[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AMERICA'S FUTURE IN ASIA: FROM REBALANCING TO MANAGING SOVEREIGNTY
DISPUTES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 5, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-123
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
LUKE MESSER, Indiana WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State............ 6
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Daniel R. Russel: Prepared statement............... 9
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 34
Hearing minutes.................................................. 35
The Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina: Prepared statement................ 36
Written responses from the Honorable Daniel R. Russel to
questions submitted for the record by:
The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific...................................................... 37
The Honorable Mo Brooks, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Alabama............................................. 46
The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana......................................... 48
AMERICA'S FUTURE IN ASIA: FROM
REBALANCING TO MANAGING
SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2175 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. Committee will come to order.
Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone to this
afternoon's subcommittee hearing. I, first, want to apologize a
bit for the late start but we had a series of votes. So we were
called to the floor to vote and I hope you will take that into
consideration. Hopefully, we won't have any other
interruptions, and I want to thank Ms. Gabbard from the great
state of Hawaii for being the ranking member here today. Eni
Faleomavaega from American Samoa is unable to make it, and we
know that she will do an excellent job for the other side. So,
thank you very much.
The United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific is built on
promoting regional stability, fostering respect for
international law, advancing respect for human rights, and
maintaining freedom of navigation and unhindered lawful
commerce in the maritime regions. These objectives are
fundamentally hinged on the United States' alliances with
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines;
our resilient relationships with Taiwan and Singapore; and our
evolving relationships with Vietnam and Indonesia.
As the title of today's hearing implies: What is America's
future in Asia? One thing is certain--the United States will
never leave Asia, because as a Pacific nation, we recognize
that the nexus of global commerce and strategy has transitioned
to the Western Pacific, and the strong bonds formed with our
friends and allies cannot be broken; however, America's
presence in the region is being challenged.
The recent flare-up of confrontations between China and its
neighbors over sovereignty claims in the East and South China
Seas is the latest example of how decades-old conflicts could
easily pivot from fishermen skirmishes into all-out military
battles. China is attempting to seize its primacy over the
Asia-Pacific region, at the expense of its neighbors. These
moves may well be aimed at undermining the interests of the
U.S. and its allies, challenging the administration's strategic
rebalance efforts, and altering the myth that China seeks a
``peaceful rise.''
Take, for example, the increasing frequency of clashes
between Chinese maritime law enforcement authorities and
Vietnamese, Philippine and Japanese fishing vessels; or the
confrontations between the U.S. Navy and Chinese naval vessels,
including the time the USNS Impeccable was harassed by Chinese
vessels in 2009, and the recent USS Cowpens incident. Let us
also not forget the 2001 Hainan Island incident when a U.S. EP-
3 electronic surveillance aircraft and a People's Liberation
Army Navy fighter jet collided mid-air. Any misstep in these
situations--an overzealous pilot or fisherman--could have
unnecessarily escalated tensions to the breaking point.
From my perspective, the administration appears to be
struggling to find a way to better direct America's resources
toward the Asia-Pacific and find a way to manage the growth of
maritime territorial disputes--surely the greatest threat, at
this point, to the strategic rebalance policy. Without a
coherent and cohesive direction, these disputes could
significantly impact America's ability to promote regional
peace and stability, enhance economic prosperity, and preserve
U.S. interests.
Finding a way to mitigate these growing tensions and
decrease the chances of miscalculation will not be easy. I
think Japan's decision to create a National Security Council is
a significantly positive step because not only will it more
efficiently direct Japanese foreign and defense policies
regarding national security, but it will also allow for
stronger collaboration with the United States--something that
is critically needed. I support efforts to revise the U.S.-
Japan bilateral defense guidelines, as well as the
consideration to locate rotational U.S. troops in the
Philippines, as we've done in Australia. At the same time, I
urge our regional allies to be measured in their actions and
rhetoric because even a slightly provocative remark could
further and unnecessarily inflame tensions.
I also believe the administration needs to do a better job
at clearly conveying U.S. commitment to working with and
supporting our regional allies. China's unilateral action to
impose an Air Defense Identification Zone over the East China
Sea presented the administration with an opportunity to do
this, but instead of rising to the occasion, it sent mixed
signals of its willingness to stand up to China's acts of
provocation. While I do not believe it is in the United States'
best interests to ``contain'' China, I do think balancing its
rise by maintaining a strong regional presence that is focused,
engaged, and forceful is imperative.
Unfortunately, that is not where we are today and since the
hearing this subcommittee held a year ago with then-Assistant
Secretary Robert Blake and Acting Assistant Secretary Joseph
Yun, efforts to strategically rebalance the U.S. toward Asia
still lack a long-term sustainable focus. They are still hinged
on ambitious rhetoric that have not reassured our allies or
partners in the region, or anyone else, for that matter. As a
result, China sees the Obama administration as weak and
indecisive, and will continue its attempts to fill a perceived
power vacuum in the region unless we find a way to enhance our
presence across the board.
In the meantime, as China continues to flex its muscles,
countries around the region are recalculating and hedging on
whether they can count on the U.S. Consequently, I think it is
in the interest of this country and in the interest of our
regional allies, notably Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the
Philippines, for the U.S. to once and for all articulate a
coherent strategy that is fundamentally built on actions. It's
time for the administration to move beyond speeches and find a
way to reassure the region that the United States is there to
stay and that America's future in Asia is strong, committed,
and absolute.
I'd now like to yield to the gentlelady from Hawaii for the
purpose of making an opening statement.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your bringing attention to this critical issue
for us to discuss and have this necessary conversation that
answers the question of what is the United States role in the
Asia-Pacific region and being able to bring about a better
understanding of the current situation so that we can best
address what that role should be both with the challenges that
we are presented with today but also so that we can project
long-term into the future.
As was previously mentioned, China's expansion in the East
China Sea and its claim over the Senkaku Islands is something
that has escalated tensions with both Japan and South Korea.
Last month, China, expanding its maritime law enforcement
presence, enforcing its fisheries law in South China Seas
contested waters, has done the same.
We need to seek cooperation in order to achieve the
maritime and air safety within the region that I think is a
common objective for all interested parties and continue to be
proactive in the Asia-Pacific region to mitigate as much as
possible the risk of an accidental military clash.
I think the United States needs to remain engaged with
China in a proactive, sustained and strategic manner, using
diplomatic peaceful means to try to address these disputes.
Abiding by international airspace and maritime rules will
decrease the threat to peace and stability in the region.
Obviously, there are several sensitivities that the United
States will need to navigate through and balance in order to
have an effective strategy in strengthening relations, both
with China as well as our allies--long-time allies within the
region.
As I mentioned, it's in the best interests of all parties
to maintain freedom of navigation both in international waters
and international airspace.
It's time to be proactive now before we end up in a
situation where there is a trigger, there is an escalation and
we are dealing with a crisis that is highly elevated and one
that will involve many of the countries in the region.
Given the increasing trade among nations on the Pacific
Rim, the urgency of setting clear norms, of having a deeper
understanding and acceptable territorial borders is paramount.
I look forward to reviewing our positions and policies in
the Asia-Pacific region as we assess our future role in the
region, as we also address the immediate air and maritime
safety concerns.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for bringing us together to
really look at this important issue and look forward to hearing
from our witness today. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Salmon, is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
I'd like to thank the chairman, Steve Chabot, for holding
this important hearing. Secretary Russel, thank you for coming
to testify before this subcommittee.
Since the administration announced their pivot toward the
Asia-Pacific region in 2011, we've seen the tensions in the
region escalate. They have risen. The hope was that if there
was U.S. influence in the region a significant influence would
help balance China's growing aggressiveness with their
neighbors.
Unfortunately, I fear the pivot has been in name only, and
the administration's strategy in Asia remains overpowered by
other regions around the globe. Over the last several years, we
have seen increased aggressions in the disputed waters of the
South China Sea and, more recently, in the East China Sea.
As China sought to expand their control in the region, our
allies are struggling to ensure their sovereignty is maintained
and navigational rights to the South and East China Seas are
protected.
Military and commercial access to the navigable waters of
the South and East China Seas are critical to the security and
economic viability of every country in the region. Strong U.S.
allies including Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, and South
Korea have come under increasing pressure from China to cede or
temper these inalienable sovereign rights to Chinese will.
There must be a peaceful pass forward that protects U.S.
regional allies, ensures U.S. national security interests and
avoids unnecessary conflict and aggressions.
One of my heroes of the region, President Ma of Taiwan, has
proposed the East China Sea peace initiative as a means to
resolving disputes peacefully by exercising restraint,
refraining from taking antagonistic actions and following
international law and continuing the dialogue.
I hope the Chinese and other regional powers will embrace
this as a solution going forward. It's the most proactive
positive solution, I think, that is on the table yet.
They have indicated--they, China, have indicated that they
have a desire to settle disputes peacefully, but they have been
unwilling to open dialogue and negotiate in a multilateral way
and this is extremely disappointing, and I would hope that as
we go forward we will all come to some recommendations or
conclusions that will help strengthen our allies in the region.
And like you, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe any of us want
to do anything to contain China. I have been one of the most
vigorous proponents of free trade with China, I believe, in
this entire body.
But we cannot neglect our allies in the region and there
has to be constructive dialogue. President Ma has put a
reasonable proposal on the table. I would like to see us run
with that. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized
for making an opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. We all agree we should be engaged in the
region. We ought to provide diplomatic support for our allies.
But I fear that we have already begun to go overboard.
Within the thing called the Pentagon budget, well over $600
billion, there are shifts and we could say that we are now
spending tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars a year
allocable to this effort to fight over a few islands, most of
which are so tiny that no one in history has ever chosen to
live there.
Already I see us shifting our research, our training, our
force configuration to facing down China in the South China
Sea. Compare that to Japan, which consistently spends only 1
percent of its GDP on its military and is ready to see us
allocate tens of billions if not hundreds of billions of
dollars to fighting for a few islands that they will wish to
exploit for economic purposes.
Keep in mind that neither Vietnam nor Japan sent any forces
to fight in the U.N. action in Afghanistan, the place from
which America was attacked for the first time in the lifetime
of, I think, just about everybody on this panel.
So likewise these islands do sit astride trade routes, but
for the most part they sit astride this trade route between the
United States and China, and you can say, well, hundreds of
billions of dollars of trade goes through that area, yes--trade
between the United States and China, trade between China and
other nations.
We--it meets the institutional needs of the Pentagon for us
to begin a new cold war with China. It gives them the kind of
adversary that we have prevailed upon in glorious actions.
Uniformed, technological, the great victories of our
military were in World War II and the Cold War, and it is
understandable that we will be told by the Pentagon that we now
have another great opportunity to confront a large, militarily
sophisticated, uniformed and conventional foe.
But keep in mind, we are talking about islands no one has
chosen to live on. We are talking about countries that have
always supported us or often supported us diplomatically but
not militarily and that they themselves, especially in the case
of Japan, limit their own military commitment while asking us
for a much more open-ended commitment.
These are uninhabited islands. Let's stay calm. I yield
back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Holding, is
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Holding. Mr. Chairman, I will submit a statement for
the record.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Scott, is recognized.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I will also submit a statement.
Mr. Chabot. Okay.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messer, is recognized.
Mr. Messer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very much appreciate
the opportunity to be here at this hearing, looking forward to
the opportunity to travel to the region with many of you just
in the coming couple of weeks.
Would just sort of hope for Mr. Russel and emphasize the
importance of talking today about the--President Ma's from
Taiwan's East China Sea peace initiative and the importance of
as we work through the challenges in that region that we apply
common sense and listen to our allies. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I will go ahead and introduce our distinguished panelist
here this afternoon. Mr. Daniel Russel is the Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and is a
career member of the Senior Foreign Service. Prior to his
appointment as Assistant Secretary, Mr. Russel served at the
White House as Special Assistant to the President and national
security staff. During his tenure there, he helped formulate
President Obama's strategic rebalance to Asia. Before joining
the national security staff, he served as director of the
Office of Japanese Affairs and had other various assignments in
Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, and Cyprus. He has also
served as chief of staff to Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering and
assistant to the Ambassador to Japan, former Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield. Mr. Russel was awarded the State
Department's Una Chapman Cox Fellowship sabbatical and authored
the book, ``America's Place in the World.'' Before joining the
Foreign Service, he was manager for an international firm in
New York City. Mr. Russel was educated at Sarah Lawrence
College and University College, University of London, U.K.
We welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Russel, and since
we have only one panelist we will be extending your time for a
statement from 5 minutes to 7 minutes before we will ask
questions.
So you are recognized for 7 minutes. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL R. RUSSEL, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much. You're very kind, Mr.
Chairman.
Thanks to Ms. Gabbard and the other members of the
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today on these
important issues.
Before I begin, I would respectfully request that you
accept my written testimony for the record. I would also like
to take the opportunity to thank the chairman for his
leadership on the issue and his work to enhance our engagement
with the Asia-Pacific region.
The members of this subcommittee know full well the
importance of our interests in the Asia-Pacific region. As
Secretary Kerry has made very, very clear, at the core of our
strategic rebalancing is a determination to ensure that the
Asia-Pacific region remains open, inclusive and prosperous, and
that it is guided by accepted rules and standards and respect
for international law.
Through our alliances, through our partnerships, the U.S.
has been instrumental in sustaining a maritime regime based on
international law that has allowed the countries in the region
to prosper, and as a maritime nation with global trading
networks the U.S. has a national interest in the maintenance of
peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded
lawful commerce and freedom of navigation and overflight,
including and especially in the East China Sea and the South
China Sea areas.
For these reasons, the behavior and the tensions between
the claimants are of deep concern to us and to our allies. An
incident in these waters could touch off an escalatory cycle,
which would have very serious adverse effects on our economic
and our security interests.
That is why the Obama administration has consistently
emphasized the importance of exercising restraint, of
maintaining open channels of dialogue, of lowering rhetoric, of
behaving safely and responsibly both in the sky and the sea and
peacefully resolving territorial and maritime disputes and
keeping with international law.
We oppose and we have sought to prevent unilateral actions
that disrupt the status quo or jeopardize that peace and
security. In the South China Sea we have supported efforts by
ASEAN and China to reach agreement on an effective code of
conduct, which is long overdue, in order to promote a rules-
based framework for managing and regulating the behavior of the
countries.
And in the East China Sea, we remain concerned about the
serious downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. It is important to
lower tensions, to turn down the rhetoric and to exercise
caution and restraint in this sensitive area.
However, China's announcement of an Air Defense
Identification Zone, an ADIZ in the East China Sea in late
November, was a step in the wrong direction. We neither
recognize nor accept China's declared ADIZ.
The United States has no intention of changing how we
conduct our operations in the region and we have made clear to
China that it should not attempt to implement that ADIZ and
should refrain from taking similar actions elsewhere in the
region.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned out the outset, the U.S. has a
deep and long-standing stake in the maintenance of prosperity
and stability in the Asia-Pacific and an equally deep and
abiding long-term interest in the continued freedom of the seas
based on the rule of law--a rule that guarantees, among other
things, freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight and the
other internationally lawful uses of the sea.
International law also makes clear the legal basis on which
states can legitimately assert their rights in the maritime
domain or can exploit maritime resources. So the United States
takes the strong position that maritime claims must accord with
customary international law.
Even though the United States isn't a claimant and even
though the United States takes no position on the competing
claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the East
China Sea or the South China Sea, we believe strongly, as I
said, that the claims must accord with international law.
We also care deeply that all countries deal with the
territorial and their maritime disputes peacefully,
diplomatically and in accordance with international law. This
means ensuring that claimants manage their differences without
intimidation, coercion or the use of force.
We are candid with claimants, all the claimants, when we
have concerns regarding their claims or the behavior in the way
that they pursue them. Deputy Secretary Bill Burns and I were
in Beijing last month and held extensive discussions with
Chinese officials, for example.
In these discussions, we directly raised our concerns about
what we see as a growing incremental pattern of efforts by
China to assert control over the area contained in the so-
called nine-dash line in the South China Sea.
Among other steps, this includes continued restrictions on
access to the Scarborough Reef, pressure on the long-standing
Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal and the recent
updating of fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the
South China Sea.
Our view is that these actions have raised tensions in the
region and have exacerbated concerns about China's long-term
strategic objectives. China's lack of clarity with regard to
its South China Sea claims have created uncertainty in the
region and limit the prospect for achieving mutually agreeable
resolution or equitable joint development arrangements.
At the risk of repeating myself, I want to reinforce the
point, Mr. Chairman, that under international law, maritime
claims in the South China Sea must be derived from land
features and any Chinese claim to maritime rights not based on
claimed land features would be inconsistent with international
law.
China could highlight its respect for international law by
clarifying or adjusting its claim to bring it into accordance
with international law of the sea. Along with that, we strongly
support serious and sustained bilateral as well as multilateral
dialogue among claimants to address and manage overlapping
claims in a peaceful and noncoercive way.
We support the rights of the claimants themselves to avail
themselves of peaceful dispute mechanisms. The Philippines
itself chose to exercise such a right last year with the filing
of an arbitration case under the Law of the Sea.
Now, these legal and diplomatic processes will take time
but the relevant parties in the near term can take steps to
lower tension and avoid escalation. That includes practical
mechanisms to prevent incidents or manage them when they occur.
Another would be for the claimants to agree not to undertake
new unilateral steps to change the status quo.
In the meantime, the U.S. is committed to promoting
regional stability through continued strong diplomatic and
military presence. This includes our efforts to promote best
practices and good cooperation on all aspects of maritime
security and to bolster maritime domain awareness including
through our capacity-building program throughout Southeast
Asia.
It includes strengthening institutions like ASEAN and the
East Asia Summit as regional venues where countries can engage
in dialogue with all involved both about the principles but
also about practical measures to avoid conflict.
This is an issue of immense importance to the United
States, to the Asia-Pacific and to the world, and I want to
reaffirm here today that the United States will continue to
play the central role in underwriting security and stability in
the Asia-Pacific that has guaranteed peace and facilitated
prosperity for the last six-plus decades.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear here today and I look forward to hearing further views
from the members of the committee and to answering any
questions that you have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russel follows:]
----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much for your testimony, and
before I begin the questioning here, I'd be remiss if I didn't
recognize an old hand, somebody that served our institution for
probably 20 years or so, was chairman of the Intelligence
Committee and served his district in Michigan very well, and
that's Congressman Pete Hoekstra.
Pete, why don't you stand up there? You deserve to be
recognized.
(Applause)
Thank you for your service, and I'll begin with myself. I
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russel, since the administration announced its policy
to strategically rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific back in
2011, many said this strategic pivot was implemented as a way
to contain China's rise. China surely believes this to be the
case and some believe this policy is the root cause of China's
sense of paranoia, which instigated the intensification of its
provocative and aggressive actions in the maritime regions in
that part of the world.
At the end of the day, do you think the United States'
forward presence in the region is more escalatory than not?
Have our efforts to increase our presence correlated with the
increase in regional tensions? If not, then what other
explanations do you give for the rise in tensions over the last
few years? I think, as Congressman Salmon and I both indicated
in our opening statements, we're not interested in containing
China. We do think that they need to act as a civilized nation,
as a leader if they want to be treated as one and,
unfortunately, their actions have been quite provocative. But
what do you say about the rebalance or the pivot, whichever
terminology one prefers?
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much for the thoughtful
question, Mr. Chairman.
I'd begin, if I may, by saying that when I was first
secunded to the White House, to the National Security Council
in January 2009 I heard and saw from the President and from the
senior administration officials a commitment to strategic
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region based on U.S. interests.
So the rebalance, certainly, dates back to 2009 to the very
beginning of the administration and has, I would say, and has
always had six basic lines of effort. First, to strengthen our
alliances; second, to participate and to build up regional
institutions; thirdly, to engage emerging powers including and
especially China; fourth, to promote economic development that
benefits the U.S. and the countries in the region; fifth, to
champion the values that America cherishes, the values of
democracy and to strengthen civil society in the region; and
sixth, to diversify our engagement. In other words, use our
soft power in addition to our strong military alliances and
presence.
That having been said, I am convinced that a diminution or
a withdrawal of U.S. engagement and presence, to answer your
question in the inverse, would be a major destabilizing factor
in the region and it would----
Mr. Chabot. Not to cut you off there--and I agree with you
that it would be and we shouldn't do that--but my question is
the way China interprets this and it seems that they interpret
it very differently than we intended and that's really what I'm
getting at.
Do you think their actions in any way are a reflection of
what we are doing--rebalancing allegedly from the Middle East
to Asia?
Mr. Russel. I do not, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Okay.
Mr. Russel. I recognize that there are many in China who
either believe or find it convenient to argue that the U.S.
strategy of engagement in the Asia-Pacific region is in some
fashion at odds with China's own interests or, arguably, part
of a containment strategy. It is not. Moreover----
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Let me stop you there, if I can, because
I've only got 2 minutes and I want to get one more question at
least.
The budget for the East Asia and Pacific Bureau is the
second smallest of the bureaus at the State Department. Vying
for funds with the Middle East is surely no easy task because
despite troop withdrawals across that region much of the
administration's focus is centered on crises occurring in the
Middle East and that part of the world.
That being said, the Asia-Pacific region is the future.
It's the driver of the global economy and will make or break
our geopolitical role in the world, I believe. Balancing the
need to increase our level of engagement in the Asia-Pacific
with budget constraints here in Washington, how do you propose
that we best increase our presence while restraining the cost
of that engagement?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Needless to say, you're preaching to the choir. Secretary
Kerry and, of course, I and my colleagues have been vigorous
advocates for not only the State Department budget but for
fully resourcing the strategic rebalance in the Asia-Pacific
region, and against the backdrop of fiscal constraint as you
alluded to we have seen important increases in other areas
where our budget have been protected, certainly, relative to
that of other agencies.
The lines of effort that we're pursuing in the State
Department and as a government include activist diplomacy,
include the clear and outspoken statements--a public assertion
of our policy which it has an important effect and is
influential in providing confidence to our partners and allies
in the region; a robust military presence which must continue
and that is enhanced greatly by our unique system of alliances
and security partnerships; an aggressive effort to partner--to
develop partner capacity including by strengthening maritime
domain awareness and other forums that allow our partners to
act and to operate; and importantly, Mr. Chairman, our active
engagement in the multilateral institutions that serve to help
rule setting.
These are projects that our men and women in our Embassies
and in our militaries are actively engaged in every day.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
My time is expired. The ranking member, the gentlelady from
Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard, is recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
I'm going to pick up where he just left off. You know,
obviously, coming from a state--Hawaii--that someone just told
me this morning--I thought it was a great terminology--where we
are the strategic point of the spear for our country's focus on
the Asia-Pacific region geographically so keep a very close eye
and are very keenly aware of things that are happening on an
ongoing basis but also aware of the opportunity that exists in
the region, and it is a question that often arises both, you
know, here at home but also from some of our allies in the
region is are we really serious about this focus on the Asia-
Pacific when numbers come out as they are--the chairman pointed
out your department's budget being the second smallest in
Department of State.
In Hawaii, we have the East-West Center, which I think
you're keenly aware of, also has seen a reduction in funding
this year.
When is this priority going to start taking place or
showing through in very real and practical ways?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you for that question, Ms. Gabbard.
We are committed and Secretary Kerry is committed not only
to the Asia-Pacific region but to an active and effective
presence, active and effective forms of engagement throughout
the Asia-Pacific region.
The East-West Center is an extremely important venue for
us. President Obama, of course, has a personal connection
there. I know the head of the East-West Center is in Washington
and I'm scheduled to meet with him soon.
The programs that we engage in not only in Hawaii but in
the region are aimed at reaching out to governments, to civil
society and to ensure that our connections with the countries
in the region are more than simply professions of bilateral
ties--that these are grass roots and people-to-people
connections.
So what Secretary Kerry, in terms of resource and in terms
of direction, has focused on includes economic engagement,
educational exchange, cooperative programs that pertain to
energy, climate and other transnational issues and threats of
common concern, economic development--everything from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership to a range of commercial and other
sorts of programs.
Ms. Gabbard. No, I appreciate your talking about that and
one of the assets that the East-West Center provides is at that
grass roots level where you're having that exposure and that
engagement with people who go back to their countries who
become leaders within their countries and takes a very
proactive approach.
I'd like to talk a little bit about--let's see, I've got a
lot of questions here. You talked about the effective code of
conduct agreed to by the ASEAN nations and China.
Could you just touch quickly on the progress of that and
what the guidelines--kind of the framework is for that?
Mr. Russel. Well, in 2002, ASEAN and China reached
agreement on a declaration of conduct that established certain
principles and that also committed them to negotiate a code of
conduct that would oversee the behavior of the parties in the
region.
The two elements to a code of conduct, which we see great
value to, are, first, reaching consensus between ASEAN and
China about acceptable forms of behavior among claimants and
relevant parties in the South China Sea based on the principles
of peaceful resolution, respect for international law, no
unilateral changes to the status quo and so on.
A second dimension of the code of conduct that we believe
can be expedited--should be expedited is the development of
practical mechanisms to prevent incidents that could trigger an
escalatory cycle or to manage those incidents should they
occur.
The United States has abundant experience with procedures
to prevent incidents at sea. We have put our experience and our
expertise at the disposal of the ASEANs. We're actively engaged
in partnerships through a number of the ASEAN-related forum for
maritime cooperation and maritime security.
We think that there is no reason why a code of conduct
can't be negotiated quickly or that practical steps can't be
taken in the interim.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Salmon, is recognized, who
is also the chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of
the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When I served in Congress back in the 90s, our Secretary of
State delineated a policy with China that was very confusing.
It was called strategic ambiguity, and it sounds like an
oxymoron.
I think that since that time as a country we've tried
desperately to seek strategic clarity in dealing with China and
we've expanded our trade relations with China. We've advocated
for permanent normal trade relations, their ascension to the
WTO, and we've, I think, acted every bit as a good partner
should.
But given the fact that in the last couple of years
especially they've increased their antagonistic ways in the
South and East China Seas, what more can we do? I mentioned in
my opening statement that President Ma of Taiwan has
recommended this East China Sea peace initiative.
Mr. Russel, do you have any thoughts on that as far as--is
that something we could pick up and run with? It doesn't call
for military action and it certainly opens the door for
meaningful dialogue.
But it has to happen with all interested parties and what
role can the United States take in establishing that kind of a
peace initiative?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Salmon.
In diplomacy, as in other aspects of life, timing is
everything and I think it is unfortunate that President Ma's
peace initiative when it was announced did not fall on fertile
soil or water, so to speak.
There are a number of very important elements to that
initiative. Others have made proposals including President
Aquino, who similarly proposed a zone of peace and cooperation.
When you break apart these initiatives and look at the key
elements thereof, you find the principles that are at the heart
of the U.S. strategy and the U.S. effort, namely, respect for
international law and peaceful resolution of disputes.
Our activist diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, at
the Presidential level, at the Secretary's level and at my
level is aimed at seeking consensus, not just lip service but
practical operational consensus around these principles
including the principles of respect for international law.
All of the claimants need to define their claims clearly in
ways that are consistent with international law. This
particularly applies to China. The ambiguity of China's claim
and the behavior of Chinese assets in asserting these claims is
a destabilizing factor.
We have made that point directly to the Chinese. I was
recently, as I mentioned, in Beijing. This is something that
Secretary Kerry has taken up directly, something that we have
included in our clear public statement.
Mr. Salmon. You know, I was one of the strongest advocates
for passage of permanent normal trade relations because I
believe that our further engaging with China in trade and
opening up more and more doors for China to do business with
the United States was a really, really good thing.
I remember having to speak to a lot of my colleagues who
were real reticent about it because of some of the horrendous
human rights abuses in China and on and on and on.
I mean, several issues--aggression toward Taiwan, and I
advocated that that passage of the permanent normal trade
relations would ultimately lead to better relations in the
region and maybe an improvement in human rights. I've been
really disappointed.
I mean, I've been incredibly disappointed that China hasn't
taken the ball and run with it and it seems to me that they're
just playing a game of dare.
You know, we're going to see what we can get away with and
if the U.S. has the guts, the cojones, to challenge us, and
given the fact that, you know, this pivot that was supposed to
happen but I don't believe it really has happened has maybe
kind of emboldened them, I'd just like to encourage us to maybe
practice a little bit of tough love with them and let them know
that we're just not going to stand for or tolerate those kind
of aggressive actions because some of those aggressive actions
have actually materialized into violence and that's just not
tolerable.
Mr. Russel. Well, Congressman, let me make absolutely clear
that the United States is committed to and is working to
achieve a stable, constructive, cooperative relationship with
China. The President, the Secretary, the members of the Cabinet
have vigorously pursued that effort.
But by the same token, we are also committed to a
relationship that allows us to speak clearly and candidly to
respond directly on areas of significant difference.
We want and the region needs a China that embraces the rule
of law. We need a China that is a net contributor to the
stability and the security of the region. To achieve that, we
have a deliberate and, I would say, sophisticated strategy that
combines the search for practical cooperation on areas of
genuine importance to both of our citizens and to the world as
everything from climate change to North Korea.
But it also enables us to address directly areas of
difference, areas of concern and problem behavior even when, to
the chagrin of the Chinese, that requires us to publicly call
them out or impose reputational costs.
The key to our China strategy, Congressman, is the strength
of our partnerships and our security alliances in the Asia-
Pacific. That is the underpinning that has allowed China to
prosper, as you alluded to. That is the framework with which we
will continue to work constructively with China.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California who is also----
Mr. Sherman. The gentleman from Virginia first.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my colleague and I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Russel, of course, I'm listening to my colleague and I
certainly consider what he's saying but to assert something is
not tolerable with respect to Chinese behavior in the South
China Sea is fascinating, you know, to hear. I'm not quite sure
what it translates into in terms of policy.
What are we prepared to do to curb Chinese excesses as we
perceive them in that region?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Congressman. I'll tell you a
bit about what we are doing as a practical matter to address
this.
First and foremost, as I said, we are strengthening our
alliances and our security posture. We are present and
accounted for in our defense capacity in a significant and in a
sustained and credible way.
Secondly, we are working with a range of partner countries
to help build local capacity, to develop their ability to
monitor their own airspace, their own territorial waters and to
acquire the wherewithal to defend themselves and their
interests in a responsible way.
This is something that the United States does bilaterally
but it is something that we do also with our partners and
through international fora.
Thirdly, we engage with China directly as well as with the
ASEANs and with neighbors including India, including Australia
in the multilateral fora that we are attempting to strengthen.
The regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific region is
under developed and the decision in 2010 by President Obama to
sign the treaty with ASEAN and to begin participating on an
annual basis both U.S. ASEAN leaders meetings and in the East
Asia Summit was a major milestone in terms of commitment to a
U.S. presence that had a palpable impact on China's calculus
and China's behavior.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
One of the concerns I have in this whole situation talked
about in a previous hearing is the space for miscalculation.
One looks at what China is doing and one is concerned.
It looks from a distance like it's picking a fight with
Vietnam, with the Philippines, with Japan, among others and one
may not intend by declaring, you know, a Air Defense
Identification Zone--one may not intend to do something overtly
provocative but the result might be just that.
And the probability of an accidental military incursion or
worse starts to rise, frankly, especially when you pick fights
with more actors in the region and encompassing more of the
region.
What is the United States position on that? I mean, do we--
is that a concern of ours and have we relayed that concern to
the Chinese Government and what's our reading of the Chinese
Government?
Have they thought that through, do you think, in a
satisfactory way? I mean, is that of concern to them as well?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Congressman.
We are very mindful of the risk of unintended conflict or
of accidents. No analyst that I know or respect believes that
China or, frankly, other major players in the Asia-Pacific
region have any desire for or intention to engage in conflict
deliberately. But as Vice President Biden is fond of saying,
there's something worse than an intended conflict and that's an
unintended conflict.
To that end, to avoid that two major lines of effort by the
United States include the direct engagement with the Chinese
and with the People's Liberation Army on upgrade of mil-mil
relations between the U.S. and China, which has enabled us to
improve our ability to communicate.
That doesn't obviate occasions in which the U.S. and
Chinese assets are at odds, as witnessed the case of the--
recent case of the USS Cowpens. But it does allow for a level
of communication that permits U.S. and Chinese officers to
resolve issues peaceably, which was also the case with the
Cowpens.
The second line of effort is more broadly with our allies
and with our partners whether it's Japan, whether it's the
Philippines or whether it's others. We are actively promoting
regional mechanisms to prevent incidents and to manage them
when they occur, everything from hot lines to rules of
engagement.
This is one important reason why the U.S. strongly supports
the call by Japan for better communications and incident
avoidance procedures in the East China Sea with China.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Connolly. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank my colleague, Mr. Sherman, for his courtesy.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Holding, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Holding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, how the United States deals--decides to engage
with the maritime conflicts or the air disputes in the East and
South China Seas, you know, not only sends important messages
to our allies as to how we take care of them but it says to
other countries around the world that might not necessarily be
an ally but someone that we have a strategic relationship with,
and one nation that I know who's been very, very close
attention to how we handle these is India, and, you know, they
watch any engagement we have with China and they watch it
closely.
So what would you say any potential action or inaction in
the East and South China Seas that we undertake--you know, what
do you think that means for our strategic relationship with
India?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you very much, Congressman.
With the caveat that my personal area of responsibility in
the State Department does not extend as far as India, I would
say that India, including as an active member of the East Asia
Summit, India, by virtue of its ``look East'' policy, India, as
the world's largest democracy and given its strategic place in
the Indo-Pacific geography has an important role to play, an
important contribution to make.
We have a consultation with India, which I'm looking
forward to undertaking as Assistant Secretary on the Asia-
Pacific region, and I have been in touch on the margins of
multilateral meetings with my Indian counterparts.
Others of our Asian allies including and especially Japan
have intense consultations as well. The Prime Minister of Japan
was recently there. Fundamentally, the rules of the South China
Sea and the East China Sea apply in the Indian Ocean and apply
globally.
The absolute requirement and a requirement that is
incumbent on China to embrace to respect rules of the road, to
accept that international law applies equally to big countries
and small, to strong and weak, is a principle--a set of
principles that I believe is essential to India, and that the
efforts by the United States including in the multilateral
forum to champion these principles have a significant impact
and, I believe, the support of the Indian democracy.
Mr. Holding. Well, you know, it's hard to see how we can
have a pivot to India without--a pivot to Asia without really
thinking about India because India is a country where we have a
very special strategic relationship with.
We are bound by, as you pointed out, it's the world's
largest democracy. We're the world's oldest democracy and, you
know, the business relationships that we have between the
United States and India are deep and far reaching and, you
know, I think that India, you know, is a balance to China
there.
I mean, obviously those two, you know, look at each other
all the time. And so do you think there are ways where we can
better incorporate India into our pivot to Asia and perhaps use
it as a foil of China--a balance to China?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Congressman.
You know, our strategy, as I said earlier, is not to
contain China. Our goal is not to disadvantage China's
legitimate interests and we don't--our policies are not aimed
at any one country and we don't use our relationships including
our relationship with India as a lever or a bludgeon against
China.
However, the issues at stake are global issues. As
democracies and as seafaring nations, India and the United
States share a common interest in respect for international
law, in protection of freedom of navigation and overflight and
in the vigorous defense of unimpeded lawful commerce.
India has--is a neighbor not only to China but also to
Burma, Myanmar, and has an important East-West corridor of
trade, a corridor that is important to India's economic future
because of the huge opportunities for economic growth in that
very dynamic region of Southeast Asia.
India is dependent on the sea lanes as so many of its
neighbors and therefore the safety and the security of the
seas, a safety and security that's predicated not on coastal
navies but on the respect for international law.
Mr. Holding. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank the
gentleman.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized,
who is also the ranking member of the Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs
Committee.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
China has land border disputes as well with India, perhaps
Pakistan, Vietnam, perhaps Burma, Russia. Has China ever agreed
to or suggested international arbitration or international
litigation of any of its land or maritime border disputes?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Congressman.
As you pointed out, China has not only something like two
dozen neighbors but something like two dozen border disputes.
Now, China has at various times made progress in resolving
and reconciling some of these disputes but does so----
Mr. Sherman. I know China has engaged in bilateral
negotiations. Have they urged or agreed to the submission of
any of these disputes to any international panel?
Mr. Russel. The Chinese position, particularly with regard
to its territorial disputes in the--in Southeast Asia and in
the East China Sea insists that the only satisfactory approach
is bilateral negotiations.
We do not agree and, moreover, in addition to bilateral and
multilateral fora we respect and defend the right of all
claimant states to avail themselves of legitimate international
legal mechanisms.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Russel. The case in point is the Philippines.
Mr. Sherman. I understand. Let me go on.
The Senkaku Islands, as Japan calls them----
Mr. Russel. Yes.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. They've got a claim and they--as
I understand it, they have had an air notification system with
regard to those islands in place for quite some time. Is that
correct?
Mr. Russel. Correct. These islands----
Mr. Sherman. So when China--so when China announced that it
wanted air notification they were simply putting themselves at
the same position and claim that Japan had insisted upon for
many years?
Mr. Russel. I would put it very differently, Congressman.
In 1972 when Okinawa reverted from the U.S. to Japan, the
administrative control of these islands, what the Japanese call
the Senkakus, also reverted to Japan.
Now, we don't take a position on the ultimate sovereignty
but the administrative control is there. With that
administrative control came the Air Defense Identification Zone
that the U.S. had created.
To create or to claim, as China did, an Air Defense
Identification Zone over an area that is administered by
another country over an area that is so highly sensitive is
not, in my view, putting itself on par with Japan.
Mr. Sherman. But they did--they did just do what Japan was
doing, albeit it's the U.S. position that Japan is the proper
administrator of these islands at the present time. I don't
think China necessarily accepts that but I want to go on to
another question.
I'm an old CPA. We have something in my field called cost
accounting where you look at an enterprise, say, spending $600
billion or $700 billion and allocate the expenditures to the
various objectives and goals of the organization. It's not an
easy thing to do.
I would allocate, for example, zero cents to defending
Montana from Canadian invasion, though that is one of the
responsibilities of our Pentagon. What portion of our overall
military expenditures would you guess or what range would you
apply to what portion is confronting China in maritime areas?
Mr. Russel. Well, Congressman----
Mr. Sherman. Because, I mean, if we weren't doing--trying
to achieve that goal we could save a lot of money but would
that be a tenth? A quarter? What?
Mr. Russel. I'd be happy to consult with my colleagues in
the Pentagon to try to get an answer for you. But I would take
issue with the formula that we are devoting our defense--a
portion of our defense budget to confront China. Our----
Mr. Sherman. Confront, deal with--in your response you'll
pick the right verb for whatever role we're playing in the
oceans off of China. I just want to get a feel.
Now, Japan spends only 1 percent of its GDP on its
military. It now has a confrontation with China over these
islands. Is there any effort in Japan to spend anything close
to 4.4 percent of its GDP on defense now that it believes its
territory is being infringed upon?
Mr. Russel. The Japanese defense budget is below 1 percent
and has been in that general area since, certainly, I served
for, speaking of Montana, Ambassador Mansfield in the 1980s.
Under the government of Prime Minister Abe and as a result
of 5 years of sustained effort in the U.S.-Japan alliance, not
only have the Japanese--has the Japanese Government increased
albeit marginally its actual defense spending but Japan has
upped its strategic cooperation with the United States as an
ally in ways that are hugely valuable to the U.S.
The issue and the goal is not to contest territory with
China. It's not to confront China. Our common objective is an
ally--as an alliance is to bolster the security and the
stability in the entire region.
Mr. Sherman. If I can just reclaim. I mean, I've met with
Pentagon people who do research and they've said every research
project is going to be focused on confronting China. We're not
interested in all the--doing the research that will help us
develop weapons to do anything else, and that's what they tell
me privately.
Mr. Russel. With all due respect, Congressman, a very
significant part of the Japanese defense budget and defense
cooperation----
Mr. Sherman. Well, I'm saying about----
Mr. Russel [continuing]. Is aimed at defense against North
Korea. A very significant amount of that is engaged in
developing the capacity of Pacific Island and Southeast Asian
partners.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
We are going to go in a second round after Mr. Perry here,
so if you want to, we can take that up or something else, for
that matter.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Russel, thank
you for your testimony and being here today.
Just a couple things. It seems like, at least from my
standpoint, we have an agreement on what should happen here but
maybe I might disagree with how we're going about it.
I mean, I certainly understand toning down the rhetoric
from our standpoint and trying to have a responsible
conversation. The instruments of power that the United States
is using and foremost in this regard is diplomatic and I would
agree with that.
My concern is is that while we are talking it seems to me
like China is doing, and while we're trying to bring down the
tone and the rhetoric they continue to do and over a period of
time certain things that have occurred will become the
commonplace, the new standard, and that's where we'll be and
maybe they'll push it and maybe they won't but they'll have
moved the ball.
So when we talk about the ADIZ or the incident with the
Cowpens, you know, these are unilateral actions and while we're
talking is there any measurable--is there anything tangible the
United States is doing to move the needle in the other
direction?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Congressman.
To your point, I am convinced that ultimately our most
effective instrument with China is diplomatic and political.
There is a significant backlash.
There is a measurable reaction in the Asia-Pacific region
to the perception of Chinese assertiveness to the incremental
steps that you allude to to make assertions and create facts on
the ground or on the water, and that translates into an
intensified demand signal for U.S. military diplomatic economic
engagement that many Chinese consider to be adverse to their
interests. Our goal----
Mr. Perry. So we're hoping that our actions will have the
desired effect from within China. That is our--that's what I'm
hearing.
Mr. Russel. We are using all the instruments of U.S.
influence and particularly the diplomatic instruments to affect
and shape China's choices in the direction of responsible
behavior in support of a stable region.
Mr. Perry. And I can appreciate that. I wonder if we know
how far is too far. Have we established that? And I'm not
asking you to tell me what that would be but have we
established how far is too far in regard to China's incursions?
Mr. Russel. Well, in this unclassified setting,
Congressman, what I would say without getting into trip wires
or milestones is that we have in no uncertain terms
communicated through action as well as through high-level
diplomacy to the Chinese our firm commitment both to honor our
security commitments alliances, to defend our interests, to
remain engaged and made clear in a number of ways that the
behavior that the Chinese manifest with regard to their
neighborhood has a direct impact on the prospects for U.S.-
China relations.
Mr. Perry. Okay. I mean, I get all that. But so you tell me
if I get a classified briefing I'm going to find out that there
is a point where the United States will say that's enough,
enough is enough and we're going to move to the next level.
You're telling me is--in a classified setting is there that
point established right now?
Mr. Russel. The way that I would put it, Congressman, is
that we are committed and determined to shape China's choices
and influence China's behavior through all means of national
and collective power.
Mr. Perry. I mean, listen, I get it. It sounds like
diplomatic mumbo jumbo to me and it's just--you know, I almost
fall asleep. No disrespect intended but I can't get to an
answer here that suits me as to we have a definitive line.
Is there a classified strategy that I can see? Do we have
one? Just yes or no. That you won't mention here but is there a
classified strategy that I might find elsewhere?
Mr. Russel. There is, Congressman, an abundance of
classified strategy with respect to both China and to the South
China Sea and there's no time to----
Mr. Perry. Okay. Let me ask you this. The treaty
requirements and alliances we had were post-World War II or
borne out of World War II at the end of World War II with our
allies in the region and with maybe some of the other partners,
China and otherwise.
But that's essentially the genesis of what we're talking
about regarding these incursions and unilateral actions whether
it's an ADIZ or what have you. That's what we're basing our
foundation and our strategy on and our agreements. Am I right
or wrong? I just want--I'm looking for clarification.
Mr. Russel. Our bilateral security commitments and
alliances are one of the essential elements of our strategy, as
I mentioned.
Mr. Perry. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
We'll go into a second round now for anybody that might
have any final questions. I'll recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, this year marks the 35th
anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act which
has withstood the test of time and has proved to be one of the,
I think, most significant policy instruments in the Asia-
Pacific region over time. Last week, Taiwan received news that
the U.S. Air Force plans to defund the Combat Avionics Program
Extension Suite, or the CAPES program, which has huge
implications for Taiwan. If continued, that program would
upgrade 300 U.S. F-16s and 146 Taiwanese F-16s with top line
avionics. If unfunded, then Taiwan will likely either turn to
South Korea or face the detrimental possibility of no upgrades
and an aging fleet of ABs. The other option is for the U.S. to
release new F-16 CD fighters, or F-35s, but despite consistent
support for many of us here in Congress, this has not happened
yet. Since the administration continues to deny Taiwan's
request to buy F-16 CD fighters and is now cutting the CAPES
program, what options does Taiwan have?
What solution, a solution that's affordable to Taiwan, does
the administration intend to offer? If the U.S. is going to
follow through on its rebalance objectives, ensuring the
security of our allies and friends is critical.
This is an important issue and I hope the administration
takes finding a solution seriously. Could you comment on that?
Mr. Russel. Yes. Well, thank you very much for raising the
issue, Mr. Chairman.
We take our unofficial relations with Taiwan and we take
our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act very seriously.
The Obama administration in less than 5 years notified
something on the order of $10 billion or $11 billion worth of
arms sales to Taiwan, which is quite formidable.
In addition, we have a sustained and a robust dialogue on
security and defense issues. Our policy is that arms sales and
our contribution to Taiwan's security contributes to cross
strait stability and we are committed to helping to meet
Taiwan's legitimate security needs.
Now, this all occurs in the context of a one-China policy
consistent with three U.S.-China communiques as well as the
Taiwan Relations Act that have been consistent over eight U.S.
administrations. What is different now, I would assert, Mr.
Chairman, are two things.
One is that the continued military build-up on the mainland
side of the straits is unabated and, as in the past, that
contributes to a sense of insecurity that in turn inspires the
Taiwanese to seek additional arms and security assistance.
But the other thing that has changed since President Obama
took office is the quality and the intensity of the cross
strait dialogue themselves. There has been a stabilizing
dynamic in the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland,
something that we very much support and encourage and we hope
to see continued progress toward reconciliation across the
straits.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I've got two more questions and I've only got a minute so
I'm going to boil them down pretty quickly and if you could
answer relatively briefly on both.
One of the main things I think we've talked about here this
afternoon is China for lack of a better term, kind of throwing
its weight around with its being provocative and aggressive
with a lot of its neighbors and what should we do with our
allies.
And let me just touch on the Philippines. For quite some
time, the most powerful nation that the world has ever known
had a pretty significant military base there, specifically at
Subic Bay, and the Philippine Government then decided that they
no longer wanted that to be there and, of course, the
Philippine people voiced their opinion relative to that. But
could you comment on what the relationship is between the
Philippines vulnerability to Chinese aggression and the absence
of that base today? That's the first question.
The other question is when you go to Asia everybody talks
about TPP. You know, that's at the top. You don't hear quite as
much about it here in this country, unfortunately; but there
it's really big, very important, and I too think it's important
and we ought to talk about it more here. Obviously, in order to
pass TPP, TPA is going to have to come first. How much of an
effort is the President going to make to accomplish that?
Because he's going to need both Democratic support and
Republican support if we're going to do TPA and TPP.
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you. I'll try to be brief, Mr.
Chairman.
On the topic of the Philippines, the U.S. is and remains
fully committed to our mutual defense treaty and to the
security of the Philippines.
We are not looking for bases in the Philippines or
elsewhere but what we are doing is working together to develop
a framework agreement that will increase the U.S. access, will
increase joint operations and this will contribute very
directly to the security of the Philippines.
Mr. Chabot. Right. But that really wasn't my question--
what's the relationship between the lack of that base and their
vulnerability? Do those two sort of--those two things kind of
go hand in glove, logically?
Mr. Russel. Again, I would tread carefully, not being a
military person.
Mr. Chabot. Undiplomatic?
Mr. Russel. But--no, no. I don't--I'm not representing the
Pentagon. But the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region is
strong and formidable. We were able to deploy virtually
instantly to the Philippines in response to the super typhoon
Haiyan using our existing bases in Okinawa and elsewhere.
Even without Clark and Subic we have, as the U.S., the
capability. Clark and Subic were not going to make the
Philippines a military superpower even if they had remained
fully operational as joint bases to the this day.
Mr. Chabot. Okay.
Mr. Russel. If I might on the----
Mr. Chabot. Well, I'll answer my own question. I think
their vulnerability is significantly related to the lack of
that base there and I think that was a strategic mistake on
their part and there wasn't much we could do about it because
they said get out. We got out. But on the TPP and TPA?
Mr. Russel. The President on down, the administration is
absolutely committed to seeing through TPP. Negotiators have
been hard at work and I think are expected to meet shortly,
perhaps in the region at ministerial level, and the President I
know has warmly welcomed the introduction of a bipartisan bill
on TPA.
Neither the U.S. nor any of the 11 members negotiating
entered into this process with any intent other than to succeed
in creating a high standard comprehensive agreement that is
going to create jobs and open markets. The President is
determined to get there.
Mr. Chabot. Excellent. Thank you.
It's going to take a real effort--joint effort both by the
President, the administration and the Congress as well to get
this done.
Ranking member, the gentlelady from Hawaii, is recognized.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. I have two
questions I hope to be able to get addressed briefly.
Recognizing you're not speaking at all for the DoD but also
understanding that the overall strategy that the President is
looking forward to in the Asia-Pacific region has a very strong
integration of both military-to-military engagements as well as
the diplomatic and economic engagements as well, this year--
later this year it'll be the first time that China was invited
and has agreed to participate in the U.S.-led RIMPAC maritime
exercise.
I understand there have been arguments made by people who
think that this kind of military-to-military engagement will
benefit--will benefit our--what the President is trying to
accomplish in the Asia-Pacific region and others say that
providing this exposure to China could strengthen their war
fighting capabilities.
I'd like you to speak to that as to why this is the
direction the President has decided to take.
Mr. Russel. Mm-hmm. Thank you.
The participation of the Chinese in RIMPAC is, in the view
of the administration, very much in the best interests of the
United States and U.S. security as well as those of our
regional partners.
We have a--we have an interest and a stake in a
professional Chinese military as compared to an unprofessional
Chinese military. Moreover, China's ability to engage
constructively and as an active participant in multilateral
exercises directly relates to the goal of China contributing as
a net security provider, a net security contributor to the
region, whether it is in connection with anti-piracy,
patrolling sea lanes or securing international waters for the
common good.
The growth of and the intensity of mil-mil relations
between the U.S. and China over the last 5 years but
particularly in the last year is, in our view, a major
contributor to long-term stability. The high level engagement
helps the Chinese People's Liberation Army understand what the
U.S. is and isn't all about.
That is fundamentally a good thing in part because it is
critical to debunk the mythology and the stereotypes widely
held in the PLA----
Ms. Gabbard. Sure.
Mr. Russel [continuing]. That drive bad behavior.
Ms. Gabbard. I hope to be able to be in Hawaii for those
exercises later this year. Last month, you were quoted in a
newspaper calling for a mechanism for crisis prevention or
crisis management in the event that incidents could trigger an
escalatory cycle.
I'm wondering if you'd talk about, you know, what that
trigger could be as well and what point the United States would
really seek to implement this kind of crisis prevention or
crisis management.
Mr. Russel. Well, the region has seen over the last few
years but certainly recently as well a number of incidents--the
tragic shooting of Taiwan fishermen by Philippines, the
intersection of a Chinese fishing vessel with the Philippine
naval vessel, cable cutting incidents between the Chinese coast
guard and Vietnamese survey ships.
The opportunities for some kind of incident for some sort
of miscalculation are legion. In every case, it has been the
ability to communicate that has been central to defusing
incidents.
Now, governments in these cases have ultimately
communicated capital to capital. We also believe that ships
themselves should be able to communicate bridge to bridge, and
rather than making up on the spot solutions to problems, rather
than delegating the decisions to junior officers in the heat of
the moment to develop consistent rules to reach agreement on
mechanisms, whether they are hot lines or whether they are
standard operating procedures is going to play an important
role in defusing----
Ms. Gabbard. So you're kind of talking what in a combat
setting we would talk about rules of engagement or something
along those lines that would be standard within the area?
Mr. Russel. Right. Standardizing rules of engagement would
be one element to a set of mechanisms that would help prevent
or manage incidents should they occur.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, will wrap up
for us here today.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Assistant Secretary, we've--at the end we
were kind of talking over each other. I was making the point
that the Pentagon was devoting more and more of its resources,
particularly at the research level and the force--and designing
its future force configuration, allocating--focusing on
confronting China, particularly off the Chinese coast.
You made the point, and I think it's a good one, that Japan
faces quite a number of national security concerns--North
Korea, its need to provide regional assistance to its partners
in its neighborhood and, of course, they've got territory that
they have a dispute over and they see the Chinese taking almost
military action.
And yet Japan is able to deal with all of those national
security concerns spending less than 1 percent of its GDP and
relies in significant part for its defense on getting the
American taxpayer to pick up a big chunk of that.
I didn't think this hearing was about trade. I'm delighted
that it came up. The lion's share of our worldwide trade
deficit is in the East Asia region, which is your bureau. I've
talked to foreign ministry--Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors
from other countries and they say--I say, what's your number
one goal. It's promoting exports.
Mr. Russel. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. What--your bureau, again, the biggest trade--
the lion's share of the largest trade deficit in the history of
the world is the U.S. trade deficit in your region. What's the
most successful and tangible and definitive success your bureau
has had in promoting U.S. exports or reducing U.S. imports?
Mr. Russel. Well, the most recent and tangible success is
the conclusion of the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement, which--
--
Mr. Sherman. I'll reclaim my time and point out that our
trade deficit with South Korea has accelerated substantially as
a result of and shortly after the effective date of that
agreement.
There's a tendency to say exports create jobs without ever
mentioning that imports cost us jobs. Both are true, and in
fact our imports to South Korea--from South Korea grew as a
result of that agreement. Our exports eventually should go up,
although in the first year they've declined.
But, clearly, the trade deficit with South Korea has grown
and grown substantially after that agreement. We have a huge
trade deficit with Japan. Japan is asking us to defend them, as
we have for over 60 years.
Has Japan offered to make any concessions as to how much
U.S. food they import or anything else in an effort to get us
engaged in this island dispute they have or do they feel that
their claim on the U.S. taxpayer is sacrosanct and doesn't need
to be encouraged through trade concessions?
Mr. Russel. Well, Congressman, as, of course, you know
well, U.S. security assistance and commitment is not for sale.
This is not something that we trade. The fact is that we're
engaged in negotiations with Japan right now in the context of
the TPP in which the Japanese have made very significant
concessions.
Mr. Sherman. Only if we give them our auto market. But I'll
point out--okay. The deal with South Korea increased our trade
deficit. What assurance do we have that the negotiations you're
referring to will not also increase our net trade deficit?
Mr. Russel. I was recently in Korea. I met with the
American Chamber of Commerce and the representatives of a wide
range of U.S. businesses including auto--U.S. auto
manufacturers who are----
Mr. Sherman. Looking to offshore our jobs and close down
U.S. factories to increase profits. How did you help them do
that? That was--sorry for the facetious question. Go on.
Mr. Russel. U.S. businesses are reporting unprecedented
access to the Korean market and significantly enhanced
opportunities for exports, and we believe that the successful
conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership by lowering
barriers and by bringing high standards to countries like
Japan, like----
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Secretary, I'll reclaim my time and say
the definition of insanity is to keep doing the same thing and
expect another result. Our agreement--numbers don't lie. I'm an
old CPA.
I look at the numbers, and our trade deficit with South
Korea has grown very substantially after that agreement and if
we do it again on a bigger scale we should expect the same
results, only bigger. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired so
we'll finish up the hearing with the definition of insanity
here this afternoon. We greatly appreciate your testimony here
this afternoon, Mr. Secretary.
Members will have 5 legislative days to submit questions or
revise their statements, and if there's no further business to
come before the committee, we're adjourned.
Thank you.
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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