
We will use this event to more fully understand the
interdependencies of our critical infrastructure, and to
improve our State and local emergency response plans.
I would be remiss if I did not recognize the numerous first
responders at all levels that worked tirelessly on this
response and continue to do so. I also want to thank the
hardworking men and women of the Division of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management and all of the interagency partners
that worked with us during this event and every event that we
do.
I also want to recognize the private sector partners who
provided support to us and the many who donated water and
supplies, as well as many volunteers who worked tirelessly
throughout this month.
I also feel it is important to recognize the Governor and
his staff who worked diligently to support the agencies and the
citizens of our State. He has already appointed an after-action
review team to analyze our response and make recommendations
for improvement.
Our goal is to make sure that an event like this never
happens again. But if it does, we will be better prepared to
respond and to mitigate it.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I thank you for
inviting me here this morning, and I will be glad to answer
questions at the appropriate time.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
And with that, Dr. Tierney is recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Tierney. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Congressman Rahall, Congresswoman Capito, Congressman Webster,
and Senator Manchin.
I am Dr. Letitia Tierney. I am State health officer and
commissioner of the Bureau for Public Health. I am both a
physician and a lawyer, and I was born and raised here in West
Virginia.
And for Congressman Webster, I was born at the General
Hospital here in Charleston.
My undergraduate degree and my medical degree are both from
West Virginia University.
I am honored to be here today to represent the hardworking
men and women across the Bureau for Public Health who work
daily on behalf of all West Virginians--from the healthiest to
the most vulnerable of our population.
As commissioner and State health officer, my focus is on
community health, ensuring the safety and well-being of West
Virginia's population. And I very much appreciate the
opportunity today to make a brief statement as to the Bureau
for Public Health's role during the events that first began on
January 9, 2014.
First, the mission of the Bureau for Public Health is to
have healthy West Virginians in healthy communities and to
shape the environments within which they can be safe and
healthy.
We rely on science and evidence-based medicine for
virtually every decision we make. This belief has guided the
Bureau for Public Health's response.
From the time West Virginia American Water issued the ``do
not use'' advisory, the DHHR set up its Health and Medical
Incident Command Unit at the Center for Threat Preparedness.
Experts from across the Bureau for Public Health and from our
partner networks were engaged in that command structure.
Immediately, we began reaching out to local health
departments, hospitals, schools, and long-term care facilities
to quickly announce the discontinuation of all water use.
The bureau's Office of Epidemiology and Prevention Services
spearheaded plans to put in motion health surveillance across
the nine-county area.
At the same time, we began collaborating with the West
Virginia Poison Control Center, which served as an
informational resource for concerned residents. It is led by a
doctor of pharmacy with significant experience in toxicology
who served as an immediate resource for health care providers
and the public alike. They also helped us track patients and
their conditions.
The bureau's Office of Environmental Health Services began
overseeing an interagency team led by the National Guard in
collecting water samples. The bureau's director of infectious
disease epidemiology reached out to the CDC to learn more about
the chemical and to obtain guidance on a screening level for
MCHM.
The CDC's toxicologists developed a very conservative
screening level for the drinking water at 1 ppm. Therefore, the
Bureau for Public Health, on the advice of the CDC, set the
threshold for lifting water zones after 24 hours of results at
1 ppm or less.
From the beginning, a valuable collaboration made up of all
stakeholders at the local, State, and Federal level was
created, allowing for the timely sharing of information in
order to provide the best possible service to our citizens.
The water has been repeatedly sampled and tested at
multiple points across the affected region, using split samples
to ensure testing results were consistent at multiple labs,
including the bureau's Office of Laboratory Services.
Seven days into the response, and 2 days after the first
zones had been reopened, the CDC issued a letter to the DHHR
suggesting an advisory be issued to pregnant women to not drink
the water until the MCHM results were at undetectable levels,
out of an abundance of caution.
The Bureau for Public Health asked CDC to clarify their
advisory. It was explained to us that all populations,
including pregnant women, were included in the original
assessment of the screening level at 1 ppm, and that the 1 ppm
screening level was set at a very conservative level.
However, the CDC explained that the advisory was
precautionary and issued only out of an abundance of caution.
Then nearly 2 weeks into the event, we were informed that
Freedom Industries had reported to the DEP a second chemical,
``PPH, stripped,'' was also spilled into the river on January
9. This chemical was stored in the same tank and was estimated
to be approximately 7 percent of the total volume.
The intra-agency team went back and retested historic water
samples. The CDC and their partners also rolled up their
sleeves and went back to work to help us obtain critical data
on PPH.
This was complicated by Freedom, who initially provided us
with the incorrect Material Safety Data Sheet, which resulted
in a delay in obtaining the appropriate screening level from
our Federal partners.
Fortunately, virtually every sample retested for the PPH
was at nondetectable levels.
Today, the Bureau for Public Health continues to oversee
water testing. However, the public confidence level in the
water quality is still low.
Moving forward, the Bureau for Public Health will continue
to work on health and community assessments. Hospital
surveillance began within 24 hours. And now, we are working
with the CDC to initiate a community assessment study. This
with the health surveillance we initiated within the first 24
hours of the event are the first steps.
Once these data sets are fully assessed, we will be able to
use a more reasoned approach to evaluate the best method for
population surveillance for possible long-term effects. Rushing
into a decision is not in the best interest of public health,
and this is not something we want to get wrong. We want to make
sure that our surveillance, whether it be research, a registry,
or other method, will yield us the data we seek in a
statistically significant and reliable manner.
This is the heart of the mission of the Bureau for Public
Health. It is what we do every day. We have been actively
engaged in this event since day one, and for us, our job is
really just beginning.
Water is fundamental and impacts every part of West
Virginia and everything we hold dear.
So I thank you for your time.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
And with that, Mr. Merry is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Merry. Thank you, Chairman, Congresswoman Capito,
Congressmen Webster and Rahall, Senator Manchin.
I am going to kind of give you the aspect of the responder.
I mean, all this has been about the chemical itself, but the
responders and what we did in Cabell County.
The issue regarding the water that the customers initially
got was they were restricted to the eastern portion of Cabell
County. For that reason, Culloden Volunteer Fire Department was
asked for their assistance in being the water distribution
site.
That evening, the Huntington Area Food Bank was notified of
the situation and a request made for bottled water. The food
bank brought all of the bottled water and soft drinks they had
on hand for distribution at the fire department.
Cabell County Emergency Service brought a 400-gallon
military water buffalo to the fire department. This provided
the ability to fill containers brought by the public.
The town of Milton, the mayor, Tom Canterbury, were
notified, and a request made from the town of Milton water
department to fill the water buffalo. It should be noted that
the town of Milton water department supplied water to fill the
water buffalo, as well as the West Virginia National Guard
water buffaloes, during this situation--which Milton is on its
own water system, so we were not.
Myself and the sheriff of the county, I notified Sheriff
McComas of the developing situation and discussed the potential
of problems, panic at the fire department distribution site.
Sheriff McComas immediately dispatched deputies to secure the
water distribution site. Deputies remained at the distribution
site for security until the site was closed.
I contacted the county commission concerning the situation
in response to that point. The commission gave myself the
authorization to do whatever is needed to be done to ensure the
residents of Cabell County and Culloden area had safe water.
The State of West Virginia EOC stood up and communications
were established between that entity and Cabell County. There
was not a firm time as to the arrival of water from the State
or FEMA resources.
Due to the lack of available water in Cabell County and
surrounding counties by private vendors, a decision was made to
send two Cabell County EMS personnel to Louisa, Kentucky, to
purchase bottled water and hand sanitizer. Since there was no
estimated ETA on the emergency resources, a Cabell County
Sheriff's Department vehicle was loaded with water and hand
sanitizer, and routed immediately to the Culloden Volunteer
Fire Department.
Myself and Sheriff McComas went to Eagle Distributing in
West Huntington to explore the possibility of donation of
canned water from Anheuser-Busch Companies. Representatives
from Eagle were able to secure the contribution and an ETA
would be Sunday morning, January 12. Eagle paid for the
shipping costs, as well as provided staff and equipment to
offload the 2,200 cases of canned water.
Several attempts were made to contact representatives from
West Virginia American Water with negative results.
Bottled water and a military water buffalo were delivered
by the West Virginia National Guard to Culloden fire
department. These deliveries continued upon request during the
duration of the situation. Myself and the sheriff drove two 5-
ton trucks to Eagle Distributing to pick up 2,200 cases of
canned water and deliver it to the Culloden fire department.
The Culloden fire department maintained a distribution site
passing out bottled water as provided by the State of West
Virginia, FEMA, and delivered by the West Virginia National
Guard.
This report in no way documents all of the things that were
done to ensure that residents of eastern Cabell County had safe
water rather than the process by which the distribution site
and water were attained, while it would be impossible to
mention all the people, entities, and resources that assisted
in the situation. I will stop.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Merry.
And with that, Mr. Petry is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Petry. I would first like to thank the distinguished
members of the House of Representatives Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure for inviting me to speak this
morning. I am appearing before the committee in my capacity as
director of Kanawha County Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management.
My primary purpose for testifying today is to offer a quick
timeline of events that occurred on January 9, as it relates to
the chemical spill at Freedom Industries that ultimately
resulted in a ``do not use'' advisory being issued for
customers of West Virginia American Water in Kanawha County and
eight other counties.
On January 9 at approximately 10 a.m., calls were received
by Metro 911, reporting a chemical odor in the area of the I-77
and I-79 split. Metro 911 notified emergency responders of the
call and C.W. Sigman, the deputy director and fire coordinator
for Kanawha County Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, and fire department officials responded
to the area of Route 119 to Edens Fork to Mink Shoals and along
Pennsylvania Avenue to look for a possibly leaking truck.
While responding to these areas, emergency officials could
smell a licorice smell in the air, but they couldn't find the
source. So within 30 minutes of the call, they returned to
service.
At approximately 10:30, Mr. Sigman returned to the
Emergency Management Office and notified me of the smell in the
air and described it as a licorice smell. I told him to check
the old Pennzoil plant on Barlow Drive, as I was familiar with
the plant being a possible source for other chemicals stored
there.
Mr. Sigman retrieved the Tier II data for the Etowah River
Plant on Barlow Drive before going to the site. Upon arriving
at Barlow Drive, Mr. Sigman found a Diversified Services truck
leaving Barlow Drive.
There had been previous complaints on this company in the
St. Albans area, and he suspected that the truck could be the
source of the smell.
Mr. Sigman then continued to Freedom Industries, where he
found two West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection
Division of Air Quality personnel onsite. DEP officials
reported to Mr. Sigman that they had received odor complaints
at DEP, and they responded to the site. And there had been a
small spill of crude MCHM, and they would talk to facility
leaders regarding the matter.
Mr. Sigman provided DEP with a copy of the Tier II reports
and MSDS for the chemical. Mr. Sigman then left the scene as
DEP officials said they were handling the situation.
At approximately 11:30 a.m., my staff issued a media
release, stating there had been a leak of MCHM at the Freedom
Industries site and DEP was on scene at that time. The media
release described the product and its usage.
At approximately 1:30, Mr. Sigman had then received a call
from Mike Dorsey with DEP. Mr. Dorsey told him that the spill
may be larger than originally thought, and it may have leaked
into the river.
Mr. Sigman, on his way back to Freedom Industries, checked
the Elk River where it flows into the Kanawha for any
indication of the spill. There were no smells or indications of
any contaminates by looking. There were ice floes on the river
that day, so it was hard to see much.
At approximately 2 p.m., Grant Gunnoe, Charleston director
of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, returned to the
site of Freedom Industries with Mr. Sigman, and they met with
DEP officials.
DEP officials showed them efforts being made to contain the
leak. Absorbent pads had been placed around the outside of the
containment.
A West Virginia American Water representative was onsite as
well. The representative stated that they would put on extra
carbon beds to capture any of the material at the water company
plant.
An official from Freedom Industries was onsite as well and
identified himself as Dennis Farrell, president of Freedom
Industries. We asked him how much of the material had leaked,
and Mr. Farrell stated ``not much'' and that they would have to
weigh the amounts removed from the tank already and deduct that
from the inventory to determine the amount that had been
leaked.
Mr. Sigman and Mr. Gunnoe asked DEP officials if they
needed any further assistance from Emergency Management and
were told no. They further asked if any notification at the
time needed to be made to the public and were also told no. Mr.
Sigman and Mr. Gunnoe then returned to their respective
offices.
At 4:30 p.m., Mr. Sigman received a call from Anita Ray at
the Kanawha-Charleston Health Department, stating that they
were receiving calls of a licorice type taste in the drinking
water. The health department was contacting the water company
to report that information.
Mr. Sigman then made county management aware of the
situation and further contacted the West Virginia Division of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management to make them aware
of the situation.
The commission president initiated a call with Dr. Gupta,
the health official for the Kanawha-Charleston Health
Department, to make him aware of the situation.
On my way to 911, I authorized our staff to activate our
EOC, so that we could have different levels of different
agencies to help with the response.
Mr. Sigman from the MSDS report was able to determine that
Eastman was the manufacturer of the chemical and facilitated a
conference call with Eastman officials, West Virginia American
Water, DHHR, and other emergency officials at 8 p.m. to discuss
the chemical properties.
Eastman reported to all officials that the product was
relatively soluble and should wash through the system and was
readily biodegradable, and odor and taste were the bigger
issues.
We immediately started asking for help through the West
Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
for their resources. We did receive water and other resources
through our E-Team that we use constantly within the State.
And I, like my predecessors, have to thank all the
volunteers that helped us in distributing all the water that
they did, because we did have a lot of people helping us out to
try to make sure the community had safe drinking water.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Petry.
With that, Mr. McIntyre is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McIntyre. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rahall, Mrs. Capito, Mr.
Webster, and Mr. Manchin, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today. My name is Jeff McIntyre, and I am the president of
West Virginia American Water.
Our approximately 283 employees operate multiple systems
and 9 water treatment plants, providing water services to
roughly one-third of the State's population.
As a steward of a water system that serves more than
300,000 people in the Kanawha Valley, we take our
responsibility of providing clean, safe water very seriously.
It is our number one priority in every decision we make.
On January 9, an undetermined amount of 4-
methylcyclohexanemethanol leaked into the Elk River from an
aboveground storage tank at a Freedom Industries facility
located about 1.5 miles above our Kanawha Valley water
treatment plant.
We first learned of the Freedom Industries spill from the
West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. We then
took immediate steps to gather more information about the
chemical, augment our treatment processes in the Kanawha Valley
plant, and begin consultations with Federal, State, and local
public health officials.
After our water quality team determined that the augmented
treatment process was not fully removing the chemical, we
reached a joint decision with the West Virginia Bureau for
Public Health to issue a ``do not use'' order to all customers
of our Kanawha Valley system for several critical reasons.
In addition to loss of water for drinking, cooking, and
bathing, a shutdown would have quickly resulted in the loss of
basic sanitation capabilities for approximately 300,000 people.
A shutdown would also have quickly resulted in a loss of
fire protection in the nine counties that we serve.
We had no way, at that time, to determine or estimate the
duration of the chemical spill or resulting plume that would
affect the water treatment plant.
And shutting down the plant, losing the system, then
restarting it, would have been a prolonged, difficult process,
keeping customers out of water for any use for a substantially
longer period of time than the actual period that the ``do not
use'' order was in place.
On January 10, the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health
received guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and confirmation from the U.S. EPA that a maximum
level of 1 ppm of MCHM would be protective of public health.
Levels of MCHM in the river's raw water and the plant's
treated water have been at less than the CDC designated
``protective of public health'' level, 1 ppm, since January 13.
On January 15, based on additional guidance from the CDC,
we issued another advisory for pregnant women to consider an
alternative drinking water source until the chemical was at a
nondetect level throughout the water distribution system.
On January 18, following extensive, around-the-clock
testing throughout the system, the last area under the ``do not
use'' order was lifted.
We will continue to flush the system and test water at
designated locations, determined jointly by West Virginia
American Water and the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health,
until MCHM levels are nondetectable at all designated sampling
locations throughout the distribution system.
On January 21, fully 12 days after the MCHM spill, Freedom
Industries informed the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection of the presence of a second chemical
in the spill, a proprietary mixture of glycol ethers known as
PPH.
Since this disclosure, a group of chemists, researchers,
regulators, health organizations, and commercial laboratories
collaborated in the development of a method of detection for
PPH at the parts per billion level. Even at this minute
detection level, only 2 samples out of 300 samples that have
been tested have shown any trace of PPH, and both of these
samples were after all customers were already under the ``do
not use'' order.
I would like to underscore West Virginia American Water's
focus during the Freedom Industries chemical spill and
aftermath. Safety is our number one priority. Continuous
sampling, testing, and treatment is critical. Our present
objective is no detectable MCHM in the distribution system
water.
We are partnering with local, State, and Federal officials.
We strive to provide our customers with nothing less than
clean, safe drinking water.
West Virginia American Water has always supported laws and
regulations that promote safe drinking water and has an
outstanding record of compliance with these requirements. We
are committed to working with State and Federal officials to
protect the public health, to protect the public from threats
to safe drinking water.
I would like to give my sincere and heartfelt thanks to the
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the
West Virginia Bureau for Public Health, and the West Virginia
National Guard, as well as other agencies, companies, and
subject matter experts, who were essential and capable partners
in the wake of the Freedom Industries spill.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
committee.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. McIntyre.
And I thank all of you. Again, I reassure you your full
statements will be in the record for the committee.
I also want to offer a statement, without objection, to the
record by Senator Rockefeller, who submitted a statement.
No objection, so ordered.
It is in the record.
Also, I understand that Senator Rockefeller's State
director Rocky Goodwin is here with us today. We welcome her
today. And I know that Senator Rockefeller is monitoring the
situation and the events very closely, so we appreciate that.
With that, we will start the round of questions. I
anticipate we will have a second round and a third round, if
necessary. I am going to yield my first 5 minutes to
Representative Capito to start the questioning.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you.
I would like to, before I begin my questioning, add to the
record ``Recommendations to Incorporate Public Health
Components to Senate Bill 373'' by Dr. Gupta, who is the
Charleston-Kanawha Health Department health officer.
Mr. Shuster. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6632.008
Mrs. Capito. Thank you.
The big question I hear, Mr. McIntyre, and it is very
simple, you said safety is your number one priority: Is the
water safe to drink?
Mr. McIntyre. As a water company, we don't set the safe
standards. But we are in compliance with all the standards set
by the health-based agencies, like the CDC, the West Virginia
Bureau of Public Health, and we have been since the 13th of
January.
Yet, I recognize the customers' fear associated with the
smell of something in their water. So as a water purveyor, we
continue to work until the smell is eradicated from the system.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you for that answer. I would still like
to hear it is safe, and I think that is what everybody wants,
that one word.
Dr. Tierney, is the water safe to drink?
Dr. Tierney. That is, in a way, a difficult thing to say,
because everybody has a different definition of ``safe.'' As I
used the example before, some people think it is safe to jump
off the bridge on Bridge Day. I don't personally think that is
safe. So everybody has a different definition.
Am I confident in the science? I am as confident as I can
be, given what we have. I believe the water, based on the
standards we have, is usable for every purpose, and that
includes drinking, bathing, and cooking.
Mrs. Capito. So I guess the frustration I am feeling is
that we can't come to that specific term where everybody could
have that assurance.
I will note that you do have a giant thing of water in
front of you, so I am assuming you are drinking that.
Dr. Tierney. I am. I am sorry, that is not meant to be a
statement. But it is from my home tap and the ice cubes from my
home ice machine. And I have been drinking it. I didn't think
about that, but yes.
Mrs. Capito. Let me ask you this, Mr. McIntyre. This is
something that you and I actually talked about on the day I
came out there. There was never any communication or any
reporting to you as the purveyor of potable water in the area
what is upstream from you.
So you never knew or had any knowledge--I mean, you knew
Freedom Industries was up there, but you didn't have any--there
is no requirement to have communication as to what is up there
and how you could have had a quicker response to this, maybe?
Mr. McIntyre. Well, I think the last part, let me address
that first, because we had enough time and information to know
that there was the spill and to respond. The information that
would have been useful to us on what products were up there are
really the aftermath in dealing with the customer and the
residents' fear of the water, because it has this odor to it.
And even its MSDS sheet doesn't refer much to its odorous
nature in the drinking water system.
We had enough time to augment our treatment plant, and we
were treating this material throughout the event but determined
that after 4 p.m. that some of the material made it through the
treatment system.
Mrs. Capito. The testing protocols weren't really in place
though for at least 24 hours. I remember you working with the
Guard to try to figure out how to detect for this. Wouldn't it
have been useful to have all this--you could have pulled it up
on your computer. We could test right away. We know what we are
looking for. We know how to prevent, to provide a quicker
response.
Mr. McIntyre. Well, again, I challenge the ``quicker
response'' part. I think having more information on all
products above a water treatment plant is extremely helpful,
extremely helpful. But we had enough information. We augmented
the treatment plant, and we followed the standard protocols.
``Do not use'' is a protocol that the West Virginia Bureau of
Public Health has in place for these situations.
And I have said publicly, if we knew again what we know now
about the materials and we had the same issue presented to us,
we would have made the same decision, to continue running the
treatment plant and put a ``do not use'' order.
It is really having information after that, that would have
been really helpful to help people understand the nature of the
health hazards, the risks associated with this product, or
apparently the lack of any of those health hazards.
Mrs. Capito. All right, Mr. Petry, thank you for your all's
response in an emergency way, and the way you were able to
disseminate water, both you and the other emergency response
responders.
You have had a lot of interaction with FEMA we have here in
Kanawha County and across the State. Would you say that the
response with FEMA in terms of helping you deliver was
satisfactory, or would you have suggestions for them?
Mr. Petry. Well, we keep telling people to be prepared for
72 hours at home, just in case a major emergency happens.
Once an incident occurs, they have to stand up their own
response and send us the resources that we request through the
State. And FEMA did, in fact, send us a lot of water that we
needed.
It is obvious that it doesn't get here quick enough for us,
but they have procedures, I am sure, they have to go through.
And we take it upon ourselves to use our local resources until
they get here.
But of course, I would like to see a quicker response.
Mrs. Capito. OK, thank you.
I have 20--oh, I have no more seconds, all right, thank
you.
Mr. Shuster. We will do a second round.
And with that, Mr. Rahall is recognized.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gordon, let me begin by asking you a couple questions. You
stated in your testimony that during the first 24 hours you had
difficulty communicating with American Water. Is that accurate?
Mr. Merry. Yes.
Mr. Rahall. Did it improve after a time period? Did your
communication improve?
Mr. Merry. No, sir. I never did get through to them. I
never got an answer. I left messages and never did get a return
phone call.
Mr. Rahall. From where were you getting your information,
then?
Mr. Merry. From Jimmy.
Mr. Rahall. From Homeland Security? OK, I think a lot of
people were doing that.
Let me ask, have you documented, Gordon, the final costs to
the county of Cabell?
Mr. Merry. When we were in the very beginning, we spent
around $2,000 for water and hand sanitizer. One of the things
that we tell, we tell the people in the community to be ready
for 48-72 hours. Local government is going to have to step up
and also be ready in that same time period. Without the
Huntington Area Food Bank, there would not have been water in
the town of Culloden.
Mr. Rahall. Mr. McIntyre, let me ask you about the school
situation here, a full month after the incident started, there
have been reports of fumes in the schools. Are you helping?
What are those fumes coming from, first of all?
Mr. McIntyre. I don't know, sir. I can't answer that
question. The National Guard has been the agency that has been
actively involved in sampling the schools. And all I can tell
you is the sampling results that I have seen before and after
these events are at nondetect levels. But I can't speak to
those events. I don't have any direct knowledge.
Mr. Rahall. Does anyone on the panel have knowledge of the
fumes in the schools? Jimmy?
Mr. Gianato. Yes, Congressman, we have put together some
National Guard and Bureau of Public Health and DEP strike teams
that have responded to these calls from the schools concerning
the fumes.
As Mr. McIntyre said, we have gone in and tested the water
immediately, going into the schools and then doing tests
afterward. But all the water before any flushing or anything
else was done came back at a nondetect level.
There have been some issues with the schools in the
cafeterias with their dishwashers, when the water has been
heated up, that that odor seems to be greater at that point.
But that is the only thing we have really seen as a
potential cause.
Mr. Rahall. Have you been assisting them in their flushing
efforts?
Mr. Gianato. The Guard has. The schools have--the schools
are a little bit more complex than the average home to flush,
in that a lot of the particularly newer schools have automated
systems that control the flow of water, just like the faucets
that you have to put your hands under to make run, so you can't
just go in and turn the faucet on and let it flush. So they are
a little bit more complicated.
But the school systems have brought plumbers in, and they
have flushed their buildings. And in cases where we have had
the thresholds above the 10 ppb, they have gone in and
reflushed. And all the schools that are at less than the 10 ppb
at this point.
Mr. Rahall. What about individual homes that want to be
tested? I know you can't just go around testing everybody's
home. What is the process they go through?
Mr. Gianato. Some individuals are doing private testing on
their own. The Governor's office and the Bureau of Public
Health are working on a plan.
As you all know, this is not a very simple issue. It is
very complex issue, particularly when you start looking at
going into homes. So we want to make sure, and the Governor
wants to make sure, whatever we do is very thoughtful and well
laid out, so that when we do something, it is something that we
can replicate down the road.
Mr. Rahall. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
With that, Mr. Webster is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Webster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple
questions.
Is there any evidence that the chemical residue could
adhere itself to iron pipes, copper pipes? Anyone know the
answer to that?
Dr. Tierney. It is a good question, and we have been
looking at it. It relates to a chemical's octanol water
partition coefficient. It is a factor in science called a KOW,
and it is a complex calculation based on the particular
substance or chemical that is involved.
We do know that if a KOW is high, it tends to be more
sticky to substances. And if a KOW is low, it tends to be less
likely to be sticky to substances. And fortunately, the MCHM
has a low partition coefficient, and so we don't anticipate it
is going to be sticky.
The EPA is looking at it right now, to make sure that the
chemical doesn't have any unique characteristics, which would
cause it to act different than we expect.
But the fact that when we have had consistently lower
levels with the testing tends to suggest it is acting like we
would expect it to act with that partition coefficient. But we
don't have an official answer from the EPA yet.
Mr. Webster. Is there a protocol for a residence or a
commercial building on what to do to flush, before you begin
using, like to flush out the water that maybe sat there for a
couple days? Is there any protocol for that, or a checklist of
some sort?
Mr. McIntyre. Yes, sir. Working with the different health
agencies, we created a flushing protocol for customers. But it
is important to remind everyone that that protocol is based on
helping homes ensure that they could get below the 1 ppm health
protective limit.
We were very clear at the time that we advised people to
follow the flushing protocol, which our customer service
center, if people call, if they haven't flushed, I would
certainly advise them to flush. We hear a number of customers
haven't. We have staff that can walk them through that process
on the phone. It is on our Web site. It is a printed three-page
brochure.
There are essentially three basic steps to the flushing.
You flush the hot water for 15 minutes, and then the cold water
for 5 minutes, then outside taps for 5 minutes. And then you
move to what we consider cleansing, which is changing any
filters on your icemaker, dealing with automatic icemakers and
that.
So again, that was to get below the protected health limit.
And that has been very effective when used and followed.
We also advised people, though, at that time, that the
flushing was not to eliminate the odor, but to meet the
protective health limit set by the CDC. And below that number,
people would still be able to smell this product in their
water.
So that is the next phase that we moved into in the
flushing and the nondetect, and we continue to work to
eradicate it, so that no people can smell it in their water.
I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Webster. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
With that, Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, it is just unconscionable that Freedom
Industries could not have known about the leak, did not report
the leak, and did not know how much of the leak happened. It is
unconscionable to me to believe that.
So I am sure action will be taken for responsible parties
there. And the answers we got afterwards were absolutely
unacceptable.
With that being said, I understand, my outrage and everyone
else's outrage should be that, of any unconscionable company
out there doing that type of business.
With that being said, Dr. Moure-Eraso, you with your
impressive background, is the water safe? Would you drink the
water and use the water? Would your children and grandchildren?
If it is not safe, and you can't say that, what do you want
to see testing before you would consider it to be safe, if you
can answer?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Well, what I would say is that the value
that was the trigger, the sampling and the trigger, the
stopping the use of the water, is what is called a screening
level, it is what the CDC says. The screening level is not
necessarily a level that protects public health.
Senator Manchin. But do you consider it to be safe?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Well, I consider that the toxicology that
exists for this chemical is so little, and the chemical is so
little studied, that it is very hard to say what is the safe
level.
What we should be looking at is what are the levels of
detection that we have, and try to use the water, as is
happening here, when they are below the levels of detection.
But I will look back to the level of detection that this is
the screening level that was reported.
Senator Manchin. So nobody is going to say it is safe. That
is what I am hearing from everybody here.
And that is the confusion that we have right now.
With that being said, Mr. McIntyre, if you could tell me,
there was no backup. You had single-sourced intake. Do you have
any other of your plants around the country that you provide
water to that only have single-source intake and no backup
system that you can't shut down the intake? Is anyone else as
vulnerable as we are?
Mr. McIntyre. I can tell you, Senator, that many water
treatment plants around the country have a single intake for
their water treatment plant.
Senator Manchin. With those type of chemicals right next
door?
Mr. McIntyre. It depends on where they are located as to
what they have. But there are major river basins----
Senator Manchin. So you are saying--how about backup? You
are saying the rest of your systems have no backup?
Mr. McIntyre. I am not saying the rest of the systems. I
don't know that. We can get you that answer.
Senator Manchin. Would you get us that information, please,
for the record, because I would like to know.
I can't imagine why we wouldn't have shut it down. That is
common sense, that you shut down the system. But then you told
me about the way it should have been done, because of the
public safety and this and that. And I just can't imagine that
we couldn't have shut that down, had the backup system until we
could determine it.
I know, at the time, they didn't let you know and all this
going on, but this makes no sense.
If I could go right quickly to Mr. Gianato and Dr. Tierney,
have you evaluated the other areas in West Virginia that people
might be with their intake systems, where the water treatment
plants that could be vulnerable right now? And have you taken
any actions?
Mr. Gianato. Yes, sir. I can tell you what we have done. We
have begun the process of mapping all the water intakes across
the State and looking at the locations----
Senator Manchin. Have we identified, basically, and
notified anybody that could be in harm's way?
Mr. Gianato. Not at this point. We are still trying to----
Senator Manchin. You are still evaluating.
Dr. Tierney?
Dr. Tierney. We have maps that need to be updated, but we
don't have any authority to do something----
Senator Manchin. So the legislation right now--I am
understanding EPA does not have the backing of any codification
of any law that allows you to go and do anything that is
nonhazmat. Is that correct?
Dr. Tierney. You'll have to ask EPA.
Senator Manchin. Mike? I am sorry, Mr. Dorsey?
Mr. Dorsey. It is all right, Senator. Well, the DEP.
But that is correct, at least from the State----
Senator Manchin. But they are saying, why didn't you do
this? Why wouldn't you have already been doing this? Why did we
have a horrific situation like this? You follow me?
People are starting to blame with everybody, but tell me
why the DEP would not have been able to do what needed to be
done?
Mr. Dorsey. Well, the laws we do have aren't designed to do
what you are suggesting, Senator. We can look at people's
stormwater. We can look at any specific outfalls that they
have. But we do not have the statutory or rule authority to go
up and say, OK, I want to do a survey upstream here.
Senator Manchin. Have you looked at the legislation that we
have provided, the legislation I introduced on the Senate side,
and I am sure our colleagues are introducing on the House side,
to see if that would give you the adequate----
Mr. Dorsey. Yes, sir. That is a big help.
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Senator, if I can comment?
Senator Manchin. Doctor?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. You know, part of our lines of inquiry in
our investigation are toward prevention. It is good that we are
looking at the waterworks and where the water is coming from.
But also, in our lines of inquiry, we are focusing on the
siting of chemical storage tanks. And we believe that it is a
very important issue, an issue that I define it as inherently
safe actions.
We have to be clear, after a mapping is done of the
facilities for water, what are the chemical storage that are
nearby and why do they need to be there if they are hazardous
substances. And that will be an important step to take.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. We will do another round, if there are more
questions.
My first question is a followup with what Representative
Capito and Senator Manchin asked. The panel sitting here,
nobody is willing to say that the water is safe, categorically
say it is safe.
And I am not going to ask you again, because I think
everybody is going to dance around the question.
And I don't know exactly why, but I suspect the main reason
why is everybody is afraid they are going to get sued if
something happens weeks from now and something enters the water
and somebody is going to bring a lawsuit against somebody. So
that is troubling to me that in our society, when we have the
people that are supposed to protect us and the experts, nobody
is willing to say it because they are afraid of a lawsuit.
So that is a different topic for today, but it is about
tort reform and making sure that our experts, that the people
who are protecting society, are able to step up and say, with
our technology, we ought to be able say the water is safe.
And so I understand why you are hedging.
Communications in this case, first, let me go to--you
talked about, Senator Manchin asked why didn't you shut down.
Can you explain again why you didn't shut down the system?
I think you talked about it in your----
Mr. McIntyre. Certainly, thank you. And it is the number
one question that we keep getting asked as the water purveyors.
And people believe that you can just physically turn off
and turn on a water plant. Unfortunately, that is not the
reality.
And it is a system that was severely stressed with the
polar vortex temperatures that we had. And then the thaw that
occurred after that, we had numerous pipe breaks. People were
turning their water on to let it run so that their taps
wouldn't freeze. We encourage that, so that they don't have a
costly service line repair or replacement.
But our system, on January 9, would not support any length
of shutdown. In fact, if we had shut down the facility, we
would have been out of water in areas within 15 minutes to 2
hours.
That aside, we provide a critical service to the community,
and I would like people to try to envision what it would be
like to be in a community where there is no water in the pipes,
and you have no sanitation. Where do you go to the bathroom?
Hospitals, if there is a fire in the hospital, how do you
protect those patients? There are no sprinkler systems in
buildings. It is a downtown area.
What if someone started a fire? How do you address that?
Those were all critical thought processes that we had to go
through.
And to extend, you can't just turn it back on. Once you
waited for the plume to pass, and we were 4 to 5 days before
the river water was below the CDC standard, so when people talk
about storage, I don't believe storage would have helped,
because you have to get the plant back on and you have to get
it running. Now you have to introduce that water very carefully
into a system that is full of air.
And if you have ever seen your tap at home with air in it
in the bathroom, when you turn it on, that explosive nature,
there would have been pipe breaks all over the system that
would have had to have been fixed, and then remedied, and then
boil water, and move out and out and out.
Conservatively, we believe that it would have been more
than a month to turn the water system back on for all
customers. We believe we made the right decision to protect
this community.
Mr. Shuster. A whole other health hazard you bring up, if
you shut that system down, potentially.
Would the staff turn the clock on for me? I need the
discipline of the clock also.
Communication, I think communication is absolutely critical
in these events. I want to start first with Mr. Merry and Mr.
Petry on the communication.
You had said you weren't able to communicate with the water
company, but the Federal, the State, how is that communication?
How did that work for you?
Mr. Merry. I had very good communications with the Office
of Emergency Service. I had no problems. I never had one issue.
Mr. Petry. I, too, had good communications with the State
Office of Emergency Services. But we have been in these
situations before, with the chemical facilities in the area,
and we found out that we were better off if we had somebody at
the site. And we had my deputy go to the meetings and be a part
of the committee that was at the water company, along with all
the other people from the National Guard and other agencies.
Mr. Shuster. And how did that information from the CDC flow
down? Does that go through the State to you folks or to you
directly?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Chairman Shuster, if I might?
Mr. Shuster. Yes.
Mr. Moure-Eraso. The issue of communications, it is an
important one, and it talks about your original question that
says there is the appearance that people are hedging when they
say what is the safe level, if this is a safe level.
But if you are going to give a scientific answer to this,
you have to have scientific data in which you can base your
statement of safety.
And in this particular chemical, there are only two
toxicological studies that were ever made. One is an acute
single dose mortality study and the other was a daily oral
study, four groups of animals in each. I mean, this is the bare
minimum that you do.
And those types of studies are not designed to give us the
answer of what is safe. That is one of the things that we are
also contemplating in our investigation of this case, to look,
what Senator Manchin is doing, to look at the Toxic Substance
Control Act, and see why the people that basically put this
chemical in commerce don't provide the necessary toxicological
data to tell us what is the level of toxicity that we should
worry about. And that remains to be done.
Mr. Shuster. And, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. Merry said he was
unable to communicate with you folks. Can you talk a little bit
about what was going on over there? Was there a reason that you
didn't communicate with them? Can you talk a little bit about
the communication?
Mr. McIntyre. To be honest, I didn't know he was trying to
communicate with us. I did not receive any calls. I am not sure
who he was calling, but we had a whole interagency team at the
water treatment plant, running day and night. So I can't speak
to who he called, but I find it very unfortunate, because I
believe we have been extremely communicative with all the
partners through this process.
A lot of communications have been happening. I don't know
where this one fell apart.
Mr. Shuster. In a situation like this, unfortunately, that
happens now and then.
But again, communication, that is something we need to
learn from this, from the Federal level all the way down. And I
think the folks, where the rubber meets the road, you guys, the
county emergency responders, you need to have that
communication all the way up the chain.
A final question, Mr. Gianato, you mentioned about learning
from other sites that are similar to West Virginia. Have you
identified other places that are similar? As the committee goes
forward, as we look at potential legislation, that we can look
and say this is a very similar situation that occurred in this
State or that State?
Mr. Gianato. What I meant to say in that is people need to
learn from what we are doing here. And we need to look at being
able to replicate and learn from the mistakes that we made, the
things that we did right, and push that model all across the
country.
We are currently talking to FEMA and DHS about developing
some things. As you know, there are some national security
implications to this that need to be discussed in another
forum.
Mr. Shuster. Absolutely.
With that, I am going to go for second round of questions.
Mr. Rahall?
Mr. Rahall. Yes. Mr. Dorsey, let me ask you about the
restoration of the site.
Mr. Dorsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rahall. You mentioned, I think somewhere in the press,
that it has been stalled because of the various investigations,
including a criminal investigation going on.
Has that restoration been restarted, or is it still on
hold?
Mr. Dorsey. Congressman Rahall, we have never really
stopped. We have been actively managing the site. But the area
where the leak actually occurred is in the tank farm on top of
the bench there. And the area where the leak occurred has been
sort of off-limits. We put sumps in there. We put some
interceptor trenches, et cetera, to collect the raw material
that was coming out. And that has stopped.
But it would surprise me if we didn't, when we move these
tanks, find additional pools of the material below that. Now
that is not to say it is going to get off-site.
Mr. McIntyre stated the water has been clean since January
13. I believe the intake side of that has been clean since
January 11. So we have been very successful keeping the stuff
on the site.
But the Chemical Safety Board is up there investigating.
The Federal prosecutor is investigating. There are several up
there. And until they give the clearance--I am hoping that this
week--we haven't been able to move those tanks and see what we
have right below them.
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Congressman Rahall?
Mr. Rahall. Yes?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. In the preliminary work that we have done,
we have been able to examine the bottom of the tank. And I will
ask our lead investigator, Mr. Banks, if he could show to you
the photographs that we have of the actual failure of the
bottom of the tank. We have it over here.
Mr. Rahall. You mentioned Mr. Banks. I met with him on his
first day he was in State. He is no stranger to our State,
either, having been here with your board in previous accidents.
Mr. Banks. Well, as you can see here, there are two holes
that we photographed in the tank. One is about 19 cm, and one
is about 10 cm. And this is the object of our attempt to get
this portion of the tank extracted and removed for forensic
examination.
We are working with our partners in the U.S. Attorney's
Office and the State to make sure that everybody understands
that there is a protocol we have developed. We are working with
a preeminent tank expert to make sure that these portions of
the tank are removed in the prescribed manner.
And I think we are close to doing that. The plaintiffs'
attorneys were out at the site this past Friday, and we are
hoping to strike an arrangement where we can remove this. Once
we remove this, the remediation can take place.
This is the main area, but we want to make sure that we
thoroughly document those other tanks that were also in similar
service to determine if there was a failure mechanism in those
tanks that could tell us why the tanks failed.
Mr. Rahall. Is that steel?
Mr. Banks. We think it is carbon steel, but we would want
to determine that before we make any pronouncements on that.
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Yes, I would like to add that one line of
investigation is to look at corrosion mechanisms. We are going
to take samples of that tank and find out how the corrosion
happened, and to try to make recommendations of what should be
recommended to build the tanks. There are materials, there are
alloys, that are especially protective towards corrosion that
we would like to recommend at the end.
Mr. Rahall. How long do you expect this process to take?
Mr. Banks. The actual removing of the sample, which is
called a coupon, could be a day. But it is a matter of getting
all of the other tanks mapped, and I think that could take
maybe 2 to 3 days. We have an expert that has recommended a
company that can come in to do the work.
Mr. Rahall. I know we have discussed this before, and it
has been mentioned in today's testimony. Your recommendations
from the last time you were in West Virginia 3 years ago,
roughly, were not acted upon. I know those recommendations have
been incorporated in various pieces of legislation my
colleagues have introduce, recommendations that I fully support
and hope to see them acted upon this time.
Would you anticipate that that will be a basis upon which
your recommendations will be based after this report is
complete?
I guess my question is, will you re-ask that those
recommendations be made again?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Well, I think we have a thorough
opportunity to present the necessity of having that type of
chemical spill protection, chemical release protection, that is
the basis of past recommendations. And this, of course, is a
case that definitely this applies to, to have a system to
address and prevent chemical spills.
Mr. Rahall. OK, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Mrs. Capito?
Mrs. Capito. Thank you.
Dr. Tierney, I would like to talk about the public health
effects of what is going on here.
First of all, just very briefly, if you could give me a
snapshot of what you have seen. Is it rashes, or is it growing,
or how many is it, approximately?
The other question I have is on the ruling, the letter from
the CDC about pregnant women. I mean, everybody that I talked
to said, of course, that startled, really shook us. Young
families have babies. They have formula they are making with
the water. Why just pregnant women? What kind of judgment was
made on that? And then maybe just briefly a little bit about
what long-term lookout you would predict on this, on the public
health aspect.
Dr. Tierney. I am sorry, what was----
Mrs. Capito. The first one was, a real snapshot as to what
you have seen.
Dr. Tierney. Oh, what we have seen.
Mrs. Capito. Yes.
Dr. Tierney. Very fortunately, in our survey of the
hospitals' emergency rooms, it is been less than a half percent
of the affected population presented, which thank God.
Mrs. Capito. Yes.
Dr. Tierney. And we have seen mostly nausea and vomiting,
which was self-limited.
Mrs. Capito. Is that from the odor or from drinking?
Dr. Tierney. All of the above.
Mrs. Capito. OK.
Dr. Tierney. And some rashes, also which resolved.
So like I said, thank God, we don't want anyone harmed from
this.
Mrs. Capito. And then the letter from the CDC?
Dr. Tierney. Now, the letter from the CDC, I can tell you
we were equally shocked, surprised, and worried when we got it.
We kept pressing them for more clarification. And the letter is
what it is.
Mrs. Capito. Right.
Dr. Tierney. I will tell you, I personally, on Saturday,
which would have been the 11th of January, when we were
discussing the screening level that they gave me, being a
doctor, I specifically asked what about babies, what about
breastfeeding, what about immunocompromised, what about
pregnant women, what about? And they told me that they felt
that the screening level, because of the safety factors that
they factored into it, were protective of all those
populations.
So we were shocked, also, when they presented us with this.
Mrs. Capito. And the last thing is, have you gotten to any
kind of strategy for some sort of long-term----
Dr. Tierney. We are in the process of that. And like I
said, it is not something that we want to get wrong. So we want
to make sure that it is a reasoned approach.
We are starting with our surveillance, looking back at it.
And then we are going to do a CASPER study, which is a
household surveillance study through the CDC.
We are going to take that information, and then we are
going to figure out what is going to give us the best
information.
Mrs. Capito. All right.
Mr. Dorsey, there was a report early on that the tanks had
never been inspected. And then, as Senator Manchin said,
everybody was getting blamed for this. What I am hearing you
say is that was not part of your legal authority. Am I correct
in that?
Mr. Dorsey. That is correct, Congresswoman Capito. Nothing
that we would have done in our legal authority that has
inspectors for the laws that are applicable up here would have
detected that leak.
Mrs. Capito. Had you had inspectors on the site at all
previously?
Mr. Dorsey. Yes. They are been inspectors onsite numerous
times over the years. Our secretary reported initially, in the
heat of the moment, when this thing first happened, that they
hadn't. But that was not the case.
Now, I can't tell you how many times they have been on
there, but it was probably over a dozen for air complaints and
other inspections up there.
Mrs. Capito. OK. But your real job there was not to inspect
the safety of the tank. It was to respond to complaints, odor
complaints and such. Is that correct?
Mr. Dorsey. That is correct. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Capito. OK. There is another myth around--not myth,
but concern with the flushing issue, in that everybody seems to
be smelling it the most with the hot water.
And I can attest to that. In the shower, I can smell it.
Although I didn't this morning, I was happy to report. But
brushing my teeth with the cold, I didn't smell it.
So is there some characteristic here with hot? Is it
because--I mean, we are talking about sediments in our hot
water tanks? Help us out with this. We are talking about it a
lot.
Mr. McIntyre. Yes, and it is well known in the water
industry that chemicals that have an odor to them, like geosmin
or MIB, which are associated with the much cleaner water we
have in the Great Lakes, decades ago, water treatment plants
started seeing odors in their water, and that is why many of
them have switched to the type of process that we have with
carbon caps, activated carbon caps, on their treatment system.
It is to deal with these odors.
And they are more prominent in hot water. I think it is
mostly in the shower, and it is because you are making it into
more of a mist, and it has temperature. It is just like
anything you cook. It smells more when it is hot than when it
is cold. It is natural.
Mrs. Capito. So that is not an unexpected result, with the
hot water you would smell it more prominently?
Mr. McIntyre. I would expect it fully.
Mrs. Capito. OK. All right.
Yes, Dr. Moure-Eraso, you mentioned in your testimony that
a private inspector had been to the site to inspect the tanks
in October of 2013. Now I don't know what reason they had a
contractor coming in. Since they are not here, we cannot ask
them that question. But I am going to surmise, since it was
sold at the end of the year, that that might have been one of
the provisos of change of ownership. I don't know that to be a
fact, but that is kind of what hit me.
You mentioned in there, in your report, you say that the
tank and then ``had been maintained to some structural
adequacy, but not necessarily full compliance of API 653 or EPA
standards.''
Can you give us some detail on that? What does that mean?
It was corroding?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Let me answer first, and then I pass you
to Mr. Banks.
First of all, they did inspect in October 2013 the chemical
tanks and terminals in Charleston and Nitro. But they didn't
address the tank that leaked, 396.
Mrs. Capito. Oh, the specific tank was not----
Mr. Moure-Eraso. It wasn't addressed because it didn't
contain any hazardous substances as legally defined.
Mrs. Capito. Oh, OK.
Mr. Moure-Eraso. But, you know, I wonder if you would like
to ask details of API 653.
Mr. Banks. Well, there is a pretty rigorous standard that
653 would hold the tanks to, if they were used in a certain
service.
Mrs. Capito. If it was toxic, is that what you----
Mr. Banks. Yes, if it was toxic. And because this material
is not considered toxic, it received a waiver for that type of
scrutiny.
Mrs. Capito. I see.
Mr. Banks. And so, moving forward, we are going to look at
using 653 as the standard for evaluating this tank to make sure
that, if there were some failure, we will be able to determine
that using that process.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you. I just finally would say that this
toxicity standard, we all realize that something that is
nontoxic can bring you right to your knees. And I think that is
probably what TSCA reform is all about, and I look forward to
working on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. I recognize Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this would be to Mr. Dorsey. You know, the
credibility of Freedom, there is no credibility. They said
first we thought it was a small leak. Then it was, like, I have
heard 3 different things, 3,000, 5,000, and 7,500.
Do we know much how much actually leaked in the river?
Mr. Dorsey. No, sir. I stopped reporting how much they were
telling me was leaked after I got three different numbers.
Senator Manchin. Why should we be relying on them for any
information?
Mr. Dorsey. Well, I am relying on the Chemical Safety
Board. When the Chemical Safety Board tells me how much they
think was leaked, that is what I am going to believe.
Senator Manchin. OK. Next of all, was there no plan? I
mean, when we knew there was a leak, why wouldn't we have
emptied those tanks immediately, before more leaked out?
Mr. Dorsey. Well, we did. Even by the time I got there,
they had a tanker hooked to that tank and were pumping the
material out. It just takes X amount of time, depending on how
much was in there, to get it emptied, to where no more will
come out.
Senator Manchin. You know, we are briefed, all of us are
briefed on a regular basis about cybersecurity and how
vulnerable our food supply, our water supply, our grid system,
and what it can do to our lives in America.
Seeing this as a wakeup call, do you think that this should
be considered the same as the national disaster?
The comparison would be this, Doctor, or whoever wants to
chime in on this, the same as Hurricane Sandy. There is no
State that can take care of this by themselves, and they are
expecting the State, but we shouldn't be looking at how much it
costs and whether we can do the testing and whether we should--
it just has to be done.
So, Doctor, we are going to need people like yourself that
will speak up and say this is a wakeup call to prevent a
national disaster, and can we expect some help from the Federal
Government?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Yes, I think one way to deal with this is
the bill you are proposing in the Senate. But what we have to
see here is what is the cost of not acting.
We are able to measure what it has cost the State of West
Virginia to have this incident in terms of money lost and
income lost and anguish to the people. To really address the
storage of chemicals in tanks will be a small cost, compared
with the other costs.
Senator Manchin. Do you agree that we should have long-term
monitoring in the valley here for the people in the affected
areas, so that we know the effect this has on humans or no
effect at all on humans?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. Exactly. I think the Toxic Substance
Control Act should address the toxicology----
Senator Manchin. We should expect the Federal Government to
work with us on that?
Mr. Moure-Eraso. And that is the Federal Government, yes.
Senator Manchin. OK, I do, too. I agree with you
wholeheartedly on that.
Dr. Tierney. I want to chime in, yes.
Senator Manchin. And I know, Dr. Tierney, I know you are
new to the job. I know you are on the frontline of defense
right now, but with that being said, I have to say a few things
here.
Your analogy of being safe, and I know no one--I am
understanding that not one of you up here are willing to say,
unequivocally, it is safe. And I would assume that you would
have to have 0 ppb, ppt, no nothing, for you to use the word
``safe.'' I think that is where everyone is probably.
I am using it normally. A lot of us are using it normally.
I don't think my water needs to be tested in my home. But if I
had a young family, I think it would be a different scenario.
So we are all in agreement.
I would just say this about your analogy on the bridge. I
have been to Bridge Day many times. I did not think it was
safe. I think there were people who wanted to throw me off at
times, but I didn't think that I would do it voluntarily.
With that being said, you understand they all sign a
waiver. They sign a waiver of the danger, to hold nobody
responsible. We shouldn't have to sign a waiver to drink our
water.
Dr. Tierney. And I agree. I just, as a doctor, cannot
countenance jumping off a bridge.
Senator Manchin. Let me ask any of you, as we are starting
to wrap this up, does the State right now, I would assume that
they are looking at all types of testing, whoever would want a
test, I am sure of that and I am very appreciative of that. And
long term, you are all receptive to have long-term monitoring.
And Dr. Gupta basically has been on the frontline and I think
we have a lot of confidence.
And I think everybody should be working together. If you
want to comment on that, and if anybody wants to comment on
something that you think would give the people in this valley
some confidence that we are moving in the right direction, that
anything and everything that possibly can be done is being
done.
So, Doctor?
Dr. Tierney. I agree. We are going to need help from our
Federal partners to establish these things. They are not done
easily or inexpensively.
Senator Manchin. You are accepting the testing and you are
accepting monitoring also?
Dr. Tierney. Absolutely. I think all of this needs to be
done to restore confidence.
Senator Manchin. Jeff, do you have anything on your
situation, do you have any plans on putting in another intake?
Do you have any plans on, basically, a backup system?
Mr. McIntyre. Senator, we have to look at all options
following this event. We still have been dealing with this as
an event working through it. There will be a time that we go
through that.
I think it is well known now that when that plant was
constructed, some 40 years ago, there was an application for a
second intake that was not approved.
Senator Manchin. Jeff, I would say this, that everyone is
upset about their water bill. You know that, right?
Mr. McIntyre. I know they are.
Senator Manchin. Can you at least give us a break?
Mr. McIntyre. Senator, it is a great question. But our
customers continue to use the water, whether they think it is
appropriate----
Senator Manchin. Well, most of it has been used for
flushing and everything else. The water bills are all spiked
higher than they have ever been. They haven't been able to use
it.
Mr. McIntyre. Well, a number of people have let their water
run it to protect it from freezing. We know that. We see that.
We have given credits to small business and residential
customers based on what was needed to be done in their homes,
and it exceeds that amount, what they needed to do to have the
water below the 1 ppm.
And I can tell you, Senator, like you, you were at the
plant, you drank the same finished water I drank that day. I
have been drinking it since the order was lifted. My wife does.
As a water company----
Senator Manchin. How are you sleeping?
Mr. McIntyre. I am sleeping great.
We have to follow what is given to us as health-based
guidance. And that treatment plant, everything we do, we
monitor for 100 contaminants at various times throughout the
year. We monitor for mercury. We monitor for arsenic. We
monitor for pesticides. And if anyone thinks that every water
treatment system has absolutely zero of all of these chemicals
or compounds, they are mistaken.
There are limits set. And as a water purveyor, we work
within those limits. So that is the hesitation we have, because
we only do what we are instructed to do in making water
available to our customers.
And again, through this whole event, through all of the
sampling, there is less than 10 results that I am aware of that
were above 1 ppm. But it is a fear-based issue, because people
can smell it. And we recognize it. And that is what we are
working to, eliminate that fear.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. I am going to let anyone know, it is not
standard operating procedure in a hearing like this, but I
think, because of the situation, in talking to Mr. Rahall and
Mrs. Capito, to allow the public, if they want to make a
comment, what we will do is we will--the public can submit
anything they want for the record. We will take it. It is open
for 30 days, as requested by Mr. Rahall.
But I am going to ask a final couple questions, and we will
take 10 statements from the audience. We will let you talk for
1 minute. But if you care, if someone in the public wants to,
if you line up over there, we will have a microphone.
But I guess we will take 10 folks. If you want to say
something, we will give you 1 minute to say it. Then, of
course, you can submit all you want for the record.
So again, I have a couple questions here.
First question is, when the facility operator discloses
that there are chemicals present at a facility, under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, that is the
law, how is the information utilized, when you have that
information, to prepare for and help prevent possible
incidents?
And I would like you folks from the county, if you could
respond to that? How do you utilize that information?
Mr. Petry. Well, when we receive a call of some type of a
leak or some type of odor complaint that we get quite often, we
respond with our fire departments. My fire coordinator
responds.
Once we determine where the smell or origination of the
leak may have happened, we do compile a list of all the Tier II
reports that we have on file. Our KPPC, which is our LEPC in
the county, our local planning committee, they as well as the
State has a list of the chemicals that are stored at the
facility.
And as far as I know, the local responding fire department
is supposed to have that information within their office also.
So we try to get all the information that we have and take
it with us to that area, so we will know as much about it as we
can, so that we can, A, not put our people in harm's way, and
then, B, let the people in the area know if there is something
they need to worry about.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Merry, similar?
Mr. Merry. I agree 100 percent. It is under SARA Title III.
They must report to the local volunteer fire departments or
fire departments, and also submit the Tier II reporting to the
local LEPC.
Mr. Shuster. And your first responders, do they get out to
these sites? The priority sites that are out there, do they get
out and visit them? Are they familiar with them?
Mr. Merry. We don't have as many sites as Kanawha County.
Fortunately, we don't.
Mr. Petry. Well, our volunteer departments, as well as our
professional fire departments, do preplanning. So they do try
to get out in the areas, trying to see what they have to
protect and protect us from. So I would say, yes, they do
probably get out.
Do they know right now how many and what all the different
types of chemicals there are? No. But they do try to get out
and preplan and talk with the presidents of the corporations to
try to find out what their problems are.
Mr. Shuster. And, Mr. Gianato, your department would be the
department involved in that?
Mr. Gianato. Our department oversees the State Emergency
Response Commission. We receive the Tier II reports from all
over the State.
Currently, I think we have about 9,000 facilities that file
those reports to the State.
The problem is that most of those facilities file paper
reports, and they come in large volumes of paper, and there is
no way--we have to literally manually enter each one of those
documents.
We are currently looking at mandating electronic filing
into a database, and we have been looking at that for some
time. It is just like everything else. There is a cost
associated with doing that, and then you have to make it
available to people who don't have access to an electronic
means to file. So we are looking to work through that.
Mr. Shuster. OK, thank you very much.
I think that is all the questions. Anyone else have any?
OK, so I see we have seven people in line. Again, Matt,
hold the mic, because, as we found in Congress, if we surrender
the mic to a Member of the House, or especially a Member of the
Senate, we may never get it back.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shuster. So with that, again, this is not something we
typically do, but again, with the urging of my colleagues up
here, and I think it is such an important subject matter, that
I will give you a minute--and again, you can submit all the
documentation you want to.
But again, we will give you a minute to make a public
statement.
So with that, introduce yourself, please, and where you are
from, or who you are with.
Ms. Nye. Thank you, Chairman Shuster. My name is Maya Nye.
I am a spokesperson for People Concerned About Chemical Safety,
but I grew up a mile away from the Institute chemical facility.
My father worked for Union Carbide for his entire career. My
mom worked there, and my stepfather worked there. I worked
there while I was in college.
Chemical incidents are, actually, they are anything but new
to me, and much like water contamination is anything but new to
the people of the coalfields of West Virginia and to the
fracking fields of West Virginia.
I have been through many chemical incidents in my life. And
when this incident first happened, my dear friend called me
panicked because she hadn't heard about the leak until after it
had already entered the drinking water supply, and she had just
bathed her twin daughters in it. And she was worried about the
immediate and long-term health effects of the chemical that she
had just unknowingly exposed her children to.
Mr. Shuster. Since we only have seven people up there, I am
going to give everybody 2 minutes, but we are going to cut it
off at seven.
So you have another minute. Go ahead.
Ms. Nye. We need peer-reviewed scientific evidence to
measure the accuracy of flushing protocols. We need peer-
reviewed scientific evidence to tell us what the long-term
health effects will be. We need medical monitoring. We have
needed it for the last 70 years in this valley.
We need to continue water distribution until someone up
here is willing to say that the water is safe. We are so glad
to have the Chemical Safety Board back here.
And while the water intake system should be high on the
priority list for protective measures that we need to put in
place, I believe that we are short-sighting ourselves if we
stop there. I mean, I think we really need to insist that
companies like Freedom invest in updating their aging
infrastructure in order to protect not only our water intakes,
but to protect the workers, protect community members, and to
protect a thriving local economy.
We need to mandate the implementation of inherently safer
technologies as well and reduce the stockpiles in order to
minimize the terrorist threat that is posed by these
facilities.
And we need to take a good hard look at chemical safety
from cradle to grave, so from community's like mine that
manufacture, through transportation, to the application, and to
the waste disposal. We have to look at that chain. And if we
don't, we are really short-sighting ourselves.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
Ms. Nye. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. You can submit it all for the record.
The next person up.
Again, we cut off the line with the last gentleman with the
flannel shirt and the beard. He is our last one. But we are
going to give everyone 2 minutes instead, so set the clock at
2.
Can you introduce yourself?
Ms. Thompson. Yes, my name is Janet J.T. Thompson, and I
appreciate everything I have heard about what you plan to do in
the future. And I can appreciate what you went through with
Freedom.
But my question is this, and we do need an answer now, we
were told that the water, that if you smelled the water, the
water was not safe. I had a little 10-year-old girl tell me the
other day that the water stinks. She can smell the smell. They
are probably about 1,000 feet from the plant. They still smell
it, and the water stinks when it comes out.
So I think what we really want to know in order to restore
the confidence is when will we stop smelling the water and when
will we hear that the chemical leak is completely stopped. And
that will assure us that it is not getting into the water.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you. Would someone care to answer? I
think someone has talked a little bit about that. I can't
remember who. There is some smell but----
Mr. Dorsey. Mr. Chairman, if I may say one thing to start
with. As everybody knows, the odor threshold on this is very,
very low.
Some of you may remember a week ago last Friday, we cut a
pipe up there that was just laying on the bottom that no one
knew about, and we had odor complaints a mile away from the
site. And we took a sample of that material and it came back at
98 ppm, less than 100 ppm, people were smelling it a mile away.
So it is very easy to smell, as everybody says.
And I need to point out that when we do get to work
removing the tanks, there will likely be odors again up there.
That doesn't mean it will be in the water. That means that we
will have exposed some of it to the air, and it is going to
smell.
But I understand what the lady is talking about. You can
smell it at extremely low levels.
Mr. Shuster. But confirm that the leak has stopped. You are
confident that the leak has----
Mr. Dorsey. Yes.
Mr. Shuster. OK.
Mr. McIntyre?
Mr. McIntyre. Let me talk to the drinking water and the
odor in the drinking water again. We have tried to be as
consistent as we can, but it is fact-based information. You can
smell MCHM in the water below the protective health limit. Just
because you can smell something doesn't mean it is not safe.
In fact, since the 17th, we have been out flushing and
testing the system, and there has been no result that is close
to the protective health limit since the 17th of January.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Next person?
Thank you for the question.
Please introduce yourself.
Ms. Davis. Yes, my name is Sue Davis. I have lived in this
valley for 71 years. And the chemicals have interrupted my life
and my well-being again, as they have over the last 71 years.
Mr. McIntyre, the money that you offer us won't pay for the
gas that I have used to get to the doctor.
Also, why do you suppose all of our stores are always
filled with every kind of drinking water possible? Jugs, small
bottles.
We simply don't have that much confidence in your water
system to begin with. So it is going to be a long time before
you restore faith in it again, and you will never have mine.
The lady from the poison control, I think she's poison
control.
Mr. Shuster. We don't have anyone here from the CDC. Dr.
Tierney, the health officer.
Ms. Davis. The doctor, yes.
I appreciate your comments, but you are not considering the
people who haven't gone to the hospitals and the doctors. I
went to one of your medical facilities. My cousin insisted that
I go because I have been sick. And when I got there, I said,
``My cousin made me come. I don't know what you can do, but we
thought maybe you might want some documentation or some
numbers.'' She said, ``We are not interested in any numbers. We
are not keeping any.''
Congresswoman Capito, I didn't care for the slip of tongue
when you refer to the ``myth'' anymore than I referred to what
you said on the TV about the shelves being stocked, and we can
go out and buy the water. I thought that was poor taste, but I
am glad that you apologized for that as well.
That bothers me. It still bothers me.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much. Your time has run out
here. We are going to get to the other folks.
Ms. Davis. I would like to say one thing, if I might.
Mr. Shuster. I will give you 10 seconds. Go ahead.
Ms. Davis. OK, we are talking about the water in the pipes.
When I came outside the other day, the water from the flooding
in the yard was so bad with the licorice smell. This has been
the last rain we had 2 or 3 days ago. And it has burned me so
tremendously and caused my breathing to be so bad. Why should
the water be on our land when it rains?
And I did keep some of the water, if anybody is interested.
I know it couldn't be scientifically accepted, but I would like
to know.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much for your comments.
Next, please?
Ms. Rosser. Hello, I am Angie Rosser, executive director of
the West Virginia Rivers Coalition.
And shortly after the spill, we worked with a team of
independent science and policy experts to issue a report that
looked out at the comprehensive failings on every level of
Government, the information gaps, and recommended policy
recommendations. I will make sure that is submitted as part of
the written record.
But I would urge this committee to look at two things. One
was a statement that our DEP secretary has made in the press.
And I noticed he is not here as a member of the panel to answer
to this. But he said that this incident could have been
prevented or minimized with the regulations we currently have
in place; it just didn't click with anyone that this was a
concern.
So I would like for the committee to ask him more on what
he means about this, could have been prevented with the current
regulations, and why it didn't click as a concern, before we
start rushing to legislate.
The other thing we are concerned about is the Charleston
intake, the Bureau of Public Health let us know that through
their source water assessment report, we have 51 potential
significant contaminant sources to this intake. Freedom
Industries is one of them.
We are wondering what about the other 50? This is not just
about one leaky tank. It is not just about aboveground storage
tanks that are a threat to our water supplies. So we need to
take comprehensive look.
In Huntington, there are 424 potential significant
contaminant sources. So please, let's not have a narrow view
and just look at tanks, but look at all the threats to our
water sources that we face in West Virginia and around the
Nation.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, and I feel confident, in talking
with Senator Manchin and both Representatives Rahall and
Capito, they are asking those types of questions right now that
you have.
Next, please introduce yourself?
Mr. Caruthers. Yes, sir. I appreciate everybody's interest
here today. I have some observations, not blame. One of my
observations is--my name is Jim Caruthers. I am the mayor of
the town of Poca.
And the flushing procedure, we are flushing our homes with
contaminated water. All we are doing is bringing dirty water in
and dumping it out. It is being flushed through the spigot. It
is not being flushed through the mains. It is not being flushed
through the hydrants. It is being flushed through the spigots,
and an unusual number of breaks.
And I think that people have a misconception. They think
they are doing themselves a lot of good when they run the water
through, but if we are still pulling dirty water in through the
main system, the main system needs to be purged, then we purge
the houses.
Secondly, the beginning of this project was a cluster. I
think everybody knows that. The notification was great by the
media. The media did a great job.
For those of us or those of you who sit with a beep-beep in
your hand that are listening or watching a computer, a
television, or a cell phone at all times, which I see through
this group almost everybody does, but there are a few of us who
go out and do things. We don't know about it.
These two counties just put in a fabulous system last year,
an emergency siren system with a voice override. It could have
been activated instantly, and everybody could have been told
``do not use the water''--the guy walking down the street, the
kids playing in the yards. There are 21 of these spread
throughout our counties.
It wouldn't have gotten everybody, but between this
notification and the phone system and the media, I think a lot
of people could have been tipped off early and not have
potentially taken in some of these hazardous materials.
I think, all in all, we are very lucky that we haven't had
major medical problems.
I am a resident of Putnam County, and we used to use the
Nitro water. You talk about smell. Whatever fish died upriver,
we smelled it that night. It has come a long way. It is far
better than it was, but it has a ways to go.
But I do appreciate your turnout. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor.
And the next gentlemen, please introduce yourself.
Mr. Gilpen. James Gilpen, I live in Cross Lanes, West
Virginia.
First and most, Freedom Industries is not who I pay my
water bill to. I pay my water bill to West Virginia American
Water. They should have protected us in all results of
anything.
And first and most, I have worked in chemical plants. I
have dealt with chemicals. There is a PPE standard that should
have been done. Does anybody have a PPE standard that we should
have had when we flushed our water?
I have a spot on my leg that I got the first day I stepped
in the water. I won't shower or bathe in it right now.
My question is, is what are we doing--not with the past and
what we have done. I understand what happened in the past. What
are we doing in the future? Why cannot one of you all stand up
and say our water is drinkable? Why can't you all say it is OK
to bathe in our water and it won't have long-term----
Mr. Shuster. I think that question has been asked and
answered a couple times.
Mr. Gilpen. But no one wants to answer that question.
Mr. Shuster. Well, the experts have said that there are
some concerns about there hasn't been enough testing. As I
pointed out----
Mr. Gilpen. Their biggest fear is a lawsuit. That is the
number one thing.
Mr. Shuster. Well, my concern is people are afraid there
are going to be lawsuits.
Mr. Gilpen. In West Virginia, I think if our government
can't supply us with good drinking water, then something needs
to be done.
Mr. Shuster. That is what we are holding this hearing here
for today, to take it back to Washington. You have three very
able and capable Representatives.
Mr. Gilpen. And to bring it up, he asked if it was a major
disaster? Yes, it is a major disaster. If our babies cannot
drink water, and our elderly cannot drink water, and my mother,
she's on a respirator, and to purify the water in our homes,
then what is there, Senator Manchin?
Mr. Shuster. That is what we are trying to get to the
bottom of. Thank you for your comments.
The next gentlemen, would you please step to the mic?
Mr. Reynolds. Yes, my name is Chuck Reynolds. I live in
Fraziers Bottom, West Virginia. That is in Putnam County, 35
miles to the west.
And we were told to flush our water system. As instructed,
I flushed the water system, and it still had the smell.
I flushed it twice, and it was still there.
And now my wife and I, of course, like everybody else, at
water distribution centers, my wife has to go to the town of
Hurricane, and both her parents are real elderly, and we have
to get water off of them, because the town of Hurricane is
smart enough to have their own water system. They are not
hooked to West Virginia Water.
And I am going to give you the standpoint from this: I am a
maintenance person, OK? I worked for the State of West Virginia
for 23 years, OK? And you get a chemical in a hot water tank,
it is very hard to get it out.
You are testing the cold water. You need to test the hot
water. Not only that, the reason people were letting their
water run is because they don't want their pipes to freeze.
They are not using the water.
I am not drinking the water. My wife is not drinking the
water. None of my neighbors trust the water.
And you know, I don't put all the blame on the water
company. We need laws to enforce. We need to enforce these laws
when you make them, and prosecute these people who are
responsible for polluting our water and polluting our air.
And the main thing, I was told by a very strong source, by
one of the workers who worked for Freedom Industries, that he
found a leak in a tank. Instead of reporting it, he was told to
take a paintbrush and paint it.
So that is what you are dealing with.
Mr. Shuster. I am sure those investigations are going on. I
thank you for your comments. Those kind of investigations, I am
sure, will be investigated.
Again, I want to thank everybody for participating,
especially our witnesses today. Thank you very much for helping
us understand and educating us on what has happened here.
As mentioned, Mr. Rahall made the motion to keep the record
open for 30 days. So anybody who wishes to submit testimony or
information to the committee has 30 days to do that.
And again, I am confident that you folks are represented by
Senator Manchin, Senator Rockefeller, Representatives Rahall
and Capito, four very able Representatives for the people of
West Virginia. Your voice will be heard, not only in the
committee, but in the Congress.
So again, I thank everybody for being here.
And with that, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]