[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 5, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-120
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
86-589 PDF WASHINGTON : 2014
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 6
Mr. James L. Capra, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Department of Justice..................... 14
Ms. Erin Logan, Principal Director for Counternarcotics and
Global Threats, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 25
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement.......... 8
Mr. James L. Capra: Prepared statement........................... 16
Ms. Erin Logan: Prepared statement............................... 27
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order
because you have been patiently awaiting us for a while, and
Mr. Cicilline is coming right on cue.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Ted
Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute
each.
We will then hear from our witnesses, and without objection
the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a part of the
record, and members may have 5 days in which to insert
statements and questions for the record subject to the length
limitation in the rules.
The Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Since Fiscal Year 2002, the U.S. has appropriated almost
$7.5 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. This
funding includes over $4 billion for the Department of State's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
INL; nearly $3 billion for the Department of Defense Drug
Interdiction and Counter Drug activities, and just over $200
million for the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA. This
amounts to about 7 percent of the $102 billion the U.S. has
appropriated for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan over
that period of time.
Last year alone we allocated nearly $1 billion toward these
counternarcotics efforts. This is a significant amount of U.S.
taxpayer money, and it is extremely important that this
subcommittee continue to conduct its oversight role to ensure
that we are achieving our goals and objectives, and that this
money is being properly spent.
Yet, despite all of this money being spent, 2013 was a
record-breaking year in terms of poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan produced over 80 percent of the
world's opium last year, and the illegal drug trade is a
contributing factor to many of the major challenges facing
Afghanistan and the U.S. The drug trade helps to generate
hundreds of millions of dollars for the Taliban and other
extremist groups every year. It creates an increase in
corruption, and it creates a very serious public health
challenge in Afghanistan as more and more Afghans get addicted
to the readily available drugs.
The narco-terrorism connection is particularly troubling
given the vast sums of money extremist groups can extract from
the drug trade and to fund terrorist activities against the
United States and our interests worldwide. And the money drug
trafficking generates permeates its way through all levels of
government, as corruption and drug trafficking in Afghanistan
go hand in hand.
Last May, I led a codel to Afghanistan and had Foreign
Affairs Committee colleagues, Mr. Kennedy and Dr. Bera along,
and we had the opportunity to see firsthand the work that the
INL, DoD, and the DEA are doing on the counternarcotics front,
and get briefed by the folks on the ground about the current
situation. We also visited the DEA Center in Afghanistan, and
it was quite impressive to see their operations and how their
programs are run.
I commend these brave men and women for doing their
absolute best to fight this very serious problems with their
resources.
The amount of capacity-building, specialty training, and
information sharing that INL, DoD, and DEA have done is a
testament to their commitment to aggressively fight this
threat. And though there have been great strides made, I remain
worried about the future of counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan as we approach the 2014 withdrawal with even
greater uncertainty.
All of our counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan to this
point have relied heavily on a robust U.S. military presence.
To add insult to injury, Karzai has not been willing to provide
vital resources to help the eradication teams in Afghanistan.
As a result of the U.S. drawdown, many of our operations have
had to be scaled back, and we have reduced our counternarcotics
presence in Afghanistan in conjunction with the dwindling
number of troops. And now with the post-2014 U.S. footprint
still in doubt, we are making it even more difficult for these
agencies that will have to make corresponding decreases in
their enduring presence and to make adjustments to their
operations.
I'm concerned that because DEA personnel is being scaled
back by over 70 percent, our counternarcotics efforts will be
undermined and will not be successful.
As Ambassador Brownfield notes in his testimony, these
counternarcotics efforts do not take place in a vacuum.
Addressing the drug issue in Afghanistan is a key part of our
overall strategy for Afghanistan and for the overall war on
terror. So much attention has been given to the Bilateral
Security Agreement, the upcoming elections in April, and the
mercurial nature of Karzai that we must not lose sight of the
counternarcotics threat that poses a direct threat to our
national security and the regional stability.
And now I'd be glad to turn to Mr. Cicilline for any
opening statements that he would like to make.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Chairman
Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Deutch for holding today's
hearing on this very important issue.
As we continue drawing down combat operations in
Afghanistan it's increasingly the responsibility of the Afghan
people to operate, build, and maintain their own civilian and
military capacity. The United States has built an important
foundation for Afghanistan's future, but long-term stability
and a sustainable peace in the region can only be accomplished
when the people of Afghanistan take on these responsibilities.
Unfortunately, ongoing and prevalent narcotics activity in
Afghanistan has led to aggressive momentum in many areas,
narcotics activities correlated with political and economic
instability, and has a substantial effect on the quality of
life. The United States must continue to monitor
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan to determine how U.S.
interests may be best served as we transition our combat forces
out of the country.
I look forward to hearing the perspectives of the witnesses
we have assembled to discuss U.S. counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan, and how they will shape our relationship going
forward.
And with that, I'd like to yield the balance of my time to
our ranking member, Mr. Deutch.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline.
And we are pleased to give the time to Mr. Deutch to make his
opening statement, and then we will turn to Mr. Brooks for a
minute statement, et cetera. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank my
friend from Rhode Island. And thanks, Madam Chairman, for
holding this hearing.
While most of our discussions about Afghanistan are focused
on troop numbers and reconciliation talks, counternarcotics is
an issue that's going to play a significant role in shaping
Afghanistan's long-term future. Afghanistan's narcotics trade
has been a financial boon for the insurgency in Afghanistan as
the world's number one producer of opium providing 80 percent
of the world's heroin supply. Afghan drugs make their way to
Russia, to Europe, and just over the border to Iran where the
drug addiction rate is the highest in the world.
The illicit drug trade in Afghanistan accounts for close to
half of the Taliban's budget. The undeniable link between drug
money and terrorism funding means that this isn't just an
Afghan threat, it is an international security threat.
For many years, U.S. efforts to combat the illicit Afghan
drug trade focus on poppy eradication, but the emphasis on
eradication did little to actually alleviate the drug
production problem. The focus on eradication instead left rural
farmers without a steady income and more vulnerable to the law
of extremism or other black market economic activities, but
economic opportunity and security go hand in hand. Programs to
replace poppies with alternative crops won't succeed unless
there is a more holistic approach. Simply giving farmers what
seeds to plant in lieu of poppies won't do anything if Afghan
wheat has not been marketed as a viable option to importers.
Efforts to improve Afghanistan's agriculture exports will only
decrease the desire for Afghan farmers to cultivate the poppy.
They'll strengthen Afghanistan's legitimate economy instead of
propping up the black market drug trade.
Programs like the Hellman Food Zone, a comprehensive effort
funded by the U.S., Britain, and Denmark not only established
alternative crops, but provided for crop storage and overland
shipping routes out of the province. That's seeing success, and
I hope we have success replicating these efforts in Kandahar
and elsewhere around the country.
I know that many see the rise in poppy cultivation as an
indicator that counternarcotics operations have failed, but we
have, in fact, seen real and serious progress in many of our
joint counternarcotics programs, most notably interdiction
efforts with DEA as the lead law enforcement agency have led to
vetted and trained units of counternarcotics police of
Afghanistan.
As Mr. Capra will explain in his testimony, these units
have led to close to 2,500 operations that resulted in over
2,200 arrests in the past 9 months. This is a good news story.
Narcotics trade and terrorism funding go hand in hand
across the globe, and I commend the DEA's activities to combat
this worldwide, but in a country as frail as Afghanistan, and
as fragile as Afghanistan is, the security risks from propping
up insurgents with hundreds of millions of dollars to fund
their operations can't be overstated.
The United States trained and supported Counternarcotics
Justice Center heard 700 drug cases last year, but without
proper support from the Afghan Government, the CNJC has largely
prosecuted low-level couriers.
I commend Ambassador Brownfield and his team, and INL for
the work that they've done to support efforts to go after high-
level traffickers which resulted in the successful prosecution
and incarceration of a U.S. designated drug kingpin, but the
fact remains the United States alone cannot stop the Afghan
drug trade. We can provide the Afghan Government with the
necessary training and support, but no amount of funding can
provide the political will to aggressively confront all aspects
of drug production and trafficking.
I do believe that there are elements of the Afghan
Government deeply committed to counternarcotics. The Minister
of Counternarcotics said last month that there is a need for
severe punishment of traffickers, adding, ``I hope that in 2014
we will witness a declining trend in both cultivation and
production of opium.'' So, as we look ahead to the future of
U.S. operations in Afghanistan, we have to turn our focus to
ways to help the Afghans sustain the counternarcotics regime
that we have helped them build.
What can we do to insure that the programs we have worked
so hard to build from the Afghan Counternarcotics Police, to
the prosecutors of the Counternarcotics Justice Center, and the
staff of the hundred drug treatment centers, what can we do to
help those continue to function with a decreased U.S. presence?
And how can we ensure that our reduced security operations
don't stretch the Afghan security forces so thin that
counternarcotics simply becomes an afterthought.
The U.S. has never conducted counternarcotics operations of
this scale in a war zone, and I commend our witnesses for the
work that your agencies have done in a most challenging
environment. I look forward to hearing from each of you, and I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Amen. Thank you so much. Mr. Cotton,
we're pleased to hear from you. Okay. Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. I'm going to follow the Senator's lead.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay, let me see. Who's there next to
you? Mr. Collins. Oh, boy, oh, boy, pithy, very pithy.
Mr. Cotton. We've kept the witnesses waiting long enough.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay, thank you. Ms. Meng here? Thank
you.
Ms. Meng. Don't worry, mine is brief. Thank you, Madam
Chairwoman and Ranking Member Deutch for holding this important
hearing. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today, as
well.
U.S. operations in Afghanistan are critical to the security
of the United States, especially now that our decade long
military presence will be decreasing. Concentrating on
counternarcotics operations is essential. Afghanistan remains
the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and has a
large hand in drug production and distribution.
Drug trafficking funnels money into terrorist groups and
contributes to economic and political instability. The drug
trade in Afghanistan threatens not only the country itself, but
also the entire Middle East region and the United States.
Therefore, I'm very interested in how the U.S. can sustain and
improve its counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan. I look
forward to hearing from today's panelists from the Departments
of State, Justice, and Defense about this serious problem.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Meng. My Florida
colleague, Ms. Frankel, is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for this
hearing, and thank you to the witnesses for being here. And I
will listen with great interest and reserve my questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, ma'am. And Mr. Connolly is
recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Well, Madam Chairwoman, as you know, I served
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee many years ago where
I looked at the drug problem. I have to say it's deja vu all
over again when I look at this data. You know, we invest a lot
of money, we have a lot of personnel, and let's see, opium
cultivation increased by 36 percent between 2012 and 2013 to a
record 516,000 acres in Afghanistan, a country where we have
troops, we've been fighting a war, difficult but we have a lot
more control than if we're not there. And it just--I'm going to
be real interested in hearing about progress and what we mean
by progress, because what I see is the United States, frankly,
losing this war. I don't want it to lose the war, but I'm
skeptical about the progress, the milestones being alleged, so
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses. Thank
you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. And we thank the
witnesses for their wonderful patience waiting an hour to start
our hearing. But I always say as a Cuban refugee who lost her
homeland to communism, I love getting interrupted by votes.
This is not a problem.
And first we welcome a dear friend to our subcommittee and
to me personally, Ambassador William Brownfield, Assistant
Secretary at the State Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
Prior to his appointment, Ambassador Brownfield was U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia, to Venezuela, and to Chile, and has
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere
Affairs. He holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the
highest rank in the U.S. Foreign Service. Welcome again, Mr.
Ambassador. I think both of us would agree that we would enjoy
spending today in a field hearing in Miami instead of being in
DC, but welcome.
And next we're so pleased to welcome a gentleman who also
has a Miami connection. It's just a coincidence, honestly. We
welcome Mr. James Capra who is Chief of Operations at the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Capra has had a long and distinguished career in law
enforcement having served in numerous roles in DEA including a
Special Agent in Charge of the Dallas Field Division, and
before this as Associate Special Agent in Charge of the Miami
Field Division. Prior to his career in law enforcement, Mr.
Capra served in the United States Navy, the Navy Reserves, the
Air National Guard, and as a military intelligence officer with
the U.S. Army Reserves. Thank you, sir, for being with us.
And third, I'm so pleased to welcome to our subcommittee
hearing Ms. Erin Logan, Principal Director for Counternarcotics
and Global Threats for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense. She previously served as the Chief of Staff and
Special Assistant for the Assistant Secretary of Defense in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Prior to
this, she was a senior professional staff member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee where she was a primary advisor to
then-Senator Joe Biden on defense issues. I believe that we has
someone here on the dias who has some kind of connection to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I'm not sure who it is, Mr.
Connolly, but we welcome all three of you to our subcommittee.
And, Ambassador Brownfield, we will begin with you, amigo.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Brownfield. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking
Member Deutch, members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss counternarcotics efforts
in Afghanistan. I agree with you, Madam Chairman, far better
were we having this meeting today in Miami, but we will meet
where we are and deal with the world as it is, not as we might
wish it would be.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have just returned from Afghanistan
last week and I look forward to sharing my observations on this
essential topic.
Members of the committee, we know that Afghanistan is the
source of more than 80 percent of the world's illegal opiates,
and that drugs represent the largest domestic source of income
for the Taliban, but there are key facts that we do not know.
We do not know the security picture we will encounter after
2014, or the exact contours of the bilateral relationship, or
the resources that will be available to us, or the posture of
the international community.
We have learned lessons in the past 40 years about anti-
drug programs. We learned that drug strategies take time. It
takes years to get into a crisis, and years to resolve it. The
strategy must be comprehensive. You cannot solve a crisis by
addressing just one element. And the strategy must be
adaptable, capable of responding to inevitable changes by the
trafficking adversary.
Last week in Kabul I discussed INL assistant efforts with
the Minister of Counternarcotics and the Minister of Interior.
We agreed on the need for a multifaceted approach with strong
Afghan Government leadership. We concluded that our drug
cooperation should be driven by five guiding principles. First,
focus on sustainable Afghan capabilities. Capacity building is
more important than equipment, and must be sustainable over the
long term. Second, emphasize Afghan priorities and strategies.
If there is no Afghan buy-in our strategies will not succeed.
Third, deliver on previous commitments. If we lose the trust of
the Afghan people cooperation withers. Fourth, integrate
international donors and regional partners into the strategy.
We cannot do this alone, and they consume far more of the
Afghan product than we do. And fifth, given changing security
and resource realities after 2014, we must adapt our monitoring
and evaluation strategies to continue to insure taxpayer funds
are protected and our programs are as effective as they can be.
Members of the committee, you will in my written statement
a summary of our counter drug programs in Afghanistan. You will
read of programs designed to address crop control, eradication,
alternative development, interdiction, prosecution, training
and capacity building, and demand reduction. You will read of
some of our efforts to engage important international partners
in the United Nations, the UK, other European institutions, and
Central Asian governments. You will read of our proposed tiered
approach to monitoring and evaluation where we use the best
available sources to evaluate our programs in the field in
light of security and resources. I hope you find a
comprehensive and sustainable drug strategy.
Madam Chairman, I detect pessimism in some media reporting
on Afghan drugs. I do not share it any more than I shared the
pessimism of those who still reported in 2007 that Plan
Colombia was a failure. Counternarcotics is critical to the
success of Afghanistan post-2014, and requires continued
support and attention. I do not promise you success this year
or next year, but I do promise with your support a sustainable
and adaptable counternarcotics strategy that builds capacities
for the Afghan Government to address drug challenges post-2014.
I thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Capra.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES L. CAPRA, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Capra. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
Administrator Leonhart and the Drug Enforcement Administration,
I appreciate your invitation to testify today regarding DEA's
counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan.
Madam Chairman, I ask that my written statement be included
in the record.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Capra. Before I get started I would like to thank you,
Madam Chairman and Representative Kennedy, for visiting the DEA
compound during your last trip. I'd also like to take this
opportunity to extend the invitation to any interested
committee members for a similar visit.
DEA focuses international efforts on identifying and
combating drug trafficking organizations that pose the greatest
threat to U.S. interests. We accomplish this by analyzing
illicit drug cultivation, manufacturing and transporting
trends, transportation trends, tracking the flow of illicit
proceeds and money laundering patterns, assessing the law
enforcement capabilities and potential growth of our foreign
counterparts, providing mentorship, training, and other
assistance to help those counterparts build capacity and
achieve strategic and tactical effectiveness, supporting
programs promoting the Rule of Law worldwide and unifying and
harmonizing efforts to bring to justice transnational drug
traffickers and narcoterrorists.
The United Nations has estimated that the international
drug trade generates $322 billion per year in revenue, making
drugs by far the most lucrative illicit activity. According to
the U.N., revenues from other types of transnational criminal
activities such as arms trafficking and alien smuggling are
small by comparison.
The narcotics trade in Afghanistan undermines the economic
development, enables corruption, erodes government legitimacy,
facilitates transnational organized crime, and threatens
stability and security in the Rule of Law in Afghanistan and
across the region.
The Taliban receives millions annually from the narcotics-
related activities. With poppy cultivation increasing in the
country, it can be assumed Taliban profits will also continue
to rise fueling further instability worldwide.
DEA is fully supportive of the Government of Afghanistan
and its national drug control strategy. This strategy reaffirms
U.S. commitment to breaking the narcotics insurgency nexus in
Afghanistan and reinforcing the legitimacy of governmental
institution. With the expected drawdown of U.S. combat forces,
DEA efforts will remain focused on supporting counternarcotics
programs which are both effective and sustainable. We
understand these challenges. With the assistance of our
interagency colleagues we stand ready to tackle the mission.
DEA will transition our role in Afghanistan to correspond
with traditional DEA overseas operations. We will continue to
collect drug-related intelligence supporting domestic DEA
investigations, as well as joint investigation with our host
nation counterparts. To meet this commitment, DEA must maintain
a sufficient staffing level in Afghanistan.
DEA continues to develop the capability and capacity of the
special vetted units of the counternarcotics police in
Afghanistan to address the illicit drug trade. Our Afghan
partners are already conducting independent investigations and
trying and convicting drug traffickers in Afghan courts.
The threat from the drug trade in Afghanistan is far from
over. It is critical that we sustain the positive momentum to
preserve security gains made over the past decade.
Administrator Leonhart and the men and women of the DEA are
committed to standing with our interagency colleagues and
Afghan counterparts to build a sustainable and effective
counternarcotics program in Afghanistan that protects U.S.
national security interests.
Madam Chair, I thank you for your time and look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Capra follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Ms. Logan, thank you very
much.
STATEMENT OF MS. ERIN LOGAN, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Logan. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch,
and other members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to
talk to you today about the Defense Department's
counternarcotics or CN work in Afghanistan and our plans post-
2014.
As the members of the subcommittee know well, since 2001
the United States has made an extraordinary investment in blood
and Treasury to eliminate the terrorist safe haven that
Afghanistan had become. To date, 2,303 Americans have lost
their lives in Operation Enduring Freedom, another 19,639 have
been wounded. DoD has invested approximately $2 billion in
dedicated CN training and programs which is a small fraction of
the over $570 billion the nation has spent on the war since
2001.
That said, we do believe that $2 billion has been well
spent. We have CN seed, if you will, that has now sprouted and
it includes all of the elements that we believe we need to
successfully grow, but that growth will only happen if we
nurture and protect that which we have planted.
As we look at the future for Afghanistan, it is impossible
to envision success without sustaining an Afghan capability to
fight the violence and corruption created by the drug trade. In
addition, we cannot ignore the growing threat to ourselves and
our allies. Our Canadian partners estimate that 90 percent of
the heroin on their streets comes from Afghanistan. They also
believe they are seeing more heroin than their user population
can absorb.
We must all be sensitive to information like this when
combined with the Governor of Vermont issuing a State of the
State speech focused entirely on Vermont's exploding heroin and
opiate problem. We have to realize and be vigilant there is a
possibility that Afghan produced heroin will become more
available across the United States. DoD as always is committed
to disrupting the flow of these drugs as far away from our
shores as possible.
Our CN strategy for post-2014 can be summarized by saying
that we believe we must focus in three key areas, continued
support for vetted units, continued aviation capacity building,
and the continued leveraging of our international and
interagency capabilities.
First, the vetted units. These units have shown that they
are willing and able to do the job, and more and more vetted
units are now able to plan, execute, and follow through on CN
missions on their own. For example, in December, on December
18th, the DoD supported, DEA mentored Sensitive Investigative
Unit was able to use judicial wire taps to build a case that
led to the arrest of two criminals, the seizure of 660 grams of
heroin, 500 boxes of ammunition, 40 remote controlled IEDs, and
75 rocket propelled grenades. This is a great example of using
CN capability to disrupt and remove lethal threats from the
battlefield.
Second, our continued support for aviation capacity
building. I cannot overstate how vital we believe this is for
the terrain of Afghanistan. For any security effort and
certainly to run effective CN operations we must enhance the
effectiveness and safety of the aviation unit. My office's
focus has been the Special Mission Wing which has demonstrated
the capability to completely plan and execute operations
without international assistance. The Special Mission Wing is
just now starting to get the aircraft they need to
simultaneously run operations, continue training personnel, and
conduct more intensive aircraft maintenance training.
As has been mentioned by my colleagues, our experience in
Colombia and elsewhere illustrates that it can take more than a
decade for aviation capability to become self-sustaining. In a
nation like Afghanistan, the pressures will be very high and it
may take longer, but with sustained support we are confident
the Special Mission Wing can continue to progress.
Third, I would be remiss if I don't point out that the
vetted units and aviation capability are part of a complete
structure that the interagency and international community have
worked hard to create. You'll see in my written testimony a lot
of examples, but one thing that I'd like to highlight is that
we believe the drawdown in Afghanistan demands that we explore
creative ways to retain some of the effective targeting and
intelligence fusion that we've been able to develop with our
international interagency partners. Starting small, we believe
we can support a regional hub for those capabilities by
modestly expanding our current work done by law enforcement
intelligence to facilitate interdictions, seizures,
investigations, and prosecution. This would be done by slowly
expanding the successful but small Operation Riptide already in
Bahrain.
Our vision is to create a reach back capability for
Afghanistan and a more effective capability for targeting the
illicit traffic that is departing the Mokran coast of Pakistan
and Iran to go to Africa and beyond.
One great example our Canadian partners have is the HMCS
Toronto had seven seizures in 2013. We estimate at DoD that 1
percent of the value of what they removed from the high seas is
equal to the amount of funding necessary to outfit a platoon of
insurgents.
A regional targeting center would allow us to retain these
valuable interagency international partnerships. Again, we
believe that the fight against illicit heroin networks in
Afghanistan is vital and an important component of insuring
that we honor the sacrifice that we have already made. This
effort is also necessary to protect vulnerable populations
globally, not just from the scourge of addiction, but also from
the corruption and violence these networks bring. Our
adversaries make good use of these networks to destabilize
territory and hurt U.S. interests. We must be equally committed
to countering these threats with our networks of creative and
capable partners both at home and overseas. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Logan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, and I agree about
the importance of those DEA wire intercept centers. We toured
the facility and it was very, very impressive.
Last year, as we know, we saw a significant increase in
poppy cultivation to record levels which is a huge setback to
our efforts to cut off that link between extremist groups and
the drug trade. The vast majority of poppy is cultivated in
some of the most dangerous, least secure areas of Afghanistan
operated and controlled by the Taliban and other extremists.
Which U.S. Government agency is in charge of coordination
efforts for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan? I'll let
you ponder that one.
Also, the drawdown has already caused our agencies to
decrease their staffs and their presence in Afghanistan and we
still don't know what the post-2014 footprint will be. This
uncertainty affects more than just our military presence, but
it impacts our strategic goals that we're aiming to accomplish
in Afghanistan, including counternarcotics efforts.
How heavily does the uncertainty about this post-2014
decision weigh over our plans for future counternarcotics
efforts? How effective can we be with a minimal to perhaps zero
troop presence?
Mr. Capra, you testified that sustaining successful
security transition to Afghan forces will rest, in part, on
limiting insurgent's access to drug-related funding and the
support that they get. And in response to this challenge, DEA
reopened the Kabul country office. At its peak, DEA had 97
authorized positions in Afghanistan plus a number of contract
employees. Did DEA receive the proper number of staff that you
requested from the Embassy? And, if not, why not? And we're now
entrusting the Afghan counternarcotics forces to do a job that
is arguably tougher now than it was before, and they will have
less U.S. support with which to do it. We've made remarkable
progress in training their forces, that is true, but I'm not
sure that they have the capability to handle this very serious
threat to both Afghan and U.S. national security.
SIGAR in a 2009 audit has criticized INL for
Counternarcotics Justice Center. Secretary Brownfield, what are
your thoughts about the audit, and what is the current capacity
of the Afghan forces for counternarcotics operations? Thank
you.
Ambassador Brownfield. I'll start, Madam Chairman, and pass
the DEA staffing question, obviously, to the good Dr. Capra
seated to my side.
All of the questions are excellent. Let me try to knock off
the three that I believe most directly apply to me. First
question, who is responsible for coordinating strategy and drug
policy in Afghanistan? Madam Chairman, we have an interagency
U.S. Government strategy that was blessed through the White
House-managed interagency process in 2012 and produced in
December of that year.
Since that time, the three organizations represented at
this table, DoD, DEA, and INL have all done our own review and
developed our own modifications and adjustments based upon the
expectation that 2014 is a transition year. And we have
attempted to answer the question for our individual agencies
where will we be going post-2014 in terms of our drug efforts?
Who is responsible for coordinating in the field in
Afghanistan? Probably, I'm the closest to the stucky in this
regard. It is the United States Ambassador, but he expects his
INL director to pull together at least in some sort of
strategic and policy way all of those players who are working
the drug issue in Afghanistan.
The 2014 and beyond footprint. You put your finger right on
the issue, Madam Chairman. Everyone at this table would like to
know with great precision how many people will we have
available for this mission after 2014. And the truth of the
matter is we still do not know. This falls into the category of
those variables I was talking about in my statement.
We do not know what is the nature of the security
relationship, whether we will have a BSA and what it will say,
who will win the election in April of this year, what will be
the number of resources that are available to us out of the FY
2013 and the FY 2014 appropriations bill, and what the other
international players will be doing. We are obligated, you pay
us to put together the best possible set of policies and
programs that allow us to adjust to whatever those variables
eventually deliver.
Finally, thank you for the question on the Counternarcotics
Justice Center. In a hearing across the way about 3 or 4 weeks
ago I did hear from the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction comments in terms of the CNJC. They
surprised me because they were almost 180 degrees different
from my own perspective. I believe the CNJC is one of the great
success stories of counternarcotics in Afghanistan today.
When I was there a week ago, I inaugurated a new detention
facility at that Justice Center for one simple reason. They are
investigating and prosecuting so many cases that they did not
have enough detention space to hold the accused during the
process of the trial. And we needed to build an annex. They are
investigating well, prosecuting well. They have a conviction
rate in the high 90s. It is widely regarded as one of the
success stories of Afghanistan and, in fact, there are a number
of other elements of the Justice sector that are hoping that
they could mimic or do a similar operation to the CNJC. Dr.
Capra, over to you.
Mr. Capra. That's why I like having meetings with
Ambassador Brownfield.
Madam Chair, a couple of questions you raised. First and
foremost, our footprint. Obviously, when we started there was
at 97. What I'd like to do is talk about first and foremost,
we, DEA, would not have the ability to operate there without
the funding that we get from Department of State and DoD.
Nearly this year, Fiscal Year 2013, $30.5 million from
Ambassador Brownfield I like to call it, another close to $15
million from DoD. We spend, DEA's direct appropriations, $17
million for 13 positions, three pilots, and three fast teams,
but in order to operate we would have needed a lot more
personnel than we did. Now, this year comes in, we know that
the U.S. Government drawdown is going to impact everybody. We
got asked if we're pulling out of forward operating bases just
like the military did. What's our plan for the future when
we're looking at Afghanistan? And this is never done in a
vacuum, meeting with our interagency partners, as well. So,
what we do just like you're familiar with any other part of the
world where DEA operates whether it's South America or Europe
is we get the biggest bang out of our buck with our SIUs and
our NIUs. It's a gold standard anywhere in the world so with
effective vetting and standing these teams up, training with
our people, so in a combat theater we were pushing out with
them constantly, so we knew that was going to be less and less
likely. So, how could we operate in that region? We put a plan
together with certain assumptions that have to be in place. One
is funding, are we able to have continued funding?
The next certainly is security, the security of our men and
women there, as well. So, all that goes into, and I don't want
to rehash what Ambassador Brownfield said, but it is, we're not
sure what's going to happen. But we are moving toward a
drawdown, and by the end of this year we will probably have
somewhere around 47 people in country. That includes still
rotating fast members there once a quarter. And really the crux
of what we're doing there is building capacity and capability
of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police. They're the vetted
teams, and having them to be able to stand on their own, and in
some instances, or actually a lot of instances they're doing
that right now.
In this past year, they've done over 2,400 operations,
2,400. They've arrested over 2,200 individuals, they've seized
over 121 tons of narcotics and another 32,000 kilos of
chemicals. And that's not including the typical weapons and
hardware, communications hardware, IED making materials that
are out there. So, when you ask, and the right thing is to ask
sometimes is what is--we started with nothing when we got
there. We started with nothing, and here we've developed SIs,
NIs, TIs, judicial wire intercept program which you know is
critical anywhere in the world. And then we have to look at it
from a regional approach, too. What will happen? So we're not
sitting here waiting and saying okay, we're also looking at
being able to partner with our regional partners in the region
in Central Asia, all a part of the plan.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Capra. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And, Ms. Logan, if you have anything to
add.
Ms. Logan. The only thing I would add is, you know, most of
the places where we do our counternarcotics work are not U.S.
declared war zones, so this is about us transitioning, as well,
to using some of the strategies and the approaches we've used
elsewhere.
It will be more difficult, Madam Chair. You're exactly
right. I mean, it's a very hard problem. And we always see ebbs
and flows, and so while I think all of us don't dispute the
sort of facts on the ground, I think how you interpret them, as
my colleague said, we see a lot of new but really impressive
capability. Is it enough? Will it answer the question, you
know, the issues the country is going to face in the next 10
years? Probably not enough, it's not going to solve the whole
problem, but we can still keep and grow that capability. And
the country itself, I mean, we've seen a lot of evidence that
the people of Afghanistan do not want to be a narco state. This
is not something they're comfortable with, so we have a lot of
material to work with, but we will transition to something that
is more similar to what we do around the globe as opposed to
what we've been able to do in Afghanistan.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, and thank you for the
committee members putting up with how long I went on that. Mr.
Deutch, you're recognized.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Logan, you said in your testimony, you gave one example
of the Sensitive Investigative Unit that used judicially
authorized wire intercepts to build the case that led to the
arrest of two criminals, seizure of 660 grams of heroin, 500
boxes of ammunition, 40 remote control IEDs and 75 rocket
propelled grenades.
Where do these RPGs come from, and where are the huge
increase in arms that the narcoterrorists use, where do they
come from?
Ms. Logan. Without getting into too many specifics, I would
say, you know, a concern that DoD has across the board and
certainly in this region is that the same networks that move
drugs move everything else. So, we see links in these networks,
we certainly see flow.
One of the goals we have with this potential regional cell
that we'd like to pull back into the Gulf to give some reach
back ability is to get greater fidelity on some of those
networks. As I mentioned, we've seen a lot of things going from
the Mokran coast which is both Iran and Pakistan that flow
actually into Africa, but we see it flowing out of Africa to
the rest of the world. We see things going through the
neighboring countries and into Afghanistan from neighboring
countries, so we are increasingly concerned about trying to
develop not just the CN approach but a counter network approach
because these networks are linked. They're not all the same,
but they have linkages and they have vulnerabilities that we
are trying to explore.
Mr. Deutch. Who do you work with as you take that network
approach, because if--and, certainly, the goal is--I mean, if
at the same time we can address the narcotics and heroin, but
also tackle RPGs and the tremendous flow of weapons we need to
do that. Who do you work with----
Ms. Logan. It's very much an interagency effort along with
international. I mean, the British are side by side with us in
all of this. As you know, our Joint Improvised Explosive Deice
Defeat Organization, the JIEDDO has led on specifically finding
the networks that move the arms and the precursors for that.
And then we try to overlap that in country and back here.
Actually, multiple commands for DoD, it's not just Central
Command but COCOM, Central Operations Command also tries to
draw that fusion. And then all of us using our partners, DEA,
State Department, FBI, other law--you know, we really try to
take a very holistic view of understanding--Treasury is a huge
partner for us in all of these sort of network attack
strategies and trying to map that out.
Mr. Deutch. Okay, great. Thanks. I appreciate that.
The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that 90 metric
tons of heroin travels from Afghanistan through Central Asia,
worth about $750 million. Can you discuss our operations? I'll
actually open this to the panel, our operations with
Afghanistan's neighbors on stemming the flow of drugs through
their countries all throughout Central Asia, in particular
Russia, the endpoint for much of Afghanistan's originating
narcotics for trade routes through Central Asia, Iran for
shipments headed west, Pakistan for shipments headed east. Can
you describe those relationships and those efforts, Ambassador
Brownfield?
Ambassador Brownfield. I'll start, Congressman, and then
yield the floor after I've offered my input.
We began a systematic and structured effort to develop a
regional program that involved the five Central Asian Republics
which yes, I can name; Kazakhstan, Krgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikstan, and Turkmenistan. Thank you very much. Plus
Afghanistan, the Russian Federation, and ourselves. And the
objective was to develop an initiative that would tie them all
together in some way with the same database, the same
information, the ability to coordinate operations.
I launched this effort in 2011 with a trip to the region
and we called it the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative,
or CACI. It has not yet been a resounding success, and I
clearly misread several signals. One signal was the extent to
which the five Central Asian nations are comfortable
cooperating with one another. And I discovered that, in fact, I
thought there was more enthusiasm for that than there really
was.
Second, I misread what I thought would be a very attractive
offer for the large nation to the north to give them access to
intelligence and operations in real time that was happening in
Afghanistan and allow them to influence. And, in fact, found
they were not as enthusiastic about that as I hoped they would
be. So, the initiative is still on the books. We still have a
concept and are making step by step progress.
We have--we are working with an organization that would
serve as the coordinating center called CARICC or the Central
Asia Regional Information Coordination Center. We are working
with the United Nations organization that does drugs, UNODC to
provide training for specialized units. We are moving in the
right direction, we're not there yet. Dr. C.
Mr. Capra. Congressman, thank you. Again, part of the
strategy that we have is to be able to look at a
counternarcotics strategy on a regional approach. So to follow
on with Ambassador Brownfield, what we're looking at is the
Central Asian states, as well, including high-level talks with
Russia to exchange information back and forth. A lot of this
heroin that's leaving the country is going into the hands of
Russian organized crime and the like. So, to dialogue with
those Central Asian states where some of the offices--we have
offices in some of them, and in some of the offices, as
Ambassador Brownfield said, it's a little bit more challenging
as we're working there, but the object is before we were even
there we had this containment type of strategy in the region to
address what was going on there. And it's to follow through
with that, it's to take a look at the regional approach, it's
continuing to dialogue knowing full well that we're going to
drawdown, you have to be able to do that.
Mr. Deutch. Can I have 30 more seconds, Madam Chairman?
Thank you. I appreciate the efforts and I understand having
recently spent time in the region, as well, that your
assessment I think is accurate about the way that the countries
interact with one another. But I'd just like to know whether
each of those countries individually, do you believe that each
of the countries on their own is committed to this effort?
Ambassador Brownfield. Sure, the tough questions you always
defer to me, Dr. Capra.
The answer, as is usually the case when you're talking
about a number of countries, Congressman, is some yes, some
less yes for a variety of reasons. One or more country might
feel that somehow it is separate from this problem and,
therefore, they don't have to address it as intensely as
others. Some may see that they have a national interest perhaps
in trying to either absorb some of this traffic or direct it in
some other way. Some are undoubtedly playing some degree of
regional politics in terms of what they will do or what they
will not do. They all have a common interest. To my knowledge,
no serious democratic or even remotely democratic government in
the world wants to become a narco state, a country who's
government is dominated or controlled by narcotics trafficking
organizations. They all have that common interest. A couple of
the seven are moving at a faster speed than others, and I think
I'd answer your question that way.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate it and I know my time is up. I'm
heartened by the approach that focuses on networks and just not
only on CN. It is true they don't want to become narco states,
but it's also true that through these networks the spread of
arms through their states and those who possess the arms is
another major consideration they should have in working
together with us and with each other to try to address this. I
thank the panel very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Mr. Weber, you're
up.
Mr. Weber. Thank you. Ambassador, I noticed you rattled off
about five countries, Tajikstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, why
don't you take a stan. I wasn't sure what all they were. Can
you go back through those again?
Ambassador Brownfield. If that's a challenge, Congressman,
I certainly can, thank you very much. I said Kazakhstan,
Krgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikstan, and Turkmenistan. That is
KKUTT, and those are the five Central Asian Republics.
Mr. Weber. Okay. I'm looking at it on a map. Okay. Golly.
And I don't know who this question is for. Afghanistan is a
narco state. Does the DEA, do we have a track record of coming
into a situation like this before and being able to clean it
up, or is this a first?
Mr. Capra. Congressman, Afghanistan is a completely
different theater as a combat theater, so it presented a whole
bunch of new challenges. There are, I would submit, there are
some similarities in places around the world that when we first
started, for instance, when I first started as a young agent in
New York, we never thought----
Mr. Weber. New York was the battleground?
Mr. Capra. Pretty much, it was part of it.
Mr. Weber. Oh, you mean a different country.
Mr. Capra. So we looked at Colombia at a time and said
would we ever be able to work with Colombia. That's 27 years
ago. I just was down in Colombia again. Colombia has been and
is----
Mr. Weber. Yes, but it wasn't in civil war, and it wasn't
as desolate as this is.
Mr. Capra. No, no, and I'm not suggesting--and there was a
government there, but the narcotics trade had taken hold of
Colombia. And if we remember, you had cartels attacking the
Supreme Court killing judges. So, yes, I'm not trying to make
both comparisons, but you said what is it? Well, we decided to
hang in there, Plan Colombia took effect. Now we have countries
like Algeria that go to Colombia to learn about best practices
in counternarcotics.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Well, of course, I realize Colombia is how
many hours away by plane?
Mr. Capra. From here we can get there pretty quickly.
Mr. Weber. I mean, 4 or 5 hours.
Mr. Capra. Five hours.
Mr. Weber. And that's not the case in Afghanistan.
Mr. Capra. No, sir. No, sir.
Mr. Weber. So, in Afghanistan, I don't know who this
question is for, who is your best ally in cleaning this up? Is
it the Afghanistan Government?
Mr. Capra. For our best ally it's the law enforcement
component which is the Counternarcotics Police in Afghanistan.
Mr. Weber. And----
Mr. Capra. It is--I'm sorry, go ahead.
Mr. Weber. No corruption there?
Mr. Capra. We face corruption everywhere, but let me go
right into that, because that's one of the challenges that we
face not just there but anywhere. Narcotics trade engenders
lots of money, engenders corruption. It just does. Since our
SIUs were stood up, these are our Sensitive Investigative
Units, our Narcotics Investigative Unit which is the action
arm, since they've been set up we have conducted in the past
year alone, there have been over 700 individuals that have been
convicted. Of them, of those convictions, 50 of them have been
government officials.
Mr. Weber. Okay, and that leads me to my next question. So,
when you go in to accuse somebody, arrest somebody, detain,
whatever, they have a constitution in Afghanistan?
Mr. Capra. To the----
Mr. Weber. So, you all operate within the parameters of
their constitution.
Mr. Capra. The Afghan law, that's right. We leave it--
right, exactly. Exactly.
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Mr. Capra. Now, we're doing things jointly, they are
bilateral investigations so DEA is conducting investigations
alongside our partners.
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Mr. Capra. In some instances we've indicted groups here in
the United States, as well. But the Afghans are using their
justice system to convict, and they've got a pretty
significant--it's not perfect and I get that, but we're talking
about a conviction rate of over 90 percent.
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Mr. Capra. So, we're again, when you look back say what did
you start with?
Mr. Weber. Do you all have, does the DEA, does our drug
interdiction forces, do they have prosecute--I don't know--
immunity? I mean, if they make a mistake, I know there was some
discussion about the Afghanistan leaving people there. Were you
all part of that?
Mr. Capra. I'm not sure what----
Mr. Weber. In other words, they were saying that--Karzai, I
think, wouldn't agree to the--there was some kind of immunity
that was going to be granted.
Mr. Capra. I'll turn it over to you.
Mr. Weber. Am I misremembering, Ambassador?
Ambassador Brownfield. Congressman, on a case by case basis
there may be matters of immunity, for example, sitting members
of the national legislature.
Mr. Weber. What I'm saying is if as a DEA agent you got
there and you hurt somebody in your line of work. Are you
protected as long as you acted in good faith?
Ambassador Brownfield. All U.S. Government personnel in
Afghanistan today either operate under a version of the Status
of Forces Agreement that covers military personnel, or if they
report up to the Chief of Mission, to the United States
Ambassador, they have diplomatic protection. And to that extent
they have a degree of immunity.
Mr. Weber. Gotcha. Mr. Capra, you said 121 tons, I think
you seized 32,000 tons of chemical, and I did a little research
on Afghanistan, 31 or 2 million people and they're not exactly
thriving industrial complexes. Where are they getting--who's
supplying them?
Mr. Capra. Well, they're getting chemicals from different
parts of the world. They're using--these are rudimentary places
out in the middle of the desert that they're--but the narcotics
trade is funding the insurgency.
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Mr. Capra. And those drugs or those finished products are
leaving Afghanistan and some are being used there by the
population.
Mr. Weber. Okay. And I notice if I could tell on my map on
my iPad, it looked like it had a tiny, tiny border with China,
Afghanistan does. How many miles is that, do you know?
Mr. Capra. I'd defer to the Ambassador.
Ambassador Brownfield. It's a very--the part that actually
borders on China is minuscule. What it is, it's a little
corridor. You'll see from your map, it's called the Panjshir
Valley, and it's about 100 miles long, and I'm guessing the
actual border with China is maybe something as small as 10 or
15 miles.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Are you seeing drug trade going in and out
of China?
Ambassador Brownfield. I do not think we are, Congressman,
not out of Afghanistan. China, we believe, does have a growing
drug consumption and abuse problem which is logical as its
economy grows and it develops a middle class. Our sense is that
most of the Chinese market is supplied out of Burma/Myanmar and
not out of Afghanistan.
Mr. Weber. And final question, forgive me, Madam Chair.
What country would you say is our greatest ally in this fight,
not counting Afghanistan? And what country is our biggest
deterrent in this fight?
Ambassador Brownfield. I could define that in dozens, if
not hundreds of ways, Congressman. I will define it this way.
The country that has been most willing to serve as an ally and
a partner with us, to offer up resources and personnel and to
jointly staff our programs, projects would be the United
Kingdom, would be the British. I would give them the highest
credit in that regard.
I'm not sure how to define who would be the worst. I mean,
among others the worst would be those who are not participating
at all, and that's probably about 180 countries around the
world.
Mr. Weber. Well, clearly, you said Russia had organized
crime, and they were going to Russia. So, if you could just
choose a list of top three, if you could just mitigate with a
magic wand the top three countries and get them uninvolved,
would Russia be number one?
Ambassador Brownfield. Yes, although----
Mr. Weber. But I don't want to put you on the spot, but I
mean to put you on the spot.
Ambassador Brownfield. I mean, if you were to ask me would
it be helpful if Russian citizens ceased using Afghan heroin,
yes, it would. And I believe the Russian Government would agree
with that, as well. They also have the objective of attacking
their own heroin abuse problem.
We could say the same thing about both of their--of
Afghanistan's neighbors to the west and to the east, Iran and
Pakistan are major consumers of the product, as well. And I
don't want to make judgment calls on those two governments, but
I have every reason to believe that they also would like to
reduce the amount of heroin that their citizens are consuming.
It's a complicated process, as you well know. It is not
possible to deal with the drug issue in Afghanistan and say if
we just solve this one issue, cultivation, or interdiction, or
laboratories, or precursor chemicals, if we just solve one
issue we have solved the problem. We have to solve all elements
of the problem to some extent. That's the lesson we learned
over 20 or 30 years in Colombia. When you finally focus on all
elements of the problem you do deliver a long-term solution.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, excellent set of questions.
Ms. Frankel, you are our clean up batter. Make it good.
Ms. Frankel. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. As a junior
member I often feel like I'm a character in the Agatha Christie
novel, ``And Then There Were None.'' And I also want to say for
the record that----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Means that you're the criminal then?
Ms. Frankel. I don't know what that means.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I don't know.
Ms. Frankel. Just for the record, Madam Chair, you and I
are wearing red today with the other women in the Congress
because today is in honor of the American Heart Association.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And we have to run over there as soon as
you're done.
Ms. Frankel. That's right.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay.
Ms. Frankel. Heart disease kills more women than any other
illness.
Anyway, getting back to Afghanistan, I have a couple of
questions. So, according to the data sheet that we received it
says that the opium production in 2013 was equivalent to
approximately 4 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic
product. So, can you just give me a general idea of what the
other 96 percent is?
Ambassador Brownfield. I don't claim to be an expert on the
Afghan economy, Congresswoman. I would say that Afghanistan is
still largely a rural country, so I would speculate that
probably more than 50 percent of its gross domestic product is
still agricultural produce of some sort. They have a limited
amount of what I would call small level industrial and
manufacturing, and they have some degree of minerals and
mining. Beyond that, I think what you would see in Afghanistan
is the economy you would expect from a country that's in--in
terms of gross domestic product and per capita, GDP, probably
in the bottom 5 percent of the nations of the world.
Ms. Frankel. So, the farmers who are producing the opium--
is most of the direct toward the Taliban, or other illicit--
what we call an illicit group, rather than for the general
well-being of Afghani population?
Ambassador Brownfield. That's a terrific question and one,
obviously, in which we have to be somewhat speculative since,
as you well can imagine, farmers who are producing opium poppy
and selling the poppy do not report either the sales or their
motivation to any government organizations or offices.
My own sense in Afghanistan, as by the way in most of the
world where you find subsistence level farmers who are
cultivating and selling an illicit drug, whether it's cocoa
leaf in Latin America or opium poppy in Central Asia or
Southeast Asia, and Burma and Myanmar is that the farmers
themselves are subsistence level farmers. They are trying to
make a basic living for their families. They are not inherently
criminals. They are not even politically motivated and what
they are trying to do. They conclude that they can make $500 a
year if they grow wheat, but they can make $2,000 a year if
they grow opium poppy, so they grow opium poppy.
Now, they then sell it, and they sell it either to a
terrorist type organization such as the Taliban, and thereby
allow the Taliban to in a sense become the producer, the
trafficker, and earn the real rewards because the subsistence
farmer is not making a great deal, or they sell it to a
traditional criminal organization.
At the end of the day, that's where the Taliban, in
essence, gets its revenue by selecting the regions where it has
a substantial presence, where there is minimal security
provided by the government, and either intimidating and forcing
the farmers to cultivate and sell to them, or simply become the
buyer of the product. That I would suggest is probably what we
see in Afghanistan, just as I would suggest it's what you see
in Colombia, Peru, or Bolivia with your subsistence farmer.
Ms. Frankel. So, one of the focuses here is alternative
development. And you feel like it is possible to provide them
with some alternative that would keep them from growing opium?
Ambassador Brownfield. Yes, Congresswoman, you put your
finger right on what, obviously, has to be one of the elements
of a program. And Jimmy Capra talked about interdiction which
is absolutely essential, as is investigations, laboratory take
downs, money laundering and so forth, but we have to address
the problem, as well, at its opening on the chain, and that is
cultivation.
We have developed over the last 10 years three programs
that are designed to address this issue, one that we call
Governor-Led Eradication. It's a very simple program. We pay
the governor of a province $250 for each hectare of opium
poppy, that's 2.5 acres roughly, that the province eradicates.
If they don't eradicate, they don't get paid. If they eradicate
1,000, they get $250,000. Simple, hard to cheat on that. We
count up what was eradicated and we then pay them.
The second program is what we call the Good Performers
Initiative. This is a program again with the governors in the
provinces where we reach an understanding or a contract, and we
say if you eradicate X number of hectares, let's say 5,000
hectares, what we will offer for you is two schools, three
clinics, four new roads, and an electricity grid that will
address these two or three villages. Again, it's a good program
because you can't cheat. First they eradicate, then the
benefits flow into the province.
The third program is directly on point for what you're
describing, alternative development. This is the Helmand Food
Zone that Mr. Deutch was talking about, and what I hope will
become in the course of later this year the Kandahar Food Zone.
This is where we will offer again together with the governors
and the local government, and the Ministry of Counternarcotics
direct alternative development assistance, not just a barrel of
seeds so they can plant wheat instead of opium poppy but, in
fact, the technology, the equipment, a road system that allows
them to get their product to market, and general improvements
in their villages that allow them to have a stake in their
future. This is what the Food Zone project is all about.
It's expensive, Congresswoman. That's why as we were
addressing the realities of 2014 and beyond we have a flexible
program that allows us to move from province to province. We
don't have the resources to do it everywhere at the same time.
We're not going to have those resources. I think we agree with
that. We do have the resources to say the toughest area right
now is Kandahar, for example, so we will do a Food Zone in
Kandahar. We'll work it for 2 years, then we will see where the
next target zone is, and move there. That's how we're trying to
address the issue.
Ms. Frankel. Madam Chair, may I ask----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Frankel. Since it's just the three of us here. I think
many of us have been very disturbed about what's happened to
funds that we've--that's gone into Afghanistan, in military and
in USAID, a lot of corruption, a lot of waste, a lot of fraud,
all that. So, a question I have for you is how could we be
certain that if we inject more resources into the kind of
activities you're describing that we're not going to have the
same waste, fraud, and corruption? And that's one part of the
question.
The other one is how much of the money do you think that
has flowed into Afghanistan, the billions of dollars through
the U.S. Government, has already gone into producing opium?
Ambassador Brownfield. I'm not sure how to answer that
question. I would say certainly none of the money that we have
provided has gone into programs designed to produce opium, but
I'm sure that's not your question. Let me answer----
Ms. Frankel. Well, through corruption, waste, fraud,
something is happening to some of that money.
Ambassador Brownfield. And at the end of the day, I'm not
going to be able to give you a good figure or even an estimate
for Afghanistan at large since I, obviously, only do the
counternarcotics part of it.
I will tell you, however, that I feel pretty confident
about the programs that we are managing with DEA, in
particular, on counternarcotics for the following reason. For
the most part, when we provide direct funding to the Government
of Afghanistan, it is for acts that have already occurred and
been verified which is to say what they have already
eradicated, or what they have already interdicted, or what they
have already taken down in terms of labs.
In terms of the support that we're providing for the
Special Units through DEA, DEA is working directly with them
day in, day out, sometimes 24 hours a day. They've got very
good visibility in terms of what they're doing, and they are
vetted, which is to say assessed on a regular basis to
determine whether any of the individuals have been corrupted or
penetrated.
Ms. Frankel. Well, what about through USAID? Isn't that one
of the purposes was to have--was on economic redevelopment?
Ambassador Brownfield. Sure, and I have to defer on giving
you an answer there because, obviously, I cannot speak for
USAID.
Ms. Frankel. Is it just us, can I ask one more then? That's
it, one more.
Mr. Deutch. My friend and neighbor from Florida has----
Ms. Frankel. Yes. So, what is your--any of you can answer
this. In terms of the danger of the narcotic issue here in
Afghanistan, do you see it--is it more of a health, more of
terrorism-related? What do you think is the largest danger?
Ms. Logan. Ma'am, I think we in DoD see it as genuinely a
national security threat that will continue. As I mentioned
this, and as was mentioned by my colleagues, the amount of
money and the use of those funds by our adversaries for
multiple nefarious purposes, this is not--it is tragic the
actual usage issues, of course. We're all very saddened by
that, and Afghanistan is facing a growing problem itself, but
for us it's really about what else this pays for, and the
instability and corruption that it breeds, as well, that makes
it impossible for the people of that region and many other
regions to reach their full potential to be honest. But it's a
national security question for us. It really very much
fundamentally is, and I let my colleagues answer, too.
Mr. Capra. Just very quickly, ma'am, the narcotics trade
generates billions of dollars, and those billions of dollars
have the ability to destabilize not just neighborhoods but
entire nations, especially those who are prone to weakness and
corruption. They have the ability to fund extremist groups
around the world, political organizations, and that's what we
see that's going on there in Afghanistan. That's the threat of
that narcotics trade. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Brownfield. Well, I'll close it, Congresswoman,
by saying three things. There are three threats out there. One,
one of the world's largest terrorist organizations receives
most of its domestic funding from narcotics. That's the Taliban
and that's the Afghan heroin industry. Second, it represents a
threat to the stability, and for that matter future of
democracy in Afghanistan. We have invested a substantial amount
of U.S. national effort in that nation. One could argue that it
is in our interest to ensure that it does not become a victim
to drug trafficking. And third and finally, you can argue about
the number. I've heard figures between 4 and 7 percent of U.S.
heroin consumed in the United States is of Afghan origin, but
there's absolutely no reason why that couldn't surge. There's
nothing magical that keeps Afghan heroin from coming to the
United States, and if that happens it is a direct threat to the
people and communities of the United States of America.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you. Mr. Deutch, I just have one last
question, which is then which is the agency that you would
designate to do the alternative redevelopment work?
Ambassador Brownfield. It would be between me from the INL
side and USAID. USAID does rural development. Now, they are the
ones who work with farmers and farming programs. I do the drug
programs. It is my responsibility to lay out the
infrastructure, if you will, for an alternative development
program, and USAID can and, in fact, very effectively does in
Afghanistan the alternative development part of it.
You ask legitimate questions about diversion and
corruption, but I do hold to my position that what USAID is
doing in alternative development is, in fact, having impact
where it is applied.
Mr. Deutch. Anything further, Congresswoman Frankel? With
that, I thank----
Ms. Frankel. If you did ask, I do have one more. I'm taking
advantage----
Mr. Deutch. You're taking advantage of----
Ms. Frankel. Yes. I don't know whether you can answer this
question, but in our last budget I believe we reduced the USAID
budget by half, so I'm just curious what you think that will
have on effect what you're trying to do?
Ambassador Brownfield. Congresswoman, let me tell you, you
not only reduced USAID's suggested budget by half, you reduced
everyone's budget for foreign assistance in Afghanistan by
half, including my own. Now, you didn't write it into the law,
you may recall. You may not have reread the 1,500 pages of the
FY 14 Appropriations Bill yet. It was written as a statement of
the managers of the bill, but it does, in fact, suggest 50
percent. And we're going to have to work our way through that
issue. We in the Executive Branch, you in the United States
Congress, we're going to have to talk about it. We're going to
have to determine to what extent does this reflect the strong
will of the United States Congress. And then we from our
perspective have to say to you what the impact is going to be
if we walk down this road. I think we have a great deal of
conversation ahead of us on this issue before we reach final
understanding as to how we're going to proceed.
Mr. Deutch. The gentle lady yields the balance of her time.
With that, I thank the witnesses for their patience, for
their testimony today and for their service to the country. And
that concludes the hearing, we're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]